[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 6 (Tuesday, February 1, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: February 1, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT
The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
Vote on Amendment No. 1327 to Amendment No. 1326
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No.
1327 offered by the Senator from New Jersey, [Mr. Lautenberg]. The yeas
and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, before we proceed with the vote, I ask
unanimous consent that the distinguished Senator from Arizona, [Mr.
McCain] be recognized after this vote to call up an amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 1327. The yeas and nays
have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk called the roll.
The result was announced--yeas 85, nays 15, as follows:
[Rollcall Vote No. 14 Leg.]
YEAS--85
Akaka
Baucus
Biden
Bingaman
Bond
Boren
Boxer
Bradley
Breaux
Brown
Bryan
Bumpers
Burns
Byrd
Campbell
Chafee
Coats
Cohen
Conrad
Coverdell
D'Amato
Danforth
Daschle
DeConcini
Dodd
Dole
Domenici
Dorgan
Durenberger
Exon
Feingold
Feinstein
Ford
Glenn
Gorton
Graham
Gramm
Grassley
Harkin
Hatch
Hatfield
Heflin
Hollings
Hutchison
Inouye
Jeffords
Johnston
Kennedy
Kerrey
Kerry
Kohl
Lautenberg
Leahy
Levin
Lieberman
Lott
Mack
Mathews
McCain
McConnell
Metzenbaum
Mikulski
Mitchell
Moseley-Braun
Moynihan
Murray
Nickles
Nunn
Packwood
Pell
Pryor
Reid
Riegle
Robb
Rockefeller
Roth
Sarbanes
Sasser
Shelby
Simon
Specter
Stevens
Warner
Wellstone
Wofford
NAYS--15
Bennett
Cochran
Craig
Faircloth
Gregg
Helms
Kassebaum
Kempthorne
Lugar
Murkowski
Pressler
Simpson
Smith
Thurmond
Wallop
So the amendment (No. 1327) was agreed to.
Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. SIMPSON. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the Simon
amendment No. 1326, as amended.
The amendment (No. 1326) was agreed to.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask the Senator from Virginia [Mr. Robb]
if he intends to--we will proceed momentarily, by agreement, with the
Senator from Arizona. I want to inquire of the Senator from Virginia if
he intends to introduce an amendment on North Korea.
Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, if I may respond to the Senator from
Massachusetts, I was just conferring with the Senator from Arizona
about the prospect of jointly introducing an amendment or a second-
degree amendment. We have not completed that conversation. As soon as
that is complete, I will be able to respond.
Mr. KERRY. I thank the Senator from Virginia.
Let me say to colleagues that we have a couple of potential votes
backed up, which we are trying to hold temporarily. If there are any
other Senators on the list who are permitted to bring amendments, we
would greatly appreciate their coming forward now so we can begin to
put an order together and try to fit as many people in before the 6
o'clock deadline and try to arrive at some agreement, if that is
possible.
Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, if I may ask the Chair, precisely what is
the business before the Senate at this moment, the pending matter
before the Senate?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Regular order.
Mr. PRYOR. Is the Senator from Arizona next to be recognized?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes.
Mr. PRYOR. I thank the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona, Mr. McCain, is
recognized.
Amendment No. 1331
(Purpose: To express the sense of Congress regarding United States
policy toward the development of nuclear weapons by North Korea)
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask
for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain], for himself and Mr.
Dole, Mr. Nickles, Mr. Bond, Mr. D'Amato, Mr. Mack, Mr.
Gramm, Mr. Kempthorne, and Mr. Craig, proposes an amendment
numbered 1331.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 179, after line 6, insert the following new
section:
SEC. 714. POLICY REGARDING THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS
PROGRAM.
(a) Findings.--The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) On February 10, 1993, North Korea refused to permit the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct special
inspections, as permitted under the terms of the Treaty on
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), of two
undeclared nuclear-related sites to clarify discrepancies
related to North Korea's nuclear program, and on March 12,
1993, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from
the NPT effective on June 12, 1993, due to the insistence of
the IAEA on exercising inspection rights under the NPT.
(2) On April 1, 1993, the IAEA declared North Korea to be
in noncompliance with the NPT, on April 2, 1993, the IAEA
voted to refer North Korean violations of the Treaty to the
United Nations Security Council; and on April 7, 1993, the
IAEA issued a formal censure on North Korea for its
noncompliance with the NPT, the first censure in the history
of the IAEA.
(3) On May 11, 1993, the United Nations Security Council
passed a resolution asked North Korea to allow IAEA
inspection under the NPT, and on May 12, 1993, North Korea
rejected the request of the United Nations Security Council
and has since impeded or refused access to any of its sites
by IAEA inspectors.
(4) On June 2, 1993, the United States and North Korea
initiated a series of meetings in New York to discuss the
impasse in nuclear site inspections, which continued until
Januar 4, 1994, when Under Secretary of State Lynn Davis
announced that North Korea had agreed to inspections of seven
declared nuclear-related sites.
(5) discussions between the IAEA and North Korea to
implement the announced agreement to permit inspections in
North Korea have reached an apparent impasse, and the issue
is anticipated to be discussed at the IAEA Board of Governors
meeting on February 21, 1994.
(6) The People's Republic of China (PRC) has repeatedly
stated it would not support any action of the United Nations
Security Council to impose sanctions on North Korea, and the
PRC may not be cooperating fully and effectively in seeking a
resolution of this issue.
(7) The United States must clearly communicate its firm
resolve to compel North Korea to comply with the inspections
required under the NPT and has instead offered to cancel 1994
Team Spirit joint military exercises with South Korea;
indications are that numerous other concessions, such as
diplomatic recognition and economic assistance, are also
being considered.
(8) The development of nuclear weapons by North Korea would
significantly increase the already serious threat to the
safety and security of South Korea and the stability of the
Pacific region posed by North Korea's military forces, which
include--
(A) an army of 1,200,000 men, much of which is positioned
near the border with South Korea;
(B) an estimated 250 tons of biological and chemical
weapons; and
(C) extended range SCUD-C missiles reportedly armed with
chemical warheads, No Dong missiles, and possibly a much
longer range intermediate-range ballistic missile in
development.
(b) Policy.--It is the sense of the Congress that--
(1) North Korea must halt its nuclear weapons program and
fully comply with the terms of the NPT and the January 30,
1992, full-scope safeguards agreement agreed to by North
Korea and the IAEA;
(2) the President should seek international consensus to
isolate North Korea economically until North Korea halts its
nuclear weapons program and reaches acceptable agreement with
the IAEA on inspections of its nuclear facilities and those
inspections have begun;
(3) the President should support United States-South Korea
joint military exercises as an expression of commitment to
the United States-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty of
1954;
(4) the President should ensure that sufficient United
States military forces are deployed in the Pacific region,
including the deployment of Patriot batteries in South Korea,
in order to be prepared to effectively defend South Korea
against any offensive action by North Korea;
(5) the President should make resolution of this issue a
matter of urgent national security security priority; and
(6) an ``acceptable agreement'' between the IAEA and North
Korea should include regular inspection of all declared
nuclear sites as well as special inspections of any suspected
nuclear-related site, as agreed to by North Korea in the
January 30, 1992, full-scope safeguards agreement with the
IAEA.
(c) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
(1) the term ``IAEA'' means the International Atomic Energy
Agency;
(2) the term ``NPT'' means the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done on July 1, 1968 at
London, Moscow, and Washington; and
(3) the term ``safeguards'' means the safeguards set forth
in an agreement between a country and the IAEA, as authorized
by Article III (A)(5) of the Statute of the International
Atomic Energy Agency.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I want to say, as I proceed with my
remarks, that the Senator from Virginia brings up a very important
point about the possible reintroduction of nuclear weapons in the event
of our failure to bring about a halt in the North Korean nuclear
capability. Perhaps by the time I finish my remarks, the Senator from
Virginia and I will be able to incorporate his proposal into my
amendment, but we will also have the Senator from Massachusetts look at
it. There is a puzzled look on the face of the Senator from
Massachusetts, and I understand that. I say to him that I recognize he
has agreed to accept just my amendment. The Senator from Virginia has
the right to either modify my amendment or propose an amendment in the
form of a second degree, as is proper parliamentary procedure. Or the
Senator from Virginia suggests that perhaps he just propose his
amendment following mine. Would that be the easiest?
Mr. KERRY. First of all, I do not know if the microphone of the
Senator from Arizona is working. I am having a hard time hearing.
Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Senator.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, if my friend will yield for a moment, I can
answer his question. I think the Senator from Virginia is disposed to
proceed separately after the Senator. We remain prepared to accept the
amendment. I will discuss it in a moment.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask the indulgence of my friend from
Virginia. I have an amendment on Thailand which will be accepted at the
end of this particular amendment.
I rise on behalf of myself, Senator Dole, and others, to offer this
amendment regarding the United States policy with respect to the North
Korean nuclear program.
Mr. President, this amendment expresses the sense of Congress
regarding the continued intransigence of North Korea in refusing to
comply with the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. For
nearly a year, North Korea has refused to allow access to its nuclear-
related facilities, as required under its safeguard agreements with the
International Atomic Energy Agency.
The International Atomic Energy Agency has not formally declared a
break in the continuity of safeguards on nuclear-related facilities in
North Korea, but inspections have not been permitted since last
January. This raises serious questions as to the possibility of
diversion of nuclear material to a weapons development program--a
situation which cannot be permitted to stand unchallenged and
unexplored.
The administration has been unsuccessful in resolving this issue, and
this amendment sets forth a firm new policy approach designed to
demonstrate United States resolve and to encourage North Korea's
agreement to permit inspections at all of its nuclear-related sites.
In general, this amendment urges the President to use strong measures
to accomplish the primary objective--halting the North Korean nuclear
weapons program and implementing the full-scope safeguards agreement
between North Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Let me briefly explain the most significant points of the policy
which this amendment urges the President to adopt:
First, the amendment urges the President to seek international
consensus to impose sanctions and other measures to isolate North Korea
economically until IAEA inspections resume. While the administration
has threatened to impose sanctions through the U.N. Security Council,
they have effectively left the decision to seek such sanctions to the
IAEA. Unless the International Atomic Energy Agency admits defeat in
its efforts to gain North Korea's agreement to resume inspections, the
United States will not press for U.N. action to impose economic
sanctions. Instead, the administration should take the lead now in
seeking a multilateral economic embargo on North Korea in order to
compel them to agree to inspections and stop building nuclear weapons.
(Mr. LIEBERMAN assumed the chair.)
Mr. McCAIN. Second, the President is urged to support United States-
South Korea joint military exercises as a demonstration of our
commitment to our South Korean allies. The amendment rejects the
administration's ill-advised linkage of these exercises with North
Korea's willingness to live up to its international commitments.
Third, the amendment calls on the President to ensure that sufficient
United States forces, including Patriot missiles, are deployed in South
Korea to adequately defend our ally against any aggressive action by
the North. General Luck, commander of United States forces in Korea,
has requested Patriot systems in order to counter Scud missiles from
the North. The administration should immediately approve the deployment
of these systems to better defend our troops against possible attack.
This amendment does not specifically authorize the President to use
military force to compel North Korea's compliance with the NPT. The
President should, however, use all means necessary to achieve that
goal, and there are many such options available to him. In addition to
continued diplomatic pressure, the President should seek multilateral
support for an economic embargo against North Korea. He should urge
Japan to stop the flow of hard currency from resident North Koreans to
their homeland. He should seek full cooperation from the Chinese in any
multilateral sanctions on North Korea, by making clear to China that
renewal of most-favored-nation status will be conditioned upon China's
demonstrated efforts to compel North Korea to comply with the NPT.
This amendment states that resolving the stalemate on nuclear
inspections in North Korea is a matter of the highest national security
priority. I believe that the President should very seriously consider
the use of all necessary means, including military force, in the event
that all other measures fail to achieve the desired result of halting
the North Korean nuclear weapons program. I do not say this lightly,
and I do not advocate the use of force at this time. But I believe that
it must be made very clear to the North that their refusal to comply
with their freely undertaken international obligations will not be
tolerated by the United States.
the north korean threat
Mr. President, the greatest challenge to U.S. security and world
stability today is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
The most dangerous and immediate expression of that global threat now
confronts American forces across the Korean DMZ.
There can be no serious doubt that our vital national interests are
imperiled by North Korea's nuclear program and the war they have
threatened to protect it. If North Korea possesses or soon obtains
nuclear weapons, the threat it poses to the region will multiply
exponentially, as will proliferation in Asia.
Every action taken in Washington should reaffirm to Kim Il Song that
the price of North Korea's lawlessness and belligerency is too great
for even the most inhumane regime to endure. So far, the administration
has signaled an accommodationist mentality that will only embolden
North Korea and encourage other nations to engage in proliferation.
CIA Director Woolsey has stated publicly that United States
intelligence indicates that North Korea has extracted enough plutonium
from its reactors to build two bombs. There are some estimates that
they possess 12 kilograms of plutonium. Yet, the administration seems
not to recognize the urgency of a situation wherein North Korea may
possess nuclear weapons and may be purposely delaying resumed
inspections in an effort to extract additional plutonium and produce
additional nuclear bombs.
My colleagues should also know that North Korea's Scud missiles are
capable of carrying primitive nuclear warheads to Seoul. North Korea is
continuing to develop its No Dong series of missiles which could carry
nuclear warheads to Japan.
The administration's efforts have been aimed at securing North
Korea's agreement to allow the IAEA to resume inspections under the
safeguards agreement, including maintaining recording devices at
Yongbyon that will reduce the likelihood that the plutonium will be
diverted to weapons production. The administration has yet to address
the possibility that North Korea may have other means to obtain
weapons-grade nuclear material beyond those currently in question, such
as centrifuges, calutrons, or chemical separation. As we belatedly
discovered in Iraq, these means of producing fissionable material are
harder to detect. It is also unclear whether the IAEA can provide
absolute assurances that the Yongbyon reactor does not have concealed
chambers to produce additional small amounts of plutonium in ways that
normal inspections will not detect.
Another important consideration is the military threat to our allies
in South Korea.
Canceling military exercises with our South Korean allies is quite
possibly the worst signal the United States could send to an
increasingly bellicose North Korea, indicating in advance to North
Korea the profits to be realized in proliferation and saber rattling.
By canceling Team Spirit exercises, the administration has taught
would-be aggressors throughout the world that, if you want American
military exercises canceled, violate an international treaty.
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the
North Korean Army has increased its tank force by 40 percent and its
artillery pieces by 50 percent. Much of the North's 1.2 million-man
army is massed on the border, with combat ready units poised for attack
at strategic locations.
Experts have estimated North Korea's current stockpile of biological
and chemical weapons at 250 tons, with 13,000 North Korean troops
trained to use them. North Korea has reportedly armed its Scud missiles
with chemical warheads, and we do not yet have Patriot batteries in
place to protect our forces from their use.
Unfortunately, the administration has shown a willingness to bargain
with North Korea separately from South Korea. It has issued vague
promises about normal relations and economic assistance, while broadly
hinting at our willingness to cancel military training exercises with
our South Korea allies.
Initially, President Clinton responded to this crisis by emphatically
stating that the United States would not allow North Korea to possess
nuclear weapons. After CIA Director Woolsey indicated North Korea's
probable possession of weapons-grade plutonium, the administration then
seemed content to oppose the North's emergence as a serious nuclear
power. This dangerous vacillation by the Clinton administration will
only encourage North Korea to dismiss the President's latest opposition
as quickly as it dismissed his original pronouncement.
the new policy
Now is the time for the administration to reverse its image abroad as
vacillating and insecure. There is nothing to be gained and much to be
lost by being frightened into appeasement for the sake of a single
concession which in the end may not matter very much. North Korea is
testing our resolve. Let us make certain they understand how grave are
the consequences of their unlawful ambitions.
We should emphatically make clear that we do not rule out any
potential response to North Korea's continued intransigence, including
a military response. We should insist that North Korea discontinue its
nuclear weapons program immediately and that it open all of its
nuclear-related facilities to international inspection.
The United States should begin devoting its energies to building an
international consensus to further economically isolate North Korea.
Our diplomacy should be conducted with forceful representations of our
seriousness. We should make it as difficult as possible for other
nations to resist our efforts.
To make sanctions effective against the insular economy of North
Korea, President Clinton must insist on full cooperation from China--
now. Secretary of State Warren Christopher dismissed China's repeated
opposition to sanctions as something less than China's final word on
the subject. The Secretary should focus his immediate efforts on making
certain that China's next pronouncement on the subject proves his
current optimism to be well-founded.
We should put the case plainly to China: All benefits derived from
their relationship with the United States--from most-favored-nation
trade status to licenses for the transfer of supercomputers and
satellite technology--will be directly connected to China's full
implementation of sanctions, should they prove necessary, and its
central involvement in efforts to prevent North Korean proliferation
and aggression. Currently, United States policy toward China is
primarily focused on human rights and trade disputes. These are
appropriate concerns for United States diplomacy, but proliferation,
and more specifically, Chinese aid and comfort to North Korean
proliferation, should be treated by the administration as the most
urgent problem in our relations.
The United States should begin making all the force improvements
necessary to enhance our conventional and rapid deployment capabilities
in South Korea, including the immediate deployment of Patriot batteries
to protect United States soldiers. Our forces should be fully ready to
repel aggression irrespective of whether North Korea's bellicosity is
real or contrived to intimidate American diplomacy. Joint military
exercises are a necessary determinant of our readiness. Finally, we
should make unambiguously clear to Pyongyang that any use of weapons of
mass destruction against South Korea will be met with greater
retaliation in kind.
urgency
Almost a month ago, Under Secretary of State Lynn Davis announced
triumphantly that North Korea had agreed to discuss with the IAEA the
resumption of inspections, despite well-founded fears that North Korea
would permit only one-time inspection of its seven declared nuclear
sites. Further, North Korea steadfastly refused access to its nuclear
waste sites. Now these discussions with the IAEA have apparently run
into another intentional roadblock set up by the North Koreans, and
they are refusing inspections of even the declared sites.
On February 21, the IAEA board of governors will meet, and if an
agreement with North Korea has not been reached at that time, the IAEA
will consider appropriate action. The IAEA may vote to refer this issue
to the United Nations to seek economic sanctions or other measures to
compel North Korea to comply with the NPT.
How much longer can we tolerate North Korean intransigence on this
vital national security issue? Every day that North Korea stalls
inspections is another day's advance toward acquiring additional
nuclear weapons. This amendment recognizes the need for decisive action
now, to prevent any increase in the North Korean threat.
conclusion
Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to vote for this important
amendment. I have worked with my colleagues on the other side to craft
this amendment so that it would have broad bipartisan support. Although
my remarks have been critical of administration policy to date, they
were not made, nor was this amendment offered, to score partisan
political points. I feel very strongly that U.S. policy on this
question is in urgent need of revision. I sincerely hope the
administration recognizes the weakness of its previous response to this
crisis, and takes immediate action to recover the advantage in our test
of wills with North Korea.
The clear and present danger which a nuclear North Korea poses to the
United States and our allies does not automatically confer on North
Korea a position of greater strength in this contest with us. Only a
failure of nerve on the part of U.S. policymakers can do that.
North Korea's economy is tottering on the verge of total collapse.
Pyongyang desperately needs to open its economy to the West to
forestall complete economic ruin and the political changes that will
likely accompany it. And despite their bellicose posturing, North
Korea's military leaders must recognize that they are unlikely to win a
war with South Korea and the United States or even emerge from the
conflict with their regime intact.
The United States and our South Korean allies still occupy the better
ground in this crisis. But we are squandering that advantage every day
we allow North Korea to believe that it can extract from us military,
diplomatic, and economic concessions without abandoning its nuclear
program entirely.
Mr. President, a Wall Street Journal article dated January 31 fairly
summarizes the current dilemma facing the United States, and quotes the
critical assessment of the administration's current policy by David
Kay, the leader of United Nations inspection teams in Iraq. Kay charges
that:
By negotiating inch by inch, North Korea has gotten what it
apparently wanted: more time to work on its nuclear weapons--
and the missiles to carry them--without outside interference.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this Wall Street Journal
article be printed in the Record following the conclusion of my
remarks, along with a column by Charles Krauthammer that
appeared in the Washington Post on January 7, 1994.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. McCAIN. By our reluctance to aggressively challenge North Korea's
nuclear program--a reluctance which can be fairly criticized as a
failure of nerve--we have gone a long way to build the confidence of
North Korean leaders what they can intimidate the United States into
tolerating their nuclear power pretensions while allowing economic
lifelines to be thrown to their dysfunctional economy. We may have gone
a long way as well toward reinforcing their suspicions that the United
States no longer has the will to defend our interests in Korea and the
rest of Asia by whatever means necessary.
Despite the ground we have already conceded, we can recover some of
it by immediately returning to a zero tolerance policy. Yes, Seoul is
uniquely vulnerable. It is within reach not only of North Korean
artillery, but quite possibly within reach of its nuclear weapons.
However, Pyongyang is well within reach of ours.
We should make abundantly clear to Kim II Song that as economic ruin
and political collapse will accompany their continued intransigence on
this issue, utter destruction will accompany their resort to force. We
have served up enough carrots to North Korea. The time has come to show
them the stick.
To paraphrase Churchill, let it not be said one day that in a
definite cisis, the United States faced a choice between accommodation
and the prospect of war; that we chose accommodation first and got war
later.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
[From the Wall Street Journal, Monday, Jan. 31, 1994]
Exhibit 1
Check of North Korea Nuclear Sites Won't Provide Comfort Clinton Wants
(By John J. Fialka)
Washington.--Earlier this month, Undersecretary of State
Lynn Davis was asked on the ``MacNell-Lehrer'' program how
the U.S. could be confident that a diversion of nuclear
materials wasn't going on at North Korea's Yongbyon research
facility.
``Well, because we've had this safeguards regime in place
over the past year, and, indeed, had an inspection in August,
so it isn't that we haven't been carrying out this regime,''
she answered.
But officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
the Vienna-based group that actually carried out that August
inspection, paint a vastly less rosy picture. Its inspectors,
the group says, were literally left groping in the dark. They
were permitted to leave their barracks-like guest quarters at
Yongbyon, 60 miles north of Pyongyang, only after 6 p.m. As
night fell, they were escorted into the pitch-black innards
of several buildings. There, using flashlight because the
buildings' lights were kept out, the inspectors only replaced
the batteries and videotape in cameras that they use to
monitor some parts of the facility. End of inspection.
``Our August inspection was not a good one. It was
something we launched unwisely,'' says David Kyd, a spokesman
for the IAEA.
u.s. accentuating the positive
As the IAEA negotiates for a fresh look at seven declared
nuclear sites at Yongbyon, the administration is again
accentuating the positive. Ms. Davis, for instance, has
predicted that the agreement the U.S. has won from North
Korea will allow the IAEA to ``tell the rest of the world
that there are no dangerous activities occurring in North
Korea with respect to nuclear weapons.''
But while outside experts disagree over just how to handle
the North Korean situation, there is widespread agreement on
one thing: It is probably impossible now for the IAEA to
ensure anything like the level of comfort the administration
is promising.
David Kay, a former Central Intelligence Agency analyst who
led United Nations Inspection teams in Iraq, says the
possibility that North Korea may already have at least one
nuclear weapon makes an IAEA declaration that there are no
dangerous activities under way in North Korea extremely
unlikely.
``The agreement calls for the inspection of only seven
declared sites. Now no one believes that the bomb is going to
be in the basement of any of those sites,'' Mr. Kay asserts.
`this is a joke'
Administration officials express hope that further
bargaining will gain IAEA access into other sites where they
suspect bomb-making activity has gone on. To that, Albert
Wohistetter, a sometime Pentagon consultant who is considered
the dean of U.S. thinkers on how to contain the spread of
nuclear weapons, has a short answer: ``This is a joke.'' The
administration, Mr. Wohistetter thinks, has vastly oversold
the ability of IAEA inspections to penetrate the deep secrecy
of North Korea, where Stalinist dogma approaches Orwellian
levels of control.
``A lot of this stuff becomes a dream if you're not talking
about an open society. You're talking about a society where
whistle-blowers commit suicide. * * * I really feel that
people are getting off the point.''
The point that he and others are focusing on is that if
North Korea has the bomb or has drawn off enough plutonium
from its ``peaceful nuclear research'' to make one or two
nuclear devices--as the CIA has suggested--then the
relationship between the isolated regime of Kim Il Sung and
its neighbors has already changed, and IAEA-style inspections
won't be able to reduce the perception of danger.
Critics say the extravagant claims for the IAEA are in
keeping with the administration's uncertain handling of the
entire North Korean nuclear issue. The Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, says Mr. Kay, requires that ``either
you completely give up your bomb program the way South Africa
has, with intrusive inspections to prove you have given it
up, or else you get out'' of the treaty. But by negotiating
inch by inch, North Korea has gotten what it apparently
wanted: more time to work on its nuclear weapons--and the
missiles to carry them--without outside interference.
Kongdan Oh, a Rand Corporation analyst who closely follows
North Korea, says that the U.S. ``showed the worst aspect of
negotiators. We showed them Americans are impatient for
results. They [North Koreans] played the game much tougher.
Now we look like we are giving things away. It's a very sad
situation.''
By hanging tough, Pyongyang appears to have won the
termination of this year's Team Spirit joint exercise between
U.S. and South Korean forces. This was the carrot that was
originally dangled before Pyongyang as a lure to get them
back into the treaty, but the Pentagon didn't enhance it much
by failing to put the funds for the exercise in its 1994
budget.
U.S. Intelligence estimates see North Korea with, at best,
a primitive nuclear device. First-generation nuclear weapons
weight at least 1,100 pounds. North Korea has Scud missiles
capable of carrying such a load to Seoul and is developing
the Nodong-1, which could carry such a warhead to parts of
Japan North Korean engineers are still trying to perfect the
guidance system for the missile, a process that could take
several more months.
Meanwhile, North Korea continues to lay the groundwork for
further delays. At Pyongyang's request, the IAEA has twice
written lengthy explanations of what it wants to inspect.
Last week, North Korea asked for a third. So far, it has
refused to resume diplomatic dialogue with South Korea. Both
the inspection and the dialogue are prerequisites for talks
leading to a ``package solution'' outlined by the U.S.
After U.S. officials made it known last week that they are
considering sending Patriot air defense missiles to protect
ports and airfields that would be needed for U.S. forces to
reinforce South Korea, Pyongyang issued a statement saying
that the real reason for the missiles ``is to impede the
progress of the DPRK [North Korea]-U.S. talks for a
fundamental solution to the nuclear issue.''
According to U.S. officials, the IAEA can end the impasse
by simply declaring that it can no longer assure the
continuity of its safeguards efforts. If the delays continue,
such a statement is likely on Feb. 22, when the agency's
board of governors holds its next meeting. That would send
the matter back to the U.N. Security Council, which would
then consider imposing economic sanctions.
Although U.S. negotiators are feeling heat from the White
House to resolve the North Korean problem, some suggest that
the U.S. shouldn't be in such a hurry. Rand's Ms. Oh, for
example, suggests that it is North Korea that ought to feel
that time is running against it. With their poverty-stricken
economy verging on total collapse, she says, Kim II Sung and
his son and annointed successor, Kim Jong II, are desperate
for Western aid. But if they open their economy to the
outside influences that come with aid from the West, Ms. Oh
believes, their regime will collapse.
``The country that has to be nervous is North Korea, not
us,'' she insists. ``But for some reason, we are the nervous
party.''
____
[From the Washington Post Jan. 7, 1994]
Capitulation in Korea--Clinton's Cave-in Makes a Joke of the NPT
(By Charles Krauthammer)
When I wrote six weeks ago regarding the U.S. attempt to
stop the North Korean nuclear bomb program that ``by year's
end . . . there will be no more room for wobble. The choice
will be blockade or surrender,'' I half expected this wobbly
president to surrender. But even I was stunned by the extent
of the capitulation in the deal the State Department has just
made with North Korea. The place to properly sign an
agreement of this kind is on the deck of the battleship
Missouri. It is unconditional surrender.
Start at the beginning. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT), which North Korea freely signed, requires a country to
allow two kinds of inspections of its potential nuclear
facilities: regular inspections of self-declared nuclear
sites and challenge inspections of sites undeclared by the
host country but suspected by the world of harboring nuclear
bomb work.
As we learned to our sorrow in Iraq, regular inspections
alone are useless. Iraq built a huge nuclear program while
faithfully allowing international inspectors to pore over its
declared sites.
Which is why last year the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) demanded challenge inspections of two North
Korea waste dumps for evidence of weapons-grade plutonium
production. North Korea refused. It then announced that it
would not allow regular inspections either.
What did the Clinton administration do? It began a long
series of negotiations with the North Koreans offering them
all kinds of goodies, most important, cancellation of our
joint military exercises with South Korea if they would come
back into compliance with the NPT.
Now the administration has reached agreement. What is the
deal? Does North Korea comply with the NPT? No. Does it allow
challenge inspections? No. Does it allow even regular
inspections, which the administration itself declared last
year to be inadequate? No. What then? The IAEA will be
allowed a one-time inspection of seven declared sites. (The
issue of more inspections has merely been deferred, not
dropped, administration officials tell The Post's R. Jeffrey
Smith. Which is, of course, an admission that the deal just
concluded ensures nothing more than a one-shot inspection.)
In return, North Korea reportedly gets something it has
coveted for years: cancellation of our ``Team Spirit''
exercises with South Korea.
``A total rout,'' says Gary Milhollin, director of the
Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. As the talks have
proceeded, Clinton has systematically abandoned one position
after another to the point that we are not even talking about
things--challenge inspections, even regular inspections--that
we were insisting on only months ago.
Everyone knows that a single inspection of Potemkin sites
is a joke. Why then the pretense?
Because the administration has a problem. It wants at all
costs to get this problem off its plate, but the NPT has
tough provisions to thwart the temptation to do so.
Specifically, when a country reneges on its NPT obligations
and refuses inspections, the IAEA declares that ``continuity
of safeguards is broken.'' These magic words are supposed to
trigger a world response against the violator.
Hans Blix, head of the IAEA, was getting ready to use
exactly those words at a United Nations speech on Nov. 1 but
held off, much to the relief of the administration. With IAEA
surveillance cameras and batteries in North Korea now about
to go dead, however, Blix would have had no choice but to
declare continuity broken.
So some genius figures out that a one-time inspection would
allow battery and film to be replaced and the IAEA to say
that, technically, continuity had not been broken. No whistle
blows, we pretend that the NPT is intact, and the crisis goes
away.
True, the one-time inspection would do nothing to stop,
slow down or even enlighten us about the North Korean nuclear
program. But the point of the Clinton policy is not to stop
the North Korean bomb. It is to get the administration off
the hook.
Hence the deal. Result? (1) The NPT is dead. North Korea
broke it and got a huge payoff from the United States not for
returning to it but for pretending to. Its nuclear program
proceeds unmolested. In Tehran and Tripoli and Baghdad the
message is received: Nonproliferation means nothing.
(2) The IAEA, if it goes along with this sham, is corrupted
beyond redemption. It is supposed to be an impartial referee
blowing the whistle on proliferators. Yet if Washington does
not want to hear the whistle, the IAEA can be bullied into
silence.
(3) American credibility--not very high after Clinton's
about-faces in Bosnia, Somalia and Haiti--sinks to a new low.
This is a president easily cowed and dangerously weak. Said
one government official to the New York Times, ``It's one of
these cases where the administration was huffing and puffing
and backed down.'' Better though, said another, than
``falling on our own sword over phony principle.'' If
nonproliferation, so earnestly trumpeted by this president,
is a phony principle, then where do we look for this
president's real principles?
This administration would not recognize a foreign policy
principle, phony or otherwise, if it tripped over one in the
street. The State Department, mixing cravenness with
cynicism, calls this capitulation ``very good news.'' For Kim
II Sung, certainly. For us, the deal is worse than dangerous.
It is shameful.
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I am pleased to be a cosponsor of the McCain
amendment which expresses the sense of Congress on United States policy
toward North Korea.
The nuclear crisis in North Korea was sparked by North Korea's
refusal last February to permit the International Atomic Energy Agency
to conduct special inspections. Four weeks later North Korea announced
that it would withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
After months and months of diplomacy--including direct talks with the
North Koreans--the administration is no closer to resolving this issue
than when the North Korean announcement was made. Sure, North Korea has
suspended its withdrawal, but it has agreed to stay in the NPT on its
own terms only.
on January 4, 1994, Under Secretary of State Lynn Davis announced
that North Korea had agreed to allow inspections of seven declared
sites--but, not challenge inspections of undeclared sites.
Nevertheless, about 2 weeks later, the North Koreans once again
rejected the IAEA's inspection demands.
Clearly, direct diplomacy and offers of concessions--such as the
canceling of Team Spirit exercises and light water reactor technology--
have gained us nothing. On the other hand, the North Koreans have
gained almost 1 year to further develop their nuclear weapons program.
News reports citing United States intelligence estimates indicate that
North Korea probably already possesses the nuclear materials needed to
build one or two bombs. Moreover, the North Koreans have been testing
the Nodong missile, and may have an intermediate range ballistic
missile in development.
Nevertheless, until now the administration's approach has been all
carrots and no sticks. Yes, the North Koreans are having their carrot
cake and eating it, too.
It is high time to chart a new course, and the course outlined in the
McCain amendment is the way to go. Pyongyang must be told in no
uncertain terms that the United States will not tolerate a North Korean
nuclear capability. Period. And, the United States must show--through
its actions, not its words--that we are committed to taking the
unilateral and multilateral steps to back up our position. We must seek
to isolate North Korea economically and we must demonstrate our
commitment to South Korea by increasing our military presence in the
Pacific and proceeding with joint United States-South Korean military
exercises. The President has before him a request from the United
States commander in South Korea for Patriot missiles. I hope that the
President will not only expeditiously approve that request, but review
other options for beefing up South Korea's defensive capabilities and
our military presence in the region.
Some may ask, what is at stake in North Korea? What is at stake is
the safety of 37,000 United States troops in South Korea, the security
of South Korea, the stability and prosperity of Asia, the integrity of
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and finally, the credibility of
the United States.
If we fail to get tough now, we will have to live with the
consequences of a nuclear North Korea which can threaten and coerce our
friends and trading partners in Asia, and further spread nuclear
technology and materials to hostile, terrorist regimes and groups.
Mr. President, the time is now for the President to take a firm
stand. I hope that my colleagues will be unanimous in support of the
McCain amendment. I think it would help the administration in their
negotiations with North Korea.
Mr. BOND. Mr. President, the situation on the Korean peninsula
continues to simmer along without adequate attention from the
administration.
It has been nearly a year since North Korea precipitated the crisis
by announcing its intention to withdraw from the NPT Treaty.
Unfortunately, the administration failed to take strong action at that
time and, in fact, seemed to ignore it almost until the end of last
year.
The last time I addressed this issue on the floor, I expressed my
concern that President Clinton and Secretary Christopher seemed
determined to be manipulated by Pyongyang. Instead of laying out
exactly where the issue stood, taking a tough stand, and taking steps
to assemble an international coalition to force North Korea to submit
to international inspection or suffer the consequences; the
administration seemed willing to offer concessions in exchange for mere
promises. In December, I was somewhat heartened when the administration
appeared to be taking a tougher stand, but then last month we witnessed
the spectacle of our negotiator announcing an agreement only to be
directly contradicted 2 weeks later when North Korean officials
announced that they would not submit to IAEA inspections.
It is bad enough that this sequence of events makes the United States
look like weak negotiators in the eyes of the world, thereby weakening
our ability to assemble a coalition in opposition to the North. Just as
bad, however, is that by negotiating for almost a year, we have given
the North Koreans exactly what they most wanted--the extra time they
needed to continue work on their nuclear program and, according to some
government sources, probably to complete a nuclear weapon.
It is imperative that North Korea halt its nuclear weapons program
and comply with the terms of the NPT. If we allow them to do otherwise,
we will suffer the consequences for a long time to come.
The dangers posed by North Korea's threat to withdraw from the NPT
and go forward with development of nuclear weapons are many.
The most obvious danger is the risk of war. South Korea whose
capital, Seoul, lies less than 30 miles from the million-man army
deployed on its northern border faces the greatest threat. The
North's conventional artillery alone is a huge threat to the South.
Ballistic missiles--of which the North has many--greatly increase the
threat. And the addition of nuclear weapons would cause that threat to
skyrocket. Not only are millions of Koreans at risk, but 36,000
American soldiers and their families are there as well. Though we would
certainly win any war on the Korean peninsula, the cost in lives and
dollars would be staggering.
A second danger we face is nuclearization of the region. We know the
North Koreans have tested ballistic missiles with significant ranges,
including the Nodong I which has the ability to hit several countries
including most of Japan. These countries have to feel threatened
already--knowing that North Korea possessed nuclear weapons as well as
missiles would likely force them to respond by developing their own
nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that the Japanese have the
technology to develop nuclear warheads in short order, and there is
little doubt that South Korea could quickly follow. Such a
nuclearization of Southeast Asia could only raise tensions among
neighboring countries including China and Russia which already possess
nuclear weapons. The result would be that an area of the world that is
about to explode with the greatest spurt of economic growth in history
could instead explode into deadly nuclear warfare.
A third danger posed by our failure to deal with North Korea is the
precedent it would set. A decision by the Clinton administration and
the rest of the civilized world to allow North Korea to get away with
flaunting its obligations under the NPT would signal to other nations
that they too should develop nuclear weapons and blackmail us as well.
The administration needs finally to take strong action. It appears
that they may be forced into action by the IAEA which is set to meet
later this month. If the IAEA board of governors finds that it can no
longer certify the North's compliance with the NPT, it is likely to
throw the problem into the lap of the U.N. Security Council. At that
point the administration will have to face the failure of its policy to
date and will, I hope, take strong action to assemble an international
coalition to bring economic and diplomatic pressure on North Korea.
Mr. President, this resolution is a moderate and reasonable statement
by this body telling the President that he cannot continue to ignore
this problem--that he must act. It makes clear that this issue is of
the highest national security priority and that it deserves his
personal attention. And it calls for reasonable steps to increase
pressure on North Korea and to increase the security of South Korea. I
urge Senators to support its adoption and implore the President to heed
its message.
Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from
Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, as the Senator said at the outset of his
remarks, we are prepared to accept the amendment.
But I want to make it clear, we do not accept the full measure of the
comments that have accompanied the amendment, and there is nothing in
the amendment itself that embraces the notion of accommodation or
appeasement. Certainly the Senator is entitled to his views about what
the administration approach is. Those views are not reflected within
the language of the amendment per se.
I share with my colleague enormous concern about events on the Korean
Peninsula and about North Korea's propensity to avoid its
responsibilities under the nonproliferation treaty.
I commend to my colleague the hearings of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee in December 1991 and January 1992 where Senator
Pell, the chairman, laid out a very important first record on this.
This was the first time that the nonproliferation problem, nonadherence
problem, of North Korea was really called fully to our attention, and I
think a strong record was laid down regarding it.
Let me say also, for those who have been following this question
closely lately, there is nothing to suggest that this administration is
content with where we are or that it is somehow stopped where we are.
The initial effort to get the investigation of the current sites at the
level that they are is a first step. And the administration has made it
very clear that more is needed, that we need to proceed further down
the road.
But I think everyone will agree that dealing with North Korea is as
tough a dealing process as there is. It may well be that we are going
to get to the point the Senator has described, but wise statesmanship
dictates that you do not leap to that confrontational stage with a
country like North Korea before you have made clear that all the other
efforts and avenues have been explored.
None of that is to suggest one iota of accommodation or appeasement,
as the case has been set. I think the contrary has been quite the
reality. The President could not have made it more clear, not only in
his trip to Asia but since then in his meetings on the west coast, as
well as more recently, that we remain concerned and we intend to keep
the pressure on.
I think the recommendations that are laid out in this, which we have
arrived at jointly, are sound. I think they are a sensible and
important message to North Korea, which I think should not
underestimate the determination of the U.S. Senate and the U.S.
Congress to keep the heat on with respect to this issue.
Before we proceed and before I give up my right to the floor, I would
like to work through, if I may, an issue that seems to be about to
bubble up here on the floor.
Last Thursday, we entered into an agreement. That agreement empowered
Senators to be able to go home on Friday and to permit those who wanted
to stay here to put amendments in to do so, with the understanding that
Senators would not vote on Monday but rather come back on Tuesday to
finish the business by 6 o'clock in the evening. There was an agreement
by the leadership on both sides, representing all Senators, that this
would be done as a matter of good faith in an effort to try to
guarantee that nobody was shut out between now and 6 o'clock.
We now still have some amendments to come between now and 6 o'clock.
It is my understanding that the Senator from New York wants to speak
for some period of time on an issue not related to the bill. Without
losing my right to the floor, I simply ask the Senator how we can
proceed so as to keep faith with the agreement and try to guarantee
that we get all amendments laid down by 6 o'clock?
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I would like to put my statement in the
Record, if I could do that?
Mr. KERRY. Without losing my right to the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent I be joined as a
cosponsor of this amendment of Senator McCain's.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, as I listened to the statements in
support of the McCain amendment, I recalled the shock Americans felt
the morning of June 25, 1950, when we awoke to learn the North Korean
Army had crossed the 38th parallel in force and was overrunning South
Korea. For some time prior to that, President Truman's administration
had issued statements which the Communist regime construed as an
invitation to forcibly reunify the divided Korean Peninsula. Of course,
such blatant aggression convinced President Truman to fight, and fight
we did, in one of the most bitter wars in modern history. Though the
Korean conflict was waged under the flag of the United Nations,
Americans bore the brunt of the battle, at the cost of over 50,000
United States dead, and thousands wounded.
It is incumbent on us to remember the veterans of that conflict. In
my opinion, they have never been properly honored by this Nation. They
fought in the most demanding conditions. At times they were vastly
outnumbered by a determined enemy. They often had to rely on inadequate
weapons and equipment left over from World War II. Yet they fought with
all the bravery, tenacity, and ingenuity that characterize the American
fighting man. We owe it to those who sacrificed so much in Korea to
safeguard the peace and freedom they fought to attain.
Let no one labor under any misunderstanding about our recent
confrontation with North Korea over efforts to enforce the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty [NPT], and to block their development of nuclear
weapons. We stood toe-to-toe with them, and we backed down. In dropping
demands for a full inspection of all suspected nuclear sites, the
administration clearly settled for less than full enforcement of the
NPT. Then, in exchange for North Korea's so-called concession to allow
a partial inspection, we canceled the Team Spirit training exercise
with our South Korean allies, and delayed bringing the issue of
economic sanctions before the U.N. Security Council.
Perhaps the administration has fooled itself into believing it has
resolved the threat of North Korea's nuclear weapons program.
Perhaps the Congress and the American people are temporarily fooled
as well. But I can assure my colleagues, the North Koreans are not
fooled. I fear they have taken the measure of the administration and
have found the President's men more concerned about rescuing the
tattered credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty than in actually
stopping the North from building nuclear weapons.
But we need to remember that membership, or even ostensible
compliance, with the NPT does not equal security. Iraq showed us that,
for Iraq was once a member in good standing of the NPT, all the while
using the treaty as a cover for their nuclear weapons effort.
The continuing confrontation with North Korea demonstrates the limits
of diplomacy in dealing with a rogue state. Multilateral regimes, like
the NPT, depend upon good will and good faith. They are virtually
useless in forcing an outlaw nation to behave responsibly. Inspection
regimes, negotiations, appeals for compliance, and all the trappings of
diplomacy do not impress dictators. They only generate contempt. In
fact, dictators like Kim Il-Sung use the language of the civilized
community to confuse, divide, and mislead us, and to camouflage their
real purposes.
A fundamental error of the administration has been to treat the so-
called Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a traditional power; as
if Kim Il-Sung believed in the conventions that govern relations
between civilized states. But it is not a traditional nation-state as
commonly understood. The very name, the ``Democratic People's Republic
of Korea'' is a falsehood. North Korea is neither democratic nor a
republic.
The regime does not answer to the people, but exists only to serve
the swollen ego and lust for power of the dictator Kim Il-Sung and his
inner circle. It would be more accurate to describe North Korea as an
organized crime family with a vast military machine and a complaint
population held in check by propaganda and terror. Or it could be
likened to feudal robber barons whose whims could send entire peoples
to war, as Kim Il-Sung did with such terrible consequences in 1950.
The cynicism and criminal paranoia of Kim's regime are illustrated by
its response to the United States decision to send Patriot missiles to
South Korea. As everyone in the world must know by now, the Patriot is
a purely defensive system. It will threaten no one in North Korea,
unless they happen to be pilots of warplanes attacking South Korea. It
will not even interfere with the North's ability to develop nuclear
weapons and ballistic missiles. It will only make them less
threatening. North Korea is like a violent criminal who complains
loudly because the homeowner he intends to rob and murder has decided
to put on a bulletproof vest.
Consequently, to make diplomacy or treaties ends in themselves will
not end North Korea's nuclear weapons program. It will only convince
the North Koreans that we lack resolve. This could tempt the North to
strike, as they did in 1950. The 1950 invasion demonstrated that wars
start when aggressors miscalculate the strength and resolve of
democracies, or misconstrue their peaceful pronouncements. A further
and more recent case in point is Saddam Hussein, who misinterpreted
ambiguous statements from the State Department, and convinced himself
he could attack Kuwait with impunity.
On the other hand, tough talk, condemnation in the courts of world
opinion, and economic sanctions are not a sufficient substitute for
failed diplomacy. They may be justified, but they will accomplish
little, except to increase whatever sense of grievance and isolation
North Korea may feel.
So far, U.S. actions have been composed of ineffectual NPT
negotiations, accompanied by bluster and harsh rhetoric, and then
timidity and inaction. The time has come to reverse that approach. This
century's tragic experience with dictators tells me that their behavior
leaves us only one choice: deterrence and defense. The time has come to
lower the level of rhetoric, then quietly to ensure the appropriate
level of military preparedness in South Korea, taking the minimum steps
necessary to deter aggression and defend our troops, and to improve the
military capabilities of our South Korean ally. In this case, the
traditional American policy, ``Walk softly, but carry a big stick,'' is
exactly the right policy.
I am convinced that ultimately we cannot determine what happens
inside North Korea through diplomacy or coercion, but we may contain
their aggressive tendencies by improving military preparedness. The
Patriot deployment is an important step in this direction, and suggests
the administration is finally getting the message. I commend the
President for considering this important first step, and urge him to
follow through.
I remind my colleagues that the present threat from North Korea is
primarily conventional. The North has deployed the bulk of their ground
forces toward the DMZ, and has moved up long-range artillery and
tactical rocket launchers that can hit Seoul. Their nuclear threat at
present is uncertain, but its very uncertainty gives North Korea a kind
of trump card. It backs up their conventional forces, and gives them
added political leverage.
The time has come for the United States to dispense with self-
delusion and act wisely toward the danger posed by North Korea.
Quietly, judiciously, and with calm determination we must do what is
necessary to deter potential aggression and defend our troops, our
allies, and our interests in the Pacific rim. There are no better
alternatives.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts has the floor.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I simply want to enter into a dialog with
my friend from New York to try to determine how we can accommodate the
Senator from New York without a detrimental impact on those who might
be shut out and where we are going here.
Mr. D'AMATO. If I might, for purposes of responding to my colleague
from Massachusetts, indicate that last week when this agreement was
being structured I requested time for a special order. It offered time
at 8:30 in the morning. That is preposterous. I asked for--I said an
hour. I said, if you give me a half-hour I am willing to cut the time
down to a half-hour, even if you give it to me at 12 o'clock or 12:30.
That could not be done.
I said, let there be fair warning that when I take the floor I am
going to do exactly what I intend to do now, and that is to make known
my serious concerns regarding the lack of action on the part of the RTC
with respect to the Madison Guaranty/Whitewater matter, and set before
the Senate the relevant facts as they relate to information that we
have been requesting now for almost 3 weeks, and still have not
received, from the RTC, although I have some hope today, and will make
a report. With Senator Riegle's help, I think we have made a
breakthrough toward obtaining a response from the RTC.
If my colleague is asking how much time will I be taking, I do not
think it will be an inordinate amount of time. I believe that it is
incumbent upon me to put this matter in front of my colleagues of the
Senate. I had attempted to arrange a time agreement, had been turned
down, but I do intend to press forward with this.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, let me say to my friend I have no--it
really does not matter to me at what hour of the day the facts he wants
to put forward are put forward. I am not afraid of the facts. I do not
think anybody is.
The issue here is how we can keep faith with the agreement that we
reached on both sides.
Mr. D'AMATO. Might I make a suggestion to my colleague?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts has the floor.
Mr. KERRY. I am also informed the Senator from New York was offered
time between 9:30--9 and 9:30, but that he was personally not able to
be there.
It is my understanding that offer was made. I do not think this bill
should be prejudiced now because the Senator could not be there from 9
to 9:30. This is a critical moment, where we need this time in order to
protect the rights of all the other Senators.
Mr. D'AMATO. If I might respond?
Mr. KERRY. Again I do not want to lose my rights to the floor.
Mr. D'AMATO. I do not want you to lose your rights. And if I might
say for purposes of responding, it seems to me on the basis of consent
you can send all those pending matters to the desk where they will have
been held. They will have been submitted before 6 o'clock. Then you can
agree to debate or not debate, or vote or not to vote, on those that
you work out agreements with. That is a very easy matter, to protect
everyone's rights. I do not intend to infringe on that.
But I do intend to take the appropriate time to bring this matter to
my colleagues' attention. I will seek an opportunity to do that.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Let me say to my friend, there is an awful lot of time
around here in this Senate to speak. We had open hours all yesterday.
There was time when people could have spoken. We had open hours all
Friday. We were here until 4 or 5 in the afternoon. I do not know where
the Senator was.
Mr. D'AMATO. I spoke Friday.
Mr. KERRY. If the Senator spoke on this matter, then I suppose that
raises the question of whether we have to go back to it now.
Leaving that aside, what the Senator has just proposed does not in
fact help all other Senators. Because other Senators have come to me
and said, what is the schedule? What are we going to be doing?
They have now arranged their day around the notion that there is a 3-
hour window left to get the floor and bring their amendments and we
will try to wrap this bill up forthrightly tonight. What the Senator is
asking is that, in order to accommodate him at this time, since he
could not be here at 9 in the morning, that all other Senators may have
to stay here a good deal later at night, not to mention everybody else
in the Senate.
I am not really sure that is fair, in keeping with the spirit of the
agreement we reached. I respectfully suggest to the Senator I am
confident the majority leader will give him the time he needs for
morning business tomorrow morning, or stay later tonight when we finish
business.
Mr. D'AMATO. I do not want to speak at 10 o'clock or 11 at night or
at 8 in the morning. To be quite candid with my friend from
Massachusetts, I want to speak at a time when my colleagues might have
an opportunity to hear my message.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I do not need any lessons from the Senator
from New York about what is usual or unusual here, nor, really, a
reinterpretation of the agreement. I am simply trying to protect the
rights of all Senators to bring their legislation to the floor in, now,
a 3-hour window, without upsetting the entire schedule of the Senate in
the process, because the Senator could not be here at 9 this morning.
All I know is we were here all day yesterday. There was plenty of
time during the waking hours of day to sound the alarm bells, and the
Senator was not here.
I am having trouble understanding where this is----
Mr. D'AMATO. I was visiting my doctor yesterday. Is that really
germane? But if you want to know, I was visiting my surgeon and that is
why I was not here yesterday.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, who has the floor?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts has the floor
and has not yielded.
Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator from Massachusetts yield for a question?
Mr. KERRY. I yield for the purpose of asking a question without
losing my rights to the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
Mr. McCAIN. The Senator from Massachusetts has now made himself clear
about how he feels about the Senator from New York, whether he should
be speaking or not. Could we continue with my amendment, since it is an
issue of some significant importance? The Senator from Maine is waiting
to speak as well.
Mr. KERRY. I would like to reach an understanding. I want to make it
clear I am not trying to block the Senator from speaking. But the
problem----
Mr. D'AMATO addressed the Chair.
Mr. KERRY. Let me reiterate. It is my understanding the Senator wants
to talk for an hour. That leaves 2 hours and pushes the entire schedule
of the Senate back.
Mr. D'AMATO. I will speak for less than an hour.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, if I could just say, if we could arrive at
an agreement by unanimous consent so that we could have a limitation on
the time that fits into the schedule of other Senators so we could
proceed with the legislation, I will be happy to do that. But I think
it would be fair--I do not think anybody on any amendment on this bill
has spoken for more than 10 or 15 minutes. So I think it really would
be unfair to suddenly have an extraneous subject, talking for a half-
hour or an hour, when we are trying to do the business of this bill.
So I ask the Senator if he could make his comment--I think the
Senator has already called attention to it, in answer to my questions,
probably much more attention than would have otherwise been afforded
it.
I ask the Senator if he might agree that 10 minutes would be a fair
amount of time to proceed so we do not upset other Senators?
Mr. D'AMATO. I believe I can make my statement and make my remarks in
less than a half-hour and I would attempt to do that. I am willing to
enter into an agreement, notwithstanding that I had requested an hour
to that effect. I think it will be less than a half-hour. I think we
are spending time now about this. Why do we not let them proceed and we
can talk?
Mr. KERRY. Let me ask my friend, I have an alternative offer. Would
the Senator permit us to come to the cutoff hour, let us proceed now as
the Senate has agreed to between now and 6 p.m., and at the hour of 6
p.m., the Senator would then be afforded a half-hour?
Mr. D'AMATO. I would rather not speak early in the morning or late at
night. For the following reason: I want to speak at a time that will
allow this body to focus attention on this matter.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, let me say to my friend, the problem is
this: If the Senator from New York speaks----
Mr. McCAIN. He has taken a half-hour.
Mr. KERRY. That may well be, but I think it is important to protect
the process, because more than a half-hour is at stake. If the Senator
from New York speaks I have been asked by the Senator from Arkansas,
Senator Pryor, for an equal amount of time.
So that means whatever we use for the Senator from New York, we are
then going to chew up with the Senator from Arkansas, which is his
right, I think, appropriately.
I ask my colleague from North Carolina, the distinguished manager of
the minority and ranking on the bill, was it not the agreement of all
Senators who came to this unanimous-consent agreement that we would use
good faith to permit all Senators the opportunity to bring their
amendments by 6 p.m.?
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I will say to the Senator, not only that,
it was hotlined by both the Democrats and the Republicans.
Mr. D'AMATO. I indicated that if we could not work out an appropriate
time. I would be willing to take a half-hour. I made it clear that I
would seek an opportunity to make this presentation.
I can possibly make it in 15 minutes, but I am not going to limit
myself. But I will make a good-faith effort. I believe I will conclude
my remarks in well under half an hour, but we have now spent 20 minutes
speaking about how long it will take me to use the 15 or 20 minutes
that I would probably need. You can also ask unanimous consent to add
to extend the available time for the matter at hand. I take 15 minutes
and Senator Pryor takes 15 minutes.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts retains the
floor.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, it is not really a question of how much
genius it might or might not take. I can see 20 different solutions. I
do not think that is the issue. The issue is, should the Senator from
New York, having not availed himself of the opportunity that was
offered him this morning, now come and upset the unanimous-consent
agreement----
Mr. D'AMATO. What opportunity, if I might ask? You say I have not
availed myself of an opportunity.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Massachusetts yield for
a question?
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I did not know there was a question. I
thought I was speaking.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator retains the floor.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, it is my understanding the Senator was
offered time. I am told by the leadership that the Senator was offered
time this morning; is that not true?
Mr. D'AMATO. At 8:30 in the morning, and I made it clear that I could
not do it at that time--I rejected this offer last Friday, so let us
get it clear. I have indicated that I will limit myself to a half hour.
I am not going to back down.
I requested time in good faith and it was denied. Now I am here to do
what I said I was going to do Friday. This is no surprise.
Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts still has the
floor.
Mr. KERRY. I know the Senator's reputation. I know he does not back
down. I am not asking him to back down. I am asking him if he would try
to recognize the needs of other Senators who are making plans for the
evening based on what the leadership and the managers of this bill have
told them. Now we are imposed with a situation where the Senator is
unilaterally, in a sense, changing all of that by his desire to speak
for a period of time that pushes the entire schedule backward.
I would like to try to accommodate the Senator. The question is,
could we ask the Senator if it is not possible to make the gist of this
alarm bell known in about 15 minutes so that we do not make it more
difficult for other Senators who have already scheduled coming to the
floor?
Mr. D'AMATO. I will say to my friend, if you are saying can I do it
in 15 minutes, I think I can. I would rather not say 15 and be cut off
if I need a few moments to conclude my remarks. That is why I said I
will do it in less than half an hour. I will do it in less than 20
minutes. Is that an accommodation?
Mr. COHEN. Will the Senator yield for a question? Is it possible to
return to a less volatile subject, like nuclear weapons in the hands of
the North Koreans?
(Disturbance in the visitors' galleries.)
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The galleries will come to order.
Mr. KERRY. I am going to try to work it out with my colleague. I
would like to clear the hoops, if we can. So if my colleague will
agree, I ask unanimous consent that we be permitted to complete the
action on the McCain amendment and after we have completed the action
on the McCain amendment, I be granted the right to the floor.
Mr. D'AMATO. I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. D'AMATO. I object.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York objects.
Mr. KERRY. If the Senator objects, then it is going to be very hard
for me to find out how we are going to accommodate him. I am trying to
be reasonable here.
Mr. D'AMATO. I said before and again, I am willing to attempt to do
this in under 20 minutes. We started from an hour, but because of the
logical and cogent arguments, I offered to limit my comments to half an
hour. Now I said I will do it in 20 minutes, and I will make a good-
faith effort to do it in less than 20 minutes, if given the
opportunity.
Mr. KERRY. That is precisely what I hope to do. I simply want to be
able to do as manager of the bill what I need to do, but I am not
empowered to do, because I am not the majority leader. I am simply
trying to protect the rights of the majority, but at the same time act
in the Senator's interest.
If the Senator will afford me the right--I can stand here and talk
now or come back. If the Senator will allow me to do that, I ask
unanimous consent I be permitted the rights to the floor after we
dispose of the McCain amendment, which is the pending business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is
so ordered.
Mr. KERRY. I thank my friend from New York.
Mr. COHEN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Maine
[Mr. Cohen].
Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I will take note that we have spent a half-
hour debating whether or not the Senator from New York might cut into
the diminishing time remaining for those wishing to offer amendments.
In the meantime, let me return to the subject Senator McCain has
raised.
I note that the Senator from Massachusetts used the expression ``wise
statesmanship requires that we not leap to certain conclusions or take
any drastic action.'' I would agree with that, but wise statesmanship
also dictates that we not give up certain perquisites as such, certain
powers and privileges as such, certain agreements as such, or
relationships, in advance of securing a commitment from the country
that we are negotiating with.
By way of example, Senator McCain talked about ``Team Spirit''--the
joint military operations and practices that we conduct with South
Korea. ``Team Spirit'' is not and should not be a bargaining chip. That
is fundamental. We should not give up a joint exercise, military
exercise, certainly not in advance. I do not think we should give that
up at all. ``Team Spirit'' is designed to make sure that we maintain a
high state of readiness. Readiness against whom? Against one of the
most belligerent countries in the world today that has some 700,000
troops in an aggressive posture facing South Korea.
So to give that up or even talk about compromising or canceling in
advance, it seems to me, sends precisely the kind of signal Senator
McCain is talking about. It is not necessary for us to use the words
``appeasement'' or ``accommodation.'' I would be happy to say there has
been an uncertain trumpet that has been blowing from the White House on
this particular issue.
But the North Koreans have wasted a year of our time, in essence, by
forcing us into long negotiations only to come back to the point we
were a year ago; namely, that they may agree to allow the international
inspectors to inspect those sites that they will allow us to inspect.
That is a year's time of negotiation. Maybe we have made some marginal
progress, but ultimately they say you cannot go into the two
nondeclared sites.
We will tell you what sites you can go in, but the others are all off
limits. It seems to me we have not made much in the way of progress,
but the little progress we have made one week is then taken back the
following week. I notice the administration correctly is saying we are
going to beef up our security there, and I applaud President Clinton
for what he is doing. I support the deployment of Patriot missiles, if
that is what it is going to take. I support beefing up our American
presence in that region.
What has been the North Korean response? The North Koreans are now
engaged in this chest beating, asserting that we, by introducing
defensive antimissile systems, are now engaged in some kind of a
provocative or aggressive action. It is very, very similar to what the
former Soviet Union used to do. When they deployed, for example, SS-
20's in the hundreds aimed at Western Europe, we said: We have to
respond. We are going to match you by deploying Pershing II's.
They said: If you do that, you are taking aggressive action. If you
do that, we will cancel the intermediate-range nuclear force
negotiations underway; we will walk away from the table.
It is precisely the same sort of chest beating, chauvinistic,
dictatorial bleating that takes place with the North Koreans today.
Some have suggested to me, I might say, what do we care? So what? So
what if North Korea has one bomb or two bombs or enough plutonium to
make three bombs? No. 1, they do not have an adequate delivery system.
We know how fallacious that argument can be. It will not take long
before they can get a delivery system. Assuming they get a delivery
system, the argument is: So what? So what if South Korea demands having
a nuclear capability? And so what if Japan demands having a nuclear
capability?
By the way, let me suggest to my colleagues, it would only be a
matter of, let me say, a few months or maybe even less before Japan
could convert its capabilities today into having a nuclear capability.
And still the argument is so what, let Japan have it. Well, what
about Iraq and what about Iran, should they not have it as well? And
what about other nations that are not quite as stable let us say, as
Japan or not as stable as the former Soviet Union, if we can say that
is still stable? Let us go back to a MAD theory, mutual assured
destruction. Anybody who fires a nuclear weapon will get 1, or 10, or
20 in return. MAD was a bad concept then, I think is a bad concept now.
And while deterrence worked against a rational, if ruthless, Soviet
leadership, will it work against the unstable leaders of unstable
regimes? The genie may be out of the bottle. We do not have to witness
it spread over every unstable nation in the world.
And so what the Senator from Arizona has recommended I think is very
sensible. It is imperative. He has changed the language he originally
intended to offer to not offend the administration, but whether it is
critical of the administration or not is not important. What is
important is that we go to the Chinese as he has suggested. They have a
China card to play. They have a China card to play, because if
sanctions are imposed China will play the crucial role. It will have to
decide whether it is going to undermine those sanctions by continuing
to supply energy to a country badly in need of it. We have to make it
very clear to the Chinese that they can align their future with North
Korea or they can continue to try to establish a healthy and working
relationship with the United States as we move into the 21st century.
But I think we have to make it very clear we need their help, it is
imperative and there will be, I think, grave consequences in the event
it is undermined.
So I support my colleague from Arizona and urge my colleagues to
support him.
Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona, [Mr. McCain].
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Maine for his, as
always, thoughtful and penetrating analysis of a very difficult and
troubling issue. I would like to just make a few additional comments. I
will not belabor this issue because it has been extensively covered in
the media and in the councils throughout not only this country but in
Asia as well.
As my friend Senator Cohen said, other nations will have no choice,
Mr. President, but to acquire nuclear weapons if through a set of
circumstances North Korea is able to develop their own nuclear
capability.
Two days ago, in a Washington Times story, it said:
Japan has technology to be a nuclear power. Japan has all
the parts for a nuclear bomb and may have already built one,
a London newspaper cites a British defense ministry report as
saying. The Sun Times yesterday cited the report as saying
Japan has the expertise to go nuclear very quickly.
Put yourself in the position of a Japanese leader with the knowledge
that the North Korean Government, as we know, the most enigmatic and
most oppressive and Orwellian nation left on the face of this Earth,
has now acquired nuclear weapons and the means to develop them. No
self-respecting leader of Japan has a choice but to develop nuclear
capability. The same goes for South Korea. The same goes for other
countries in the area.
What I am saying, Mr. President, is that if we fail to stop this
nuclear weapons buildup, it is inevitable that nuclear weapons will
proliferate throughout Asia. They must do that unless this challenge is
met.
Second of all, let me just mention for a moment the Patriot missile.
We all know that the Patriot missile had not as spectacular a success
in the Persian Gulf as was first believed, but certainly was successful
in being the only defensive weapons system to challenge an incoming
Scud missile. Understandably, our military commander in Korea has asked
that Patriot missile batteries be deployed to South Korea, given the
information that he has and the possibility that North Korea may have
or does have nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them.
Mr. President, the military commander's responsibility really gives
him no choice but to so provide his troops, not to mention the civilian
personnel, American civilian personnel, that are within range of these
weapons. What has been the North Korean response?
On January 29, the Washington Post said:
Communist North Korea today denounced a plan to deploy U.S.
Patriot air defense missiles in South Korea, saying the
decision would heighten tensions on the peninsula and
increase the danger of war.
Mr. President, it is not quite clear to me how even the North Koreans
could view a defensive system that has no offensive capability as
something that would increase the danger of war.
And a North Korean official called the installation of
Patriot missiles an unpardonable, grave mistake, a challenge
that threatens diplomatic efforts now centered on North Korea
opening its nuclear sites for inspection. ``If the United
States and its followers think they can subdue North Korea
with pressure and threat, it is a big mistake. That method
may lead the situation to a hopeless phase far from resolving
the problem,'' the agency said.
Mr. President, I do not believe that North Koreans would be quite so
bellicose if they had not forced us to back down already, at least in
their view.
According to the Wall Street Journal, on January 31:
Earlier this month, Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis was
asked on the ``MacNeil/Lehrer'' program how the U.S. could be
confident that a diversion of nuclear materials wasn't going
on at North Korea's Yongbyon research facility.
``Well, because we've had this safeguards regime in place
over the past year, and, indeed, had an inspection in August,
so it isn't that we haven't been carrying out this regime,''
she answered.
But officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
the Vienna-based group that actually carried out that August
inspection, paint a vastly less rosy picture. Its inspectors,
the group says, were literally left groping in the dark. They
were permitted to leave their barracks--like guest quarters
at Pyongyang only after 6 p.m. As night fell, they were
escorted into the pitch black innards of several buildings.
There, using flashlights because the buildings' lights were
kept out, the inspectors only replaced the batteries and
videotape in cameras they use to monitor some parts of the
facility. End of inspection.
I do not think that fits what Undersecretary Lynn Davis described on
the ``MacNeil/Lehrer'' program.
I guess what I am saying, Mr. President, and I will wrap-up my
remarks--and I know this amendment has been accepted by both sides--I
was not happy when we took every position on the issue of Bosnia; that
we were going to launch air strikes, we were not going to launch air
strikes; we were going to send peacekeepers, we were not going to send
peacekeepers. I was embarrassed as well, as other Americans were, as a
group of thugs on a pier in Haiti with AK-47's drove away an American
force. I was grieved and mourned when 18 young Americans died because
of a failed policy in Somalia.
Mr. President, now we are talking about the big leagues. We are
talking about 27,000 American lives. We are talking about the
possibility of the extermination of hundreds of thousands of South
Korean lives. We better get serious, Mr. President, and we better learn
that when we try appeasement to avoid war, we usually get both. I hope
that this resolution would provide the proper impetus to get us into a
position vis-a-vis North Korea that we make it clear we expect China to
assist us; that we will take all necessary economic measures and, if
those fail, then we must be prepared to take further ones, first taking
all economic measures and seeing what the result of that is.
I thank my friend from Massachusetts for his patience. I enjoyed the
spirited debate over whether the Senator from New York would have
sufficient time to view an issue of importance to him, and I appreciate
his patience.
If I might ask the indulgence of my friend from Massachusetts, I did
also have an amendment on Thailand that I would like to offer
immediately upon acceptance of this one and I would be finished with
him, on this issue.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Arizona. This is a
very important amendment, on a very important subject. The Senator is
absolutely correct that there is an ultimate moment of confrontation.
Certainly, there is an ultimate moment of destabilization if we are not
successful.
In my meetings in China recently, it was very clear to me that the
Chinese are deeply concerned about this, that the last thing they want
is another nuclear power. I think there is much that we can do to work
together in this effort, and we need to avail ourselves of every
diplomatic opening in order to do that.
So I think the amendment of the Senator is an important amendment,
and I am prepared to accept it.
Mr. MURKOWSKI. I rise today in support of Senator McCain's resolution
expressing the strong sense of the Congress regarding North Korea's
nuclear program. The resolution sends the right signal to North Korea
and to the President: North Korea must halt its nuclear weapons program
and fully comply with the terms of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and
the safeguards agreement of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The resolution properly defines an ``acceptable agreement'' as one
which includes regular inspection of all declared nuclear sites as well
as special inspections of any suspected nuclear-related site.
Mr. President, I am troubled by the administration's strategy toward
North Korea. Frankly, if I were Kim Il Sung, I am not sure whether I
would even be contemplating giving up my nuclear program when the
United States is already moving toward agreeing to my offer of highly
limited inspections of known sites in exchange for the United States
canceling the annual Team Spirit joint military exercises.
I am particularly troubled that this appeasement process is directed
at a leader who launched the invasion of South Korea in 1950, resulting
in the deaths of 3 million of his countrymen and more than 33,000
American troops; a leader whose agents detonated a bomb in Rangoon
killing 16 South Korean officials; a leader of the country who blew up
a Korean Airlines flight killing 115 passengers and crew; and a leader
whose military hacked American personnel to death in the DMZ.
In the 10 months since North Korea announced that it was withdrawing
from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, the North has managed to buy
time to pursue whatever nuclear capability they were contemplating
while Washington and Seoul have dangled even more carrots their way,
such as diplomatic recognition and economic assistance. Moreover, the
administration backed off its original demand that North Korea agree to
regular inspections of all known sites and special inspections of
suspected nuclear sites. Instead, the United States negotiators agreed
to North Korea's offer of a one-time inspection at seven declared
sites.
I understand that the administration's ability to follow through on
any threat of sanctions in impossible to back up without the support of
all our allies, most importantly, China. This resolution properly notes
that China might not be cooperating fully and effectively in seeking a
resolution of this issue. The administration must stress in the
strongest terms to China that their cooperation is essential to
addressing the very real threat of a nuclear North Korea.
The administration must not accept China's often used excuse that
they no longer have leverage with North Korea. China supplies almost
all of North Korea's oil. A country cannot run without oil--as an
Alaskan, I feel I am especially qualified to speak to this issue. China
could very effectively threaten to cut off North Korea's oil supply.
Similarly, Japan should be asked to consider measures that country
could take to stem the flow of illegal money from Japan that is
currently making its way into North Korea's failing economy. The amount
of illegal money flowing from Japan to North Korea is estimated to be
at least $600 million per year.
But it is up to the administration, as the party directly negotiating
with the North Koreans, to send a clear and strong signal that the
United States is prepared to live up to its threats if North Korea does
not agree to our terms. As part of this strategy, the administration
should go through with the proposed deployment of Patriot missiles to
South Korea.
Mr. President, let me again commend the Senator from Arizona for this
amendment, and I urge my colleagues to support this effort.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?
The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 1331) was agreed to.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. KERRY. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, it is my understanding that the Senator has
another amendment which we are prepared to accept.
Amendment No. 1332
(Purpose: To express the sense of the Congress concerning the
Government of Thailand need to support democracy in Cambodia and Burma)
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask
for its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain], for himself, Mr.
Moynihan, and Mr. Pell, proposes an amendment numbered 1332.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
SEC. . POLICY REGARDING THE RELATIONSHIP OF THAILAND WITH
ITS NEIGHBORS STRUGGLING FOR DEMOCRACY,
CAMBODIA AND BURMA.
(a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
(1) the Government of Thailand is to be commended for its
return to democracy and its commitment to representative
government;
(2) the United States-Thai security relationship is a
cornerstone of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) and a key to stability in Southeast Asia;
(3) Cambodia, Thailand's neighbor to the East, is
struggling to prevent violence from disrupting the creation
of a democratic state;
(4) the cooperation of Thailand in implementing the Paris
Peace Accords was instrumental in assisting Cambodians to
achieve their goal of political reconciliation;
(5) Peace in Cambodia promotes stability in Southeast Asia
and the continued cooperation of Thailand in bringing lasting
peace to that nation is vital. That peace is threatened by
the Khmer Rouge, which has attempted to violently disrupt the
Cambodian effort to institute an elected government.
(6) The Government of Thailand is commended for the steps
it has taken to discontinue the Thai relationship with the
Khmer Rouge, and in particular its adherence to United
Nations sanctions on timber and petroleum trade between
Thailand and Khmer controlled areas of Cambodia.
(7) Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai and the Commander-in-Chief
of the Thai military, Wimol Wongawanich, have publicly
enunciated a policy of non-support for the Khmer Rouge.
Furthermore, Prime Minister Chuan has demonstrated
considerable support for the freely elected Government of
Cambodia.
(8) The extent to which the Government of Thailand permits
trade and particularly military contact with the armed
opposition to the newly elected Cambodian government,
directly impact the prospects for peace and political
reconciliation in Cambodia.
(9) Congress is concerned that elements of the Thai
military and companies with close links to the Thai military,
continue to operate against the will and policy of the
government to support the Khmer Rouge.
(10) Congress is concerned that the Clinton Administration
has not articulated its position regarding United States
policy toward Burma.
(11) The Senate unanimously declared in S. Res. 112 that it
does not recognize the military junta in Burma known as the
State Law and Order Restoration Council (referred to as the
``SLORC''), since the people of Burma gave the National
League for Democracy a clear victory in the election of May
27, 1990.
(12) Nobel Peace Prize winner Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, a
leader of the National League for Democracy, has been under
house arrest since July 1989. Many of her colleagues who were
able to escape imprisonment or death have taken refuge in
Thailand, where they have organized to work peacefully to
bring democracy to Burma.
(13) The Government of Thailand should be praised for
providing safe haven to the many Burmese forced to flee the
brutal repression of the SLORC regime. Despite pressure from
the SLORC, Thailand has allowed those groups to operate
within its borders, and has granted visas for international
travel.
(14) Congress is concerned by reports that the Government
of Thailand may adopt more restrictive policies towards the
Burmese have raised considerable concern. In particular,
Congress is concerned by reports that Dr. Sein Win and other
Burmese dissidents may not be allowed to return from their
trip to the United States and to the United Nations to secure
support for their democratic aspirations.
(15) Congress is deeply interested in seeing the peaceful
transition of power to those elected in 1990. Aung San Suu
Kyi and other senior National League for Democracy leaders
imprisoned in Burmese jails, are unable to conduct
political activity inside Burma and have never been
allowed to take their elected positions. Those who were
able to escape must rely on Thailand's continued
hospitality.
(16) in recent years there has been an increase in the
number of Burmese women and girls conscripted into Thai
brothels. Human Rights Watch has recently issued a report
documenting the problems faced by these women. Many of these
Burmese become virtual slaves, with no way to escape the
brothels where they are kept. When these prostitution rings
have been broken up by Thai authorities, often those forced
into prostitution are detained in jails, or deported to Burma
where they are arrested for prostitution, further victimizing
them, and
(17) in 1992, Thai Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai pledged to
crack down on official involvement in forced and child
prostitution. Congress welcomes the Government of Thailand's
efforts to eliminate forced prostitution. However, Thai
border officials and police are reportedly involved in the
transport of these women from Burma, and at times, directly
in the brothel operations.
(b) Sense of the Congress.--It is the Sense of the Congress
that--
(1) the Government of Thailand should continue and must
intensify its efforts to end the relationship between the
Khmer Rouge and the Thai military;
(2) the President of the United States should convey to the
Government of Thailand American concern over renegade Thai
military support for the Khmer Rouge;
(3) the President should adopt the policies called for in
S. Res. 112 and to clearly enunciate policy with respect to
Burma;
(4) the Government of Thailand should continue to allow the
democratic leaders of Burma to operate freely within Thailand
and to grant them free passage to allow them to present their
case to the world at the United Nations and other
international gatherings; and
(5) the Government of Thailand is further urged to
prosecute those responsible for the trafficking, forced labor
and physical and sexual abuse of women. If Thai officials are
found to be involved, they should be prosecuted to the
fullest extent of the law. In addition, the Government of
Thailand should protect the civil and human rights of Burmese
women and refrain from their further victimization.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, this amendment calls on the Government of
Thailand to continue an intense effort to end the relationship between
the Khmer Rouge and elements of the Thai military. It is an important
issue. It further calls on the President of the United States to convey
to the Government of Thailand United States concern over Thai military
support for the Khmer Rouge.
Recent press reports have brought renewed attention to a very
disturbing situation in Southeast Asia, the continued external support
for the Khmer Rouge, an organization which continues to resist the
development of democracy in Cambodia.
On December 8, 1993, a massive cache of arms was discovered along the
Thai-Cambodia border. Thai police seized 1,500 tons of Chinese-made
weapons, including antitank mines, rockets, grenades, machine guns,
over a dozen artillery pieces, and more than 1 million rounds of
ammunition.
Contrary to Thai military claims that the weapons seized are a
remnant from the days of the Cambodian civil war, there is substantial
evidence that the arms cache was part of a continuing effort to assist
the Khmer Rouge. The most incriminating of this evidence involves the
circumstances of the seizure. It was the interception of a shipment of
arms from the storage site to Khmer Rouge-controlled areas of Cambodia
that led police to the guarded compound. Further testament to Thai-
Khmer Rouge cooperation, Khmer Rouge soldiers, apparently guarding the
site, were apprehended in the raid of December 8, 1993.
Although clearly the most sensational, this is not the only report of
continued cooperation between the Thai military and the Khmer Rouge.
There have been reports of direct Thai support for the Khmer Rouge in
battles with Cambodian Government forces along the border. Accusations
of Thai complicity have come from both Cambodian and U.N. officials and
have ranged from simple logistical support to allowing attacks from
Thai territory.
Khmer Rouge and Thai military personnel are regularly seen together
along the border, often riding in the same trucks. In September, UNTAC
officials reported that, in the heat of battle, the Thai army
transported 400 retreating Khmer Rouge rebels through Thai territory.
I understand well the long relationship that the United States has
enjoyed with Thailand, a relationship strengthened by the return to
democracy in that proud nation. Our close military cooperation is a
cornerstone of ASEAN and critical to the security of international
shipping lanes. Thailand was an important element of our efforts to
assist the Government of South Vietnam in fending off Communist
aggression. During some of the most difficult years of the cold war,
and during Operation Desert Storm, Thailand stood by us as allies.
But from one democracy to another, I must say to my friends in
Thailand that they can do more to end a relationship that benefits one
of the most murderous movements in the history of mankind, the Khmer
Rouge.
I understand the geopolitical reasons why elements of the Thai
military may support a relationship with the Khmer Rouge. Vietnam
remains a formidable military power and is bound to become an equally
formidable economic power. I understand Thailand's need to keep Vietnam
at arms length, but I do not agree with the logic that links this need
to support for the Khmer Rouge in its war against the elected
Government of Cambodia.
My friends in Thailand should have no doubts concerning the U.S.
commitment to our regional security structures. ASEAN is the proper
place to create a viable balance of power in Southeast Asia, not on the
battlefields of Cambodia. Any regional military advantage offered by
continued support for the Khmer Rouge is greatly outweighed by the evil
represented by Cambodia's former rulers and Cambodia's new embrace of
democracy.
I have worked with Senator Moynihan to fashion this amendment, and
upon his initiative I have agreed to include provisions concerning
Thai-Burmese relations.
The amendment, as it is now constituted, calls on the Government of
Thailand to continue extending to the Democratic leaders of Burma the
privilege of residing in their country.
The amendment also encourages continued efforts by the Thai
government to end the exploitation of young Burmese women. Despite the
efforts of the Government of Thailand to bring to justice those
involved in luring young Burmese women into prostitution rings in
Bangkok, the illegal activity continues, often with the complicity of
Thai officials.
I fully endorse both of sections of the amendment and I am pleased
that the Senate has been given the opportunity to address them.
In summary, let me emphasize that I approach these issues in the
spirit of alliance and respect for the sovereignty of the
democratically elected Government of Thailand. It is my hope that in
this age of democracy, we can work together to further the cause of
representative government and respect for human rights in Southeast
Asia.
I appreciate my friend from North Carolina and my friend from
Massachusetts accepting this amendment.
I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I wanted the Record to reflect that this is
an issue that we on the committee have been deeply concerned about. I
have raised it personally with Thais authorities when I have been
there. The Senator and I have talked about it. The recent discovery of
a very large Khmer Rouge arms cache on the border has raised serious
questions about cooperation. We are aware of that, and we are in dialog
with the Thais about it. But it is very hopeful that those efforts will
increase. The Thais are our friends, and we want the democratic
Government of Thailand to be able to show the ability to be able to
control its own military with regard to this. It is an important issue
and we accept it.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I fully support the amendment of Senator
Moynihan and Senator McCain concerning the situation in Cambodia and
Burma.
I was impressed by the overwhelming support the Cambodian people gave
to democracy during last year's United Nations' sponsored elections.
I was, thus, shocked by the disclosure late last year of a large
Khmer Rouge arms cache located in Thailand and apparently controlled by
Thai security forces.
For years the Thai military have had a cozy relationship with the
Khmer Rouge. The dreaded Khmer Rouge leader, Pol Pot, has maintained an
estate on Thai soil with, reportedly, millions of dollars stored in
Thai banks.
The relationship must end. I believe Thailand's democratically
elected civilian government is trying hard to gain control of the Thai
military. It is rough going. For decades Thai politics have been
dominated by coup and counter-coup.
The United States has had close security relationship with the Thai
military. We have trained them; we have equipped them. This amendment
sends a strong signal that our security relations with Thailand will be
affected if the Thai military continues to support opponents of
Cambodian democracy.
Unfortunately, as democracy flourishes in Cambodia, it languishes in
Burma. In May 1990, the Burmese people spoke as eloquently as the
Cambodians for democracy. Unfortunately, their elections were subverted
by a military regime that has imprisoned since July 1989 Noble Peace
Prize winner Daw Aung Sau Kyi.
Burmese democratic forces have long used Thailand as a refuge. This
shelter is not being jeopardized by the Government of Thailand's recent
effort to curtail Burmese proponents of democracy.
With this amendment, the Congress underscores its continuing support
for democracy in Southeast Asia.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 1332) was agreed to.
Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. KERRY. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from New York for
waiting, and I think we can proceed now. But I would like the Record at
least to reflect, on behalf of the majority leader with whom I have
conferred regarding this, that the majority leader would like to make
it clear that while certainly any Senator can find ways to take the
floor, and we all understand that, it was certainly the majority
leader's understanding that this time would be devoted exclusively to
the bill.
I do not want to take up a lot of time now, but the majority leader
did offer 8:30, and he offered 9 o'clock, and I offered 6 o'clock
tonight on his behalf. So the time that will be taken is taken from
other colleagues who might or might not have amendments, because the
majority leader is not going to assent to changing the 6 o'clock cutoff
time.
Therefore, I ask my colleague, obviously, if he could try to expedite
the process. I ask unanimous consent that subsequent to that, the
Senator from Arkansas be granted such time as he deems necessary
commensurate with the time used by the Senator from New York to
respond, if indeed he wants to respond; and that following that, the
Senate return directly to the bill at hand, S. 1281, and that all time
between the completion of those two Senators and the 6 o'clock deadline
be devoted to amendments that are permitted under the list.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Mr. KERRY. I ask further that the time afforded to the Senator from
New York--and he said he would speak less than 20 minutes. In keeping
with that spirit, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from New
York be afforded time not to exceed 20 minutes to speak on a matter of
his choosing.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from New York is recognized.
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