[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 5 (Monday, January 31, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: January 31, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                           Amendment No. 1317

  (Purpose: To require a report on Russian military operations in the 
             Independent States of the former Soviet Union)

  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for 
its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Maine [Mr. Cohen] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 1317.

  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 179, after line 6, add the following:

     SEC.  . REPORT ON RUSSIAN MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE 
                   INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION.

       (a) In General.--Not later than July 1, 1994, the President 
     shall submit to Congress a report on the operations and 
     activities of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, 
     including elements purportedly operating outside the chain of 
     command of the armed forces of Russian Federation, outside 
     the borders of the Russian Federation and, specifically, in 
     the other independent states that were a part of the former 
     Soviet Union and the Baltic States.
       (b) Content of Report.--The report required by subsection 
     (a) shall include, but not be limited to--
       (1) an assessment of the numbers and types of Russian armed 
     forces deployed in each of the other independent states of 
     the former Soviet Union and the Baltic States and a summary 
     of their operations and activities since the demise of the 
     Soviet Union in December 1991;
       (2) a detailed assessment of the involvement of Russian 
     armed forces in conflicts in or involving Armenia, 
     Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Tajikistan, including 
     support provided directly or indirectly to one or more 
     parties to these conflicts;
       (3) an assessment of the political and military objectives 
     of the operations and activities discussed in paragraphs (1) 
     and (2) and of the strategic objectives of the Russian 
     Federation in its relations with the other independent states 
     of the former Soviet Union and the Baltic States;
       (4) an assessment of other significant actions, including 
     political and economic, taken by the Russian Federation to 
     influence the other independent states of the former Soviet 
     Union and the Baltic States in pursuit of its strategic 
     objectives; and
       (5) an analysis of the new Russian military doctrine 
     adopted by President Yeltsin on November 2, 1993, with 
     particular regard to its implications for Russian policy 
     toward the other independent states of the former Soviet 
     Union and the Baltic States.
       (c) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section--
       (1) ``the other independent states of the former Soviet 
     Union'' means Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
     Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
     Ukraine, and Uzbekistan; and
       (2) ``the Baltic States'' means Latvia, Lithuania and 
     Estonia.

  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, Russian nationalists have been gaining 
influence for some time. Not just bombastic extremists like Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky, but also a large segment of the Russian senior officer 
corps and foreign policy elite. This includes many who are viewed in 
the West, not necessarily incorrectly, as democratic reformers. The 
primary focus of these nationalists is what they call the near abroad: 
the new countries formed after the breakup of the Soviet Union that 
have significant Russian minorities.
  The new Russian military doctrine, which Yeltsin approved after 
October's violent showdown, seems to display both imperialist designs 
on Russia's neighbors and deep-seated fears that the West is implacably 
hostile to Russia.
  This imperialist threat is more than just a paper doctrine. The 
Russian military has been putting it into practice. To give you an 
example, this summer, it set up a protection racket in the caucuses. 
First, it gave military aid to separatists fighting the Georgia 
government led by former Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze--whom the 
Russian military blames for having lost Eastern Europe. Then, after 
bringing Shevardnadze to the point of defeat, it agreed to save his 
government in exchange for Georgia joining the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. This grouping might be more accurately named the 
Commonwealth of Temporarily Independent States, since many Russians 
hope to use it as the vehicle to rebuild their empire.
  In 1992, a purportedly run-away Russian division came to the aid of 
ethnic Russian separatists in Moldova, setting up the self-proclaimed 
Dneister Republic on Ukraine's western border. This sent a signal to 
other near abroad countries that they, too, might be carved up if they 
did not cooperate satisfactorily. It also put Ukraine in Russian 
pincers, with a western front ready to be opened in the event Russian-
Ukraine disagreements turn to hostilities.
  Earlier this year, the Russian military helped oust the 
democratically elected leaders of Azerbaijan. First, they provided 
military aid to Armenia, whose resulting military successes weakened by 
Azerbaijan's government. Russia then reportedly dealt the fatal blow by 
providing heavy armaments to a renegade Tajik military unit that moved 
on the capital and by supporting the former communist head of 
Azerbaijan in his successful effort to regain the Presidency.
  The Russian military is also heavily involved in the civil war in 
Tajikistan, supporting the former Communist apparatchiks against the 
democratic and Islamic opposition.
  The Clinton administration's response over the past year to these 
Russian military interventions was to ignore them, while supporting 
efforts to aid President Yeltsin's government and cooperate with the 
Russian military. When it finally did turn its attention to this 
disturbing trend, however, the policy the administration adopted can be 
described as confused, at best.
  During the Moscow summit, President Clinton compared Russian military 
interventions in the so-called near abroad to United States operations 
in Panama and Grenada and other places near our area. He specifically 
cited as stabilizing Russia's choreography of the conflict in Georgia, 
which led to an offer of protection that Shevardnadze could not refuse. 
Besides asserting its claim that Georgia falls within Moscow's sphere 
of influence, the humiliation of the government of Shevardnadze--whose 
policies led to German unification, freedom for Eastern Europe, and the 
break-up of the Soviet Union--involved a symbolism that may be lost on 
the administration, but not on Russians nor their neighbors.

  No doubt emboldened this Clinton doctrine, as Washington Post 
columnist Stephen Rosenfeld recently described it, Russian Foreign 
Minister Andrei Kozyrev clearly stated Russia's intent to reestablish a 
``sphere of Russian interest.'' ``We should not fear the words,'' he 
declared in a statement obviously directed at his fellow Russians and 
not Russia's neighbors.
  Then, just 2 weeks ago, the world was stunned with a statement 
attributed to Kozyrev that Russian troops might not withdraw from 
Latvia and Estonia, after all, despite an agreement signed in Moscow by 
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin reaffirming that Russian troops would be 
withdrawn. While Kozyrev quickly asserted that he had been misquoted, 
the view attributed to him is certainly held by many high-ranking 
Russian military officials. And Kozyrev himself has advocated that 
Russia has a ``special role and influence over the former Soviet 
republics,'' as he put it at the United Nations in September, and he 
has emphasized the role of the Russian military in exercising this 
``special role.''
  He followed this up in October with a warning that Russia must 
intervene in the ``near abroad'' lest it risk ``losing geographical 
positions that took centuries to conquer.'' This imperialist attitude 
has prevailed in the Foreign Ministry since at least late 1992 when, 
according to a Wall Street Journal article by James Sherr of Oxford 
University, it issued a policy document advocating a ``divide and 
influence policy'' using force when necessary to ``ensure firm good 
neighborliness'' by other former Soviet republics and ensure that 
Russia is the ``leader of stability and security on the entire 
territory of the U.S.S.R.'' All of this from the ministry in the 
Russian Government that has proved to be the most amenable to 
cooperation with the West.
  As Henry Kissinger notes in his article published in the Washington 
Post recently:

       The Foreign Minister of Russia has repeatedly put forward a 
     scheme for a Russian monopoly on peace-keeping in the ``near 
     abroad,'' indistinguishable from an attempt to re-establish 
     Moscow's domination. By its silence and repeated invocation 
     of an American-Russian partnership, the United States 
     acquiesces in these actions.

  Dr. Kissinger goes on to state that:

       A moderate Russian foreign policy will be impeded, not 
     helped, by turning a blind eye to the reappearance of 
     historical Russian imperial pretensions.

  Perhaps we should give the administration the benefit of the doubt 
and assume that it simply has not been paying attention to these 
matters. While this may seem incredible, there may be some basis to 
believe it.
  The Washington Post has reported that a recent national intelligence 
estimate forecasts the partition of Ukraine into Ukrainian and Russian 
states accompanied by ethnic conflict. According to the Post, when the 
NIE was circulated earlier this month, it ``shook up a lot of people'' 
in the administration. Perhaps White House officials or Members of 
Congress who have to say on top of the full breadth of domestic and 
international issues can be forgiven for being surprised by such a 
forecast. But administration officials responsible for foreign and 
security policy should hardly be surprised, given the many indicators 
over the past 2 years. These have included calls by ethnic Russians in 
Ukraine for secession or incorporation into Russia of Ukrainian 
territory in which Russians predominate and the assertion of 
sovereignty over the Crimea previous Russian parliament.
  The first step in correcting U.S. policy in addressing these matters 
is to compel the administration to study them and publicly address them 
in detail.
  My amendment would call for a report by mid-year on activities by the 
Russian armed forces in the former Soviet republics. Among the issues 
to be covered would be Russian intervention in the conflicts in 
Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Tajikistan the implications of the 
new Russian military doctrine for Russian relations with other former 
Soviet republics.
  Such a report would serve as an important input to further 
congressional consideration of these important issues. I urge my 
colleagues to support the amendment.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to print in the Record the 
articles by Mr. Rosenfeld, Mr. Sherr, and Dr. Kissinger.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

               [From the Washington Post, Jan. 25, 1994]

                       Be Realistic About Russia

                          (By Henry Kissinger)

       The most significant aspect of President Clinton's recent 
     progression across Europe may have been obscured by the 
     atmospherics surrounding it. In fact, the trip ushered in an 
     important reevaluation of heretofore accepted premises of 
     American foreign policy: In effect, the president's 
     statements elevated the radical critique of Cold War policies 
     into the operational premises of contemporary American 
     foreign policy.
       For nearly a half-century, that critique had maintained 
     that Soviet policies were as much caused by American policies 
     as by Communist ideology; that the Soviet government was 
     divided, just as the American government was, between hawks 
     and doves; that it was the task of American diplomacy to east 
     Soviet fears, many of which were quite legitimate; and that 
     an attitude of genuine cooperation would overcome Soviet 
     bellicosity.
       As late as January 1990, these propositions were 
     refurbished in a Time magazine article in which Mikhail 
     Gorbachev was anointed Man of the Decade. Its author was Time 
     correspondent Strobe Talbott, recently appointed deputy 
     secretary of state, who argued that the doves of 40 years of 
     Cold War debate had been right all along and that it had not 
     been the West's policy that brought about the Soviet collapse 
     but the inherent weakness of the Soviet system; indeed, that 
     the collapse might have occurred earlier had Western hard-
     liners not enabled the Soviet leaders to rally their people 
     on behalf of security.
       The essence of these themes was repeated by President 
     Clinton on many occasions during his European trip. To 
     explain why he did not favor the admission of Poland, 
     Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia--the so-called 
     Visegrad nations--into NATO, he argued in effect that such a 
     step might be provocative. The Atlantic Alliance, he said, 
     could not ``afford to draw a new line between East and West 
     that could create a self-fulling prophecy of future 
     confrontation. . . . I say to all those in Europe and the 
     United States who would simply have us draw a new line in 
     Europe further east that we should not foreclose the 
     possibility of the best possible future for Europe which is a 
     democracy everywhere, a market economy everywhere, people 
     cooperating everywhere for mutual security.''
       The assumptions behind these statements challenge the very 
     intellectual foundations of NATO--the core of America's 
     postwar foreign policy. Whether the former victims of Soviet 
     imperialism should join NATO is a complicated question. There 
     are many ways to accomplish that goal, from full membership 
     to various levels of associate membership or, indirectly, via 
     membership in the European Union. On balance, I thought that, 
     at this moment of Russian relative weakness and East European 
     uncertainty, it was an opportunity to extend NATO in some 
     way--especially as there were many measures available by 
     which to reassure Russia.
       But the key issue is not the timing of NATO expansion. In 
     putting forward the Partnership for Peace, the administration 
     did not just delay East European participation, it 
     emphatically rejected the principle despite many misleading 
     statements to the contrary. The Partnership invites all the 
     successor states of the Soviet Union and all of Moscow's 
     former East European satellites to participate with NATO in a 
     vague, multilateral entity specializing in missions having 
     next to nothing to do with realistic military tasks; it 
     equates the victims of Soviet and Russian imperialism with 
     its perpetrators and gives the same status to the Central 
     Asian republics at the borders of Afghanistan as it does to 
     Poland, the victim of four partitions in which Russia 
     participated and the route across which Russia has 
     historically invaded Europe.
       If the Partnership for Peace is designed to propitiate 
     Russia, it cannot also serve as a way station into NATO, 
     especially as the administration has embraced the proposition 
     rejected by all its predecessors over the past 40 years--that 
     NATO is a potential threat to Russia. An official traveling 
     with the president's party expressed the logic behind the 
     administration position when he stated that Eastern Europe 
     would have to find security in placating its feared neighbor 
     by ``encouraging domestic reform in Russia.''
       It is instructive to compare the current approach with that 
     of Dean Acheson when NATO was founded. Testifying before the 
     Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the secretary of state 
     was asked whether the Soviet Union had reason to fear NATO. 
     His reply was: ``Any nation which claims that this treaty is 
     directed against it should be reminded of the biblical 
     admonition that `the guilty flee where no man pursueth.'''
       No reasonable observer can imagine that Poland, the Czech 
     Republic, Hungary or Slovakia could ever mount a military 
     threat against Russia, either singly or in combination. The 
     countries of Eastern Europe are terrified, not threatening. 
     And NATO forces, doctrine and deployment are strictly 
     defensive. Moreover, Russia could easily be given additional 
     assurances, for instance, that no foreign troops would be 
     stationed on the soil of new NATO members.
       The key question, however, is what the American theory 
     means for NATO. What is to be its precise role in the new 
     dispensation? If a security guarantee along the Polish-
     Russian border creates an unacceptable dividing line, why is 
     the current eastern border of NATO any more pacifying? If 
     Russia can veto NATO membership now, when it is in need of 
     economic support, what will it veto when it has been 
     strengthened through reform and American economic assistance?
       It is high time to take another look at our Russia policy, 
     which stakes everything on a kind of psychoanalytic social 
     engineering. The world evoked by Clinton's reference to 
     ``democracy everywhere . . . people cooperating everywhere'' 
     is decades away. In the real environment of today's ethnic 
     conflict and internecine struggle in the former Soviet Union 
     and Eastern Europe, how are security and progress to be 
     organized until that utopian world is reached? Can it be wise 
     to create two categories of frontier--those which NATO 
     protects and others which are refused protection--when both 
     frontiers face in the same direction? The practical 
     consequence will be to bring about an unprotected no-man's-
     land between Germany and Russia, which has historically been 
     the cause of all recent European conflicts.
       A realistic approach to Russian policy would recognize that 
     integrating Russia into the international system has two 
     components that must be kept in balance: influencing Russian 
     attitudes and affecting Russian calculations. The 
     administration deserves support in extending generous 
     economic assistance to Russian reform. And Russia should be 
     made welcome in institutions that foster economic, cultural 
     and political cooperation with the West. The European 
     Security Conference would be a far better home for this than 
     to invent, as the Partnership for Peace does, common military 
     missions within the framework of NATO whose essential 
     irrelevance underlines the artificially of the conception.
       The administration's tendency to treat Russian leaders as 
     if they were fragile novices easily flustered by exposure to 
     their realities of international politics is an invitation to 
     disillusionment and misunderstanding. These are tough men who 
     have survived the brutal school of Communist and Russian 
     politics; they are quite capable of comprehending a policy 
     based on mutual respect for each other's national interest.
       Russia is bound to have a special security interest in what 
     it calls the ``near abroad''--the republics of the former 
     Soviet Union. The test is whether the rest of the world 
     treats this relationship as an international problem subject 
     to accepted rules of foreign policy or as an outgrowth of 
     unilateral Russian decision-making to be influenced, if at 
     all, by appeals to Russian goodwill.
       Perhaps the most serious misapprehension of the Partnership 
     for Peace proposal is that a reformist Russian government 
     would automatically abandon traditional foreign policy goals. 
     For the incentives of the most well-meaning Russian 
     government are quite different. Nationalism is on the rise, 
     and there is a great temptation to ease the pain of 
     transition to market economics for the Russian population by 
     appealing to that basic instinct.
       At the moment, Russian armies are in Moldova, Georgia, 
     Azerbaijan, Estonia, Latvia and Tajikistan, and participate 
     insome of the local civil wars with a strategy that seems 
     designed to make these new republics--all of them members of 
     the United Nations--rue their independence. The foreign 
     minister of Russia has repeatedly put forward a scheme for a 
     Russian monopoly on peace-keeping in the ``near abroad,'' 
     indistinguishable from an attempt to reestablish Moscow's 
     domination. By its silence and its repeated invocation of an 
     American-Russian partnership, the United States acquiesces in 
     these actions.
       A moderate Russian foreign policy will be impeded, not 
     helped, by turning a blind eye to the reappearance of 
     historical Russian imperial pretensions. Russia's effort at 
     reform cannot exempt it from accepted principles of 
     conducting foreign policy. It is in fact ambiguity about 
     dividing lines, not their existence, and ambivalence about 
     Western reactions, not their certainty, that tempt 
     militarists and nationalists.
       Russia and America share a mutual interest in a stable 
     Europe. This can be achieved only by America's presence in 
     Europe, which is based on NATO. Stability in Europe requires 
     reaffirming the centrality of NATO rather than diluting it in 
     an abstract multilateralism.
       The Partnership for Peace should be redefined to deal 
     primiarly with political, economic and cultural issues for 
     which the proper venue is the European Security Conference, 
     not NATO.
       NATO, meanwhile, must face the fact that some form of 
     Visegrad membership is inevitable. In the wake of the NATO 
     summit, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl has urged speeding up 
     the entry of these four countries into the European Union, of 
     which they are already associate members. Since the vast 
     majority of nations in the European Union are also members of 
     NATO, it is inconceivable that the Union will for long accept 
     the notion that some of its territory is not protected. At 
     that point at the latest, either the NATO guarantee will be 
     extended or NATO will fall apart.
       A stateman can always escape his dilemmas by making the 
     most favorable assumptions about the future. The new Russian 
     leadership is entitled to understanding for the anguish of 
     trying to overcome two generations of Communist misrule and 
     to help in building a new society. But in pursuing that goal, 
     American policy must not be embarrassed to emphasize that 
     domestic reform, however desirable, contributes to a better 
     world only if Russia embraces the disciplines of a 
     cooperative international system as well as its benefits.
                                  ____


               [From the Washington Post, Jan. 21, 1994]

                  Permission for Kremlin Intervention

                       (By Stephen S. Rosenfeld)

       In Moscow, Bill Clinton pretty much handed off to Russia 
     the task of policing the unrest in the borderlands that 
     formerly were part of the Soviet Union. Boris Yeltsin had 
     asked the United Nations for just such a grant of ``special 
     powers.'' Clinton enunciated a kind of Clinton doctrine, one 
     applying not to restrictive standards for American 
     intervention but to permissive standards for Russian 
     intervention.
       He characterized Russia's involvement in Georgia--where in 
     fact the Russian army first contributed to and then exploited 
     the local government's duress--as ``stabilizing.'' He went on 
     to liken Russian involvement in such operations to American 
     involvement in Panama and Grenada ``and other places near our 
     area.''
       Two standards were specified: Intervention must be 
     consistent with international law, and when possible it must 
     be supported by other nations through the United Nations or 
     otherwise. But Clinton then offered a broad blanket 
     dispensation for cases where the demise of totalitarian rule 
     uncorked old conflicts; this can be read to apply to almost 
     every little war in the Russian ``near abroad.''
       The striking aspect of this pronouncement is, or course, 
     that Clinton is so much more clear and forthright about 
     Russia's intervention in situations of strife near its 
     borders than he is about America's intervention in situations 
     of strife far from its own borders.
       No less striking, he is making a gesture of great deference 
     to Yeltsin. The Russian president is under growing pressure 
     from the nationalist right to conduct a vigorous and 
     interventionist Russian foreign policy.
       Already Secretary of State Warren Christopher had observed 
     that the countries of the former Soviet Union were ``a long, 
     long ways from the United States'' and that Russia could act 
     to guarantee regional stability if it respected 
     ``international norms.''
       Little wonder, then, that days after a beaming Clinton came 
     home from Moscow, Yeltsin's foreign minister--and he is one 
     of the good guys--fudged an earlier pledge to pull all troops 
     out of the Baltics. Openly he enunciated a claim to 
     reestablish a traditional ``sphere of Russian interest'' 
     (``we should not fear the words'') in the newly independent 
     states created out of the former Soviet Union.
       This from a man--Andrei Kozyrev--who a year ago was himself 
     cautioning of a comeback by those with a ``fascist ideology'' 
     and with ``a grand vision of restoring Russia in its grandeur 
     to the borders of the former U.S.S.R.''
       Let us stipulate that it comes naturally to a country with 
     a long geopolitical reach (the United States) or an old 
     imperial habit (Russia) to assign neighborhood intervention 
     rights to the metropolitan power. Set aside the modest irony 
     of a somewhat liberal American president embracing the 
     Reagan-Bush interventions in Grenada and Panama. Set aside as 
     well the painful irony of the lapse of the American 
     interventionist urge in present-day Haiti. Policing what is, 
     whatever it is called, a sphere of interest is a familiar 
     geopolitical chore and far from an inherently reprehensible 
     one.
       What President Clinton failed to fold into his remarks in 
     Moscow, however, is the potential dark side of the current 
     Russian interventionist trend. Researchers Fiona Hill and 
     Pamela Jewett spell it out in a new Kennedy School paper 
     ``Back in the USSR.'' Moscow, pretending to good deeds, is 
     exploiting regional conflicts to destabilize its neighbors 
     and reestablish its own authority, they say; Washington is 
     ``acquiescing in the de facto reconstitution of the USSR by 
     turning its head.''
       That strikes me as an exaggerated or at least premature 
     conclusion. But it is no more exaggerated than the Clinton 
     premise that Russian interventionism is essentially a 
     civilizing force.
       The Clinton view skips past the fact that the Russian army 
     is moving not in the relatively settled geopolitical 
     conditions of Central America and the Caribbean but in an 
     anything-can-happen context where no rules reliably apply. 
     Here civilian Russian nationalism is compounded by a 
     headstrong Russian army's desperate quest for institutional 
     survival.
       Russia's policy in the near abroad is becoming more evident 
     and more unsettling. Clinton's responses are going to have to 
     be sharpened. His commitment to Yeltsin cannot be allowed to 
     extend to the point where the United States becomes by 
     default a party to the reconstruction of the Russian empire. 
     Clinton's approach to many tough foreign policy dilemmas is 
     to talk out loud about them. Let him broaden his public 
     address to this one.
                                  ____


             [From the Wall Street Journal, Dec. 17, 1993]

                    Russia's New Threat to Neighbors

                            (By James Sherr)

       The disturbing results of Russia's elections raise an 
     obvious question. Could Russia once again become a danger to 
     others as well as to itself? The publication of Russia's new 
     military doctrine in November is persuading many that it 
     could. It is a revealing and often blunt document, leaving no 
     doubt that military power will remain an important instrument 
     of Russian policy for years to come.
       Those certain to be discomfited by the doctrine--Ukraine, 
     the Baltic states and the former Warsaw Pact countries--must 
     ask whose thinking the doctrine expresses. In Mr. Yeltsin's 
     Russia, the military has been only one institution among 
     many. Despite the dramatic triumph of the nationalists, 
     institutional discord is likely to remain the rule rather 
     than the exception. Who ultimately is making military and 
     foreign policy decisions, and who will do so in the future? 
     And will the army actually be given the means to act on its 
     intentions?
       In the nuclear sphere, these intentions are plainly 
     unsettling. The most striking feature of the new doctrine is 
     its reversal of the ``no first use'' nuclear policy which had 
     been in existence since 1982. Given the collapse of the 
     Warsaw Pact and the first echelon of Soviet military power, 
     the revocation of this policy is not altogether surprising.
       But what is surprising is how far that revocation extends. 
     In the first place, Russia reserves the right to launch 
     nuclear strikes in response not only to a conventional attack 
     but also to a conventional attack carried out by a non-
     nuclear state, if that state has an alliance agreement with a 
     nuclear state. This is a clear reference to Turkey and a 
     clear warning to Poland and other former Warsaw Pact 
     countries who see to join NATO.
       Second, Russia adopts a most permissive definition of 
     ``attack.'' It encompasses not only Russian Federation 
     territory, but also C.I.S. allies and Russia's forces abroad, 
     as well as ``actions to destroy or disrupt'' strategic 
     nuclear forces, the early warning system, nuclear power and 
     chemical installations.
       Equally unsettling is the document's treatment of local 
     war, which the new doctrine now labels, ``the main threat to 
     stability.'' For one thing the focus is still largely on how 
     local war can escalate into general conflict. In a veiled 
     reference to NATO, the risk that local conflict ``might be 
     used as an excuse'' by ``other states'' to launch a general 
     war is deemed ``considerable.'' For this reason, such 
     conflicts must be ``localized and suppressed'' as quickly as 
     possible, the army must be free to operate offensively or 
     defensively, as it sees fit, and forces must be trained to 
     fight ``in any scenario where war is unleashed and conducted, 
     amid the massive use of modern and future weapons.''
       The distinctly local aspects of the doctrine have also 
     raised eyebrows. Suppression of the ``rights, freedoms and 
     legitimate interests'' of the 25-million-strong Russian 
     diaspora in the former Soviet Union is defined not as a 
     security concern but as a military threat to Russia itself. 
     Russia reserves the right to maintain forces abroad and to 
     ``terminate any unlawful armed violence'' within the C.I.S. 
     as a whole. Its notion of peacekeeping, in contrast to 
     Western practice, calls for using force to ``create the 
     conditions'' for peace, rather than simply to enforce a peace 
     once it has been reached.
       The doctrine seems to give Russia's foreign policy a set of 
     military teeth, but the question remains of the extent to 
     which the defense establishment is creating its own foreign 
     policy. According to Russian foreign ministry sources, the 
     doctrine, including its political aspects, was drawn up by 
     the defense ministry and general staff without the 
     collaboration of any civilian agency. It was then 
     rubberstamped by the security council at Boris Yeltsin's 
     insistence.
       Antagonism between the defense ministry and the foreign 
     ministry on the ``near abroad'' issues is no secret. Yet that 
     antagonism arose more out of a policy vacuum than a policy 
     difference. From the collapse of the Soviet Union to the end 
     of 1992, the foreign ministry focused its efforts on the 
     West. The army, with several hundred thousand troops in 
     former Soviet republics, quickly found itself making policy 
     by default. For its part, the foreign ministry lacked the 
     resources to deal with what, until recently, had been 
     internal matters. It also lacked the inclination. Most 
     foreign ministry officials believed that the economic 
     dependencies of the old Soviet system would pull the former 
     republics back in orbit around Moscow. Little policy would be 
     needed; still less, coercion.
       The dashing of these hopes has made the foreign ministry 
     more realistic and has narrowed policy disagreements with the 
     army. A December 1992 foreign ministry document argues that 
     Russia must be the ``leader of stability and security on the 
     entire territory of the former U.S.S.R.,'' and that it should 
     pursue a ``divide and influence policy,'' using force where 
     necessary ``to achieve firm good neighborliness.''
       Disagreements nonetheless remain. To the authors of the 
     military doctrine, Western untrustworthiness is axiomatic; to 
     Russia's diplomats, the West is a partner whose longing for 
     stability can be used to strengthen Russia's hold over the 
     near abroad. The army believes that Russia, as a great power, 
     should not shy away from brandishing swords or using them; 
     the foreign ministry believes that Russia must achieve its 
     aims with reference to ``universal principles,'' even if it 
     does not always abide by them. For all these disagreements, 
     the army has been the bad cop in a liberal foreign policy. If 
     military hard-liners did not exist, they would have to be 
     invented.
       Before this month's elections the real foil to the army was 
     the economic radicals in Mr. Yeltsin's entourage, for the 
     simple reason that shock therapy would quickly bankrupt most 
     of Russia's remaining defense enterprises. After the 
     election, these radicals are seriously weakened. Yet in the 
     future the military will still be foiled by economic reality. 
     Shock therapy or not, the army is likely, in Bismarck's 
     phrase, to be left with ``a big appetite and poor teeth.'' 
     Yet those, like the Balts, who have no teeth at all will 
     derive little comfort from that.

  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs. Feinstein). The Senator from 
Massachusetts.
  Mr. COHEN. I have one additional amendment I can offer at this time 
or later.
  Mr. KERRY. I ask the Senator, is that the amendment on Germany?
  Mr. COHEN. Yes.
  Mr. KERRY. Does the Senator want to dispense with this amendment 
first?
  Mr. COHEN. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, let me say to my friend from Maine that I 
appreciate his holding off on that. I think it may be that we wind up 
having a record vote on it. I am perfectly prepared to accept this 
amendment. It ought to be that we would have enough certainty in the 
reports that we get or the evaluations that we get that we should not 
have to ask for this report. But the Senator, who is an expert in these 
affairs, and has served both on the Armed Services Committee and the 
Intelligence Committee, understands, as I have come to learn as a 
member of the Intelligence Committee and also as a Foreign Relations 
Committee member, that that is not true; there is no certainty. For 
whatever reasons, we have had a bad history of missing certain 
developments and certain trends.
  So I think the Senator is wise to ask that we evaluate this very 
carefully, particularly in light of the other things that we are being 
asked to do with respect to the former Soviet Union, and also 
particularly in light of the debate that we have just had and which 
will be ongoing about the new form of NATO and the question of the 
rapidity of the membership within NATO of the Eastern bloc states. 
Clearly, these activities will have a bearing on all of those 
questions.
  So to have a solid, targeted analysis of what is going on would be 
extraordinarily helpful to us. I commend the Senator for suggesting it.
  Mr. COHEN. Madam President, I thank my friend from Massachusetts for 
his comments. At this time, I would like to defer the question of 
whether to have a recorded vote. I understand that the committee is now 
faced with a proliferation of recorded votes which may take a good deal 
of time tomorrow. It may be that I will simply allow it to pass on a 
voice vote.
  The purpose, of course, in asking for a recorded vote would be to 
draw as much attention as possible to the significance of what is 
taking place in the former Soviet Union. I think too much of the 
Russian military's activities have been either ignored or downplayed in 
order to serve our own political ends, and yet as we look to that part 
of the world, it is very disturbing.
  We are seeing on the political front at least a succession of 
moderates who are resigning from office who see and detect a very 
substantial reactionary drift. The voices of the extremists are 
becoming louder. Those of the moderates tend to be drowning out. In 
conjunction with that, we are seeing the military engage in what I call 
the protectionist racket by bringing governments nearly to the point of 
collapse and then offering protection provided they agree to join the 
Commonwealth of Independent States, which is now under the control of 
the Russian military.
  So you see a spread of the influence of the Russian military, and we 
may very well see simply a replacement of the Russian flag over states 
that formerly had the banner and the flag of the U.S.S.R. flying above 
them.
  So the purpose of requesting a recorded vote would be to highlight 
the importance that we place on following and tracking and perhaps even 
having some influence, at least politically, with the direction that 
the Russian military seems to be going.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, the Senator is correct. If you look at 
events in Georgia and the terrible Hobson's choice that President 
Shevardnadze and the people now face with respect to the presence of 
the army, and you also look at Azerbaijan and Armenia, what has been 
happening there, the trends are certainly worthy of significant 
questions, if not deemed disturbing. So, as I say, we are happy to 
proceed. I appreciate the forbearance on the issue of the vote. It may 
be that we will not have as many votes backed up, but I think it would 
be unfortunate if we had a series of 100 to zero votes and then had a 
series of very contentious ones. So I appreciate the Senator's 
forbearance.


                           amendment no. 1318

(Purpose: To encourage Germany to assume full and active participation 
   in international peacekeeping activities, and for other purposes)

  Mr. COHEN. Let me say to my friend that I have another amendment, on 
which I will ask for a recorded vote, which I now send to the desk and 
ask for its immediate consideration.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the prior 
amendment of the Senator from Maine be temporarily set aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The clerk will report the amendment.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Maine [Mr. Cohen] proposes an amendment 
     numbered 1318.

  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       On page 179, after line 6, add the following:

     SEC.   . POLICY REGARDING GERMAN PARTICIPATION IN 
                   INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

       (a) Findings.-- The Congress finds that--
       (1) for more than four decades following the Second World 
     War, Germany was a divided nation;
       (2) notwithstanding the creation of the Federal Republic of 
     Germany on September 7, 1949, and the German Democratic 
     Republic on October 7, 1949, the Four Allied Powers retained 
     rights and responsibilities for Germany as a whole;
       (3) the Federal Republic of Germany acceded to the United 
     Nations Charter without reservation, ``accept[ing] the 
     obligations contained in the Charter . . . and solemnly 
     undertak[ing] to carry them out'', and was admitted as a 
     member of the United Nations on September 26, 1973;
       (4) the Federal Republic of Germany's admission to the 
     United Nations did not alter Germany's division nor infringe 
     upon the rights and responsibilities of the Four Allied 
     Powers for Germany as a whole;
       (5) these circumstances created impediments to the Federal 
     Republic of Germany fulfilling all obligations undertaken 
     upon its accession to the United Nations Charter;
       (6) Germany was unified within the Federal Republic of 
     Germany on October 3, 1990;
       (7) with the entry into force of the Final Settlement With 
     Respect to Germany on March 4, 1991, the unified Germany 
     assumed its place in the community of nations as a fully 
     sovereign national state;
       (8) German unification and attainment of full sovereignty 
     and the Federal Republic's history of more than four decades 
     of democracy have removed impediments that have prevented its 
     full participation in international efforts to maintain or 
     restore international peace and security;
       (9) international peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace-
     enforcing operations are becoming increasingly important for 
     the maintenance and restoration of international peace and 
     security;
       (10) United Nations Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
     has called for the ``full participation of Germany in 
     peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace-enforcing measures'';
       (11) the North Atlantic Council, meeting in ministerial 
     session on June 4, 1992, and December 17, 1992, stated the 
     preparedness of the North Atlantic Alliance to ``support, on 
     a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own procedures, 
     peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the 
     Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe'' and 
     ``peacekeeping operations under the authority of the United 
     Nations Security Council'';
       (12) the Federal Republic of Germany participated in these 
     North Atlantic Council meetings and fully associated itself 
     with the resulting communiques;
       (13) the Western European Union (WEU) Ministerial Council, 
     in the Petersberg Declaration adopted June 19, 1992, declared 
     that ``As the WEU develops its operational capabilities in 
     accordance with the Maastricht Declaration, we are prepared 
     to support, on a case-by-case basis and in accordance with 
     our own procedures, the effective implementation of conflict-
     prevention and crisis-management measures, including 
     peacekeeping activities of the CSCE or the United Nations 
     Security Council'';
       (14) the Federal Republic of Germany presided over this 
     Western European Union Ministerial Council meeting and fully 
     associated itself with the Petersberg Declaration;
       (15) the Federal Republic of Germany, by virtue of its 
     political, economic, and military status and potential, will 
     play an important role in determining the success or failure 
     of future international efforts to maintain to restore 
     international peace and security;
       (16) Germany is currently engaged in a debate on the proper 
     role for the German military in the international community 
     and, in this regard, on how to amend the provisions of the 
     Federal Republic's Basic Law that govern German military 
     activities;
       (17) one important element in the German debate is the 
     attitude of the international community toward full German 
     participation in international peacekeeping, peacemaking, and 
     peace-enforcing operations;
       (18) it is, therefore, appropriate for the United States, 
     as a member of the international community and as a permanent 
     member of the United Nations Security Council, to express it 
     position on the question of such German participation; and
       (19) distinctions between peacekeeping, peacemaking, and 
     peace-enforcing measures are becoming burred, making absolute 
     separation of such measures difficult, if not impossible.
       (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of the Congress 
     that--
       (1) an appropriate response under current circumstances to 
     Germany's past would be for Germany to participate fully in 
     international efforts to maintain or restore international 
     peace and security; and
       (2) the President should strongly encourage Germany, in 
     light of its increasing political and economic influence, its 
     successful integration into international institutions, and 
     its commitment to peace and democratic ideals, to assume full 
     and active participation in international peacekeeping, 
     peacemaking, and peace-enforcing operations and to take the 
     necessary measures with regard to its constitutional law and 
     policy and its military capabilities so as to enable the full 
     and active participation of Germany in such operations.

  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, if my colleague will withhold, I would 
ask unanimous consent that with respect to the amendment the Senator 
from Maine just set aside, no second-degree amendments be in order.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none, and 
that is the order.
  Mr. COHEN. Mr. President, in 5 weeks, about the time that this bill 
is signed into law, the people of Germany will celebrate one of the 
most important dates in German history.
  March 4 will mark the third anniversary of the entry into force of 
the Two-Plus-Four Agreement under which the four allied powers of World 
War II gave up their special rights and responsibilities and Germany 
returned to the world stage as a sovereign, full fledged member of the 
family of nations.
  Within months of regaining the reins of its destiny, Germany began 
exercising previously unimaginable international political leadership, 
as it cajoled and pressured its European Community partners and 
eventually the United States into recognizing Solvenia and Coratia. 
Some called it muscle-flexing. Others viewed it as a natural, if 
somewhat undiplomatic, testing of the newfound possibilities afforded 
by Germany's new status and abetted by German officials still heady 
from unification.
  Unfortunately, many Germans have not been as quick to recognize that 
rights are accompanied by responsibilities--and that Germany's new 
situation and status brings with it not only new opportunities but new 
obligations, as well.
  Principal among these is the need for Germany to join with other 
nations in efforts to maintain and, if necessary, restore international 
peace and security.
  When the Federal Republic joined the United Nations 20 years ago, it 
did so without reservation. The Federal Republic's deed of accession to 
the United Nations states that it ``accepts the obligations contained 
in the charter of the United Nations and solemnly undertakes to carry 
them out.'' Yet, while it has contributed to U.N. peacekeeping efforts 
financially and occasionally with military personnel for humanitarian 
functions, the Federal Republic declared itself unable to fully 
participate notwithstanding its obligations and its economic and 
military resources.
  Similarly, while the Federal Republic has been a faithful ally within 
NATO for nearly four decades, it is hesitating now that NATO is 
extending its operations eastward in accord with its new mission to 
support international peacekeeping.
  The same is true with regard to the Western European Union, which has 
also declared its intent to support international peacekeeping 
operations--ironically at a meeting at which Germany presided.
  This hesitation was understandable so long as Germany was a divided 
nation, lacking full sovereignty and, in the first decades after the 
war, still coming to grips with the Nazi era. But Germany's situation 
and status have changed, removing these impediments to the Federal 
Republic's full and active participation in international military 
operations.
  To their credit, Chancellor Kohl, Defense Minister Ruehe, and other 
prominent political figures in Germany have worked to enable the 
Federal Republic to meet these responsibilities. The Chancellor, 
supported by most German legal scholars, argues that the Basic Law, the 
Federal Republic's constitution, permits the Bundeswehr to participate 
in international military operations to a much greater extent than it 
has in the past. In an effort to move Germany toward fulfillment of its 
international responsibilities, he and Defense Minister Ruehe have 
sought to further define the Federal Republic's constitutional policy 
through both public debate and praxis. I will give you some notable 
examples:
  German destroyers have helped to monitor the United Nations embargo 
on the former Yugoslavia, although German vessels are not engaged in 
interdiction;
  Some 1,600 German military personnel are in Somalia, where the UNITAF 
rules of engagement exceed those of past United Nations peacekeeping 
operations; and
  German military personnel helped to operate NATO AWACS planes during 
the gulf war and, at the insistence of the Defense Minister, have been 
helping to operate NATO AWACS in enforcing the Bosnian no-fly zone.
  To go beyond this marginal progress, the Chancellor has proposed a 
constitutional amendment to build the political consensus needed for 
full German participation in efforts to maintain and restore 
international peace and security.
  While these efforts by the German Government are to be commended, I 
find it quite disturbing that some Germans, particularly in the 
political opposition, are arguing that even if the Basic Law is 
amended, Germany will for reasons of history not be able to participate 
fully in international military operations.
  Some have even argued that German troops cannot be sent anywhere that 
was overrun or occupied by German forces during the Second World War--
an area that extends from the Atlantic to the Caucasus, from the 
Maghreb to the Barents Sea--an area, moreover, which includes many of 
the regions now undergoing or expected to undergo communal, ethnic, and 
religious conflict. Such an effort to circumscribe Germany's 
international role would essentially nullify the constitutional 
amendment now under consideration.
  Mr. President, Germany cannot hide from history, but neither can it 
hide behind history.
  We cannot accept the argument that the events of history forever bind 
nations and their leaders. One of the principal reasons war has 
returned to the Balkans is that leaders there insist upon dredging up 
old grievances to justify digging fresh graves.
  Germany--whose citizens have forthrightly grappled with the 
aggression and atrocities of the Nazi era, built a solidly democratic 
state, and securely anchored Germany in international institutions--
should not now invoke the past to avoid the responsibility to build a 
better future.
  Having worked so diligently to overcome their history, Germans cannot 
now seek refuge in it nor opportunistically stoke fears abroad of 
German interventionism.
  Claims by some in Germany that the world community does not want 
Germany to fulfill its obligations in the security sphere 
mischaracterize international opinions in an effort to manipulate the 
German constitutional debate, and we have an obligation to set the 
record straight.
  U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali has clearly and forcefully 
stated that the United Nations ``needs the full participation of 
Germany in peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peace-enforcing measures.''
  The purpose of this amendment is to bolster the Secretary General's 
clarion call by putting the Senate on record as favoring the full and 
active participation of Germany in such operations. To the extent that 
the German constitutional debate is based on international opinion, it 
is critical that our views be clearly understood.
  Mr. President, I would like to emphasize that this is not just a 
question of obligations and burden sharing, although these are not to 
be discounted. The end of the cold war and the collapse of communism 
are unleashing powerful forces that, despite our best efforts to manage 
them, have led and will continue to lead to conflicts in Europe and 
elsewhere. Given its political, economic, and military status and 
potential, Germany will play an important role in determining the 
success or failure of international efforts to deal with these 
conflicts.
  Full German participation in these efforts is not only right, it is 
absolutely needed, as the Secretary General has stated.
  To the extent that Germany any longer needs to atone for the evils of 
an earlier generation, an appropriate way to do so in today's world 
would be to join with other nations in combating threats to 
international peace and stability.
  The German people must be commended for dealing forthrightly with the 
evils of the Nazi era, for building a democratic state, and for 
integrating Germany into an international institution designed to 
strengthen democracy and international security.
  I believe an appropriate response to Germany's past would be for it 
to fully participate in international efforts to restore or maintain 
international peace and stability. My amendment would call on the 
President to encourage Germany to take the necessary measures with 
regard to its constitutional law and policy and military capabilities 
to enable it to participate fully in these international military 
operations.
  I urge my colleagues to support this amendment.
  As I indicated, Madam President, at the appropriate time I am going 
to ask for a recorded vote on this for another reason. William Perry 
will be coming before the Senate Armed Services Committee this week for 
his confirmation hearings. I hope the Senate will move rather quickly 
to confirm Mr. Perry.
  Mr. Perry is also planning to attend an important conference to be 
held in Munich beginning this Friday. I am told he will propose a major 
policy statement at that important conference that is held annually. It 
is important because it annually brings together all of the senior NATO 
officials, and the defense ministers and some foreign ministers from 
the NATO countries. Also attending will be many officials from the 
Eastern European countries that are seeking membership in NATO.
  The Russian defense minister has been invited. But because of the 
instability that is currently taking place in that country, we do not 
know if he is going to be attending the conference, although he did 
have plans to address the conference.
  So it is going to be a very important conference at which William 
Perry will make an important policy statement.
  This amendment, supported overwhelmingly by the United States Senate, 
will, I think, add to the importance of what Mr. Perry will say at that 
conference. It will also send a very strong signal to the German people 
that as far as we are concerned, and we are part of world opinion, we 
want Germany to assume full responsibility as a member of NATO and the 
United Nations, and not simply hide behind its historical past and say 
we really cannot be engaged in any area that we occupied during World 
War II.
  So for that reason, tomorrow I will be asking for a recorded vote.
  Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, the views expressed by the Senator from 
Maine I think are probably shared by the vast majority of the Members 
of the Senate. There is no question in my mind that in a world that is 
increasingly having to deal with issues of peacemaking and 
peacekeeping, and as we increasingly try to find a more refined method 
for the United Nations to be able to adequately represent our interests 
and guide those efforts, you cannot have major economic powers, leading 
economic powers of the world, and major powers in terms of technology 
and military capacity, totally out of the mix. It is incomprehensible 
if you are really going to make the United Nations the kind of entity 
it ought to be.
  The only question I would ask my colleague is: The Senate passed last 
Friday, I believe, an amendment of the Senator from Delaware with 
respect to Germany's membership within the Security Council of the 
United Nations, and Japan's. And as a component of the conditions for 
that membership we expressed our view that Germany must be able to 
carry out the full responsibilities of membership, including 
peacemaking and peacekeeping.
  I would simply ask my colleague if he does not believe that amendment 
does not adequately say to Germany, we are not only permissive as to 
Germany's role within peacekeeping and peacemaking we are actually 
encouraging, we are advocates of their assuming this role. I think that 
position of advocacy was well stated. Again, maybe the Senator wants to 
go further with specificity.
  Mr. COHEN. Madam President, I would point out that whether or not 
Germany becomes a permanent member of the Security Council my amendment 
would apply. My concern is and has been for the past year with the 
political debate that has been taking place in Germany in which some 
have sought to exploit, if not create, fears about Germany becoming an 
active participant in military peacekeeping-peacemaking operations. I 
found it to be unacceptable from my perspective that we would allow a 
nation as strong militarily and financially to simply pass that 
responsibility to other members.
  So I believe that having the Senate going on record specifically on 
the need for Germany to fulfill its responsibilities will add to 
Secretary-designate Perry's statement when he appears before this NATO 
conference this weekend.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I know the Senator from Maine cannot 
fault me for trying as manager of the bill to reduce the total number 
of votes. But I cannot disagree with his judgment. If it is all right 
with the Senator from Maine--I do not know if the Senator from North 
Carolina wishes to address this amendment--if he does not, if it is all 
right with the Senator from Maine to at least temporarily set this 
aside and I guarantee him that at the appropriate time pending the only 
question is whether another Senator wishes to address this issue we 
will set this up for a vote as agreed upon.
  Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. I thank the Chair.
  I say to the Senator from Maine that both of the amendments of the 
Senator from Maine are acceptable on this side. I do not blame him for 
wanting a rollcall vote on both of them. I commend him for offering 
each of them.
  I join Senator Kerry in suggesting that we lay both of these 
amendments aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is 
so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 1319

       (Purpose: To prohibit assistance to countries expropriating 
     United States citizens property)
  Mr. HELMS. Madam President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask 
for its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from North Carolina [Mr. Helms] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 1319.

  Mr. HELMS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:
       On page 179, after line 6, insert the following:

     SEC. 714. PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES 
                   EXPROPRIATING UNITED STATES PROPERTY.

       (a) Prohibition.--None of the funds made available to carry 
     out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended, the Arms 
     Export Control Act, or the Support for East European 
     Democracy Act may be provided to a country (other than a 
     country described in subsection (c) whose government (or any 
     agency or instrument thereof)--
       (1) has before, on, or after the date of enactment of this 
     Act--
       (A) nationalized or expropriated the property of any United 
     States person, or
       (C) taken any other action (such as the imposition of 
     discriminatory taxes or other exactions) which has the effect 
     of seizing ownership or control of the property of any United 
     States person, and
       (2) has not, within a period of 3 years (or where 
     applicable, the period described in subsection (b), returned 
     the property or provided adequate and effective compensation 
     for such property in convertible foreign exchange equivalent 
     to the full value thereof, as required by international law.
       (3) the President may waive the prohibition in section (a) 
     if he determines and so notifies Congress that it is in the 
     national interest to do so. Such determination must be made 
     on a country by country basis every 180 days.
       (b) Extended Period for Compensation in the Case of Newly 
     Elected Democratic Governments.--In the case of a 
     democratically elected foreign government that had been a 
     totalitarian or authoritarian government at the time of the 
     action described in subsection (a)(1), the 3-year period 
     described in subsection (a)(2) shall be deemed to have begun 
     as of the date of the installation of the democratically 
     elected government.
       (c) Excepted Countries and Territories.--This section shall 
     not apply to any country established by international mandate 
     through the United Nations or to any territory recognized by 
     the United States Government to be in dispute.
       (d) Reporting Requirement.--Not later than 90 days after 
     enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the 
     Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the House 
     of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations 
     of the Senate, a report containing the following:
       (1) A list of all countries in which a United States person 
     has an outstanding expropriations claim.
       (2) The total number of outstanding expropriation claims 
     made by United States persons against any foreign country.
       (3) The period of time in which each claim has been 
     outstanding.
       (4) All efforts made on a case by case basis by the United 
     States government, any international organization, and the 
     country in which the expropriation claim has been made, to 
     return the property or provide adequate and effective 
     compensation for such property.
       (e) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the term 
     ``United States person'' means a United States citizen or 
     corporation, partnership, or association at least 50 percent 
     beneficially owned by United States citizens.

  Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I just ask my colleagues' indulgence for 
a moment, and I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. HELMS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. HELMS. Madam President, I again thank the Chair.
  Madam President, this amendment is almost identical to a Helms 
amendment adopted by the Senate 92 to 4 back on September 23 of last 
year. It involves the confiscation of American property overseas, which 
I consider to be an outrageous set of circumstances. This amendment's 
language is the exact language, as I say, as that adopted last year 
with an additional requirement that the State Department report to 
Congress on the status of these outstanding claims.
  The State Department has sat on its hands year after year on this 
question. Frankly, I am sick and tired of it. I want Congress to know 
what if anything the State Department is doing when this amendment 
becomes law.
  Despite the efforts of Senators McConnell and Leahy, the House 
refused to accept the provision adopted by the Senate last year. It was 
in the foreign aid appropriations conference and the House typically 
did not go along with it.
  Since this provision was dropped, the Senate is obliged to address 
this issue again.
  I intend to be a conferee on this bill this time. I say that we will 
work to ensure the inclusion of this amendment in the final conference 
report on the State Department authorization bill.

  For the record, let me outline the impact of the pending amendment. 
It is very simple. It would cut off U.S. foreign aid money, furnished 
by the American taxpayers, to any country whose government has 
confiscated the property of U.S. citizens and has not returned that 
property or fairly compensated the legitimate owner within a period of 
3 years.
  I realize that every country is going to argue that it has a right to 
confiscate property for national interest reasons. But they also have 
the obligation to compensate the original owner. Far too often, in too 
many countries, the property rights of U.S. citizens are being violated 
willy-nilly.
  For years, Madam President, I have been besieged with letters from 
American citizens in various countries who have had their homes or 
their businesses or both confiscated around the world. Every letter 
tells a similar story. When attempting to reclaim their property, they 
find a deaf ear and a closed door at the U.S. Embassy. The State 
Department is just not interested in helping American citizens who are 
being mistreated by foreign countries. Worse, many American citizens 
have told me that the U.S. Embassy plays the role of the host 
government's foreign ministry. That is not an exaggeration. I have run 
into it. I have checked into it, and it is the absolute truth. The 
State Department aides, in fact, side with the foreign government and 
not with the American taxpayers. I want to build a fire down in Foggy 
Bottom. I felt this way in the previous administration, and I certainly 
feel this way now. It is a perfect outrage.
  Let us go back a little bit in time. Last year, along about this 
time, Secretary Christopher stated at his confirmation hearing before 
the Foreign Relations Committee, of which I am ranking member, that he, 
Mr. Christopher, intended to have an ``American desk'' at the U.S. 
State Department if, as, and when he became Secretary of State. Well, 
that is a phrase he borrowed from former Senator Herman Talmadge of 
Georgia. I do not know how many times I heard him on the Senate floor 
say, ``What we need is an American desk down at the State Department.'' 
He said, ``We have a European desk, a Latin American desk, an Asian 
desk, but we ain't got no American desk.'' He was right.
  I applauded what Mr. Christopher said when he was bidding to become 
U.S. Secretary of State. Well, I wish that he had followed up on his 
pledge. But if progress on these property claims is any guide, I see no 
evidence of an ``American desk'' down at Foggy Bottom today.
  To put it another way, it is high time that the State Department 
started putting American interests first. We do not have an embassy in 
Nicaragua to kowtow to that government. We have an embassy there to 
look after American interests there. We do not send ambassadors around 
the world to sip tea and drink cocktails. We send them there to look 
after the American people and the interests of this country in general.
  I imagine that some Senators might ask which countries will be 
affected by this amendment. Will it hurt a country that we like? I hope 
I do not hear that, because my answer might be a little sharper than I 
would want to make it, because I do not give a damn which country will 
be affected. I care about protecting the rights of the American 
citizens.
  Some may remember that this issue first came to light with the 
Hickenlooper amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act in the year 1962. 
That law, while highlighting the problem of the expropriation of 
American citizens' property, has been all but ignored by the executive 
branch. And this is a bipartisan folly. I am not pointing fingers 
simply at the present occupants of the White House. I am saying that it 
has been almost a custom, a bipartisan folly, as I say, of both 
administrations.
  The executive branch, due to the overly broad language of the 
Hickenlooper amendment, has chosen to ignore the intent of the 
Hickenlooper amendment. Amendments over the years have weakened the 
original amendment to some extent, because since 1962, more than 30 
years ago, Presidents have exercised the Hickenlooper amendment only 
two times. Meanwhile, thousands of innocent Americans have had their 
property unfairly taken from them. With the language of this pending 
amendment, Madam President, it will be perfectly clear to all that 
foreign governments will, one, have to return expropriated properties 
or compensate the owners, or, two, lose their foreign aid, which the 
American taxpayers are sick and tired of furnishing anyhow. The ball 
will be in the court of the foreign governments who are just now 
``thumbing their nose'' at the American citizens and the United States 
of America.
  Now, as I said earlier, a similar amendment that I offered a few 
months ago--5 or 6 months ago--was approved by the Senate 92-4. This 
amendment is only slightly different in that it requires the President 
to report to Congress as to the number of outstanding property claims 
covered by this amendment.
  Madam President, I asked the State Department last year for a list of 
all the confiscation claims by American citizens in this hemisphere. I 
was told in a hearing of the Foreign Relations Committee that a review 
of this issue was underway, and that all U.S. Embassies would be 
reporting on outstanding claims in each country. To this day, almost 1 
year later, I have received no report on this matter. I have concluded 
that officials at the State Department simply do not care--they do not 
want to risk hurting the feelings of a foreign government. For that 
reason I have added a provision to this amendment which requires the 
State Department to report to Congress every 6 months on the countries 
in which American citizens have outstanding claims.
  My office is currently working on the expropriation claims of 
hundreds of American citizens in many countries. My staff is aware of 
more than 1,200 claims in Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Honduras alone. I 
have done everything in my power to resolve these cases, but the State 
Department almost always jumps to the defense of the foreign 
government. And I cannot make progress on these cases unless pressure 
is brought to bear on the offending government by the State Department. 
The most direct pressure we have is U.S. foreign aid.
  Let me respond to the question about how this amendment might affect 
Russia. First of all, I would say that if any Senator is aware of 
outstanding expropriation claims Americans have in Russia, I would be 
very interested to know. They must have access to high-placed friends 
at the State Department because I have asked State repeatedly for the 
number of outstanding American claims worldwide--not just in Russia. 
But State has refused to provide that information and that is why this 
amendment requires the State Department to report on how many 
outstanding claims Americans have in Russia and everywhere else.
  This amendment does not cut off aid to Russia. It does not cut off 
aid to any Republic of the Former Soviet Union. Under my amendment, 
each of these countries has 3 years from the date its first 
democratically elected government took office since emerging from 
totalitarianism to settle outstanding claims.

  Russia, for example, still has plenty of time to settle up with 
Americans who have had their property unfairly stolen. Since Boris 
Yeltsin was elected president in June 1991, Russia has time to settle 
outstanding claims. This amendment simply lets these governments know 
that the clock is ticking. It makes sure Russia and other countries 
make this issue a priority and compensate Americans fairly--and 
promptly.
  Now, the Communists seized power in Russia in 1917. That was a long 
time ago. After that, Lenin and his cronies quickly--and brutally, I 
will add--confiscated all private property. I have no idea if Americans 
lost property during that time, but if they did, I think after 75 years 
these Americans sure as heck deserve compensation for it.
  This year alone, Russia and the other former Soviet Republics will 
receive about $2.5 billion from United States taxpayers. That's no 
small change. And it's coming straight out of the pockets of hard 
working Americans. If these countries don't want to make property 
claims a priority, then they don't deserve our money.
  Furthermore, those who are worried about the implications of cutting 
off aid to a certain country should consider what happens when these 
countries have no respect for private property rights. Governments 
which do not respect property rights do not gain foreign investment--
thus, no amount of money from the U.S. Treasury will buy those 
countries economic stability. As Andrew Carnegie said, ``Upon the 
sacredness of property civilization itself depends--the right of the 
laborer to his hundred dollars in the savings bank, and equally the 
legal right of the millionaire to his millions.''
  Madam President, we were each elected to the United States Senate to 
defend and protect American citizens. Unfortunately, many who are 
serving at American Embassies around the world are suffering a severe 
case of what I call clientitis, backing foreign governments instead of 
American citizens. That is just plain wrong.
  If this amendment is passed into law, the State Department will no 
longer be able to make excuses for foreign governments as to why those 
governments have not settled thousands of property claims by United 
States citizens. It will be perfectly clear to all those receiving U.S. 
foreign aid that there will be no more aid until all American claims 
are settled.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, we are prepared to accept this amendment. 
As the Senator said, it was voted on previously in the Senate and 
passed overwhelmingly. That should not indicate, however, that there 
are not in the language as it is currently framed certain problems that 
can arise in terms of the certitude of the conditions under which a 
country is going to automatically lose its entire foreign assistance 
program if just one American's property is affected or if one contract 
is broken or nullified. There might be significant, legitimate 
questions between countries as to why a particular contract is at 
issue. Those are definitional problems and those are more practical 
problems.
  I want the Senator to understand that I share completely with him the 
notion that American interests have to be put out there in a 
significant way. There is no advocate in the Senate who is more dogged 
or adamant in his placing of those American interests first, and I know 
this amendment is well intended and intended to assert those interests. 
I know of some of the instances the Senator refers to, where we have 
people who some time ago lost property in countries, and now we are 
giving those countries assistance in one form or another, and these 
people are desperately struggling within the eternal processes of those 
countries with a thousand different wheels spinning in different 
directions trying to get their property back or some compensation for 
it.
  So we need to make it clear that we have an expectation that American 
citizens' legitimate claims are responded to. The trick is balancing 
this desire in a way that does not become draconian in its 
implementation. So you wind up cutting off assistance in a case where 
you do not really want to, for some claim that says you ought to, but 
in point of fact there are serious questions about the claim itself.
  I think the Senator has tried to take care of that in a waiver that 
he has allowed and, in the fact, that the President can explain the 
circumstances which permit us to continue the aid.
  I really wanted to cite those kinds of tensions so that the Record is 
clear as to how we come at this. But nevertheless I think that the 
overall intent of the Senator is sound, and it is certainly a priority 
that we ought to be putting front and center in our dealings with these 
countries.
  So we are prepared, with those understandings, to accept this 
amendment.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on the amendment of 
the Senator from North Carolina?
  Mr. HELMS. Madam President, I have sent for some examples of the 
absurd things that are going on. I had not intended to burden the 
Record with those, but just to indicate that there is nothing frivolous 
about this amendment. There is not the slightest intent that it be 
implemented without good reason. I want to give some examples of what 
has been going on, and the State Department has not lifted a finger to 
correct it.
  Apparently, I am going to have to look in my records because one 
country seized the property of an American citizen and it is now being 
occupied by the Cuban Embassy. You know that is just absolutely absurd. 
But I will put those in the Record at a later time.
  As to confiscations that we know of in Latin America alone, there are 
50 in Honduras; there are 17 in Costa Rica; there are 790 people with 
1,200 pieces of property in Nicaragua; two in Panama; two in Venezuela; 
one in Argentina, and so forth and so on.
  But I am not going to await the delivery to me of the information 
that I frankly did not ask my staff to get up for me, but we will get 
it up and we will insert it in the Record later on.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Madam President, let me just say to my friend that I hope 
he did not interpret my remarks in any way as somehow indicating other 
than seriousness of it because, as I said in the remarks, I have worked 
with him and I am well aware of some of these egregious situations, and 
I think it would be healthy if the Record reflected it.
  Madam President, the point is well taken. The language does say that 
all of the aid would be cut off if the nationalized or expropriated 
property of any United States person--you can wind up with one 
situation. I think you want to be careful to balance it. I know the 
Senator does not intend for an absurd situation to be put in place. I 
think he intended for us to eliminate the absurdity.
  Mr. HELMS. I thank the Senator. None of us favor unreasonable 
implementation of anything.
  Having said what I have said in criticism of this sort of thing that 
has been going on, let me say in my 21 years in the Senate, I have 
hundreds of examples of where U.S. Embassies in Europe and other places 
in the world have gone out of their way to be helpful to U.S. citizens. 
So there are two different sides to the story, but most of what I am 
talking about has happened in Latin America.
  I thank the Senator and I thank the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?
  If not, the question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator 
from North Carolina?
  So the amendment (No. 1319) was agreed to.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. KERRY. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. HELMS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order 
for the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           Amendment No. 1320

 (Purpose: To maintain the current number of Assistant Secretaries of 
  State and State Department officials compensated at level IV of the 
                          Executive Schedule)

  Mr. HELMS. Madam President, I send an unprinted amendment to the desk 
and ask that it be stated.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the pending amendment is 
laid aside.
  The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from North Carolina [Mr. Helms] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 1320.

  Mr. HELMS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of 
the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

       On page 32, line 19, strike out ``20'' and insert in lieu 
     thereof ``18''.
       Beginning on page 32, strike out line 21 and all that 
     follows through line 3 on page 33.
       On page 33, line 4, strike out ``(c)'' and insert in lieu 
     thereof ``(b)''.
       On page 34, line 19, strike out ``(20)'' and insert in lieu 
     thereof ``(18)''.
       On page 34, line 22, strike out ``(d)'' and insert in lieu 
     thereof ``(c)''.
       On page 35, line 5, strike out ``(e)'' and insert in lieu 
     thereof ``(d)''.

  Mr. HELMS. Madam President, I understand that the pulse rate of the 
other side begins to quicken when I call up this amendment. I hope they 
will see the light, because I am perfectly willing to accept this one 
on a voice vote. But if there is not that willingness, I am going to 
insist on a rollcall vote.
  All I want to do is put a hold on the current size of the bureaucracy 
at the U.S. State Department. My amendment deals specifically with the 
number of Assistant Secretary positions.
  Let me go down the list and see how other Cabinet officers or 
Departments handle their affairs, in terms of Assistant Secretaries.
  Let us see how many employees each Assistant Secretary is responsible 
for.
  At the Commerce Department, each Assistant Secretary is responsible 
for 6,372 employees; at the State Department, each Assistant Secretary 
is responsible for 702 employees; at the Defense Department, each 
Assistant Secretary has responsibility for 34,141 subordinates; at the 
State Department Assistant Secretaries are responsible for 702.
  At the Justice Department, each Assistant Secretary, or equivalent, 
is responsible for 4,660 employees; and I repeat the State Department, 
702 employees.
  The Treasury Department, each Assistant Secretary is responsible for 
25,247 employees; and I repeat that the State Department, each 
Assistant Secretary is responsible for 702.
  I ask unanimous consent that this table be printed in the Record at 
the conclusion of my remarks.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Mathews). Without objection, it is so 
ordered.
  (See Exhibit 1.)
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the amendment now pending is not punitive. 
It simply authorizes the Secretary of State to operate with the same 
number of Assistant Secretaries and equivalent paid positions as Mr. 
Christopher had when he was first appointed Secretary of State. I might 
add, Secretary Christopher is operating with two additional Assistant 
Secretaries, two more Assistant Secretaries than he had during his last 
tour of duty with the Carter administration.
  When Warren Christoper and his Deputy Secretary appeared before our 
committee for their confirmations about 12 months ago, they promised--
and this is a matter of record--they promised to dedicate themselves to 
the implementation of what they called a ``broad-based reorganization. 
* * * which would reduce excessive layering'' of bureaucrats 
``within''--I inserted the word ``bureaucrats''--``layering within the 
State Department and streamline the bureaucracy.'' The President, 
himself, proclaimed last February that ``it was time to shift from top-
down bureaucracy to entrepreneurial government that generates changes 
from the bottom up.'' To even my surprise, I found myself falling in 
step with this kind of talk. I was, of course, disappointed as the 
months passed and we pulled off pages of the calendar and we found 
that, after all, it was just plain rhetoric.
  But a year ago I told Secretary Christopher if he was serious about 
streamlining to count me in. The price was that I would hold him to his 
promise. That is what I am doing here right now.
  So, here we go with another full load of rhetoric for the past year. 
When the State Department transmitted its official request for 
authorization to our committee, the broad-based reorganization sure was 
broad based, broad at the top, broad at the sides, and broad in the 
middle. That is the way the bureaucracy has always been. The 
proliferation of bureaucrats, and especially top level positions at 
State, was astounding to anyone who was keeping an eye on it.
  Let me quote President Clinton's statement, found in the National 
Performance Review, page 23. He said:

       First, we must cut the waste and make government operations 
     more responsive to the American people.

  Anybody who did not say amen to that rhetoric was just off the wall. 
Of course all of us agreed to that.
  Then the President continued:

       It is time to shift from top-down bureaucracy to 
     entrepreneurial government that generates change from the 
     bottom up.

  But, as I have indicated just a moment ago, this same administration 
that wanted to shift from top-down bureaucracy requested a 33-percent 
increase in bureaucrats, specifically the Assistant Secretary-titled 
positions at the topmost layers of the State Department bureaucracy.
  This ballooning, in the overall spectrum, may not make a lot of 
difference when you are talking about a $4.4 trillion Federal debt and 
all of that. But if you are not exercising good stewardship with 
smaller things, then you end up with that kind of debt and you end up 
with that kind of annual deficit. That is what is wrong with this 
Government today. The State Department almost alone in the bureaucracy 
has insisted on having more striped pants guys strolling up and down 
the corridors of the State Department. This ballooning translated into 
an additional 6 Assistant Secretary titles, all of whom would be 
politically appointed positions.
  The State Department also requested an additional 5 positions to be 
compensated at the executive level IV rate, and that costs, salary-
wise, about $115,000 a year a person, not to mention the additional 
salaries for the new staff and all the accompanying administrative 
expenses.
  Again, I acknowledge that in the overall spectrum what I am talking 
about is not much money. But it is the principle of the thing. The 
State Department's request would have cost the American taxpayers 
another $1.3 million in new salaries alone, not to mention the 
additional duplicative administrative support expenses and additional 
staff positions associated with setting up all of these new bureaucrats 
in office.
  Let me give an example. When the South Asia Bureau was created by the 
State Department a couple of years ago, the State Department study 
estimated that each new bureau with management and administrative 
personnel and staff and equipment, space and supplies, et cetera, et 
cetera, would cost the taxpayer at the minimum $2 million more each 
year.
  That mushrooming effect is certainly apparent now.
  The distinguished Democratic Senators on our committee had a 
difficult time supporting their own administration on this one back in 
July. The Foreign Relations Committee rejected the bloated 
administration request but unfortunately passed a provision giving the 
administration two more Assistant Secretary titles and two more paid 
positions than they now have.
  If I understood the President and the Vice President and the 
Secretary of State correctly over the past 12 months, and I think I 
have understood, they have said over and over and over, this is not the 
time for more bureaucracy. They have said one way or another at one 
time or another--all of them--that this is the time for belt tightening 
and streamlining, and certainly I agree with that.
  Again, let me read from the National Performance Review, page 83, 
where President Clinton was quoted as saying:

       In short, it's time our Government adjusted to the real 
     world, tightened its belt, managed its affairs.

  Our committee withstood a 17-percent decrease in funding in staffing 
support in the last 12 months. The pending amendment does not require 
that the State Department take any sort of staffing decrease. This 
amendment is fair and reasonable. I know we are going to hear arguments 
against it, but I do not think they will withstand close examination.
  This amendment gives the State Department precisely what they are 
working with at the present time. We do not cut anybody. We do not 
eliminate any jobs. I would like to, but I know the facts of life. But 
we are not increasing it. We do not propose to increase. We are going 
to let them stay with the bureaucrats they now have.
  Let me tell you, Mr. President, I have looked over the personnel 
graphs of the high-level executives in other Federal agencies. At 
present, as I said at the outset, there is already one Assistant 
Secretary for every 700 or so State Department employees. When you 
compare that to one Assistant Secretary for every 34,000 employees at 
the Department of Defense and one Assistant Secretary for every 25,000 
employees at Treasury, it is strikingly obvious that the State 
Department ought to quit while they are winning and stop pushing for 
more and bigger bureaucracy.
  Let me be clear about this. This amendment does not affect any sort 
of congressionally mandated Assistant Secretaries. It does not direct 
the Secretary of State to create or maintain or abolish or modify any 
existing Assistant Secretary position. It does not cut into the State 
Department's current management structure, and it does not eliminate 
any existing political appointee positions. Instead, this amendment 
holds the State Department to the promises of its own administration 
during these austere economic times.

                               Exhibit 1

             EXECUTIVE PAY PLANS BY LEVEL--FEDERAL AGENCIES             
               [Executive Level IV=Assistant Secretary/AS]              
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                            Number of positions                         
                                 by level                               
                          ----------------------    Total    AS:Employee
                               II  III            employees     ratio   
                           I            IV    V                         
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agriculture..............  ..   1  ...  ...   6     125,765    ,        
Commerce.................  ..   1  ...    6   1      38,232    1:6,371  
Defense..................   1   5    2   27   2     921,817    1:34,141 
Justice..................   1   2    3   21  13      97,878    1:4,660  
Labor....................   1   1  ...   12   2      17,299    1:1,441  
Energy...................   1   1    1   16  ..      20,681    1:1,292  
Education................   1   1  ...   10   6       5,095    1:509    
HHS......................   1   1  ...   14   1     129,144    1:9,224  
HUD......................   1   1  ...   11  ..      13,389    1:1,217  
Interior.................   1   1  ...    9   9      80,894    1:8,988  
State....................   1   2    5   24  ..      16,885    1:702    
Transport................   1   3    4    7   1      69,971    1:9,995  
Treasury.................   1   3    4    7   1     176,729    1:25,247 
Veterans.................   1   1    2   10  ..     268,943    1:26,894 
SecDef...................   1   2    2   16   1           ,  ...........
Air Force................  ..   1  ...  ...  ..     196,009  ...........
Army.....................  ..   1  ...    6   1     306,914  ...........
Navy.....................  ..   1  ...    5  ..     285,600  ...........
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:                                                                 
A. U.S. Office of Personnel Management and ``Policy and Supporting      
  Positions'', Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, 
  November 10, 1992.                                                    
B. Office of Personnel Management, March 1993.                          

  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, since I understand that there will be no 
inclination on the part of the other side to accept this amendment, I 
ask for the yeas and nays.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a 
sufficient second.
  The yeas and nays were ordered.
  Mr. HELMS. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, my friend from North Carolina has indeed 
accurately read the mood. There will need to be a vote on this.
  I would like to ask my colleagues to think carefully about the 
comparisons that the Senator has asked us all to make and also to 
examine very carefully what the State Department does and what the 
Assistant Secretaries are asked to do, particularly in this new world 
of the post-cold-war so-called order, better described as a disorder, 
really.
  My colleague from North Carolina has been quick to point out that at 
the Commerce Department there are 6 Assistant Secretaries overseeing 
6,372 people; in the Defense Department, 27 overseeing 34,141, and so 
forth, and has repeatedly pointed out that in the State Department, 
Assistant Secretaries oversee only 702 people. I think it is admirable 
that there are only 702 people. The functions of the Commerce 
Department and the Department of Defense, particularly in view of the 
latter's involvement with managing millions of people in uniform, 
really do not relate to the responsibilities and duties of the State 
Department.
  I respectfully submit that the qualifications and the rigorous 
examination and the backgrounds of the people that we ask to go into 
the State Department are significantly different from those who make up 
the 34,000 people within the Defense Department, most of whom are at a 
different tier within the bureaucracy and perform far more ministerial 
and bureaucratic functions. But in the State Department, we have a 
cadre of people who have been brought in with a large portion of them 
with significant language skills or skills they gain once they are in 
the Department, with doctorates, master's degrees, and significant 
graduate education, law degrees, because we are in fact talking about 
diplomacy measured against administration of certain kinds of 
functional duties within departments. It is a very different job to be 
sitting on a desk and evaluating what is happening in the Middle East 
or what is happening in Africa or what is happening in Latin America 
and to be able to make judgments about a whole set of interests: 
International narcotics trafficking, international terrorism, 
international crime, global environmental issues, the problems of 
various conflicts, civil disorder, the peace process, the interests and 
rights of citizens under international law, the problems of emerging 
nations in development, the administration of aid programs, 
developmental loan programs. There are many totally different kinds of 
decisions that we are asking people within the State Department to 
either make or to evaluate which are just night and day differentiated 
from the other bureaucracies that my colleague has articulated.
  Moreover and significantly--I hope my colleague is listening in the 
cloakroom because I would like him to know or at least to reflect on 
the fact because I believe he does know it--the Secretary of State has 
already ordered significant cuts within the Department. You cannot come 
out here and just say, ``Well, we should not have three additional 
Secretaries at the Assistant Secretary level to better manage affairs 
of a Department,'' when the Department is already making significant 
cuts. A 14-percent cut in administrative costs from fiscal year 1994 to 
fiscal year 1997, and that is in line with the Department's 1994 budget 
that represents a 3-percent reduction in administrative costs. There 
will also be a reduction in personnel.
  So my colleague is coming to the floor and asking us to micromanage 
the Secretary's choice of what he would like at the top level in order 
to be able to better manage this overall Department.
  Somehow my colleague is suggesting that we in the Congress are better 
equipped to tell Secretary Christopher he should not have 20 or 21 
Assistant Secretaries to better feed information to him; he ought to 
have just the 18 that have been there; I might add, in a world that is 
totally different from the world in which we have just been living. It 
is one thing to contemplate the kinds of decisions the State Department 
had to make in a world where you had the Soviet Union against the 
United States and most of the world's foreign policy decisions were 
divided in East-West terms. Most of our focus was divided in East-West 
terms.
  I might add, Mr. President, during the time that we were so focused 
and most of the energy of these good minds was trying to figure out 
East-West, we were in fact missing an awful lot of the North-South and 
South-East, and so forth. But be that as it may, you had a more simply 
defined diplomatic equation.
  I do not think anybody is going to come to the floor of the Senate in 
1994 and suggest you have an easily definable diplomatic equation 
today. In fact, one of the things that has struck me in the course of 
my travels to various countries in the course of Senate business is the 
degree to which we could actually use more input, not less--the degree 
to which we are being taken to the cleaners in the foreign marketplace 
because we do not have enough people in our foreign commercial service 
or because we do not have enough oversight or because we do not have 
enough people to enable our businesses to jump through the export 
hurdles or jump through the access hurdles in these countries, and we 
are denying ourselves jobs in this country.
  My colleague from North Carolina would be one of the first people to 
come to the floor and say, ``I want the people of North Carolina to be 
working.'' I know in the triangle down there around Raleigh-Durham they 
have one heck of a complex of technology and universities and health 
care not unlike that which we have in Massachusetts. Those folks could 
use more assistance from an Assistant Secretary who is dealing with 
exports, which is precisely what Secretary Christopher wants to do. 
Secretary Christopher, whose words were quoted by the Senator from 
North Carolina about what he wants to do with the Department, came to 
the Senate in his confirmation hearings and said, ``I think we ought to 
have an America desk in the State Department--an America desk, a desk 
in our embassies that is geared to try to put people in the United 
States to work by taking advantage of these new opportunities in these 
foreign markets.
  Mr. President, I was just in Hong Kong meeting with our foreign 
commercial service personnel. We have a couple of Americans there, just 
a couple. They were telling me they are working from 6 in the morning 
until midnight every day, and there is so much to do they are missing 
opportunities to get contracts for American businesses. They cannot 
keep up.
  We could be harnessing billions of dollars of contracts, I am 
certain, all through Asia, Europe, and other places if we had a greater 
ability to help our companies find out what business is being offered, 
what are the terms of the requests for proposals, when will they be 
due, how many companies can compete, how do you get into this business, 
who is going to help me get the export licensing, how do I learn how to 
do this when I have never done it before? A host of midsized and small 
American businesses could double their business tomorrow if we were 
willing to put two people to work. They would pay for themselves in 1 
week. They would probably pay for themselves in 1 day, but I will give 
them 1 week, Mr. President. We are sitting here micromanaging two or 
three positions for the Secretary of State, who wants to engage in that 
kind of enterprise.
  Now, we are not talking about the management of the employees of the 
IRS. My colleague cites the Treasury Department as an example of a 
whole lot of employees and just one or two managers. Well, the IRS 
lends itself to that kind of management. Most of these people are 
working on computers. Most of these people are moving paper or 
processing documents in a fairly formatted, regimented way.
  That is not diplomacy, Mr. President. It takes an Assistant Secretary 
of State to go to a particular country with the imprimatur of his 
office or her office, Secretary or Assistant Secretary of State to be 
able to sit down with leaders of other countries and proffer either the 
early grounds of a treaty, the early terms of an international trade 
agreement, the early terms of a nonproliferation agreement, or a 
hazardous waste agreement.
  More and more of the world is international. More and more of the 
dealings of the world are going to be trying to create an international 
playing field where we understand the rules of engagement between 
ourselves and other countries. You cannot become Fortress America, 
putting your head in the sand and believing that somehow, because we 
were No. 1, we have a birthright to be No. 1. You do not have that 
birthright. You have the birthright to compete and the birthright to 
have opportunity and the birthright of equal opportunity in a country 
unparalleled to be able to go out and compete. But if we sit here 
ignoring what the real world is doing and stripping our ability to be 
engaged by taking these kinds of positions away, I think we are just 
denying ourselves the opportunity to put our birthright to its best 
advantage.
  Mr. President, I will tell you, as a Senator, when I have gone to 
these countries and met with their Presidents and their foreign 
ministers and their defense ministers, we have been able to get 
business done. We have been able to talk about things that are of 
interest to our countries and find avenues of opportunity that will put 
Americans to work and, indeed, meet the security interests of our 
Nation. Person after person I hear say, ``We have not seen an Assistant 
Secretary of State or anybody from your administration over here,'' or, 
``We have never met,'' or, ``Gee, do you think we can get in to see the 
Secretary or Assistant Secretary at some point so we could make our 
points about why we are pursuing a certain policy?''
  I would respectfully suggest to my colleague, that I share his desire 
to reduce the bureaucracy. I think bureaucracy in our own Government is 
the enemy, and we have too much of it. You can point to the Agriculture 
Department as an example where we have more bureaucracy, more 
bureaucrats than there are farmers in America. It is ridiculous. But 
the administration is cutting the State Department's midlevel 
bureaucracy.
  Lest my colleague doubt that, let me be very, very precise in the 
numbers. Under the Secretary of State's reorganization plan, the 
Department has already reduced the number of Deputy Assistant 
Secretaries and Deputy-Assistant-Secretary-equivalent positions from 
roughly 120 down to 76. So my colleague is complaining about adding two 
or three people, and it is not even fixed that they are going to be 
added. It simply gives the Secretary the permission to do it, gives him 
the permission at the upper level to set up a chain of command which 
allows the Secretary the capacity to make the judgments the Secretary 
needs to make to move the decisionmaking process, to engage people in a 
field like exports, which is particularly one of the assistant 
secretaryships we are talking about. And the Department cut underneath 
that level from 120 to 76. This represents a cut of 37 percent of the 
Deputy-Assistant-Secretary-equivalent positions.
  Let us repeat that. We are talking about allowing the Secretary of 
State to organize his Department as he wants, to streamline 
decisionmaking, and to implement the cuts he is trying to make. We 
should not micromanage or second-guess or undermine the Secretary's 
ability to be able to do that, particularly when you measure it against 
the fact that the Secretary has done precisely what the Senator from 
North Carolina wants and what he says the Secretary said he would do in 
the course of his confirmation hearings. He has cut the number of 
Deputy Assistant Secretary and DAS-equivalent positions from 120 to 76.
  In addition, the Department has made a number of other position 
changes, and those have been spread throughout the Department through a 
process of absorption.
  I think my colleague knows negotiating the agreements in this new 
world is not easy.
  If we are going to get other countries adhering to our standards on 
working out agreements, you have to have somebody who has the stature 
within the Department to be able to engage in the discussions that lead 
to those treaties, or agreements.
  I think that for us to sit here and suggest to the Secretary that he 
cannot have somebody to help him open up the export markets of the 
world and in a sense have an America's desk that is engaged in opening 
up job opportunities for North Carolina and Massachusetts, is to deny 
the State Department one of the most important tools of guidance that 
the embassies have. We should remember that most of these other 
Departments that operate in our embassies are precisely that. They are 
in the Embassy; the Commerce Department, ExIm, the others. It is the 
Embassy and the Secretary of State who have the best handle on the 
levers that are available to help create the maximum opportunity in any 
particular country. In fact, it is the ambassadors who, working with 
the Secretary, can best balance the other policy interests of a 
particular region of the world or a particular country in the effort to 
help our companies compete against other countries that are not bashful 
about putting their government officials in those countries and 
spending more sums than we are in an effort to advantage their workers 
and their companies.
  It is time for the United States of America to wake up. If we are 
going to put American citizens first and American interests first. You 
are not going to do it with a State Department that is shrinking by the 
day and whose capacity to be able to pursue some of these interests is 
diminished.
  I am for getting rid of the bureaucracy at the lower level. But that 
is not what Secretary Christopher is asking for in these two or three 
positions which will help him to streamline and effect the overall 
changes that he seeks to effect in the Department.
  Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, wonders never cease. I do not know what 
amendment the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts has been talking 
about. But he sure as heck has not been talking about mine, not the one 
that is pending. He got his figures all jumbled up. I do not know who 
wrote that thing for him. At one time he said Deputy Secretary, at 
another time he said Assistant Secretary, and so forth. He may have his 
staff correct the copy in the Congressional Record so it will be in 
order.
  Let us review the bidding on what this amendment actually does, not 
what Senator Kerry says it does.
  First of all, this amendment gives the State Department absolutely 
the same number of Assistant Secretaries and absolutely the same number 
of executive level IV pay positions as it has now.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, will my colleague yield?
  Mr. HELMS. I did not interrupt my colleague.
  Who has the floor, Mr. President?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. I sat quietly while the Senator engaged in a friendly 
diatribe, and now I want to refute it a little bit.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, will the Senator just yield for a question?
  Mr. HELMS. Will the Chair please inform the Senator who has the floor 
once more?
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I know nothing in the rules of the Senate 
that do not allow me to ask the Senator if he would yield for a 
question. He can say no.
  Mr. HELMS. I did not say there is.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from North Carolina choose to 
yield for a question?
  Mr. HELMS. Not now. I did not interrupt the Senator. I beg his 
indulgence because he was saying Helms is against the building trade. 
That was the implication of what he said. He brought into this the 
Research Triangle Park in North Carolina. But I will tell you one thing 
about most of the businessmen from all over the country who come to me 
for help. They never say anything at all about what help the State 
Department gives them. It is the Commerce Department officials who they 
mention--not these people stationed over there in the embassies.
  So it is a lot of baloney to say that, boy, these ambassadors are 
doing a great job. Some of them are. But I tell you the businessmen in 
my State and other States who come to me I have called many times 
overseas, I have written many times overseas and it is not the 
bureaucrat in the State Department who renders the help. It is the 
people from the Commerce Department who are stationed in the embassies.
  So let us get that straight. I am not going to sit here and take a 
lot of baloney about what I am trying to do and what this amendment 
tries to do, because the amendment speaks for itself. I am perfectly 
capable of speaking for myself. I do not need the Senator from 
Massachusetts to speak for me. I do not try to speak for him.
  I know that he is very sensitive about any suggestion of criticism of 
his administration, yet he was one of the most critical of the previous 
administration.
  The present bill which gives the State Department 26 executive level 
IV pay positions and 20 Assistant Secretary title positions, and what 
was the figure per person--it cost $125,000.
  By the way, so the Senator will know what I am trying to do, let me 
read you a little explanation that the American taxpayers understand. I 
put it in the Record every day the Senate is in session. At the close 
of business on Friday, January 28, Mr. President, the Federal debt 
stood at $4,512,950,244,156.40. That means that on a per capita basis, 
every man, woman and child in America owes $17,310.16 as his or her 
share of that debt.
  That is what prompted this amendment. If you do not exercise good 
stewardship on small things, you are not likely to do it in overall 
things.
  This amendment does not eliminate even one existing Assistant 
Secretary position. To hear the Senator from Massachusetts tell it--I 
did hear him, I heard every syllable when I was in the Cloakroom--we 
just propose mayhem. Now anybody knows that is not so. It does not 
require the Secretary of State to establish any particular bureau or 
any Assistant Secretary to accompany any bureau. We are not 
micromanaging.
  I am trying to be a little faithful to what the American taxpayer is 
putting up with in terms of the deficit spending of this Government.
  All congressionally mandated Assistant Secretary positions have been 
retained under this amendment. And the original administration request 
included 24 Assistant Secretary positions and 29 executive level IV 
positions. So let us review the bidding again.

  The proliferation of bureaucracy throughout this Government and at 
the State Department is nothing new. I complained about this when the 
Republican administrations were in office.
  Let me share with you the comments of former Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk on this topic, as recorded in ``Annex H--Streamlining the Policy 
Process,'' which is a section of ``State 2000,'' a report by the State 
Department Office of Management Task Force from January 1993. Mr. Rusk 
testified in 1963:

       I would say * * * that inside the Department of State, our 
     principal problem is layering.

  ``Layering'' is the word that Warren Christopher used approximately a 
year ago at his confirmation hearing.
  Let me continue to read from Annex H of ``State 2000'':

       The major causes of layering are the proliferation of 
     bureaus, bureau-equivalents, independent and semi-independent 
     offices, deputy assistant secretaries and deputy assistant 
     secretary equivalents, and staff for seventh-floor 
     principals.

  That means the seventh floor of the State Department.
  Continuing:

       The larger the number of organizational units, the more 
     participants there are on any given policy issue.

  They like to sit around, look important, and take up time.

       This increases the number of clearances and lengthens the 
     time required to make a decision.

  When Dean Rusk made this criticism in 1963, the Department of State 
had 21 bureaus or bureau-equivalents, 6 independent or semi-independent 
offices, 46 Deputy Assistant Secretaries or Deputy Assistant Secretary 
equivalents and a fairly modest number of staff aides serving seventh-
floor principals.
  Let me continue from the report:

       Today there are 32 bureaus or bureau-equivalents * * * and 
     18 of these are assistant secretary positions with full 
     bureaucratic regalia. There are * * * 14 independent or semi-
     independent offices, 121 deputy assistant secretaries or 
     deputy assistant secretary equivalents and considerably 
     larger staffs for seventh-floor principals * * * In addition, 
     a number of the bureaus, bureau-equivalents and independent 
     offices were established by Congress * * *

  And that is the Lord's truth. I insert that parenthetically.
  Continuing:

       The growth can be attributed, I believe, to Parkinson's 
     Law.

  That is an understatement, Mr. President.

       Justified or not, new units and positions contribute to the 
     problem of layering and need to be reassessed in light of our 
     changing diplomatic requirements.

  I ask unanimous consent that at this point in the Record the table to 
which I am referring be printed.
  There being no objection, the table was ordered to be printed in the 
Record, as follows:

------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                    Bureau or   Ind. office     DAS or  
              Year                 equivalent                 equivalent
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1963.............................           21            6           46
1992.............................           32           14          121
------------------------------------------------------------------------

  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, this, according to Annex H--Streamlining 
the Policy Process of the U.S. State Department, from State 2000, 
which, as I said earlier, is a January 1993 report from the office of 
management task force. That report recommended a new decrease--yes, I 
said it correctly; it recommended a decrease in the bureau positions or 
bureau-equivalent positions.
  Read the amendment. I am not even saying a decrease. I am saying to 
hold it where it is. I am not micromanaging anything. I am just saying 
let us not push this debt any higher.
  As the administration requested, the task force did not recommend an 
increase in positions as this bill provides, nor did the task force 
recommend a 33-percent increase in Assistant Secretary positions. This 
amendment, Mr. President, eliminates layering, and it eliminates 
bureaucratic growth.
  I say again that it is not exactly correct to get up and say this 
amendment is against full participation in world trade. If you turn our 
businessmen loose from a lot of the bureaucratic controls, we will see 
how they function.
  But never a day passes that I am not in contact with somebody 
overseas, seeing if I cannot get somebody in the door. Most of the 
time, I do not talk with the Ambassador. I talk with the Department of 
Commerce or sometimes the Treasury Department representative in the 
embassy in question. The Senate can do what it pleases, of course, but 
I want it to vote on the amendment as it is, not as Senator Kerry 
described it.
  I yield the floor.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, the amendment of the Senator is precisely 
as I have described it. The Senator says it leaves the situation 
exactly as it is today. It does not. It, in fact, cuts three existing 
executive level IV positions. So the Senator can stand here and say one 
thing, but saying it does not make it true. The fact is that the 
numbers here are three less than the Secretary currently has in the 
full paid positions.
  Second, the Senator read a number of numbers of Deputy Assistants, 
but he took it from the old book. The Senator has made much of how 
important it is that we talk about reality here. The reality is that 
there are not 121 Deputy Assistant Secretaries. Let us understand this. 
Deputy Assistant Secretaries--they have been cut. They have been cut by 
Secretary Christopher, and they are down to the number of 76.
  So the Senator can come here and offer an amendment to cut a status 
which does not exist and rail against a status that does not exist, and 
then come to the floor and say Senator Kerry is incorrect. But he 
cannot support it. He never addressed the question of how many Deputy 
Assistant Secretaries are now within Secretary Christopher's 
reorganization. The number is 76, not 121.

  Moreover, when the Senator talks about we have to get rid of this 
layer that Dean Rusk talked about, that is precisely what Secretary 
Christopher is doing.
  When you get rid of the 120 down to 76 Deputy Assistant Secretaries, 
you are stripping away a layer and you are getting rid of the in-
between layers so that the people at the top layer can make decisions 
and be directly engaged with the decisionmaking process without the 
interference of layers.
  So, let us try to deal with reality.
  I want to report from our committee's markup, and this is the 
testimony of Assistant Secretary Wendy Sherman. I quote her line 10 of 
the testimony in the Foreign Relations Committee.

       There were 120 Deputy Assistant Secretaries and Deputy 
     Assistant Secretary equivalents. We have tried to move that 
     down to about 76 Deputy Assistant Secretaries, a substantial 
     cut of 28 percent of the positions, and 37 percent of the 
     Deputy Assistant Secretary equivalent positions.

  We will save an additional 50 percent or more personnel in this 
process, and the Senator is right. It is a very difficult process, one 
that has to be driven very hard.
  Now, let me continue further on bureau consolidation from the 
testimony in front of our committee, again, Assistant Secretary Wendy 
Sherman testifying:

       We had when we came in 30 bureaus and bureau equivalents. 
     We have reduced those to 29. We had 12 independent units 
     reporting to the Secretary when we came in. That is now 
     reduced to 7, almost a 50 percent reduction in the 
     independent units reporting to the Secretary.

  That is what Secretary Christopher is trying to do.
  My colleague comes here and reads Dean Rusk who has not been in the 
State Department with all due respect for how many years and is not 
there today, and that is not what we are addressing.
  So, Mr. President, I want to make it clear. If the Senator wants to 
back it up with facts, then let us do that, but let us not do it on the 
basis of just someone's assertion.
  Now, my colleague also says that this does not have anything to do 
with business, and he does not know how it is going to help business. 
Let me say to my colleague that we represent sections of our States 
that are very similar. North Carolina has done an extraordinary job of 
building up its technology capacity, its educational capacity, its 
export ability, and indeed the triangle is renowned and greatly 
respected across the country.
  Those folks in that triangle will be benefited by having the ability 
to get into the export marketplace, and any one of them can tell you 
horror stories of what happens because of the export licensing process 
or the restraints on access.
  The Secretary has determined that he wants a high-level person within 
his Department focused on export controls so that the United States is 
not always playing catchup in the marketplace, but rather we are ahead 
of the curve helping our businesses get in there, managing the commerce 
and other efforts within the Embassies and doing a much more effective 
job of helping our companies to find export opportunities or to reduce 
the restraints that exist at this point in time.
  I say to my colleague with all due respect that the Secretary 
deserves the opportunity to indeed peel away the layers but to 
guarantee that when he is busy as he is in shuttle diplomacy or greatly 
in demand for the President at a summit, or whether it is Russia or 
Belgium, or wherever, that the people are there underneath him but 
immediately reporting to him who are empowered to do the business of 
this country and to get things done.
  If we were not peeling away these other layers, I would stand here 
with my colleague and join him, and when he says I am sensitive about 
criticism being directed at this administration, I have directed 
criticism at this administration. I think the record is very clear that 
on a number of occasions in the course of the last months in more than 
foreign policy efforts or other efforts I have been willing to 
criticize where criticism is necessary.
  But I ask my colleague to focus on the fact that this is pennywise 
and pound foolish when you measure what we will gain for it. For about 
$230,000 or so for two Secretaries, we are going to forgo conceivably 
millions and perhaps billions of dollars of contracts or the 
opportunity for them, and that is documentable.
  Moreover, we cut $333 million from the State budget, and we cut 
another $170 million from the USIA budget, for a total of roughly $500 
million from the level of the President's request, which is a real cut 
beneath this year's level because the President's request was a freeze.
  So we are talking about a real cut in the Department's budget of $333 
million, and we are talking about two or three positions that the 
Secretary of State has determined would make a difference in his 
ability to be able to manage and further cut the affairs of the 
Department or personnel places in the Department.
  My colleague said he is doing this only to come and deal with the 
$4,512,950,000,000 debt, and so forth.
  I applaud that, and I hope he will join me and other colleagues in 
voting for an additional $45 billion of cuts that we are bringing to 
the floor shortly which we proposed.
  Let me show two charts, if I may, and I hope my colleague will take a 
look at these two charts. This chart, if I could show my colleague and 
perhaps have his attention.
  Mr. HELMS. Just a minute.
  Yes, I would be glad to give the Senator my attention.
  Mr. KERRY. This sheet of paper, which I have shown my colleague, and 
I will make a copy of it for him, shows the current organization of the 
Department of State. This is what you have--a huge page of blocks of 
people reporting and layers. This is what the Secretary of State has 
done to this chart. Here is the comparison. It is highly simplified, 
highly streamlined. The Secretary has gotten rid of several layers.
  So I hope my colleague will look at the difference between these two 
charts. That is a streamlining, and the Secretary, I think, deserves 
the right to complete the job and to finish that streamlining process.
  My colleague says that this is not micromanagement. Let me 
respectfully disagree with my colleague and say why it amounts to 
micromanagement.
  If the Secretary were not cutting at all, if we were not cutting, and 
we came to the floor and mandated some cuts, I would say to my 
colleague that is proper. We ought to do that. But we have done that. 
We have mandated $333 million of cuts.
  Moreover, the Secretary is proactively cutting and getting rid of 
almost 38 percent ot the Deputy Assistant Secretary level positions. It 
seems to me that it is completely micromanaging to tell him that he 
cannot have two or three positions to be at a level that he wants them 
at in order to be able to better manage the Department. To deny him 
that right is to micromanage.
  When the Secretary of State takes the number of DAS or DAS-equivalent 
positions from 120 down to 76, but we say he cannot have 2 or 3 
Assistant Secretary positions that he wants, I cannot think of anything 
that is a more classical definition of micromanagement.
  I understand what my colleague is trying to do. I think it is 
laudable that he wants to reduce the budget, but I believe in this 
effort we have in good faith brought serious cuts to the floor of the 
Senate. They are not without pain. They are not without dislocation. 
And I would hope my colleagues would give the Secretary the tools to 
address the needs of the post-cold-war world with some discretion 
rather than our sitting here and tying his hands completely.
  Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Drogan). The Chair recognizes Senator 
Helms.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, again, I am obliged to wonder what 
amendment the Senator from Massachusetts is talking about. He is not 
talking about my amendment.
  Furthermore, I wish the distinguished Senator from Massachusetts 
would send one of his aides to a telephone to ask the State 
Department--if you would listen to me, please--ask the State Department 
if one position, if one job, if one person has lost his job in all of 
this elimination of Deputy Assistant Secretaries.
  Now, it is true enough that he has done away with a bunch of titles. 
But he still has the people there in another capacity. If the Senator 
doubts that, telephone to ask the State Department whether or not I am 
accurate about that. I do not know whether he wants to do that or not.
  My amendment does not undermine or seek to at all impede the 
authority of the Secretary of State. I repeat, all it does is maintain 
what he already has. Our committee, including Mr. Kerry, voted to 
maintain the statutorily mandated positions, and that is how you define 
micromanagement. He voted for micromanagement. My amendment and my 
position in committee and my position now is to give the Secretary the 
judgment and let him make the judgment call on these things.
  I do not know what the Senator from Massachusetts is talking about. 
And I must respectfully say that I do not think he does, either.
  Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes Senator Pell.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I realize that questions like this look 
different depending on the holder's position, as they say, it is in the 
eyes of the beholder.
  Well, in this case, is it micromanagement or not? In my 
view, it is micromanagement. I think we should let the Secretary, if he 
chooses, have any number of Assistant Secretaries or cut them, either 
way.
  I feel particularly strongly on this, because many years ago not 
enough attention was being given to the 70 percent of the Earth that 
was covered by the ocean. I can remember arguing with Dean Rusk at 
several meetings and in several Congresses about the necessity of 
having a bureau that would focus on the oceans, which is now expanded 
to include scientific affairs on ocean and environmental affairs.
  I think sometimes when Congress wants to underline that point, as 
they have on a couple of occasions, that should be permitted. I think 
to take this power away from the Secretary would be a mistake. And, as 
fond as I am of the Senator from North Carolina, I must regretfully 
disagree with him on this matter.
  Mr. HELMS addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes Senator Helms.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, Senator Pell has stated it correctly. He 
stated that it is his opinion. He carefully delineated between what is 
fact and what is opinion. Now, that is the reason I respect Senator 
Pell. I have enjoyed working with him on the committee.
  But, when we start saying that another Senator has done so and so and 
he is taking on the whole business future worldwide of the United 
States of America, that is when I have to protest and that is when I 
say, ``Read the amendment.''
  I accept Senator Pell's opinion as his opinion. I appreciate his 
comments because he is a thoroughbred gentleman.
  Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Let me ask my colleague, without losing my right to the 
floor, a question or two.
  Does the amendment of the Senator from North Carolina cut the number 
of Assistant Secretaries that are in the bill today? A very simple 
question. Does it cut the number that is in the bill today?
  Mr. HELMS. Well, what do you mean by cutting? Are you talking about 
what the bill specifies or what the Secretary of State has now?
  Mr. KERRY. My question to the Senator from North Carolina is: Does 
the amendment of the Senator from North Carolina cut the number of 
Assistant Secretaries authorized in the bill that is on the floor? It 
is not very complicated.
  Mr. HELMS. Yes, it is complicated, because I want to know what you 
are talking about. Are you talking about people on the job or people 
proposed or what?
  Mr. KERRY. Let me ask the question again so it is very clear.
  Mr. HELMS. No, it is not clear.
  Mr. KERRY. Does the amendment of the Senator from North Carolina seek 
to cut the number of positions that are authorized in the bill on the 
floor?
  Mr. HELMS. Oh, that is a different thing.
  Mr. KERRY. No, that is the same thing I have been talking about.
  Mr. HELMS. No, it is not. We are not talking about anybody on the 
job. We are talking about what has been proposed by a majority of two 
on the Foreign Relations Committee, are we not?
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, the last time I looked, this is a country 
that works by a majority. A majority, indeed, voted to do this, and it 
is in the bill.
  My question to the Senator--and I think he has answered it 
affirmatively --is that the amendment that he is proposing seeks to 
undo what the Foreign Relations Committee has approved; correct?
  Mr. HELMS. That is not the same question the Senator asked. But the 
answer to that question is yes.
  Mr. KERRY. That is precisely the point.
  Mr. HELMS. No, it is not.
  Mr. KERRY. Now, when the Senator says that somehow he does not know 
what amendment I am talking about because his does not do what I am 
talking about, that is precisely what I am talking about.
  Secretary Christopher has asked for those people. Those are an 
authorization at the request of the Secretary of State. Now, the 
exchange is this: the Foreign Relations Committee took those additional 
positions and gave them to the Secretary, recognizing that we had cut 
$333 million elsewhere in the Department's budget and recognizing that 
the Secretary was going to cut many other positions to make up for 
those two.
  So, in effect, I am talking about the amendment of the Senator from 
North Carolina. I am saying that the U.S. Senate should not deny 
Secretary Christopher the right to the two people or three people he 
has asked for to help him effectively manage the State Department, 
particularly when you bear in mind the steps already taken to delayer 
the Department if you can put it that way.
  Now, is it not accurate, I ask the Senator from North Carolina, that 
he does not want Secretary Cristopher to have the additional positions 
he has asked for to help him manage the Department in the way the 
Secretary has said he needs them?
  Mr. HELMS. I certainly agree to that. And I think the majority of the 
American people, the taxpayers, would agree with it.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, this is really the nub of it. The Senator 
has acknowledged that he is trying to micromanage the Secretary's 
Department. The Secretary has come to us and said, ``I need these three 
positions.'' He has also said to us, ``I am cutting all these other 
positions,'' a 37 percent cut.
  You tell me the American people are going to rise up and say, ``Mr. 
Secretary, with all your years of experience and with all the difficult 
issues you have to face, we don't like it that you are cutting 50 
people and putting three of them in a new position?''
  I do not believe that. The American people would be proud of the fact 
that $333 million are cut in this bill. I think they would give the 
Secretary of State the discretion to put three people into important 
positions.
  Now, what are those positions? Well, refugees. We have an increasing 
problem with refugees--refugees from Haiti, refugees coming out of 
Mexico or illegal aliens, refugees out of China. The Secretary is 
inundated with the problems of refugees. He wants somebody in his 
office reporting directly to him who can help discern what our policy 
ought to be with respect to it and to implement it.
  Mr. President, this is an amendment that seeks to tell the Secretary 
of State he cannot manage his own office. We are going to tell him how 
many people he can have, even though he is busy cutting the entire 
Department.
  I think it is wrong. I think it is penny wise, pound foolish, bad 
policy, and it simply should not be agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from North 
Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, there he goes again. He said, ``Cut 50 
people. Cut 50 people.''
  No way. The Secretary has not eliminated one person. He has 
eliminated 50 titles. I ask--if the State Department gives a different 
report now than the report they gave to us, I want to check up on that, 
too.
  I remind my colleague, in committee I proposed eliminating all 
congressionally imposed assistant secretaries, and allow the Secretary 
of State to reorganize as he wished, using fewer people. The majority 
of members of the committee rejected that amendment and mandated--I am 
sure it was at least five assistant secretaries. It may be more than 
that, but it was at least five.
  Now, who is micromanaging? Not this amendment. Not the Senator from 
North Carolina.
  I wonder if the chairman seriously wishes to repeal the requirements 
to have statutorily created Assistant Secretary positions. Chairman 
Pell and the manager of the bill on the other side refused to give the 
Secretary authority to organize without mandated offices. 
Micromanagement is what the other side did. They are pointing fingers--
and saying ``micromanagement''--at me. No way. I 
just want to cut the cost of operating the State Department. That 
always raises the hackles of some people in the Senate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, let me say to my colleague--and we do not 
need to go back, and back, and back, and back and forth. I know he is 
earnest about wanting these changes and I have joined him in trying to 
get some of the reduction because there is too much bureaucracy. But 
let me tell my colleague exactly where we are in this. We just checked 
up and I want him to understand.
  The Senator from North Carolina and I both know that you cannot take 
a Foreign Service Officer and summarily fire him or her without cause. 
You can take them out of a position, but you cannot remove them from 
the service unless they are bought out or they leave. That is 
happening.
  So, the Senator is correct in saying that not every one of these 50 
has gone from the Department. Some have, however. The Senator says to 
me he wants me to tell him if one person has left? And the answer is 
yes.
  Let me be precise. The Deputy Assistant Secretary positions, the 
majority of them were filled by career Foreign Service Officers. So you 
can eliminate the layer but, absent cause, those folks go off into some 
other area of the Department unless they leave. The political 
appointees are all gone. The political appointees who were there under 
the other party left. Those positions have been eliminated. So there is 
an elimination of real people and positions.
  Second, the Department is now eliminating 391 positions in this 
fiscal year. Real people going out of the door. The Senator from North 
Carolina has intelligently helped the Secretary to be able to do this 
through an amendment which gives the Secretary further ability by 
offering him what we call RIF, reduction in force, authority. So the 
Secretary has now, if we pass this, additional authority to be able to 
reduce positions.
  So I would say to my colleague, this is an improvement. We are seeing 
genuine movement. And really I come back to the argument I made before. 
We do not need to beat a dead horse here, but I do think when you 
measure this good record of genuine attrition and loss of personnel and 
movement and the elimination of the bureaucracy itself--the elimination 
of the positions so a whole layer is stripped away, as I showed the 
Senator in the chart--I think you are on the right road. I think to say 
to the Secretary, ``You cannot manage the sort of decisionmaking part 
of this,'' is a mistake.
  I would simply, respectfully maintain that position. It is my 
judgment and my opinion it is based on the facts, and I emphasize 
facts, that I have laid before my colleague and the Senate.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from North 
Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, this may be one of those times--I ask the 
Senator if he is familiar with the poem, The Blind Men and the 
Elephant, about the blind men of Indostan. They were asked to describe 
an elephant. One of them put his hand on the side of an elephant. 
``Surely he is built like a wall.''
  Another put his hand on the leg and he described him in some other 
fashion.
  And then another one, the third one, put his hand on the trunk, and 
said ``Surely the elephant is built like a snake.''
  But I will say this. The Senator from Massachusetts has acknowledged 
that nobody has been fired indiscriminately--or discriminately, for 
that matter. And all of this Assistant or Deputy Assistant Secretary, 
or whatever that layer is, they have been RIF'd, they have been 
retired, they have been kept on in another capacity. And all of that is 
going on all the time in the Government, throughout the Government, no 
matter who is President, no matter who is Secretary of Commerce or 
Treasury or Attorney General or Secretary of State.
  So I am not willing, yet, to confer sainthood upon Secretary 
Christopher. He is a nice guy and all of that, but I do not know that 
he has done anything remarkable to any great extent.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, let me just say to my friend, the Secretary 
of State will be delighted to hear that he is at least eligible to be 
judged for sainthood. I thank the Senator for saying he has not done it 
yet. But ``yet'' means there is the possibility.
  Mr. HELMS. Did I say statehood?
  Mr. KERRY. Sainthood.
  Mr. HELMS. That is right. I do not want to consider him for sainthood 
today. Talk to me tomorrow about that.
  Mr. KERRY. I thank the Senator.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I appreciate and sympathize with the 
Senator's desire to streamline the Department's operations. Indeed, 
there is no disagreement about that goal between myself and the Senator 
or for that matter between the Senator and the Department itself. 
Shortly after taking office, Secretary Christopher announced a major 
reorganization at the Department, in large part to streamline its 
operations.
  But what I think we have here is an unwarranted attempt at 
congressional micromanagement of the Department of State. Let's look at 
the overall picture.
  President Clinton has proposed and the Department is implementing a 
14-percent cut in administrative expenses from fiscal years 1994 to 
1997; in line with this objective, the fiscal year 1994 budget request 
represents a 3-percent reduction from the 1993 baseline levels. In 
addition, the President has mandated a 4-percent cut in personnel over 
3 years from fiscal years 1993 to 1995.
  The committee cut $333 million out of the Department's fiscal year 
1994 budget request. Moreover, with the exception of U.S. contributions 
to International Organizations and Peacekeeping activities, which are 
not really funding for the Department's operation in any event, the 
Department's budget is frozen into 1995.
  At the same time that these cuts are being made, the committee has 
recommended that bureaus established by Congress in law remain so, and 
I support that position. Bureaus such as South Asia and Oceans and 
International Environmental and Scientific Affairs were created 
specifically to address issues that had not received sufficient 
attention at the Department. But given these congressionally mandated 
positions, I do not think we should add insult to injury by unduly 
limiting the Secretary's ability to establish bureaus that he believes 
are necessary.
  Let us transfer this situation to a congressional office. We are all 
facing constraints on our office expenses which we accept grudgingly. 
But I don't think any of us would simultaneously accept a numerical cap 
on the number of legislative assistants we could have, while at the 
same time being told what some of their responsibilities must be. But 
that, in effect, is what this amendment would do.
  Moreover, it is simply wrong to think that this amendment will result 
in a cost savings. It will not. As I just said, this committee cut $333 
million out of the Department's request. The President's budget calls 
for reductions in both funding and personnel. Any additional Assistant 
Secretary positions will have to be accommodated within these 
constraints.
  So what then does this amendment accomplish? To my mind, it prevents 
the Secretary and the Department from carrying out a plan with the goal 
I believe we should all support: to make the Department a more 
effective, responsive, streamlined organization. I urge my colleagues 
to oppose this amendment.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, if the Senator from Ohio is offering an 
amendment, I ask unanimous consent that this amendment be temporarily 
set aside.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The Chair 
recognizes the Senator from Ohio.


                           Amendment No. 1321

  (Purpose: To impose sanctions against any foreign person or United 
  States person that assists a foreign country in acquiring a nuclear 
   explosive device or unsafeguarded nuclear material, and for other 
                               purposes)

  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for 
its immediate consideration.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
  The legislative clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from Ohio [Mr. Glenn] for himself, Mr. Pell, 
     Mr. Helms, Mr. Riegle, Mr. Simon, Mr. D'Amato, Mr. Akaka, Mr. 
     Campbell and Mr. Kerrey, proposes an amendment numbered 1321.

  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the 
amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  (The text of the amendment is printed in today's Record under 
``Amendments Submitted.'')
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, going back to my first days in the Senate, 
way back when I was first sworn in in 1975, I started making inquiry 
about who was looking into matters dealing with nuclear 
nonproliferation because, having been through a couple of wars, it is 
hard to envision the horrors that nuclear war would bring upon us and 
the rest of the world. It turned out that no one was really doing quite 
as much in that area as I thought they should. There were some people 
who were looking at some things.
  But I have been involved with this matter of nuclear nonproliferation 
ever since those days and in fact passed, in 1978, the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Act of 1978.
  One of the earliest actions I took on the Senate floor--in fact I 
believe it was one of the first amendments that dealt with any money--
was to try and get a bit more funding for the International Atomic 
Energy Agency which was running out of money to pay their inspectors 
back in those days, in 1975 and 1976.
  I think we got $1 million at that time, $1 million to help the IAEA 
put their inspectors out there on what is admittedly a thin red line, a 
very thin line of safeguards around the world. It is mainly an 
information-gathering agency.
  Mr. President, we have passed a number of pieces of legislation 
through the years. This is another one that I send to the desk today.
  This amendment is, in substance, the same bill that passed the Senate 
three times in 1992 but, for various legislative reasons between here 
and the House, it has not yet been enacted. But in 1992, it was passed 
on April 9, on September 18 and October 8, each time by unanimous 
consent. No one in the Senate disagreed with what we were trying to do.
  What this amendment is designed to do is help take the profits out of 
nuclear proliferation. Specifically, the amendment expands Presidential 
authority to impose sanctions against companies that engage in illicit 
sales of nuclear technology and requires new sanctions against 
countries that traffic specifically in bomb parts or critical bomb 
design information. That seems so fundamental that it is no wonder we 
have passed this unanimously on three previous occasions.
  The sanctions provisions include a ban on Government contracting with 
firms that materially and knowingly assist other nations to acquire the 
bomb and contain additional severe penalties against nations that 
traffic in bomb parts or critical bomb design information.
  The amendment also contains a sense-of-the-Congress resolution that 
the United States pursue some 24 reforms to strengthen the 
implementation of safeguards administered by the IAEA, the 
International Atomic Energy Agency.
  I am convinced that this international agency needs the support and 
cooperation of all nations as it undergoes many reforms in the wake of 
the lessons of Iraq and the new challenges from growing commercial uses 
of bomb-usable nuclear materials, as well as watching what is happening 
in the breakup of the old Soviet Union where nuclear material and 
nuclear know-how can be found scattered among some of the newly 
independent nations.
  The amendment also contains a sunshine provision to require the 
public disclosure of nonproprietary data on United States nuclear-
related exports, basic information about the implementation of United 
States nuclear sanctions policies, including demarches the United 
States has both received and sent relating to nonproliferation, and a 
summary of the progress of the former Soviet Republics, which I 
mentioned, in implementing their nonproliferation commitments.
  The need for this legislation arises from three quarters. First, 
proliferation remains a profit-making activity for all too many people 
and companies both here and around the world. The temptation to go for 
the profits as opposed to what might be in the greater interest of the 
greatest number of people around the world is sometimes ignored.
  Second, although the IAEA is gradually responding to the many new 
challenges it is facing, both from the global plutonium economy and 
from clandestine bomb programs, America must do more to encourage other 
nations to support and strengthen the agency as it grapples with these 
problems in the years ahead.
  Third, for too long Congress and the American people have been in the 
dark about illicit deals involving commodities that can contribute to 
the ability of other countries to build nuclear explosive devices. My 
amendment would help to keep us all better informed about such 
developments.
  Might I add in that regard that the IAEA is basically an information-
gathering agency so that it can keep the world informed about what is 
going on and about such developments of which I am speaking today.
  Mr. President, I am very pleased and honored that this bill enjoys 
the original cosponsorship of the distinguished chairman of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, my friend Claiborne Pell, whose 
steadfast support of this proposed legislation in 1992 was in large 
measure responsible for its passage not once but three times by 
unanimous consent of the Senate.
  I also add with regard to Senator Pell, when I first came to the 
Senate, I was on the Foreign Relations Committee for a number of years, 
back in those days when we were passing some of this early legislation 
with regard to nuclear nonproliferation, and I know of no one in the 
U.S. Senate that has been more steadfast in their support of trying to 
cut down on the proliferation of these weapons of mass destruction 
around the world.
  Senator Pell deserves a great deal of credit for that, and I am glad 
to recognize him today since he was in large measure responsible for 
the passage of this particular piece of legislation on three different 
occasions as it went through the Foreign Relations Committee and, of 
course, he is chairman of that committee. I am very happy to have 
worked with him for all these years, and I look forward to working with 
him on these things in the future.
  I am also pleased the amendment is cosponsored by Senators Helms, 
Riegle, Simon, D'Amato, Akaka, Campbell, and Kerrey of Nebraska. I 
encourage all of my colleagues to join me in this effort to revitalize 
these key elements of our nonproliferation strategy. Early enactment of 
this legislation will make the world a safer place for future 
generations.
  Mr. President, I believe this has been cleared on both sides. It has 
passed before. I believe it has been cleared on both sides. I hope we 
will adopt it by unanimous consent again today.
  I urge adoption of the amendment. I yield the floor.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate on this amendment?
  Mr. PELL addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, first I just wish to thank the Senator from 
Ohio for his very kind remarks. Second, far more important is his 
support of this measure. This is an important measure. It may somewhat 
reduce the dangers to our grandchildren and great grandchildren and 
should be adopted once again. I hope it will finally be implemented.
  Mr. President, I am pleased that the Senate is considering today the 
Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994.
  Mr. President, this bill is a cooperative effort dating back to the 
last Congress. Following passage of the Chemical and Biological Weapons 
Control and Warfare Elimination Act in the last Congress, the Senators 
from Ohio and North Carolina, Mr. Glenn and Mr. Helms, and I realized 
that some serious updating of existing legislation setting forth 
sanctions for nuclear misbehavior was recognized. The Glenn and 
Symington amendments which had proved to be critically important 
deterrents to nuclear proliferation needed to be both broadened and 
toughened to reflect the continuing need to rely upon the application 
of sanctions and the threat of application of sanctions deter potential 
miscreants. Moreover, unless the nuclear provisions were updated, we 
would have been in a situation in which the deterrents to chemical and 
biological weapons misbehavior were greater than those for nuclear 
misbehavior.
  Accordingly, the Senator from Ohio [Mr. Glenn] authored S. 1128, the 
Omnibus Nuclear Proliferation Control Act. This bill in its final form 
late in the session had been carefully worked out with the Bush 
administration, approved without dissent by the Committee on Foreign 
Relations and approved without dissent by the Senate three times.
  Unfortunately, for reasons having nothing to do with the nuclear 
bill, it failed to gain passage in the House when, in the waning hours 
of the session, wrangling doomed a redrafted Export Administration Act, 
to which it was amended.
  Senators Glenn, Helms, and I recognized the critical importance of 
that effort and it has been reintroduced in this Congress as S. 1054 
and has won the full support of the Clinton administration. The 
amendment under consideration today is comparable to the current 
legislation, that is an updated version of the 1992 final text so as to 
be acceptable as possible to both House and Senate.
  Mr. President, this excellent legislation's primary author is Senator 
Glenn, who is a former member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
and presently chairman of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. 
The senior Senator from Ohio has labored tirelessly and effectively to 
solve problems of nuclear proliferation since he came to the Senate 
more than 19 years ago.
  I am pleased, as is the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. Helms], to 
have shepherded this legislation through the Committee on Foreign 
Relations last year with a strong Pell-Helms amendment added in markup 
to strengthen existing law regarding illicit weapons-related transfers 
and nuclear detonation added in markup.
  The administration is currently developing its own nonproliferation 
policy. I firmly believe that this legislation, establishing a strong 
sanctions regime, would be an integral part of an effective new policy 
and would once again demonstrate U.S. leadership in the effort to curb 
nuclear proliferation.
  The act applies to nuclear proliferation some of the same approaches 
taken in comprehensive chemical weapons legislation, the Chemical and 
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, which I 
authored with the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. Helms].
  The main purpose of the act is to create strong barriers against 
illicit exports that would help nations to acquire nuclear arsenals. 
Accordingly, the bill targets persons and firms that materially and 
with requisite knowledge contribute through the export of goods or 
technology to the efforts by any individual, group or nonnuclear-
weapons state to acquire unsafeguarded weapons-grade uranium or 
plutonium or to use, develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire a 
nuclear explosive device. Those engaged in such activities would lose, 
with certain specified exceptions, the right to sell to the U.S. 
Government for at least a year. Banks, insurers, and other financial 
institutions that willingly back this dangerous nuclear traffic could 
also be penalized.
  In addition, the bill prohibits U.S. support for multilateral aid 
that would promote the acquisition of unsafeguarded nuclear materials 
or the acquisition of nuclear explosive devices; provides expanded 
presidential authority to impose economic sanctions against foreign 
firms under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act; and 
requires that the President ban Export-Import Bank credits to countries 
that willfully aid and abet other countries in the acquisition of 
nuclear explosive devices or weapon material.

  Moreover, the bill authorizes payment of rewards for information 
useful in halting nuclear proliferation; eliminates Pakistan's special 
exemption from Glenn/Symington amendments of the Foreign Assistance 
Act; and, requires recipients of United States arms to comply with 
their nonproliferation commitments.
  At the time of approval of this legislative initiative by the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, the Senator from North Carolina [Mr. 
Helms], and I authored an amendment substantially expanding and 
toughening the sanctions that would be applied against nations 
transferring or receiving nuclear devices and the means to make them.
  At present, section 670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 
provides for a cutoff of military and economic assistance, except for 
humanitarian aid, to any nation that transfers a nuclear explosive 
device to a non-nuclear-weapon state that either receives such or 
detonates one.
  Our experience in recent years has demonstrated that section 670 
provision should be made to apply to components and design information 
as well. Moreover, the Iraq experience and other problems have made it 
abundantly clear that the list of sanctions must be more far reaching 
so that no nation could doubt the severity of the price to be paid for 
nuclear misbehavior. Under these new sanctions any nation giving the 
wherewithal for a nuclear device to a nonnuclear-weapon state or any 
such state receiving such help would become a pariah among the world's 
nations so far as the United States was concerned. I would hope other 
nations would follow our lead, as they have before in proliferation 
matters.
  The new country sanctions would consist of a ban on all foreign 
assistance except for humanitarian aid, on arms sales and arms sales 
financing, denial of U.S. Government credit or other financial 
assistance; opposition to multilateral bank assistance; a ban on bank 
loans except to buy agricultural commodities and a prohibition on 
exports to the sanctioned nations.
  Mr. President, the headlines of the past few months, or even weeks, 
bear stark witness to the continuing and urgent problems of 
nonproliferation. Currently, the refusal of the North Koreans to agree 
to the inspections necessary for the reassurance of the nations 
concerned by the prospect of yet another maverick nations seeking 
nuclear weapons.
  We still face the possibility of serious nonproliferation problems 
emanating from the former Soviet Union, with particular regard to 
Russia and Ukraine. I think that progress is being made in both nations 
with the strong backing of the Clinton administration and the Congress. 
Nonetheless, the possible diversion of highly enriched uranium, weapons 
grade plutonium, key components, scientific knowledge, or the 
scientists themselves remain threats of major significance.
  There remain nations throughout the world who are committed to the 
attainment of a nuclear weapons capability as we should be to thwarting 
them. Our efforts to this end are in our own vital national security 
interests, but they also protect our friends and allies, as well as 
innocent peoples throughout the world.
  Some believe that the best way to deal with potential proliferation 
is through cajolery and sweet talking. There is place for diplomacy. 
But it can well be backed by the kind of big stick provided by this 
legislation. We should make it clear that there will be rewards for 
those who help in the cause of nonproliferation. At the same time, 
there must be severe punishments for companies and corporations that 
misbehave.
  Mr. President, the Symington amendment was conceived and enacted 
nearly two decades ago. It was followed by the Glenn amendment, the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1968, the Pressler amendment, and now 
the Omnibus bill. It is true that they have not saved the world from 
nuclear proliferation. Nonetheless, they have stopped proliferation in 
many cases, averted it in others, and slowed it in still other cases. 
Most importantly, they have helped create a climate in which the spread 
of nuclear weapons is anathema and those who seek such weapons are 
beyond the pale.
  With this legislation, more effective barriers to the spread of 
weapons that can destroy civilizations will be created. There will 
remain more to be done later. For now, we must not do less.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there further debate?
  Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I want to inquire of the Senator from Ohio 
if I am identified as a cosponsor of his amendment.
  Mr. GLENN. Yes.
  Mr. HELMS. I wanted to be sure about that. Of course, we have no 
objection on this side.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 1321) was agreed to.
  Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the 
amendment was agreed to.
  Mr. KERRY. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agree to.
  Mr. KERRY. I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, let me say that we will shortly propound a 
unanimous consent request with respect to votes tomorrow, but I would 
put Senators on notice that there will be two votes at least tomorrow 
morning beginning at approximately 10 o'clock in the morning subject to 
final confirmation from the leaders. This is a good time still for 
those who have amendments who want to make sure they do not run up 
against the barrier tomorrow to come to the floor. We would like to try 
to dispose of several amendments, if possible, or at least have the 
debate, if possible, and lay down a few if they need record votes 
tomorrow. So I ask colleagues, if they are listening or are here, to 
come to the floor so we can proceed to do that so everybody has ample 
opportunity not to run up against tomorrow night's deadline.
  Mr. LOTT addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from 
Mississippi.
  Mr. HELMS. Will the Senator yield?
  Mr. LOTT. I will be glad to defer to the Senator from North Carolina.
  Mr. HELMS. I have one amendment on behalf of Senator Hatch, if the 
Senator will yield to me 1 minute.

                          ____________________