[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 15 (Tuesday, February 22, 1994)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E]
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[Congressional Record: February 22, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                E X T E N S I O N   O F   R E M A R K S


         (OMITTED FROM THE RECORD OF FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1994)

                  THE PIN-STRIPE APPROACH TO GENOCIDE

                                 ______


                               speech of

                          HON. FRANK McCLOSKEY

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                       Friday, February 11, 1994

  Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to submit a very important 
statement on Bosnian policy development by Richard Johnson, a very 
dedicated and able State Department officer.
  The statement follows:

                  The Pin-Stripe Approach to Genocide

                          (By Richard Johnson)

       My thesis here is a simple one: senior U.S. Government 
     officials know that Serb leaders are waging genocide in 
     Bosnia, but will not say so in plain English because this 
     would raise the pressures for U.S. action.
       Since late summer 1992 the Executive Branch of the U.S. 
     Government, under both the Bush and Clinton Administrations, 
     has come under significant pressure to make an unequivocal 
     determination that the Serb campaign in Bosnia constitutes 
     genocide under the 1948 UN Genocide Convention.\1\
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     Footnotes at end of article.
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       External pressures have come from the U.S. media, human 
     rights organizations, American Jewish and Moslem advocacy 
     groups, prominent foreign policy experts, members of 
     Congress, the Bosnian government, and from states friendly to 
     Bosnia at UN fora including the UN General Assembly, the UN 
     Commission for Human Rights, and the June 1993 UN World 
     Conference on Human Rights in Vienna.\2\
       Internal pressures have come from lower and middle-level 
     Foreign Service Officers (FSO's) with line responsibilities 
     for U.S. policy on Bosnia, other FSO's who have used the 
     State Department's dissent channel mechanism to press their 
     views, and the four FSO's who subsequently resigned to 
     protest U.S. policies.\3\
       These pressures have triggered a number of statements by 
     senior State Department officials and by the President, 
     particularly since December 1992, that implicitly or 
     explicitly address the issue of whether genocide is underway 
     in Bosnia.\4\
       Some of these come very close to saying yes. However, none 
     make a clear and unequivocal determination that Serb leaders 
     are waging genocide in Bosnia, and that the moral and legal 
     obligations of the Genocide Convention apply. Instead, 
     Administration statements have typically asserted that the 
     Serb campaign ``borders on genocide,'' or that ``certain 
     actions'' by ``Bosnian Serbs'' have been ``tantamount to 
     genocide'' or constitute ``acts of genocide.''\5\ There are 
     two hypothetical explanations for such equivocation.
       One is that further collection and assessment of evidence 
     is needed before a clear determination can be made, 
     particularly with regard to intent (e.g., do Serb leaders and 
     their forces seek to destroy a substantial part of the 
     Bosnian Moslem population, or rather to displace it, or does 
     the mass murder by Serb forces stem from a systematic plan or 
     from a coincidence of local decisions by local commanders?) 
     and responsibility (can responsibility be traced up to 
     Bosnian Serb political and military leaders, and to Serb 
     leaders in Serbia, and with what degree of conclusiveness?).
       Several State and NSC officials put forward this 
     explanation to the author, in more or less explicit terms. 
     These officials would often also assert that the genocide 
     issue may be of moral and historical interest, but is not of 
     operational importance in terms of pursuing justice (war 
     crimes are easier to prove than genocide) or ending the 
     killing in Bosnia (through a ``negotiated settlement'').\6\
       However, some of these as well as other State officials 
     also acknowledge that policy-makers at the White House and in 
     State have shown little interest in clearing up the questions 
     that supposedly stand in the way of an unequivocal finding of 
     Serb genocide in Bosnia. There has never been a Presidential 
     or NSC directive to State and other intelligence agencies to 
     conduct research and analysis aimed at establishing whether 
     there is a good case against Milosevic et al. for genocide in 
     Bosnia. Nor has there been any mobilization of resources to 
     this end. The human resources applied to the Bosnia war 
     crimes issue at State and CIA have been minimal, and have 
     declined at State in 1993. The personnel involved have been 
     tasked more with recording specific war crimes than with 
     tracking the responsibility for such war crimes to the Serb 
     leadership.\7\
       The other explanation is that policy-makers have opted for 
     equivocation because an explicit, unequivocal determination 
     that genocide is underway in Bosnia, and that 
     Milosevic, Karadzic and their military commanders are 
     responsible, would produce more political pressure to take 
     effective action, including the use of force, to end and 
     punish the genocide. At a minimum, such a determination 
     would undermine the credibility of Western policies that 
     rely on UN/EC-mediated ``peace talks'' to reach a 
     ``voluntary settlement'' between ``warring factions''--who 
     would now be defined as the perpetrators and victims of 
     genocide. This explanation is supported by the following 
     elements of the Executive Branch treatment of this issue 
     since fall 1992.\8\
       The most explicit, forward-leaning Administration positions 
     have never been followed up with consequent actions. In 
     August 1992 State confirmed that Serb-run ``detention 
     centers'' in Bosnia featuring systematic killing and torture 
     were a significant problem.\9\ State then initiated a process 
     of submitting data on war crimes in Bosnia to the UN War 
     Crimes Commission. However, lead action on compiling these 
     submissions was assigned to an FSO in the Human Rights Bureau 
     with no prior knowledge of Balkan affairs, and a short-term 
     State intern just out of college: hardly a commitment of 
     personnel and expertise commensurate to the recognized 
     gravity of the issue.\10\
       In mid-December 1992, Acting Secretary Eagleburger broke 
     new ground in drawing parallels between Serb behavior in 
     Bosnia and Nazi behavior, naming senior Serb leaders as 
     bearing responsibility for war crimes and crimes against 
     humanity in Bosnia, and citing some of the questions they 
     should face. However, his public statements were not followed 
     up by any internal taskings within State or to CIA to build 
     up cases against these leaders.\11\
       In mid-December 1992 the United States also voted for a UN 
     General Assembly resolution on Bosnia which, among other 
     things, stated that Serb ``ethnic cleansing'' in Bosnia is a 
     form of genocide.\12\ However, the Executive Branch never 
     followed up by citing or using this determination as a basis 
     for Western policies. Similarly, in June 1993 the United 
     States supported an appeal of the UN World Conference on 
     Human Rights to the UN Security Council to take ``necessary 
     measures to end the genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina . . 
     .'' However, the U.S. took no subsequent action on the basis 
     of this appeal and its finding of genocide. Indeed, as of 
     December 1993, an official at State Department Bureau of 
     Human Rights was unable to locate a copy of the Conference 
     appeal in office files, and described it as something the 
     Department viewed as ``not really an official act of the 
     Conference.''\13\
       More equivocal statements tend to be made by more senior 
     officials in high-profile fashion. Less equivocal statements 
     are made by lesser officials in lower-profile fashion. The 
     President has, largely in response to questioning, repeatedly 
     drawn some degree of analogy between the Holocaust and the 
     present mass extermination of Bosnians. But he has chosen 
     never explicitly to address whether Serb leaders are engaged 
     in genocide.\14\ Warren Christopher volunteered during his 
     confirmation hearings that the Serb campaign of ``ethnic 
     cleansing'' was resulting in ``near genocidal or perhaps 
     really genocidal conditions.''\15\ But he has never raised 
     the issue since becoming Secretary, and his most extensive 
     comments on the matter since then, under questioning on May 
     18, 1993, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, are 
     also the most equivocal presentation by any Administration 
     official since the beginning of the war in Bosnia.\16\ These 
     comments triggered an extraordinary memo to the Secretary 
     from the Acting Assistant Secretary for Human Rights 
     reminding the Secretary that Serb and Bosnian Serb forces 
     were responsible for the vast majority of war crimes in 
     Bosnia.\17\
       The most straight-forward statement by a senior official of 
     the Clinton Administration has also been the most obscure: a 
     mid-November written submission to a House subcommittee in 
     response to a question taken by State Counselor Wirth five 
     months earlier, stating that ``The Department of State does 
     believe that certain acts committed as part of the systematic 
     Bosnian Serb campaign of `ethnic cleansing' in Bosnia 
     constitute acts of genocide.''\18\
       Secretary Christopher has opted out of the Bosnia genocide 
     issue since May. Persistent questioning by Congressman 
     McCloskey has been the primary trigger of Administration 
     review of this issue since April 1, when McCloskey got 
     Christopher to promise him a clear determination as to 
     whether the Serb campaign in Bosnia is genocide under the 
     Convention.\19\ How to respond to McCloskey's question (and 
     his repeated follow-ups) was a recurrent issue among the 
     Bureaus of European Affairs, Human Rights, Intelligence and 
     Research, International Organizations, Congressional 
     Relations, and the Office of the Legal Advisor, and between 
     these offices and the ``seventh floor'' (i.e., the Secretary 
     and his senior advisors) from April to October. On October 13 
     the Secretary finally approved an action memo which had been 
     redrafted numerous times, and which would authorize the 
     Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations to sign a 
     letter to McCloskey using the language subsequently used in 
     State's mid-November submission to the House cited above. 
     However, the Secretary annulled his approval of the proposed 
     letter to McCloskey after the latter called for his 
     resignation in mid-October.
       In a subsequent exchange with McCloskey during a House 
     Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, Christopher chose not to 
     respond to McCloskey's question on the genocide issue. 
     Instead, the Secretary charged that McCloskey's views on 
     Bosnia would require several hundred thousand U.S. ground 
     troops, asserted that McCloskey's emotions were clouding his 
     judgment, and rejected any further ``debate'' with McCloskey 
     on Bosnia.\20\
       Seventh-floor policy makers at State have repeatedly 
     rejected efforts by the Bureaus to have them make less 
     equivocal statements of genocide in Bosnia.\21\ On April 1, 
     perhaps in response to McCloskey's questions to Christopher, 
     outgoing State Department spokesman Boucher instructed then-
     Bosnia desk officer Harris to draft a strong statement by the 
     Secretary on genocide in Bosnia. Harris's draft, dated April 
     2, was cleared by all the relevant Bureaus and submitted to 
     the Office of the Spokesman. It included the assertion that 
     ``The United States Government believes that the practice of 
     `ethnic cleansing' in Bosnia includes actions that meet the 
     international definition of genocide as well as constitute 
     other war crimes.'' The statement was never issued; Harris 
     believes it was killed by incoming Department spokesman 
     Donilon, in consultation with the Secretary.
       Similar language was again cleared by the relevant Bureaus 
     in September in one iteration of the proposed response to 
     McCloskey's April question to the Secretary; this draft was 
     also rejected by the seventh floor.\21\
       Senior policy-makers do not have better information about 
     realities in the Balkans than do the lesser officials who 
     have sought to bring them to make clearer statements on 
     genocide. Some light on their thinking in rejecting Bureaus' 
     recommendations is shed by comments made by Under Secretary 
     Tarnoff and Counselor Wirth at an April 28, 1993 State 
     Department luncheon for Elie Weisel.
       Weisel argued that whether or not genocide was underway in 
     Bosnia, the Serb concentration camps and mass murders there 
     constituted a moral imperative for decisive outside 
     intervention. Tarnoff took Weisel's point but noted that 
     failure in Bosnia would destroy the Clinton Presidency. Wirth 
     agreed with Weisel that the moral stakes in Bosnia were high, 
     but asserted that there were even higher moral stakes at 
     play: ``the survival of the fragile liberal coalition 
     represented by this Presidency.''\22\


                               conclusion

       The story told above is one of many failures. Senior 
     policy-makers have failed to level with the American people 
     on the nature of the moral and security challenge the United 
     States faces in the Balkans. Lesser officials have failed to 
     resist the obfuscation of their seniors. Outside the 
     Executive Branch, the broad range of interested observers who 
     see Milosevic's campaign for a Greater Serbia as an instance 
     of genocidal aggression that the United States must confront 
     have failed to apply coherent and sustained pressure to force 
     at least a straightforward Executive Branch statement on the 
     genocide issue.
       I draw no constructive lessons from these failures except 
     that avoiding them requires a series of moral choices by 
     individuals. Those made by senior policy-makers with the most 
     influence in defining the challenges America faces are most 
     momentous. But all, cumulatively, make a difference.


                               FOOTNOTES

     \1\Under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
     of the Crime of Genocide, to which the United States, the 
     successor states to former Yugoslavia, and some 100 other 
     countries are parties, ``genocide'' is defined to include any 
     of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in 
     whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious 
     group: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious 
     bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) 
     deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
     calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole 
     or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births 
     within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the 
     group to another group.
     The Convention is a specific response to Nazi extermination 
     practices during World War II.
     \2\The author is compiling a list of prominent persons, 
     groups, governments, and international fora that have defined 
     Serb behavior in Bosnia as genocide, and will make it 
     available on request.
     \3\The author is personally aware that in December 1992 three 
     FSO's who had shared responsibility for Yugoslav affairs 
     between 1990 and 1992 used the dissent channel to press for a 
     State determination that Milosevic was engaged in genocide in 
     Bosnia; that in April 1993 twelve FSO's actively engaged in 
     Bosnia policy submitted a letter to the Secretary which among 
     other things described the conflict in Bosnia as Serb 
     genocide; and that the four FSO's who have resigned in 
     protest--George Kenney in August 1992 and Marshall Harris, 
     Steve Walker, and Jon Western in August 1993, have all 
     defined the war as genocide.
     \4\See compendium at Tab A, drawn from White House, State 
     Department and Congressional public documents and the U.S. 
     media.
     \5\Several officers currently and formerly in State's Office 
     of the Legal Advisor have told the author that there is no 
     legal difference between saying starkly that ``what has 
     happened is genocide,'' and saying less starkly that ``what 
     has happened is tantamount to genocide'' or ``what has 
     happened are acts of genocide.'' The ``tantamount to'' 
     formulation appears to have originated on the Seventh floor.
     \6\Author's December 1993 interviews with sixteen current and 
     former State employees ranging from desk officers to Deputy 
     Assistant Secretaries, and with NSC European Affairs Director 
     Jenonne Walker in May 1993. In December 1993, Walker declined 
     to discuss U.S. policy process on the issue of genocide in 
     Bosnia with the author, on the grounds that it was ``too 
     sensitive.''
     \7\ibid.
     \8\This explanation is also advanced by many of the sixteen 
     current and former FSO's interviewed by the author for this 
     essay.
     \9\See President Bush's August 6, 1992 remarks on 
     ``Containing the Crisis in Bosnia and in Former Yugoslavia'' 
     and Acting Secretary Eagleburger's August 5, 1992 statement 
     ``Detention Centers in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Serbia'' in 
     Dispatch, U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, 
     August 10, 1992; and George Kenney, ``See No Evil,'' in The 
     Washington Monthly, November 1992. Kenney underlines senior 
     State officials' resistance to investigating, confirming, or 
     publicizing Serb atrocities in Bosnia, and their efforts to 
     minimize U.S. media attention to them.
     \10\Author's interview with the State Human Rights Bureau 
     action officer and the former intern in question.
     \11\See Secretary Eagleburger's December 16, 1992 statements 
     in Dispatch, U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public 
     Affairs, December 28, 1992. The absence of follow-up taskers 
     was confirmed to the author in interviews with the current 
     and former FSO's cited above.
     \12\See United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/47/92 of 
     December 17, 1992, passed 102 for (including the U.S.), 57 
     abstentions, and none against, which holds Serbian and 
     Montenegrin forces responsible for aggression and for ``the 
     abhorrent policy of `ethnic cleansing,' which is a form of 
     genocide . . .''
     \13\Author's interviews with State Human Rights Bureau 
     officers, December 1993. Notwithstanding State's unofficial 
     views as to the unofficial status of the Conference's appeal, 
     it was in fact forwarded by Alois Mock, President of the 
     World Conference on Human Rights, to the President of the UN 
     Security Council on June 16, 1993, as a decision of the 
     Conference.
     \14\For texts of the President's and Secretary's statements, 
     see compendium at Tab A.
     \15\See New York Times, January 14, 1993, cited in compendium 
     at Tab A.
     \16\See Christopher's May 18 comments in compendium at Tab A, 
     including the insinuation that Bosnian Moslems are suspected 
     of genocide themselves. Several State officials have told the 
     author that they were flabbergasted by Christopher's remarks 
     on atrocities and genocide in Bosnia in his May 18 House 
     Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing, and that these remarks 
     bore no relationship to expert and consensus views within 
     State on those issues. One State official has told the author 
     that late on May 17, the Secretary's office sought urgent 
     information from the Human Rights Bureau on Bosnian Moslem 
     atrocities only.
     \17\Author's interviews with current and former FSO's.
     \18\See text of Wirth statement in compendium at Tab A. This 
     statement responded to a question put to Wirth by Congressman 
     McCloskey on June 10 at a House Appropriations Subcommittee 
     meeting.
     \19\See McCloskey's April 1 question and Christopher's 
     initial response in compendium at Tab A. The author's account 
     of the reaction to McCloskey's pressures within the 
     Department is based on interviews with current and former 
     FSO's in December 1993.
     \20\See transcripts of November 4, 1993 House Foreign Affairs 
     Committee Hearing.
     \21\This and the following paragraph are based primarily on 
     the author's December 1993 interview with Marshall Harris, 
     currently foreign policy advisor to Congressman McCloskey.
     \22\The author witnessed this Weisel/Tarnoff/Wirth luncheon 
     discussion.


                                 TAB A

       December 1993--Draft State Department Human Rights for 
     Bosnia: no mention of genocide.
       November 18: State Department Counselor Wirth's response to 
     Congressman McCloskey's June 10 questions in public hearings:
       ``. . . The Department of State does believe that certain 
     acts committed as part of the systematic Bosnian Serbs 
     campaign of `ethnic cleansing' in Bosnia constitute acts of 
     genocide.''
       November 22: Secretary Christopher, Four On-the-Record 
     Interviews with European media: no mention of genocide or 
     even aggression; Bosnia treated as an issue of ``warring 
     parties'' unwilling to conclude a peace settlement.
       November 13: State Department spokesman McCurry declines to 
     comment on whether continuing siege of Sarajevo meets the 
     criteria for NATO air strikes laid down by Christopher in 
     August (i.e., ``continued strangulation'') and adds: ``Is 
     Bosnia horrifying, troubling? . . . it is no more horrifying 
     or troubling than the instances around this globe where 
     populations, because of civil strife . . . face these kinds 
     of humanitarian disasters.'' President Clinton asserts ``All 
     we can do is to try to make sure that we minimize the human 
     loss coming on for this coming winter.'' A State Department 
     official's comments: ``Who do you champion any more? It's not 
     clear.'' (Washington Post, November 13)
       November 30: Secretary Christopher addresses CSCE 
     Ministerial: no mention of genocide or aggression; Bosnia and 
     Herzegovina treated as humanitarian crisis and scene of 
     ``atrocities'' to be dealt with by UN War Crimes Tribunal.
       November 15: Assistant Secretary Oxman speech on ``Why 
     Europe Matters'': no mention of the word Bosnia, much less 
     genocide or aggression; Bosnia and Herzegovina treated as 
     ``ethnic conflict'' within borders of former Yugoslavia.
       November 9: Secretary Christopher before Senate Foreign 
     Relations Committee lists 6 US foreign policy (not including 
     Bosnia, Somalia or Haiti) (Newsday, November 5)
       November 4: Secretary Christopher before House Foreign 
     Affairs Committee dismisses Congressman McCloskey's charges 
     that USG and Christopher are ignoring genocide in Bosnia, 
     asserts ``I don't see any point in debating this subject 
     further,'' (AP, November 5, Barry Schweid); Christopher does 
     not address McCloskey's assertion that genocide is underway 
     in Bosnia; rather, Christopher asserts that McCloskey's 
     objectives require sending hundreds of thousands of US ground 
     troops to Bosnia whereas ``I don't think our vital interests 
     are sufficiently involved to do so . . .'' (Reuters, November 
     5, Carol Giacomo)
       November 5: Secretary Christopher on CNN ``the World 
     Today'', responding to Congressman McCloskey's charge that 
     the U.S. is allowing genocide in Bosnia: ``. . . We have a 
     fundamental disagreement. At the end of the day, his proposal 
     would require putting 200,000 or 300,000 American troops into 
     Bosnia to try to take the country back . . . to put it back 
     in its pre-war status. I simply disagree with that. And I 
     want the country to know, I don't think that's a good idea.''
       October 10: Secretary Christopher declines to predict 
     whether US troops will ever be sent to Bosnia to enforce a 
     peace settlement, emphasizing that ``very hard questions'' 
     will have to be answered positively by the Administration in 
     consultation with Congress (NBC ``Meet the Press'' October 
     10)
        October 21: Secretary Christopher, Questions and Answers 
     comments on Bosnia, in Hungary:
       ``. . . President Clinton has said early on and we continue 
     to say we will not try to impose a solution on the parties. 
     The U.S. is not prepared to send hundreds of thousands of its 
     troops to impose a solution on the parties that are not quite 
     ready for a solution or don't seem to be ready for a 
     solution. We're hoping the parties will come to a peaceful 
     agreement, that they will finally recognize that there is 
     only futility in the war they are pursuing . . .''
        October 5: Assistant Secretary Oxman before Senate Foreign 
     Relations Committee:
       ``Lots of innocent people are being killed. But it is a 
     complex problem that we didn't create. And our approach to it 
     has been to support a negotiated settlement. That isn't 
     jazzy, but that's our approach.''
        September 5: Assistant Secretary Oxman appears before 
     House Foreign Affairs Committee:
       ``McCloskey, who has been trying since April to get the 
     State Department to say Serb actions fit the legal 
     definitions of genocide, tried again. `Are they guilty of 
     genocide . . . a systematic policy of extermination of, you 
     know, members of a particular ethnic group?' Oxman, using 
     language previously used by Secretary of State Warren 
     Christopher, said actions `tantamount to genocide have been 
     committed.' But he did not say Serb actions fit `the 
     technical definition of genocide' under a 1948 UN 
     conventions. McCloskey said afterwards that U.S. policy 
     amounts to `putting a gun to Izetbegovic's head to accept 
     this settlement that will be the death of his country.' He 
     said the State Department was trying to evade its `moral and 
     legal obligations' to brand Serb actions as genocide and try 
     to prevent them.'' (Washington Post, September 16)
        September 9: Washington Post article on Clinton-
     Izetbegovic meeting/press conference:
       ``Clinton reaffirmed his willingness to send troops if 
     there is a `fair peace that is willingly entered into by the 
     parties . . .' But Clinton, asked about the proposal [of 
     Izetbegovic, for NATO air strikes to lift the siege of 
     Sarajevo], rejected it. `I believe all that has to be part of 
     the negotiating process. I don't think that the U.S. can 
     simply impose an element like that,' he told reporters.''
        September 9: The New York Times article on Clinton-
     Izetbegovic meeting describes Clinton Administration as 
     backing away both from threat of NATO air strikes to relieve 
     siege of Sarajevo, and from idea of NATO peacekeepers to 
     enforce settlement.
       September 3: The Washington Post:
       ``The U.S. yesterday backed efforts by Bosnia's Muslims to 
     gain more territory in the proposed partition of the country, 
     as President Clinton warned Serb and Croat forces that the 
     option of using NATO air power against them `is very much 
     alive' . . . `If while talks are in abeyance,' the President 
     added, `there is abuse of those who would seek to interfere 
     with humanitarian aid--attacking protected areas, resuming 
     sustained shelling of Sarajevo, for example--then first, I 
     would remind you that the NATO military option is very much 
     alive . . .' Clinton, asked if he intended to revive his 
     proposal for exempting Bosnia's Muslim-led government from a 
     UN arms embargo, said . . . `I have always favored lifting 
     the arms embargo. I think the policy of the UN as it applies 
     to that government is wrong,' he said. `But I am in the 
     minority. I don't know that I can prevail.'''
        September 15: Assistant Secretary Oxman appears before 
     House Foreign Affairs Committee:
       ``Rep. McCloskey. . . . As you know, since April I've been 
     trying to get an answer from State as to whether these 
     activities of the Bosnian Serbs and Serbs constitute 
     genocide. Will I get a reply on that today . . .?
       Mr. Oxman. I learned, just today, that you hadn't had your 
     response. And the first thing I'm going to do when I get back 
     to the Department is find out where that is. We'll get you 
     that response as soon as we possibly can. But to give you my 
     personal view, I think that acts tantamount to genocide have 
     been committed. Whether the technical definition of genocide 
     . . . I think this is what the letter that you're asking for 
     needs to address.''
       August 9: Statement by Secretary Christopher, released by 
     the Office of the Spokesman, August 9, 1993, ``Air strikes in 
     Bosnia-Herzegovina'':
       ``The United States is pleased by the important actions 
     taken today by the North Atlantic Council. These steps 
     significantly further the United States initiative to make 
     air power available to lift the strangulation of Sarajevo and 
     other areas, stop interference with humanitarian relief 
     operations, and promote a viable political settlement in the 
     negotiations in Geneva. At the North Atlantic Council meeting 
     last Monday, NATO unanimously made the policy decision to 
     prepare for air strikes and laid down a clear warning to 
     those responsible for the strangulation of Sarajevo and other 
     civilian areas. Today, the alliance unanimously approved a 
     thorough and detailed operational plan for air strikes 
     prepared by the NATO military committee over the last week in 
     conjunction with UNPROFOR. The plan is sound and 
     comprehensive. It sets forth the targeting identification 
     process and the command and control arrangements for air 
     strikes. With today's decision, the alliance now has in place 
     all the means necessary to take forceful action against the 
     Serbs should they not cease their intolerable behavior. The 
     unanimous decision today signals that the international 
     community will not accept the laying siege of cities and the 
     continued bombardment of civilians, the denial of 
     humanitarian assistance to people in need, or empty promises 
     as a cover for aggression. The Serbs are on notice, and 
     whether air power is used depends on their deeds.''
       June 2: AFP ``U.S. Has No Vital Interests in Bosnia: 
     Christopher'':
       ``Secretary of State Warren Christopher has said the United 
     States has no vital interests in Bosnia and that the military 
     options it backed there would not be effective. `Bosnia is a 
     human tragedy--just a grotesque humanitarian situation,' 
     Christopher said on television Tuesday as the United Nations 
     Security Council finalized plans for six protected Moslem 
     safe havens. `It does not affect our vital national interests 
     except as we're concerned about humanitarian matters and 
     except as we're trying to contain it.' He said Washington 
     still preferred lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian 
     Moslems and carrying out air strikes against Bosnian Serb 
     military forces attacking the Moslems, though he conceded the 
     air attacks alone would have limited effect . . . `If you 
     rule out ground troops, you find air power ineffective, and 
     if you define it as a humanitarian situation, then your 
     options are really much different than they would be in 
     places like Somalia where militarily it was rather simple to 
     solve problems,' Christopher said.''
       June 29: Explanation of U.S. Vote on Lifting Arms Embargo 
     Against Bosnia, Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Permanent 
     Representative to the United Nations, Statement before the UN 
     Security Council, New York City, June 29, 1993:
       ``. . . Nor should today's vote be seen as an indication 
     that the international community is willing to turn a blind 
     eye to the gross violations of human rights that have been 
     committed in Bosnia, primarily by the Bosnian Serbs. We will 
     continue to insist that, if the authorities in Belgrade want 
     to rejoin the family of nations, they will have to stop the 
     violence, stop the killing, stop their aggressive war against 
     the Bosnian state and comply with all relevant Security 
     Council resolutions. . . . Our goal remains a negotiated 
     settlement freely agreed to by all the parties.''
       June 10: House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on 
     International Security:
       ``Mr. McCloskey. . . . But specifically, what does the 
     State Department say about genocide, are they ready to state 
     that this is genocide rather than tantamount to genocide or 
     akin to----
       Mr. Wirth. We have done so. We have done so.
       Mr. McCloskey. In what document, or record, or 
     communication?
       Mr. Wirth. In supporting the Tribunal on genocide. We have 
     done so.
       Mr. McCloskey. Could I get a copy of a definitive statement 
     that genocide has occurred? Because quite frankly, I have 
     been asking Mr. Christopher for that since April 1st. Again, 
     not to be pejorative on that, but I just have not gotten a 
     reply. That would be very helpful if I could get that in the 
     next day.
       Mr. Wirth. We have, as you know, supported the war crimes 
     tribunal. And we have made statements and made clear that 
     genocidal acts have taken place.
       Mr. McCloskey. I do not want to go on about it. But to two 
     such distinguished State Department representatives here, if 
     I say by tomorrow afternoon if I could have a statement as to 
     whether the State Department believes it is genocide or not, 
     it would be helpful.
       Mr. Wirth. We will get that right back to you. Those 
     statements have been made, and we'll get it right back to 
     you.''
       May 25: ABC News Nightline Interview with the Secretary of 
     State Warren Christopher:
       ``Secretary Christopher. We're prepared to keep the 
     sanctions on until they move back from the aggression they 
     followed . . . I can blame the Bosnian Serbs for being guilty 
     of aggression. I can blame the Bosnian Serbs for being guilty 
     of a series of atrocities. They are the main perpetrator of 
     evil in atrocities by all parties. But the Bosnian Serbs are 
     subject to a lot of blame, and I will not absolve them from 
     that.
       Koppel. If they continue in their atrocities, if they 
     continue killing and raping, some of the other things that 
     they have been accused of doing--again, if I understand U.S. 
     policy correctly, you would be willing to use air power only 
     to protect the U.N. forces that are on the ground right now, 
     in effect, to get out, not to do anything about stopping the 
     atrocities. Do I misunderstand the policy?
       Secretary Christopher. No, I think that's correct. Our 
     commitment to use United States military force at the present 
     time is only to protect the U.N. forces that are there. And I 
     think that's the limit of our commitment for military power 
     at present time. We have concluded that our national 
     interests are not sufficiently engaged to use U.S. troops in 
     this situation. It's a quagmire. It's a morass. I think if 
     U.S. troops are put in there, they'll be there for an 
     indefinite period of time. It does not meet the test that 
     I've laid down for being a situation where you can define 
     your goals with care, where you have a chance of success, 
     where you have an exit strategy and it's a situation that the 
     American people would support over a long period of time.''
       May 12: Interview With Don Imus of WFAN Radio in New York 
     City, May 12, 1993:
       ``Mr. Imus. You know, I agreed with you when you said 
     during the campaign that history has shown that you can't 
     allow the mass extermination of people and just sit by and 
     watch it happen, and that really is driving this, isn't it?
       The President. Yes. It is a difficult issue. Let me say 
     that when we have people here who've been involved in many 
     previous administrations that are involved in national 
     security including, obviously, a lot of people who were 
     involved in the two previous ones, I mean, and everybody I 
     talk to believes that this is the toughest foreign policy 
     problem our country has faced in a long time. And I'm trying 
     to proceed in a very deliberate way to try to make sure there 
     isn't a Vietnam problem here. But also to try to make sure 
     that the United States keeps pushing to save lives and to 
     confine the conflict. I don't think we can just turn away 
     from this. Just because we don't want to make the mistake we 
     did in Vietnam doesn't mean we shouldn't be doing anything. 
     There are things that we can do, and we're trying to do more 
     to push this thing toward a settlement . . .
       I think there are some things that we're going to be able 
     to do with our allies that will continue to turn the pressure 
     up. But this is a European issue, as well as a world issue, 
     and I think we have to move forward with Europe . . .
       It is a very, very difficult issue, but I think that we're 
     pushing in the right direction, going in the right 
     directions, and I think the American people will support the 
     combination of clear, disciplined restraint on our part and 
     not creating a unilateral American involvement, but 
     continuing to push to end the slaughter, end the ethnic 
     cleansing and confine the conflict so that it doesn't cause 
     us a lot more problems.''
       April 21: The President's News Conference:
       ``The President. I will say what I said from the very 
     beginning. Our fundamental interests here, the United States' 
     interests, are two. We want the conflict to be contained, and 
     we want the slaughter and the ethnic cleansing to stop. We 
     believe in order to get that done ultimately there will have 
     to be some reasonable borders--some political solution to 
     this which has a reasonable territorial component. And we'll 
     just have to see what happens over the next few weeks.''
       May 14: The President's News Conference:
       ``Q. Mr. President, you've said that the United States will 
     not go it alone with military action in Bosnia. And yet, the 
     European allies have refused to sign-on to your proposals. If 
     the allies refuse to follow suit, where does that leave the 
     United States?
       The President. . . . I do not believe the United States has 
     any business sending troops there to get involved in a 
     conflict in behalf of one of the sides. I believe that we 
     should continue to turn up the pressure. And as you know, I 
     have taken the position that the best way to do that would be 
     to lift the arms embargo with a standby authority of air 
     power in the event that the present situation was interrupted 
     by the unfair use of artillery by the Bosnian Serbs. That 
     position is still on the table.
       Q. Mr. President, you said last week that if you went to 
     air power in Bosnia you would have a clear strategy and it 
     would have a beginning, middle, and end. What happens, 
     though, sir, if a plane is shot down, if you lose a pilot or 
     a couple of pilots, or if the Bosnian Serbs decide to 
     escalate the conflict, or the Serbians by going into, say, 
     Kosovo?
       The President. Well, the Bush administration before I 
     became President issued a clear warning to the Serbs that if 
     they try to occupy Kosovo and repress the Albanians there, 
     that the United States would be prepared to take some strong 
     action. And I have reaffirmed that position . . .
       Q. There seems to be a Catch 22 emerging on Bosnia. One 
     would be, you have consistently said that you want to have a 
     consensus with the U.S. allies. But until that consensus is 
     formed, you found it seems very difficult to explain to the 
     American people precisely how that war should be defined: Is 
     it a civil war? Is it a war of aggression? And also not 
     necessarily what the next step should be, but what are the 
     principles, the overriding principles that should guide you 
     as a policy? What can you tell the American people right now 
     about that?
       The President. First, that is both a civil war and a war of 
     aggression, because Bosnia was created as a separate legal 
     entity. It is both a civil war where elements of people who 
     live within that territory are fighting against each other. 
     And there has been aggression from without, somewhat from the 
     Croatians and from the Serbs, principally from the Serbs--
     that the inevitable but unintended impact of the arms embargo 
     has been to put the United Nations in the position of 
     ratifying an enormous superiority of arms for the Bosnian 
     Serbs that they got from Serbia, and that our interest is in 
     seeing, in my view at least, that the United Nations does not 
     foreordain the outcome of a civil war. That's why I've always 
     been in favor of some kind of lifting of the arms embargo, 
     that we contain the conflict, and that we do everything we 
     can to move to an end of it and to move to an end of ethnic 
     cleansing. Those are our interests there, and those are the 
     ones I'm trying to pursue. But we should not introduce 
     American ground forces into the conflict in behalf of one 
     of the belligerents, and we must move with our allies. It 
     is a very difficult issue. I realize in a world where we 
     all crave for certainty about everything, it's tough to 
     deal with, but it's a difficult issue. . . . I have a 
     clear policy. I have gotten more done on this than my 
     predecessor did. And maybe one reason he didn't try to do 
     it is because if you can't force everybody to fall in line 
     overnight for people who have been fighting each other for 
     centuries, you may be accused of vacillating. We are not 
     vacillating. We have a clear, strong policy.''
       May 18: House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing:
       ``Secretary Christopher. Mr. Ackerman, you've given me a 
     lot to answer in the few moments I have here. First, with 
     respect to the moral case that you make, one of the just 
     absolutely bewildering parts of this problem is that the 
     moral case is devastating and clear that there are 
     atrocities, but there are atrocities on all sides . . . We've 
     been filling reports with the United Nations for some time--
     we're in the seventh or eighth report of that kind. If you 
     look at those and read those, you'll find indication of 
     atrocities by all three of the major parties against each 
     other, the level of hatred is just incredible. So, you know, 
     it's somewhat different than the Holocaust; it's been easy to 
     analogize this to the Holocaust, but I never heard of any 
     genocide by the Jews against the German people. But here you 
     have atrocities by all sides which makes this problem 
     exceedingly difficult to deal with. Now, with respect to the 
     use of air power--and I will try to capsulize my responses--
     the respect in which the president has recommended a possible 
     standby use of air power is in connection with the lifting of 
     the arms embargo. We think there's a strong moral case for 
     the lifting of the arms embargo because it works to the 
     disadvantage of one party, that is, the Bosnian government. 
     The air power would be used to compensate during the 
     transition period when the Bosnians are getting some arms so 
     as to level the playing field.
       Rep. Frank McCloskey (D-Indiana). . . . I am fearful of 
     remarks that you made today positing moral equivalency, if 
     you will, as to the Serbs, the Croats, and particularly the 
     Muslims in all this, as I would rather refer to them, the 
     Bosnians. I would just advise being very careful about this. 
     You, yourself, and even more eloquently, Mr. Clinton, have in 
     the past made very good statements about what is at stake 
     here. I know, you know that my request is still pending right 
     now as to whether the Serb aggression--and they are the 
     overwhelming perpetrators of evil in all this, much more so 
     than anyone else on the scene--whether Serb aggression does 
     constitute genocide under the outlines of the U.N. 
     convention.
       That being said, I don't see how this thing moves off the 
     diplomatic dime without a clear and forceful statement from 
     President Clinton. Will he try to use, or would you advise 
     him to use the bully pulpit soon to rally the American 
     people, to rally the Congress and to rally the West as to 
     what is really at stake here, as hundreds of people continue 
     to die every day, and so far nothing stops, nothing deters 
     ongoing Bosnian Serb and Serb aggression.
       Secretary Christopher. Mr. McCloskey, thank you for the 
     question, and for giving me an opportunity to say that I 
     share your feeling that the principal fault lies with the 
     Bosnian Serbs. And I've said that several times before. They 
     are the most at fault of all three sides, and atrocities 
     abound in this area, as we have seen in the last several days 
     and weeks.
       But I agree that the aggression coming from Serbia is the 
     principal perpetrator of the problem in the area. With 
     respect to genocide, the definition of genocide is a fairly 
     technical definition. Let me get it for you here.
       Under the 1948 convention, the crime of genocide is to 
     commit--an individual, in order to commit the crime of 
     genocide, must commit one or more specific acts with intent 
     to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial 
     or religious group as such.
       I would say that some of the acts that have been committed 
     by various parties in Bosnia, principally by the Serbians, 
     could constitute genocide under the 1948 convention if their 
     purpose was to destroy the religious or ethnic group in whole 
     or in part. And that seems to me to be a standard that may 
     well have been reached in some of the aspects of Bosnia. 
     Certainly some of the conduct there is tantamount to 
     genocide.
       Rep. McCloskey. And the hoped for more comprehensive public 
     assertion of leadership, sir?
       Secretary Christopher. Well, you know, the president is 
     very much seized with this problem, and when the time comes 
     for him to want to enlist the American people, especially in 
     the commitment of military forces, if that ever becomes 
     necessary, I'm certain that he will undertake to explain it 
     fully to the American people. He must do so. He must also 
     consult with Congress extensively.''
       May 6: Remarks by the President to the Export-Import Bank 
     Conference, Washington, DC.
       ``The President.  .  .  . The international community, I 
     believe, must not allow the Serbs to stall progress toward 
     peace and continue brutal assaults on innocent civilians. 
     We've seen too many things happen, and we do have fundamental 
     interests there, not only the United States, but particularly 
     the United States as a member of the world community.
       The Serbs' actions over the past year violate the principle 
     that internationally-recognized borders must not be violated 
     or altered by aggression from without. Their actions threaten 
     to widen the conflict and foster instability in other parts 
     of Europe in ways that could be exceedingly damaging. And 
     their savage and cynical ethnic cleansing offends the world's 
     conscience and our standard of behavior.  .  .
       Your presence here--your understanding of the importance of 
     exports to America's future, to the blending of our nation 
     and our culture and our values with those of like-minded 
     persons throughout the world--should only reinforce our 
     determination to confine, inasmuch as the international 
     community can possibly confine, savage acts of inhumanity to 
     people solely because of their ethnicity or their religion; 
     to confine insofar as we possibly can as an international 
     community the ability of one country to invade another and 
     upset its borders; and certainly to try to confine this 
     centuries-old series of ethnic and religious enmities to the 
     narrowest possible geographic boundaries.''
       May 1: US Consultations With Allies on Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
     Secretary Christopher, Opening Statement at a news 
     conference, Washington, DC:
       ``Upon taking office, President Clinton inherited a complex 
     and tragic situation in the former Yugoslavia. The situation 
     has bedeviled the international community now for almost 2 
     years. It's a problem with deep historic roots. In the post-
     Cold War period, the former Yugoslavia has been the scene of 
     violence, tragedy, and outrageous conduct.
       The President has acted to deal with this conflict.  .  .  
     . Yet the outrages have continued in the former Yugoslavia 
     area. In the face of Serbian aggression, the President has 
     been rigorously reviewing further options for action during 
     the course of the last week.
       . . . He has been exploring additional actions the 
     international community can take to respond to the violence, 
     stop the aggression, and contain the conflict.
       The President has just completed a meeting with his 
     principal national security advisers. At this meeting the 
     President decided on the direction that he believes the 
     United States and the international community should now take 
     in this situation. This direction involves a number of 
     specific recommendations, including military steps. The 
     President is sending me to Europe to consult with our allies 
     and friends on a course of actions. The problem is at the 
     heart of Europe's future. Our efforts will be undertaken with 
     our partners. We're ready to play our part, but others must 
     be as well.  .  .  .
       There are, of course, issues of conscience and humanitarian 
     concerns at stake in this situation. But fundamentally our 
     actions are also based upon the strategic interest of the 
     United States. All of us seek to limit the risk of a widening 
     instability that could lead to a  .  .  .  war.''
       May 25: Madeleine K. Albright, Excerpts from statement by 
     the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, UN 
     Security Council Adopts Resolution 827 on War Crimes 
     Tribunal, New York City, May 25, 1993.
       ``. . . The crimes being committed, even as we meet today, 
     are not just isolated acts of drunken militia men, but often 
     are the systematic and orchestrated crimes of government 
     officials, military commanders, and disciplined artillery men 
     and foot soldiers.''
       April 23: Clinton Defends First 100 Days, Stresses Options 
     in Bosnia, Presidential News Conference:
       ``Q. Mr. President, there's a growing feeling that the 
     Western response to the bloodshed in Bosnia has been woefully 
     inadequate. Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel asked you 
     yesterday to do something, anything to stop the fighting. Is 
     the United States considering taking unilateral action such 
     as airstrikes against Serb artillery sites?
       President Clinton. Well, first let me say, as you know, for 
     more than a week now we have been seriously reviewing our 
     options for further action . . . I think we should act. We 
     should lead, the United States should lead. We have led for 
     the last three months.
       We have moved the coalition, and to be fair, our, our 
     allies in Europe have been willing to, to do their part, and 
     they have troops on the ground there. But I do not think we 
     should act alone, unilaterally, nor do I think we will have 
     to.
       And in the next several days I think we will finalize the 
     extensive review which has been going on, and which has taken 
     a lot of my time, as well as the time of the administration, 
     as it should have, over the last 10 days or so. I think we'll 
     finish that in the near future and then we'll have a policy, 
     and we'll announce it and everybody can evaluate it.
       Q. Do you see any parallel between the ethnic cleansing in 
     Bosnia and the Holocaust?
       P. I think the--I think the Holocaust is on a whole 
     different level. I think it is without precedent, or peer in 
     human history. On the other hand, ethnic cleansing is the 
     kind of inhumanity that the Holocaust took to the nth degree. 
     The idea of moving people around, abusing them and often 
     killing them solely because of their ethnicity is an 
     abhorrent thing. And especially troublesome in that area 
     where people of different ethnic groups lived side by side 
     for so long together.
       And I think you have to stand up against it. I think it's 
     wrong . . .
       Q. Mr. President getting back to the situation in Bosnia, 
     and we understand you haven't made any final decision on new 
     options previously considered unacceptable, but the two most 
     commonly heard options would be lifting the arms embargo to 
     enable the Bosnian Muslims to defend themselves, and to 
     initiate some limited airstrikes, perhaps to cut off supply 
     lines.
       Without telling us your decision--presumably you haven't 
     made any final decisions on those two options--what are the 
     pros and cons--that are going through your mind right now and 
     will weigh heavily on your final decision?
       P. I'm reluctant to get into this. Those are two of the 
     options. There are some other options that have been 
     considered. All have pluses and minuses. All have supporters 
     and opponents in the Congress, where I would remind you, 
     heavy consultations will be required to embark on any new 
     policy.
       I do believe that on the airstrike issue, the pronouncement 
     that [Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Gen. Colin L.] 
     Powell [Jr.] has made generally about military action apply 
     there. If you take action, if the United States takes action, 
     we must have a clearly defined objective that can be met, we 
     must be able to understand it, and its limitations must be 
     clear.
       The United States is not, should not become involved as a 
     partisan in a war. With regard to the, to the lifting of the 
     arms embargo, the question obviously there is the--if you 
     widen the capacity of people to fight, will that help to get 
     a settlement and bring about peace, or will it lead to more 
     bloodshed, and what kind of reaction can others have that 
     would, that would undermine the effectiveness of the policy.
       But I think both of them deserve some serious consideration 
     along with some other options we have. . . .
       Q. Since you said that one side in the Bosnian conflict 
     represents inhumanity, the Holocaust carried to the `nth 
     degree,' why do you then tell us that the United States 
     cannot take a partisan view in this war?
       P. Well, I said that the principle of ethnic cleansing is 
     something we ought to stand up against. That does not mean 
     that the United States or the United Nations can enter a war, 
     in effect, to redraw the lines, geographical lines of 
     republics within what was Yugoslavia, or that that would 
     ultimately be successful.
       I think what the United States has to do is to try to 
     figure out whether there is some way, consistent with forcing 
     the people to resolve their own difficulties, we can stand up 
     to and stop ethnic cleansing, and that is obviously the 
     difficulty we are wrestling with.
       This is clearly the most difficult foreign policy problem 
     we face and that all of our allies face. And if it were easy, 
     I suppose it would have been solved before. We have tried to 
     do more in the last 90 days than was previously done. It has 
     clearly not been enough to stop the Serbian aggression, and 
     we are now looking at what else we can do.
       Q. Yesterday you specifically criticized the Roosevelt 
     administration for not having bombed the railroads to the 
     concentration camps and things that were near military 
     targets. Aren't there steps like that that would not involve 
     conflict, direct conflict or partisan belligerence that you 
     might consider?
       P. There may be. I would remind you that the circumstances 
     were somewhat different. We were then at war with Germany . . 
     . and that's what made that whole incident, series of 
     incidents, so perplexing. But we have, as I say, we've got 
     all of our options under review. . . .''
       April 21: The Washington Times: ``Airstrikes in Bosnia lose 
     appeal; Congress urges stronger steps'' by Warren Strobel.
       ``. . .With Mr. Christopher describing U.S. policy toward 
     Bosnia as `at a turning point,' President Clinton called 
     together his top policy advisers to discuss possible new 
     steps.
       Alluding to the Nazi attempt to exterminate Jews, Mr. 
     Clinton said the carnage there merits U.S. intervention.
       `I think the Holocaust is the most extreme example the 
     world has ever known of ethnic cleansing and I think that 
     even in its more limited manifestations it's an idea that 
     should be opposed,' he said yesterday at the beginning of a 
     meeting with Czech president Vaclav Havel. . .
       The administration is under intense pressure from 
     lawmakers, many of whom are pointing to tomorrow's dedication 
     of the Holocaust Memorial Museum and asking whether the West 
     really meant it when it said, `Never again.'''
       April 1: President Clinton, Question-and-Answer Session 
     With the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Annapolis, 
     Maryland,
       ``Q. Mr. President, . . . Do we have a national interest in 
     checking the spread of greater Serbian ethnic cleansing in 
     the Balkans? And are we losing our credibility as a nation as 
     this horrifying aggression in a sovereign state continues 
     without your unrestrained, forceful, and public condemnation 
     of it?
       The President. Yes, we have a national interest in limiting 
     ethnic cleansing. . .The thing that I have not been willing 
     to do is to immediately take action the end of which I could 
     not see. Whatever I want to do, I want to do it with vigor 
     and wholeheartedly. I want it to have a reasonable prospect 
     of success. And I have done the best I could with the cards 
     that I found on the table when I became President. If you 
     have other ideas about what you think I ought to do that 
     would minimize the loss of life, I would be glad to have 
     them.
       Q. Sir, do you condemn it here today?
       The President. Absolutely. I condemn it, and I have 
     condemned it repeatedly and thoroughly. And I have done 
     everything I could to increase the pressure of the 
     international community on the outrages perpetrated in Bosnia 
     by the aggressors and to get people to stand up against 
     ethnic cleansing. The question is what are we capable of 
     doing about it from the United States. If you look at the 
     responses that have been mustered so far from the European 
     states that are even closer and that have a memory of what 
     happened when Hitler, who was not shy about using his power, 
     had hundreds of thousands of people in the former Yugoslavia 
     and even then was unable to subdue it entirely.
       I think you have to look at what our realistic options are 
     for action. The question is not whether we condemn what's 
     going on. Ethnic cleansing is an outrage, and it is an idea 
     which should die, which should not be able to be expanded. 
     The question is, what can we do?
       Now, I have said that the United States would be prepared 
     to join with a United Nations effort in supporting a 
     peacekeeping process that was entered into in good faith. If 
     the Serbs refuse to do that, then we will all have to 
     reassess our position. But we must be careful not to use 
     words that will outstrip our capacity to back them up. That 
     is a grave error for any great nation, and one I will try not 
     to commit.''
       April 15: NBC Today Show Interview, Guest: Secretary of 
     State Warren Christopher.
       ``Q. Mr. Secretary, let me ask you about Bosnia for a 
     moment. Margaret Thatcher said on this program that the 
     European Community was guilty of being an accomplice to 
     massacre by not intervening militarily in Bosnia and she 
     called for two things: loosening the arms embargo so the 
     Bosnians could get arms, and a bombing campaign to make it 
     painful for the Serbs. What's your reaction to that?
       Secretary Christopher. Well, I've said before it's a 
     horrifying situation in Bosnia and it seems to get worse 
     every day. It seems to me that Prime Minister Thatcher's 
     prescription is one for only increasing the carnage. The 
     United States does not have any intention in intervening in 
     that war with ground troops. We're taking a number of 
     important steps to try to persuade the Serbs not to continue 
     their aggression, but I do not think that her prescription is 
     the right approach to it. It's a rather emotional response to 
     an emotional problem.''
       April 22: President Clinton, US Holocaust Museum Dedicated, 
     Address at the dedication ceremony, Washington, DC:
       ``. . . The Holocaust reminds us forever that knowledge 
     divorced form values can only serve to deepen the human 
     nightmare, that a head without a heart is not humanity.
       For those of us here today representing the nations of the 
     West, we must live forever with this knowledge: Even as our 
     fragmentary awareness of crimes grew into indisputable facts, 
     far too little was done. Before the war even started, doors 
     to liberty were shut. And even after the United States and 
     the Allies attacked Germany, rail lines to the camps within 
     miles of military significant targets were left undisturbed . 
     . .
       Ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia is but the most 
     brutal and blatant and ever-present manifestation of what we 
     see also with the oppression of the Kurds in Iraq, the 
     abusive treatment of the Baha'i in Iran, the endless race-
     based violence in South Africa. And in many other places we 
     are reminded again and again how fragile are the safeguards 
     of civilizations . . .''
       April 1: House Foreign Affairs Committee International 
     Operations Subcommittee
       ``Rep. Frank McCloskey (D-Indiana). . . Previously in 
     response to a question to whether or not genocide has taken 
     place, the reply from State was that acts tantamount to 
     genocide have taken place. I think that's not a clear answer 
     to a very important and policy driving question.
       Would you order a clear, explicit determination, yes or no, 
     if the outrageous Serb systematic barbarism amounts to 
     genocide? That's one question . . .
       Secretary Christopher. With respect to the definition of 
     circumstances in Bosnia, we certainly will reply to that. 
     That is a legal question that you have posed.
       I have said several times that the conduct there is an 
     atrocity: the killing, the raping, the ethnic cleansing is 
     definitively an atrocious set of acts, whether it meets the 
     technical legal definition of genocide, it's a matter we will 
     look and get back to you.''
       March 23: Questions for the record submitted to Mr. Stephen 
     Oxman by Senator Dole, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
       ``Question. Bosnia-Herzegovina. In November, 1992, the U.N. 
     Human Rights Commission approved a resolution, which was 
     supported by the United States, which asks member states to 
     provide their views as to whether the actions of the Serb 
     forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina constitute genocide under the 
     Genocide Convention. What is the U.S. legal judgment on this 
     matter? Has the United States submitted its views to the U.N. 
     Human Rights Commission? If not, why has it not done so?
       Answer. The resolution in question `called upon all States 
     to consider the extent to which the acts committed in Bosnia 
     and Herzegovina and Croatia constitute genocide.' It did not 
     request views to be submitted, but rather for States to look 
     at this question.
       The Administration has done so, and concluded that acts 
     tantamount to genocide have taken place in Bosnia. Because of 
     this, and because of the need to ensure accountability for 
     such acts, the Administration believes that the War Crimes 
     Tribunal being established by the Security Council should 
     have jurisdiction over such acts.''
       March 10: House Appropriations Subcommittee Hearing, Topic: 
     State Department programs, Witness: Secretary of State Warren 
     Christopher.
       ``Rep. Skaggs. Let me also invite you to lay out your sense 
     of the U.S. national interest in our efforts to calm things 
     down in the former Yugoslavia, an identification of U.S. 
     interests that goes beyond certainly the laudable 
     humanitarian objectives that we're now pursuing.
       Secretary Christopher. Well, thank you for that 
     opportunity. The case, Mr. Skaggs, is no less than the 
     prevention of a conflagration that could envelop all of 
     southeastern Europe and perhaps rage beyond, as it sometimes 
     has from that area, to consume a substantial portion of the 
     world. That's what's at stake here, preventing a widespread 
     area conflict . . . At a very minimum, it's important to stop 
     them before they enter other areas, and that's why we've 
     attached so much importance to giving them a strong warning 
     about creating conflict in Kosovo as well as the stationing 
     of international observers on the border of Macedonia . . .
       So the stakes for the United States, and for the citizens 
     of the United States, are to prevent the broadening of that 
     conflict to bring in our NATO allies, and to bring in vast 
     sections of Europe, and perhaps as happened before, 
     broadening into a world war.
       You know, there's kind of an eery analogy here. When you 
     think of Sarajevo as being the triggering point for World War 
     I, here we are again. How many years later, seven decades 
     later we're back with Sarajevo perhaps being once again the 
     trigger. If that isn't warning enough for us, then we 
     certainly are failing to follow the lessons of history.
       That's why the United States is interested. That's why we 
     are wanting to take an active role there.''
       February 22: UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 808 on 
     War Crimes Tribunal. Statement by Madeleine K. Albright, US 
     Permanent Representative to the United Nations, UN Security 
     Council, New York City, February 22, 1993.
       ``There is an echo in this chamber today. The Nuremberg 
     principles have been reaffirmed. We have preserved the long-
     neglected compact made by the community of civilized nations 
     48 years ago in San Francisco: to create the United Nations 
     and enforce the Nuremberg principles. The lesson that we are 
     all accountable to international law may have finally taken 
     hold in our collective memory. . .''
       February 10: New Steps Toward Conflict Resolution In the 
     Former Yugoslavia, Secretary Christopher, Opening statement 
     at a news conference, Washington, DC, February 10, 1993.
       ``. . . This conflict may be far from our shores, but it is 
     not distant to our concerns. We cannot afford to ignore it. 
     Let me explain why.
       We cannot ignore the human toll . . .
       Our conscience revolts at the idea of passively accepting 
     such brutality.
       Beyond these humanitarian interests, we have direct 
     strategic concerns as well. The continuing destruction of a 
     new UN member state challenges the principal that 
     internationally recognized borders should not be altered by 
     force. In addition, this conflict itself has no natural 
     borders. It threatens to spill over into new regions, such as 
     Kosovo and Macedonia. It could then become a greater Balkan 
     war, like those that preceded World War I. Broader 
     hostilities could touch additional nations, such as Greece, 
     Albania, and Turkey. The river of fleeing refugees, which has 
     already reached the hundreds of thousands, would swell. The 
     political and economic vigor of Europe, already tested by the 
     integration of former communist states, would be further 
     strained.
       There is a broader imperative here. The world's response to 
     the violence in the former Yugoslavia is an early and crucial 
     test of how it will address the concerns of ethnic and 
     religious minorities in the post-Cold War world. That 
     question reaches throughout Eastern Europe. It reaches to the 
     states of the former Soviet Union, where the fall of 
     communism has left some 25 million ethnic Russians living as 
     minorities in other republics, and it reaches to other 
     continents as well.
       The events in the former Yugoslavia raise the question of 
     whether a state may address the rights of its minorities by 
     eradicating those minorities to achieve `ethnic purity.' Bold 
     tyrants and fearful minorities are watching to see whether 
     `ethnic cleansing' is a policy [that] the world will 
     tolerate. If we hope to promote the spread of freedom of if 
     we hope to encourage the emergence of peaceful multi-ethnic 
     democracies, our answer must be a resounding no.''
       January 20: President Clinton's inaugural address:
       ``. . . When our vital interests are challenged, or the 
     will and conscience of the international community is defied, 
     we will act--with peaceful diplomacy whenever possible, with 
     force when necessary. . .''
       January 22: Los Angeles Times: Clinton to Press Active U.S. 
     Role in Bosnia
       ``. . .`This is clearly the highest priority of the 
     President in the National Security Council's agenda. . .,' 
     Madeleine Albright, Clinton's nominee for ambassador to the 
     United Nations, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
     `We will, in fact, be meeting on this subject very soon.'''
       January 20: Washington Post: U.S. Human Rights Report 
     Charges Serb Drive `Borders on Genocide':
       ``The `ethnic cleansing' campaign pursued by Bosnian Serbs 
     to drive Muslims and other ethnic groups from their homes in 
     Bosnia-Herzegovina has resulted in murder, torture, rape and 
     starvation on a scale that `dwarfs anything seen in Europe 
     since Nazi times,' the State Department said yesterday in its 
     annual human rights report.
       `It borders on genocide,' Patricia Diaz Dennis, assistant 
     secretary of state for human rights, said in describing the 
     efforts of Serb irregular forces, aided by Serbia and the 
     Serbian-controlled Yugoslav army, to bring most of Bosnia 
     under their control.''
       January 14: The New York Times: Clinton's State Dept. 
     Choice Backs, `Discreet' Force (report on Christopher's 
     confirmation hearing):
       ``. . . Later, his remarks were more pointed. The Serbian 
     campaign of `ethnic cleansing,' he said, was resulting in 
     `near genocidal conditions or perhaps really genocidal 
     conditions.' At another point he said, `It is a situation 
     where Europe has performed in an abysmal way.''
       January 14: The New York Times: Excerpt From an Interview 
     With Clinton After the Air Strikes:
       ``Q: Are you ready to support a Nuremberg-like war criminal 
     trial? Eagleburger has named several leaders there as war 
     criminals?
       A: Absolutely . . . Somehow the West has got to say 
     something and do something about the idea of ethnic 
     cleansing, which is such an embracing idea that if you 
     believe in it, it justifies the brutalization of women who 
     aren't your women and the torture of children that aren't 
     your children.
       I think it is important to point out that this Bosnian 
     thing has potential ramifications further away from the reach 
     of the United States and Europe on the republics of the 
     former Soviet Union, in central Europe. This is the idea 
     under which this whole thing has proceeded is what the West 
     has to stand up against, what the United Nations has to stand 
     up against.
       . . . I think that as horrible as the loss of life, and the 
     torture and the butchery and the starvation has been the 
     potential for a bigger impact is greater than that even. 
     Because it's all been done under the notion of ethnic 
     cleansing. I mean, here we are on the verge of the 21st 
     century, and people who are literate, who can read and write, 
     who are part of a very old, civilized tradition, think it's 
     O.K. to slaughter the living daylights out of one another 
     under the guise of ethnic cleansing. It is a barbaric idea . 
     . . We've got to take a stand against it. It's an awful idea, 
     and the potential ramifications are very very great, because 
     they justify doing anything.''
       December 16, 1992: The Need To Respond to War Crimes in the 
     Former Yugoslavia, Secretary Eagleburger, Statement at the 
     International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Geneva, 
     Switzerland.
       ``. . . We have, on the one hand, a moral and historical 
     obligation not to stand back a second time in this century 
     while a people faces obliteration . . . The fact of the 
     matter is that we know that crimes against humanity have 
     occurred, and we know when and where they occurred. We know, 
     moreover, which forces committed those crimes, and under 
     whose command they operated. And we know, finally, who the 
     political leaders are to whom those military commanders 
     were--and still are--responsible . . .
       Finally, there is another category of fact which is beyond 
     dispute--namely, the fact of political and command 
     responsibility for the crimes against humanity which I have 
     described. Leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic, the President 
     of Serbia, Radovan Karadzic, the self-declared President of 
     the Serbian Bosnian republic, and General Ratko Mladic, 
     commander of Bosnian Serb military forces, must eventually 
     explain whether and how they sought to ensure, as they must 
     under international law, that their forces complied with 
     international law. They ought, if charged, to have the 
     opportunity of defending themselves by demonstrating whether 
     and how they took responsible action to prevent and punish 
     the atrocities I have described which were undertaken by 
     their subordinates . . .
       It is clear that the reckless leaders of Serbia, and of the 
     Serbs inside Bosnia, have somehow convinced themselves that 
     the international community will not stand up to them now, 
     and will be forced eventually to recognize the fruits of 
     their aggression and the results of ethnic cleansing . . .
       Thus, we must make it unmistakably clear that we will 
     settle for nothing less than the restoration of the 
     independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina with its territory 
     undivided and intact, the return of all refugees to their 
     homes and villages, and, indeed, a day of reckoning for those 
     found guilty of crimes against humanity . . .
       But in waiting for the people of Serbia, if not their 
     leaders, to come to their senses, we must make them 
     understand that their country will remain alone, friendless, 
     and condemned to economic ruin and exclusion from the family 
     of civilized nations for as long as they pursue the suicidal 
     dream of a Greater Serbia. They need, especially, to 
     understand that a second Nuremberg awaits the practitioners 
     of ethnic cleansing, and that the judgment, and opprobrium, 
     of history awaits the people in whose name their crimes were 
     committed.''

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