[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 6 (Tuesday, February 1, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: February 1, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                  FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.


            Vote on Amendment No. 1327 to Amendment No. 1326

  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 
1327 offered by the Senator from New Jersey, [Mr. Lautenberg]. The yeas 
and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll.
  Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, before we proceed with the vote, I ask 
unanimous consent that the distinguished Senator from Arizona, [Mr. 
McCain] be recognized after this vote to call up an amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The question is on agreeing to amendment No. 1327. The yeas and nays 
have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk called the roll.
  The result was announced--yeas 85, nays 15, as follows:

                      [Rollcall Vote No. 14 Leg.]

                                YEAS--85

     Akaka
     Baucus
     Biden
     Bingaman
     Bond
     Boren
     Boxer
     Bradley
     Breaux
     Brown
     Bryan
     Bumpers
     Burns
     Byrd
     Campbell
     Chafee
     Coats
     Cohen
     Conrad
     Coverdell
     D'Amato
     Danforth
     Daschle
     DeConcini
     Dodd
     Dole
     Domenici
     Dorgan
     Durenberger
     Exon
     Feingold
     Feinstein
     Ford
     Glenn
     Gorton
     Graham
     Gramm
     Grassley
     Harkin
     Hatch
     Hatfield
     Heflin
     Hollings
     Hutchison
     Inouye
     Jeffords
     Johnston
     Kennedy
     Kerrey
     Kerry
     Kohl
     Lautenberg
     Leahy
     Levin
     Lieberman
     Lott
     Mack
     Mathews
     McCain
     McConnell
     Metzenbaum
     Mikulski
     Mitchell
     Moseley-Braun
     Moynihan
     Murray
     Nickles
     Nunn
     Packwood
     Pell
     Pryor
     Reid
     Riegle
     Robb
     Rockefeller
     Roth
     Sarbanes
     Sasser
     Shelby
     Simon
     Specter
     Stevens
     Warner
     Wellstone
     Wofford

                                NAYS--15

     Bennett
     Cochran
     Craig
     Faircloth
     Gregg
     Helms
     Kassebaum
     Kempthorne
     Lugar
     Murkowski
     Pressler
     Simpson
     Smith
     Thurmond
     Wallop
  So the amendment (No. 1327) was agreed to.
  Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. SIMPSON. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the Simon 
amendment No. 1326, as amended.
  The amendment (No. 1326) was agreed to.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask the Senator from Virginia [Mr. Robb] 
if he intends to--we will proceed momentarily, by agreement, with the 
Senator from Arizona. I want to inquire of the Senator from Virginia if 
he intends to introduce an amendment on North Korea.
  Mr. ROBB. Mr. President, if I may respond to the Senator from 
Massachusetts, I was just conferring with the Senator from Arizona 
about the prospect of jointly introducing an amendment or a second-
degree amendment. We have not completed that conversation. As soon as 
that is complete, I will be able to respond.
  Mr. KERRY. I thank the Senator from Virginia.
  Let me say to colleagues that we have a couple of potential votes 
backed up, which we are trying to hold temporarily. If there are any 
other Senators on the list who are permitted to bring amendments, we 
would greatly appreciate their coming forward now so we can begin to 
put an order together and try to fit as many people in before the 6 
o'clock deadline and try to arrive at some agreement, if that is 
possible.
  Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, if I may ask the Chair, precisely what is 
the business before the Senate at this moment, the pending matter 
before the Senate?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Regular order.
  Mr. PRYOR. Is the Senator from Arizona next to be recognized?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Yes.
  Mr. PRYOR. I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona, Mr. McCain, is 
recognized.


                           Amendment No. 1331

  (Purpose: To express the sense of Congress regarding United States 
    policy toward the development of nuclear weapons by North Korea)

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain], for himself and Mr. 
     Dole, Mr. Nickles, Mr. Bond, Mr. D'Amato, Mr. Mack, Mr. 
     Gramm, Mr. Kempthorne, and Mr. Craig, proposes an amendment 
     numbered 1331.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 179, after line 6, insert the following new 
     section:

     SEC. 714. POLICY REGARDING THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
                   PROGRAM.

       (a) Findings.--The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) On February 10, 1993, North Korea refused to permit the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct special 
     inspections, as permitted under the terms of the Treaty on 
     the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), of two 
     undeclared nuclear-related sites to clarify discrepancies 
     related to North Korea's nuclear program, and on March 12, 
     1993, North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from 
     the NPT effective on June 12, 1993, due to the insistence of 
     the IAEA on exercising inspection rights under the NPT.
       (2) On April 1, 1993, the IAEA declared North Korea to be 
     in noncompliance with the NPT, on April 2, 1993, the IAEA 
     voted to refer North Korean violations of the Treaty to the 
     United Nations Security Council; and on April 7, 1993, the 
     IAEA issued a formal censure on North Korea for its 
     noncompliance with the NPT, the first censure in the history 
     of the IAEA.
       (3) On May 11, 1993, the United Nations Security Council 
     passed a resolution asked North Korea to allow IAEA 
     inspection under the NPT, and on May 12, 1993, North Korea 
     rejected the request of the United Nations Security Council 
     and has since impeded or refused access to any of its sites 
     by IAEA inspectors.
       (4) On June 2, 1993, the United States and North Korea 
     initiated a series of meetings in New York to discuss the 
     impasse in nuclear site inspections, which continued until 
     Januar 4, 1994, when Under Secretary of State Lynn Davis 
     announced that North Korea had agreed to inspections of seven 
     declared nuclear-related sites.
       (5) discussions between the IAEA and North Korea to 
     implement the announced agreement to permit inspections in 
     North Korea have reached an apparent impasse, and the issue 
     is anticipated to be discussed at the IAEA Board of Governors 
     meeting on February 21, 1994.
       (6) The People's Republic of China (PRC) has repeatedly 
     stated it would not support any action of the United Nations 
     Security Council to impose sanctions on North Korea, and the 
     PRC may not be cooperating fully and effectively in seeking a 
     resolution of this issue.
       (7) The United States must clearly communicate its firm 
     resolve to compel North Korea to comply with the inspections 
     required under the NPT and has instead offered to cancel 1994 
     Team Spirit joint military exercises with South Korea; 
     indications are that numerous other concessions, such as 
     diplomatic recognition and economic assistance, are also 
     being considered.
       (8) The development of nuclear weapons by North Korea would 
     significantly increase the already serious threat to the 
     safety and security of South Korea and the stability of the 
     Pacific region posed by North Korea's military forces, which 
     include--
       (A) an army of 1,200,000 men, much of which is positioned 
     near the border with South Korea;
       (B) an estimated 250 tons of biological and chemical 
     weapons; and
       (C) extended range SCUD-C missiles reportedly armed with 
     chemical warheads, No Dong missiles, and possibly a much 
     longer range intermediate-range ballistic missile in 
     development.
       (b) Policy.--It is the sense of the Congress that--
       (1) North Korea must halt its nuclear weapons program and 
     fully comply with the terms of the NPT and the January 30, 
     1992, full-scope safeguards agreement agreed to by North 
     Korea and the IAEA;
       (2) the President should seek international consensus to 
     isolate North Korea economically until North Korea halts its 
     nuclear weapons program and reaches acceptable agreement with 
     the IAEA on inspections of its nuclear facilities and those 
     inspections have begun;
       (3) the President should support United States-South Korea 
     joint military exercises as an expression of commitment to 
     the United States-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty of 
     1954;
       (4) the President should ensure that sufficient United 
     States military forces are deployed in the Pacific region, 
     including the deployment of Patriot batteries in South Korea, 
     in order to be prepared to effectively defend South Korea 
     against any offensive action by North Korea;
       (5) the President should make resolution of this issue a 
     matter of urgent national security security priority; and
       (6) an ``acceptable agreement'' between the IAEA and North 
     Korea should include regular inspection of all declared 
     nuclear sites as well as special inspections of any suspected 
     nuclear-related site, as agreed to by North Korea in the 
     January 30, 1992, full-scope safeguards agreement with the 
     IAEA.
       (c) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
       (1) the term ``IAEA'' means the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency;
       (2) the term ``NPT'' means the Treaty on the Non-
     Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done on July 1, 1968 at 
     London, Moscow, and Washington; and
       (3) the term ``safeguards'' means the safeguards set forth 
     in an agreement between a country and the IAEA, as authorized 
     by Article III (A)(5) of the Statute of the International 
     Atomic Energy Agency.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I want to say, as I proceed with my 
remarks, that the Senator from Virginia brings up a very important 
point about the possible reintroduction of nuclear weapons in the event 
of our failure to bring about a halt in the North Korean nuclear 
capability. Perhaps by the time I finish my remarks, the Senator from 
Virginia and I will be able to incorporate his proposal into my 
amendment, but we will also have the Senator from Massachusetts look at 
it. There is a puzzled look on the face of the Senator from 
Massachusetts, and I understand that. I say to him that I recognize he 
has agreed to accept just my amendment. The Senator from Virginia has 
the right to either modify my amendment or propose an amendment in the 
form of a second degree, as is proper parliamentary procedure. Or the 
Senator from Virginia suggests that perhaps he just propose his 
amendment following mine. Would that be the easiest?
  Mr. KERRY. First of all, I do not know if the microphone of the 
Senator from Arizona is working. I am having a hard time hearing.
  Mr. McCAIN. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, if my friend will yield for a moment, I can 
answer his question. I think the Senator from Virginia is disposed to 
proceed separately after the Senator. We remain prepared to accept the 
amendment. I will discuss it in a moment.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask the indulgence of my friend from 
Virginia. I have an amendment on Thailand which will be accepted at the 
end of this particular amendment.
  I rise on behalf of myself, Senator Dole, and others, to offer this 
amendment regarding the United States policy with respect to the North 
Korean nuclear program.
  Mr. President, this amendment expresses the sense of Congress 
regarding the continued intransigence of North Korea in refusing to 
comply with the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. For 
nearly a year, North Korea has refused to allow access to its nuclear-
related facilities, as required under its safeguard agreements with the 
International Atomic Energy Agency.
  The International Atomic Energy Agency has not formally declared a 
break in the continuity of safeguards on nuclear-related facilities in 
North Korea, but inspections have not been permitted since last 
January. This raises serious questions as to the possibility of 
diversion of nuclear material to a weapons development program--a 
situation which cannot be permitted to stand unchallenged and 
unexplored.
  The administration has been unsuccessful in resolving this issue, and 
this amendment sets forth a firm new policy approach designed to 
demonstrate United States resolve and to encourage North Korea's 
agreement to permit inspections at all of its nuclear-related sites.
  In general, this amendment urges the President to use strong measures 
to accomplish the primary objective--halting the North Korean nuclear 
weapons program and implementing the full-scope safeguards agreement 
between North Korea and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
  Let me briefly explain the most significant points of the policy 
which this amendment urges the President to adopt:
  First, the amendment urges the President to seek international 
consensus to impose sanctions and other measures to isolate North Korea 
economically until IAEA inspections resume. While the administration 
has threatened to impose sanctions through the U.N. Security Council, 
they have effectively left the decision to seek such sanctions to the 
IAEA. Unless the International Atomic Energy Agency admits defeat in 
its efforts to gain North Korea's agreement to resume inspections, the 
United States will not press for U.N. action to impose economic 
sanctions. Instead, the administration should take the lead now in 
seeking a multilateral economic embargo on North Korea in order to 
compel them to agree to inspections and stop building nuclear weapons.
  (Mr. LIEBERMAN assumed the chair.)
  Mr. McCAIN. Second, the President is urged to support United States-
South Korea joint military exercises as a demonstration of our 
commitment to our South Korean allies. The amendment rejects the 
administration's ill-advised linkage of these exercises with North 
Korea's willingness to live up to its international commitments.
  Third, the amendment calls on the President to ensure that sufficient 
United States forces, including Patriot missiles, are deployed in South 
Korea to adequately defend our ally against any aggressive action by 
the North. General Luck, commander of United States forces in Korea, 
has requested Patriot systems in order to counter Scud missiles from 
the North. The administration should immediately approve the deployment 
of these systems to better defend our troops against possible attack.
  This amendment does not specifically authorize the President to use 
military force to compel North Korea's compliance with the NPT. The 
President should, however, use all means necessary to achieve that 
goal, and there are many such options available to him. In addition to 
continued diplomatic pressure, the President should seek multilateral 
support for an economic embargo against North Korea. He should urge 
Japan to stop the flow of hard currency from resident North Koreans to 
their homeland. He should seek full cooperation from the Chinese in any 
multilateral sanctions on North Korea, by making clear to China that 
renewal of most-favored-nation status will be conditioned upon China's 
demonstrated efforts to compel North Korea to comply with the NPT.
  This amendment states that resolving the stalemate on nuclear 
inspections in North Korea is a matter of the highest national security 
priority. I believe that the President should very seriously consider 
the use of all necessary means, including military force, in the event 
that all other measures fail to achieve the desired result of halting 
the North Korean nuclear weapons program. I do not say this lightly, 
and I do not advocate the use of force at this time. But I believe that 
it must be made very clear to the North that their refusal to comply 
with their freely undertaken international obligations will not be 
tolerated by the United States.


                        the north korean threat

  Mr. President, the greatest challenge to U.S. security and world 
stability today is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
The most dangerous and immediate expression of that global threat now 
confronts American forces across the Korean DMZ.
  There can be no serious doubt that our vital national interests are 
imperiled by North Korea's nuclear program and the war they have 
threatened to protect it. If North Korea possesses or soon obtains 
nuclear weapons, the threat it poses to the region will multiply 
exponentially, as will proliferation in Asia.
  Every action taken in Washington should reaffirm to Kim Il Song that 
the price of North Korea's lawlessness and belligerency is too great 
for even the most inhumane regime to endure. So far, the administration 
has signaled an accommodationist mentality that will only embolden 
North Korea and encourage other nations to engage in proliferation.
  CIA Director Woolsey has stated publicly that United States 
intelligence indicates that North Korea has extracted enough plutonium 
from its reactors to build two bombs. There are some estimates that 
they possess 12 kilograms of plutonium. Yet, the administration seems 
not to recognize the urgency of a situation wherein North Korea may 
possess nuclear weapons and may be purposely delaying resumed 
inspections in an effort to extract additional plutonium and produce 
additional nuclear bombs.
  My colleagues should also know that North Korea's Scud missiles are 
capable of carrying primitive nuclear warheads to Seoul. North Korea is 
continuing to develop its No Dong series of missiles which could carry 
nuclear warheads to Japan.
  The administration's efforts have been aimed at securing North 
Korea's agreement to allow the IAEA to resume inspections under the 
safeguards agreement, including maintaining recording devices at 
Yongbyon that will reduce the likelihood that the plutonium will be 
diverted to weapons production. The administration has yet to address 
the possibility that North Korea may have other means to obtain 
weapons-grade nuclear material beyond those currently in question, such 
as centrifuges, calutrons, or chemical separation. As we belatedly 
discovered in Iraq, these means of producing fissionable material are 
harder to detect. It is also unclear whether the IAEA can provide 
absolute assurances that the Yongbyon reactor does not have concealed 
chambers to produce additional small amounts of plutonium in ways that 
normal inspections will not detect.
  Another important consideration is the military threat to our allies 
in South Korea.
  Canceling military exercises with our South Korean allies is quite 
possibly the worst signal the United States could send to an 
increasingly bellicose North Korea, indicating in advance to North 
Korea the profits to be realized in proliferation and saber rattling. 
By canceling Team Spirit exercises, the administration has taught 
would-be aggressors throughout the world that, if you want American 
military exercises canceled, violate an international treaty.
  According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the 
North Korean Army has increased its tank force by 40 percent and its 
artillery pieces by 50 percent. Much of the North's 1.2 million-man 
army is massed on the border, with combat ready units poised for attack 
at strategic locations.

  Experts have estimated North Korea's current stockpile of biological 
and chemical weapons at 250 tons, with 13,000 North Korean troops 
trained to use them. North Korea has reportedly armed its Scud missiles 
with chemical warheads, and we do not yet have Patriot batteries in 
place to protect our forces from their use.
  Unfortunately, the administration has shown a willingness to bargain 
with North Korea separately from South Korea. It has issued vague 
promises about normal relations and economic assistance, while broadly 
hinting at our willingness to cancel military training exercises with 
our South Korea allies.
  Initially, President Clinton responded to this crisis by emphatically 
stating that the United States would not allow North Korea to possess 
nuclear weapons. After CIA Director Woolsey indicated North Korea's 
probable possession of weapons-grade plutonium, the administration then 
seemed content to oppose the North's emergence as a serious nuclear 
power. This dangerous vacillation by the Clinton administration will 
only encourage North Korea to dismiss the President's latest opposition 
as quickly as it dismissed his original pronouncement.


                             the new policy

  Now is the time for the administration to reverse its image abroad as 
vacillating and insecure. There is nothing to be gained and much to be 
lost by being frightened into appeasement for the sake of a single 
concession which in the end may not matter very much. North Korea is 
testing our resolve. Let us make certain they understand how grave are 
the consequences of their unlawful ambitions.
  We should emphatically make clear that we do not rule out any 
potential response to North Korea's continued intransigence, including 
a military response. We should insist that North Korea discontinue its 
nuclear weapons program immediately and that it open all of its 
nuclear-related facilities to international inspection.
  The United States should begin devoting its energies to building an 
international consensus to further economically isolate North Korea. 
Our diplomacy should be conducted with forceful representations of our 
seriousness. We should make it as difficult as possible for other 
nations to resist our efforts.
  To make sanctions effective against the insular economy of North 
Korea, President Clinton must insist on full cooperation from China--
now. Secretary of State Warren Christopher dismissed China's repeated 
opposition to sanctions as something less than China's final word on 
the subject. The Secretary should focus his immediate efforts on making 
certain that China's next pronouncement on the subject proves his 
current optimism to be well-founded.
  We should put the case plainly to China: All benefits derived from 
their relationship with the United States--from most-favored-nation 
trade status to licenses for the transfer of supercomputers and 
satellite technology--will be directly connected to China's full 
implementation of sanctions, should they prove necessary, and its 
central involvement in efforts to prevent North Korean proliferation 
and aggression. Currently, United States policy toward China is 
primarily focused on human rights and trade disputes. These are 
appropriate concerns for United States diplomacy, but proliferation, 
and more specifically, Chinese aid and comfort to North Korean 
proliferation, should be treated by the administration as the most 
urgent problem in our relations.
  The United States should begin making all the force improvements 
necessary to enhance our conventional and rapid deployment capabilities 
in South Korea, including the immediate deployment of Patriot batteries 
to protect United States soldiers. Our forces should be fully ready to 
repel aggression irrespective of whether North Korea's bellicosity is 
real or contrived to intimidate American diplomacy. Joint military 
exercises are a necessary determinant of our readiness. Finally, we 
should make unambiguously clear to Pyongyang that any use of weapons of 
mass destruction against South Korea will be met with greater 
retaliation in kind.


                                urgency

  Almost a month ago, Under Secretary of State Lynn Davis announced 
triumphantly that North Korea had agreed to discuss with the IAEA the 
resumption of inspections, despite well-founded fears that North Korea 
would permit only one-time inspection of its seven declared nuclear 
sites. Further, North Korea steadfastly refused access to its nuclear 
waste sites. Now these discussions with the IAEA have apparently run 
into another intentional roadblock set up by the North Koreans, and 
they are refusing inspections of even the declared sites.
  On February 21, the IAEA board of governors will meet, and if an 
agreement with North Korea has not been reached at that time, the IAEA 
will consider appropriate action. The IAEA may vote to refer this issue 
to the United Nations to seek economic sanctions or other measures to 
compel North Korea to comply with the NPT.
  How much longer can we tolerate North Korean intransigence on this 
vital national security issue? Every day that North Korea stalls 
inspections is another day's advance toward acquiring additional 
nuclear weapons. This amendment recognizes the need for decisive action 
now, to prevent any increase in the North Korean threat.


                               conclusion

  Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to vote for this important 
amendment. I have worked with my colleagues on the other side to craft 
this amendment so that it would have broad bipartisan support. Although 
my remarks have been critical of administration policy to date, they 
were not made, nor was this amendment offered, to score partisan 
political points. I feel very strongly that U.S. policy on this 
question is in urgent need of revision. I sincerely hope the 
administration recognizes the weakness of its previous response to this 
crisis, and takes immediate action to recover the advantage in our test 
of wills with North Korea.
  The clear and present danger which a nuclear North Korea poses to the 
United States and our allies does not automatically confer on North 
Korea a position of greater strength in this contest with us. Only a 
failure of nerve on the part of U.S. policymakers can do that.
  North Korea's economy is tottering on the verge of total collapse. 
Pyongyang desperately needs to open its economy to the West to 
forestall complete economic ruin and the political changes that will 
likely accompany it. And despite their bellicose posturing, North 
Korea's military leaders must recognize that they are unlikely to win a 
war with South Korea and the United States or even emerge from the 
conflict with their regime intact.
  The United States and our South Korean allies still occupy the better 
ground in this crisis. But we are squandering that advantage every day 
we allow North Korea to believe that it can extract from us military, 
diplomatic, and economic concessions without abandoning its nuclear 
program entirely.
  Mr. President, a Wall Street Journal article dated January 31 fairly 
summarizes the current dilemma facing the United States, and quotes the 
critical assessment of the administration's current policy by David 
Kay, the leader of United Nations inspection teams in Iraq. Kay charges 
that:

       By negotiating inch by inch, North Korea has gotten what it 
     apparently wanted: more time to work on its nuclear weapons--
     and the missiles to carry them--without outside interference.

  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this Wall Street Journal 
article be printed in the Record following the conclusion of my 
remarks, along with a column by Charles Krauthammer that 
appeared in the Washington Post on January 7, 1994.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (See exhibit 1.)
  Mr. McCAIN. By our reluctance to aggressively challenge North Korea's 
nuclear program--a reluctance which can be fairly criticized as a 
failure of nerve--we have gone a long way to build the confidence of 
North Korean leaders what they can intimidate the United States into 
tolerating their nuclear power pretensions while allowing economic 
lifelines to be thrown to their dysfunctional economy. We may have gone 
a long way as well toward reinforcing their suspicions that the United 
States no longer has the will to defend our interests in Korea and the 
rest of Asia by whatever means necessary.
  Despite the ground we have already conceded, we can recover some of 
it by immediately returning to a zero tolerance policy. Yes, Seoul is 
uniquely vulnerable. It is within reach not only of North Korean 
artillery, but quite possibly within reach of its nuclear weapons. 
However, Pyongyang is well within reach of ours.
  We should make abundantly clear to Kim II Song that as economic ruin 
and political collapse will accompany their continued intransigence on 
this issue, utter destruction will accompany their resort to force. We 
have served up enough carrots to North Korea. The time has come to show 
them the stick.
  To paraphrase Churchill, let it not be said one day that in a 
definite cisis, the United States faced a choice between accommodation 
and the prospect of war; that we chose accommodation first and got war 
later.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor.

         [From the Wall Street Journal, Monday, Jan. 31, 1994]

                               Exhibit 1

 Check of North Korea Nuclear Sites Won't Provide Comfort Clinton Wants

                          (By John J. Fialka)

       Washington.--Earlier this month, Undersecretary of State 
     Lynn Davis was asked on the ``MacNell-Lehrer'' program how 
     the U.S. could be confident that a diversion of nuclear 
     materials wasn't going on at North Korea's Yongbyon research 
     facility.
       ``Well, because we've had this safeguards regime in place 
     over the past year, and, indeed, had an inspection in August, 
     so it isn't that we haven't been carrying out this regime,'' 
     she answered.
       But officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
     the Vienna-based group that actually carried out that August 
     inspection, paint a vastly less rosy picture. Its inspectors, 
     the group says, were literally left groping in the dark. They 
     were permitted to leave their barracks-like guest quarters at 
     Yongbyon, 60 miles north of Pyongyang, only after 6 p.m. As 
     night fell, they were escorted into the pitch-black innards 
     of several buildings. There, using flashlight because the 
     buildings' lights were kept out, the inspectors only replaced 
     the batteries and videotape in cameras that they use to 
     monitor some parts of the facility. End of inspection.
       ``Our August inspection was not a good one. It was 
     something we launched unwisely,'' says David Kyd, a spokesman 
     for the IAEA.


                     u.s. accentuating the positive

       As the IAEA negotiates for a fresh look at seven declared 
     nuclear sites at Yongbyon, the administration is again 
     accentuating the positive. Ms. Davis, for instance, has 
     predicted that the agreement the U.S. has won from North 
     Korea will allow the IAEA to ``tell the rest of the world 
     that there are no dangerous activities occurring in North 
     Korea with respect to nuclear weapons.''
       But while outside experts disagree over just how to handle 
     the North Korean situation, there is widespread agreement on 
     one thing: It is probably impossible now for the IAEA to 
     ensure anything like the level of comfort the administration 
     is promising.
       David Kay, a former Central Intelligence Agency analyst who 
     led United Nations Inspection teams in Iraq, says the 
     possibility that North Korea may already have at least one 
     nuclear weapon makes an IAEA declaration that there are no 
     dangerous activities under way in North Korea extremely 
     unlikely.
       ``The agreement calls for the inspection of only seven 
     declared sites. Now no one believes that the bomb is going to 
     be in the basement of any of those sites,'' Mr. Kay asserts.


                            `this is a joke'

       Administration officials express hope that further 
     bargaining will gain IAEA access into other sites where they 
     suspect bomb-making activity has gone on. To that, Albert 
     Wohistetter, a sometime Pentagon consultant who is considered 
     the dean of U.S. thinkers on how to contain the spread of 
     nuclear weapons, has a short answer: ``This is a joke.'' The 
     administration, Mr. Wohistetter thinks, has vastly oversold 
     the ability of IAEA inspections to penetrate the deep secrecy 
     of North Korea, where Stalinist dogma approaches Orwellian 
     levels of control.
       ``A lot of this stuff becomes a dream if you're not talking 
     about an open society. You're talking about a society where 
     whistle-blowers commit suicide. * * * I really feel that 
     people are getting off the point.''
       The point that he and others are focusing on is that if 
     North Korea has the bomb or has drawn off enough plutonium 
     from its ``peaceful nuclear research'' to make one or two 
     nuclear devices--as the CIA has suggested--then the 
     relationship between the isolated regime of Kim Il Sung and 
     its neighbors has already changed, and IAEA-style inspections 
     won't be able to reduce the perception of danger.
       Critics say the extravagant claims for the IAEA are in 
     keeping with the administration's uncertain handling of the 
     entire North Korean nuclear issue. The Nuclear 
     Nonproliferation Treaty, says Mr. Kay, requires that ``either 
     you completely give up your bomb program the way South Africa 
     has, with intrusive inspections to prove you have given it 
     up, or else you get out'' of the treaty. But by negotiating 
     inch by inch, North Korea has gotten what it apparently 
     wanted: more time to work on its nuclear weapons--and the 
     missiles to carry them--without outside interference.
       Kongdan Oh, a Rand Corporation analyst who closely follows 
     North Korea, says that the U.S. ``showed the worst aspect of 
     negotiators. We showed them Americans are impatient for 
     results. They [North Koreans] played the game much tougher. 
     Now we look like we are giving things away. It's a very sad 
     situation.''
       By hanging tough, Pyongyang appears to have won the 
     termination of this year's Team Spirit joint exercise between 
     U.S. and South Korean forces. This was the carrot that was 
     originally dangled before Pyongyang as a lure to get them 
     back into the treaty, but the Pentagon didn't enhance it much 
     by failing to put the funds for the exercise in its 1994 
     budget.
       U.S. Intelligence estimates see North Korea with, at best, 
     a primitive nuclear device. First-generation nuclear weapons 
     weight at least 1,100 pounds. North Korea has Scud missiles 
     capable of carrying such a load to Seoul and is developing 
     the Nodong-1, which could carry such a warhead to parts of 
     Japan North Korean engineers are still trying to perfect the 
     guidance system for the missile, a process that could take 
     several more months.
       Meanwhile, North Korea continues to lay the groundwork for 
     further delays. At Pyongyang's request, the IAEA has twice 
     written lengthy explanations of what it wants to inspect. 
     Last week, North Korea asked for a third. So far, it has 
     refused to resume diplomatic dialogue with South Korea. Both 
     the inspection and the dialogue are prerequisites for talks 
     leading to a ``package solution'' outlined by the U.S.
       After U.S. officials made it known last week that they are 
     considering sending Patriot air defense missiles to protect 
     ports and airfields that would be needed for U.S. forces to 
     reinforce South Korea, Pyongyang issued a statement saying 
     that the real reason for the missiles ``is to impede the 
     progress of the DPRK [North Korea]-U.S. talks for a 
     fundamental solution to the nuclear issue.''
       According to U.S. officials, the IAEA can end the impasse 
     by simply declaring that it can no longer assure the 
     continuity of its safeguards efforts. If the delays continue, 
     such a statement is likely on Feb. 22, when the agency's 
     board of governors holds its next meeting. That would send 
     the matter back to the U.N. Security Council, which would 
     then consider imposing economic sanctions.
       Although U.S. negotiators are feeling heat from the White 
     House to resolve the North Korean problem, some suggest that 
     the U.S. shouldn't be in such a hurry. Rand's Ms. Oh, for 
     example, suggests that it is North Korea that ought to feel 
     that time is running against it. With their poverty-stricken 
     economy verging on total collapse, she says, Kim II Sung and 
     his son and annointed successor, Kim Jong II, are desperate 
     for Western aid. But if they open their economy to the 
     outside influences that come with aid from the West, Ms. Oh 
     believes, their regime will collapse.
       ``The country that has to be nervous is North Korea, not 
     us,'' she insists. ``But for some reason, we are the nervous 
     party.''
                                  ____


                [From the Washington Post Jan. 7, 1994]

    Capitulation in Korea--Clinton's Cave-in Makes a Joke of the NPT

                        (By Charles Krauthammer)

       When I wrote six weeks ago regarding the U.S. attempt to 
     stop the North Korean nuclear bomb program that ``by year's 
     end . . . there will be no more room for wobble. The choice 
     will be blockade or surrender,'' I half expected this wobbly 
     president to surrender. But even I was stunned by the extent 
     of the capitulation in the deal the State Department has just 
     made with North Korea. The place to properly sign an 
     agreement of this kind is on the deck of the battleship 
     Missouri. It is unconditional surrender.
       Start at the beginning. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
     (NPT), which North Korea freely signed, requires a country to 
     allow two kinds of inspections of its potential nuclear 
     facilities: regular inspections of self-declared nuclear 
     sites and challenge inspections of sites undeclared by the 
     host country but suspected by the world of harboring nuclear 
     bomb work.
       As we learned to our sorrow in Iraq, regular inspections 
     alone are useless. Iraq built a huge nuclear program while 
     faithfully allowing international inspectors to pore over its 
     declared sites.
       Which is why last year the International Atomic Energy 
     Agency (IAEA) demanded challenge inspections of two North 
     Korea waste dumps for evidence of weapons-grade plutonium 
     production. North Korea refused. It then announced that it 
     would not allow regular inspections either.
       What did the Clinton administration do? It began a long 
     series of negotiations with the North Koreans offering them 
     all kinds of goodies, most important, cancellation of our 
     joint military exercises with South Korea if they would come 
     back into compliance with the NPT.
       Now the administration has reached agreement. What is the 
     deal? Does North Korea comply with the NPT? No. Does it allow 
     challenge inspections? No. Does it allow even regular 
     inspections, which the administration itself declared last 
     year to be inadequate? No. What then? The IAEA will be 
     allowed a one-time inspection of seven declared sites. (The 
     issue of more inspections has merely been deferred, not 
     dropped, administration officials tell The Post's R. Jeffrey 
     Smith. Which is, of course, an admission that the deal just 
     concluded ensures nothing more than a one-shot inspection.) 
     In return, North Korea reportedly gets something it has 
     coveted for years: cancellation of our ``Team Spirit'' 
     exercises with South Korea.
       ``A total rout,'' says Gary Milhollin, director of the 
     Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. As the talks have 
     proceeded, Clinton has systematically abandoned one position 
     after another to the point that we are not even talking about 
     things--challenge inspections, even regular inspections--that 
     we were insisting on only months ago.
       Everyone knows that a single inspection of Potemkin sites 
     is a joke. Why then the pretense?
       Because the administration has a problem. It wants at all 
     costs to get this problem off its plate, but the NPT has 
     tough provisions to thwart the temptation to do so. 
     Specifically, when a country reneges on its NPT obligations 
     and refuses inspections, the IAEA declares that ``continuity 
     of safeguards is broken.'' These magic words are supposed to 
     trigger a world response against the violator.
       Hans Blix, head of the IAEA, was getting ready to use 
     exactly those words at a United Nations speech on Nov. 1 but 
     held off, much to the relief of the administration. With IAEA 
     surveillance cameras and batteries in North Korea now about 
     to go dead, however, Blix would have had no choice but to 
     declare continuity broken.
       So some genius figures out that a one-time inspection would 
     allow battery and film to be replaced and the IAEA to say 
     that, technically, continuity had not been broken. No whistle 
     blows, we pretend that the NPT is intact, and the crisis goes 
     away.
       True, the one-time inspection would do nothing to stop, 
     slow down or even enlighten us about the North Korean nuclear 
     program. But the point of the Clinton policy is not to stop 
     the North Korean bomb. It is to get the administration off 
     the hook.
       Hence the deal. Result? (1) The NPT is dead. North Korea 
     broke it and got a huge payoff from the United States not for 
     returning to it but for pretending to. Its nuclear program 
     proceeds unmolested. In Tehran and Tripoli and Baghdad the 
     message is received: Nonproliferation means nothing.
       (2) The IAEA, if it goes along with this sham, is corrupted 
     beyond redemption. It is supposed to be an impartial referee 
     blowing the whistle on proliferators. Yet if Washington does 
     not want to hear the whistle, the IAEA can be bullied into 
     silence.
       (3) American credibility--not very high after Clinton's 
     about-faces in Bosnia, Somalia and Haiti--sinks to a new low. 
     This is a president easily cowed and dangerously weak. Said 
     one government official to the New York Times, ``It's one of 
     these cases where the administration was huffing and puffing 
     and backed down.'' Better though, said another, than 
     ``falling on our own sword over phony principle.'' If 
     nonproliferation, so earnestly trumpeted by this president, 
     is a phony principle, then where do we look for this 
     president's real principles?
       This administration would not recognize a foreign policy 
     principle, phony or otherwise, if it tripped over one in the 
     street. The State Department, mixing cravenness with 
     cynicism, calls this capitulation ``very good news.'' For Kim 
     II Sung, certainly. For us, the deal is worse than dangerous. 
     It is shameful.

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I am pleased to be a cosponsor of the McCain 
amendment which expresses the sense of Congress on United States policy 
toward North Korea.
  The nuclear crisis in North Korea was sparked by North Korea's 
refusal last February to permit the International Atomic Energy Agency 
to conduct special inspections. Four weeks later North Korea announced 
that it would withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
  After months and months of diplomacy--including direct talks with the 
North Koreans--the administration is no closer to resolving this issue 
than when the North Korean announcement was made. Sure, North Korea has 
suspended its withdrawal, but it has agreed to stay in the NPT on its 
own terms only.
  on January 4, 1994, Under Secretary of State Lynn Davis announced 
that North Korea had agreed to allow inspections of seven declared 
sites--but, not challenge inspections of undeclared sites. 
Nevertheless, about 2 weeks later, the North Koreans once again 
rejected the IAEA's inspection demands.
  Clearly, direct diplomacy and offers of concessions--such as the 
canceling of Team Spirit exercises and light water reactor technology--
have gained us nothing. On the other hand, the North Koreans have 
gained almost 1 year to further develop their nuclear weapons program. 
News reports citing United States intelligence estimates indicate that 
North Korea probably already possesses the nuclear materials needed to 
build one or two bombs. Moreover, the North Koreans have been testing 
the Nodong missile, and may have an intermediate range ballistic 
missile in development.

  Nevertheless, until now the administration's approach has been all 
carrots and no sticks. Yes, the North Koreans are having their carrot 
cake and eating it, too.
  It is high time to chart a new course, and the course outlined in the 
McCain amendment is the way to go. Pyongyang must be told in no 
uncertain terms that the United States will not tolerate a North Korean 
nuclear capability. Period. And, the United States must show--through 
its actions, not its words--that we are committed to taking the 
unilateral and multilateral steps to back up our position. We must seek 
to isolate North Korea economically and we must demonstrate our 
commitment to South Korea by increasing our military presence in the 
Pacific and proceeding with joint United States-South Korean military 
exercises. The President has before him a request from the United 
States commander in South Korea for Patriot missiles. I hope that the 
President will not only expeditiously approve that request, but review 
other options for beefing up South Korea's defensive capabilities and 
our military presence in the region.
  Some may ask, what is at stake in North Korea? What is at stake is 
the safety of 37,000 United States troops in South Korea, the security 
of South Korea, the stability and prosperity of Asia, the integrity of 
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and finally, the credibility of 
the United States.
  If we fail to get tough now, we will have to live with the 
consequences of a nuclear North Korea which can threaten and coerce our 
friends and trading partners in Asia, and further spread nuclear 
technology and materials to hostile, terrorist regimes and groups.
  Mr. President, the time is now for the President to take a firm 
stand. I hope that my colleagues will be unanimous in support of the 
McCain amendment. I think it would help the administration in their 
negotiations with North Korea.
  Mr. BOND. Mr. President, the situation on the Korean peninsula 
continues to simmer along without adequate attention from the 
administration.
  It has been nearly a year since North Korea precipitated the crisis 
by announcing its intention to withdraw from the NPT Treaty. 
Unfortunately, the administration failed to take strong action at that 
time and, in fact, seemed to ignore it almost until the end of last 
year.
  The last time I addressed this issue on the floor, I expressed my 
concern that President Clinton and Secretary Christopher seemed 
determined to be manipulated by Pyongyang. Instead of laying out 
exactly where the issue stood, taking a tough stand, and taking steps 
to assemble an international coalition to force North Korea to submit 
to international inspection or suffer the consequences; the 
administration seemed willing to offer concessions in exchange for mere 
promises. In December, I was somewhat heartened when the administration 
appeared to be taking a tougher stand, but then last month we witnessed 
the spectacle of our negotiator announcing an agreement only to be 
directly contradicted 2 weeks later when North Korean officials 
announced that they would not submit to IAEA inspections.
  It is bad enough that this sequence of events makes the United States 
look like weak negotiators in the eyes of the world, thereby weakening 
our ability to assemble a coalition in opposition to the North. Just as 
bad, however, is that by negotiating for almost a year, we have given 
the North Koreans exactly what they most wanted--the extra time they 
needed to continue work on their nuclear program and, according to some 
government sources, probably to complete a nuclear weapon.
  It is imperative that North Korea halt its nuclear weapons program 
and comply with the terms of the NPT. If we allow them to do otherwise, 
we will suffer the consequences for a long time to come.
  The dangers posed by North Korea's threat to withdraw from the NPT 
and go forward with development of nuclear weapons are many.
  The most obvious danger is the risk of war. South Korea whose 
capital, Seoul, lies less than 30 miles from the million-man army 
deployed on its northern border faces the greatest threat. The 
North's conventional artillery alone is a huge threat to the South. 
Ballistic missiles--of which the North has many--greatly increase the 
threat. And the addition of nuclear weapons would cause that threat to 
skyrocket. Not only are millions of Koreans at risk, but 36,000 
American soldiers and their families are there as well. Though we would 
certainly win any war on the Korean peninsula, the cost in lives and 
dollars would be staggering.

  A second danger we face is nuclearization of the region. We know the 
North Koreans have tested ballistic missiles with significant ranges, 
including the Nodong I which has the ability to hit several countries 
including most of Japan. These countries have to feel threatened 
already--knowing that North Korea possessed nuclear weapons as well as 
missiles would likely force them to respond by developing their own 
nuclear weapons. There is no doubt that the Japanese have the 
technology to develop nuclear warheads in short order, and there is 
little doubt that South Korea could quickly follow. Such a 
nuclearization of Southeast Asia could only raise tensions among 
neighboring countries including China and Russia which already possess 
nuclear weapons. The result would be that an area of the world that is 
about to explode with the greatest spurt of economic growth in history 
could instead explode into deadly nuclear warfare.
  A third danger posed by our failure to deal with North Korea is the 
precedent it would set. A decision by the Clinton administration and 
the rest of the civilized world to allow North Korea to get away with 
flaunting its obligations under the NPT would signal to other nations 
that they too should develop nuclear weapons and blackmail us as well.
  The administration needs finally to take strong action. It appears 
that they may be forced into action by the IAEA which is set to meet 
later this month. If the IAEA board of governors finds that it can no 
longer certify the North's compliance with the NPT, it is likely to 
throw the problem into the lap of the U.N. Security Council. At that 
point the administration will have to face the failure of its policy to 
date and will, I hope, take strong action to assemble an international 
coalition to bring economic and diplomatic pressure on North Korea.
  Mr. President, this resolution is a moderate and reasonable statement 
by this body telling the President that he cannot continue to ignore 
this problem--that he must act. It makes clear that this issue is of 
the highest national security priority and that it deserves his 
personal attention. And it calls for reasonable steps to increase 
pressure on North Korea and to increase the security of South Korea. I 
urge Senators to support its adoption and implore the President to heed 
its message.
  Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, as the Senator said at the outset of his 
remarks, we are prepared to accept the amendment.
  But I want to make it clear, we do not accept the full measure of the 
comments that have accompanied the amendment, and there is nothing in 
the amendment itself that embraces the notion of accommodation or 
appeasement. Certainly the Senator is entitled to his views about what 
the administration approach is. Those views are not reflected within 
the language of the amendment per se.
  I share with my colleague enormous concern about events on the Korean 
Peninsula and about North Korea's propensity to avoid its 
responsibilities under the nonproliferation treaty.
  I commend to my colleague the hearings of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in December 1991 and January 1992 where Senator 
Pell, the chairman, laid out a very important first record on this. 
This was the first time that the nonproliferation problem, nonadherence 
problem, of North Korea was really called fully to our attention, and I 
think a strong record was laid down regarding it.
  Let me say also, for those who have been following this question 
closely lately, there is nothing to suggest that this administration is 
content with where we are or that it is somehow stopped where we are. 
The initial effort to get the investigation of the current sites at the 
level that they are is a first step. And the administration has made it 
very clear that more is needed, that we need to proceed further down 
the road.
  But I think everyone will agree that dealing with North Korea is as 
tough a dealing process as there is. It may well be that we are going 
to get to the point the Senator has described, but wise statesmanship 
dictates that you do not leap to that confrontational stage with a 
country like North Korea before you have made clear that all the other 
efforts and avenues have been explored.
  None of that is to suggest one iota of accommodation or appeasement, 
as the case has been set. I think the contrary has been quite the 
reality. The President could not have made it more clear, not only in 
his trip to Asia but since then in his meetings on the west coast, as 
well as more recently, that we remain concerned and we intend to keep 
the pressure on.
  I think the recommendations that are laid out in this, which we have 
arrived at jointly, are sound. I think they are a sensible and 
important message to North Korea, which I think should not 
underestimate the determination of the U.S. Senate and the U.S. 
Congress to keep the heat on with respect to this issue.
  Before we proceed and before I give up my right to the floor, I would 
like to work through, if I may, an issue that seems to be about to 
bubble up here on the floor.
  Last Thursday, we entered into an agreement. That agreement empowered 
Senators to be able to go home on Friday and to permit those who wanted 
to stay here to put amendments in to do so, with the understanding that 
Senators would not vote on Monday but rather come back on Tuesday to 
finish the business by 6 o'clock in the evening. There was an agreement 
by the leadership on both sides, representing all Senators, that this 
would be done as a matter of good faith in an effort to try to 
guarantee that nobody was shut out between now and 6 o'clock.
  We now still have some amendments to come between now and 6 o'clock. 
It is my understanding that the Senator from New York wants to speak 
for some period of time on an issue not related to the bill. Without 
losing my right to the floor, I simply ask the Senator how we can 
proceed so as to keep faith with the agreement and try to guarantee 
that we get all amendments laid down by 6 o'clock?
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I would like to put my statement in the 
Record, if I could do that?
  Mr. KERRY. Without losing my right to the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Carolina.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent I be joined as a 
cosponsor of this amendment of Senator McCain's.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, as I listened to the statements in 
support of the McCain amendment, I recalled the shock Americans felt 
the morning of June 25, 1950, when we awoke to learn the North Korean 
Army had crossed the 38th parallel in force and was overrunning South 
Korea. For some time prior to that, President Truman's administration 
had issued statements which the Communist regime construed as an 
invitation to forcibly reunify the divided Korean Peninsula. Of course, 
such blatant aggression convinced President Truman to fight, and fight 
we did, in one of the most bitter wars in modern history. Though the 
Korean conflict was waged under the flag of the United Nations, 
Americans bore the brunt of the battle, at the cost of over 50,000 
United States dead, and thousands wounded.
  It is incumbent on us to remember the veterans of that conflict. In 
my opinion, they have never been properly honored by this Nation. They 
fought in the most demanding conditions. At times they were vastly 
outnumbered by a determined enemy. They often had to rely on inadequate 
weapons and equipment left over from World War II. Yet they fought with 
all the bravery, tenacity, and ingenuity that characterize the American 
fighting man. We owe it to those who sacrificed so much in Korea to 
safeguard the peace and freedom they fought to attain.
  Let no one labor under any misunderstanding about our recent 
confrontation with North Korea over efforts to enforce the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty [NPT], and to block their development of nuclear 
weapons. We stood toe-to-toe with them, and we backed down. In dropping 
demands for a full inspection of all suspected nuclear sites, the 
administration clearly settled for less than full enforcement of the 
NPT. Then, in exchange for North Korea's so-called concession to allow 
a partial inspection, we canceled the Team Spirit training exercise 
with our South Korean allies, and delayed bringing the issue of 
economic sanctions before the U.N. Security Council.
  Perhaps the administration has fooled itself into believing it has 
resolved the threat of North Korea's nuclear weapons program.
  Perhaps the Congress and the American people are temporarily fooled 
as well. But I can assure my colleagues, the North Koreans are not 
fooled. I fear they have taken the measure of the administration and 
have found the President's men more concerned about rescuing the 
tattered credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty than in actually 
stopping the North from building nuclear weapons.
  But we need to remember that membership, or even ostensible 
compliance, with the NPT does not equal security. Iraq showed us that, 
for Iraq was once a member in good standing of the NPT, all the while 
using the treaty as a cover for their nuclear weapons effort.
  The continuing confrontation with North Korea demonstrates the limits 
of diplomacy in dealing with a rogue state. Multilateral regimes, like 
the NPT, depend upon good will and good faith. They are virtually 
useless in forcing an outlaw nation to behave responsibly. Inspection 
regimes, negotiations, appeals for compliance, and all the trappings of 
diplomacy do not impress dictators. They only generate contempt. In 
fact, dictators like Kim Il-Sung use the language of the civilized 
community to confuse, divide, and mislead us, and to camouflage their 
real purposes.
  A fundamental error of the administration has been to treat the so-
called Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a traditional power; as 
if Kim Il-Sung believed in the conventions that govern relations 
between civilized states. But it is not a traditional nation-state as 
commonly understood. The very name, the ``Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea'' is a falsehood. North Korea is neither democratic nor a 
republic.
  The regime does not answer to the people, but exists only to serve 
the swollen ego and lust for power of the dictator Kim Il-Sung and his 
inner circle. It would be more accurate to describe North Korea as an 
organized crime family with a vast military machine and a complaint 
population held in check by propaganda and terror. Or it could be 
likened to feudal robber barons whose whims could send entire peoples 
to war, as Kim Il-Sung did with such terrible consequences in 1950.
  The cynicism and criminal paranoia of Kim's regime are illustrated by 
its response to the United States decision to send Patriot missiles to 
South Korea. As everyone in the world must know by now, the Patriot is 
a purely defensive system. It will threaten no one in North Korea, 
unless they happen to be pilots of warplanes attacking South Korea. It 
will not even interfere with the North's ability to develop nuclear 
weapons and ballistic missiles. It will only make them less 
threatening. North Korea is like a violent criminal who complains 
loudly because the homeowner he intends to rob and murder has decided 
to put on a bulletproof vest.

  Consequently, to make diplomacy or treaties ends in themselves will 
not end North Korea's nuclear weapons program. It will only convince 
the North Koreans that we lack resolve. This could tempt the North to 
strike, as they did in 1950. The 1950 invasion demonstrated that wars 
start when aggressors miscalculate the strength and resolve of 
democracies, or misconstrue their peaceful pronouncements. A further 
and more recent case in point is Saddam Hussein, who misinterpreted 
ambiguous statements from the State Department, and convinced himself 
he could attack Kuwait with impunity.
  On the other hand, tough talk, condemnation in the courts of world 
opinion, and economic sanctions are not a sufficient substitute for 
failed diplomacy. They may be justified, but they will accomplish 
little, except to increase whatever sense of grievance and isolation 
North Korea may feel.
  So far, U.S. actions have been composed of ineffectual NPT 
negotiations, accompanied by bluster and harsh rhetoric, and then 
timidity and inaction. The time has come to reverse that approach. This 
century's tragic experience with dictators tells me that their behavior 
leaves us only one choice: deterrence and defense. The time has come to 
lower the level of rhetoric, then quietly to ensure the appropriate 
level of military preparedness in South Korea, taking the minimum steps 
necessary to deter aggression and defend our troops, and to improve the 
military capabilities of our South Korean ally. In this case, the 
traditional American policy, ``Walk softly, but carry a big stick,'' is 
exactly the right policy.
  I am convinced that ultimately we cannot determine what happens 
inside North Korea through diplomacy or coercion, but we may contain 
their aggressive tendencies by improving military preparedness. The 
Patriot deployment is an important step in this direction, and suggests 
the administration is finally getting the message. I commend the 
President for considering this important first step, and urge him to 
follow through.
  I remind my colleagues that the present threat from North Korea is 
primarily conventional. The North has deployed the bulk of their ground 
forces toward the DMZ, and has moved up long-range artillery and 
tactical rocket launchers that can hit Seoul. Their nuclear threat at 
present is uncertain, but its very uncertainty gives North Korea a kind 
of trump card. It backs up their conventional forces, and gives them 
added political leverage.
  The time has come for the United States to dispense with self-
delusion and act wisely toward the danger posed by North Korea. 
Quietly, judiciously, and with calm determination we must do what is 
necessary to deter potential aggression and defend our troops, our 
allies, and our interests in the Pacific rim. There are no better 
alternatives.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts has the floor.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I simply want to enter into a dialog with 
my friend from New York to try to determine how we can accommodate the 
Senator from New York without a detrimental impact on those who might 
be shut out and where we are going here.
  Mr. D'AMATO. If I might, for purposes of responding to my colleague 
from Massachusetts, indicate that last week when this agreement was 
being structured I requested time for a special order. It offered time 
at 8:30 in the morning. That is preposterous. I asked for--I said an 
hour. I said, if you give me a half-hour I am willing to cut the time 
down to a half-hour, even if you give it to me at 12 o'clock or 12:30.
  That could not be done.
  I said, let there be fair warning that when I take the floor I am 
going to do exactly what I intend to do now, and that is to make known 
my serious concerns regarding the lack of action on the part of the RTC 
with respect to the Madison Guaranty/Whitewater matter, and set before 
the Senate the relevant facts as they relate to information that we 
have been requesting now for almost 3 weeks, and still have not 
received, from the RTC, although I have some hope today, and will make 
a report. With Senator Riegle's help, I think we have made a 
breakthrough toward obtaining a response from the RTC.
  If my colleague is asking how much time will I be taking, I do not 
think it will be an inordinate amount of time. I believe that it is 
incumbent upon me to put this matter in front of my colleagues of the 
Senate. I had attempted to arrange a time agreement, had been turned 
down, but I do intend to press forward with this.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, let me say to my friend I have no--it 
really does not matter to me at what hour of the day the facts he wants 
to put forward are put forward. I am not afraid of the facts. I do not 
think anybody is.
  The issue here is how we can keep faith with the agreement that we 
reached on both sides.
  Mr. D'AMATO. Might I make a suggestion to my colleague?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts has the floor.
  Mr. KERRY. I am also informed the Senator from New York was offered 
time between 9:30--9 and 9:30, but that he was personally not able to 
be there.
  It is my understanding that offer was made. I do not think this bill 
should be prejudiced now because the Senator could not be there from 9 
to 9:30. This is a critical moment, where we need this time in order to 
protect the rights of all the other Senators.
  Mr. D'AMATO. If I might respond?
  Mr. KERRY. Again I do not want to lose my rights to the floor.
  Mr. D'AMATO. I do not want you to lose your rights. And if I might 
say for purposes of responding, it seems to me on the basis of consent 
you can send all those pending matters to the desk where they will have 
been held. They will have been submitted before 6 o'clock. Then you can 
agree to debate or not debate, or vote or not to vote, on those that 
you work out agreements with. That is a very easy matter, to protect 
everyone's rights. I do not intend to infringe on that.
  But I do intend to take the appropriate time to bring this matter to 
my colleagues' attention. I will seek an opportunity to do that.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Let me say to my friend, there is an awful lot of time 
around here in this Senate to speak. We had open hours all yesterday. 
There was time when people could have spoken. We had open hours all 
Friday. We were here until 4 or 5 in the afternoon. I do not know where 
the Senator was.
  Mr. D'AMATO. I spoke Friday.
  Mr. KERRY. If the Senator spoke on this matter, then I suppose that 
raises the question of whether we have to go back to it now.
  Leaving that aside, what the Senator has just proposed does not in 
fact help all other Senators. Because other Senators have come to me 
and said, what is the schedule? What are we going to be doing?
  They have now arranged their day around the notion that there is a 3-
hour window left to get the floor and bring their amendments and we 
will try to wrap this bill up forthrightly tonight. What the Senator is 
asking is that, in order to accommodate him at this time, since he 
could not be here at 9 in the morning, that all other Senators may have 
to stay here a good deal later at night, not to mention everybody else 
in the Senate.
  I am not really sure that is fair, in keeping with the spirit of the 
agreement we reached. I respectfully suggest to the Senator I am 
confident the majority leader will give him the time he needs for 
morning business tomorrow morning, or stay later tonight when we finish 
business.
  Mr. D'AMATO. I do not want to speak at 10 o'clock or 11 at night or 
at 8 in the morning. To be quite candid with my friend from 
Massachusetts, I want to speak at a time when my colleagues might have 
an opportunity to hear my message.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I do not need any lessons from the Senator 
from New York about what is usual or unusual here, nor, really, a 
reinterpretation of the agreement. I am simply trying to protect the 
rights of all Senators to bring their legislation to the floor in, now, 
a 3-hour window, without upsetting the entire schedule of the Senate in 
the process, because the Senator could not be here at 9 this morning.
  All I know is we were here all day yesterday. There was plenty of 
time during the waking hours of day to sound the alarm bells, and the 
Senator was not here.
  I am having trouble understanding where this is----
  Mr. D'AMATO. I was visiting my doctor yesterday. Is that really 
germane? But if you want to know, I was visiting my surgeon and that is 
why I was not here yesterday.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, who has the floor?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts has the floor 
and has not yielded.
  Mr. McCAIN. Will the Senator from Massachusetts yield for a question?
  Mr. KERRY. I yield for the purpose of asking a question without 
losing my rights to the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona.
  Mr. McCAIN. The Senator from Massachusetts has now made himself clear 
about how he feels about the Senator from New York, whether he should 
be speaking or not. Could we continue with my amendment, since it is an 
issue of some significant importance? The Senator from Maine is waiting 
to speak as well.
  Mr. KERRY. I would like to reach an understanding. I want to make it 
clear I am not trying to block the Senator from speaking. But the 
problem----
  Mr. D'AMATO addressed the Chair.
  Mr. KERRY. Let me reiterate. It is my understanding the Senator wants 
to talk for an hour. That leaves 2 hours and pushes the entire schedule 
of the Senate back.
  Mr. D'AMATO. I will speak for less than an hour.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, if I could just say, if we could arrive at 
an agreement by unanimous consent so that we could have a limitation on 
the time that fits into the schedule of other Senators so we could 
proceed with the legislation, I will be happy to do that. But I think 
it would be fair--I do not think anybody on any amendment on this bill 
has spoken for more than 10 or 15 minutes. So I think it really would 
be unfair to suddenly have an extraneous subject, talking for a half-
hour or an hour, when we are trying to do the business of this bill.
  So I ask the Senator if he could make his comment--I think the 
Senator has already called attention to it, in answer to my questions, 
probably much more attention than would have otherwise been afforded 
it.
  I ask the Senator if he might agree that 10 minutes would be a fair 
amount of time to proceed so we do not upset other Senators?
  Mr. D'AMATO. I believe I can make my statement and make my remarks in 
less than a half-hour and I would attempt to do that. I am willing to 
enter into an agreement, notwithstanding that I had requested an hour 
to that effect. I think it will be less than a half-hour. I think we 
are spending time now about this. Why do we not let them proceed and we 
can talk?
  Mr. KERRY. Let me ask my friend, I have an alternative offer. Would 
the Senator permit us to come to the cutoff hour, let us proceed now as 
the Senate has agreed to between now and 6 p.m., and at the hour of 6 
p.m., the Senator would then be afforded a half-hour?
  Mr. D'AMATO. I would rather not speak early in the morning or late at 
night. For the following reason: I want to speak at a time that will 
allow this body to focus attention on this matter.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, let me say to my friend, the problem is 
this: If the Senator from New York speaks----
  Mr. McCAIN. He has taken a half-hour.
  Mr. KERRY. That may well be, but I think it is important to protect 
the process, because more than a half-hour is at stake. If the Senator 
from New York speaks I have been asked by the Senator from Arkansas, 
Senator Pryor, for an equal amount of time.
  So that means whatever we use for the Senator from New York, we are 
then going to chew up with the Senator from Arkansas, which is his 
right, I think, appropriately.
  I ask my colleague from North Carolina, the distinguished manager of 
the minority and ranking on the bill, was it not the agreement of all 
Senators who came to this unanimous-consent agreement that we would use 
good faith to permit all Senators the opportunity to bring their 
amendments by 6 p.m.?
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I will say to the Senator, not only that, 
it was hotlined by both the Democrats and the Republicans.
  Mr. D'AMATO. I indicated that if we could not work out an appropriate 
time. I would be willing to take a half-hour. I made it clear that I 
would seek an opportunity to make this presentation.
  I can possibly make it in 15 minutes, but I am not going to limit 
myself. But I will make a good-faith effort. I believe I will conclude 
my remarks in well under half an hour, but we have now spent 20 minutes 
speaking about how long it will take me to use the 15 or 20 minutes 
that I would probably need. You can also ask unanimous consent to add 
to extend the available time for the matter at hand. I take 15 minutes 
and Senator Pryor takes 15 minutes.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts retains the 
floor.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, it is not really a question of how much 
genius it might or might not take. I can see 20 different solutions. I 
do not think that is the issue. The issue is, should the Senator from 
New York, having not availed himself of the opportunity that was 
offered him this morning, now come and upset the unanimous-consent 
agreement----
  Mr. D'AMATO. What opportunity, if I might ask? You say I have not 
availed myself of an opportunity.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Massachusetts yield for 
a question?
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I did not know there was a question. I 
thought I was speaking.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator retains the floor.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, it is my understanding the Senator was 
offered time. I am told by the leadership that the Senator was offered 
time this morning; is that not true?
  Mr. D'AMATO. At 8:30 in the morning, and I made it clear that I could 
not do it at that time--I rejected this offer last Friday, so let us 
get it clear. I have indicated that I will limit myself to a half hour. 
I am not going to back down.
  I requested time in good faith and it was denied. Now I am here to do 
what I said I was going to do Friday. This is no surprise.
  Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts still has the 
floor.
  Mr. KERRY. I know the Senator's reputation. I know he does not back 
down. I am not asking him to back down. I am asking him if he would try 
to recognize the needs of other Senators who are making plans for the 
evening based on what the leadership and the managers of this bill have 
told them. Now we are imposed with a situation where the Senator is 
unilaterally, in a sense, changing all of that by his desire to speak 
for a period of time that pushes the entire schedule backward.
  I would like to try to accommodate the Senator. The question is, 
could we ask the Senator if it is not possible to make the gist of this 
alarm bell known in about 15 minutes so that we do not make it more 
difficult for other Senators who have already scheduled coming to the 
floor?
  Mr. D'AMATO. I will say to my friend, if you are saying can I do it 
in 15 minutes, I think I can. I would rather not say 15 and be cut off 
if I need a few moments to conclude my remarks. That is why I said I 
will do it in less than half an hour. I will do it in less than 20 
minutes. Is that an accommodation?
  Mr. COHEN. Will the Senator yield for a question? Is it possible to 
return to a less volatile subject, like nuclear weapons in the hands of 
the North Koreans?
  (Disturbance in the visitors' galleries.)
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The galleries will come to order.
  Mr. KERRY. I am going to try to work it out with my colleague. I 
would like to clear the hoops, if we can. So if my colleague will 
agree, I ask unanimous consent that we be permitted to complete the 
action on the McCain amendment and after we have completed the action 
on the McCain amendment, I be granted the right to the floor.
  Mr. D'AMATO. I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. D'AMATO. I object.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from New York objects.
  Mr. KERRY. If the Senator objects, then it is going to be very hard 
for me to find out how we are going to accommodate him. I am trying to 
be reasonable here.
  Mr. D'AMATO. I said before and again, I am willing to attempt to do 
this in under 20 minutes. We started from an hour, but because of the 
logical and cogent arguments, I offered to limit my comments to half an 
hour. Now I said I will do it in 20 minutes, and I will make a good-
faith effort to do it in less than 20 minutes, if given the 
opportunity.
  Mr. KERRY. That is precisely what I hope to do. I simply want to be 
able to do as manager of the bill what I need to do, but I am not 
empowered to do, because I am not the majority leader. I am simply 
trying to protect the rights of the majority, but at the same time act 
in the Senator's interest.
  If the Senator will afford me the right--I can stand here and talk 
now or come back. If the Senator will allow me to do that, I ask 
unanimous consent I be permitted the rights to the floor after we 
dispose of the McCain amendment, which is the pending business.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. I thank my friend from New York.
  Mr. COHEN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Maine 
[Mr. Cohen].
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I will take note that we have spent a half-
hour debating whether or not the Senator from New York might cut into 
the diminishing time remaining for those wishing to offer amendments. 
In the meantime, let me return to the subject Senator McCain has 
raised.
  I note that the Senator from Massachusetts used the expression ``wise 
statesmanship requires that we not leap to certain conclusions or take 
any drastic action.'' I would agree with that, but wise statesmanship 
also dictates that we not give up certain perquisites as such, certain 
powers and privileges as such, certain agreements as such, or 
relationships, in advance of securing a commitment from the country 
that we are negotiating with.
  By way of example, Senator McCain talked about ``Team Spirit''--the 
joint military operations and practices that we conduct with South 
Korea. ``Team Spirit'' is not and should not be a bargaining chip. That 
is fundamental. We should not give up a joint exercise, military 
exercise, certainly not in advance. I do not think we should give that 
up at all. ``Team Spirit'' is designed to make sure that we maintain a 
high state of readiness. Readiness against whom? Against one of the 
most belligerent countries in the world today that has some 700,000 
troops in an aggressive posture facing South Korea.
  So to give that up or even talk about compromising or canceling in 
advance, it seems to me, sends precisely the kind of signal Senator 
McCain is talking about. It is not necessary for us to use the words 
``appeasement'' or ``accommodation.'' I would be happy to say there has 
been an uncertain trumpet that has been blowing from the White House on 
this particular issue.
  But the North Koreans have wasted a year of our time, in essence, by 
forcing us into long negotiations only to come back to the point we 
were a year ago; namely, that they may agree to allow the international 
inspectors to inspect those sites that they will allow us to inspect. 
That is a year's time of negotiation. Maybe we have made some marginal 
progress, but ultimately they say you cannot go into the two 
nondeclared sites.
  We will tell you what sites you can go in, but the others are all off 
limits. It seems to me we have not made much in the way of progress, 
but the little progress we have made one week is then taken back the 
following week. I notice the administration correctly is saying we are 
going to beef up our security there, and I applaud President Clinton 
for what he is doing. I support the deployment of Patriot missiles, if 
that is what it is going to take. I support beefing up our American 
presence in that region.
  What has been the North Korean response? The North Koreans are now 
engaged in this chest beating, asserting that we, by introducing 
defensive antimissile systems, are now engaged in some kind of a 
provocative or aggressive action. It is very, very similar to what the 
former Soviet Union used to do. When they deployed, for example, SS-
20's in the hundreds aimed at Western Europe, we said: We have to 
respond. We are going to match you by deploying Pershing II's.
  They said: If you do that, you are taking aggressive action. If you 
do that, we will cancel the intermediate-range nuclear force 
negotiations underway; we will walk away from the table.
  It is precisely the same sort of chest beating, chauvinistic, 
dictatorial bleating that takes place with the North Koreans today.
  Some have suggested to me, I might say, what do we care? So what? So 
what if North Korea has one bomb or two bombs or enough plutonium to 
make three bombs? No. 1, they do not have an adequate delivery system.
  We know how fallacious that argument can be. It will not take long 
before they can get a delivery system. Assuming they get a delivery 
system, the argument is: So what? So what if South Korea demands having 
a nuclear capability? And so what if Japan demands having a nuclear 
capability?
  By the way, let me suggest to my colleagues, it would only be a 
matter of, let me say, a few months or maybe even less before Japan 
could convert its capabilities today into having a nuclear capability.
  And still the argument is so what, let Japan have it. Well, what 
about Iraq and what about Iran, should they not have it as well? And 
what about other nations that are not quite as stable let us say, as 
Japan or not as stable as the former Soviet Union, if we can say that 
is still stable? Let us go back to a MAD theory, mutual assured 
destruction. Anybody who fires a nuclear weapon will get 1, or 10, or 
20 in return. MAD was a bad concept then, I think is a bad concept now. 
And while deterrence worked against a rational, if ruthless, Soviet 
leadership, will it work against the unstable leaders of unstable 
regimes? The genie may be out of the bottle. We do not have to witness 
it spread over every unstable nation in the world.
  And so what the Senator from Arizona has recommended I think is very 
sensible. It is imperative. He has changed the language he originally 
intended to offer to not offend the administration, but whether it is 
critical of the administration or not is not important. What is 
important is that we go to the Chinese as he has suggested. They have a 
China card to play. They have a China card to play, because if 
sanctions are imposed China will play the crucial role. It will have to 
decide whether it is going to undermine those sanctions by continuing 
to supply energy to a country badly in need of it. We have to make it 
very clear to the Chinese that they can align their future with North 
Korea or they can continue to try to establish a healthy and working 
relationship with the United States as we move into the 21st century. 
But I think we have to make it very clear we need their help, it is 
imperative and there will be, I think, grave consequences in the event 
it is undermined.
  So I support my colleague from Arizona and urge my colleagues to 
support him.
  Mr. McCAIN addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Arizona, [Mr. McCain].
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I thank my friend from Maine for his, as 
always, thoughtful and penetrating analysis of a very difficult and 
troubling issue. I would like to just make a few additional comments. I 
will not belabor this issue because it has been extensively covered in 
the media and in the councils throughout not only this country but in 
Asia as well.
  As my friend Senator Cohen said, other nations will have no choice, 
Mr. President, but to acquire nuclear weapons if through a set of 
circumstances North Korea is able to develop their own nuclear 
capability.
  Two days ago, in a Washington Times story, it said:

       Japan has technology to be a nuclear power. Japan has all 
     the parts for a nuclear bomb and may have already built one, 
     a London newspaper cites a British defense ministry report as 
     saying. The Sun Times yesterday cited the report as saying 
     Japan has the expertise to go nuclear very quickly.

  Put yourself in the position of a Japanese leader with the knowledge 
that the North Korean Government, as we know, the most enigmatic and 
most oppressive and Orwellian nation left on the face of this Earth, 
has now acquired nuclear weapons and the means to develop them. No 
self-respecting leader of Japan has a choice but to develop nuclear 
capability. The same goes for South Korea. The same goes for other 
countries in the area.
  What I am saying, Mr. President, is that if we fail to stop this 
nuclear weapons buildup, it is inevitable that nuclear weapons will 
proliferate throughout Asia. They must do that unless this challenge is 
met.
  Second of all, let me just mention for a moment the Patriot missile. 
We all know that the Patriot missile had not as spectacular a success 
in the Persian Gulf as was first believed, but certainly was successful 
in being the only defensive weapons system to challenge an incoming 
Scud missile. Understandably, our military commander in Korea has asked 
that Patriot missile batteries be deployed to South Korea, given the 
information that he has and the possibility that North Korea may have 
or does have nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them.
  Mr. President, the military commander's responsibility really gives 
him no choice but to so provide his troops, not to mention the civilian 
personnel, American civilian personnel, that are within range of these 
weapons. What has been the North Korean response?
  On January 29, the Washington Post said:

       Communist North Korea today denounced a plan to deploy U.S. 
     Patriot air defense missiles in South Korea, saying the 
     decision would heighten tensions on the peninsula and 
     increase the danger of war.

  Mr. President, it is not quite clear to me how even the North Koreans 
could view a defensive system that has no offensive capability as 
something that would increase the danger of war.

       And a North Korean official called the installation of 
     Patriot missiles an unpardonable, grave mistake, a challenge 
     that threatens diplomatic efforts now centered on North Korea 
     opening its nuclear sites for inspection. ``If the United 
     States and its followers think they can subdue North Korea 
     with pressure and threat, it is a big mistake. That method 
     may lead the situation to a hopeless phase far from resolving 
     the problem,'' the agency said.

  Mr. President, I do not believe that North Koreans would be quite so 
bellicose if they had not forced us to back down already, at least in 
their view.
  According to the Wall Street Journal, on January 31:

       Earlier this month, Undersecretary of State Lynn Davis was 
     asked on the ``MacNeil/Lehrer'' program how the U.S. could be 
     confident that a diversion of nuclear materials wasn't going 
     on at North Korea's Yongbyon research facility.
       ``Well, because we've had this safeguards regime in place 
     over the past year, and, indeed, had an inspection in August, 
     so it isn't that we haven't been carrying out this regime,'' 
     she answered.
       But officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
     the Vienna-based group that actually carried out that August 
     inspection, paint a vastly less rosy picture. Its inspectors, 
     the group says, were literally left groping in the dark. They 
     were permitted to leave their barracks--like guest quarters 
     at Pyongyang only after 6 p.m. As night fell, they were 
     escorted into the pitch black innards of several buildings. 
     There, using flashlights because the buildings' lights were 
     kept out, the inspectors only replaced the batteries and 
     videotape in cameras they use to monitor some parts of the 
     facility. End of inspection.

  I do not think that fits what Undersecretary Lynn Davis described on 
the ``MacNeil/Lehrer'' program.
  I guess what I am saying, Mr. President, and I will wrap-up my 
remarks--and I know this amendment has been accepted by both sides--I 
was not happy when we took every position on the issue of Bosnia; that 
we were going to launch air strikes, we were not going to launch air 
strikes; we were going to send peacekeepers, we were not going to send 
peacekeepers. I was embarrassed as well, as other Americans were, as a 
group of thugs on a pier in Haiti with AK-47's drove away an American 
force. I was grieved and mourned when 18 young Americans died because 
of a failed policy in Somalia.
  Mr. President, now we are talking about the big leagues. We are 
talking about 27,000 American lives. We are talking about the 
possibility of the extermination of hundreds of thousands of South 
Korean lives. We better get serious, Mr. President, and we better learn 
that when we try appeasement to avoid war, we usually get both. I hope 
that this resolution would provide the proper impetus to get us into a 
position vis-a-vis North Korea that we make it clear we expect China to 
assist us; that we will take all necessary economic measures and, if 
those fail, then we must be prepared to take further ones, first taking 
all economic measures and seeing what the result of that is.
  I thank my friend from Massachusetts for his patience. I enjoyed the 
spirited debate over whether the Senator from New York would have 
sufficient time to view an issue of importance to him, and I appreciate 
his patience.
  If I might ask the indulgence of my friend from Massachusetts, I did 
also have an amendment on Thailand that I would like to offer 
immediately upon acceptance of this one and I would be finished with 
him, on this issue.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Arizona. This is a 
very important amendment, on a very important subject. The Senator is 
absolutely correct that there is an ultimate moment of confrontation. 
Certainly, there is an ultimate moment of destabilization if we are not 
successful.
  In my meetings in China recently, it was very clear to me that the 
Chinese are deeply concerned about this, that the last thing they want 
is another nuclear power. I think there is much that we can do to work 
together in this effort, and we need to avail ourselves of every 
diplomatic opening in order to do that.
  So I think the amendment of the Senator is an important amendment, 
and I am prepared to accept it.
  Mr. MURKOWSKI. I rise today in support of Senator McCain's resolution 
expressing the strong sense of the Congress regarding North Korea's 
nuclear program. The resolution sends the right signal to North Korea 
and to the President: North Korea must halt its nuclear weapons program 
and fully comply with the terms of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and 
the safeguards agreement of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
  The resolution properly defines an ``acceptable agreement'' as one 
which includes regular inspection of all declared nuclear sites as well 
as special inspections of any suspected nuclear-related site.
  Mr. President, I am troubled by the administration's strategy toward 
North Korea. Frankly, if I were Kim Il Sung, I am not sure whether I 
would even be contemplating giving up my nuclear program when the 
United States is already moving toward agreeing to my offer of highly 
limited inspections of known sites in exchange for the United States 
canceling the annual Team Spirit joint military exercises.
  I am particularly troubled that this appeasement process is directed 
at a leader who launched the invasion of South Korea in 1950, resulting 
in the deaths of 3 million of his countrymen and more than 33,000 
American troops; a leader whose agents detonated a bomb in Rangoon 
killing 16 South Korean officials; a leader of the country who blew up 
a Korean Airlines flight killing 115 passengers and crew; and a leader 
whose military hacked American personnel to death in the DMZ.
  In the 10 months since North Korea announced that it was withdrawing 
from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, the North has managed to buy 
time to pursue whatever nuclear capability they were contemplating 
while Washington and Seoul have dangled even more carrots their way, 
such as diplomatic recognition and economic assistance. Moreover, the 
administration backed off its original demand that North Korea agree to 
regular inspections of all known sites and special inspections of 
suspected nuclear sites. Instead, the United States negotiators agreed 
to North Korea's offer of a one-time inspection at seven declared 
sites.
  I understand that the administration's ability to follow through on 
any threat of sanctions in impossible to back up without the support of 
all our allies, most importantly, China. This resolution properly notes 
that China might not be cooperating fully and effectively in seeking a 
resolution of this issue. The administration must stress in the 
strongest terms to China that their cooperation is essential to 
addressing the very real threat of a nuclear North Korea.
  The administration must not accept China's often used excuse that 
they no longer have leverage with North Korea. China supplies almost 
all of North Korea's oil. A country cannot run without oil--as an 
Alaskan, I feel I am especially qualified to speak to this issue. China 
could very effectively threaten to cut off North Korea's oil supply.
  Similarly, Japan should be asked to consider measures that country 
could take to stem the flow of illegal money from Japan that is 
currently making its way into North Korea's failing economy. The amount 
of illegal money flowing from Japan to North Korea is estimated to be 
at least $600 million per year.
  But it is up to the administration, as the party directly negotiating 
with the North Koreans, to send a clear and strong signal that the 
United States is prepared to live up to its threats if North Korea does 
not agree to our terms. As part of this strategy, the administration 
should go through with the proposed deployment of Patriot missiles to 
South Korea.
  Mr. President, let me again commend the Senator from Arizona for this 
amendment, and I urge my colleagues to support this effort.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?
  The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 1331) was agreed to.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. KERRY. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, it is my understanding that the Senator has 
another amendment which we are prepared to accept.


                           Amendment No. 1332

     (Purpose: To express the sense of the Congress concerning the 
Government of Thailand need to support democracy in Cambodia and Burma)

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Arizona [Mr. McCain], for himself, Mr. 
     Moynihan, and Mr. Pell, proposes an amendment numbered 1332.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

     SEC.  . POLICY REGARDING THE RELATIONSHIP OF THAILAND WITH 
                   ITS NEIGHBORS STRUGGLING FOR DEMOCRACY, 
                   CAMBODIA AND BURMA.

       (a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
       (1) the Government of Thailand is to be commended for its 
     return to democracy and its commitment to representative 
     government;
       (2) the United States-Thai security relationship is a 
     cornerstone of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
     (ASEAN) and a key to stability in Southeast Asia;
       (3) Cambodia, Thailand's neighbor to the East, is 
     struggling to prevent violence from disrupting the creation 
     of a democratic state;
       (4) the cooperation of Thailand in implementing the Paris 
     Peace Accords was instrumental in assisting Cambodians to 
     achieve their goal of political reconciliation;
       (5) Peace in Cambodia promotes stability in Southeast Asia 
     and the continued cooperation of Thailand in bringing lasting 
     peace to that nation is vital. That peace is threatened by 
     the Khmer Rouge, which has attempted to violently disrupt the 
     Cambodian effort to institute an elected government.
       (6) The Government of Thailand is commended for the steps 
     it has taken to discontinue the Thai relationship with the 
     Khmer Rouge, and in particular its adherence to United 
     Nations sanctions on timber and petroleum trade between 
     Thailand and Khmer controlled areas of Cambodia.
       (7) Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai and the Commander-in-Chief 
     of the Thai military, Wimol Wongawanich, have publicly 
     enunciated a policy of non-support for the Khmer Rouge. 
     Furthermore, Prime Minister Chuan has demonstrated 
     considerable support for the freely elected Government of 
     Cambodia.
       (8) The extent to which the Government of Thailand permits 
     trade and particularly military contact with the armed 
     opposition to the newly elected Cambodian government, 
     directly impact the prospects for peace and political 
     reconciliation in Cambodia.
       (9) Congress is concerned that elements of the Thai 
     military and companies with close links to the Thai military, 
     continue to operate against the will and policy of the 
     government to support the Khmer Rouge.
       (10) Congress is concerned that the Clinton Administration 
     has not articulated its position regarding United States 
     policy toward Burma.
       (11) The Senate unanimously declared in S. Res. 112 that it 
     does not recognize the military junta in Burma known as the 
     State Law and Order Restoration Council (referred to as the 
     ``SLORC''), since the people of Burma gave the National 
     League for Democracy a clear victory in the election of May 
     27, 1990.
       (12) Nobel Peace Prize winner Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, a 
     leader of the National League for Democracy, has been under 
     house arrest since July 1989. Many of her colleagues who were 
     able to escape imprisonment or death have taken refuge in 
     Thailand, where they have organized to work peacefully to 
     bring democracy to Burma.
       (13) The Government of Thailand should be praised for 
     providing safe haven to the many Burmese forced to flee the 
     brutal repression of the SLORC regime. Despite pressure from 
     the SLORC, Thailand has allowed those groups to operate 
     within its borders, and has granted visas for international 
     travel.
       (14) Congress is concerned by reports that the Government 
     of Thailand may adopt more restrictive policies towards the 
     Burmese have raised considerable concern. In particular, 
     Congress is concerned by reports that Dr. Sein Win and other 
     Burmese dissidents may not be allowed to return from their 
     trip to the United States and to the United Nations to secure 
     support for their democratic aspirations.
       (15) Congress is deeply interested in seeing the peaceful 
     transition of power to those elected in 1990. Aung San Suu 
     Kyi and other senior National League for Democracy leaders 
     imprisoned in Burmese jails, are unable to conduct 
     political activity inside Burma and have never been 
     allowed to take their elected positions. Those who were 
     able to escape must rely on Thailand's continued 
     hospitality.
       (16) in recent years there has been an increase in the 
     number of Burmese women and girls conscripted into Thai 
     brothels. Human Rights Watch has recently issued a report 
     documenting the problems faced by these women. Many of these 
     Burmese become virtual slaves, with no way to escape the 
     brothels where they are kept. When these prostitution rings 
     have been broken up by Thai authorities, often those forced 
     into prostitution are detained in jails, or deported to Burma 
     where they are arrested for prostitution, further victimizing 
     them, and
       (17) in 1992, Thai Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai pledged to 
     crack down on official involvement in forced and child 
     prostitution. Congress welcomes the Government of Thailand's 
     efforts to eliminate forced prostitution. However, Thai 
     border officials and police are reportedly involved in the 
     transport of these women from Burma, and at times, directly 
     in the brothel operations.
       (b) Sense of the Congress.--It is the Sense of the Congress 
     that--
       (1) the Government of Thailand should continue and must 
     intensify its efforts to end the relationship between the 
     Khmer Rouge and the Thai military;
       (2) the President of the United States should convey to the 
     Government of Thailand American concern over renegade Thai 
     military support for the Khmer Rouge;
       (3) the President should adopt the policies called for in 
     S. Res. 112 and to clearly enunciate policy with respect to 
     Burma;
       (4) the Government of Thailand should continue to allow the 
     democratic leaders of Burma to operate freely within Thailand 
     and to grant them free passage to allow them to present their 
     case to the world at the United Nations and other 
     international gatherings; and
       (5) the Government of Thailand is further urged to 
     prosecute those responsible for the trafficking, forced labor 
     and physical and sexual abuse of women. If Thai officials are 
     found to be involved, they should be prosecuted to the 
     fullest extent of the law. In addition, the Government of 
     Thailand should protect the civil and human rights of Burmese 
     women and refrain from their further victimization.

  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, this amendment calls on the Government of 
Thailand to continue an intense effort to end the relationship between 
the Khmer Rouge and elements of the Thai military. It is an important 
issue. It further calls on the President of the United States to convey 
to the Government of Thailand United States concern over Thai military 
support for the Khmer Rouge.
  Recent press reports have brought renewed attention to a very 
disturbing situation in Southeast Asia, the continued external support 
for the Khmer Rouge, an organization which continues to resist the 
development of democracy in Cambodia.
  On December 8, 1993, a massive cache of arms was discovered along the 
Thai-Cambodia border. Thai police seized 1,500 tons of Chinese-made 
weapons, including antitank mines, rockets, grenades, machine guns, 
over a dozen artillery pieces, and more than 1 million rounds of 
ammunition.
  Contrary to Thai military claims that the weapons seized are a 
remnant from the days of the Cambodian civil war, there is substantial 
evidence that the arms cache was part of a continuing effort to assist 
the Khmer Rouge. The most incriminating of this evidence involves the 
circumstances of the seizure. It was the interception of a shipment of 
arms from the storage site to Khmer Rouge-controlled areas of Cambodia 
that led police to the guarded compound. Further testament to Thai-
Khmer Rouge cooperation, Khmer Rouge soldiers, apparently guarding the 
site, were apprehended in the raid of December 8, 1993.
  Although clearly the most sensational, this is not the only report of 
continued cooperation between the Thai military and the Khmer Rouge. 
There have been reports of direct Thai support for the Khmer Rouge in 
battles with Cambodian Government forces along the border. Accusations 
of Thai complicity have come from both Cambodian and U.N. officials and 
have ranged from simple logistical support to allowing attacks from 
Thai territory.
  Khmer Rouge and Thai military personnel are regularly seen together 
along the border, often riding in the same trucks. In September, UNTAC 
officials reported that, in the heat of battle, the Thai army 
transported 400 retreating Khmer Rouge rebels through Thai territory.
  I understand well the long relationship that the United States has 
enjoyed with Thailand, a relationship strengthened by the return to 
democracy in that proud nation. Our close military cooperation is a 
cornerstone of ASEAN and critical to the security of international 
shipping lanes. Thailand was an important element of our efforts to 
assist the Government of South Vietnam in fending off Communist 
aggression. During some of the most difficult years of the cold war, 
and during Operation Desert Storm, Thailand stood by us as allies.

  But from one democracy to another, I must say to my friends in 
Thailand that they can do more to end a relationship that benefits one 
of the most murderous movements in the history of mankind, the Khmer 
Rouge.
  I understand the geopolitical reasons why elements of the Thai 
military may support a relationship with the Khmer Rouge. Vietnam 
remains a formidable military power and is bound to become an equally 
formidable economic power. I understand Thailand's need to keep Vietnam 
at arms length, but I do not agree with the logic that links this need 
to support for the Khmer Rouge in its war against the elected 
Government of Cambodia.
  My friends in Thailand should have no doubts concerning the U.S. 
commitment to our regional security structures. ASEAN is the proper 
place to create a viable balance of power in Southeast Asia, not on the 
battlefields of Cambodia. Any regional military advantage offered by 
continued support for the Khmer Rouge is greatly outweighed by the evil 
represented by Cambodia's former rulers and Cambodia's new embrace of 
democracy.
  I have worked with Senator Moynihan to fashion this amendment, and 
upon his initiative I have agreed to include provisions concerning 
Thai-Burmese relations.
  The amendment, as it is now constituted, calls on the Government of 
Thailand to continue extending to the Democratic leaders of Burma the 
privilege of residing in their country.
  The amendment also encourages continued efforts by the Thai 
government to end the exploitation of young Burmese women. Despite the 
efforts of the Government of Thailand to bring to justice those 
involved in luring young Burmese women into prostitution rings in 
Bangkok, the illegal activity continues, often with the complicity of 
Thai officials.
  I fully endorse both of sections of the amendment and I am pleased 
that the Senate has been given the opportunity to address them.
  In summary, let me emphasize that I approach these issues in the 
spirit of alliance and respect for the sovereignty of the 
democratically elected Government of Thailand. It is my hope that in 
this age of democracy, we can work together to further the cause of 
representative government and respect for human rights in Southeast 
Asia.
  I appreciate my friend from North Carolina and my friend from 
Massachusetts accepting this amendment.
  I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I wanted the Record to reflect that this is 
an issue that we on the committee have been deeply concerned about. I 
have raised it personally with Thais authorities when I have been 
there. The Senator and I have talked about it. The recent discovery of 
a very large Khmer Rouge arms cache on the border has raised serious 
questions about cooperation. We are aware of that, and we are in dialog 
with the Thais about it. But it is very hopeful that those efforts will 
increase. The Thais are our friends, and we want the democratic 
Government of Thailand to be able to show the ability to be able to 
control its own military with regard to this. It is an important issue 
and we accept it.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I fully support the amendment of Senator 
Moynihan and Senator McCain concerning the situation in Cambodia and 
Burma.
  I was impressed by the overwhelming support the Cambodian people gave 
to democracy during last year's United Nations' sponsored elections.
  I was, thus, shocked by the disclosure late last year of a large 
Khmer Rouge arms cache located in Thailand and apparently controlled by 
Thai security forces.
  For years the Thai military have had a cozy relationship with the 
Khmer Rouge. The dreaded Khmer Rouge leader, Pol Pot, has maintained an 
estate on Thai soil with, reportedly, millions of dollars stored in 
Thai banks.
  The relationship must end. I believe Thailand's democratically 
elected civilian government is trying hard to gain control of the Thai 
military. It is rough going. For decades Thai politics have been 
dominated by coup and counter-coup.
  The United States has had close security relationship with the Thai 
military. We have trained them; we have equipped them. This amendment 
sends a strong signal that our security relations with Thailand will be 
affected if the Thai military continues to support opponents of 
Cambodian democracy.
  Unfortunately, as democracy flourishes in Cambodia, it languishes in 
Burma. In May 1990, the Burmese people spoke as eloquently as the 
Cambodians for democracy. Unfortunately, their elections were subverted 
by a military regime that has imprisoned since July 1989 Noble Peace 
Prize winner Daw Aung Sau Kyi.
  Burmese democratic forces have long used Thailand as a refuge. This 
shelter is not being jeopardized by the Government of Thailand's recent 
effort to curtail Burmese proponents of democracy.
  With this amendment, the Congress underscores its continuing support 
for democracy in Southeast Asia.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 1332) was agreed to.
  Mr. McCAIN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. KERRY. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I thank my colleague from New York for 
waiting, and I think we can proceed now. But I would like the Record at 
least to reflect, on behalf of the majority leader with whom I have 
conferred regarding this, that the majority leader would like to make 
it clear that while certainly any Senator can find ways to take the 
floor, and we all understand that, it was certainly the majority 
leader's understanding that this time would be devoted exclusively to 
the bill.
  I do not want to take up a lot of time now, but the majority leader 
did offer 8:30, and he offered 9 o'clock, and I offered 6 o'clock 
tonight on his behalf. So the time that will be taken is taken from 
other colleagues who might or might not have amendments, because the 
majority leader is not going to assent to changing the 6 o'clock cutoff 
time.
  Therefore, I ask my colleague, obviously, if he could try to expedite 
the process. I ask unanimous consent that subsequent to that, the 
Senator from Arkansas be granted such time as he deems necessary 
commensurate with the time used by the Senator from New York to 
respond, if indeed he wants to respond; and that following that, the 
Senate return directly to the bill at hand, S. 1281, and that all time 
between the completion of those two Senators and the 6 o'clock deadline 
be devoted to amendments that are permitted under the list.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Mr. KERRY. I ask further that the time afforded to the Senator from 
New York--and he said he would speak less than 20 minutes. In keeping 
with that spirit, I ask unanimous consent that the Senator from New 
York be afforded time not to exceed 20 minutes to speak on a matter of 
his choosing.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?
  Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from New York is recognized.

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