[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 12 (Wednesday, February 9, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: February 9, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
INDEPENDENT COUNSEL REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1993
The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaRocco). Pursuant to House Resolution
352 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of
the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the
bill, H.R. 811.
{time} 1507
in the committee of the whole
Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill
(H.R. 811) to reauthorize the independent counsel law for an additional
5 years, and for other purposes, with Mr. Torricelli in the chair.
The Clerk read the title of the bill.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having
been read the first time.
Under the rule, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] will be
recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr.
Gekas] will be recognized for 30 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks].
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may require.
(Mr. BROOKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 811, the
Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act. I am pleased we are able to
take up this important bill today.
Last Congress, the Independent Counsel Act died a less than honorable
death--the result of bludgeoning and being held hostage by some
Republicans who viewed a good government mechanism somehow as the enemy
rather than as a trusted watchman. In the face of unrelenting hostility
by the previous Republican administration--including the threat of a
Senate filibuster--the law lapsed on December 15, 1992. Certainly, that
was unfitting treatment for one of the few truly novel enhancements to
our constitutional democracy in the 20th century. For some strange
reason, the ardent opponents of the statute have now experienced a
miraculous conversion--they walk; they see--in the past few months.
I am proud to say that there are those who have shown an abiding
faith in the value of this law. Both President Bill Clinton and
Attorney General Janet Reno, a former prosecutor herself, have
consistently indicated their strong support for our efforts to revive
it.
Under H.R. 811, the Independent Counsel Law is reauthorized for
another 5 years, with new accountability and cost control safeguards
based on recommendations from the General Accounting Office. These
safeguards will apply to all existing independent counsels as well as
any future ones, and they more than answer any lingering criticism
about the operation of the act in the recent past.
In addition, the bill gives the Attorney General explicit authority
to use the act in cases involving Members of Congress. Nonetheless--
and, despite the fact that it is a red herring--some Republicans have
made the so-called Member coverage issue the heart of their debate. The
irony is that the act and H.R. 811 have provided for Member coverage
since 1982, but that fact seems to be an overlooked detail to those
making the noise and hoping to set off a panic vote. I think they will
be surprised as they were in the other body when the same ploy failed.
Finally, the Republican substitute to H.R. 811 would gut, dismantle,
and abridge every major procedural and substantive provision of the
Independent Counsel Act. In this sense, it is indeed a very thorough
piece of work, but is the functional equivalent of gutting the statute,
as was done by other means last Congress.
Let us support H.R. 811 and get on with the business of good
government.
{time} 1510
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from New York [Mr. Fish], the ranking member of the Committee
on the Judiciary.
(Mr. FISH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this
time.
Mr. Chairman, the independent counsel statute is an important and
necessary law. It should be reauthorized. However, several issues
surfaced during the time the now-expired statute was in effect which
made it clear that certain basic reforms in this law are needed.
Obviously, there are circumstances when a conflict of interest may
exist, or at least when the appearance of a conflict may arise, and the
Attorney General is placed in a difficult position to effectively
investigate and prosecute another high-ranking Government official. The
Watergate episode certainly highlighted the potential for such
conflicts. The independent counsel law has proved a useful tool on some
occasions to avoid such conflicts.
However, the expired law has not completely fulfilled its promise or
purpose. All too often it has not restored the public's confidence in
Government or our legal system. Since its enactment in 1978, this law
has resulted in 14 separate investigations but there has only been one
final conviction of a named subject. These court-appointed prosecutors,
who are accountable to absolutely nobody, have spent more than $61
million. Unfortunately, all too often there is little to show for their
costly efforts.
However, despite these obvious shortcomings, the majority has brought
a bill (H.R. 811) to the floor today which would essentially
reauthorize the same statute. At a time when the public is demanding
Federal budget sanity and real congressional reform, they bring us a
bill which essentially ignores our experience under this law--a bill
which strives to maintain the status quo. H.R. 811 either completely
avoids, or merely pays lip service to, such fundamental and serious
issues as accountability, cost, the handling of classified information,
the scope of prosecutorial jurisdiction, and consistency with Justice
Department criminal enforcement policies.
H.R. 811, Mr. Chairman, is in need of substantial improvement. It
needs to be improved in particular with regard to those provisions
regarding the accountability and cost of independent counsel. Despite
the use of misleading subtitles like ``Added Cost Controls,'' H.R. 811
would actually allow independent counsel to continue enjoying virtually
unlimited budgets. Although the bill includes vague requirements that
the independent counsel conduct their activities with due regard for
expenses and that he or she authorize only reasonable and lawful
expenditures, those terms are left undefined in the bill.
Furthermore, under this bill, the independent counsel is provided
with an enormous loophole through which it can choose to ignore the
established expenditure policies of the Justice Department. The bill
states the independent counsel need not comply with established
departmental expenditure policies if they determine that such
compliance is inconsistent with the purposes of the statute. They alone
make that determination. It is not subject to judicial review. It is
not subject to congressional oversight. I ask my colleagues, with this
total lack of accountability, how can we realistically expect
expenditures to be controlled?
Further, the expenses of all independent counsel would remain under a
permanent, indefinite appropriation and thus totally outside the
scrutiny of the annual congressional appropriations process.
Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh, who just concluded a 7-year
investigation, has spent more than $39 million. The average cost for
prosecutions per criminal defendant in a U.S. attorney's office in this
country is approximately $10,000; Mr. Walsh averaged $2.5 million per
defendant. Again, one of the most frequent and cogent criticisms of
this law is that it is too expensive and there is no incentive to curb
costs. Unfortunately, H.R. 811 does not effectively address these
problems.
Also ignoring our experience under the prior law, H.R. 811 does
nothing to safeguard the handling of national security information or
classified documents. During the independent counsel's Iran-Contra
investigation, numerous shortcomings in this area became evident. For
example, CIA cables--with highly sensitive markings--were released as
exhibits during trials; in a motion to quash a subpoena, a covert agent
was identified by name, and highly sensitive classified documents were
inexplicably lost at the Los Angeles International Airport. At a
minimum, we should make it clear that an independent counsel must fully
comply with Federal law and regulations regarding the handling and
disclosure of classified information. Most importantly, if there is a
failure to comply, then removal should occur. The problem with a Brooks
amendment, which we will consider later today, is that it imposes no
sanction if an independent counsel fails to follow the law or
applicable regulations on handling national security documents. As a
practical matter, we cannot realistically expect that a special
prosecutor will be prosecuted for violating 18 U.S.C. 798. The only
realistic sanction in these kinds of circumstances is to make the
independent counsel subject to removal for good cause--just as my good
friend from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] proposes.
Also troubling to me, Mr. Chairman, is the fact that independent
counsel are allowed to ignore Justice Department policies regarding
criminal prosecutions. While the bill includes language which appears
to require compliance with Department policies regarding the
enforcement of our criminal laws, it provides another loophole through
which a counsel may choose to completely ignore such policies. The bill
states that independent counsel shall comply with Justice Department
policy regarding the enforcement of criminal law--``except to the
extent that to do so would be inconsistent with the purposes of this
chapter.''
Mr. Chairman, there should be no exception for a Federal prosecutor
with respect to Justice Department criminal enforcement policies. All
Federal prosecutors--including every independent counsel--should abide
by the same policies with regard to the enforcement of our criminal
laws. An independent counsel, who stands in the shoes of Justice
Department prosecutors, should not be the beneficiary of a lesser
standard.
Mr. Chairman, later when amendments are considered, I have been
authorized under the rule to offer two amendments, which I would like
to discuss briefly.
Fish amendment No. 2 provides that the General Services
Administration [GSA]--instead of the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts--would be the Government agency responsible for the
administrative support of independent counsel. Mr. Chairman, the
Administrative Office is an arm of the judicial branch and is not the
appropriate agency to provide operational support for an executive
branch function, in this case prosecution. Further, and important, it
is without legal authority to effectively oversee and control the
expenditures of the various independent counsel. The General Services
Administration already has the staff and expertise necessary to provide
procurement and administrative support for all executive branch
agencies. It simply is a waste of the taxpayers' money to duplicate
this support function through a judicial branch agency, when it is
already available through an executive branch agency.
Amendment designated ``Fish No. 3'' places limitations on the salary
levels that the independent counsels can pay their assistants. My
amendment would authorize each independent counsel to hire two
assistants at Executive Level V, $108,200/year, and would cap other
legal assistants at the maximum salary level of a Washington-based
Assistant U.S. Attorney, $90,252. This amendment is made necessary
because of confusing language contained in H.R. 811 which appears to
allow such assistants to be compensated up to the amount payable for
level IV, $115,700, of the executive schedule. First of all, this is
the same annual rate of pay set by law for the independent counsel
himself or herself. Does it make any budgetary or policy sense to allow
employees--that is, assistants--to potentially make the same salary as
their boss? This is not a complicated amendment. It is about common
sense and elementary cost controls.
Mr. Chairman, later we will consider the substitute offered by
Congressman Hyde, known as the Independent Counsel Accountability and
Reform Act. It is a comprehensive, common sense reform package that
would address all of the serious shortcomings in this law which I have
discussed. Only if the Hyde substitute is adopted, will the House
ensure that independent counsel will be accountable in a policy sense
and a due process sense. Furthermore, only if we adopt the Hyde
substitute, will the American taxpayers be protected against
unnecessary, wasteful spending. Finally, the Hyde substitute is the
only sure way we can achieve genuine congressional reform as part of
this process--mandatory congressional coverage under the independent
counsel statute. I strongly urge my colleagues to carefully study this
issue and vote accordingly. If we are serious about reforming our
institutions of Government, then adoption of the Hyde substitute is the
only real alternative.
The purpose of the independent counsel law was to restore public
faith in our system of government and ensure a fair and impartial
system of justice. If we forgo this opportunity to reform this law and
instead allow it to remain vulnerable to the criticisms that it is
arbitrary, too costly, and unfair, then the very purpose of this law
will be undermined.
{time} 1520
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the House, both the chairman of the
committee and the ranking member have outlined the general purposes of
bringing this matter to the floor. We should review real quickly how it
happened that we are on the floor today at all. It is because the
independent counsel statute faded out of existence, just died, and we
the Congress allowed that to happen.
Now, if we brought in partisan politics as having partially or
substantially been the cause of the demise of the act, it could be
equally shared, I believe. I think the Democrats allowed it to fail.
They have control of the House, and they could have, for a variety of
reasons, revived or brought the reauthorization to the floor way before
the expiration of the last term and before the expiration of the
statute. And maybe the Republicans, who were sick and tired of the
profligacy of Lawrence Walsh and other abuses that we have heard over
the years about the office of independent counsel, were willing to see
it die because of some abuses. $40 million were spent by Walsh in
pursuit of ghosts, in many occasions, only to have a final report that
regurgitated matters that everyone knew and had digested many years
ago.
In any event, those were the arguments about independent counsel.
Now, when the movement began in this term to reinstate it, one of the
reasons that it began to gain momentum, Mr. Chairman, was because there
was a possibility of a Whitewatergate situation arising in Arkansas.
Everyone knows by now the allegations that are swirling around the
failed S&L in Arkansas, about the manipulations of takeovers and all
the matters that would, in a proper circumstance, have cried out for an
independent counsel right from the start.
Alas, we had none in front of us. It is only today that in late
February of 1994 we are approaching the subject. But I venture to say
that if Whitewatergate really had blossomed into some kind of cry for
independent counsel, we would have authorized such an event and the
Attorney General would have applied for the appointment of same.
Why am I confident of that? Because indeed, a special counsel was
appointed by the Attorney General, albeit it was after some hedging on
her part and some mixed signals that undoubtedly she was receiving from
the White House.
So, in retrospect, we should have reauthorized the independent
counsel statute for those purposes.
But I still would have had tremendous qualms about it. Why? Because,
No. 1, the accountability, as has been referred to by the gentleman
from New York. I am constrained to look favorably upon this independent
counsel act only because of ego.
In subcommittee, as will be recalled, when our committee was
considering this subject matter, I offered an amendment for a yearly
reporting, a yearly accounting to the Congress of the progress of the
independent counsel appointed by virtue of this statute. That was
carried, and now the main bill, oddly and ironically, makes me coauthor
of the language because my call for an annual audit or annual
accounting is part of the bill.
But, in addition to that, I wanted to see a 2-year reauthorization of
the independent counsel appear in the bill as well. Mr. Chairman, I
would have like to have seen every independent counsel work for 2 solid
years and then, if necessary to justify further time and expenditure
for the subject matter at hand in the office of independent counsel, to
go before the very court that appointed him and allow evidence to be
demonstrated as to why he should continue that investigation. And this
would have applied in Whitewatergate if we had independent counsel on
board if the statute had been in effect.
It would have meant that a majority of the minority on the Judiciary
or any member of the Judiciary, or other ways in which allegations
would have reached the Attorney General, would have convinced the
Attorney General to conduct a preliminary investigation and then,
pursuant to the statute, to do those things that would lead to
requesting a court for the appointment of independent counsel. We do
not have that, we did not have that.
Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GEKAS. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. WALKER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
In the gentleman's opinion, then in the matter of Whitewatergate,
this would have brought almost an automatic appointment of an
independent counsel?
Mr. GEKAS. Yes. That is borne out by this fact, I say to the
gentleman from Pennsylvania, that indeed even though the Attorney
General, the current incumbent, in effect was hedging as to whether or
not to appoint a special counsel and was receiving undoubtedly signals
from the White House as to what to do or not to do, finally, after
denying the need for it, acceded to a special counsel. There would have
been no need for that. The hue and cry would have been so overwhelming
if a good independent counsel statute had been in effect, that that
would have automatically occurred, the Attorney General would have done
a preliminary investigation and the court would have appointed him.
Mr. WALKER. If the gentleman would yield further, under the
provisions here if, for example, the independent counsel became aware,
as we saw in this morning's paper, that a law firm might be shredding
documents related to a Whitewatergate, would the independent counsel at
that point under the provisions of this law have the ability to step in
and investigate under that kind of a matter?
Mr. GEKAS. In my judgment, undoubtedly, yes, could have done so.
Mr. WALKER. I thank the gentleman. That does help clarify it.
Mr. GEKAS. I thank the gentleman for the question.
So, now the only thing that remains because I am leaning hard toward
wanting to accept the bill, the general purpose of the bill, only
because I wrote part of it in calling for the annual accounting to the
Congress, I think that as an important step, I still feel bruised that
my 2-year sunset provision was not permitted by the Committee on Rules,
and another salutary feature that I had provided, but you have more of
me now than you ever had before because you agreed to the language I
proposed on accounting.
But if the Gekas amendment fails later, then I will have to revisit
my compatibility with some of the language of the bill as it now
stands.
{time} 1530
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished
gentleman from Oregon [Mr. Kopetski].
(Mr. KOPETSKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the distinguished chairman
of the Committee on the Judiciary for granting me a brief moment of
time, and as he is well aware of an unfortunate occurrence in our
history, I bring with me to the Congress, having worked on what was
known as the Senate Watergate committee, and at the same time that that
congressional investigation was going on there was an independent
counsel invited, as well, or appointed, as well, and the reason was
because there were allegations of Federal criminal activity, and I
think it is ironic that those on the Republican side of the aisle who,
for years, opposed the concept of the independent counsel, in fact
allowed the laws under the independent counsel to expire this past
December because of opposition from the then-Bush White House, are now
saying how much we have got to have this law. Consistently the
Democrats have said that we need an opportunity in the statute to
ensure that the appearances of investigation of Federal criminal
activity by high ranking Government officials is in appearance being
conducted without bias, without political pressures, and that is why we
have this concept of an independent counsel. It is important for the
credibility of Government, it is important for the credibility of the
accused, and I believe we fashioned a fair bill.
Here, as we learn from the experiences of previous and the most
recent independent counsel, there are no real checks and balances on
their budget, and we face a budget deficit, and what we built into
this, into this version of the bill, is cost controls, budgeting
procedures, so that there is accountability on how much money they are
spending in these appropriate Federal criminal investigations.
Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] for
having yielded this time to me.
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to the remaining respective
times?
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas] has 13
minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] has 24
minutes remaining.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from
Kansas [Mr. Glickman], a distinguished member of the Committee on the
Judiciary.
(Mr. GLICKMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this bill.
Mr. Chairman, my constituents often tell me that they think it is
important for Congress and the Government in general to improve its
image, to look like we are acting like the rest of the people, to not
live by a different set of standards and to subject ourselves to all of
the powers of the law enforcement process in the event that one of us,
or somebody as a member of the executive branch, gets into trouble, and
that is the purpose of this bill. It is an example of very good
government.
Mr. Chairman, what we are saying is, ``When you have high level
officials that get themselves into some degree of trouble, there is a
procedure to make sure that they are investigated and, if necessary,
prosecuted,'' and I would point out that this law, which expired last
year, has always had the support of many of us in Congress, many of us
on our side of the aisle for sure, and is an example of particularly
good government.
Here we have an administration pushing for the passage of this bill
and, as opposed to the previous administration which discouraged, in
fact worked against the passage of this bill, we now have an
administration who wants to see this independent counsel law passed,
and we have a Congress which is moving ahead in that regard, and I
think that this will be passed and signed into law soon, and it was one
item, maybe not the most significant item in the history of the world,
but it is one item that will provide an example that this Congress and
this Government is listening to the people in terms of the whole
situation involving ethics in government and good government generally.
I might also add, Mr. Chairman, there is some controversy as to the
issue of coverage of Members of Congress under the independent counsel
law, and I will point out that under this statute Members of Congress
are covered under this law. The Attorney General has the authority to
seek the appointment of an independent counsel.
Am I correct?
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GLICKMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. BROOKS. I ask the gentleman, ``When you were chairman of the
subcommittee that passed this bill some years ago in one of the
renewals, did it not include Members of Congress then?''
Mr. GLICKMAN. Yes, it did absolutely.
Mr. BROOKS. It has and it does?
Mr. GLICKMAN. That is correct.
Mr. BROOKS. It is the option of the Attorney General?
Mr. GLICKMAN. That is correct.
Mr. BROOKS. None of them that agreed to that, Republican or Democrat,
have felt that it needed to be done?
Mr. GLICKMAN. And in fact virtually every Attorney General,
Republican and Democrat, are very opposed to the provisions of the
amendment that the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas] is seeking
which mandates that an independent counsel be appointed.
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GLICKMAN. Let me finish my point.
It mandates that an independent counsel be appointed under
circumstances where misconduct is alleged, takes away the power of the
Justice Department and the criminal justice process to use other means
like, for example, a grand jury, separate grand jury, separate
prosecutorial discretion, on behalf of the U.S. attorney, and in
addition, probably, will cause a manyfold increase in the cost of the
operation of Government by mandating that every Member of Congress
absolutely be covered by a statute which squeezes out other important
ways to indict and convict Members of Congress; namely, the grand jury
and the process involving U.S. attorneys.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would continue to yield,
is it not true that there was some feeling that, if they had made
Members of Congress automatically included in that, it would have led
to possible mischief on the part of either Democrats or even possibly,
not likely, but possibly even Republicans by having half of the members
of that party in the Committee on the Judiciary plus one make a
recommendation on October 10 that they investigate the gentleman from
Georgia [Mr. Gingrich], or the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Foley] or
whoever?
Mr. GLICKMAN. The independence of the Committee on the Judiciary in
my judgment would be threatened by a mandatory independent counsel law,
and I think it should be pointed out that the Justice Department has
had no trouble investigating and indicting Members of Congress, when
necessary, under existing law. There may be some circumstances where an
independent counsel is needed. There may be times when they have a
relationship, that Member of Congress does, with an executive branch
official. Then it is appropriate----
Mr. BROOKS. In that case could they not get one?
Mr. GLICKMAN. The gentleman is correct. In that case they have all
the legal authority in the world to get one.
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Indiana [Mr. Burton].
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague, the
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas], for yielding this time to me,
and I would like to say that I congratulate the chairman and the
ranking Republican for bringing this bill to the floor. However, Mr.
Chairman, I find it very strange that they are bringing it at this
time.
We had an investigation going on involving the Secretary of Commerce,
Mr. Ron Brown, who allegedly took $700,000 in bribes to help lead the
fight to normalize relations with Vietnam, and he was cleared by a
grand jury in Miami just last week, and yet we tried time, and time,
and time again to get a special prosecutor, or a special independent
counsel, to look into the charges, and we could not get anybody to help
us. We were stonewalled by the White House. We were stonewalled by the
Department of Commerce. We were stonewalled by Justice. They said they
could not pick anybody to do this because they would be accused of
showing favoritism because they were part of the administration.
And yet now President Clinton and Janet Reno say they are in favor of
this special counsel law.
Now, when Janet Reno got involved in the Ron Brown affair, Mr.
Chairman, she sent one of her top aides down to Miami to conduct a
grand jury investigation, and everybody knows that a prosecuting
attorney has great control over whether or not to get an indictment,
and, since she sent one of her top aides down, it was no surprise to me
that Mr. Brown was exonerated. But the fact of the matter is the man
who accused Mr. Brown, Mr. Binh Ly, passed a 6-hour FBI lie detector
test. In addition to that, it was alleged that a large sum of money was
going to be transferred to Bank Indo Suez in Singapore, and the FBI
said that a large sum of money was wire transferred to a bank in
Vietnam to a bank in Singapore. In addition to that, Mr. Chairman, Mr.
Brown testified before a committee in Congress that he had no
involvement with any of his staff regarding this, and yet the lead
agency at a National Security Council meeting last July pushing for
normalization with Vietnam was Mr. Brown's agency, the Department of
Commerce.
As my colleagues know, there are just so many problems with this that
it just boggled the mind, and yet Mr. Brown has been exonerated, and we
cannot get a special counsel or special prosecutor, and yet 1 week
later the special counsel law comes to the floor after all this has
been taken care of. I think that is very, very interesting, very
interesting.
I would just like to say to my colleagues that I hope that we do not
sweep anything else under the rug. I think this Ron Brown affair has
been swept under the rug. I think it is a terrible tragedy.
{time} 1540
Mr. Chairman, I think the American people are upset about it. I know
I am because we have gone into this a great deal to try to get to the
bottom of it, and now, after everything is done and the ink is dry on
the paper, we bring this special counsel law to the floor of the House.
I think it is really a tragic state of affairs.
Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I am happy to yield to my colleague.
Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Speaker, I think it is interesting that the gentleman
comes to the floor today and raises questions about why the independent
counsel law was allowed to lapse, which I will elaborate on later. But
in 1987, I say to the gentleman and to the Members that he voted
against passage of the independent counsel law. How does the gentleman
square that with his comments of today:
Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Well, the independent counsel law was abused
by Mr. Walsh. he spent millions and millions and millions of dollars
and did not get one conviction.
Mr. BRYANT. Yes; but that had not happened in 1987, had it?
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] has
expired.
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from
Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
(Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr.
Gekas] for this time.
I say to my colleagues that I have always supported an independent
counsel bill, and I was one who supported it back in 1978 when it first
passed, but it seems to me we should learn something from experience. A
mere reauthorization of the law as it has presently stood until it
lapsed last December just will not cut it. It indicates that we are
impervious to the lessons of experience.
For example, there is the matter of treatment of classified
information. We have heard stories about the independent counsel that
investigated the Iran-Contra controversy taking a suitcase full of
classified material that was used in a deposition out on the west coast
of former President Reagan and tossing it to a red cap at the curb of
the Los Angeles Airport, and it has never been seen again. And it was
not reported for many, many weeks.
That cannot happen. That should not happen. There should be some
accountability.
The chairman of our committee, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks],
has thoughtfully prepared an amendment that says the independent
counsel shall follow the laws and the regulations pertaining to
classified material. That is well and good, but where is the sanction?
There is no sanction.
In my substitute which the Members will get a chance to vote for, it
provides that if indeed the independent counsel or any of his staff do
not follow the rules or regulations concerning the proper treatment of
classified material, they are removed. We have a sanction. I suggest
with all deference to my chairman that his provision is toothless. It
has no bite. We should provide a sanction.
Effective cost controls: One of the things we ought to have learned
was the profligacy with which Mr. Walsh operated his office. I must say
that Midas never in his wildest days had the resources available to
him, even after everything he touched, turned to gold. There was
absolutely no accountability, no oversight as to the millions that were
spent by Judge Walsh over a period of 7 years.
What we want in the substitute--and that is the only place where we
find this reform--is that the annual appropriations process obtains
after the first 2 years. The independent counsel has 2 years to do
whatever he or she will, but after that we ask them to ``Please submit
yourself to an appropriations process.'' We are dealing with taxpayers'
money.
The jurisdiction of an independent counsel: The bill that we are
asked to vote for, the bill that the chairman of the committee has
brought to us, has nothing to say about narrowing the focus or
jurisdiction of the independent counsel. He does not have a license to
go hunting in the forest and shoot every critter that moves. It should
be specific. It should be targeted. It should be directed, it should be
focused so that there is not this grandiose, lavish, expensive, and
reputation-ruining hunting expedition.
Jurisdiction defined: What is the basis for a preliminary
investigation? Right now you can trigger the Attorney General's action
under the independent counsel statute, the one that just lapsed and the
one we are asked to reauthorize, by information that there may have
been a violation of Federal law. Instead, it ought to be specific
information from a credible source. That is fine-tuning and tightening
up the trigger mechanism for this whole elaborate process of an
independent counsel. I am going to have an opportunity to offer that as
a freestanding amendment, and I hope that it will be supported because
it makes this a more lawyerlike and a more professional and workable
piece of legislation.
Duration of an investigation: Does it go on and on from generation to
generation to generation? Judge Walsh served longer, I think, than any
Attorney General in history except maybe one or two, I am told--7
years. Somewhere along the line there should be some accountability. So
my substitute says that the court that appointed the independent
counsel can terminate the independent counsel whenever the court
decides that the job is done or it is in the public interest that
enough is enough. It would seem to me that that is a very useful
amendment.
It also provides that if the job is not done after 2 years, the
independent counsel must apply for reappointment. There is nothing
wrong with that. It just simply requires a review of the tenure, the
unlimited tenure that is inherent in the existing bill.
What about attorneys' fees? If you are a target and you went to trial
and you were acquitted or your conviction is reversed on appeal, that
is a pyrrhic victory if you are bankrupt, if you have been economically
devastated by the money you have had to raise to defend yourself. My
substitute requires payment of those attorney fees.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from
Oklahoma [Mr. Synar], a distinguished Member of the Judiciary
Committee.
Mr. SYNAR. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman of the committee for
yielding me this time, and I want to take this opportunity, first of
all, to thank the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] and the gentleman
from Texas [Mr. Bryant] for the job they have done today, and also for
the demeanor in which they have approached this debate.
I rise with great disappointment because I think this is an issue
that for a long time in our Nation's history has been one that we have
been very proud of because it has been bipartisan. Regrettably, today
we now see, because of very shabby political tricks, that we can no
longer work on something that is in the best interest of our country.
I think it is important to review the history of the independent
counsel, and so we go back to 1978, when Jimmy Carter first passed this
legislation.
It was then twice during the Reagan administration that this Congress
overwhelmingly, along with the President, twice renewed the independent
counsel. It is imperative to remember that on all these occasions it
was done in a bipartisan fashion. It was only during that last session
of Congress that we really began to see the falling apart of this
cooperation, when Bill Barr, not once but twice, refused the use of an
independent counsel, one for the Inslaw investigation, and second, for
Iraqgate. It was because of the fear of that administration of the
place of the special prosecutor that they allowed that law to expire on
December 15, which brings us here today.
Anyone who has followed the debate over the last couple of hours
realizes that what this debate has come down to is whether or not we as
Members of Congress should be explicitly covered in this legislation. I
think it is important to remember that since 1982 we have been covered
by this administration, and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Bryant] has
gone one step further than that because, with his alternative, Members
of Congress will be explicitly covered by the independent counsel for
the first time. As the Members know, the Bryant amendment, which we
will have an opportunity to address later, authorizes the Attorney
General to invoke the independent counsel procedures to investigate and
prosecute Members of Congress whenever he or she determines that it is
in the public interest. This is nearly identical language that we find
in the U.S. Senate in their bipartisan majority support of this
legislation.
{time} 1550
Now, I must say, it is regrettable that we have this debate today and
we have lost that bipartisanship that has served this institution and
this country well. But this has not been lost on two groups that I
think command a lot of respect, that the American public would pay some
attention to.
For example, we have the American Bar Association, which has written
every Member of Congress with these words:
We strongly support this legislation, and we oppose any
effort to amend the statute to make it applicable on a
mandatory basis to allegations involving Members of Congress.
Mr. Chairman, the American Bar Association is not a liberal bastion
institution, and I think that clearly shows. They have reviewed that we
are trying to do today and support the Bryant approach.
Second, probably the largest public interest group in this country,
one who has in many ways been the watchdog of Congress, as well as
Government, Common Cause, has written every Member of Congress, and
they suggest:
We strongly urge you to support the Bryant substitute as a
critical Government accountability measures.
Mr. Chairman, I think it is very clear that as we come to the end of
this general debate, that we remember that we can do this in a
bipartisan fashion, as the other body has, and let us keep the focus on
the fact that we will have the kind of investigations that people want.
The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would advise that the gentleman from Texas
[Mr. Brooks] has 17 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas] has 5 minutes remaining.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I would inform my dear friend from
Pennsylvania that I have one more speaker, and I will reserve the
balance of my time until the gentleman from Pennsylvania concludes.
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, on the basis of the assertion made to me by
the chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, as a note, I wanted the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr.
Synar] to know that the American Bar Association, to which the
gentleman referred as a supporter of the independent counsel statute,
also supported several of the measures that we transformed into
amendments for the bill, and they have been roundly rejected. So it is
not as if the American Bar Association's total set of recommendations
was adopted.
Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. GEKAS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, I would ask the gentleman, did they support
mandatory Member coverage?
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I do not recall.
Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, they did not. They most affirmatively did
not support that.
Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, they did not approve of
the salary of Walsh, and they do not approve of the number of staff,
and they do not say one word or another about various facets of
administration. But I am saying to the gentleman that as to the
coverage of the accounting to be made to the public, they had certain
recommendations, as to the accounting procedures, to make things
public. Not as to coverage or to other matters which the gentleman so
cleverly refers to.
Mr. Chairman, in any event, there is another element of this debate
that has to be repeated, and constantly repeated. The American people
know to the fullest extent possible that the Congress exempts itself,
excuses itself, recuses itself, from 1001 mandates that they impose
upon the American people or on other members of the Government of the
United States. We do it in OSHA rules and all kinds of employment
practices and things that we would not even think about as affecting
adversely the rights of our fellow American citizens. Yet we continue
to do that. Here is an example that we are trying to correct.
Mr. Chairman, the bill as presented exempts the Members of Congress
from the mandated coverage of possible targets of independent counsel.
Now, if that is not selective favoritisms, I do not know what it is.
Mr. Chairman, the offerers of the bill acknowledge that Members of
Congress can be in a position of conflict of interest. Otherwise, they
would not allow the Attorney General in her discretion to bring an
action or to bring independent counsel to visit against a Member of
Congress. So conflict of interest is acknowledged as a possibility
between a Member of Congress and the Attorney General and/or the White
House. So why not make it equal to those targets of the independent
counsel that the independent counsel law was drafted to pursue.
Mr. HYDE. If the gentleman will yield, on this question of
congressional coverage, first of all, we are not talking about 535
Members of Congress. Only in the most generic sense. We are talking
about those few about whom specific information of a violation of
Federal law from a credible source has been developed. I hope that is
not more than a handful, or less than that. I hope it is nobody.
But it is not 535 and all this overwhelming bookkeeping. We are
talking about the very few about whom specific information of the
violation of a Federal law by a credible source is obtained, if, if, I
say, my amendment is adopted and that becomes the threshold, which it
ought to be.
But we have also said that the Bryant amendment weakens existing law,
and it does. Because the Bryant amendment, making congressional
coverage optional, which it already is under the old bill, but just a
few words are changed, a cosmetic difference, but the standard now is
that the Attorney General can invoke congressional coverage and seek
the appointment of an independent counsel if she finds it is in the
public interest. That is the new standard that Mr. Bryant will seek to
impose on us, in the public interest, optional with the Attorney
General.
But the old law, and the law he is changing by his amendment, if the
old law were to be reenacted, provides that she can ask for an
independent counsel if she finds herself in a personal, political, or
financial conflict of interest.
So we will have the interesting spectacle of the Attorney General
perhaps finding herself in a personal, a political, or a financial
conflict of interest, but it is not in the public interest.
So it seems to me we ought to have all of those standards, or no
standard. We ought to have Congressmen covered like any other Member of
the executive branch, if specific information from a credible source of
violating a Federal statute is provided.
We cannot operate immune, sacrosanct, from the very standards we seek
to impose on the executive department.
I do not know if the American bar likes that, but I will tell you the
American people like it.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from
Colorado [Mrs. Schroeder], a distinguished member of the Committee on
the Judiciary and other committees.
(Mrs. SCHROEDER asked and was given permission to revise and extend
her remarks.)
Mrs. SCHROEDER. I couldn't wait to get over here, Mr. Chairman,
because, first of all, it is interesting to see how many people on the
other side got religion over the holidays and are suddenly for this
bill. With all this gray hair, I remember back even when we had this
bill up before, this was not a good idea. So that is the first part.
But now I walk in on this debate where they are attacking the other
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Bryant], as being soft on Congress. The
gentleman from Texas is the one who in both cloakrooms usually 24 hours
on day everybody is beating up on, because I know Johnny Bryant. If
there is one thing he is not, it is soft on Congress. This is the man
who has been leading all sorts of reforms out there that Members love
to hate sometimes. But to accuse him of being soft on Congress in this
bill, it is really hard to keep from giggling as I hear it. It doesn't
pass the giggle test, I guess is what I am trying to say.
Now, let us talk about some of these things. Yes, indeed, the Bryant
amendment puts Members of Congress explicitly under the independent
counsel law.
{time} 1600
It does that. Unfortunately, there is no truth in political debate.
We have got the truth in advertising so one can say things about
toothpaste and they better be true or one can sue. But on political
debate, one can say anything about a bill, and it does not have to be
true.
But let me say, the Bryant amendment--and anybody who knows his
background knows that this would not be an oversight--he allows the
Attorney General to invoke the independent counsel law. This is
appropriate discretion.
There are U.S. attorneys all over America that can move out and go
after Members of Congress in a vigorous way and have done so. If there
have been U.S. attorneys that have been shy in doing this, I want to
know who they are. I cannot think of any that have been intimidated by
this, nor can I think of any Attorney Generals that have been
intimidated by this. I really see this as kind of a delaying tactic.
There are different rules sometimes for Congress. Unfortunately, that
came out of the Constitution. There are many of us trying to change
that. Separate branches of Government are not allowed to police the
other branch. We cannot go over to the Court across the street and
start telling them how to run their personnel system, and they are not
supposed to come over here. And we are not supposed to go to the
executive branch, and they are not supposed to come over there. So we
have to set up our own policing systems, and we have been trying to do
that. And we have got to put more and more teeth in it, believe me.
Their is no one around here that wants more teeth in these things than
I do.
Ex-Congresswoman Lynn Martin and I used to run around with a bill
here all the time trying to get Members on it, trying to get them
moving on House fair employment practices and other such things.
Members would always run for the door, a lot of the Members who give
speeches.
I must say, as I have been listening to this debate, I have found it
a little humorous. I think the real trick is to look at the bill and
why it is needed. I salute the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Bryant] and
how hard he has worked on this.
If Members look at Watergate, and I an old enough and have been
around here long enough to remember Watergate, this got started because
Archibald Cox got interfered with. He had all of that turbulence, all
of that commotion.
I am pleased the other side now agrees that we need this, even though
we let it run out because we could not get the votes in the last House
session. Oh, goodness, it looks like we are going to get the votes now.
But let us move on, and let us get this going. Let us get this
independent counsel out there so that there can be these
investigations.
Members are covered. Yes, we can also be covered by the U.S.
attorneys. Yes, we are covered by the U.S. House Committee on Standards
of Official Conduct, which has not been shy either, and the House
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct cannot try the Supreme
Court. And it cannot try Members of the executive. And they have their
ethics, and they do not try us. That is they there are different
things.
Now I know we are not under OSHA. We are bringing in every dead cat
we can think of. We are not under OSHA. We are not under this. We are
not under that. Well, we should be. I agree we should be. But that is
not the issue here.
The issue here is how does the independent counsel bill work vis-a-
vis Members of Congress. It gives many, many bites out of the apple.
I think it says that Members of Congress are going to be as
vigorously pursued as anybody else and probably much more so. And
believe me, if somebody had some real concrete ideas to be even more
so, I am sure the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Bryant] would take them.
Because the one thing he has been in the forefront of is trying to make
this place absolutely squeeky clean and to rebuild this institution and
to rebuild the trust and dignity that he thinks Members should give it.
And I do, too. I thank him.
The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas]
has expired.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Bryant].
(Mr. BRYANT asked and was give permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, we have before us today a historic statute,
a unique statute in our jurisprudence that grew out of a unique event
in American history. That is the Watergate event of some 20 years ago.
It resulted in the passage, in 1978, of a special provision that
recognized the great difficulty that an Attorney General can have in
objectively investigating and prosecuting another member of the
President's Cabinet, a colleague with whom they work and with whom they
are often close friends. And so a law was written with regard to about
60 very high officials in the executive branch.
If there is a specific allegation from a credible source, it triggers
a mechanism which can result in the appointment, by a court, of an
independent counsel so that those cases may be investigated an
prosecuted objectively and fairly. And there have been 13 instances
like that. Half of them have resulted in no prosecution; the other half
have resulted in very high profile investigations and prosecutions of
which all of us are aware.
This law has worked well for 15 years. Because it is novel and
because it is unique, each time it is passed it has had attached to it
a provision which provided that the law would expire at the end of 5
years, so it has been necessary twice to reinstate the law, to pass it
once again. And it fell to us again, in 1992, to reinstate that law, 5
years having elapsed since it was last passed.
We could not do it, though, because President Bush promised that if
we did it he would veto it. Part of the reason we could not do it in
1992 is because 25 Republican Senators signed a letter to the
leadership of the Senate saying that if this bill was brought up, the
would filibuster it and kill it. And so the Congress did not reinstate
the law and it was allowed to lapse.
In 1993, with a new President, we have begun this process once again,
and the Committee on the Judiciary and my subcommittee took up this
bill.
We had hearings. We had witnesses. We had expert witnesses from
places within our Government and with academia that could give us the
best analysis of how the law had worked.
We had communication from the American Bar Association, from Common
Cause, from the U.S. Attorney General's office, all of whom said we
ought to pass the bill again.
Now Republicans read in the newspaper that there are those making
some allegations about President Clinton, and all of a sudden they are
hot to trot for an independent counsel law. We hear fulminations here
about the fact that it has not been passed and that it has been allowed
to lapse. It is quite incredible. Some of the most prominent advocates
of the Republican position are now blaming the Democrats for having
allowed this law to lapse.
I know that Members are all very concerned about the length and the
expense of the investigation of Oliver North et al. by Lawrence Walsh.
There is no need to debate that. We acknowledge that there were some
areas with regard to expenses that, in my view, were not handled
prudently. I believe, however, the investigation was in all respects
well-motivated and carried out in a fine fashion and that Mr. Walsh, by
the way a Republican, did a fine job. That is my view.
The fact of the matter is we now have an opportunity today,
regardless of all the partisan winds that may blow back and forth, to
reenact the statute. It makes common sense. It has served the public
well, and we ought to do so.
The statute that we bring forward contains some provisions to address
the possibility that independent counsel might spend a little bit too
much, and we have some restraints on that. We also have a specific
provision in the bill which in effect continues a part of the statute
that has been in place since 1982. That provision makes it clear--with
specific reference to Members of Congress--that if the Attorney General
wants to go beyond the 60 for whom this law was originally written and,
in her discretion, to decide that it would be in the public interest to
seek the appointment of an independent counsel to pursue a case against
a Member of Congress, she may do so. But she is not obligated to so. We
think that is prudent.
I would point out to the Members one other thing as well. I wish very
much that the American people could see on a daily basis what goes on
here so that they could better see the posturing that I think is taking
place on the other side. We heard a number of Members come up here and
fulminate about the fact that this law is not strong enough, that it
ought to be stronger, it ought to have other provisions in it; how much
of a shame it is that somehow the Democrats prevented the law from
being reinstated, which, as I said a moment ago, is patently false.
{time} 1410
Who were those Members? The gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Gingrich],
the Republican leader-elect, came in and said those things. The
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] came and said those things. The
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Walker], the de facto floor leader for
the Republican Party, came and said those things.
Do the Members know what the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Gingrich]
and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] and the gentleman from
Pennsylvania [Mr. Walker] have in common? In 1987, all three of them
voted against the independent counsel statute, so how are we to take
anything they say today with credibility when they come forward and say
that the bill is not good enough, when they did not want the bill in
the first place?
We have an opportunity here today to pass for the fourth time a
historic statute that has served the country well. I will elaborate on
details when we get into the amendments later on, but I urge the
Members to set aside all of their partisan posturing. I urge the public
to see this bill for what it is. It has been a good provision in the
past. Let us reauthorize it one more time, give it 5 more years to run,
and serve the American people, give them the opportunity to know that
with regard to the 60 highest officials in the executive branch, if
there are allegations against them, an independent counsel can be
entrusted to deal with them.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BRYANT. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend for yielding to me.
Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that I hope the gentleman knows that
we, in the Committee on the Judiciary on the Republican side, who voted
against the bill were protesting the fact that every single one of our
amendments was defeated on a party-line vote. It was not that we are
against the concept. I voted for this in 1978.
I might add, the distinguished chairman voted ``no'' in 1978. I might
add that the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Dingell], the gentleman from
Illinois [Mr. Rostenkowski], and many others voted ``no.'' That is all
right. That is all right. He has been on the road to Damascus and he
has seen the light. I understand that.
However, we are for this bill. It is just that we would like to have
a couple of amendments to improve it.
Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I believe the gentleman
is for it, because unlike the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Gingrich] and
the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Walker] and the gentleman from
Indiana [Mr. Burton], in 1987 the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde]
voted for the bill and for the conference report.
Mr. HYDE. And in 1978.
Mr. BRYANT. He has earned the right to come forward with amendments,
and the Committee on Rules has given the gentleman the opportunity to
offer these amendments today.
However, the gentlemen who got up here and made the hot speeches, the
red hots of the Republican side today, voted against this bill in 1987.
What they say in the rest of this debate ought to be judged in light of
that.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a
substitute printed in the bill is considered as an original bill for
the purpose of amendment and is considered as read.
The text of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is
as follows:
H.R. 811
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Independent Counsel
Reauthorization Act of 1993''.
SEC. 2. FIVE-YEAR REAUTHORIZATION.
Section 599 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
striking ``1987'' and inserting ``1993''.
SEC. 3. ADDED CONTROLS.
(a) Cost Controls and Administrative Support.--Section 594
of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the
end the following new subsection:
``(l) Cost Controls and Administrative Support.--
``(1) Cost controls.--
``(A) In general.--An independent counsel shall--
``(i) conduct all activities with due regard for expense;
``(ii) authorize only reasonable and lawful expenditures;
and
``(iii) promptly, upon taking office, assign to a specific
employee the duty of certifying that expenditures of the
independent counsel are reasonable and made in accordance
with law.
``(B) Department of Justice policies.--An independent
counsel shall comply with the established policies of the
Department of Justice respecting expenditures of funds,
except to the extent that compliance would be inconsistent
with the purposes of this chapter.
``(2) Administrative support.--The Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall
provide administrative support and guidance to each
independent counsel. No officer or employee of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall
disclose information related to an independent counsel's
expenditures, personnel, or administrative acts or
arrangements without the authorization of the independent
counsel.
``(3) Office space.--The Administrator of General Services,
in consultation with the Director of the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts, shall promptly provide
appropriate office space for each independent counsel. Such
office space shall be within a Federal building unless the
Administrator of General Services determines that other
arrangements would cost less.''.
(b) Independent Counsel Per Diem Expenses.--Section 594(b)
of title 28, United States Code, is amended--
(1) by striking ``An independent counsel'' and inserting
``(1) In general.--An independent counsel''; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(2) Travel expenses.--Except as provided in paragraph
(3), an independent counsel and persons appointed under
subsection (c) shall be entitled to the payment of travel
expenses as provided by subchapter 1 of chapter 57 of title
5, including travel or transportation expenses in accordance
with section 5703 of title 5.
``(3) Travel to primary office.--An independent counsel and
any person appointed under subsection (c) shall not be
entitled to the payment of travel and subsistence expenses
under subchapter 1 of chapter 57 of title 5 with respect to
duties performed in the city in which the primary office of
that independent counsel or person is located after 1 year of
service by that independent counsel or person (as the case
may be) under this chapter unless the employee assigned
duties under subsection (l)(1)(A)(iii) certifies that the
payment is in the public interest to carry out the purposes
of this chapter. Any such certification shall be effective
for 6 months, but may be renewed for additional periods of 6-
months each if, for each such renewal, the employee assigned
duties under subsection (l)(1)(A)(iii) makes a
recertification with respect to the public interest described
in he proceeding sentence. In making any certification or
recertification under this paragraph with respect to travel
and subsistence expenses of an independent counsel or person
appointed under subsection (c), such employee shall consider,
among other relevant factors--
``(A) the cost of the Government of reimbursing such travel
and subsistence expenses;
``(B) the period of time for which the independent counsel
anticipates that the activities of the independent counsel or
person, as the case may be, will continue;
``(C) the personal and financial burdens on the independent
counsel or person, as the case may be, of relocating so that
such travel and subsistence expenses would not be incurred;
and
``(D) the burdens associated with appointing a new
independent counsel, or appointing another person under
subsection (c), to replace the individual involved who is
unable or unwilling to so relocate.
An employee making a certification of recertification under
this paragraph shall be liable for an invalid certification
or recertification to the same extent as a certifying
official certifying a voucher is liable under section 3528 of
title 31.''.
(c) Independent Counsel Employee Pay Comparability.--
Section 594(c) of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
striking the last sentence and inserting the following:
``Such employees shall be compensated at levels not to exceed
those payable for comparable positions in the Office of
United States Attorney for the District of Columbia under
sections 548 and 550, but in no event shall any such employee
be compensated at a rate greater than the rate of basic pay
payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section
5315 of title 5.''.
(d) Ethics Enforcement.--Section 594(j) of title 28, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following
new paragraph:
``(5) Enforcement.--The Attorney General and the Director
of the Office of Government Ethics have authority to enforce
compliance with this subsection.''.
(e) Compliance With Policies of the Department of
Justice.--Section 594(f) of title 28, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``shall, except where not possible,
comply'' and inserting ``shall, except to the extent that
to do so would be inconsistent with the purposes of this
chapter, comply''.
(f) Publication of Reports.--Section 594(h) of title 28,
United States Code, is amended--
(1) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(3) Publication of reports.--At the request of an
independent counsel, the Public Printer shall cause to be
printed any report previously released to the public under
paragraph (2). The independent counsel shall certify the
number of copies necessary for the public, and the Public
Printer shall place the cost of the required number to the
debit of such independent counsel. Additional copies shall be
made available to the public through the Superintendent of
Documents sales program under section 1702 of title 44 and
the depository library program under section 1903 of such
title,''; and
(2) in the first sentence of paragraph (2), by striking
``appropriate'' the second place it appears and inserting
``in the public interest, consistent with maximizing public
disclosure, ensuring a full explanation of independent
counsel activities and decisionmaking, and facilitating the
release of information and materials which the independent
counsel has determined should be disclosed''.
(g) Annual Reports to Congress.--Section 595(a)(2) of title
28, United States Code, is amended by striking ``such
statements'' and all that follows through ``appropriate'' and
inserting `'annually a report on the activities of the
independent counsel, including a description of the progress
of any investigation or prosecution conducted by the
independent counsel. Such report may omit any matter that in
the judgment of the independent counsel should be kept
confidential, but shall provide information adequate to
justify the expenditures that the office of the independent
counsel has made.''
(h) Periodic Reappointment of Independent Counsel.--Section
596(b)(2) of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following new sentence: ``If the
Attorney General has not made a request under this paragraph,
the division of the court shall determine on its own motion
whether termination is appropriate under this paragraph not
later than 3 years after the appointment of an independent
counsel and at the end of each succeeding 3-year period.''.
(i) Audits by the Comptroller General.--Section 596(c) of
title 28, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
``(c) Audits.--By December 31 of each year, an independent
counsel shall prepare a statement of expenditures for the
fiscal year that ended on the immediately preceding September
30. An independent counsel whose office is terminated prior
to the end of the fiscal year shall prepare a statement of
expenditures by the date that is 90 days after the date on
which the office is terminated. The Comptroller General shall
audit each such statement and shall, not later than March 31
of the year following the submission of any such statement,
report the results of each audit to the Committee on the
Judiciary and the Committee on Government Operations of the
House of Representatives and to the Committee on Governmental
Affairs and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate.''.
SEC. 4. MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.
Section 591(c) of title 28, United States Code, is
amended--
(1) by indenting paragraphs (1) and (2) two ems to the
right and by redesignating such paragraphs as subparagraphs
(A) and (B), respectively;
(2) by striking ``The Attorney'' and all that follows
through ``if--'' and inserting the following:
``(1) In general.--The Attorney General may conduct a
preliminary investigation in accordance with section 592 if--
''; and
(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
``(2) Members of congress.--When the Attorney General
determines that it would be in the public interest, the
Attorney General may conduct a preliminary investigation in
accordance with section 592 if the Attorney General receives
information sufficient to constitute grounds to investigate
whether a Member of Congress may have violated any Federal
criminal law other than a violation classified as a Class B
or C misdemeanor or an infraction.''.
SEC. 5. GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL.
Section 596(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, is
amended by striking ``physical disability, mental
incapacity'' and inserting ``physical or mental disability
(consistent with prohibitions on discrimination otherwise
imposed by law)''.
SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATE.
The amendments made by this Act shall become effective on
the date of the enactment of this Act.
The CHAIRMAN. No amendment to the substitute is in order except the
amendments printed in House Report 103-419. Each amendment may be
offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member designated
in the report, shall be considered as read, is not subject to
amendment, except as specified in the report, and is not subject to a
demand for a division of the question.
Debate time on each amendment will be equally divided and controlled
by the proponent and an opponent of the amendment.
amendment offered by mr. brooks
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Brooks: Change any reference in
the bill to the ``Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of
1993'' to the ``Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of
1994''.
Page 2, line 5, insert before ``Section'' the following:
(a) Reauthorization.--
Page 2, insert the following after line 6:
(b) Effectiveness of Statute.--Chapter 40 of title 28,
United States Code, shall be effective, on and after the date
of the enactment of this Act, as if the authority for such
chapter had not expired before such date.
Page 10, redesignate section 6 as section 7 and insert the
following after line 20:
SEC. 6. NATIONAL SECURITY.
Section 597 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following:
``(c) National Security.--An independent counsel shall
comply with guidelines and procedures used by the Department
in the handling and use of classified materials.''.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] will be
recognized for 5 minutes, and a Member opposed will be recognized for 5
minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks].
(Mr. BROOKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment which I believe is without
controversy. The first part merely updates the short title of the bill
from 1993 to 1994.
The second part simply removes any possible question that the
underlying independent counsel statute is being revived to prevent any
possible litigation over the effect of the lapse of the statute on
December 15, 1992.
Finally, the third part of the amendment makes clear that each
independent counsel must follow the Department of Justice guidelines
and procedures with regard to the handling of classified materials.
There is absolutely no disagreement between the Republican and
Democratic sides that the independent counsel should be so bound.
Independent counsel, of course, are already bound by the operation of
the Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 United States Code
Appendix 4(e)1, under which the Attorney General has the sole and final
authority regarding use or release of classified information in all
cases.
They are also bound by extensive regulations that implement Executive
Order 12356, National Security Information, which governs the handling
of classified information.
To make all of this crystal clear, my amendment explicitly, rather
than implicitly, requires compliance with the procedures under the
independent counsel statute, and I would hope that my amendment will be
acceptable to the other side, and that we could move on to the
amendment of the gentleman from New York [Mr. Fish].
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. Is the gentleman from New York [Mr. Fish] opposed to
the amendment?
Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I am in opposition to the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York [Mr. Fish] is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to make clear that the three amendments
are offered en bloc, and I have no objection whatsoever to the changing
of the date of the reauthorization, nor do I have any objection to
clarification of the independent counsel statute as being revived.
I do, however, wish to speak on the third part which the chairman
offers, which requires each independent counsel to follow Department of
Justice guidelines procedures with regard to the handling of classified
materials. This is certainly an improvement, but it is far from what it
might be.
The problem with this amendment is that there is absolutely no
sanction imposed if the independent counsel fails to follow the law or
applicable regulations on the handling of national security documents.
The chairman mentioned 18 U.S.C. 798 as the statute, but Mr.
Chairman, this is absolutely unrealistic, as a practical matter, to
expect that a special prosecutor will in turn be prosecuted under this
statute. The only realistic sanction in this type of circumstance is to
make the independent counsel subject to removal for good cause, and
this is, of course, embodied in the amendment in the nature of a
substitute that will be before the House later on by the gentleman from
Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
H.R. 811, the amendment before us, ignores the experience in the
prior law, does nothing to safeguard the handling of national security
information or classified documents. We learned this before in the Iran
Contra investigation, about the shortcomings in this area. The example
was cited by me and other gentlemen of the Los Angeles International
Airport, of highly sensitive documents. I mentioned earlier the fact
that the CIA cables with highly sensitive markings were released as
exhibits during trials, and so forth, so this matter has been before us
before.
This is not addressed appropriately because of the lack of any
sanction.
Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman
from Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, the problem with the amendment by the
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] is that it is a good amendment as far
as it goes. It just does not go far enough. There is no sanction for
violating the rules and regulations concerning the handling of
classified information.
Do the Members know that during the Walsh independent counsel
adventure, CIA cables with highly sensitive markings were released as
exhibits during the trial? During a motion to quash a subpoena, a
covert agent was identified by name. Classified information was not
redacted from pleadings. Classified material was included in official
correspondence, which later had to be retrieved and redacted. Then it
had to be classified. Highly sensitive documents were delivered to
defense counsel's office in an unsecured manner.
The worst of all was the suitcase full of classified material that
was given away at the curb at LAX Airport and never seen again.
It does not do to simply say, ``Follow the law.'' There has to be a
sanction. Mr. Chairman, I am asking my friends if they want to make
this meaningful, why not provide for removal of the independent counsel
if he or she is found to have violated the law concerning the treatment
of classified information.
{time} 1620
What is the objection? May I ask my friend from Texas [Mr. Bryant]
and I yield to him, what is the objection to having a sanction?
Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, that is a fair question and there is a good
answer for it.
First of all, every American, no matter whether they are an
independent counsel or not, is subject to title 18, United States Code,
section 798, which provides criminal penalties for disclosure of
classified information.
In addition to that, Government employees, which independent counsel
are, can also be punished for improper communication of classified
information pursuant to title 50, United States Code, section 783.
Independent counsel are also subject to 47 pages of regulations
regarding handling of classified materials, and they can be fired for a
serious breach of these rules. That is to say, they can be fired for
cause and violation of any of these statutes would probably satisfy
that standard.
Mr. HYDE. If I can say to my friend I agree. But nothing happened,
and these egregious breaches occurred, and the gentleman was not
prosecuted. I cannot see the Government, the Justice Department
prosecuting an independent counsel. I can see a motion to remove him as
effective. I just do not think these others are effective.
Mr. BRYANT. But if the gentleman will continue to yield, your
complaint goes to whether or not you think the Attorney General in that
particular period acted appropriately.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from
Texas [Mr. Bryant] to continue his dialog.
Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, I just want to continue saying I think that
the objection of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] goes to his
view that the Attorney General did not act appropriately at that time.
But that is a fact question. The fact of the matter is the law clearly
gives the Attorney General the power to do that, and the Brooks
amendment makes explicit that these independent counsel are so covered.
That is the point of it.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. BRYANT. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I am just trying to make it mean something,
and I just do not think anything other than removal means a great deal.
But I accede to the gentleman's argument.
Mr. BRYANT. Again, I would emphasize removal is possible for an
independent counsel for cause, and a serious violation of any of these
standards would satisfy that requirement.
Mr. HYDE. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas
[Mr. Brooks].
The amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 printed
in House Report 103-419.
amendment offered by mr. fish
Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Fish:
Page 2, line 9, insert ``(1)'' before ``Section''.
Page 3, strike lines 5 through 13 and redesignate the
succeeding paragraph accordingly.
Page 3, insert the following after line 21:
(3) Section 594(d)(1) of title 28, United States Code, is
amended by adding at the end the following: ``The General
Services Administration shall provide administrative support
to each independent counsel.''.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New York [Mr.
Fish] will be recognized for 5 minutes, and a Member opposed, the
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] will be recognized for 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. Fish].
Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. FISH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, H.R. 811 would specifically require that the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts provide administrative support
and guidance to each independent counsel. This is not a good policy
choice because the Administrative Office is an arm of the judicial
branch. In other words, we have a separation of powers issue here. It
is not the appropriate agency to provide operational support for an
executive-branch function, that is prosecution. Further, it is without
legal authority to effectively oversee and control the expenditures of
these offices, as a GAO audit will explain in a minute.
The Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts made it
clear in testimony before the Administrative Law Subcommittee that
considered this legislation that they do not want this responsibility,
that they are ill equipped to handle this responsibility, and, again,
are without authority to properly oversee such expenditures by the
independent counsel. This point is underscored in a GAO financial audit
to the Congress dated October 9, 1992.
I quote from page 1.
Five of the nine independent counsels did not provide some
of the reports of their expenditures required by law. We
found that expenditures were often incorrectly recorded due
to serious internal control weaknesses at offices of
independent counsel and the Administrative Office of the U.S.
Courts (AOUSC), which through agreement with Justice,
performs the disbursing and accounting functions for
independent counsels.
In addition, we found that some expenditures were
inconsistent with laws and regulations. Some of the instances
we identified may be attributable to an oversight or
ambiguities in the independent counsel law and a lack of
comprehensive guidance to help independent counsels
understand and follow operational and administrative legal
requirements. Other instances were caused by the independent
counsels relying on erroneous advice from AOUSC.
My amendment would transfer the administrative support function to
the General Services Administration [GSA], the appropriate executive
branch agency to perform this function for an executive branch
function.
The GSA already has the staff and expertise necessary to provide
procurement and administrative support for every executive branch
agency and office. We are talking here additionally about a waste of
taxpayers' money to duplicate services in our judicial branch.
Placing the administrative aspects of independent counsel
investigations in the GSA would not diminish the prosecutorial
independence of the independent counsel which the statute strives to
achieve.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment.
Since the very first independent counsel was appointed, the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts--not an executive branch
agency--has provided the administrative support for independent counsel
and helped to ensure the independence of independent counsel from the
executive branch. With the adjustments now made by H.R. 811, the
Administrative Office informs us that they will be happy to continue to
provide this assistance, building on their 15 years of experience and
expertise in doing so.
During the committee markup of H.R. 811, the distinguished gentleman
from New York [Mr. Fish] offered an amendment to put the Department of
Justice in charge of providing such administrative support. I and
others believed that went against the whole purpose of the act--of
avoiding the possible conflict of interest of the executive branch
investigating itself.
Now, the gentleman's amendment would put up another executive branch
agency--the General Services Administration--to do the job. That takes
us back to the same place and the same problem.
As a well-known supporter of the General Services Administration, I
have to draw the line here and say that it is totally inappropriate for
that agency to be involved in these duties. Moreover, it has no
experience in handling such things as expenditures and payrolls for
independent counsel.
The provisions of H.R. 811 already have it right, and I urge the
rejection of this amendment.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I have remaining.
Mr. Chairman, the chairman of the committee just talked about the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts having 15 years'
experience and expertise in this matter. I would like to quote from the
testimony of L. Ralph Mecham, Director of the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations of March 3, 1993:
Our sole interest and concern with the legislation is
limited to section 3(a) (2) and (3) of the bill. . . In
essence, this bill would task an entity within the Judicial
Branch of government to support an entity--the Independent
Counsel--that has a prosecutorial function. The Judicial
Conference has concluded, and I concur, that this is an
inappropriate function for the Administrative Office to
perform, and we respectfully request that you delete us from
the bill.
Continuing the testimony:
As I am sure the Committee is aware, the Administrative
Office, on a voluntary basis, has provided administrative
support to Independent Counsels for several years. This was
carried out under an agreement between subordinates of my
predecessor and the Justice Department. I am sure this
agreement was entered into in an effort to accommodate the
Justice Department and provide a temporary service.
The Administrative Office is caught in a ``Catch 22''
position.
{time} 1630
We have no authority whatsoever to enforce compliance with
Federal laws and executive branch regulations as they apply
to independent counsels on such matters as payment for hotel
accommodations, per diem, first-class travel, contract laws,
personnel regulations, accounting procedures and an array of
other regulatory requirements. Yet, the General Accounting
Office recently issued a report on the independent-counsel
program which criticized the administrative office for not
enforcing the laws and regulations, even though we have no
lawful power to enforce them. We have taken a series of steps
to correct the administrative deficiencies cited in the GAO
report, but the fundamental problem is that the independent
counsels are not answerable to the administrative office and
cannot be compelled to follow any guidance we might give
them. Yet, we are expected to issue checks and to keep the
balances and the independent counsels are completely free to
ignore any questions that we might raise.
Mr. Chairman and my colleagues, I submit the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Court is not the appropriate body to lend their support and
guidance to the independent counsel, and my amendment should be
adopted.
Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
Mr. FISH. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, I just wondered if the gentleman is aware,
or I would like to make him aware, that subsequent to the events
regarding the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts referred to by
the gentleman, that office has since come in and indicated their
readiness and willingness to continue to assume these duties.
The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New
York [Mr. Fish].
The amendment was agreed to.
The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 printed
in House Report 103-419.
amendment offered by mr. fish
Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
The text of the amendment is as follows:
Amendment offered by Mr. Fish: Page 6, line 11, strike
``Such'' and all that follows through line 17 and insert the
following: ``Not more than 2 such employees may be
compensated at a rate not to exceed the rate of basic pay
payable for level V of the Executive schedule under section
5316 of title 5, and all other such employees shall be
compensated at rates not to exceed the maximum rate of basic
pay payable for GS-15 of the General Schedule under section
5332 of title 5.''.
The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New York [Mr.
Fish] will be recognized for 5 minutes, and a Member opposed to the
amendment will be recognized for 5 minutes.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. Fish].
Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
(Mr. FISH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his
remarks.)
Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, the former law provided that the independent
counsel receive a salary equivalent to level IV of the executive
schedule. That is currently an annual salary of $115,700. H.R. 811
contains confusing language that appears to allow employees of the
independent counsel to be paid up to the same level.
My amendment would provide that the independent counsel remain at the
executive level IV salary, but gives him authority to hire two
assistants at executive level V, a salary of $108,200 per year. At the
same time, my amendment caps other assistants' salaries at that of a
GS-15, step 10 of the Federal pay scale, or a $90,252 per year figure.
That is the level at which other Justice Department line prosecutors
are paid.
Independent counsels and each of their employees, unlike all other
U.S. attorneys or assistant U.S. attorneys, are, pursuant to this
statute, exempted from sections 202-209 of title 18 of the U.S. Code.
Among other things, that means that they are allowed to have collateral
income over and above, the salary they are being paid by the U.S.
Government.
An independent counsel investigation and prosecution is fundamentally
about one case--sometimes involving the prosecution of more than one
individual--but it involves essentially one criminal case.
Assistant U.S. attorneys, on the other hand, on average handle
approximately one hundred criminal prosecutions per year.
The maximum salary for all other Washington-based Justice Department
assistant U.S. attorneys is GS-15, step 10, that is currently a salary
of $90,252 per year.
Assistant U.S. Attorney are covered by section 209 of title 18 which
provides for a $5,000 fine and imprisonment for 1 year for accepting a
salary or for supplementing a salary from any source other than the
U.S. Government.
With the cost of independent counsel investigations going through the
roof, and Mr. Walsh's investigation rounding out at $40 million; and
with the large numbers of employees hired by Walsh, which, according to
testimony before our Administrative Law Subcommittee, included 70
lawyers and 50 FBI and IRS agents during its 7 year reign, certainly
the salary levels of such assistants has become a substantial cost
factor.
Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
I want to commend my distinguished friend, the gentleman from New
York, and I will say that I am opposed to the amendment, but I have
been persuaded, I have seen the light, I believe that my friend from
New York has a wonderful amendment, and I have no objections to it.
I would suggest that we pass it by a voice vote at this point.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the
gentleman from New York [Mr. Fish].
The amendment was agreed to.
Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
The motion was agreed to.
Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore [Mr.
Barca of Wisconsin] having assumed the chair, Mr. Torricelli, Chairman
of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 811)
to reauthorize the independent counsel for an additional 5 years, and
for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.
____________________