[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 15 (Tuesday, February 22, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: February 22, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
 NOMINATION OF STROBE TALBOTT, OF OHIO, TO BE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the nomination.
  Mr. METZENBAUM addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Ohio is recognized. Who 
yields time?
  Several Senators addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Senator Helms is recognized. The Senator from 
North Carolina is recognized.
  Mr. HELMS. I will be glad to yield to the distinguished Senator from 
Ohio provided I do not lose my right to the floor.
  Mr. SPECTER. Will my colleague yield for a 30-second unanimous-
consent request?
  Mr. METZENBAUM. I was about to make one myself.
  Mr. SPECTER. I will await Senator Metzenbaum.
  Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I be able 
to speak for 10 minutes as in morning business on a totally different 
subject than the Talbott nomination.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? If not, the Senator is 
recognized.
  Mr. McCAIN. I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard. The Senator from North 
Carolina [Mr. Helms] is recognized.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I have a unanimous-consent request. 
Following the remarks by the distinguished Senator, Mr. McCain, who 
will follow, as I understand it, the distinguished Senator from 
Pennsylvania, I ask that the distinguished Senator from Washington [Mr. 
Gorton] be recognized for 20 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there an objection?
  Mr. SPECTER addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. SPECTER. I thank my colleagues for yielding----
  Mr. METZENBAUM. Is this on the unanimous-consent request to which the 
Senator from Pennsylvania is addressing himself?
  Mr. SPECTER. I am addressing the Chair. The Senator from Ohio is 
making a parliamentary inquiry, subject to the yielding of time by the 
manager of the bill.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that articles by Ambassador 
Talbott be printed in the Record in full dated April 3, 1989, August 
20, 1990, June 3, 1991, and October 7, 1991, which constitute the text 
of Ambassador Talbott's comments which I had submitted in my floor 
statement this morning which shows a pattern of attitude on the United 
States-Israeli relationship, which is of recent origin, not going back 
to 1981. I have said that these items were not furnished to me----
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator withhold? Who yields time to 
the Senator from Pennsylvania?
  Mr. McCAIN. The Senator from North Carolina had stated that I would 
be recognized under the previous agreement for 20 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. SPECTER. I thought the Senator from North Carolina yielded time 
to me for my unanimous-consent request.
  Mr. President, is there a parliamentary inquiry from the Senator from 
Ohio?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Was there an inquiry from the Senator from 
Ohio?
  Mr. METZENBAUM. Indeed, there was. The question was whether or not 
while my parliamentary inquiry was being made, a request for permission 
to speak as in morning business, then as I understand it, the Senator 
from North Carolina asked unanimous consent that certain people be 
recognized for the purpose of speaking on the Talbott nomination. I do 
not believe that consent was ever given to that request.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, when the Senator from Ohio sought the 
floor earlier and asked for recognition, I asked for 30 seconds to make 
a unanimous-consent request. I then understood the Senator from Ohio to 
say that he had a 30-second unanimous-consent request that he asked for 
consent for 10 minutes and the Senator from Arizona objected. Then the 
Senator from North Carolina, who is the manager on the Republican side, 
yielded time for my unanimous-consent request which may go to 45 
seconds instead of 30 seconds and then yielded time to Senator McCain 
and to Senator Gorton. I believe the Senator from North Carolina has 
the authority to yield that time since he has that much time on the 
bill.
  Mr. HELMS. That is correct.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina has the 
authority to yield the time. However, it takes unanimous consent to 
establish that.
  Mr. HELMS. I certainly ask unanimous consent. I thought it was 
implicit. If not, I am glad to ask unanimous consent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is their objection? Hearing none it is so 
ordered. The Senator from Pennsylvania is recognized.
  Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from North Carolina 
and I thank the Chair.
  I just wanted to make a clarifying statement following a floor 
presentation I made this morning to include these copies of Ambassador 
Talbott's articles in Time which represent, in my view, a continuation 
of his attitudes far beyond the 1981 date. Second, I wish to add that 
when I met with Ambassador Talbott for more than an hour on February 8, 
he said he would send me a copy of his articles so that I could read 
them in their entirety. That had not been received.
  What had been received by my office last Thursday was a packet of 
materials which contained a good bit of information in favor of 
Ambassador Talbott's nomination, but not the articles I had requested. 
I just wanted to clarify the record on that. I do not wish to make a 
Federal case out of whether he sent me the material or not, but I was 
reciting a concern I had in collaboration with materials which were 
supposed to have been sent by Ambassador Talbott following the hearing 
of the Foreign Relations Committee on January 24, 1994. I thank my 
colleagues and yield the floor.
  There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                   [From Time magazine, Apr. 3, 1989]

               America Abroad; How to Move the Immovable

                          (By Strobe Talbott)

       Yitzhak Shamir personifies intransigence. Wherever he goes, 
     even if it is just to his office in Jerusalem, he is attended 
     by low expectations for Arab-Israeli diplomacy. Still, his 
     visit to Washington next week could advance the cause of 
     peace if his encounters with the American President, Congress 
     and the Jewish community reinforce the message he has been 
     getting back home: something has to give on the occupied 
     territories.
       Shamir believes that Israel has a historic birthright to 
     the lands it seized from Jordan in the 1967 War. After 21 
     years of Israeli rule and settlements in the West Bank, 
     Palestinian Arabs still outnumber Jews there 16 to 1. For 
     demographic reasons alone, it is hard to see how ``Greater'' 
     Israel can remain a Jewish state and still be a true 
     democracy. Nor is an Israel whose soldiers are ordered to 
     break teenagers' bones the ``light unto the nations'' that 
     its Zionist founders wanted.
       Not incidentally, those founders--David Ben-Gurion and 
     Chaim Weizmann--detested the Stern Gang that was implicated 
     in terrorist bombings and assassinations. Shamir was one of 
     its most notorious members. If Israel refuses to budge on the 
     West Bank, it could, over time, become just another Levantine 
     war zone pretending to be a country, in which latter-day 
     equivalents of the Stern Gang battle with the most extremist 
     of the Palestinians.
       Like all other Administrations since 1967, the new 
     leadership in Washington believes that Israel must at some 
     point trade some of the West Bank for peace. The U.S. opened 
     a dialogue with the P.L.O. last year because it hoped the 
     organization was redefining the first two words of its name: 
     the ``Palestine'' to be ``liberated'' is on the West Bank; it 
     does not include pre-1967 Israel. As part of an eventual 
     agreement, the U.S. is looking for reciprocal territorial 
     concessions by Israel.
       But forcing the issue now will do no good and could do harm 
     by giving Shamir an excuse to dig in his heels. Likud has 
     consolidated its strength in recent local elections, so it 
     would be folly to peg American diplomacy to the more pliable 
     policies of the weakened Labor Party.
       Left to his own devices and instincts, Shamir would come to 
     the U.S. with his jaw out, his dukes up and nothing in his 
     pocket. The idea of a ``Shamir initiative'' sounds like a 
     contradiction in terms. His preferred role is still that of 
     defiant custodian of the status quo.
       But the status quo is untenable. That is the message Shamir 
     has been getting not just from the Palestinian stone throwers 
     but from their antagonists in the Israeli army as well. It is 
     a reminder of the enduring humanism and idealism of the 
     Zionist state that many of its warriors hate breaking bones 
     and say so to their Prime Minister.
       So Shamir knows he needs to make a move, if only to escape 
     the impression that he alone is standing still while events 
     run beyond his control. He is expected to arrive with a 
     proposal for elections among the Palestinians in the West 
     Bank, followed by negotiations between those elected 
     representatives and Israel. He wants to buy time by avoiding 
     the question of whether Israeli withdrawal from--and Arab 
     sovereignty over--the West Bank might someday be on the 
     agenda of those negotiations. The Bush Administration will 
     probably not insist that he bless the idea of territorial 
     compromise in advance, but as his part of the bargain he had 
     better not rule it out forever. That would probably be as 
     much flexibility as the U.S. or the Arabs are likely to get 
     out of this Israeli leader. But it might be enough to restart 
     the diplomatic process; and perhaps that process will 
     continue long enough for other Israeli statesmen to decide 
     where it finally leads.
                                  ____


                  [From Time magazine, Aug. 20, 1990]

              America Abroad; The Dangers of Demonization

                          (By Strobe Talbott)

       According to a perverse law of international politics, 
     hard-liners on opposing sides tend to reinforce each other's 
     stubbornness and influence, especially in times of tension. 
     Consider the interaction between Baghdad and Jerusalem. Prime 
     Minister Yitzhak Shamir's Likud government is hoping that 
     Iraq's conquest of Kuwait will make it easier for Israel to 
     retain possession of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
       Before the crisis broke, Shamir's Foreign Minister, David 
     Levy, intended to visit Washington last week for what had 
     promised to be a tough session. Secretary of State James 
     Baker was prepared to bear down hard on the need to jump-
     start the peace process that Shamir let stall last spring. 
     Both Bush and Congress have grown impatient with the Likud's 
     ingenuity in finding excuses not to negotiate with the 
     Palestinians.
       Levy's trip has now been postponed until early next month. 
     Thanks to Saddam, Levy will probably find his American hosts 
     less insistent on Israeli concessions. A full-scale 
     confrontation in the Middle East makes this an inauspicious 
     time for the U.S. to be pressuring its closest ally in the 
     area. Besides, the Iraqi dictator's well-publicized embraces 
     last week of Palestine Liberation Organization chairman 
     Yasser Arafat and the Precarious Little King of Jordan make 
     it all the easier for hawkish Israelis to say: You expect us 
     to deal with these people?
       The American answer to that question ought still to be yes. 
     The Likud is using the current upheaval to underscore one 
     reason for the Arab-Israeli conflict--the bellicosity and 
     treacherousness of its radical neighbors--while obscuring 
     another--Israeli intransigence and expansionism. As long as 
     Israel refuses to budge from any of the occupied territory 
     and as long as it continues to repress the Palestinians who 
     live there, Israeli policy will be a source of instability; 
     and the U.S., as Israel's friend and guardian, will pay a 
     price in its ability to deal with Arabs of all stripes, 
     moderates as well as radicals.
       Iraq's aggression has inflicted another, more subtle kind 
     of collateral damage on the prospects for peace between 
     Israel and the Arabs. No sooner had word of the attack 
     reached the outside world than politicians, pundits and 
     editorial cartoonists in the U.S. and Europe, including 
     Germany--and particularly in Israel--were identifying Saddam 
     with Adolf Hitler, and Kuwait in 1990 with Czechoslovakia in 
     1938. One purveyor of this parallel even found historical 
     prototypes for King Hussein (Benito Mussolini) and President 
     Hosni Mubarak of Egypt (Neville Chamberlain).
       In the case of Saddam, the name-calling is far from 
     preposterous. He has unleashed a blitzkrieg against a weak 
     country on his border and committed mass murder--using poison 
     gas, no less--on Iraq's Kurdish minority. But there is 
     nonetheless something pernicious about the analogy. 
     Regardless of how those making the comparison try to qualify 
     its implications, there is a danger that many of their 
     readers and listeners will, at least subliminally, take the 
     point to its invidious extreme: Saddam equals Hitler, ergo 
     Arabs equal Nazis. As a brutalizing corollary, the forces 
     fighting the Jewish state, from P.L.O. commandos to the child 
     warriors of the intifadeh, can too easily appear as agents of 
     a new Holocaust.
       Saddam has done enough on his own to make the Middle East a 
     more dangerous place than it was two weeks ago. His critics, 
     in their justifiable outrage, should be careful not to feed, 
     however inadvertently, the tendency that already exists on 
     all sides in that region to demonize adversaries.
                                  ____


                   [From Time magazine, June 3, 1991]

               America Abroad: What Good Friends Are For

                          (By Strobe Talbott)

       The U.S. has ``special relationships'' with half a dozen or 
     so countries. Near the top of the list are Israel and Japan. 
     The U.S. was instrumental in the founding of the Jewish state 
     in 1948, and almost 6 million American Jews could be 
     automatically entitled to citizenship there. The case of 
     Japan is more ambiguous but no less special. The U.S. used A-
     bombs to finish off a militaristic empire, then helped 
     rebuild what has become an economic superpower.
       Both relationships are strained these days. The Likud 
     government's commitment to the de facto annexation of the 
     occupied West Bank, hence to the open-ended subjugation of 
     its Palestinian population, hinders the U.S.'s ongoing effort 
     to broker a Middle East peace and jeopardizes Israel as a 
     humane and democratic society.
       Ties between Tokyo and Washington are frayed as a result of 
     bad American habits, notably an addiction to debt, as well as 
     predatory Japanese trade practices.
       But if the U.S. is having trouble with both Israel and 
     Japan, these two countries have had practically nothing to do 
     with each other. Without ever admitting it was doing so, 
     Japan has aided and abetted the Arabs in their 43-year-old 
     economic boycott of Israel. The U.S., Canada and some 
     countries in Western Europe have laws against companies' 
     abiding by the boycott. The Japanese kept mumbling that they 
     favored free trade, but that the ``private sector'' must make 
     its own decisions on commercial grounds.
       In fact, there is no such thing as a private sector in 
     Japan. Either that or there is nothing but the private 
     sector. For years Japan Inc. has had a one-dimensional 
     foreign policy: what's good for Japanese exports is good for 
     Japan. Since there were many times more customers for Toyota 
     and Nippon Steel in the Arab and Islamic worlds than in 
     Israel, Japan abided by the boycott.
       That's begun to change. In April, Toyota announced it would 
     sell cars directly to Israel. Nissan and Mazda are expected 
     to follow. For the first time, Japan is adding a 
     representative of the powerful Ministry of International 
     Trade and Industry to the staff of its embassy in Israel. El 
     Al is being allowed to open service between Tel Aviv and 
     Tokyo (via Moscow).
       Israeli diplomats consider these moves to be modest and 
     tentative but welcome nonetheless. American Jewish leaders 
     and members of Congress have been lobbying hard for the 
     staff. So, much more quietly, have some younger civil 
     servants inside several Japanese ministries. They see their 
     country's compliance with the boycott as symptomatic of the 
     parochialism and selfishness that have until now marked 
     Japan's definition of its role in the world.
       The Reagan and Bush administrations have helped too. Former 
     Secretary of State George Shultz raised the issue repeatedly. 
     James Baker and most of his senior deputies have done the 
     same. During a meeting in California in April, President 
     George Bush told Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu that the end of 
     the gulf war ``might be an opportunity for Japan to have 
     closer relations with Israel.'' Kaifu agreed, adding that the 
     Arab boycott was ``undesirable.'' Vice President Dan Quayle, 
     who met with Kaifu in Tokyo last week, pressed for more steps 
     in the right direction.
       This story, while unfinished, already has a moral: the 
     Japanese need gai-atsu, or outside pressure, almost as much 
     as they resent it. By leaning hard on its friends in Tokyo, 
     the U.S. is doing a favor for Japan as well as Israel. But, 
     then, what else are special relationships for?
                                  ____


                   [From Time Magazine, Oct. 7, 1991]

                 America Abroad; They Come Bearing Hope

                          (By Strobe Talbott)

       When I visited Israel earlier this year, the night flight 
     from Cairo taxied to a spot between two El Al jumbo jets that 
     were already disgorging onto the tarmac a profusion of 
     joyous, exhausted humanity. Standing in line for customs, I 
     was engulfed by a sibilant jabber that I recognized from 
     other journeys--to Moscow, Minsk, Kiev, Tbilisi, Tashkent, 
     Baku, Irkutsk.
       The people around me were the latest of the 1 million 
     immigrants from the U.S.S.R. who are expected to swell the 
     Jewish population of Israel nearly 30% in the coming years. 
     I've thought about them a lot in the past few weeks.
       In the short term, they're part of the problem that's 
     poisoning Israel's relations with far-off American friends 
     and diminishing the chances of peace with its nearby Arab 
     enemies.
       The Likud government has been using the massive influx of 
     Soviet Jews to justify a tripling in settlement activity in 
     the occupied territories. Never mind that few of the new 
     arrivals have any desire to live in the West Bank or Golan 
     Heights; never mind that even though Israel is a small 
     country, there's still plenty of undeveloped real estate 
     inside the pre-1967 borders.
       Likud is bent on settling the territories to ensure their 
     defacto annexation and preclude any exchange of land for 
     peace. If Housing Minister Ariel Sharon had his way, the 
     Trojan horse would be filled with immigrants speaking 
     Russian.
       George Bush, quite rightly, doesn't want the U.S. to 
     subsidize Sharon's operation. That's why Bush has asked 
     Congress to hold off granting Israel $10 billion in loan 
     guarantees to help in the ``absorption'' of the Soviet Jews. 
     Bush's critics, in both Israel and the U.S., have accused him 
     of playing a crude and cynical game with the immigrants, 
     holding them hostage to his political objectives. It's the 
     right charge, but it should be aimed at Sharon, not Bush.
       Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir is also dead set against 
     conceding one square inch of the West Bank. Inaugurating a 
     new settlement last week, he vowed that ``all our territories 
     that can be built on will be populated by Jews to the end of 
     the horizon.'' But at least Shamir is motivated by a sense of 
     what he believes to be the historical birthright of his 
     people.
       Sharon's goal, by contrast, has less to do with an 
     ideological commitment to Greater Israel than with the 
     aggrandizement of his personal power. His strategy, 
     breathtakingly obvious and all too promising, seems to be to 
     subvert the peace process, provoke a crisis with Washington 
     and then elbow Shamir aside in the resulting Cabinet 
     upheaval.
       For Sharon, the Soviet Jews have appeared at just the right 
     moment. Desperate for somewhere to live, they're natural 
     constituents of the Housing Minister. Many are easy recruits 
     for Likud--if only because the alternative, the Labor party, 
     files a red flag, celebrates May Day and has been known to 
     sing the Internationale.
       Nonetheless, because they've come to stay, ``the 
     Russians,'' as they're often called, may in the long run be 
     part of the salvation of their new homeland. They joined the 
     aliyah (literally, ``the ascent'') in order to move up in the 
     world. They didn't leave an expansionist, totalitarian empire 
     that repressed its minorities only to become citizens of a 
     garrison state at war with its neighbors as well as with 1.7 
     million embittered, disfranchised and mutinous Palestinians.
       Nor are the Soviet Jews happy at the prospect of foundering 
     in another bureaucratized, militarized, socialistic economy. 
     They don't just need places to live--they need meaningful, 
     productive jobs. Even if they bring nothing but what they can 
     carry in two suitcases, they are rich in education, skill and 
     ambition. Already there are enough doctors for a clinic on 
     every corner, enough musicians for a string quartet in every 
     apartment building and enough engineers and computer 
     programmers for a booming, high-tech, export-oriented 
     manufacturing sector on the order of Taiwan's or Singapore's.
       Yet Israel is too burdened by defense spending and too 
     isolated internationally, especially in its own region, to 
     take advantage of the infusion of human capital that the 
     Soviets Jews represent.
       Writing last April in the weekly magazine the Jerusalem 
     Report, Natan Sharansky, a former prisoner of conscience in 
     the U.S.S.R. and a leading spokesman for Soviet Jews, 
     complained that ``in the existing stagnant economic and 
     political system, there is no place for the enormous energy 
     the immigrants bring with them.'' Unless Israel develops an 
     ``open economy,'' he warned, the Zionist dream itself will be 
     in jeopardy. Sharansky picked up that theme again in the 
     latest issue of the Report: ``Whether this exodus will become 
     a great blessing or a terrible burden for our country depends 
     on how our government meets the challenge.''
       Sooner or later, Israel will face a stark choice: either it 
     can have Arab lands or it can have Arab markets; either it 
     can absorb the West Bank or it can absorb the Soviet Jews.
       Last week several planeloads of newcomers arrived at Ben-
     Gurion Airport. Fortunately, most of them will be around a 
     lot longer than Sharon and Shamir.

  Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona is recognized.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, first, I would like to say to the Senator 
from Ohio, who I see has left the floor, I apologize if I 
inconvenienced him. The fact is I had asked for a specific amount of 
time and I had asked earlier today if I could address the Senate at 
this particular time. I am more than agreeable for the Senator from 
Ohio to proceed after I conclude my remarks, but since we are on the 
Talbott nomination, that is the subject of my remarks and I had asked 
for this particular time and it had been agreed to, it is my 
understanding, by both sides.
  I would prefer to proceed with my remarks and then, if the Senator 
from Ohio wishes to address the Senate as in morning business, that 
would be perfectly agreeable to me. I hope there is no misunderstanding 
or inconvenience.
  Mr. President, last spring I addressed the Senate in opposition to 
the confirmation of Strobe Talbott to serve as Ambassador at Large and 
Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for the New Independent 
States. My opposition was based on my grave concern that as a 
statesman, Ambassador Talbott would exercise the same flawed judgment 
about urgent matters of State that he consistently demonstrated as a 
journalist.
  At the time, I explained my opposition in the following terms:

       My opposition is neither partisan nor personal. I take no 
     pleasure in denying support to the President's choice for 
     this critically important post. I am aware that Mr. Talbott 
     is a close friend of the President, and I am generally 
     disposed to defer to the Commander in Chief's choice of 
     personnel to implement his foreign policy. But if I find a 
     nominee's judgment to be consistently in error on questions 
     of such great importance to our national security as I have 
     found to be the case with Mr. Talbott, then I cannot in good 
     conscience vote to confirm his appointment.

  I suspected that Ambassador Talbott's flawed judgment, consequential 
as a policy analyst, would prove even more important as a policymaker. 
Mr. President, I take no satisfaction in saying that Ambassador 
Talbott's record in office over the last 9 months has confirmed my 
original concern.
  Thus, I must again voice my strong opposition to the nomination of 
Strobe Talbott, this time to an even more important office, Deputy 
Secretary of State, an office where Ambassador Talbott's proclivity for 
zealously defending one's thesis beyond the bounds of logic and truth 
and wisdom will potentially endanger our national interests in a much 
larger area of the globe than he has heretofore had the opportunity to 
effect.
  Frankly, I find alarming the prospect that Ambassador Talbott could 
possess the same ability to influence our policy in Korea that he has 
had with regard to our policies in Europe and the former Soviet Union.
  While I am under no illusion that a majority of my colleagues will 
join me in opposing this nomination, I would caution Senators to 
consider very carefully the unfortunate parallels between Ambassador 
Talbott's record as a journalist and his record as a policymaker before 
voting to confirm him.
  In my previous statement, I quoted generously from Ambassador 
Talbott's many essays for Time magazine to support my contention that 
while he occasionally responded by modifying his reasoning for finding 
fault in United States policies toward the Soviet Union, he never 
waivered in his conclusions. More often than not, his conclusions found 
the policies of Presidents Reagan and Bush toward the Soviet Union to 
be reckless, dangerously simple minded, unnecessarily provocative, and 
ultimately counterproductive.
  Throughout the last decade, Ambassador Talbott challenged virtually 
every Reagan-Bush initiative to counter the Soviet threat, arguing 
variously that anti-Soviet diplomacy and rhetoric from Washington only 
undermined Soviet reformers; that United States positions in arms 
control negotiations would never be accepted by the Kremlin; that the 
Soviets would match any United States defense buildup, be they 
offensive or defensive weapons.
  When subsequent developments discredited Mr. Talbott's opinions, he 
quickly dismissed the accomplishments of Reagan and Bush policies by 
either questioning the value of the accomplishment or by rejecting the 
relevance of U.S. policies to these developments. When the Soviets 
acceded to the terms of the INF Treaty, Talbott questioned whether the 
elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons in Europe was a 
result ``we should have asked for? And do we want it now?''
  When the Soviet Union not only failed to match the U.S. defense 
buildup but collapsed while trying to do so, when one Soviet reformer 
was replaced by an even more ambitious reformer, Mr. Talbott refused to 
credit the containment policies of 40 years with that singular 
achievement. Instead, he chastised the ``hawks'' of the cold war debate 
for consistently overestimating Soviet strength and attributing the 
Soviet system's collapse solely to its own inadequacies and defects.
  Mr. President, I wonder if Ambassador Talbott could identify those 
cold war hawks who exaggerated Soviet strength more often than he did 
as he dismissed everything from cruise missiles to Pershing II's to SDI 
as feckless provocations of Soviet fears of encirclement, provocations 
which the Soviets would ultimately overcome? Why did not Ambassador 
Talbott consider the inadequacies and defects of the Soviet system when 
he reckoned Soviet military might to be impervious to the puny efforts 
of the West to correct the cold war balance of power?
  ``The doves in the great debate of the past 40 years were right all 
along,'' Ambassador Talbott wrote in 1990. But who among Ambassador 
Talbott's doves concurred with Ronald Reagan's 1982 address to the 
British Parliament envisioning the West's triumph over the Soviet 
threat in our lifetime? Who among them shared President Reagan's belief 
that ``a new age is not only possible but probable.'' Who among these 
visionary doves did not wince when Ronald Reagan brought a little 
honesty to the cold war debate accurately describing the nature of the 
Soviet empire as evil?
  Who among them truly believed that as Lech Walesa scaled the wall of 
the Gdansk shipyards he in effect breached the fortifications of the 
Soviet empire? Who among them thought Vaclav Havel, and every other 
courageous East European who braved the imperial wrath of the Kremlin 
could by their courage restore their national sovereignty? Who among 
them grasped the real power of one dissident, one Sakharov, one 
Shcharansky, one refusenik to defy the prerogatives of the police state 
and hasten its collapse?
  I do not fault Ambassador Talbott for not envisioning the demise of 
the Soviet Union. Only a few people possessed such wisdom, and I was 
certainly not among their number. But I do fault Ambassador Talbott for 
claiming after the fact that the doves of the great debate, among whom 
we can include Ambassador Talbott, saw it coming all along and hastened 
its arrival.
  He could have spared a few words of praise for Soviet dissidents, for 
Solidarity, for Afghan rebels, for the people of Czechoslovakia, East 
Germany, Hungary, Lithuania and every captive nation where good 
triumphed over evil. And he could have given a little of the credit to 
those Western statesmen--those hawks--who had the honesty to call evil 
evil, the wisdom to see its defeat, and the courage to proclaim it 
before it happened.
  Mr. President, I will return to Ambassador Talbott's opinions as a 
commentator on foreign policy later in my remarks. But I would now like 
to examine his record as a statesman, a record I find to be just as 
flawed as his record as a journalist.
  ``Less shock, more therapy.'' It is ironic that a prolific writer 
like Ambassador Talbott has come to be associated with that pithy 
remark more than any other. Perhaps it is the price a journalist pays 
when he enters government service. One learns that musing out loud is a 
risky hobby when every day dozens of foreign embassies report back to 
their governments every utterance of senior American officials. Being 
cavalier in one's remarks is a luxury which statesmen should not share 
with journalists. I suspect Ambassador Talbott understands that rule 
better now that he has had to endure considerable criticism for 
uttering his clever, but reckless prescription for Russian reform. But 
utter it, he did. And the criticism he has received for it has been 
deserved.
  The most powerful criticism came from a leading Russian reformer 
former Finance Minister Boris Fyodorov, as he left the Yeltsin 
government. According to Fyodorov, Ambassador Talbott had ``stabbed 
Russian reform in the back.''
  I asked Ambassador Talbott about that criticism in a question I 
submitted for the record at his confirmation hearing. He responded by 
saying that his remark had been ``widely misinterpreted,'' and that he 
had merely meant that reform should be ``pursued in a way that 
alleviates the social pain caused by the transition from a command 
economy to a market economy.'' He went on to stress the importance of 
controlling inflation in Russia and that he understood Fyodorov's 
``frustration with the events of recent months.'' Finally, he boldly 
stated that the Clinton administration's support for Fyodorov's cause 
``is beyond question.''
  Well, Mr. Fyodorov saw fit to question it, along with former Deputy 
Prime Minister Gaidar and other Russian reformers. With President 
Clinton, Vice President Gore, Secretary Christopher, Ambassador 
Talbott, and much of the administration's Russian policy team in Moscow 
last month, I would think that reformers like Gaidar and Fyodorov could 
have had their concerns about United States support for serious reform 
assuaged. Why was it that the President and Ambassador Talbott, two 
very articulate and persuasive men, were not able to correct Fyodorov's 
misinterpretation of Talbott's remark?
  I suspect it is because they had cause to believe that Ambassador 
Talbott's remark correctly indicated that the pace and extent of reform 
has become less important to the administration.
  Surely, United States assistance can address some of the dislocation 
that precedes real economic and political reform. But, in political 
campaign parlance--which I am sure this administration understands--the 
United States should never get off message in its insistence to Moscow 
that urgent, systemic reform is the quickest way out of Russia's 
current mess. Most of that mess has not been caused by rapid economic 
changes, but by half-hearted efforts to privatize huge state-run 
industries, and control inflation.
  Recently, Ambassador Talbott explained that United States assistance 
can continue even if IMF assistance cannot. He went on to say that a 
``major goal of our assistance program is the development of `islands 
of success' at the regional and local levels, with the hope that these 
islands will have a spillover effect into less reform-minded areas.'' 
That is all well and good, but United States assistance will not be 
very effective without the macroeconomics reforms that Moscow now seems 
to fear. If the Russian Central Bank doesn't quit printing rubles, 
national economic chaos will overwhelm any ``island of success.''
  Admittedly, some of the administration's rhetoric in recent weeks has 
stressed their commitment to promoting real reform in Russia. 
Unfortunately, all too often in the administration's foreign policies 
there has been a yawning chasm between rhetoric and action. I will 
judge their commitment by their deeds and not their words. Ambassador 
Talbott's admonition notwithstanding, until such time that I have 
evidence of a sustained administration insistence on urgent, systemic 
economic reform in Russia, I will continue to have questions about that 
commitment.

  Other criticisms have been leveled at the administration and 
Ambassador Talbott in particular for developing aid programs that leave 
other former Soviet republics waiting for the table scraps left over 
from our generous assistance to Russia. And I also note the concerns 
raised by the chairman and ranking Republican of the Foreign Operations 
Subcommittee, Senators Leahy and McConnell, who have complained about 
the lack of a coherent strategy to guide our aid program.
  The most distressing recent manifestation of Ambassador Talbott's 
preoccupation with Kremlin sensitivities is the administration's 
Partnership for Peace proposal. This proposal in effect denies NATO 
membership to the Visegrad countries, offering them instead membership 
in a sort of junior auxiliary where the terms and requirements of their 
association with NATO have been left deliberately vague.
  The Wall Street Journal credits Ambassador Talbott with almost 
single-handedly preventing an offer of provisional NATO membership to 
Eastern Europe's new democracies because the move would feed Russian 
paranoia and weaken Mr. Yeltsin.
  Mr. President, the United States should substantially assist the 
political and economic transformation of Russia. But we should work 
just as hard at preparing for the consequences of failure as we do 
pursuing the benefits of success. We should make clear to Russia that 
we appreciate the importance of Russian stability to our own security. 
But we should make equally clear to Russia that we are free to pursue 
all opportunities for enhancing our security and that of our allies.
  Why should the United States forgo opportunities to expand the 
frontiers of NATO ever further from the plains of Germany while Russia 
feels free to meddle in the affairs of newly independent nations on its 
borders--a meddling which, by and large, has been tacitly tolerated by 
the Clinton administration? A Harvard University report released last 
January concluded that ``the U.S. is acquiescing in the de facto 
reconstitution of the U.S.S.R. by turning its head as Russia maneuvers 
its way back into the affairs of all its former republics.''
  Giving the Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Hungarians and others a date 
certain for NATO membership should they meet a specific set of 
political and economic conditions is sound security policy and morally 
right. NATO is and always has been a defensive alliance. That Russia 
should fear encirclement by a security guarantee to the Czech republic 
is absurd.
  Talbott's narrow concern with Moscow--a concern which one journalist 
has described as ``yielding'' to rather than confronting the Kremlin--
has begun to attract greater criticism.
  Duke University Russian scholar Jerry Hough described Talbott's views 
as ``extraordinarily dubious and dangerous.'' Richard Haas calls them 
``unrealistic,'' and Zbigniew Brzezinski contends that Talbott suffers 
from a ``Russocentric obsession which is troubling.'' Lately, 
journalist Morton Kondrake, as well as former Bush administration 
foreign policy professionals such as Robert Zoellick and Brent 
Scowcroft, and a great many other observers have raised concerns about 
that obsession as well.
  Mr. President, I want to touch on another concern which has recently 
been raised about the nominee. I believe other Senators will address 
Ambassador Talbott's writings about the United States/Israel 
relationship in greater detail, but I want to register my concern over 
the tone and substance of some of those writings.
  I understand that quotes lifted from larger essays can magnify the 
import of those quotes beyond the author's intention. In fairness, some 
of the quotes which have been cited recently, when read in context, are 
qualified somewhat. However, the nature of many of these opinions, read 
in or out of context, substantially exceed that Ambassador Talbott 
described as ``provocative.'' They are insulting, immature, and 
incorrect.
  In a 1981 article entitled: ``What to Do About Israel,'' Talbott 
contended that: ``Israel was well on its way to becoming not just a 
dubious asset but an outright liability.'' Ambassador Talbott now 
claims that his thinking about the value of the United States/Israeli 
relationship has evolved, and that the opinion expressed in that 
article was wrong.
  I will leave it to others to determine whether Talbott's mea culpa 
constitutes the real thing or just a confirmation conversion. I must 
admit that, at a minimum, I find his retraction to be refreshing since 
it is one of the rare occasions I know of when Ambassador Talbott has 
conceded that he is capable of making mistakes in judgment.
  Both Democrat and Republican members of the Foreign Relations 
Committee expressed their concern over the insensitivity of many of 
Ambassador Talbott's writings on United States/Israel relations. Often 
cited was Ambassador Talbott's 1990 essay, entitled, ``How Israel is 
like Iraq,'' drawing some comparisons between Yitzak Shamir and Saddam 
Hussein.
  Talbott wrote that ``Shamir's talk of a greater Israel is as ominous 
for the prospects of there ever being real and lasting peace in the 
region as Saddam's militant nostalgia for Nebuchadnezzar's Babylonian 
empire.''
  He went on to assert that ``Ariel Sharon is busily creating new facts 
in the form of Jewish settlements on the West Bank. Saddam too is in 
the new facts business with his systematic obliteration of Kuwaiti 
nationhood.''
  Again to be fair, Talbott did draw distinctions between Israel and 
Iraq in that article, and he has also recently apologized for the 
comparisons he did draw characterizing them as ``invidious.'' Indeed 
they were.
  Another Talbott comment that distressed a good many people was his 
reference to Israel's meddling in American politics and his description 
of Menachem Begin's appreciation for the political influence that the 
American Jewish community wielded being ``far beyond their numbers.'' I 
do not accuse Ambassador Talbott of antisemitism. But as many other 
Senators pointed out to Ambassador Talbott such characterizations of 
Jewish political influence quite often find their way into the most 
despicable antisemitic tracts.
  Mr. President, I do not know Mr. Talbott personally nor am I trained 
in psychoanalysis. My speculation on why Ambassador Talbott, in Dr. 
Brzezinski's words, has a ``Russocentric obsession'' would be purely 
subjective. Suffice it to say that in both his journalistic and 
government careers, Talbott has manifested such an obsession, an 
obsession which has often been at odds with the national interest.
  To illustrate that point let me cite two quotes about SDI, the first 
is from a 1983 column by Ambassador Talbott. He wrote:

       If the U.S. tried to erect the sort of protective umbrella 
     Reagan has in mind, the Soviet Union would suspect that the 
     U.S. was seeking the capability of destroying the USSR with 
     impunity. To forestall that, the Soviets would no doubt 
     accelerate their own already considerable research into 
     defensive weapons, while simultaneously refining their 
     offensive weapons in order to ``beat'' or ``penetrate'' 
     whatever ABM system the U.S. devises. In that sense, the 
     worst sin against strategic sensibility is a good defense--
     particularly the kind of ``prevent defense'' Reagan has in 
     mind.

  Now, let me quote a far more astute analyst of the Soviet regime, 
Alexander Solzhenitsyn:

       The Cold War was essentially won by Ronald Reagan when he 
     embarked on the ``star wars'' program and the Soviet Union 
     understood that it could not take the next step. Ending the 
     Cold War had nothing to do with Gorbachev's generosity; he 
     was compelled to end it. He had no choice but to disarm.

  Mr. President, in recent years a great many former Soviet officials 
have corroborated Solzhenitsyn's view that SDI and the Reagan defense 
buildup helped force the Soviet Union into bankruptcy and greatly 
accelerated the break up of the Soviet Empire and the democratic 
reforms underway in Russia today.
  In response to questions during his confirmation process, Ambassador 
Talbott allowed that he had a social relationship with a Mr. Victor 
Louis, an established disinformation agent for the KGB who long 
masqueraded as a journalist. Ambassador Talbott has maintained that 
irrespective of Victor Louis' covert assignment to spread Soviet 
disinformation through the articles of unsuspecting Western 
journalists, Louis never influenced Mr. Talbott's work. I will take 
Ambassador Talbott at his word.
  However, I could also observe that given Ambassador Talbott's 
facility as a journalist to embrace a considerable variety of Soviet 
diplomatic strategies, Victor Louis might have seen no further need to 
use Ambassador Talbott's columns as vehicles for Soviet propaganda.
  Mr. President, I have taken up a considerable amount of the Senate's 
time, and I will conclude my remarks in a moment. In closing, let me 
stress my primary concern about this nominee. I have no doubt that 
Ambassador Talbott is an intelligent, industrious, and dedicated public 
servant. But it is my belief that Ambassador Talbott lacks sound 
judgment about most of the critical foreign policy questions of our 
time. I have found sufficient evidence of this failing in Ambassador 
Talbott's record as a journalist and his record in government.
  Until his recent retraction of remarks about Israel, I knew of no 
occasion when Ambassador Talbott had admitted making an error in 
judgment despite the fact that many of his expressed opinions about 
Russia, and United States policy toward the Soviet Union have been 
thoroughly discredited by other more experienced observers and by 
subsequent historical developments.
  This, then, is my greatest concern about Strobe Talbott. A person so 
reluctant to admit error when confronted with abundant evidence of his 
bad judgment is probably incapable of learning from his mistakes. This 
is an irritating failing in a journalism. It is a very dangerous 
attribute in a statesman. This flaw alone provides the Senate with 
sufficient justification to reject this nomination and I strongly urge 
my colleagues to do so.
  Senator PELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senator from 
Washington is recognized.
  Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I do note that my friend from Illinois, 
Senator Simon, has been here for some time. How much time is he going 
to use?
  Mr. SIMON. If I could have 3 minutes, I would appreciate it.
  Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, without losing my right to the floor, I am 
delighted to yield to my friend from Illinois.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time to the Senator from Illinois?
  Mr. PELL. I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from Illinois.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Illinois [Mr. Simon] is 
recognized for 3 minutes.
  Mr. SIMON. Mr. President, Strobe Talbott has written some things that 
I wish he had not written. Strobe Talbott has written some things that 
he wishes he had not written.
  Part of being a journalist is you write a great deal--sometimes with 
wisdom; sometimes lacking it.
  Part of being a public official is we speak a great deal. I am sure 
if someone went back over the speeches of Paul Simon, you will find 
some things that I wish I had not said. That might even be true of the 
Senator from Colorado or the Senator from Rhode Island or the Senator 
from Washington or the Senator from Arizona.
  But the question is: First, does he have the basic skills and ability 
to be a good Deputy Secretary of State? I think he does. That is my 
judgment. I have worked with him on some things.
  The second question, and a very sensitive one and an important one: 
Does he harbor an attitude toward Israel that has some tone that should 
not be there?
  I was interested in his response to the questions from Senator Helms 
and Senator Biden. My judgment is that he has learned in this process; 
he has learned about our concerns; he is going to be more sensitive; he 
is going to be helpful in the Middle East situation and not harmful; 
and we would be wise to follow the President's recommendation and 
advise and consent to his nomination.
  Sometimes we learn through mistakes. That is true for all of us. I 
think Strobe Talbott has learned that he has to be more careful and 
that some things can be misinterpreted.
  The very basic question is: Is there any touch of anti-Semitism in 
his background? I do not think there is. I think we are not taking any 
huge gamble by approving the President's recommendation.
  Mr. GORTON addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Washington is recognized.
  Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I do not frequently vote against 
Presidential nominees who serve at the pleasure of the President. 
Barring unusual circumstances, I believe the President should be 
allowed to pick whoever he believes can best serve his administration, 
particularly in his capacity as Commander in Chief.
  Last April, however, I voted not to confirm Strobe Talbott as 
Ambassador at Large to the New Independent States. I based this 
decision on the only evidence of his character available to the Senate 
at that time, his writings. Because Mr. Talbott had written some 150 
articles between 1980 and the early 1990's, and, because for most of 
that time I had been one of his readers, I considered myself qualified 
to evaluate him fairly. On the issue of United States policy toward the 
Soviet Union--Ambassador Talbott's area of expertise--he was wrong on a 
great majority of the major decisions made by the Reagan and Bush 
administrations, decisions that won the endgame of the cold war and led 
to the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
  Mr. Talbott began the 1980's by expressing his agreement with the 
Reagan administration on a number of assumptions about the Soviet 
Union. He saw its threat with a clear eye, finding it not only recently 
enlarged but dangerously active. In 1982, he reported Soviet military 
that was ``at least as powerful as the United States in some respects 
and more powerful in others,'' and a Soviet foreign policy that, ``when 
the United States was shrinking from overseas commitments because of 
Vietnam, * * * was busy making mischief, on its own and by proxy, in 
Africa, Indochina and Central America.''
  But by 1983 Mr. Talbott began to oppose Reagan policies aimed to meet 
that threat. His positions were based on arms control policies rather 
than military buildup, and included opposition to the Strategic Defense 
Initiative, to increased funding for advanced technologies, and to 
President Reagan's zero option initiative on intermediate missiles in 
Europe.
  On SDI, he wrote:

       If the U.S. tried to erect the sort of protective umbrella 
     Reagan has in mind, the Soviet Union would suspect that the 
     U.S. was seeking the capability of destroying the U.S.S.R. 
     with impunity. To forestall that, the Soviets would no doubt 
     accelerate their own already considerable research into 
     defensive weapons, while simultaneously refining their 
     offensive weapons in order to ``beat'' or ``penetrate'' 
     whatever ABM system the U.S. devises. In that sense, the 
     worst sin against strategic stability is a good defense.

  Let me delete some words in that last sentence to convey the essence 
of Mr. Talbott's thinking in the very area of foreign policy for which 
we are asked to confirm him: ``The worst sin * * * is a good defense.''
  Two years later he capitulated completely writing:

       If Reagan holds firm on Star Wars, he might as well abandon 
     the pursuit of drastic reductions in existing Soviet 
     weaponry.

  In fact, the Reagan administration did achieve major arms cuts, and 
former Soviet officials later acknowledged SDI to be a realistic 
proposal that improved our negotiating position.
  On the issues of advanced technologies, such as the Tomahawk cruise 
missile, Mr. Talbott opposed increased funding not only because he saw 
no need for them, but because they would slow progress in arms control 
talks. In 1983, he wrote:

       One of the burdens under which the administration's arms-
     control negotiators are laboring is an injunction not to 
     trade away or even accept, significant limitations on weapons 
     systems where the U.S. has a technological edge. For example, 
     microelectronics and precision guidance put the U.S. cruise 
     missile program well ahead of the U.S.S.R.'s. As a result, 
     cruise missiles have been declared virtually out of bounds 
     for restrictions under START. This faith in technology as the 
     solution to the country's military problems may be both 
     forgetful about the past and shortsighted about the future.

  In fact, these claims were unfounded: Tomahawk cruise missiles were 
later subject to a successful arms control agreement with the Soviet 
Union. Furthermore, less than a decade after his comments, the very 
missiles that he labelled ``shortsighted,'' rapidly accelerated our 
victory in the Gulf war.
  Finally, Mr. Talbott devoted an entire book to denouncing President 
Reagan's attempt to obtain a zero option agreement. He preferred a deal 
in which the United States would deploy fewer Pershing II's and allow 
the Soviets to keep some of their heavy SS-20's, all the while 
considering the zero option unrealistic and grandstanding. He wrote: 
``[In Reagan's opinion,] as No. 2, the United States must try harder; 
it must build up while the Soviet Union scales down. That is the 
premise on which both his START and INF theories are based, and it is 
dubious.''
  Yet, the United States signed an INF agreement accomplishing the zero 
option initiative 5 years later, this one removing 850 United States 
weapons in return for 1,750 Soviet missiles stationed not only in 
Europe, but in Asia as well.
  Mr. Talbott was dead wrong on three of the fundamental decisions of 
the cold war, and as the New Republic put it, ``knew that Reagan's bold 
and rudely moralistic rhetoric and the sanctions linked to human rights 
attacked the Soviet Union as its weakest point: Its political 
illegitimacy. And for precisely that reason he opposed them.''
  All of Mr. Talbott's flawed suggestions and predictions, however, 
might well be forgiven if he had had the grace to admit to and learn 
from his mistakes. After all, an ability to reevaluate the collapse of 
the Soviet Union would be one of the most valuable assets of an 
Ambassador at Large.
  But after the cold war was won, Mr. Talbott insisted that only the 
inherent weakness of the Soviet system was responsible for our victory, 
and that President Reagan's military buildup was unnecessary. In 1990, 
he wrote:

       A new consensus is emerging, that the Soviet threat is not 
     what it used to be. The real point, however, is that it never 
     was. The doves in the great debate of the past 40 years were 
     right all along.

  Yet, I can find no instance of Mr. Talbott predicting the imminent 
fall of the Soviet Union. Rather, 1982, he said:

       It would be wishful thinking to predict that international 
     communism someday will either self-destruct or so exhaust 
     itself in internecine conflict that other nations will no 
     longer be threatened.

  He goes on to say that--

       The sorry state of morale and well-being [in the east bloc] 
     do not automatically mean the imminent demise of the system, 
     at least in the U.S.S.R.

  Mr. Talbott did not predict the Soviet Union's demise until after it 
happened.
  Instead of reflecting on his mistaken analysis, Mr. Talbott attempted 
to rewrite history. He said:

       If the Soviet Union had ever been as strong as the 
     threatmongers believed, it would not be undergoing its 
     current upheavals. Those events are actually a repudiation of 
     the hawkish conventional wisdom that has largely prevailed 
     over the past 40 years.

  Mr. Talbott apparently believes that the Soviet collapse discredits 
not just the Reagan and Bush military policies, put the entire post-
World War II policy of containment. Nor would he allow that forcing the 
Soviet Union to spend 20 to 25 percent of its GNP on defense might have 
helped bring about its dissolution.
  While I may be biased with respect to President Reagan's Soviet 
policy, former Soviet leaders cannot be. Two years ago, President 
Yeltsin stood in this Capitol to thank the Reagan and Bush 
administrations for their policies toward the Soviet Union, admitting 
that they contributed to the second Russian revolution. Mr. Talbott's 
inability to recognize this truth was perhaps the greatest indictment 
of his suitability for the ambassadorship: if he could not correctly 
evaluate the forces that toppled communism, I believed, he was unlikely 
to appreciate the complicated forces that threaten a tenuous Russian 
reform. That failure argues with equal weight against his promotion.
  Today, however, as we consider Ambassador Talbott for Deputy 
Secretary of State, we must examine his writings not only in regard to 
Russia, but with respect to the rest of the world as well. The most 
disturbing, no doubt, are the product of a 1981 article titled, ``What 
To Do About Israel,'' in which Mr. Talbott joined the chorus of those 
who doubt the strategic worth of Israel to the United States.
  He wrote:

       The sad fact is that Israel is well on its way to becoming 
     not just a dubious asset but an outright liability to 
     American security interests, both in the Middle East and 
     worldwide.

  The implications of that statement are devastating. If the United 
States ceases to consider Israel a strategic ally, Israel may very well 
cease to exist. Moreover, Mr. Talbott made this statement 12 years ago. 
Since then, his predictions that Israel--a nation that at our request 
turned its cheek to Saddam Hussein's Scuds, and that has boldly 
embraced a dangerous peace process--have proven completely groundless.
  In other articles, Mr. Talbott compared Israel's administration of 
the West Bank to Iraq's pillaging of Kuwait, and suggested that the 
United States condition aid to Israel on progress in the peace talks. 
During his hearings, Ambassador Talbott said he had simply changed his 
mind, that he now considered Israel a strategic ally that should not be 
pressured to make concessions in the peace process. Yet he also said 
that he made the comments because he knew ``what was good for 
[Israel].'' It is this same assumption that State Department officials 
know better than Israel what is in Israel's best interests that too 
often taints the administration's policies toward the Mideast peace 
process.
  After President Clinton's meeting with President Assad, Charles 
Krauthammer wrote:

       The administration expects Israel to respond with radical 
     territorial concessions to satisfy Assad. The heat is on.

  Such pressure ultimately works against our interests. The concession 
that the administration asks of Israel is the Golan Heights from which 
someday may come a devastating Syrian offensive. In exchange, Syria has 
allegedly offered normal diplomatic ties, while remaining vague about 
the numerous steps required to achieve them. Israel should pursue these 
negotiations only to the extent that it benefits her well-being. Our 
role, in turn, is not to serve Syria, or Jordan, or even the 
Palestinians. Israel is our most important and stable ally in the 
region, and the party with the most to lose. If Ambassador Talbott is 
to serve our interests in the peace talks as Deputy Secretary of State, 
his views toward Israel will, indeed, need to have changed dramatically 
since 1981.

  Mr. President, again unlike the situation 10 months ago when we last 
considered Mr. Talbott's ability to serve the Department of State, we 
now have his record. Indeed, we have the record of the entire 
Department of State.
  I find it bewildering that the administration has chosen someone with 
little managerial experience for a post that requires enormous 
managerial skill, in an agency which has been consistently criticized 
for its inability to reorganize itself. On this issue alone, I believe 
the Ambassador's nomination invites serious skepticism.
  But even more relevant is an emerging Russian policy that bears a 
striking resemblance to Ambassador Talbott's views on the possibilities 
of Russian reform, and its potential threat to former Warsaw Pact 
nations. The most disturbing aspect of this policy is its effect on the 
enlargement of NATO membership--an issue on which the Ambassador's 
views have held sway over Secretary Christopher.
  Just as in the cold war, Mr. Talbott prefers a course that minimizes 
conflict with Russia, the places all the eggs in his basket on that 
nation's willingness and ability to reform. In January, he wrote in the 
Boston Globe that Russia's economic reform was stabilizing. Days later 
two of its prominent leaders resigned, undercut by Mr. Talbott's flip 
comment that the Russian election called for less shock and more 
therapy and the Russian Prime Minister said he was considering wage and 
price controls. Russian officials, meanwhile, claim their right to 
stabilize the near-abroad, while interfering in Georgia, Azerbaijan, 
and other neighboring republics, and Mr. Zhirinovsky brandishes a map 
which places much of Europe, not to mention Alaska, under Russian 
control. Even so, the United States has not developed a strategy for 
protecting Eastern European nations.
  Part of the problem is a policy that has focused too narrowly on 
furthering Russian reform, and has interpreted that effort as including 
the appeasement of, rather than confrontation with, Russian 
nationalism.
  While I support our efforts to promote reform in Russia, we should 
realize that our attempts to affect Russia's internal struggles can be 
only marginally effective. Everything so far--from aid, to public shows 
of support, to overlooking violations of democratic practice--had no 
influence on December election returns in which totalitarian forces won 
nearly half the vote. We should proceed with an understanding that 
Russia's fate is almost entirely in Russia's hands, and that its 
democratic neighbors need the promise of security.
  Our current policy not only ignores the security of nations clearly 
dedicated to democracy, free markets and the West; it encourages 
Russian nationalism. In effect, we have given Russian nationalism a 
veto on the enlargement of NATO membership. Given this deference, what 
else will Russia soon be demanding? Almost certainly portions of 
President Yeltsin's foreign policy, with a renewed understanding that 
Eastern Europe, not to mention support of the Serb position in the 
Balkan conflict, remain within their sphere of influence.
  In fact, the proper way to deal with these nationalists is by 
including the Eastern Europeans in NATO at the first opportunity. Since 
its inception in 1949, NATO has acted as a purely defensive entity; it 
has had no role but to protect its members from the threat of attack 
and to support stability in the region. The President should be capable 
of explicitly stating that, while offering no threat to the Russians, 
the United States supports the entrance of stable, democratic Eastern 
European nations into NATO. The creation and history of NATO is the 
only justification he needs.
  If this is not persuasive, he should ask what threat the Russians 
perceive in the armies of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. The 
people of Poland live in a nation whose boundaries have shifted east 
and west on half a dozen occasions over 200 or 300 years, always as a 
result of aggression from a more powerful nation. It has been literally 
partitioned out of existence on four separate occasions. Are the Poles 
a threat? Can their actions be considered provocative? To ask these 
questions is to answer them.
  We have allowed artificial concerns to become overriding. Henry 
Kissinger recently reminded us in the Washington Post of Dean Acheson's 
quote in regard to Soviet fears of NATO: ``the guilty flee where no man 
pursueth.''
  For the Eastern European countries, the administration has 
unfortunately created a Partnership for Peace Project that provides no 
clear requirements, and no timetable, for enlarging membership in NATO. 
This project, whose chief purpose was to mollify nations hoping to join 
NATO, was called by the Polish Prime Minister a buzz-off. Contrary to 
Mr. Talbott's suggestion in 1992, that, ``It is time to think seriously 
about eventually retiring the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,'' 
that alliance is central to the future of Eastern Europe's stability.
  In fact, NATO's relevance depends on its expansion east. The 
President has said it, the Europeans have said it, Boris Yeltsin said 
it in August, and most importantly for the purposes of this nomination, 
the U.S. Senate has said it with a 94 to 3 vote in favor of a 
resolution urging enlarged NATO membership as soon as possible. That 
was an easy vote, a sense of the Senate resolution, as certain not to 
offend the administration as it was to be ignored by it. But if those 
Senators seriously propose to advance the recommendations of that 
amendment, they should vote against this nomination. It's Ambassador 
Talbott who brought us the Partnership for Peace, and it is the 
rejection of his nomination that will effectively deliver on our 
January 27 sentiments.
  Eastern Europe, Mr. President, is just one region in which I consider 
our current foreign policy to be dangerously misdirected. As we look 
around the world, we see others in which we are engaged in fruitless 
diplomacy, or are risking our uniformed men and women without clear 
objectives. None of these policies will be much improved, in my 
opinion, by moving Ambassador Talbott to the Deputy Secretary of State 
position.
  For a year, North Korea has refused the International Atomic Energy 
Agency's request to inspect two locations believed to contain 
plutonium. In that time, the United States has relied solely on 
diplomacy to win North Korean compliance, and has avoided any 
confrontation with the North Korean Government, either by the IAEA or 
the United Nations Security Council itself. In June, the administration 
offered the North Koreans new political and economic ties if they would 
agree to maintain the continuity of the IAEA safeguards, a phrase which 
by itself allows North Korea to avoid inspections of the two sites 
under question. Predictably, the Koreans did not agree, but demanded 
until last Tuesday that the IAEA inspect only portions of the other 
seven of the nine acknowledged sites. We have moved no closer to 
attaining access to the two clandestine sites, forcing the President to 
back off on a November pledge that North Korea cannot be allowed to 
develop a nuclear bomb.
  The cost of these failures is too high: a North Korea with nuclear 
capability will destabilize the entire region, spur rearmament, and 
threaten the region's economic development. It also seriously 
jeopardizes South Korea, and the 37,000 American troops stationed 
there. The United States must either stop making concessions to Kim-Il 
Sung, and firmly demand North Korean compliance with the nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty with a threat of possible military destruction 
of its key nuclear sites, or candidly admit that the nuclear 
Nonproliferation Treaty is dead, not only in Korea, but in every other 
bandit nation around the world.
  Instead, the President has delivered an ultimatum to the Serbs. 
Admittedly, Sunday's gambit appears to have succeeded: Sarajevo's 
380,000 residents now enjoy immediate relief from the daily artillery 
and mortar shelling--for which the President deserves credit.
  But we are unwilling to extend our protection to other Bosnian 
communities, the atrocities which are not covered by CNN. Nor would the 
actual use of our air power and its inevitable American casualties, be 
likely to bring the conflict to an end. Finally, in return for a 
limited cessation of Serb atrocities, we are now attempting to enforce 
a partition on the Bosnians which just a few months ago we denounced as 
unjust and incapable of producing a viable Bosnian nation. In other 
words, we are now willing to ratify the results of Serbian aggression.
  If the administration wishes to establish its leadership and make 
good on its sentiments, it should prevail upon the Europeans to lift 
the misdirected arms embargo or do so unilaterally. As recently as the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan we provided profoundly billions of 
dollars in aid to people with whom we disagreed except for their desire 
to be free and independent. Yet, we have accepted the notion that 
Bosnia's citizens were not entitled to fight for their own independence 
with arms secured not just from the United States, but from anyplace in 
the world. The result has been an immoral policy, superficially 
evenhanded but on the ground overwhelmingly favorable to Serb 
aggressors. If there is to be true peace in Bosnia, it will need to be 
forged on the ground by the Bosnians.
  A similar sentiment must have driven the President's Somalia policy. 
First, the decision to adopt the U.N. policy of nation-building there, 
and his decision in October to keep U.S. troops in Mogadishu in spite 
of mounting casualties, suggested an overvaluation of our ability to 
restore peace and democracy on the cheap in a country totally unwilling 
to accept them. The troops now there could have returned home in 
October after the failed raid, or earlier in May when we adopted 
nation-building responsibilities, and left behind the same conditions 
we will leave in March.
  Last week, the Washington Post reported that clan warfare is erupting 
daily in Mogadishu, and, even more disturbingly, in southern towns like 
Kismayoo and Baidoa, which for more than a year have been considered 
secure. The Post went on to say:

       The latest surge in violence raises questions about exactly 
     what the costly 14-month-long Western military intervention 
     in Somalia has achieved. Instead of resolving the problem of 
     warfare, clan violence and banditry that led to widespread 
     famine and prompted the international community to send 
     troops to relieve the starving, the intervention seems only 
     to have placed Somalis' fighting on hold. Now that fragile 
     peace appears to be breaking down, Somalis are returning to 
     settle old scores.

  No doubt future generations will look back upon this intervention and 
debate whether we left too early. The fact is, we left too late--and 
were wrong to enter at all. We never had an attainable objective clear 
enough to warrant our intervention. It was an intervention caused and 
maintained by television.
  Mr. President, every foreign crisis deserves to be examined 
individually. Each requires a unique response--which makes it difficult 
to determine exactly how and why an administration has faltered. But 
disturbing patterns have emerged from the Clinton administration: A 
willingness to commit forces--or allow them to linger--in areas where 
we have neither a vital national interest nor a clear objective. And 
perhaps more importantly a heavy reliance on fruitless diplomacy, and 
faith in the promises of potential adversaries to reform, when clearly 
action is required.
  The United States must at times use force, and just as importantly, 
lead. We are blessed today by being the world's only superpower at a 
time when many of our former enemies are attempting democratic reform. 
This is a historic opportunity, which we can seize only if we act 
decisively and without fear, and properly use our influence.
  Throughout the cold war, Ambassador Talbott argued that the United 
States should not attempt to win. In his current post, he has helped 
forge a policy that appeases Russia's least savory elements, while 
turning his back on democratic states in Eastern Europe. Now, that 
style of management is to be applied to all of the responsibilities of 
the Department of State. As the New Republic put it,

       Talbott's assignment is to give the administration's 
     floundering statecraft a new direction and a more polished 
     spokesman. He is the favorite to succeed Secretary of State 
     Warren Christopher when the appointed hour arrives.

  I suggest that we begin repairing this administration's floundering 
state-craft by ensuring that Mr. Talbott's views do not continue as 
State Department policy. Mr. Talbott is a man of great intelligence and 
eloquence--and has wisdom. As a consequence we should not elevate or 
confirm the exemplar of the words ``the worst sin * * * is a good 
defense.'' I will vote against Ambassador Talbott's confirmation, and I 
encourage my colleagues to do the same.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Lieberman). Who yields time?
  Mr. PELL. I yield as much time as he may desire to the Senator from 
Georgia.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Georgia has the floor.
  Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Rhode Island.
  I rise to support the nomination of Strobe Talbott to be Deputy 
Secretary of State. I have known and respected Mr. Talbott for a number 
of years, and I am particularly pleased that President Clinton 
appointed him to be the overall coordinator for United States policy 
toward Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union at a 
period of time when we really needed coordination and leadership.
  Of course, that challenge continues. He has done, I think, a fine job 
in that position. This was the position that Senator Lugar and I, and 
others in the Senate urged, and Strobe Talbott has brought to this 
position energy, imagination and extensive backgrounds in foreign 
policy generally and in Soviet affairs specifically--now Russian 
affairs--and, of course, now the former Soviet Union. He has performed 
with distinction, and we have been fortunate to have a person of 
Strobe's talents and experience in this key position.
  Among his many accomplishments over the past year, Mr. Talbott has 
advanced programs to dismantle weapons of mass destruction in Russia, 
Byelarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine pursuant to legislation originating 
in this body in 1991. In particular, the trilateral agreement between 
Russia, Ukraine, and the United States signed during President 
Clinton's recent visit to Moscow has the potential to resolve a very 
serious and potentially very dangerous dispute between Russia and 
Ukraine over strategic nuclear weapons and, correspondingly, to advance 
the national security interests of the United States.
  The removal of strategic nuclear weapons from Byelarus is proceeding 
smoothly and a comparable program is about to be instituted with 
Kazakhstan.
  Strobe Talbott and his staff can take pride in these accomplishments, 
and we all share that pride in what has been done so far, realizing 
that a great deal more needs to be done.
  I believe that Mr. Talbott's talents and experience will enable him 
to serve with distinction as Deputy Secretary of State. Strobe has 
followed foreign policy matters and national security matters, and 
particularly arms control matters, very carefully and very closely. For 
years he has written extensively on arms control and on international 
relations. And so he certainly has the background required for this 
foreign policy challenge.
  He has developed an excellent productive working relationship with 
Secretary of State Christopher. He enjoys the personal friendship and 
full confidence of President Clinton, which is enormously important in 
this key position.
  My only concern that I will share with my colleagues--not about this 
nomination but the collateral concern I have that would flow from this 
nomination--is that we would be losing an ideal, full-time coordinator 
of our policy toward the former Soviet Union at a time of complex 
historic transition in that critical part of the world.
  Mr. President, we saw during the last administration that an 
effective Deputy Secretary of State, no matter how able and 
accomplished and experienced, simply does not have time to also be an 
effective coordinator of policy toward the former Soviet Union. In my 
view, that is a full-time job. I hope the administration will come to 
this realization because I believe we need to preserve the coordinator 
position as Mr. Talbott has developed it. We need to fill that position 
with a person who, like Strobe, has considerable stature and standing 
and also has a close relationship with the Secretary of State and the 
President of the United States.
  Mr. President, the Strobe Talbott nomination fully merits the 
Senate's confirmation as Deputy Secretary of State. I urge my 
colleagues to support this nomination. I thank the Chair. I thank my 
colleague from Rhode Island for yielding me the time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, in the order of appearance, as I understand 
it, we are going from Democrat to Republican. That is the way it should 
be. I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from Colorado [Mr. Brown] 
be recognized for 10 minutes; the distinguished Republican leader, Mr. 
Dole, for 12 minutes; Mr. McConnell for 10 minutes; and Mr. Murkowski 
for 10 minutes in the order of their being recognized.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Senator from Rhode 
Island.
  Mr. PELL. One question. I think if we go back and forth, if a 
Democrat comes in, he or she will----
  Mr. HELMS. Absolutely. That was understood.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair understood that to be the intention 
of the Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. PELL. If, for example, there is a Republican, Democrat, and you 
stop, then a Democrat should be recognized.
  Mr. HELMS. Certainly.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. HELMS. I hope that unanimous consent did not include any of my 
time because we are running short.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair suggests to the Senator  that it did 
not. Under the previous order, the Chair now recognizes the Senator 
from Colorado [Mr. Brown].

  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, I rise out of concern for the nomination of 
Mr. Talbott to be Deputy Secretary of State.
  This body has previously voted on Mr. Talbott when he was appointed 
as special Ambassador at Large to the New Independent States. I voted 
for Mr. Talbott for that nomination. I find myself often voting not 
necessarily for people I would appoint myself or whom I would normally 
endorse, but I believe great deference is given to the President, as is 
appropriate, whether that President is Democrat or Republican.
  However, it seems to me that this nomination for Deputy Secretary of 
State is a different matter than the ambassadorial post that Mr. 
Talbott now holds. It is different in that the primary focus is 
managerial. It is different in that the scope of responsibilities is 
much broader and the areas affected are much broader. This job involves 
the entire world and not simply an area where Mr. Talbott had, I 
thought, significant experience and expertise, in the area of the 
former Soviet Union or the Newly Independent States.
  I am concerned about Mr. Talbott's nomination, and I want to be 
specific. It is not that I do not believe he is intelligent. I think he 
is quite intelligent. It is not that I do not believe he has some fine 
attributes. I do indeed recognize him as not only a scholar but a very 
effective journalist who has a distinguished career. But I do have 
specific concerns and I want to go through them individually.
  No. 1: I am concerned about Mr. Talbott's view of the Soviet threat 
throughout much of our recent history. In 1990, Mr. Talbott wrote:

       A new consensus is emerging that the Soviet threat is not 
     what it used to be. The real point, however, is that it never 
     was. The doves in the great debate of the past 40 years were 
     right all along.

  Mr. President, I respectfully disagree with Mr. Talbott on that 
observation. I believe if one thing is apparent, it is that far from 
the doves being correct, those who wanted a firm hand against the 
former Soviet Union were correct. There is no more specific or clear 
differentiation than the policies of President Reagan and President 
Jimmy Carter.
  President Carter sincerely and honestly believed the way to deal with 
the Soviet Union was to unilaterally disarm, make unilateral 
concessions on nuclear items and engender in the Soviet Union a 
response that would lead to peace, harmony and a reduction of tensions. 
Thus, Jimmy Carter unilaterally reduced military expenditures. The 
Soviet response was to increase their military.
  President Carter unilaterally declared, even after the countries of 
Western Europe had called for intermediate range missiles to be 
deployed, that he would not deploy those missiles. The Soviet response 
was to increase deployment of their intermediate range ballistic 
missiles. In response to our dovish approach to the Soviet Union, the 
Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.
  To say that the doves in the great debate of the last 40 years were 
right all along is simply not correct. At least in that perception of 
the Soviet Union, I fundamentally disagree with Mr. Talbott. I do not 
question the sincerity of his comments. I simply disagree fundamentally 
with his conclusions.
  On June 11, 1990, referring to Mr. Yeltsin, Mr. Talbott said:

       He is a lightweight demagog, a buffoon, a windbag, at best 
     naive, at worst dangerous.

  Mr. President, I fundamentally disagree on that analysis of Mr. 
Yeltsin. It seems to me that in that process--and I would believe 
Strobe Talbott at this point would describe his reactions to the new 
President differently--he has failed to properly assess the qualities 
and commitment that President Yeltsin brought to his job.
  Third, with regard to Israel, on September 4, 1981, he was quoted as 
saying:

       Israel sometimes seems to have taken a visage and a tone of 
     a rather nasty, bitter nation, even a violent one. Israel, in 
     the past, has managed to convey more sorrow than anger when 
     it wielded its terrible swift sword.

  Now there seems to be only one anger and it is too often shrill and 
self-righteous and even a bit frightening.
  I fundamentally disagree with Mr. Talbott's assessment of Israel. It 
seems to me Israel has a right to exist and to defend itself.
  On October 29, 1990, speaking on how Israel is like Iraq, he said:

       Ariel Sharon has an apparent mandate to treat zoning as the 
     conduct of war by other means.

  Mr. President, I fundamentally disagree with Mr. Talbott on his 
assessment.
  Fourth, Mr. President, in developing a policy of partnership for 
peace in Eastern Europe, Mr. Talbott's position has been to oppose 
immediate membership in NATO for the nations of Eastern Europe. This 
body has gone on record, as I have, in favor of NATO membership for 
these countries. Mr. Talbott even disagrees with setting a time line 
for that membership. I find myself in fundamental disagreement on this 
important aspect of policy.
  No. 5. Mr. President, it is clear that Mr. Talbott opposed the 
deployment of Pershing missiles in Europe in 1982. I simply disagree, 
and I think the proof is in the pudding. The fact is the Soviets had 
deployed intermediate range ballistic missiles prior to that. The U.S. 
failure to deploy intermediate range ballistic missiles in the Carter 
administration had led to further deployments, and the reality is our 
willingness to deploy intermediate range ballistic missiles in 1982, 
contrary to Mr. Talbott's viewpoint and advice, ended up helping bring 
about a reconciliation, bringing about a reduction of arms rather than 
the opposite.
  Sixth, Mr. President, in U.S. News & World Report, Mr. Talbott is 
quoted with regard to star wars as saying:

       If Reagan holds firm, he might as well abandon the pursuit 
     of drastic ``Soviet arms'' reductions.

  Mr. President, Mr. Talbott was fundamentally wrong on that 
observation. The reality is that President Reagan's holding firm was 
the key that brought about fundamental reductions in arms. Once again, 
I find myself in strong disagreement.
  Mr. President, recently, July 20, 1992, in Time, an article entitled 
``The Birth of the Global Nation,'' Mr. Talbott is quoted as follows:

       I'll bet that within the next hundred years nationhood as 
     we know it will be obsolete. All States will recognize a 
     single global authority.

  He is further quoted as saying:

       All countries are basically social arrangements, 
     accommodations to changing circumstances. No matter how 
     permanent and even sacred they may seem at one time, in fact, 
     they are all artificial and temporary.

  Mr. President, I fundamentally disagree not just with the forecast 
but with the view of our Nation. It is far more than simply a social 
arrangement. It is a commitment to an ideal, something far more 
fundamental than a social arrangement that could be a passing fancy. 
The commitment to human rights and individual rights is so fundamental 
to pass it off as a social arrangement ignores or overlooks the 
fundamental focus of the American dream and the American experience as 
well as its influence on the world.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record 
an editorial from the Rocky Mountain News of February 11, and a copy of 
an article from the New Republic that was recently published concerning 
Mr. Talbott.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

             [From the Rocky Mountain News, Feb. 11, 1994]

                       A Dismal Record of Opinion

       The Senate confirmation hearings for Strobe Talbott, who 
     will be the next deputy secretary of state, were strangely 
     lopsided. They aired at length the nominee's controversial 
     writings on Israel but scarcely noted his slant on a more 
     far-reaching issue, the Soviet Union.
       As a longtime diplomatic correspondent and editor-at-large 
     for Time magazine, Talbott commented regularly on 
     international affairs throughout the 1980s. He also 
     translated Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs and wrote scholarly 
     works on arms control. He argued that U.S. policy for four 
     decades was based on a ``grotesque exaggeration'' of the 
     Soviet threat.
       Consistent with this assessment, Talbott opposed NATO's 
     deployment of Pershing missiles in Europe in 1982, considered 
     the Star Wars defense system a dangerous provocation, scolded 
     President Ronald Reagan for ``challenging the legitimacy of 
     the Soviet regime'' (something the captive peoples of the 
     Soviet empire would soon risk their lives to do en masse) and 
     chalked up to ``extraordinary luck'' Reagan's part in the 
     unravelling of Soviet communism.
       These beliefs are serious misjudgments. Soviet expansionism 
     was no delusion. As late as the second half of the 1970s, 
     former arms control chief Ken Adelman reminds us, the Soviets 
     planned or assisted a communist takeover of a pro-Western 
     country each year: ``in 1975, South Vietnam; in 1976, Angola; 
     1977, Ethiopia; 1978, Cambodia; and in 1979, Afghanistan and 
     Nicaragua.''
       Numerous former Soviet officials have confirmed Reagan's 
     significant role in spurring change in Moscow. The senators 
     might have asked Talbott whether the fall of communism has 
     changed his thinking. They were too busy grilling him on a 
     1981 statement that Israel was becoming ``a liability to U.S. 
     interests,'' which he said he no longer believes.
       No one is right all of the time, but Talbott's record in 
     his field of expertise inspires little confidence. We still 
     hope that he at least will do some good in combatting this 
     president's inclination to ignore foreign affairs altogether.
                                  ____


                 [From the New Republic, Mar. 7, 1994]

                         The Master of the Game

                           (By Charles Lane)

       On an April day in 1967 columnist James Reston of The New 
     York Times visited the campus of Yale College. The protests 
     at Yale had been quieter than at most places, so Reston came 
     to prove that the anti-Vietnam war movement was not just 
     ``weirdies and beardies.'' Respectable students were 
     involved, too. Exhibit A was Nelson Strobridge Talbott III, 
     ``a clean-cut, solemn, serious, patriotic, progressive 
     Republican type.'' His opposition to the war seemed a matter 
     of mature concern for the national interest, and the tone of 
     the national debate, not mere adolescent moralism. As Talbott 
     told Reston, ``I do not want to help pillory the present 
     administration. I am interested to see if there are new means 
     and attitudes by which this university--and hence the 
     university community in general--can make discussion less 
     polemical and more meaningful, and at the same time help the 
     search for peace.''
       Talbott has written since of the nation's ``traumatic 
     memory'' of Vietnam, but for him those years were free of 
     trauma. It was a time in which he assumed the identity 
     expected of him as son and namesake of Nelson Strobridge 
     Talbott Jr., Cleveland investment banker and chum of the 
     Republican Tafts. Strobe Talbott wasted no time on failure, 
     introspection or rebellion. ``Though he was our age, he 
     always seemed much, much older,'' says Hannah Achtenberg, a 
     fellow student in those years. From Hotchkiss and Yale, where 
     his father and grandfather had also studied, Talbott went on 
     to Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar, then to a job in Eastern 
     Europe for Time magazine, where he worked for the next 
     twenty-two years as White House correspondent, diplomatic 
     correspondent, Washington bureau chief and editor-at-large.
       His memories of being shaped by the turbulent '60s seem 
     only to underscore his actual insulation. During the Cuban 
     Missile Crisis, he and the rest of the Hotchkiss boys were 
     summoned to the chapel to pray for peace. ``A vivid memory of 
     our sixteenth year--along with proms, high school sports and 
     our first driver's license--was the prospect of instant 
     obliteration,'' Talbott and his friend, political scientist 
     Michael Mandelbaum, wrote in an essay for their Yale twenty-
     fifth class reunion. In a Time essay he wrote in 1992 to 
     defend his friend and fellow Rhodes Scholar Bill Clinton from 
     charges of draft-dodging, Talbott recalled another epiphany: 
     Clinton and housemate Frank Aller, a draft resister, arguing 
     the issue so heatedly they lost track of time while basting a 
     Thanksgiving turkey.
       Talbott himself secured a medical deferment thanks to a 
     letter to his draft board from a friendly orthopedist in 
     Cleveland. He later confessed to ``a moral discomfort 
     bordering on guilt'' about the trick knee that kept him ``out 
     of the Mekong Delta, but not the squash courts and playing 
     fields of Oxford.'' He and Mandelbaum conceded that ``it took 
     more intellectual and political courage to support [the war] 
     than to oppose it,'' given the campus mood of the times. But 
     Talbott had opted for a Clintonian gambit: he kept his ties 
     to his establishment elders, without alienating his friends 
     or breaking ranks with his generation. He protested the war, 
     but in a calibrated way. ``At Yale, he was not an organizer 
     of events, not even teach-ins,'' recalls classmate and 
     brother-in-law Derek Shearer. ``He did not participate in 
     marches.'' In the essay with Mandelbaum, Talbott claimed to 
     have written a Yale Daily News editorial endorsing Eugene 
     McCarthy for president. Talbott is writing a larger role for 
     himself in the rebellious history of his generation than he 
     actually played: in fact, the paper's endorsement editorial 
     was written by Alan Boles, a junior.
       Today, Nelson Strobridge Talbott III is poised to assume 
     the stewardship of American foreign policy. During a jog on 
     the beach during the Renaissance Weekend in Hilton Head, 
     South Carolina, in 1992, President-elect Clinton invited 
     Talbott to be his special envoy to the former Soviet Union. 
     After a year in that post, Talbott has been nominated to be 
     deputy secretary of state. Traditionally the number two at 
     State has either focused on department management or on 
     issues the secretary himself doesn't want to deal with. 
     But in the Clinton administration, Friends of Bill are 
     usually more important than their bosses. Talbott's 
     assignment is to give the administration's floundering 
     statecraft a new direction and a more polished spokesman. 
     He is the favorite to succeed Secretary of State Warren 
     Christopher when the appointed hour arrives.
       The intellect and probity of this product of elite 
     institutions are not, and should not be, in doubt. His 
     competence, his geniality and his remarkable discipline have 
     won him the power and admiration for which he always seemed 
     destined. ``Strobe believes that by doing right in the world, 
     America enhances its own strength,'' says author Walter 
     Isaacson, a former colleague at Time. Such a view is not 
     incorrect, but what exactly does it mean? For all his 
     glittering credentials, even Talbott's friends fall back on 
     platitudes to describe what he stands for.
       At 47, Talbott has perfected the Clintonian art of squaring 
     circles. His thinking is analytic rather than empirical, 
     pragmatic rather than idealistic, though it pretends to 
     idealism. While he takes moral positions, he prefers to 
     defend them in the language of national self-interest. His 
     characteristic prescription is one that lets the country keep 
     its options open, while meritocratic elites, at ``the highest 
     levels,'' keep the state afloat. Thus, in 1986, during the 
     ferocious Nicaragua debate--a time, like Vietnam, when 
     friendships were ending over the issue--Talbott urged 
     Congress to grant military aid to the contras, but if and 
     only if it were used as a form of pressure to win diplomatic 
     concessions from the Sandinistas. Partnership for Peace, the 
     Clinton administration's security framework for the new 
     Europe, ``can go either way,'' in Talbott's recent phrase. If 
     Russia turns aggressive, we can let the Eastern European 
     countries into nato; if not, we might let the Russians in, 
     too.
       But Talbott's worldview is not all compromise. Two 
     lodestars have remained fixed throughout his carefully 
     measured career. The first is the mystique of Russia. Talbott 
     is a passionate student of Russian language and poetry. He 
     translated Nikita Khrushchev's two-volume memoirs for Time 
     while still at Oxford, and has written or co-written six 
     books on U.S.-Soviet relations. Yet for all the depth of 
     Talbott's Russophilia, its origins seem puzzlingly 
     serendipitous. Though Talbott has visited the country often, 
     he never lived there for more than a few months at a time--in 
     part due to a kgb ban imposed because he worked on the 
     smuggled Khrushchev papers.
       Rather, he has lived for years in the Russia of his 
     imagination. The origins of this enthusiasm lie in an 
     experience that seems to have been a cross between youthful 
     indulgence and the flowering of a mature, but not exactly 
     flamboyant, aesthetic sensibility. As a tenth-grader at 
     Hotchkiss, Talbott was assigned to an English class taught by 
     an inspiring young man named Clinton Ely. Ely also happened 
     to teach Russian and Russian literature to eleventh-graders, 
     and he recruited Talbott to join his class the next year. 
     Young Strobe became ``enraptured and fascinated,'' recalls 
     Ely, with whom Talbott has remained friends ever since. ``We 
     both felt there was just something magical about Russia.''
       The fascination deepened at Yale. As his mother wished, 
     Talbott started out pre-med, but turned to journalism and 
     Russian studies after he did poorly in chemistry. As a Yale 
     senior he wrote a 256-page thesis, ``Fyodor Tyutchev: Poet of 
     Privacy,'' about an ardent pan-Slavist who once wrote: 
     ``Russia cannot be known with the mind, cannot be gauged with 
     some general measure. . . . In Russia, it is only possible to 
     believe.'' In Tyutchev, Talbott found a character whose 
     career had a particular resonance for the romantic but 
     career-minded Yalie. Tyutchev was a minor aristocrat and 
     diplomat who, after losing a package of secret codes in 
     Switzerland, was fired from the foreign service and wound up 
     later as a toady in the imperial court. As a reward for an 
     essay in which he had called on the West to join with 
     reactionary Russia against the forces of reform in Europe, 
     Tyutchev was appointed by Czar Nicholas I to a commission in 
     charge of censoring foreign publications. ``Neither before or 
     since has the Russian autocracy had a more loyal bard,'' 
     writes Joseph Brodsky. Tyutchev is said to have been one of 
     Lenin's favorite poets as well.
       Tyutchev's contempt for the masses would find a faint, but 
     unmistakable, echo in Talbott's own career. The second 
     concept around which Talbott's intellectual system revolves 
     is the special, anointed role of elites. At the Highest 
     Levels, the title of his recent study (with Michael 
     Beschloss) of George Bush, Mikhail Gorbachev and the end of 
     the cold war, could be Talbott's credo. The participation in 
     the affairs of foreign policymakers by lobbies, Congress or 
     an unruly public has long annoyed Talbott. In an August 1992 
     Time column, for instance, he took China's and Bush's side in 
     the debate over Most Favored Nation status for Beijing--even 
     as Clinton campaigned against Bush's coddling of the butchers 
     of Tiananmen Square: ``Once again those would-be statesmen on 
     Capitol Hill are trying to micromanage American foreign 
     policy and legislate morality in another country--something 
     Congress does often and badly. . . . The whole episode is a 
     vivid reminder of the uneasy, often unhelpful interaction 
     between U.S. politics and foreign policy, especially in an 
     election year. Politicians are quick to embrace simple 
     positions on complex issues that make them feel good and look 
     good--but in fact make a bad situation worse.''
       His admirers construe his elitism as virtue, calling him 
     the lineal descendant of the ``Wise Men''--the centrist, 
     internationalist mandarins who shaped postwar American 
     foreign policy. ``Strobe is part of the honest foreign policy 
     tradition that began with Elihu Root and Henry Stimson, and 
     runs through Paul Nitze and Cyrus Vance,'' says Isaacson, 
     himself an admiring chronicler of the ``Wise Men.''
       It's a peculiar encomium for a journalist. At Time, 
     Taibott's stories were almost entirely free of any insurgent 
     spirit. His writing about George Kennan, Cyrus Vance, et al., 
     was always reverent. Sometimes it was worshipful. In the 
     preface to The Master of the Game, his critical but admiring 
     biography of Paul Nitze (Hotchkiss `24), Talbott's salute to 
     the liberal meritocrats of the establishment was downright 
     unctuous: ``Harold Brown, who has been such an important 
     theoretician and practitioner of national security policy . . 
     . McGeorge Bundy . . . soon to publish a landmark book on the 
     role of nuclear weapons . . . Robert McNamara, himself a key 
     figure in the history of the nuclear age. . . .''
       Talbott's books and articles were billed as top-secret 
     inside looks at the movers and shakers, but their real 
     purpose was more to explain than to expose. His three major 
     books on arms control and the cold war, Endgame, Deadly 
     Gambits and At the Highest Levels, were all done with the 
     cooperation of senior officials who agreed to confide in 
     Talbott as long as he agreed not to write anything 
     contemporaneously for Time, or to reveal their identities. 
     Talbott's access lent his otherwise anodyne writing a ``you 
     are there'' feel.
       To some, it also lent it an air of professional compromise. 
     In the New York Times Book Review in 1984, Theodore Draper 
     took on the ``novelized history'' of Deadly Gambits. Talbott 
     had provided word-for-word quotations, attributed to no 
     source, for the famous 1983 ``Walk in the Woods'' arms 
     negotiations between Nitze and his Soviet counterpart, Yuli 
     Kvitsinsky. First, Draper pointed out, there were only two 
     men present at the Walks in the Woods, so hiding the source 
     of the words was a charade. Obviously it was Nitze, as Nitze 
     himself later admitted. Second, how could other researchers 
     check Talbott's accuracy if no source was cited?
       Draper's polemic was a bit overwrought, and Talbott was 
     right to respond that sometimes reporters have no choice but 
     to protect their sources. (This article is no exception.) 
     Still, Draper raised a legitimate issue. Talbott's coziness 
     with his sources was troubling not because there was a 
     conflict of interest, but because there was an identity of 
     interest. Most of the people Talbott was writing about, or 
     using as sources, were his colleagues in the study groups and 
     panel discussions of such bodies as the Aspen Strategy Group 
     and the Council on Foreign Relations. No fewer than seventeen 
     people mentioned in his books are now fellow senior officials 
     of the Clinton administration. (It was almost eighteen. But 
     Talbott's source and Aspen colleague, Bobby Ray Inman, whom 
     he enthusiastically recommended to Clinton for secretary of 
     defense, confounded Talbott's confidence by staging a public 
     psychological meltdown.--
       The cold war. Talbott's intellectual obsession from 
     adolescence to adulthood, posed a series of contradictions 
     for him: between the inner grandeur of the Russian people and 
     the manifest barbarity of Soviet communism (he never denied 
     this); between the danger of nuclear war and the promise of 
     superpower cooperation; between the demands of democracy and 
     the demands of diplomacy. Talbott's romantic view of Russia 
     and elite view of politics shaped the template he developed 
     for sorting out these tensions.
       His was a careful balancing act, derived largely from 
     Kennan's work. The Soviets were dangerous. But they were 
     dangerous mostly because Russians feel threatened by, and 
     inferior to the West. That insecurity might press less 
     urgently upon them if they were shown respect and reassured 
     about the West's intentions. This could be achieved through 
     contact--at the highest levels--between statesmen on both 
     sides. Engagement was valuable for its own sake. In this 
     policy prescription, detente provided mutual reassurance and 
     arms control provided stability. ``He was a `two apes on a 
     treadmill' kind of guy,'' says one specialist in Russian 
     affairs, ```If we could only have smart people from the Aspen 
     Institute in charge this would all be over.'''
       These views once again placed Talbott in the position he 
     found most comfortable; that of treating complicated moral 
     and historical matters in the technocratic language of 
     national interest. Talbott argued that the balance of terror 
     paradoxically was the most realistic, and therefore best, 
     hope of preventing nuclear war. This was a perfectly 
     defensible position, and in the days of the peace movement of 
     the early '80s, a courageous one, because deterrence was 
     under moral attack both from advocates of a nuclear freeze on 
     the left, and from advocates of Star Wars on the right. The 
     purpose of arms control was to refine deterrence. Thus 
     Talbott hailed the Carter administration for its 1979 SALT II 
     agreement with the Soviets, and urged the Reagan 
     administration to swap Star Wars for Soviet reductions in 
     heavy missiles.
       The end of the cold war wrecked Talbott's worldview, as it 
     did everyone else's. His first reaction was to declare 
     vindication. In 1990, in a paean to Mikhail Gorbachev as 
     Time's ``Man of the Decade,'' Talbott announced the triumph 
     of Kennanism: ``A new consensus is emerging that the Soviet 
     threat is not what it used to be. The real point, however, is 
     that it never was. The doves in the great debate of the past 
     forty years were right all along.'' The Soviet system had 
     collapsed of its own weight, he maintained, proving it had 
     always been a paper tiger. The West's rearmament and 
     resurgence had had nothing to do with it. ``That piece 
     offered Strobe the unique opportunity to commit to paper his 
     conclusions about a subject he'd devoted most of his 
     attention to over twenty years,'' recalls Henry Muller, the 
     magazine's managing editor at the time. ``I pushed Strobe to 
     write his definitive view of the cold war.'' Reading this 
     essay now, you do feel as if Talbott had been liberated to 
     express the Russophilia that had been welling up inside him 
     for years.
       But his ``definitive view'' is stunningly lopsided. First, 
     it does not follow, logically or empirically, that the 
     hollowness of the Soviet economy and the corruption of Soviet 
     civil institutions rendered the Soviet war machine impotent. 
     Even internally weak regimes can be aggressive abroad. In 
     fact, it is often at moments of greatest internal weakness 
     that dictatorships lash out, seeking to divert public 
     anger or to find abroad the legitimacy that they cannot 
     find at home. The crisis in the Soviet Union became 
     manifest on the domestic front, but it had a clear 
     international component as well: ``imperial overstretch.'' 
     The wars in Angola, Central America and especially 
     Afghanistan not only drained the material resources of the 
     Soviet empire, but also its political legitimacy. Talbott 
     brushed this aside. Star Wars, too, spurred the Soviets to 
     rethink their foreign policy by confronting them with a 
     potential arms race they could not possibly win.
       The Soviets were also impressed with the deployment of U.S. 
     nuclear missiles in Europe in 1983. The villain of Deadly 
     Gambits was an assistant secretary of defense, Richard Perle, 
     whose insistence on the ``zero option'' for intermediate-
     range missiles in Europe Talbott blames for much of the 
     internal administration bickering that undid the talks. The 
     zero option meant the United States would not deploy its 
     cruise missiles and Pershing rockets if the Soviets would 
     agree to take out the SS-20s they already had deployed within 
     range of Europe. Talbott favored a Walk in the Woods-like 
     deal in which the United States would deploy fewer missiles, 
     and the Soviets would keep some of their heavy SS-20s. The 
     Talbott, the zero option was a grandstanding ploy never 
     intended to be acceptable to the Soviets. The Reagan 
     administration's hawks preferred to think of it as political 
     cover for European allies reluctant to deploy U.S. missiles 
     without appearing to try arms control first. The hawks 
     preferred no agreement to an agreement that could help the 
     Soviets by driving a wedge in the alliance and leaving the 
     SS-20s in place, unmatched by similar American weapons.
       The American missile deployment prompted a Soviet walkout 
     from the talks. Talbott, like many others, wrung his hands 
     about dire consequences for the peace of the world. Talbott 
     thought our interest lay--what else?--in keeping up a 
     dialogue with the Russians, even if no agreement was in 
     range. But the Reagan administration made the judgment that, 
     at that moment, there were greater interests at stake to the 
     West than a continuation of talks: among other things, the 
     political cohesion of the alliance.
       The view was vindicated. In 1987 the ``Man of the Decade'' 
     accepted the zero option. In time, Talbott tried to depict 
     this capitulation as a Soviet victory, claiming they had 
     achieved their goal of getting the U.S. missiles out of 
     Europe. This is absurd. Not only had the USSR failed to keep 
     the U.S. missiles out in 1983, when it mattered most during 
     the cold war, but the Russians had also ended up having to 
     remove all medium-range missiles in Asia as well as in 
     Europe. It was all part of the general Soviet military ebb 
     tide that began as a tactical, negotiated retreat and ended 
     in utter strategic collapse.
       For Talbott, Reagan was dangerous not just because he 
     threatened arms control, but also because he hurt the 
     Russians' feelings. The thrust of Talbott's 1984 book, Reagan 
     and the Russians, and many of his other writings, was that 
     there were some ugly truths about the Soviet Union better 
     left unspoken. The United States ``overplayed its hand'' in 
     labeling the Soviet shootdown of Koreans Airlines Flight 007 
     as a mass murder. Reagan's 1982 speech to the British 
     Parliament, in which he spoke of ``a great revolutionary 
     crisis'' in the Soviet bloc, and of a system bound for ``the 
     ash heap of history,'' was, to Talbott, ``bear-baiting.'' (It 
     now reads like clairvoyance.) Talbott also derided Reagan's 
     ``evil empire'' remark.
       Talbott opposed ``linkage,'' the idea that American 
     positions on arms control and the like should be ``linked'' 
     to Soviet military intervention in Africa or the fate of 
     dissidents. He echoed the realpolitikal, Kissingerian view 
     that efforts to alter the internal order of the Soviet Union 
     were countrerproductive--threatening to the high-level 
     dialogue over ``bilateral issues,'' Talbott repeatedly 
     singles out the 1974 Jackson-Vanik Amendment--another 
     intrusion into foreign-making by Congress and its 
     obstreperous constituents--as proof that using trade to 
     pressure the Soviets (or anyone else) on human rights is 
     bound to fail. This is at best half-right. The amendment 
     denied the Soviet Union Most Favored Nation trading status 
     unless it permitted freedom of travel to Soviet Jews. 
     Shortly after it was passed, the Brezhnev regime did 
     sharply reduce emigration by Jews. But later the Soviet 
     Union restored emigration to higher levels in an effort to 
     curry favor with the United States.
       Meanwhile, the West had achieved something of political 
     importance; to once again call attention to the true nature 
     of the Soviet system, and to stand by its victims. Not every 
     futile gesture is an empty gesture. Talbott can't be faulted 
     for failing to predict the fall of the Soviet Union. Only a 
     handful got it right: in the East, Sakharov, Havel and their 
     associates; in the West, Reagan, Thatcher and their 
     associates. Talbott's error was, in a sense, even worse. He 
     knew that Reagan's bold and rudely moralistic rhetoric, and 
     the sanctions linked to human rights, attacked the Soviet 
     Union as its weakest point: its political illegitimacy. And 
     for precisely that reason, he opposed them.
       Talbott assigns no credit for the end of the Soviet Union 
     to the long struggle waged by the dissidents and the 
     refuseniks, or the Afghan rebels and the Polish workers. In 
     fact, no one who stood up and took risks to defy the Soviets 
     gets credit. Talbott instead wrote a glowing introduction to 
     Georgi Arbatov's book The System, published in 1992, in which 
     the erstwhile apparatchik claims that it was he who was the 
     dissident, that it was the ever so discreet dissent of soft-
     liners like himself that set the stage for Gorbachev and his 
     reforms. Talbott endorses Arbatov's claim. But then Arbatov 
     like Tyutchev, was a Talbottesque figure: a fixture at 
     conferences and a man of his establishment.
       The collapse of the Soviet empire was a boon for high-level 
     conversation. So many more high levels in so many more low 
     places! As early as March 1990, Talbott was calling for the 
     United States unilaterally to extend full diplomatic 
     relations to Angola, Afghanistan, Cuba and Vietnam. Now that 
     the cold war had ended, there was no point to what Talbott 
     strangely referred to as American ``vendettas'' against the 
     likes to Muammar Qaddafi and Fidel Castro. ``The task for the 
     West is to coax nations with die-hard leftist tyrannies into 
     as much engagement as possible with the outside world,'' he 
     wrote. ``That will accelerate the inevitable transformation 
     of their societies and perhaps even reduce the danger of 
     bloodshed.''
       Talbott systematically minimizes the fact that constructive 
     engagement contains a moral hazzard, which is appeasement. 
     There are bad guys, however cruelly misunderstood, who 
     respond only to one thing: force. The Reagan and Bush 
     administrations learned that the hard way from their dealings 
     with Saddam Hussein; North Korea, a die-hard leftist tyranny 
     newly ``engaged'' by U.S. diplomats on its nuclear bomb-
     building program, may yet teach the Clinton administration 
     the same lesson.
       Talbott has written little about South Africa, but it is 
     one case where sanctions--imposed by Congress over Reagan 
     administration objections--did as much or more than 
     constructive engagement (the Talbottian-Reagan policy toward 
     Pretoria) to help topple a brutal dictatorship. Indeed, it 
     was also a case in which wrangling between Congress and the 
     president was, contrary to Talbott's expressions of disdain, 
     a paradoxically useful factor. Between an engagement-minded 
     president and a sanctions-minded Congress, America developed 
     a good cop/bad cop routine that resulted in an appropriate 
     blend of carrots and sticks. The unruliness of the American 
     foreign policy-making process can, in fact, be a strength: 
     adversaries such as the Soviets and other dictators tend to 
     prefer a predictable environment in which to develop their 
     long-term plans.
       The Gulf crisis in 1990 forced Talbott, for the first time 
     since Vietnam, to grapple with the imminent prospect of a 
     major use of U.S. force abroad. His existing outlook provided 
     an uncertain template for the task. On the once hand, he had 
     always seen the oil of the Persian Gulf as a vital U.S. 
     interest, vulnerable to a ``Soviet thrust'' toward the 
     petroleum and the warm waters. On the other hand, well, there 
     was Vietnam. Also, the prospect of going to war had split the 
     establishment. People like Nitze were against it. People like 
     George Shultz were for it. And so Talbott reacted in his 
     way--carefully. His prewar position is no clearer than Bill 
     Clinton's. A person who went with him to Saudi Arabia before 
     the war recalls that Talbott was ``hawkish'' but an editor at 
     Time says, ``I can guess he was among those who hoped a 
     resolution could be arrived at short of war.'' During the 
     Desert Shield phase of the operation, he never wrote a Time 
     column urging Bush to use force. The closest Talbott came was 
     to muse that it was right to put an offensive U.S. capability 
     in Saudi Arabia, because it might pressure Saddam to leave 
     without a fight.
       Talbott fretted about the ability of the United States and 
     its allies to handle Iraq's military. In part, this was a 
     matter of Saddam's supposed advantages as ``a master of 
     twentieth-century totalitarianism,'' which meant he could be 
     more ruthless in battle than the democracies that opposed 
     him. ``Winning [the war] will not be easy,'' Talbott wrote. 
     The Iraqis were ``every bit as tough a military and strategic 
     challenge to the U.S.'' as the Vietnamese. Talbott was also 
     skittish about the danger of ``demonizing'' Saddam. As 
     always, he was concerned about the enemy's self-esteem: it 
     was important to defeat Iraq, but ``equally important that 
     this crisis not end with the Arab world feeling it has 
     suffered a humiliation at the hands of the West.'' This 
     fashionable but unfounded expression of anxiety did not 
     include an explanation of how Talbott's finely calibrated 
     proposed outcome could emerge from the ugly crucible of war.
       By the end of Desert Storm, however, Talbott had become an 
     enthusiastic hawk, along with everyone else. Correctly, he 
     took Bush to task for failing to support the Shiite and 
     Kurdish rebels who rose to topple Saddam in the wake of 
     Desert Storm. His earlier reticence about legislating 
     morality and interfering in the internal affairs of 
     sovereign countries suddenly vanished. ``Now that the cold 
     war is over,'' he wrote, ``intervention need no longer be 
     quite so suspect as a cynical gambit on the East-West 
     chessboard. The concept of benevolent interference is 
     already coming back into fashion.'' Still, Talbott shrank 
     from casting this in terms of America's taking a stand. 
     Rather, the world community could act as one in the name 
     of principle. And the United States, he argued, should be 
     prepared to subordinate its sovereignty to multilateral 
     institutions. Our forces could ``join a posse led by 
     someone else.'' even when our vital interests are not 
     directly threatened.
       On Bosnia, he rightly, and early, advocated force against 
     the Serbs, although his motivation seemed curiously driven by 
     domestic concerns. In a column called ``Why Bosnia is not 
     Vietnam,'' written in August 1992, Talbott called for ``an 
     all-out [NATO] peacemaking effort'' as a way for the United 
     States to ``truly cure itself of the Vietnam syndrome.'' In 
     December 1992 he supported a U.N. trusteeship over Somalia--
     ``humanity's burden.'' Talbott pooh-poohed the military risk 
     facing the United States and its U.N.-authorized allies as 
     ``Toyota Land Cruisers mounted with recoilles rifles manned 
     by boys.''
       Just beyond the horizon, Talbott discerned a United States 
     of the World growing out of today's multilateral expeditions 
     and organizations. In a July 1992 column, ``Birth of the 
     Global Nation,'' Talbott announced his (hedged) bet that in a 
     century or so, ``nationhood as we know it will be obsolete; 
     all states will recognize a single global authority.'' The 
     stage was set for ``a world federalism . . . a union of 
     separate states that allocate certain powers to central 
     government while retaining many others for themselves.''
       Talbott's aims were nobel, his assertions sweeping. His 
     call for U.N. trusteeship was a refreshing departure from 
     squeamishness about ``neo-colonialism.'' His mistake, 
     however, was to suppose that removing the element of 
     superpower conflict from regional conflicts rendered any 
     military action there somehow apolitical. The trend to global 
     integration is real; but there is also a cross-cutting trend 
     toward fragmentation along ethnic lines. It is by no means 
     clear which tendency will win out in the end. Meanwhile, all 
     politics is still maddeningly local. Thus, in Somalia, the 
     United States led in a U.N. posse to feed the hungry--what 
     could be more apolitical? American forces wound up 
     spearheading a U.N. effort to sort out a byzantine clan 
     struggle that was deadly but in which we had no real stake. 
     The net result was an American humiliation: the defeat of 
     elite Delta Force and Ranger troops by those boys in Land 
     Cruisers--among the wounded were Talbott's dreams of 
     trusteeship, not to mention world government.
       Then there is the Middle East. At Talbott's recent 
     confirmation hearings, he was quizzed by senators about a 
     1981 article in Time titled ``What To Do About Israel,'' 
     which he penned just after Israel's bombing of the Iraqi 
     nuclear reactor at Osirak In the article, Talbott called the 
     idea of Israel's strategic value to the United States a 
     ``delusion'' and suggested cuts in military aid to Israel if 
     it ever took ``international law into its own hands'' as 
     ``violently and as embarrassingly to the United States'' as 
     it has done over Iraq. He suggested that American Jews 
     ``Wield influence far beyond their numbers.''
       Of course, the Osirak action was in the interest of 
     America--and even of Saddam's rival Arab states. Just think 
     how the Iran-Iraq War, or the Gulf crisis, would have 
     unfolded if that bomb factory has been left intact. 
     Confronted with his own words at the hearings, Talbott pursed 
     his lips, shifted in his chair and repudiated his paper 
     trail. ``On that I simply have changed my opinion,'' he said. 
     ``I do believe Israel is indeed a strategic asset of the 
     United States.'' Pressed by Senator Paul Sarbanes of Maryland 
     on using aid to change to policy of democracies with which 
     the United States ``has a special relationship,'' Talbott 
     said his ``core belief'' was exactly the same as Sarbanes's; 
     he had just ``deviated'' from it in the ``heat'' of this 
     ``different line of work'' as a journalist.
       The truth is that the alleged problems Israel causes for 
     U.S. interests in the Middle East were a staple Talbott 
     theme. In 1990 he compared the rape of Kuwait to the 
     occupation of the West Bank. While conceding that Israel has 
     come by the West Bank in a defensive war with Jordan, he 
     argued that its settlement of the territory was like Saddam's 
     claim to a nineteenth province. In 1991 he wrote that the 
     Soviet Jews flowing into Israel might obstruct peace and harm 
     U.S.-Israel relations because they were ''easy recruits'' for 
     the hard-line Likud party in the upcoming election, and 
     because they would be settled on the West Bank.
       In the short run Talbott's views on Israel probably won't 
     matter very much, because he will concentrate on Russia. The 
     labor party is back in control in Israel, having won the 1992 
     election, pace Talbott, with the lion's share of newly 
     settled Soviet Jews' votes. Israel is pursuing a land-for-
     peace deal with the Palestinians--a fact that vindicates 
     Talbott's view that such a deal was in Israel's long-term 
     interest, but debunks his claim that the settlements were to 
     main obstacle to a breakthrough. And, to be sure, Talbott had 
     reason to feel frustrated with the dilatory government of 
     Yitzhak Shamir.
       Israel nevertheless represents a glaring exception to 
     Talbott's overall penchant for stroking countries that give 
     the United States a hard time. He doesn't seem to worry about 
     wounding Israeli leaders' self-esteem or interfering in their 
     internal affairs. In fact, 1981 he advocated U.S. pressure on 
     Israel as a means of helping topple then Prime Minister 
     Menachem Begin at the polls: after all, he noted acidly, 
     ``Israel has been interfering skillfully in U.S. politics for 
     decades, and will be doing so with a vengeance . . . over the 
     Saudi AWACS sale.''
       Perhaps Talbott harbors these feeling because 
     Israeli behavior simply flies in the face of all of his 
     postrums. The Israelis don't have much use for summit 
     conferences. They protect their principles and their 
     security, as at Osirak, whether that costs them friends or 
     not. Indeed, they wear the enmity of certain countries as 
     a badge of honor. Israel, with its fractions Parliament 
     and citizen army, makes decisions hyperdemocratically. And 
     its support in the United States depends less on the 
     considered assent of disinterested regional specialists 
     than it does on winning over Congress with the help of a 
     citizen's lobby.
       Strobe Talbott is undeniably a smart man, but is he really 
     a wise one? We are bout to find out. For the first time in 
     his distinguished but safe career, he finds himself in a post 
     where his judgments will have life-and-death consequences. It 
     will be impossible not to make real enemies. To this 
     unaccustomed role, he brings the same conceptual equipment 
     that produced such mixed results for him during and after the 
     cold war. His newfound impulse to moral interventionism, and 
     his earnest optimism about increasing world cooperation, 
     could lead the administration into more blind alleys in the 
     regional conflicts of the non-Western world. His stubbornly 
     romantic view of Russia--together with a desire to keep 
     dealing with a Kremlin elite that is no longer necessarily in 
     control--could prove an obstacle to fresh and realistic 
     thinking.
       In terms of taking a stand, the high point of Talbott's 
     government service so far was his unequivocal defense of 
     President Boris Yeltsin against the reactionaries of the now 
     disbanded Russian parliament. The low point was his 
     performance in the wake of the strong showing by neo-fascist 
     Vladimir Zhirinovsky in the December 12, 1993, elections for 
     a new parliament. He lost his cool and compounded the damage, 
     saying that the vote meant that Russia's economy needed 
     ``less shock and more therapy.'' The comment betrayed 
     colossal ignorance about the true nature of the economic 
     reform, ignored the failure of the United States to provide 
     substantial aid sooner (see ``Betrayal'' by Jeffrey Sachs, 
     TNR, January 24) and handed the reactionaries in Russia a 
     propaganda coup. The last reformer in Yeltsin's Cabinet, 
     Finance Minister Boris Fyodorov, resigned, blaming Talbott 
     for ``stabbing reform in the back.'' He had a point. Talbott 
     has subsequently undermined U.S. credibility even further by 
     partially withdrawing his comment.
       Talbott was right in the recent debate on expanding NATO. 
     His five-page, single-spaced memo arguing against including 
     the Eastern European countries in the alliance persuaded 
     Secretary of State Christopher to back the more tentative 
     ``Partnership for Peace.'' Poland, Hungary and the Czech 
     Republic are not ready for full participation in NATO (and 
     America is not ready to commit itself to their defense); 
     their more pressing need is access to Western markets. But 
     Talbott won this argument by invoking the wrong reason: the 
     encirclement cliche. We can't risk arousing the Russians' 
     fears, which would inflame the Russian military, which would 
     set back the cause of reform. Russia is important, the fate 
     of Russia's leader is important to the fate of Russia and the 
     fate of Russia is important to America. Russia's interests 
     and residual military strength must be taken into account. 
     But none of that means that the leader of Russia must be 
     given a say in the policy of the West--on NATO, Bosnia (think 
     of Bill Clinton waiting two days to have a dialogue about 
     Bosnia with Yeltsin) or anywhere else.
       Talbott, though, seems most comfortable treating the 
     Kremlin as if it were still the seat of a superpower. It's 
     all a part of engagement. And it serves another purpose. As 
     long as Moscow, twinned with Washington, is vital to the 
     world, there will always be a conversation partner for Strobe 
     Talbott--at the highest level. The American foreign policy 
     elite can perpetuate a role for itself into the next century. 
     The long, twilight dialogue can go on; and the master of the 
     game can keep on playing.

  Mr. BROWN. Mr. President, it seems to me that when one finds himself 
in fundamental disagreement with a nominee to a very high office, over 
matters that will come under the purview of that office, the 
presumption in favor of the President's nominee should be overridden.
  As one who voted for Mr. Talbott for his ambassadorial post, I find 
myself unable to vote for him as a Deputy Secretary of State. I 
fundamentally disagree with him on a wide range of U.S. policy issues 
over which he will have determinative influence.
  In a way, we have an opportunity today to judge his short tenure as 
Ambassador to the New Independent States. What are the results? 
President Yeltsin has called for trade, not aid. Yet the reality is 
that this country has primarily given the New Independent States 
Government assistance. There have been virtually no major trade 
initiatives. I think that has been a fundamental mistake in policy.
  The fact is, under Ambassador Talbott's tenure there has, indeed, 
been a resurgence of hard line Marxists in the former Soviet Union and 
particularly Russia. I certainly do not attribute this or mean to imply 
in any way that this is favored by Ambassador Talbott nor pleases him 
in any way. I suggest, though, the results of his tenure have been less 
than what all of us had hoped. It seems to me that it would be a 
mistake for this country to appoint as Deputy Secretary of State 
someone who holds the views and has held the views that I have 
outlined. I believe a more appropriate choice would be someone who has 
a more fundamental commitment to the views and beliefs of mainstream 
America and who has a greater appreciation for the qualities that have 
made this country great.
  I yield the floor, Mr. President.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The Senator from Rhode 
Island.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I am glad to yield 10 minutes to the Senator 
from Massachusetts.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. Kerry, has 
the floor for up to 10 minutes.
  Mr. KERRY. I thank the Chair. I thank the distinguished chairman of 
the Foreign Relations Committee.
  Just listening to my good friend from Colorado, with whom I have 
worked on so many issues within the Foreign Relations Committee and 
with whom I enjoy working, I must say I just do not find myself 
agreeing with him and his comments, but obviously he believes what he 
believes, and he is always a person who has arrived at those beliefs, I 
know, with careful judgment.
  If you just take the last comment he made, in which he suggested that 
we need somebody who believes more deeply in freedom and democracy and 
free enterprise, I do not know of anything in the record, or outside of 
the record, or anything in the background of Strobe Talbott that 
suggests anything other than an extraordinary belief in freedom, 
democracy, and free enterprise. I think it is possible as a journalist 
to make observations about a country's policy at a particular moment in 
time that may displease the government or displease some of the most 
passionate supporters of that government but nevertheless not in any 
way be diminishing or even declarative of that particular journalist's 
commitment to freedom, democracy, or free enterprise.
  In fact, if one were to look at most of the writings of Ambassador 
Talbott through the course of his heralded tenure at Time magazine, I 
think you would notice, to the contrary, a remarkable continuum of 
articles that are consistently articulating the best interests of the 
United States in how to stand up for freedom or democracy and free 
enterprise. Indeed, the very focus of much of his interest and writings 
with respect to the former Soviet Union were to try to help us better 
understand as a nation how those particular concerns were going to be 
best served. His passionate writing about arms control is a classic 
example of that.
  I think Strobe Talbott was consistently ahead of the curve, 
understood the dynamics and helped many people in this country to 
understand better the relationship of our money to the arms we were 
buying and to the issues that we were facing.
  I have listened to a number of speakers during the course of this 
morning, and I want the Record to be very clear with regard to 
Ambassador Talbott, particularly on the question of Israel and support 
of Israel.
  Let me, first of all, remind my colleagues that Ambassador Talbott 
has been referred to the floor for a full vote of the Senate by a vote 
of 17 to 2 by the Foreign Relations Committee. Seventeen of our 
colleagues on that committee heard the testimony or read the record and 
are satisfied that Ambassador Talbott brings no anti-Israel bias or 
dereliction with respect to his views on one of our foremost allies in 
the world.
  I think it is very important to state that I have not agreed with 
everything that he wrote during the period of time when he was a 
journalist. I have reread some of it recently. I still disagree with 
some of it. But none of it suggested to me that there was somehow 
either a bias or a fundamental disagreement with the basics of our 
relationship with Israel. There may have been disagreement with 
strategies; there may have been disagreement with a particular choice 
at a particular moment in time or a particular policy pursued, but that 
must not be, particularly in our country, which allows for such a broad 
scope of dialog, interpreted as being a whole hearted disapproval of 
the Nation itself or its people or its goals.
  I do not think there is a lot of value spending a huge amount of time 
on this, on trying to analyze every comment, every article he wrote on 
Israel, or the Mideast conflict over the last decade or more. I think 
that what we are seeing here, to a certain degree, is what some might 
call ``much ado about nothing.'' By that I mean what is relevant to 
this nomination is what Ambassador Talbott has accomplished in his role 
as a public person, what he has said as a public person, and what he 
has said and done that carries out his responsibilities and expresses 
the confidence the President of the United States in putting him in 
this position.
  He made those views very clear in his confirmation hearing before our 
committee on February 8. I just want to share these with my colleagues 
very quickly. Regarding Israel, Ambassador Talbott told the committee, 
and I quote:

       My core beliefs where Israel is concerned are that Israel 
     is a very special country in the world, by virtue of its 
     people, by virtue of the circumstances that brought about its 
     birth. It is also a very special country for the United 
     States of America for many reasons, including our own proud 
     role in the birth of Israel and, of course, also because so 
     many Americans have such close ties to Israel. My core 
     beliefs are also that we have a special obligation for 
     reasons not only rooted in our moral obligation to Israel 
     but also rooted in our geopolitical interests to support 
     the security of Israel.

  Mr. President, I do not think you can be more straightforward or 
clear. I know of nothing in the public record of Ambassador Talbott 
that suggests pursuing a policy other than that. In fact, this 
administration has vigorously pursued a constructive Mideast policy 
which led to the momentous occasion that took place on the White House 
lawn last year. I am confident that it is high on the priority list of 
Ambassador Talbott.
  I might add that, commenting upon United States relations with 
Israel, and the Clinton administration's policy in particular, 
Ambassador Talbott said and I quote:

       First, I have always believed that the U.S.-Israeli 
     relationship is unshakeable. Second, I have always believed 
     that a strong Israel is in America's interest because it 
     serves the cause of peace and stability in the region. Third, 
     I am proud to be part of an administration that has already 
     done so much to promote a comprehensive peace in the area, 
     and I look forward to assisting Secretary Christopher in any 
     way I can to keep that process moving forward.

  When asked whether he found the involvement of domestic groups such 
as American Jews or Polish Americans or Greek Americans as a 
complicating factor in American foreign policy making, as some of his 
writings seemed to imply, Ambassador Talbott answered:

       I do not think that I have ever expressed the view that it 
     is improper. Complicating is not in and of itself a normative 
     word. It is, in general, an aspect of American politics. And 
     the interaction between American politics and American 
     foreign policy, I think, is enriching, and that, basically we 
     are better for it * * * I would certainly not endorse any 
     interpretations of my writings that suggest that I thought 
     this was anything other than a strong feature of the American 
     system.

  When asked if American interests were being undervalued because of 
lobbying by ethnic American groups, Ambassador Talbott responded 
directly and unequivocally:

       No. Quite the contrary * * * it is not only one of the 
     aspects of American society that makes us as strong as we 
     are, namely, our diversity and our variety, but it is also a 
     feature of American society that ties us to the rest of the 
     world. It means that we are almost constitutionally incapable 
     of being isolationists, because some Americans have such 
     strong ties to countries elsewhere in the world.

  Mr. President, I really think that these statements speak for 
themselves. And they underscore why the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee by a vote of 17 to 2 expressed its confidence in Ambassador 
Talbott. Ambassador Talbott recognizes the importance of Israel as a 
unique nation in the Mideast. He understands there is a special 
relationship between the United States and Israel, and I know and am 
confident that he sees the involvement of all domestic ethnic groups as 
a strengthening factor in American foreign policy. It is very clear 
that he is committed to pursuing the President's policy, which is, in 
and of itself, strongly supportive of Israel and its security 
interests.
  Mr. President, I heard my colleague, the Senator from Colorado, 
suggest that somehow we do not have a lot to show for Ambassador 
Talbott's efforts with respect to the former Soviet Union.
  I ask for 3 additional minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island yields an 
additional 3 minutes to the Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, indeed it would be wonderful if we could 
trade more with Russia. I think Ambassador Talbott is certainly 
struggling to see that happen. But it is very clear also that Russia 
has serious economic problems--not to mention the political problems 
that it has--including the lack of a means of production, the lack of 
convertibility in currency, and the lack of a banking structure. A host 
of decisions which he, and others, have encouraged President Yeltsin to 
try to make obviously were not made, not because Ambassador Talbott did 
not want them to be made, not because they were not suggesting them, 
but because President Yeltsin has had trouble getting any decisions 
made with a Parliament that was unwilling to make them because it was 
filled with the very people that the Senator from Colorado most 
despises.
  So I think that in fact Ambassador Talbott and Secretary Christopher 
and President Clinton deserve enormous credit for walking an 
extraordinarily complex, difficult, line. The fact is that reform is 
going to come extremely slowly in the former Soviet Union. And I think 
many of us anticipate that there may be far more difficult days before 
there are good days.
  The fact is also that Ambassador Talbott had an extremely important 
view that in fact helped to mold the policy of the Partnership for 
Peace and conceivably restrained us from moving in a direction that 
might have worked contrary to the very reforms that the Senator from 
Colorado wants.
  The Chairman of the Federal Reserve spoke about a week or so ago to a 
group of citizens assembled from Massachusetts here in Washington. And 
he suggested that perhaps one of the most important foreign policy 
issues of our time will be how events turn out in Russia because it 
will have a profound impact on our spending and a whole host of choices 
that we make in this country as well as in Europe.
  I would respectfully suggest that Ambassador Talbott comes to this 
particular role at an important moment with relevant experience and 
with demonstrated capacity to do the job.
  I equally respectfully suggest that there is nothing in the record 
that diminishes from Ambassador Talbott's ability to perform this job 
with the confidence that the President of the United States has 
expressed in him, and I hope my colleagues will overwhelmingly confirm 
him for this position and express the confidence of the U.S. Senate in 
the prospective No. 2 person at the State Department.
  Mr. DOLE addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Chair recognizes 
the Senate Republican leader, Senator Dole.
  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, until last week I was prepared to 
reluctantly support the President's nominee for Deputy Secretary of 
State, Strobe Talbott, but with serious reservations. However, I have 
decided that a strong signal needs to be sent with all the widespread 
speculation about where he may go from here. And maybe it is time to 
say enough promotions for Strobe Talbott.
  There is no doubt that Strobe Talbott has an impressive background. 
He is well-educated, well-traveled, and has had a prolific career as a 
journalist. However, my concerns rest with Mr. Talbott's perspective on 
U.S. foreign policy matters, specifically his judgment on how best to 
promote U.S. interests. In light of the widespread speculation that he 
may move up to Secretary of State someday soon, it is well to point out 
that during the cold war Mr. Talbott was critical of tough-minded 
policies toward the Soviet Union. He argued that a hardnosed approach 
would be ineffective and counterproductive. Yet, now that the cold war 
is over, we learn from top Soviet military leadership that the strong 
U.S. defense posture, including programs like the Strategic Defense 
Initiative, initiated during the Reagan administration, had a 
significant impact on the demise of the Soviet Union.
  It is also clear that it paid off to expose the Soviet regime for 
what it was--illegitimate, totalitarian, and imperialistic--regardless 
of how much these characterizations offended the Soviet leadership. 
Despite Mr. Talbott's protestations, the clear statement of United 
States principles heartened aspiring Democrats throughout the Soviet 
bloc.
  Ambassador Talbott tries to have it both ways. He opposed tough 
policies during the cold war, and then wrote that ``The doves in the 
great debate of the last 40 years were right all along'' once the tough 
policies paid off. Twelve years ago, President Reagan spoke of leaving 
the Soviet system on ``The ash heap of history.'' Talbott criticized 
that bold--and prophetic--remark as bear-baiting. In my view, it was 
precisely because the West was resolute--and unafraid to speak and act 
clearly--that the Soviet system has been left on the ash heap of 
history.
  There is no doubt that the United States relationship with Russia is 
a central element of our foreign policy. And, Mr. Talbott has learned a 
great deal about Russia over the years. However, Russia is not our only 
interest. It seems to me that Mr. Talbott must be reminded of that 
fact.

  Mr. President, over the past few months Russia has been casting 
silent vetoes over United States foreign policy options. I am concerned 
that Mr. Talbott has been the leading advocate within the 
administration for yielding to Russia's wishes.
  I do not want to be misunderstood. I am a strong supporter of 
President Yeltsin and his reform program. The Congress has backed up 
its support for Russian reform with a substantial aid package. However, 
I am opposed to developing United States foreign policy options 
according to the expected response from hardliners in Russia. U.S. 
interests should guide U.S. foreign policy, not the potential reaction 
of Yeltsin critics.
  At the NATO summit, the United States rejected the pleas from Poland, 
Hungary and the Czech Republic to join NATO and instead offered the 
partnership for peace. Reportedly, Mr. Talbott played a critical role 
in resisting the move toward establishing criteria for expanded NATO 
membership because of Russian objections. President Yeltsin changed his 
position on expanding NATO after the military sided with him in his 
showdown with the parliament; he is probably trying to keep the 
military leadership on his side--and that is understandable.
  The administration is also considering supporting Russian military 
actions in former Soviet Republics under the banner of United Nations 
peacekeeping. I asked Ambassador Talbott several questions for the 
record on this issue. His responses do not satisfy my concerns. For 
example, Ambassador Talbott writes that the ``Russian role must be 
desired by all parties'' before the United States would vote yes at the 
United Nations. But I hope Ambassador Talbott recalls that the Soviets 
were invited into Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and 
Afghanistan in 1979. Giving the overwhelming power and presence of 
Russia in the so-called ``near abroad,'' the freedom of countries like 
Georgia, Tajikistan and others to desire Russian peacekeeping is in 
serious question. This administration has enough problems on its 
peacekeeping platter without indulging and legitimizing Russians 
neoimperialism.

  The United States response to Yeltsin's domestic pressure should not 
be abandoning the right course, but reassuring President Yeltsin as we 
reassured President Gorbachev when Germany was reunited and Eastern 
Germany joined NATO as part of that process. The best way to strengthen 
the hand of hardliners is to remain silent toward their policies.
  This Russia tilt is evident in United States policy toward Bosnia. 
The United States has bent over backward to accommodate Russia--which 
staunchly opposes tough action against its close ally, Serbia--despite 
the fact that Serbia is the aggressor. While I support NATO's latest 
decision, it is more than just evenhanded, it favors the Serbian 
position. And Russia's involvement is destined to make the situation 
even more favorable to the Bosnian Serbs.
  The United States must not only expect reform in Russia's domestic 
policy, but in its foreign policy, as well.
  I must say, based upon reports today of espionage activity with the 
arrest, on Sunday of this week, of some mole in the CIA that has been 
getting information and informing Russia, it could be the most serious 
espionage activity in the past 20, 30 years that has just been revealed 
in the last 2 hours.
  And I understand President Clinton will send a strong protest to 
Moscow. So the world is not quite the way we would like to have it. We 
would like to think we have a changed relationship and everything is 
fine, nothing is going to go wrong.
  And it is another reason, when you look at Mr. Talbott and some of 
his positions, it makes you wonder if he is the right person for the 
job.
  Finally, many of Ambassador Talbott's writings about the Middle East 
reveal a clear anti-Israel bias. He has shown virtually no regard for 
Israel's legitimate security concerns. He has compared Israel to Saddam 
Hussien's Iraq. He has disparaged Jewish-Americans. He has repeatedly 
seen the worst in Israel and the best in hard-line Arab States. At his 
committee hearing, we heard of a classic confirmation conversion when 
Ambassador Talbott disavowed these writings but his disavowal does not 
put the concerns shared by many Americans to rest.
  Because of my misgivings, I will vote against confirming Ambassador 
Talbott as Deputy Secretary of State. While I believe in the right of 
the President to have the nominees of his or her choice, I do believe 
the Senate has a right to work its will on potential nominees. 
President Clinton may share Ambassador Talbott's views--on the Middle 
East, on the cold war, and on policy toward Russia. If he does, we in 
the Senate will consider and debate administration policies based on 
those views in the coming months. And we will monitor Ambassador 
Talbott's performance and policies towards Russia, Bosnia, Israel and 
the rest of the world if he is confirmed--as I expect he will be.
  However, I will vote against Ambassador Talbott because of my 
concerns over his past views--only some of which have been renounced--
and because I believe he is not the right person for this, or any more 
senior, position.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. PELL. I yield myself such time as is necessary.
  Mr. President, as I see it, there are really four targets of doubt 
that are the main sources of criticism of Strobe Talbott: One, his 
views on Russia; two, his views on Israel; three, his managerial 
ability; and, four, his acquaintanceship with Victor Louis.
  First, on his views on Russia, you could see in his own quotations 
the seriousness with which he took the Soviet threat. At the same time 
he also recognized that the Soviet system was fatally flawed, 
containing inequities, illusions and roughness.
  The views on Israel that are accredited to him were actually spoken 
by Mr. Begin. And that has been cited in the Record already.
  As to his managerial ability, Mr. Kenneth Damm was a very 
distinguished Deputy Secretary some years ago who came from very much 
the same background as did Strobe Talbott.
  Finally, when it comes to his contacts with Victor Louis, I think it 
is very important that to be familiar with your adversary, to have as 
wide a range of contact as possible, particularly if you are a diplomat 
or journalist. In this case, I think he should not be criticized but 
rather praised for branching out from the usual circuit when he was 
assigned to Moscow.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator will withhold.
  Under the previous order, the Senator from Kentucky was authorized to 
speak for up to 10 minutes.
  Mr. McCONNELL. If I could inquire of my friend, the junior Senator 
from Rhode Island, who I see on the floor, how much time he might need, 
I might defer momentarily.
  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I would take 2 minutes or less.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when I finish, the 
Senator from Kentucky would then proceed.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. PELL. I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Rhode Island.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island yields 2 minutes 
to his colleague who now has the floor.
  Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I would like to make several comments 
regarding Ambassador Strobe Talbott and specifically his nomination to 
be Deputy Secretary of State, the number two position at the State 
Department.
  I have known Strobe Talbott for many years. He is a friend for whom I 
have the very highest regard. We worked together on a board, where I 
grew to know him well. I have always found Strobe Talbott to be a 
thoughtful, intelligent, and capable person.
  In recent weeks, and during today's floor debate, Mr. Talbott's many 
writings have been scrutinized to gauge his views in a variety of 
important foreign policy issues. This type of scrutiny is fair and 
appropriate for a person who hopes to hold such a high position in the 
State Department.
  I certainly do not agree with everything that Mr. Talbott has written 
in Time magazine over many, many years. Nevertheless, I am confident 
that Mr. Talbott, if confirmed, will be responsive to U.S. interests in 
Europe, the Middle East, the Pacific rim, and all around the globe.
  In conclusion, I want to say how pleased I am that a person of Strobe 
Talbott's character and quality wants to enter public service today. We 
are always trying to get good people to come into public service. 
Strobe Talbott is doing this at considerable personal financial 
sacrifice. He has done a good job for the President, in my opinion, and 
I think he will be an asset to Secretary Christopher's team at the 
State Department. Accordingly, I plan to support the Talbott nomination 
and urge my colleagues to do likewise.
  Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Kentucky for 
letting me proceed. I know that he has been waiting and I came outside 
of my turn.
  And, of course, I thank my colleague from Rhode Island for permitting 
me to speak at this time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Kentucky has the floor for up 
to 10 minutes.
  Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. President, over the past several weeks, I have 
given a great deal of thought to the nomination of Strobe Talbott for 
Deputy Secretary of the Department of State. In reviewing the 
nomination, I gave three factors consideration: The Department's 
management interests, Mr. Talbott's record, and the balance of 
executive and congressional responsibilities and authority.
  This has not been an easy decision.
  Let me first, briefly address my view of the concerns which have been 
raised about the management role of the Deputy Secretary. Although many 
argue the day-to-day management of the State Department is the burden 
of the Deputy Secretary, I do not think these responsibilities are set 
in bureaucratic cement. Historically, some of the most effective Deputy 
Secretaries have been the most active on policy matters. In fact, Larry 
Eagleburger assumed routine responsibility for overseeing the emerging 
relationships in Eastern Europe and the NIS through the Ambassador at 
Large office.
  At heart, the management and morale of the State Department will 
improve through the effective administration of diplomacy. During the 
Bush administration some complained at being excluded from the Baker 
inner circle, but all foreign service officers were proud to be 
associated with such a successful team.
  In contrast, as our foreign policy fortunes have sunk through 
setbacks in Haiti, Bosnia, North Korea, and elsewhere, there has been 
an ever louder call for new management and committed managers. Frankly, 
management is not the issue. If the Secretary and Deputy Secretary can 
work out a reasonable division of the responsibilities to address the 
difficult problems which trouble the foreign policy landscape, real 
management issues can appropriately be left to the Under Secretary. I 
believe Mr. Talbott and Secretary Christopher have worked well together 
and expect that to continue, as there is no shortage of crises around 
the world to tax even their combined abilities.
  Since I think the management question is largely driven by policy 
matters,in considering this nomination, I turned next to Mr. Talbott's 
views and record. Frankly, this is the area offering the weakest 
justification for Mr. Talbott's confirmation. Over the past year, a 
number of his decisions and comments have provoked me to say that I 
have met very few people in my life who are as well educated and smart 
as Strobe Talbott who are so consistently wrong. Indeed, it is not an 
overstatement to say that Mr. Talbott's life is a cautionary tale about 
the difference between great learning and common sense.
  On matters of vital importance in the past, at present, and of future 
concern, I find myself in strong personal and policy disagreement with 
Mr. Talbott. I have been inundated with calls and letters from friends 
of long standing and good judgment who have been appalled at his 
thinking on Middle East issues. While he attempted to clarify his point 
of view before the Foreign Relations Committee, speaking to some 
special moral obligation the United States has and vaguely identifying 
geopolitical interests, I do not think he particularly helped his case.
  In fact, I think he made matters worse by failing to fully and 
precisely acknowledge the basis for our relations with Israel.
  Ours is not a bond born of a paternal role in establishing the state 
of Israel, as Mr. Talbott suggested. The alliance rests firmly on a 
common commitment to peace, the fundamentals of freedom, and the 
entwined destiny all democracies share.
  These points were never mentioned when he defined what he called his 
core beliefs about our relationship with Israel. It seems past time for 
him to bury those core beliefs.
  Now, the Middle East is not the only area where Mr. Talbott has 
demonstrated how shortsighted he can be. I might say that Mr. Talbott 
could argue that his views on the Middle East are somewhat old; that he 
has a chance to reexamine those and reach a different conclusion. So I 
would, instead, Mr. President, like to focus on more current Talbott 
positions. For the better part of a year, I have urged the 
administration to look beyond Russia as it defines our policy and 
national interests in the New Independent States. In hearings, in 
letters, and in meetings, I have pressed Mr. Talbott and his associates 
to enlarge the scope of our political interests, to increase our 
economic commitment, to expand our national attention and involvement 
beyond Russia.
  Unfortunately, the administration's architect for post-cold-war 
policy has actively pursued a Russia-first approach. In my view, we 
have paid a high price for this Moscow myopia.
  Mr. Talbott may have been well-intentioned in his preoccupation with 
Moscow and Yeltsin's survival. Nonetheless, because of his overbearing 
regard for Russian sensitivities, in effect, he surrendered United 
States interests in regional stability, economic growth and political 
liberty.
  Throughout 1993, President Yeltsin and his advisers moved to 
establish Russian interests in the so-called near abroad. I was 
astonished to hear Foreign Minister Kozyrev's speech to the U.N. 
General Assembly last fall, actually seeking funding and approval for 
expanding Russia's security role in the NIS. As Foreign Minister 
Kozyrev left the floor of the United Nations, he was joined in an 
international news conference by Secretary Christopher who applauded 
this novel role for Russia. The news conference was one of many 
statements and actions which were viewed as alarming by Russia's 
neighbors. Leaders across the continent from the Baltics to Ukraine 
understandably wondered whether United States policymakers had 
relinquished any responsibility for the region's future. From their 
perspective, Russia sought and received American approval for political 
and military activity which undermined their sovereign national 
interests.
  Nowhere was the evidence of this more frightening than the clear 
intervention of Russian troops in Georgia. Under siege in Abkhazia, 
President Shevardnadze pleaded for American support. Although the 
administration chose to ignore this assault on democracy, Congress 
could not. At the time, I worked with Senator Byrd and others to draft 
an amendment to the foreign operations appropriations bill linking our 
aid to respect for territorial borders and national sovereignty. In 
spite of strong objections from Mr. Talbott's office and the 
administration, the amendment passed with bipartisan support. Sadly, 
the administration's recent report on this important issue, which is 
required by law, once again, diminishes concerns expressed by Congress 
and Russia's neighbors.
  This Russia-first approach has also affected congressional debate on 
Ukraine. Although Congress was able to overcome vocal administration 
objections to my earmarking $300 million of the NIS package 
specifically for Ukraine, the battle has continued. Since passage of 
the bill, Ukraine has been virtually ignored. Russia has received the 
lion's share of obligated resources, with Ukraine squeezing out 2 
percent of the total, so far.
  Ukraine has clearly been punished for failing to accommodate our sole 
interest. The only item on Mr. Talbott's agenda with Ukraine has been 
arms control and pushing Ukraine to comply with START obligations and 
turn over to Russia its nuclear inventory.
  No leader in Ukraine ever contradicted or attempted to undercut that 
goal--the key has always been forging a Parliamentary consensus to 
ratify the obligations. Instead of building confidence, encouraging a 
process of coalition and consensus to support U.S. goals--we issued 
ultimatums. Fortunately, in their own way, in their own time, Ukraine 
has ratified START and will no doubt fulfill its arms control 
obligations.
  Ironically, overnight, it has become the year of Ukraine at the White 
House. Recently, the President, the Vice President, and Mr. Talbott met 
with the national leadership of the Ukrainian-American community. The 
group stopped by to visit with me afterward and I told them how much I 
welcomed the President's announcement that he intended to provide at 
least $300 million to Ukraine. It is, of course, no less than Congress 
designated last fall. In short, he had no choice.
  Ukrainian-Americans worry how they can sustain the administration's 
interest in nations other than Russia. Their concern is echoed by 
Americans with family ties and roots in Eastern and Central Europe--for 
the consequences of a Russia-first approach have unfortunately now 
extended beyond the Newly Independent States.
  Here again, I find fault with Mr. Talbott's thinking. In deference to 
Russian concerns about drawing new lines in Europe, Mr. Talbott argued 
against expanding NATO membership to new democratic nations including 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and others. The substitute, 
Partnership for Peace, left most confused and many out in the cold.
  Just after the European summit, I introduced an amendment encouraging 
the administration to move quickly to clarify the terms for NATO 
admission. Passage of the amendment provoked an eloquent letter of 
support from an Eastern European ambassador. He noted that it is in 
Western interests to ``enlarge the space of stability and security in 
Europe and to offer new democracies, which have demonstrated both the 
capability and willingness to join NATO, an unambiguous chance to 
become part of this most reliable security structure.'' That is a 
direct quote from his letter. Certainly, I agree.
  Instead, the administration allowed Russia to dictate our policy--
again. Fear of rising nationalism, among other arguments, was advanced 
by Mr. Talbott and his colleagues. I find myself in total accord with 
former Secretary of State Kissinger who said ``It is, in fact, 
ambiguity about dividing lines, not their existence, and ambivalence 
about Western reactions, not their certainty, which tempt militarists 
and nationalists.''
  American ambiguity and ambivalence have also troubled the 
negotiations with North Korea over nuclear proliferation. I do not 
think Mr. Talbott made a constructive contribution during his 
confirmation hearing by suggesting he had reason to believe the Chinese 
would support United States efforts to resolve the violations Security 
Council sanctions or similar action. I gather his statement was 
immediately and summarily rejected by the Chinese Ambassador to the 
United Nations. He and I may have misunderstood Mr. Talbott's 
statement, but the complex, arduous negotiations on matters of life and 
death on the Korean peninsula require precision and scrupulous 
attention to detail, not contradictory, confusing policy pontification.

  As I scan the globe, I find myself in disagreement with Mr. Talbott 
on most of the pressing issues which no doubt will dominate American 
foreign policy today and in the future.
  In fairness, with other nominees, I have balanced any policy 
differences I might have with my basic philosophy that the President 
should have the flexibility to appoint people to key policy positions 
who reflect his views, possess his trust, and maintain his confidence.
  In my case, I have supported every one of President Clinton's 
nominees for positions in the foreign policy community. In fact, as I 
think back, the last time I voted against a State Department nominee, 
it was a George Bush choice. In general, short of legal, moral or 
ethical considerations, the President is entitled to his choice. I 
might note, that Mr. Talbott obviously has unimpeachable credentials in 
these areas. It was for all these reasons, I was able to support his 
initial confirmation as Ambassador-at-Large.
  However, there are rare occasions when a nominee demands customary 
practice and convention be set aside. After a year in office, such is 
the case with Mr. Talbott.
  Since we are all prone to Olympic metaphors this week, I will, add 
mine. I give Mr. Talbott very high marks for artistic impression. It is 
the technical proficiency category that he falls down.
  I have no doubt Mr. Talbott will be confirmed--he continues to enjoy 
the President's friendship and support. However, I am so troubled by 
his views and his record of the past year, I can no longer offer him my 
support. I have reached a point, where I feel compelled to send the 
strongest possible signal to this administration that we urgently need 
to correct course. Unfortunately, Mr. Talbott is directly responsible 
for many of the decisions which I consider damaging to U.S. credibility 
and U.S. national interests. It is not his comments from 20 years ago 
that concern me. It is this past year of decisions which are damaging.
  Yet I should say I enjoy working with Mr. Talbott. As he has 
described himself, he thrives on the ``heat of forensic and 
journalistic battle.'' So, too, has he thrived on policy disagreements 
in working with the foreign operations subcommittee. He does not wither 
in the face of argumentative opponents on the other side.
  At the end of the day, U.S. national security is not just an academic 
exercise of forensic battle. American men and women may be forced into 
war over a miscalculation in our negotiations with North Korea. They 
may find themselves in the crossfire of Bosnia because of a mistake.
  I can not vote for a nominee with Mr. Talbott's track record of 
miscalculation. I am respectful of his close ties with the President, 
but it is simply too high a price to pay.
  In conclusion, Mr. President, I hope my colleagues will oppose the 
nomination of Strobe Talbott as simply a statement that it is time 
Ambassador Talbott be correct on some of the policy positions he has 
taken.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Wellstone). The Senator from Rhode Island.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I think it important at this point to read 
into the Record some of the statements that Strobe Talbott has made, 
because as the author he is best equipped to speak for himself. As he 
says here:

       To recognize that the Soviet threat has been exaggerated is 
     not to commit the sin of ``moral equivalence''; Western self-
     criticism about the phobias of the cold war does not imply a 
     neutral judgment about the Soviet system. Quite the contrary: 
     It is precisely because that system is such an abomination 
     against basic human aspirations, against human nature itself, 
     that much of what the West called ``Soviet power'' was 
     actually Soviet weakness, and the instruments of that power 
     could never have been all they were cracked up to be.
       For years there has been dissenting wisdom in the West. 
     Most notably George Kennan, the intellectual godfather of the 
     original concept of containment, has objected to the way it 
     was applied; he cautioned against demonizing the adversary, 
     overestimating enemy strength, overmilitarizing the Western 
     response.
       As early as 1947, Kennan suggested Soviet power ``bears 
     within it the seeds of its own decay'' and that the U.S.S.R. 
     might turn out to be ``one of the weakest and most pitiable 
     of national societies.''

  These words speak for themselves. We all know the dissolution, 
removal from the world stage of the evil empire, of the Soviet Union, 
the Communist system, was the result of two factors: One was the 
containment philosophy, originally promoted by President Harry Truman 
years ago, and the other was the evilness, immorality, and incompetence 
of the Communist system. One factor did not play more of a role than 
the other, but a combination of the two that finally brought that evil 
empire down.
  I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I join in that, but I ask unanimous consent 
that the time be charged on either side on this one.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk 
will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, what is the parliamentary situation?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. We are on the nomination of Strobe Talbott. 
Senator Pell controls the time, and Senator Helms controls the time.
  Mr. PELL. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from Vermont.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Vermont is recognized.
  Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished chairman of the 
Foreign Relations Committee.
  I rise to express my strong support for the President's nomination of 
Ambassador Strobe Talbott to be Deputy Secretary of State. I am 
concerned that we are seeing on this nomination partisanship running 
rampant for the sake of partisanship. We have seen nominees, including 
many Deputy Secretaries of State--certainly, I have in the 20 years I 
have been here--very well-qualified people, people who sometimes I have 
agreed with and sometimes I have not agreed with, who have gone through 
with virtual unanimity. The Senate does this with the realization that 
administrations are granted wide latitude in whom they pick for these 
positions, especially if they are well-qualified people. And Ambassador 
Talbott is certainly well qualified.
  It appears to me, though, that this is not a debate on qualifications 
or abilities but unfortunately one that has evolved more into 
partisanship for the sake of partisanship. I think that is unfortunate, 
and as one who has worked very hard in both Republican and Democratic 
administrations to bring about consensus in foreign policy, I urge my 
colleagues not to fall into this trap. It is not good for the Senate. 
It is not good for the country. It is certainly not good for our 
conduct of foreign policy.
  Over the last year, I have come to know Ambassador Talbott quite 
well. As the administration's chief strategist on relations with 
Russia, he worked closely with me and others in the Senate and House to 
shape and push through the U.S. package of aid to the New Independent 
States of the former Soviet Union.
  During that time, we put together a strong bipartisan coalition, and 
I saw Ambassador Talbott work very closely with Republicans and 
Democrats alike. I do not recall any of them suggesting there was 
anything partisan in his approach to the foreign policy of our Nation 
but, rather, he did it in the way we expect those at the highest level 
of the State Department. He sought a broad bipartisan consensus, 
because we are working as Americans for American foreign policy, not 
for any individual President or any individual Secretary of State, but 
as Americans for American foreign policy. I am sorry to see there are 
those who might feel otherwise.
  There is no greater United States foreign policy priority today than 
to help the chances for democracy and economic reform in Russia, 
possessor of many thousands of nuclear weapons capable of reaching the 
United States. We have to find a cooperative relationship with Russia. 
Just today's headlines alone point out the need to move away from the 
dangers and the threats, the spying and everything else from the cold 
war, into a new era.
  Now, concerns have been raised about Ambassador Talbott's previous 
writings in Time magazine and elsewhere on Israel. This is a decision 
we have to make as Americans in America's best interests. No Senator 
should tell another country whom they should or should not appoint. I 
would not expect anybody to come onto our shores and tell us whom we 
should appoint. As a friend of Israel, and as one who, incidentally, 
has carried through and led the debate on Israeli foreign aid in this 
Senate for the last several years, as one who has put together and 
helped pass the aid packages to Israel--and, in fact, as the chairman 
who has passed the largest aid packages to Israel--I have no doubt 
about Ambassador Talbott's acceptance of the foundation of United 
States policy toward Israel ever since its formation as a state--that a 
primary objective of the United States in the Middle East is the 
security of Israel.
  To that end, the United States has provided over $56 billion in 
economic and military assistance to Israel, and unstinting diplomatic 
and political support. Ambassador Talbott is part of an administration 
which has repeatedly, from the President on down, publicly and 
privately, reiterated its commitment to the security of Israel and to 
participation in the Middle East peace process. This administration, 
particularly Secretary of State Christopher, has worked very closely 
with Prime Minister Rabin in the effort to negotiate a just and lasting 
peace.
  I think it is a red herring to suggest this is a reason to turn him 
down.
  Mr. President, I have an article from the Philadelphia Inquirer of 
February 8 quoting the Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister as calling 
Ambassador Talbott ``a very good man.'' The Israeli Deputy Foreign 
Minister indicates that certain American Jewish groups that have 
criticized Ambassador Talbott's nomination do not speak for Israel. A 
number of major American Jewish organizations have voiced support for 
Ambassador Talbott's nomination. I ask unanimous consent that several 
articles and statements about those endorsements be included in the 
Record at the conclusion of my remarks.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. LEAHY. I also note that Ambassador Talbott was presented to the 
Foreign Relations Committee for his confirmation hearing by Senator 
Howard Metzenbaum. There is no more active or determined voice for a 
strong, close United States relationship with Israel than Howard 
Metzenbaum. If Senator Metzenbaum is prepared to endorse Ambassador 
Talbott, then I fail to understand why any friend of Israel would 
withhold their support for this nomination.
  Mr. President, President Clinton wishes to have Ambassador Talbott to 
serve as Deputy Secretary on his foreign policy team. There are 
extremely important events taking place around the globe which 
materially affect U.S. foreign policy. We need to get our foreign 
policy team in place to deal with those events. I realize there will be 
some ``no'' votes today in protest against some statements Ambassador 
Talbott wrote as a journalist many years ago. That is very unfortunate. 
The vote should be unanimous. But if it is not to be unanimous, let us 
make it overwhelming. I urge all Senators to vote to confirm Ambassador 
Strobe Talbott as Deputy Secretary of State.

                               Exhibit 1

             [From the Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 8, 1994]

                    Israeli Defends Clinton Nominee

                           (By Barry Schweid)

       Washington.--Defending Strobe Talbott as ``a very good 
     man.'' Israel's deputy foreign minister said yesterday that 
     Talbott's critical articles for Time magazine were no reason 
     to reject his nomination to be deputy secretary of state.
       Yossi Beilin, at a news conference, said that Talbott's 
     Jewish opponents in the United States do not speak for Israel 
     and that ``generally speaking, he is friendly to Israel.''
       Beilin also said, however, that not everything Talbott 
     wrote is ``my cup of tea.''
       Talbott, whose nomination will be taken up today by the 
     Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wrote critically at times 
     abut policies of Israel's former Likud government Beilin, an 
     architect of Israel's recognition of the Palestine Liberation 
     Organization, is prominent in the Labor Party, which now 
     governs the country.
       Last week, the Jewish Institute for National Security 
     Affairs said Talbott's views disqualified him from the No. 2 
     post at the State Department. Two other Jewish groups, the 
     Zionist Organization of America and the National Jewish 
     Coalition, distributed excerpts of his writings.
       The former Time magazine bureau chief and diplomatic 
     correspondent wrote in 1990, during the Persian Gulf war, 
     that Likud's claim to the West Bank had ``something in 
     common''with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.
       Talbott also said that then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's 
     assertion of a ``greater Israel'' was as ominous for peace in 
     the Middle East as Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's 
     ``militant nostalgia for Nebuchadnezzar's Babylonian 
     empire.''
       Beilin, referring to the Jewish groups, said, ``If there 
     are people who are criticizing the nomination, they are not 
     speaking in behalf of my government.''
       Beilin said his opinion was that Talbott ``is a very 
     important and a very good man. I don't see any reason to 
     reject his nomination.''
                                  ____


 American Jewish Congress Leaders Welcome Talbott's Statements to the 
                   Senate Foreign Relations Committee

       The following statement was issued by Robert K. Lifton, 
     president, and Henry Siegman, executive director, of the 
     American Jewish Congress, following the approval by the 
     Senate Foreign Relations Committee of Strobe Talbott for the 
     position of Deputy Secretary of State.
       ``We welcome Strobe Talbott's statements before the Senate 
     Foreign Relations Committee in which he distanced himself 
     from earlier writings on the subject of the relationship of 
     the United States and the State of Israel. His expressions of 
     unqualified commitment to that relationship, and his view 
     that ``a strong Israel is in America's interest'' are 
     reassuring. Equally reassuring has been his full support for 
     the Administration's peace efforts in the Middle East and his 
     complete identification with President Clinton and Secretary 
     of State Christopher's deep friendship for and support of the 
     State of Israel.
       ``In this connection, we categorically reject as totally 
     unfounded the charge by the Jewish War Veterans that the 
     Clinton Administration is changing its support of Israel and 
     ``moving in the direction that would endanger Israel's 
     security in the Middle East peace negotiations.'' It is a 
     reckless charge, and can only serve to damage U.S.-Israel 
     relations. Israel has never had greater support and more 
     understanding friends in Washington than it has in President 
     Clinton and in Secretary Christopher.''
                                  ____


    National Jewish Democratic Council Announces Support for Talbott

       Washington, DC.--The National Jewish Democratic Council 
     today announced its support for the nomination of Strobe 
     Talbott to the post of Deputy Secretary of State.
       ``The Jewish community is not being represented by the 
     actions and views of the groups now rushing to condemn 
     Talbott,'' said NJDC Chair Monte Friedkin, one of several 
     Jewish leaders who spoke with the nominee Friday in a 
     conference call designed to answer questions raised by the 
     attacks.
       ``I'm not suggesting that certain comments he made in the 
     past don't deserve review and explanation,'' Friedkin said. 
     ``But he supports foreign aid to Israel in its present form. 
     He understands and supports Israel's unique relationship with 
     the U.S. He endorses the position of the president, whose 
     support for Israel is equal to, if not superior to, that of 
     any previous administration.
       ``It is clear to me that Talbott is holding out a hand to 
     the Jewish community, demonstrating sensitivity to our 
     concerns and issues. We should accept that offer.''
                                  ____



                                      Americans for Peace Now,

                                 Washington, DC, February 4, 1994.
     Hon. Claiborne Pell,
     Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dirksen Senate 
         Office Building, Washington, DC.
       Dear Senator Pell: We are an American Zionist organization 
     with strong concerns for the peace and security of the State 
     of Israel. In that connection, we write to you in support of 
     the nomination of Ambassador Strobe Talbott to be Deputy 
     Secretary of State.
       We have spoken directly with Ambassador Talbott about his 
     views on the U.S.-Israeli relationship. In our discussion, he 
     vigorously affirmed his support for the Clinton 
     Administration's peace initiatives, its strong strategic 
     connection with Israel and its support of the ongoing foreign 
     assistance package for Israel. Ambassador Talbott assured us 
     of his commitment to maintaining Israel's qualitative 
     security edge, recognizing that it is surrounded by 
     traditional enemies. He had a firm understanding of the 
     unique nature of Israel's democratic role in the region.
       As uncompromising supporters of Israel, we are fully 
     assured that Ambassador Talbott is pro-Israel and pro-peace.
           Sincerely,
     Linda Heller Kamm,
     Richard Gunther,
       Co-Presidents.
                                  ____


        Americans for Peace Now Supports the Talbott Nomination

       In a letter to Senate Foreign Relations Committee chair 
     Senator Claiborne Pell, Richard Gunther and Linda Heller 
     Kamm, co-presidents of Americans for Peace Now endorsed the 
     nomination of Ambassador Strobe Talbott as Deputy Secretary 
     of State.
       In their letter they stated that:
       ``We are an American Zionist organization with strong 
     concerns for the peace and security of the State of Israel. 
     In that connection, we write to you in support of the 
     nomination of Ambassador Strobe Talbott to be Deputy 
     Secretary of State.
       ``We have spoken directly with Ambassador Talbott about his 
     views on the U.S.-Israeli relationship. In our discussion, he 
     vigorously affirmed his support for the Clinton 
     Administration's peace initiatives, its strong strategic 
     connection with Israel and its support of the ongoing foreign 
     assistance package for Israel. Ambassador Talbott assured us 
     of his commitment to maintaining Israel's qualitative 
     security edge, recognizing that it is surrounded by 
     traditional enemies. He had a firm understanding of the 
     unique nature of Israel's democratic role in the region.
       ``As uncompromising supporters of Israel, we are fully 
     assured that Ambassador Talbott is pro-Israel and pro-peace.

  Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Who yields time?
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I yield such time as he may need to the 
Senator from Ohio.
  Mr. METZENBAUM. I thank my friend from Rhode Island.
  Mr. President, I rise in support of the President's nomination of 
Strobe Talbott for the post of Deputy Secretary of State.
  This is the No. 2 post in the State Department. Under any 
circumstances, this is a nomination that deserves to be debated.
  The Senate would be shirking its duty if it were to give this 
nomination pro forma examination, and then approve it late at night by 
unanimous consent.
  Mr. President, there has been no lack of talk about Strobe Talbott's 
nomination. But I wonder how much of this talk has been the type of 
debate contemplated by the advice and consent clause of the 
Constitution. I wonder what this discussion has really been about.
  Mr. President, it seems that Strobe Talbott has the unfortunate 
distinction of being a convenient target for partisan mud-slinging. 
Frankly, I have heard much invective regarding this nomination. But I 
have heard very little debate.
  Mr. President, there have been all sorts of charges thrown at Strobe 
Talbott.
  If we took his accusers at their word, we could neatly sum up Strobe 
Talbott as a rabid anti-Semite, and indiscriminate Israel-basher, a 
diplomatic nincompoop, and managerial moron. And with respect to 
Russia, we could label him as little more than a Boris Yeltsin groupie.
  This is all very nice talk. But it has not contributed much to the 
debate that the Senate should be conducting.
  Mr. President, for sure there has been a lot of talk. But let us look 
at the facts.
  On the former Soviet Union, Strobe Talbott has been accused of making 
United States policy totally dependent on the success of Boris Yeltsin. 
We all know that in the recent Russian election, Yeltsin received a 
political cold shoulder. So now people tag Strobe Talbott with losing 
Russia.
  Mr. President, this allegation assumes as fact a number of fantasies.
  First, Russia is not lost; second, neither is United States policy on 
Russia lost.
  Among other things, Russia recently adopted a new democratic 
Constitution. Furthermore, Russia, Ukraine, and the United States 
recently reached an agreement on removal of Ukrainian nuclear weapons.
  Moreover, the very Russian election which the Talbott critics use to 
paint him as naive, was the first open, multi-party election in 
Russia--in over 70 years.
  Mr. President, I wonder how Talbott's critics would have supported 
reform in Russia without supporting Boris Yeltsin? The fact of the 
matter is that it was simply impossible for the United States to back a 
generic policy of reform, without backing the key leader of reform.
  There was no reason named reform standing atop a tank, defying Soviet 
Communist coup plotters--it was Boris Yeltsin.
  This magical person named ``reform'' has not been at the political 
barricades, confronting old-line Communists and new-age Fascists at 
every turn.
  The person who has been there is Boris Yeltsin.
  Mr. President, I think that debating whether we backed Yeltsin too 
strongly or too weakly is a debate on the margins: it is a distinction 
without difference.
  The fact is that there was no one else to support who was so well 
known to the Russian people, and whose face and voice stood so clearly 
for the forces of reform in Russia.
  Mr. President, I do not know every word that Strobe Talbott uttered 
with respect to Boris Yeltsin.
  I do not know if he was 100 percent correct on every fact; 100 
percent perceptive in every opinion; 100 percent prescient on every 
prediction.
  I do know that he is able to offer his views in 100 percent fluent 
Russian, which is more than can be said of many key United State 
diplomats working in that arena.
  Mr. President, I am frank to say that when it comes to being a 100 
percent ace-in-the-hole every day of the week, I just do not care.
  Absolute perfection is not the standard that this Senator demands 
from any nominee of any President.
  If Strobe Talbott's critics want to condemn him for giving advice 
which was far from unreasonable, on a cause that is far from lost, they 
can go right ahead.
  I just do not care to play that game.
  Intellect, judgment, stamina, and a proven ability to articulate U.S. 
policy and defend that policy are what I look for in a nominee.
  And all of those qualities are abundantly present in this nominee.
  Mr. President, I do believe that Strobe Talbott is a superb candidate 
for this job.
  Yet, it is my sad duty to confirm for Talbott's critics the 
regrettable fact that * * * Strobe Talbott does not walk on water.
  Mr. President, another area of controversy has been Talbott's views 
on the Middle East and on Israel. Frankly, he has written some articles 
I wish he had not written, some of which I have strong disagreements 
with. However, I would respectfully remind my colleagues that this 
Senator is not in the habit of supporting anyone who does not view 
Israel as an asset to, and ally of, the United States.
  I have read what Talbott has written on the Middle East.
  I have read those columns, some dating back 3 years, and some dating 
back 13 years.
  I have read all of those columns, not merely the cut-and-paste jobs 
being circulated around Washington lately.
  Mr. President, I have read Talbott's writings on the Middle East, and 
I have spoken with him on the Middle East. If I felt that Strobe 
Talbott would be hurtful to the security of Israel, I would be on this 
floor leading the charge against his nomination.
  While I am frank to say that I would not have chosen some of the 
words Talbott chose, I can state that I am satisfied, that Strobe 
Talbott will be a vigorous, determined advocate for a strong United 
States-Israel relationship.
  Let there be no mistake: It is my unequivocal belief that Strobe 
Talbott is now, and will be in the future, as solid a supporter of 
United States-Israel relations as anyone in the Clinton administration. 
He will reflect the views of the President, a president who is openly 
and unabashedly supportive of the long-time close relationship between 
our country and Israel.
  Mr. President, I have one more comment with respect to Strobe 
Talbott's alleged anti-Israel position.
  It has been said by some that the Jewish community opposes Strobe 
Talbott's nomination. This is pure, undiluted fantasy. It is sheer 
fiction.
  The Jewish community, like so many other segments of our Nation, does 
not speak with a single voice.
  Mr. President, the fact is that there are two, possibly three, 
organizations within the Jewish community which have mounted a campaign 
against Talbott's nomination.
  By fax and by phone, they are attempting to create the impression 
that American Jews, who obviously care deeply about the Middle East, 
collectively oppose Strobe Talbott's elevation to the position of 
Deputy Secretary.
  Mr. President, these organizations are among the few within the 
Jewish community which have been identified, implicitly or explicitly, 
with partisan political causes.
  I have no quarrel with the right of any organization to affiliate 
itself with any political position.
  I do quarrel, however, when such an organization creates the 
impression that it represents something, or someone, for whom it has no 
right to speak.
  The fact of the matter is that mainstream organizations within the 
Jewish community have expressed satisfaction with Strobe Talbott's 
views on the Middle East.
  If any organizations can be said to represent the majority of 
American Jews, it is those organizations that have indicated their 
satisfaction. A number of groups have even endorsed him outright.
  So let us put to rest once and for all any suggestion that there is 
some kind of Jewish community campaign against Strobe Talbott. There is 
a campaign all right--but it is not by the Jewish community.
  It is by a small group of conservative Americans and the 
organizations to which they belong who happen to be Jewish.
  Mr. President, I will conclude by repeating my concern about the 
Senate's debate on Strobe Talbott:
  It seems to me that some Senators are using debate on this nomination 
as a smokescreen to throw partisan mud.
  What is really going on here? Is there really concern about Strobe 
Talbott's policy positions? Or is this an attempt to get some partisan 
payback?
  Rather than being the subject of serious study and debate, the 
nomination of Strobe Talbott is being put through the political 
wringer.
  Mr. President, we have had all to much talk, and far too little 
debate. I believe that a vast majority of Senators have seen through 
the partisan smokescreen.
  I believe that they have studied Strobe Talbott's record, and know 
how truly well-suited he is for this job.
  Mr. President, let us cut out the talk. Let us confirm this talented 
man for this tough job. Let us allow him to finally turn his energies 
to the real work ahead.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield the remainder of my time to the 
distinguished Senator from Alaska.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Alaska has 7 minutes.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I thank the Chair.
  Mr. President, I rise to express my concerns about the nomination of 
Strobe Talbott to be Deputy Secretary of State.
  I think, Mr. President, that we have here in Mr. Talbott a gentleman 
who is ultimately a high risk for our President, and I am inclined to 
believe that he is basically the wrong man for the job.
  Many nominees, as we know, grow into their jobs. Based on everything 
I have read about this nominee, however, I think this job is simply 
beyond his brief.
  In this new position, Talbott is but a heartbeat away from being the 
Secretary of State and, very frankly, that gives the Senator from 
Alaska heartburn.
  First and foremost, I am concerned about Mr. Talbott's policy toward 
Russia. Some of his comments make me wonder whether he gets his 
influence from Boris Yeltsin or Bill Clinton.
  As a Senator from a State that is near to Russia, nearer than any 
other State, I pay particular attention to the ambitions of Russia. 
Based on his numerous comments, I am not sure that Talbott is equally 
concerned about Russia's ambitions. Writing about Gorbachev in 1990, 
Talbott wrote of a ``new consensus'' which he saw emerging; ``That the 
Soviet threat is not what it used to be. The real point, however, is 
that it never was. The doves in the Great Debate over the past 40 years 
were right all along.''
  Well, Mr. President, I do not believe the doves were right all along. 
I surely hope we do not base our current policy toward Russia on the 
assumption that the Russians have made a complete turn toward freedom 
and free markets, because the facts prove that she has not.
  The strong showing of Russian nationalist Zhirinovsky shows that an 
ultra-nationalist message is popular in Russia today. I might remind my 
colleagues that Zhirinovsky suggested that Russia take back Alaska, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland.
  Even more frightening is that since the election Boris Yeltsin's 
party has sounded more and more like Zhirinovsky. Mr. President, 
Russian foreign policy and military doctrines call for the ``use of 
force to protect Russian speakers outside the current boundaries should 
Moscow perceive their rights to be threatened.'' On the economic front, 
economic reformers in Yeltsin's Cabinet have been replaced by Communist 
hardliners.
  And what does Strobe Talbott have to say about these disturbing 
trends? He has called for ``less shock and more therapy.'' As many 
Russian experts have observed, this comment displayed extreme ignorance 
about the nature of economic reform and handed reactionary forces in 
Russia a propaganda coup.
  Alaska, my State, is full of many entrepreneurs who are very anxious 
to do business in Russia, and the activities of these businessmen will 
be helpful in Russia's transformation to a free market. But if there is 
one thing all these business people tell me, it is that for economic 
reform to succeed, Russia must escape the yoke of Moscow's bureaucrats: 
those that have simply changed their Communist hat for a reformer's 
hat.
  Unfortunately, Strobe Talbott seems to think the world revolves 
around Moscow and he seems reluctant to support initiatives that may 
ruffle Moscow's feathers. This fear of ruffling the feathers of the 
Moscovites seems to be a constant character trait of Talbott, and one 
that I do not want to see at the number two spot down at State.
  Finally, Mr. President, I am concerned Talbott's Russia-centric 
policy views have led him to ignore a significant part of the world, 
particularly in Asia. His answers to questions of members of the 
Foreign Relations Committee, on which I serve, leads one to wonder 
whether he knows, or to what extent he really cares, about the Asian 
region. At such a critical time in our relations with China and North 
Korea, such lack of experience is not comforting.
  My colleagues have commented extensively on Mr. Talbott's troublesome 
views on the Middle East, and I do not intend to comment further on 
those. But I simply feel that those views represent a troubling trend 
of how he views the world as a whole.
  For these reasons, Mr. President, I plan to vote against this 
nominee.
  I yield the remaining time back to the Senator from North Carolina.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time?
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I yield 3 minutes to the Senator from New 
Jersey [Mr. Bradley].
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New Jersey is recognized.
  Mr. BRADLEY. Mr. President, I rise today in support of the nomination 
of Strobe Talbott to be Deputy Secretary of State.
  In thinking about the nominations that come before the Senate for 
advice and consent, I try to evaluate the nominee against three simple 
criteria. First, can the nominee work well with his or her new 
colleagues? That is usually an easy call, and something I do not need 
to deal with further today. The President and Secretary of State want 
Strobe Talbott to be Deputy Secretary of State. Enough said.
  The second criterion is whether the nominee has the background, 
skills, and intellectual capacity to handle the responsibilities of the 
new position. Again, there is no question about Strobe Talbott's 
abilities. Everything he has touched has turned to gold. After 
compiling a brilliant academic record, he had a distinguished career as 
a journalist and author. For the past year, Talbott has structured the 
administration's policy toward Russia and the other former Soviet 
Republics. While we may not always agree on the specifics of policy, it 
is clear that Strobe Talbott has demonstrated his ability to make the 
Government work in his area of responsibility.
  The third, and last, criterion is what I call the ``sanity test.'' 
That is, are the nominee's ideas sound. This is a substantive, not a 
political criterion. It is not based on whether I agree with the 
nominees ideas. Rather, it is whether the ideas are sufficiently in the 
mainstream of American political thought. For example, I would vote 
against even a competent extremist.
  Here, too, Strobe Talbott passes muster. I have already mentioned his 
stewardship of the NIS account. No one seriously questions his 
nomination on these grounds.
  However, concerns have been expressed about Strobe Talbott's ideas 
about United States relations with Israel. I have seen the excerpts 
from his Time magazine columns, and I have looked at his testimony 
before the Foreign Relations Committee. While I cannot condone all his 
remarks or, indeed, any administration activity that would imply a 
weakening of the United States commitment to Israel, I simply do not 
believe, based on the evidence, that Strobe Talbott would do anything 
except work competently in support of the administration's policy. 
This, I might add, is a policy of strong support for Israel and for the 
political peace process that can ensure Israel's security.
  Columnists write provocative pieces. They question accepted ideas. 
That is their function. That is what they get paid for. But I have no 
reason to doubt Strobe Talbott's assertions before the Foreign 
Relations Committee that he believes that a strong Israel is in 
America's interests.
  In my book, then, Strobe Talbott is a 3 for 3. He is wanted, he is 
capable, and he is mainstream. We in the U.S. Senate should today 
confirm him as Deputy Secretary of State.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Kohl). Who yields time?
  Mr. PELL. I yield 5 minutes to the Senator from New York [Mr. 
Moynihan].
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York is recognized for 5 
minutes.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. President, I, too, rise in support of the 
nomination of Strobe Talbott to be Deputy Secretary of State. I would 
like to emphasize just one aspect of his work, which is a little bit 
apart from the comment of my distinguished friend from New Jersey about 
his being mainstream; and that is to just record the consistency with 
which he observed the weakness of the Soviet economy and the Soviet 
political system at a time when many saw it as an imminent threat to 
the whole world, not least to the United States.
  We, of my generation in all events, will remember him. He first came 
to the attention of the Nation when he appeared as the translator of 
that extraordinary book, ``Khrushchev Remembers,'' which Time magazine 
was able to publish in 1970, the first insight we had into the world of 
the Kremlin. It was altogether unprecedented, smuggled out of the 
Soviet Union by various devices. I can recall Andrew Heiskell 
describing on an occasion the ways in which they had used voice 
profiles to establish, that the tapes were indeed recordings of 
Khrushchev. And young Talbott, with great clarity, did the translation. 
For the first time we got a sense of the degree to which the Soviet 
Union was badly governed and facing decline. Withal, we did not 
necessarily learn all we could have at the time.
  But in 1981, Talbott wrote, in Time magazine, on the state of the 
Soviet economy. He put it thus. He said:

       Legitimate American worries about Soviet military might and 
     Soviet aggressiveness tend to obscure the reality that the 
     U.S.S.R. has major problems of its own. It has a rigid, 
     inefficient economic system that simply does not work and a 
     sclerotic, unimaginative leadership tied to an ideology that 
     carries neither resonance nor conviction.

  If only someone at the Central Intelligence Agency had read that 
paragraph and comprehended it. This was at a time when they estimated 
that the great Soviet Union was growing at a rate twice that of the 
United States; higher than the whole European union. By 1987 our 
intelligence community estimated that the East German per capita gross 
domestic product was higher than the West German--2 years before the 
wall came down; a fantasy persisted in our Government, oblivious to a 
clarifying comment from an informed journalist.
  In that same article he wrote that ``The economic ills of the 
satellites are not just chronic, they are degenerative and could be 
terminal,'' including East Germany, which we assumed to be a wealthier 
state than the Federal Republic of Germany. Any taxi driver in Berlin 
might have told you that was not so, but in Washington, only Strobe 
Talbott and a few others were doing so.
  In Time magazine, on April 18, 1983, Mr. Talbott continued to warn 
that the Soviet economic situation would prove ruinous, characterizing 
the Soviet economy as being in a state of ``permanent, 
institutionalized crisis.''
  ``Permanent, institutionalized crisis,'' at the time we were thinking 
we might have to stand them off at Arlington, TX. If you recall, Mr. 
President, in that same article he wrote:

       One limit on the Soviet acquisition of raw power has been 
     internal. The military-industrial complex of the U.S.S.R. 
     (which is far more pervasive than anything Dwight Eisenhower 
     warned against in the U.S.) is made up of what the Soviets 
     themselves call ``metal eaters,'' which devour resources that 
     might otherwise feed the anemic, crippled economy.

  Mr. President, if I am running out of time, perhaps I might ask for 
another 2 minutes from my distinguished chairman?
  Mr. PELL. Absolutely.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. Thank you.
  In that same article he went on to criticize President Reagan for 
failing to understand the significance of the Soviet's economic plight. 
He said:

       Reagan has frequently stressed the intramural weakness in 
     the Soviet empire. Yet, strangely, he has not factored those 
     weaknesses into his calculation of Soviet strength.

  In Time magazine on September 25, 1989, Mr. Talbott wrote that ``The 
Soviet economy, all but bankrupt when Gorbachev came into office nearly 
5 years ago, has actually deteriorated.'' He was right onto the trend.
  In Time magazine's ``Man of the Decade'' edition on January 1, 1990, 
Strobe Talbott continued to write about the decaying Soviet economy and 
the West's misrepresentation of it.
  I close with this passage:

       Gorbachev is admitting that much of what has been perceived 
     by the outside world as his country's collective 
     ``discipline'' is actually an ossifying, demoralizing, 
     brutalizing system of institutionalized inefficiency. Yet in 
     the West, the era of stagnation was seen as one of Soviet 
     ascendancy--even, in some key and dangerous respects, of 
     Soviet supremacy.

  Mr. President, a man with such a clear record of contrarian views, 
many of which have proved accurate in the end on the central issue of 
American diplomacy surely deserves our confidence. I cannot doubt he 
will be confirmed by the Senate this afternoon under the able and 
determined leadership of the chairman of our Committee on Foreign 
Relations, Claiborne Pell.
  I thank the chairman for his indulgence and I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Rhode 
Island.
  Mr. PELL. I thank the Senator from New York for his kind remarks. I 
congratulate him, too, on his prescience in evaluating the long-term 
viability of the Soviet system. He, and others, including George 
Kennan, saw that the Soviet system was so antinatural, so incapable of 
satisfying human needs that it eventually would rot away.
  Added to the system's internal rot were also the effects of the U.S. 
policy of containment, first promulgated by President Truman in the 
late 1940's. The combination of those two factors certainly was 
certainly a critical factor in the downfall of the Soviet system. Some 
of us believe one factor is more responsible for this, some believe the 
other. But it is certainly a combination of the two. And Senator 
Moynihan was one of those who early noticed and made public reference 
to the internal contradictions in the system.
  Mr. MOYNIHAN. I thank you, sir.
  Mr. PELL. Thank you.
  I would like to read some words from Strobe Talbott that are in the 
Time magazine of January 4, 1982:

         
       The quest for security can be aggressive, especially when 
     it involves the hot pursuit of some enemies, the pre-emption 
     of others, subjugation or subversion of still others. In a 
     world full of dangers--real, imagined or exaggerated--the 
     Soviet leadership would prefer to protect its gains with 
     minimum risk of war by means of diplomacy, intimidation, 
     propaganda, covert action, or the use of proxies. If 
     necessary, though, it will resort to direct military 
     intervention to ensure the survival of the Soviet system 
     including in those countries where the system has been 
     imposed by outright conquest--such as Hungary, Czechoslovakia 
     and possibly next, Poland. On Christmas Day two years ago, 
     the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan to prop up a faltering 
     Marxist regime and has been there ever since.
       Even when Soviet force is not on the move, the existence of 
     so gargantuan a military machine threatens other states. It 
     emboldens zealots within the Politburo who might be tempted 
     to use this prowess, as well as pro-Soviet forces abroad who 
     might hope that Moscow's leaders will aid or rescue their own 
     bids for power.
       Communism is serious competition for other social and 
     economic systems in large measure because it is backed up by 
     the threat of Soviet force.

  I think these remarks show that Strobe Talbott was very conscious of 
the Soviet threat and the use of force in January 1982.
  I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, notwithstanding the time situation, I ask 
unanimous consent it be in order for the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. 
Lott] to have 5 minutes.
  Mr. PELL. Under whose time is he speaking?
  Mr. HELMS. It would have to be on not your time or my time, it will 
be just 5 minutes for the Senator from Mississippi to have a chance, 
since nobody is here speaking.
  Mr. PELL. I rather he did it under my time.
  Mr. HELMS. Very well. All right.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Mississippi.
  Mr. LOTT. Mr. President, I thank the distinguished Senator from Rhode 
Island for that courtesy. I will stick to my time.
  I would like at this time to rise in opposition to the nomination of 
Strobe Talbott, Ambassador-at-Large to the former Soviet Republics, to 
be Deputy Secretary of State.
  Statecraft is not just arms and armies. Wisdom and foresight are also 
essential elements in foreign policy. Mr. Talbott in his writings and 
public statements has not shown wisdom or foresight. Never have clearer 
minds and sharper eyes been needed than now in this time of 
international turmoil and uncertainty.
  This Nation needs and deserves better than this nominee whose foreign 
policy prowess is dubious and whose experience as a manager is almost 
nonexistent, as far as I can tell.
  With the end of the cold war, America and her ideals should be 
triumphant. The international sphere has never been a Garden of Eden, 
but America, sure in its resolve and rightness, and steeled by its 
victory over communism, should now have a sturdier hand and influence 
in the world.
  Yet we are floundering. Part of the problem is that this 
administration is unsure of our country's rightness. Thus, you have 
this multilateralism fetish. The United States has been carrying water 
for the United Nations because we are not willing to play the 
quarterback ourselves. We have threatened force and not used it. We 
have promised intervention, then we have cowered. We have been blind 
sided by events in the world. There is the danger that our allies and, 
even worse, our enemies think our resolve is only bluster and that we 
are weak and we are blind.
  The administration needs strong foreign policy wisdom. Any 
administration does. It is not just this one. Mr. Talbott, though, does 
not have it. He has written and has spoken against the policies that 
won the cold war. He harshly criticized Israel and the special 
relationship we have with that strategic nation. Also, he has in his 
current position maybe even jeopardized or at least caused some problem 
with reform in Russia.
  Mr. Talbott was soft on the former Soviet Union, touting its 
legitimacy while denigrating this Nation's legitimacy. In a May 21, 
1984 article in Time magazine, he criticized the Reagan 
administration's policy of peace through strength. In that article, Mr. 
Talbott wrote:

       The Reagan administration has made a bad situation worse in 
     two ways: First, by convincing the Soviet leaders that the 
     U.S. no longer accepts military parity as the basis for 
     relations with Moscow; second, by challenging the legitimacy 
     of the Soviet regime, calling the U.S.S.R. an ``evil empire'' 
     doomed to fail.

  Obviously, President Reagan was right and Strobe Talbott was not 
right in those enunciations. The United States was in the cold war to 
win, yet Mr. Talbott seemed to advocate a stalemate.
  Further, the Soviet Union was an illegitimate regime and was an evil 
empire. Yet, Mr. Talbott took the former Soviet Union to be legitimate 
and morally equivalent to our own system, which it was not.
  The Soviet Union was doomed to fail and people who Mr. Talbott 
criticized in his columns, like former President Reagan, saw this. Mr. 
Talbott, though, did not have the wisdom or the foresight to see the 
inevitable. Do we want a man like this in charge of our foreign policy? 
I doubt it. In a January 1990 column in Time magazine, Mr. Talbott 
wrote:

       A new consensus is emerging that the Soviet threat is not 
     what it used to be. The real point, however, is that it never 
     was. The doves in the great debate of the past 40 years was 
     right after all * * *.

  I do not accept that, and I think there are a lot of questions about 
whether that is a correct statement.
  The problem with the statement though is the doves during the dark 
days of the cold war wanted us to give up and unilaterally disarm. This 
country stood its ground and won. For Mr. Talbott to praise those who 
would have cost us victory is misjudgment in the least, plain blindness 
at the most.
  Let me point out here that it is not just about fighting the cold war 
or partisanship. This is about the eagle-eye view and the true judgment 
that our foreign policy leaders must have, certainly should have. 
Though I point out what Mr. Talbott has said and written in the past, I 
feel that these things from the past play a role here and now and tell 
us a lot about his judgment.
  He has been exceptionally a harsh critic of Israel. Maybe it was 10 
years ago. That is not that long ago--in the early 1980's. For 
instance, in an article of September 7, 1981 in Time magazine, Mr. 
Talbott wrote:

       The sad fact is that Israel is well on its way to becoming 
     not just a dubious asset but an outright liability to 
     American security interest, both in the Middle East and the 
     world.

  This was written after the Israeli Air Force had bombed a nuclear 
facility in Iraq. We are very fortunate today,  especially after Desert 
Storm, that Iraq does not have nuclear weapons capability. We can thank 
the Israelis for that. Yet, Mr. Talbott saw Israel as a liability. 
Foreign policy is not just about knowing your enemy, it is about 
knowing your friends and, in this case, Mr. Talbott did not seem to 
know that.

  He also called for conditioning aid to Israel on Israel's willingness 
to engage in negotiations with its avowed enemies. There is a hostility 
in his writings about Israel in particular and in other areas that 
brings into question whether he will continue to foster a good 
relationship with a very important ally. I think there is enough 
evidence to say that Mr. Talbott will promote policies which will harm 
that relationship or at least based on his earlier statements and 
writings one can come to that conclusion.
  Recently, reformers in Russia accused Ambassador Talbott of stabbing 
them in the back for criticizing President Yeltsin's economic reforms 
after former Communist leaders gained electoral control in the Russian 
legislature. This event required the United States to bolster those 
proreform forces, but Mr. Talbott disparaged those forces. This area of 
the world is very sensitive and I hope that we will not make that kind 
of mistake again.
  I have mentioned just a few things that Mr. Talbott has written. 
There is much more we could say. I just feel like he is the wrong 
person at this time for this particular position, Deputy Secretary of 
State. He is one step away from being the Secretary of State. He does 
not have the management experience he needs for the job and his 
writings certainly bring into question his judgment. I urge my 
colleagues today to vote against this nominee.
  I thank the Senator again, the chairman of the committee, for 
yielding me that time. I yield the floor at this time.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the 
Senator from Ohio be recognized to speak as in morning business but 
that the time relating thereto be charged against the Senator from 
Rhode Island.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

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