[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 7 (Wednesday, February 2, 1994)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: February 2, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                    NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR CHALLENGE

                                 ______


                          HON. LEE H. HAMILTON

                               of indiana

                    in the house of representatives

                      Wednesday, February 2, 1994

  Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, North Korea, one of the few remaining 
hardline Stalinist countries in the world, appears intent on developing 
a nuclear weapons arsenal.
  Should it succeed, stability on the Korean peninsula, where 36,000 
American troops stand guard along the demilitarized zone, will be 
threatened. Our friends in Japan and South Korea will face heightened 
pressures to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. And our global 
nonproliferation efforts will suffer a serious setback.
  Several days ago, the Washington Post published an essay by 
Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis, which sets forth many of the basic 
tenets of U.S. policy on this dangerous issue.
  Since I know that many of the Members of this House have been 
following this matter with concern, I ask that a copy of Ms. Davis's 
article be reprinted in the Record.

               [From the Washington Post, Jan. 26, 1994]

                         Korea: No Capitulation

                            (By Lynn Davis)

       Charles Krauthammer's column of Jan. 7 [``Capitulation in 
     Korea''] is so full of flaws and distorts American policy so 
     badly that the record must be set straight. The president has 
     been steady and firm in his objectives: a nonnuclear Korean 
     peninsula and a strong international nonproliferation regime.
       The stakes in Korea are high. Nuclear weapons there could 
     destabilize all of Northeast Asia and undermine the global 
     nonproliferation regime. If the North launched military 
     operations, it would be defeated, but we would be engaged 
     alongside our South Korea allies in a major war that could 
     leave destruction throughout much of the peninsula. So there 
     is good reason to give diplomacy a responsible chance before 
     turning to other alternatives.
       Before outlining our diplomatic tasks let me correct four 
     misconceptions contained in Krauthammer's article.
       First, his views are based on the erroneous premise that we 
     have agreed to ``one-time'' inspection by the International 
     Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to maintain continuity of 
     safeguards. The number and scope of inspections required is a 
     matter for the IAEA, not the United States, to decide. And 
     North Korea knows it must permit continuing, periodic 
     inspections for the IAEA to be able to certify that the 
     continuity of safeguards has been maintained.
       Second, Krauthammer mistakes an interim step for final 
     resolution of this problem. Our immediate task has been to 
     ensure that no more fissile material is diverted. Maintaining 
     IAEA safeguards does that. We will then press North Korea for 
     inspection of suspect sites and dismantling of nuclear 
     facilities.
       Third, Krauthammer unjustifiably attacks the integrity of 
     the IAEA, IAEA Director Hans Blix has been beyond reproach in 
     his handling of this issue. The United States had insisted 
     that North Korea deal directly with the IAEA so that the 
     inspectors will be able to obtain the kind of access they 
     need to maintain the continuity of safeguards. The IAEA's 
     integrity remains fully intact.
       Finally, Krauthammer called the suspension of the U.S.-
     South Korean Team Spirit exercise for 1994 a ``huge payoff'' 
     for North Korea. He is wrong again. The United States and 
     South Korea agree that Team Spirit '94 should be suspended 
     only if progress on the nuclear issue reduces the threat 
     faced by our allies. Even if Team Spirit '94 is not held, we 
     plan to continue our other major joint exercises in South 
     Korea. As the president told the South Korea National 
     Assembly last July, our defense commitment to the Republic of 
     Korea remains unshakable.
       So how will we seek to achieve our goals?
       Our immediate task has been to ensure no further diversion 
     of plutonium. For that reason, in June we told the North 
     Koreans we would meet with them only as long as they met 
     certain conditions: no refueling of their nuclear reactor 
     without IAEA inspectors present, and no breaks in the 
     continuity of IAEA safeguards. Talks between the IAEA and 
     North Korea in Vienna are now going on, and we urged rapid 
     agreement on the IAEA inspections required to maintain 
     continuity of safeguards at the seven sites in Yongbyon.
       It is essential that North Koreans comply fully with the 
     Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including the safeguards 
     agreement they signed. This includes inspection of the two 
     suspect nuclear waste sites that triggered North Korea's 
     withdrawal from the NPT in the first place.
       During our first negotiating round, the North Koreans 
     agreed to ``suspend'' their withdrawal from the NPT, but they 
     are not now living up to all of the treaty's provisions. 
     After the second round, the North agreed to begin 
     consultations with the IAEA on ``outstanding safeguards 
     issues,'' but agreement was not reached on the IAEA's request 
     for a special inspection at the suspect waste site. We will 
     continue to press the North to comply with all the NPT's 
     provisions, including access to the waste sites.
       Further, North and South Korea must fully implement their 
     Denuclearization Declaration, which includes a ban on uranium 
     enrichment and plutonium reprocessing on the peninsula. The 
     North has agreed to resume North-South talks that would 
     include discussion of this agreement, but progress has been 
     slow. We will proceed with further U.S.-North Korean 
     negotiations only after North-South exchanges and IAEA 
     inspections.
       We also seek the decommissioning and dismantling of North 
     Korea's graphite moderated nuclear reactors and its 
     reprocessing facility. The North would then be unable to use 
     these facilities to produce the plutonium needed for weapons. 
     The reprocessing plan is prohibited by the North-South 
     agreement, and North Korea has indicated its willingness to 
     convert from graphite moderated reactors to a less dangerous 
     type of light reactors for its energy needs.
       North Korea must also address our concerns about other 
     matters, including its support for terrorism, violation of 
     human rights, export of ballistic missiles and hostile 
     policy. If it does, North Korea should understand that it can 
     change from being a rogue state to an accepted member of the 
     international community.
       Krauthammer is right in asserting that we still have a long 
     way to go, but he is wrong in claiming that the United States 
     lacks resolve and a clear strategy. We are pursuing a course 
     that gives North Korea a clear choice and tests its true 
     intentions. We are prepared to take steps to help bring North 
     Korea into the family of nations, but only as it meets our 
     conditions.
       North Korea also knows that the patience of the United 
     States and the international community has its limits. We 
     will not tolerate continued stalling or repeated instances of 
     bad faith. If North Korea fails to comply with its 
     international obligations, we will have to take other steps, 
     including seeking a range of international sanctions. The 
     firm diplomatic strategy that the United States has been 
     pursuing will help ensure that the international community 
     will endorse such sanctions if they were needed.
       The United States has led the international community to a 
     consensus that gives North Korea a clear choice between 
     opening doors and increased international isolation. North 
     Korea has no illusions about what it must do to remove 
     concerns about its nuclear intentions. Mr. Krauthammer should 
     have no illusions that there is an easy fix to a complex and 
     dangerous dispute.

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