[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 14 (Friday, February 11, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: February 11, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                        THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA

  Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, Wednesday evening, I was privileged to be 
included in the congressional leadership group that went to the White 
House to consult with the President of the United States and members of 
his Cabinet and other senior advisers on a range of foreign policy 
issues, but primarily those relating to Bosnia.
  At that meeting, I expressed my concerns about an expanded use of air 
power in Bosnia. I have done that many times on this floor, most often 
in conjunction with our noted and experienced colleague, Senator 
McCain.
  I also expressed my belief that it is essential, and I repeat--it is 
essential--that the Congress at the earliest opportunity begin a full 
and thorough debate regarding the next evolution of the Bosnia policy. 
We should do that before committing our men and women of the Armed 
Forces to what appears to be a tragic and never-ending conflict.
  Bosnia, in my judgment, poses one of the most complex political-
diplomatic-military equations that we have had to face in recent time.
  We have great compassion for the suffering of the Bosnian people, 
suffering which has been vividly portrayed to us through vivid 
television coverage. We are moved; we are concerned; we are 
compassionate. But we must not let our foreign policy be dictated by 
our emotions. We must carefully, patiently, and thoroughly assess what 
the strategic interests of this country are in that part of the world, 
and the extent to which we are willing to commit our Armed Forces and 
our tax dollars to resolve that conflict.
  We must try to understand the complexity of the conflict. There is so 
little clarity. There are so few options. Yet, we are now faced with a 
new policy, a policy by which we are going to become more heavily 
committed militarily in that conflict. For some period of time, our 
naval forces, our air forces, and some small elements of other types of 
our military forces have been engaged in various noncombat missions in 
Bosnia. But now we are on the brink of involving ourselves in outright 
combat situations with the use of air power.
  The Congress is now confronted with a situation with certain 
parallels to our experience in Somalia. From the time the Somalia 
operation was transferred to United Nations control in May 1993, the 
objectives of United States policy and the mission of United States 
military forces went through a series of evolutions.
  Few in Congress expressed our views as we went from one evolution to 
the next. I have gone back and read the Record on this issue. One or 
two Members addressed this body, but we as a body really did not give 
that serious situation the attention it deserved, nor did we go on 
record with a vote and express ourselves with clarity, prior to the 
tragic events of October 3-4 in Somalia.
  The Congress followed the proper course prior to the Persian Gulf 
conflict. I brought with me today the resolution that was adopted by 
this body, Senate Joint Resolution 2, where by a very narrow margin of 
but five votes, we expressed with clarity our intention to back the 
President of the United States and to give him the discretion as 
Commander in Chief to utilize force when and if he believed it was 
necessary in the Persian Gulf operation. Together with our allies, that 
operation was brought to a successful conclusion.
  I return, however, to Somalia. Again, we had a series of policy 
evolutions, with very little attention given by the Congress to the 
charges. And then, on October 3 and 4, we witnessed the tragic events 
in Somalia that led to 18 deaths and over 70 casualties just of United 
States troops. Other nations sustained lesser casualties. And suddenly, 
the people of the United States understandably asked: Why are we there? 
What is it we are trying to achieve?
  We remember so vividly the early pictures of December 1992 when we 
landed and were warmly greeted by the people of Somalia. We provided 
food. We greatly lessened the starvation and the suffering. We were 
there as peacekeepers, a relatively new term in our lexicon, not as 
peacemakers, which often involves combat. And indeed the evolution of 
this conflict was such that we were soon involved in conflict, and we 
sustained heavy, tragic losses.
  The American people reacted with anger and indignation for the 
losses. Had our President, had our Congress prepared the American 
people for this contingency, for these losses? In my judgment, no. We 
failed in our respective responsibilities.
  Within days, the Senate was involved in a heated debate, threatening 
to overturn this Nation's policy in Somalia, challenging the President 
in his decision regarding when to bring our troops home.
  There were a number here who believed that our troops should be 
brought home from Somalia immediately, no later than Christmas. It was 
only with great difficulty that a compromise was forged which accorded 
to the Commander in Chief, the President, the right to decide when to 
withdraw U.S. forces. In the end, the President's withdrawal date of 
March 31 was adopted.
  Senator Levin and I went to Somalia in December at the request of the 
chairman and ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, on 
which we serve. During the course of our inspection trip, we visited 
with the unit commanders of some dozen other nations that had troops in 
Somalia. They were perplexed as to why the United States was leaving 
Somalia so precipitously when the situation in that country was far 
from resolved. We cannot have a parallel situation in Bosnia.
  Mr. President, I am concerned because I fear that once again the 
congressional role in the commitment of U.S. troops to hostile 
situations is not being fulfilled. We are about to leave now for a 
week-long recess. During this period of time, our troops could well 
become involved in combat, and this concerns me greatly.

  As I said, I brought this to the attention of the Senate on Wednesday 
of this week. As we are about to conclude here this afternoon, I bring 
it again to the attention of the leadership, with the hope that 
possibly today, they could indicate to the Chamber, to the Senate, to 
the American people that upon our return, the leadership will try to 
present to the Senate some legislation that will allow us to express 
our views and make a decision regarding the use of air power in Bosnia.
  It is very difficult today, far more difficult than when I grew up in 
the World War II period--and I served briefly in the Navy--and far more 
difficult indeed than in Korea, where I was privileged once again to 
wear the uniform of this country, to assess the staying power of the 
country in terms of its willingness to back a commitment of our Armed 
Forces abroad. One thing is clear--the American people will not support 
the deployment of United States troops to Bosnia unless the objectives 
of United States policy and the mission of United States Forces is 
clearly articulated.
  None of us can predict now what will evolve in Bosnia in the days and 
the weeks to come. But I think it is essential that the Senate as a 
body, the House as a body, the Congress as a whole address this issue 
early upon its return so that there is clarity and we speak with one 
voice: Our President, our Congress, and hopefully our people.
  At our briefing on Wednesday, the President very clearly indicated 
what he believed were the strategic interests of the United States in 
Bosnia. That is a part of the world which could provide the spark for 
an expanded war in Europe, which would pose a very serious challenge to 
our principal allies and longstanding friends, the other nations in 
Europe.
  We should concentrate in this Chamber on very serious and lengthy 
debate as to exactly why we are undertaking this additional mission, 
what is the likelihood of success or failure, the risk of casualties.
  I have reviewed the various and limited congressional actions we have 
taken to date regarding Bosnia. I do not find clear authorization by 
the Congress or the clear concurrence by the Congress with the proposed 
action that our President is now considering--that is, the use of our 
air power to retaliate against the weapons of war that are being used 
to inflict this senseless and tragic suffering in Sarajevo.
  Yet, the North Atlantic Council yesterday, with U.S. concurrence, 
adopted a communique which ``authorized the Commander in Chief of 
Allied Forces Southern Europe to launch airstrikes, at the request of 
the United Nations, against artillery or mortar positions in or around 
Sarajevo * * * which are determined by UNPROFOR to be responsible for 
attacks against civilian targets in that city.''
  According to the communique, these airstrikes will begin 10 days from 
now unless certain conditions are met. As I said, I have great 
reservations about this new policy. I want to support our President. He 
is the Commander in Chief. But there is much to be learned about the 
situation in Bosnia. Even though I have expended a good deal of my time 
and made three visits to the region of Bosnia, including one into 
Sarajevo itself, there is still much I have to study and understand 
about this conflict.
  I wish to have the benefit of the wisdom and the understanding of my 
colleagues. I wish to cast a vote--I say that very clearly--cast a vote 
on an explicit resolution, just like we did on Senate Joint Resolution 
2, a resolution which was privileged to draw up.
  Selective bombing of military and mortar sites in Sarajevo is an 
extremely difficult military mission. There are several Members of our 
distinguished Senate who have had experience in these missions--Senator 
McCain is foremost in mind. He has spoken of his experiences and shared 
with us the knowledge of many others with whom he has consulted over 
the past year about these missions. The artillery and mortars are 
highly mobile. The terrain lends itself to natural camouflage and the 
hostile forces are experienced at locating these weapons near schools, 
hospitals, and other population centers. The risk of collateral damage 
to innocent civilians is very high.
  The terrain in Bosnia, which I have seen by air, is not unlike the 
terrain that our troops faced in Korea. I was then a ground officer 
with an aviation unit that flew missions daily. I participated in the 
briefings of the airmen, and at limited times had the opportunity to 
see for myself the difficulty of performing these missions in highly 
mountainous terrain, in frightful weather, not unlike what is 
experienced in Bosnia today.
  It is a tough, difficult, dangerous mission. We have to assume that 
airmen will go down, perhaps to hostile fire, even though General 
Shalikashvili assessed the risk of antiaircraft weapons and handheld 
weapons as very low in that region. There is also the risk of 
mechanical failure with aircraft. Remote as it may be, that risk is 
always there. We have to prepare ourselves if an airplane is downed, an 
airman taken as a hostage.
  I used the term in these remarks today ``hostile forces'' in Bosnia. 
Throughout this conflict, it has been difficult for outsiders to know 
who is shooting at whom, much less why such appalling carnage is being 
inflicted. Indeed, it has not yet been determined which side is 
responsible for the recent bombing of the marketplace in Sarajevo. 
Clearly, there is a strong, if not the strongest case, of wrongdoing 
associated with the Serbian side. But, in my judgment, no party to this 
conflict is without guilt. We are witnessing cruel and inhuman 
treatment of civilians by all sides. There is simply no clarity, no 
complete understanding, and that leaves me great concern as to how this 
conflict can be resolved.
  In addition, I am not sure what we will accomplish even if we are 
successful in destroying some of the artillery and mortar sites around 
Sarajevo. We may temporarily reduce the shelling of Sarajevo. But what 
happens if that same weaponry is carried to another region in Bosnia, 
and the pictures begin to come out of other marketplaces being bombed, 
or the pictures come out of the UNPROFOR forces--not peacemakers, but 
peacekeepers--being subjected to hostile fire. What will we do next? 
These are the types of questions we have to answer prior to the 
commitment of United States troops to a combat mission in Bosnia.
  With the start of airstrikes, the U.N. troops on the ground in Bosnia 
could become the targets of hostile retaliation. The humanitarian aid 
missions will cease, in all probability, and the NATO planes involved 
in the airstrikes  will be subjected to hostile fire. These are the 
sorts of things we should very carefully consider in this Chamber. We 
should consult with our constituencies, in my judgment, before we take 
this next step.

  I come back again to my principal concern; that is the airstrike 
option. Will it bring us any closer to the goal of ending the fighting 
in Bosnia and achieving a negotiated settlement to the conflict? We may 
be successful in bringing a measure of relief to Sarajevo, but again we 
have to understand that that same hostility could go elsewhere in that 
troubled country and the bloodshed will continue.
  If airstrikes fail, what are the next steps that we will take? The 
credibility of our country, the credibility of the United States as a 
military power in future actions, is at stake. I wish to know exactly 
what is the course of action once these airstrikes start. How does this 
spell out an option to bring about the cessation of fighting and some 
form of agreement and resolution of this crisis? At the moment, these 
facts are not before this Senator to my satisfaction.
  Mr. President, few military engagements begin very large. History 
shows this. They so often begin with incremental, gradual actions which 
grow over time to larger, protracted conflicts. We seldom anticipate 
long wars, but wars have a way of lasting longer and costing more in 
lives and treasure than politicians can estimate or, indeed, the 
military can estimate, or our President can estimate. Unfortunately, 
the men and women in uniform and their families here at home pay the 
price.
  We are now facing, as I said, a week-long congressional recess. It is 
my hope that this policy, as adopted by NATO, and as we speak, being 
considered by the Security Council of the United Nations, will not be 
undertaken and firm commitments made until the Congress of the United 
States has had an opportunity to assume its rightful constitutional 
role as a partner with the executive branch in making these important 
decisions.
  I am hopeful the leadership will, early on our return, establish an 
opportunity for us to debate this issue in full.
  Mr. President, I am willing to relinquish the floor if there are 
other Senators desiring to speak on this or other issues. But at this 
point in time, I see none seeking recognition, so I will yield the 
floor in hopes that others might come over and speak to this.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so 
ordered.

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