[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 10 (Monday, February 7, 1994)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: February 7, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                E X T E N S I O N   O F   R E M A R K S


                   ACDA'S NEW DIRECTOR AND HIS AGENDA

                                 ______


                          HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                        Monday, February 7, 1994

  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
has a new Director, John D. Holum, and he has set an ambitious agenda 
for his agency.
  The House of Representatives supports a revitalized Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency [ACDA]. It will be conferencing soon with the Senate 
on the Department of State authorization bill which contains provisions 
in both the House and Senate version to revitalize ACDA and improve 
congressional oversight of the agency.
  In a speech to the Arms Control Association on December 13, 1993, 
ACDA Director Holum correctly emphasized that the post-cold war setting 
has laid before us a broad range of compelling arms control, 
disarmament, and nonproliferation challenges.
  I support a revitalized ACDA and its important work, yet I must 
mention that one important arms control issue, conventional arms 
transfers, did not receive any attention in Director Holum's speech. It 
continues to trouble me that we don't seem to be able to come up with, 
nor apply, arms control solutions to the proliferation of conventional 
weaponry. Those weapons are responsible for the daily death toll and 
physical devastation occurring in so many regional wars and armed 
conflicts.
  I trust that ACDA's attention and resources will turn to this problem 
and that ACDA will work closely with the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
to try to come up with some arms control solutions to the conventional 
arms proliferation issue.
  The text of Director Holum's speech follows:

Speech by the Honorable John D. Holum, Director, U.S. Arms Control and 
   Disarmament Agency at the Arms Control Association Annual Dinner, 
                           December 13, 1993


                              introduction

       It is a pleasure to be here. That is so not least because 
     were it not for the efforts of many of you, I couldn't be 
     here in my present capacity, because the organization I am 
     now privileged to lead would not exist.
       I undertake this job with a profound appreciation for the 
     fact that the cause of arms control is sustained by its 
     strong constituency--a constituency that is potent because it 
     is manifestly public spirited, and meticulously prepared to 
     make its case. You deserve much of the credit for ACDA's 
     survival. I salute you for that, and for all your efforts to 
     promote national security and the safety of our planet.
       Of course there are others who deserve credit. In 
     particular, the President--who listened to the arguments and 
     concluded that arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament 
     are so central to our national purposes that they require 
     sustained and focused advocacy at the highest levels. 
     President Clinton, Secretary of State Christopher, National 
     Security Adviser Lake, and others in this Administration 
     clearly want ACDA to survive and succeed.
       I also want to note at the outset that whatever happens 
     next, there were profoundly important achievements before my 
     arrival--on the proper interpretation of the ABM Treaty, on 
     the testing moratorium, and on the President's solid 
     commitment to a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Much 
     credit for those, as well as for ACDA's renewed opportunity, 
     goes to the people who make up the Agency--who have persisted 
     on these issues over the years, in times of frustration as 
     well as in times of promise.
       That includes especially the heart and soul of the Agency 
     for more than a score of years, Tom Graham. I know you share 
     my gratitude for his leadership--and my conviction that he 
     should continue to have a prominent role in ACDA's main 
     endeavors.


                rebirth of acda in the post-cold war era

       ACDA now has the political support and institutional 
     structure it needs to perform its post-Cold War mission. The 
     Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Foreign 
     Affairs Committee have taken an intense interest in the fate 
     of ACDA and have helped the Agency survive and gather 
     strength. Final action by the Congress on ACDA's 
     revitalization will solidify the Agency's future.
       ACDA's central mission will be to consistently and 
     forcefully put forward its unique perspective. We have an 
     obligation to the President and Congress, and a duty to the 
     American people, to ensure that the arms control and 
     nonproliferation implications of all relevant decisions are 
     fully and fairly heard in the Executive Branch. We 
     must vigorously pursue that goal, even when we stand 
     alone--indeed, especially then, because that is when ACDA 
     is most needed.
       I am guided by the principle that arms control and defense 
     are both vital elements of the same national purpose--to 
     support the national security of the United States. Arms 
     control can reduce the risk of war by limiting and reducing 
     destabilizing military forces, by preventing the spread of 
     weapons of mass destruction or missiles, and by building 
     confidence and trust through measures designed to enhance 
     transparency. As they directly bolster our security, such 
     measures also promote other strategic priorities of U.S. 
     foreign policy such as reform in Russia and the other newly 
     independent states, and our economic goals in Asia and the 
     Pacific region. Arms control can also play an important 
     stabilizing role in support of broader political efforts to 
     resolve long-standing disputes in the Middle East and South 
     Asia.


                        the future role of acda

       I would like to offer a few personal observations about 
     ACDA's role in crucial policy areas. The Agency has always 
     played a pivotal role in unclear arms control, from the 
     negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the 1960s to 
     the monumental Cold War achievements of START and the ABM and 
     INF Treaties. This focus on controlling and preventing the 
     spread of nuclear weapons will remain a primary element of 
     ACDA's post-Cold War agenda. President Clinton's decisions to 
     negotiate a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, to 
     continue the nuclear test moratorium, and to negotiate a 
     convention banning the production of missile material for 
     nuclear weapons attest to the increased importance of nuclear 
     nonproliferation.
       But the agenda has broadened. The Missile Technology 
     Control Regime has emerged as a principal arms control 
     institution to address ballistic missile proliferation. The 
     use of chemical weapons provides substantial impetus to 
     completion of the Chemical Weapons Convention, with its 
     groundbreaking verification regime. In his address to the UN 
     General Assembly, President Clinton called on all nations, 
     including the United States, to ratify this accord quickly. 
     It was submitted to the Senate for advice and consent on 
     November 24.
       Export controls are an essential nonproliferation tool. 
     Advances in global industrialization diminish the utility of 
     such approaches, however, and force us to work even more on 
     the demand side, that is to influence the motivations of 
     countries seeking to proliferate. ACDA will place more 
     emphasis on regional arms control, whether in the Middle 
     East, South Asia, or the Korean peninsula.
       Over time I will have more to say on these and other 
     elements of our arms control strategy. Tonight I would like 
     to focus in more depth on just a few key ACDA missions and 
     issues.


                 nuclear non-proliferation treaty (npt)

       In April 1995, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty parties 
     will convene in New York for the purpose of reviewing and 
     extending the Treaty. The outcome of this Conference will 
     have a major impact on future global security. The indefinite 
     and unconditional extension of the NPT ranks among ACDA's 
     most crucial and urgent priorities. President Clinton has 
     made nonproliferation a first-order national purpose. The NPT 
     is the indispensable means to fulfill it.
       The NPT, as you know, sets forth the international norm 
     against further nuclear weapon proliferation beyond the five 
     nuclear-armed states. The NPT gives regional adversaries 
     reliable assurance about each other, so they can escape the 
     costs and perils of nuclear arms races. It legitimates global 
     responses, not just unilateral ones, when errant states 
     violate the norm--a point with special meaning now in 
     connection with North Korea. And the NPT provides for 
     comprehensive safeguards by the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency to guard against the diversion of equipment and 
     material to nuclear weapons use--an on-site inspection regime 
     more than a quarter-century old and now being strengthened.
       U.S. leadership and thorough preparations will be critical 
     to a positive outcome at the 1995 Conference. With very 
     little public attention, ACDA, as the lead agency, has been 
     at work for more than two years organizing those 
     preparations.
       In line with President Clinton's mandate, ACDA and other 
     agencies are making nonproliferation--including NPT 
     extension--a major element of U.S. bilateral relationships 
     with other countries. Senior officials of the State 
     Department and other agencies are promoting indefinite NPT 
     extension in public statements and in private conversations 
     with foreign leaders. The 1993 G-7 Summit in Tokyo and 
     several Ministerial level meetings involving NATO, the North 
     Atlantic Cooperation Council, and the Conference on Security 
     and Cooperation in Europe, have endorsed indefinite 
     extension.
       The ACDA effort includes a broad program of consultations 
     through diplomatic channels with over 100 NPT parties, 
     particularly those in the developing world. In addition, 
     during 1993 alone, ACDA led delegations to three meetings in 
     Vienna of the NPT Depositary Governments, and to meetings 
     with France and China to discuss NPT issues. The Agency has 
     led bilateral discussions this year with more than a dozen 
     other countries including Indonesia, Kenya, Mexico, Peru, 
     Morocco, Egypt, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, 
     Senegal and Thailand.
       In May, ACDA headed the U.S. delegation to the first NPT 
     Preparatory Committee meeting in New York. Decisions were 
     reached on only a few issues, but this meeting was a good 
     start to the preparations for 1995. We are hopeful that the 
     second meeting of this Committee to be held January 17-21, 
     1994, in New York will be able to resolve more of the 
     procedural and organizational questions, so we can turn 
     our attention to the important substantive issues of the 
     NPT and its extension in 1995.
       Our goal in the months between now and the Conference is to 
     convince an overwhelming majority of NPT parties that their 
     national interests are best served through an indefinite and 
     unconditional extension of the NPT. This will require 
     extensive consultations, at home and abroad.
       To intensify this effort, I have accelerated the selection 
     of the chief of our new division specifically devoted to the 
     NPT. I would like to announce tonight another important 
     organizational step.
       I have concluded that our overall NPT extension effort 
     requires a leader with nonproliferation expertise, who is a 
     highly effective advocate, who has stamina and diplomatic 
     skills of the highest order, and who has the respect of both 
     the domestic and international arms control community. Though 
     that is a rare combination of qualities, I did not have to 
     look far. Tom Graham will be undertaking this task.
       Tom will be hitting the road at once. I anticipate that he 
     will not only initiate wide-ranging consultations, but will 
     head our delegations to the Preparatory Committees. He will, 
     of course, be drawing heavily on the Nonproliferation and 
     Regional Arms Control Bureau, but I have assured him that the 
     resources of the Agency as a whole are available. We will do 
     everything we can to demonstrate to the world that nuclear 
     nonproliferation is an enduring value and to achieve the 
     indefinite extension of the NPT.


                 Comprehensive NUCLEAR Test Ban Treaty

       Another and closely related ACDA responsibility, long 
     overdue, is a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty.
       As you know, President Clinton announced the 
     Administration's support for negotiating a CTB on July 3. 
     Since then, the United States has been working hard to get 
     the negotiations off to a good start. We have been examining 
     in some detail verification and resource questions. We have 
     held a series of bilateral consultations with both nuclear 
     and non-nuclear-weapon states to discuss substantive and 
     procedural issues. The Geneva Conference on Disarmament has 
     agreed to begin CTB negotiations in January. The Conference 
     also decided that informal consultations this fall and winter 
     could help pave the way so that its Ad Hoc Committee on 
     Nuclear Test Ban could be quickly constituted and get down to 
     work.
       A CTB will strengthen the global norm against the 
     proliferation of nuclear weapons. It will also constrain the 
     qualitative development of nuclear weapons in nuclear-weapon 
     states and help to limit further weapons capability in 
     proliferant states. And although we do not accept a direct 
     linkage--for good reason--the CTB is also important to our 
     efforts on the NPT.
       Article VI of the NPT, as you know, requires ``. . . 
     negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to 
     cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to 
     nuclear disarmament. . . .'' We should not be reticent about 
     highlighting a broad range of achievements fulfilling that 
     obligation such as the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty; 
     the reduction and dismantling of tactical nuclear weapons; 
     the cuts agreed under START; and the deeper cuts under START 
     II. The Article VI achievements help make the case for 
     indefinite NPT extension. Now we can add to the Article VI 
     list the further initiatives President Clinton has announced, 
     including the commitment to negotiate a CTB.
       That, of course, leads to the question of timing. This 
     Administration is committed to achieving a CTB at the 
     earliest possible time. In my view, that is clearly different 
     from using all the available time, such as to the September 
     1996 statutory deadline. Other nuclear-weapon states have 
     their own interests, so we cannot unilaterally set the pace. 
     But we can try hard to push the process, keeping in mind the 
     implications for the NPT extension, and that is what we will 
     do.
       What happens in the meantime? There is virtually universal 
     support for the principle of a CTB. The First Committee of 
     the UN General Assembly last month approved by consensus a 
     resolution advocating a global treaty to ban nuclear weapon 
     tests--with the support of the five nuclear-weapon states.
       Nevertheless, some states may be opposed to a CTB, at least 
     for now. They would argue for 1998, or next century, or some 
     other distant date. They may be committed to negotiation, but 
     not necessarily to an early conclusion. So near-term success 
     is by no means assured. Conceivably we could arrive at the 
     NPT Conference in April 1995 with only limited progress.
       That means the nuclear testing moratorium, at least among 
     the four--China having so far ignored the urging of much of 
     the world community--is also important to success of the NPT 
     in 1995. To enter the extension conference with little 
     progress toward a CTB and active nuclear test programs by all 
     five nuclear-weapon states would make it very difficult to 
     achieve our NPT objectives. I hope it will be possible to 
     continue the moratorium under the four principles the 
     President has defined. It serves as a demonstration by the 
     nuclear-weapon states of their commitment to 
     nonproliferation, and also as insurance against a failure to 
     achieve substantial progress in the CTB negotiations by April 
     1995. That is why it, too, is a vitally important part of the 
     President's policy.


                     other nonproliferation efforts

       The Administration's nonproliferation policy also includes 
     a commitment to strengthen multilateral export controls and 
     to ensure that the International Atomic Energy Agency has the 
     resources necessary to implement its vital safeguards 
     responsibilities. We want to improve the Missile Technology 
     Control Regime and use it as a vehicle for joint action to 
     combat missile proliferation. The United States will also 
     seek increased transparency of activities relevant to the 
     Biological Weapons Convention. And we must continue to probe 
     for solutions in those regions where nonproliferation norms 
     have not taken hold.
       The President has taken a strong stand against any North 
     Korean nuclear weapon ambitions. In coordination with many 
     other countries, we are trying to persuade North Korea to 
     abide by its obligations under the NPT and to fulfill its 
     denuclearization agreement with South Korea. North Korea 
     faces stark choices. We hope it chooses the route consistent 
     with becoming a responsible member of the international 
     community.
       South Asia and the Middle East are other regions where 
     proliferation threats are acute. We are encouraging India and 
     Pakistan to join in a multilateral effort to examine regional 
     security and arms control issues. We continue to support the 
     activities of the Middle East Arms Control and Regional 
     Security Working Group. In the Middle East, it is also 
     important to keep the pressure on countries such as Iran, 
     Iraq, and Libya to abandon weapons of mass destruction and 
     missile programs.
       The Administration has taken the initiative to enhance 
     controls of fissile materials, both civil and military. We 
     have begun preliminary talks with key allies and friends on 
     ways to limit and reduce the growth in civil plutonium 
     stockpiles. This will not be an easy task, because many of 
     these states disagree with our view that reprocessing in 
     civil programs is not justified on economic grounds.
       Of particular significance for military stockpiles is the 
     President's announcement in his September 27 UN General 
     Assembly speech that the United States would press for an 
     international agreement to ban the production of separated 
     plutonium and highly enriched uranium for weapons. Such an 
     agreement could bring the unsafeguarded nuclear programs of 
     certain non-NPT states under some measure of restraint for 
     the first time. It would also advance our objectives for the 
     NPT in 1995, by removing a long-standing issue of 
     discrimination between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon states.
       Finally, I note that we are reviewing so-called negative 
     and positive security assurances for NPT non-nuclear-weapon 
     states. Coincidentally, DOD has initiated a comprehensive 
     review of our nuclear posture, which includes doctrinal 
     issues. We expect to provide views on the DOD nuclear posture 
     review before options are presented to the President. 
     Certainly, U.S. policies related to the use of 
     nuclear weapons must account for our arms control and 
     nonproliferation objectives, including strengthening the 
     NPT.


                                 START

       Another leading priority is to achieve the strategic force 
     reductions agreed to in the START Treaties. When START II was 
     signed last January, a very wise fellow, Jack Mendelsohn, 
     described it as a ``promissory note'' because it was 
     dependent on approval and implementation of START I. In fact, 
     both START Treaties linger in that status as a result of the 
     difficulties we have had in obtaining Ukrainian compliance 
     with all portions of the Lisbon Protocol, including an 
     unconditional ratification of START and adherence to the NPT 
     as a non-nuclear-weapon state.
       The START I and START II Treaties codify very substantial 
     U.S. and former Soviet warhead reductions. They are 
     profoundly important in managing the security of post-Cold 
     War Europe. The breakup of the Soviet Union drastically 
     changed the political conditions under which START I must be 
     implemented, and added a new imperative of ensuring that the 
     three successor states to the Soviet Union, other than 
     Russia, with START-limited systems on their territories--
     Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine--do not emerge as new 
     nuclear-weapon states.
       Good progress has been made with Belarus and Kazakhstan, 
     but the action of the Ukrainian Parliament last month was 
     very disappointing. The Rada's resolution of ratification 
     excluded Ukrainian adherence to Article 5 of the Lisbon 
     Protocol concerning the NPT, and lacked a clear commitment to 
     the elimination of all nuclear weapons and strategic 
     offensive arms in the Treaty's seven year period for 
     reductions.
       President Clinton has expressed his deep disappointment 
     over the Rada's action to Ukrainian President Kravchuk, 
     pointing out that several of the conditions on ratification 
     make it impossible to put the Treaty into force. President 
     Kravchuk pledged to resubmit the START Treaty and the NPT to 
     the Rada after new elections.
       We believe the best course is continue working with 
     Ukraine, pressing for full ratification and implementation of 
     the START Treaty and accession to the NPT. Meanwhile, we will 
     pursue efforts to meet Ukraine's concerns on security, on 
     facilitating the dismantlement of nuclear weapons and 
     delivery systems, and on sharing the proceeds from the sale 
     of the United States of low enriched uranium derived from the 
     nuclear weapons being returned to Russia. For example, we 
     recently signed an agreement to provide Ukraine with up to 
     $135 million in Nunn-Lugar assistance for dismantling 
     strategic nuclear arms. This aid can be quickly provided once 
     Ukraine brings into force the necessary legal framework for 
     all Nunn-Lugar assistance.


                        abm and theater defense

       Before concluding, let me say a few words about recent 
     decisions related to the ABM Treaty. I imagine there is a 
     good chance this will come up in the question and answer 
     session, but I would like to make six central points now:
       First, President Clinton has affirmed our country's 
     commitment to the ABM Treaty. Its preservation remains 
     crucial to stability, to the START I and START II reductions, 
     and to longer term strategic arms control opportunities.
       Second, in line with that, the Clinton Administration has 
     explicitly repudiated unilateral reinterpretations of the ABM 
     Treaty that would have done it grave harm.
       Third, in the Treaty's implementing body--the Standing 
     Consultative Commission--we have also withdrawn the broad 
     revisions to the Treaty proposed by the previous 
     Administration.
       Fourth, clarification of the Treaty is needed on the line 
     of demarcation between strategic defense, which are limited, 
     and theater defenses, which are not. The spread of missile 
     technology--and the reality of long lead times for designing 
     and building any military systems--makes it prudent to 
     resolve such issues sooner rather than later.
       Fifth, that clarification will be done by agreement, 
     through the SCC, rather than by unilateral pronouncement. We 
     are respecting the Treaty.
       Sixth, and finally, what any agreed clarification is called 
     as a legal matter should properly await the outcome of the 
     negotiations, and there will be consultations with the Senate 
     on that matter. A conclusion that it is an amendment would 
     have significant implications for success, of course, because 
     we have also accepted in the SCC the principle that other 
     states of the former Soviet Union should be added as Treaty 
     partners--which can seriously complicate ratification, as we 
     know from our experience on START.
       I know many of you are concerned about this issue. I have 
     read the transcript of your press conference last Wednesday. 
     But I hope you will give us credit for moving in the right 
     way to address an issue that truly does need resolution. It 
     is an approach designed to preserve, rather than undermine, 
     an agreement that remains profoundly important.


                               conclusion

       These few issues confirm that our country has a massive and 
     urgent arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament 
     agenda--including many things I have not discussed or even 
     mentioned here. By their omission I do not intend to 
     denigrate their importance--but only to appreciate how long 
     you have been waiting for the monologue to end so the 
     dialogue can begin.
       To the surprise of some, the end of the Cold War actually 
     has increased ACDA's mission. It has made the great promise 
     of START harder to realize, while at the same time creating 
     new proliferation sources, and loosening some of the 
     constraints on third countries that a bipolar structure 
     imposed. Meanwhile, as always, technology has run ahead of 
     politics and human wisdom, easing the challenge to 
     proliferators and correspondingly complicating ours.
       We have no choice but to rise to this challenge. And to do 
     that, the Clinton Administration, ACDA, and I need your help. 
     Above all that is why I wanted to be here tonight--to make a 
     direct appeal for your continued advice, ideas, and support. 
     Obviously I prefer reasoned discourse, but you are also 
     entitled to raise your voices from time to time--for cause, 
     of course.
       In return, you have my assurance that I will bring to the 
     Directorship of ACDA not only whatever intellectual resources 
     I have--but also all the energy, constancy, voice, and 
     audacity I can muster. I intend to keep faith with President 
     Clinton, with the proud history of ACDA, with its 
     extraordinary people, and with you.

                          ____________________