[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 16 (Wednesday, February 23, 1994)] [Senate] [Page S] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov] [Congressional Record: February 23, 1994] From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] RUSSIAN SPY SCANDAL AND RUS-SIAN BOSNIA SUMMIT PROPOSAL Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, it now is clear that the Russian spy scandal is as damaging as any in United States intelligence history--it may be months, if ever, before we know how much damage was done to United States security and how many lives were lost due to the Ames' treachery. It is also clear that the United States has moved too far, too fast in assuming that changes in Russia have permanently altered the international landscape. The administration has allowed Russia to veto NATO expansion. The administration has turned a blind eye to Russian military and intelligence activity in the former Republics of the Soviet Union. Last week, the administration welcomed a Russian military role in the Balkans. Now, we learn that Russia has continued and maintained a Soviet intelligence asset in the very core of the Central Intelligence Agency--a situation known to some administration officials well before the Moscow summit. I just guess or surmise that had we known this when we talked about foreign aid to Russia, it would not have passed. There is no doubt about it. There probably would not have been a vote for it on either side of the aisle. Russia has tried to minimize the importance of this affair--and that is a grave mistake. Russia cannot have it both ways. If they want to pursue cold war business as usual, the American Congress and American taxpayers will not keep sending billions for aid. Russia can and should take immediate steps to correct their policies. If the security services are under the government's control, these steps could be taken immediately. In my view, such steps are a bare minimum for a recipient of massive tax dollars from the United States. First, Russia must cease and condemn efforts to penetrate American intelligence. A clear and public assurance from President Yeltsin announcing such a policy must be made. Second, Russia must cooperate fully with the United States in assessing the damage from this episode, including revealing what was learned from the Ames' and any other moles. Virtually all U.S. intelligence sources and methods since 1985 could have been compromised due to the sensitive position held by Mr. Ames. The least Russia can do is work with our Government to evaluate the extent of what was compromised. Third, President Yeltsin should remove all Russian personnel from the United States involved in espionage activities, including those responsible for handling Mr. and Mrs. Ames. President Yeltsin should also publicly announce who was responsible for the Russian Republic's decision to keep the Ames file active, and dismiss all those responsible. If we are truly in a new era of cooperation with the Russian Republic, President Yeltsin should cooperate in a new way. Many of us in Congress extended the hand of friendship to President Yeltsin's Russia--approving billions in aid and repealing outdated statutes. We did so with the expectation that cooperation would be a two-way street. It is now time for President Yeltsin to act. The administration must give this priority attention. President Clinton should immediately dispatch the newly confirmed Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, to Moscow to press United States concerns with President Yeltsin. Deputy Secretary Talbott, because of his long association with Russia and Russians, would make an ideal envoy. Deputy Talbott should make clear that the United States is not simply lodging a protest, but that this affair threatens the foundation of our relationship with Russia. Until a satisfactory Russian response has been achieved, President Clinton should use his executive authority to temporarily freeze United States assistance to the Russian Government. And he should announce that if any further Russian espionage activities against the United States are uncovered, an aid freeze will become permanent. In fact, I think Congress would see to that, too. Congressional and public support for aid to Russia will not endure in this environment. Russia cannot divert attention from this travesty. Today, President Yeltsin called for a 1-day summit with the United States, Germany, France, and Great Britain on the former Yugoslavia. President Yeltsin indicated that some document could be signed that could, and a I quote, ``put a final end to the bloodshed.'' I hope that President Clinton rejects this idea. Russia's objective seems clear: Blunt the actions of NATO and protect the gains of Serbian aggression. Russian officials have not only criticized the NATO ultimatum--which was long overdue--but, are increasingly critical of NATO. President Yeltsin has cited Russian domestic opinion in opposition to NATO's recent decision to relieve the siege of Sarajevo. In response, the administration should communicate clearly to President Yeltsin that United States policy and NATO policy on Bosnia will not be driven by the Russian public's sympathy for the Serbs; nor will we respond to Communist-style attacks on NATO. It is ironic that Russia recently indicated its wish to join the NATO partnership for peace, and now is criticizing the very institution with which it wishes to have a closer relationship. Mr. President, it seems to me that the last thing we need is to cut a deal with Russia and a few of our allies and impose it on Bosnia. The last thing we ought to do is impose any settlement on Bosnia. Bosnia is not a colony under the control of so-called great powers. It is a member of the United States and the victim of aggression. We should be empowering the Bosnian Government, not dismembering it and disarming its forces. We should allow the Bosnians to exercise their right to self-defense under the U.N. Charter. Moreover, I would hope that, if a settlement is reached, it will provide for a viable Bosnian state capable of defending its own borders and interests. Some have said that reform in Russia--especially in the security policy area--is moving too slowly. The latest developments make me wonder if it was ever moving at all. ____________________