[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 15 (Tuesday, February 22, 1994)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E]
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[Congressional Record: February 22, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
E X T E N S I O N O F R E M A R K S
(OMITTED FROM THE RECORD OF FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 1994)
THE PIN-STRIPE APPROACH TO GENOCIDE
______
speech of
HON. FRANK McCLOSKEY
of indiana
in the house of representatives
Friday, February 11, 1994
Mr. McCLOSKEY. Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to submit a very important
statement on Bosnian policy development by Richard Johnson, a very
dedicated and able State Department officer.
The statement follows:
The Pin-Stripe Approach to Genocide
(By Richard Johnson)
My thesis here is a simple one: senior U.S. Government
officials know that Serb leaders are waging genocide in
Bosnia, but will not say so in plain English because this
would raise the pressures for U.S. action.
Since late summer 1992 the Executive Branch of the U.S.
Government, under both the Bush and Clinton Administrations,
has come under significant pressure to make an unequivocal
determination that the Serb campaign in Bosnia constitutes
genocide under the 1948 UN Genocide Convention.\1\
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Footnotes at end of article.
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External pressures have come from the U.S. media, human
rights organizations, American Jewish and Moslem advocacy
groups, prominent foreign policy experts, members of
Congress, the Bosnian government, and from states friendly to
Bosnia at UN fora including the UN General Assembly, the UN
Commission for Human Rights, and the June 1993 UN World
Conference on Human Rights in Vienna.\2\
Internal pressures have come from lower and middle-level
Foreign Service Officers (FSO's) with line responsibilities
for U.S. policy on Bosnia, other FSO's who have used the
State Department's dissent channel mechanism to press their
views, and the four FSO's who subsequently resigned to
protest U.S. policies.\3\
These pressures have triggered a number of statements by
senior State Department officials and by the President,
particularly since December 1992, that implicitly or
explicitly address the issue of whether genocide is underway
in Bosnia.\4\
Some of these come very close to saying yes. However, none
make a clear and unequivocal determination that Serb leaders
are waging genocide in Bosnia, and that the moral and legal
obligations of the Genocide Convention apply. Instead,
Administration statements have typically asserted that the
Serb campaign ``borders on genocide,'' or that ``certain
actions'' by ``Bosnian Serbs'' have been ``tantamount to
genocide'' or constitute ``acts of genocide.''\5\ There are
two hypothetical explanations for such equivocation.
One is that further collection and assessment of evidence
is needed before a clear determination can be made,
particularly with regard to intent (e.g., do Serb leaders and
their forces seek to destroy a substantial part of the
Bosnian Moslem population, or rather to displace it, or does
the mass murder by Serb forces stem from a systematic plan or
from a coincidence of local decisions by local commanders?)
and responsibility (can responsibility be traced up to
Bosnian Serb political and military leaders, and to Serb
leaders in Serbia, and with what degree of conclusiveness?).
Several State and NSC officials put forward this
explanation to the author, in more or less explicit terms.
These officials would often also assert that the genocide
issue may be of moral and historical interest, but is not of
operational importance in terms of pursuing justice (war
crimes are easier to prove than genocide) or ending the
killing in Bosnia (through a ``negotiated settlement'').\6\
However, some of these as well as other State officials
also acknowledge that policy-makers at the White House and in
State have shown little interest in clearing up the questions
that supposedly stand in the way of an unequivocal finding of
Serb genocide in Bosnia. There has never been a Presidential
or NSC directive to State and other intelligence agencies to
conduct research and analysis aimed at establishing whether
there is a good case against Milosevic et al. for genocide in
Bosnia. Nor has there been any mobilization of resources to
this end. The human resources applied to the Bosnia war
crimes issue at State and CIA have been minimal, and have
declined at State in 1993. The personnel involved have been
tasked more with recording specific war crimes than with
tracking the responsibility for such war crimes to the Serb
leadership.\7\
The other explanation is that policy-makers have opted for
equivocation because an explicit, unequivocal determination
that genocide is underway in Bosnia, and that
Milosevic, Karadzic and their military commanders are
responsible, would produce more political pressure to take
effective action, including the use of force, to end and
punish the genocide. At a minimum, such a determination
would undermine the credibility of Western policies that
rely on UN/EC-mediated ``peace talks'' to reach a
``voluntary settlement'' between ``warring factions''--who
would now be defined as the perpetrators and victims of
genocide. This explanation is supported by the following
elements of the Executive Branch treatment of this issue
since fall 1992.\8\
The most explicit, forward-leaning Administration positions
have never been followed up with consequent actions. In
August 1992 State confirmed that Serb-run ``detention
centers'' in Bosnia featuring systematic killing and torture
were a significant problem.\9\ State then initiated a process
of submitting data on war crimes in Bosnia to the UN War
Crimes Commission. However, lead action on compiling these
submissions was assigned to an FSO in the Human Rights Bureau
with no prior knowledge of Balkan affairs, and a short-term
State intern just out of college: hardly a commitment of
personnel and expertise commensurate to the recognized
gravity of the issue.\10\
In mid-December 1992, Acting Secretary Eagleburger broke
new ground in drawing parallels between Serb behavior in
Bosnia and Nazi behavior, naming senior Serb leaders as
bearing responsibility for war crimes and crimes against
humanity in Bosnia, and citing some of the questions they
should face. However, his public statements were not followed
up by any internal taskings within State or to CIA to build
up cases against these leaders.\11\
In mid-December 1992 the United States also voted for a UN
General Assembly resolution on Bosnia which, among other
things, stated that Serb ``ethnic cleansing'' in Bosnia is a
form of genocide.\12\ However, the Executive Branch never
followed up by citing or using this determination as a basis
for Western policies. Similarly, in June 1993 the United
States supported an appeal of the UN World Conference on
Human Rights to the UN Security Council to take ``necessary
measures to end the genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina . .
.'' However, the U.S. took no subsequent action on the basis
of this appeal and its finding of genocide. Indeed, as of
December 1993, an official at State Department Bureau of
Human Rights was unable to locate a copy of the Conference
appeal in office files, and described it as something the
Department viewed as ``not really an official act of the
Conference.''\13\
More equivocal statements tend to be made by more senior
officials in high-profile fashion. Less equivocal statements
are made by lesser officials in lower-profile fashion. The
President has, largely in response to questioning, repeatedly
drawn some degree of analogy between the Holocaust and the
present mass extermination of Bosnians. But he has chosen
never explicitly to address whether Serb leaders are engaged
in genocide.\14\ Warren Christopher volunteered during his
confirmation hearings that the Serb campaign of ``ethnic
cleansing'' was resulting in ``near genocidal or perhaps
really genocidal conditions.''\15\ But he has never raised
the issue since becoming Secretary, and his most extensive
comments on the matter since then, under questioning on May
18, 1993, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, are
also the most equivocal presentation by any Administration
official since the beginning of the war in Bosnia.\16\ These
comments triggered an extraordinary memo to the Secretary
from the Acting Assistant Secretary for Human Rights
reminding the Secretary that Serb and Bosnian Serb forces
were responsible for the vast majority of war crimes in
Bosnia.\17\
The most straight-forward statement by a senior official of
the Clinton Administration has also been the most obscure: a
mid-November written submission to a House subcommittee in
response to a question taken by State Counselor Wirth five
months earlier, stating that ``The Department of State does
believe that certain acts committed as part of the systematic
Bosnian Serb campaign of `ethnic cleansing' in Bosnia
constitute acts of genocide.''\18\
Secretary Christopher has opted out of the Bosnia genocide
issue since May. Persistent questioning by Congressman
McCloskey has been the primary trigger of Administration
review of this issue since April 1, when McCloskey got
Christopher to promise him a clear determination as to
whether the Serb campaign in Bosnia is genocide under the
Convention.\19\ How to respond to McCloskey's question (and
his repeated follow-ups) was a recurrent issue among the
Bureaus of European Affairs, Human Rights, Intelligence and
Research, International Organizations, Congressional
Relations, and the Office of the Legal Advisor, and between
these offices and the ``seventh floor'' (i.e., the Secretary
and his senior advisors) from April to October. On October 13
the Secretary finally approved an action memo which had been
redrafted numerous times, and which would authorize the
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations to sign a
letter to McCloskey using the language subsequently used in
State's mid-November submission to the House cited above.
However, the Secretary annulled his approval of the proposed
letter to McCloskey after the latter called for his
resignation in mid-October.
In a subsequent exchange with McCloskey during a House
Foreign Affairs Committee hearing, Christopher chose not to
respond to McCloskey's question on the genocide issue.
Instead, the Secretary charged that McCloskey's views on
Bosnia would require several hundred thousand U.S. ground
troops, asserted that McCloskey's emotions were clouding his
judgment, and rejected any further ``debate'' with McCloskey
on Bosnia.\20\
Seventh-floor policy makers at State have repeatedly
rejected efforts by the Bureaus to have them make less
equivocal statements of genocide in Bosnia.\21\ On April 1,
perhaps in response to McCloskey's questions to Christopher,
outgoing State Department spokesman Boucher instructed then-
Bosnia desk officer Harris to draft a strong statement by the
Secretary on genocide in Bosnia. Harris's draft, dated April
2, was cleared by all the relevant Bureaus and submitted to
the Office of the Spokesman. It included the assertion that
``The United States Government believes that the practice of
`ethnic cleansing' in Bosnia includes actions that meet the
international definition of genocide as well as constitute
other war crimes.'' The statement was never issued; Harris
believes it was killed by incoming Department spokesman
Donilon, in consultation with the Secretary.
Similar language was again cleared by the relevant Bureaus
in September in one iteration of the proposed response to
McCloskey's April question to the Secretary; this draft was
also rejected by the seventh floor.\21\
Senior policy-makers do not have better information about
realities in the Balkans than do the lesser officials who
have sought to bring them to make clearer statements on
genocide. Some light on their thinking in rejecting Bureaus'
recommendations is shed by comments made by Under Secretary
Tarnoff and Counselor Wirth at an April 28, 1993 State
Department luncheon for Elie Weisel.
Weisel argued that whether or not genocide was underway in
Bosnia, the Serb concentration camps and mass murders there
constituted a moral imperative for decisive outside
intervention. Tarnoff took Weisel's point but noted that
failure in Bosnia would destroy the Clinton Presidency. Wirth
agreed with Weisel that the moral stakes in Bosnia were high,
but asserted that there were even higher moral stakes at
play: ``the survival of the fragile liberal coalition
represented by this Presidency.''\22\
conclusion
The story told above is one of many failures. Senior
policy-makers have failed to level with the American people
on the nature of the moral and security challenge the United
States faces in the Balkans. Lesser officials have failed to
resist the obfuscation of their seniors. Outside the
Executive Branch, the broad range of interested observers who
see Milosevic's campaign for a Greater Serbia as an instance
of genocidal aggression that the United States must confront
have failed to apply coherent and sustained pressure to force
at least a straightforward Executive Branch statement on the
genocide issue.
I draw no constructive lessons from these failures except
that avoiding them requires a series of moral choices by
individuals. Those made by senior policy-makers with the most
influence in defining the challenges America faces are most
momentous. But all, cumulatively, make a difference.
FOOTNOTES
\1\Under the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide, to which the United States, the
successor states to former Yugoslavia, and some 100 other
countries are parties, ``genocide'' is defined to include any
of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious
group: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c)
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the
group to another group.
The Convention is a specific response to Nazi extermination
practices during World War II.
\2\The author is compiling a list of prominent persons,
groups, governments, and international fora that have defined
Serb behavior in Bosnia as genocide, and will make it
available on request.
\3\The author is personally aware that in December 1992 three
FSO's who had shared responsibility for Yugoslav affairs
between 1990 and 1992 used the dissent channel to press for a
State determination that Milosevic was engaged in genocide in
Bosnia; that in April 1993 twelve FSO's actively engaged in
Bosnia policy submitted a letter to the Secretary which among
other things described the conflict in Bosnia as Serb
genocide; and that the four FSO's who have resigned in
protest--George Kenney in August 1992 and Marshall Harris,
Steve Walker, and Jon Western in August 1993, have all
defined the war as genocide.
\4\See compendium at Tab A, drawn from White House, State
Department and Congressional public documents and the U.S.
media.
\5\Several officers currently and formerly in State's Office
of the Legal Advisor have told the author that there is no
legal difference between saying starkly that ``what has
happened is genocide,'' and saying less starkly that ``what
has happened is tantamount to genocide'' or ``what has
happened are acts of genocide.'' The ``tantamount to''
formulation appears to have originated on the Seventh floor.
\6\Author's December 1993 interviews with sixteen current and
former State employees ranging from desk officers to Deputy
Assistant Secretaries, and with NSC European Affairs Director
Jenonne Walker in May 1993. In December 1993, Walker declined
to discuss U.S. policy process on the issue of genocide in
Bosnia with the author, on the grounds that it was ``too
sensitive.''
\7\ibid.
\8\This explanation is also advanced by many of the sixteen
current and former FSO's interviewed by the author for this
essay.
\9\See President Bush's August 6, 1992 remarks on
``Containing the Crisis in Bosnia and in Former Yugoslavia''
and Acting Secretary Eagleburger's August 5, 1992 statement
``Detention Centers in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Serbia'' in
Dispatch, U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs,
August 10, 1992; and George Kenney, ``See No Evil,'' in The
Washington Monthly, November 1992. Kenney underlines senior
State officials' resistance to investigating, confirming, or
publicizing Serb atrocities in Bosnia, and their efforts to
minimize U.S. media attention to them.
\10\Author's interview with the State Human Rights Bureau
action officer and the former intern in question.
\11\See Secretary Eagleburger's December 16, 1992 statements
in Dispatch, U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public
Affairs, December 28, 1992. The absence of follow-up taskers
was confirmed to the author in interviews with the current
and former FSO's cited above.
\12\See United Nations General Assembly Resolution A/47/92 of
December 17, 1992, passed 102 for (including the U.S.), 57
abstentions, and none against, which holds Serbian and
Montenegrin forces responsible for aggression and for ``the
abhorrent policy of `ethnic cleansing,' which is a form of
genocide . . .''
\13\Author's interviews with State Human Rights Bureau
officers, December 1993. Notwithstanding State's unofficial
views as to the unofficial status of the Conference's appeal,
it was in fact forwarded by Alois Mock, President of the
World Conference on Human Rights, to the President of the UN
Security Council on June 16, 1993, as a decision of the
Conference.
\14\For texts of the President's and Secretary's statements,
see compendium at Tab A.
\15\See New York Times, January 14, 1993, cited in compendium
at Tab A.
\16\See Christopher's May 18 comments in compendium at Tab A,
including the insinuation that Bosnian Moslems are suspected
of genocide themselves. Several State officials have told the
author that they were flabbergasted by Christopher's remarks
on atrocities and genocide in Bosnia in his May 18 House
Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing, and that these remarks
bore no relationship to expert and consensus views within
State on those issues. One State official has told the author
that late on May 17, the Secretary's office sought urgent
information from the Human Rights Bureau on Bosnian Moslem
atrocities only.
\17\Author's interviews with current and former FSO's.
\18\See text of Wirth statement in compendium at Tab A. This
statement responded to a question put to Wirth by Congressman
McCloskey on June 10 at a House Appropriations Subcommittee
meeting.
\19\See McCloskey's April 1 question and Christopher's
initial response in compendium at Tab A. The author's account
of the reaction to McCloskey's pressures within the
Department is based on interviews with current and former
FSO's in December 1993.
\20\See transcripts of November 4, 1993 House Foreign Affairs
Committee Hearing.
\21\This and the following paragraph are based primarily on
the author's December 1993 interview with Marshall Harris,
currently foreign policy advisor to Congressman McCloskey.
\22\The author witnessed this Weisel/Tarnoff/Wirth luncheon
discussion.
TAB A
December 1993--Draft State Department Human Rights for
Bosnia: no mention of genocide.
November 18: State Department Counselor Wirth's response to
Congressman McCloskey's June 10 questions in public hearings:
``. . . The Department of State does believe that certain
acts committed as part of the systematic Bosnian Serbs
campaign of `ethnic cleansing' in Bosnia constitute acts of
genocide.''
November 22: Secretary Christopher, Four On-the-Record
Interviews with European media: no mention of genocide or
even aggression; Bosnia treated as an issue of ``warring
parties'' unwilling to conclude a peace settlement.
November 13: State Department spokesman McCurry declines to
comment on whether continuing siege of Sarajevo meets the
criteria for NATO air strikes laid down by Christopher in
August (i.e., ``continued strangulation'') and adds: ``Is
Bosnia horrifying, troubling? . . . it is no more horrifying
or troubling than the instances around this globe where
populations, because of civil strife . . . face these kinds
of humanitarian disasters.'' President Clinton asserts ``All
we can do is to try to make sure that we minimize the human
loss coming on for this coming winter.'' A State Department
official's comments: ``Who do you champion any more? It's not
clear.'' (Washington Post, November 13)
November 30: Secretary Christopher addresses CSCE
Ministerial: no mention of genocide or aggression; Bosnia and
Herzegovina treated as humanitarian crisis and scene of
``atrocities'' to be dealt with by UN War Crimes Tribunal.
November 15: Assistant Secretary Oxman speech on ``Why
Europe Matters'': no mention of the word Bosnia, much less
genocide or aggression; Bosnia and Herzegovina treated as
``ethnic conflict'' within borders of former Yugoslavia.
November 9: Secretary Christopher before Senate Foreign
Relations Committee lists 6 US foreign policy (not including
Bosnia, Somalia or Haiti) (Newsday, November 5)
November 4: Secretary Christopher before House Foreign
Affairs Committee dismisses Congressman McCloskey's charges
that USG and Christopher are ignoring genocide in Bosnia,
asserts ``I don't see any point in debating this subject
further,'' (AP, November 5, Barry Schweid); Christopher does
not address McCloskey's assertion that genocide is underway
in Bosnia; rather, Christopher asserts that McCloskey's
objectives require sending hundreds of thousands of US ground
troops to Bosnia whereas ``I don't think our vital interests
are sufficiently involved to do so . . .'' (Reuters, November
5, Carol Giacomo)
November 5: Secretary Christopher on CNN ``the World
Today'', responding to Congressman McCloskey's charge that
the U.S. is allowing genocide in Bosnia: ``. . . We have a
fundamental disagreement. At the end of the day, his proposal
would require putting 200,000 or 300,000 American troops into
Bosnia to try to take the country back . . . to put it back
in its pre-war status. I simply disagree with that. And I
want the country to know, I don't think that's a good idea.''
October 10: Secretary Christopher declines to predict
whether US troops will ever be sent to Bosnia to enforce a
peace settlement, emphasizing that ``very hard questions''
will have to be answered positively by the Administration in
consultation with Congress (NBC ``Meet the Press'' October
10)
October 21: Secretary Christopher, Questions and Answers
comments on Bosnia, in Hungary:
``. . . President Clinton has said early on and we continue
to say we will not try to impose a solution on the parties.
The U.S. is not prepared to send hundreds of thousands of its
troops to impose a solution on the parties that are not quite
ready for a solution or don't seem to be ready for a
solution. We're hoping the parties will come to a peaceful
agreement, that they will finally recognize that there is
only futility in the war they are pursuing . . .''
October 5: Assistant Secretary Oxman before Senate Foreign
Relations Committee:
``Lots of innocent people are being killed. But it is a
complex problem that we didn't create. And our approach to it
has been to support a negotiated settlement. That isn't
jazzy, but that's our approach.''
September 5: Assistant Secretary Oxman appears before
House Foreign Affairs Committee:
``McCloskey, who has been trying since April to get the
State Department to say Serb actions fit the legal
definitions of genocide, tried again. `Are they guilty of
genocide . . . a systematic policy of extermination of, you
know, members of a particular ethnic group?' Oxman, using
language previously used by Secretary of State Warren
Christopher, said actions `tantamount to genocide have been
committed.' But he did not say Serb actions fit `the
technical definition of genocide' under a 1948 UN
conventions. McCloskey said afterwards that U.S. policy
amounts to `putting a gun to Izetbegovic's head to accept
this settlement that will be the death of his country.' He
said the State Department was trying to evade its `moral and
legal obligations' to brand Serb actions as genocide and try
to prevent them.'' (Washington Post, September 16)
September 9: Washington Post article on Clinton-
Izetbegovic meeting/press conference:
``Clinton reaffirmed his willingness to send troops if
there is a `fair peace that is willingly entered into by the
parties . . .' But Clinton, asked about the proposal [of
Izetbegovic, for NATO air strikes to lift the siege of
Sarajevo], rejected it. `I believe all that has to be part of
the negotiating process. I don't think that the U.S. can
simply impose an element like that,' he told reporters.''
September 9: The New York Times article on Clinton-
Izetbegovic meeting describes Clinton Administration as
backing away both from threat of NATO air strikes to relieve
siege of Sarajevo, and from idea of NATO peacekeepers to
enforce settlement.
September 3: The Washington Post:
``The U.S. yesterday backed efforts by Bosnia's Muslims to
gain more territory in the proposed partition of the country,
as President Clinton warned Serb and Croat forces that the
option of using NATO air power against them `is very much
alive' . . . `If while talks are in abeyance,' the President
added, `there is abuse of those who would seek to interfere
with humanitarian aid--attacking protected areas, resuming
sustained shelling of Sarajevo, for example--then first, I
would remind you that the NATO military option is very much
alive . . .' Clinton, asked if he intended to revive his
proposal for exempting Bosnia's Muslim-led government from a
UN arms embargo, said . . . `I have always favored lifting
the arms embargo. I think the policy of the UN as it applies
to that government is wrong,' he said. `But I am in the
minority. I don't know that I can prevail.'''
September 15: Assistant Secretary Oxman appears before
House Foreign Affairs Committee:
``Rep. McCloskey. . . . As you know, since April I've been
trying to get an answer from State as to whether these
activities of the Bosnian Serbs and Serbs constitute
genocide. Will I get a reply on that today . . .?
Mr. Oxman. I learned, just today, that you hadn't had your
response. And the first thing I'm going to do when I get back
to the Department is find out where that is. We'll get you
that response as soon as we possibly can. But to give you my
personal view, I think that acts tantamount to genocide have
been committed. Whether the technical definition of genocide
. . . I think this is what the letter that you're asking for
needs to address.''
August 9: Statement by Secretary Christopher, released by
the Office of the Spokesman, August 9, 1993, ``Air strikes in
Bosnia-Herzegovina'':
``The United States is pleased by the important actions
taken today by the North Atlantic Council. These steps
significantly further the United States initiative to make
air power available to lift the strangulation of Sarajevo and
other areas, stop interference with humanitarian relief
operations, and promote a viable political settlement in the
negotiations in Geneva. At the North Atlantic Council meeting
last Monday, NATO unanimously made the policy decision to
prepare for air strikes and laid down a clear warning to
those responsible for the strangulation of Sarajevo and other
civilian areas. Today, the alliance unanimously approved a
thorough and detailed operational plan for air strikes
prepared by the NATO military committee over the last week in
conjunction with UNPROFOR. The plan is sound and
comprehensive. It sets forth the targeting identification
process and the command and control arrangements for air
strikes. With today's decision, the alliance now has in place
all the means necessary to take forceful action against the
Serbs should they not cease their intolerable behavior. The
unanimous decision today signals that the international
community will not accept the laying siege of cities and the
continued bombardment of civilians, the denial of
humanitarian assistance to people in need, or empty promises
as a cover for aggression. The Serbs are on notice, and
whether air power is used depends on their deeds.''
June 2: AFP ``U.S. Has No Vital Interests in Bosnia:
Christopher'':
``Secretary of State Warren Christopher has said the United
States has no vital interests in Bosnia and that the military
options it backed there would not be effective. `Bosnia is a
human tragedy--just a grotesque humanitarian situation,'
Christopher said on television Tuesday as the United Nations
Security Council finalized plans for six protected Moslem
safe havens. `It does not affect our vital national interests
except as we're concerned about humanitarian matters and
except as we're trying to contain it.' He said Washington
still preferred lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian
Moslems and carrying out air strikes against Bosnian Serb
military forces attacking the Moslems, though he conceded the
air attacks alone would have limited effect . . . `If you
rule out ground troops, you find air power ineffective, and
if you define it as a humanitarian situation, then your
options are really much different than they would be in
places like Somalia where militarily it was rather simple to
solve problems,' Christopher said.''
June 29: Explanation of U.S. Vote on Lifting Arms Embargo
Against Bosnia, Madeleine K. Albright, U.S. Permanent
Representative to the United Nations, Statement before the UN
Security Council, New York City, June 29, 1993:
``. . . Nor should today's vote be seen as an indication
that the international community is willing to turn a blind
eye to the gross violations of human rights that have been
committed in Bosnia, primarily by the Bosnian Serbs. We will
continue to insist that, if the authorities in Belgrade want
to rejoin the family of nations, they will have to stop the
violence, stop the killing, stop their aggressive war against
the Bosnian state and comply with all relevant Security
Council resolutions. . . . Our goal remains a negotiated
settlement freely agreed to by all the parties.''
June 10: House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on
International Security:
``Mr. McCloskey. . . . But specifically, what does the
State Department say about genocide, are they ready to state
that this is genocide rather than tantamount to genocide or
akin to----
Mr. Wirth. We have done so. We have done so.
Mr. McCloskey. In what document, or record, or
communication?
Mr. Wirth. In supporting the Tribunal on genocide. We have
done so.
Mr. McCloskey. Could I get a copy of a definitive statement
that genocide has occurred? Because quite frankly, I have
been asking Mr. Christopher for that since April 1st. Again,
not to be pejorative on that, but I just have not gotten a
reply. That would be very helpful if I could get that in the
next day.
Mr. Wirth. We have, as you know, supported the war crimes
tribunal. And we have made statements and made clear that
genocidal acts have taken place.
Mr. McCloskey. I do not want to go on about it. But to two
such distinguished State Department representatives here, if
I say by tomorrow afternoon if I could have a statement as to
whether the State Department believes it is genocide or not,
it would be helpful.
Mr. Wirth. We will get that right back to you. Those
statements have been made, and we'll get it right back to
you.''
May 25: ABC News Nightline Interview with the Secretary of
State Warren Christopher:
``Secretary Christopher. We're prepared to keep the
sanctions on until they move back from the aggression they
followed . . . I can blame the Bosnian Serbs for being guilty
of aggression. I can blame the Bosnian Serbs for being guilty
of a series of atrocities. They are the main perpetrator of
evil in atrocities by all parties. But the Bosnian Serbs are
subject to a lot of blame, and I will not absolve them from
that.
Koppel. If they continue in their atrocities, if they
continue killing and raping, some of the other things that
they have been accused of doing--again, if I understand U.S.
policy correctly, you would be willing to use air power only
to protect the U.N. forces that are on the ground right now,
in effect, to get out, not to do anything about stopping the
atrocities. Do I misunderstand the policy?
Secretary Christopher. No, I think that's correct. Our
commitment to use United States military force at the present
time is only to protect the U.N. forces that are there. And I
think that's the limit of our commitment for military power
at present time. We have concluded that our national
interests are not sufficiently engaged to use U.S. troops in
this situation. It's a quagmire. It's a morass. I think if
U.S. troops are put in there, they'll be there for an
indefinite period of time. It does not meet the test that
I've laid down for being a situation where you can define
your goals with care, where you have a chance of success,
where you have an exit strategy and it's a situation that the
American people would support over a long period of time.''
May 12: Interview With Don Imus of WFAN Radio in New York
City, May 12, 1993:
``Mr. Imus. You know, I agreed with you when you said
during the campaign that history has shown that you can't
allow the mass extermination of people and just sit by and
watch it happen, and that really is driving this, isn't it?
The President. Yes. It is a difficult issue. Let me say
that when we have people here who've been involved in many
previous administrations that are involved in national
security including, obviously, a lot of people who were
involved in the two previous ones, I mean, and everybody I
talk to believes that this is the toughest foreign policy
problem our country has faced in a long time. And I'm trying
to proceed in a very deliberate way to try to make sure there
isn't a Vietnam problem here. But also to try to make sure
that the United States keeps pushing to save lives and to
confine the conflict. I don't think we can just turn away
from this. Just because we don't want to make the mistake we
did in Vietnam doesn't mean we shouldn't be doing anything.
There are things that we can do, and we're trying to do more
to push this thing toward a settlement . . .
I think there are some things that we're going to be able
to do with our allies that will continue to turn the pressure
up. But this is a European issue, as well as a world issue,
and I think we have to move forward with Europe . . .
It is a very, very difficult issue, but I think that we're
pushing in the right direction, going in the right
directions, and I think the American people will support the
combination of clear, disciplined restraint on our part and
not creating a unilateral American involvement, but
continuing to push to end the slaughter, end the ethnic
cleansing and confine the conflict so that it doesn't cause
us a lot more problems.''
April 21: The President's News Conference:
``The President. I will say what I said from the very
beginning. Our fundamental interests here, the United States'
interests, are two. We want the conflict to be contained, and
we want the slaughter and the ethnic cleansing to stop. We
believe in order to get that done ultimately there will have
to be some reasonable borders--some political solution to
this which has a reasonable territorial component. And we'll
just have to see what happens over the next few weeks.''
May 14: The President's News Conference:
``Q. Mr. President, you've said that the United States will
not go it alone with military action in Bosnia. And yet, the
European allies have refused to sign-on to your proposals. If
the allies refuse to follow suit, where does that leave the
United States?
The President. . . . I do not believe the United States has
any business sending troops there to get involved in a
conflict in behalf of one of the sides. I believe that we
should continue to turn up the pressure. And as you know, I
have taken the position that the best way to do that would be
to lift the arms embargo with a standby authority of air
power in the event that the present situation was interrupted
by the unfair use of artillery by the Bosnian Serbs. That
position is still on the table.
Q. Mr. President, you said last week that if you went to
air power in Bosnia you would have a clear strategy and it
would have a beginning, middle, and end. What happens,
though, sir, if a plane is shot down, if you lose a pilot or
a couple of pilots, or if the Bosnian Serbs decide to
escalate the conflict, or the Serbians by going into, say,
Kosovo?
The President. Well, the Bush administration before I
became President issued a clear warning to the Serbs that if
they try to occupy Kosovo and repress the Albanians there,
that the United States would be prepared to take some strong
action. And I have reaffirmed that position . . .
Q. There seems to be a Catch 22 emerging on Bosnia. One
would be, you have consistently said that you want to have a
consensus with the U.S. allies. But until that consensus is
formed, you found it seems very difficult to explain to the
American people precisely how that war should be defined: Is
it a civil war? Is it a war of aggression? And also not
necessarily what the next step should be, but what are the
principles, the overriding principles that should guide you
as a policy? What can you tell the American people right now
about that?
The President. First, that is both a civil war and a war of
aggression, because Bosnia was created as a separate legal
entity. It is both a civil war where elements of people who
live within that territory are fighting against each other.
And there has been aggression from without, somewhat from the
Croatians and from the Serbs, principally from the Serbs--
that the inevitable but unintended impact of the arms embargo
has been to put the United Nations in the position of
ratifying an enormous superiority of arms for the Bosnian
Serbs that they got from Serbia, and that our interest is in
seeing, in my view at least, that the United Nations does not
foreordain the outcome of a civil war. That's why I've always
been in favor of some kind of lifting of the arms embargo,
that we contain the conflict, and that we do everything we
can to move to an end of it and to move to an end of ethnic
cleansing. Those are our interests there, and those are the
ones I'm trying to pursue. But we should not introduce
American ground forces into the conflict in behalf of one
of the belligerents, and we must move with our allies. It
is a very difficult issue. I realize in a world where we
all crave for certainty about everything, it's tough to
deal with, but it's a difficult issue. . . . I have a
clear policy. I have gotten more done on this than my
predecessor did. And maybe one reason he didn't try to do
it is because if you can't force everybody to fall in line
overnight for people who have been fighting each other for
centuries, you may be accused of vacillating. We are not
vacillating. We have a clear, strong policy.''
May 18: House Foreign Affairs Committee Hearing:
``Secretary Christopher. Mr. Ackerman, you've given me a
lot to answer in the few moments I have here. First, with
respect to the moral case that you make, one of the just
absolutely bewildering parts of this problem is that the
moral case is devastating and clear that there are
atrocities, but there are atrocities on all sides . . . We've
been filling reports with the United Nations for some time--
we're in the seventh or eighth report of that kind. If you
look at those and read those, you'll find indication of
atrocities by all three of the major parties against each
other, the level of hatred is just incredible. So, you know,
it's somewhat different than the Holocaust; it's been easy to
analogize this to the Holocaust, but I never heard of any
genocide by the Jews against the German people. But here you
have atrocities by all sides which makes this problem
exceedingly difficult to deal with. Now, with respect to the
use of air power--and I will try to capsulize my responses--
the respect in which the president has recommended a possible
standby use of air power is in connection with the lifting of
the arms embargo. We think there's a strong moral case for
the lifting of the arms embargo because it works to the
disadvantage of one party, that is, the Bosnian government.
The air power would be used to compensate during the
transition period when the Bosnians are getting some arms so
as to level the playing field.
Rep. Frank McCloskey (D-Indiana). . . . I am fearful of
remarks that you made today positing moral equivalency, if
you will, as to the Serbs, the Croats, and particularly the
Muslims in all this, as I would rather refer to them, the
Bosnians. I would just advise being very careful about this.
You, yourself, and even more eloquently, Mr. Clinton, have in
the past made very good statements about what is at stake
here. I know, you know that my request is still pending right
now as to whether the Serb aggression--and they are the
overwhelming perpetrators of evil in all this, much more so
than anyone else on the scene--whether Serb aggression does
constitute genocide under the outlines of the U.N.
convention.
That being said, I don't see how this thing moves off the
diplomatic dime without a clear and forceful statement from
President Clinton. Will he try to use, or would you advise
him to use the bully pulpit soon to rally the American
people, to rally the Congress and to rally the West as to
what is really at stake here, as hundreds of people continue
to die every day, and so far nothing stops, nothing deters
ongoing Bosnian Serb and Serb aggression.
Secretary Christopher. Mr. McCloskey, thank you for the
question, and for giving me an opportunity to say that I
share your feeling that the principal fault lies with the
Bosnian Serbs. And I've said that several times before. They
are the most at fault of all three sides, and atrocities
abound in this area, as we have seen in the last several days
and weeks.
But I agree that the aggression coming from Serbia is the
principal perpetrator of the problem in the area. With
respect to genocide, the definition of genocide is a fairly
technical definition. Let me get it for you here.
Under the 1948 convention, the crime of genocide is to
commit--an individual, in order to commit the crime of
genocide, must commit one or more specific acts with intent
to destroy in whole or in part a national, ethnical, racial
or religious group as such.
I would say that some of the acts that have been committed
by various parties in Bosnia, principally by the Serbians,
could constitute genocide under the 1948 convention if their
purpose was to destroy the religious or ethnic group in whole
or in part. And that seems to me to be a standard that may
well have been reached in some of the aspects of Bosnia.
Certainly some of the conduct there is tantamount to
genocide.
Rep. McCloskey. And the hoped for more comprehensive public
assertion of leadership, sir?
Secretary Christopher. Well, you know, the president is
very much seized with this problem, and when the time comes
for him to want to enlist the American people, especially in
the commitment of military forces, if that ever becomes
necessary, I'm certain that he will undertake to explain it
fully to the American people. He must do so. He must also
consult with Congress extensively.''
May 6: Remarks by the President to the Export-Import Bank
Conference, Washington, DC.
``The President. . . . The international community, I
believe, must not allow the Serbs to stall progress toward
peace and continue brutal assaults on innocent civilians.
We've seen too many things happen, and we do have fundamental
interests there, not only the United States, but particularly
the United States as a member of the world community.
The Serbs' actions over the past year violate the principle
that internationally-recognized borders must not be violated
or altered by aggression from without. Their actions threaten
to widen the conflict and foster instability in other parts
of Europe in ways that could be exceedingly damaging. And
their savage and cynical ethnic cleansing offends the world's
conscience and our standard of behavior. . .
Your presence here--your understanding of the importance of
exports to America's future, to the blending of our nation
and our culture and our values with those of like-minded
persons throughout the world--should only reinforce our
determination to confine, inasmuch as the international
community can possibly confine, savage acts of inhumanity to
people solely because of their ethnicity or their religion;
to confine insofar as we possibly can as an international
community the ability of one country to invade another and
upset its borders; and certainly to try to confine this
centuries-old series of ethnic and religious enmities to the
narrowest possible geographic boundaries.''
May 1: US Consultations With Allies on Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Secretary Christopher, Opening Statement at a news
conference, Washington, DC:
``Upon taking office, President Clinton inherited a complex
and tragic situation in the former Yugoslavia. The situation
has bedeviled the international community now for almost 2
years. It's a problem with deep historic roots. In the post-
Cold War period, the former Yugoslavia has been the scene of
violence, tragedy, and outrageous conduct.
The President has acted to deal with this conflict. . .
. Yet the outrages have continued in the former Yugoslavia
area. In the face of Serbian aggression, the President has
been rigorously reviewing further options for action during
the course of the last week.
. . . He has been exploring additional actions the
international community can take to respond to the violence,
stop the aggression, and contain the conflict.
The President has just completed a meeting with his
principal national security advisers. At this meeting the
President decided on the direction that he believes the
United States and the international community should now take
in this situation. This direction involves a number of
specific recommendations, including military steps. The
President is sending me to Europe to consult with our allies
and friends on a course of actions. The problem is at the
heart of Europe's future. Our efforts will be undertaken with
our partners. We're ready to play our part, but others must
be as well. . . .
There are, of course, issues of conscience and humanitarian
concerns at stake in this situation. But fundamentally our
actions are also based upon the strategic interest of the
United States. All of us seek to limit the risk of a widening
instability that could lead to a . . . war.''
May 25: Madeleine K. Albright, Excerpts from statement by
the U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, UN
Security Council Adopts Resolution 827 on War Crimes
Tribunal, New York City, May 25, 1993.
``. . . The crimes being committed, even as we meet today,
are not just isolated acts of drunken militia men, but often
are the systematic and orchestrated crimes of government
officials, military commanders, and disciplined artillery men
and foot soldiers.''
April 23: Clinton Defends First 100 Days, Stresses Options
in Bosnia, Presidential News Conference:
``Q. Mr. President, there's a growing feeling that the
Western response to the bloodshed in Bosnia has been woefully
inadequate. Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel asked you
yesterday to do something, anything to stop the fighting. Is
the United States considering taking unilateral action such
as airstrikes against Serb artillery sites?
President Clinton. Well, first let me say, as you know, for
more than a week now we have been seriously reviewing our
options for further action . . . I think we should act. We
should lead, the United States should lead. We have led for
the last three months.
We have moved the coalition, and to be fair, our, our
allies in Europe have been willing to, to do their part, and
they have troops on the ground there. But I do not think we
should act alone, unilaterally, nor do I think we will have
to.
And in the next several days I think we will finalize the
extensive review which has been going on, and which has taken
a lot of my time, as well as the time of the administration,
as it should have, over the last 10 days or so. I think we'll
finish that in the near future and then we'll have a policy,
and we'll announce it and everybody can evaluate it.
Q. Do you see any parallel between the ethnic cleansing in
Bosnia and the Holocaust?
P. I think the--I think the Holocaust is on a whole
different level. I think it is without precedent, or peer in
human history. On the other hand, ethnic cleansing is the
kind of inhumanity that the Holocaust took to the nth degree.
The idea of moving people around, abusing them and often
killing them solely because of their ethnicity is an
abhorrent thing. And especially troublesome in that area
where people of different ethnic groups lived side by side
for so long together.
And I think you have to stand up against it. I think it's
wrong . . .
Q. Mr. President getting back to the situation in Bosnia,
and we understand you haven't made any final decision on new
options previously considered unacceptable, but the two most
commonly heard options would be lifting the arms embargo to
enable the Bosnian Muslims to defend themselves, and to
initiate some limited airstrikes, perhaps to cut off supply
lines.
Without telling us your decision--presumably you haven't
made any final decisions on those two options--what are the
pros and cons--that are going through your mind right now and
will weigh heavily on your final decision?
P. I'm reluctant to get into this. Those are two of the
options. There are some other options that have been
considered. All have pluses and minuses. All have supporters
and opponents in the Congress, where I would remind you,
heavy consultations will be required to embark on any new
policy.
I do believe that on the airstrike issue, the pronouncement
that [Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Gen. Colin L.]
Powell [Jr.] has made generally about military action apply
there. If you take action, if the United States takes action,
we must have a clearly defined objective that can be met, we
must be able to understand it, and its limitations must be
clear.
The United States is not, should not become involved as a
partisan in a war. With regard to the, to the lifting of the
arms embargo, the question obviously there is the--if you
widen the capacity of people to fight, will that help to get
a settlement and bring about peace, or will it lead to more
bloodshed, and what kind of reaction can others have that
would, that would undermine the effectiveness of the policy.
But I think both of them deserve some serious consideration
along with some other options we have. . . .
Q. Since you said that one side in the Bosnian conflict
represents inhumanity, the Holocaust carried to the `nth
degree,' why do you then tell us that the United States
cannot take a partisan view in this war?
P. Well, I said that the principle of ethnic cleansing is
something we ought to stand up against. That does not mean
that the United States or the United Nations can enter a war,
in effect, to redraw the lines, geographical lines of
republics within what was Yugoslavia, or that that would
ultimately be successful.
I think what the United States has to do is to try to
figure out whether there is some way, consistent with forcing
the people to resolve their own difficulties, we can stand up
to and stop ethnic cleansing, and that is obviously the
difficulty we are wrestling with.
This is clearly the most difficult foreign policy problem
we face and that all of our allies face. And if it were easy,
I suppose it would have been solved before. We have tried to
do more in the last 90 days than was previously done. It has
clearly not been enough to stop the Serbian aggression, and
we are now looking at what else we can do.
Q. Yesterday you specifically criticized the Roosevelt
administration for not having bombed the railroads to the
concentration camps and things that were near military
targets. Aren't there steps like that that would not involve
conflict, direct conflict or partisan belligerence that you
might consider?
P. There may be. I would remind you that the circumstances
were somewhat different. We were then at war with Germany . .
. and that's what made that whole incident, series of
incidents, so perplexing. But we have, as I say, we've got
all of our options under review. . . .''
April 21: The Washington Times: ``Airstrikes in Bosnia lose
appeal; Congress urges stronger steps'' by Warren Strobel.
``. . .With Mr. Christopher describing U.S. policy toward
Bosnia as `at a turning point,' President Clinton called
together his top policy advisers to discuss possible new
steps.
Alluding to the Nazi attempt to exterminate Jews, Mr.
Clinton said the carnage there merits U.S. intervention.
`I think the Holocaust is the most extreme example the
world has ever known of ethnic cleansing and I think that
even in its more limited manifestations it's an idea that
should be opposed,' he said yesterday at the beginning of a
meeting with Czech president Vaclav Havel. . .
The administration is under intense pressure from
lawmakers, many of whom are pointing to tomorrow's dedication
of the Holocaust Memorial Museum and asking whether the West
really meant it when it said, `Never again.'''
April 1: President Clinton, Question-and-Answer Session
With the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Annapolis,
Maryland,
``Q. Mr. President, . . . Do we have a national interest in
checking the spread of greater Serbian ethnic cleansing in
the Balkans? And are we losing our credibility as a nation as
this horrifying aggression in a sovereign state continues
without your unrestrained, forceful, and public condemnation
of it?
The President. Yes, we have a national interest in limiting
ethnic cleansing. . .The thing that I have not been willing
to do is to immediately take action the end of which I could
not see. Whatever I want to do, I want to do it with vigor
and wholeheartedly. I want it to have a reasonable prospect
of success. And I have done the best I could with the cards
that I found on the table when I became President. If you
have other ideas about what you think I ought to do that
would minimize the loss of life, I would be glad to have
them.
Q. Sir, do you condemn it here today?
The President. Absolutely. I condemn it, and I have
condemned it repeatedly and thoroughly. And I have done
everything I could to increase the pressure of the
international community on the outrages perpetrated in Bosnia
by the aggressors and to get people to stand up against
ethnic cleansing. The question is what are we capable of
doing about it from the United States. If you look at the
responses that have been mustered so far from the European
states that are even closer and that have a memory of what
happened when Hitler, who was not shy about using his power,
had hundreds of thousands of people in the former Yugoslavia
and even then was unable to subdue it entirely.
I think you have to look at what our realistic options are
for action. The question is not whether we condemn what's
going on. Ethnic cleansing is an outrage, and it is an idea
which should die, which should not be able to be expanded.
The question is, what can we do?
Now, I have said that the United States would be prepared
to join with a United Nations effort in supporting a
peacekeeping process that was entered into in good faith. If
the Serbs refuse to do that, then we will all have to
reassess our position. But we must be careful not to use
words that will outstrip our capacity to back them up. That
is a grave error for any great nation, and one I will try not
to commit.''
April 15: NBC Today Show Interview, Guest: Secretary of
State Warren Christopher.
``Q. Mr. Secretary, let me ask you about Bosnia for a
moment. Margaret Thatcher said on this program that the
European Community was guilty of being an accomplice to
massacre by not intervening militarily in Bosnia and she
called for two things: loosening the arms embargo so the
Bosnians could get arms, and a bombing campaign to make it
painful for the Serbs. What's your reaction to that?
Secretary Christopher. Well, I've said before it's a
horrifying situation in Bosnia and it seems to get worse
every day. It seems to me that Prime Minister Thatcher's
prescription is one for only increasing the carnage. The
United States does not have any intention in intervening in
that war with ground troops. We're taking a number of
important steps to try to persuade the Serbs not to continue
their aggression, but I do not think that her prescription is
the right approach to it. It's a rather emotional response to
an emotional problem.''
April 22: President Clinton, US Holocaust Museum Dedicated,
Address at the dedication ceremony, Washington, DC:
``. . . The Holocaust reminds us forever that knowledge
divorced form values can only serve to deepen the human
nightmare, that a head without a heart is not humanity.
For those of us here today representing the nations of the
West, we must live forever with this knowledge: Even as our
fragmentary awareness of crimes grew into indisputable facts,
far too little was done. Before the war even started, doors
to liberty were shut. And even after the United States and
the Allies attacked Germany, rail lines to the camps within
miles of military significant targets were left undisturbed .
. .
Ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia is but the most
brutal and blatant and ever-present manifestation of what we
see also with the oppression of the Kurds in Iraq, the
abusive treatment of the Baha'i in Iran, the endless race-
based violence in South Africa. And in many other places we
are reminded again and again how fragile are the safeguards
of civilizations . . .''
April 1: House Foreign Affairs Committee International
Operations Subcommittee
``Rep. Frank McCloskey (D-Indiana). . . Previously in
response to a question to whether or not genocide has taken
place, the reply from State was that acts tantamount to
genocide have taken place. I think that's not a clear answer
to a very important and policy driving question.
Would you order a clear, explicit determination, yes or no,
if the outrageous Serb systematic barbarism amounts to
genocide? That's one question . . .
Secretary Christopher. With respect to the definition of
circumstances in Bosnia, we certainly will reply to that.
That is a legal question that you have posed.
I have said several times that the conduct there is an
atrocity: the killing, the raping, the ethnic cleansing is
definitively an atrocious set of acts, whether it meets the
technical legal definition of genocide, it's a matter we will
look and get back to you.''
March 23: Questions for the record submitted to Mr. Stephen
Oxman by Senator Dole, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
``Question. Bosnia-Herzegovina. In November, 1992, the U.N.
Human Rights Commission approved a resolution, which was
supported by the United States, which asks member states to
provide their views as to whether the actions of the Serb
forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina constitute genocide under the
Genocide Convention. What is the U.S. legal judgment on this
matter? Has the United States submitted its views to the U.N.
Human Rights Commission? If not, why has it not done so?
Answer. The resolution in question `called upon all States
to consider the extent to which the acts committed in Bosnia
and Herzegovina and Croatia constitute genocide.' It did not
request views to be submitted, but rather for States to look
at this question.
The Administration has done so, and concluded that acts
tantamount to genocide have taken place in Bosnia. Because of
this, and because of the need to ensure accountability for
such acts, the Administration believes that the War Crimes
Tribunal being established by the Security Council should
have jurisdiction over such acts.''
March 10: House Appropriations Subcommittee Hearing, Topic:
State Department programs, Witness: Secretary of State Warren
Christopher.
``Rep. Skaggs. Let me also invite you to lay out your sense
of the U.S. national interest in our efforts to calm things
down in the former Yugoslavia, an identification of U.S.
interests that goes beyond certainly the laudable
humanitarian objectives that we're now pursuing.
Secretary Christopher. Well, thank you for that
opportunity. The case, Mr. Skaggs, is no less than the
prevention of a conflagration that could envelop all of
southeastern Europe and perhaps rage beyond, as it sometimes
has from that area, to consume a substantial portion of the
world. That's what's at stake here, preventing a widespread
area conflict . . . At a very minimum, it's important to stop
them before they enter other areas, and that's why we've
attached so much importance to giving them a strong warning
about creating conflict in Kosovo as well as the stationing
of international observers on the border of Macedonia . . .
So the stakes for the United States, and for the citizens
of the United States, are to prevent the broadening of that
conflict to bring in our NATO allies, and to bring in vast
sections of Europe, and perhaps as happened before,
broadening into a world war.
You know, there's kind of an eery analogy here. When you
think of Sarajevo as being the triggering point for World War
I, here we are again. How many years later, seven decades
later we're back with Sarajevo perhaps being once again the
trigger. If that isn't warning enough for us, then we
certainly are failing to follow the lessons of history.
That's why the United States is interested. That's why we
are wanting to take an active role there.''
February 22: UN Security Council Adopts Resolution 808 on
War Crimes Tribunal. Statement by Madeleine K. Albright, US
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, UN Security
Council, New York City, February 22, 1993.
``There is an echo in this chamber today. The Nuremberg
principles have been reaffirmed. We have preserved the long-
neglected compact made by the community of civilized nations
48 years ago in San Francisco: to create the United Nations
and enforce the Nuremberg principles. The lesson that we are
all accountable to international law may have finally taken
hold in our collective memory. . .''
February 10: New Steps Toward Conflict Resolution In the
Former Yugoslavia, Secretary Christopher, Opening statement
at a news conference, Washington, DC, February 10, 1993.
``. . . This conflict may be far from our shores, but it is
not distant to our concerns. We cannot afford to ignore it.
Let me explain why.
We cannot ignore the human toll . . .
Our conscience revolts at the idea of passively accepting
such brutality.
Beyond these humanitarian interests, we have direct
strategic concerns as well. The continuing destruction of a
new UN member state challenges the principal that
internationally recognized borders should not be altered by
force. In addition, this conflict itself has no natural
borders. It threatens to spill over into new regions, such as
Kosovo and Macedonia. It could then become a greater Balkan
war, like those that preceded World War I. Broader
hostilities could touch additional nations, such as Greece,
Albania, and Turkey. The river of fleeing refugees, which has
already reached the hundreds of thousands, would swell. The
political and economic vigor of Europe, already tested by the
integration of former communist states, would be further
strained.
There is a broader imperative here. The world's response to
the violence in the former Yugoslavia is an early and crucial
test of how it will address the concerns of ethnic and
religious minorities in the post-Cold War world. That
question reaches throughout Eastern Europe. It reaches to the
states of the former Soviet Union, where the fall of
communism has left some 25 million ethnic Russians living as
minorities in other republics, and it reaches to other
continents as well.
The events in the former Yugoslavia raise the question of
whether a state may address the rights of its minorities by
eradicating those minorities to achieve `ethnic purity.' Bold
tyrants and fearful minorities are watching to see whether
`ethnic cleansing' is a policy [that] the world will
tolerate. If we hope to promote the spread of freedom of if
we hope to encourage the emergence of peaceful multi-ethnic
democracies, our answer must be a resounding no.''
January 20: President Clinton's inaugural address:
``. . . When our vital interests are challenged, or the
will and conscience of the international community is defied,
we will act--with peaceful diplomacy whenever possible, with
force when necessary. . .''
January 22: Los Angeles Times: Clinton to Press Active U.S.
Role in Bosnia
``. . .`This is clearly the highest priority of the
President in the National Security Council's agenda. . .,'
Madeleine Albright, Clinton's nominee for ambassador to the
United Nations, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
`We will, in fact, be meeting on this subject very soon.'''
January 20: Washington Post: U.S. Human Rights Report
Charges Serb Drive `Borders on Genocide':
``The `ethnic cleansing' campaign pursued by Bosnian Serbs
to drive Muslims and other ethnic groups from their homes in
Bosnia-Herzegovina has resulted in murder, torture, rape and
starvation on a scale that `dwarfs anything seen in Europe
since Nazi times,' the State Department said yesterday in its
annual human rights report.
`It borders on genocide,' Patricia Diaz Dennis, assistant
secretary of state for human rights, said in describing the
efforts of Serb irregular forces, aided by Serbia and the
Serbian-controlled Yugoslav army, to bring most of Bosnia
under their control.''
January 14: The New York Times: Clinton's State Dept.
Choice Backs, `Discreet' Force (report on Christopher's
confirmation hearing):
``. . . Later, his remarks were more pointed. The Serbian
campaign of `ethnic cleansing,' he said, was resulting in
`near genocidal conditions or perhaps really genocidal
conditions.' At another point he said, `It is a situation
where Europe has performed in an abysmal way.''
January 14: The New York Times: Excerpt From an Interview
With Clinton After the Air Strikes:
``Q: Are you ready to support a Nuremberg-like war criminal
trial? Eagleburger has named several leaders there as war
criminals?
A: Absolutely . . . Somehow the West has got to say
something and do something about the idea of ethnic
cleansing, which is such an embracing idea that if you
believe in it, it justifies the brutalization of women who
aren't your women and the torture of children that aren't
your children.
I think it is important to point out that this Bosnian
thing has potential ramifications further away from the reach
of the United States and Europe on the republics of the
former Soviet Union, in central Europe. This is the idea
under which this whole thing has proceeded is what the West
has to stand up against, what the United Nations has to stand
up against.
. . . I think that as horrible as the loss of life, and the
torture and the butchery and the starvation has been the
potential for a bigger impact is greater than that even.
Because it's all been done under the notion of ethnic
cleansing. I mean, here we are on the verge of the 21st
century, and people who are literate, who can read and write,
who are part of a very old, civilized tradition, think it's
O.K. to slaughter the living daylights out of one another
under the guise of ethnic cleansing. It is a barbaric idea .
. . We've got to take a stand against it. It's an awful idea,
and the potential ramifications are very very great, because
they justify doing anything.''
December 16, 1992: The Need To Respond to War Crimes in the
Former Yugoslavia, Secretary Eagleburger, Statement at the
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Geneva,
Switzerland.
``. . . We have, on the one hand, a moral and historical
obligation not to stand back a second time in this century
while a people faces obliteration . . . The fact of the
matter is that we know that crimes against humanity have
occurred, and we know when and where they occurred. We know,
moreover, which forces committed those crimes, and under
whose command they operated. And we know, finally, who the
political leaders are to whom those military commanders
were--and still are--responsible . . .
Finally, there is another category of fact which is beyond
dispute--namely, the fact of political and command
responsibility for the crimes against humanity which I have
described. Leaders such as Slobodan Milosevic, the President
of Serbia, Radovan Karadzic, the self-declared President of
the Serbian Bosnian republic, and General Ratko Mladic,
commander of Bosnian Serb military forces, must eventually
explain whether and how they sought to ensure, as they must
under international law, that their forces complied with
international law. They ought, if charged, to have the
opportunity of defending themselves by demonstrating whether
and how they took responsible action to prevent and punish
the atrocities I have described which were undertaken by
their subordinates . . .
It is clear that the reckless leaders of Serbia, and of the
Serbs inside Bosnia, have somehow convinced themselves that
the international community will not stand up to them now,
and will be forced eventually to recognize the fruits of
their aggression and the results of ethnic cleansing . . .
Thus, we must make it unmistakably clear that we will
settle for nothing less than the restoration of the
independent state of Bosnia-Herzegovina with its territory
undivided and intact, the return of all refugees to their
homes and villages, and, indeed, a day of reckoning for those
found guilty of crimes against humanity . . .
But in waiting for the people of Serbia, if not their
leaders, to come to their senses, we must make them
understand that their country will remain alone, friendless,
and condemned to economic ruin and exclusion from the family
of civilized nations for as long as they pursue the suicidal
dream of a Greater Serbia. They need, especially, to
understand that a second Nuremberg awaits the practitioners
of ethnic cleansing, and that the judgment, and opprobrium,
of history awaits the people in whose name their crimes were
committed.''
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