[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 12 (Wednesday, February 9, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: February 9, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]


                              {time}  1700
 
          AVOID UNITED STATES INVOLVEMENT IN FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

  The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the 
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Pete Geren, is recognized for 5 minutes.
  Mr. PETE GEREN of Texas. Mr. Speaker, the carnage of last weekend in 
the former Yugoslavia that was brought into all of our living rooms 
over the television set I fear has brought us to the brink of 
intervention in a bloody 1,000-year-old civil war in what was the 
former Yugoslavia.
  Mr. Speaker, as we consider this as a Congress and as a nation, I 
think it is important that we consider it very soberly and consider the 
implications. You do not get a little bit into a war. You do not get a 
little bit into the middle of a conflict. We talk about just using 
airstrikes. But once you have made the commitment of putting American 
men and women into combat, you have stepped over a line from which 
there is no coming back.
  The media accounts of the conflict in Yugoslavia have given us the 
impression that there are some good guys in that conflict and some bad 
guys in that conflict. The media has painted the Serbs as the 
aggressors. I would like to just share an anecdote from a hearing in 
front of the Committee on Armed Services when we were having hearings 
on the Bosnian situation.
  We had a former NATO commander, a general from Canada, speak to us. 
He said first let me disabuse all of you of the notion that there are 
any good guys in this conflict. If we in NATO or if you Americans 
choose to engage yourselves in this conflict, you are choosing among 
degrees of serial killers. Perhaps 1 has killed 100, and the other has 
killed 75, and the other has only killed 50. If that provides you a 
basis to choose one or the other, well, so be it. But you need to know 
going in, there are no white hats over there. There is no natural ally 
for the United States of America in that conflict. And it is a conflict 
which, if you look at history, is a conflict without end.
  Another witness told us one day, in order to understand the conflict 
over there, ask yourself if you came home one day from work and someone 
had broken into your house, killed your spouse, murdered and raped your 
children, how would you spend the rest of your life?

                              {time}  1710

  What would you do for the rest of your life? Well, put yourself in 
that position and you have a hint of understanding of what is driving 
the forces of the civil war and the chaos in the former Yugoslavia.
  As our country debates whether or not to get into this war, I would 
like to go back to a speech that then-Secretary of Defense Caspar 
Weinberger gave in 1984, as he tried to give us a blueprint to lead us 
into this post-cold-war era, a blueprint that has been used repeatedly 
over and over by our great military leaders since that time.
  Let me quote from that speech:

       I believe the postwar period has taught us several lessons, 
     and from them I have developed six major tests to be applied 
     when we are weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad. 
     Let me now share them with you:
       First, the United States should not commit forces to combat 
     overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is 
     deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies. 
     That emphatically does not mean that we should declare 
     beforehand, as we did with Korea in 1950, that a particular 
     area is outside our strategic perimeter.
       Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops 
     into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and 
     with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to 
     commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our 
     objectives, we should not commit them at all. Of course if 
     the particular situation requires only limited force to win 
     our objectives, then we should not hesitate to commit forces 
     sized accordingly. When Hitler broke treaties and 
     remilitarized the Rhineland, small combat forces then could 
     perhaps have prevented the Holocaust of World War II.
       Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, 
     we should have clearly defined political and military 
     objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can 
     accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should 
     have and send the forces needed to do just that. As 
     Clausewitz wrote, ``No one starts a war--or rather, no one in 
     his senses ought to do so--without first being clear in his 
     mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he 
     intends to conduct it.''
       War may be different today than in Clausewitz's time, but 
     the need for well-defined objectives and a consistent 
     strategy is still essential. If we determine that a combat 
     mission has become necessary for our vital national 
     interests, then we must send forces capable to do the job--
     and not assign a combat mission to a force configured for 
     peacekeeping.
       Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the 
     forces we have committed--their size, composition and 
     disposition--must be continually reassessed and adjusted if 
     necessary. Conditions and objectives invariably change during 
     the course of a conflict. When they do change, then so must 
     our combat requirements. We must continuously keep as a 
     beacon light before us the basic questions: ``Is this 
     conflict in our national interest?'' ``Does our national 
     interest require us to fight, to use force of arms?'' If the 
     answers are ``yes'', then we must win. If the answers are 
     ``no'', then we should not be in combat.
       Fifth, before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there 
     must be some reasonable assurance we will have the support of 
     the American people and their elected representatives in 
     Congress. This support cannot be achieved unless we are 
     candid in making clear the threats we face; the support 
     cannot be sustained without continuing and close 
     consultation. We cannot fight a battle with the Congress at 
     home while asking our troops to win a war overseas or, as in 
     the case of Vietnam, in effect asking our troops not to win, 
     but just to be there.
       Finally, the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be 
     a last resort.

  As we as a nation consider this weighty decision, I think that we 
must reflect back on these questions asked by Secretary Weinberger and 
also ask ourselves is this a fight we are willing to go to the finish. 
I do not think so, Mr. Speaker. I hope that the carnage of the last 
weekend, the tremendous emotional appeal and the desire of every 
honorable person in the world to do something about this does not cause 
us to act imprudently. I fear that the Bosnian crisis is a riddle 
without an American solution.

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