[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 4 (Friday, January 28, 1994)]
[House]
[Page H]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: January 28, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT
The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
Amendment No. 1290
(Purpose: To give fullest possible consideration to asylum
applications from Chinese nationals fleeing coercive
population control policies)
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I have an amendment at the desk and I ask
that it be stated.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from North Carolina [Mr. Helms], for himself,
Mr. DeConcini, Mr. Coats, and Mr. Brown, proposes an
amendment numbered 1290.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading of
the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
On page 179, after line 6, insert the following:
SEC. . CHINESE FLEEING COERCIVE POPULATION CONTROL
POLICIES.
(1) Pursuant to paragraph (42)(A) of section 101(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A)),
all adjudicators of asylum or refugee status shall give
fullest possible consideration to applications from nationals
of the People's Republic of China who express a fear of
persecution upon return to that country because they refuse
to abort a pregnancy or resist surgical sterilization in
violation of Chinese Communist Party directives on
population, or who demonstrate that they have experienced
persecution on account of such refusal, if such refusal is or
was undertaken with full awareness of the urgent priority
assigned to such directives by all levels of the Chinese
government, and full awareness of the severe consequences
which may be imposed for violation of such directives.
(2) In view of the urgent priority assigned to the ``one
couple, one child'' policy by high level Chinese Communist
Party officials and local party cadres at all levels, as well
as the severe consequences commonly imposed for violations of
that policy, which are regarded as ``political dissent,''
refusal to abort or to be sterilized, as described in
subsection (a) of this section, shall be viewed as an act of
political defiance justifying a ``well-founded fear of
persecution'' sufficient to establish refugee status under
paragraph (42)(A) of section 101(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A)).
(3) All other factors which may contribute to a
determination of asylum or refugee status in such cases are
to be given additional weight by asylum and refugee
adjudicators, such factors including, but not limited to,
overt political activities while in the United States or
third countries, membership in an ethnic or religious
minority, family background and history, or suspicion of
``counterrevolutionary'' activities by Chinese Communist
Party officials.
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to
necessitate a grant of asylum or refugee status to any
individual who is ineligible for admission to the United
States under section 212(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)).
The Secretary of State and the Attorney General shall,
within 30 days of enactment of this section, promulgate
regulations and guidelines to carry out the provisions of
this section.
(6) Nothing in this section shall be construed as--
(A) Shifting the burden of providing, in each individual
case, facts sufficient to establish a claim of asylum or
refugee status as described in subsection (a) of this
section, from any person making such claim of asylum or
refugee status to the Attorney General; or
(B) Requiring the Attorney General to disprove such claim
in the absence of proof of facts sufficient to establish a
claim of refugee or asylum status as described in subsection
(a) of this section by any person making such claim.
(7) The number of persons receiving political status solely
because of the provisions of this section shall not exceed
1,000 in any fiscal year.
(8) The Attorney General shall not be obligated to grant
political asylum to any person claiming to qualify under
subsection (a) if the Attorney General proves by clear and
convincing evidence that such person has claimed such status
solely for the purposes of evading the immigration laws of
the United States.
(9) The provisions of this section shall take effect on the
date of enactment of this Act, and notwithstanding the
provisions of subsection (c) of this section or any other
provision of law, all adjudicators of asylum or refugee
status shall apply the provisions of this section to every
case, administrative or judicial proceeding, or appeal that
is pending on the date of enactment of this Act, and to any
claim that arises on or after such date of enactment.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, in 1989--I believe in July--both Houses of
Congress overwhelmingly agreed to an amendment to the Emergency Chinese
Refugee Relief Act sponsored by Senator Armstrong and Senator
DeConcini.
Senators will probably remember that this legislation was in response
to the Tiananmen Square crackdown. The amendment required asylum
adjudicators to give fullest possible consideration to asylum
applications from Chinese nationals fleeing coercive population control
policies, specifically the program of forced abortion and coerced
sterilization.
The Senate vote was 95 to 0 on that amendment which is virtually
identical to the one I have just offered. The House vote was 300 in
favor, 115 opposed. Unfortunately, the amendment never became law
because the underlying bill was vetoed, and that is why I have offered
virtually the same amendment that was offered in 1989 by Senators
Armstrong and DeConcini.
I am offering the amendment again because--I find this difficult to
believe--the administration's policy today is to deport individuals
fleeing the brutal population control program of Communist China. As I
understand it, this administration does not believe that these people
are being persecuted.
President Bush issued an Executive order and interim regulations
which should have resolved this problem. The Clinton administration
never rescinded the Bush Executive order, but they have nonetheless
changed the policy. The pending amendment would not be necessary if the
Clinton administration had not blocked Attorney General Barr's final
regulations to implement the Executive order from being printed in the
Federal Register.
Some Senators believe that these refugees are already being given
what they call enhanced consideration, but these refugees are not being
given any such consideration.
This is a little confusing since it was candidate Clinton who was so
critical of President Bush in 1992 for not being tougher on Communist
China. I remember the campaign rhetoric of the then candidate Mr.
Clinton, and because I did not agree with Mr. Bush I applauded
candidate Clinton for his position on this issue. He spoke over and
over again about the human rights abuses by and in Communist China. I
thought he was right then, and I still think that is the right
position, but he has totally reversed it, totally reversed it.
Senators should understand that since the then Attorney General
Barr's regulations were never published in the Federal Register, the
bureaucracy continues to operate under rules and regulations which do
not grant asylum to Chinese nationals fleeing coercive population
control policies.
I go back, and I point out that both Houses of Congress passed this
amendment, virtually this same amendment. The vote in this Senate was
95 to zero. The vote in the House was 300 to 115. That is why I feel
obliged to offer today what I am calling the Armstrong-DeConcini
amendment of 1989.
Mr. President, I will not talk about the brutal nature of the Chinese
population control program unless it becomes necessary. I think every
Senator agrees that there is ample documentation proving beyond a doubt
that the persecution is real, that the persecution is brutal, and that
the persecution is tantamount to political persecution. The past two
administrations held this view. President Clinton, when he was a
candidate for the Presidency in 1992, not only embraced the view, he
said it was not enough; we ought to do more. And he chided a fellow
named George Bush for not being stronger.
So what is going on? Mr. President, there is no reason to believe
that the Chinese policy has changed. There is no evidence whatsoever to
support any contention that there has been a change. To the contrary,
on December 22 of last year, 1993, it was reported that China intends
to require--require--abortions, sterilizations, and marriage bans--you
cannot even get married--in order to avoid new births of inferior
quality--get that--and heighten the standards of the whole population.
What was that fellow's name in Germany back in the thirties? Was it
Hitler, or somebody like that, who said precisely the same thing? And
everybody in America and around the world was aghast. Now the
administration says boys will be boys, nothing going on over there,
forget it. I cannot forget it.
Mr. President, this amendment should receive broad bipartisan, and I
would hope, unanimous support. Again, that is what it had in 1989.
I think the record will show, and show clearly, that the Senator from
North Carolina is not a Senator who favors opening the borders of our
Nation, I do not favor allowing anyone to come to the United States for
any contrived reason, but I hope Senators will agree that this type of
case I am describing is not acceptable and we ought to let these people
in. We ought to give them asylum. We ought to help them avoid the
brutal persecution in their homeland which is Communist China.
This amendment will not result in a significant increase of illegal
Chinese immigrants. During fiscal year 1992, when the more generous
policy was in place, just about 200 of those given asylum based their
claims on fear of persecution under Communist China's coercive
population control policy which I have just described.
Mr. President, there are just some things that the U.S. Government
should not do. Surely, we can agree that the administration should not
send back to Communist China people who will, if returned, have to
suffer unspeakable torture at the hands of the Chinese population
control police.
I am prepared to talk about this for a long time, but I do not think
it is necessary. I am going to yield the floor in the hopes that my
colleague from Massachusetts [Mr. Kerry] will be willing to accept this
amendment.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, it may well be that we will. I am just
trying to run it through the appropriate channels to make sure that all
parties who have a concern with respect to this issue are in agreement.
There is absolutely no question whatsoever on the part of any Senator,
and I absolutely know on the part of this administration, that we are
opposed to the Chinese incentive structure with respect to one child,
one family and the policy of coercion that has forced people either to
leave the country or to seek extraordinary solutions to the coercion
that they live under.
The question, obviously, here is a very difficult one of how you
measure what we just voted on a few moments ago in the amendment of
Senator Byrd and Senator Simpson where we talked about how we have to
get stricter on this issue of asylum and whether or not the language
that is proposed--I do not know that it does or not; I just want to
make sure that it does not--but that the language proposed by the
Senator does not now open up an ability of almost anybody who wants to
to come in and claim that this is the rationale for their asylum.
How you balance that is difficult. I was just in China. I spent a
week there. This is one of the issues that I raised with Chinese
officials. They have enormous concerns themselves not only about the
world's view on the policy--I think we are having an impact. I think it
is important to say that the world's opprobrium that has been cast on
their policy has been felt and heard. So it is appropriate, indeed, for
us to take the position.
At the same time, China is struggling with the reality that they
already have about 11 people per half an acre or something. They are
the fastest growing population on the face of this planet. They are
one-quarter of the world's population, 1.2 billion people. In fact, if
you want to talk about problems, China, just to keep up with the
current rate of population, has to create something like 2 million jobs
a year.
So this is an enormous problem which they are aware of. Also, I think
they are beginning to understand that it cannot be dealt with in the
way that they have in the past.
We need, obviously, to be much more engaged with China, and in fact
with the rest of the world, on this question of population growth. It
is not insignificant. You look at a country like Haiti where already it
has enormous turmoil. Haiti is a country of 7 million people. In the
next 18 years it is going to become a country of 14 million people, and
it already cannot sustain the 7 million that it has. You can go from
country to country around the world and find this replicated.
How we are going to deal with this problem in the context of our
immigration policy that tries to respect the rights of people not to be
coerced but at the same time balance our own ability to take them in is
going to be a very, very difficult issue indeed. And that is the issue
that the Senator is confronting us with in this resolution.
So I simply want to make certain that a couple of things are
understood.
President Clinton is not only 100 percent opposed, as he said he was
in his campaign, to any kind of family coercion with respect to
planning, but our Government is working on a number of different fronts
right now to promote safe and voluntary--I underscore voluntary--access
to family planning around the world. Voluntarism and informed choice
and protection of individual reproductive rights are the guiding
principle of this administration's population policy and this country's
population policy.
I might add, as the world's leader in international population
efforts, we are going to promote vigorously these views at the upcoming
International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo. I have
personally written to the majority leader already and asked that we put
together a Senate delegation and a House delegation to formally attend
this conference because of its importance and because of the very kind
of issue that the Senator from North Carolina has raised.
So if the Senator from North Carolina will simply let me make certain
that those who are most concerned with this area of jurisdiction are
comfortable with the language he has proposed--I am personally
comfortable, I do not foresee a problem, and I want to make sure there
is not one. If there is not, we should be able to accept this
amendment. If he would forbear until we have done that, we can proceed.
Mr. HELMS. Very well. Will the Senator yield?
Mr. KERRY. I yield the floor.
Mr. HELMS. The Senator could not offer a more fair proposition, Mr.
President. Senator Kerry has already voted for this amendment once at
the time it was passed, and there have been only two minor changes for
clarification. The television camera may not be able to focus on this
amendment because we took out of the Congressional Record the exact
text that was enacted. All that we have done is to add the words
``sterilization in violation of Chinese Communist Party directives on
population, or who demonstrate that they have experienced persecution
on account of such refusal.''
I had that put in, Mr. President, to keep out any interlopers or
anybody who has contrived a reason to come into this country.
So the Senator's proposition is entirely fair. I might note that I
have advised that Senator Simpson wants a second degree to this
amendment which is fair enough because he, too, is a fair man and a
good friend.
So what shall we do?
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, if I could just ask my colleague if he is
prepared to proceed forward, I think we are working to close off some
en bloc, and hopefully we will be able to proceed to an en bloc
amendment shortly. If the Senator has any other amendment or any other
colleagues have an amendment, we could temporarily set this aside until
Senator Simpson arrives and then proceed.
Mr. HELMS. Very well.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this amendment be set
aside so that I may prepare to call up another one.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HELMS. While I am doing that, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Order of Procedure
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the two
amendments listed for Senator Boren on the consented amendment list be
deleted, and I ask that the amendments of Senator Feingold, also listed
on the prior-approved list, be deleted.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Conrad). Without objection, it is so
ordered.
Amendment No. 1291
(Purpose: To express the sense of the Senate that certain conditions
should be met before the People's Republic of China is accorded
nondiscriminatory most-favored-nation treatment)
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for
its immediate consideration.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report.
The assistant legislative clerk read as follows:
The Senator from North Carolina [Mr. Helms] proposes an
amendment numbered 1291.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the
amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
SECTION 1. POLICY REGARDING THE CONDITIONS WHICH THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
SHOULD MEET TO CONTINUE TO RECEIVE
NONDISCRIMINATORY MOST-FAVORED-NATION
TREATMENT.
It is the sense of the Senate that the People's Republic of
China should not continue to be accorded nondiscriminatory
most-favored-nation treatment by the United States, unless
the President reports to the Congress that the government of
that country--
(1) has taken appropriate actions to begin adhering to the
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
China and Tibet;
(2) is allowing unrestricted emigration of the citizens who
desire to leave China for reasons of political or religious
persecution to join family members abroad, or for other valid
reasons;
(3) has provided an acceptable accounting and release of--
(A) Chinese citizens detained, accused, or sentenced as a
result of the nonviolent expression of their political
beliefs in relation to events which occurred during and after
the violent repression of demonstrations in Tiananmen Square
on June 4, 1989; and
(B) other citizens detained, accused, or sentenced for the
nonviolent expression of their political beliefs or for
peacefully exercising their internationally guaranteed rights
of freedom of speech, association, and assembly;
(4) has taken effective, verifiable action to prevent
export of products to the United States manufactured wholly
or in part by convict, forced, or indentured labor and has
complied with the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding
signed on August 7, 1992, by allowing, without limitation or
restriction, United States Customs officials to visit places
suspected of producing such goods for export; and
(5) has made overall significant progress in--
(A) ceasing religious persecution and lifting restrictions
on freedom of religious belief in the People's Republic of
China and Tibet;
(B) releasing leaders and members of religious groups
detained, imprisoned, or under house arrest for expression of
their religious beliefs;
(C) ceasing financial and other incentives to encourage
non-Tibetans to relocate in Tibet, including development and
other projects which bring in substantial numbers of non-
Tibetan workers;
(D) ceasing unfair and discriminatory trade practices which
restrict and unreasonably burden American business;
(E) providing United States exporters fair access to
Chinese markets, including lowering tariffs, removing
nontariff barriers, and increasing the purchase of United
States goods and services;
(F) adhering to the guidelines and parameters of the
Missile Technology Control Regime and the controls adopted by
the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Australian Group on
Chemical and Biological Arms;
(G) adhering to the Joint Declaration on Hong Kong that was
entered into between the United Kingdom and the People's
Republic of China;
(H) cooperating with United States efforts to obtain an
acceptable accounting of United States military personnel who
are listed as prisoners of war or missing in action as a
result of their service in--
(i) the Korean conflict; or
(ii) the Vietnam conflict;
(I) ceasing the jamming of Voice of America broadcasts; and
(J) providing international human rights and humanitarian
groups access to prisoners, trials, and places of detention.
Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, this subject has been, on many occasions,
on the floor of the Senate. It is the issue of most-favored-nation
trading status for Communist China. If there ever was a modest
amendment, this one is. It clearly restates the priorities specified in
S. 806, which was Senator Mitchell's China MFN legislation, on which I
am an original cosponsor with Senators Moynihan, Sarbanes, Dodd, Leahy,
and others.
The point I am making is that this amendment is by no means a new
proposal, because the Senate has passed precisely this proposal in the
past. It does not impose any new statutory conditions. Rather, it is
intended to send a direct message, and does send a direct message to
both the Chinese and the administration, that as part of the MFN
renewal process later this year, the Senate will measure Chinese
progress on the following concerns:
Human rights, including adherence to the universal declaration of
human rights.
The release of political and religious detainees. That is a fancy
word for prisoners.
Freedom of emigration.
And, most important to me, respect for Tibet. Yes; I confess right
this minute that I am a great admirer and a friend of the Dalai Lama. I
meet with him every time he comes to Washington.
The second measurement is trade, including whether China has
genuinely stopped the practice of illegal prison labor exports and
unfair anti-American trade practices in general.
Nonproliferation, including full adherence to ballistic missile,
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons control, and other items; for
example, whether China has stopped jamming the Voice of America, and
whether China is upholding agreements on the future of Hong Kong.
If I ever agreed with the distinguished majority leader on anything,
I agreed with him when he took a respectful stand on this floor on this
matter. He was eloquent and he was right. I was proud to stand with
him.
Let me share a few of the comments of George Mitchell, the
distinguished majority leader. I remind my colleagues that this
amendment is by no means binding, and I do not propose that it be,
which I think makes it all the more appropriate at the present time. In
any case, Senator Mitchell had this to say--and listen to the clarity
of this former Federal judge's assessment of the situation. He said:
This is a reasonable bill. It does not impose arbitrary or
unattainable conditions on extending MFN trade status to
China. It merely requires that the Communist Chinese leaders
live up to the commitments they have made to respect
international standards of human rights and fair trade
practices and missile, nuclear and chemical weapons
agreements. It supports fundamental American principles and
values.
Obviously, no two Senators always agree on everything. And there have
been times when he and I have strongly disagreed with each other. I
hope, as it has always been as far as I am concerned, that we agree to
disagree agreeably. But I completely concur with him on this subject.
We all know of Communist China's sorry record of continued human
rights abuses, unfair trade practices and failure to comply with arms
proliferation agreements. That record has not improved, and I hope no
Senator with a straight face will get up in this Chamber and say that
situation has indeed improved. Why, you may ask yourself. In large part
because China apparently believes that when push comes to shove, the
United States is all talk and no action. We sent some people over there
during the Bush administration, and I protested, and they clinked the
champagne glasses with a bunch of folks who used tanks to run over
students and pulverize those young Chinese students.
The Clinton administration is helping foster this perception that
China has regarding the United States, that we are a paper tiger, et
cetera. Actions speak louder than words. And despite the
administration's tough words in the campaign of 1992 and since, the
appeasing actions sent absolutely the wrong signal, and that is the
reason I am offering this amendment and asking for it to be considered.
For example, despite the importance we have rightly attached to
China's strict adherence to nuclear and ballistic missile technology
and nonproliferation agreements, the administration has failed to back
up its impressive rhetoric with effective action.
Specifically, when China knowingly violated the Missile Technology
Control Regime yet again by transferring missile technology to
Pakistan, the administration reluctantly imposed only the minimum--the
minimum--sanctions required by law. Without the law, I doubt that
anything at all would have been done.
Incredibly, the administration is now in the process of waiving the
sanctions statute by legal reinterpretation and thereby accepting as
progress--as progress--China's offer merely to talk about
nonproliferation. What is going on?
This administration--and I found the same fault and I was just as
candid when George Bush was sitting in the Oval Office--this
administration is helping China make a mockery of nonproliferation
compliance. There are no two ways about it.
When will it take Chinese violations seriously? When terrorist Iran
fires a Chinese-designed nuclear missile, will that do it?
I say, Mr. President, that if the administration will not send a firm
signal, then the Senate must do so. Again, I emphasize that I said the
same thing when George Bush was sitting in the Oval Office.
There are numerous other examples of appeasement in the areas of
human rights and trade. I think it is truly ironic. When Mr. Clinton,
the candidate, called George Bush's policy of engagement with China
``coddling the dictators in Beijing,'' I said, ``Right on, Mr.
Clinton.'' George Bush was my friend, and I supported him, but I
disagreed with him on his administration's handling of Communist China.
Mr. Clinton disagreed with him during the campaign. But the same Mr.
Clinton today is engaging in a love-fest with China even more amorous
through his own self-described policy of deeper engagement. I do not
know what he means by that. He has never defined it.
Meanwhile, all of this has not been lost on those guys sitting over
there in Beijing. If you think it has, think again.
I do not want to say that this administration practices the opposite
of what it preaches, but I need to be shown with clarity what is going
to be done. At least we should ask ourselves why should the Chinese
take the MFN threat seriously?
They are not. The rubberstamp Chinese Congress recently enacted
another forced abortion and infanticide law. The inhumanity is
incredible. I guess the Communist dictators just cannot kill innocent
babies fast enough over there, Mr. President.
With much media hype, China released a couple of dissidents, just a
token gesture to impress some high-level American businessmen. Maybe
some Senators were over there bowing and scraping. I do not know.
Now, I thank the dictators of Red China for small blessings, I
suppose, but these detainees, as they call them--they were political
prisoners; that is the word to call them--these political prisoners
were simply replaced by other people whom the government in Beijing
arrested and imprisoned to keep its political gulags full and
operating, many of them manufacturing goods to be exported into the
United States. One small step forward for three big giant steps
backwards is no way to have a relationship, and we should not put up
with it.
I am encouraged that some in the administration appear to be waking
up to this problem and warning the Chinese about MFN renewal
conditions. It is about time.
This amendment will help. It will help reinforce and provide
credibility to these few and late warnings because it will remind the
Chinese that regardless of what mixed signals they may receive from the
executive branch, the legislative branch, the Congress of the United
States, does have the final say, after all, in the matter of MFN
renewal. I want our message to be crystal clear. I do not want it to be
watered down, and I do not want it to be haggled over.
We have taken this stand before, and let us have the courage to take
it again. Let us say and mean that Congress expects genuine progress,
demonstrable progress, and that is a heck of a lot more than a couple
steps forward and steps backwards, and all that sort of thing.
I am well aware that the Chinese are sensitive to the perception that
they are being pressured to change. That does not bother me at all. It
should not bother anybody in this Congress. Oh, yes; they pretend to
get all excited and huffy about proving no American can tell them what
to do. And China apologists erroneously claim that amendments like this
one at the desk right now harden Chinese resistance to change. Baloney.
What are we--a bunch of squirming earthworms? China always looks
after China's best interests. Go back and look in history. And China
knows that MFN renewal is very much in its best self-interest. They
want it. They need it.
If the threat of MFN denial is credible, they will react. I repeat,
they will react.
So this amendment at the desk, which restates our concerns 5 months
before the final decision on MFN, gives the Chinese the time to make
measurable progress, not imaginary progress, not contrived progress; it
gives the Chinese time to gain the flexibility to justify positive
changes any way they like.
For example, if they want to euphemistically call real compliance
with the nonproliferation agreements Deng Xiaoping's new national
security initiative, that suits me fine. They can call it anything they
want to. But let us make them put up or shut up.
Similarly, it gives business interests time to both increase their
own lobbying with the Chinese Government for change and make
contingency plans should MFN not be renewed by this Congress. Everyone
is forearmed and forewarned about what to expect and what might happen.
But let us stand up and have character about this Government's position
because, Mr. President, there is no right way to do a wrong thing.
I am delighted with the stand that the distinguished majority leader
has taken in the past and I assume in the present.
This makes it a fully bipartisan approach which has been strongly
supported by leaders of the majority and Cabinet officers alike.
Senator Mitchell said it well. He said, ``This is a modest, limited
and carefully crafted bill.''
This amendment is a nonbinding version of his bill. The Senator from
Maine has been quite emphatic about this point, stating:
I repeat: The conditions in the bill are conditions which
the Chinese Government itself has said that it can meet. Why
should we object to asking the Chinese to do what they have
said they are prepared to do?
Why? Are we a bunch of namby-pamby earthworms trying to find an easy
way out of every problem that comes up?
Listen to what Senator Mitchell had to say about President Bush's
policy of ``engagement.'' And I, at the time said, ``Hooray. You are
exactly right.'' And George Bush, I reiterate, was my friend and I
supported him both times he ran for the Presidency.
Senator Mitchell said, ``The administration's policy,'' meaning the
Bush administration policy, ``has rested on a hope, a hope that the
Chinese regime would improve its behavior. That hope has not been
realized. It is time to replace personal hope with national incentives
for change.''
And to George Mitchell, I say, ``Amen, brother. You were right then,
and what you said then is right now.''
Our distinguished former colleague from Texas, Mr. Bentsen, now a
member of the President's Cabinet, as a Senator said the following
about the language of this amendment now pending in the U.S. Senate:
The conditions set forth in this legislation are reasonable. They are
not extreme, as some would claim. They are the minimum that we ought to
ask a country which is enjoying a highly profitable trade relationship
with this country,'' meaning the United States.
And Secretary Bentsen is not the only current high administration
official who supported this approach. As Senator Bentsen told this
Chamber in 1992, ``In August, we heard testimony in the Finance
Committee from President Reagan's last Ambassador to China, Winston
Lord.'' Mr. President, this is the same Winston Lord who is now in
charge of policy for China as Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asia. Senator Bentsen continued describing Winston Lord's position
saying:
He counseled us to forge a China policy that both conducts
requisite business and honors our ideals.
That is a seesaw. We have to keep it level.
``He counseled us to pass the bill before the Senate today.''
The chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Pell, stated
in 1992, ``These are not onerous commitments. We are not asking China
to do what others are not asked. These are international commitments to
which most states have acceded. They are the brick and mortar of the
world order.''
And I remind my friend, Senator Kerry, that he, too, provided his
endorsement, stating, ``American interests and ideals are clearly
served by this legislation.''
And, again, I agree with my friend John Kerry, of Massachusetts. I
hope he has not changed his mind.
The other Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. Kennedy, got in his
opinion. He said, ``As long as the Chinese Government pursues its
repressive and irresponsible policies, China should be a least-favored
nation, not a most-favored nation. Enacting this legislation will place
America on the side of human rights, economic reform, and ending the
arms race.''
And then my friend from Connecticut, Senator Dodd, with his usual
eloquence, said, ``In the case of China, we have simply run out of
options. We have held out the carrot; now is the time for the stick.''
A pretty good statement Chris Dodd made. But he said more. He said,
``The alternative is a policy that coddles a repressive and inhumane
leadership in Beijing.''
Amen, Chris Dodd. You are exactly right.
And then he said about the language which is now before the Senate in
the pending amendment, ``The legislation before us represents an effort
by Congress to set United States-China relations on a wiser course.''
Now those are just a few statements by a few people, all of whom I
respect. I do not agree with them all of the time, just as I did not
agree with President Bush on everything. I agreed with the
distinguished majority leader of the U.S. Senate, Mr. Mitchell, and
disagreed with my President. I still agree with the majority leader.
In any case, Mr. President, it is clear that China needs a strong
bipartisan signal from Congress and the pending amendment does just
that in a most measured and reasonable way.
I urge its approval. I yield the floor.
Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I hope my friend from North Carolina is not
going to totally take off from this debate. He has asked some
interesting questions and he certainly deserves answers to them.
I trust he wants the answers and not just to ask the questions for
the sake of the politics of the situation. But that is really what you
are looking at here. I think we ought to just stop and pay tribute to a
significant figure in the Senate who knows how to sort of raise the
political rubes, if you will.
But when you really look at the policy and when you really examine
what President Clinton is doing, there is no relationship between that
and what the Senator from North Carolina was just talking about.
What the Senator from North Carolina is doing is pretty transparent--
quoting a lot of Democrats, turning to now Secretary Bentsen, turning
to the majority leader, Senator Mitchell, pulling their words out from
the debate several years ago; and even turning, in his good wisdom, to
the comments from the two Senators from Massachusetts in an effort
somehow, I suppose, to put us on the spot and to suggest that perhaps
there is something we ought to be embarrassed about.
Let me say, point blank to the Senator from North Carolina, not only
is there nothing to be embarrassed about, but the policy that is in
place today is tougher than the policy that was in place with President
Bush and it is precisely the same policy that is reflected in the very
document that he reads from, from 1992, that was offered by Senator
Mitchell. Except that rather than be a policy that is pushed
exclusively under the banner of MFN, this administration has wisely
chosen to highlight human rights under the banner of MFN, and work on
the issues of proliferation and trade on separate tracks.
I ask my colleague from North Carolina to measure what this
administration has done in 1 year, on those separate tracks, versus
what President Bush or President Reagan did in 12 years, on MFN. Year
after year after year, President Bush was vetoing, President Reagan was
vetoing.
This administration has taken sanctions which the Bush administration
never was willing to take, on trade and on missiles. On the missile
transfer it was President Clinton who put in the sanctions on the sale
of satellites. And on trade most recently, we went to the brink of a
trade war because we were willing to be tough on unfair trade practices
of the Chinese in the transshipment of textiles through Hong Kong and
other countries to the United States. And we got something out of the
Chinese through that separate track.
We did not have to wait for a June annual process of MFN. We did it
now. We did it in the last month.
So, in point of fact, President Clinton has a tougher policy, a
working policy, a successful policy and a policy that, just because it
does not fit under this one banner of what Senator Mitchell and many of
us supported 2 years ago, does not mean you are not pushing those same
issues in 1994.
Let me be very, very precise about this so we understand the game
that is being offered here by the Senator from North Carolina. The
Senator comes to the floor and he quotes Senator Mitchell and says,
``Gee, whiz, if it was good enough for George Bush it ought to be good
enough for President Clinton.''
The fact is, what President Clinton has is better than what was
offered to George Bush. And the Senator from North Carolina ought to
understand the distinction of what has happened now versus what
happened then.
Let me not rely on my statements and my rhetoric. Let me read
directly from the President's Executive order which is the judgment of
today. And let us compare it to the language that the Senator from
North Carolina relies on.
In the language that the Senator from North Carolina has now offered
the Senate, saying why are we not doing this tough stuff now, in that
language we were required to take appropriate actions to deal with
universal declaration of human rights in China and Tibet.
I read from the President's Executive order saying that
Secretary of State cannot--cannot--recommend that China has
sufficiently adhered--again, MFN--unless it takes steps to adhere to
the universal declaration of human rights. And that it protects Tibet's
distinctive religious and cultural heritage.
So we have the very thing in the Executive order today on human
rights singled out at a higher order of priority than you had in the
bill that the Senator from North Carolina is pointing to.
Then the bill says, ``is allowing unrestricted immigration of
citizens who desire to leave China for reasons of religious or
political persecution.''
You look to the Executive order and it says, ``Extension will
substantially promote the freedom of emigration objectives of section
402 of the act.''
So you have the precise requirements of emigration. Then you look
further and it has requirements regarding an accounting and release of
people who were in Tiananmen.
We have been getting that accounting. It is almost irrelevant now
because we know. We have gotten the accounting. The accounting is
ongoing and we forced that process. In fact most of them are now out of
jail. Not all of them. There are some serving sentences, and we are
still struggling on these who are serving sentences. But their release
and visitation is one of the conditions of the Executive order.
If you look at the Executive order it says, ``The Secretary shall
also determine whether China has made progress with respect to
releasing and providing an acceptable accounting for Chinese citizens
imprisoned or detained for the nonviolent expression of their political
and religious beliefs, including such expression of beliefs in
connection with the democracy wall in Tiananmen Square.''
So not only is Tiananmen Square but all freedom of expression and
democracy efforts and rights to assemble, et cetera, taken account in
the Executive order just as they were in the language that is held up
by Senator Helms.
Next, adhering to the guidelines and parameters of missile
technology. OK, that is one of the items that is taken out and treated
separately; but which our administration, the Clinton administration,
has taken sanctions on. Contrary to anything that the Bush
administration did.
Then you point to the joint declaration on Hong Kong. That is also
something that we have asserted in the U.S. Senate by now making part
of our law. It is already part of our law. We have asserted it in all
of our discussions with the Chinese. In fact in Secretary Bentsen's
recent visit to China it was front and center as one of the points of
discussion.
Then you have cooperating with the United States to obtain an
accounting of U.S. military personnel in Korea and Vietnam.
I might point out that China has just permitted a dig to take place,
an excavation and exploration on the Chinese border near Vietnam. And
they have further permitted us to have cooperation with respect to the
issue of Americans missing from that war.
The next item is ceasing the jamming of Voice of America broadcasts.
That is the item in the Helms bill.
If you turn to the Executive order it says ``Permitting international
radio and television broadcasts into China.'' So that item is contained
in the bill.
That is it. That is the Helms bill, entirely accounted for within the
Executive order and within the two tracks which we are operating on, on
trade and on the issue of missile technology transfer.
As I mentioned earlier, Mr. President, I just came back from a week
in China--a couple of days in Hong Kong, in Kwangtung Province, the
south provinces, and several days in Beijing.
I met with dissidents, I met with business people, I met with Hong
Kong officials, I met with Chris Patten, the Governor of Hong Kong for
Great Britain, I met with ministers of defense and foreign ministry
personnel and others in China, I met with officials in Kwangtung and so
forth.
I will say to my friend from North Carolina, I and others--Secretary
Bentsen was there, Congressman Gephardt was there, Senator Johnston and
the delegation were there--they have had an enormous transmission of
message in the last month of the seriousness of the United States
present administration's position on human rights, which is fully
embracing all of the components of what he is complaining Senator
Mitchell put on the floor 2 years ago but which somehow is in a
different standard today.
We are making enormous progress on that. In certain portions. Not
enough progress in other portions. Emigration is not fundamentally a
problem today. They are allowing people to leave China and to come to
the United States. That is being served.
On the issue of prison labor we believe we have made enormous
progress, and that is now part of a memorandum of understanding and of
a joint process.
On intellectual property rights we are making enormous progress, and
there is now a memorandum of understanding and they are promulgating
new laws and rules in China with transparency within the process, so we
will have an ability to enforce the law and protect our rights.
We are now with respect to the visits to the prisons still discussing
that issue and pushing it. But I believe we are going to make progress
on that within the next few months. While I was there they told me that
they are planning to release certain political prisoners. Indeed, the
very next day after the meetings I had, they released people in Tibet.
It is not enough yet, but it is a process that is working.
So to suggest that somehow President Clinton and this administration,
which I think have put human rights into a far more significant bubble,
if you will, as a consequence of putting it into a single Executive
order package, while not only promising to follow through on the
missile track and the trade track but, in fact, demonstratedly having
followed through on that track far more than President Bush and
President Reagan did--it is really hard to understand where the Senator
from North Carolina is coming from except to try to create some kind of
moment of embarrassment.
It does not work. It is not there. There is nothing to be embarrassed
about. This administration is proceeding forward with far greater
vigor, with far more focus, and with far more follow through than
either administration of the last 12 years. I think the Senator from
North Carolina ought to be here congratulating him. He may come back
and suggest, ``Well, if they are doing so well, why don't they put it
all into this one message?'' That is not the way diplomacy ought to be
carried out, and the United States Senate should not sit here and undo
the new initiative of the President and his Secretary of State which
they engaged in last fall with the Chinese. We should not just stand
here and suddenly undo something that is working.
Last fall, they initiated, at some risk, a new dialog with the
Chinese in an effort to try to recognize the fact that you cannot just
always be in confrontation status with large nations in the world. That
is one of the most important impressions that I think I came back with
from that part of the world, Mr. President.
The Senator from North Carolina said something very important. He
said China looks after China's interests, just as we look after our
interests in the United States. Those words are true. China will look
after China's interest. The question is how far you can push one
interest of the United States, or the rest of the world, up against
China's real bottom-line interests, and how much leverage do we in
truth have or believe we have to be able to do that.
One of the things that I have learned in 20 years now of dealing with
different countries in Asia--and I was deeply involved in the efforts
in the Philippines; I have been deeply involved in Cambodia, Thailand,
and Vietnam and now more recently have begun to focus more attention on
the issue of China and Indonesia--we should recognize that we are all
in a different position today than we were yesterday and in a different
position yesterday than we were a month ago and a year ago and 2 years
ago.
A remarkable process of change is going on in China. There is no
turning back for China. This huge country with a population one-quarter
of the globe, 1.2 billion people and growing at a rate that exceeds the
imagination, has the fastest economic growth of any nation on the face
of this planet, growing at 20 percent in some provinces, growing at 11
or 12 percent as a nation.
In those provinces where they are growing and where there are now
businesses from all over the world, their people are beginning to think
differently, behave differently, and enjoy a different set of rights.
I met with American businesses and foreign businesses there. I asked
them what happens to the Chinese person who comes into the company. Do
they get paid differently? Do they work under different rules? Do they
have different opportunities? And the answers to those questions in
every case is, yes, not only that but because of this transition,
people who used to have to get the permission of their so-called work
unit to be able to leave one place of business and go work somewhere
else are today able just to quit a job and go out and find a job
somewhere else and work somewhere else.
A lot of fancy cars are turning up in Kwangtung Province and in other
provinces on the coast. A lot of people are making money. In fact, the
Peoples Liberation Army, the PLA, is busily involved today in making a
lot of money. They are investing. In point of fact, the Army has been
told by the central government they do not have enough money to
fundamentally pay for a lot of stuff; they have to go out and earn
money to support themselves. Only 7 percent of their budget goes into
the military. They are trying to modernize in some regards.
But much is changing in China. Every person I talked to in every part
of Asia indicated to me that they cannot turn back without some
wrenching, extraordinary, convoluted confrontation that would rip the
country apart and have enormous implications for the rest of the world.
I have personally come to question--while I voted for MFN many, many,
many times and it was the right policy all the way along and it is the
right policy this year, now, it is still correct--I can see a point
soon where we should recognize that China is in a post-Tiananmen
period. The transition has already begun from Deng Xiaoping. We should
understand that in the future it may be that we need to begin to think
about dealing with different issues in a different way.
I am not going to go into that now or make that speech now, but I am
going to suggest respectfully to the Senator from North Carolina that
our administration is on a sensible course that is sensitive to this
change in the region, sensitive to other decisions that other countries
are making.
Let me give an example of one.
The Prime Minister of France just recently decided that he is not
only visiting China but that they made a new decision on the sale of
weapons to Taiwan, and they are going into China. What you see is raw
economic power speaking. You are going to see that, I suggest, more and
more in the relationships of countries in that region as they emerge as
huge producers and suppliers for the rest of the world and as a major
market for infrastructure, for communications, for enormous
opportunities to change.
I am not sure the United States can go it alone, if you will, with
unilateral, sort of gun-at-the-head policies that open up the
opportunities for a whole lot of other countries to go do what they
want to do while we sit here tying things to certain standards of
behavior that others are not willing to necessarily stand up for and
which raise serious questions about the international community's
resolve on these issues. That, too, is another issue.
The fact is the amendment of the Senator from North Carolina
fundamentally makes mischief with the current policy of this
administration that is stronger than the policy of the prior two
administrations and that is working. We in the Senate should not send
China a mixed message that somehow suggests that the track the
administration is on does not have the support of the Congress or has
not been working. That would be contrary to reality, and it would also
be contrary to common sense in terms of the course that we are on.
The bottom line is, and I say this with great respect to the Senator
from North Carolina because he and I have worked on human rights issues
with respect to Latin America and other parts of the world and I agree
with him on his concern for it, but his concern is being met by this
administration, which has cleverly focused on human rights within the
context of MFN, heightened the visibility on those issues, achieved
already some measure of progress toward meeting it, and has proven its
willingness to follow through on the two other areas of trade and of
missile proliferation.
I respectfully suggest to the Senator that his amendment is
unnecessary if his goal is truly to send a strong message to China, and
his amendment is certainly unnecessary if its goal is simply to try to
prove a political point that is both inappropriate and unjustifiable.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. HELMS. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HELMS. Madam President, before I begin, let me make it clear to
the Chair and anybody else that might be listening, including the folks
watching on television, that John Kerry and I are very, very good
friends. We do not belong to the same party. We do not have exactly the
same philosophy. But as far as I know, we have always agreed to
disagree agreeably. I sat in the cloakroom and listened to a good part
of his rebuttal to my comments about the pending amendment. Then I went
down, and got a bowl of clam chowder. I recommend it, if you have not
had lunch. It is not Boston clam chowder, but it is very good.
But it sort of surprised me when the Senator from Massachusetts said
that I was transparent, whatever that means, in offering this
amendment.
I guess what I am saying is we ought to have truth in advertising.
But that is neither here nor there. I would say to my friend that if
the administration is doing all of the fine things he said it is doing
with reference to relations with China, then he ought to welcome this
amendment and be just as enthusiastic for it now as he was when George
Mitchell, the distinguished majority leader, offered his legislation
back during the Bush administration.
I do not see why it is a matter of such sensitivity for the
administration to be differed with on this matter, because I differed
with my administration. I did it publicly, and I did it on this floor,
when George Bush was President. And I am still doing it. I would do it
right now.
If I offended the Senator by criticizing the Clinton administration,
I am sorry.
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, will the Senator simply yield for a
dialog on this?
Mr. HELMS. Sure.
Mr. KERRY. The Senator asks a good question. Why would you not, if
the administration is doing all these good things, want to accept the
amendment that the Senator has offered? The answer to that is that the
Senator's amendment--I do not disagree with anything the Senator has in
the amendment in terms of substance, as I just described.
Mr. HELMS. The Senator from Massachussetts voted for it.
Mr. KERRY. The Senator is correct, Madam President. I did indeed vote
for it. I pressed for each of these items today. The reason I say to
the Senator that I would not want to embrace it in the form the Senator
has it here is that it conditions MFN on all of those items, and the
President has chosen to condition MFN on the human rights but push the
other two items separately.
That is the distinction. It is an approach.
Mr. HELMS. I have the floor. We are just talking in a friendly
fashion.
Mr. KERRY. I agree.
Mr. HELMS. That is not what the current President said, Madam
President, when he was campaigning in 1992. He just lambasted Bush. And
as I said in my remarks, I applauded what he said. Did I not say that?
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, the Senator from North Carolina certainly
did say that. He probably said a lot of things in his own campaign that
he might not want to be held accountable for today if they were
absolutely followed through on.
All I am saying to the Senator from North Carolina is if the
President is achieving what the Senator from North Carolina wants, is
it more important to simply go back to the campaign and try to
formulate a policy around that, or is it important to embrace the fact
that he is accomplishing what the Senator wants?
Mr. HELMS. If my friend will yield, I am not suggesting we go back to
the campaign at all. I am just pointing out that the President took a
stronger position then. If he wants to get some others, including the
distinguished chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, who are
especially interested in this China/MFN matter, and privately tell us
what he is doing that is so great, I will keep it a secret. I will not
discuss it with the media or anybody else.
But I am just operating on what I am able to see, just as we operated
when George Bush was President.
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, if the Senator will yield, I will both
answer him and ask him a question. He has asked me what the President
is doing that is so great. I have listed precisely how every component,
the Senator's human rights components, of this is embraced in the
Executive order. So the President is doing nothing differently from
what the Senator proposed in his amendment. He is doing nothing
differently in his Executive order.
The only other two items in the Senator's amendment pertain to
missile technology which he is addressing in the same track with
sanctions. The question of the missile technology is one side, and the
trade issue is being dealt with on a separate track. The trade issue,
as the Senator knows, we just had this very significant clash over the
textiles. They are prepared to bring extremely strong sanctions against
China. They had emergency meetings, and before the January 15 deadline
China backed down.
So each of the concerns expressed by the Senator from North Carolina
are in fact not only being addressed but are embraced in the current
policy.
Mr. HELMS. Then the Senator from Massachussetts ought to have no
objection to the amendment. Let us just pass it over a voice vote and
be done with it.
Mr. KERRY. If I may say to the Senator, clearly what the Senator is
doing is trying to change the administration's approach as it is stated
to the Chinese and as it is, indeed.
The Senator shakes his head. But the Senator is taking back trade and
taking back missile technology and conditioning MFN specifically on
both of those. That is the language here.
Mr. HELMS. Madam President, I beg my friend's pardon. Maybe, like the
three blind men from Hindustan who were trying to describe an elephant,
each of us is seeing it our way.
But China is sitting back laughing at us. They are sitting back
laughing at us, and they are going to continue to do things that this
amendment addresses.
Let me say that I applaud thus far the position that the
administration has taken with respect to textiles. But that hand has
not been played out yet, I say to the Senator. And there is nothing
wrong with saying, and this Senate said, ``Just a minute here, Red
China. This is the way we still feel.''
The former Federal Judge and the distinguished majority leader said
it right. I think we ought to just keep on saying it until they do.
Mr. KERRY. If my friend from North Carolina will stay with me for a
moment here--
Mr. HELMS. I will stay with my friend as long as I am in the Senate.
Mr. KERRY. I thank the Senator for that.
Madam President, the first sentence of the Senator's amendment--and I
know he knows it, but I want to put it in the Record--says:
Policy regarding the conditions which the Government of the
People's Republic of China should meet to continue to receive
nondiscriminatory most-favored-nation treatment.
In other words, that follows; in the Senator's amendment are
conditions which China must meet to get MFN. What the Senator is saying
is that missile technology behavior and trade policy behavior are part
of whether or not they get MFN.
President Clinton has distinctly separated those three tracts. He has
conditioned MFN on the human rights record.
Mr. HELMS. If the Senator will defer a moment, I want to be sure the
Chair knows who has the floor. Will the Chair state it?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from North Carolina has the floor.
Mr. KERRY. I will not abuse the Senator's time.
Mr. HELMS. No, No. I just wanted that clear.
Mr. KERRY. So when the Senator says to me: Why should we not just
pass this? Why should we not accept this? Why would the President not
want to embrace this? It is because the President has personally
decided he thinks he can get more out of China and progress further by
tying MFN to human rights and by proceeding in two other forums, to
discuss the issue of the missile technology and the issue of the trade
labor violations.
I respectfully say to my colleague that is working. And to now change
it in one fell swoop in the U.S. Senate and try to send a contrary
message would, No. 1, be an inappropriate and a wrongful intrusion by
the Senate in the prerogatives of the President. No. 2, it would be
contrary to good, common sense, in view of the fact that what the
President is doing is working.
So if the Senator really wants to achieve what is in here, I would
like to join with him. I suggest that we try to construct a message to
China and let us see if we can join jointly now on the floor to put
together a message that embraces all of what the Senator is trying to
say here, which is that China must improve in these areas. I agree with
the Senator. Let us contain each of the sections of human rights, which
we know to be of importance to us, which the President has set forward
in the Executive order; but let us respect the right of the President
to proceed in these two other courses, while simultaneously saying to
China, as we ought to, that we expect improvement in this area of
missile technology, transfer, and in proliferation, and we expect
improvement with respect to the section of trade violations.
If we did that, I think we would wind up sending the very message he
is seeking to send to China without being disruptive to the policy of
the administration. That would be constructive for the Senate.
Mr. HELMS. Is the Senator finished?
Mr. KERRY. I ask the Senator if he would be interested in pursuing
that?
Mr. HELMS. I will entertain anything the Senator would bring to me.
He is a very bright, young man, and I enjoy working with him, but----
Mr. KERRY. The Senator has been extremely gracious, and I appreciate
the time.
Mr. HELMS. What we are talking about is an Executive order which can
be changed tomorrow. By the way, I am not among those who would
abdicate this matter to the executive branch, because we have a
responsibility. Otherwise, we would not be called upon to vote on MFN.
So we do have a stake in this thing, and we do have a responsibility. I
am not prepared to surrender my responsibilities.
The Executive order requires only a ``no'' recommendation if China
does not adhere to the 1992 labor agreement and if China cannot meet
the Jackson-Vanik waiver. That is it. Everything else is merely
something to be considered. If China does nothing, under this Executive
order, the Secretary of State is not required to issue a ``no''
recommendation. So where does that leave the Senate of the United
States? Out in left field, if we do nothing. I think we ought to take a
stand. If the President wants to say to the hierarchy over in Beijing
that you have these fellows like Jesse Helms in the U.S. Senate
requiring this, that is fine. You and I are going to work this out--and
nobody will applaud louder than I when we are done. But in the
meantime, I do not think we ought to relinquish our stand one iota. The
Executive order, by the way--we researched that a little bit--is
substantially weaker than S. 806.
My amendment is only a sense of the Senate. The Senator is correct,
and I intended that; but even though most senses of the Senate are like
kissing your sister, they do not mean anything, in this case it means
something because it is conveyed to the people who need it conveyed to,
that we are watching, in addition to the State Department and the
executive branch in general. Does the Senator want my amendment to be
stronger than it is?
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, this Senator would enjoy working with the
Senator from North Carolina to try to see if we cannot construct a
message. And I think we ought to send a message. I do not think we
ought to have the MFN debate now. I do not think that we ought to
construct a new MFN policy now. I think we ought to try to find a way
to constructively bolster the efforts of the administration,
recognizing that this debate is going to occur in 3 or 4 months. We are
going to have this debate on the floor of the Senate. The
administration is going to have to make this judgment. This is not yet
the time for it.
Mr. HELMS. And we are going to have to make this judgment.
Mr. KERRY. Yes. I recommend respectfully, Madam President, to my
colleague that we try to construct now a message that is less
confrontational internally between us and more constructive externally
toward the Chinese, that all Senators could join together on this bill,
which is not really the appropriate moment to have the MFN debate. I
think that would be a constructive effort, and I would like to work
with the Senator to do that.
Mr. HELMS. Does the Senator----
Mr. KERRY. I do not want to diminish any of the concepts that are
contained within the bill that I once voted for, and that is the
essence of our approach. It is just a question of the formulation and
structure of it.
Mr. HELMS. Does the Senator contemplate having that ready for us to
examine by maybe Monday morning?
Mr. KERRY. I think that would be appropriate.
Mr. HELMS. Let me say again that I am always interested in hearing
what the Senator has to say and what he has to propose. It would be
foolish for me to take any other position. But I do not quite
understand, nor do I share the Senator's position that we ought not to
be confrontational with the Communist Chinese.
Mr. KERRY. No. I beg to differ. It is not a question of--I am talking
about confrontational between ourselves and our administration.
Mr. HELMS. The Senator is suggesting that I am being confrontational
with whom?
Mr. KERRY. The Senator is suggesting that the policy contained within
the Senator's amendment is, by definition, confrontational with current
policy, because the Senator is proposing a different approach than the
administration, a different approach only in structure, not in
substance.
Mr. HELMS. I have the floor. But I will say to the Senator that I do
not quite understand his position on that because this is a very fine
document written by and introduced by a distinguished majority leader
of the Senate in April 1993. True enough it was first introduced during
a different set of circumstances with a different President. But as I
have said ad nauseam so many times, I disagreed with President Bush. He
had gone over to China and he had certain attitudes which I understood,
and I am not trying to say yea, yea, yea, you said so and so.
I just thought George Mitchell was right then, and I think what he
said then is right now. I do not see where it is unacceptably
confrontational.
Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
Mr. HELMS. I have the floor. I am glad to yield to the Senator.
Mr. KERRY. I was about to ask the Senator to do that.
Mr. HELMS. Yes.
Mr. KERRY. If I could simply say, George Mitchell was right then and
he is right now. These are indeed strong sentiments that we ought to be
expressing.
The problem, and I say again, is the administration has appropriately
chosen, appropriately in the sense that it is their right and they
initiate foreign policy, and has appropriately chosen to try a new
initiative with the Chinese, a new dialog. That new dialog is
predicated on the notion that they separate out the missile
proliferation questions and the labor standards trade questions, they
will separate them from the human rights, but all of the same concepts
contained in Senator Mitchell's original bill, which I voted for, the
Senator from North Carolina voted for, we voted for, all of those
concepts are contained in the current policy. They are simply being
offered in a different framework.
The amendment of the Senator tries to bring them back into one
framework, and that is the bone of contention. That is what is creating
the confrontation.
The administration does not want to put them in one House. They think
they can be more successful in achieving what the Senator wants by
proceeding down the two tracks.
I am merely saying let us try to see if we can embrace the goals that
we want to achieve, send a strong message to the Chinese, but do it in
a way that emboldens the administration and frankly empowers them to be
able to achieve what we want, rather than send a decisive note. I think
we can do that, and I would like to try.
Mr. HELMS. I hope we can. Nothing would suit me better than to take
an honorable position against what is going on in Red China. Do not
pussyfoot around as happened during the Bush administration when those
guys went over there and drank the champaign. I did not like that at
all. They ground that student under that tank, made mush out of him,
and all other sorts of things.
And the latest--do we have the latest human rights report somewhere?
They are not doing a thing on human rights, nothing. Freedom House
ranked Communist China as 1 of the terrible 20 human rights abusers
along with North Korea, Iran, Cuba, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, among
others.
If the Senator is going to try to share with me and encourage me to
join him in a draft that does not offend some of the people in Beijing,
I do not believe I can accept that, but let us look at what you have.
Now, I looked at the parliamentary situation after I read for the
first time that we were not going to have any votes after the two we
had earlier. I had not been notified about that until I saw it over
there and over there. I do not know whether the Senator knew that. I
thought we could have a vote this afternoon on this. But you have a
right to second degree whether I go along or not.
But if the Senator is suggesting to me that he and I work together
and our respective staffs work together and try to come up with
something that is meaningful, I accept his offer with gratitude.
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, may I say to the Senator I appreciate his
willingness to try to do that. I think that is an important way for us
to proceed and if we cannot have a meeting of the minds, obviously, as
the Senator said, I do have a right to second degree.
Mr. HELMS. Sure.
Mr. KERRY. I would want to protect that right, but I hope it is not
necessary. I think it would be good for us to send a message. My own
opinion is, and I can tell you this from having come back and met with
the Chinese, what is in the Executive order offends them.
Mr. HELMS. I am glad.
Mr. KERRY. And the Senator should be glad.
So I am saying that there is plenty already on the table that they
could find offensive, and it seems to me that there is a way for us to
put together an approach here that ought to recommend the best
intentions of the Senate without undoing the next 3 or 4 months of
effort of this administration. That is not a long time, I think, for
the Senator to wait to make the measurement that we are all going to
make. This issue is going to be joined in in a short period of time. I
would hate to see us get hung up over it here today.
Mr. HELMS. I do not propose that we do. Now, my folks are passing me
notes just as the Senator's folks are passing him notes.
Mr. KERRY. I did not have a chance to read my notes.
Mr. HELMS. I confess a lot of what I know is in their heads.
But the point that they suggest that I make to the Senator at this
moment is that the President's Executive order and the President's
report to Congress that follows that order reflect all of the
provisions in the pending amendment.
Mr. KERRY. I beg pardon.
Mr. HELMS. That is what they say.
Mr. KERRY. I apologize to the Senator. I did not quite hear all of
that.
Mr. HELMS. The Senator is saying we are just packing all the things
in and the President is trying to work to this aspect and this aspect
and that aspect separately.
That is not the way I am advised that the President's Executive order
and his report to Congress are comprised.
Mr. KERRY. I may say respectfully to the Senator in all of the
conversations that I had when I was in China I met with our entire
staff of field team and I had conversations with their ministry, with
various of their ministers. They understand that Executive order to
contain all seven of those items. They are, in fact, hearing us
reiterate on a consistent, basis because they understand that the
Senate is not going to make a judgment based on one or two. The Senate
is going to make a judgment on all of those items.
In fact, a great concern was expressed by a number of us who were
there about the question of progress in those areas.
So I do not think if you listen to people in Hong Kong who are
concerned about the loss on MFN, or you listen to the Chinese officials
or to others, there is no question at this point in time that they have
the message that they have not sufficiently responded yet and that
there is going to be a high standard applied.
Mr. HELMS. There is no question in my mind that they sought to
persuade the Senator of that.
The Senator cannot go into their heads and know what he really is
thinking. I think they are smirking behind their hands.
But I repeat, it is not valid to say that the President's Executive
order and report to Congress depart in any way from the substance of
the pending amendment, and I will say again what I said earlier that
the Executive order requires only a no recommendation if China fails to
comply with the 1992 prison labor agreement, for example, or the
Jackson-Vanik waiver.
There is no binding human rights requirement. The Executive order is
just an Executive order, and the President can withdraw it, change it,
do whatever he wants to.
But what this Congress does when it approves a resolution, even a
resolution which is the sense of the Senate, then that is a matter of
record, and that is the way the Senate will be on record.
I will tell the Senator to let us see what can be worked out over the
weekend. At least as far as I am concerned, I think that I have been
stimulated by this conversation with the Senator. I promise the Senator
we will take serious note of whatever recommendation the Senator
provides to us.
Madam President, I yield the floor.
Mr. COATS. Madam President, I rise to support the Helms amendment on
Chinese refugees. I commend Senator Helms for taking action to correct
this flaw in U.S. policy.
We cannot ignore this particular abuse of its citizens by the Chinese
Government when we have the power to help. As we have seen, the Chinese
Government has stepped up its repression of their people through
policies which force families to limit their children to one. They do
this by forcing women to undergo abortions, and both men and women to
be sterilized. Many women are even cruelly forced to have abortions
often late in term in order to prosecute this one-child policy.
Earlier this year we heard reports of another new horror taking place
in China. In order to ensure the births of only perfect babies, a new
Chinese law would require mothers to undergo genetic testing of their
fetuses. This is a requirement, not a voluntary personal choice as in
the United States. Even more horrible is the fact that, should the
results of these test reveal that the child might be born with a
disability, the mother is forced to terminate the pregnancy.
I don't think anyone will disagree that these measures are
abominable. While we may have no power to dictate Chinese policy, we
can acknowledge the fear which moves them to escape such oppressive
policies by helping them enter the United States.
This amendment would grant asylum to those Chinese who come to the
United States because they fear persecution by China for refusing to
abort a pregnancy or undergo sterilization. It gives this group of
refugees equivalent status as those fleeing for political dissent.
Madam President, in 1989, Members may recall an amendment dealing
with this same subject we voted on in this body which passed 95 to 0.
The language of the Helms amendment is identical to that language.
Although the 1989 vote followed closely after the Chinese massacre of
students at Tiananmen Square, we should be no less willing today to
take action to assist people on whom an enormous injustice is being
perpetrated.
Until a year ago it was a matter of Justice Department Policy to
grant favorable immigration status to Chinese coming to the United
States under these circumstances. However, President Clinton chose to
reverse this decision, and rescinded a directive issued by Attorney
General William Barr shortly before he left office which laid out the
implementing regulations.
For a year now it has been United States policy to deport Chinese who
fled China's coercive one-child per family policy. I frankly couldn't
understand why President Clinton made such a decision. Although a
recent case involving a Chinese man who left China revealed his
reasoning. The Clinton Justice Department wrote in its brief that
involuntary sterilization was not a manifestation of Communist
Doctrine, a punishment for Chinese dissidents, or a form of persecution
on the basis of political opinion because Mr. Guo had not be singled
out for persecution. China's population policies, the administration
reasoned, were applied equally to all citizens and therefore he could
not be viewed as a political dissenter.
Fortunately, the Federal judge in Alexandria ruled against the
administration in a decision handed down on January 20. He declared
that ``Political opinion encompasses an individual's views regarding
procreation.'' He called China's policy of involuntary sterilization an
egregious infringement on the fundamental right to procreate.
Accordingly, the judge ruled that Mr. Guo's opposition to Chinese
practice equals political opinion.
Madam President, I don't think we needed a Federal judge to tell us
that opposing China policy on forced abortions and sterilization is
akin to political dissent.
I know that many of my colleagues are concerned that such a policy
would open the doors to thousands of Chinese immigrants entering the
United States But the facts do not bear this out. According to
statistics from 1992, 4,803 refugees from China were apprehended by the
INS. Of this number, 654 were given grants of asylum by immigration
judges. Although the INS did not keep strict statistics on the asylum
claims, rough estimates indicate that only about 100 applied for asylum
based on fear of the forced abortion policies. Even if the numbers were
double that or more it would hardly be an overwhelming number to bring
such concern. In any event, this amendment limits the numbers who can
apply for asylum on this claim to 1,000 a year.
Madam President, the issue at stake is not one of whether one
supports or opposes abortion, but rather one of respect for human
rights. It is time we recognized the horror of these programs of
coercion in China, and took a stand on behalf of people willing to risk
everything to evade this type of oppression. I hope Members will once
again be willing to cast a vote, as 95 Members did in 1989, and extend
to these Chinese a preferential immigration status.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I would ask by way of video whether or
not there are any collegues prepared to bring any amendments to the
floor at this time. We may have an en bloc amendment that we are
prepared to proceed forward on.
Mr. PELL. Madam President, I have some remarks on the amendment
concerning Senator Helms, if I may speak for a moment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Rhode Island.
Mr. PELL. Madam President, Senator Helms and I have stood together
over the years in our condemnation of China's noncompliance with
international weapons treaties, to their horrific human rights record
in Tibet and against their own people, to their use of forced labor and
unfair trade practices and so on.
We share a deep regard and affection for His Holiness the Dalai Lama
and together have welcomed him on several occasions to the Foreign
Relations Committee. We have cosponsored legislation providing for VOA
broadcasts, Fulbright scholarships, and sense-of-the-Senate resolutions
expressing our support to those suffering under oppressive Chinese rule
and urging a United States policy that would put some teeth in our
commitment to back them up.
However, I do not support Senator Helm's amendment to increase the
conditions China must meet before MFN can be renewed this spring. Every
provision in this amendment is a good one, and China should comply with
them all. But we should not build United States-China relations solely
around MFN.
President Clinton, in consultation with the Congress, carefully
crafted last year's MFN renewal to be an effective tool for improving
China's human rights performance. We have seen some incremental
improvements and have good reason to believe that we will see more.
We are now 6 months into the 1-year conditional MFN extension, I do
not believe we would be operating in good faith to up the ante at the
half way point and still permit us to up the ante at some future date,
if we so choose.
Mr. HELMS. Madam President, may I inquire of the distinguished
Senator from Massachusetts where we stand with respect to the en bloc
amendments?
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, we are prepared to proceed forward on the
en bloc amendments, if we want to do that.
Mr. HELMS. I would like to get that out of the way.
amendments nos. 1292 through 1314, en bloc
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that it be in
order to send to the desk en bloc 23 amendments. I ask unanimous
consent that the Senate proceed to their immediate consideration en
bloc; that the amendments be agreed to en bloc and the motions to
reconsider be laid upon the table en bloc; and that explanatory
statements regarding these amendments be printed in the Record as if
read.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. HELMS. Madam President, I will simply observe, lest anybody wants
to know what is going on with 23 amendments being adopted en bloc,
these are technical amendments and they do not address any substantive
areas of the bill.
Mr. PELL. The Senator is absolutely correct.
Have we voted on those amendments?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendments have been agreed to.
The amendments (Nos. 1292 through 1314), en bloc, are as follows:
amendment no. 1292
Technical Amendments to S. 1281
SEC. 101(b). LIMITATIONS.
In subsection 101(b)(1)(A), page 8, line 8, strike
``available'' and insert ``appropriated'';
In subsection 101(b)(1)(B), page 8, line 13, strike
``available'' and insert ``appropriated'';
In subsection 101(b)(2), page 8, line 20, strike
``available'' and insert ``appropriated''; and
In subsection 101(b)(3), page 9, line 1, strike
``available'', and insert ``appropriated''.
SEC. 104. MIGRATION AND REFUGEE ASSISTANCE.
In subsection (A)(1)(B), page 12, line 13, strike
``available'' and insert ``appropriated''.
SEC. 114. INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION FUND.
Strike the two sentences starting on page 18, line 3 and
ending on page 18, line 7 (viz., ``The ILF shall be available
to such extent and in such amounts as may be provided in
advance in appropriations Acts. Amounts so provided are
authorized to remain available without fiscal year
limitation.'') and insert the following:
``The ILF may be available without fiscal year limitation.
Funds otherwise available to the Department for the purposes
of this paragraph may be credited to the ILF.''.
SEC. 115. PROHIBITION ON DISCRIMINATORY CONTRACTS.
In subsection (b), on page 21, line 4, strike ``on'' and
insert ``of''; and
In subsection (d), on page 23, line 1, strike ``OF'' and
insert ``AND''.
SEC. 116. EMERGENCIES IN THE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR SERVICE.
Insert after ``striking'' the following: ````and the
Foreign Service''; and by striking''.
SEC. 118. VISAS.
In section 118(a)(3), on page 25, line 10, strike
``$56,000,000'' and insert ``$107,500,000''; and
At the end of subsection (a), on page 25, after line 10,
add the following new paragraph:
``(4) The provisions of the Act of August 18, 1856 (Revised
Statutes 1726-28; 22 U.S.C. 2212-14) concerning accounting
for consular fees shall not apply to fees collected under
this subsection.''.
SEC. 119. ROLE OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE.
Strike everything after the section title and insert the
following:
Chapter 7 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 is amended--
(1) in the chapter title, by sriking ``Foreign Service
Institute,'';
(2) in section 701 (22 U.S.C. 4021)--
(A) by striking the section title and inserting
``Institution for Training.'';
(B) in subsection 701(a)--
(i) by striking ``the Foreign Service Institute
(hereinafter in this chapter referred to as the
``Institute'')'' and inserting ``an institution or center for
training (hereinafter in this chapter referred to as the
``institution'')''; and
(ii) by striking ``Institute'' and inserting
``institution'';
(C) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
``(d)(1) The Secretary of State is authorized to provide
for special professional foreign affairs training and
instruction of employees of foreign governments through the
institution.
``(2) Training and instruction under paragraph (1) shall be
on a reimbursable or advance-of-funds basis. Such
reimbursements or advances to the Department of State may be
provided by an agency of the United States Government or by a
foreign government and shall be credited to the currently
available applicable appropriation account.
``(3) Training should be made available in the first
instance to officials from newly emerging democratic nations,
and then to other nations as deemed to be in the national
interest of the United States.
``(4) The authorities of section 704 shall apply to
training and instruction provided under this section.'';
(3) in subsection 701(b) and sections 702, 704, 705, and
707, by striking ``Foreign Service Institute'' and
``Institute'' wherever they appear and inserting
``institution''.
SEC. 131. UNDER SECRETARY AND ASSISTANT SECRETARY POSITIONS.
In subsection (b), on page 32, line 24, insert ``of''
before ``title''; and
In subsection (e), on page 35, line 5, strike, ``of new
office''.
SEC. 133. REDESIGNATION OF POSITION AS ASSISTANT SECRETARY
FOR DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR.
Strike subsection (b) on page 38;
Redesignate subsection (c) on page 38 as ``(b)''; and
In the newly redesignated subsection (b), strike ``of new
office''.
SEC. 142. WAIVER OF LIMITATION FOR CERTAIN CLAIMS.
In subsection (a), page 48, line 16, strike ``arise from''
and insert ``in circumstances where there is in effect''.
SEC. 147. EDUCATIONAL TRAVEL FOR COLLEGE STUDENTS STUDYING
ABROAD.
In subsection (b), page 52, line 6, insert the following
after ``enrolled'': ``, with the allowable travel expense not
to exceed the cost of travel to and from the school in the
United States''.
SEC. 154. FOREIGN LANGUAGE TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER CAREER
SERVICE PROGRAM.
In subsection (e), on page 64, line 2, strike ``(1)'';
In subsection (e), on page 64, line 9, strike the entire
line and insert ``(f) Use of Funds.--''; Funds collected
under the authority of subsections (d) and'';
In newly designated subsection (f), on page 64, line 16,
add the following at the end: ``Such funds may remain
available until expended.''; and
On page 64, lines 17-19, strike subsection (f).
SEC. 169. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.
At the beginning of the section, on page 76, line 11,
strike ``Not'' and insert the following:
``(a) Except as modified by subsection (b), not'';
On page 76, line 19, insert before the period ``for the
previous fiscal year'';
On page 76, line 22, strike ``as of the date of'' and
insert ``covered by'';
On page 76, line 23, insert ``such'' before
``peacekeeping''; and
On page 77, insert the following new subsection at the end
of section 169:
``(b) The first report submitted pursuant to this section
shall cover all United Nations peacekeeping operations up to
the date of the report.''
SEC. 170. UNITED STATES PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL CONTRIBUTIONS
TO PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.
Strike section 170 in its entirety.
SEC. 214. PROHIBITION ON DISCRIMINATORY CONTRACTS.
In subsection (b), on page 110, line 10, strike ``on'' and
insert ``of''; and
In subsection (d), on page 112, line 9, strike ``OF'' and
insert ``AND''.
SEC. 704. TECHNICAL AMENDMENTS TO CAPTIVE NATIONS RESOLUTION.
Strike section 704 in its entirety.
SEC. 710. ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST NORTH KOREA.
Strike subsection (b) on page 176 and insert the following:
``(b) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of
subsection (a) if the President determines that such a waiver
would serve the national interest.''.
At the appropriate place in the bill, add the following new
section:
``SEC. . PUBLISHING INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS.
Section 112a of title 1 of the United States Code is
amended--
(1) by inserting ``(a)'' immediately before ``The Secretary
of State''; and
(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new
subsections:
``(b) The Secretary of State may determine that publication
of certain categories of agreements is not required, provided
that the following criteria are met:
``(1) such agreements are not treaties which have been
brought into force for the United States after having
received Senate advice and consent pursuant to section 2(2)
of Article II of the Constitution of the United States;
``(2) the public interest in such agreements is
insufficient to justify their publication, in that (i) as of
the date of enactment of this legislation,the agreements are
no longer in force, (ii) the agreements do not create private
rights or duties, nor establish standards intended to govern
government action in the treatment of private individuals;
(iii) in view of the limited or specialized nature of the
public interest in such agreements, such interest can
adequately be satisfied by an alternative means; or (iv) the
public disclosure of the text of the agreement would, in the
opinion of the President, be prejudicial to the national
security of the United States; and
``(3) copies of such agreements (other than those in
subsection (2)(b)(iv)), including certified copies where
necessary for litigation or similar purposes, can be made
available by the Department of State union reasonable
request.
``(c) Any determination pursuant to subsection (b) shall be
published in the Federal Register.''.
At the appropriate place in the bill, add the following new
section:
``Sec. . Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe.--The President is authorized to implement, for the
United States, the provisions of Annex 1 of the Decision
concerning Legal Capacity and Privileges and Immunities,
issued by the Council of Ministers of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe on December 1, 1993, in
accordance with the terms of that Annex.''
At the appropriate place in the bill, add the following new
section:
``Sec. . Agreement on State and Local Taxation.--The
President is authorized to bring into force for the United
States the Agreement on State and Local Taxation of Foreign
Employees of Public International Organizations, which was
signed by the United States on April 21, 1992: Provided,
That, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1.B of such
Agreement, such Agreement shall not require any refunds of
monies paid with respect to tax years ending on or before
December 31, 1993.''
SEC. XX. FEES FOR COMMERCIAL SERVICES.
Title I of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of
1956 (22 U.S.C. 2669 et seq.) is amended by adding the
following new section at the end:
``SEC. 52. FEES FOR COMMERCIAL SERVICES.
``(a) Authority To Charge Fee.--(1) Subject to paragraph
(2), the Secretary of State is authorized to charge a fee to
cover the actual or estimated cost of providing any person,
firm or organization (other than agencies of the United
States Government) with commercial services at posts abroad
on matters within the authority of the Department of State.
``(2) The authority of this section may be exercised only
in countries where the Department of Commerce does not
perform commercial services for which it collects fees.
``(b) use of Fees.--Funds collected under the authority of
subsection (a) shall be deposited as an offsetting collection
to any Department of State appropriation to recover the costs
of providing commercial services.''
``SEC. . PERSONAL SERVICES CONTRACTS ABROAD.
``Section 2(c) of the State Department Basic Authorities
Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2669(c)) is amended by inserting the
following before the period: ``; and such contracts are
authorized to be negotiated, the terms of the contracts to be
prescribed, and the work to be performed, where necessary,
without regard to such statutory provisions as relate to the
negotiation, making, and performance of contracts and
performance of work in the United States''.
At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following
new section:
``SEC. . UNITED STATES MEMBERSHIP IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COPPER STUDY GROUP.
(a) United States Membership.--The President is authorized
to accept the Terms of Reference of and maintain membership
of the United States in the International Copper Study Group
(ICSG).
(b) Payments of Assessed Contributions.--For fiscal year
1995 and thereafter the United States assessed contributions
to the ICSG may be paid from funds appropriated for
``Contributions to International Organizations''.
Amendment to section 154, Foreign Language Translator and
Interpreter Career Service Program.
In subsection (e), on page 64, lines 6-9, strike ``for
which the Secretary of State has determined for purposes of
subsection (b)(2) there is a shortage of qualified Government
personnel'';
On page 64, lines 12-14, strike ``for which the Secretary
has determined there is a shortage of qualified Government
personnel''.
amendment no. 1293
(Purpose: To update the PLO Commitments Compliance Act of 1989)
On page 179, after line 6, add the following:
SEC. . AMENDMENTS TO THE PLO COMMITMENTS COMPLIANCE ACT.
The PLO Commitments Compliance Act of 1989 (title VIII of
Public Law 101-246) is amended--
(1) in section 804(b), by striking ``Beginning 30 days
after the date of enactment of this Act, and every 120 days
thereafter in which the dialogue between the United States
and the PLO has not been discontinued'', and inserting in
lieu thereof ``In conjunction with each written policy
justification required under section (3)(b)(1) of the Middle
East Peace Facilitation Act of 1994 or every 180 days,'';
(2) in section 804(b)(1), by striking ``regarding the
cessation of terrorism and recognition of Israel's right to
exist'' and inserting in lieu thereof ``and each of the
commitments described in section (4)(A) of the Middle East
Peace Facilitation Act of 1994 (Oslo commitments)'';
(3) in section 804(b)(2), by inserting ``and Oslo'' after
``Geneva'';
(4) by striking paragraphs (3) and (8) of section 804(b);
(5) by redesignating paragraphs (4), (5), (6), (7), (9),
and (10) of section 804(b) as paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6),
(7), and (8), respectively of that section;
(6) in section 802(8), by inserting ``and on September 9,
1993'' after ``1998'';
(7) in section 802, by redesignating paragraph (8) as
paragraph (10);
(8) by striking ``and'' at the end of section 802(7); and
(9) by inserting after section 802(7) the following:
``(8) the President, following an attempted terrorist
attack upon a Tel Aviv beach on May 30, 1990, suspended the
United States dialogue with the PLO;
``(9) the President resumed the United States dialogue with
the PLO in response to the commitments made by the PLO in
letters to the Prime Minister of Israel and the Foreign
Minister of Norway of September 9, 1993; and''.
Mr. MACK. Madam President, I rise to join my colleague and friend
from Connecticut, Senator Lieberman, to offer this amendment updating
the PLO Commitments Compliance Act of 1989. All of us were moved by the
historic ceremony on the White House lawn on September 13, 1993. None
of us ever thought we would see the day that the Prime Minister of
Israel and the head of the PLO shaking hands and their representatives
signing the same document.
Today, 4 months later, the euphoria that many felt at that moment has
dimmed, but we knew in our hearts that it would. We knew that it would
be a long road to true peace and security for the tiny State of Israel.
We knew that we would have to be vigilant and make sure that the
commitments made by Yasser Arafat be kept, or the peace process would
collapse in another wave of violence.
We also remembered that almost 5 years before, at a press conference
in Geneva on December 14, 1988, Yasser Arafat made some of the same
commitments he made this September. At that time he committed to end
terror, recognize Israel, and accept U.N. Security Council Resolutions
242 and 338. In response, the Secretary of State George Shultz opened
the first official U.S.-PLO dialog. A few months later the U.S.
Congress, skeptical that Arafat would in fact keep his commitments,
passed the PLO Commitments Compliance Act of 1989. That bill, also
known as the Mack/Lieberman bill, required the State Department to
submit a detailed report to Congress three times a year regarding the
PLO's compliance with the Geneva commitments.
In the following months, the State Department did submit reports that
tended to gloss over numerous terrorist attacks against Israel, on the
grounds that PLO responsibility for those attacks could not be proven.
Then, on May 30, 1990, came a massive attempted terrorist attack
against the beaches of Tel Aviv. The attack was thwarted, but clearly
would have been deadly and clearly was carried out by mainstream PLO
elements. Since the State Department could not report to Congress that
the PLO was abiding by its commitments, President Bush ended the U.S./
PLO dialog.
This brings us to today. On September 9, 1993, Yasser Arafat signed
two letters, one to the Prime Minister of Israel Yitzhak Rabin, the
other to the late Foreign Minister of Norway Johan Holst. In those
letters the PLO committed to:
First, recognize the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace
and security; second, accept United Nations Security Council
Resolutions 242 and 338; third, renounce the use of terrorism and other
acts of violence; fourth, assume responsibility over all PLO elements
and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations
and discipline violators; fifth, call upon the Palestinian people in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip to take part in the steps leading to the
normalization of life, rejecting violence and terrorism, and
contributing to peace and stability; and sixth, submit amendments in
the Palestine National Council [PNC] to the Palestinian Covenant
deleting provisions inconsistent with Israel's right to exist.
The first three commitments were also made just 5 years ago in Geneva
by the same person, Yasser Arafat. The last three commitments--to take
responsibility over all PLO elements, to call for an end to the
``intifada'' against Israel, and to amend the PLO covenant--are new,
but are in effect measures to implement and give reality to the first
three commitments.
This time, the PLO's commitments were not made in a vacuum, but in
the context of the Israel/PLO Declaration of Principles and the
handshake on the White House lawn. This time, we have higher hopes that
the PLO's commitments will be kept. But we must be no less vigilant.
The day after the Arafat letters were signed outlining the six
commitments, Senator Lieberman and I spoke with and wrote to Secretary
Christopher to urge the administration to renew reporting under the PLO
Commitments Compliance Act of 1989. Secretary Christopher agreed that
the reporting, which ended when the U.S./PLO dialogue was suspended in
1990, should be resumed.
On January 11, 1994, the State Department sent to Congress the first
report since the reopening of the U.S. dialogue with the PLO. While it
was a serious report, Senator Lieberman and I were concerned that it
did not deal frankly enough with serious deficiencies in the PLO's
compliance over the past few months. Further, the report suffered from
the fact that it was not explicitly tied to the six commitments made in
September, but to the less explicit 1988 Geneva commitments.
Madam President, the Congress and the administration must monitor and
demand that the PLO abide by all its commitments, particularly those
that go to the heart of recognizing Israel's right to exist in peace
and security. If the PLO is truly committed to living side by side with
Israel and end terrorism, then why has it not amended its covenant,
which repeatedly calls for Israel's utter destruction? Why does the PLO
symbol on stationery signed by Arafat picture a map of ``Palestine''
that encompasses all of Israel? Why does Arafat refuse to consistently
condemn all terrorism by Hamas and rejectionist PLO elements? Most
importantly, if we don't frankly take the PLO to task for less than
full compliance, why should the PLO improve its behavior?
The purpose of this amendment is to update the PLO Commitments
Compliance Act by requiring the State Department to report on PLO
compliance with all six September 1993 commitments. With the law so
amended, I hope the next State Department report will report on PLO
behavior with more specificity and frankness, which will in turn help
ensure better PLO compliance with its commitments.
This amendment also provides for future reports to be submitted at
the same time as the written justifications required under the Middle
East Peace Facilitation Act, but no less than every 6 months if no such
justification is submitted. The amendment also updates the findings
section of the law to reflect the suspension and resumption of the
dialogue since the law passed in 1989.
I ask for adoption of the amendment and I ask unanimous consent that
the following documents be included in the Record at this point: First,
September 9, 1993, letters from Yasser Arafat to Prime Minister Rabin
and Foreign Minister Holst; second, September 10, 1993, letter from
Senators Mack and Lieberman to Secretary Christopher; third, January
10, 1994, State Department Report on PLO Compliance, fourth, January
24, 1994, letter from Senators Mack and Lieberman to Secretary
Christopher.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
September 9, 1993.
Yitzhak Rabin,
Prime Minister of Israel.
Mr. Prime Minister: The signing of the Declaration of
Principles marks a new era in the history of the Middle East.
In firm conviction thereof, I would like to confirm the
following PLO commitments:
The PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to
exist in peace and security.
The PLO accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions
242 and 338.
The PLO commits itself to the Middle East peace process,
and to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between the two
sides and declares that all outstanding issues relating to
permanent status will be resolved through negotiations.
The PLO considers that the signing of the Declaration of
Principles constitutes a historic event, inaugurating a new
epoch of peaceful coexistence, free from violence and all
other acts which endanger peace and stability. Accordingly,
the PLO renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of
violence and will assume responsibility over all PLO elements
and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent
violations and discipline violators.
In view of the promise of a new era and the signing of the
Declaration of Principles and based on Palestinian acceptance
of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the PLO affirms
that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny
Israel's right to exist, and the provisions of the Covenant
which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter
are now inoperative and no longer valid. Consequently, the
PLO undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council
for formal approval the necessary changes in regard to the
Palestinian Covenant.
Sincerely,
Yasser Arafat,
Chairman, the Palestine
Liberation Organization.
____
September 9, 1993.
His Excellency Johan Jorgen Holst,
Foreign Minister of Norway.
Dear Minister Holst: I would like to confirm to you that,
upon the signing of the Declaration of Principles, I will
include the following positions in my public statements.
In light of the new era marked by the signing of the
Declaration of Principles, the PLO encourages and calls upon
the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to
take part in the steps leading to the normalization of life,
rejecting violence and terrorism, contributing to peace and
stability and participating actively in shaping
reconstruction, economic development and cooperation.
Sincerely,
Yasser Arafat,
Chairman, The Palestine
Liberation Organization.
____
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, September 10, 1993.
Hon. Warren M. Christopher,
Secretary of State, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Secretary: At this historic moment in the long
struggle to attain peace in the Middle East, we are writing
you as principal sponsors of the legislation which became the
PLO Commitments Compliance Act of 1989 to express our
encouragement over the recent exchanges between Israel and
the Palestinian Liberation Organization. In light of the
statements in Mr. Arafat's letter of September 9th, we concur
that the U.S. conditions for resumption of a dialogue between
the United States and the Palestine Liberation Organization
have been met and that such a dialogue could contribute to
achieving the long-stated goals of the United States in this
region. His statements appear consistent with the policy
approach in Section 803(a) of the Act.
With the resumption of the dialogue, we believe that the
requirement for periodic reports from your Department to the
Congress, as set forth in Section 804 of the Act, concerning
PLO policies and actions, including any terrorist incidents,
again would come into effect. We are obviously entering an
important new period and we believe these reporting
provisions can be of assistance in monitoring progress toward
a lasting peace.
Sincerely,
Joseph I. Lieberman.
Connie Mack.
____
Report Pursuant of Title VIII of Public Law 101-246, Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, January 10, 1994
PLO COMMITMENTS COMPLIANCE ACT--Report on PLO Compliance
Background
The U.S. dialogue with the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), initiated in December 1988, was suspended
in June 1990 following an attempted terrorist attack on
Israel by PLO constituent group. On September 10, 1993,
President Clinton announced the United States would resume a
dialogue with the PLO on the basis of commitments undertaken
in letters of mutual recognition exchanged by Israel and the
PLO (attached). President Clinton said the commitments PLO
Chairman Arafat set forth in his letter to Israeli Prime
Minister Rabin and in a follow up letter to Norwegian Foreign
Minister Holst (attached) satisfied the U.S. conditions for
resuming the dialogue. President Clinton's September 10
statement is also attached.
On September 13 in Washington, the PLO and Israel signed a
Declaration of Principles (DOP) on interim self-government
arrangements in which the PLO committed to substantive and
wide-ranging negotiations with Israel based on UN Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
PLO involvement in terrorism and violence
June 1990--September 9, 1993
President Bush suspended the U.S.--PLO dialogue in June
1990 following an attempted terrorist seaborne raid on a Tel
Aviv beach by Abu Abbas's faction of the Palestine Liberation
Front (PLF), a PLO constituent group. During the period in
which our dialogue with the PLO was suspended (June 1990-
September 9, 1993) the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP) and Nayif Hawatmeh's faction of the
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DELP-
Hawatmeh), PLO constituent groups opposed to Arafat's
policies, conducted attacks against Israeli civilians in
Israel and the occupied territories, including an October
1991 attack by the PFLP on an Israeli bus which killed two
Israelis. There are also inconclusive reports that PLO groups
loyal to Arafat mounted terrorist operations in Israel and
the occupied territories. These include incidents such as a
July 1990 pipe bombing in Jerusalem which killed a Canadian
national and the February 1992 murder of an Israeli security
guard in Eilat.
PLO member groups conducted military operations against
Israeli forces in southern Lebanon during the June 1990-
September 1993 time frame. PLO elements opposed to the peace
process also claimed responsibility for several unsuccessful
raids into Israel from Lebanon, including attacks by the PFLP
in January 1991 and the DFLP in July 1991. An element of
Arafat's Fatah may have perpetrated an attempt seaborne raid
in September 1991 which resulted in the death of a Lebanon-
based Swedish UNIFIL officer. The unidentified assailants
never reached Israel and their specific target there is
unknown. The Israelis publicly attributed a July 1990 border
raid to Fatah and a December 1990 raid to the DFLP-Hawatmeh.
PLO groups also fired rockets into Israel on numerous
occasions.
We have no information that the PLO conducted any attacks
against U.S. citizens during this time, nor do we have
information that any PLO group engaged in acts of
international terrorism (i.e., outside Israel, the occupied
territories, and Lebanon).
Post-September 10, 1993
In his September 9 letter to Prime Minister Rabin, Arafat
affirmed that the PLO recognizes Israel's right to exist in
peace and security, accepts UN Security Council Resolutions
242 and 338, and commits itself to a peaceful resolution of
the conflict between the two sides. The PLO also ``renounces
the use of terrorism and other acts of violence . . .''
Arafat publicly reiterated the PLO's renunciation of
violence and terrorism on September 20. He instructed Fatah
activists in the territories to halt all violent activity
against Israeli and Palestinian targets. The activists appear
to have complied with these instructions with two exceptions,
the murder of Haim Mizhari on October 29, which Arafat
denounced, and the December 31 claim by the Fatah Hawks that
they murdered two Israelis in Ramallah. Two of the largest of
these activist groups, the Fatah Hawks, a Fatah-affiliated
street gang, and the Black Panthers, initially announced they
would cease activities against Israelis to comply with
Arafat's order. On October 24, Fatah issued a leaflet calling
for an end to the torture and execution of suspected
collaborators in the West Bank and Gaza. However, as the
level of violence has increased on both sides in recent
weeks, the Fatah Hawks have threatened to attack Israeli
targets in retaliation for IDF sweeps against its members.
With the exception of the December 31 claim, and to the best
of our knowledge, the group has not conducted an anti-Israeli
operation since September 10. In addition, Arafat dismissed a
senior Fatah military commander in Lebanon who publicly
advocated violent opposition to the DOP.
The level of violence in the occupied territories and the
West Bank initially declined following the White House
signing of the DOP. Since October, however, the number of
violent incidents has risen. All but one Palestinian attack
(the Mizrahi murder) has been attributed to groups which
reject the DOP and are committed to using violence to
undermine it. HAMAS and those factions of the Palestine
Islamic Jihad (PIJ) not members of the PLO are responsible
for the majority of attacks on Israelis. The PFLP and the
Hawatmeh faction of the DFLP are also responsible for some of
these attacks. While nominally under the PLO umbrella, the
PFLP and the DFLP-Hawatmeh have suspended their participation
in the PLO because of their opposition to the DOP. Both the
PFLP and the DFLP-Hawatmeh continue to mount military
operations against IDF and Southern Lebanon Army (SLA) forces
in southern Lebanon.
Shortly after the signing of the DOP, the PFLP and DFLP
resigned their positions on the Executive Committee, the PLO
policy organ, and announced they had ``frozen'' their
participation in the PLO to express their opposition to the
DOP (although they did not formally withdraw). The two groups
have aligned themselves with a number of non-PLO rejectionist
elements based in Damascus.
Only two incidents, the murder of Israeli settler Haim
Mizrahi and the December 31 claim of responsibility by the
Fatah Hawks for the murder of two Israelis, has been
attributed to a group under Arafat's control. Mizrahi was
killed when he stopped to buy eggs at a farm in the West
Bank. An Israeli investigation revealed that five members of
Fatah--acting on their own and without the foreknowledge of
the PLO headquarters in Tunis--were responsible. The Israeli
security service apprehended the suspects.
Faisal Husseini, the recently-appointed head of Arafat's
Fatah in the West Bank, immediately denounced the attack and
the individuals responsible. He told journalists that those
responsible had violated the PLO's orders and that the PLO
would take measures against anyone who violated these orders.
Arafat himself responded the following day, saying ``We
denounce and condemn the killing of Israeli settler Haim
Mizrahi.'' He called on all parties ``to oblige with the
agreement and to put an end to all acts of violence for
the preservation of peace.''
Despite his declared intention to assume responsibility
over all PLO elements and personnel, Arafat has not denounced
the attacks of the PLO groups over which he has no control
(specifically, the PFLP and the DFLP-Hawatmeh). The PLO in
Tunis does not exercise operational control over these
elements and the PLO has not provided funding for them since
at least 1991. While calling for the additional denunciations
of the violence by the PLO leadership, the Israeli Government
has made a distinction between the PLO leadership based in
Tunis and rejectionist elements over which Arafat has only
nominal control.
Since September 10, at least 17 Israelis have been killed
by Palestinians in the occupied territories and in Israel. Of
those killed, 10 were civilians and 7 were military
personnel. Approximately 28 Palestinians have been killed in
conflicts with IDF forces, and 5 have been killed by settlers
during the same period. Following is a chronological
description of the incidents of Palestinian violence since
September 10.
Most of these incidents involve Palestinian groups which
are not part of the PLO and which reject the DOP and the
PLO's recognition of Israel. This list is current as of
December 31, 1993.
September 12: Three Israeli soldiers on a routine patrol
near Gaza City were ambushed and killed. Two similar
incidents occurred the same day. We have no specific
information on other casualties. No one claimed
responsibility for any of the incidents.
September 13: An Israeli civilian was stabbed in the
occupied territories. HAMAS (Islamic Resistance) claimed
responsibility for the attack.
September 13: A suicide bomber attacked a police station in
the occupied territories. The perpetrator died; no Israelis
were killed. HAMAS claimed responsibility for the attack.
September 14: Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed
responsibility for a drive-by shooting on an IDF checkpoint
in Gaza. No one was killed.
September 22: An Israeli civilian was killed in the West
Bank. HAMAS claimed responsibility for the attack.
October 1: HAMAS claimed responsibility for a bombing in
the West Bank. No one was killed.
October 3: HAMAS claimed responsibility for a drive-by
shooting attack on a civilian in the occupied territories.
October 4: A suicide car bomber attacked an Israeli bus.
Several Israeli civilians and military were wounded. HAMAS
claimed responsibility for the attack.
October 5: PIJ elements attempted to attack a settler camp
in the occupied territories.
October 7: PIJ attempted a cross-border raid from Lebanon
into the occupied territories.
October 9: The PFLP claimed responsibility for a failed
seaborne raid on northern Israel.
October 10: Two Israeli hikers were killed near Jericho.
The DFLP, PFLP and HAMAS each claimed responsibility.
October 15: An Israeli settler was stabbed by an
unidentified Palestinian near Hebron.
October 18: The DFLP claimed responsibility for a grenade
attack on an IDF patrol near Nabulus. No one was killed;
three Palestinians were wounded.
October 19: HAMAS claimed responsibility for a shooting
attack on an Israeli civilian. No one was killed.
October 24: Two Palestinians posing as Orthodox Jews
kidnapped and killed two IDF reservists in Gaza. HAMAS
claimed responsibility for the attack.
October 25: An unidentified Palestinian attempted a car
bomb attack. No one was hurt or killed.
October 29: Israeli settler Haim Mizrahi was stabbed and
killed when he stopped to buy eggs in the West Bank. An
Israeli investigation revealed that five members of Fatah,
apparently acting independently, were responsible.
October 31: An unidentified Palestinian stabbed an Israeli
civilian in the occupied territories.
November 2: A HAMAS member was responsible for a failed car
bomb attack. The driver was killed.
November 7: HAMAS and the DFLP each claimed responsibility
for a shooting attack on an Israeli settler. The settler was
wounded and his Israeli driver was killed. We believe HAMAS
is responsible.
November 12: A Palestinian belonging to the PIJ stabbed and
wounded an Israeli in Gaza.
November 13: The DFLP claimed responsibility for an attack
on an IDF camp. No Israeli soldiers were hurt or killed.
November 15: A settler was attacked by two Palestinians
with an ax near the Tomb of Abraham in Hebron. Another
settler at the scene shot and killed one of the attackers.
The PFLP claimed responsibility for the attack.
November 16: An unidentified Palestinian stabbed and
wounded an Israeli soldier at a Gaza checkpoint. The
perpetrator was shot and killed.
November 18: An IDF officer was killed and another wounded
in Gaza. Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed responsibility for the
attack.
November 22: Israeli soldiers wounded a suicide bomber
belonging to PIJ who attempted to ram a garbage truck into a
Civil Administration (CIVAD) car. No Israelis were hurt or
killed; the perpetrator later died of his wounds.
December 1: Two Israelis were killed in the West Bank near
Al-Birah when they stopped to change a flat tire and were
fired on. Two other Israelis were wounded. HAMAS and the DFLP
both claimed responsibility for the attack.
December 5: A member of the PIJ attempted to hijack a
commuter bus near Tel Aviv. An Israeli civilian was killed;
off-duty Israeli soldiers later killed the perpetrator.
December 6: An Israeli father and son were shot and killed
in the West Bank. HAMAS claimed responsibility for the
attack.
December 7: A member of the PFLP shot and wounded an
Israeli settler near Bethlehem.
December 10: Three Palestinians attacked and stabbed their
Israeli employer in Gaza. The employer was slightly wounded,
as was the father of one of the attackers who tried to
intervene.
December 10: Unidentified Palestinians shot at an Israeli
police car from their vehicle. An officer was slightly
wounded.
December 10: A guard at the headquarters of the Gaza police
was shot and wounded. No one has claimed responsibility.
December 12: Unidentified Palestinians opened fire on a bus
in the West Bank, seriously wounding the driver.
December 13: PIJ claimed responsibility for a suicide
terrorist attack in Gaza in which an individual drove a
booby-trapped ambulance into an IDF jeep. The ambulance
driver was killed and one Israeli soldier was wounded.
December 14: A border policeman was slightly injured in an
exchange of gunfire in Gaza. One of the attackers was killed.
No one has claimed responsibility.
December 15: A Palestinian with an ax attacked an Israeli
soldier in the West Bank. IDF troops shot and killed the
attacker. The soldier was unharmed. The perpetrator's
affiliation, if any, is unknown.
December 16: Two IDF targets in Gaza were attacked with
explosives. No one was hurt or killed. No one has claimed
responsibility for the attack.
December 22: Two Israeli civilians were shot and killed in
a drive by shooting of their vehicle near Ramallah. No one
has claimed responsibility for the attack.
December 23: An Israeli security guard was killed in the
occupied territories. HAMAS claimed responsibility.
December 24: Four Palestinian gunmen opened fire on an IDF
jeep, wounding three and killing an officer. No one has
claimed responsibility for the attack. One witness claimed
the attackers shouted the name of HAMAS.
December 25: Three Israeli soldiers were wounded by a
remotely-detonated explosive device near Hebron. No one has
claimed responsibility.
December 29: Unidentified Palestinians attacked two Israeli
sanitation workers near Hebron. One of the two workers was
stabbed and is in serious condition.
December 29: Three terrorists, probably belonging to the
Abu Musa group, infiltrated northern Israel from Lebanon. No
Israelis were hurt or killed; IDF troops killed the three
infiltrators.
December 31: A man claiming to be from the Fatah Hawks
claimed responsibility for the murder of two Israeli
civilians. However, Fatah officials in Gaza reportedly denied
that they had issued any orders for this action and indicated
that any Fatah activist involved was acting on his own.
PLO statements on commitments
Since September 13, Arafat has stressed that the PLO will
adhere to UNSCR 242 and 338 in ``all their aspects'' and has
actively worked to secure support for the agreement. Some of
his statements have acknowledged the provision of the DOP
``guaranteeing security for all.'' Arafat publicly reiterated
the PLO's renunciation of violence and terrorism on September
20. There have been a number of public statements, by both
Israeli and PLO officials, that support the PLO's compliance
with the commitments it undertook in September 1993.
Following is a chronological list of some examples:
September 20: In a statement to the official PLO news
agency WAFA, Arafat publicly reiterated his opposition to
violence. He called for ``the rejection of violence and
terror'' and said that ``the establishment of a lasting,
comprehensive and just peace is the essential goal which we
all seek to accomplish.''
September 27: Arafat ordered PLO members in refugee camps
in Lebanon to turn over their arms to the Lebanese Army.
September 29: In a meeting with Israeli MAPAM party
chairman Erez, Arafat reiterated his adherence to the
implementation of all clauses of the DOP. He specifically
emphasized his call to end all acts of violence against Arabs
and Jews in the occupied territories and in Israel.
October 24: Fatah issued a leaflet calling for an end to
the torture and execution of suspected collaborators in the
occupied territories and Gaza.
October 25: Senior PLO official Nabil Sha'ath condemned the
killing of two IDF soldiers in the Gaza Strip, as well as all
other acts of violence and called for people in the West Bank
and Gaza to refrain from violence.
November 12: Faisal Husseini denounced the Fatah Hawks
members responsible for the death of Israeli settler Haim
Mizrahi. Husseini told journalists the five had violated the
PLO's orders and that the PLO would take measures against
anyone who violated these orders.
November 13: Arafat condemned the Fatah Hawks attack on
Mizrahi, saying ``we renounce and condemn the killing of
Israeli settler Mizrahi.'' Arafat said the attach was carried
out by an individual linked to the PLO who acted without the
orders of the leadership. He called on all parties to ``put
an end to all acts of violence for the preservation of
peace.''
December 13: The Unified National Leadership of the
Uprising (UNLU), which has provided leadership to the
uprising known as the ``intifada,'' issued a leaflet
expressing support for the peace process and calling on the
Palestinians to be patient. The UNLU is not a PLO constituent
group, although it is dominated by Fatah.
These statements, Chairman Arafat's letter recognizing
Israel's right to exist, and the PLO's continuing efforts to
implement the DOP indicate the PLO is repudiating its
``strategy of stages.''
In late November, the Fatah Hawks street gang unilaterally
declared they would continue the armed struggle in response
to Israeli security forces' operations against their members.
Fatah officials have denied that they ordered the December 31
acts, and we have no other evidence that the Hawks have
engaged in any attacks on Israeli military forces or
civilians since issuing this statement. In late December, the
Fatah Hawks issued a further statement calling for the
intifada to be kept at ``high levels'' and urging
confrontation with settlers. Arafat has not responded
publicly to either statement or to the December 31 claim. We
have no evidence that suggests Arafat or the PLO headquarters
in Tunis had any involvement with the Fatah Hawks' issuance
of such statements or the claimed act nor that Arafat is
directing such a policy. Arafat's ability to exercise control
over groups like the Fatah Hawks, which are basically street
gangs that are loosely affiliated with the PLO, is uncertain.
On several occasion, senior Israeli officials have made
statements indicating that the Israeli Government believes
the PLO is upholding its commitments. Prime Minister Rabin
and Foreign Minister Peres have both made public distinctions
between the PLO, which is upholding the commitments, and
rejectionist elements which seek to undermine the DOP.
Other issues
Other issues not related to the Israeli-Palestinian
Declaration of Principles have not been central to our
discussion with the PLO, and certain issues have become less
significant since the date of the enactment of the PLO
Commitments Compliance Act. For example, while the U.S.
request for the extradition of Muhammad Rashid was denied by
the Government of Greece, it did, with U.S. assistance,
convict Rashid of the 1982 bombing of a Pan Am jet in which
one person was killed. Rashid is currently incarcerated
there. We also note that there is no current extradition
request for Muhammad Zaydan (Abu Abbas) because there are no
pending criminal charges against him.
The Hawari Group is largely defunct due to the death of its
leader and PLO funding cuts. With the exception of a 1992
weapons charge in Vienna against a Hawari group member, we
have no information of Hawari Group involvement in terrorist
activity since 1990. Arafat has provided only limited funding
to Force 17, and has transferred some members to other
components. According to recent reports, Force 17 may be
reconstituted to serve in VIP protection, but would continue
to be subject to the orders against participation in violent
or terrorist acts.
The PLO has not yet made any statements of its position on
providing compensation to the American victims or the
families of American victims of PLO terrorism. With respect
to the Arab League Boycott of Israel, we continue to urge the
PLO to come out publicly against the boycott and to bring the
boycott to an end. It should be noted that in their ongoing
talks, Israel and the PLO have been discussing the economic
interaction between them, and these talks may promote the
eventual elimination of the boycott. On negotiations with
other Arab countries, the PLO is directly negotiating with
Israel in the context of both direct talks between Israel and
Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria, and multilateral discussions
which involve most other regional states.
PLO Covenant
Only the 500-member Palestine National Council (PNC) can
amend the Palestinian National Covenant. In his September 9
letter to Prime Minister Rabin, Arafat committed the PLO to
``undertake to submit to the Palestinian National Council for
formal approval the necessary changes in regard to the
Palestinian Covenant.'' Thus far, Arafat has successively
obtained approval for the DOP from the Fatah Central
Committee, the PLO Executive Committee, and the Palestinian
Central Council (PCC).
Conclusion
We believe that the PLO is complying with the commitments
embodied in the Declaration of Principles and in the letters
to Prime Minister Rabin and Foreign Minister Holst.
Rejectionist elements who claim to be under the PLO umbrella
continue to commit terrorist acts. At the same time, both the
U.S. and the Israeli Government recognize that Arafat has no
real ability to exert operational control over these groups.
In the single case in which we can confirm that members of an
active PLO group were involved in an act of violence, the PLO
leadership denounced the attack and reiterated that such
attacks should cease. There is no information indicating the
PLO leadership either directed or had knowledge of the
incident before it occurred.
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC, January 24, 1994.
Hon. Warren Christopher,
Department of State, Washington, DC.
Dear Secretary Christopher: We have read the State
Department's recent report to Congress pursuant to the PLO
Commitments Compliance Act and wish to comment on it. While
we appreciate the report's comprehensive nature and agree
that the PLO has substantially complied with its commitments,
we are concerned that a few critical points the report reads
more like a defense of the PLO's lapses than a constructively
critical guide to better behavior.
In his September 9, 1993 letters to Israeli Prime Minister
Rabin and Norwegian Foreign Minister Holst, PLO Chairman
Yassir Arafat committed to: recognize Israel's right to
exist, renounce terrorism and violence, accept UN Security
Council Resolutions 242 and 338, assure compliance of all PLO
elements and personnel, call for an end to the ``intifada'',
and submit amendments to the PLO Covenant to remove
provisions inconsistent with Israel's right to exist.
Taken together, these commitments implied the
transformation of the PLO from a terrorist organization
committed to Israel's destruction to a political organization
representing Palestinians committed to living side by side
with Israel. We recognize that such major transformations do
not happen overnight. We are concerned, however, that the
State Department report glosses over and too easily excuses
the occasions when the PLO may be unwilling or incapable of
completing such a transformation.
The report states that, ``Rejectionist elements who claim
to be under the PLO umbrella continue to commit terrorist
acts. At the same time, both the U.S. and the Israeli
governments recognize that Arafat has no real ability to
exert operational control over these groups.'' In his
September 9 letter, however, Arafat committed to ``assume
responsibility over all PLO elements'' in order to ``assure
their compliance, prevent violations and discipline
violators.''
By citing without comment Arafat's lack of control over
rejectionist elements of the PLO the report implies that
Arafat can escape responsibility for terrorism by simply
claiming lack of control. If, in fact, Arafat cannot
control the ``Fatah Hawks'' who are still within the PLO,
let alone Hamas which is clearly outside the PLO, that
does not relieve him of the responsibility to condemn
their continuing terrorist acts.
As President Clinton stated, ``leaders who seek peace must
speak out in a loud and clear voice against those who would
destroy those aspirations for peace.'' Instead, with the
exception of one statement after the murder of the Israeli
settler Haim Mizrahi by the Fatah Hawks, we have not heard a
word from the PLO leadership condemning the terrorism of
Hamas and rejectionist elements of the PLO.
Regarding the ``strategy of stages'' whereby the PLO had
declared its intent to create a Palestinian state as a first
step to eliminating Israel entirely, the report states that
Arafat's letters and the Israel/PLO agreement that the PLO is
repudiating'' such a strategy. The report, however, does not
question Arafat's refusal to take the most concrete act of
repudiation of the ``strategy of stages''--fulfilling his
commitment to seek amendment of the PLO Convenant by the
Palestine National Council. Nor does the report mention
symbolic remnants of the refusal to recognize Israel, such as
the letterhead used by the PLO's Permanent Observer Mission
to the United Nations which continues to depict ``Palestine''
as including the entirety of Israel.
What does it say about the PLO's commitment to peace if the
Palestine National Council cannot bring itself to endorse
Israel's right to exist? The State Department report, rather
than accepting these lapses, should frankly describe areas
where the United States is seeking the PLO's full compliance
with its commitments. We recognize the high level of
Administration commitment to achieving this end. This report,
however, accepts the PLO's failures without comment and
thereby seems to excuse them rather than establishing any
benchmark by which to measure progress. This undermines the
U.S. effort to improve compliance by implying that no
progress is necessary.
Notwithstanding some of the timid language in this report,
we assume that the United States remains committed to the
PLO's full compliance with its commitments, including
amending the PLO convenant, and that we will hold the PLO and
its leadership to President Clinton's appropriate standard of
``a loud and clear voice'' against violence. We would
appreciate your reassurance in this regard.
Again, we appreciate the effort behind this report and look
forward to receiving improved reports in the future.
Sincerely,
Connie Mack,
U.S. Senate.
Joseph I. Lieberman,
U.S. Senate.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I join my distinguished colleague
Senator Mack in offering this amendment to the State Department
authorization bill in order to modify an important piece of legislation
which Senator Mack and I offered in 1989 and saw enacted as the PLO
Commitments Compliance Act of 1989. With the historic events of
September 1993 when Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization
signed the declaration of principles, the search for a lasting peace in
the Middle East entered a new and hope-filled stage. But the road to
peace in that troubled region has been a long and rocky one and while
we hope that peace will at last become a reality, we must continue to
be realistic about the possibility of problems developing along the
way. Senator Mack and I believed, as did the Secretary of State, that
the resumption of a dialogue with the PLO was appropriate and in the
interests of peace and, thus, the reporting requirements of the PLO
Commitments Compliance Act were once again relevant. We have recently
received the first report by the Secretary of State since the
resumption of the dialogue.
It was apparent to Senator Mack and I that in light of the
commitments made by PLO Chairman Yassir Arafat as part of the peace
process, the PLO Commitments Compliance Act merited revision to update
its provisions and to take into account the provisions of the Middle
East Peace Facilitation Act. This amendment which we offer today brings
the PLO Commitments Compliance Act into harmony with the Middle East
Peace Facilitation Act in both the timing of the reports and the
commitments by the PLO which the administration must report on. We
believe the amendment will enable the Secretary of State to make best
use of his resources in preparing the reports required to be
transmitted to us and will give the Congress a fuller explanation of
the manner in which the PLO has complied with the important commitments
it has made on the road to peace.
Mr. President, I am hopeful that the events of September 1993 will be
marked by future generations as the beginning of the end of violence,
animosity, and war in the Middle East. But at the same time, I remain
cautious and alert to the possibility that commitments which have been
made might not be lived up to. It is critical that the Secretary of
State stay attuned to this possibility and keep the Congress fully
informed. The amendment which Senator Mack and I offer today will
ensure that this is done.
AMENDMENT No. 1294
SEC. 1. SHORT TITLE.
This act may be cited as the ``Middle East Peace
Facilitation Act of 1994''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds that--
(1) the Palestine Liberation Organization has recognized
the State of Israel's right to exit in peace and security and
to amend its covenant to recognize that fact; accepted United
Nations Security Council resolutions 242 and 338; committed
itself to the peace process and peaceful coexistence with
Israel, free from violence and all other acts which endanger
peace and stability; and assumed responsibility over all
Palestine Liberation Organization elements and personnel in
order to assure their compliance, prevent violations, and
discipline violators;
(2) Israel has recognized the Palestine Liberation
Organization as the representative of the Palestinian people;
(3) Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization signed
a Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements on September 13, 1993, at the White House;
(4) The United States has resumed a bilateral dialogue with
the Palestine Liberation Organization; and
(5) In order to implement the Declaration of Principles on
Interim Self-Government Arrangements and facilitate the
Middle East peace process, the President has requested
flexibility to suspend certain provisions of law pertaining
to the Palestine Liberation Organization.
SEC. 3. AUTHORITY TO SUSPEND CERTAIN PROVISIONS.
(a) In General.--Subject to subsection (b), beginning July
1, 1994, the President may suspend for a period of not more
than 180 days any provision of law specified in subsection
(c). The President may continue the suspension for a period
or periods of not more than 180 days if, before each such
period, the President satisfies the requirements of
subsection (b). Any suspension shall cease to be effective
after 180 days, or at such earlier date as the President may
specify.
(b) Conditions.--
(1) Consultation.--Prior to each exercise of the authority
provided in subsection (a), the President shall consult with
the relevant congressional committees. The President may not
exercise that authority until 30 days after a written policy
justification is submitted to the relevant Congressional
Committees.
(2) Presidential Certification.--The President may exercise
the authority provided in subsection (a) only if the
President certifies to the relevant congressional committees
each time he exercises such authority that--
(A) it is in the national interest of the United States to
exercise such authority; and
(B) the Palestine Liberation Organization continues to
abide in good faith by all the commitments described in
paragraph (4).
(3) Requirement for Continuing PLO Compliance.--Any
suspension under subsection (a) of a provision of law
specified in subsection (c) shall cease to be effective if
the President certifies to the relevant congressional
committees, or if the Congress determines by Joint
Resolution, that the Palestine Liberation Organization has
not continued to abide in good faith by all the commitments
described in paragraph (4).
(A) Any joint resolution under this subsection shall be
considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of
section 601(b) of the International Security Assistance and
Arms Export Control Act of 1976.
(B) For the purpose of expediting the consideration and
enactment of joint resolutions under this subsection, a
motion to proceed to the consideration of any such joint
resolution after it has been reported by the appropriate
committee shall be treated as highly privileged in the House
of Representatives.
(4) PLO Commitments Described.--The commitments referred to
in paragraphs (2) and (3) are the commitments made by the
Palestine Liberation Organization--
(A) in it letter of September 9, 1993, to the Prime
Minister of Israel; in its letter of September 9, 1993, to
the Foreign Minister of Norway to--
(i) recognize the right of the State of Israel to exist in
peace and security;
(ii) accept United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242
and 338;
(iii) renounce the use of terrorism and other acts of
violence;
(iv) assume responsibility over all PLO elements and
personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent
violations and discipline violators;
(v) call upon the Palestinian people in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip to take part in the steps leading to the
normalization of life, rejecting violence and terrorism, and
contributing to peace and stability; and
(iv) submit to the Palestine National Council for formal
approval the necessary changes to the Palestinian Covenant
regarding recognizing Israel's right to exist in peace and
security, and
(B) in, and resulting from the implementation of, the
Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government
Arrangements signed on September 13, 1993.
(c) Provisions That May Be Suspended.--The provisions that
may be suspended under the authority of subsection (a) are
the following:
(1) Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2227) as it applies with respect to the Palestine
Liberation Organization or entities associated with it.
(2) Section 114 of the Department of State Authorization
Act, Fiscal years 1984 and 1985 (22 U.S.C. 287e note) as it
applies with respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization
or entities associated with it.
(3) Section 1003 of the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act, Fiscal years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 5202).
(4) Section 37 of the Bretton Woods Agreement Act (22
U.S.C. 286w) as it applies to the granting to the Palestine
Liberation Organization of observer status or other official
status at any meeting sponsored by or associated with the
International Monetary Fund. As used in this paragraph, the
term ``other official status'' does not include membership in
the International Monetary Fund.
(d) Relevant Congressional Committees Defined.--As used in
this section, the term ``relevant congressional committees''
means--
(1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on
Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, and the Committee on
Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and
(2) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on
Appropriations of the Senate.
Mr. PELL. Madam President, this amendment will allow the President to
continue to waive legislative restrictions against the PLO. Under the
terms of the amendment, the President's authority to waive such
restrictions can be renewed indefinitely for 6 month periods.
The net effect of the amendment is to facilitate the Middle East
peace process by allowing the PLO to open an office in Washington, and
by enabling the provision of assistance to Palestinians in the West
Bank and Gaza.
The amendment builds upon legislation introduced by Senator Helms and
myself last year, which was passed by the Congress and signed into law.
This amendment is the product of a great deal of bipartisan
cooperation, and it has the full support of the State Department.
I would note for the record that the amendment preserves the
prerogatives of the Congress on this issue. Like the legislation passed
last year, the amendment does not erase any restrictions against the
PLO; it only gives the President authority to waive. The amendment also
contains strict requirements for the President to consult and notify
Congress about any use or renewal of the waiver authority.
Mr. HELMS. Madam President, this amendment puts the President's right
to waive certain provisions regarding the PLO into permanent law. The
State Department assures us these changes are necessary for the peace
process to move ahead smoothly.
Senator Pell and I have agreed to submit this amendment, and I
believe my colleagues on the other side are prepared to accept it. I
have only one final note: I do not like the PLO, and I don't trust
them. I pray that the PLO will use any new privileges responsibly and
that the President will relax U.S. policy on the PLO gradually and very
carefully.
AMENDMENT NO. 1295
On page 25, between lines 10 and 11 insert:
(4) No fee or surcharge authorized under subsection (a)(1)
may be charged to a national of a country that is a signatory
to the North American Free-Trade Agreement.
Mr. DOMENICI. Madam President, the State Department authorization
bill includes a provision, requested by the administration, that would
provide authority to the Department of State to charge a fee or
surcharge for processing machine-readable nonimmigrant visas, border-
crossing identification cards, and regular nonimmigrant visas. The
Department intends to exercise this authority, if provided, by imposing
a $20 application fee for machine readable nonimmigrant visas.
While this fee will not fall on American citizens, it will have an
impact on those who cross our borders as either tourists or
businessmen. Therefore, it could have a negative impact on efforts to
open our borders to more trade and commerce.
In addition, the United States recently imposed two increases to user
fees that affect cross-border traffic; the Customs user fee was
increased from $5 to $6.50, and the INS international airline fee was
increased from $5 to $6.
Now, the income from both these fees goes to support worthy programs;
indeed, the income from the visa fee will support improved border
security and monitoring of aliens who enter the United States. However,
most worthy programs are supported through general tax revenues. To the
extent these programs are worthy, perhaps they should compete with
other programs of Government that are not susceptible to user fees.
Perhaps the biggest concern I have is the possible impact on the
North American Free-Trade Agreement. The very concept of NAFTA implies
that we will make commercial and business interchange between Canada,
Mexico, and the United States easier and less expensive. That is why
tariffs are being reduced. The imposition of a new user fee is contrary
to that spirit.
In addition, and perhaps most importantly, in practice this fee would
apply to Mexican citizens and not Canadian citizens. Under NAFTA we
should be treating both countries on an equal basis.
While I am willing to accept the administration's proposal for a new
fee program, I believe the signatories to NAFTA should be treated on an
equal basis and that both Canada and Mexico should be exempt from this
fee. Therefore, I am offering an amendment which would make this
change, which the State Department has indicated is acceptable. I urge
the managers and the Senate to accept it.
amendment no. 1296
(Purpose: To amend the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal
year 1993, to impose sanctions on certain transfers of equipment and
technology used in the manufacture or delivery of weapons of mass
destruction and to impose additional sanctions for violations of that
Act)
At the appropriate place in the bill, insert the following
new title:
IRAN-IRAQ ARMS NON-PROLIFERATION AMENDMENTS OF 1994
SEC. 01. SHORT TITLE, REFERENCES IN ACT.
(a) Short Title.--This title may be cited as the ``Iran-
Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Amendments of 1994.''
(b) Reference in Title.--Except as specifically provided in
this title, whenever in this title an amendment or repeal is
expressed as an amendment to or repeal of a provision, the
reference shall be deemed to be made to the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993.
SEC. 02. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to halt the
proliferation of advanced conventional weapons within Iran
and Iraq.
SEC. 03. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE.
It is the purpose of this title to impose additional
sanctions against those foreign countries and persons that
transfer destabilizing numbers and types of advanced
conventional weapons, or goods and technology that assist in
enhancing the capabilities of Iran and Iraq to manufacture
and deliver such weapons.
SEC. 04. SANCTIONS AGAINST PERSONS.
Section 1604 is amended to read as follows:
``(a) Prohibition.--If the President determines that any
person has transferred or retransferred goods or technology
so as to contribute knowingly and materially to the efforts
by Iran or Iraq (or any agency or instrumentality of either
such country) to acquire destabilizing numbers and types of
advanced conventional weapons, then--
``(1) the sanctions described in subsection (b) shall be
imposed; and
``(2) the President may apply, in the discretion of the
President, the sanctions described in subsection (c).
``(b) Mandatory Sanctions.--The sanctions to be imposed
pursuant to subsection (a)(1) are as follows:
``(1) Procurement sanction.--Except as provided in
subsection (d), the United States Government shall not
procure directly or indirectly, or enter into any contract
for the procurement of, any goods or services from the
sanctioned person.
``(2) Export sanction.--The United States Government shall
not issue any license for any export by or to the sanctioned
person.
``(c) Discretionary Sanctions.--The sanctions referred to
in subsection (a)(2) are as follows:
``(1) Transiting united states territory.--
(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law (other than
a treaty or other international agreement), no employee or
official of a sanctioned person and no good or technology
that is manufactured, produced, sold, or shipped by the
sanctioned person may transit by vessel or aircraft any
territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
The Secretary of Transportation may promulgate regulations,
as necessary, to provide for the implementation of this
sanction in the most effective manner.
(B) The Secretary of Transportation may provide for such
exceptions from this paragraph as the Secretary considers in
the interest of the United States.
``(2) Financial institutions.--(A) The President may by
order prohibit any depositary institution that is chartered
by, or that has its principal place of business within, a
State or the United States from making any loan or providing
any credit to the sanctioned person, except for loans or
credits for the purpose of purchasing food or other
agricultural commodities.
``(B) As used in this paragraph, the term `depository
institution' means a bank or savings association, as defined
in section 3 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.
``(3) Use of authorities of the international emergency
economic powers act.--The President may exercise the
authorities of the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act to prohibit any transaction involving any property in
which the sanctioned person has any interest whatsoever
except for transactions involving the provision of
humanitarian assistance.
``(4) Prohbition on vessels that enter ports of sanctioned
countries to engage in trade.--
``(A) In General.--Beginning on the 10th day after a
sanction is imposed under this Act against a country, a
vessel which enters a port or place in the sanctioned country
to engage in the trade of goods or services may not if the
President so requires within 180 days after departure from
such port or place in the sanctioned country, load or unload
any freight at any place in the United States.
``(B) Definitions.--As used in this paragraph, the term
`vessel' includes every description of water craft or other
contrivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of
transportation in water, but does not include aircraft.
``(d) Exceptions.--The sanction described in subsection
(b)(1) shall not apply--
``(1) in the case of procurement of defense articles or
defense services--
``(A) under existing contracts or subcontracts, including
the exercise of options for production quantities to satisfy
operational military requirements essential to the national
security of the United States;
``(B) if the President determines that the person or other
entity to which the sanctions would otherwise be applied is a
sole source supplier of the defense articles or services,
that the defense articles or services are essential, and that
alternative sources are not readily or reasonably available;
or
``(C) if the President determines that such articles or
services are essential to the national security under defense
coproduction agreements;
``(2) to products or services provided under contracts
entered into before the date on which the President makes a
determination under subsection (a),
``(3) in the case of contracts entered into before the date
on which the President makes a determination under subsection
(a), with respect to--
``(A) spare parts which are essential to United States
products or production; or
``(B) component parts, but not finished products essential
to United States products or production; or
``(C) routine servicing and maintenance of products, to the
extent that alternatives sources are not readily or
reasonably available;
``(4) to information and technology essential to United
States products or production; or
``(5) to medical or other humanitarian items.
``(e) Consultation With and Actions by Foreign Government
of Jurisdiction.--
``(1) Consultations.--Whenever the President makes a
determination under subsection (a) with respect to a foreign
person, the Congress urges the President--
``(A) to initiate consultations immediately with the
government with primary jurisdiction over that foreign person
with respect to the imposition of sanctions pursuant to this
section; and, as appropriate,
``(B) to take steps in the United Nations and other
multilateral groups to negotiate comprehensive multilateral
sanctions pursuant to the provisions of chapter 7 of the
United Nations Charter, including a partial or complete
embargo, against the government of the foreign country of
primary jurisdiction over that sanctioned person, as long as
that government has not taken specific and effective actions,
including appropriate penalties, to terminate the involvement
of the sanctioned person or firm in the activities described
in section 1604(a).
``(2) Actions by Government of Jurisdiction.--In order to
pursue such consultations with the government, the President
may delay imposition of sanctions pursuant to subsections
(b) and (c) for up to 90 days. Following these
consultations, the President shall impose sanctions
immediately unless the President determines and certifies
to the Congress that that government has taken specific
and effective actions, including appropriate penalties, to
terminate the involvement of the foreign person in the
activities described in subsection (a). The President may
delay the imposition of sanctions for up to an additional
90 days if the President determines and certifies to the
Congress that that government is in the process of taking
the actions described in the preceding sentence.
``(3) Report to congress.--Not later than 90 days after the
application of sanctions under this section, the President
shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the
Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives
a report on the status of consultations with the appropriate
government under this subsection, and the basis for any
determination under paragraph (2) of this subsection that
such government has taken specific corrective action.''
SEC. 05. SANCTIONS AGAINST CERTAIN FOREIGN COUNTRIES.
Section 1605 is amended--
(1) in subsection (a)--
(B) in paragraph (2), by striking ``sanction'' and
inserting ``sanctions'';
(2) in subsection (c)--
(A) by striking ``sanction.--The sanction referred to in
subsection (a)(2) is'' and inserting ``sanctions.--The
sanctions referred to in subsection (a)(2) are''; and
(B) by adding at the end the following new paragraphs:
``(3) Denial of most-favored-nation status.--
Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, the President
may suspend the application of nondiscriminatory trade
agreement (most-favored-nation status) to the sanctioned
country for such time as the President so determines.
``(4) Diplomatic relations.--The President is urged to
downgrade or suspend diplomatic relations between the United
States and the government of the sanctioned country.
``(5) Suspension of special trade privileges.--The
President is authorized to suspend special trade privileges
which were extended pursuant to the Generalized Systems of
Preferences or the Caribbean Basin Initiative.
``(6) Suspension of trade agreements.--The President is
authorized to suspend any trade agreement with the sanctioned
country.
``(7) Revocations of licenses for export of nuclear
material.--The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is authorized to
revoke any license for the export of nuclear material
pursuant to a nuclear cooperation agreement with the
sanctioned country.
``(8) Presidential action regarding aviation.--
(A)(i) The President is authorized to notify the government
of a sanctioned country of his intention to suspend the
authority of foreign air carriers owned or controlled by the
government of that country to engage in foreign air
transportation to or from the United States.
``(ii) The President is authorized to direct the Secretary
of Transportation to suspend at the earliest possible date
the authority of any foreign air carrier owned or controlled,
directly or indirectly, by that government to engage in
foreign air transportation to or from the United States,
notwithstanding any agreement relating to air services.
``(B)(i) The President may direct the Secretary of State to
terminate any air service agreement between the United States
and a sanctioned country in accordance with the provisions of
that agreement.
``(ii) Upon termination of an agreement under this
subparagraph, the Secretary of Transportation is authorized
to take such steps as may be necessary to revoke at the
earliest possible date the right of any foreign air carrier
owned, or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the
government of that country to engage in foreign air
transportation to or from the United States.
``(C) The President may direct the Secretary of
Transportation to provide for such exceptions from this
subsection as the President considers necessary to provide
for emergencies in which the safety of an aircraft or its
crew or passengers is threatened.
``(D) For purposes of this paragraph, the terms `aircraft',
`air carrier', `air transportation', and `foreign air
carrier' have the meanings given those terms in section 101
of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (49 U.S.C. 1301).
``(9) Other sanctions.--The President may apply the
sanctions described in section 1605(c) with respect to
actions of a foreign government.''
SEC. 06. WAIVER.
Section 1606 is amended--
(1) ``by striking ``waiver'' each place it appears and
inserting ``modification, and waiver''; and
(2) by striking ``waive'' each place it appears and
inserting ``modify or waive''.
SEC. 07. TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.
The Act is amended by inserting after section 1606 the
following new section:
``SEC. 1606A. TERMINATION OF SANCTIONS.
``Except as otherwise provided in this title, the sanctions
imposed pursuant to the Act shall apply for a period of at
least 24 months following the imposition of sanctions and
shall cease to apply thereafter only if the President
determines and certifies to the Congress that--
``(1) reliable information indicates that the government of
jurisdiction has taken specific and effective action,
including appropriate penalties, to terminate the
involvement of the sanctioned person in the sanctionable
activity.
``(2) The President has received reliable assurances from
the sanctioned government that such government will not, in
the future, violate this Act.''
SEC. 08. STAY OF SANCTIONS.
The Act is amended by inserting after section 1607 the
following new section:
(a) Criterion for Stay.--The President may stay the
imposition of any sanction on any entity in order to
protect--
(1) ongoing criminal investigations, or
(2) sensitive intelligence sources and methods which are
being used to acquire further information on the
proliferation of advanced conventional weapons, weapons of
mass destruction, or missiles that would be comprised by the
publication of the sanctioned entity's name.
(a) Determination.--The President shall exercise the
authority described in paragraph (1) only when the President
determines that the non-proliferation goals of the Act are
better served by delaying the imposition of sanctions rather
than by compromising the criminal investigation or
intelligence sources and methods at issue.
(c) Lifting of Stay.--The President shall lift any stay
imposed pursuant to this subsection as soon as the basis for
the determination made pursuant to paragraph (2) no longer
exists.
(d) Notification and Report to Congress.--Whenever the
duration of any stay imposed pursuant to this subsection
exceeds 120 days, the President shall promptly report to the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives the rationale and circumstances that led the
President to exercise the stay authority.
SEC. 09. RULES AND REGULATIONS.
The Act is amended by inserting after section 1607 the
following new section:
``SEC. 1607A. RULES AND REGULATIONS.
``The President is authorized to prescribe such rules and
regulations as the President may require to carry out this
Act.''
SEC. 10. DEFINITIONS.
Section 1608 is amended by adding at the end the following
new paragraph:
``(8) The terms `goods and technology' includes any item of
the type that is listed on the Nuclear Referral List under
section 309(c) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978,
the United States Munitions List (established in section 38
of the Arms Export Control Act), or the MTCR Annex (as
defined in section 74(4) of the Arms Export Control Act) or
any item that is subject to licensing by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.
``(9) The term `United States' includes territories and
possessions of the United States and the customs waters of
the United States, as defined in section 401 of the Tariff
Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1401).
Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, I rise today to propose with my
colleague from Connecticut, Senator Lieberman, the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-
Proliferation Amendments of 1994 as an amendment to S. 1281, the State
Department authorization bill for fiscal years 1994 and 1995. This
legislation has the support of the administration and the Foreign
Relations Committee and is similar to a bill introduced last year by
Senator Lieberman and myself, which was cosponsored by Senators
Bumpers, Campbell, D'Amato, and Hutchison.
I would like to express my appreciation to Senator Lieberman and his
staff, to the staff of the National Security Council, and to the
members and staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for their
assistance in crafting this final version of the legislation. With this
amendment, we hope to continue in a bipartisan effort to reduce one of
the greatest threats to world peace today--the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and advanced conventional weaponry to Iraq and
Iran.
Purpose of the Amendment
Madam President, both Iraq and Iran have reemerged as continuing
threats to the peace and stability of the Middle East, and thus pose a
threat to the stability of the post-cold-war world. The amendment
offered by Senator Lieberman and myself is intended to halt these
nations' efforts to build or acquire destabilizing advanced
conventional weapons.
Our amendment would fill a gap in existing nonproliferation statutes
by providing for sanctions against third parties who assist Iran or
Iraq in their ongoing efforts to build or acquire these weapons.
This amendment builds on legislation which I cosponsored in 1992 with
then-Senator Gore and which was subsequently enacted into law as part
of the Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1993. That law
provides for sanctions which may be imposed against United States and
foreign persons, as well as foreign countries, that provide such
assistance to Iran and Iraq in acquiring weapons of mass destruction or
destabilizing advanced conventional weapons. That law also authorizes
sanctions which may be imposed against Iran or Iraq for their own
actions.
However, due to their limited scope, current sanction provisions have
proven less than effective in deterring third-party violators, whether
foreign countries or persons. Our amendment recognizes that sanctions
focused primarily on United States individuals and firms do not affect
the principal suppliers of weapons to Iran or Iraq. It is these third-
party violations which present the most urgent threat to world
stability by making available to Iran and Iraq both technology and the
weapons of mass destruction, means of their delivery, and destabilizing
advanced conventional weapons.
This amendment would give the President the authority to impose
additional discretionary sanctions when violators are identified using
typical intelligence methods. The legislation is intended to allow the
President the maximum leeway practical in determining the appropriate
sanctions.
The amendment is slightly different from the original bill we
introduced last year. It does not include a section from the original
bill which provided for import sanctions against persons found in
violation of the law. We have removed this section on the advice of the
staff of the Foreign Relations Committee because import sanctions
constitute a form of revenue and such measures must originate in the
House of Representatives.
Let me be clear, however, that import sanctions would greatly enhance
the effectiveness of this legislation. Should this bill be returned by
the conferees with the import sanctions which were included in our
original bill, I fully expect the Senate would support its adoption.
We must use every measure to fight the transfer of weapons and
military technology to Iran and Iraq. International arms control
agreements and regimes are vital, but they often lack effective
enforcement mechanisms; some, like the Biological Weapons Convention,
have no teeth at all. Other nations will be far more likely to support
and comply with arms control regimes if they know that a failure to do
so could cost them access to U.S. technology, aid, and markets.
Strong penalties that affect primarily United States businesses
ignore the fact that most sales to Iran and Iraq come from foreign
sources. Thus, U.S.-only sanctions penalize American firms without
solving the problem. In fact, in my view, they help foreign
competition.
It is critical and essential to give our President the authority to
sanction all violators with sufficient severity to compel compliance
with the regime. It is critical and essential to sanction those foreign
entities who would act to help Iran and Iraq acquire menacing,
destabilizing weapons or technology.
The Threat from Iraq and Iran
As I have said, both Iraq and Iran are nations that will continue to
pose a threat to peace and stability in the Middle East and the post-
cold war world.
In the past, Iraq has used poison gas against defenseless Kurdish
civilians, invaded Iran and Kuwait, and launched missile attacks on
cities in Israel and Saudi Arabia. Just last year, Iraq blew up relief
convoys to the Kurds, used its army against the Shiites, supported
terrorist attacks, carried out terrorist operations in Turkey,
continued to block U.N. efforts to destroy its weapons of mass
destruction, and arrested innocent civilians along the Kuwaiti border
as spies. Iraq even attempted to assassinate President Bush.
Iraq never had significant supplies of United States weapons or
technology, but received well over $100 billion of advanced
conventional arms and $27 billion of technology and supplies for
weapons of mass destruction from other nations during the Iran-Iraq war
and in the period just before the Persian Gulf war. Many of these later
transfers came from Europe, and most came from nations that have signed
or ratified international arms control agreements.
Iraq has finally agreed to long-term monitoring of its arms
potential, which will require intricate monitoring of some 100 critical
sites in the country and over 1,000 industrial establishments capable
of producing components for weapons of mass destruction, according to
the International Atomic Energy Agency. This massive and expensive
monitoring effort is required because of Iraq's continued efforts to
rebuild its offensive military capabilities.
Iran is also a threat to its neighbors and to regional security. In
the past, it has encouraged terrorism and has seized islands in the
gulf. Iran continues to steadily expand its military capabilities,
including acquiring several submarines to patrol the waters of the
gulf, and is aggressively seeking advanced weapons and related
technology.
Unlike Iraq, whose efforts to acquire arms were stymied by their
defeat in the gulf war, Iran has had access to continuing supplies of
arms, technology, and supplies for weapons of mass destruction. Since
1988, some 65 percent of all Iran's arms have come from Russia; 16
percent have come from China; 8 percent from Europe; and 10 percent
from other nations. Iran has received 6.7 billion dollars' worth of
arms since 1988 and well over 1 billion dollars' worth of technology
and supplies for weapons of mass destruction.
key elements
Let me briefly summarize the four key elements of our amendment.
First, our amendment clearly sets forth United States policy toward
destabilizing arms sales to Iran and Iraq, and reinforces
the importance of rigorously enforcing existing laws, such as the Arms
Export Control Act.
Second, our amendment would put needed additional pressure on the
foreign suppliers to these countries, who have provided most of the
advanced weapons and technology to Iran and Iraq.
Third, our amendment builds on existing law that prohibits the
transfer of equipment or technology that would contribute to the
efforts by Iran or Iraq to acquire destabilizing numbers and types of
advanced conventional weapons.
Fourth and most important, our amendment would strengthen existing
sanctions for violators and provide the President with the flexibility
to impose new discretionary sanctions, which would act to deter
potential violators by confronting them with clear legal and economic
penalties if they persist in aiding the military buildup in Iran and
Iraq.
mandatory sanctions in current law
The existing Iran-Iraq nonproliferation legislation provides for the
following sanctions:
Against persons--United States or foreign: Prohibition on receiving
U.S. Government contracts; and prohibition on receiving United States
export licenses.
Against foreign countries: Suspension of United States and
multilateral development bank assistance; and suspension of
codevelopment, coproduction, and military and dual-use technical
exchange agreements.
These mandatory sanctions apply to all offenders, although the
President may waive them in the event of urgent national security
needs.
discretionary sanctions
Current law provides for the discretionary use of authorities of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act to block international
financial transactions of United States or foreign persons or foreign
governments that assist Iran or Iraq in their weapons acquisition
efforts. The McCain-Lieberman amendment provides for the following new
discretionary sanctions:
Against persons and countries.--United States or foreign: Prohibition
against assistance from financial institutions; and suspension of U.S.
aviation and port rights, and a prohibition on transiting U.S.
territory.
Against foreign countries: Denial of most-favored-nation status;
suspension of diplomatic relations, special trade privileges, and trade
agreements; and revocations of licenses for nuclear material exports.
These sanctions would serve as a deterrent to potential violators of
the law and would allow the President to tailor his actions and impose
those sanctions that would be most effective in a particular situation.
encouraging multilateral cooperation
Our amendment does not mandate action by the United States when
foreign governments are willing to take real and decisive action on
their own. The legislation offers traditional incentives for foreign
governments to join in international arms control efforts and to pass
and enforce national legislation that parallels the nonproliferation
legislation adopted by the United States.
Our bill is not intended as a substitute for other efforts to control
arms transfers and proliferation. We believe that every effort should
be made to reach international and regional agreements and to persuade
foreign governments to establish sanctions on the actions of their own
companies and citizens. At the same time, we acknowledge that certain
nations present a special threat to their neighbors, our allies, and
American strategic interests. Iran and Iraq are two such nations, and
our bill reinforces the seriousness we attach to the threat posed by
Iran and Iraq.
urgency
Madam President, we must enact the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation
Amendments soon. We must heed the lessons of Desert Storm and stop the
weapons buildup by Iran and Iraq. We cannot make an ally or a pillar
out of either country. A look at the Washington Post of January 23,
1994, makes clear the danger of harboring any illusions about the
prospects for real change in Iraq.
An article in that Sunday newspaper raises once again the specter of
Iraq's aggressive efforts to rebuild its chemical weapons program. If
true, this is another example of Iraq's duplicitous behavior and its
refusal to accept international norms prohibiting the use or
manufacture of chemical weapons. In this instance, our amendment would
permit the President to impose sanctions not only against Iraq, but
against the companies or countries that financed, produced, packed, or
shipped this dangerous material. These extensive sanctions are not
available under current law.
In summary, the proposed amendments complement existing legislation
in the fiscal year 1993 Defense Authorization Act and other U.S. and
international arms control efforts. Together with rigorous enforcement
of existing law, this amendment would improve the stability and
security of the gulf region. It will help protect key friends and
allies elsewhere in the Middle East, like Israel and Egypt.
Senator Lieberman and I urge our colleagues to continue to support a
bipartisan effort to reduce the greatest potential threat to peace in
the world today, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and
advanced conventional weapons in Iran and Iraq. I urge the adoption of
our amendment.
Mr. LIEBERMAN. Madam President, I am pleased to join my distinguished
colleague, Senator McCain, in sponsoring this amendment, which
addresses a serious proliferation threat: The transfer of advanced
conventional weaponry to Iran and Iraq. Senator McCain has already
described the purpose and principal elements of our amendment, so I
will not reiterate them here. I do, however, want to emphasize the
urgency of the proliferation threat we face and the need to address it.
Iran is engaged in an across-the-board buildup of its military.
Despite falling oil prices, Iran continues to spend money on its armed
forces, purchasing weapon systems which will strengthen its ability to
block shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. In addition to acquiring
attack submarines from Russia, Iran has recently purchased improved
mines which can be used against passing ships, and is currently
negotiating the purchase of advanced antiship missiles. Iraq is
attempting to reestablish its weapons arsenal, while at the same time
obstructing United Nations efforts to ensure compliance with
resolutions aimed at restricting that arsenal. Unless we take decisive
action now to deal with these two states, we may, by our passivity,
ensure the success of their endeavors.
Given the adverse effect such success would have on regional and,
indeed, on international stability, this amendment is designed to
discourage foreign persons and countries from providing Iran and Iraq
with advanced conventional weapons or with technology and equipment
that would enhance their advanced weapons capabilities. While U.S. law
generally offers adequate sanctions against abuses by U.S. entities,
smiliar measures are needed for foreign entities. Such measures could
prove effective because Iran and Iraq rely on foreign suppliers for
both weapons and technical assistance. Under this amendment, sanctions
can now be applied against these suppliers. It is our hope that the
sanctions which Senator McCain has outlined for you will provide strong
disincentive to would-be proliferators.
I want to emphasize this amendment builds upon legislation we agreed
upon in the fiscal year 1993 National Defense Authorization Act. This
act mandated certain sanctions against persons and foreign countries
that contribute goods or technology to help Iran or Iraq acquire
advanced conventional weapons. Our amendment revises and extends the
provisions of the act principally by giving the President additional,
discretionary authority to apply a wide range of sanctions against
proliferators. I believe such authority is fully consistent with the
purpose and direction of the existing legislation.
Madam President, the provisions of this amendment will enhance the
U.S.'s ability to counter the spread of destabilizing weaponry in two
particularly dangerous states. These provisions should serve as a
deterrent to current and potential violators and should slow, or
hopefully even prevent, Iran and Iraq from achieving their military
ambitions. I strongly urge my colleagues to join Senator McCain and me
in supporting this amendment.
amendment no. 1297
At the appropriate place in the bill insert:
SEC. . REIMBURSEMENT OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.
Section 208 of title 3, United States Code, is amended by
inserting at the end the following new subsection:
``(c) Out of funds otherwise available for fiscal year 1994
and fiscal year 1995 for ``Protection of Foreign Missions and
Officials,'' the Secretary of State is authorized to
reimburse the City of Seattle and State of Washington up to a
total of $440,000 for fiscal year 1994 and $500,000 for
fiscal year 1995 for unexpected extraordinary security costs
associated with the change in the level of the participation
in the Asian Pacific Cooperation conference held in Seattle
in November 1993 from Ministerial to Heads-of-State.
amendment no. 1298
(Purpose: To require a report on the activities of the People's
Mujaheddin of Iran)
On page , between lines and , insert the following:
Sec. . (a) Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The People's Mujaheddin of Iran receives material,
logistic, and financial support from the Iraq Government.
(2) The People's Mujaheddin of Iran has been involved in
terrorist activities since the inception of the organization
in 1963.
(3) During the past 30 years, terrorist activities of the
People's Mujaheddin of Iran have resulted in the deaths of
more than 10,000 Iranians.
(4) The People's Mujaheddin of Iran is responsible for the
deaths of several United States military advisers in 1972 and
1973, for the deaths of two Air Force officers in 1975, and
the deaths of three United States employees of the Rockwell
International Corporation in 1976.
(5) The People's Mujaheddin of Iran actively and vigorously
supported the seizure of the United States Embassy in Tehran,
Iran, in 1979.
(6) The Department of State informally recognizes the
involvement of the People's Mujaheddin of Iran in
international terrorist activities and has refused contact
with representatives of the organization.
(7) The annual report of the Secretary of State on
terrorist activities does not provide adequate information on
the terrorist activities of the People's Mujaheddin of Iran.
(8) The past activities of the People's Mujaheddin of Iran,
and the current policy of the Department of State with
respect to the organization, create a presumption that the
organization is currently engaged in international terrorist
activities.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (d), the annual report
of the Secretary of State that is submitted to Congress on
April 30, 1994, under section 140 of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (Public Law
100-204; 22 U.S.C. 2656f) shall include information referred
to in subsection (c) on the People's Mujaheddin of Iran.
(c) The report referred to in subsection (b) shall
include--
(1) an assessment of the activities of the People's
Mujaheddin of Iran in accordance with subsection (a)(1) of
such section 140; and
(2) any other relevant information on the People's
Mujaheddin of Iran referred to in subsection (a)(2) of such
section 140, including a detailed discussion of each of the
matters referred to in subparagraphs (a) through (D) of
subsection (b)(2) of such section.
(d) The Secretary may elect not to include the information
referred to in subsection (c) in the report referred to in
subsection (b). In the event of such an election, the
Secretary shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
Senate a justification for such election.
(e) In the event of an election under subsection (d), not
less than sixty days from the submittal of the report
referred to in subsection (b), the Secretary shall submit an
unclassified report to Congress detailing the structure
current activities, external support and history of the
People's Mujaheddin of Iran. Such report shall include any
connection to organizations operating in the United States.
(f) In this section, the term ``People's Mujaheddin of
Iran'' means the organization also know as the Mujaheddin-e
Khalq that is based in Iraq and led by Iranian expatriates
Massoud Rajavi or Maryam Rajavi and includes any group or
organization associated with such organization, including the
Iraqi-based National Liberation Army and the National Council
of Resistance of Iran.
amendment no. 1299
(Purpose: To impose notification and waiting requirements regarding
certain events involving the Missile Technology Control Regime)
On page 179, after line 6, add the following:
SEC. 714. NOTIFICATION OF CONGRESS ON CERTAIN EVENT INVOLVING
THE MTCR.
(a) Export in Support of Space Launch Vehicle (SLV)
Programs.--At least 30 days before the export of any item
controlled pursuant to United States obligations under the
Missile Technology Control Regime and intended to support the
design, development, or production of a Category I system, as
defined in the MTCR Annex, to be utilized for the launch of
satellites into space, the President shall transmit to
Congress a report describing the proposed export and the
rationale for approving such export, including the
consistency of such export with United States missile
nonproliferation policy. The President may waive the 30-day
waiting period in any case in which the President certifies
in the report that the national security interests of the
United States necessitate immediate approval of the export or
that the export represents the continuation of a long-
standing relationship with an MTCR partner.
(b) United States Position Regarding Admission of New MTCR
Members.--At least 30 days before the United States takes the
position to favor the admission of a particular country into
the Missile Technology Control Regime, the President shall
transmit to Congress a report describing the rationale for
such position together with all relevant information
concerning that country's nonproliferation policies,
practices,and commitments. The President may waive the 30-day
waiting period in any case in which the President certifies
in the report that the national security interests of the
United States necessitate immediate approval of the new
member.
(c) Definitions.--For purposes of this section--
(1) the terms ``Missile Technology Control Regime'' and
``MTCR'' mean the policy statement, between the United
States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany,
France, Italy, Canada, and Japan, announced on April 16,
1987, to restrict sensitive missile-relevant transfers based
on the MTCR Annex, and any amendments thereto; and
(2) the term ``MTCR Annex'' means the Guidelines and
Equipment and Technology Annex of the MTCR, and any
amendments thereto.
amendment no. 1300
(Purpose: To retain the statutory charter of the Office of Foreign
Missions to assist with diplomatic reciprocity and counterintelligence
functions)
On page 43, beginning on line 22, strike section 138 of the
bill.
On page 3, strike from the table of contents of the bill
the item relating to section 138.
Mr. DeCONCINI. Madam President, the purpose of this amendment is
simple. It would preserve in law the existing status of the Office of
Foreign Missions [OFM] within the Department of State.
That office was created in 1982 by the Department of State
Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1982 and 1983--Public Law 97-241. At
the time Congress was concerned that foreign diplomats in the United
States were enjoying benefits denied to U.S. diplomats abroad. The
Office of Foreign Missions, by controlling the privileges of foreign
diplomats in the United States, gives us the means to improve the
treatment of U.S. diplomatic personnel abroad. Congress also sought to
ensure that the OFM assisted the Federal Bureau of Investigation in its
counterintelligence mission.
The cold war may have ended, but nothing has happened to alter OFM's
charter. Indeed, it plays as important a role today as when it was
created in 1982.
Section 138 of the bill would, in the interests of streamlining and
consolidating functions under the Secretary of State, abolish the
statutory mandate for the OFM, leaving its continued existence a matter
of discretion for future Secretaries.
Senator Warner and I believe this is undesirable, inevitably
weakening the status of the office. Also, by mandating the existence of
the office in law the State Department is relieved of the burden of
explaining and justifying to other governments why their diplomats in
the United States must be regulated. The Department ought to appreciate
having a congressional enactment to rely on in this regard.
In short, we believe that the statutory provisions relating to OFM
should remain intact. That is all our amendment would do.
Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the letter dated August
3, 1993, which Senator Warner and I sent to the Committee on Foreign
Relations concerning this amendment be printed in the Record.
Mr. President, I understand that this amendment is agreeable to the
floor managers on both sides and thus I hope that it can be accepted by
voice vote.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee on Intelligence,
Washington, DC, August 3, 1993.
Hon. Claiborne Pell,
Chairman,
Hon. Jesse Helms,
Ranking Republican,
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Gentlemen: Section 138 of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995 (S. 1281) would
abolish the statutory mandate for the Office of Foreign
Missions (OFM). In our judgment, the establishment and
operation of the OFM is vital to the effective conduct of
U.S. diplomatic and counterintelligence affairs. We fear that
both would suffer if OFM's statutory charter is repealed. We
respectfully urge, therefore, that appropriate action be
taken to remove Section 138 from the bill.
In 1982, Congress created the OFM in the Department of
State Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1982 and 1983
(Public Law 97-241). Congress was concerned that foreign
diplomats in the U.S. enjoyed benefits denied to U.S.
diplomats abroad. The OFM, by controlling the privileges of
foreign diplomats in the U.S., gave the U.S. the means to
improve the treatment of U.S. personnel abroad. Congress also
sought to ensure that the OFM assisted the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) in the performance of its
counterintelligence mission. Repeal of OFM's charter would
likely impair the provision of this crucial support to the
FBI.
It was not clear to us from your Committee's report why the
change in the OFM statute was recommended. If, as it appears,
the motivation was simply to give the Secretary of State
additional organizational flexibility, we urge you to
reconsider the matter. In our view, the existence of OFM is
of vital importance and should not depend upon the decision
of an executive branch official. We would note also that
mandating the existence of the office by law relieves the
Department of State of the burden of explaining and
justifying its existence to foreign countries which
undoubtedly would prefer that their diplomats not be
regulated.
We appreciate the opportunity to present our views on this
matter and we look forward to working with you on it.
Sincerely,
Dennis DeConcini,
Chairman.
John W. Warner,
Vice Chairman.
amendment no. 1301
(Purpose: To encourage the assignment of Foreign Service officers with
advanced proficiency in foreign languages)
On page 65, after line 12, insert the following new
section:
SEC. 155. ASSIGNMENT OF FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS WITH
ADVANCED PROFICIENCY IN FOREIGN LANGUAGES.
(a) Purpose.--It is the purpose of this section to
encourage the assignment of Foreign Service personnel with
language proficiency at the S4/R4 level (full professional
proficiency, as tested by the Foreign Service Institute) to
posts or positions in which their language capabilities are
effectively utilized.
(b) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
(1) the Department of State's Office of the Inspector
General noted, in its July 1993 report, that existing foreign
language proficiency among members of the Foreign Service is
not adequately weighed in the assignments process, and that
existing skills are not adequately utilized, and
(2) the Department of State's Office of the Inspector
General urged that the Department has legitimate requirements
at overseas posts that can only be satisfied through S4/R4
level skills, and recommended that certain overseas positions
be designated at the S4/R4 competency level.
(c) Program.--(1) Pursuant to section 702 of the Foreign
Service Act of 1980 (22 U.S.C. 4022), the Secretary of State
shall direct the establishment and apportionment of a certain
number of overseas positions, at the S4/R4 level, in each of
a majority of overseas missions, as follows:
(A) For missions using world languages with more than 13
Foreign Service Officer positions assigned by the Department
of State, 8 percent of positions and not less than one
position will be established at the S4/R4 level.
(B) For posts using hard or incentive languages, with more
than nine Foreign Service Officer positions assigned by the
Department of State, the number of S4/R4-designated positions
shall be at least 4 percent of positions, and not less than
one position.
(2) Overseas posts and the Department of State shall retain
flexibility to apportion S4/R4 language-designated positions
within respective overseas posts.
(3) Assignment of personnel with full professional
proficiency shall be completed not later than September 30,
1995.
(d) Report to the Congress.--The Secretary of State shall
report to the Congress not later than September 30, 1994,
describing the progress made toward implementation of this
section.
Mr. SIMON. Madam President, we have the world's only Foreign Service
with no language entry requirement, so it is particularly important
that we encourage proficiency in languages among Foreign Service
officers. I've put forward several measures in the authorization bill,
and others in past years, with the object of raising language
proficiency in the Foreign Service.
I now offer another amendment, modestly designed to stimulate the
assignment to our overseas posts of Foreign Service officers who speak
and read the local language well.
S4/R4--speaking:four/reading:four--is the score given to Foreign
Service officers with so-called full professional proficiency in a
language. This means real fluency, the ability to appear at a public
meeting or be interviewed on television. Getting and keeping an S4/R4
takes hard work and talent. In comparison, S5/R5 is the score for an
educated native-language speaker.
Last year I consulted with numerous ambassadorial nominees, Foreign
Service officers, who stressed the importance of having at least some
staffers in their Embassies with full professional proficiency.
But we have never, so far, accepted full professional proficiency as
a requirement for any job in any of our Embassies overseas. The highest
current requirement for any job is minimum professional proficiency,
which is defined as able to speak the language with sufficient
structural accuracy and vocabulary to participate effectively in most
formal and informal conversations on practical, social, and
professional topics. In other words, able to make yourself understood,
sort of, most of the time.
This isn't good enough. My amendment mandates the State Department to
assign Foreign Service officers with full professional proficiency to 8
percent of the Foreign Service officer positions in each significantly
sized mission, with not less than one position per mission.
We have many fine linguists in our Foreign Service. Often, we aren't
using their talents as we should.
Full professional proficiency is what we should increasingly expect
of our Embassies overseas, and 8 percent seems to me a modest
beginning. I hope you agree.
amendment no. 1302
(Purpose: To state the sense of the Senate on encouraging the peace
process in Northern Ireland)
On page 179, below line 6, add the following new section:
SEC. 714. SENSE OF SENATE ON THE PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN
IRELAND.
(a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
(1) The people of Northern Ireland, Ireland, and Great
Britain earnestly seek a peaceful end to a conflict in the
North of Ireland which has caused more than 3,000 deaths
since 1969.
(2) The people of the United States, many of whom share a
common ancestry and cultural roots with the people of
Northern Ireland, Ireland, and Great Britain, are deeply
concerned about the continuing conflict and desire to
facilitate an early resolution to the conflict.
(3) In 1993, John Hume, head of the Social Democratic and
Labour Party and Gerry Adams, President of Sinn Fein,
conducted talks on the conflict.
(4) These talks were a significant contribution to a
climate encouraging peace in the North of Ireland.
(5) The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government
of Ireland have held talks on Northern Ireland culminating in
the Joint Declaration issued by the two governments on
December 15, which declaration offers a framework for lasting
peace in the region.
(b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that
the United States should strongly encourage all parties to
the conflict in the North of Ireland to renounce violence and
to participate in the current search for peace in the region.
Mr. WOFFORD. Madam President, I think we all agree that one of the
most persistent and tragic troublespots in the world is Northern
Ireland. Recently, there have been encouraging signs that at least some
of the parties to the dispute there may be prepared to forgo violence
and turn toward peaceful dialog in an effort to bring the troubles to
an end. Many of us were encouraged when John Hume, head of the Social
Democratic and Labor Party, and Gerry Adams, president of Sinn Fein,
revealed that after months of meetings the two sides had apparently
conducted serious discussions aimed at bringing peace to Northern
Ireland.
In the wake of the Hume-Adams initiative, the Irish and British
Governments have also undertaken important talks. The Downing Street
Joint Declaration which resulted is a new milestone in efforts to bring
the troubles to an end. Many Americans, concerned about the troubles in
Northern Ireland, are hopeful that this new effort will bear fruit. It
is on this basis that I have offered this sense-of-the-Senate
resolution encouraging the process.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
amendment no. 1303
(Purpose: To make available funds for the recruitment of Hispanic
Americans into the Foreign Service and other careers in international
affairs)
On page 9, between lines 4 and 5, insert the following:
(4) Of the amounts authorized to be appropriated for
``Salaries and Expenses'' under subsection (a)(2), $300,000
for each of the fiscal years 1994 and 1995 is authorized to
be available for the recruitment by the Department of State
of Hispanic American students from United States institutions
of higher education (as defined in section 1201(a) of the
Higher Education Act of 1965) with a high percentage
enrollment of Hispanic Americans for the purpose of training
such individuals for careers in the Foreign Service and
international affairs.
Mr. BRADLEY. Madam President, I have sent an amendment to the desk to
authorize $300,000 from the State Department's salaries and expenses
account for the recruitment and training of Hispanic-Americans in the
Foreign Service.
Our diplomats are America's face to the world. They are the people
who live abroad and represent not only American interests, but America
itself. For our diplomatic corps properly to represent the United
States, it must mirror the diversity of American society.
Indeed, one of our most effective diplomatic tools in this post-cold
war environment is the power of America's example as a prosperous,
democratic, multiethnic, multicultural democracy. One of the lessons of
the recent Russian elections is that people must have a vision of how
such a democracy can function. Our ability to project that vision by
our example is undercut by the unrepresentative nature of our current
Foreign Service.
In addition, it is essential that all individuals, from all ethnic
and gender groups, have equal opportunity to pursue a career in the
diplomatic service. This is the flip side of the American example,
living by our own principles.
No one argues against the need for a representative diplomatic corps.
Where we differ with the administration is in the criterion of success.
The administration's criterion is process. It argues that it has
programs in place to ensure that all gender and minority groups are
represented in appropriate numbers. My criterion is stricter--results.
And the results are sobering. The administration's programs are not
working. Hispanic-Americans in particular are badly underrepresented in
the Foreign Service. Let me cite a few statistics:
Whereas Hispanic-Americans are America's fastest growing ethnic group
and in 1990 made up 9 percent of the American population, they made up
only 4.2 percent of Foreign Service Officers in fiscal year 1993.
This figure is no improvement over 1992 in percentage terms, and a
drop of three officers in absolute terms.
It is also only a small increase over the 1985-91 average of 3.8
percent.
At the senior executive level, there are only 10 Hispanic men,
including 2 ambassadors, and no Hispanic women.
There clearly is a need for better results. The House has recognized
this problem by appropriating $500,000 per year in fiscal years 1994
and 1995 for recruiting and training Hispanic-Americans into our
Foreign Service. My amendment aims at the same goal by authorizing
$300,000 per year. In this way, my amendment will put the State
Department on notice that Hispanic-Americans must have equal
opportunity to represent their country--our country--in the Foreign
Service. It will put the State Department on notice that the only
acceptable criterion is results.
amendment no. 1304
(Purpose: To require restoration of retired pay improperly withheld
from any retired member of the uniformed services furnishing military
service to a newly democratic nation)
On page 179, after line 6, add the following:
SEC. 714. RESTORATION OF WITHHELD BENEFITS.
(a) Eligibility.--With respect to any person for which the
Secretary of State and the Secretary concerned within the
Department of Defense has approved the employment or the
holding of a position pursuant to the provisions of section
1058, title 10, United States Code, before the date of
enactment of this Act, the consents, approvals and
determinations under that section shall be deemed to be
effective as of January 1, 1993.
(b) Technical Correction.--Subsection (d) of section 1433
of Public Law 103-160 is repealed.
Mr. McCAIN. Madam President, last spring, the Department of Defense
terminated the military retired pay of Col. Alexander Einseln, an
American citizen and former active duty Army officer, for accepting the
position of Commander in Chief of the Estonian Armed Forces. In the
interest of assisting Colonel Einseln in his vital effort to reform the
Estonian military, I took action on the 1994 Defense bill to gain
approval for his employment with the Government of Estonia and restore
his military retired pay.
Colonel Einseln's service to the Government of Estonia was approved
by both the Secretary of State and Secretary of the Army as required by
Public Law 103-160. Notification was made to the Defense Finance and
Accounting Service and Colonel Einseln has begun to receive his checks.
Because of a drafting error in the legislation and a difference of
legal opinion, however, the Department of Defense failed to make
payment on the pay withheld from Colonel Einseln in the course of 1993.
The intent of my amendment today is to require the Department of
Defense to make payment on the portion of his retired pay withheld.
It is my hope that the Department of Defense will act expeditiously
to restore retroactively the pay that Colonel Einseln earned with more
than 30 years of service to our Nation.
amendment no. 1305
(Purpose: To extend the auto parts advisory committee to advise United
States auto parts negotiators in trade negotiations with Japan, and for
other purposes)
On page 129, after line 6, add the following new section:
SEC. . EXTENSION OF THE FAIR TRADE IN AUTO PARTS ACT OF
1988.
(a) In General.--Section 2125 of the Fair Trade in Auto
Parts Act of 1988 (15 U.S.C. 4704) is amended by striking
``1993'' and inserting ``1998''.
(b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by this section
shall take effect on December 30, 1993.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, I am offering an amendment, along with
Senators Riegle and Wofford, to extend an important industry advisory
group that advises the administration on auto parts issues.
My amendment extends the Auto Parts Advisory Committee which advises
the administration on auto parts trade negotiations. The Auto Parts
Advisory Committee, known as APAC, is a national advisory committee
established by the Fair Trade in Auto Parts Act included in the Omnibus
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. This committee, made up of
members of the U.S. auto parts industry, advises the Department of
Commerce on programs to increase sales of United States-made auto parts
and accessories to Japanese automotive manufacturers world wide. APAC
members are private sector representatives who devote their time and
extensive expertise and receive no Government compensation for their
membership on the committee.
We are at a critical juncture in the ongoing United States auto parts
negotiations with Japan, yet APAC authority has expired as of December
31, 1993. In recognition of APAC's significant contributions to the
auto parts debate and the U.S. negotiating position, we must quickly
extend their life.
The Department of Commerce, the agency taking the lead on auto parts
negotiations, has urged us to extend APAC authority because of the
invaluable contributions APAC has made to the process. The Department
of Commerce continues to need this industry input during the critical
framework auto-parts negotiations with Japan. President Clinton has
also urged us to act swiftly to extend APAC. In a letter he sent me on
this topic President Clinton said of the Auto Parts Advisory Committee:
During the past 5 years of its existence, the committee has
provided, on a continuing basis, sound advice to the
administration on the very complex issues involved in
automotive trade with Japan. Beginning in the summer of 1992,
the Department of Commerce initiated the process to
reauthorize the committee for an additional 5 years . . .
[we] will appreciate your efforts in ensuring the swift
passage of this legislation.
Let me reiterate that APAC's reauthorization is particularly time
sensitive because of the need for the administration to continue to
receive important industry guidance and support during the critical
weeks of the United States-Japan economic framework negotiations. I ask
unanimous consent that the President's letter be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be printed in the
Record, as follows:
The White House,
Washington, January 6, 1994.
Hon. Carl Levin,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
Dear Carl: Thank you for your thoughtful letter regarding
the expiration of the Automotive Parts Advisory Committee to
the Department of Commerce.
During the past five years of its existence, the Committee
has provided, on a continuing basis, sound advice to the
Administration on the very complex issues involved in
automotive trade with Japan. Beginning in the summer of 1992,
the Department of Commerce initiated the process to
reauthorize the Committee for an additional five years.
Proposed legislation was sent to the Congress in October of
last year but, unfortunately, it was not enacted before
Congress adjourned.
We intend to re-submit proposed legislation to Congress
early in 1994, and will appreciate your efforts in ensuring
the swift passage of this legislation. In the interim, I have
instructed the Department of Commerce to seek temporary
authorization for the Committee to meet so that the
Administration may continue to receive important industry
guidance and support during the approaching critical weeks of
the U.S.-Japan Economic Framework negotiations.
Thank you for your support of the Administration's efforts
on behalf of the U.S. automotive industry.
With best wishes,
Sincerely,
Bill Clinton.
Mr. LEVIN. Madam President, APAC has been an important catalyst in
organizing a diverse auto parts industry that includes over 5,000 U.S.-
owned companies, many of them small businesses, and directly employing
over 700,000 people. This has led to a more unified industry able to
make important contributions to the trade debate. APAC has also made
significant contributions to the wealth of knowledge of our U.S.
negotiations and bolstered the U.S. negotiating position on auto parts.
APAC's contributions to the process in the 5 years since the
enactment of the Fair Trade in Auto Parts Act include American
Government and industry conducted studies on the competitiveness of the
United States auto parts industry and of the barriers to trade faced in
selling to Japan. APAC has also issued a number of reports and
recommendations to the Commerce Department on what steps must be taken
to open Japan's markets to United States auto parts.
Both the auto parts industry and the administration strongly support
a swift extension of APAC so that it can continue to contribute to the
ongoing United States-Japan auto parts negotiations. APAC's guidance
and support to the administration bolsters our negotiating hand both in
providing industry knowledge and presenting a united front to our
negotiating partners.
I commend the hardworking members of APAC for their dedicated service
to the United States and hope that APAC will soon be extended so it can
continue to provide these invaluable services for an additional 5
years.
Mr. RIEGLE. Madam President, I rise in support of the amendment
offered by my colleague from Michigan, Senator Levin, to reauthorize
the Fair Trade in Auto Parts Act of 1988. I would also like to commend
Senator Levin for his leadership on this issue and commend the efforts
of the other members of Congressional Auto Parts caucus.
This amendment will insure that the Automotive Parts Advisory
Committee will continue its work. This is especially important as we
reach a critical state in the United States-Japan economic framework
negotiations.
As many of my colleagues know, these negotiations are essentially
stalled, with a critical deadline approaching. President Clinton and
the Japanese Prime Minister Hosokawa are scheduled to meet February 11
to review progress on the United States-Japan framework negotiations--
including progress on negotiations to open the Japanese market and
Japanese auto transplants in this country to U.S. autos and auto parts.
Yet, Commerce Secretary Ron Brown is quoted as saying, ``We haven't had
a lot of luck in negotiations thus far.'' Secretary Brown also said
that the deficit with Japan could jump 20 percent this year to $60
billion.
So far, the administration seems to be holding firm on the
negotiations. Treasury Secretary Bensten, during his recent trip to
Japan, said:
We'd rather have no agreement than have a weak agreement or
something that has a cosmetic result where we go home patting
each other on the back.
I believe it is important for the administration to continue to stand
firm in all aspects of the negotiations--especially specific measurable
targets and access to Japanese auto transplants. The auto parts deficit
alone accounted roughly 20 percent of our total trade deficit with
Japan. Thus, it is easy to understand the importance of the Automotive
Parts Advisory Committee.
I also believe that the administration must be prepared to take tough
action if the negotiations fail. Last year, I introduced S. 1132, the
Fair Trade in Motor Vehicle Parts of 1993, to extend the existing Fair
Trade in Auto Parts Act for 5 years and strengthens our ability to deal
with unfair trade practices in auto parts.
In addition to reauthorizing the 1988 act, S. 1132 mandates section
301 actions against countries whose policies effectively limit U.S.
motor vehicle parts manufacturers' access to their market. It also
requires the USTR to undertake negotiations to eliminate trade barriers
that limit the access to U.S. auto parts manufacturers and requires the
Commerce Secretary to initiate an antidumping investigation for motor
vehicle parts imports from countries with which the United States has a
motor vehicle parts deficit of $5 billion or more in each of the
preceding 3 years.
The bill also attacks the well documented trade restricting aspects
of the Japanese keiretsu system head on. If a country's distribution
system restricts access to their market, that barrier would be
considered an unfair trade practice.
These are some of the actions I believe the administration should
consider if the framework negotiations fail to resolve the problem of
the trade imbalance in autos and auto parts between the United States
and Japan.
We in Congress can take a step toward the resolution of the trade
imbalance by supporting the amendment by Senator Levin. I urge its
adoption.
Mr. WOFFORD. Madam President, I am pleased to join my colleague from
Michigan in introducing this legislation to extend the Fair Trade in
Auto Parts Act.
Among other things, the act requires the Secretary of Commerce to
establish an initiative to increase sales of United States-made auto
parts and accessories to Japanese markets.
In my State of Pennsylvania, 17,000 workers are employed in auto
manufacturing related industries. And these workers consistently turn
out a high-quality, competitively priced product.
So, for these workers and their families, the current trade imbalance
with Japan is unfair and unacceptable. During the last 8 years of auto
parts negotiations, the United States auto parts deficit with Japan has
grown from $3.3 billion in 1985 to nearly $11 billion in 1993. There's
been a lot of talk, but no action from the Japanese.
During the talks leading up to the President's visit to Japan next
month, the United States needs to obtain definite commitments by
Japanese auto manufacturers to increase the purchase of United States
parts. And if we can't achieve a more balanced trade relationship this
way, the United States should use the available laws to level the
playing field.
The legislation we are introducing today will help the United States
Government keep its focus on improving the trade imbalance with the
Japanese in the auto parts sector. It should also serve as signal to
the Japanese Government and auto industry of our resolve to reverse
that imbalance.
amendment no. 1306
(Purpose: To require a report of the use of Haitian, Iraqi, Iranian
frozen or blocked government assets or any other official government
assets frozen or blocked by the United States)
On page 179, after line 6, insert the following:
SEC. 714. REPORT ON THE USE OF FOREIGN FROZEN OR BLOCKED
ASSETS.
Not later than 30 days after enactment of this Act, the
President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives a report containing a detailed
accounting analysis and justification for all expenditures
made from foreign governments' assets that have been frozen
or blocked by the United States Government, including but not
limited to those expenditures made from Haitian frozen or
blocked assets by the Government of President Jean Bertrand
Aristide, and those made from Iranian and Iraqi frozen or
blocked assets.
amendment no. 1307
On page 12, line 3, strike ``$14,200,000'' and insert in
lieu thereof ``$16,000,000''.
Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, in accordance with President Clinton's
budget request for fiscal year 1994, S. 1281 authorizes $14.2 million
for fiscal year 1994 for the International Fisheries Commissions in
section 103(4) of the bill.
Because of the critical need for sea lamprey control, Congress
appropriated $2 million for fiscal year 1994 above the President's
budget request. This additional amount was designed to help the Great
Lakes Fisheries Commission pay for the cost of registering the
lampricide TFM with EPA. Because of this appropriation, the Great Lakes
Fisheries Commission has announced that it will be able to continue its
vital lamprey control program during fiscal year 1994.
My amendment would increase the authorized amount for fiscal year
1994 for the International Fisheries Commission to $16.2 million in
order to accommodate this increase in funds which have already been
appropriated.
Failure to authorize an additional $2 million for registration of the
pesticide TFM would not be a cost effective strategy. Sea lamprey
control is essential to maintaining Great Lakes fisheries. The economic
value of the Great Lakes sport and commercial fisheries is estimated at
$2 to $4 billion annually.
I urge adoption of my amendment.
amendment no. 1308
(Purpose: To promote sustainable development and the American
Environmental Technology Industry)
At the appropriate place in this Act insert the following:
It is the sense of the Senate that the President has
determined that sustainable development is one of the goals
of United States foreign policy and therefore, the United
States, in conducting bilateral and multilateral
negotiations, should to the maximum extent feasible, take
into consideration the principles of sustainable development
that encourage broad based economic growth, protect the
environment, build human capital and knowledge, and promote
democratic participation and development.
It is the further sense of the Senate that domestic
producers of environmental goods and services should, to the
maximum extent practicable, be notified of any potential
business opportunities which result from United States
bilateral and multilateral assistance programs and
negotiations.
Mr. BAUCUS. Madam President, I rise to introduce an amendment to this
bill to promote sustainable development as a goal of American foreign
policy. This is a sense-of-the-Senate amendment, and I believe it has
been cleared by both sides.
The amendment notes that the President has declared sustainable
development a goal of our foreign policy. Given that, it states that in
our various international and bilateral negotiations and to the extent
feasible, the United States shall take the principles of sustainable
development into consideration.
Sustainable development, of course, is an attempt to promote broad-
based economic growth; but growth that promotes environmental
protection; stabilizes world population growth; builds human capital
and knowledge; and promotes democratic participation and development.
It is a new approach, and President Clinton has made a top priority in
foreign policy. I hope the Senate will back him up.
Finally, and to take us from the visionary to the practical, the
amendment also states the sense of the Senate that domestic producers
of environmental goods and services shall be notified of the business
opportunities which result from our negotiations.
Once again, this amendment has the support of both sides, and the
administration as well. I urge the Senate to adopt it.
amendment no. 1309
On page 101, line 24, strike ``$2,000,000'' and insert in
lieu thereof ``$1,000,000''.
On page 102, line 12, strike ``$4,500,000'' and insert in
lieu thereof ``$1,500,000''.
amendment no. 1310
(Purpose: To provide for the coordination of refugee affairs programs
through officials other than the United States Coordinator for Refugee
Affairs)
On page 42, strike out lines 5 through 11 and insert in
lieu thereof the following:
(a) Coordination of Refugee Affairs.--Section 301 of the
Refugee Act of 1980 (8 U.S.C. 1525) is amended to read as
follows:
``Sec. 301. (a) The Secretary of State, together with the
Secretary of Health and Human Services and the Attorney
General, shall--
``(1) develop overall United States refugee admission and
resettlement policy;
``(2) coordinate all United States domestic and
international refugee admission and resettlement programs in
a manner that assures that policy objectives are met in a
timely fashion;
``(3) develop an effective and responsive liaison between
the Federal Government and voluntary organizations, Governors
and mayors, and others involved in refugee relief and
resettlement work to reflect overall United States Government
policy; and
``(4) make recommendations to the President and to the
Congress with respect to policies for, objectives of, and
establishment of priorities for, Federal functions relating
to refugee admission and resettlement in the United States.
``(b) In the conduct of the duties described in subsection
(a), the Secretary of State, together with the Secretary of
Health and Human Services and the Attorney General, shall
consult regularly with States, localities, and private
nonprofit voluntary agencies concerning the sponsorship
process and the intended distribution of refugees.
``(c) The Secretary of State, together with the Secretary
of Health and Human Services and the Attorney General, shall
design an overall budget strategy to provide individual
agencies with policy guidance on refugee matters in the
preparation of their budget requests, and to provide the
Office of Management and Budget with an overview of all
refugee-related budget requests.''.
(b) Amendments to the Refugee Act of 1980.--Title III of
the Refugee Act of 1980 is amended--
(1) in the title heading, by striking ``UNITED STATES
COORDINATOR FOR REFUGEE AFFAIRS'' and inserting ``UNITED
STATES COORDINATION OF REFUGEE AFFAIRS''; and
(2) in the heading of part A, by striking ``United States
Coordinator for Refugee Affairs'' and inserting United States
Coordination of Refugee Affairs''.
On page 43, line 4, before the semicolon, insert ``and
inserting `, together with the Secretary of State,'''.
Mr. KENNEDY. Madam President, I am offering today with my colleague
on the Immigration Subcommittee, Senator Simpson, a modest amendment to
ensure coordination between the various agencies of the executive
branch in developing and implementing U.S. refugee policy.
Section 137(a) of S. 1281 eliminates the Office of U.S. Coordinator
for Refugee Affairs. The Coordinator's office was established in the
Refugee Act of 1980 to ensure coordination between the Department of
State, the Department of Health and Human Services, and the Department
of Justice in planning for refugee entry and resettlement in the United
States.
Although many fine people served in the Coordinator role since 1980,
much of the Coordinator's independent authority eroded over time.
Therefore, it is perhaps appropriate that Senator Pell's bill
eliminates that office. The need for coordination between Federal
agencies on refugee program issues has not abated, however. States and
localities continue to be concerned about refugee resettlement on their
communities, highlighting the importance of a coordinated and well-
articulated resettlement policy among Federal agencies.
The amendment thus does not change S. 1281's elimination of the U.S.
Coordinator's office. Instead, it provides that the Department of State
shall coordinate with the Department of Health and Human Services and
the Attorney General on the development of overall refugee resettlement
policy, accomplishment of refugee policy objectives, and liaison
between the Federal Government and States and localities. It further
requires these three agencies to work together in designing an overall
budget strategy for refugee program matters.
amendment no. 1311
At the appropriate place in the bill insert the following
sections:
Section 1. Section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. 1255, is amended by adding at the
end thereof the following new subsection:
``(i)(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (a)
and (c) of this section, an alien physically present in the
United States who (A) entered the United States without
inspection; or (B) is within one of the classes enumerated in
subsection (c) of this section may apply to the Attorney
General for the adjustment of his or her status to that of an
alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence. The Attorney
General may accept such application only if the alien remits
with such application a sum equalling five times the fee
required for the processing of applications under this
section as of the date of receipt of the application. The sum
specified herein shall be in addition to the fee normally
required for the processing of an application under this
section.
``(2) Upon receipt of such an application and the sum
hereby required, the Attorney General may adjust the status
of the alien to that of an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence if (A) the alien is eligible to receive
an immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for
permanent residence; and (B) an immigrant visa is immediately
available to the alien at the time the application is filed.
``(3) Sums remitted to the Attorney General pursuant to
paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection shall be disposed
of by the Attorney General as provided in sections 286 (m),
(n), and (o) of this Title.''
Section 2. Section 212(a)(9) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, as amended, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(9), is amended
by adding at the end thereof the following:
``(D) An alien applying for an immigrant visa who has been
physically present in the United States within the ninety day
period immediately preceding the date of such application is
excludable.''
Mr. KENNEDY. Madam President, I am pleased to join my colleague on
the Immigration Subcommittee, Senator Simpson, in offering this
amendment to strengthen the capacity of our consular services overseas
by changing a provision of current immigration law.
According to both the Department of State and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service about 30 percent of current immigrant visa
applicants at consular posts abroad have been living in the United
States prior to their application for an immigrant visa. Because they
are prohibited by section 245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C. 1101 et seq.) from adjusting their status to that of immigrant
while they are in the United States, these individuals--including
children--are required to leave the United States and secure a visa at
a U.S. consular section so they may reenter as immigrants.
Designed to dissuade visa overstays and others circumventing normal
visa requirements, this provision of law has not provided the intended
deterrent to illegal immigration and its effect as a penalty for
violation of our immigration laws has been minimal. Further, it has
become very costly and time-consuming for the Department of State's
Consular Service to provide visa services for this group of
individuals.
In examining the Department of State authorization bill, we have
found that certain of its provisions could adversely effect the
Department of State's budgetary capacity to provide consular services
for our citizens both here in the United States and abroad. These
provisions, such as freezing the size of the Foreign Service,
authorizing the collection of application fees for nonimmigrant visas,
and instituting statutorily mandated sanctions for the erroneous
issuance of a nonimmigrant visa, have worthy goals. Nevertheless, if
they are instituted without consideration for funding or personnel
shifts they will inevitably require, services to U.S. citizens will
suffer.
Our proposed amendment to the pending bill, is designed to reduce
significantly the immigrant visa processing caseload at consular
offices abroad. If adopted, these changes could eliminate at least 30
percent of the workload of the immigrant visa sections at our
consulates. This could free as many as 40 officer positions and over
200 foreign service national positions to cover the new consular
requirements.
Additionally, by moving the immigrant visa processing now done
overseas to the Immigration and Naturalization Service [INS]
adjudication centers in the United States, we will generate funds to
meet the costs of those services and provide INS resources to protect
the integrity of the immigration process. INS has both the capacity and
willingness to assume these responsibilities with the funds that will
be made available to it through the additional fees mandated in our
amendment.
I urge the adoption of this amendment.
amendment no. 1312
(Purpose: To include in the Secretary of State's annual country report
on terrorism a description of terrorist assets held in the United
States)
On page 94, strike out lines 3 through 12 and insert in
lieu thereof the following:
(a) In General.--Section 140(a) of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C.
2656f(a)) is amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by redesignating subparagraphs (A)
and (B) as clauses (i) and (ii), respectively;
(2) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as
subparagraphs (A) and (B), respectively;
(3) by inserting ``(1)'' immediately after ``Terrorism.--
'';
(4) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (A);
(5) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (B)
and inserting ``; and''; and
(6) by adding at the end the following:
``(C) the nature and extent of assets held in the United
States on behalf of foreign countries and groups responsible
for the acts described in subparagraphs (A) and (B).
``(2) In reporting on the information required by paragraph
(1)(C), the Secretary of State shall consult with the
Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, and such
other heads of relevant departments and agencies of the
United States as may be necessary.''.
(b) Conforming Amendments.--Section 140(b) of such Act is
amended--
(1) in paragraph (1), by striking ``subsection (a)(1)'' and
inserting ``subsection (a)(1)(A)''; and
(2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``subsection (a)(1)'' and
inserting ``subsection (a)(1)(B)''.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Madam President, the amendment before us will require
the U.S. Government to compile an annual report on assets held by
terrorist nations and groups in the United States.
This amendment is similar to one that was adopted as part of the 1992
State Department reauthorization bill. And, I understand this amendment
has been accepted on both sides.
Under the 1992 amendment, the Treasury Department is required to
compile and issue an annual report on these terrorist assets.
Unfortunately, the Treasury Department, under both the Bush and Clinton
administrations, has been derelict in its duty to carry out the law.
After being nearly a year and a half late in issuing its first
report, Treasury did finally issue one that was short on information
and severely lacking in details. Despite the law's direction to compile
information on both terrorist states and groups or organizations,
Treasury chose to report only on country assets and ignored its
responsibility regarding information on group assets. Disregarding its
mandate, Treasury stated that it ``does not compile information on the
holdings of private individuals or organizations in the United States
unless those assets are subject to sanctions * * *.''
Because the Treasury Department appears to be unable to carry out
this responsibility, the amendment before us will transfer the
responsibility to the State Department as part of its already well-
established annual terrorist report. The State Department will consult
with Treasury and other relevent investigative agencies in order to
prepare a detailed asset report.
With the advent of terrorist attacks within the United States in the
last year, the need for more information on terrorists has become
imperative. Information on terrorist assets will help law enforcement,
as well as victims of terrorism, to go after the money and property
that funds terrorist activities. Without these assets, terrorists will
not be able to function.
One of the major purposes of the asset report is to help implement
the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1992, which I sponsored. Under this law, we
gave victims of terrorism the authority to sue terrorists for civil
damages. A detailed asset report will help victims locate and satisfy
any court-awarded damages.
A detailed terrorist asset report is necessary if we are going to
carry out a successful overall anti-terrorism strategy. I look forward
to working with the State Department as it carries out this mandate.
AMENDMENT No. 1313
At the appropriate place, add the following:
``SEC. . PASSPORT SECURITY.
``(a) It is the Sense of the Congress that the Department
of State is strongly urged to assure that any new passport
issuances should, to the maximum extent practicable:
``(1) be secure against counterfeiting, alteration,
duplication or simulation;
``(2) be easily verifiable with appropriate inspection by
public officials and private and commercial personnel; and,
``(3) contain only American-sourced materials and
technology.
``(b) The Secretary of State shall provide a report to the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs within 30 days of enactment detailing
actions taken by the Department to accomplish the goals set
forth in subsection (a).''.
AMENDMENT NO. 1314
(Purpose: Regarding the safety of United States personnel in Sarajevo)
On page 179, after line 6, add the following new section:
SEC. . SAFETY OF UNITED STATES PERSONNEL IN SARAJEVO.
(a) Findings.--The Congress finds that--
(1) the United States has recognized and established
diplomatic relations with the Government of Bosnia-
Hercegovina;
(2) the United States Ambassador to Bosnia-Hercegovina does
not have any secure permanent or semipermanent facilities to
conduct United States diplomatic activities in Sarajevo;
(3) the protracted conflict in Bosnia-Hercegovina creates
serious physical risks to United States diplomatic personnel
serving there;
(4) the United States Ambassador to Bosina-Hercegovina
resides and carries out his duties from Vienna, Austria; and
(5) an increased and more secure United States diplomatic
presence in Sarajevo would enhance United States interests in
Bosnia-Hercegovina.
(b) Policy.--(1) It is, therefore, the sense of the Senate
that the Secretary of State should immediately take steps to
increase the presence of United States diplomatic personnel
in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Hercegovina consistent with the objective
of ensuring their physical safety.
(2) Such steps should include secure facilities,
communication capability, ground transportation and other
capabilities, as appropriate, to enable United States
diplomatic personnel to conduct regular official United
States diplomatic activities in Sarajevo.
(c) Report.--The Secretary of State shall report to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the steps taken
to enhance the security and safety of United States
diplomatic personnel not later than 30 days after the date of
enactment of this Act.
Mr. LUGAR. Madam President, this amendment urges the Secretary of
State to immediately take steps to improve the security and safety of
our diplomatic personnel in and around Sarajevo, Bosnia and
Hercegovina.
The situation in Sarajevo, as it now stands, is dangerous for our
Ambassador and his staff to function in any semblance of normality. He
enjoys no secure permanent or semipermanent facility, no secure
communication capability and very little security in ground
transportation. This limits the time and the operations of our
Ambassador and our diplomatic activities in Bosnia and Hercegovina. By
definition, his ability to promote United States interests in Bosnia
and Hercegovina is constrained.
I am informed that the creation of secure diplomatic facilities in
Sarajevo would not require any substantial increase in funding over and
above that which is already being spent to protect him there.
If our Ambassador and his diplomatic staff enjoyed improved security
and safety by having secure facilities in Sarajevo, they would not only
be safer, these personnel would be better able to promote and safeguard
United States interests in that country.
I urge the Members to support this amendment.
Mr. DOLE. Madam President, it is my understanding that this amendment
has been cleared on both sides.
This amendment is very simple. It is a sense-of-the-Senate that the
Secretary of State should immediately take steps to increase the United
States diplomatic presence in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
consistent with the objective of ensuring their physical safety--to
include the provision of secure facilities, communication capability,
ground transportation and other capabilities.
At present, the United States Ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Victor Jackovich, carries out his duties from Vienna, Austria. But,
when he travels to Sarajevo--which is increasingly rare, due to
limitations placed on his travel by the State Department--he is without
a facility from which to operate.
Now we all know that Sarajevo is a dangerous place. But, in my view,
we need to support our Foreign Service and diplomatic personnel
wherever they may be because they have an important role to play.
To date, the State Department has addressed the question of safety in
Sarajevo by essentially not addressing it. The Department's answer to
the security question is limiting Ambassador Jackovich's travel to
Sarajevo--not trying to enhance his security while he is in this war
zone. While the Ambassador can carry out some of his duties from
Vienna, he is still the Ambassador to Bosnia and must have the ability
to represent the United States in Sarajevo on a fairly regular basis.
I believe that it is in the United States interest to have a presence
in Sarajevo on a more regular basis consistent with reasonable security
requirements. The United States recognizes and has established
diplomatic relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina. While administration
policy has been to push aside the issue of the war in Bosnia as much as
possible, we cannot let our representation and presence in Bosnia
suffer the same fate.
Therefore, I hope that those responsible for this matter in the State
Department will interpret this amendment as a big hint and move forward
with providing the Ambassador immediately with armored vehicles, a
reliable communications capability, and at the very least, a
semipermanent facility for which he can operate in Sarajevo, and where
he can take shelter if he gets stuck there during periods of
intensified fighting. Let's not forget that the situation in Sarajevo
is unpredictable; the Ambassador may intend to go in for a day, but
find that the airport is closed only an hour later--we're not talking
about the Washington-New York shuttle.
I thank the managers for working with us on language that is
acceptable to the Foreign Relations Committee.
Mr. KERRY. Madam President, if I may just clarify for the record, the
Senator from North Carolina was absolutely correct that there are
technical amendments in the group of en bloc amendments. But there are
also amendments of substance that both sides have agreed on that are in
these en bloc amendments. So I think, for the record, for anybody
wondering, all of the amendments are amendments that have been cleared
on both sides and that would have been passed by voice vote.
Madam President, with respect to the bill we have been on up until
now, the State authorization bill, there will be votes Tuesday
beginning at 10 o'clock in the morning and we will be here to work on
amendments as of 1 o'clock on Monday. So for those people who are on
the list who have amendments that need to be disposed of before the
deadline on Tuesday evening, we will be working Monday at 1 o'clock
with votes to occur starting at 10 o'clock in the morning on Tuesday.
Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER The absence of a quorum has been suggested.
The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order
for the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. GRASSLEY. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to speak as if
in the morning business.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
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