[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 15 (Tuesday, February 22, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: February 22, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
      NOMINATION OF STROBE TALBOTT TO BE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

  The Senate continued with the nomination.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I should like to read into the Record a 
couple of sentences here that show Strobe Talbott's feelings about 
Israel. He says:

       The wisdom of the United States original sponsorship of 
     Israel has been vindicated many times in many ways, by the 
     sturdiness and vitality of Israeli democracy as well as by 
     the richness of Israeli artistic and intellectual life. As a 
     culture, a society and a polity--as hospitable if sometimes 
     overheated environment for the thriving of Western values--
     Israel has been a credit to itself and to its American 
     benefactors.

  In reading some of the material that we have all had a chance to look 
at these past days, one finds real sympathy, empathy for Israel, and it 
certainly denies the canard that there are any anti-Semitic feelings in 
Mr. Talbott.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, the nominee being considered by the Senate 
is a man of great intellect and significant accomplishment. From his 
selection as a young man to be a Rhodes scholar to his debut as a young 
scholar translating Khrushchev's memoirs to his well-sourced books on 
arms control and the Reagan administration, Mr. Talbott has been an 
overachiever.
  At the same time, we have heard today a number of questions raised 
about the views that Mr. Talbott has expressed over the years 
concerning the Soviet Union, Israel, and other matters.
  I want to join my colleagues in expressing concern about many of the 
statements Mr. Talbott has made, in writing. While Mr. Talbott's 
advocates argue that some of his most egregious statements were made 
more than a decade ago and he has since matured in his understanding 
and views, many of these writings are quite recent.
  In the fall of 1990, as Saddam Hussein sought to link any effort to 
reverse his invasion of Kuwait with efforts to resolve the fate of the 
Israeli occupied territories, Mr. Talbott compared Israel's policies 
with those of Saddam, writing that ``Israel's policy today does indeed 
have something in common with Iraq's.''
  In 1991, he compared the United States-led international effort to 
expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait with Russian troops' attacks in 
Lithuania. ``There was a bizarre similarity,'' Mr. Talbott wrote, 
``between what Gorbachev and Bush felt compelled to do last week. Each 
was resorting to the use of force in the name of law and order.''
  The only thing bizarre was that Mr. Talbott's ``felt compelled to'' 
compare rather than contrast these decidedly different events, which 
were expressions of totally contradictory concepts of law and order. 
One could just as well compare President Eisenhower's sending troops to 
Little Rock to protect schoolchildren to Bull Connors' sending his 
troopers to assault civil rights marchers in Birmingham--each was 
resorting to the use of force in the name of law and order.
  According to Henry Kissinger, writing in a recent article in the 
Washington Post, Mr. Talbott and the Clinton administration have 
``elevated the radical critique of cold war policies into the 
operational premises of contemporary American foreign policy.''
  ``For nearly half a century,'' Kissinger writes, ``that critique had 
maintained that Soviet policies were as much caused by American 
policies as by Communist ideology; that the Soviet government was 
divided, just as the American government was, between hawks and doves; 
that it was the task of American diplomacy to ease Soviet fears, many 
of which were quite legitimate.'' This critique was rehashed, Dr. 
Kissinger notes, in Mr. Talbott's article in the 1990 Time magazine 
issue naming the Soviet Union's last Communist leader, Mikhail 
Gorbachev, as Man of the Decade.
  In that article, Mr. Talbott stated that there was a growing 
consensus not only that the Soviet threat was diminished from what it 
had been in the past, but also that it had never been so great in the 
first place.
  In fact, the information that has come to light in recent years leads 
to exactly the opposite conclusion, namely that the Soviet Union was 
far better prepared for war than we estimated and very serious about 
waging war in Western Europe. To cite a few examples:
  In East Germany, the Soviets had stocked occupation currency and 
Cyrillic road signs for Western European cities.
  Their stocks of ammunition and other war material in the GDR were 
much larger than we had estimated.
  They had climate-controlled tank shelters in the GDR so that armored 
equipment would be ready to go to war on a few hours notice, rather 
than the days or weeks we estimated.
  They had operational maneuver groups for rapid, deep penetration of 
Western Europe and encirclement of NATO troops. When U.S. Government 
analysts warned of such units in the 1980's, liberal Western analysts 
dismissed this as baseless paranoia.
  Their nuclear arsenal, according to the Russian Minister of Atomic 
Energy, was some 45,000 weapons, far higher than publicly estimated by 
anyone in the West save for Caspar Weinberger.
  Contrary to Mr. Talbott's contention that it was the doves who were 
right during the cold war, it was Ronald Reagan who campaigned on the 
platform that Russia was on the edge of fiscal crisis and could not 
afford to engage us in an arms race.
  While Mr. Talbott may have changed his views on Israel, as he 
announced during his confirmation hearings, it appears that he has not 
altered his views toward Moscow.
  At a hearing last October before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Chairman Hamilton questioned Mr. Talbott about ``Russia's move to 
reassert its influence and power in the various regions of the former 
Soviet Union.'' In a remarkable response, Mr. Talbott stated that ``We 
are not yet prepared to characterize the situation in precisely those 
terms, Mr. Chairman. I would put it like this: There is unquestionably 
a good deal of disorder, tension, conflict, ethnic conflict and 
otherwise, around the periphery of the old U.S.S.R.''
  This neutral statement, like Mr. Talbott's statement that Gorbachev 
``felt compelled'' to use military force to attack Lithuanians, may be 
the epitome of diplomacy to some. But, besides being free of judgment 
and values, they also are devoid of factual context as they also 
contradict the undeniable fact that, as Chairman Hamilton stated, 
Russia has moved to reassert its influence and power in the former 
Soviet Union.
  After receiving this response from Mr. Talbott, Chairman Hamilton 
began to sharply question him about specific cases of Russian military 
intervention in its neighbors, beginning with Georgia. Mr. Talbott 
testified that ``while there were problems from time to time, we did 
not, at any point, feel that those problems were part of a pattern 
suggesting that the Moscow leadership itself was conducting a 
mischievous foreign policy toward Georgia.'' ``It was,'' he said, ``a 
mixed picture and very complicated.''
  This was less than 2 weeks after Moscow had manipulated the situation 
in Georgia, first fighting on the side of a rebellious Province of 
Georgia and then offering to come to the rescue of the Georgian 
Government, but only for a price. The price was for Georgia to join the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, one of the principle mechanisms by 
which Moscow is reasserting its influence and power in the other 
Republics of the former Soviet Union.
  Even more disturbing than his testimony is the fact that it has been 
translated into the administration's policy. During the Moscow summit 
last month, President Clinton compared Russian military intervention in 
the so-called near abroad to United States operations in Panama and 
Grenada and other places near our area. The President specifically 
cited Russian intervention in Georgia as stabilizing.
  One columnist has termed this policy the Clinton doctrine, but it 
could more accurately be described as the Talbott doctrine. And clearly 
in response to the President's enunciation of this Talbott doctrine, 
shortly after the summit, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev affirmed 
Russia's intent to reestablish a ``sphere of Russian interest.'' ``We 
should not fear the words,'' he declared, although Russia's neighbors 
might have another view.
  Concerned by the administration's failure to speak out against 
Russian intervention in the other States of the former Soviet Union, 
last fall Congress adopted an amendment conditioning continued aid to 
Russia on its respecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of 
its neighbors. In its December 1993 report justifying continuation of 
aid despite these statutory conditions, the State Department argued 
that the situation was complex and that it was not possible to draw 
conclusions. As special adviser to the Secretary of State for the New 
Independent States, Mr. Talbott presumably had a major hand in this 
report, which mirrors his October testimony.
  I would merely point out that this State Department report is at odds 
with more than one intelligence community report which did draw 
conclusions. This is not to say that aid should necessarily have been 
cut off. But it does raise questions about the State Department and the 
administration's policy on these matters and about those who crafted 
those policies.
  Republicans, I would point out, are not the only ones questioning Mr. 
Talbott's policies. Democratic Senators have questioned the coherence 
and management of our aid programs to the former Soviet Union, for 
which Mr. Talbott has been responsible.
  And even more telling, Mr. Talbott's policies have been attacked by 
Russian reformers, the very people who were supposed to be the 
beneficiaries of America's Russian policy. Referring to the terribly 
damaging effect that resulted from Mr. Talbott's infamous remark last 
December that Russia needed ``less shock and more therapy,'' Russian 
Finance Minister Boris Fyodorov declared that Russian reformers had 
been ``stabbed in the back'' by Mr. Talbott.
  During its consideration of the State Department authorization bill 
last month, the Senate adopted several amendments to address 
administration policy mistakes in which Mr. Talbott has been involved, 
including the issues of NATO expansion and Russian military 
intervention in its neighbors. We can continue to pass legislation in 
an effort to ameliorate mistaken administration policies. Or we can 
take actions to dissuade the administration from adopting such mistaken 
policies in the first place.
  The later course obviously makes more sense, and defeating this 
nomination would be a step toward that end.
  While I have generally given Presidents great deference in making 
appointments to their administrations, Mr. Talbott's nomination is far 
from a routine case. I believe that the policies crafted by Mr. Talbott 
in his position as ambassador at large have had the consequence of 
weakening Russian reformers, encouraging Russians with imperial 
ambitions, and shaking our friends in East-Central Europe.
  Ordinarily, I offer great deference to Presidential nominees. My vote 
should not be construed to mean that Mr. Talbott lacks the 
qualifications to serve in this high post. It is, rather, a protest 
over the policies that have been developed and pursued.
  In this case, the vote may only be symbolic, but it is one I 
nevertheless believe should be cast.
  Mr. President I ask unanimous consent that several articles be 
printed in the Record related to some of the matters I have discussed.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

             [From the Wall Street Journal, Jan. 26, 1994]

                      Toward the Brezhnev Doctrine

                           (By Paul A. Goble)

       Today much attention will be focused on last night's State 
     of the Union message, with emphasis no doubt falling on 
     domestic issues--President Clinton's favorites. But the 
     president's foreign agenda should not be forgotten. His 
     concessions to Russian sensibilities at his meetings in 
     Brussels and Moscow earlier this month threaten to strengthen 
     rather than reduce the division of Europe and to lead to a 
     regime in Russia that could ignite a new cold war.
       In past weeks, the president has done destructive work. By 
     refusing to extend NATO membership east, out of concern that 
     it would undermine Boris Yeltsin. Mr. Clinton has in fact 
     signaled that there are still two Europes, not one. And by 
     acquiescing to Russian demands that Moscow be allowed to 
     intervene militarily in the former Soviet republics in the 
     guise of ``peacekeeping,'' he has set in motion pressures 
     that will preclude stability in the region and the 
     establishment of Russian democracy, and he has set the stage 
     for renewed Russian-American competition.
       If the first of these actions has been much discussed, the 
     second--especially its implications for Russia's neighbors, 
     for Russia itself and for us--has been largely ignored. But, 
     in fact, it is likely to have even more fateful implications. 
     Of course, no one would dispute that Russia has legitimate 
     interests in these countries that should be taken into 
     account. But we should not concede to Russia a right to 
     behave toward its neighbors in ways that we would not allow 
     any other country to get away with.
       Indeed, Russian claims of a right to intervene in former 
     Soviet ``space'' represent, as it were, a revival of the 
     Brezhnev Doctrine, the notion that the Soviet state had the 
     right to intervene in any socialist country to defend the 
     status quo. These days, virtually everyone recognizes that 
     this doctrine was harmful not only for Eastern Europe but for 
     the Soviet Union as well. Yet similarities in the current 
     scenario have not been understood by President Clinton or his 
     advisers.
       Instead, Mr. Clinton, Strobe Talbott (the president's 
     nominee for deputy secretary of state and currently a State 
     Department special adviser), and the U.S. ambassador in 
     Moscow, Thomas Pickering, have characterized Russian military 
     involvement in these countries as ``stabilizing.'' This even 
     when Russian force has been used to seize territory or 
     overthrow governments. Moreover, they have failed to respond 
     to Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev's demands that 
     Russia have the right to send ``peacekeepers'' into all 
     former Soviet republics and that the international community 
     pay for this. Mr. Kozyrev, incidentally, made this claim not 
     only in a private meeting that the Russian government has 
     denied--to the relief of Washington--but in a Jan. 14 article 
     in the Russian army newspaper.
       As this newspaper's European edition reported early this 
     month. Mr. Clinton is prepared to be extremely solicitous to 
     Russian insistence on this point. When pressed by his 
     advisers to urge restraint on the Kremlin, Mr. Clinton 
     responded that ``you are right on the policy'' but went on to 
     say that everyone must ``understand'' what the Russians are 
     going through.
       Call for ``understanding'' are fine, but they miss the 
     point. Precisely because the states of the former Soviet 
     Union were so integrated in the past and because there are 
     not only 25 million Russians living outside the Russian 
     Federation but also 35 million non-Russians living outside 
     their home territories, the divorce between Russia and such 
     states as the Baltics needs to be clean and nonviolent. 
     Unless that happens, and unless we and the rest of the 
     international community insist that Russia behave as we would 
     expect others to behave, the risks are all too great that the 
     situation will spiral out of control and that we will see the 
     restoration of a single entity unstable within and hostile to 
     us abroad.
       The first victims will be the non-Russian states. Russian 
     pressure on the 14 new countries is already creating a 
     disaster: First, it is undermining the legitimacy of these 
     governments in the eyes of their own populations, thus 
     reducing still further their ability to manage the difficult 
     transitions we are urging on them. Second, it is leading to 
     the birth of anti-Russian nationalism among these 
     populations. When the Soviet Union collapsed, there were 
     virtually no physical attacks on Russians. Now, there are 
     likely to be, which will make Russian military intervention 
     more likely, not less. Our failure to oppose Russian military 
     intervention absolutely is reducing our influence in many of 
     these countries because their populations increasingly view 
     us as assisting the Russian reconquest.
       The next victim is Russia itself. A newly militaristic 
     Russia will mean that Russia will have to maintain a larger 
     defense sector in order to control the situation and that the 
     military will have a larger say in what goes on. Both these 
     things will make the transition to a market economy and a 
     democracy far more difficult. But the change also means that 
     Russians will not have to come to terms with their own place 
     in the world, with the fact that Russia should become a 
     country, not a cause. The strong showing of Vladimir 
     Zhirinovsky is a symptom of this, not its source, as so many 
     in the administration seem to think.
       But the final victims will be Europe and the U.S. and the 
     hopes for peace and prosperity in the future. Just as a 
     liberal and friendly Soviet Union proved to be a 
     contradiction in terms, so too will be a ``liberal'' Russian 
     empire pursuing what its defenders in Moscow and the West see 
     as a benign ``Monroeski Doctrine.'' In short, by catering to 
     Russian sensitivities, we are not doing anyone any favors--
     not the non-Russians, not Russia itself and certainly not 
     ourselves.

               [From the Washington Post, Jan. 21, 1994]

                  Permission for Kremlin Intervention

                       (By Stephen S. Rosenfeld)

       In Moscow, Bill Clinton pretty much handed off to Russia 
     the task of policing the unrest in the borderlands that 
     formerly were part of the Soviet Union. Boris Yeltsin had 
     asked the United Nations for just such a grant of ``special 
     powers.'' Clinton enunciated a kind of Clinton doctrine, one 
     applying not to restrictive standards for American 
     intervention but to permissive standards for Russian 
     intervention.
       He characterized Russia's involvement in Georgia--where in 
     fact the Russian army first contributed to and then exploited 
     the local government's duress--as ``stabilizing.'' He went on 
     to liken Russian involvement in such operations to American 
     involvement in Panama and Grenada ``and other places near our 
     area.''
       Two standards were specified: Intervention must be 
     consistent with international law, and when possible it must 
     be supported by other nations through the United Nations or 
     otherwise. But Clinton then offered a broad blanket 
     dispensation for cases where the demise of totalitarian rule 
     uncorked old conflicts; this can be read to apply to almost 
     every little war in the Russian ``near abroad.''
       The striking aspect of this pronouncement is, of course, 
     that Clinton is so much more clear and forthright about 
     Russia's intervention in situations of strife near its 
     borders than he is about America's intervention in situations 
     of strife far from its own borders.
       No less striking, he is making a gesture of great deference 
     to Yeltsin. The Russian president is under growing pressure 
     from the nationalist right to conduct a vigorous and 
     interventionist Russian foreign policy.
       Already Secretary of State Warren Christopher had observed 
     that the countries of the former Soviet Union were ``a long, 
     long ways from the United States'' and that Russia could act 
     to guarantee regional stability if it respected 
     ``international norms.''
       Little wonder, then, that days after a beaming Clinton came 
     home from Moscow, Yeltsin's foreign minister--and he is one 
     of the good guys--fudged an earlier pledge to pull all troops 
     out of the Baltics. Openly he enunciated a claim to 
     reestablish a traditional ``sphere of Russian interest'' 
     (``we should not fear the words'') in the newly independent 
     states created out of the former Soviet Union.
       This from a man--Andrei Kozyrev--who a year ago was himself 
     cautioning of a comeback by those with a ``fascist ideology'' 
     and with ``a grand vision of restoring Russia in its grandeur 
     to the borders of the former U.S.S.R.''
       Let us stipulate that it comes naturally to a country with 
     a long geopolitical reach (the United States) or an old 
     imperial habit (Russia) to assign neighborhood intervention 
     rights to the metropolitan power. Set aside the modest irony 
     of a somewhat liberal American president embracing the 
     Reagan-Bush interventions in Grenada and Panama. Set aside as 
     well the painful irony of the lapse of the American 
     interventionist urge in present-day Haiti. Policing what is, 
     whatever it is called, a sphere of interest is a familiar 
     geopolitical chore and far from an inherently reprehensible 
     one.
       What President Clinton failed to fold into his remarks in 
     Moscow, however, is the potential dark side of the current 
     Russian interventionist trend. Researchers Fiona Hill and 
     Pamela Jewett spell it out in a new Kennedy School paper 
     ``Back in the USSR.'' Moscow, pretending to good deeds, is 
     exploiting regional conflicts to destabilize its neighbors 
     and reestablish its own authority, they say; Washington is 
     ``acquiescing in the de facto reconstitution of the USSR by 
     turning its head.''
       That strikes me as an exaggerated or at least premature 
     conclusion. But it is no more exaggerated than the Clinton 
     premise that Russian interventionism is essentially a 
     civilizing force.
       The Clinton view skips past the fact that the Russian army 
     is moving not in the relatively settled geopolitical 
     conditions of Central America and the Caribbean but in an 
     anything-can-happen context where no rules reliably apply. 
     Here civilian Russian nationalism is compounded by a 
     headstrong Russian army's desperate quest for institutional 
     survival.
       Russia's policy in the near abroad is becoming more evident 
     and more unsettling. Clinton's responses are going to have to 
     be sharpened. His commitment to Yeltsin cannot be allowed to 
     extend to the point where the United States becomes by 
     default a party to the reconstruction of the Russian empire. 
     Clinton's approach to many tough foreign policy dilemmas is 
     to talk out loud about them. Let him broaden his public 
     address to this one.
                                  ____


               [From the Washington Post, Nov. 26, 1993]

                     An Earlier Tilt Toward Moscow

                       (By Stephen S. Rosenfeld)

       A Yale graduate student's obscure journal article on World 
     War II diplomacy is sending ripples through Washington. It is 
     conveying an immensely damaging blow to the reputation of a 
     lion of the American establishment and casting a trace of a 
     shadow over President Clinton's approach to the former Soviet 
     empire.
       History doctoral candidate William Larsh is the author of 
     the article on then-ambassador to Moscow W. Averell 
     Harriman's handling of the Polish question in 1943 and 1944. 
     It was published in the ``Eastern European Politics and 
     Societies'' journal of the University of California-Berkeley. 
     The late enjoy's heretofore untapped personal papers are 
     Larsh's principal source.
       I respected the service of the former New York governor, 
     Democratic presidential hopeful and longtime Washington 
     policy maker, who died in 1986. I was saddened by this fuller 
     disclosure of the American role, and his role, in Stalin's 
     consummation of a Communist takeover in a nation whose 
     liberation from Nazis was a principal Allied war aim.
       Saddened and sickened. For what the new article argues is 
     that Harriman ``fundamentally'' misread Stalin. He covertly 
     negotiated replacing the recognized Polish government in 
     exile with the Soviet dictator's Polish puppets.
       Harriman was not without high purpose: to strengthen the 
     U.S.-Soviet link at a time when the war against Germany and 
     Japan was still going strong. His hope was that Stalin, 
     having tended to Soviet security needs in the East European 
     buffer zone, would let Poles run their own internal affairs. 
     His method was to hide American diplomacy so as not to stir 
     public opinion, especially among Polish Americans.
       Only when the Red Army stood by and deliberately let the 
     German army destroy the Poles' own forces, which had risen up 
     to preempt Moscow's liberation of Warsaw, did Harriman begin 
     to alter his sanguine outlook, the young scholar Larsh 
     suggests. George Kennan wrote that this incident 
     ``shattered'' Harriman, who would repeatedly deny his own 
     daughter's allusion that he had suffered a near nervous 
     breakdown because of it.
       Harriman's chief, Franklin D. Roosevelt, evidently had to 
     similar illusions about what Stalin had in mind for Eastern 
     Europe. Harriman recorded this breathtaking note: ``On one 
     occasion in May [1944] the president had told me that he 
     didn't care whether the countries bordering Russia became 
     communized.''
       ``At that time''--Harriman goes on--``I did not have a 
     chance to indicate my views. * * *''
       Later Harriman authorized historian Herbert Feis to write 
     up his Moscow experiences. The Feis manuscript included ``a 
     sharply critical evaluation'' of Harriman on Poland, Larsh 
     says. Harriman never released it. ``Perhaps,'' Larsh 
     speculates, ``it was decided to keep the Feis synopsis under 
     lock and key because of the possible political 
     ramifications--Sen. Joseph McCarthy's accusation, among 
     others, that the Roosevelt administration had `sold Eastern 
     Europe down the river' should be kept in mind here.''
       The Harriman papers detail what Larsh describes as 
     Washington's ``wobbly and over-accommodating stance'' toward 
     Moscow in a key episode leading up to the Cold War. This new 
     presentation undercuts recent ``revisionist'' histories 
     attributing sinister anti-Soviet motives to Washington and is 
     bound to deepen historical debate.
       Political debate, too. Thanks in the first instance to 
     Yale's publicity department, the Larsh study is becoming 
     known within the Clinton administration. It is starting to 
     touch the current updated form of the enduring Western 
     question of how to deal with the weight of Moscow on the 
     European scales.
       Boris Yeltsin's Russia is vastly different from Joseph 
     Stalin's Soviet Union. It isn't communist, and it has 
     emergent democratic tendencies. But it also has resurgent 
     nationalistic and imperialistic tendencies. I want to be 
     careful not to exaggerate the threat. But today Poles and 
     others in central Europe feel a tentative double chill. From 
     the east, for instance, Yeltsin warns against East Europe's 
     being taken into NATO. From the west, the United States 
     offers what many Eastern Europeans perceive as insufficient 
     concern for their exposure to Russia.
       The NATO-membership issue is key, going to the ultimate 
     security structure of the new Europe. The Clinton 
     administration has its reasons not to invite new members in 
     right now. First it wants to settle solidly on a new NATO 
     mission; meanwhile it offers democratic Eastern Europeans a 
     lesser ``partnership.''
       But in dissenting circles inside the administration and 
     elsewhere, the suspicion lingers that Washington is again 
     tilting to Moscow at others' expense, this time to keep an 
     embattled Yeltsin upright and moving forward. The new study 
     of Harriman is a timely reminder of the perils still lying on 
     the path to European security.
                                  ____


               [From the Washington Post, Mar. 16, 1993]

          Soviet Bloc Had Detailed Plan To Invade West Germany

                            (By Marc Fisher)

       East German and Soviet planning for a military offensive 
     against West Germany was so detailed and advanced that the 
     communists had already made street signs for western cities, 
     printed cash for their occupation government and built 
     equipment to run eastern trains on western tracks, according 
     to documents found by the German military.
       Documents covering the period from the 1960s to the mid-
     1980s--as well as assault equipment found in the East German 
     communist regime's huge underground storage facilities--have 
     persuaded German military planners and historians that the 
     Soviet Bloc not only seriously considered an assault but had 
     achieved a far higher level of readiness than western 
     intelligence had assumed.
       ``We have found that the National Peoples Army [East German 
     military] made every necessary preparation to conquer and 
     occupy the west, and especially West Germany,'' Vice Admiral 
     Ulrich Weisser, chief of the planning staff for the German 
     Bundeswehr, or armed forces, said in an interview. ``Our 
     officers were deeply impressed.''
       The preparations, which were regularly updated over the 
     years, ranged from the trivial to the terrifying. East 
     Germany's military and the Stasi secret police had printed up 
     new street maps and signs for western cities. Koenigsalee, 
     Dusseldorf's tony avenue of furs, jewels and designer 
     fashions, was to be dubbed Karl Marx Allee.
       When western officers took over eastern bases after East 
     and West Germany reunited in 1990, they found more ammunition 
     for the 160,000-man East German force than the Bundeswehr had 
     for its 500,000 troops.
       In the eastern town of Lehnin, less than 30 miles from West 
     Berlin, the East German military had erected a mock western 
     city in which East German and Soviet troops practiced for the 
     invasion and street battles that would never happen. Now a 
     collection of abandoned, shell-pocked buildings, the 
     ``city'' of Scholzenslust included a school, bank, 
     courthouse, bar, hotel, rail station and subway entrances. 
     Until the Bundeswehr took control of the area, bands of 
     neo-Nazi teenagers would sneak into the town for weekend 
     training shoot-ups.
       The East German documents now being studied by the German 
     military and German historians indicate that western analysis 
     of Soviet and East German military planning may have 
     underestimated the bloc's capabilities. Not only did the 
     Warsaw Pact nations have elaborate plans for taking over West 
     Germany, but they had logistical resources well beyond what 
     western intelligence had reported.
       If a combined East German and Soviet force had moved to 
     conquer West Berlin and West Germany according to plan, the 
     west would have been initially ``outmanned, out-armed and 
     overwhelmed,'' Weisser said. ``The operational planning was 
     far more advanced than anything our intelligence had 
     envisioned. The National Peoples Army was designed to invade 
     within hours of a political decision.''
       Although historians have been inclined to take the 
     blueprints for the takeover of the west with a considerable 
     portion of salt, the East German stockpiles and other 
     physical evidence indicate a capacity well beyond anything 
     the west had expected.
       ``We found cellars full of cash that they had printed up 
     for immediate distribution in a West Germany controlled by an 
     occupation government,'' said Heinrich Weisse, the 
     Bundeswehr's deputy planning chief. ``They had already made 
     up medals, complete with designations for their officers who 
     performed well in the conquering of the west.''
       In vast cellars previously unknown to the west, according 
     to officials, the East Germans kept huge arsenals, including 
     weapons, vehicles and railroad equipment that would have 
     allowed East German rolling stock to be used immediately on 
     West German rails, which were built to different standards.
       As dreary and dilapidated as western officers found East 
     German and Soviet bases in East Germany to be after 
     reunification, there was a clear distinction between the 
     communists' care of their soldiers and their maintenance of 
     the vehicles and equipment that would be needed to invade the 
     west.
       ``The soldiers had to live in an infrastructure that was 
     left unrenovated for more than five decades,'' Weisser said. 
     ``But the tanks were kept in the best shape in warmed holding 
     areas so they could be started up immediately.''
       As late as 1985, according to Stasi documents examined by 
     Berlin historian Otto Wenzel, the East German secret police 
     prepared a detailed plan for the takeover of West Berlin, The 
     plan, written for a deputy of Stasi chief Erich Mielke, 
     described the creation of 12 neighborhood administrative 
     offices for West Berlin and laid out a battle plan for the 
     Soviet forces and East German army, border police and 
     local police who would storm through the Berlin Wall.
       On ``Day X,'' as the plan called the day of invasion, 
     specific units were assigned to tasks such as capturing U.S., 
     British and French military bases in West Berlin, shutting 
     down airports and taking over the city's radio and TV 
     stations, newspapers, museums, telephone switching stations, 
     churches and universities.
       In all, the plan envisioned 32,000 communist troops 
     invading a West Berlin that would be defended by 12,000 
     allied forces and local police.
       The plan, written in coordination with Soviet officers in 
     East Berlin, called for the Soviets to capture and hold the 
     city's most important symbols--the Brandenburg Gate and the 
     Reichstag legislature building, which the Soviets had 
     liberated from Nazi Germany at the end of World War II.
       Wenzel, writing in the Frankfurter Allgemeine newspaper, 
     said there are indications that the communists had prepared 
     lists of West Berliners--intelligence agents, police, 
     politicians, journalists and scientists with access to 
     technological secrets--who were to be arrested to prevent 
     them from leading opposition to the invasion. No such lists 
     have been found to date in the East German archives.
                                  ____


             [From the Agence France Presse, Aug. 3, 1991]

 Confirmed: Warsaw Pact Planned Nuclear, Chemical Onslaught on Western 
                                 Europe

                          (By Richard Ingham)

       Wheel to wheel, the massed armour of the Warsaw Pact 
     launches its offensive against the rich lands of western 
     Europe, knifing across the German plain towards the North 
     Sea.
       On day two the conflict goes nuclear, as Soviet commanders 
     smash through North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) troop 
     concentrations and then divide their forces.
       Polish tanks swing north to capture the Danish peninsula, 
     letting the Soviet Baltic fleet spring free into the Atlantic 
     to ravage NATO convoys. Tens of Soviet and East German 
     divisions wheel to the Southwest, towards Paris, Spain and 
     Portugal, as NATO's forces crumble or retreat in disarray.
       A nightmare scenario existing only in the minds of NATO 
     planners? A Tom Clancy novel?
       No: these were the Warsaw Pact's battle plans, seized by 
     the western German military last October, when East Germany 
     and its National People's Army (NVA) dissolved into the 
     history books.
       For NATO experts, the find is of immense historical value. 
     It enables them to check their evaluations of the threat 
     posed by the seven-nation Pact until it fell apart last year 
     after the anti-Communist revolutions of 1989.
       It also confirms their view, maintained over 40 years, that 
     the Pact was offensive-based, in contrast to its propaganda 
     image as a defensive organisation and to NATO's own strategy 
     of defence and deterrence.
       ``The threat was very serious and very real,'' says Captain 
     Walter Reichenmillar, a spokesman at the German Defence 
     Ministry. ``It was no `Potemkin village' which we dressed up 
     to alarm people.''
       ``Tonnes'' of secret documents, including maps, 
     intelligence reports and exercise evaluations, were taken 
     from eastern Germany after German unification and are now 
     being sifted by experts, Reichenmillar said.
       ``We can only make a first appraisal at this stage,'' he 
     said. ``Later, we will put together a full report and make it 
     public.''
       But some startling details have already leaked to the 
     press:
       As late as June 1990, eight months after the fall of the 
     Berlin Wall, the NVA's 5th Army carried out joint exercises 
     with the Soviet military that still rehearsed for a westward 
     offensive in northern Germany.
       The plan involved the use of chemical weapons and up to 87 
     nuclear warheads. And a similar wargame involving Soviet and 
     East German generals was planned for September, less than a 
     month before German unification.
       The overall Soviet plan centered on a gigantic offensive 
     from the ``start line'' of the inter-German border, sending 
     hundreds of thousands of men and thousands of tanks on a 20-
     pronged blitzkrieg, advancing at an average of 50 kilometers 
     (31 miles) per day.
       Options included a widening of the front to the south, 
     sending Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Soviet troops to seize 
     Yugoslavia and northern Italy.
       Each Pact member was responsible for seizing and occupying 
     a certain area of land. The NVA, for instance, was tasked 
     with administering West Germany after the victory: it even 
     printed a mountain of ``Besatzungsgeld'' (occupation money) 
     to replace the Deutsche mark. And it trained personnel, in 
     advance, to manage ``captured'' installations such as 
     airports and rail stations.
       East German troops, up to a very senior level, were kept in 
     the dark about NATO doctrine and troop strengths. Propaganda 
     was reflected even in operational maps, which depicted NATO 
     forces as poised offensively along the inter-German border, 
     and in numbers far superior to reality.
       Secrecy even extended to the overall Pact strategy, which 
     the Soviet high command jealously kept from East German 
     generals. But East German leader Erich Honecker was fully 
     briefed by the Stasi intelligence service, which gave him 
     accurate ``eyes-only'' reports unvarnished by propaganda.
       Well-informed sources who have seen the documents say they 
     contain little that surprises NATO except perhaps the Pact's 
     readiness to use nuclear weapons.
       ``We now know that they were considered an operational 
     weapon, something quite normal,'' a Bonn official said.
       NATO's doctrine is to use its atomic arsenal as a last 
     resort, to riposte to nuclear attack or a land offensive that 
     could not be stopped by conventional means.
       ``What we've had confirms what we thought,'' said Henry 
     Dodds, editor of Jane's Intelligence Review in London.
       But he was disappointed that the documents relate primarily 
     to the East German role and reveal little of what he called 
     the ``Soviet master plan.''
       ``That one takes you all the way down to Gibraltar and up 
     to the tip of Scotland,'' Dodds said. ``It's pretty 
     frightening.''

  Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I would like to speak for a few minutes 
about the pending nomination of Strobe Talbott to be Deputy Secretary 
of State, and the confirmation 15 days ago of Tom Dine. In both cases, 
I will focus on the issue of United States assistance to Russia and 
Ukraine.
  My own experience in directing a tiny part of our assistance toward 
new civilian roles for Soviet weapons scientists leads me to conclude 
that our assistance strategy is flawed and that its management needs 
overhauling. I have seldom encountered such entrenched and 
unimaginative attitudes as I found among the officials working for 
Ambassador Talbott and our Agency for International Development's NIS 
task force.
  Adjustments are already underway. Ambassador Talbott's recent shift 
in tone and focus regarding United States relations with Russia is one 
instance. A new emphasis on assistance for Kazakhstan and Ukraine is 
another. These changes help, but it is clear that the President's long 
friendship with Talbott and reliance on his advice has left Talbott 
with too little time and energy to manage the foreign aid program.
  The appointment of an experienced and decisive public figure such as 
Tom Dine to manage AID's efforts in the region is another sign that the 
administration now recognizes that it will be held fully accountable 
for the $5 billion that has been appropriated for the former Soviet 
Union.
  The amount of American assistance to Russia and the newly liberated 
nations of Central and Eastern Europe will not, as some assert, 
determine their future. It is possible, however, that mismanagement of 
our aid programs over there by the Agency for International Development 
could shatter the reputation of the United States in the nations that 
we used to call the Soviet bloc.
  The elevation of Ambassador Talbott to the position of Deputy 
Secretary of State is likely to make AID the major focus of 
accountability for assistance to Russia and Ukraine. The confirmation 
of Tom Dine as the AID official responsible for Russia and Ukraine may 
preclude a management disaster in the making and result in United 
States assistance being delivered more effectively. If the assistance 
programs already underway are not quickly brought under tight control 
and accountability, then Dine will surely have to answer for the 
scandals that will result.

  The initial euphoria about the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of 
communism is over now. The peoples of Russia and East Central Europe 
now realize that whatever dollars or D-marks that can be coaxed from 
Western purses will matter less than the evolution of their own civic 
traditions and economic strategies.
  The imminent arrival of democracy and a market economy is currently 
the foundation of our assistance strategy in the region. Confusing 
ideals with reality, democracy, and a free market are the outcome we 
often anticipate, prematurely, as the inevitable result of each 
nation's evolution. Such confusion is a sure recipe for the waste of 
both billions of tax dollars, and a unique opportunity to reduce 
tension and promote trade.
  Let me review the complex history of executive branch efforts to 
coordinate American assistance to Russia and Ukraine.
  The Bush administration had failed to take the advice of myself and 
other Senators to designate a single individual to manage Russian aid 
on a Government-wide basis, so I was hopeful that the new 
administration was doing the right thing.
  At one time, we were told that American financial and technical 
support for Russia, Ukraine, and their neighbors would be managed by 
the President's personal coordinator, Ambassador Strobe Talbott. That 
was not to be the case.
  It became clear over the course of 1993 that no single individual was 
coordinating, much less managing our aid program in Russia. It was 
commonly assumed that Strobe Talbott was in charge. He took the title 
``Special Advisor to the Secretary of State on the New Independent 
States.'' As the President came to rely on Talbott for policy advice in 
many other areas, Talbott delegated much of his management role to 
others.
  At the Department of State, two of Talbott's subordinates were 
designated as coordinators for specific functions. Our former 
Ambassador to Poland, Tom Simons, was named coordinator for United 
States Assistance to the New Independent States. Our former Deputy 
Chief of Mission in Moscow, James F. Collins, was named coordinator for 
Regional Affairs for the New Independent States. Collins is expected to 
assume Talbott's existing title and duties for assistance, although he 
is a career diplomat with none of Talbott's experience or access to the 
President.
  Programs funded outside the foreign aid appropriations bill largely 
escaped Talbott's control. Elsewhere in the Department of State, in the 
Bureau of Political- Military Affairs, Elizabeth Verville is senior 
coordinator of Nuclear Safety and Science Centers in the NIS. At the 
Department of Defense, there is a cooperative threat reduction 
coordinator, Gloria Duffey, for the Nunn-Lugar program. Yet, many 
decisions on aid to Russia were relegated to the NIS Task Force at our 
Agency for International Development, chaired by Malcolm Butler, whose 
most recent assignment was in the Philippines.

  The confirmation of Tom Dine as the AID official responsible for 
Russia and Ukraine brings a very different record and style of 
management to these programs. Tom has direct experience working 
overseas as a peace corps volunteer and leader in the Philippines, as 
well as a tour with our Embassy in India. He spent a decade working for 
Congress, including a period at the Budget Committee. As executive 
director of the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee, he presided 
over the growth of a remarkable grassroots expansion of that 
organization.
  Dine's character is exceptional. It signals a bolder attitude toward 
management of assistance to Ukraine and Russia. When others arranged 
for medical deferments to avoid military service, he volunteered for 2 
years in the Philippines between 1962 and 1964 as one of the early 
Peace Corps volunteers. He did this in the face of a physical 
disability that would have exempted him from any type of national 
service.
  Dine's personal courage and willingness to dissent from conventional 
views was demonstrated on many occasions. As a senior Democratic 
congressional staffer, he broke with an incumbent President of his 
party to support Senator Kennedy's bid for the Presidency in 1980. As 
executive director of AIPAC, Dine endorsed Middle East peace 
initiatives that were very unpopular with some of his members. In such 
instances he did what he thought was right at some risk to his career 
prospects.
  I intend to vote in favor of Strobe Talbott's nomination as Deputy 
Secretary of State. I do this because I believe that each President 
enjoys the benefit of the doubt in his subcabinet appointments. My vote 
for his nomination today is for Deputy Secretary of State. Should Mr. 
Talbott be nominated for a Cabinet post, based on his record to date, I 
would be far less likely to support him.
  Like my colleagues, I am troubled by aspects of Mr. Talbott's record. 
Like many journalists and academics specializing in Soviet matters, he 
has been wrong often. Unlike some, he has shown that he learns from his 
mistakes. He has been accessible to me in his current post, and willing 
to overturn the mistakes of his subordinates.
  Finally, I reject the notion that opposition to this nomination 
violates someone's notion of a bipartisan foreign policy. Although 
Talbott himself has shown no undue partisanship in his dealings with 
me, others in the State Department have shown little reluctance to cut 
Republicans out of timely information. For the first time in my 
experience, this year the Department's basic budget data was released 
on a partisan basis. Any Member voting against this nomination is fully 
within his or her rights. There is no bipartisan foreign policy at this 
time.
  Mr. MACK. Mr. President, the Constitution gives the Senate of the 
United States the responsibility and power to advise and consent upon 
the nomination of high Cabinet and subcabinet administration officials. 
Each Senator must decide how to exercise his or her advise or consent 
role. Generally, I believe that Senators should let the President 
choose his key advisors. I have voted to confirm almost every 
administration appointee, including many with whom I have important 
disagreements.
  There comes a point, however, when the conscience and judgment of a 
Senator demands that he or she oppose a President's choice. As a 
Senator, I cannot vote in a way that I believe would jeopardize 
fundamental American national interests.
  A number of my colleagues have spoken about Mr. Talbott's record of 
misguided foreign policy judgment over many years, and the Russia-
focused policy that resulted in the denial of NATO membership to new 
democracies in central Europe. I share their concerns, but wish to 
focus on what in my judgment is the most serious threat to our 
fundamental interest--the willingness to jeopardize the security of the 
only free and democratic American ally in the Middle East, the State of 
Israel.
  While speaking in glowing terms about an idealized Israel in the 
past, Mr. Talbott's writings, taken together, go beyond common 
criticisms to a systematic attack upon the foundations of America's 
close relationship with Israel. His views have been outside the 
American foreign policy consensus and in conflict with the policies of 
every American President over the past generation.
  Strobe Talbott has blamed Israel in part for instability in the Arab 
world, for the Lebanese civil war, for undermining our relations with 
Europe and the Arab States and Third World, and for the spread of 
Soviet influence in the Middle East. He repeatedly compared Israel's 
settlements policy to the Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iraq. He has 
largely dismissed the strategic importance of the American-Israel 
alliance, suggested that Israel could become a net liability to the 
United States, and suggested cuts in military aid to Israel.
  When asked to explain these views in his confirmation hearing, 
Ambassador Talbott dismissed his own writings as deviations from his 
real views in the heat of forensic and journalistic battle.
  What does Ambassador Talbott mean when he says ``in the heat of 
battle''? Does he mean he was so passionate about punishing a 
democratic ally for policies he disagreed with that he could not 
control himself?
  Does he mean that he was highly irresponsible as a prominent 
journalist, but he would not be so as a top policymaker?
  Does he mean that as a top Time magazine correspondent he used words 
sloppily, but he would not be so sloppy as a public official?
  This is like Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. Mr. Hyde, the out-of-control 
journalist, transforms magically into Dr. Jekyll, the responsible 
public official. When Strobe Talbott is a journalist, he writes some of 
the most anti-Israel essays in any mainstream media. But what if he 
becomes Deputy Secretary of State? What assurance do we have that if 
there is a change in Israeli Government or policies that he won't turn 
back into Mr. Hyde?
  Mr. Talbott says he no longer believes that the United States should 
cut military aid to Israel to punish Israel for actions taken to 
protect her security, such as the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor. 
He said he no longer believes that Israel was ``a dubious asset, on the 
way to becoming an outright liability.'' Why has he changed his mind?
  At the confirmation hearing Mr. Talbott gave no explanation as to why 
he changed his mind, only that his former views were temporary 
aberrations from his core views. But this aberration continued from 
1981 all the way to 1990, when Talbott applauded President Bush for 
linking loan guarantees for Israel to Israeli policy on settlements. 
The more the administration pressured Israel, the happier Strobe 
Talbott was.
  Which is the true Strobe Talbott? The Strobe Talbott of a decade of 
essays in Time magazine or the Strobe Talbott of this week's 
confirmation hearings? This is what is called a confirmation 
conversion. It was not a convincing one for me.
  Our foreign policy must be rooted in the principles of freedom, 
democracy, justice, and human rights. We cannot afford to have someone 
at or near the helm of the ship of state who will in the heat of the 
moment toss aside these principles to the detriment of our own 
interests and those of our key allies.
  I would urge Members to focus on what is at stake here. This week's 
New Republic magazine cover story describes Ambassador Talbott as our 
next Secretary of State. This is not just a vote for Deputy Secretary 
of State, as important as that is. Strobe Talbott will be, from day 1, 
not a manager of the Department, but a surrogate Secretary of State. 
Second, there is good chance that someday he will be nominated to be 
Secretary of State himself.
  If he is one day nominated to Secretary of State, it will be very 
difficult for Senators, who voted to confirm twice before, to vote 
against him on the third vote.
  If you are a strong supporter of Israel's freedom security, and you 
believe that Strobe Talbott's conversion to such support is sincere, 
you should vote for him. But if you believe that as Secretary of State 
Strobe Talbott's passion for pressuring Israel will probably emerge--
now is the time to vote against his nomination.
  Now is the time to end an unequivocal signal that the Senate will 
reject the notion of an American Secretary of State who has, at best, 
an enormous blind spot when it comes to America's fundamental national 
interests in the Middle East, and in particular, our interest in a 
strong, secure, and free State of Israel.
  Mr. COATS. Mr. President, today I will oppose the nomination of 
Strobe Talbott for Deputy Secretary of State. This is not a decision I 
make lightly nor one I make for solely philosophical differences. In 
general, I am disposed to give great deference to Presidential 
nominations.
  However, I have serious reservations about Mr. Talbott serving in 
such a high policy position in the U.S. Government. There is no doubt 
that Ambassador Talbott is an intellectual with experience in foreign 
policy arena particularly in Russia. However, I have found that Mr. 
Talbott's judgment as expressed in numerous articles to be severely 
flawed. His opinions particularly on Israel and on the Soviet Union are 
disturbing. In his writings over the last decade he was remarkably 
shortsighted in his failure to recognize the importance of Israel to 
the security interests of the United States. He challenged every 
Reagan/Bush initiative which heralded us to successfully triumph over 
the Soviet threat.
  Today, Ambassador Talbott says that he believes the breakup of the 
Soviet Union was inevitable. He opposed the U.S. defense buildup of the 
eighties. He opposed the MX missile, the B-1 and B-2 bombers and 
Trident II submarine-launched missile programs. He also opposed the 
placement of Pershing missiles in Europe. Mr. Talbott attributes the 
collapse of the Soviet State to ``internal contradictions and pressures 
within the Soviet Union and the Soviet system itself.'' He fails to 
acknowledge the primacy of Western resolve in precipitating the 
downfall of the Soviet Union. Today, former Soviet military leaders 
attribute tough minded United States defense policies for a major role 
in the demise of the Soviet State.
  In 1990 Talbott wrote that:

       For more than four decades, western policy was based on a 
     grotesque exaggeration of what the U.S.S.R. could do if it 
     wanted to. The doves in the great debate of the past 40 years 
     were right all along.

  But while Talbott opposed our defense buildup he seemed to cast a 
blind eye to the Soviet modernization program and their involvement in 
exporting revolution. He called the potential dangers of a Soviet Union 
attack on Western Europe paranoid fantasy. Instead he favored detente 
and arms control--exclusively. President Reagan's vision of providing 
real defense for the American people, the strategic defense initiative, 
would only interfere with arms control success, in his opinion.
  Strobe Talbott in 1985:

       Star Wars is a dream of total safety, of a world without 
     missiles and MIRV's. Dreams are not the stuff of which 
     bargaining chips are made. * * * If Reagan holds firm on 
     Star Wars, he might as well abandon his pursuit of drastic 
     reductions in existing Soviet weaponry.

  His writings about Israel are equally troubling, demonstrating a 
pattern of anti-Israel views. In 1981 he called Israel ``well on its 
way to becoming not just a dubious asset but an outright liability to 
American security interests, both in the Middle East and worldwide.'' 
He called the proposition that Israel has ever been a strategic ally a 
delusion.
  In 1990, he likened Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait to Israel's 
continued occupation of the West Bank. Talbott's writings are sharply 
critical or Israel's retention of the territories seized during the Six 
Day War. He attributes the complex problems of the Arab States on 
United States support of Israel and Israeli occupation of the 
territories. Talbott also suggests that the United States reduce its 
security commitment to Israel.
  He call on the United States in 1981 ``to engage Israel in a debate 
over the fundamental nature of their relationship. If that means 
interfering in Israeli internal politics, then so be it.''
  His opinions about Israel are remarkably clear upon reading his 
columns. Despite these statements, at his recent confirmation hearing, 
he recanted what he had written by saying that he has ``always believed 
that a strong Israel is in America's interest because it serves the 
cause of peace and stability in the region.'' He added that he doesn't 
feel the same way today as he did 13 years ago. It bothers me that a 
man can so easily change from a decade of strongly expressed opinions.
  Mr. President, I am concerned that Ambassador Talbott has 
consistently demonstrated deeply flawed judgment on two vital areas of 
United States strategic interest: our past relationship with Communist 
Soviet Union and our interest in a strong Israel for a stable Middle 
East. For this reason, I will oppose his nomination for Deputy 
Secretary of State.
  Mr. BURNS. Mr. President, I rise today in opposition to the 
nomination of Mr. Strobe Talbott of Ohio for Deputy Secretary of State.
  Today the Senate is undertaking one of its most important functions, 
as we prepare to vote on the confirmation of a Presidential nominee. 
This is serious business. While our President has the privilege of 
nominating his choice for the top jobs in Government, the Senate has 
the duty to ensure that his choice is the best choice for America.
  After deep consideration of this nomination I feel that Mr. Strobe 
Talbott is not the best choice. I took a long time in reviewing his 
record and his ability to fulfill the requirements of the No. 2 slot at 
State. After a thorough study of his previous writings. I have several 
concerns about his nomination.
  As a journalist, Mr. Talbott has a long history of recorded thoughts 
on U.S. foreign policy. He has said that he has changed his mind on 
some of his writings and some of my colleagues say they can understand 
this. I don't understand how ideas and thoughts on issues written 
repeatedly over a long period of time can suddenly change overnight. 
While his writings on the former Soviet Union have proven to be dead 
wrong, they ruled his decisions in his last position as Ambassador at 
Large for the former Soviet Union.
  As Ambassador at Large for the former Soviet Union, he was 
responsible for drafting United States policy toward Russia. I am not 
convinced that he was not more of a hindrance than a helping hand while 
he was in Moscow.
  I also have grave concerns about his ability to handle the job of 
Deputy Secretary of State. Mr. Talbott has never held a position in 
management in a large organization at any point in his career. The 
State Department needs a proven manager who is capable of streamlining 
the huge bureaucracy and reigning in costs to bring it into the post-
cold-war era.
  The Secretary of State is responsible for policy making. The State 
Department needs an effective manager capable of handling 
administrative responsibilities--not another policy wonk. Strobe 
Talbott may know how to write about policy from his old job in 
journalism, but is that what we need, or want?
  I don't believe Mr. Strobe Talbott has the wisdom, foresight, and 
experience required for the No. 2 job at the Department of State. As I 
am not completely satisfied that he is the right choice for this 
important job, I plan to cast a vote against his confirmation when the 
Senate votes.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I want to make a few brief remarks in 
connection with the nomination of Strobe Talbott to serve as Deputy 
Secretary of State.
  This is an important position which requires the incumbent to step in 
for the Secretary of State in his absence and participate in broad-
ranging policy decisions at the Department. At the same time, the 
occupant of this Office must have the capability to run a huge and 
complex bureaucracy which stretches around the globe.
  During consideration of the Talbott nomination, before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, some questions were raised about Mr. 
Talbott's views on the Middle East and, in particular, whether he might 
harbor ill will toward the State of Israel or be insensitive to her 
security needs and the potential threats she faces in the region. These 
questions were raised because of several articles Mr. Talbott wrote 
about the region during his tenure as a journalist at Time magazine. 
These articles are disturbing and provocative and contain views with 
which I strongly disagree.
  Mr. President, in seeking additional information about Mr. Talbott's 
views on Middle Eastern issues, I have reviewed the hearing record of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which was charged with 
initially reviewing the Talbott nomination.
  I also sought out Mr. Talbott personally to discuss his perspectives 
on the Middle East and the policies he would be responsible for 
implementing. I questioned him closely about his views on these issues 
and his past writings. I sought to satisfy myself that he could 
discharge these important responsibilities in a manner with which I 
felt comfortable and which is consistent with Clinton administration 
policy on the Middle East.
  I also spoke directly to President Clinton about the nomination. 
President Clinton reassured me in the strongest possible terms that 
United States policy regarding Israel is set in the White House and 
that both his Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary of State are 
charged by him to carry out his policy. He assured me that the United 
States--Israel relationship will remain strong in the future because it 
is based on our mutual security needs.
  Mr. President, I have satisfied myself that Mr. Talbott should be 
confirmed to serve as Deputy Secretary of State. As a senior member of 
the Senate Foreign Operations Subcommittee on Appropriations, I intend 
to stay in close touch with him on issues of concern and will certainly 
respond quickly should I find any evidence of bias or imbalance in his 
discharge of his duties.
  Secretary Christopher has listed the Middle East as one of the 
Clinton administration's top foreign policy priorities. I commend the 
President and the Secretary for the diligence with which they have 
sought peace in the Middle East and for the strong and consistent 
support they have provided to Israel, our strongest ally in the region.
  Mr. President, when Mr. Talbott testified before the Foreign 
Relations Committee earlier this month, he pledged himself to fully 
adhere to the administration's policies in the region. He was 
questioned closely by Senators Biden and Sarbanes, among others on that 
score. They probed the rationale behind some of his earlier writings 
and questioned him about his views on the Middle East and the United 
States-Israeli relationship.
  During these hearings, and in conversations with me and others, he 
has clarified his views and stated clearly and emphatically that he 
will implement administration policies. He's indicated that he 
understands the importance of Israel to United States national security 
interests and the special relationship that exists between our two 
countries based on strategic interests, shared democratic values, and 
historic ties.
  Let me quote from Mr. Talbott's testimony:

       First, I have always believed that the U.S.-Israeli 
     relationship is unshakable. Second, I have always believed 
     that a strong Israel is in America's interest because it 
     serves the cause of peace and stability in the region. Third, 
     I am proud to be part of an Administration that has already 
     done so much to promote a comprehensive peace in the area, 
     and I look forward to assisting Secretary Christopher in any 
     way I can to keep that process moving forward.

  Mr. President, I disagree strongly, even vehemently, with some of the 
things Mr. Talbott wrote in the past. But, I am impressed by that 
unequivocal testimony and am prepared to accept that Mr. Talbott meant 
what he said to the committee. In conversation this morning, Mr. 
Talbott conveyed to me an appreciation of the importance of the United 
States-Israeli relationship and an understanding of the unique 
challenges Israel faces.
  Mr. President, Strobe Talbott and I had a good, frank talk. I believe 
that he will be faithful to the spirit, as well as the letter, of 
President Clinton's policies in the Middle East and that he will do all 
he can to move the peace process forward in a manner that protects 
Israel's security needs.
  Mr. President, President Clinton has forged the strongest ties with 
Israel of any recent President and is committed to forging a peace 
accord that protects Israel from threats to her sovereignty and safety. 
All of us hope for a resolution of the age-old conflicts in the Middle 
East. The nations of that war-torn region would benefit enormously from 
a peace that is genuine, stable, and enduring. So would the United 
States, which now provides substantial foreign aid and military 
assistance to Israel and some of her Arab neighbors.
  Mr. President, today we are closer to a Mideast peace than we have 
been since the birth of Israel. I commend the President for his 
constructive role and encourage him to continue to serve as a catalyst 
to a peace that can bring with it stability and growing prosperity for 
the entire region, and, accordingly, I will support his nominee for the 
position of Deputy Secretary of State.
  Mr. PELL. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, Ambassador Strobe Talbott has a 
distinguished career and is well qualified to do an outstanding job in 
the post of Deputy Secretary of State. He has recently demonstrated his 
ability to promote democratic reform in Russia and the other New 
Independent States.
  Ambassador Talbott has stated his support for Israel's democracy. He 
has indicated that he has always believed that the United States-
Israeli relationship is unshakable.
  As a journalist, Ambassador Talbott has naturally expressed several 
different points of view in his over 20 years of covering international 
foreign policy affairs. However, any close, unbiased reading of his 
writing reveals an acute sensitivity and understanding of world affairs 
and the national best interests of the United States.
  He has the full and complete confidence of the President and the 
Secretary of State. He brings to the office of Deputy Secretary of 
State a broad understanding of the international scene and the 
importance of our relationship with our allies in promoting world peace 
and the national security of the United States.
  He is eminently qualified to successfully assist Secretary 
Christopher in establishing and carrying out the difficult and 
important international task which our country must now undertake in 
creating a new foreign policy framework for our role in a turbulent 
post-cold-war world.
  I intend to support Ambassador Talbott's nomination and I urge my 
colleagues to vote for his confirmation.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I believe I have 2 or 3 minutes remaining. 
I yield my time.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I believe I have some larger number of 
minutes. In any case, I yield my time.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time is yielded.
  The question is: Will the Senate advise and consent to the nomination 
of Strobe Talbott of Ohio to be Deputy Secretary of State? On this 
question, the yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call 
the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk called the roll.
  Mr. FORD. I announce that the Senator from Arkansas [Mr. Pryor] and 
the Senator from West Virginia [Mr. Rockefeller] are necessarily 
absent.
  Mr. SIMPSON. I announce that the Senator from Utah [Mr. Bennett] is 
necessarily absent.
  I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Utah 
[Mr. Bennett] would vote nay.
  The result was announced--yeas 66, nays 31, as follows:

                       [Rollcall Vote No. 46 Ex.]

                                YEAS--66

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Boren
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     Danforth
     Daschle
     DeConcini
     Dodd
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Exon
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Graham
     Gregg
     Harkin
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Hollings
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kassebaum
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lugar
     Mathews
     Metzenbaum
     Mikulski
     Mitchell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Nunn
     Pell
     Pressler
     Reid
     Riegle
     Robb
     Sarbanes
     Sasser
     Shelby
     Simon
     Stevens
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wofford

                                NAYS--31

     Bond
     Brown
     Burns
     Coats
     Cochran
     Cohen
     Craig
     D'Amato
     Dole
     Durenberger
     Faircloth
     Gorton
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Hatch
     Helms
     Hutchison
     Kempthorne
     Lott
     Mack
     McCain
     McConnell
     Murkowski
     Nickles
     Packwood
     Roth
     Simpson
     Smith
     Specter
     Thurmond
     Wallop

                             NOT VOTING--3

     Bennett
     Pryor
     Rockefeller
  So, the nomination was confirmed.

                          ____________________