[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 12 (Wednesday, February 9, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: February 9, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
            INDEPENDENT COUNSEL REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1993

  The SPEAKER pro tempore (Mr. LaRocco). Pursuant to House Resolution 
352 and rule XXIII, the Chair declares the House in the Committee of 
the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the 
bill, H.R. 811.

                              {time}  1507


                     in the committee of the whole

  Accordingly, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the 
Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill 
(H.R. 811) to reauthorize the independent counsel law for an additional 
5 years, and for other purposes, with Mr. Torricelli in the chair.
  The Clerk read the title of the bill.
  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the bill is considered as having 
been read the first time.
  Under the rule, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] will be 
recognized for 30 minutes, and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. 
Gekas] will be recognized for 30 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks].
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may require.
  (Mr. BROOKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 811, the 
Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act. I am pleased we are able to 
take up this important bill today.
  Last Congress, the Independent Counsel Act died a less than honorable 
death--the result of bludgeoning and being held hostage by some 
Republicans who viewed a good government mechanism somehow as the enemy 
rather than as a trusted watchman. In the face of unrelenting hostility 
by the previous Republican administration--including the threat of a 
Senate filibuster--the law lapsed on December 15, 1992. Certainly, that 
was unfitting treatment for one of the few truly novel enhancements to 
our constitutional democracy in the 20th century. For some strange 
reason, the ardent opponents of the statute have now experienced a 
miraculous conversion--they walk; they see--in the past few months.
  I am proud to say that there are those who have shown an abiding 
faith in the value of this law. Both President Bill Clinton and 
Attorney General Janet Reno, a former prosecutor herself, have 
consistently indicated their strong support for our efforts to revive 
it.
  Under H.R. 811, the Independent Counsel Law is reauthorized for 
another 5 years, with new accountability and cost control safeguards 
based on recommendations from the General Accounting Office. These 
safeguards will apply to all existing independent counsels as well as 
any future ones, and they more than answer any lingering criticism 
about the operation of the act in the recent past.
  In addition, the bill gives the Attorney General explicit authority 
to use the act in cases involving Members of Congress. Nonetheless--
and, despite the fact that it is a red herring--some Republicans have 
made the so-called Member coverage issue the heart of their debate. The 
irony is that the act and H.R. 811 have provided for Member coverage 
since 1982, but that fact seems to be an overlooked detail to those 
making the noise and hoping to set off a panic vote. I think they will 
be surprised as they were in the other body when the same ploy failed.
  Finally, the Republican substitute to H.R. 811 would gut, dismantle, 
and abridge every major procedural and substantive provision of the 
Independent Counsel Act. In this sense, it is indeed a very thorough 
piece of work, but is the functional equivalent of gutting the statute, 
as was done by other means last Congress.
  Let us support H.R. 811 and get on with the business of good 
government.

                              {time}  1510

  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Fish], the ranking member of the Committee 
on the Judiciary.
  (Mr. FISH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this 
time.
  Mr. Chairman, the independent counsel statute is an important and 
necessary law. It should be reauthorized. However, several issues 
surfaced during the time the now-expired statute was in effect which 
made it clear that certain basic reforms in this law are needed.
  Obviously, there are circumstances when a conflict of interest may 
exist, or at least when the appearance of a conflict may arise, and the 
Attorney General is placed in a difficult position to effectively 
investigate and prosecute another high-ranking Government official. The 
Watergate episode certainly highlighted the potential for such 
conflicts. The independent counsel law has proved a useful tool on some 
occasions to avoid such conflicts.
  However, the expired law has not completely fulfilled its promise or 
purpose. All too often it has not restored the public's confidence in 
Government or our legal system. Since its enactment in 1978, this law 
has resulted in 14 separate investigations but there has only been one 
final conviction of a named subject. These court-appointed prosecutors, 
who are accountable to absolutely nobody, have spent more than $61 
million. Unfortunately, all too often there is little to show for their 
costly efforts.
  However, despite these obvious shortcomings, the majority has brought 
a bill (H.R. 811) to the floor today which would essentially 
reauthorize the same statute. At a time when the public is demanding 
Federal budget sanity and real congressional reform, they bring us a 
bill which essentially ignores our experience under this law--a bill 
which strives to maintain the status quo. H.R. 811 either completely 
avoids, or merely pays lip service to, such fundamental and serious 
issues as accountability, cost, the handling of classified information, 
the scope of prosecutorial jurisdiction, and consistency with Justice 
Department criminal enforcement policies.
  H.R. 811, Mr. Chairman, is in need of substantial improvement. It 
needs to be improved in particular with regard to those provisions 
regarding the accountability and cost of independent counsel. Despite 
the use of misleading subtitles like ``Added Cost Controls,'' H.R. 811 
would actually allow independent counsel to continue enjoying virtually 
unlimited budgets. Although the bill includes vague requirements that 
the independent counsel conduct their activities with due regard for 
expenses and that he or she authorize only reasonable and lawful 
expenditures, those terms are left undefined in the bill.

  Furthermore, under this bill, the independent counsel is provided 
with an enormous loophole through which it can choose to ignore the 
established expenditure policies of the Justice Department. The bill 
states the independent counsel need not comply with established 
departmental expenditure policies if they determine that such 
compliance is inconsistent with the purposes of the statute. They alone 
make that determination. It is not subject to judicial review. It is 
not subject to congressional oversight. I ask my colleagues, with this 
total lack of accountability, how can we realistically expect 
expenditures to be controlled?
  Further, the expenses of all independent counsel would remain under a 
permanent, indefinite appropriation and thus totally outside the 
scrutiny of the annual congressional appropriations process. 
Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh, who just concluded a 7-year 
investigation, has spent more than $39 million. The average cost for 
prosecutions per criminal defendant in a U.S. attorney's office in this 
country is approximately $10,000; Mr. Walsh averaged $2.5 million per 
defendant. Again, one of the most frequent and cogent criticisms of 
this law is that it is too expensive and there is no incentive to curb 
costs. Unfortunately, H.R. 811 does not effectively address these 
problems.
  Also ignoring our experience under the prior law, H.R. 811 does 
nothing to safeguard the handling of national security information or 
classified documents. During the independent counsel's Iran-Contra 
investigation, numerous shortcomings in this area became evident. For 
example, CIA cables--with highly sensitive markings--were released as 
exhibits during trials; in a motion to quash a subpoena, a covert agent 
was identified by name, and highly sensitive classified documents were 
inexplicably lost at the Los Angeles International Airport. At a 
minimum, we should make it clear that an independent counsel must fully 
comply with Federal law and regulations regarding the handling and 
disclosure of classified information. Most importantly, if there is a 
failure to comply, then removal should occur. The problem with a Brooks 
amendment, which we will consider later today, is that it imposes no 
sanction if an independent counsel fails to follow the law or 
applicable regulations on handling national security documents. As a 
practical matter, we cannot realistically expect that a special 
prosecutor will be prosecuted for violating 18 U.S.C. 798. The only 
realistic sanction in these kinds of circumstances is to make the 
independent counsel subject to removal for good cause--just as my good 
friend from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] proposes.

  Also troubling to me, Mr. Chairman, is the fact that independent 
counsel are allowed to ignore Justice Department policies regarding 
criminal prosecutions. While the bill includes language which appears 
to require compliance with Department policies regarding the 
enforcement of our criminal laws, it provides another loophole through 
which a counsel may choose to completely ignore such policies. The bill 
states that independent counsel shall comply with Justice Department 
policy regarding the enforcement of criminal law--``except to the 
extent that to do so would be inconsistent with the purposes of this 
chapter.''
  Mr. Chairman, there should be no exception for a Federal prosecutor 
with respect to Justice Department criminal enforcement policies. All 
Federal prosecutors--including every independent counsel--should abide 
by the same policies with regard to the enforcement of our criminal 
laws. An independent counsel, who stands in the shoes of Justice 
Department prosecutors, should not be the beneficiary of a lesser 
standard.
  Mr. Chairman, later when amendments are considered, I have been 
authorized under the rule to offer two amendments, which I would like 
to discuss briefly.
  Fish amendment No. 2 provides that the General Services 
Administration [GSA]--instead of the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts--would be the Government agency responsible for the 
administrative support of independent counsel. Mr. Chairman, the 
Administrative Office is an arm of the judicial branch and is not the 
appropriate agency to provide operational support for an executive 
branch function, in this case prosecution. Further, and important, it 
is without legal authority to effectively oversee and control the 
expenditures of the various independent counsel. The General Services 
Administration already has the staff and expertise necessary to provide 
procurement and administrative support for all executive branch 
agencies. It simply is a waste of the taxpayers' money to duplicate 
this support function through a judicial branch agency, when it is 
already available through an executive branch agency.

  Amendment designated ``Fish No. 3'' places limitations on the salary 
levels that the independent counsels can pay their assistants. My 
amendment would authorize each independent counsel to hire two 
assistants at Executive Level V, $108,200/year, and would cap other 
legal assistants at the maximum salary level of a Washington-based 
Assistant U.S. Attorney, $90,252. This amendment is made necessary 
because of confusing language contained in H.R. 811 which appears to 
allow such assistants to be compensated up to the amount payable for 
level IV, $115,700, of the executive schedule. First of all, this is 
the same annual rate of pay set by law for the independent counsel 
himself or herself. Does it make any budgetary or policy sense to allow 
employees--that is, assistants--to potentially make the same salary as 
their boss? This is not a complicated amendment. It is about common 
sense and elementary cost controls.
  Mr. Chairman, later we will consider the substitute offered by 
Congressman Hyde, known as the Independent Counsel Accountability and 
Reform Act. It is a comprehensive, common sense reform package that 
would address all of the serious shortcomings in this law which I have 
discussed. Only if the Hyde substitute is adopted, will the House 
ensure that independent counsel will be accountable in a policy sense 
and a due process sense. Furthermore, only if we adopt the Hyde 
substitute, will the American taxpayers be protected against 
unnecessary, wasteful spending. Finally, the Hyde substitute is the 
only sure way we can achieve genuine congressional reform as part of 
this process--mandatory congressional coverage under the independent 
counsel statute. I strongly urge my colleagues to carefully study this 
issue and vote accordingly. If we are serious about reforming our 
institutions of Government, then adoption of the Hyde substitute is the 
only real alternative.
  The purpose of the independent counsel law was to restore public 
faith in our system of government and ensure a fair and impartial 
system of justice. If we forgo this opportunity to reform this law and 
instead allow it to remain vulnerable to the criticisms that it is 
arbitrary, too costly, and unfair, then the very purpose of this law 
will be undermined.

                              {time}  1520

  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman and Members of the House, both the chairman of the 
committee and the ranking member have outlined the general purposes of 
bringing this matter to the floor. We should review real quickly how it 
happened that we are on the floor today at all. It is because the 
independent counsel statute faded out of existence, just died, and we 
the Congress allowed that to happen.
  Now, if we brought in partisan politics as having partially or 
substantially been the cause of the demise of the act, it could be 
equally shared, I believe. I think the Democrats allowed it to fail. 
They have control of the House, and they could have, for a variety of 
reasons, revived or brought the reauthorization to the floor way before 
the expiration of the last term and before the expiration of the 
statute. And maybe the Republicans, who were sick and tired of the 
profligacy of Lawrence Walsh and other abuses that we have heard over 
the years about the office of independent counsel, were willing to see 
it die because of some abuses. $40 million were spent by Walsh in 
pursuit of ghosts, in many occasions, only to have a final report that 
regurgitated matters that everyone knew and had digested many years 
ago.
  In any event, those were the arguments about independent counsel.
  Now, when the movement began in this term to reinstate it, one of the 
reasons that it began to gain momentum, Mr. Chairman, was because there 
was a possibility of a Whitewatergate situation arising in Arkansas. 
Everyone knows by now the allegations that are swirling around the 
failed S&L in Arkansas, about the manipulations of takeovers and all 
the matters that would, in a proper circumstance, have cried out for an 
independent counsel right from the start.
  Alas, we had none in front of us. It is only today that in late 
February of 1994 we are approaching the subject. But I venture to say 
that if Whitewatergate really had blossomed into some kind of cry for 
independent counsel, we would have authorized such an event and the 
Attorney General would have applied for the appointment of same.
  Why am I confident of that? Because indeed, a special counsel was 
appointed by the Attorney General, albeit it was after some hedging on 
her part and some mixed signals that undoubtedly she was receiving from 
the White House.
  So, in retrospect, we should have reauthorized the independent 
counsel statute for those purposes.
  But I still would have had tremendous qualms about it. Why? Because, 
No. 1, the accountability, as has been referred to by the gentleman 
from New York. I am constrained to look favorably upon this independent 
counsel act only because of ego.
  In subcommittee, as will be recalled, when our committee was 
considering this subject matter, I offered an amendment for a yearly 
reporting, a yearly accounting to the Congress of the progress of the 
independent counsel appointed by virtue of this statute. That was 
carried, and now the main bill, oddly and ironically, makes me coauthor 
of the language because my call for an annual audit or annual 
accounting is part of the bill.
  But, in addition to that, I wanted to see a 2-year reauthorization of 
the independent counsel appear in the bill as well. Mr. Chairman, I 
would have like to have seen every independent counsel work for 2 solid 
years and then, if necessary to justify further time and expenditure 
for the subject matter at hand in the office of independent counsel, to 
go before the very court that appointed him and allow evidence to be 
demonstrated as to why he should continue that investigation. And this 
would have applied in Whitewatergate if we had independent counsel on 
board if the statute had been in effect.
  It would have meant that a majority of the minority on the Judiciary 
or any member of the Judiciary, or other ways in which allegations 
would have reached the Attorney General, would have convinced the 
Attorney General to conduct a preliminary investigation and then, 
pursuant to the statute, to do those things that would lead to 
requesting a court for the appointment of independent counsel. We do 
not have that, we did not have that.
  Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GEKAS. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
  Mr. WALKER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
  In the gentleman's opinion, then in the matter of Whitewatergate, 
this would have brought almost an automatic appointment of an 
independent counsel?
  Mr. GEKAS. Yes. That is borne out by this fact, I say to the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania, that indeed even though the Attorney 
General, the current incumbent, in effect was hedging as to whether or 
not to appoint a special counsel and was receiving undoubtedly signals 
from the White House as to what to do or not to do, finally, after 
denying the need for it, acceded to a special counsel. There would have 
been no need for that. The hue and cry would have been so overwhelming 
if a good independent counsel statute had been in effect, that that 
would have automatically occurred, the Attorney General would have done 
a preliminary investigation and the court would have appointed him.
  Mr. WALKER. If the gentleman would yield further, under the 
provisions here if, for example, the independent counsel became aware, 
as we saw in this morning's paper, that a law firm might be shredding 
documents related to a Whitewatergate, would the independent counsel at 
that point under the provisions of this law have the ability to step in 
and investigate under that kind of a matter?
  Mr. GEKAS. In my judgment, undoubtedly, yes, could have done so.
  Mr. WALKER. I thank the gentleman. That does help clarify it.
  Mr. GEKAS. I thank the gentleman for the question.
  So, now the only thing that remains because I am leaning hard toward 
wanting to accept the bill, the general purpose of the bill, only 
because I wrote part of it in calling for the annual accounting to the 
Congress, I think that as an important step, I still feel bruised that 
my 2-year sunset provision was not permitted by the Committee on Rules, 
and another salutary feature that I had provided, but you have more of 
me now than you ever had before because you agreed to the language I 
proposed on accounting.
  But if the Gekas amendment fails later, then I will have to revisit 
my compatibility with some of the language of the bill as it now 
stands.

                              {time}  1530

  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2\1/2\ minutes to the distinguished 
gentleman from Oregon [Mr. Kopetski].
  (Mr. KOPETSKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. KOPETSKI. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the distinguished chairman 
of the Committee on the Judiciary for granting me a brief moment of 
time, and as he is well aware of an unfortunate occurrence in our 
history, I bring with me to the Congress, having worked on what was 
known as the Senate Watergate committee, and at the same time that that 
congressional investigation was going on there was an independent 
counsel invited, as well, or appointed, as well, and the reason was 
because there were allegations of Federal criminal activity, and I 
think it is ironic that those on the Republican side of the aisle who, 
for years, opposed the concept of the independent counsel, in fact 
allowed the laws under the independent counsel to expire this past 
December because of opposition from the then-Bush White House, are now 
saying how much we have got to have this law. Consistently the 
Democrats have said that we need an opportunity in the statute to 
ensure that the appearances of investigation of Federal criminal 
activity by high ranking Government officials is in appearance being 
conducted without bias, without political pressures, and that is why we 
have this concept of an independent counsel. It is important for the 
credibility of Government, it is important for the credibility of the 
accused, and I believe we fashioned a fair bill.
  Here, as we learn from the experiences of previous and the most 
recent independent counsel, there are no real checks and balances on 
their budget, and we face a budget deficit, and what we built into 
this, into this version of the bill, is cost controls, budgeting 
procedures, so that there is accountability on how much money they are 
spending in these appropriate Federal criminal investigations.
  Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] for 
having yielded this time to me.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire as to the remaining respective 
times?
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas] has 13 
minutes remaining, and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] has 24 
minutes remaining.
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from 
Kansas [Mr. Glickman], a distinguished member of the Committee on the 
Judiciary.
  (Mr. GLICKMAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this bill.
  Mr. Chairman, my constituents often tell me that they think it is 
important for Congress and the Government in general to improve its 
image, to look like we are acting like the rest of the people, to not 
live by a different set of standards and to subject ourselves to all of 
the powers of the law enforcement process in the event that one of us, 
or somebody as a member of the executive branch, gets into trouble, and 
that is the purpose of this bill. It is an example of very good 
government.
  Mr. Chairman, what we are saying is, ``When you have high level 
officials that get themselves into some degree of trouble, there is a 
procedure to make sure that they are investigated and, if necessary, 
prosecuted,'' and I would point out that this law, which expired last 
year, has always had the support of many of us in Congress, many of us 
on our side of the aisle for sure, and is an example of particularly 
good government.
  Here we have an administration pushing for the passage of this bill 
and, as opposed to the previous administration which discouraged, in 
fact worked against the passage of this bill, we now have an 
administration who wants to see this independent counsel law passed, 
and we have a Congress which is moving ahead in that regard, and I 
think that this will be passed and signed into law soon, and it was one 
item, maybe not the most significant item in the history of the world, 
but it is one item that will provide an example that this Congress and 
this Government is listening to the people in terms of the whole 
situation involving ethics in government and good government generally.
  I might also add, Mr. Chairman, there is some controversy as to the 
issue of coverage of Members of Congress under the independent counsel 
law, and I will point out that under this statute Members of Congress 
are covered under this law. The Attorney General has the authority to 
seek the appointment of an independent counsel.
  Am I correct?
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GLICKMAN. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. BROOKS. I ask the gentleman, ``When you were chairman of the 
subcommittee that passed this bill some years ago in one of the 
renewals, did it not include Members of Congress then?''
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Yes, it did absolutely.
  Mr. BROOKS. It has and it does?
  Mr. GLICKMAN. That is correct.
  Mr. BROOKS. It is the option of the Attorney General?
  Mr. GLICKMAN. That is correct.
  Mr. BROOKS. None of them that agreed to that, Republican or Democrat, 
have felt that it needed to be done?
  Mr. GLICKMAN. And in fact virtually every Attorney General, 
Republican and Democrat, are very opposed to the provisions of the 
amendment that the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas] is seeking 
which mandates that an independent counsel be appointed.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GLICKMAN. Let me finish my point.
  It mandates that an independent counsel be appointed under 
circumstances where misconduct is alleged, takes away the power of the 
Justice Department and the criminal justice process to use other means 
like, for example, a grand jury, separate grand jury, separate 
prosecutorial discretion, on behalf of the U.S. attorney, and in 
addition, probably, will cause a manyfold increase in the cost of the 
operation of Government by mandating that every Member of Congress 
absolutely be covered by a statute which squeezes out other important 
ways to indict and convict Members of Congress; namely, the grand jury 
and the process involving U.S. attorneys.
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman would continue to yield, 
is it not true that there was some feeling that, if they had made 
Members of Congress automatically included in that, it would have led 
to possible mischief on the part of either Democrats or even possibly, 
not likely, but possibly even Republicans by having half of the members 
of that party in the Committee on the Judiciary plus one make a 
recommendation on October 10 that they investigate the gentleman from 
Georgia [Mr. Gingrich], or the gentleman from Washington [Mr. Foley] or 
whoever?
  Mr. GLICKMAN. The independence of the Committee on the Judiciary in 
my judgment would be threatened by a mandatory independent counsel law, 
and I think it should be pointed out that the Justice Department has 
had no trouble investigating and indicting Members of Congress, when 
necessary, under existing law. There may be some circumstances where an 
independent counsel is needed. There may be times when they have a 
relationship, that Member of Congress does, with an executive branch 
official. Then it is appropriate----
  Mr. BROOKS. In that case could they not get one?
  Mr. GLICKMAN. The gentleman is correct. In that case they have all 
the legal authority in the world to get one.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. Burton].
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague, the 
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas], for yielding this time to me, 
and I would like to say that I congratulate the chairman and the 
ranking Republican for bringing this bill to the floor. However, Mr. 
Chairman, I find it very strange that they are bringing it at this 
time.
  We had an investigation going on involving the Secretary of Commerce, 
Mr. Ron Brown, who allegedly took $700,000 in bribes to help lead the 
fight to normalize relations with Vietnam, and he was cleared by a 
grand jury in Miami just last week, and yet we tried time, and time, 
and time again to get a special prosecutor, or a special independent 
counsel, to look into the charges, and we could not get anybody to help 
us. We were stonewalled by the White House. We were stonewalled by the 
Department of Commerce. We were stonewalled by Justice. They said they 
could not pick anybody to do this because they would be accused of 
showing favoritism because they were part of the administration.
  And yet now President Clinton and Janet Reno say they are in favor of 
this special counsel law.
  Now, when Janet Reno got involved in the Ron Brown affair, Mr. 
Chairman, she sent one of her top aides down to Miami to conduct a 
grand jury investigation, and everybody knows that a prosecuting 
attorney has great control over whether or not to get an indictment, 
and, since she sent one of her top aides down, it was no surprise to me 
that Mr. Brown was exonerated. But the fact of the matter is the man 
who accused Mr. Brown, Mr. Binh Ly, passed a 6-hour FBI lie detector 
test. In addition to that, it was alleged that a large sum of money was 
going to be transferred to Bank Indo Suez in Singapore, and the FBI 
said that a large sum of money was wire transferred to a bank in 
Vietnam to a bank in Singapore. In addition to that, Mr. Chairman, Mr. 
Brown testified before a committee in Congress that he had no 
involvement with any of his staff regarding this, and yet the lead 
agency at a National Security Council meeting last July pushing for 
normalization with Vietnam was Mr. Brown's agency, the Department of 
Commerce.
  As my colleagues know, there are just so many problems with this that 
it just boggled the mind, and yet Mr. Brown has been exonerated, and we 
cannot get a special counsel or special prosecutor, and yet 1 week 
later the special counsel law comes to the floor after all this has 
been taken care of. I think that is very, very interesting, very 
interesting.
  I would just like to say to my colleagues that I hope that we do not 
sweep anything else under the rug. I think this Ron Brown affair has 
been swept under the rug. I think it is a terrible tragedy.

                              {time}  1540

  Mr. Chairman, I think the American people are upset about it. I know 
I am because we have gone into this a great deal to try to get to the 
bottom of it, and now, after everything is done and the ink is dry on 
the paper, we bring this special counsel law to the floor of the House. 
I think it is really a tragic state of affairs.
  Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I am happy to yield to my colleague.
  Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Speaker, I think it is interesting that the gentleman 
comes to the floor today and raises questions about why the independent 
counsel law was allowed to lapse, which I will elaborate on later. But 
in 1987, I say to the gentleman and to the Members that he voted 
against passage of the independent counsel law. How does the gentleman 
square that with his comments of today:
  Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Well, the independent counsel law was abused 
by Mr. Walsh. he spent millions and millions and millions of dollars 
and did not get one conviction.
  Mr. BRYANT. Yes; but that had not happened in 1987, had it?
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] has 
expired.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from 
Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
  (Mr. HYDE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. 
Gekas] for this time.
  I say to my colleagues that I have always supported an independent 
counsel bill, and I was one who supported it back in 1978 when it first 
passed, but it seems to me we should learn something from experience. A 
mere reauthorization of the law as it has presently stood until it 
lapsed last December just will not cut it. It indicates that we are 
impervious to the lessons of experience.
  For example, there is the matter of treatment of classified 
information. We have heard stories about the independent counsel that 
investigated the Iran-Contra controversy taking a suitcase full of 
classified material that was used in a deposition out on the west coast 
of former President Reagan and tossing it to a red cap at the curb of 
the Los Angeles Airport, and it has never been seen again. And it was 
not reported for many, many weeks.
  That cannot happen. That should not happen. There should be some 
accountability.
  The chairman of our committee, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks], 
has thoughtfully prepared an amendment that says the independent 
counsel shall follow the laws and the regulations pertaining to 
classified material. That is well and good, but where is the sanction? 
There is no sanction.
  In my substitute which the Members will get a chance to vote for, it 
provides that if indeed the independent counsel or any of his staff do 
not follow the rules or regulations concerning the proper treatment of 
classified material, they are removed. We have a sanction. I suggest 
with all deference to my chairman that his provision is toothless. It 
has no bite. We should provide a sanction.
  Effective cost controls: One of the things we ought to have learned 
was the profligacy with which Mr. Walsh operated his office. I must say 
that Midas never in his wildest days had the resources available to 
him, even after everything he touched, turned to gold. There was 
absolutely no accountability, no oversight as to the millions that were 
spent by Judge Walsh over a period of 7 years.
  What we want in the substitute--and that is the only place where we 
find this reform--is that the annual appropriations process obtains 
after the first 2 years. The independent counsel has 2 years to do 
whatever he or she will, but after that we ask them to ``Please submit 
yourself to an appropriations process.'' We are dealing with taxpayers' 
money.

  The jurisdiction of an independent counsel: The bill that we are 
asked to vote for, the bill that the chairman of the committee has 
brought to us, has nothing to say about narrowing the focus or 
jurisdiction of the independent counsel. He does not have a license to 
go hunting in the forest and shoot every critter that moves. It should 
be specific. It should be targeted. It should be directed, it should be 
focused so that there is not this grandiose, lavish, expensive, and 
reputation-ruining hunting expedition.
  Jurisdiction defined: What is the basis for a preliminary 
investigation? Right now you can trigger the Attorney General's action 
under the independent counsel statute, the one that just lapsed and the 
one we are asked to reauthorize, by information that there may have 
been a violation of Federal law. Instead, it ought to be specific 
information from a credible source. That is fine-tuning and tightening 
up the trigger mechanism for this whole elaborate process of an 
independent counsel. I am going to have an opportunity to offer that as 
a freestanding amendment, and I hope that it will be supported because 
it makes this a more lawyerlike and a more professional and workable 
piece of legislation.
  Duration of an investigation: Does it go on and on from generation to 
generation to generation? Judge Walsh served longer, I think, than any 
Attorney General in history except maybe one or two, I am told--7 
years. Somewhere along the line there should be some accountability. So 
my substitute says that the court that appointed the independent 
counsel can terminate the independent counsel whenever the court 
decides that the job is done or it is in the public interest that 
enough is enough. It would seem to me that that is a very useful 
amendment.
  It also provides that if the job is not done after 2 years, the 
independent counsel must apply for reappointment. There is nothing 
wrong with that. It just simply requires a review of the tenure, the 
unlimited tenure that is inherent in the existing bill.
  What about attorneys' fees? If you are a target and you went to trial 
and you were acquitted or your conviction is reversed on appeal, that 
is a pyrrhic victory if you are bankrupt, if you have been economically 
devastated by the money you have had to raise to defend yourself. My 
substitute requires payment of those attorney fees.
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from 
Oklahoma [Mr. Synar], a distinguished Member of the Judiciary 
Committee.
  Mr. SYNAR. Mr. Chairman, I thank the chairman of the committee for 
yielding me this time, and I want to take this opportunity, first of 
all, to thank the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] and the gentleman 
from Texas [Mr. Bryant] for the job they have done today, and also for 
the demeanor in which they have approached this debate.
  I rise with great disappointment because I think this is an issue 
that for a long time in our Nation's history has been one that we have 
been very proud of because it has been bipartisan. Regrettably, today 
we now see, because of very shabby political tricks, that we can no 
longer work on something that is in the best interest of our country.
  I think it is important to review the history of the independent 
counsel, and so we go back to 1978, when Jimmy Carter first passed this 
legislation.
  It was then twice during the Reagan administration that this Congress 
overwhelmingly, along with the President, twice renewed the independent 
counsel. It is imperative to remember that on all these occasions it 
was done in a bipartisan fashion. It was only during that last session 
of Congress that we really began to see the falling apart of this 
cooperation, when Bill Barr, not once but twice, refused the use of an 
independent counsel, one for the Inslaw investigation, and second, for 
Iraqgate. It was because of the fear of that administration of the 
place of the special prosecutor that they allowed that law to expire on 
December 15, which brings us here today.
  Anyone who has followed the debate over the last couple of hours 
realizes that what this debate has come down to is whether or not we as 
Members of Congress should be explicitly covered in this legislation. I 
think it is important to remember that since 1982 we have been covered 
by this administration, and the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Bryant] has 
gone one step further than that because, with his alternative, Members 
of Congress will be explicitly covered by the independent counsel for 
the first time. As the Members know, the Bryant amendment, which we 
will have an opportunity to address later, authorizes the Attorney 
General to invoke the independent counsel procedures to investigate and 
prosecute Members of Congress whenever he or she determines that it is 
in the public interest. This is nearly identical language that we find 
in the U.S. Senate in their bipartisan majority support of this 
legislation.

                              {time}  1550

  Now, I must say, it is regrettable that we have this debate today and 
we have lost that bipartisanship that has served this institution and 
this country well. But this has not been lost on two groups that I 
think command a lot of respect, that the American public would pay some 
attention to.
  For example, we have the American Bar Association, which has written 
every Member of Congress with these words:

       We strongly support this legislation, and we oppose any 
     effort to amend the statute to make it applicable on a 
     mandatory basis to allegations involving Members of Congress.

  Mr. Chairman, the American Bar Association is not a liberal bastion 
institution, and I think that clearly shows. They have reviewed that we 
are trying to do today and support the Bryant approach.
  Second, probably the largest public interest group in this country, 
one who has in many ways been the watchdog of Congress, as well as 
Government, Common Cause, has written every Member of Congress, and 
they suggest:

       We strongly urge you to support the Bryant substitute as a 
     critical Government accountability measures.

  Mr. Chairman, I think it is very clear that as we come to the end of 
this general debate, that we remember that we can do this in a 
bipartisan fashion, as the other body has, and let us keep the focus on 
the fact that we will have the kind of investigations that people want.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would advise that the gentleman from Texas 
[Mr. Brooks] has 17 minutes remaining, and the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas] has 5 minutes remaining.
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I would inform my dear friend from 
Pennsylvania that I have one more speaker, and I will reserve the 
balance of my time until the gentleman from Pennsylvania concludes.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, on the basis of the assertion made to me by 
the chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, as a note, I wanted the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. 
Synar] to know that the American Bar Association, to which the 
gentleman referred as a supporter of the independent counsel statute, 
also supported several of the measures that we transformed into 
amendments for the bill, and they have been roundly rejected. So it is 
not as if the American Bar Association's total set of recommendations 
was adopted.
  Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. GEKAS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, I would ask the gentleman, did they support 
mandatory Member coverage?
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, I do not recall.
  Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, they did not. They most affirmatively did 
not support that.
  Mr. GEKAS. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, they did not approve of 
the salary of Walsh, and they do not approve of the number of staff, 
and they do not say one word or another about various facets of 
administration. But I am saying to the gentleman that as to the 
coverage of the accounting to be made to the public, they had certain 
recommendations, as to the accounting procedures, to make things 
public. Not as to coverage or to other matters which the gentleman so 
cleverly refers to.
  Mr. Chairman, in any event, there is another element of this debate 
that has to be repeated, and constantly repeated. The American people 
know to the fullest extent possible that the Congress exempts itself, 
excuses itself, recuses itself, from 1001 mandates that they impose 
upon the American people or on other members of the Government of the 
United States. We do it in OSHA rules and all kinds of employment 
practices and things that we would not even think about as affecting 
adversely the rights of our fellow American citizens. Yet we continue 
to do that. Here is an example that we are trying to correct.
  Mr. Chairman, the bill as presented exempts the Members of Congress 
from the mandated coverage of possible targets of independent counsel. 
Now, if that is not selective favoritisms, I do not know what it is.
  Mr. Chairman, the offerers of the bill acknowledge that Members of 
Congress can be in a position of conflict of interest. Otherwise, they 
would not allow the Attorney General in her discretion to bring an 
action or to bring independent counsel to visit against a Member of 
Congress. So conflict of interest is acknowledged as a possibility 
between a Member of Congress and the Attorney General and/or the White 
House. So why not make it equal to those targets of the independent 
counsel that the independent counsel law was drafted to pursue.
  Mr. HYDE. If the gentleman will yield, on this question of 
congressional coverage, first of all, we are not talking about 535 
Members of Congress. Only in the most generic sense. We are talking 
about those few about whom specific information of a violation of 
Federal law from a credible source has been developed. I hope that is 
not more than a handful, or less than that. I hope it is nobody.
  But it is not 535 and all this overwhelming bookkeeping. We are 
talking about the very few about whom specific information of the 
violation of a Federal law by a credible source is obtained, if, if, I 
say, my amendment is adopted and that becomes the threshold, which it 
ought to be.
  But we have also said that the Bryant amendment weakens existing law, 
and it does. Because the Bryant amendment, making congressional 
coverage optional, which it already is under the old bill, but just a 
few words are changed, a cosmetic difference, but the standard now is 
that the Attorney General can invoke congressional coverage and seek 
the appointment of an independent counsel if she finds it is in the 
public interest. That is the new standard that Mr. Bryant will seek to 
impose on us, in the public interest, optional with the Attorney 
General.
  But the old law, and the law he is changing by his amendment, if the 
old law were to be reenacted, provides that she can ask for an 
independent counsel if she finds herself in a personal, political, or 
financial conflict of interest.
  So we will have the interesting spectacle of the Attorney General 
perhaps finding herself in a personal, a political, or a financial 
conflict of interest, but it is not in the public interest.
  So it seems to me we ought to have all of those standards, or no 
standard. We ought to have Congressmen covered like any other Member of 
the executive branch, if specific information from a credible source of 
violating a Federal statute is provided.
  We cannot operate immune, sacrosanct, from the very standards we seek 
to impose on the executive department.
  I do not know if the American bar likes that, but I will tell you the 
American people like it.
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from 
Colorado [Mrs. Schroeder], a distinguished member of the Committee on 
the Judiciary and other committees.
  (Mrs. SCHROEDER asked and was given permission to revise and extend 
her remarks.)
  Mrs. SCHROEDER. I couldn't wait to get over here, Mr. Chairman, 
because, first of all, it is interesting to see how many people on the 
other side got religion over the holidays and are suddenly for this 
bill. With all this gray hair, I remember back even when we had this 
bill up before, this was not a good idea. So that is the first part.
  But now I walk in on this debate where they are attacking the other 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Bryant], as being soft on Congress. The 
gentleman from Texas is the one who in both cloakrooms usually 24 hours 
on day everybody is beating up on, because I know Johnny Bryant. If 
there is one thing he is not, it is soft on Congress. This is the man 
who has been leading all sorts of reforms out there that Members love 
to hate sometimes. But to accuse him of being soft on Congress in this 
bill, it is really hard to keep from giggling as I hear it. It doesn't 
pass the giggle test, I guess is what I am trying to say.
  Now, let us talk about some of these things. Yes, indeed, the Bryant 
amendment puts Members of Congress explicitly under the independent 
counsel law.

                              {time}  1600

  It does that. Unfortunately, there is no truth in political debate. 
We have got the truth in advertising so one can say things about 
toothpaste and they better be true or one can sue. But on political 
debate, one can say anything about a bill, and it does not have to be 
true.
  But let me say, the Bryant amendment--and anybody who knows his 
background knows that this would not be an oversight--he allows the 
Attorney General to invoke the independent counsel law. This is 
appropriate discretion.
  There are U.S. attorneys all over America that can move out and go 
after Members of Congress in a vigorous way and have done so. If there 
have been U.S. attorneys that have been shy in doing this, I want to 
know who they are. I cannot think of any that have been intimidated by 
this, nor can I think of any Attorney Generals that have been 
intimidated by this. I really see this as kind of a delaying tactic.
  There are different rules sometimes for Congress. Unfortunately, that 
came out of the Constitution. There are many of us trying to change 
that. Separate branches of Government are not allowed to police the 
other branch. We cannot go over to the Court across the street and 
start telling them how to run their personnel system, and they are not 
supposed to come over here. And we are not supposed to go to the 
executive branch, and they are not supposed to come over there. So we 
have to set up our own policing systems, and we have been trying to do 
that. And we have got to put more and more teeth in it, believe me. 
Their is no one around here that wants more teeth in these things than 
I do.
  Ex-Congresswoman Lynn Martin and I used to run around with a bill 
here all the time trying to get Members on it, trying to get them 
moving on House fair employment practices and other such things. 
Members would always run for the door, a lot of the Members who give 
speeches.
  I must say, as I have been listening to this debate, I have found it 
a little humorous. I think the real trick is to look at the bill and 
why it is needed. I salute the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Bryant] and 
how hard he has worked on this.
  If Members look at Watergate, and I an old enough and have been 
around here long enough to remember Watergate, this got started because 
Archibald Cox got interfered with. He had all of that turbulence, all 
of that commotion.
  I am pleased the other side now agrees that we need this, even though 
we let it run out because we could not get the votes in the last House 
session. Oh, goodness, it looks like we are going to get the votes now.
  But let us move on, and let us get this going. Let us get this 
independent counsel out there so that there can be these 
investigations.
  Members are covered. Yes, we can also be covered by the U.S. 
attorneys. Yes, we are covered by the U.S. House Committee on Standards 
of Official Conduct, which has not been shy either, and the House 
Committee on Standards of Official Conduct cannot try the Supreme 
Court. And it cannot try Members of the executive. And they have their 
ethics, and they do not try us. That is they there are different 
things.
  Now I know we are not under OSHA. We are bringing in every dead cat 
we can think of. We are not under OSHA. We are not under this. We are 
not under that. Well, we should be. I agree we should be. But that is 
not the issue here.
  The issue here is how does the independent counsel bill work vis-a-
vis Members of Congress. It gives many, many bites out of the apple.
  I think it says that Members of Congress are going to be as 
vigorously pursued as anybody else and probably much more so. And 
believe me, if somebody had some real concrete ideas to be even more 
so, I am sure the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Bryant] would take them. 
Because the one thing he has been in the forefront of is trying to make 
this place absolutely squeeky clean and to rebuild this institution and 
to rebuild the trust and dignity that he thinks Members should give it. 
And I do, too. I thank him.
  The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Gekas] 
has expired.
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the balance of my time to the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Bryant].
  (Mr. BRYANT asked and was give permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, we have before us today a historic statute, 
a unique statute in our jurisprudence that grew out of a unique event 
in American history. That is the Watergate event of some 20 years ago.
  It resulted in the passage, in 1978, of a special provision that 
recognized the great difficulty that an Attorney General can have in 
objectively investigating and prosecuting another member of the 
President's Cabinet, a colleague with whom they work and with whom they 
are often close friends. And so a law was written with regard to about 
60 very high officials in the executive branch.
  If there is a specific allegation from a credible source, it triggers 
a mechanism which can result in the appointment, by a court, of an 
independent counsel so that those cases may be investigated an 
prosecuted objectively and fairly. And there have been 13 instances 
like that. Half of them have resulted in no prosecution; the other half 
have resulted in very high profile investigations and prosecutions of 
which all of us are aware.
  This law has worked well for 15 years. Because it is novel and 
because it is unique, each time it is passed it has had attached to it 
a provision which provided that the law would expire at the end of 5 
years, so it has been necessary twice to reinstate the law, to pass it 
once again. And it fell to us again, in 1992, to reinstate that law, 5 
years having elapsed since it was last passed.
  We could not do it, though, because President Bush promised that if 
we did it he would veto it. Part of the reason we could not do it in 
1992 is because 25 Republican Senators signed a letter to the 
leadership of the Senate saying that if this bill was brought up, the 
would filibuster it and kill it. And so the Congress did not reinstate 
the law and it was allowed to lapse.
  In 1993, with a new President, we have begun this process once again, 
and the Committee on the Judiciary and my subcommittee took up this 
bill.
  We had hearings. We had witnesses. We had expert witnesses from 
places within our Government and with academia that could give us the 
best analysis of how the law had worked.
  We had communication from the American Bar Association, from Common 
Cause, from the U.S. Attorney General's office, all of whom said we 
ought to pass the bill again.
  Now Republicans read in the newspaper that there are those making 
some allegations about President Clinton, and all of a sudden they are 
hot to trot for an independent counsel law. We hear fulminations here 
about the fact that it has not been passed and that it has been allowed 
to lapse. It is quite incredible. Some of the most prominent advocates 
of the Republican position are now blaming the Democrats for having 
allowed this law to lapse.
  I know that Members are all very concerned about the length and the 
expense of the investigation of Oliver North et al. by Lawrence Walsh. 
There is no need to debate that. We acknowledge that there were some 
areas with regard to expenses that, in my view, were not handled 
prudently. I believe, however, the investigation was in all respects 
well-motivated and carried out in a fine fashion and that Mr. Walsh, by 
the way a Republican, did a fine job. That is my view.
  The fact of the matter is we now have an opportunity today, 
regardless of all the partisan winds that may blow back and forth, to 
reenact the statute. It makes common sense. It has served the public 
well, and we ought to do so.
  The statute that we bring forward contains some provisions to address 
the possibility that independent counsel might spend a little bit too 
much, and we have some restraints on that. We also have a specific 
provision in the bill which in effect continues a part of the statute 
that has been in place since 1982. That provision makes it clear--with 
specific reference to Members of Congress--that if the Attorney General 
wants to go beyond the 60 for whom this law was originally written and, 
in her discretion, to decide that it would be in the public interest to 
seek the appointment of an independent counsel to pursue a case against 
a Member of Congress, she may do so. But she is not obligated to so. We 
think that is prudent.
  I would point out to the Members one other thing as well. I wish very 
much that the American people could see on a daily basis what goes on 
here so that they could better see the posturing that I think is taking 
place on the other side. We heard a number of Members come up here and 
fulminate about the fact that this law is not strong enough, that it 
ought to be stronger, it ought to have other provisions in it; how much 
of a shame it is that somehow the Democrats prevented the law from 
being reinstated, which, as I said a moment ago, is patently false.

                              {time}  1410

  Who were those Members? The gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Gingrich], 
the Republican leader-elect, came in and said those things. The 
gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] came and said those things. The 
gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Walker], the de facto floor leader for 
the Republican Party, came and said those things.
  Do the Members know what the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Gingrich] 
and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Burton] and the gentleman from 
Pennsylvania [Mr. Walker] have in common? In 1987, all three of them 
voted against the independent counsel statute, so how are we to take 
anything they say today with credibility when they come forward and say 
that the bill is not good enough, when they did not want the bill in 
the first place?
  We have an opportunity here today to pass for the fourth time a 
historic statute that has served the country well. I will elaborate on 
details when we get into the amendments later on, but I urge the 
Members to set aside all of their partisan posturing. I urge the public 
to see this bill for what it is. It has been a good provision in the 
past. Let us reauthorize it one more time, give it 5 more years to run, 
and serve the American people, give them the opportunity to know that 
with regard to the 60 highest officials in the executive branch, if 
there are allegations against them, an independent counsel can be 
entrusted to deal with them.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BRYANT. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend for yielding to me.
  Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that I hope the gentleman knows that 
we, in the Committee on the Judiciary on the Republican side, who voted 
against the bill were protesting the fact that every single one of our 
amendments was defeated on a party-line vote. It was not that we are 
against the concept. I voted for this in 1978.
  I might add, the distinguished chairman voted ``no'' in 1978. I might 
add that the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. Dingell], the gentleman from 
Illinois [Mr. Rostenkowski], and many others voted ``no.'' That is all 
right. That is all right. He has been on the road to Damascus and he 
has seen the light. I understand that.
  However, we are for this bill. It is just that we would like to have 
a couple of amendments to improve it.
  Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, reclaiming my time, I believe the gentleman 
is for it, because unlike the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. Gingrich] and 
the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Walker] and the gentleman from 
Indiana [Mr. Burton], in 1987 the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] 
voted for the bill and for the conference report.
  Mr. HYDE. And in 1978.
  Mr. BRYANT. He has earned the right to come forward with amendments, 
and the Committee on Rules has given the gentleman the opportunity to 
offer these amendments today.
  However, the gentlemen who got up here and made the hot speeches, the 
red hots of the Republican side today, voted against this bill in 1987. 
What they say in the rest of this debate ought to be judged in light of 
that.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.
  Pursuant to the rule, the committee amendment in the nature of a 
substitute printed in the bill is considered as an original bill for 
the purpose of amendment and is considered as read.
  The text of the committee amendment in the nature of a substitute is 
as follows:

                                H.R. 811

       Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
     the United States of America in Congress assembled,

     SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

       This Act may be cited as the ``Independent Counsel 
     Reauthorization Act of 1993''.

     SEC. 2. FIVE-YEAR REAUTHORIZATION.

       Section 599 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by 
     striking ``1987'' and inserting ``1993''.

     SEC. 3. ADDED CONTROLS.

       (a) Cost Controls and Administrative Support.--Section 594 
     of title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the 
     end the following new subsection:
       ``(l) Cost Controls and Administrative Support.--
       ``(1) Cost controls.--
       ``(A) In general.--An independent counsel shall--
       ``(i) conduct all activities with due regard for expense;
       ``(ii) authorize only reasonable and lawful expenditures; 
     and
       ``(iii) promptly, upon taking office, assign to a specific 
     employee the duty of certifying that expenditures of the 
     independent counsel are reasonable and made in accordance 
     with law.
       ``(B) Department of Justice policies.--An independent 
     counsel shall comply with the established policies of the 
     Department of Justice respecting expenditures of funds, 
     except to the extent that compliance would be inconsistent 
     with the purposes of this chapter.
       ``(2) Administrative support.--The Director of the 
     Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall 
     provide administrative support and guidance to each 
     independent counsel. No officer or employee of the 
     Administrative Office of the United States Courts shall 
     disclose information related to an independent counsel's 
     expenditures, personnel, or administrative acts or 
     arrangements without the authorization of the independent 
     counsel.
       ``(3) Office space.--The Administrator of General Services, 
     in consultation with the Director of the Administrative 
     Office of the United States Courts, shall promptly provide 
     appropriate office space for each independent counsel. Such 
     office space shall be within a Federal building unless the 
     Administrator of General Services determines that other 
     arrangements would cost less.''.
       (b) Independent Counsel Per Diem Expenses.--Section 594(b) 
     of title 28, United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by striking ``An independent counsel'' and inserting
       ``(1) In general.--An independent counsel''; and
       (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
       ``(2) Travel expenses.--Except as provided in paragraph 
     (3), an independent counsel and persons appointed under 
     subsection (c) shall be entitled to the payment of travel 
     expenses as provided by subchapter 1 of chapter 57 of title 
     5, including travel or transportation expenses in accordance 
     with section 5703 of title 5.
       ``(3) Travel to primary office.--An independent counsel and 
     any person appointed under subsection (c) shall not be 
     entitled to the payment of travel and subsistence expenses 
     under subchapter 1 of chapter 57 of title 5 with respect to 
     duties performed in the city in which the primary office of 
     that independent counsel or person is located after 1 year of 
     service by that independent counsel or person (as the case 
     may be) under this chapter unless the employee assigned 
     duties under subsection (l)(1)(A)(iii) certifies that the 
     payment is in the public interest to carry out the purposes 
     of this chapter. Any such certification shall be effective 
     for 6 months, but may be renewed for additional periods of 6-
     months each if, for each such renewal, the employee assigned 
     duties under subsection (l)(1)(A)(iii) makes a 
     recertification with respect to the public interest described 
     in he proceeding sentence. In making any certification or 
     recertification under this paragraph with respect to travel 
     and subsistence expenses of an independent counsel or person 
     appointed under subsection (c), such employee shall consider, 
     among other relevant factors--
       ``(A) the cost of the Government of reimbursing such travel 
     and subsistence expenses;
       ``(B) the period of time for which the independent counsel 
     anticipates that the activities of the independent counsel or 
     person, as the case may be, will continue;
       ``(C) the personal and financial burdens on the independent 
     counsel or person, as the case may be, of relocating so that 
     such travel and subsistence expenses would not be incurred; 
     and
       ``(D) the burdens associated with appointing a new 
     independent counsel, or appointing another person under 
     subsection (c), to replace the individual involved who is 
     unable or unwilling to so relocate.

     An employee making a certification of recertification under 
     this paragraph shall be liable for an invalid certification 
     or recertification to the same extent as a certifying 
     official certifying a voucher is liable under section 3528 of 
     title 31.''.
       (c) Independent Counsel Employee Pay Comparability.--
     Section 594(c) of title 28, United States Code, is amended by 
     striking the last sentence and inserting the following: 
     ``Such employees shall be compensated at levels not to exceed 
     those payable for comparable positions in the Office of 
     United States Attorney for the District of Columbia under 
     sections 548 and 550, but in no event shall any such employee 
     be compensated at a rate greater than the rate of basic pay 
     payable for level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 
     5315 of title 5.''.
       (d) Ethics Enforcement.--Section 594(j) of title 28, United 
     States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following 
     new paragraph:
       ``(5) Enforcement.--The Attorney General and the Director 
     of the Office of Government Ethics have authority to enforce 
     compliance with this subsection.''.
       (e) Compliance With Policies of the Department of 
     Justice.--Section 594(f) of title 28, United States Code, is 
     amended by striking ``shall, except where not possible, 
     comply'' and inserting ``shall, except to the extent that 
     to do so would be inconsistent with the purposes of this 
     chapter, comply''.
       (f) Publication of Reports.--Section 594(h) of title 28, 
     United States Code, is amended--
       (1) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(3) Publication of reports.--At the request of an 
     independent counsel, the Public Printer shall cause to be 
     printed any report previously released to the public under 
     paragraph (2). The independent counsel shall certify the 
     number of copies necessary for the public, and the Public 
     Printer shall place the cost of the required number to the 
     debit of such independent counsel. Additional copies shall be 
     made available to the public through the Superintendent of 
     Documents sales program under section 1702 of title 44 and 
     the depository library program under section 1903 of such 
     title,''; and
       (2) in the first sentence of paragraph (2), by striking 
     ``appropriate'' the second place it appears and inserting 
     ``in the public interest, consistent with maximizing public 
     disclosure, ensuring a full explanation of independent 
     counsel activities and decisionmaking, and facilitating the 
     release of information and materials which the independent 
     counsel has determined should be disclosed''.
       (g) Annual Reports to Congress.--Section 595(a)(2) of title 
     28, United States Code, is amended by striking ``such 
     statements'' and all that follows through ``appropriate'' and 
     inserting `'annually a report on the activities of the 
     independent counsel, including a description of the progress 
     of any investigation or prosecution conducted by the 
     independent counsel. Such report may omit any matter that in 
     the judgment of the independent counsel should be kept 
     confidential, but shall provide information adequate to 
     justify the expenditures that the office of the independent 
     counsel has made.''
       (h) Periodic Reappointment of Independent Counsel.--Section 
     596(b)(2) of title 28, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following new sentence: ``If the 
     Attorney General has not made a request under this paragraph, 
     the division of the court shall determine on its own motion 
     whether termination is appropriate under this paragraph not 
     later than 3 years after the appointment of an independent 
     counsel and at the end of each succeeding 3-year period.''.
       (i) Audits by the Comptroller General.--Section 596(c) of 
     title 28, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:
       ``(c) Audits.--By December 31 of each year, an independent 
     counsel shall prepare a statement of expenditures for the 
     fiscal year that ended on the immediately preceding September 
     30. An independent counsel whose office is terminated prior 
     to the end of the fiscal year shall prepare a statement of 
     expenditures by the date that is 90 days after the date on 
     which the office is terminated. The Comptroller General shall 
     audit each such statement and shall, not later than March 31 
     of the year following the submission of any such statement, 
     report the results of each audit to the Committee on the 
     Judiciary and the Committee on Government Operations of the 
     House of Representatives and to the Committee on Governmental 
     Affairs and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate.''.

     SEC. 4. MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.

       Section 591(c) of title 28, United States Code, is 
     amended--
       (1) by indenting paragraphs (1) and (2) two ems to the 
     right and by redesignating such paragraphs as subparagraphs 
     (A) and (B), respectively;
       (2) by striking ``The Attorney'' and all that follows 
     through ``if--'' and inserting the following:
       ``(1) In general.--The Attorney General may conduct a 
     preliminary investigation in accordance with section 592 if--
     ''; and
       (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
       ``(2) Members of congress.--When the Attorney General 
     determines that it would be in the public interest, the 
     Attorney General may conduct a preliminary investigation in 
     accordance with section 592 if the Attorney General receives 
     information sufficient to constitute grounds to investigate 
     whether a Member of Congress may have violated any Federal 
     criminal law other than a violation classified as a Class B 
     or C misdemeanor or an infraction.''.

     SEC. 5. GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL.

       Section 596(a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, is 
     amended by striking ``physical disability, mental 
     incapacity'' and inserting ``physical or mental disability 
     (consistent with prohibitions on discrimination otherwise 
     imposed by law)''.

     SEC. 6. EFFECTIVE DATE.

       The amendments made by this Act shall become effective on 
     the date of the enactment of this Act.

  The CHAIRMAN. No amendment to the substitute is in order except the 
amendments printed in House Report 103-419. Each amendment may be 
offered only in the order printed in the report, by a Member designated 
in the report, shall be considered as read, is not subject to 
amendment, except as specified in the report, and is not subject to a 
demand for a division of the question.
  Debate time on each amendment will be equally divided and controlled 
by the proponent and an opponent of the amendment.


                    amendment offered by mr. brooks

  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Brooks: Change any reference in 
     the bill to the ``Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 
     1993'' to the ``Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 
     1994''.
       Page 2, line 5, insert before ``Section'' the following:
       (a) Reauthorization.--
       Page 2, insert the following after line 6:
       (b) Effectiveness of Statute.--Chapter 40 of title 28, 
     United States Code, shall be effective, on and after the date 
     of the enactment of this Act, as if the authority for such 
     chapter had not expired before such date.
       Page 10, redesignate section 6 as section 7 and insert the 
     following after line 20:

     SEC. 6. NATIONAL SECURITY.

       Section 597 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by 
     adding at the end the following:
       ``(c) National Security.--An independent counsel shall 
     comply with guidelines and procedures used by the Department 
     in the handling and use of classified materials.''.

  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] will be 
recognized for 5 minutes, and a Member opposed will be recognized for 5 
minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks].
  (Mr. BROOKS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment which I believe is without 
controversy. The first part merely updates the short title of the bill 
from 1993 to 1994.
  The second part simply removes any possible question that the 
underlying independent counsel statute is being revived to prevent any 
possible litigation over the effect of the lapse of the statute on 
December 15, 1992.
  Finally, the third part of the amendment makes clear that each 
independent counsel must follow the Department of Justice guidelines 
and procedures with regard to the handling of classified materials.
  There is absolutely no disagreement between the Republican and 
Democratic sides that the independent counsel should be so bound.
  Independent counsel, of course, are already bound by the operation of 
the Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 United States Code 
Appendix 4(e)1, under which the Attorney General has the sole and final 
authority regarding use or release of classified information in all 
cases.
  They are also bound by extensive regulations that implement Executive 
Order 12356, National Security Information, which governs the handling 
of classified information.
  To make all of this crystal clear, my amendment explicitly, rather 
than implicitly, requires compliance with the procedures under the 
independent counsel statute, and I would hope that my amendment will be 
acceptable to the other side, and that we could move on to the 
amendment of the gentleman from New York [Mr. Fish].
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. Is the gentleman from New York [Mr. Fish] opposed to 
the amendment?
  Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I am in opposition to the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York [Mr. Fish] is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
  Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I would like to make clear that the three amendments 
are offered en bloc, and I have no objection whatsoever to the changing 
of the date of the reauthorization, nor do I have any objection to 
clarification of the independent counsel statute as being revived.
  I do, however, wish to speak on the third part which the chairman 
offers, which requires each independent counsel to follow Department of 
Justice guidelines procedures with regard to the handling of classified 
materials. This is certainly an improvement, but it is far from what it 
might be.
  The problem with this amendment is that there is absolutely no 
sanction imposed if the independent counsel fails to follow the law or 
applicable regulations on the handling of national security documents.
  The chairman mentioned 18 U.S.C. 798 as the statute, but Mr. 
Chairman, this is absolutely unrealistic, as a practical matter, to 
expect that a special prosecutor will in turn be prosecuted under this 
statute. The only realistic sanction in this type of circumstance is to 
make the independent counsel subject to removal for good cause, and 
this is, of course, embodied in the amendment in the nature of a 
substitute that will be before the House later on by the gentleman from 
Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
  H.R. 811, the amendment before us, ignores the experience in the 
prior law, does nothing to safeguard the handling of national security 
information or classified documents. We learned this before in the Iran 
Contra investigation, about the shortcomings in this area. The example 
was cited by me and other gentlemen of the Los Angeles International 
Airport, of highly sensitive documents. I mentioned earlier the fact 
that the CIA cables with highly sensitive markings were released as 
exhibits during trials, and so forth, so this matter has been before us 
before.
  This is not addressed appropriately because of the lack of any 
sanction.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman 
from Illinois [Mr. Hyde].
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, the problem with the amendment by the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] is that it is a good amendment as far 
as it goes. It just does not go far enough. There is no sanction for 
violating the rules and regulations concerning the handling of 
classified information.
  Do the Members know that during the Walsh independent counsel 
adventure, CIA cables with highly sensitive markings were released as 
exhibits during the trial? During a motion to quash a subpoena, a 
covert agent was identified by name. Classified information was not 
redacted from pleadings. Classified material was included in official 
correspondence, which later had to be retrieved and redacted. Then it 
had to be classified. Highly sensitive documents were delivered to 
defense counsel's office in an unsecured manner.
  The worst of all was the suitcase full of classified material that 
was given away at the curb at LAX Airport and never seen again.
  It does not do to simply say, ``Follow the law.'' There has to be a 
sanction. Mr. Chairman, I am asking my friends if they want to make 
this meaningful, why not provide for removal of the independent counsel 
if he or she is found to have violated the law concerning the treatment 
of classified information.

                              {time}  1620

  What is the objection? May I ask my friend from Texas [Mr. Bryant] 
and I yield to him, what is the objection to having a sanction?
  Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, that is a fair question and there is a good 
answer for it.
  First of all, every American, no matter whether they are an 
independent counsel or not, is subject to title 18, United States Code, 
section 798, which provides criminal penalties for disclosure of 
classified information.
  In addition to that, Government employees, which independent counsel 
are, can also be punished for improper communication of classified 
information pursuant to title 50, United States Code, section 783.
  Independent counsel are also subject to 47 pages of regulations 
regarding handling of classified materials, and they can be fired for a 
serious breach of these rules. That is to say, they can be fired for 
cause and violation of any of these statutes would probably satisfy 
that standard.
  Mr. HYDE. If I can say to my friend I agree. But nothing happened, 
and these egregious breaches occurred, and the gentleman was not 
prosecuted. I cannot see the Government, the Justice Department 
prosecuting an independent counsel. I can see a motion to remove him as 
effective. I just do not think these others are effective.
  Mr. BRYANT. But if the gentleman will continue to yield, your 
complaint goes to whether or not you think the Attorney General in that 
particular period acted appropriately.
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from 
Texas [Mr. Bryant] to continue his dialog.
  Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, I just want to continue saying I think that 
the objection of the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hyde] goes to his 
view that the Attorney General did not act appropriately at that time. 
But that is a fact question. The fact of the matter is the law clearly 
gives the Attorney General the power to do that, and the Brooks 
amendment makes explicit that these independent counsel are so covered. 
That is the point of it.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. BRYANT. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.
  Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I am just trying to make it mean something, 
and I just do not think anything other than removal means a great deal. 
But I accede to the gentleman's argument.
  Mr. BRYANT. Again, I would emphasize removal is possible for an 
independent counsel for cause, and a serious violation of any of these 
standards would satisfy that requirement.
  Mr. HYDE. I thank the gentleman.
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from Texas 
[Mr. Brooks].
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 2 printed 
in House Report 103-419.


                     amendment offered by mr. fish

  Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Fish:
       Page 2, line 9, insert ``(1)'' before ``Section''.
       Page 3, strike lines 5 through 13 and redesignate the 
     succeeding paragraph accordingly.
       Page 3, insert the following after line 21:
       (3) Section 594(d)(1) of title 28, United States Code, is 
     amended by adding at the end the following: ``The General 
     Services Administration shall provide administrative support 
     to each independent counsel.''.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Fish] will be recognized for 5 minutes, and a Member opposed, the 
gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] will be recognized for 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. Fish].
  Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. FISH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, H.R. 811 would specifically require that the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts provide administrative support 
and guidance to each independent counsel. This is not a good policy 
choice because the Administrative Office is an arm of the judicial 
branch. In other words, we have a separation of powers issue here. It 
is not the appropriate agency to provide operational support for an 
executive-branch function, that is prosecution. Further, it is without 
legal authority to effectively oversee and control the expenditures of 
these offices, as a GAO audit will explain in a minute.
  The Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts made it 
clear in testimony before the Administrative Law Subcommittee that 
considered this legislation that they do not want this responsibility, 
that they are ill equipped to handle this responsibility, and, again, 
are without authority to properly oversee such expenditures by the 
independent counsel. This point is underscored in a GAO financial audit 
to the Congress dated October 9, 1992.
  I quote from page 1.

       Five of the nine independent counsels did not provide some 
     of the reports of their expenditures required by law. We 
     found that expenditures were often incorrectly recorded due 
     to serious internal control weaknesses at offices of 
     independent counsel and the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
     Courts (AOUSC), which through agreement with Justice, 
     performs the disbursing and accounting functions for 
     independent counsels.
       In addition, we found that some expenditures were 
     inconsistent with laws and regulations. Some of the instances 
     we identified may be attributable to an oversight or 
     ambiguities in the independent counsel law and a lack of 
     comprehensive guidance to help independent counsels 
     understand and follow operational and administrative legal 
     requirements. Other instances were caused by the independent 
     counsels relying on erroneous advice from AOUSC.

  My amendment would transfer the administrative support function to 
the General Services Administration [GSA], the appropriate executive 
branch agency to perform this function for an executive branch 
function.
  The GSA already has the staff and expertise necessary to provide 
procurement and administrative support for every executive branch 
agency and office. We are talking here additionally about a waste of 
taxpayers' money to duplicate services in our judicial branch.
  Placing the administrative aspects of independent counsel 
investigations in the GSA would not diminish the prosecutorial 
independence of the independent counsel which the statute strives to 
achieve.
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this amendment.
  Since the very first independent counsel was appointed, the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts--not an executive branch 
agency--has provided the administrative support for independent counsel 
and helped to ensure the independence of independent counsel from the 
executive branch. With the adjustments now made by H.R. 811, the 
Administrative Office informs us that they will be happy to continue to 
provide this assistance, building on their 15 years of experience and 
expertise in doing so.
  During the committee markup of H.R. 811, the distinguished gentleman 
from New York [Mr. Fish] offered an amendment to put the Department of 
Justice in charge of providing such administrative support. I and 
others believed that went against the whole purpose of the act--of 
avoiding the possible conflict of interest of the executive branch 
investigating itself.
  Now, the gentleman's amendment would put up another executive branch 
agency--the General Services Administration--to do the job. That takes 
us back to the same place and the same problem.
  As a well-known supporter of the General Services Administration, I 
have to draw the line here and say that it is totally inappropriate for 
that agency to be involved in these duties. Moreover, it has no 
experience in handling such things as expenditures and payrolls for 
independent counsel.
  The provisions of H.R. 811 already have it right, and I urge the 
rejection of this amendment.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I have remaining.
  Mr. Chairman, the chairman of the committee just talked about the 
Administrative Office of the United States Courts having 15 years' 
experience and expertise in this matter. I would like to quote from the 
testimony of L. Ralph Mecham, Director of the Administrative Office of 
the U.S. Courts before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and 
Governmental Relations of March 3, 1993:

       Our sole interest and concern with the legislation is 
     limited to section 3(a) (2) and (3) of the bill. . . In 
     essence, this bill would task an entity within the Judicial 
     Branch of government to support an entity--the Independent 
     Counsel--that has a prosecutorial function. The Judicial 
     Conference has concluded, and I concur, that this is an 
     inappropriate function for the Administrative Office to 
     perform, and we respectfully request that you delete us from 
     the bill.

  Continuing the testimony:

       As I am sure the Committee is aware, the Administrative 
     Office, on a voluntary basis, has provided administrative 
     support to Independent Counsels for several years. This was 
     carried out under an agreement between subordinates of my 
     predecessor and the Justice Department. I am sure this 
     agreement was entered into in an effort to accommodate the 
     Justice Department and provide a temporary service.
       The Administrative Office is caught in a ``Catch 22'' 
     position.

                              {time}  1630

       We have no authority whatsoever to enforce compliance with 
     Federal laws and executive branch regulations as they apply 
     to independent counsels on such matters as payment for hotel 
     accommodations, per diem, first-class travel, contract laws, 
     personnel regulations, accounting procedures and an array of 
     other regulatory requirements. Yet, the General Accounting 
     Office recently issued a report on the independent-counsel 
     program which criticized the administrative office for not 
     enforcing the laws and regulations, even though we have no 
     lawful power to enforce them. We have taken a series of steps 
     to correct the administrative deficiencies cited in the GAO 
     report, but the fundamental problem is that the independent 
     counsels are not answerable to the administrative office and 
     cannot be compelled to follow any guidance we might give 
     them. Yet, we are expected to issue checks and to keep the 
     balances and the independent counsels are completely free to 
     ignore any questions that we might raise.

  Mr. Chairman and my colleagues, I submit the Administrative Office of 
the U.S. Court is not the appropriate body to lend their support and 
guidance to the independent counsel, and my amendment should be 
adopted.
  Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?
  Mr. FISH. I am happy to yield to the gentleman from Texas.
  Mr. BRYANT. Mr. Chairman, I just wondered if the gentleman is aware, 
or I would like to make him aware, that subsequent to the events 
regarding the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts referred to by 
the gentleman, that office has since come in and indicated their 
readiness and willingness to continue to assume these duties.
  The CHAIRMAN. All time has expired.
  The question is on the amendment offered by the gentleman from New 
York [Mr. Fish].
  The amendment was agreed to.
  The CHAIRMAN. It is now in order to consider amendment No. 3 printed 
in House Report 103-419.


                     amendment offered by mr. fish

  Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will designate the amendment.
  The text of the amendment is as follows:

       Amendment offered by Mr. Fish: Page 6, line 11, strike 
     ``Such'' and all that follows through line 17 and insert the 
     following: ``Not more than 2 such employees may be 
     compensated at a rate not to exceed the rate of basic pay 
     payable for level V of the Executive schedule under section 
     5316 of title 5, and all other such employees shall be 
     compensated at rates not to exceed the maximum rate of basic 
     pay payable for GS-15 of the General Schedule under section 
     5332 of title 5.''.

  The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from New York [Mr. 
Fish] will be recognized for 5 minutes, and a Member opposed to the 
amendment will be recognized for 5 minutes.
  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. Fish].
  Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  (Mr. FISH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his 
remarks.)
  Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, the former law provided that the independent 
counsel receive a salary equivalent to level IV of the executive 
schedule. That is currently an annual salary of $115,700. H.R. 811 
contains confusing language that appears to allow employees of the 
independent counsel to be paid up to the same level.
  My amendment would provide that the independent counsel remain at the 
executive level IV salary, but gives him authority to hire two 
assistants at executive level V, a salary of $108,200 per year. At the 
same time, my amendment caps other assistants' salaries at that of a 
GS-15, step 10 of the Federal pay scale, or a $90,252 per year figure. 
That is the level at which other Justice Department line prosecutors 
are paid.
  Independent counsels and each of their employees, unlike all other 
U.S. attorneys or assistant U.S. attorneys, are, pursuant to this 
statute, exempted from sections 202-209 of title 18 of the U.S. Code. 
Among other things, that means that they are allowed to have collateral 
income over and above, the salary they are being paid by the U.S. 
Government.
  An independent counsel investigation and prosecution is fundamentally 
about one case--sometimes involving the prosecution of more than one 
individual--but it involves essentially one criminal case.
  Assistant U.S. attorneys, on the other hand, on average handle 
approximately one hundred criminal prosecutions per year.
  The maximum salary for all other Washington-based Justice Department 
assistant U.S. attorneys is GS-15, step 10, that is currently a salary 
of $90,252 per year.
  Assistant U.S. Attorney are covered by section 209 of title 18 which 
provides for a $5,000 fine and imprisonment for 1 year for accepting a 
salary or for supplementing a salary from any source other than the 
U.S. Government.
  With the cost of independent counsel investigations going through the 
roof, and Mr. Walsh's investigation rounding out at $40 million; and 
with the large numbers of employees hired by Walsh, which, according to 
testimony before our Administrative Law Subcommittee, included 70 
lawyers and 50 FBI and IRS agents during its 7 year reign, certainly 
the salary levels of such assistants has become a substantial cost 
factor.
  Mr. Chairman, I reserve the balance of my time.
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.
  The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Texas [Mr. Brooks] is recognized for 
5 minutes.
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.
  I want to commend my distinguished friend, the gentleman from New 
York, and I will say that I am opposed to the amendment, but I have 
been persuaded, I have seen the light, I believe that my friend from 
New York has a wonderful amendment, and I have no objections to it.
  I would suggest that we pass it by a voice vote at this point.
  Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
  The CHAIRMAN. The question is on the amendment offered by the 
gentleman from New York [Mr. Fish].
  The amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I move that the Committee do now rise.
  The motion was agreed to.
  Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker pro tempore [Mr. 
Barca of Wisconsin] having assumed the chair, Mr. Torricelli, Chairman 
of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported 
that that Committee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 811) 
to reauthorize the independent counsel for an additional 5 years, and 
for other purposes, had come to no resolution thereon.

                          ____________________