[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 13 (Thursday, February 10, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: February 10, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1993
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to House Resolution 352 and rule
XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House
on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the bill,
H.R. 811.
{time} 1100
in the committee of the whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of
the bill (H.R. 811) to reauthorize the independent counsel law for an
additional 5 years, and for other purposes, with Mr. Torricelli in the
chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. When the Committee of the Whole rose on Wednesday,
February 9, 1994, amendment No. 3 printed in House Report 103-419 had
been disposed of.
It is now in order to consider amendment No. 4 printed in House
Report 103-419.
amendment offered by mr. ramstad
Mr. RAMSTAD. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Ramstad: Page 10, insert the
following after line 20 and redesignate the succeeding
section accordingly:
SEC. 6. GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL.
Section 596(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end the following: ``Failure of the
independent counsel to comply with the established policies
of the Department of Justice as required by section 594(f) or
to comply with section 594(j) may be grounds for removing
that independent counsel from office for good cause under
this subsection.''.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr.
Ramstad] will be recognized for 5 minutes, and a Member opposed to the
amendment will be recognized for 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Ramstad].
Mr. RAMSTAD. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such times as I may
consume.
Mr. Chairman, my amendment is both reasonable and straightforward.
Under my amendment, an independent counsel may be removed for good
cause for failure to comply with the standards of conduct which are set
forth in the independent counsel statute.
Those standards of conduct are spelled out in the statute in two
sections, the first section 594(f), as amended by the subcommittee
reads:
An independent counsel shall, except to the extent that to
do so would be inconsistent with the purposes of this
chapter, comply with the written or other established
policies of the Department of Justice respecting enforcement
of the criminal laws.
The other provision is section 594(j). This places employment
restrictions on independent counsel and staff while they are serving
and for periods subsequently. It also provides restrictions on law firm
associates of the independent counsel.
Mr. Chairman, these standards of conduct are wise and reasonable.
Presently, however, there is no enforcement mechanism, no penalty
whatsoever for failing to comply with sections 594 (f) or (j).
My amendment seeks to correct this oversight. It simply states that:
Failure of the independent counsel to comply [with sections
594(f) or 594(j)] * * * may be grounds for removing that
independent counsel from office for good cause.
I want to emphasize again, this does not compel the Attorney General
to remove an independent counsel, it only provides guidance.
Clearly, the intent of this amendment is not to seek the removal of
an independent counsel for minor or technical violations of DOJ policy.
Mr. Chairman, if we think it is important enough to impose certain
requirements on an independent counsel, then we should be willing to
enforce those requirements.
Let us remember what role an independent counsel plays. He or she
simply acts in the place of a U.S. attorney, whom we do not want to
conduct the investigation because of a conflict of interest. For all
intents and purposes, an independent counsel should and must adhere to
the very same prosecutorial standards that a U.S. attorney would have
followed.
Indeed, this principle is recognized in the Judiciary Committee
report on page 20:
Section 594(f) maintains the policy that independent
counsel are expected to follow the same rules as the
Department of Justice in their investigations and in making
decisions on whether or not to seek indictments. This
provision is designed to help ensure that an individual who
is the subject of an independent counsel investigation will
not be held to a higher standard or subject to stricter
enforcement of the laws than other individuals.
The committee report on page 21 goes on to clarify that, and I quote:
Penalties [to be applied to U.S. Attorneys] for failure to
comply with policy range from no sanction or administrative
reprimand all the way to dismissal, depending on the
importance of the policy and the extent and nature of the
divergence.
I would suggest that all independent counsel be held to the very same
standard for breach of established Department of Justice policies.
Clearly, only the most serious breaches would lead to removal from
office.
Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to vote for this sensible
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. Is the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] opposed to the
amendment?
Mr. BROOKS. The Chairman is correct.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. BROOKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment
offered by my good friend and a distinguished member of the committee,
Mr. Ramstad, the gentleman from Minnesota. Because the Attorney General
already has the power to remove any independent counsel for good cause,
this amendment is unnecessary.
But of equally great concern to me is that this amendment spells out
two--but only two--of the grounds which might constitute ``good cause''
under the statute. Because good cause for removal could be based on any
number of actions, misdeeds, or circumstances, the statute has wisely
left the determination of what constitutes the standard of good cause
in the hands of the Attorney General. H.R. 811 continues to do so.
On a more technical ground, the amendment on the surface appears to
repeat the scheme that is currently in the independent counsel statute,
but by using different words, it could lead to interpretive confusion.
I very much respect the motivation behind the gentleman's amendment,
but I urge that we keep the statute's current treatment of good cause
in place. For this reason, I must urge rejection of this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. RAMSTAD. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, in response to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks],
the distinguished chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, I would
just quote from the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1993,
the committee report from 1982, which totally contradicts what my good
friend from Texas said, and I am quoting now from the committee report:
This section should not be interpreted to mean that failure
of the special prosecutor to follow departmental policies
would constitute grounds for removal of the special
prosecutor by the Attorney General.
So, this section should not be interpreted to mean that failure of
the special prosecutor to comply with these two sections should
constitute grounds of removal of the special prosecutor by the Attorney
General.
Such an interpretation would seriously compromise the
special prosecutor's dependence.
Well, Mr. Chairman, obviously the legislative history spells out
that, if the independent counsel fails to comply with existing policy,
that that is not grounds for removal.
That is right here in the committee report.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. RAMSTAD. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, to my distinguished friend from Minnesota I
say, ``This section is included in the Hyde amendment substitute, and I
would hope that we could resolve it in that overall context and not in
a long, separate vote in contention here on the floor. We have got
three or four, at least, additional votes on this bill before we
conclude this afternoon, and some of the Members are trying to depart
from this city by plane early before that snow storm hits.''
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman.
Mr. RAMSTAD. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I am one of those
Members who would like to get out of town, but this amendment is, as
the distinguished chairman points out, part of the more comprehensive
amendment to be offered subsequently. However that amendment is very
controversial. There are two other major points of contention in that
broader amendment.
So, Mr. Chairman, this is a very straightforward amendment, and I did
not think it would be a controversial amendment. It simply says that if
the independent counsel fails to comply with standard Department of
Justice policies, and those are accepted widely by the criminal bar
across this country, and they are reasonable standards of conduct, if
he or she fails to comply with those standards of conduct, then the
Attorney General may--not must or shall, but may--remove the
independent counsel. If there are flagrant abuses, violations, of
established policy, prosecutorial policy, then it seems to me it is
only reasonable that the Attorney General have the power to remove an
independent counsel. I think there needs to be that minimum check or
balance, and again I would emphasize that it is discretionary.
So, Mr. Chairman, I am real puzzled by the chairman's opposition to
this amendment.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. RAMSTAD. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I would just say that I believe that this
is something that we might consider in the conference. In other words,
I am going to be opposed to the Hyde amendment and hope we can beat it.
But that does not mean we will exclude this concept from consideration
in the conference.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Ramstad]
has expired.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. RAMSTAD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BROOKS. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.
Mr. RAMSTAD. I would just suggest, Mr. Chairman, to my good friend
from Texas that he accept the amendment. That is an easy resolution of
this very straightforward amendment which is discretionary, I would
remind my friend from Texas, totally discretionary, it the independent
counsel violates these provisions. The broader amendment, which is
coming subsequently, Mr. Chairman, is much more controversial, so I do
not want to muddy the waters of that amendment.
{time} 1110
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, let me reclaim my time in order to answer
the question briefly.
It is good cause if you limit it to just one or two issues, but there
might be several more that the Attorney General might well consider
good cause, and I would rather have the broader interpretation
available to the Attorney General. That is really my only real query or
question about rewriting the language. That is what we do not want to
do.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. Ramstad].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the noes
appeared to have to have it.
recorded vote
Mr. RAMSTAD. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 187,
noes 227, not voting 24, as follows:
[Roll No. 18]
AYES--187
Allard
Andrews (NJ)
Archer
Armey
Bachus (AL)
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bateman
Bentley
Bereuter
Bilbray
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bunning
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Castle
Clinger
Coble
Collins (GA)
Combest
Cooper
Cox
Crane
Crapo
Cunningham
DeFazio
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Dooley
Doolittle
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Emerson
Everett
Fawell
Fields (TX)
Fish
Fowler
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frost
Gallegly
Gallo
Gekas
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gingrich
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Grams
Grandy
Greenwood
Gunderson
Hancock
Hansen
Hayes
Hefley
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Horn
Houghton
Huffington
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Inhofe
Istook
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Johnston
Kasich
Kim
King
Kingston
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kyl
Lazio
Leach
Levy
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lightfoot
Linder
Livingston
Machtley
Manzullo
Margolies-Mezvinsky
McCandless
McCollum
McCrery
McCurdy
McDade
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
McMillan
Meyers
Mica
Michel
Miller (FL)
Molinari
Moorhead
Morella
Myers
Nussle
Orton
Oxley
Packard
Parker
Paxon
Penny
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Quillen
Quinn
Ramstad
Ravenel
Regula
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roth
Roukema
Royce
Santorum
Saxton
Schaefer
Schiff
Sensenbrenner
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Sisisky
Skeen
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (TX)
Snowe
Solomon
Spence
Stearns
Stump
Sundquist
Talent
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas (CA)
Thomas (WY)
Torkildsen
Traficant
Upton
Walker
Walsh
Weldon
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NOES--227
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews (ME)
Applegate
Bacchus (FL)
Baesler
Barca
Barcia
Barlow
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Beilenson
Berman
Bevill
Bishop
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Brewster
Brooks
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Byrne
Cantwell
Cardin
Carr
Clay
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Condit
Conyers
Coppersmith
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Danner
Darden
de Lugo (VI)
Deal
DeLauro
Dellums
Derrick
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Durbin
Edwards (CA)
Edwards (TX)
Engel
English
Eshoo
Evans
Faleomavaega (AS)
Farr
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Filner
Fingerhut
Flake
Foglietta
Ford (MI)
Frank (MA)
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Geren
Gibbons
Glickman
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamburg
Hamilton
Harman
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hoagland
Hochbrueckner
Holden
Hoyer
Hughes
Hutto
Inslee
Jacobs
Jefferson
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E. B.
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kennelly
Kildee
Kleczka
Klein
Klink
Kopetski
Kreidler
LaFalce
Lambert
Lantos
LaRocco
Lehman
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Lloyd
Long
Lowey
Maloney
Mann
Markey
Matsui
Mazzoli
McCloskey
McDermott
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moran
Murphy
Murtha
Nadler
Natcher
Neal (MA)
Norton (DC)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Pallone
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Pickett
Pickle
Pomeroy
Poshard
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Reynolds
Richardson
Roemer
Romero-Barcelo (PR)
Rose
Rostenkowski
Rowland
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sangmeister
Sarpalius
Sawyer
Schenk
Schroeder
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Sharp
Shepherd
Skaggs
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (IA)
Spratt
Stark
Stenholm
Stokes
Strickland
Studds
Stupak
Swett
Synar
Tanner
Tauzin
Tejeda
Thompson
Thornton
Thurman
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Underwood (GU)
Unsoeld
Valentine
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Wheat
Whitten
Williams
Wilson
Wise
Woolsey
Wyden
Wynn
Yates
NOT VOTING--24
Andrews (TX)
Bilirakis
Blackwell
Chapman
Coleman
de la Garza
Dornan
Ewing
Ford (TN)
Hastert
Hastings
Lancaster
Laughlin
Manton
Martinez
Neal (NC)
Ridge
Roberts
Slattery
Smith (OR)
Swift
Tucker
Vucanovich
Washington
{time} 1133
The Clerk announced the following pairs:
On this vote:
Mr. Bilirakis for with Mr. Blackwell against.
Mr. Ewing for with Mr. Washington against.
Mr. Dornan for with Mr. Manton against.
Ms. SCHENK and Messrs. JOHNSON of Georgia, WILSON, HEFNER, KENNEDY,
and MINGE changed their vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Messrs. LEWIS of California, PETERSON of Florida, and FIELDS of Texas
changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 5 printed
in House Report 103-419.
amendment offered by mr. hyde
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Hyde: Page 2, add the following
after line 6 and redesignate succeeding sections and
references thereto, accordingly:
SEC. 3. BASIS FOR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.
(a) Initial Receipt of Information.--Section 591 of title
28, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) by striking ``information'' and inserting ``specific
information from a credible source that is''; and
(B) by striking ``may have'' and inserting ``has'';
(2) in subsection (c)(1)--
(A) by striking ``information'' and inserting ``specific
information from a credible source that is''; and
(B) by striking ``may have'' and inserting ``has''; and
(3) by amending subsection (d) to read as follows:
``(d) Time Period for Determining Need for Preliminary
Investigation.--The Attorney General shall determine, under
subsection (a) or (c) (or section 592(c)(2)), whether grounds
to investigate exist not later than 15 days after the
information is first received. If within that 15-day period
the Attorney General determines that there is insufficient
evidence of a violation of Federal criminal law referred to
in subsection (a), then the Attorney General shall close the
matter. If within that 15-day period the Attorney General
determines there is sufficient evidence of such a violation,
the Attorney General shall, upon making that determination,
commence a preliminary investigation with respect to that
information. If the Attorney General is unable to determine,
within that 15-day period, whether there is sufficient
evidence of such a violation, the Attorney General shall, at
the end of that 15-day period, commence a preliminary
investigation with respect to that information.''.
(b) Receipt of Additional Information.--Section 592(c)(2)
of title 28, United States Code, is amended by striking
``information'' and inserting ``specific information from a
credible source that is''.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr.
Hyde] will be recognized for 10 minutes, and a Member opposed will be
recognized for 10 minutes.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, what I am seeking by this amendment is to
make this a better independent counsel bill. Right now the threshold
for triggering a preliminary investigation by the Attorney General,
simply requires that ``information,'' not evidence--information is
received sufficient to constitute grounds that a covered person ``may''
have violated any Federal criminal law.
I suggest to the Members that is way too low. I suggest to the
Members to make this a meaningful, effective statute, we ought to
elevate the triggering threshold to the ``specific evidence from a
credible source.'' I am tightening up what is a rather loosely drawn
piece of law that has too wide a net. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 591(a). I am doing
this, Mr. Chairman, as a Republican. One would think it would be in our
interests to have the threshold low, to catch as many people as
possible. I can assure the Members, that is not in my interest. That is
not my intention.
I have always supported the Independent Counsel law. I voted for it
in 1978. I voted to reauthorize it in 1983 and 1987. But I want it to
be a professionally drawn, good, effective law that provides due
process. I do not want to trigger expensive and sometimes awkward
investigations that are brought sometimes for political purposes.
The manpower, the resources of the Justice Department should not have
to be expended on surmise, on rumors, on innuendo, on more allegations.
Rather, there should be real evidence so I am asking my colleagues in a
bipartisan way, because nothing can pass, at least from the Republican
side, without Democrat support, to join me in raising the threshold for
triggering this law to specific evidence from a credible source. It
seems to me that is in everybody's interest, to eliminate the
trivialities and the frivolities of people who want to cause somebody a
hard time.
I have never served on the Committee on Standards of Official
Conduct, but I have been told by people who do that the non-members
would be amazed at the mail they get. The charges they get that are
frequently off the wall, not all of them, but a lot of them are.
{time} 1140
And it just seems to me that the triggering of this law ought to
require the provision of specific evidence from a credible source.
So I am attempting to tighten it, to fine-tune it, to sand off the
rough edges and to help the cause of due process.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] is recognized for
10 minutes
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may require.
(Mr. BROOKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I must rise in strong opposition to this
amendment.
The amendment, has two different parts--which, for some reason, seems
to be obscured by the sponsors in describing the amendment. Now that
the moment of truth has arrived it is essential that all Members
understand what both parts would do to the structure of the Independent
Counsel process.
It is understandable why the sponsors of the amendment emphasized
only the first part of the amendment: For that part is nothing more
than a restatement of the existing standard found in the Independent
Counsel statute that guides the Attorney General in conducting a
preliminary investigation.
It was in the bill in 1978.
Thus, part 1 of the Hyde amendment requires that the Attorney
General--in determining whether there are grounds to conduct a
preliminary investigation--find that the information submitted to her
is ``specific'' and from a ``credible source.'' It sounds good.
Guess what? The existing independent counsel statute (28 U.S.C.
591(D)(1)) states the following: ``In determining * * * whether grounds
to investigate exist, the Attorney General shall consider only (a) the
specificity of the information received; and (b) the credibility of the
source of the information.'' In other words, it is the same.
If the Hyde amendment was simply a restatement of the existing
standard, it would be superfluous but nothing more. But it is something
more because of the second part of the amendment. That part creates a
new, untested legal standard which eviscerates the very independence of
the independent counsel once he or she is appointed.
``Hyde, part two''--as I shall call it--directs the Attorney General
not to proceed with the process if, within 15 days, she ``determines
there is insufficient evidence of a violation of criminal law * * *.''
But requiring the Attorney General to make an ultimate finding of
whether there is a criminal violation is not the Attorney General's
function at the ``preliminary stage'': Ultimate findings of guilt or
not are for the independent counsel to make. In other words, the second
part of the Hyde amendment would make the appointment of an independent
counsel a mere ``afterthought'' since the Attorney General will have
already prejudged the likely existence of a criminal offense.
What is the point of having an independent counsel if the Attorney
General is both prosecutor and adjudicator of guilt or innocence? How
does this type of provision avoid the conflict of interest of the
executive branch judging itself?
For all these reasons, I must urge you to reject the Hyde amendment.
It started out so promising and unobjectionable, but at the end of the
road, it is a radical concept that strips away the very independence of
the independent counsel.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I my consume.
Mr. Chairman, I am really astonished at my friend, the gentleman from
Texas [Mr. Brooks]. I think he is trying to impute some Machiavellian
method here. I am trying to make this a workable provision.
Under the law that we are about to reauthorize, the preliminary
investigation threshold question was too low. It is true the gentleman
talks about insufficient evidence of a violation. But that comes later,
after a 15-day inquiry. It is the beginning of the preliminary
investigation that I want to deal with and I want to raise that
threshold, not lower it. I do not want political manipulation of the
independent counsel law, nor the Office of Attorney General. I want the
trigger, the threshold of the preliminary investigation, not to have to
happen unless there is specific evidence from a credible source of a
violation of a Federal law. The complicated machinery of the
independent counsel law should not get underway unless there is real
evidence of possible wrongdoing. I am simply raising the threshold.
After the investigation is underway, I have no problem with sufficient
evidence.
Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HYDE. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, I really wonder if the gentleman
understands what we are saying is what the gentleman has done is
provide that the Attorney General under his provision has 15 days in
order to determine whether there is sufficient evidence of a violation.
And the statute has always said that they have 15 days to determine if
there is a specific allegation from a credible source, and if there is,
then there is a 90-day period in which an investigation takes place.
I do not think the gentleman realizes the effect of the words he has
written.
Mr. HYDE. Recapturing my time, the law we are reenacting says the
Attorney General must conduct a preliminary investigation whenever the
she (or he) receives information sufficient to constitute grounds that
any person may have violated any Federal criminal law. But I want to
change that to say not mere information but specific evidence, real
evidence--not rumors, not assertions but specific evidence from a
credible source.
Mr. BRYANT. The gentleman is right. But will the gentleman yield
further?
Mr. HYDE. Certainly I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. BRYANT. The gentleman stopped reading too soon. If he kept
reading he would specifically see that the statute already says that
the specificity of information received and the credibility of the
source are the key factors in her determination. So it is exactly like
the language the gentleman is talking about. The problem is the second
half of his amendment which requires the Attorney General to determine
in 15 days if there is sufficient evidence of a violation, and that is
the province of the independent counsel, not the Attorney General. So
if we leave it to the Attorney General, then we have no independent
counsel.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. HYDE. Of course I yield to the gentleman from Texas, the
gentleman who voted no on this bill when it first was presented in
1978, and I am still shocked about that.
Mr. BROOKS. But I saw the light. The gentleman remembers that I voted
for it ever since.
Mr. HYDE. That is true. The road to Damascus is a short one for the
gentleman from Texas.
Mr. BROOKS. But I have never deterred from my route since then. It is
these people that go back and forth that make you nervous.
Mr. HYDE. I think I see a halo. I think.
Mr. BROOKS. Now, what I was going to suggest is I believe that the
first part of the amendment is a useful statement of what is in the
bill now. It is the second part that we have trouble with. If the
gentleman would get unanimous consent to drop that part of it, we would
accept the first part and be very pleased. I think it encourages a
restatement, makes more clear that we need to have specificity and
credibility of the source of the information, just as we really believe
there should be.
{time} 1150
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I am trying to elevate the threshold that
triggers this whole complicated operation. If the gentleman is
satisfied to have it based merely on allegations that somebody may
make, then the gentleman is welcome. Because it is his party that may
be the focus of these investigations--unless, of course, we are
successful in getting Congress covered, which I hope we do. But I am
trying to make it a more workmanlike, professional due-process
threshold.
The gentleman thinks there is some motive that frankly does not exist
to eviscerate the bill. I am trying to strengthen it. If the gentleman
does not want it strengthened, then the gentleman will prevail, but I
hope people understand the threshold should be elevated.
Mr. BROOKS. If the gentleman will yield further, I do not want the
gentleman to portray my effort as weakening in any way, because I think
that if you give more authority to the Attorney General, you will
destroy the authority of the independent counsel.
Mr. HYDE. No. I want to give her specific----
Mr. BROOKS. She makes all the judgments at this point, if you combine
the adjudication with the administration, and we do not want to do
that.
Mr. HYDE. I do not want to give the Attorney General more authority.
I want to give her specific evidence rather than just information. I
want it from a credible source, not somebody off the wall. I think that
helps everybody. But the gentleman obviously does not.
Mr. BROOKS. Section 591 in the bill.
Mr. HYDE. Pardon?
Mr. BROOKS. Section 591 in the bill, ``shall'' uses the word
``shall,'' and it uses the same words, the same terminology exactly.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas [Mr. Bryant].
Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to restate what the
chairman said. We would be glad to accept the first part of the
amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde], because it
is simply a restatement of what is in the bill with regard to
specificity.
It is the second part that is the problem. I am not sure he realizes
the catastrophic impact it has on the bill. The question is, What
threshold do you have to meet for the Attorney General to go into the
90-day period? The history of this act is that only 13 independent
counsels have been appointed in 15 years. It is not as though this has
been rushed into and independent counsels are appointed willy-nilly,
right and left all the time. It is very rare.
In fact, of those 13 independent counsels, almost half of them have
decided there was no reason to prosecute.
So changing fundamentally the threshold would be a terrible mistake.
What the amendment offered by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde]
does is provide that the Attorney General would have only 15 days in
which to determine, not if there is a specific allegation from a
credible source, but 15 days in which to determine whether or not there
is sufficient evidence to go forward. If you impose the sufficiency-of-
evidence standard, you have then given all of the authority to the
Attorney General, which is the person from whom we are trying to take
the authority in order to guarantee that a conflict of interest will
not result in unnecessarily, unfairly, unjustly shielding her
colleagues, 60 people in the executive branch, from an objective
analysis and objective investigation of their activity and possible
prosecution.
Unless the gentleman from Illinois wants to accept an amendment in
which we adopt the first half of his amendment and drop the second
half, I am afraid we will have to continue our opposition to the
amendment.
I strongly urge Members to vote ``no.''
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
The amendment was rejected.
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 6 printed
in House Report No. 103-419.
amendment offered by mr. gekas
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Gekas: Page 9, strike line 18 and
all that follows through line 14 on page 10 and insert the
following:
SEC. 4. APPLICATION TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.
Section 591(b) of title 28, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (7);
(2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (8) and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(9) any Senator or Representative in, or Delegate or
Resident Commissioner to, the Congress, or any person who has
served as a Senator, a Representative, Delegate, or Resident
Commissioner within the 2-year period before the receipt of
the information under subsection (a) with respect to conduct
that occurred while such person was a Senator, a
Representative, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner.''.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Pennsylvania
[Mr. Gekas] will be recognized for 15 minutes, and a Member opposed to
the amendment will be recognized for 15 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas].
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, if there is one thing the American people have
unanimously voiced over the last several years, it is disgust with the
Congress in the fact that the Congress seeks and often accomplishes
exemption of itself from the laws which it imposes upon the public at
large. There are many, many examples of it. The people not only
perceive it but believe it, because it is actually true.
Let me give you an example of how this occurs. Now, we are talking
about the Congress subjecting the general public to certain laws and
other segments of society to certain laws, but not itself to the
disgust of the American people.
Here is a list of them: the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans
with Disabilities Act, the AIDS Discrimination in Employment Act, the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the National Labor Relations Act, the Fair
Labor Standards Act, the Equal Pay Act of 1963, OSHA, the Freedom of
Information Act, and the Privacy Act. I state these and put them in the
Record to demonstrate that what the Gekas amendment does in the bill
that is now in front of us is to rectify that just a little bit to give
to the American people the sense that we are going to be about the
business of setting that sorry record straight, that here we have an
independent-counsel statute that calls for the Attorney General, in the
case of alleged wrongdoing of a member of the Cabinet, that that
Attorney General must take action to bring that wrongdoer before an
independent counsel, but then, lo and behold, if a Member of Congress
is accused of wrongdoing, and God knows we have had that happen quite
often in the past 10 years, if a Member of Congress be accused of some
wrongdoing, then when the Attorney General gets that information, the
Attorney General does not have to appoint an independent counsel to
look into the wrongdoing of a Member of Congress.
Is that or is that not a double standard, I ask the Members of
Congress?
At the same time I will not yield at the moment.
Now, those who propose the bill will, in sophistry and in very
pastor-like ways, say, ``We have taken care of that problem, Mr. Gekas.
We have language in the bill, and you know it, Mr. Gekas, that will
allow the Attorney General to visit an independent counsel against a
Member of Congress.''
But the language is not to the satisfaction of the American people.
It says, ``may''; it says ``may be''; ``well, perhaps,'' while the
Gekas amendment says it must investigate when allegations of wrongdoing
are visited against a Member of Congress just as it is for members of
the Cabinet, and that is what I want to do with the Gekas amendment,
put for the first time in a long time Members of Congress on the same
level of culpability, of liability, as the general members of the
public, especially to those who are members of the Cabinet. The people
want this, and I urge that we successfully defeat the Bryant amendment
that will come later which is aimed at obviating, erasing the Gekas
amendment.
Let us make no mistake about this: the Bryant amendment that is to
follow, because remember, the Gekas amendment will not be voted on up
or down. The Committee on Rules took care of that. Rather, after we
finish debate on the Gekas amendment, bill-Bryant, as I said yesterday,
the bill, the Bryant bill that carries the bill language, the bill-
Bryant will be brought up, and then we must vote, those of us who want
to preserve the Gekas amendment, we must vote ``no''on Bryant, because
it just carriers that ``maybe'' language allowing the Attorney General
to weasel out of an independent-counsel investigation of a Member of
Congress.
So be careful and stick with me, and we will do something for the
American people to rectify this imbalance.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. Is the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] opposed to the
amendment?
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in vigorous opposition to the
amendment?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] is recognized for
15 minutes.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. BROOKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in vigorous opposition to the
amendment offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas] and
urge my colleagues to support the Bryant substitute offered by the
distinguished chairman of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on
Administrative Law and Governmental Relations.
The Gekas amendment can only be viewed as a rhetorical smokebomb
lobbed at Members to create panic and destroy the careful plan of the
independent counsel statute. The amendment is a misnomer--for it
implies that Members of Congress are not covered by the statute. That
is plain wrong; Members have been covered since 1983. If we have truth
in advertising, it is high time for truth in amending.
No one has ever accused the Department of Justice of not diligently
investigating and prosecuting individual Members of Congress, as well
as conducting broad-scale investigations of the House as an
institution. It has done so zealously under Democratic and Republican
Administrations, alike. Yet, the Gekas amendment straitjackets the
Attorney General from having the option of using U.S. Attorneys or an
independent counsel in pursuing charges of wrongdoing against a Member
of Congress.
Both the administration and the Attorney General--a former prosecutor
herself--opposed the Gekas amendment. Let me read from the Attorney
General's letter I received yesterday on February 9, 1994, which I will
submit for the Record of this debate. She states:
* * * Let me reiterate the position of the administration
and the Department [of Justice] that the act should not be
amended to provide for mandatory coverage of Members of
Congress. Such an amendment would be at odds with the
fundamental purpose of the act: to deal with the potential
for conflicts of interest in the investigation and
prosecution of high-level officials within the executive
branch. No such inherent conflict of interest exists in the
investigation of Members of Congress. Moreover, I firmly
reject the notion that the criminal investigative process
should be made the pawn of political gamesmanship by covering
Members of the legislative branch simply because certain
executive branch officials are covered.
A more thoughtful application of the independent counsel statute is
found in the substitute amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas
[Mr. Bryant]. Under the Bryant amendment, and to remove all doubt,
Members of Congress are explicitly covered by the independent counsel
statute. The Bryant amendment authorizes the Attorney General to invoke
the independent counsel procedures to investigate and prosecute Members
of Congress if doing so would be in the public interest.'' Thus, under
the Bryant amendment, the Attorney General has two options: She can use
the independent counsel process when she believes it to be in the
public interest; or, she can investigate and prosecute Members by using
the formidable enforcement resources of the Department of Justice--just
as she can do with members of the Federal judiciary, State and local
officials or any other American citizen.
The other body by a bipartisan vote of 67 to 31 rejected the Gekas
approach in favor of the Bryant approach. I urge you to cast an ``aye''
vote in support of the Bryant substitute to the Gekas amendment.
Office of the Attorney General,
Washington, DC, February 9, 1994.
Hon. Jack Brooks,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: I want to take this opportunity to
express the support of the Department of Justice and the
Administration for reauthorization of the Independent Counsel
Act. Public trust in our government is predicated on the
belief that our Nation's justice system is being administered
in an even-handed and impartial manner; reauthorization of
the Independent Counsel Act is crucial to ensuring continued
public confidence in the integrity of that system. Both H.R.
811 and the Senate companion bill, S. 24, advance this vital
goal and make valuable improvements to the underlying Act.
You and your Senate counterparts are to be congratulated for
your efforts in reviving this measure.
In particular, let me retirate the position of the
Administration and the Department that the Act should not be
amended to provide for mandatory coverage of Members of
Congress. Such an amendment would be at odds with the
fundamental purpose of the Act: to deal with the potential
for conflicts of interest in the investigation and
prosecution of high-level officials within the Executive
Branch. No such inherent conflict of interest exists in the
investigation of Members of Congress. Moreover, I firmly
reject the notion that the criminal investigative process
should be made the pawn of political gamesmanship by covering
Members of the Legislative Branch simply because certain
Executive Branch officials are covered.
Again, I appreciate your consideration of the Department's
views and commend you for advancing this important
legislation.
Sincerely,
Janet Reno.
{time} 1200
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I now yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
North Carolina [Mr. Coble], a member of the subcommittee and the
committee of jurisdiction.
Mr. COBLE. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.
Mr. Chairman, I came to the floor with no intentions of speaking
today, but I have heard this and I felt compelled to speak.
I hear words such as ``double standard''; I hear words such as
``exemption'' from this proposal or that proposal. As the gentleman
from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas] just said, this is what annoys the
American public, seeing this body day in and day out enacting laws and
then, very conveniently, exempting ourselves.
We feed the Congress from one bucket filled with sweet water, and
then the public goes to another trough and drinks from that container.
It is simply not right. The situation is, if Mr. Gekas's amendment does
not pass, will simply be permissive. The Attorney General will not have
to assign anyone or do anything.
Now, I am not wild generally about independent counsels. it is my
belief that the public integrity section of the Justice Department can
handle these situations, and I am particularly not wild about it in
view of the last exercise that the Walsh investigation conducted when
the meter ran eternally. I think it is going to end up costing the
American taxpayers somewhere in the vicinity of $50 million. That is
one reason why I am opposed to it. But the public integrity section can
take care of it.
Having said that, we are going to steam along this course whether we
like it or not. So if we are going to go the independent counsel route,
for gosh sake let us respond as we make everyone else respond.
I think that is the way to go. If I had my druthers, I would say let
the public integrity section handle it. But I do not have my druthers.
So if we are going to go the route of the independent counsel, by all
means, as the gentleman from Pennsylvania said, let us bring ourselves
under the umbrella.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
Texas [Mr. Bryant].
(Mr. BRYANT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, I do not know where the folks who have been
talking on the Republican side have been the last 10 years. They are as
capable of reading the law as we are.
It is available to them. I guess they do not want to read it. The law
as of 10 years ago said Members of Congress were covered by this act.
They continue to say that we are not. They are covered, just like any
other American, and it has been that way since 1983.
They say they want Congress to be covered by the laws just as
everybody else, and I agree, there are some instances where we should
have been and we were not. But this is not one of those instances, and
they know it is not one of them. Look at the statute. We are treated
just like every other American under that statute, and we would be
under my amendment as well.
Now, the fact of the matter is this rhetoric is part of a
premeditated strategy to pound on a Republican theme that even though
this does not quite fit into it, it is OK with them, apparently, to
come up here and say that it does. Read the statute.
Let me ask a question, a rhetorical queston--and I am not afraid to
yield to anybody. When we began this debate last year on the Judiciary
Committee, I pointed out at that time that we had three investigations
of Members of Congress under way by the Justice Department, four
prosecutions in progress, and there had been three convictions in the
recent couple of years.
Now, I do not find any evidence that there has been any evidence that
there has been any hesitance on the part of the Attorney General of the
United States, Republican or Democrat, to pursue Members of Congress. I
have never heard anyone suggest in private or in public that there is
somebody out there who is shielded from prosecution by the Attorney
General because they are friends with them.
Now, if the gentleman knows of any, some case like that, this is a
good time to tell us.
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BRYANT. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. GEKAS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Mr. Chairman, I subscribe to the statement that the gentleman made,
but that does not preclude the new wave of authority that we want to
put in the Attorney General to investigate wrongdoing in Members of
Congress, high-profile Members of Congress, who have apparent or actual
conflict of interest, and give them the additional power, the Attorney
General, to execute an independent counsel appointment so that the
whole world will know that this will be an independent investigation of
a high-ranking Member of Congress who is a member of the same party as
the Attorney General and the White House.
This is the purpose of this bill.
Mr. BRYANT. Are you not reading the newspapers?
Mr. GEKAS. The gentleman yielded to me. Now, if the U.S. attorney on
his own or the Attorney General on his own wishes to follow that, that
is all right. But we want that opportunity mandated just like the
members of the Cabinet are to have an alleged wrongdoing in the
Congress, a high-ranking profile Member who is tied in with the
Attorney General and the White House in the same party. That is what we
are trying to get.
Mr. BRYANT. Reclaiming my time, and the gentleman pointed out that I
yielded to him, and I did. I wish I could get them to yield to us
occasionally.
I will proceed with my statement.
Are you not reading the papers? Are you not aware that high-ranking
Members of Congress of both parties are presently under investigation?
Is there some indication otherwise? Have you not read the law? I will
not yield again.
Have you not read the law that says clearly Members of Congress are
covered? It is optional, but what the gentleman wants to do is to make
it mandatory. They continue this rhetoric that somehow we are not
treated like all other Americans. The independent counsel statute was
written for 60 people who have become such good friends with the
Attorney General that we cannot rely on human beings who serve as
Attorney General to investigate objectively or to prosecute. Only 60.
Everybody else is treated the same. The public integrity unit, the drug
unit, every other unit out there is out and available to the
prosecutors to investigate us, just like the general public. That is
the way it ought to be.
I will be back in a moment with an amendment to the Gekas amendment
that I think gives every Member an opportunity to vote on the principle
that Members ought to be covered, but the coverage ought to be at the
discretion of the Attorney General.
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Virginia [Mr. Goodlatte] a member of the committee.
{time} 1210
Mr. GOODLATTE. My colleagues, nothing angers my constituents more
than the idea that Members of Congress are treated differently than
others by so many different statutes, and the gentlemen from Texas are
correct that Members of Congress are included in this bill. But they
are treated differently than the members of the executive branch in the
fact that the Attorney General has the option to choose to treat them
with a preliminary investigation or not to treat them. She does not
have that option with the other members of the executive branch that
are included in the bill, and that is what is wrong.
Mr. Chairman, we are sending a message here that Members of this
body, some of whom who are very high ranking, very high profile, who
are under investigation right now; under this bill the Attorney
General, in some instances a member of the same party as those
individuals, would have an opportunity to turn a blind eye to those
situations and choose not to conduct that preliminary investigation,
and that is what we are talking about.
The distinction here is between whether it should be optional on the
part of the Attorney General or mandatory.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GOODLATTE. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. BROOKS. To my friend I say, ``The Attorney General said very
clearly, and she uses English, American, you know, in her letters,
said, `No such inherent conflict of interest exists in the
investigation of Members of Congress.' In other words, you investigate
the Members of Congress on an optional basis the way you want to. They
haven't had any trouble doing it. But you don't mandate that they do it
just like they do the 60 members of the executive department.''
Mr. Chairman, this bill is not designed to investigate Congress. They
can do that anyway with U.S. attorneys all over the United States.
Mr. GOODLATTE. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time because I have very
little of it, let me say that this bill is intended to make sure that
Members of Congress can have special prosecutors, independent counsels,
appointed to investigate high crimes on their part, and we should make
sure that there is no difference.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Hughes].
(Mr. HUGHES asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HUGHES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the Gekas
amendment.
I realize that an increasing number of our colleagues find that there
is political mileage in attacking the institution of which they are
Members, and maligning their colleagues.
Like the American officer in Vietnam who uttered the explanation,
``It was necessary to destroy the village in order to save it,'' some
of our colleagues believe that they must destroy this institution in
order to get control of it.
This amendment is based on that premise. Proponents of the amendment
argue that the present law and the bill before us is another example of
Congress passing laws for everyone else, and carving out an exception
for themselves.
The facts are that the independent counsel law and the bill before us
do create some special exceptions, but there is no such exception for
Members of Congress.
The special exception is for the President, Vice President, members
of the President's Cabinet and officials of comparable rank, high
ranking members of the White House staff, and key operatives of the
President's reelection efforts. The special exception provides that
when any of these officials are to be investigated for criminal
wrongdoing, the investigation should, in every case, be turned over to
an investigator, and, if ultimately justified, a prosecutor who is
independent of the control and direction of the Attorney General.
The basis for this exception is that the Attorney General, who is
appointed by and closely associated with the President, should not be
investigating and prosecuting the President or other persons closely
associated with the President.
This special exception applies to only about 60 individuals. The
other 250 million of us--including the 535 Members of Congress--are
subject to no exceptional rules, but are investigated and prosecuted by
normal Department of Justice processes.
Members of Congress are subject to no special rules, nor should we
be. We are not appointed by the President. Under our system of
separation of powers, we do not work for him, and he does not work for
us.
There is not one shred of evidence to suggest that Department of
Justice investigators and prosecutors are reluctant to pursue
allegations of criminal misconduct by Members of Congress. In fact,
prosecutions of Members of Congress of both parties is a common
occurrence, regardless of which party controls the White House.
Members of Congress are already subject to investigation by
independent counsel, a fact which will be made even more explicit when
this legislation is enacted. It is not mandatory, nor should it be. If
we need referral to an independent counsel to investigate Members of
Congress in every case, one would think that the four Republican
Attorneys General we had between 1981 and 1993 would have found at
least one occasion in which appointment of a special counsel was
appropriate. There have been none.
The fact is there is reason to believe that mandatory referral to an
independent counsel would likely make prosecution of Members of
Congress more subject to political manipulation, not less.
Under our present system, an Attorney General who personally takes
charge of decisionmaking in the prosecution of a Member of Congress is
subject to special scrutiny and suspicion, and should be. If a
political ally is involved, the suspicion is of favoritism; if an
enemy, the suspicion is of unfair persecution.
However, if independent counsel referral is mandatory, the personal
intervention of the Attorney General will be mandated. Not only
mandated, but mandated at a very early stage in the proceedings. Rather
than thoroughly investigating allegations against a Member of Congress,
investigators will be required to turn the matter over to the
politically appointed Attorney General at a very preliminary stage for
decision on the future of the investigation.
Suppose that at this point the Attorney General decides that there is
no basis for further investigation. Even if this is based on lack of
evidence and not on political manipulation, it makes the process more
suspect, and prosecution of Members of Congress much more difficult.
Cases which should be and could be made if the regular procedures
were followed may not be made if the case is prematurely taken out of
the hands of career investigators and prosecutors.
Furthermore, in cases which are initially rejected by the Attorney
General, while it is theoretically possible that additional information
could be produced, leading to a decision that an independent counsel
should be appointed, this is unlikely. It is unlikely because the best
source of such information is not anonymous phone calls to the Attorney
General, but Justice Department investigators. However, once an
Attorney General finds that, in the words of the statute, ``That there
are no reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is
warranted.'' A pretty clear message is sent to career investigators and
prosecutors that the matter is closed.
The shrill voices clamoring for mandatory referral of cases involving
Members of Congress to an independent counsel seem to be proclaiming
that the independent counsel process is superior to the normal methods
of bringing Federal prosecutions, and that Members should always be
investigated and prosecuted by this superior process.
The fact of the matter is the independent counsel process is not the
best process for prosecuting Federal crimes--the best process, the one
most likely to lead to conviction where conviction is warranted, is the
normal criminal justice procedure under which all but about 60
individuals in our Nation are investigated and prosecuted. It is only
in the case of this handful of individuals that we should and must
resort to the extraordinary processes of the indepdendent counsel, an
inherently inferior process for most cases, but one that is superior
for the special circumstances of these few individuals.
We heard much talk yesterday about coverage of Members versus cover
for Members. The fact is the committee bill and the Bryant amendment
provide appropriate coverage of Members. Cover for Members is found not
in those proposals, but in the Republican proposals to free Members, in
every case, from the time-tested and proven investigative and
prosecutorial practices of the Department of Justice. The Republicans
would instead force every case into a decisionmaking process not
designed for and often totally unsuited for the circumstances
presented.
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1\1/2\ minutes to the gentleman from
Ohio [Mr. Hoke].
Mr. HOKE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to respond to some of the things
that the previous gentleman, the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr.
Hughes], said.
First of all, Mr. Chairman, this is not a partisan issue, and to
suggest that it is a gross misrepresentation of the debate. The fact is
that the Attorney General is wrong, wrong with respect to there being
no conflict of interest. In fact there is a very real conflict of
interest.
It should be absolutely clear to anyone who has ever spent even 1 day
in this Chamber that a tremendous amount of power is wielded here by
certain Members of the House and the Senate and that there are Members
that any administration, and it does not matter if it is Democrat or
Republican, must do business with in order to advance its own agenda,
and any administration, whether it is Democrat or Republican, will at
the very least think very carefully before pursuing a criminal
investigation of a Member of Congress who commands great power and
influence. That is the fact.
I say to my colleague:
The fact is, if you just look at the very recent history,
we have gone through a period in which there has been a
scandal with respect to the House Post Office, there has been
a scandal with respect to the House Bank. Have we had any
indictments of any Members of Congress with respect to either
one? No, we have not. But have we had indictments and, in
fact, convictions of staff members? Yes, we have, multiples,
and yet the fact is that, because there has been a conflict
of interest, we have not had the kind of investigation, we
have not had the kind of results, that ought to come from
those investigations.
Clearly, Mr. Chairman, the Attorney General is wrong with respect to
the conflict of interest.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, what is the time remaining on each side?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] has 2 minutes
remaining, and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas] has 5
minutes remaining.
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Oklahoma [Mr. Istook].
{time} 1220
Mr. ISTOOK. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the Gekas amendment.
I hear people saying, ``Oh, we will destroy the institution'' if we
are asked to have Congress follow the same laws and rules and standards
that apply to everyone else. The problem is that Congress seems dead
set on destroying itself, and it has got to be changed.
I remember back in the Watergate scandal the so-called Saturday Night
Massacre, because the counsel was not independent and could be removed
and only acted at the pleasure of the Attorney General. And it is
correct, as the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. Hoke] pointed out, that any
President needs Members of Congress and their support to accomplish his
agenda and, therefore, wants to be on good terms with them and has
reservations about anything that might step on their toes such as a
criminal indictment.
And making it optional? Will that happen? Look at what is going on.
Look at what has happened with the House Post Office. Seven months ago
there was a guilty plea in Federal Court by the former Postmaster of
this institution, who took three counts of conspiring with Members of
Congress to embezzle taxpayers' money.
It was tens of thousands of dollars. Where are the indictments? They
are not there.
Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. ISTOOK. I will not yield.
Mr. BRYANT. Why not?
Mr. ISTOOK. I will not.
Mr. BRYANT. Why not?
Mr. ISTOOK. Because the Ethics Committee of this body is sitting on
it instead of investigating as it needs to do to get to the bottom of
this scandal and hold Members of this institution accountable.
We have guilty pleas, and we have Federal court papers identifying
that several Members of Congress were involved in embezzlement, and it
is time for this institution to get with it and stop the double
standard and stop the word games of trying to exempt ourselves from the
standards that everybody else in this country must follow.
Mr. BRYANT. Now, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. ISTOOK. No, sir.
Mr. BRYANT. Why not?
Mr. ISTOOK. I have heard enough of your rhetoric.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he might desire to the
gentleman from Florida [Mr. Shaw], who in 1987 launched a similar
effort to try to make mandatory the inclusion of Members of Congress as
subjects and targets of the independent counsel.
Mr. SHAW. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to
me.
Mr. Chairman, I think this is a tremendously important amendment. Let
us really look at the record of the special prosecutors and how they
have evolved over the years. It is a very tough standard that we must
put on any administration that a special prosecutor with all these
powers can be appointed, and this person is appointed to investigate a
specific person, and this person is semi-independent from the
Department of Justice.
I think that what we have to do is say that if we are going to put
this as a standard on the administration, then we certainly should
apply it ourselves. It can be said that here we go again, exempting
ourselves from these laws, and that is exactly what we are doing.
By boiling this thing down and saying it is permissive, it just
simply yanks the heart out of the whole thing.
This is a high standard that we place upon the administration. We
should place this same standard upon ourselves and this body. I do not
view this as a partisan move at all. It simply says that exactly what
we are going to do to any administration, whether it be a Republican or
a Democratic administration, we simply apply the same standard to
ourselves. That is the question. It is plain and simple.
Mr. Chairman, I ask for a positive vote on the Gekas amendment and a
negative vote on the watered-down amendment.
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Bryant].
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Bryant] is recognized for
2 minutes.
Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, I will not consume all of the remaining
time.
I just have to observe that whenever a human being, in the face of
the language of the law when it is laid before them and repeated over
and over in terms that anyone could understand, continues to deny what
is before their very eyes, there is something afoot other than a
legitimate effort to offer an amendment to improve legislation.
The law since 1983 has provided that Members of Congress are covered
by the independent counsel statute when the Attorney General would like
to appoint an independent counsel. My amendment to the Gekas amendment
which I will offer in just a moment will continue the law just as it
has been, and it has worked well for 15 years. After all, there have
been only 13 independent counsels appointed.
Notwithstanding that, as I said a moment ago, despite the outburst we
heard a moment ago--and I noticed that the Member would not yield to
me, apparently for fear that he would hear the words I am about to
speak--while considering this matter in the Judiciary Committee last
year, we had four people being investigated, I think three convictions
had already taken place, and there were also a number of other ones
going on at the same time. There has never been any hesitancy to
prosecute Members of Congress.
Let me point out one other thing that was said so very well by the
gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Hughes] a moment ago. The great irony of
this is that you would come to the floor and act as though you were
somehow trying to guarantee that Members of Congress are treated like
everyone else when the plain result of what you are doing is to put us
in a special category that would make it harder, more cumbersome, and
more difficult for the Attorney General to prosecute or conduct an
investigation against the Member of Congress. Every knowledgeable
analyst of this statute agrees with what I have just said.
This is a shell game, as the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. Hughes]
described it so aptly a moment ago.
Mr. Chairman, I urge the Members of Congress to vote against the
Gekas amendment and vote for the Bryant amendment which I will bring
before the body in just a few moments.
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the remainder of my time. Mr.
Chairman, we do read the statute, we do read the Bryant language, we
read the bill language, and the bill language and the Bryant
confirmation of the present language says that when the Attorney
General deems that it would be in the public interest, this would
happen. These are tremendous loopholes. Discretion is given to the
Attorney General. Public interest is what the Attorney General may
decide it might be.
Then it says the Attorney General may conduct a preliminary
investigation. We are reading the law, the bill, the Bryant language,
the very language that the gentleman from Texas wants us to read. I am
reading it into the Record. That is permissive. It uses the words,
``may'' and ``maybe.'' Who knows whether we will or not. It is that
kind of language. I do not know what it is. I am reading it in the
Record again.
It is ``may'' language. It is discretionary on the part of the
Attorney General, and the Attorney General may just not move against a
Member of Congress when indeed that Attorney General would be compelled
under similar circumstances to move against a member of the Cabinet.
So the question remains: Shall we raise the Member of Congress to
that state of liability and of targetism of the independent counsel law
that we accord now to the members of the Cabinet?
The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired for debate on the amendment.
amendment offered by mr. bryant as a substitute for the amendment
offered by mr. gekas
Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment as a substitute for
the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered as a substitute by Mr. Bryant for the
amendment offered by Mr. Gekas: Page 10, strike lines 6
through 14 and insert the following:
``(2) Members of Congress.--Whenever the Attorney General
determines that it would be in the public interest, the
Attorney General may conduct a preliminary investigation in
accordance with section 592 if the Attorney General has
received information sufficient to constitute grounds to
investigate whether a Member of Congress may have violated
any Federal criminal law other than a violation classified as
a Class B or C misdemeanor or an infraction.''.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from Texas [Mr.
Bryant] will be recognized for 15 minutes, and a Member opposed will be
recognized for 15 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Bryant].
Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the substitute amendment to which
I referred a moment ago.
We bring this amendment to the floor in order that every Member of
the House might have an opportunity to vote as we voted in the
Judiciary Committee in favor of an amendment on Member coverage. That
amendment provides that whenever the Attorney General determines that
it would be in the public interest, the Attorney General may conduct a
preliminary investigation in accordance with section 592, if the
Attorney General has received information sufficient to constitute
grounds to investigate whether a Member of Congress may have violated
any Federal criminal law other than minor misdemeanors.
It makes it very plain that we continue to be covered as we have been
covered for the last 10 years.
As the Members know, the independent counsel law was enacted because
the American people lacked confidence in the ability of the Justice
Department to act impartially when allegations of criminal wrongdoing
were made against high ranking officers of the executive department.
Those reasons are quite obvious.
The Attorney General is a member of the President's Cabinet and is
part of the political team.
While we have come to expect that Attorneys General will avoid most
forms of partisan wrangling, it is unreasonable to expect that any
human being who holds that job would not be influenced by the threat
that investigation or prosecution of members of the President's Cabinet
might pose to the success of the administration. In addition, in order
to do their jobs, Attorneys General must form strong bonds with other
Cabinet officers, White House officials, and division heads of the
Justice Department itself. These are the people they work with from day
to day to carry out the President's policies and, under those
circumstances, it is just unreasonable to expect an Attorney General to
act impartially when making decisions about whether to investigate and,
if appropriate, to prosecute one of their colleagues.
{time} 1230
When the law was first passed, it covered senior officials of the
administration. Once the act's thresholds were met, use of the
independent counsel process with regard to those individuals was
mandatory. In 1982, when the statute was reauthorized for the first
time, the act was amended to include a second category of coverage.
That category provided that in other cases where a personal, economic,
or political conflict of interest might arise, the Attorney General
would be permitted to use the independent counsel process.
This amendment that I offer makes it very explicit that that portion
of the statute refers to Members of Congress.
Mr. Chairman, I submit that this is a good standard. It has worked
well in the past. We make it more explicit today. The adoption of the
amendment would obviate the language that the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas] has brought forward, which would make it
mandatory, thereby expanding the category of the class of those who
would be covered by the independent counsel statute to almost 600
people from the originally intended 60. That would be, in my view, a
great mistake.
Mr. Chairman, the amendment offered by the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas], as I said a moment ago, I think basically
originated with a political strategy to somehow continue to pound this
theme that we are in some fashion placing ourselves in a special
category. I am arguing that we should not place the Members of the
House in a special category. They should be treated as they have been
treated in the past, like everybody else is treated.
Only 60 people are treated in a special way. It does not make sense
to continue this argument, to say that we are somehow, by virtue of
treating ourselves like everybody else, treating ourselves in a special
fashion.
In fact, as I stated a moment ago, there has been no hesitancy to
prosecute Members of Congress. I regret very much the outrageous
statements made a few moments ago on the floor of the House that
suggested anything otherwise. I think it may be time for us to purchase
a subscription to a daily newspaper for a few people who have been
speaking a moment ago.
There are Members of Congress, powerful Members of Congress, on both
sides of the aisle, under investigation at the present time by the
Attorney General, who were being investigated by the previous Attorney
General. The fact of the matter is there is no objective evidence
whatsoever that we ought to place ourselves in a special category.
Mr. Chairman, I urge Members to vote in favor of the Bryant amendment
to the Gekas amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas] is
recognized for 15 minutes.
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, it has come down to this, the vote. The Bryant
amendment is an endorsement of the bill language. The Bryant amendment
embraces the bill language.
Mr. Chairman, we had a division of the question, a very discernible,
easy issue: Either the bill or the Gekas amendment. But by virtue of
the games that the Committee on Rules played, the Bryant bill comes
back out through the back door into the whole issue, reverberating what
the bill contained in the first place. So the Bryant bill says the
Attorney General may, if the Attorney General wants to, prosecute
through the independent counsel mechanism. May, if the Attorney General
finds it be in the public interest, another discretionary phrase in
favor of the Attorney General.
The Gekas amendment, which opposes the bill and the Bryant amendment,
says that when such wrongdoing is alleged on the part of a Member of
Congress and it comes to the attention of the Attorney General, the
Attorney General must proceed with an investigation to determine
whether or not that should lead to the appointment of an independent
counsel. It is black and white, clear as crystal, the issue before us.
Those who want to make sure that Members of Congress who are accused
of wrongdoing are put under the same scrutiny as members of the Cabinet
will vote no on Bryant, because that would be a vote for the Gekas
amendment. Vote no on Bryant, which is a reprise of the bill, which
gives wide discretion to the Attorney General, in favor of the later
vote on the Gekas amendment, which will be to tighten up the Attorney
General's discretion on the appointment of an independent counsel.
Mr. Chairman, that is the nub of the problem, and I want the support
of all Members.
There is another thing that has been said by the gentleman from
Texas, Mr. Bryant, which I need to counter a little bit. I believe that
the very examples the gentleman gives, and others have given, that in
past cases the Attorney General has utilized the U.S. Attorney to
properly and successfully prosecute Members of Congress, does not erase
the contention of many of us and the observation that there still is a
potential conflict of interest, even in those kinds of cases, in the
original impetus of the case.
Mr. Chairman, I repeat, if there is a powerful Member of Congress who
is put to the fire by the Attorney General, by the appointment of a
U.S. Attorney, it still remains as a basic fact that the high ranking
Member of Congress and the U.S. Attorney and the Attorney General and
the President of the United States might all be of the same party.
Even in those cases, the only way we can approach impartiality would
be if the Attorney General turned the matter over to an independent
counsel, so that the court would appoint someone to pursue the Member
of Congress who has been accused of wrongdoing.
I say that the actuality of conflict, which everybody acknowledges
can happen, at least the appearance of conflict, which everybody must
agree can occur when a high ranking Member of Congress is alleged to
have done something wrong, then the only way we can make sure that the
public will be satisfied with what we do on the floor with respect to
conflict of interest and appearance of conflict of interest is to erase
it by voting for the Gekas amendment and against the Bryant amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute.
Mr. Chairman, I just cannot resist observing that as the gentleman
continues to characterize our efforts here in opposing the Gekas
amendment in favor of the Bryant amendment as some type of a
conspiracy, that I have to repeat what I said yesterday, which was
initially contradicted by the gentleman, and I think the gentleman has
checked the Record and seen that it was true, that the ranking
Republican Member of the Committee on the Judiciary, the gentleman from
New York [Mr. Fish] voted against the Gekas amendment, and voted in a
fashion exactly consistent with the amendment I am about to offer, in
1987, as did 14 of the leading Republican Members of the Senate just a
few weeks ago when the Senate voted down the Gekas amendment and kept
language like the Bryant amendment by a margin of 67 to 31.
Mr. Chairman, I think we are pursuing a prudent course here that is
constructive. It leaves the Attorney General in the position where she
can prosecute the laws without any hindrances. It does not put Members
of Congress on a pedestal, but treats us like everybody else.
Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman
from Massachusetts, [Mr. Frank].
Mr. FRANK of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from
Texas, Mr. Bryant, who is doing an extremely good job of managing this
bill.
First of all, I do want to say both the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Brooks, the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, and the
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Bryant, the subcommittee chairman, and
others, deserve credit. We had some skeptics say that the independent
counsel statute was just some partisan tool that Democrats liked
because it harassed Republicans.
Let us just remind people of the history. The independent counsel
statute was first enacted by a Democratic House and a Democratic Senate
under a Democratic President, Jimmy Carter. It was in fact at its most
ferocious back then. The trigger level that set off the independent
counsel was, by everybody's agreement, too low at that point. But it
was set up by Democrats under a Democratic President.
Now that a Democratic President is back in office, we had predictions
that we would allow it to lapse. In fact, that is not the case. Once
the Senate acted, we have moved very quickly.
{time} 1240
The Senate did not act. There had been a partisan dispute in the
Senate. The Senate finally acted at the end of last session. Here we
are at the outset of this session moving a bill to where I hope it will
be on the President's desk within the first week when we come back,
because there will not be many differences between us and the Senate
unless we adopt the amendment offered by the gentleman from
Pennsylvania.
One point should be very clear. For those who want the independent
counsel statute reauthorized quickly, adopting the amendment of the
gentleman from Pennsylvania will certainly delay this and may kill it
for this reason. The U.S. Senate, of blessed memory, dealt with this
exact issue last November. And an amendment that embodied the principle
of the amendment of the gentleman from Pennsylvania was presented by
the Senator from Arizona.
The Senate, by 67 to 31, voted it down. Leading the charge were two
Senators, the Democratic Senator from Michigan, Mr. Levin, and the
Republican Senator from Maine, Mr. Cohen. The Assistant Republican
Leader, Mr. Simpson, voted against the amendment.
The Senate dealt with this issue and very firmly, by better than 2 to
1, said, ``We want to leave it as is.''
If the House were, in fact, to disagree, we would be guaranteeing a
long conference from which perhaps no bill might emerge, because the
House and Senate position on this central issue greatly at variance
guarantees no quick action.
One way to get quick action so that the Clinton administration will,
in fact, be subjected to the exact same independent counsel statute,
remember, we are talking about the same panoply of powers aimed at the
executive branch now as was facing Reagan and faced Bush, the only way
to do that is, in fact, to defeat this amendment. Because if we can get
this amendment defeated, the differences between the House and the
Senate are sufficiently small. And there has been sufficient
discussions on a bipartisan basis from Senators Levin and Cohen so that
we can get a bill to the President's desk very quickly.
Next I want to talk about the substance. The gentleman from
Pennsylvania said, if a senior member of the President's own party were
to be indicted or investigated by that Attorney General, there would be
the appearance of conflict. I want to defend Attorney General Barr
against the criticism that has been leveled at him by Republicans,
because Attorney General Barr, appointed by Bush, Attorney General
Thornburgh, appointed by, I think, Reagan and Bush, Attorney General
Meese and Attorney General Smith, all four men who served as Attorneys
General under President Reagan and President Bush authorized Justice
Department investigations of Members of Congress of both parties.
All four of those men authorized investigations of both Democratic
and Republican Congressmen, in some cases some senior Members of their
own party.
Now, all four of those men, under the statute as it then existed and
as the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Bryant] wants to reconstitute it, had
the unchallenged authority to ask for an independent counsel. Any
Attorney General at any time could ask for an independent counsel for
anybody if he or she thinks there is a conflict. So if, in fact, there
was that appearance of conflict, as the gentleman from Pennsylvania
says, why did four Republican Attorneys General refuse to use the
mechanism available to them? Why did Mr. Meese and Mr. Smith and Mr.
Thornburgh and Mr. Barr all refuse to ask for an independent counsel?
We will be told that they believed that it should be mandatory. That
is the oddist profession I have ever heard. Here are four men who
apparently insist that, I guess their argument is, stop me before I
conflict again. Here are four men who ignored their own authority to
ask for an independent counsel, who now tell us that what they did was
somehow wrong, apparently, and that an independent counsel must be
offered. If that seems illogical to Members, I think that helps them
understand what the basis of what we are talking about is.
Yes, when the Attorney General is asked to investigate the Vice
President, the Secretary of Labor, the Chairman of the President's own
party, we believe there is an inherent conflict. When a Member of
Congress is involved, there may or may not be a conflict. We leave it
up to the Attorney General to decide it.
Members have also said this thing costs too much. Well, what my
friends on the other side want to do is to increase the cost of this by
a factor of 10. Nothing would be more likely to undermine the existence
of the independent counsel than to increase the cost by a factor of 10,
because 60 people are now automatically covered, they would make 600
people automatically covered. And if we had the same incidents of
appointments among Members of Congress and the executive branch, we
could increase it by a factor of 10, if we made it automatic.
Now, I am prepared to concede that the Republican Attorneys General
erred in the past and should have appointed an Independent Counsel two
or three times when they did not. I am sorry that they never did it. I
am sorry that they never dealt with the potential of a conflict. I am
sorry that they disagreed with the gentleman from Pennsylvania, who
said it was an apparent conflict. And he is right to use the phrase
``apparent conflict.'' That is one of the things we legitimately are
concerned about.
But when four Republican Attorneys General over a 12-year period
consistently refuse to use this authority, which they had without any
possible challenge, how can it be argued that somehow this is the
logical policy that they should have been forced to do it?
Finally, let me address the procedure. We have a procedure where,
yes, the pending amendment is already in the bill. That happens from
time to time, because Members want to make sure that the issue is
properly framed in debate. If it was up to me, we would never do it. If
it was up to my friends on the Republican side, I believe from history,
we would sometimes do it and sometimes not do it. Because we do it when
it helped them and not when it did not.
When we debated the Defense bill, we had the Skelton amendment. The
Skelton amendment was the text of the bill. And we had a King of the
Hill situation. There were two amendments prior to the Skelton
amendment on gays in the military. They both lost. We then voted on the
Skelton amendment. And in that case we did not even have a Gekas type
amendment to choose between.
We had a situation that said, if we voted for the Skelton amendment,
it would be in the bill. But if we voted against the Skelton amendment,
it would be in the bill.
I challenge my colleagues to find in the Congressional Record one
Republican objecting to that procedure. We did that. It was less
logical than this one. Because here we will be making a choice. In the
military issue, we choose between Skelton and Skelton. Here we are
choosing between Bryant and Gekas.
Now, Members may not think that the difference between Gekas and
Bryant is great. I happen to think it is, but the difference between
Bryant and Gekas is greater than the difference between Skelton and
Skelton. I mean, Members who believe in that procedure, frankly, might
have thought that it was designed not by the gentleman from Missouri
[Mr. Skelton] but by Red Skelton. But I did not remember a single
Republican objection, not one, not during the rule debate, not during
the debate on the floor.
So we have a procedure that has been used before with Republican
support. We have a rule that says the Attorney General can appoint,
whenever he or she wants to, an independent counsel. And four
Republican Attorneys General have declined to do that, and many of them
have investigated Members of their own party and of the other party.
We have a proposal that would increase by a factor of perhaps 10, a
thousand percent, the cost of this. The history of the independent
counsel is that when Mr. Nixon was in trouble, there were difficulties.
And that is what led to the independent counsel statute. There was not
a history of executive branch officials being unwilling to prosecute
Members of Congress. Jimmy Carter presided over Abscam, which sent
mostly Democrats to prison. Republican Attorneys General have indicted
and convicted or dismissed charges against Members of Congress.
This is a continuation of what we have had. The Democrats have a
challenge, and I believe we are meeting it. Will we apply to the
Clinton administration exactly the same rules that we applied to the
Bush and Reagan administrations?
Vote for the Bryant amendment and that is what we will accomplish,
because we will be able to go promptly to conference with the Senate
and put that bill on the President's desk. Vote for the amendment
offered by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, and we will guarantee the
grinding down, people will be talking about gridlock. We will have a
difficulty with the Senate which has already rejected it, and we may or
may not be able to resuscitate.
I believe we will take the appropriate action, and I call for a yes
vote on the Bryant amendment.
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I might ask the gentleman from
Texas [Mr. Bryant] a question or two.
It is my belief that the gentleman's amendment on coverage, optional
coverage of Congress, eliminates, of course, the mandatory coverage but
also provides a weaker standard. Under the existing law or, rather, the
law that we seek to reincarnate, it says, ``Preliminary investigation
with respect to persons not listed.'' Then, of course, that would be
Congressmen. The Attorney General determines that an investigation or
prosecution of the person with respect to the information received by
the Attorney General or other officer of the Department of Justice may
result in a ``personal, financial or political conflict of interest.''
When that happens, then the independent counsel is triggered. Under
the amendment of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Bryant], he eliminates
``financial, personal or political conflict of interest,'' and he puts
in ``in the public interest.''
It seems to me there could be a financial conflict of interest. There
could be a political conflict of interest. There could be a personal
conflict of interest, but the AG will not find it in the public
interest to appoint an independent counsel.
{time} 1250
Why did the gentleman change the standard? Why did he not go with the
tried and true, proven phrase, ``personal, financial, or political
conflict of interest''?
Mr. BRYANT. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GEKAS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. BRYANT. I would say to the gentleman, because ``personal,
financial, or political conflict of interest,'' all of those would be
good grounds for going forward, but we have broadened it even further
to say if it is in the public interest for any reason, she can include
a Member of Congress under the coverage of this statute. We are trying
to make it easier, not harder.
Mr. HYDE. Why did the gentleman not add it, then, instead of
substituting it, because many of us think ``in the public interest'' is
a different standard and one could have a political conflict, a
personal conflict, a financial conflict, but not find it in the public
interest. There are two different standards.
Mr. BRYANT. If the gentleman will continue to yield, the answer is
very easy. Whenever we begin to place specific language in there, we
then place a negative inference on the remaining language.
We have written it in such a way that the broadest possible
interpretation allows the Attorney General to use the independent
counsel statute to apply to a Member of Congress if she thinks it is in
the public interest, rather than limiting it the way it is now.
Mr. HYDE. The gentleman keeps characterizing it as the broadest
possible, but really and truly, the public interest may well be
different from a personal, financial, or political conflict.
Mr. BRYANT. If the gentleman will continue to yield, it is broader.
Mr. HYDE. I think it weakens rather than strengthens the standards,
and I just regret that the gentleman has done that. I thank the
gentleman.
Mr. BRYANT. I do not agree with that.
Mr. GEKAS. May I inquire of the Chair the balance of the time
remaining?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas] has 8\1/2\
minutes remaining, and the gentleman on the other side has exhausted
his time.
parliamentary inquiry
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, may I pose a parliamentary inquiry to the
Chair?
Mr. Chairman, the so-called Gekas amendment will not receive a yes or
no vote at this juncture, is that correct?
The CHAIRMAN. The first vote will be on the question of the
substitute offered by Mr. Bryant.
Mr. GEKAS. Further inquiring of the Chair, the so-called Bryant
amendment would in effect, if successful, meld into the so-called Gekas
amendment and really substitute for it, is that correct?
The CHAIRMAN. The amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas [Mr.
Bryant] is a substitute for the so-called Gekas amendment. The question
on the language of the so-called Gekas amendment would only arise if
the substitute offered by Mr. Bryant were not to succeed.
Mr. GEKAS. So that, in further inquiry on a parliamentary basis, if
the Members called to vote by the Chair would have the option, if they
wanted to support the so-called Gekas amendment, they would have to
vote no on Bryant, is that correct?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has correctly stated the position. The
so-called Gekas amendment would not arise for a vote unless the
substitute offered by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Bryant] were
defeated.
Mr. GEKAS. I would ask, Mr. Chairman, is that quite correct?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman will suspend.
The answer to the gentleman's inquiry is that there could be a vote
on the so-called Gekas amendment as amended if the substitute offered
by the gentleman from Texas succeeded.
Mr. GEKAS. If the so-called Bryant amendment should fail, then the
so-called Gekas amendment would recur for a vote, is that correct?
The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. The gentleman has stated the situation
correctly.
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is recognized for the balance of his
time.
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I am hopeful that as the Members come to the
floor, they will picture in their mind the following scene. A high-
ranking, high-profile Member of Congress is accused of wrongdoing in
one form or another, and that accusation, that allegation, finds itself
on the desk of the Attorney General.
The Attorney General, under the concept of bill and Bryant, bill/
Bryant, may decide to call for an independent counsel, may, and may
decide not to even investigate, could quash the whole matter right at
the Attorney General's desk, refuse to investigate, refuse to
articulate any concern or jurisdiction over that matter.
Envision further, I ask the Members as they come up, this high-
ranking, powerful Member of Congress happens to be of the same
political party as the Attorney General, and the Attorney General, of
course, is of the same political party as the President of the United
States.
Under bill/Bryant, if in the public interest, and if upon further
reflection, perhaps, maybe the Attorney General might consider doing
something about the case, is the bill and the Bryant approach, against
which we must vote if we want to enter the proper picture in the minds
of the Members, and that is, we have a high-ranking, powerful Member of
Congress on whom the White House might depend for clearance of bills
and for initiatives near and dear to the heart of the President of the
United States, or of the Attorney General, being of the same party of
the Attorney General and of the President of the United States, under
the so-called Gekas amendment, accusations or allegations of wrongdoing
against that Member of Congress will find its way to the Attorney
General's desk, and then under the Gekas amendment law, if it should
become law, that Attorney General must do the duties ascribed to it by
that law and must launch an investigation into these allegations of
wrongdoing on the part of the powerful Member of Congress. That is the
picture.
If Members believe they like the picture of the high-ranking Member
of Congress looking at the Attorney General of the same party and the
President of the United States of the same party and seeing whether or
not that will be followed through by the Attorney General, vote yes for
Bryant, go ahead and vote yes for Bryant.
If you think there is something wrong with that picture, and that the
high-ranking Member of Congress, when allegations of wrongdoing are put
in front of his fellow partisan in the White House and the Attorney
General, then would it not be leveling with the American people to say,
``We are going to have a full faith and credit type of investigation, a
just inquiry into these facts,'' because the Attorney General under the
so-called Gekas amendment will be compelled to relegate this to an
independent counsel appointed by a court and an individual who will be
appointed as independent counsel, who will have no ties with the
President, no ties with the Attorney General, and no ties with the
high-ranking, powerful Member of Congress. That is an advance into good
government.
Mr. Chairman, I implore the Members to keep that vision in mind and
vote no on Bryant, bill/Bryant, bill/Bryant, no, and vote to place into
law the vision of better Government through the so-called Gekas
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas
[Mr. Bryant] as a substitute for the amendment offered by the gentleman
from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas].
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
recorded vote
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to clause 2 of rule XXIII, the Chair announces
that he will reduce to not less than 5 minutes the period of time for a
rollcall vote, if ordered, on the so-called Gekas amendment.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 230,
noes 188, not voting 20, as follows:
[Roll No. 19]
AYES--230
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews (ME)
Applegate
Baesler
Barca
Barcia
Barlow
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Beilenson
Berman
Bevill
Bilbray
Bishop
Blackwell
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Brewster
Brooks
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Byrne
Cantwell
Cardin
Carr
Chapman
Clayton
Clement
Clyburn
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Condit
Conyers
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Danner
Darden
de Lugo (VI)
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Dooley
Durbin
Edwards (CA)
Edwards (TX)
Engel
English
Eshoo
Evans
Faleomavaega (AS)
Farr
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Filner
Fingerhut
Flake
Foglietta
Ford (MI)
Ford (TN)
Frank (MA)
Frost
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gibbons
Glickman
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hamburg
Hamilton
Harman
Hayes
Hefley
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hoagland
Hochbrueckner
Holden
Hoyer
Hughes
Hutto
Inslee
Jefferson
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kennelly
Kildee
Kleczka
Klein
Klink
Kopetski
Kreidler
LaFalce
Lambert
Lancaster
Lantos
LaRocco
Lehman
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Lloyd
Long
Lowey
Maloney
Mann
Manton
Margolies-Mezvinsky
Markey
Martinez
Matsui
McCloskey
McDermott
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moran
Murphy
Murtha
Nadler
Natcher
Neal (MA)
Norton (DC)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Owens
Oxley
Pallone
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Penny
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Pickett
Pickle
Pomeroy
Poshard
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Reynolds
Richardson
Roemer
Romero-Barcelo (PR)
Rose
Rostenkowski
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sangmeister
Sarpalius
Sawyer
Schenk
Schroeder
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Sharp
Shepherd
Sisisky
Skaggs
Slaughter
Smith (IA)
Spratt
Stark
Stokes
Strickland
Studds
Stupak
Swift
Synar
Tanner
Tejeda
Thompson
Thornton
Thurman
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Traficant
Underwood (GU)
Unsoeld
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Wheat
Whitten
Wilson
Wise
Woolsey
Wyden
Wynn
Yates
NOES--188
Allard
Andrews (NJ)
Archer
Armey
Bacchus (FL)
Bachus (AL)
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bateman
Bentley
Bereuter
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bunning
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Castle
Clinger
Coble
Collins (GA)
Combest
Cooper
Coppersmith
Cox
Crane
Crapo
Cunningham
Deal
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Emerson
Everett
Fawell
Fields (TX)
Fish
Fowler
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Furse
Gallegly
Gallo
Gekas
Geren
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gingrich
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Grams
Grandy
Greenwood
Gunderson
Hall (TX)
Hancock
Hansen
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Horn
Houghton
Huffington
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Inhofe
Istook
Jacobs
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Kasich
Kim
King
Kingston
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kyl
Lazio
Leach
Levy
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lightfoot
Linder
Livingston
Machtley
Manzullo
Mazzoli
McCandless
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHale
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
Meyers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Molinari
Moorhead
Myers
Nussle
Orton
Packard
Parker
Paxon
Petri
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Quillen
Quinn
Ramstad
Ravenel
Regula
Roberts
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roth
Roukema
Rowland
Royce
Santorum
Saxton
Schaefer
Schiff
Sensenbrenner
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Snowe
Solomon
Spence
Stearns
Stenholm
Stump
Sundquist
Swett
Talent
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas (CA)
Thomas (WY)
Torkildsen
Upton
Valentine
Volkmer
Vucanovich
Walker
Walsh
Weldon
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NOT VOTING--20
Andrews (TX)
Bilirakis
Clay
Coleman
de la Garza
Derrick
Ewing
Hastert
Hastings
Laughlin
McCurdy
McMillan
Michel
Morella
Neal (NC)
Ridge
Slattery
Tucker
Washington
Williams
{time} 1317
The Clerk announced the following pair:
On this vote:
Mr. Washington for, with Mr. Bilirakis against.
Messers. DEAL, ROWLAND, and SKELTON changed their vote from ``aye''
to ``no.''
Mrs. MINK of Hawaii and Mrs. THURMAN changed their vote from ``no''
to ``aye.''
So the amendment offered as a substitute for the amendment was agreed
to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas], as amended.
The question was taken; and the Chairman announced that the ayes
appeared to have it.
recorded vote
Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 339,
noes 76, not voting 23, as follows:
[Roll No. 20]
AYES--339
Ackerman
Allard
Andrews (ME)
Andrews (NJ)
Applegate
Bacchus (FL)
Bachus (AL)
Baesler
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barca
Barcia
Barlow
Barrett (WI)
Bateman
Becerra
Beilenson
Bentley
Bereuter
Berman
Bevill
Bilbray
Bishop
Blackwell
Blute
Boehlert
Bonilla
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Brewster
Brooks
Browder
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Bunning
Byrne
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Cantwell
Cardin
Carr
Castle
Chapman
Clayton
Clement
Clinger
Clyburn
Collins (GA)
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Combest
Condit
Conyers
Cooper
Coppersmith
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Cunningham
Danner
Darden
de Lugo (VI)
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Derrick
Deutsch
Dickey
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Dooley
Durbin
Edwards (CA)
Edwards (TX)
Engel
English
Eshoo
Evans
Everett
Faleomavaega (AS)
Farr
Fawell
Fields (LA)
Filner
Fingerhut
Fish
Flake
Foglietta
Ford (MI)
Ford (TN)
Frank (MA)
Franks (NJ)
Frost
Gallegly
Gallo
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Geren
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Glickman
Gonzalez
Goodlatte
Goodling
Gordon
Green
Greenwood
Gunderson
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamburg
Hamilton
Harman
Hayes
Hefley
Hefner
Herger
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hoagland
Hobson
Hochbrueckner
Hoekstra
Holden
Hoyer
Hughes
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hutto
Inhofe
Inslee
Istook
Jacobs
Jefferson
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kennedy
Kennelly
Kildee
Kim
Kleczka
Klein
Klink
Klug
Knollenberg
Kopetski
Kreidler
LaFalce
Lambert
Lancaster
Lantos
LaRocco
Lazio
Leach
Lehman
Levin
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lewis (GA)
Lightfoot
Lipinski
Livingston
Lloyd
Long
Lowey
Machtley
Maloney
Mann
Manton
Manzullo
Margolies-Mezvinsky
Markey
Martinez
Matsui
Mazzoli
McCandless
McCloskey
McCrery
McCurdy
McDade
McDermott
McHale
McInnis
McKeon
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Meyers
Mfume
Mineta
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Molinari
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moran
Morella
Murphy
Murtha
Nadler
Natcher
Neal (MA)
Norton (DC)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Orton
Owens
Oxley
Pallone
Parker
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Penny
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickett
Pickle
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Ravenel
Reed
Regula
Reynolds
Richardson
Roberts
Roemer
Rogers
Romero-Barcelo (PR)
Rose
Rostenkowski
Roth
Roukema
Rowland
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sangmeister
Santorum
Sarpalius
Sawyer
Saxton
Schaefer
Schenk
Schiff
Schroeder
Schumer
Scott
Sensenbrenner
Serrano
Sharp
Shaw
Shays
Shepherd
Shuster
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skeen
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (IA)
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Snowe
Spratt
Stark
Stenholm
Stokes
Strickland
Studds
Stupak
Swift
Synar
Talent
Tanner
Tauzin
Tejeda
Thomas (WY)
Thompson
Thornton
Thurman
Torkildsen
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Traficant
Tucker
Unsoeld
Upton
Valentine
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Walsh
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Wheat
Whitten
Wilson
Wise
Wolf
Woolsey
Wyden
Wynn
Yates
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zimmer
NOES--76
Abercrombie
Archer
Armey
Baker (CA)
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bliley
Boehner
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Coble
Cox
Crane
Crapo
Deal
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Dunn
Ehlers
Emerson
Fields (TX)
Fowler
Franks (CT)
Furse
Gekas
Gingrich
Goss
Grams
Grandy
Hancock
Hansen
Hoke
Horn
Houghton
Huffington
Hyde
Inglis
Johnson, Sam
King
Kingston
Kolbe
Kyl
Levy
Linder
McCollum
McHugh
Mica
Miller (FL)
Moorhead
Myers
Nussle
Packard
Paxon
Pombo
Quillen
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Smith (TX)
Solomon
Spence
Stearns
Stump
Sundquist
Swett
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas (CA)
Vucanovich
Walker
Weldon
Zeliff
NOT VOTING--23
Andrews (TX)
Bilirakis
Brown (CA)
Clay
Coleman
de la Garza
Duncan
Ewing
Fazio
Gutierrez
Hastert
Hastings
Laughlin
McMillan
Michel
Miller (CA)
Neal (NC)
Ridge
Royce
Slattery
Underwood (GU)
Washington
Williams
{time} 1326
The Clerk announced the following pair:
On this vote:
Mr. Fazio for, with Mr. Bilirakis against.
Messrs. ROHRABACHER, KYL, SUNDQUIST, and PAXON changed their vote
from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Messrs. KASICH, LAZIO, and CUNNINGHAM changed their vote from ``no''
to ``aye.''
So the amendment, as amended, was agreed to.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mrs. Mink of Hawaii). It is now in order to
consider amendment No. 8 printed in House Report 103-419.
Amendment in the Nature of a Substitute Offered by Mr. Hyde
Mr. HYDE. Madam Chairman, pursuant to the rule, I offer amendment No.
8, an amendment in the nature of a substitute.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. The Clerk will designate the amendment in
the nature of a substitute.
The text of the amendment in the nature of a substitute is as
follows:
Amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Mr.
Hyde:
Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the
following:
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Independent Counsel
Accountability and Reform Act of 1994''.
SEC. 2. EXTENSION.
Section 599 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
striking ``Reauthorization Act of 1987'' and inserting
``Accountability and Reform Act of 1994''.
SEC. 3. APPLICATION TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.
Section 591(b) of title 28, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (7);
(2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (8) and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(9) any Senator, or any Representative in, or Delegate or
Resident Commissioner to, the Congress, or any person who has
served as a Senator or such a Representative, Delegate, or
Resident Commissioner within the 2-year period before the
receipt of the information under subsection (a) with respect
to conduct that occurred while such person was a Senator or
such a Representative, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner.''.
SEC. 4. BASIS FOR PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.
(a) Initial Receipt of Information.--Section 591 of title
28, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(A) by striking ``information'' and inserting ``specific
information from a credible source that is''; and
(B) by striking ``may have'' and inserting ``has'';
(2) in subsection (c)(1)--
(A) by striking ``information'' and inserting ``specific
information from a credible source that is''; and
(B) by striking ``may have'' and inserting ``has''; and
(3) by amending subsection (d) to read as follows:
``(d) Time Period for Determining Need for Preliminary
Investigation.--The Attorney General shall determine, under
subsection (a) or (c) (or section 592(c)(2)), whether grounds
to investigate exist not later than 15 days after the
information is first received. If within that 15-day period
the Attorney General determines that there is insufficient
evidence of a violation of Federal criminal law referred to
in subsection (a), then the Attorney General shall close the
matter. If within that 15-day period the Attorney General
determines there is sufficient evidence of such a violation,
the Attorney General shall, upon making that determination,
commence a preliminary investigation with respect to that
information. If the Attorney General is unable to determine,
within that 15-day period, whether there is sufficient
evidence of such a violation, the Attorney General shall, at
the end of that 15-day period, commence a preliminary
investigation with respect to that information.''.
(b) Receipt of Additional Information.--Section 592(c)(2)
of title 28, United States Code, is amended by striking
``information'' and inserting ``specific information from a
credible source that is''.
SEC. 5. SUBPOENA POWER.
Section 592(a)(2) of title 28, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``grant immunity, or issue subpoenas''
and inserting ``or grant immunity, but may issue subpoenas
duces tecum''.
SEC. 6. PROSECUTORIAL JURISDICTION OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL.
(a) Prosecutorial Jurisdiction.--Section 593(b) of title
28, United States Code, is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1)--
(A) by striking ``define'' and inserting ``, with
specificity, define''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following: ``Such jurisdiction
shall be limited to the alleged violations of criminal law
with respect to which the Attorney General has requested the
appointment of the independent counsel, and matters directly
related to such criminal violations.''; and
(2) by amending paragraph (3) to read as follows:
``(3) Scope of prosecutorial jurisdiction.--In defining the
independent counsel's prosecutorial jurisdiction, the
division of the court shall assure that the independent
counsel has adequate authority to fully investigate and
prosecute the alleged violations of criminal law with respect
to which the Attorney General has requested the appointment
of the independent counsel, and matters directly related to
such criminal violations, including perjury, obstruction of
justice, destruction of evidence, and intimidation of
witnesses.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--Section 592(d) of title 28,
United States Code, is amended by striking ``subject matter
and all matters related to that subject matter'' and
inserting ``the alleged violations of criminal law with
respect to which the application is made, and matters
directly related to such criminal violations''.
SEC. 7. USE OF STATE AND LOCAL PROSECUTORS; STAFF OF
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL.
(a) Prosecutors as Independent Counsel.--Section 593(b)(1)
of title 28, United States Code, as amended by section 7 of
this Act, is further amended by adding at the end the
following: ``The division of the court should strongly
consider exercising the authority of section 3372 of title 5
so that it may appoint as independent counsel prosecutors
from State or local governments, and the division of the
court may exercise the authorities of such section 3372 for
such purpose to the same extent as the head of a Federal
agency.''.
(b) Staff of Independent Counsel.--Section 594(c) of title
28, United States Code, is amended by striking the last
sentence and inserting the following: ``Not more than 2 such
employees may be compensated at a rate not to exceed the rate
of basic pay payable for level V of the Executive schedule
under section 5316 of title 5, and all other such employees
shall be compensated at rates not to exceed the maximum rate
of basic pay payable for GS-15 of the General Schedule under
section 5332 of title 5. The independent counsel should, to
the greatest extent possible, use personnel of the Department
of Justice, on a reimbursable basis, in lieu of appointing
employees, to carry out the duties of such independent
counsel. The independent counsel should also strongly
consider exercising the authority of section 3372 of title 5
so that he or she may appoint as employees under this
subsection prosecutors of State or local governments. In
order to carry out the preceding sentence, each independent
counsel shall, for purposes of such section 3372, be
considered to be the head of a Federal agency.''.
SEC. 8. ATTORNEYS' FEES.
Section 593(f)(1) of title 28, United States Code, is
amended in the first sentence--
(1) by striking ``the court may'' and inserting ``the court
shall'';
(2) by inserting after ``pursuant to that investigation,''
the following: ``if such individual is acquitted of all
charges, or no conviction is obtained against such
individual, at a trial brought pursuant to that
investigation, or if the conviction of such individual at
such a trial is overturned on appeal,''; and
(3) by inserting ``, trial, and appeal (if any)'' after
``during that investigation''.
SEC. 9. TREATMENT OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
Section 594(a) of title 28, United States Code, is amended
by adding at the end the following:
``An independent counsel appointed under this chapter who
gains access to classified information shall follow all
procedures established by the United States Government
regarding the maintenance, use, and disclosure of such
information. The failure to follow such procedures shall be
grounds for removal for good cause under section 596(a)(1),
in addition to any penalty provided in section 798 of title
18 or any other law that may apply.''.
SEC. 10. INDEPENDENT COUNSEL PER DIEM EXPENSES.
Section 594(b) of title 28, United States Code, is amended
to read as follows:
``(b) Compensation.--
``(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), an
independent counsel appointed under this chapter shall
receive compensation at the per diem rate not to exceed the
annual rate of basic pay payable for level IV of the
Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5.
``(2) Travel and lodging in washington.--An independent
counsel and persons appointed under subsection (c) shall not
be entitled to the payment of travel and subsistence expenses
under subchapter 1 of chapter 57 of title 5, with respect to
duties performed in the District of Columbia after 1 year of
service under this chapter.''.
SEC. 11. AUTHORITIES AND DUTIES OF INDEPENDENT COUNSEL.
(a) Administrative Support.--Section 594 of title 28,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following new subsection:
``(l) Administrative Services.--
``(1) Administrative support.--The Administrator of General
Services shall provide administrative support to each
independent counsel.
``(2) Office space.--The Administrator of General Services
shall promptly provide appropriate office space for each
independent counsel. Such office space shall be within a
Federal building unless the Administrator of General Services
determines that other arrangements would cost less.''.
(b) Compliance With Policies of the Department of
Justice.--Section 594(f) of title 28, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by striking ``, except where not possible,'' and
inserting ``at all times''; and
(2) by striking ``enforcement of the criminal laws'' and
inserting ``the enforcement of criminal laws and the release
of information relating to criminal proceedings''.
(c) Limitation on Expenditures.--Section 594 of title 28,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(m) Limitation on Expenditures.--No funds may be expended
for the operation of any office of independent counsel after
the end of the 2-year period after its establishment, except
to the extent that an appropriations Act enacted after such
establishment specifically makes available funds for such
office for use after the end of that 2-year period.''.
SEC. 12. PERIODIC REPORTS.
Section 595(a)(2) of title 28, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``such statements'' and all that follows
through ``appropriate'' and inserting ``annually a report on
the activities of such independent counsel, including a
description of the progress of any investigation or
prosecution conducted by such independent counsel. Such
report need not contain information which would--
``(A) compromise or undermine the confidentiality of an
ongoing investigation under this chapter,
``(B) adversely affect the outcome of any prosecution under
this chapter, or
``(C) violate the personal privacy of any individual,
but shall provide information adequate to justify the
expenditures which the office of that independent counsel has
made, and indicate in general terms the state of the work of
the independent counsel''.
SEC. 13. REMOVAL, TERMINATION, AND PERIODIC REAPPOINTMENT OF
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL.
(a) Grounds for Removal.--Section 596(a)(1) of title 28,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following: ``Failure of the independent counsel to comply
with the established policies of the Department of Justice as
required by section 594(f) or to comply with section 594(j)
may be grounds for removing that independent counsel from
office for good cause under this subsection.''.
(b) Termination.--Section 596(b)(2) of title 28, United
States Code, is amended to read as follows:
``(2) Termination by division of the court.--The division
of the court may terminate an office of independent counsel
at any time--
``(A) on its own motion,
``(B) upon the request of the Attorney General, or
``(C) upon the petition of the subject of an investigation
conducted by such independent counsel, if the petition is
made more than 2 years after the appointment of such
independent counsel,
on the ground that the investigation conducted by the
independent counsel has been completed or substantially
completed and that it would be appropriate for the Department
of Justice to complete such investigation or to conduct any
prosecution brought pursuant to such investigation, or on the
ground that continuation of the investigation or prosecution
conducted by the independent counsel is not in the public
interest.''.
(c) Periodic Reappointment.--Section 596 of title 28,
United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the
following:
``(d) Periodic Reappointment of Independent Counsel.--If an
office of independent counsel has not terminated before--
``(1) the date that is 2 years after the original
appointment to that office, or
``(2) the end of each succeeding 2-year period,
such counsel shall apply to the division of the court for
reappointment. The court shall first determine whether the
office of that independent counsel should be terminated under
subsection (b)(2). If the court determines that such office
will not be terminated under such subsection, the court shall
reappoint the applicant if the court determines that such
applicant remains the appropriate person to carry out the
duties of the office. If not, the court shall appoint some
other person whom it considers qualified under the standards
set forth in section 593 of this title. If the court has not
taken the actions required by this subsection within 90 days
after the end of the applicable 2-year period, then that
office of independent counsel shall terminate at the end of
that 90-day period.''.
SEC. 14. JOB PROTECTIONS FOR INDIVIDUALS UNDER INVESTIGATION.
(a) In General.--Section 597 of title 28, United States
Code, is amended--
(1) by amending the section caption to read as follows:
``Sec. 597. Relationship with Department of Justice; job
protection for individuals under investigation''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following:
``(c) Job Protection for Individuals Under Investigation.--
``(1) Prohibited personnel practice.--It shall be a
prohibited personnel practice for an employee of the United
States Government who has authority to take, direct others to
take, recommend, or approve any personnel action (as defined
in section 2302(a)(2)(A) of title 5) with respect to an
individual described in paragraph (2) who is the subject of
an investigation or prosecution under this chapter, to take
or fail to take, or threaten to take or fail to take, such a
personnel action with respect to such individual, on account
of such investigation or prosecution.
``(2) Applicability.--The individuals referred to in
paragraph (1) are individuals other than--
``(A) any person described in section 591(a); and
``(B) any employee of the Federal Government whose position
is excepted from the competitive service on the basis of its
confidential, policy-determining, policy-making, or policy-
advocating character.
``(3) Exemption.--Paragraph (1) does not apply in the case
of an individual who is convicted of a criminal offense
pursuant to an investigation or prosecution described in
paragraph (1), unless such conviction is overturned on
appeal.
``(4) Remedies.--An individual with respect to whom a
prohibited personnel practice applies under paragraph (1) may
seek corrective action from the Merit Systems Protection
Board to the same extent as an employee may seek corrective
action under section 1221 of title 5 (including subsection
(h) of such section), except that, for purposes of such
section, any reference to section 2302(b)(8) of title 5 shall
be deemed to refer to paragraph (1) of this subsection, and
any reference to a disclosure under such section 2302(b)(8)
shall be deemed to refer to an investigation or prosecution
described in paragraph (1) of this subsection.''.
(b) Conforming Amendment.--The item relating to section 597
in the table of sections at the beginning of chapter 40 of
title 28, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
``597. Relationship with Department of Justice; job protection for
individuals under investigation.''.
SEC. 15. EFFECT OF TERMINATION OF CHAPTER.
Section 599 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
inserting ``, or until 120 days have elapsed, whichever is
earlier'' after ``completed''.
SEC. 16. GAO REPORT.
The Comptroller General of the United States shall submit
to the Congress, not later than 1 year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, a report setting forth recommendations
of ways to improve controls on costs of offices of
independent counsel under chapter 40 of title 28, United
States Code.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from
Illinois [Mr. Hyde] will be recognized for 20 minutes, and a Member
opposed will be recognized for 20 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
Mr. HYDE. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HYDE. Madam Chairman, ladies and gentlemen of the House, this is
nearly the last vote we will have on this very significant piece of
legislation, the reauthorization of the independent counsel statute. My
substitute, in my opinion, makes it a better bill. I am for the
concept, I have always been for the concept, I voted for this when it
was first presented back in 1978, and I have voted for it in every
succeeding time that it has been presented. I think we should have
learned something from experience. We should have learned from history
how this bill has operated, and now we have an opportunity to sand off
the rough edges, an opportunity to fine-tune it, to make it a better
law, a more effective law.
Madam Chairman, I suggest nobody can accuse me of trying to
eviscerate, diminish or demean or weaken this independent counsel law.
I ask you to put partisanship aside. I know it is difficult,
difficult for all of us, but try to make this a better bill, try to go
to school on the experience we have had under the most recent
independent counsel operation.
{time} 1330
This substitute is about reform, congressional reform. It is about
accountability, budgetary accountability, and personal, professional
accountability of the independent counsel. And it is about due process
of law. These are things that ought to concern us mightily.
Under the old, and I will call it the Walsh law because it is the law
that Judge Walsh operated under, its reincarnation, which is what we
are about today, I suggest this will be too costly without the reforms
in my substitute. It is too open-ended and, thus, violates due process
or has the potential to violate due process, and it is too easily
manipulated.
I ask anybody who is listening to me to tell me if they do not think
the indictment of former Secretary Weinberger 3 days before the
election was not political. Now, one may say, ``Secretary Weinberger
ought to have been indicted.'' One could say that if they wish. But the
timing 3 days before the election, I suggest to anybody, was
manipulation, political manipulation, and, if it can happen to
Secretary Weinberger, it can happen to my colleagues, and we ought to
prevent that type of politicization of this very important office of
independent counsel.
Now the reason for this law is that no man or woman should be above
the law. That only makes sense. I say to my colleagues, ``Whether you
hold high office in the executive branch or not, nobody should be above
the law, but let us not create an office where the office holder, the
independent counsel, is above the law, and I fear that's what we have
done. We have created Dr. Frankenstein in creating an office that is
not accountable to the Congress, to the Justice Department, to the
Committee on Appropriations, to anybody of indefinite duration, 7 years
and $40 million.''
I suggest we, as the trustees of the tax dollars of the people we
represent, have a duty to put some accountability into this important
office of independent counsel as well as fairness, due process,
accountability, cost controls and congressional reform.
Now the first thing in my bill, my substitute, is mandatory
congressional coverage. We have just voted twice on the Bryant bill,
and the Bryant bill provides optional congressional coverage. I suggest
to my colleagues that the American people, not the American Bar
Association, the American people, want Congress to cover itself with
the same laws that have applied to other people, in this case a small
few people in the executive department, but political conflicts of
interest can arise not only just within the executive, but within
Congress. The people want us to be covered by this law, and this is the
only chance my colleagues will get to vote on mandatory coverage of
Members of Congress. It is not 535 Members because, if my substitute
passes, it will be only those Members, and may they be few, about whom
specific evidence from a credible source has been adduced that a
Federal crime has been violated.
Second, Madam Chairman, effective cost controls. We need
accountability from the Office of Independent Counsel. The independent
counsel has to have some oversight, some restraints, and there are none
in the bill that we are about to reauthorize if my substitute is
defeated. My substitute requires a submission to the Committee on
Appropriations for further money, further millions of dollars, after 2
years. In the first 2 years the independent counsel can go right ahead
as he or she wishes. But, after 2 years, for goodness sake come
forward, and come to the Congress, the steward of tax dollars, and ask
for the money, and make a showing that the money has been spent well
and that the money will be spent well in the future with effective cost
controls.
Treatment of classified information:
It is outrageous what has happened to classified information in the
last independent counsel's conduct of the office both in court and out
of court. Now the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] to his credit
emphasizes in the bill and through an amendment that the rules and
regulations dealing with classified information must be followed. What
the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] omits is a sanction, and my
amendment provides the sanction of removal if these rules and
regulations are ignored.
Another thing:
I say to my colleagues, ``When you are appointed independent counsel,
you don't have a hunting license to kill elephants and woodchucks. You
should have a specific jurisdiction that is defined. You shouldn't go
roaming through the forest with an Uzi shooting everything that moves.
There should be focus, there should be direction, and you should have a
jurisdiction that is defined, not one of these general jurisdictional
grants that permits you to go on, and on, and on against anyone and
everything,'' So, Madam Chairman, I am asking for focus, jurisdiction
defined.
Now we have already debated, my colleagues, the gentlemen from Texas,
Mr Bryant and Mr. Brooks, and I, my amendment which was previously
offered as a freestanding amendment to require, before the preliminary
investigation, the 15 days' lapse, that specific evidence, not just
information, and it must be from a credible source, not from anybody,
that a Federal law has been violated, not may have been violated. Now,
once that threshold is crossed, it seems to me that we can make a
determination thereafter, one by the Attorney General, that
insufficient evidence exists and no independent counsel need be
appointed. But make the threshold high, make it at the outset, so this
whole operation is not triggered for less than specific evidence from a
credible source.
Duration of an investigation, 7 years:
Judge Walsh went on, and maybe 7 years was called for. I will not
even comment on that. But somebody ought to take a look at this after a
few years and say, ``Yes, go ahead,'' or, ``You've done your job. Fold
up your tent,'' And what I am suggesting is that after 2 years a review
of the appointment is made, and the court must reappoint the office or
it expires.
I say to my colleagues, ``Maybe you don't like the 2 years, but 2
years ought to be enough to justify going forward or folding up.''
Attorney fees:
One of the great injustices in our system of justice is that people
who are targets of investigation who get indicted, who get tried and
who are found not guilty, are left with the satisfaction that they are
not guilty and with enormous legal fees that never get paid, and they
never get out from under. I suggest that if that happens, Madam
Chairman, if someone is found not guilty or if someone is found guilty
and their conviction is reversed, they get their attorney fees. That is
the least we can do to make people whole who have been through a
hellish adventure and experience, and those fees are set by the court.
That is only fair. That is due process. That is reauthorization.
My colleagues, a prosecutor ought to be as zealous to protect the
innocent as to prosecute the guilty. That is due process. That is
fairness. And I am suggesting, if we circumscribe this omnipotent power
that the independent counsel is given, that we restrain it in a
budgetary way, in an accountability way, and, if we expand the coverage
to include ourselves, because we can be as capable, as much as some
person working over in the Executive Office Building of violating a
Federal law, then we will have done a good day's work.
{time} 1340
Madam Chairman, I suggest to the Members that this improves the bill.
It does not eviscerate it, it does not hobble it, but it makes it a
fairer bill and it is respectful of the taxpayers' interests.
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BROOKS. Madam Chairman, I rise in opposition to the substitute
amendment.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mrs. Mink). The gentleman from Texas [Mr.
Brooks] is recognized for 20 minutes.
Mr. BROOKS. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may
require.
(Mr. BROOKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BROOKS. Madam Chairman, as I said earlier, the independent
counsel statute is an important law and it should be reauthorized.
However, the law which expired has not fulfilled its purpose due to
shortcomings in the former statute. We need to reform this law if we
are to reauthorize it here today.
The Hyde substitute embraces virtually every issue debated and voted
on in the Judiciary Committee. It represents a responsible and
comprehensive reform package that will improve this law and make it a
better law than the one that expired in 1992. Colleagues, this
substitute is the only comprehensive reform measure that we will be
voting on today.
Accountability and cost control, as I stated in opening the debate on
this bill, are central to improving the independent counsel function.
Madam Chairman, these are they key concepts of the Hyde substitute. For
example, the substitute provides that after 2 years each independent
counsel shall become subject to the annual appropriations process. This
is a responsible cost control intended to avoid runway investigations
such as Iran-Contra, which spent over $39 million. If the substitute
passes, the independent counsel will be subject to congressional
oversight and the appropriations process.
Additionally, under the Hyde substitute, every 2 years the
independent counsel would have to apply to the court for reappointment.
If the court determines that the investigation should continue and that
the specific independent counsel remains the appropriate individual to
carry on the investigation, by reappointing that individual, the court
adds to his credibility. This provision is about accountability and
review, and will allow us to avoid irresponsible fishing expeditions
that last for years.
Madam Chairman, the Hyde substitute would require that independent
counsel comply at all times with the established policies of the
Department of Justice with respect to the enforcement of criminal law.
This is an amendment which I offered at the Judiciary Committee, and
which closes a substantial loophole found in H.R. 811.
Madam Chairman, there should be no exception for a Federal prosecutor
with respect to Justice Department criminal enforcement policies. We
should not provide anyone the authority to avoid compliance with
established prosecutorial policy as set forth in the U.S. attorneys
manual or the Code of Federal Regulations. The independent counsel,
Madam Chairman, was intended to merely step into the shoes of our other
duly appointed Federal prosecutors, and as such should not be made the
beneficiary of a lesser standard regarding criminal prosecution.
Finally, ignoring our experience under the prior law, H.R. 811 does
nothing to safeguard the handling of national security information and
classified documents. During the independent counsel's Iran-Contra
investigation, numerous shortcomings in this area became evident. For
example CIA cables--with highly sensitive markings--were released as
exhibits during trials; in a motion to quash a subpoena, a covert agent
was identified by name, and highly sensitive classified documents were
inexplicably lost at the Los Angeles International Airport. At a
minimum, we should make it clear that an independent counsel must fully
comply with Federal law and regulations regarding the handling and
disclosure of classified information. Most importantly, if there is
failure to comply, then removal should occur. The problem with the
Brooks amendment which passed yesterday regarding this issue, is that
it imposes no sanction if an independent counsel fails to follow the
low or applicable regulations on handling national security documents.
As a practical matter, we cannot realistically expect that a special
prosecutor will be prosecuted for violating 18 U.S.C. 798. The only
realistic sanction in these kinds of circumstances is to make the
independent counsel subject to removal for good cause--just as my good
friend from Illinois, Mr. Hyde, proposes.
Madam Chairman, I say to my colleagues the purposes of the
independent counsel law was to restore public faith in our system of
government and to ensure a fair and impartial system of justice. This
substitute provides us the opportunity to vote for real reform of this
important law and allows us the opportunity to make the independent
counsel more accountable to the public. If we forego the opportunity to
reform this law and instead allow it to remain vulnerable to the
criticisms that it is arbitrary, too costly and unfair, then the very
purpose of the law will be undermined. I encourage my colleagues to
vote ``yes'' on the Hyde substitute.
Madam Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. HYDE. Madam Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished
ranking Republican member of the Committee on the Judiciary, the
gentleman from New York [Mr. Fish].
(Mr. FISH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. FISH. Madam Chairman, I thank my colleague for yielding this time
to me.
Madam Chairman, I rise in opposition to the substitute offered by the
distinguished gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde]. While I do not
question his sincerity in putting forth this substitute, I must
nevertheless say what it is: A radical, broadside attach on every
aspect of the independent counsel process and authority. Parts of this
substitute have already been offered as individual amendments, and have
been already defeated. We need to do the same thing here.
The independent counsel statute was devised to ensure the
independence of action by judicially appointed counsel without
interference by Congress or the executive branch. Yet, the Hyde
substitute creates a new, untested legal standard for the use of the
independent counsel process. The House earlier today defeated the
gentleman's separate amendment on this issue.
The substitute also includes the text of the Gekas amendment--which,
again, the House defeated earlier today. This part of the Hyde
substitute would take away the double-barrelled power of the Attorney
General to prosecute Members of Congress when prosecution by the
Justice Department would be more appropriate than use of the
independent counsel process.
At the same time, the substitute gives an extraordinary option to the
subject of an investigation: It allows the target of investigation to
be able to petition the court to terminate the investigation, and to do
so as frequently and as often as the subject wants. I wonder what U.S.
attorneys and local prosecutors would think about the concept.
The substitute further requires that all independent counsel
investigations lasting more than 2 years be tied directly to the
appropriations process in Congress, thus politicizing the tenure of an
independent counsel to congressional whim. Does this mean Congress can
put a rider on a 1200-page appropriation bill and shut down an
independent counsel investigation? It sure does.
While H.R. 811 controls costs in the manner recommended by the
General Accounting Office, the Hyde substitute fails to include those
administrative and cost control provisions--including the appointment
of a certifying employee for expenditures.
The substitute has many other infirmities, but I hope the case has
been made against it. Suffice it to say, passage of the Hyde substitute
would be the functional equivalent of the Republican strategy last
Congress--which was to render the independent counsel statute a
nullity. I urge you to cast a ``nay'' vote.
{time} 1350
Mr. HYDE. Madam Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from
Virginia [Mr. Goodlatte].
Mr. GOODLATTE. Madam Chairman, more accountability is necessary in
the Office of Independent Counsel than this bill provides. The Hyde
amendment corrects that.
Since 1978 a permanent, indefinite appropriation within justice has
existed to fund expenditures by independent counsels. This is a formula
for abuse.
We have the power today to prevent history from repeating itself. No
one should have the unbridled authority possessed by Lawrence Walsh
during the Iran-Contra investigation. The General Accounting Office
found during its financial audit of Judge Walsh's investigation that
many of the expenses incurred were inconsistent with laws and
regulations.
For instance, GAO computations showed that Mr. Walsh received
reimbursements in excess of the amounts he should have received. Based
on records provided by Mr. Walsh, GAO calculated that the total amount
of unallowable reimbursements for lodging and meals for Judge Walsh was
approximately $78,000 more than the allowable per diem rate.
For at least his first 2 years as independent counsel, Mr. Walsh was
reimbursed for first class air travel--while most businesses are flying
their executives economy class.
GAO concluded in its report that the problems they found in not only
Walsh's investigation but eight other independent counsel
investigations ``Showed a serious breakdown in the accountability over
independent counsel administrative operation.''
As written, H.R. 811 is too costly and easily subject to abuse by
independent counsels who choose to wield their power as a political
weapon. This statute needs real accountability and cost controls--H.S.
811 does not go far enough to attain that goal.
That is why I support provisions in the Hyde substitute which require
the independent counsel to reapply for appointment every 2 years; place
cost controls on independent counsels by making them subject to the
annual appropriations process after 2 years; limit staff salaries and
travel expenses; require each independent counsel to follow established
Department of justice policies with respect to expenditures and
personnel; and allow the appointing court to terminate an independent
counsel's office when it is in the public interest.
The Hyde substitute contains safeguards to prevent the abuses of
power cited in the GAO report. It is clear that independent counsels
must be held more accountable for their expenditures. The Hyde
amendment accomplishes that goal.
Mr. BROOKS. Madam Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished
gentlewoman from Colorado [Mrs. Schroeder], a member of the Committee
on the Judiciary.
Mrs. SCHROEDER. Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.
Madam Chairman, I think I can safely say this, and then we can yield
back all the time and hopefully get to a vote. Most of the Members have
heard this over and over again. Let me reiterate what the Hyde
amendment does. It absolutely guts everything we have done so far
today. So if you want to gut it, this is the thing you want to vote
for.
Madam Chairman, remember what we are trying to do today. We are
trying to reinstate what we did before, which is to find a way that we
can have a judicially appointed counsel that can be independent and not
interfered with by either the Congress or the executive branch. If you
like that concept, then you should vote ``no,'' because what this does
is take that and stand it on its head.
It allows interference by the Congress in a lot of different ways. It
has some new, untested legal standards, as the gentleman from Texas
[Mr. Brooks], the chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, pointed
out earlier.
It also ties this to the appropriations cycle of 2 years. That might
sound a little political. It seems to me Members of Congress run every
2 years. Could that be what it is about? I am sure it is not. If I
sound like I am being a little facetious with tongue in cheek, I am.
Nevertheless, that is what I am talking about when I say it takes
away the independence of this judicially appointed counsel that we are
so concerned about and want to reinstate for 5 years in this bill.
Madam Chairman, it does some other things. It takes away the ability
of the Attorney General to have a double-barreled shot at any Member of
Congress. It only gives her one shot. They can do it with an
independent counsel, but they cannot use U.S. attorneys. They cannot do
those types of things.
Madam Chairman, I could go on and on. The chairman listed it at the
beginning. I know there are Dear Colleagues out. I think one of the
problems has been we have been talking about everything except what the
amendment does. If you want to gut the bill, you should vote for this.
I do not. I think this is a bill that we should have passed last time.
I think it is very important, and we should proceed.
The final thing that I was very surprised the amendment did, is it
took out the part of the bill that really put fiscal responsibility
into it. What this bill says, if it is allowed to stand, is you appoint
an employee to make sure the funds are being spent properly. If that
employee does not do it, they have to repay. This does not have that in
it. So if you vote for the Hyde amendment, you are, one more time,
allowing for this money to come out, and no one knows exactly how it is
spent.
Madam Chairman, I would encourage Members to vote ``no'' and get on
with it, and finally reinstate the independent counsel bill, which has
had a long and distinguished trial period. I think we have found it has
worked very well. Let us keep it working in the way that we had
anticipated.
Madam Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] for his
handling of this.
Mr. BROOKS. Madam Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to
the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Bryant].
(Mr. BRYANT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BRYANT. Madam Chairman, I am glad we are moving to the end of
this debate. I think it has been a good debate. We have strong words
that have been spoken throughout it. Strong feelings, of course, exist
on both sides. In fact, we are trying to pass a bill today that has a
15-year history, a noble history. We would like to see it reinstated
basically as it has functioned in the past. The bill that is on the
floor today would accomplish that, with some notable improvements that
I think are constructive and respond to what we have learned during the
operation of the statute during the last 15 years.
The Hyde substitute which is before us for the next vote, in my view,
would move us away from what we have learned with regard to the
operation of the act, and I think take us away also from common sense.
One point that has been made well here, and ought to be made again,
is that if you do what is in the Hyde substitute and include mandatory
coverage of Members of Congress, rather than keeping it optional, and
also require Congress to vote every year on the appropriation for the
independent counsel, then obviously you will be building into the law
an enormous conflict of interest. I do not think that is workable in
any way, and I am not sure that has been thought through, even by the
author.
Members should also be aware that the Hyde substitute does not
contain the cost controls that are found in the existing bill, which is
ironic, since the alleged extravagant expenditures of funds by Mr.
Walsh's investigation have been raised as an argument to change the
law.
Under H.R. 811, an independent counsel is required to conduct all
activities with due regard for expense. That provision is not in the
Hyde substitute. Under the bill before us, H.R. 811, an independent
counsel can authorize only reasonable and lawful expenditures. That is
not in the Hyde substitute. And under H.R. 811, the bill before us, an
independent counsel must assign a specific employee to certify that
expenditures are reasonable and made in accordance with law, and that
is not in the Hyde substitute.
The bill before us provides a very reasonable and meaningful
structure within which we can guarantee that expenditures in the future
will be prudent and will be consistent with the public interest.
I urge the Members not to vote to change that. I urge Members to vote
against the Hyde substitute. Let us reinstate a law that has worked
well for 15 years. With the changes that we have made, based upon what
we have learned in the last 15 years, it will make it even better.
I urge Members to vote ``no'' on the Hyde substitute and to vote
``aye'' in favor of H.R. 811.
Mr. BROOKS. Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. HYDE. Madam Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Just a couple of very brief comments.
Somebody said this would render the bill a nullity. Why in the world
would we Republicans want to weaken the Office of Independent Counsel,
now that the administration of the folks from Arkansas are in power? We
want an independent counsel, oh, how we want a strong independent
counsel law. Please understand that.
Second, the gentlewoman from Colorado says my substitute guts the
bill. Well, it is true. It does put accountability in. It does require
some oversight over the millions of dollars that one of these special
creatures, who is very much above the law, can spend. If coming to
Congress for appropriations after 2 years is somehow a bad move, then
so be it. Do not vote for accountability. But 7 years and $40 million
for the Iran Contra hearings and producing dust, it just seems to me
that is not very responsible on our part.
I want to make one last appeal to the freshmen, who came here hell-
bent for reform. We are going to reform the way this place operates.
Here is their chance. Here is the first vote of this session on real
reform, to include mandatorily Members of Congress under the blanket,
under the mantle of the independent counsel law. Think about that as
they cast their vote.
Mr. MICHEL. Madam Chairman, I rise in strong support of the Hyde
substitute.
We have now had several years of experience with the independent
counsel statute and it seems to me we have yet to learn the lessons of
history. Mr. Hyde, great student of history himself, rights those
wrongs in his substitute.
Make no mistake about it, the Hyde substitute is the only way left to
dramatically improve this bill. If this substitute is defeated, this
House will leave untouched the abuses of past prosecutors and the
vicious attacks against decent public servants. We will have forsaken
our oversight responsibilities once again.
The Congress, without the Hyde amendment, will forfeit once again its
constitutional responsibilities of oversight. Nowhere in our Government
today is there a more autonomous office than that of the independent
counsels.
We all knew that Lawrence Walsh dangled plea bargains in front of
lesser targets. His weapon was not justice, it was money.
Plead guilty to a minor infraction, Mr. Walsh would say, or face
years of legal battles to save your name and reputation at a cost that
will leave you virtually bankrupt.
What an abuse of power, and Congress couldn't do anything about it.
We all knew that Lawrence Walsh was renting an apartment at the
Watergate Hotel, traveled first class, and paid staff top dollar, and
we couldn't do anything about it.
We all knew that Mr. Walsh had carelessly lost highly classified
information and that he attempted to coverup this embarrassment, and
Congress couldn't do anything about it.
We all knew that Lawrence Walsh had tired and had turned over day-to-
day operations to his bitterly partisan deputy--and we couldn't do
anything about it.
We all knew that Lawrence Walsh had essentially completed his
investigation years ago, but we couldn't do anything about it.
We all knew Mr. Walsh was incompetent and Congress couldn't do
anything about it.
We all knew Lawrence Walsh was spending, or wasting, upwards of $40
million dollars, and couldn't do anything about it.
We all knew that Lawrence Walsh wanted to nab George Bush. Where else
did the leak come from about the Weinberger notes? These were notes
that Mr. Weinberger himself told Mr. Walsh existed and could be found
at the Library of Congress, notes that Mr. Walsh's deputies looked
through but missed the critical information that Mr. Walsh later
claimed Mr. Weinberger concealed.
Congress created a legal bully and watched helplessly as rogue
prosecutors destroyed reputations.
Do any of you remember Ray Donovan, the former Secretary of Labor. He
endured two trials and was ultimately found not guilty. At the
conclusion of his long ordeal he painfully asked ``tell me where I go
to get my reputation back?''
And Congress, in adopting the Hyde substitute, will be getting back
at least part of its reputation as a responsible and effective
institution.
I say to my colleagues that I can support a prosecutor who is
independent of the executive branch, but it is our responsibility to
carefully craft that office so its mission is defined, its legal
parameters clear, the rights of the targets are the same in any
investigation, that we do not unleash a rogue operation, and that we
maintain proper oversight and that, yes, covers the Congress.
I maintain that only in the Hyde substitute has the Congress
adequately achieved these goals. I urge the adoption of the Hyde
substitute.
Mr. HYDE. Madam Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mrs. Mink). All time having expired, the
question is on the amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by
the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
The question was taken; and the Chairman pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
recorded vote
Mr. HYDE. Madam Chairman, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 181,
noes 238, not voting 19, as follows:
[Roll No. 21]
AYES--181
Allard
Archer
Armey
Bachus (AL)
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bateman
Bentley
Bereuter
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Bunning
Burton
Buyer
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Castle
Clinger
Coble
Collins (GA)
Combest
Cooper
Cox
Crane
Crapo
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Emerson
Everett
Fawell
Fish
Fowler
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Gallegly
Gallo
Gekas
Geren
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gingrich
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Grams
Grandy
Greenwood
Gunderson
Hall (TX)
Hancock
Hansen
Hefley
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Horn
Houghton
Huffington
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hutto
Hyde
Inglis
Inhofe
Istook
Jacobs
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Kasich
Kim
Kingston
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kyl
Lazio
Leach
Levy
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lightfoot
Linder
Livingston
Machtley
Manzullo
McCandless
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
Meyers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Molinari
Montgomery
Moorhead
Morella
Myers
Nussle
Oxley
Packard
Parker
Paxon
Petri
Pickle
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Quillen
Quinn
Ramstad
Ravenel
Regula
Roberts
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roth
Roukema
Royce
Santorum
Saxton
Schaefer
Schiff
Sensenbrenner
Shaw
Shays
Shuster
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Snowe
Solomon
Spence
Stearns
Stenholm
Stump
Sundquist
Talent
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas (CA)
Thomas (WY)
Torkildsen
Upton
Valentine
Vucanovich
Walker
Walsh
Weldon
Wilson
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NOES--238
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews (ME)
Andrews (NJ)
Applegate
Bacchus (FL)
Baesler
Barca
Barcia
Barlow
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Beilenson
Berman
Bevill
Bilbray
Bishop
Blackwell
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Brewster
Brooks
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Byrne
Cantwell
Cardin
Carr
Chapman
Clay
Clement
Clyburn
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Condit
Conyers
Coppersmith
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Danner
Darden
de Lugo (VI)
Deal
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Derrick
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Dooley
Durbin
Edwards (CA)
Edwards (TX)
Engel
English
Eshoo
Evans
Faleomavaega (AS)
Farr
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Filner
Fingerhut
Flake
Foglietta
Ford (MI)
Ford (TN)
Frank (MA)
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gibbons
Glickman
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hamburg
Hamilton
Harman
Hayes
Hefner
Hilliard
Hinchey
Hoagland
Hochbrueckner
Holden
Hoyer
Hughes
Inslee
Jefferson
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E.B.
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennelly
Kildee
King
Kleczka
Klein
Klink
Kopetski
Kreidler
LaFalce
Lambert
Lancaster
Lantos
LaRocco
Lehman
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Long
Lowey
Maloney
Mann
Manton
Margolies-Mezvinsky
Markey
Martinez
Matsui
Mazzoli
McCloskey
McCurdy
McDermott
McHale
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Moran
Murphy
Murtha
Nadler
Natcher
Neal (MA)
Norton (DC)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Orton
Owens
Pallone
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Penny
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Pickett
Pomeroy
Poshard
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Reynolds
Richardson
Roemer
Romero-Barcelo (PR)
Rose
Rostenkowski
Rowland
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sangmeister
Sarpalius
Sawyer
Schenk
Schroeder
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Sharp
Shepherd
Sisisky
Skaggs
Slaughter
Smith (IA)
Spratt
Stark
Stokes
Strickland
Studds
Stupak
Swett
Swift
Synar
Tanner
Tejeda
Thompson
Thornton
Thurman
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Traficant
Tucker
Underwood (GU)
Unsoeld
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Wheat
Whitten
Williams
Wise
Woolsey
Wyden
Wynn
Yates
NOT VOTING--19
Andrews (TX)
Bilirakis
Clayton
Coleman
Cunningham
de la Garza
Ewing
Fields (TX)
Hastert
Hastings
Kennedy
Laughlin
Lloyd
McMillan
Michel
Neal (NC)
Ridge
Slattery
Washington
{time} 1424
The Clerk announced the following pair:
On this vote:
Mr. Ewing for, with Mr. Washington against.
Messrs. LIPINSKI, HAMBURG, RUSH, and WISE changed their vote from
``aye'' to ``no.''
Mr. GRANDY changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the amendment in the nature of a substitute was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore (Mrs. Mink of Hawaii). The question is on
the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended.
The committee amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended,
was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Under the rule, the Committee rises.
Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore (Mr.
Cardin) having assumed the chair, Mrs. Mink of Hawaii, Chairman pro
tempore of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union,
reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill
(H.R. 811) to reauthorize the independent counsel law for an additional
5 years, and for other purposes, pursuant to House Resolution 352 she
reported the bill back to the House with an amendment adopted by the
Committee of the Whole.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under the rule, the previous question is
ordered.
Is a separate vote demanded on any amendment to the committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute adopted by the Committee of the
Whole? If not, the question is on the amendment.
The amendment was agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the engrossment and third
reading of the bill.
The bill was ordered to be engrossed and read a third time, and was
read the third time.
motion to recommit offered by mr. gekas
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is the gentleman opposed to the bill?
Mr. GEKAS. I am opposed to it as presently framed, Mr. Speaker.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The Clerk will report the motion to
recommit.
The Clerk read as follows:
Mr. Gekas moves to recommit the bill (H.R. 811) to the
Committee on the Judiciary with instructions to report the
bill back to the House forthwith with the following
amendment:
Page 9, strike line 18 and all that follows through line 14
on page 10 and insert the following:
SEC. 4. APPLICATION TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.
Section 591(b) of title 28, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by striking ``and'' at the end of paragraph (7);
(2) by striking the period at the end of paragraph (8) and
inserting ``; and''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following:
``(9) any Senator or Representative in, or Delegate or
Resident Commissioner to, the Congress, or any person who has
served as a Senator, a Representative, Delegate, or Resident
Commissioner within the 2-year period before the receipt of
the information under subsection (a) with respect to conduct
that occurred while such person was a Senator, a
Representative, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner.''.
Mr. GEKAS (during the reading). Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent
that the motion to recommit be considered as read and printed in the
Record.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the
gentleman from Pennsylvania?
There was no objection.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas]
is recognized for 5 minutes in support of his motion to recommit.
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, we have just gone through a very tortuous
exercise in the Gekas amendment as amended by Bryant, and so we never
had the opportunity to clearly define or to vote up or down on the
Gekas amendment, which is opposite in notion to that which the bill
carries. Once again, this will be our opportunity to vote yes or no, up
or down on the Gekas amendment.
{time} 1430
Once again, the picture I want to paint here is this: As you prepare
to vote, consider this, consider that you see in front of you a high-
ranking Member of Congress against whom some allegations have been made
and which allegations reach the desk of the Attorney General.
Under the bill that has been now amended by Bryant which really
returns to the original language of the bill, the Bryant bill language
under that, the Attorney General does not have any duty at all to move
those allegations but has utmost discretion to deal with it as the
Attorney General wants to do.
Consider the alternative: The Gekas amendment, when these allegations
are made against this high-ranking Member of Congress, the Attorney
General, upon seeing them, must act on it. And why? Because we make the
language comparable to that that is applicable to Members of the
Cabinet.
When the high-ranking Member of Congress is of the same party as the
Attorney General and the Attorney General, of course, has been
appointed by the President, all three being in the same party, if these
is not conflict of interest there certainly is the appearance of
conflict of interest. That is what the Gekas amendment cures. It gives
to the American people the opportunity to say, ``Yes for Congress. It
has finally acted to bring a sense of proportion and justice to its
procedures at least in one area, that of independent counsel.''
I ask for a yes vote on the motion to recommit, because in doing so,
you are restoring the faith of the American people in the ability of
Congress to treat its Members as all other citizens.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to the motion to
recommit.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Cardin). The gentleman from Texas [Mr.
Brooks] will be recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, I rise in opposition to this motion to
recommit.
The Members of this body have spoken loudly and clearly on the
application of the independent-counsel statute through the Members of
Congress. They have voted, we have voted, this afternoon to cover all
Members of the U.S. Congress through the Bryant amendment by a vote of
339 to 76.
They also voted against the Gekas amendment and the Hyde amendment.
I do not think we need to take up any more time. We know what we want
to do. Let us kill the motion to recommit, pass the bill, and I am
going to Texas.
Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion to recommit.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the noes appeared to have it.
recorded vote
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 183,
noes 230, answered, not voting 20, as follows:
[Roll No. 22]
AYES--183
Allard
Archer
Armey
Bachus (AL)
Baker (CA)
Baker (LA)
Ballenger
Barrett (NE)
Bartlett
Barton
Bateman
Bentley
Bereuter
Bliley
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonilla
Brown (FL)
Bunning
Burton
Buyer
Byrne
Callahan
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Castle
Clinger
Coble
Collins (GA)
Combest
Cox
Crane
Crapo
Cunningham
Deal
DeLay
Diaz-Balart
Dickey
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Dunn
Ehlers
Emerson
Everett
Fawell
Fish
Fowler
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Gallegly
Gallo
Gekas
Geren
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Gingrich
Goodlatte
Goodling
Goss
Grams
Grandy
Greenwood
Gunderson
Hall (TX)
Hancock
Hansen
Hefley
Herger
Hobson
Hoekstra
Hoke
Horn
Houghton
Huffington
Hunter
Hutchinson
Hyde
Inglis
Inhofe
Istook
Jacobs
Johnson (CT)
Johnson, Sam
Kasich
Kim
Kingston
Klug
Knollenberg
Kolbe
Kyl
Lazio
Leach
Levy
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lightfoot
Linder
Livingston
Machtley
Manzullo
McCandless
McCollum
McCrery
McDade
McHugh
McInnis
McKeon
Meyers
Mica
Miller (FL)
Molinari
Moorhead
Morella
Myers
Nussle
Oxley
Packard
Parker
Paxon
Petri
Pombo
Porter
Portman
Pryce (OH)
Quillen
Quinn
Ramstad
Ravenel
Regula
Roberts
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Roth
Roukema
Royce
Santorum
Saxton
Schaefer
Schiff
Sensenbrenner
Shaw
Shays
Shepherd
Shuster
Skeen
Skelton
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Snowe
Solomon
Spence
Stearns
Stenholm
Stump
Sundquist
Swett
Talent
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Taylor (NC)
Thomas (CA)
Thomas (WY)
Torkildsen
Upton
Valentine
Volkmer
Vucanovich
Walker
Walsh
Weldon
Wolf
Young (AK)
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NOES--230
Abercrombie
Ackerman
Andrews (ME)
Andrews (NJ)
Applegate
Baesler
Barca
Barcia
Barlow
Barrett (WI)
Becerra
Beilenson
Berman
Bevill
Bilbray
Bishop
Blackwell
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Brewster
Brooks
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Cantwell
Cardin
Carr
Chapman
Clay
Clement
Clyburn
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Condit
Conyers
Cooper
Coppersmith
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Danner
Darden
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Derrick
Deutsch
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Dooley
Durbin
Edwards (CA)
Edwards (TX)
Engel
English
Eshoo
Evans
Farr
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Filner
Fingerhut
Flake
Foglietta
Ford (MI)
Ford (TN)
Frank (MA)
Frost
Furse
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gibbons
Glickman
Gonzalez
Gordon
Green
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hamburg
Hamilton
Harman
Hayes
Hefner
Hinchey
Hoagland
Hochbrueckner
Holden
Hoyer
Hughes
Hutto
Inslee
Jefferson
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kennedy
Kennelly
Kildee
King
Kleczka
Klein
Klink
Kopetski
Kreidler
LaFalce
Lambert
Lancaster
Lantos
LaRocco
Lehman
Levin
Lewis (GA)
Lipinski
Lloyd
Long
Lowey
Maloney
Mann
Manton
Margolies-Mezvinsky
Martinez
Mazzoli
McCloskey
McCurdy
McDermott
McHale
McKinney
McNulty
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Mfume
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moran
Murphy
Murtha
Nadler
Natcher
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Orton
Owens
Pallone
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Penny
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Pickett
Pickle
Pomeroy
Poshard
Price (NC)
Rahall
Rangel
Reed
Reynolds
Richardson
Roemer
Rose
Rostenkowski
Rowland
Roybal-Allard
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sangmeister
Sarpalius
Sawyer
Schenk
Schroeder
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Sharp
Sisisky
Skaggs
Slaughter
Smith (IA)
Spratt
Stark
Stokes
Strickland
Studds
Stupak
Swift
Synar
Tanner
Tejeda
Thompson
Thornton
Thurman
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Traficant
Tucker
Unsoeld
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Wheat
Whitten
Williams
Wilson
Wise
Woolsey
Wyden
Wynn
Yates
NOT VOTING--20
Andrews (TX)
Bacchus (FL)
Bilirakis
Clayton
Coleman
de la Garza
Ewing
Fields (TX)
Hastert
Hastings
Hilliard
Laughlin
Markey
Matsui
McMillan
Michel
Neal (NC)
Ridge
Slattery
Washington
{time} 1450
The Clerk announced the following pairs:
On this vote:
Mr. Bilirakis for, with Mr. Andrews (TX) against.
Mr. Ewing for, with Mr. Washington against.
Mr. SKELTON changed his vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the motion to recommit was rejected.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Cardin). The question is on the passage
of the bill.
The question was taken; and the Speaker pro tempore announced that
the ayes appeared to have it.
recorded vote
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Speaker, I demand a recorded vote.
A recorded vote was ordered.
The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were--ayes 356,
noes 56, not voting 21, as follows:
[Roll No. 23]
AYES--356
Ackerman
Allard
Andrews (ME)
Andrews (NJ)
Applegate
Bachus (AL)
Baesler
Baker (LA)
Barca
Barcia
Barlow
Barrett (NE)
Barrett (WI)
Bateman
Becerra
Beilenson
Bentley
Bereuter
Berman
Bevill
Bilbray
Bishop
Blackwell
Blute
Boehlert
Boehner
Bonior
Borski
Boucher
Brewster
Brooks
Browder
Brown (CA)
Brown (FL)
Brown (OH)
Bryant
Burton
Byrne
Calvert
Camp
Canady
Cantwell
Cardin
Carr
Castle
Chapman
Clay
Clement
Clinger
Clyburn
Collins (GA)
Collins (IL)
Collins (MI)
Combest
Condit
Conyers
Cooper
Coppersmith
Costello
Coyne
Cramer
Cunningham
Danner
Darden
Deal
DeFazio
DeLauro
Dellums
Derrick
Deutsch
Diaz-Balart
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Dooley
Dunn
Durbin
Edwards (CA)
Edwards (TX)
Ehlers
Engel
English
Eshoo
Evans
Everett
Farr
Fawell
Fazio
Fields (LA)
Filner
Fingerhut
Fish
Flake
Foglietta
Ford (MI)
Ford (TN)
Fowler
Frank (MA)
Franks (CT)
Franks (NJ)
Frost
Furse
Gallegly
Gallo
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Geren
Gibbons
Gilchrest
Gillmor
Gilman
Glickman
Gonzalez
Goodlatte
Gordon
Goss
Grandy
Green
Greenwood
Gunderson
Gutierrez
Hall (OH)
Hall (TX)
Hamburg
Hamilton
Harman
Hayes
Hefner
Herger
Hinchey
Hoagland
Hobson
Hochbrueckner
Hoekstra
Holden
Horn
Hoyer
Huffington
Hughes
Hunter
Hutto
Hyde
Inhofe
Inslee
Istook
Jacobs
Jefferson
Johnson (CT)
Johnson (GA)
Johnson (SD)
Johnson, E. B.
Johnston
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kasich
Kennedy
Kennelly
Kildee
Kingston
Kleczka
Klein
Klink
Klug
Knollenberg
Kopetski
Kreidler
LaFalce
Lambert
Lancaster
Lantos
LaRocco
Lazio
Leach
Lehman
Levin
Levy
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lewis (GA)
Lightfoot
Lipinski
Livingston
Lloyd
Long
Lowey
Machtley
Maloney
Mann
Manton
Manzullo
Margolies-Mezvinsky
Markey
Martinez
Matsui
Mazzoli
McCandless
McCloskey
McCollum
McCrery
McCurdy
McDade
McDermott
McHale
McHugh
McKeon
McKinney
Meehan
Meek
Menendez
Meyers
Mfume
Mica
Miller (CA)
Miller (FL)
Mineta
Minge
Mink
Moakley
Molinari
Mollohan
Montgomery
Moorhead
Moran
Morella
Murphy
Murtha
Myers
Nadler
Natcher
Neal (MA)
Oberstar
Obey
Olver
Ortiz
Orton
Owens
Packard
Pallone
Parker
Pastor
Payne (NJ)
Payne (VA)
Pelosi
Penny
Peterson (FL)
Peterson (MN)
Petri
Pickett
Pickle
Pomeroy
Porter
Portman
Poshard
Price (NC)
Pryce (OH)
Quinn
Rahall
Ramstad
Rangel
Ravenel
Reed
Regula
Reynolds
Richardson
Roberts
Roemer
Rogers
Rohrabacher
Ros-Lehtinen
Rose
Rostenkowski
Roukema
Rowland
Roybal-Allard
Royce
Rush
Sabo
Sanders
Sangmeister
Santorum
Sarpalius
Sawyer
Saxton
Schenk
Schiff
Schroeder
Schumer
Scott
Serrano
Sharp
Shaw
Shays
Shepherd
Sisisky
Skaggs
Skeen
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (IA)
Smith (MI)
Smith (NJ)
Smith (OR)
Smith (TX)
Snowe
Spence
Spratt
Stark
Stearns
Stenholm
Stokes
Strickland
Studds
Stupak
Swett
Swift
Synar
Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor (MS)
Tejeda
Thomas (WY)
Thompson
Thornton
Thurman
Torkildsen
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Traficant
Tucker
Unsoeld
Upton
Valentine
Velazquez
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Vucanovich
Walsh
Waters
Watt
Waxman
Weldon
Wheat
Whitten
Williams
Wilson
Wise
Wolf
Woolsey
Wyden
Wynn
Yates
Young (FL)
Zeliff
Zimmer
NOES--56
Abercrombie
Archer
Armey
Ballenger
Bartlett
Barton
Bliley
Bonilla
Bunning
Buyer
Callahan
Coble
Cox
Crane
Crapo
DeLay
Dickey
Doolittle
Dornan
Dreier
Duncan
Emerson
Gekas
Gingrich
Goodling
Grams
Hancock
Hansen
Hefley
Hoke
Houghton
Hutchinson
Inglis
Johnson, Sam
Kim
King
Kolbe
Kyl
Linder
McInnis
McNulty
Nussle
Oxley
Paxon
Pombo
Quillen
Schaefer
Sensenbrenner
Shuster
Solomon
Stump
Sundquist
Taylor (NC)
Thomas (CA)
Walker
Young (AK)
NOT VOTING--21
Andrews (TX)
Bacchus (FL)
Baker (CA)
Bilirakis
Clayton
Coleman
de la Garza
Ewing
Fields (TX)
Hastert
Hastings
Hilliard
Laughlin
McMillan
Michel
Neal (NC)
Ridge
Roth
Slattery
Talent
Washington
{time} 1459
Mr. NUSSLE changed his vote from ``aye'' to ``no.''
Messrs. HOBSON, SMITH of Michigan, ROYCE, and BURTON of Indiana
changed their vote from ``no'' to ``aye.''
So the bill was passed.
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.
A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.
{time} 1500
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the provisions of House
Resolution 352, I call up from the Speaker's table the Senate bill (S.
24) to reauthorize the independent counsel law for an additional 5
years, and for other purposes, and ask for its immediate consideration.
The Clerk read the title of the Senate bill.
motion offered by mr. brooks
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion.
The Clerk read as follows:
Mr. Brooks moves to strike out all after the enacting
clause of the Senate bill, S. 24, and insert in lieu thereof
the provisions of H.R. 811 as passed by the House, as
follows:
S. 24
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Independent Counsel
Reauthorization Act of 1994''.
SEC. 2. FIVE-YEAR REAUTHORIZATION.
(a) Reauthorization.--Section 599 of title 28, United
States Code, is amended by striking ``1987'' and inserting
``1993''.
(b) Effectiveness of Statute.--Chapter 40 of title 28,
United States Code, shall be effective, on and after the date
of the enactment of this Act, as if the authority for such
chapter had not expired before such date.
SEC. 3. ADDED CONTROLS.
(a) Cost Controls and Administrative Support.--Section 594
of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the
end the following new subsection:
``(l) Cost Controls and Administrative Support.--
``(1) Cost controls.--
``(A) In general.--An independent counsel shall--
``(i) conduct all activities with due regard for expense;
``(ii) authorize only reasonable and lawful expenditures;
and
``(iii) promptly, upon taking office, assign to a specific
employee the duty of certifying that expenditures of the
independent counsel are reasonable and made in accordance
with law.
``(B) Department of justice policies.--An independent
counsel shall comply with the established policies of the
Department of Justice respecting expenditures of funds,
except to the extent that compliance would be inconsistent
with the purposes of this chapter.
``(2) Administrative support.--The Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall
provide administrative support and guidance to each
independent counsel. No officer or employee of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall
disclose information related to an independent counsel's
expenditures, personnel, or administrative acts or
arrangements without the authorization of the independent
counsel.
``(3) Office space.--The Administrator of General Services,
in consultation with the Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, shall promptly provide
appropriate office space for each independent counsel. Such
office space shall be within a Federal building unless the
Administrator of General Services determines that other
arrangements would cost less.''.
(b) Independent Counsel Per Diem Expenses.--Section 594(b)
of title 28, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking ``An independent counsel'' and inserting
``(1) In general.--An independent counsel''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(2) Travel expenses.--Except as provided in paragraph
(3), an independent counsel and persons appointed under
subsection (c) shall be entitled to the payment of travel
expenses as provided by subchapter 1 of chapter 57 of title
5, including travel or transportation expenses in accordance
with section 5703 of title 5.
``(3) Travel to primary office.--An independent counsel and
any person appointed under subsection (c) shall not be
entitled to the payment of travel and subsistence expenses
under subchapter 1 of chapter 57 of title 5 with respect to
duties performed in the city in which the primary office of
that independent counsel or person is located after 1 year of
service by that independent counsel or person (as the case
may be) under this chapter unless the employee assigned
duties under subsection (l)(1)(A)(iii) certifies that the
payment is in the public interest to carry out the purposes
of this chapter. Any such certification shall be effective
for 6 months, but may be renewed for additional periods of 6-
months each if, for each such renewal, the employee assigned
duties under subsection (l)(1)(A)(iii) makes a
recertification with respect to the public interest described
in the preceding sentence. In making any certification or
recertification under this paragraph with respect to travel
and subsistence expenses of an independent counsel or person
appointed under subsection (c), such employee shall consider,
among other relevant factors--
``(A) the cost to the Government of reimbursing such travel
and subsistence expenses;
``(B) the period of time for which the independent counsel
anticipates that the activities of the independent counsel or
person, as the case may be, will continue;
``(C) the personal and financial burdens on the independent
counsel or person, as the case may be, of relocating so that
such travel and subsistence expenses would not be incurred;
and
``(D) the burdens associated with appointing a new
independent counsel, or appointing another person under
subsection (c), to replace the individual involved who is
unable or unwilling to so relocate.
An employee making a certification or recertification under
this paragraph shall be liable for an invalid certification
or recertification to the same extent as a certifying
official certifying a voucher is liable under section 3528 of
title 31.''.
(c) Independent Counsel Employee Pay Comparability.--
Section 594(c) of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
striking the last sentence and inserting the following:
``Such employees shall be compensated at levels not to exceed
those payable for comparable positions in the Office of
United States Attorney for the District of Columbia under
sections 548 and 550, but in no event shall any such employee
be compensated at a rate greater than the rate of basic pay
payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section
5315 of title 5.''.
(d) Ethics Enforcement.--Section 594(j) of title 28, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following
new paragraph:
``(5) Enforcement.--The Attorney General and the Director
of the Office of Government Ethics have authority to enforce
compliance with this subsection.''.
(e) Compliance With Policies of the Department of
Justice.--Section 594(f) of title 28, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``shall, except where not possible,
comply'' and inserting ``shall, except to the extent that to
do so would be inconsistent with the purposes of this
chapter, comply''.
(f) Publication of Reports.--Section 594(h) of title 28,
United States Code, is amended--
(1) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) Publication of reports.--At the request of an
independent counsel, the Public Printer shall cause to be
printed any report previously released to the public under
paragraph (2). The independent counsel shall certify the
number of copies necessary for the public, and the Public
Printer shall place the cost of the required number to the
debit of such independent counsel. Additional copies shall be
made available to the public through the Superintendent of
Documents sales program under section 1702 of title 44 and
the depository library program under section 1903 of such
title.''; and
(2) in the first sentence of paragraph (2), by striking
``appropriate'' the second place it appears and inserting
``in the public interest, consistent with maximizing public
disclosure, ensuring a full explanation of independent
counsel activities and decisionmaking, and facilitating the
release of information and materials which the independent
counsel has determined should be disclosed''.
(g) Annual Reports to Congress.--Section 595(a)(2) of title
28, United States Code, is amended by striking ``such
statements'' and all that follows through ``appropriate'' and
inserting ``annually a report on the activities of the
independent counsel, including a description of the progress
of any investigation or prosecution conducted by the
independent counsel. Such report may omit any matter that in
the judgment of the independent counsel should be kept
confidential, but shall provide information adequate to
justify the expenditures that the office of the independent
counsel has made''.
(h) Periodic Reappointment of Independent Counsel.--Section
596(b)(2) of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following new sentence: ``If the
Attorney General has not made a request under this paragraph,
the division of the court shall determine on its own motion
whether termination is appropriate under this paragraph not
later than 3 years after the appointment of an independent
counsel and at the end of each succeeding 3-year period.''.
(i) Audits by the Comptroller General.--Section 596(c) of
title 28, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
``(c) Audits.--By December 31 of each year, an independent
counsel shall prepare a statement of expenditures for the
fiscal year that ended on the immediately preceding September
30. An independent counsel whose office is terminated prior
to the end of the fiscal year shall prepare a statement of
expenditures by the date that is 90 days after the date on
which the office is terminated. The Comptroller General shall
audit each such statement and shall, not later than March 31
of the year following the submission of any such statement,
report the results of each audit to the Committee on the
Judiciary and the Committee on Government Operations of the
House of Representatives and to the Committee on Governmental
Affairs and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate.''.
SEC. 4. MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.
Section 591(c) of title 28, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by indenting paragraphs (1) and (2) two ems to the
right and by redesignating such paragraphs as subparagraphs
(A) and (B), respectively;
(2) by striking ``The Attorney'' and all that follows
through ``if--'' and inserting the following:
``(1) In general.--The Attorney General may conduct a
preliminary investigation in accordance with section 592 if--
''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) Members of congress.--When the Attorney General
determines that it would be in the public interest, the
Attorney General may conduct a preliminary investigation in
accordance with section 592 if the Attorney General receives
information sufficient to constitute grounds to investigate
whether a Member of Congress may have violated any Federal
criminal law other than a violation classified as a Class B
or C misdemeanor or an infraction.''.
SEC. 5. GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL.
Section 596(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``physical disability, mental
incapacity'' and inserting ``physical or mental disability
(consistent with prohibitions on discrimination otherwise
imposed by law)''.
SEC. 6. NATIONAL SECURITY.
Section 597 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``(c) National Security.--An independent counsel shall
comply with guidelines and procedures used by the Department
in the handling and use of classified materials.''.
SEC. 7. EFFECTIVE DATE.
The amendments made by this Act shall become effective on
the date of the enactment of this Act.
The motion was agreed to.
The Senate bill was ordered to be read a third time, was read the
third time, and passed, and a motion to reconsider was laid on the
table.
A similar House bill (H.R. 811) was laid on the table.
appointment of conferees on h.r. 811
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the provisions of House
Resolution 352, I move that the House insist on its amendments to the
Senate bill, S. 24, and request a conference with the Senate thereon.
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. Cardin). The question is on the motion
offered by the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks].
The motion was agreed to.
The SPEAKER pro tempore. Without objection, the Chair appoints the
following conferees: Messrs. Brooks, Bryant, Glickman, Frank of
Massachusetts, Fish, Hyde, and Gekas.
There was no objection.
____________________