[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 15 (Tuesday, February 22, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: February 22, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
NOMINATION OF STROBE TALBOTT TO BE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
The Senate continued with the nomination.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I should like to read into the Record a
couple of sentences here that show Strobe Talbott's feelings about
Israel. He says:
The wisdom of the United States original sponsorship of
Israel has been vindicated many times in many ways, by the
sturdiness and vitality of Israeli democracy as well as by
the richness of Israeli artistic and intellectual life. As a
culture, a society and a polity--as hospitable if sometimes
overheated environment for the thriving of Western values--
Israel has been a credit to itself and to its American
benefactors.
In reading some of the material that we have all had a chance to look
at these past days, one finds real sympathy, empathy for Israel, and it
certainly denies the canard that there are any anti-Semitic feelings in
Mr. Talbott.
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, the nominee being considered by the Senate
is a man of great intellect and significant accomplishment. From his
selection as a young man to be a Rhodes scholar to his debut as a young
scholar translating Khrushchev's memoirs to his well-sourced books on
arms control and the Reagan administration, Mr. Talbott has been an
overachiever.
At the same time, we have heard today a number of questions raised
about the views that Mr. Talbott has expressed over the years
concerning the Soviet Union, Israel, and other matters.
I want to join my colleagues in expressing concern about many of the
statements Mr. Talbott has made, in writing. While Mr. Talbott's
advocates argue that some of his most egregious statements were made
more than a decade ago and he has since matured in his understanding
and views, many of these writings are quite recent.
In the fall of 1990, as Saddam Hussein sought to link any effort to
reverse his invasion of Kuwait with efforts to resolve the fate of the
Israeli occupied territories, Mr. Talbott compared Israel's policies
with those of Saddam, writing that ``Israel's policy today does indeed
have something in common with Iraq's.''
In 1991, he compared the United States-led international effort to
expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait with Russian troops' attacks in
Lithuania. ``There was a bizarre similarity,'' Mr. Talbott wrote,
``between what Gorbachev and Bush felt compelled to do last week. Each
was resorting to the use of force in the name of law and order.''
The only thing bizarre was that Mr. Talbott's ``felt compelled to''
compare rather than contrast these decidedly different events, which
were expressions of totally contradictory concepts of law and order.
One could just as well compare President Eisenhower's sending troops to
Little Rock to protect schoolchildren to Bull Connors' sending his
troopers to assault civil rights marchers in Birmingham--each was
resorting to the use of force in the name of law and order.
According to Henry Kissinger, writing in a recent article in the
Washington Post, Mr. Talbott and the Clinton administration have
``elevated the radical critique of cold war policies into the
operational premises of contemporary American foreign policy.''
``For nearly half a century,'' Kissinger writes, ``that critique had
maintained that Soviet policies were as much caused by American
policies as by Communist ideology; that the Soviet government was
divided, just as the American government was, between hawks and doves;
that it was the task of American diplomacy to ease Soviet fears, many
of which were quite legitimate.'' This critique was rehashed, Dr.
Kissinger notes, in Mr. Talbott's article in the 1990 Time magazine
issue naming the Soviet Union's last Communist leader, Mikhail
Gorbachev, as Man of the Decade.
In that article, Mr. Talbott stated that there was a growing
consensus not only that the Soviet threat was diminished from what it
had been in the past, but also that it had never been so great in the
first place.
In fact, the information that has come to light in recent years leads
to exactly the opposite conclusion, namely that the Soviet Union was
far better prepared for war than we estimated and very serious about
waging war in Western Europe. To cite a few examples:
In East Germany, the Soviets had stocked occupation currency and
Cyrillic road signs for Western European cities.
Their stocks of ammunition and other war material in the GDR were
much larger than we had estimated.
They had climate-controlled tank shelters in the GDR so that armored
equipment would be ready to go to war on a few hours notice, rather
than the days or weeks we estimated.
They had operational maneuver groups for rapid, deep penetration of
Western Europe and encirclement of NATO troops. When U.S. Government
analysts warned of such units in the 1980's, liberal Western analysts
dismissed this as baseless paranoia.
Their nuclear arsenal, according to the Russian Minister of Atomic
Energy, was some 45,000 weapons, far higher than publicly estimated by
anyone in the West save for Caspar Weinberger.
Contrary to Mr. Talbott's contention that it was the doves who were
right during the cold war, it was Ronald Reagan who campaigned on the
platform that Russia was on the edge of fiscal crisis and could not
afford to engage us in an arms race.
While Mr. Talbott may have changed his views on Israel, as he
announced during his confirmation hearings, it appears that he has not
altered his views toward Moscow.
At a hearing last October before the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
Chairman Hamilton questioned Mr. Talbott about ``Russia's move to
reassert its influence and power in the various regions of the former
Soviet Union.'' In a remarkable response, Mr. Talbott stated that ``We
are not yet prepared to characterize the situation in precisely those
terms, Mr. Chairman. I would put it like this: There is unquestionably
a good deal of disorder, tension, conflict, ethnic conflict and
otherwise, around the periphery of the old U.S.S.R.''
This neutral statement, like Mr. Talbott's statement that Gorbachev
``felt compelled'' to use military force to attack Lithuanians, may be
the epitome of diplomacy to some. But, besides being free of judgment
and values, they also are devoid of factual context as they also
contradict the undeniable fact that, as Chairman Hamilton stated,
Russia has moved to reassert its influence and power in the former
Soviet Union.
After receiving this response from Mr. Talbott, Chairman Hamilton
began to sharply question him about specific cases of Russian military
intervention in its neighbors, beginning with Georgia. Mr. Talbott
testified that ``while there were problems from time to time, we did
not, at any point, feel that those problems were part of a pattern
suggesting that the Moscow leadership itself was conducting a
mischievous foreign policy toward Georgia.'' ``It was,'' he said, ``a
mixed picture and very complicated.''
This was less than 2 weeks after Moscow had manipulated the situation
in Georgia, first fighting on the side of a rebellious Province of
Georgia and then offering to come to the rescue of the Georgian
Government, but only for a price. The price was for Georgia to join the
Commonwealth of Independent States, one of the principle mechanisms by
which Moscow is reasserting its influence and power in the other
Republics of the former Soviet Union.
Even more disturbing than his testimony is the fact that it has been
translated into the administration's policy. During the Moscow summit
last month, President Clinton compared Russian military intervention in
the so-called near abroad to United States operations in Panama and
Grenada and other places near our area. The President specifically
cited Russian intervention in Georgia as stabilizing.
One columnist has termed this policy the Clinton doctrine, but it
could more accurately be described as the Talbott doctrine. And clearly
in response to the President's enunciation of this Talbott doctrine,
shortly after the summit, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev affirmed
Russia's intent to reestablish a ``sphere of Russian interest.'' ``We
should not fear the words,'' he declared, although Russia's neighbors
might have another view.
Concerned by the administration's failure to speak out against
Russian intervention in the other States of the former Soviet Union,
last fall Congress adopted an amendment conditioning continued aid to
Russia on its respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of
its neighbors. In its December 1993 report justifying continuation of
aid despite these statutory conditions, the State Department argued
that the situation was complex and that it was not possible to draw
conclusions. As special adviser to the Secretary of State for the New
Independent States, Mr. Talbott presumably had a major hand in this
report, which mirrors his October testimony.
I would merely point out that this State Department report is at odds
with more than one intelligence community report which did draw
conclusions. This is not to say that aid should necessarily have been
cut off. But it does raise questions about the State Department and the
administration's policy on these matters and about those who crafted
those policies.
Republicans, I would point out, are not the only ones questioning Mr.
Talbott's policies. Democratic Senators have questioned the coherence
and management of our aid programs to the former Soviet Union, for
which Mr. Talbott has been responsible.
And even more telling, Mr. Talbott's policies have been attacked by
Russian reformers, the very people who were supposed to be the
beneficiaries of America's Russian policy. Referring to the terribly
damaging effect that resulted from Mr. Talbott's infamous remark last
December that Russia needed ``less shock and more therapy,'' Russian
Finance Minister Boris Fyodorov declared that Russian reformers had
been ``stabbed in the back'' by Mr. Talbott.
During its consideration of the State Department authorization bill
last month, the Senate adopted several amendments to address
administration policy mistakes in which Mr. Talbott has been involved,
including the issues of NATO expansion and Russian military
intervention in its neighbors. We can continue to pass legislation in
an effort to ameliorate mistaken administration policies. Or we can
take actions to dissuade the administration from adopting such mistaken
policies in the first place.
The later course obviously makes more sense, and defeating this
nomination would be a step toward that end.
While I have generally given Presidents great deference in making
appointments to their administrations, Mr. Talbott's nomination is far
from a routine case. I believe that the policies crafted by Mr. Talbott
in his position as ambassador at large have had the consequence of
weakening Russian reformers, encouraging Russians with imperial
ambitions, and shaking our friends in East-Central Europe.
Ordinarily, I offer great deference to Presidential nominees. My vote
should not be construed to mean that Mr. Talbott lacks the
qualifications to serve in this high post. It is, rather, a protest
over the policies that have been developed and pursued.
In this case, the vote may only be symbolic, but it is one I
nevertheless believe should be cast.
Mr. President I ask unanimous consent that several articles be
printed in the Record related to some of the matters I have discussed.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
[From the Wall Street Journal, Jan. 26, 1994]
Toward the Brezhnev Doctrine
(By Paul A. Goble)
Today much attention will be focused on last night's State
of the Union message, with emphasis no doubt falling on
domestic issues--President Clinton's favorites. But the
president's foreign agenda should not be forgotten. His
concessions to Russian sensibilities at his meetings in
Brussels and Moscow earlier this month threaten to strengthen
rather than reduce the division of Europe and to lead to a
regime in Russia that could ignite a new cold war.
In past weeks, the president has done destructive work. By
refusing to extend NATO membership east, out of concern that
it would undermine Boris Yeltsin. Mr. Clinton has in fact
signaled that there are still two Europes, not one. And by
acquiescing to Russian demands that Moscow be allowed to
intervene militarily in the former Soviet republics in the
guise of ``peacekeeping,'' he has set in motion pressures
that will preclude stability in the region and the
establishment of Russian democracy, and he has set the stage
for renewed Russian-American competition.
If the first of these actions has been much discussed, the
second--especially its implications for Russia's neighbors,
for Russia itself and for us--has been largely ignored. But,
in fact, it is likely to have even more fateful implications.
Of course, no one would dispute that Russia has legitimate
interests in these countries that should be taken into
account. But we should not concede to Russia a right to
behave toward its neighbors in ways that we would not allow
any other country to get away with.
Indeed, Russian claims of a right to intervene in former
Soviet ``space'' represent, as it were, a revival of the
Brezhnev Doctrine, the notion that the Soviet state had the
right to intervene in any socialist country to defend the
status quo. These days, virtually everyone recognizes that
this doctrine was harmful not only for Eastern Europe but for
the Soviet Union as well. Yet similarities in the current
scenario have not been understood by President Clinton or his
advisers.
Instead, Mr. Clinton, Strobe Talbott (the president's
nominee for deputy secretary of state and currently a State
Department special adviser), and the U.S. ambassador in
Moscow, Thomas Pickering, have characterized Russian military
involvement in these countries as ``stabilizing.'' This even
when Russian force has been used to seize territory or
overthrow governments. Moreover, they have failed to respond
to Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev's demands that
Russia have the right to send ``peacekeepers'' into all
former Soviet republics and that the international community
pay for this. Mr. Kozyrev, incidentally, made this claim not
only in a private meeting that the Russian government has
denied--to the relief of Washington--but in a Jan. 14 article
in the Russian army newspaper.
As this newspaper's European edition reported early this
month. Mr. Clinton is prepared to be extremely solicitous to
Russian insistence on this point. When pressed by his
advisers to urge restraint on the Kremlin, Mr. Clinton
responded that ``you are right on the policy'' but went on to
say that everyone must ``understand'' what the Russians are
going through.
Call for ``understanding'' are fine, but they miss the
point. Precisely because the states of the former Soviet
Union were so integrated in the past and because there are
not only 25 million Russians living outside the Russian
Federation but also 35 million non-Russians living outside
their home territories, the divorce between Russia and such
states as the Baltics needs to be clean and nonviolent.
Unless that happens, and unless we and the rest of the
international community insist that Russia behave as we would
expect others to behave, the risks are all too great that the
situation will spiral out of control and that we will see the
restoration of a single entity unstable within and hostile to
us abroad.
The first victims will be the non-Russian states. Russian
pressure on the 14 new countries is already creating a
disaster: First, it is undermining the legitimacy of these
governments in the eyes of their own populations, thus
reducing still further their ability to manage the difficult
transitions we are urging on them. Second, it is leading to
the birth of anti-Russian nationalism among these
populations. When the Soviet Union collapsed, there were
virtually no physical attacks on Russians. Now, there are
likely to be, which will make Russian military intervention
more likely, not less. Our failure to oppose Russian military
intervention absolutely is reducing our influence in many of
these countries because their populations increasingly view
us as assisting the Russian reconquest.
The next victim is Russia itself. A newly militaristic
Russia will mean that Russia will have to maintain a larger
defense sector in order to control the situation and that the
military will have a larger say in what goes on. Both these
things will make the transition to a market economy and a
democracy far more difficult. But the change also means that
Russians will not have to come to terms with their own place
in the world, with the fact that Russia should become a
country, not a cause. The strong showing of Vladimir
Zhirinovsky is a symptom of this, not its source, as so many
in the administration seem to think.
But the final victims will be Europe and the U.S. and the
hopes for peace and prosperity in the future. Just as a
liberal and friendly Soviet Union proved to be a
contradiction in terms, so too will be a ``liberal'' Russian
empire pursuing what its defenders in Moscow and the West see
as a benign ``Monroeski Doctrine.'' In short, by catering to
Russian sensitivities, we are not doing anyone any favors--
not the non-Russians, not Russia itself and certainly not
ourselves.
[From the Washington Post, Jan. 21, 1994]
Permission for Kremlin Intervention
(By Stephen S. Rosenfeld)
In Moscow, Bill Clinton pretty much handed off to Russia
the task of policing the unrest in the borderlands that
formerly were part of the Soviet Union. Boris Yeltsin had
asked the United Nations for just such a grant of ``special
powers.'' Clinton enunciated a kind of Clinton doctrine, one
applying not to restrictive standards for American
intervention but to permissive standards for Russian
intervention.
He characterized Russia's involvement in Georgia--where in
fact the Russian army first contributed to and then exploited
the local government's duress--as ``stabilizing.'' He went on
to liken Russian involvement in such operations to American
involvement in Panama and Grenada ``and other places near our
area.''
Two standards were specified: Intervention must be
consistent with international law, and when possible it must
be supported by other nations through the United Nations or
otherwise. But Clinton then offered a broad blanket
dispensation for cases where the demise of totalitarian rule
uncorked old conflicts; this can be read to apply to almost
every little war in the Russian ``near abroad.''
The striking aspect of this pronouncement is, of course,
that Clinton is so much more clear and forthright about
Russia's intervention in situations of strife near its
borders than he is about America's intervention in situations
of strife far from its own borders.
No less striking, he is making a gesture of great deference
to Yeltsin. The Russian president is under growing pressure
from the nationalist right to conduct a vigorous and
interventionist Russian foreign policy.
Already Secretary of State Warren Christopher had observed
that the countries of the former Soviet Union were ``a long,
long ways from the United States'' and that Russia could act
to guarantee regional stability if it respected
``international norms.''
Little wonder, then, that days after a beaming Clinton came
home from Moscow, Yeltsin's foreign minister--and he is one
of the good guys--fudged an earlier pledge to pull all troops
out of the Baltics. Openly he enunciated a claim to
reestablish a traditional ``sphere of Russian interest''
(``we should not fear the words'') in the newly independent
states created out of the former Soviet Union.
This from a man--Andrei Kozyrev--who a year ago was himself
cautioning of a comeback by those with a ``fascist ideology''
and with ``a grand vision of restoring Russia in its grandeur
to the borders of the former U.S.S.R.''
Let us stipulate that it comes naturally to a country with
a long geopolitical reach (the United States) or an old
imperial habit (Russia) to assign neighborhood intervention
rights to the metropolitan power. Set aside the modest irony
of a somewhat liberal American president embracing the
Reagan-Bush interventions in Grenada and Panama. Set aside as
well the painful irony of the lapse of the American
interventionist urge in present-day Haiti. Policing what is,
whatever it is called, a sphere of interest is a familiar
geopolitical chore and far from an inherently reprehensible
one.
What President Clinton failed to fold into his remarks in
Moscow, however, is the potential dark side of the current
Russian interventionist trend. Researchers Fiona Hill and
Pamela Jewett spell it out in a new Kennedy School paper
``Back in the USSR.'' Moscow, pretending to good deeds, is
exploiting regional conflicts to destabilize its neighbors
and reestablish its own authority, they say; Washington is
``acquiescing in the de facto reconstitution of the USSR by
turning its head.''
That strikes me as an exaggerated or at least premature
conclusion. But it is no more exaggerated than the Clinton
premise that Russian interventionism is essentially a
civilizing force.
The Clinton view skips past the fact that the Russian army
is moving not in the relatively settled geopolitical
conditions of Central America and the Caribbean but in an
anything-can-happen context where no rules reliably apply.
Here civilian Russian nationalism is compounded by a
headstrong Russian army's desperate quest for institutional
survival.
Russia's policy in the near abroad is becoming more evident
and more unsettling. Clinton's responses are going to have to
be sharpened. His commitment to Yeltsin cannot be allowed to
extend to the point where the United States becomes by
default a party to the reconstruction of the Russian empire.
Clinton's approach to many tough foreign policy dilemmas is
to talk out loud about them. Let him broaden his public
address to this one.
____
[From the Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1993]
An Earlier Tilt Toward Moscow
(By Stephen S. Rosenfeld)
A Yale graduate student's obscure journal article on World
War II diplomacy is sending ripples through Washington. It is
conveying an immensely damaging blow to the reputation of a
lion of the American establishment and casting a trace of a
shadow over President Clinton's approach to the former Soviet
empire.
History doctoral candidate William Larsh is the author of
the article on then-ambassador to Moscow W. Averell
Harriman's handling of the Polish question in 1943 and 1944.
It was published in the ``Eastern European Politics and
Societies'' journal of the University of California-Berkeley.
The late enjoy's heretofore untapped personal papers are
Larsh's principal source.
I respected the service of the former New York governor,
Democratic presidential hopeful and longtime Washington
policy maker, who died in 1986. I was saddened by this fuller
disclosure of the American role, and his role, in Stalin's
consummation of a Communist takeover in a nation whose
liberation from Nazis was a principal Allied war aim.
Saddened and sickened. For what the new article argues is
that Harriman ``fundamentally'' misread Stalin. He covertly
negotiated replacing the recognized Polish government in
exile with the Soviet dictator's Polish puppets.
Harriman was not without high purpose: to strengthen the
U.S.-Soviet link at a time when the war against Germany and
Japan was still going strong. His hope was that Stalin,
having tended to Soviet security needs in the East European
buffer zone, would let Poles run their own internal affairs.
His method was to hide American diplomacy so as not to stir
public opinion, especially among Polish Americans.
Only when the Red Army stood by and deliberately let the
German army destroy the Poles' own forces, which had risen up
to preempt Moscow's liberation of Warsaw, did Harriman begin
to alter his sanguine outlook, the young scholar Larsh
suggests. George Kennan wrote that this incident
``shattered'' Harriman, who would repeatedly deny his own
daughter's allusion that he had suffered a near nervous
breakdown because of it.
Harriman's chief, Franklin D. Roosevelt, evidently had to
similar illusions about what Stalin had in mind for Eastern
Europe. Harriman recorded this breathtaking note: ``On one
occasion in May [1944] the president had told me that he
didn't care whether the countries bordering Russia became
communized.''
``At that time''--Harriman goes on--``I did not have a
chance to indicate my views. * * *''
Later Harriman authorized historian Herbert Feis to write
up his Moscow experiences. The Feis manuscript included ``a
sharply critical evaluation'' of Harriman on Poland, Larsh
says. Harriman never released it. ``Perhaps,'' Larsh
speculates, ``it was decided to keep the Feis synopsis under
lock and key because of the possible political
ramifications--Sen. Joseph McCarthy's accusation, among
others, that the Roosevelt administration had `sold Eastern
Europe down the river' should be kept in mind here.''
The Harriman papers detail what Larsh describes as
Washington's ``wobbly and over-accommodating stance'' toward
Moscow in a key episode leading up to the Cold War. This new
presentation undercuts recent ``revisionist'' histories
attributing sinister anti-Soviet motives to Washington and is
bound to deepen historical debate.
Political debate, too. Thanks in the first instance to
Yale's publicity department, the Larsh study is becoming
known within the Clinton administration. It is starting to
touch the current updated form of the enduring Western
question of how to deal with the weight of Moscow on the
European scales.
Boris Yeltsin's Russia is vastly different from Joseph
Stalin's Soviet Union. It isn't communist, and it has
emergent democratic tendencies. But it also has resurgent
nationalistic and imperialistic tendencies. I want to be
careful not to exaggerate the threat. But today Poles and
others in central Europe feel a tentative double chill. From
the east, for instance, Yeltsin warns against East Europe's
being taken into NATO. From the west, the United States
offers what many Eastern Europeans perceive as insufficient
concern for their exposure to Russia.
The NATO-membership issue is key, going to the ultimate
security structure of the new Europe. The Clinton
administration has its reasons not to invite new members in
right now. First it wants to settle solidly on a new NATO
mission; meanwhile it offers democratic Eastern Europeans a
lesser ``partnership.''
But in dissenting circles inside the administration and
elsewhere, the suspicion lingers that Washington is again
tilting to Moscow at others' expense, this time to keep an
embattled Yeltsin upright and moving forward. The new study
of Harriman is a timely reminder of the perils still lying on
the path to European security.
____
[From the Washington Post, Mar. 16, 1993]
Soviet Bloc Had Detailed Plan To Invade West Germany
(By Marc Fisher)
East German and Soviet planning for a military offensive
against West Germany was so detailed and advanced that the
communists had already made street signs for western cities,
printed cash for their occupation government and built
equipment to run eastern trains on western tracks, according
to documents found by the German military.
Documents covering the period from the 1960s to the mid-
1980s--as well as assault equipment found in the East German
communist regime's huge underground storage facilities--have
persuaded German military planners and historians that the
Soviet Bloc not only seriously considered an assault but had
achieved a far higher level of readiness than western
intelligence had assumed.
``We have found that the National Peoples Army [East German
military] made every necessary preparation to conquer and
occupy the west, and especially West Germany,'' Vice Admiral
Ulrich Weisser, chief of the planning staff for the German
Bundeswehr, or armed forces, said in an interview. ``Our
officers were deeply impressed.''
The preparations, which were regularly updated over the
years, ranged from the trivial to the terrifying. East
Germany's military and the Stasi secret police had printed up
new street maps and signs for western cities. Koenigsalee,
Dusseldorf's tony avenue of furs, jewels and designer
fashions, was to be dubbed Karl Marx Allee.
When western officers took over eastern bases after East
and West Germany reunited in 1990, they found more ammunition
for the 160,000-man East German force than the Bundeswehr had
for its 500,000 troops.
In the eastern town of Lehnin, less than 30 miles from West
Berlin, the East German military had erected a mock western
city in which East German and Soviet troops practiced for the
invasion and street battles that would never happen. Now a
collection of abandoned, shell-pocked buildings, the
``city'' of Scholzenslust included a school, bank,
courthouse, bar, hotel, rail station and subway entrances.
Until the Bundeswehr took control of the area, bands of
neo-Nazi teenagers would sneak into the town for weekend
training shoot-ups.
The East German documents now being studied by the German
military and German historians indicate that western analysis
of Soviet and East German military planning may have
underestimated the bloc's capabilities. Not only did the
Warsaw Pact nations have elaborate plans for taking over West
Germany, but they had logistical resources well beyond what
western intelligence had reported.
If a combined East German and Soviet force had moved to
conquer West Berlin and West Germany according to plan, the
west would have been initially ``outmanned, out-armed and
overwhelmed,'' Weisser said. ``The operational planning was
far more advanced than anything our intelligence had
envisioned. The National Peoples Army was designed to invade
within hours of a political decision.''
Although historians have been inclined to take the
blueprints for the takeover of the west with a considerable
portion of salt, the East German stockpiles and other
physical evidence indicate a capacity well beyond anything
the west had expected.
``We found cellars full of cash that they had printed up
for immediate distribution in a West Germany controlled by an
occupation government,'' said Heinrich Weisse, the
Bundeswehr's deputy planning chief. ``They had already made
up medals, complete with designations for their officers who
performed well in the conquering of the west.''
In vast cellars previously unknown to the west, according
to officials, the East Germans kept huge arsenals, including
weapons, vehicles and railroad equipment that would have
allowed East German rolling stock to be used immediately on
West German rails, which were built to different standards.
As dreary and dilapidated as western officers found East
German and Soviet bases in East Germany to be after
reunification, there was a clear distinction between the
communists' care of their soldiers and their maintenance of
the vehicles and equipment that would be needed to invade the
west.
``The soldiers had to live in an infrastructure that was
left unrenovated for more than five decades,'' Weisser said.
``But the tanks were kept in the best shape in warmed holding
areas so they could be started up immediately.''
As late as 1985, according to Stasi documents examined by
Berlin historian Otto Wenzel, the East German secret police
prepared a detailed plan for the takeover of West Berlin, The
plan, written for a deputy of Stasi chief Erich Mielke,
described the creation of 12 neighborhood administrative
offices for West Berlin and laid out a battle plan for the
Soviet forces and East German army, border police and
local police who would storm through the Berlin Wall.
On ``Day X,'' as the plan called the day of invasion,
specific units were assigned to tasks such as capturing U.S.,
British and French military bases in West Berlin, shutting
down airports and taking over the city's radio and TV
stations, newspapers, museums, telephone switching stations,
churches and universities.
In all, the plan envisioned 32,000 communist troops
invading a West Berlin that would be defended by 12,000
allied forces and local police.
The plan, written in coordination with Soviet officers in
East Berlin, called for the Soviets to capture and hold the
city's most important symbols--the Brandenburg Gate and the
Reichstag legislature building, which the Soviets had
liberated from Nazi Germany at the end of World War II.
Wenzel, writing in the Frankfurter Allgemeine newspaper,
said there are indications that the communists had prepared
lists of West Berliners--intelligence agents, police,
politicians, journalists and scientists with access to
technological secrets--who were to be arrested to prevent
them from leading opposition to the invasion. No such lists
have been found to date in the East German archives.
____
[From the Agence France Presse, Aug. 3, 1991]
Confirmed: Warsaw Pact Planned Nuclear, Chemical Onslaught on Western
Europe
(By Richard Ingham)
Wheel to wheel, the massed armour of the Warsaw Pact
launches its offensive against the rich lands of western
Europe, knifing across the German plain towards the North
Sea.
On day two the conflict goes nuclear, as Soviet commanders
smash through North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) troop
concentrations and then divide their forces.
Polish tanks swing north to capture the Danish peninsula,
letting the Soviet Baltic fleet spring free into the Atlantic
to ravage NATO convoys. Tens of Soviet and East German
divisions wheel to the Southwest, towards Paris, Spain and
Portugal, as NATO's forces crumble or retreat in disarray.
A nightmare scenario existing only in the minds of NATO
planners? A Tom Clancy novel?
No: these were the Warsaw Pact's battle plans, seized by
the western German military last October, when East Germany
and its National People's Army (NVA) dissolved into the
history books.
For NATO experts, the find is of immense historical value.
It enables them to check their evaluations of the threat
posed by the seven-nation Pact until it fell apart last year
after the anti-Communist revolutions of 1989.
It also confirms their view, maintained over 40 years, that
the Pact was offensive-based, in contrast to its propaganda
image as a defensive organisation and to NATO's own strategy
of defence and deterrence.
``The threat was very serious and very real,'' says Captain
Walter Reichenmillar, a spokesman at the German Defence
Ministry. ``It was no `Potemkin village' which we dressed up
to alarm people.''
``Tonnes'' of secret documents, including maps,
intelligence reports and exercise evaluations, were taken
from eastern Germany after German unification and are now
being sifted by experts, Reichenmillar said.
``We can only make a first appraisal at this stage,'' he
said. ``Later, we will put together a full report and make it
public.''
But some startling details have already leaked to the
press:
As late as June 1990, eight months after the fall of the
Berlin Wall, the NVA's 5th Army carried out joint exercises
with the Soviet military that still rehearsed for a westward
offensive in northern Germany.
The plan involved the use of chemical weapons and up to 87
nuclear warheads. And a similar wargame involving Soviet and
East German generals was planned for September, less than a
month before German unification.
The overall Soviet plan centered on a gigantic offensive
from the ``start line'' of the inter-German border, sending
hundreds of thousands of men and thousands of tanks on a 20-
pronged blitzkrieg, advancing at an average of 50 kilometers
(31 miles) per day.
Options included a widening of the front to the south,
sending Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Soviet troops to seize
Yugoslavia and northern Italy.
Each Pact member was responsible for seizing and occupying
a certain area of land. The NVA, for instance, was tasked
with administering West Germany after the victory: it even
printed a mountain of ``Besatzungsgeld'' (occupation money)
to replace the Deutsche mark. And it trained personnel, in
advance, to manage ``captured'' installations such as
airports and rail stations.
East German troops, up to a very senior level, were kept in
the dark about NATO doctrine and troop strengths. Propaganda
was reflected even in operational maps, which depicted NATO
forces as poised offensively along the inter-German border,
and in numbers far superior to reality.
Secrecy even extended to the overall Pact strategy, which
the Soviet high command jealously kept from East German
generals. But East German leader Erich Honecker was fully
briefed by the Stasi intelligence service, which gave him
accurate ``eyes-only'' reports unvarnished by propaganda.
Well-informed sources who have seen the documents say they
contain little that surprises NATO except perhaps the Pact's
readiness to use nuclear weapons.
``We now know that they were considered an operational
weapon, something quite normal,'' a Bonn official said.
NATO's doctrine is to use its atomic arsenal as a last
resort, to riposte to nuclear attack or a land offensive that
could not be stopped by conventional means.
``What we've had confirms what we thought,'' said Henry
Dodds, editor of Jane's Intelligence Review in London.
But he was disappointed that the documents relate primarily
to the East German role and reveal little of what he called
the ``Soviet master plan.''
``That one takes you all the way down to Gibraltar and up
to the tip of Scotland,'' Dodds said. ``It's pretty
frightening.''
Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I would like to speak for a few minutes
about the pending nomination of Strobe Talbott to be Deputy Secretary
of State, and the confirmation 15 days ago of Tom Dine. In both cases,
I will focus on the issue of United States assistance to Russia and
Ukraine.
My own experience in directing a tiny part of our assistance toward
new civilian roles for Soviet weapons scientists leads me to conclude
that our assistance strategy is flawed and that its management needs
overhauling. I have seldom encountered such entrenched and
unimaginative attitudes as I found among the officials working for
Ambassador Talbott and our Agency for International Development's NIS
task force.
Adjustments are already underway. Ambassador Talbott's recent shift
in tone and focus regarding United States relations with Russia is one
instance. A new emphasis on assistance for Kazakhstan and Ukraine is
another. These changes help, but it is clear that the President's long
friendship with Talbott and reliance on his advice has left Talbott
with too little time and energy to manage the foreign aid program.
The appointment of an experienced and decisive public figure such as
Tom Dine to manage AID's efforts in the region is another sign that the
administration now recognizes that it will be held fully accountable
for the $5 billion that has been appropriated for the former Soviet
Union.
The amount of American assistance to Russia and the newly liberated
nations of Central and Eastern Europe will not, as some assert,
determine their future. It is possible, however, that mismanagement of
our aid programs over there by the Agency for International Development
could shatter the reputation of the United States in the nations that
we used to call the Soviet bloc.
The elevation of Ambassador Talbott to the position of Deputy
Secretary of State is likely to make AID the major focus of
accountability for assistance to Russia and Ukraine. The confirmation
of Tom Dine as the AID official responsible for Russia and Ukraine may
preclude a management disaster in the making and result in United
States assistance being delivered more effectively. If the assistance
programs already underway are not quickly brought under tight control
and accountability, then Dine will surely have to answer for the
scandals that will result.
The initial euphoria about the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of
communism is over now. The peoples of Russia and East Central Europe
now realize that whatever dollars or D-marks that can be coaxed from
Western purses will matter less than the evolution of their own civic
traditions and economic strategies.
The imminent arrival of democracy and a market economy is currently
the foundation of our assistance strategy in the region. Confusing
ideals with reality, democracy, and a free market are the outcome we
often anticipate, prematurely, as the inevitable result of each
nation's evolution. Such confusion is a sure recipe for the waste of
both billions of tax dollars, and a unique opportunity to reduce
tension and promote trade.
Let me review the complex history of executive branch efforts to
coordinate American assistance to Russia and Ukraine.
The Bush administration had failed to take the advice of myself and
other Senators to designate a single individual to manage Russian aid
on a Government-wide basis, so I was hopeful that the new
administration was doing the right thing.
At one time, we were told that American financial and technical
support for Russia, Ukraine, and their neighbors would be managed by
the President's personal coordinator, Ambassador Strobe Talbott. That
was not to be the case.
It became clear over the course of 1993 that no single individual was
coordinating, much less managing our aid program in Russia. It was
commonly assumed that Strobe Talbott was in charge. He took the title
``Special Advisor to the Secretary of State on the New Independent
States.'' As the President came to rely on Talbott for policy advice in
many other areas, Talbott delegated much of his management role to
others.
At the Department of State, two of Talbott's subordinates were
designated as coordinators for specific functions. Our former
Ambassador to Poland, Tom Simons, was named coordinator for United
States Assistance to the New Independent States. Our former Deputy
Chief of Mission in Moscow, James F. Collins, was named coordinator for
Regional Affairs for the New Independent States. Collins is expected to
assume Talbott's existing title and duties for assistance, although he
is a career diplomat with none of Talbott's experience or access to the
President.
Programs funded outside the foreign aid appropriations bill largely
escaped Talbott's control. Elsewhere in the Department of State, in the
Bureau of Political- Military Affairs, Elizabeth Verville is senior
coordinator of Nuclear Safety and Science Centers in the NIS. At the
Department of Defense, there is a cooperative threat reduction
coordinator, Gloria Duffey, for the Nunn-Lugar program. Yet, many
decisions on aid to Russia were relegated to the NIS Task Force at our
Agency for International Development, chaired by Malcolm Butler, whose
most recent assignment was in the Philippines.
The confirmation of Tom Dine as the AID official responsible for
Russia and Ukraine brings a very different record and style of
management to these programs. Tom has direct experience working
overseas as a peace corps volunteer and leader in the Philippines, as
well as a tour with our Embassy in India. He spent a decade working for
Congress, including a period at the Budget Committee. As executive
director of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, he presided
over the growth of a remarkable grassroots expansion of that
organization.
Dine's character is exceptional. It signals a bolder attitude toward
management of assistance to Ukraine and Russia. When others arranged
for medical deferments to avoid military service, he volunteered for 2
years in the Philippines between 1962 and 1964 as one of the early
Peace Corps volunteers. He did this in the face of a physical
disability that would have exempted him from any type of national
service.
Dine's personal courage and willingness to dissent from conventional
views was demonstrated on many occasions. As a senior Democratic
congressional staffer, he broke with an incumbent President of his
party to support Senator Kennedy's bid for the Presidency in 1980. As
executive director of AIPAC, Dine endorsed Middle East peace
initiatives that were very unpopular with some of his members. In such
instances he did what he thought was right at some risk to his career
prospects.
I intend to vote in favor of Strobe Talbott's nomination as Deputy
Secretary of State. I do this because I believe that each President
enjoys the benefit of the doubt in his subcabinet appointments. My vote
for his nomination today is for Deputy Secretary of State. Should Mr.
Talbott be nominated for a Cabinet post, based on his record to date, I
would be far less likely to support him.
Like my colleagues, I am troubled by aspects of Mr. Talbott's record.
Like many journalists and academics specializing in Soviet matters, he
has been wrong often. Unlike some, he has shown that he learns from his
mistakes. He has been accessible to me in his current post, and willing
to overturn the mistakes of his subordinates.
Finally, I reject the notion that opposition to this nomination
violates someone's notion of a bipartisan foreign policy. Although
Talbott himself has shown no undue partisanship in his dealings with
me, others in the State Department have shown little reluctance to cut
Republicans out of timely information. For the first time in my
experience, this year the Department's basic budget data was released
on a partisan basis. Any Member voting against this nomination is fully
within his or her rights. There is no bipartisan foreign policy at this
time.
Mr. MACK. Mr. President, the Constitution gives the Senate of the
United States the responsibility and power to advise and consent upon
the nomination of high Cabinet and subcabinet administration officials.
Each Senator must decide how to exercise his or her advise or consent
role. Generally, I believe that Senators should let the President
choose his key advisors. I have voted to confirm almost every
administration appointee, including many with whom I have important
disagreements.
There comes a point, however, when the conscience and judgment of a
Senator demands that he or she oppose a President's choice. As a
Senator, I cannot vote in a way that I believe would jeopardize
fundamental American national interests.
A number of my colleagues have spoken about Mr. Talbott's record of
misguided foreign policy judgment over many years, and the Russia-
focused policy that resulted in the denial of NATO membership to new
democracies in central Europe. I share their concerns, but wish to
focus on what in my judgment is the most serious threat to our
fundamental interest--the willingness to jeopardize the security of the
only free and democratic American ally in the Middle East, the State of
Israel.
While speaking in glowing terms about an idealized Israel in the
past, Mr. Talbott's writings, taken together, go beyond common
criticisms to a systematic attack upon the foundations of America's
close relationship with Israel. His views have been outside the
American foreign policy consensus and in conflict with the policies of
every American President over the past generation.
Strobe Talbott has blamed Israel in part for instability in the Arab
world, for the Lebanese civil war, for undermining our relations with
Europe and the Arab States and Third World, and for the spread of
Soviet influence in the Middle East. He repeatedly compared Israel's
settlements policy to the Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iraq. He has
largely dismissed the strategic importance of the American-Israel
alliance, suggested that Israel could become a net liability to the
United States, and suggested cuts in military aid to Israel.
When asked to explain these views in his confirmation hearing,
Ambassador Talbott dismissed his own writings as deviations from his
real views in the heat of forensic and journalistic battle.
What does Ambassador Talbott mean when he says ``in the heat of
battle''? Does he mean he was so passionate about punishing a
democratic ally for policies he disagreed with that he could not
control himself?
Does he mean that he was highly irresponsible as a prominent
journalist, but he would not be so as a top policymaker?
Does he mean that as a top Time magazine correspondent he used words
sloppily, but he would not be so sloppy as a public official?
This is like Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. Mr. Hyde, the out-of-control
journalist, transforms magically into Dr. Jekyll, the responsible
public official. When Strobe Talbott is a journalist, he writes some of
the most anti-Israel essays in any mainstream media. But what if he
becomes Deputy Secretary of State? What assurance do we have that if
there is a change in Israeli Government or policies that he won't turn
back into Mr. Hyde?
Mr. Talbott says he no longer believes that the United States should
cut military aid to Israel to punish Israel for actions taken to
protect her security, such as the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor.
He said he no longer believes that Israel was ``a dubious asset, on the
way to becoming an outright liability.'' Why has he changed his mind?
At the confirmation hearing Mr. Talbott gave no explanation as to why
he changed his mind, only that his former views were temporary
aberrations from his core views. But this aberration continued from
1981 all the way to 1990, when Talbott applauded President Bush for
linking loan guarantees for Israel to Israeli policy on settlements.
The more the administration pressured Israel, the happier Strobe
Talbott was.
Which is the true Strobe Talbott? The Strobe Talbott of a decade of
essays in Time magazine or the Strobe Talbott of this week's
confirmation hearings? This is what is called a confirmation
conversion. It was not a convincing one for me.
Our foreign policy must be rooted in the principles of freedom,
democracy, justice, and human rights. We cannot afford to have someone
at or near the helm of the ship of state who will in the heat of the
moment toss aside these principles to the detriment of our own
interests and those of our key allies.
I would urge Members to focus on what is at stake here. This week's
New Republic magazine cover story describes Ambassador Talbott as our
next Secretary of State. This is not just a vote for Deputy Secretary
of State, as important as that is. Strobe Talbott will be, from day 1,
not a manager of the Department, but a surrogate Secretary of State.
Second, there is good chance that someday he will be nominated to be
Secretary of State himself.
If he is one day nominated to Secretary of State, it will be very
difficult for Senators, who voted to confirm twice before, to vote
against him on the third vote.
If you are a strong supporter of Israel's freedom security, and you
believe that Strobe Talbott's conversion to such support is sincere,
you should vote for him. But if you believe that as Secretary of State
Strobe Talbott's passion for pressuring Israel will probably emerge--
now is the time to vote against his nomination.
Now is the time to end an unequivocal signal that the Senate will
reject the notion of an American Secretary of State who has, at best,
an enormous blind spot when it comes to America's fundamental national
interests in the Middle East, and in particular, our interest in a
strong, secure, and free State of Israel.
Mr. COATS. Mr. President, today I will oppose the nomination of
Strobe Talbott for Deputy Secretary of State. This is not a decision I
make lightly nor one I make for solely philosophical differences. In
general, I am disposed to give great deference to Presidential
nominations.
However, I have serious reservations about Mr. Talbott serving in
such a high policy position in the U.S. Government. There is no doubt
that Ambassador Talbott is an intellectual with experience in foreign
policy arena particularly in Russia. However, I have found that Mr.
Talbott's judgment as expressed in numerous articles to be severely
flawed. His opinions particularly on Israel and on the Soviet Union are
disturbing. In his writings over the last decade he was remarkably
shortsighted in his failure to recognize the importance of Israel to
the security interests of the United States. He challenged every
Reagan/Bush initiative which heralded us to successfully triumph over
the Soviet threat.
Today, Ambassador Talbott says that he believes the breakup of the
Soviet Union was inevitable. He opposed the U.S. defense buildup of the
eighties. He opposed the MX missile, the B-1 and B-2 bombers and
Trident II submarine-launched missile programs. He also opposed the
placement of Pershing missiles in Europe. Mr. Talbott attributes the
collapse of the Soviet State to ``internal contradictions and pressures
within the Soviet Union and the Soviet system itself.'' He fails to
acknowledge the primacy of Western resolve in precipitating the
downfall of the Soviet Union. Today, former Soviet military leaders
attribute tough minded United States defense policies for a major role
in the demise of the Soviet State.
In 1990 Talbott wrote that:
For more than four decades, western policy was based on a
grotesque exaggeration of what the U.S.S.R. could do if it
wanted to. The doves in the great debate of the past 40 years
were right all along.
But while Talbott opposed our defense buildup he seemed to cast a
blind eye to the Soviet modernization program and their involvement in
exporting revolution. He called the potential dangers of a Soviet Union
attack on Western Europe paranoid fantasy. Instead he favored detente
and arms control--exclusively. President Reagan's vision of providing
real defense for the American people, the strategic defense initiative,
would only interfere with arms control success, in his opinion.
Strobe Talbott in 1985:
Star Wars is a dream of total safety, of a world without
missiles and MIRV's. Dreams are not the stuff of which
bargaining chips are made. * * * If Reagan holds firm on
Star Wars, he might as well abandon his pursuit of drastic
reductions in existing Soviet weaponry.
His writings about Israel are equally troubling, demonstrating a
pattern of anti-Israel views. In 1981 he called Israel ``well on its
way to becoming not just a dubious asset but an outright liability to
American security interests, both in the Middle East and worldwide.''
He called the proposition that Israel has ever been a strategic ally a
delusion.
In 1990, he likened Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait to Israel's
continued occupation of the West Bank. Talbott's writings are sharply
critical or Israel's retention of the territories seized during the Six
Day War. He attributes the complex problems of the Arab States on
United States support of Israel and Israeli occupation of the
territories. Talbott also suggests that the United States reduce its
security commitment to Israel.
He call on the United States in 1981 ``to engage Israel in a debate
over the fundamental nature of their relationship. If that means
interfering in Israeli internal politics, then so be it.''
His opinions about Israel are remarkably clear upon reading his
columns. Despite these statements, at his recent confirmation hearing,
he recanted what he had written by saying that he has ``always believed
that a strong Israel is in America's interest because it serves the
cause of peace and stability in the region.'' He added that he doesn't
feel the same way today as he did 13 years ago. It bothers me that a
man can so easily change from a decade of strongly expressed opinions.
Mr. President, I am concerned that Ambassador Talbott has
consistently demonstrated deeply flawed judgment on two vital areas of
United States strategic interest: our past relationship with Communist
Soviet Union and our interest in a strong Israel for a stable Middle
East. For this reason, I will oppose his nomination for Deputy
Secretary of State.
Mr. BURNS. Mr. President, I rise today in opposition to the
nomination of Mr. Strobe Talbott of Ohio for Deputy Secretary of State.
Today the Senate is undertaking one of its most important functions,
as we prepare to vote on the confirmation of a Presidential nominee.
This is serious business. While our President has the privilege of
nominating his choice for the top jobs in Government, the Senate has
the duty to ensure that his choice is the best choice for America.
After deep consideration of this nomination I feel that Mr. Strobe
Talbott is not the best choice. I took a long time in reviewing his
record and his ability to fulfill the requirements of the No. 2 slot at
State. After a thorough study of his previous writings. I have several
concerns about his nomination.
As a journalist, Mr. Talbott has a long history of recorded thoughts
on U.S. foreign policy. He has said that he has changed his mind on
some of his writings and some of my colleagues say they can understand
this. I don't understand how ideas and thoughts on issues written
repeatedly over a long period of time can suddenly change overnight.
While his writings on the former Soviet Union have proven to be dead
wrong, they ruled his decisions in his last position as Ambassador at
Large for the former Soviet Union.
As Ambassador at Large for the former Soviet Union, he was
responsible for drafting United States policy toward Russia. I am not
convinced that he was not more of a hindrance than a helping hand while
he was in Moscow.
I also have grave concerns about his ability to handle the job of
Deputy Secretary of State. Mr. Talbott has never held a position in
management in a large organization at any point in his career. The
State Department needs a proven manager who is capable of streamlining
the huge bureaucracy and reigning in costs to bring it into the post-
cold-war era.
The Secretary of State is responsible for policy making. The State
Department needs an effective manager capable of handling
administrative responsibilities--not another policy wonk. Strobe
Talbott may know how to write about policy from his old job in
journalism, but is that what we need, or want?
I don't believe Mr. Strobe Talbott has the wisdom, foresight, and
experience required for the No. 2 job at the Department of State. As I
am not completely satisfied that he is the right choice for this
important job, I plan to cast a vote against his confirmation when the
Senate votes.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I want to make a few brief remarks in
connection with the nomination of Strobe Talbott to serve as Deputy
Secretary of State.
This is an important position which requires the incumbent to step in
for the Secretary of State in his absence and participate in broad-
ranging policy decisions at the Department. At the same time, the
occupant of this Office must have the capability to run a huge and
complex bureaucracy which stretches around the globe.
During consideration of the Talbott nomination, before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, some questions were raised about Mr.
Talbott's views on the Middle East and, in particular, whether he might
harbor ill will toward the State of Israel or be insensitive to her
security needs and the potential threats she faces in the region. These
questions were raised because of several articles Mr. Talbott wrote
about the region during his tenure as a journalist at Time magazine.
These articles are disturbing and provocative and contain views with
which I strongly disagree.
Mr. President, in seeking additional information about Mr. Talbott's
views on Middle Eastern issues, I have reviewed the hearing record of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which was charged with
initially reviewing the Talbott nomination.
I also sought out Mr. Talbott personally to discuss his perspectives
on the Middle East and the policies he would be responsible for
implementing. I questioned him closely about his views on these issues
and his past writings. I sought to satisfy myself that he could
discharge these important responsibilities in a manner with which I
felt comfortable and which is consistent with Clinton administration
policy on the Middle East.
I also spoke directly to President Clinton about the nomination.
President Clinton reassured me in the strongest possible terms that
United States policy regarding Israel is set in the White House and
that both his Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary of State are
charged by him to carry out his policy. He assured me that the United
States--Israel relationship will remain strong in the future because it
is based on our mutual security needs.
Mr. President, I have satisfied myself that Mr. Talbott should be
confirmed to serve as Deputy Secretary of State. As a senior member of
the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee on Appropriations, I intend
to stay in close touch with him on issues of concern and will certainly
respond quickly should I find any evidence of bias or imbalance in his
discharge of his duties.
Secretary Christopher has listed the Middle East as one of the
Clinton administration's top foreign policy priorities. I commend the
President and the Secretary for the diligence with which they have
sought peace in the Middle East and for the strong and consistent
support they have provided to Israel, our strongest ally in the region.
Mr. President, when Mr. Talbott testified before the Foreign
Relations Committee earlier this month, he pledged himself to fully
adhere to the administration's policies in the region. He was
questioned closely by Senators Biden and Sarbanes, among others on that
score. They probed the rationale behind some of his earlier writings
and questioned him about his views on the Middle East and the United
States-Israeli relationship.
During these hearings, and in conversations with me and others, he
has clarified his views and stated clearly and emphatically that he
will implement administration policies. He's indicated that he
understands the importance of Israel to United States national security
interests and the special relationship that exists between our two
countries based on strategic interests, shared democratic values, and
historic ties.
Let me quote from Mr. Talbott's testimony:
First, I have always believed that the U.S.-Israeli
relationship is unshakable. Second, I have always believed
that a strong Israel is in America's interest because it
serves the cause of peace and stability in the region. Third,
I am proud to be part of an Administration that has already
done so much to promote a comprehensive peace in the area,
and I look forward to assisting Secretary Christopher in any
way I can to keep that process moving forward.
Mr. President, I disagree strongly, even vehemently, with some of the
things Mr. Talbott wrote in the past. But, I am impressed by that
unequivocal testimony and am prepared to accept that Mr. Talbott meant
what he said to the committee. In conversation this morning, Mr.
Talbott conveyed to me an appreciation of the importance of the United
States-Israeli relationship and an understanding of the unique
challenges Israel faces.
Mr. President, Strobe Talbott and I had a good, frank talk. I believe
that he will be faithful to the spirit, as well as the letter, of
President Clinton's policies in the Middle East and that he will do all
he can to move the peace process forward in a manner that protects
Israel's security needs.
Mr. President, President Clinton has forged the strongest ties with
Israel of any recent President and is committed to forging a peace
accord that protects Israel from threats to her sovereignty and safety.
All of us hope for a resolution of the age-old conflicts in the Middle
East. The nations of that war-torn region would benefit enormously from
a peace that is genuine, stable, and enduring. So would the United
States, which now provides substantial foreign aid and military
assistance to Israel and some of her Arab neighbors.
Mr. President, today we are closer to a Mideast peace than we have
been since the birth of Israel. I commend the President for his
constructive role and encourage him to continue to serve as a catalyst
to a peace that can bring with it stability and growing prosperity for
the entire region, and, accordingly, I will support his nominee for the
position of Deputy Secretary of State.
Mr. PELL. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, Ambassador Strobe Talbott has a
distinguished career and is well qualified to do an outstanding job in
the post of Deputy Secretary of State. He has recently demonstrated his
ability to promote democratic reform in Russia and the other New
Independent States.
Ambassador Talbott has stated his support for Israel's democracy. He
has indicated that he has always believed that the United States-
Israeli relationship is unshakable.
As a journalist, Ambassador Talbott has naturally expressed several
different points of view in his over 20 years of covering international
foreign policy affairs. However, any close, unbiased reading of his
writing reveals an acute sensitivity and understanding of world affairs
and the national best interests of the United States.
He has the full and complete confidence of the President and the
Secretary of State. He brings to the office of Deputy Secretary of
State a broad understanding of the international scene and the
importance of our relationship with our allies in promoting world peace
and the national security of the United States.
He is eminently qualified to successfully assist Secretary
Christopher in establishing and carrying out the difficult and
important international task which our country must now undertake in
creating a new foreign policy framework for our role in a turbulent
post-cold-war world.
I intend to support Ambassador Talbott's nomination and I urge my
colleagues to vote for his confirmation.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I believe I have 2 or 3 minutes remaining.
I yield my time.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I believe I have some larger number of
minutes. In any case, I yield my time.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time is yielded.
The question is: Will the Senate advise and consent to the nomination
of Strobe Talbott of Ohio to be Deputy Secretary of State? On this
question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call
the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Pryor] and
the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. Rockefeller] are necessarily
absent.
Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the Senator from Utah [Mr. Bennett] is
necessarily absent.
I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Utah
[Mr. Bennett] would vote nay.
The result was announced--yeas 66, nays 31, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 46 Ex.]
YEAS--66
Akaka
Baucus
Biden
Bingaman
Boren
Boxer
Bradley
Breaux
Bryan
Bumpers
Byrd
Campbell
Chafee
Conrad
Coverdell
Danforth
Daschle
DeConcini
Dodd
Domenici
Dorgan
Exon
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Glenn
Graham
Gregg
Harkin
Hatfield
Heflin
Hollings
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnston
Kassebaum
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lugar
Mathews
Metzenbaum
Mikulski
Mitchell
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murray
Nunn
Pell
Pressler
Reid
Riegle
Robb
Sarbanes
Sasser
Shelby
Simon
Stevens
Warner
Wellstone
Wofford
NAYS--31
Bond
Brown
Burns
Coats
Cochran
Cohen
Craig
D'Amato
Dole
Durenberger
Faircloth
Gorton
Gramm
Grassley
Hatch
Helms
Hutchison
Kempthorne
Lott
Mack
McCain
McConnell
Murkowski
Nickles
Packwood
Roth
Simpson
Smith
Specter
Thurmond
Wallop
NOT VOTING--3
Bennett
Pryor
Rockefeller
So, the nomination was confirmed.
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