[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 2 (Wednesday, January 26, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: January 26, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                           THE NAVAL MILITIA

 Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, yesterday, I submitted for the 
Record the first installment of a two-part series describing the 
history, function, and advantages of the Naval Militia recently 
published in the Naval Review Association magazine. I ask that part II 
be included in the Record.
  The article follows:

       [From the Naval Review Association Magazine, October 1993]

       The Naval Militia, Part II. Mission for the Naval Reserve

    (By Commander William A. Murphy, USNR/NYNM and Commander Walter 
                          Johanson, USNR/NYNM)

       Participation in the Naval Militia by Naval and Marine 
     Corps Reservists should be recognized as good public policy. 
     The United States is a maritime nation. It should be a 
     mission of the naval service (including, by definition, the 
     Naval and Marine Corps Reserves) to assure the national 
     consensus that we are a MARITIME nation and therefore ALL 
     have a real interest in the maintenance of an effective naval 
     service.
       The greatest modern builders of that consensus were Alfred 
     Thayer Mahan and President Theodore Roosevelt. Their 
     intellectual heirs are found at the US Naval War College in 
     Newport, Rhode Island; ultimately, it is the responsibility 
     of each member of the naval service to understand the mission 
     and help build that consensus in the national interest.
       A important and very American national security tradition 
     is to place significant reliance upon the militia--``the 
     Guard and Reserve''--to meet a major national or state 
     emergency. This is not only philosophically sound traditional 
     practice, it is also the cornerstone of the very practical 
     Total Force Policy which worked so well in OPERATION DESERT 
     SHIELD/DESERT STORM in 1990/91. The Naval and Marine Corps 
     Reserves are an important part of this American militia 
     tradition--as demonstrated in the Arabian Gulf--and they can 
     have an even larger functional share of this American militia 
     tradition. It is worthy of note that the origin of the United 
     States Naval and Marine Corps Reserves is to be found not 
     only abstractly in the militia (``citizen-soldier'') 
     tradition, but, specifically, in the Naval Militia.


               naval/marine corps reserve--congress' navy

       The force structure and operational requirements of the 
     Naval and Marine Corps Reserves is principally a function of 
     the will of Congress (which is, at least in part, a 
     reflection of constituent opinion). Congress, for its part, 
     seems to intend that the Guard and Reserve will continue to 
     be funded as a significant part of the over-all defense 
     establishment of the United States.
       In order to continue this generally amicable relationship 
     between Congress, on the one hand, and the Naval and Marine 
     Corps Reserves, on the other hand, it is necessary that the 
     Naval and Marine Corps Reserves have a physical presence and 
     a higher profile in each and every State of the Union. There 
     are three aspects to this presence:
       Greater community presence;
       Maintenance of at least one Naval and Marine Corps Reserve 
     Center (or Naval and Marine Corps permanent presence in an 
     Armed Forces Reserve Center) in each and every state, 
     commonwealth, territory and the District of Columbia;
       Increase the functional utility of the Naval and Marine 
     Corps Reserves to the States and to the people.
       This last aspect is particularly important to the naval 
     service in that most activity of the US Naval and Marine 
     Corps Reserves (unlike the National Guard) tends to be over 
     the horizon, i.e., out of public view. The individual 
     opinions of Naval and Marine reservists, and the addition of 
     their drill pay to the local economy, while positive factors, 
     are probably not of themselves compelling arguments to 
     Congressional budget committees. By expanding the domestic 
     mission of the Naval and Marine Corps Reserves their value to 
     the body politic might be better appreciated at all levels of 
     government.
       The continued existence at an effective force structure 
     level of the United States Navy and Marine Corps, and 
     derivatively, of the United States Naval and Marine Corps 
     Reserves, is dependent upon the will of the American people 
     (expressed through Congress); that is to say that it is not 
     enough to rely upon the fact that an effective naval service 
     (including reserves) is objectively in the national interest. 
     An enhanced general appreciation of the Naval and Marine 
     Corps Reserves, and hence of the entire naval service--and of 
     our maritime national interests (including our merchant 
     marine/sealift capability and the Merchant Marine Reserve 
     component of the US Naval Reserve), is truly in the national 
     interest and ultimately as important to the Regular Navy and 
     Marine Corps as to the Reserves (some Regular inclinations to 
     the contrary notwithstanding).


                             Naval Militia

       In two States--New York and Alaska--the Naval and marine 
     Corps Reserves have an additional mission, a mission (and 
     raison d'etre which enhances the value of the Naval and 
     marine Corps Reserves to those States, namely, participation 
     in the Naval Militia of the State. (See New York State 
     Military Law, ARTICLE II--THE ORGANIZED MILITIA, Section 43; 
     reference: McKinney's Consolidated Laws. Book 35--Military 
     Law 1990. See also Alaska Statute. Sections 26.05.010, 
     26.05.030, 26.05.060, 26.05.330, 26.05.340.)
       New York has had a Naval Militia since 1891, a Marine 
     Reserve component since 1893. It was a meeting of the 
     Association of the Naval Militias of the United States at the 
     US Naval War College in 1900 which gave a major boost to the 
     idea of a US Naval Reserve.
       The Naval Militia, put simply, is an opportunity for any 
     state willing to conform to the standards set forth in 
     statute law (Title 10, USC) to add to the Organized Militia 
     of the State those members of the US Naval and Marine Corps 
     Reserves who are willing to be appointed to/enlisted in the 
     Naval Militia. That is to say that those Naval and Marine 
     Corps Reservists would then be subject to call up to active 
     duty by the governor of the State with full pay and 
     allowances, paid by the State per the USNR/USMCR pay scale. 
     [Pay is 75% reimbursable by the Federal Government after the 
     fact in Federally-declared emergencies (such as Hurricane 
     Andrew in Florida and Louisiana).] Members remain subject to 
     call-up/mobilization by the United States. Thus, the Naval 
     Militia is a no additional cost augment to the existing 
     Organized Militia system of the Army National Guard and Air 
     National Guard (the National Guard is covered in Title 32, 
     USC).
       Put another way, the Naval and Marine Corps Reserves are 
     already being paid for by the taxpayer; through the Naval 
     Militia that same taxpayer gets greater return on his 
     investment in that the Naval/Marine Reservist who is also a 
     member of the Naval Militia acquires a dual Federal/State 
     reserve/militia identity, directly accessible for State as 
     well as Federal emergencies. As set forth in Title 10, USC 
     (Chapter 659.--NAVAL MILITIA. Sections 7851 through 7854), 
     Section 7851 establishes that the ``Naval Militia'' consists 
     of ``the Naval Militia of the States, the Territories and the 
     District of Columbia.''
       Participation in the Naval or Marine Corps Reserve 
     qualifies one for membership in the Naval Militia without any 
     additional training; Title 10 US Code Section 7854 (2) 
     states: ``the organization, administration and training of 
     the Naval Militia conform to the standards prescribed by the 
     Secretary [of the Navy]. Aug. 10, 1956, c. 1041, 70A Stat. 
     486.'' [See Also Alaska statutes. Section 26.05.030 (1) and 
     (2).]
       The advantage to the individual Naval/Marine Reservist is 
     that he suddenly becomes more relevant to his State, its 
     government and its people, and, therefore, to its 
     Representatives in Congress. This enhanced relevance to 
     Congress could benefit the reservist through an increased 
     appreciation of the importance of maintaining Naval/Marine 
     Corps Reserve force structure and institutional support 
     within the State. It benefits the regular United States Navy 
     and Marine Corps by increasing the numbers and the geographic 
     distribution of those persons who have a vested interest in 
     the continued existence of a naval service with sufficient 
     critical mass to accomplish the missions which go with world 
     leadership.


                   joint state military/naval forces

       The inclusion of the Naval Militia in the Organized Militia 
     of a state provides the opportunity for the creation of a 
     truly Joint Staff under The Adjutant General, as is currently 
     being done in New York State. This, in turn, offers the 
     potential for joint training, planning and operations 
     experience to the Army and Air National Guard as well as to 
     the Naval and Marine Corps Reservists participating in the 
     Naval Militia. Given the joint nature of modern warfare, such 
     joint experience for an organized Militia would pay great 
     dividends in the next mobilization for a national emergency.
       The operational cost to the state of a Naval Militia is 
     more than offset by the income tax revenues generated by the 
     drill pay of Naval and Marine Corps Reservists (not to 
     mention the pay of TARs and other full-time support personnel 
     in reserve facilities).\1\
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     \1\In a New York State Division of Military and Naval Affairs 
     annual operating budget in excess of $15 million, less than 
     $100,000 is currently required to administer the Naval 
     Militia.
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       Should future drawdowns of military force totally eliminate 
     the presence of the Naval and Marine Corps Reserve from a 
     State, it is quite possible that returning Navy and Marine 
     Corps veterans might be forced to compete with Army and Air 
     Force veterans for National Guard billets should they wish to 
     continue their service as citizen soldiers. Politics is, 
     ultimately, local; whatever political support such persons 
     might wish to give to the naval service could then be 
     expected to be of a lower priority to their new vested 
     interest in the National Guard, but through participation in 
     the Naval Militia, the solution is in making common cause 
     with the National Guard and other elements of the Organized 
     Militia. For example, in New York State this has been done 
     professionally and politically through the Militia 
     Association of New York, where the Naval and Marine Corps 
     Reserve message (including both the Navy homeport and Marine 
     aviation messages) from New York has been carried to the New 
     York Congressional delegation by officers who in other States 
     might only have been concerned with the (Army/Air) agenda of 
     the National Guard Association.


                            win-win solution

       What is proposed is essentially a win-win solution to the 
     problem of expanding the mission (and the support base) of 
     the Naval and Marine Corps Reserves, in this case a domestic 
     mission, without adding to the taxpayer's cost or to the 
     federal budget. Among the potential domestic missions of the 
     militia are responding to public health or public security 
     emergencies which result from strikes, natural, 
     technological, or civil disasters. Port security, coastal 
     defense, public utilities, and pollution control are possible 
     emergency missions. The maritime defense zone mission was a 
     historic Naval Militia and Naval Reserve tasking prior to 
     World War II; the Naval Militia could augment this function, 
     which is primarily a tasking of the Naval Reserve and Coast 
     Guard Reserve at present. The militia is not constrained by 
     the Posse Comitatus Act from playing a role in the war 
     against drugs, as already-demonstrated by the National Guard.
       In Alaska, the Naval Militia responded to the Valdez oil 
     spill in 1989; in 1991, the Alaska Naval Militia also wrote 
     most of the master scenario events list (MSEL) items for the 
     Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)/State of Alaska 
     1992 earthquake exercise SHAKER 3. Members of the New York 
     Naval Militia have been utilized in support of the 1980 Lake 
     Placid Olympics, and for a variety of emergencies.
       Participation of Naval and Marine Corps Reservists in the 
     Naval Militia of a State also enhances the support within 
     that State for the United States Navy and Marine Corps, for 
     the ``* * * FROM THE SEA'' policy, for the naval service 
     generally and for the recognition that the United States is a 
     maritime as well as a continental power. The cost to the 
     State is administrative: minimally, one office, two people 
     and three phone lines to administer the program, a cost 
     offset by the state tax revenues and far outweighed by the 
     benefit to the Organized Militia of the State. The Naval 
     Militia is obviously and very cost-effectively in the 
     national interest.
       It is, therefore, proposed that (State) Naval Militias be 
     authorized by, and organized in, each of our 50 States in the 
     District of Columbia, in Puerto Rico and as otherwise already 
     provided for by law in accordance with Title 10, United 
     States Code (Chapter 659--NAVAL MILITIA) Sections 7851 
     through 7854.
       This course of action has already been recommended for the 
     States by the 1993 National Convention of the Marine Corps 
     Reserve Officers Association, and to the National Guard 
     Association by the 1993 Conference of the Militia Association 
     of New York. It was also recommended by the 1992 Annual 
     General Meeting of the Naval Militia Association, Inc.
       For the States individually, and for the United States, the 
     Naval Militia helps to provide for the common defense and to 
     promote the general welfare in a very traditional American 
     way.

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