[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 9 (Friday, February 4, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: February 4, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
THE DECONTROL OF OUR EXPORT CONTROL STRATEGY AND THE ENDANGERING OF OUR 
                        FUTURE NATIONAL SECURITY

  Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I rise today to discuss the 
administration's policy in regard to the export of computer technology, 
and its moves in export control in general.
  I would like to say from the outset, that I am very hopeful that the 
United States does not create a situation that sacrifices our domestic 
and national security. I fully realize the need to help our economy and 
expand our exports, but we cannot endanger our future security by 
allowing dangerous dual-use technology to make its way into the hands 
of the uncontrollable rogue states that threaten the security of the 
United States and our allies.
  In their book, ``Putting People First, How We Can All Change 
America,'' Bill Clinton and Al Gore wrote, ``We can do more to stop 
weapons of mass destruction from spreading.'' They continued on by 
stating that they would get tough with countries and companies that 
sell these technologies and work with all countries for tough, 
enforceable, international nonproliferation agreements. (p. 136)
  Nothing could be farther from the truth. If you look at recent 
administration decisions in the export control arena, you will find 
that there is a distinct effort at decontrolling vast areas of 
technologies that will in fact enhance and speed the ability of rogue 
regimes to acquire technologies to advance their production of weapons 
of mass destruction.
  In a February 2, 1994 article in the Wall Street Journal, Asra Q. 
Nomani explained that Japan rebuffed U.S. attempts to redefine 
supercomputers as products operating at more than 2,000 [MTOPS] 
millions of theoretical operations per second. They only agreed to set 
the level at 1,500. With a higher level of MTOPS, more calculations can 
be made and more complicated technological operations can be conducted. 
This makes research into and production of weapons of mass destruction 
easier and faster. While some have said that this could represent an 
effort by the Japanese to keep a hold on a market that they are behind 
in, it nevertheless signals that this administration is leaning too far 
away from important national security considerations.
  Lally Weymouth, in an article in the Washington Post on February 4, 
1994, further detailed this tilt away from national security by stating 
that ``National security concerns are being sacrificed to American 
business interests.'' Ms. Weymouth also examined another important area 
of concern in the export control debate, the expiration of [CoCom] the 
Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls.
  With CoCom due to expire on March 31, 1994, the administration seems 
to be doing little to work toward any successor regime that would 
include anything close to the restrictions that CoCom enforced. Without 
a viable successor regime to CoCom, multilateral export control will be 
left to national discretion. Export control is important for all 
nations and it is a commodity that cannot be left up to the individual 
whims of each participating nation.
  If national discretion will be the case, then the only option left to 
the United States will be unilateral controls. This alternative is 
wholly unacceptable to business and would be seen as counterproductive. 
Yet, we might be left with no other choice if the administration does 
not work to toughen the future regime.
  In the end, we have to ask ourselves, do we wish to allow the 
Qadhafis, the Assads, or the Kim-Il-Sungs of the world to obtain 
technology that could one day be used against us or our allies? Do we 
wish to sacrifice short-term economic well being for future insecurity 
for our Nation and our national interests? I think not.
  This administration has downsized our military, virtually ignored our 
foreign policy, and is now jeopardizing our future security by 
decontrolling on such a massive level. What is the administration 
thinking about? We are turning inward and burying our heads in the 
sand, while the world around us is fracturing and becoming ever more 
dangerous.
  As Congress begins to hold hearings into the reauthorization of the 
Export Administration Act, we must remain cognizant of these facts and 
restructure the system so that the economy can grow through increased 
exports, yet the rogue regimes of the world will at the least be slowed 
down in their efforts to acquire such dangerous technology. If we do 
anything less, then we will be negligent in our duty. Our future 
depends upon it.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the above-mentioned 
articles be included in the Record, following my statement.
  There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

              [From the Wall Street Journal, Feb. 2, 1994]

 U.S. Is Made To Alter Plan for Computers--Its Trading Partners Force 
             Scaling Back of Proposal To Ease Export Curbs

                          (By Asra Q. Nomani)

       Washington.--The U.S. was forced by its major trading 
     partners to scale back a plan to liberalize export controls 
     on computers.
       Clinton administration officials said members of the 
     Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls 
     rejected a U.S. proposal that would have eased export 
     restrictions on computers operating up to 500 MTOPS, or 
     million theoretical operations per second, an indicator that 
     measures the speed of a computer.
       The controls, which require government approval of certain 
     exports, apply to computer sales to Cocom-proscribed 
     countries, including the former Soviet Union, other former 
     Communist countries and China.
       The officials said Cocom countries--which include Japan, 
     Australia and all members of the North Atlantic Treaty 
     Organizations except Iceland--have accepted easing 
     restrictions on computers only up to 260 MTOPS. Late last 
     year, Cocom members agreed to raise the limit to 67 MTOPS 
     from 12.5. The 260-MTOP level should include most 
     workstations on the market today, but U.S. computer makers 
     have expressed concern that it wouldn't cover products that 
     will be manufactured over the next couple of years.
       ``We settled on that because that is as high as we could 
     get as a consensus,'' a U.S. official said. ``But we haven't 
     given up on 500. It was viewed by us as an interim measure.'' 
     Another U.S. official said the administration is planning to 
     issue details of the new arrangement ``soon,'' probably in 
     the coming days.
       The U.S. officials also said Japan has refused to accept a 
     U.S. proposal defining supercomputers as products operating 
     at more than 2,000 MTOPS. In recent negotiations, the 
     Japanese drew the line at computers operating at more than 
     1,500 MTOPS. That would represent a huge boost from the 
     current definition of any computer operating over 194 MTOPS, 
     but it, too, falls short of U.S. corporate demands. Products 
     defined as supercomputers are subject to tougher export 
     controls.
       The Clinton administration laid out the 500-MTOP level as 
     one of its goals last October in a much-ballyhooed report of 
     its inter-agency Trade Promotion Coordination Committee, 
     headed by Commerce Secretary Ron Brown.
       Paul Freedenberg, a lawyer for the Computer and Business 
     Equipment Manufacturers Association and a Commerce 
     undersecretary in the Reagan administration, said he 
     understands Japan represented the main obstacle to raising 
     the limit to 500 MTOPS. ``They are essentially behind us in 
     technology, and they are suspicious the U.S. is trying to get 
     a competitive advantage,'' by easing export restrictions, he 
     said.
       Richard Barth, assistant director of international trade 
     relations and government relations at Motorala Inc., a 
     Schaumburg, Ill.-based electronics company, said ``The 
     computer industry is likely to be disappointed that the 
     administration couldn't deliver on its proposal to decontrol 
     to 500.'' Mr. Barth headed a project by the Council on 
     Competitiveness, a Washington business-backed group, that 
     lays out the cost of unilateral export restrictions. The 
     report is expected to be released tomorrow.
       Although Cocom is to be disbanded next month, the limits 
     agreed upon now are considered important because they will 
     basically define computer export controls until a new system 
     is created to set restrictions. U.S. negotiators are still 
     discussing various proposals with other Cocom members. The 
     U.S. officials said they are hopeful they can reach the 500-
     MTOP level even in a post-Cocom system, which is expected to 
     shift its focus to restrict exports to nations such as Iraq, 
     Iran, Libya and North Korea, rather than the former Soviet 
     and communist countries.
       The administration was supposed to present proposed 
     legislation covering export control reform today at a Capitol 
     Hill hearing, but hearing was postponed until next week as 
     the administration still tries to settle on its plan. The 
     administration is under pressure to liberalize export 
     controls by corporate interests, which argue the restrictions 
     are costly to the U.S. economy.
                                  ____


                (From the Washington Post, Feb. 4, 1994)

                       Good News for Rogue States

                          (By Sally Weymouth)

       The Clinton administration claims it is dedicated to 
     fighting nuclear proliferation. Indeed, on Dec. 7 (Pearl 
     Harbor Day, as it happens), Secretary of Defense Les Aspin 
     called nuclear weapons the danger ``that most urgently and 
     directly threatens America at home and American interests 
     abroad.'' Aspin argued that the United States needed a 
     counter-proliferation initiative.
       As things stand, however, the administration is presiding 
     over a massive decontrol (for export purposes) of sensitive 
     dual-use technologies--including computers, machine tools and 
     telecommunications equipment These are the very technologies 
     that rogue states require for the indigenous development and 
     production of weapons of mass destruction. The result? 
     National security concerns are being sacrificed to American 
     business interests.
       Astonishing though it may seem, decontrol is already 
     underway--prior to any assessment of the impact it will 
     likely have on American security interests. ``In Congress, 
     the wind is blowing one way: It's business that is lobbying . 
     . . to emasculate export controls,'' says one knowledgeable 
     source.
       One ardent backer of decontrolling exports long deemed 
     sensitive is Clinton's new appointee for secretary of 
     defense, William Perry. Indeed, during Perry's confirmation 
     hearings for the post of deputy secretary of defense, he 
     suggested that ``we have to draw a clean distinction between 
     defense-unique systems and . . . dual-use technology. The 
     former, we can and should control the sale [of] whenever we 
     think that's going to damage our proliferation goals. But in 
     [the case of] . . . dual-use technology, I think that's a 
     hopeless task. . . . It only interferes with a company's 
     ability to succeed internationally if we try to impose all 
     sorts of controls in that area.''
       Ken Timmerman, of former House Foreign Affairs Committee 
     staffer, offers a valid analysis of the implications of this 
     approach: ``Perry's position and the position of this 
     administration are an open invitation to proliferators 
     everywhere.''
       In the past, proliferation foes have always been able to 
     count on the Defense Department to maintain a hard-line 
     position on export controls--to fight off attempts by the 
     business community and, often, the Commerce Department to 
     loosen sensitive export restrictions. Now--with Perry's 
     confirmation probable--those concerned by the proliferation 
     of weapons of mass destruction lack a high-level advocate 
     within the administration to argue the issues from a national 
     security and nonproliferation standpoint.
       The first wave of the effort decontrol is in computers. To 
     counter rapid nuclear proliferation, it's important to 
     control the sale of highspeed computers. Countries developing 
     nuclear weapons programs seek high-speed computers to 
     accelerate the design and production of their programs. 
     Moreover, advanced computers allows states to break codes as 
     well as to develop them.
       Nevertheless, with Perry's approval, the United States 
     recently proposed decontrolling sophisticated computers up to 
     260 MTOPS--millions of theoretical operations per seconds. (A 
     very high-speed desktop computer is 12.5 MTOPS.) Moreover, 
     Washington liberalized controls on supercomputers--very high-
     speed computers--by reclassifying them from 195 MTOPS to 
     2,000 MTOPS. (The United States was only able to get Japan's 
     agreement to go to 1,500 MTOPS.)
       There's more to come in this realm. As of April 1, the 
     Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls 
     (CoCom)--which was invented to prevent the Soviet Union and 
     other Communist countries from obtaining key strategic 
     goods--will cease to exist. With no clear decision made as to 
     a successor regime, one thing is clear: CoCom will be 
     replaced by an entity that will no longer require members to 
     ``pre-notify'' the United States regarding the shipment of 
     sensitive exports. Absent this safeguard, it will be 
     impossible to stop European countries from selling dual-use 
     technology to any one of the 23 nations now pursuing programs 
     of weapons of mass destruction.
       The new U.S. policy on export controls is good news for 
     Syria, Iran and North Korea--rogue states that have close 
     working relations with one another. These outlaw states may 
     now turn to sharing missile and nuclear technology. Syria, 
     for example, has been removed from America's ``nuclear watch 
     list,'' a step that will give Damascus access via third 
     parties to high-tech computers and other key machine tools. 
     Such dual-use items are central to manufacturing technology 
     for nuclear weapons.
       This week, Congress has been holding hearings on Perry's 
     nomination (recommending him for confirmation yesterday) and 
     on a revised version of the Export Administration Act. 
     Congress plans to rewrite the statute that now gives the 
     secretary of defense the power to review sensitive dual-use 
     exports headed for the former Soviet Union, China, Poland and 
     Czechoslovakia. Ironically, the battle to keep tough export 
     controls is being led by the State Department, not by 
     Defense. In revising this act, national security concerns 
     should be addressed.
       Perry has thus far presided over what one official 
     described as a ``virtual free fall'' of export controls over 
     sensitive technologies. He has made decisions that may affect 
     America adversely in the future. In the next three to five 
     years, while the United States is sizing down its armed 
     forces, some defense experts worry that there may not be an 
     adequate defense budget to counter technological gains made 
     by other countries--gains facilitated by the new secretary of 
     defense.
       Selling American high technology to U.S. adversaries will 
     require developing new and more expensive systems. Can 
     America gamble that its ability to develop countermeasures 
     will forever outpace any offensive threat?
       ``Decontrol is going to make future wars more costly and 
     difficult to fight,'' warns one well-informed U.S. official. 
     In this context, Secretary-designate Perry would do well to 
     heed the 1976 words of President Gerald Ford: ``All nations 
     [need to] recognize that the U.S. believes that 
     nonproliferation objectives must take precedence over 
     economic and energy benefits if a choice must be made. . . 
     The goal is to prevent proliferation, not simply to deplore 
     it.''

                          ____________________