[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 2 (Wednesday, January 26, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: January 26, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS
By Mr. GRAMM (for himself, Mr. Helms, Mr. Smith and Mr. Burns):
S. 1800. A bill to protect the personal security of Americans by
ensuring the imprisonment of violent criminals; to the Committee on the
Judiciary.
THE PREDATOR CRIMINAL IMPRISONMENT ACT OF 1994
Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, today I am going to introduce a bill
entitled ``The Predator Criminal Imprisonment Act of 1994.''
This bill contains the toughest provisions from the anticrime bill
which we adopted in the Senate last year and which I believe contained
the nucleus of an effective program to grab violent criminals by the
throat and not let them go to get a better grip.
I want to explain to my colleagues and to the American people why I
am introducing this bill and what my plans are in regard to it.
We have not passed comprehensive and effective anticrime legislation
in the U.S. Congress in 9 years. For 9 years we have passed strong
provisions in the Senate. Sometimes we have passed strong provisions in
the House. But what has happened is that when those bills have gone to
conference, passing through that bottleneck where decisions are made by
a small number of people who hold views on crime quite different from
the views held by the average American, where the conference seems to
blame society and not the criminal for crime, what has happened is that
those tough provisions have ended up being stripped out of the bills.
A perfect example was in the last Congress. We passed a provision in
the Senate that allowed us to strengthen law enforcement and to make it
possible for us to carry out tough sentences, the most important of
which was the death penalty, the so-called habeas corpus reforms. That
provision was adopted in the Senate. We went to conference with the
House on that crime bill, and not only did the members of that
conference committee in a dark room somewhere in this great old Capitol
strip out the get-tough provision of the Senate bill, but they
substituted a provision that would have actually weakened law
enforcement.
All of us last night listened to the President endorse the three-
time-loser provision. I have personally offered that provision on the
floor of the Senate a number of times. It has been offered by others.
And I have obviously supported it when I offered it, and I supported it
when they offered it. And I am delighted that the President has
endorsed that provision.
But I am concerned about two things. First of all, I am concerned
that last year in his first address to the Nation in a Joint Session of
Congress, the President talked about getting tough on crime. But later
when we got his budget he cut prison construction by $580 million. The
President and the Attorney General have spent the entire last year
trying to repeal mandatory minimum sentencing. Now the President has
done a 180, and he says he is for the three-time-loser provision.
I want the President to support the Senate crime bill. We passed a
tough crime bill. The House has not yet dealt with that legislation.
But I have not heard the President say that he supports the funding
mechanism that would cut existing programs to build prisons, to
institute a truth-in-sentencing provision, to have 10 years in prison
without parole for possessing a firearm during the commission of a
violent crime or a drug felony, 20 years for discharging it, life
imprisonment for killing somebody, the death penalty in aggravated
cases, to have 10 years in prison for selling drugs to a child no
matter who your daddy is or how you think society has done you wrong,
get-tough provisions that the American people want.
So I have offered this bill today because I am afraid that the House
is not going to adopt our funding mechanism, that we are not going to
build the prisons, that our get-tough minimum mandatory sentences will
not become the law of the land, that our partnership with the States to
build regional prisons and to incarcerate repeat offenders will not be
put into effect.
So today, I wanted to put the Senate on notice that I am offering a
bill that has the get-tough provisions of the Senate bill in it. If by
May 1 the House has not passed a crime bill, if by May 1 we have not
taken action to give the American people something they desperately
want but have been denied for 9 years in a row in getting, I am going
to begin in the month of May offering these get-tough provisions as an
amendment to the bills under consideration in the Senate.
It would not be my objective to tie up the Senate. I do not think we
would need a lengthy debate. We have already voted by large margins for
the provisions of this bill.
The provisions of the bill include: Mandatory minimum sentences for
gun offenses, the death penalty in aggravated cases for murder with a
gun, mandatory minimum sentencing for selling drugs to a child, life
imprisonment on a second offense, imprisonment for individuals who
commit violent crimes and drug felonies and on the third offense put
them in prison for life and keep them there and do not engage in plea
bargaining on that third offense and direct prosecutors to go for life
in prison.
Basically, these are get-tough provisions that build prisons; that
enter into a partnership with the States; that guarantee that when
somebody is put in prison for 10 years for a violent crime, they serve
almost every single day in prison of those 10 years; that use existing
prison space by setting a higher standard on the Federal courts because
today 43 of our States are limited by the Federal courts in terms of
their ability to keep violent predator criminals off the streets, even
though many of these criminals are committing 100 violent crimes a
year.
Mr. President, our bleeding Nation demands that we act. For 9 years
we have not acted. The President, last night, got on America's team on
this issue. I urge him to do several things: Endorse the Senate bill.
If there are areas of the Senate bill the President cannot support,
tell us what they are, give us an opportunity to sit down and work out
a viable compromise. Urge those in the House who still blame society
for crime to recognize that the American people, this year, will not be
denied. The purpose of this legislation is to guarantee that we are not
denied. I will introduce this bill today.
I ask unanimous consent that this two-page outline be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
The Predator Criminal Imprisonment Act of 1994
TITLE 1. FINDINGS
The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The most important domestic function of the Federal
government is the protection of the personal security of
individual Americans through the enactment and enforcement of
laws against criminal behavior.
(2) The criminal justice system in America is failing to
achieve its basic objective of protecting the innocent and
punishing the guilty.
(3) In America today, there exists crime without
punishment. Failure to remedy this imperils the public
safety, disrupts domestic tranquility, and threatens the rule
of law.
title 2. effective mandatory minimum prison sentences
A. Provide for a mandatory term in prison of at least 10
years for any individual who possesses a firearm while
committing a crime of violence or drug felony, not less than
20 years in prison if the weapon is discharged and either
life imprisonment or the penalty of death in aggravated
circumstances if the gun is used to kill a person during the
commission of such a crime.
B. Provide for a mandatory, minimum term in prison of 10
years for any adult who sells drugs to a minor or who
involves a minor in drug trafficking operations; provide for
not less than life imprisonment upon conviction for a second
such offense.
C. Provide for not less than life imprisonment for any
individual who commits a serious drug felony or violent crime
after two prior convictions for such offenses.
The Senate agreed by voice vote to include these penalties in
H.R. 3355, the 1993 Senate passed anti-crime bill after
voting 58-42 to modify the Gramm amendment with the D'Amato
proposal to apply the gun penalties to State as well as
Federal offenses.
title 3. construction of regional prisons for violent criminals
A. Authorize the construction of at least 10 regional
prisons with each housing at least 2500 inmates. Such
regional prisons would house violent criminals convicted in
either state or federal court. In order to be eligible to use
the regional prisons, each participating state must insure
that violent criminals serve at least 85% of their sentence;
must adopt pre-trial detention policies similar to those in
the Federal system; must adopt sentences for firearms
offenders that are at least as long as those imposed under
Federal law; and must allow recognition of the rights of
victims of crime. The Senate voted to include such provisions
in H.R. 3355 when it voted 94-4 in November 1993 and passed
the Byrd amendment.
title 4. increased use of existing prison space
A. Currently, too many violent criminals serve too little
of their sentences because the Federal courts have placed
population limits or ``caps'' on prisons to remedy a variety
of prison conditions deemed unsuitable by the court. Title 4
would limit such ``cap'' orders to those circumstances where
an individual plaintiff inmate has proven that crowded
conditions have violated the Constitution.
Thus, court ordered limits on prison inmate population
levels would be used only to remedy Constitutional violations
created by overcrowding. In addition, other remedies, such as
improved health care, would have to be exhausted prior to the
imposition of a prison population cap.
The Senate voted 68-31 to include this Helms-Gramm-Mack-
Graham language as Section 5139 in H.R. 3355, the Senate
passed anti-crime bill.
title 5. establishment of ``violent crime reduction trust fund''
A. The Senate voted 94-4 to adopt the Byrd amendment which
would establish a new ``Violent Crime Reduction Trust Fund''.
The $22 billion fund would be created by reducing over a
period of 5 years the level of federal employment by 252,000.
The reduction in federal personnel levels was recommended by
Vice-President Gore in the Report of the National Performance
Review. During consideration of the 1993 Unemployment
Compensation bill the Senate had voted 82-14 in favor of such
a personnel reduction as proposed in the Gramm amendment; the
House had approved the proposal 275-146.
______
Mr. RIEGLE (for himself and Mr. D'Amato):
S. 1801. A bill to apply certain minimum standards to the conversion
of savings associations and savings banks from the mutual form to the
stock form, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs.
mutual depository institution conversion protection act of 1994
Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. President, today I am introducing the Mutual
Depository Institution Conversion Protection Act of 1994. I am pleased
that Senator D'Amato is joining me as an original cosponsor. This
important legislation is designed to address problems that have arisen
as mutually held depository institutions have converted to stock
ownership form.
While mutual to stock conversions are not a new phenomenon, they have
become the subject of outrageous insider abuse. Conversions have
historically been an effective means for ailing mutuals to raise
capital. More recently, however, management and insiders at well
capitalized institutions have used the conversion process to unfairly
profit by obtaining stock and options, and by generally underpricing
the institutions themselves. Where Federal regulations governing
conversions have proven too effective in limiting abuse, the
institutions have switched to State charters in order to take advantage
of more lenient State regulations.
By way of example, I am including with my statement an article from
the American Banker describing a conversion recently proposed by an
institution that had switched from a Federal to a State charter. In
this case, management and insiders would obtain all the shares offered
in the conversion. The depositors, who theoretically own the
institution, would receive nothing. To make matters worse, the
institution would end up with less capital as a result of the
transaction because the proceeds of the proposed conversion would be
less than the cost of the deal. In the end, the depositors/owners would
have a smaller stake in a more poorly capitalized institution.
The conversion games have clearly gotten out of hand. A recent issue
of Money Magazine urged readers to open deposit accounts in mutuals in
order to cash in on future conversions, stating, ``Just $500 in an
account at the right institution will buy you your very own place at
the trough. You won't be able to scarf up as much as the insiders, but
you'll do okay.''
This self-dealing should stop, and stop now. These outrageous
conversions are not victimless crimes. To the extent that management
and insiders are skimming off the net worth of the institution through
a conversion, they are doing so at the expense of the institution and
its account holders. Significantly, such transactions also siphon
capital that ultimately protects the deposit insurance system.
The legislation that I introduce today will ensure that management
and trustees fulfill their obligations to act in the interest of the
institution. My intention is not to abolish conversions, but to ensure
that proper incentives drive these transactions.
First, the bill eliminates the incentives for institutions to switch
to State charters by establishing the Federal regulations as the
starting point for all conversions. The Office of Thrift Supervision
would enforce the Federal regulations for all depository institutions,
but the States would retain authority to impose more stringent
protections against abuse. The Federal regulations would simply serve
as a floor.
Second, the bill forbids management and insiders from receiving
benefits through the transactin except in their role as depositors. If
they are depositors, they may receive the same preferential terms that
all depositors are offered and no more--no free stock, no preferential
purchase rights. Otherwise, management and insiders are treated as the
general public is treated. Further, the Director of the Office of
Thrift Supervision is required to set both a percentage and dollar cap
on the ownership stake acquired by insiders.
Third, incentive compensation such as stock options cannot be
conferred during the first year following the conversion. Decisions
concerning such incentive programs are better made by established
stockholders who can evaluate the costs and benefits of such a program,
rather than mutual depositors contemplating a conversion proposal.
Finally, the bill mandates a study of the conversion process by the
Secretary of the Treasury. This study will determine the adequacy of
existing Federal law and regulations in ensuring an equitable
conversion process, the accuracy of the stock appraisals employed in
conversions, and the adequacy of disclosure to the depositors and the
public required in conversions. The Secretary will report his findings
to the Congress within 1 year.
Mutual to stock conversions are complex transactions in which the
problems are far easier to identify than the solutions. It is
essential, however, that we stop insiders from putting their own best
interest ahead of their depositors, and this bill will do so. I look
forward to working with Senator D'Amato and the rest of the Banking
Committee to improve the bill as we move through the legislative
process.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that additional material be
printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
An Insiders-Only IPO Would Lower Net Worth of a Milwaukee Mutual
(By Robyn Meredith)
Washington.--In a new twist on the controversial trend of
mutual thrifts selling stock for the first time, Wisconsin's
largest mutual plans a deal that for the first time ever
would leave a thrift with lower net worth after it issues
stock.
Milwaukee's Mutual Savings Bank would still have capital
equal to about 9.5% of assets, high by industry standards.
But Mutual's offerings is also unusual in that no
depositors will be allowed to buy the stock, which is being
reserved solely for company insiders.
Congress Hearing the Critics
Mutual's plans to sell stock for the first time come as
Congress is holding hearings on conversions.
Key members of the House Banking committee, including
Chairman Henry B. Gonzalez, D-Tex., have introduced
legislation that would require federal regulators to tighten
state laws that permit large blocks of the new thrift stock
to be given or sold to insiders.
With the transaction, Mutual plans to keep the majority of
the company depositor-owned while selling a minority share of
stock. It will do so by forming a mutual holding company.
Preferred Stock
The $1.24 billion-asset thrift would form a holding
company-owned by the thrift's depositors--which in turn will
be the parent of the savings bank.
The savings bank will issue stock, at least 80% of which
will be held by the mutual holding company. The minority
share--a preferred stock class paying a 6% annual dividend--
will be given and solid to the thrifts' executives and
employees.
President and chief executive Michael T. Crowley Jr.
defended the deal, saying the thrift needs a holding company
to acquire other institutions in the future.
He said the shares were offered only to insiders because a
traditional stock offering, in which roughly $129 million in
stock would have been sold to the public, would have raised
too much capital for the thrift to safely deploy.
Mr. Crowley said that although the depositors who own the
thrift can't buy stock in the deal he is protecting their
interests. By granting employees and managers large blocks of
stock and stock options, he is giving them incentives to
boost the thrift's performance, he said.
All the officers are 60 years old or less including Mr.
Crowley, 51, who is also a director. One of the other six
directors is below retirement age. Chairman Michael T.
Crowley Sr. is 80.
Incentives Called Appropriate
The thrift president said paying the directors performance
incentives is appropriate. ``They are certainly going to be
staying with the company as long as they are functioning and
contributing to the company,'' Mr. Crowley said. ``I don't
think that I would categorize any of the directors as old.''
By creating a holding company that can make acquisitions,
``We are creating more value for the depositors, not less,''
by protecting depositors' ability to buy stock should the
thrift later go fully public, he added.
In standard stock conversions, insiders often wind up with
large blocks of the new stock--up to 25%, according to Mr.
Crowley. By doing a mutual holding company conversion, ``We
are preserving 80%'' for depositors, Mr. Crowley said.
`Nothing Is Being Taken Away'
Depositors ``will own the institution when it is done and
they will own the institution in the same proportion as if we
had done a stock offering,'' he said. ``Nothing is being
taken away from them at all.''
As a result of Mutual's stock issuance, its capital will
decline from $129 million, or 10.4% of assets, to $117
million, or 9.5%. The stake going to insiders amounts to
1,787,000 shares valued at about $15 each.
If the stock were sold at $15 a share, Mutual would raise
its capital by roughly $26.8 million.
Free Stock, Plus Bonuses
The deal will produce just $2.34 million in income--the
amount sold to the 10 directors and officers--while costing
Mutual roughly $17.8 million.
In addition to the stock they purchase. Mutual executives
will share $2.34 million in free stock, along with $1.8
million in cash bonuses to offset taxes they would otherwise
face.
In addition, $8.3 million of the stock will go to a tax-
qualified employee stock ownership plan. Mr. Crowley's
supplemental pension plan will be funded through $341,000 in
the stock.
And 900,000 shares in stock options valued at roughly $4.5
million will be issued. Fees for the transaction will be
$432,000.
Kip A. Weissman, a partner who specializes in thrift stock
conversions at the Washington-based law firm Silver, Freedman
& Taff, said, ``As currently structured, the cost of the
stock programs appears to offset the amount of capital raised
in the private placement.''
The deal could raise hackles in Congress, which held
hearings Thursday in North Carolina to consider depositors'
complaints about such deals. A second hearing will be held
Wednesday on Capitol Hill. ``If the transaction does result
in a capital drain, I would think it could be subjected to
criticism on Capitol Hill,'' Mr. Weissman said.
Reid Nagle, president of Charlottesville, Va.-based SNL
Securities, said Mutual's deal, ``obviously benefits
insiders, and exclusively insiders.''
If executives were solely interested in enriching
themselves, ``They probably could have done equally well in a
standard conversion, but in a mutual holding company
conversion, they retain control,'' he said.
Because the depositor-owned holding company would control
at least 80% of the company, outside stockholders could not
unseat the board. ``They have the comfort of going home at
night knowing that they can remain as directors and officers
as long as they choose,'' Mr. Nagle said. ``This is self-
enrichment without loss of control.''
The deal would not be allowed under Office of Thrift
Supervision rules, which govern stock conversions for all
savings and loans and for federally chartered savings banks.
In 1992, Mutual changed its charter from an OTS-regulated,
state-chartered savings and loan to a state-chartered savings
bank.
The differences are important because the proposed
legislation would force Mutual's deal to follow standards
similar to those imposed by the OTS.
State Approval Needed
Mutual filed its conversion plan Jan. 4 with its state
regulator, which must approve the deal. Although the deal
would result in a lower net worth, Mutual said in the
documents that it planned to use the proceeds from the
transaction ``to increase its regulatory capital and for
general corporate purposes.''
Harold N. Lee Jr., the Wisconsin savings and loan
commissioner, refused to comment on the deal. Mr. Lee last
year was chairman of the American Council of State Savings
Supervisors, the trade group that represents regulators.
In the past, he supported deals that have awarded thrift
executives large blocks of free and low-priced stock. He has
said executives deserve to be rewarded for successfully
steering thrifts through the S&L crisis.
Asked why he would pursue a deal that would lower net
worth, Mr. Crowley Jr. said that Mutual is already
overcapitalized.
``I guess if we were at 4%, we would be more concerned
about it,'' he said. ``I don't know that 9\1/2\% is a bad
number--last time I looked,'' that was a very good capital
ratio to have, he said. ``It makes a lot more sense not to
force a glut of capital into a very highly capitalized
institution.
``If we wanted to just increase our salaries over the next
10 years or five years, it wouldn't be an issue--It wouldn't
be news,'' Mr. Crowley said. This way, employees will own a
stake in the company as well. Selling stock will ``start to
create a change in our corporate culture, which has been a
mutual for 101 years,'' he said.
Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I am pleased to cosponsor S. 1801,
legislation designed to regulate mutual to stock conversions of savings
associations.
This is an issue that causes me great concern. It represents nothing
less than the plunder of our Nation's depositors by some unscrupulous
managers and officers of mutual savings institutions.
In our depository system, there are two types of savings
institutions. Stock savings banks are incorporated institutions owned
by their shareholders, and managed by an elected board of directors.
Mutual savings banks have no shareholders. These institutions are owned
by the depositors, and managed by a board of trustees, acting in a
fiduciary capacity, who often nominate and elect themselves to these
positions.
Recently, some of these mutual savings banks have discovered a quick
way to enrich their own officers and managers at the expense of
depositors. While there are excellent reasons for conversions--to raise
capital, for example--the conversion process has been misused, and
depositor funds misappropriated, by sharp operators. In too many
instances, insiders simply convert the mutual to a stock institution,
providing themselves with lucrative stock options, or even outright
grants of stock, in the new institution. The depositors, the actual
owners, get disproportionately little of the benefits of the
conversion, while the insiders get rich.
One glaring example of this attempted abuse occurred in my own State
of New York. The trustees of the Green Point Savings Bank wanted to
convert the institution to a stock savings bank, and in the process
would have given themselves stock worth an estimated $85 million, money
that rightly belongs to the institution's depositors.
Fortunately, the New York State Banking Department, under able
leadership of Superintendent Derrick Cephas, stepped in and prevented
this deal from going forward under the original egregious terms. On
Monday, Mr. Cephas issued an order requiring Green Point to cancel all
stock grants to insiders, eliminate other personal benefits for the
trustees, and appoint three new independent outside directors who will
report directly to the banking department.
However, this problem is far from solved. While Mr. Cephas has taken
forceful and decisive action in New York, conversions of this nature
are going on across the Nation. Only yesterday I was advised that
Wisconsin's largest mutual savings bank is planning to convert to stock
form, without allowing any depositors to purchase stock in the new
bank. Worse yet, the conversion would actually lower the capital of the
institution.
Mr. President, this abuse of depositors must stop. It is clear to me
that many of these transactions are nothing less than bank robbery.
Federal legislation is needed to correct these abuses now and on a
nationwide basis, as well as to tighten up existing Federal regulation
of the conversion process. That is why I am joining with Senator Riegle
in introducing legislation to set basic depositor protection standards
for mutual to stock conversions. These new Federal standards will set a
floor, not a ceiling. State regulators will be free to provide
additional protection. But if the States do not act, or do not provide
sufficient protection on their own, our legislation will establish
fundamental depositor rights needed to protect our citizens from this
type of financial abuse.
Mr. President, I hope that the Banking Committee will be able to
consider this proposal as soon as possible, and that Senate passage of
this important consumer protection measure will occur soon
thereafter.
______
By Mr. DOLE (for himself, Mr. Pressler, Mr. Domenici, Mr.
Nickles, Mr. Cochran, Mr. Helms, Mr. Simpson, Mr. D'Amato, Mr.
Coverdell, Mr. Gregg, Mr. Gorton, Mr. Thurmond, and Mr.
Kempthorne):
S. 1803. A bill to amend the United Nations Participation Act of 1945
to facilitate coordination between the executive and legislative
branches of Government regarding U.S. participation in, or the use of
U.S. funds for, United Nations peacekeeping activities; to the
Committee on Foreign Relations.
peace powers act of 1994
Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, last year's congressional uproar over United
States blunders in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti, has prompted some to
call for a review of the War Powers Act. However, in my view, at the
root of Congress' balking about these foreign policy flops and flip-
flops is not the relationship between the Congress and the Executive,
but the relationship between the United States and the United Nations--
and the lack of a statutory congressional role in that relationship.
The problem in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti was not the unilateral
pursuit of United States national interests. Each of these foreign
blunders was the result of the administration deferring to or depending
on the United Nations to define U.S. policy. Our policy in Somalia went
awry when the mission changed from carrying out humanitarian aid
deliveries to carrying out the U.N.'s vendetta against General Aideed,
and when feeding people turned into nation-building.
Instead of supporting Bosnia's right to self-defense under article 51
of the U.N. charter, at the urging of fellow members of the U.N.
Security Council the administration tentatively pledged 25,000 troops
to implement a U.N.-mediated plan which would reward aggression and
dismember Bosnia-Hercegovina, a U.N. member state. In the case of
Haiti, only a mob scene prevented the commitment of United States
troops to a U.N.-commanded deployment with a murky mission and
inadequate security.
The administration has reviewed or altered these ill-conceived, U.N.-
driven policies as a result of congressional pressure--not as a result
of congressional oversight or authority. The reality is that Congress
plays no formal role in U.N. peacekeeping decisions and so, the usual
checks and balances do not exist. In contrast to the foreign aid
process--where Congress must be notified of minor dollar changes in
assistance programs--hundreds of millions of dollars are committed for
U.N. peacekeeping without the Congress ever receiving even copies of
the relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions or reports. The Congress
is expected to pay the bills, no questions asked, and after the fact.
The process by which U.N. peacekeeping missions are recommended and
decided upon are shrouded in secrecy, and appear based on inconsistent
criteria. Nevertheless, once the U.N. Security Council votes to approve
a peacekeeping operation, the United States is automatically obligated
to pay nearly one-third of every operation. By the end of this fiscal
year, the United States will owe roughly $1 billion beyond the $401
million already appropriated for U.N. peacekeeping--and this does not
count hundreds of millions spent in support of U.N. peacekeeping
objectives.
At a time when the American people are calling for budgetary
restraint at home, U.N. peacekeeping has become an exploding
international entitlement program--with some 20 operations currently
underway. On September 27, 1993, when President Clinton laid out
criteria for U.N. peacekeeping operations, he also said the United
Nations ``must know when to say no'' to peacekeeping. Yet, since late
September, the Security Council--with the United States casting ``yes''
votes--has begun, continued, or modified peacekeeping operations in
Mozambique, the Iraq/Kuwait border, Somalia, El Salvador, Cyprus,
Lebanon, Georgia, Haiti, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and Liberia--
and is considering new operations in Angola, Tajikistan and other hot
spots in the former Soviet Union. Yet, the Security Council has only
said ``no'' to peacekeeping in Burundi.
Meanwhile, there has been minimal consultation with Congress on
peacekeeping matters, despite serious funding shortfalls and
congressional concerns about administration policy in this regard. With
peacekeeping costs and deployments mushrooming, peacekeeping
environments increasingly dangerous and hostile, and this
administration's increasing reliance on the United Nations for policy
direction, the Congress is compelled to take action.
Therefore, together with Senators Pressler, Domenici, Nickles,
Cochran, Helms, Simpson, D'Amato, Coverdell, Gregg, Gorton, Thurmond,
and Kempthorne, I am introducing the Peace Powers Act of 1994, to bring
U.S. interests, as well as greater openness and accountability, into
the peacekeeping decisionmaking process.
The United Nations Participation Act was passed in 1945 and has only
been amended twice--the last time nearly 30 years ago. Traditionally,
Congress has paid little attention to U.N. peacekeeping activities
because they were low-cost and low-risk. In recent years, however, as
U.N. peacekeeping activities proliferated and as U.S. commitments to
these operations increased, Congress has taken a closer look, and
thanks to the leadership of some of my Republican colleagues, Congress
has begun to impose some limits on U.N. peacekeeping.
The Peace Powers Act of 1994 is largely the product of those earlier
legislative efforts to get a handle on U.N. activities. This
legislation was intended as an umbrella--to cover the concepts and
ideas of many Senators. My distinguished colleagues, Senators Domenici,
Pressler, Nickles and Cochran deserve special mention for their
efforts. Numerous provisions they have sponsored in other bills are
included in this legislation.
Senator Pressler has a long and distinguished track record in
pressing for U.N. reform. In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he
offered four provisions on notifications, reporting, and reimbursement
which were incorporated into S. 1281, the State Department
authorization bill, which the Senate will begin to consider today. All
four provisions are included in this legislation. Senator Pressler also
will offer an amendment on an inspector general at the U.N., and that
concept is also included in the Peace Powers Act.
Senator Domenici has authored provisions on accountability, buy
America, and cost savings in his work on the Appropriations Committee--
all of which are reflected in the Peace Powers Act. And, Senators
Nickles and Cochran raised the issue of foreign command of U.S. forces
last fall during debate on the Defense Appropriations bill; this
critical issue is also addressed in this legislation in a manner which
should meet the key concerns raised about the Nickles/Cochran amendment
last year. I appreciate all of my colleagues efforts and their
cosponsorship of this legislation.
Let me just highlight some of the key provisions of the Peace Powers
Act of 1994:
First, no U.S. troops under foreign command for United Nations
peacekeeping activities. American troops should not be placed under
foreign command in U.N. operations. When I went to war, it was for the
stars and stripes not for the blue banner of the United Nations. Our
military personnel should only be asked to risk their lives in support
of U.S. interests in operations led by U.S. commanders. The tragedy in
Somalia illustrates the unacceptable danger to U.S. military personnel
of serving with multinational units with different equipment and levels
of expertise, under untested command structures. The Peace Powers Act
does, however, address some of the criticisms leveled against the
Nickles-Cochran amendment. The restriction on foreign command only
applies to U.N. peacekeeping activities--not to all actions taken under
NATO or the U.N. charter--so Desert Storm-type scenarios would not be
affected. Furthermore, the bill allows the President to place American
troops under foreign command if he determines it is in the U.S.
national security interest and is constitutional.
Second, no U.S. forces for a U.N. army without congressional
approval. The men and women in the U.S. Armed Forces voluntarily enlist
to protect and defend U.S. interests, and should not be turned over to
a U.N. standing army at the beck and call of the U.N. Secretary
General--who is an unelected international bureaucrat ill-prepared to
run military operations as is so painfully evident in the former
Yugoslavia. The Peace Powers Act clarifies that any article 43
agreement for a standing U.N. army must be subject to congressional
approval.
Third, put Congress in the loop. Congress needs to be in the loop
before the U.S. casts its vote on peacekeeping activities in the
Security Council. Rarely are these emergency decisions, and they always
lead to a pledge of U.S. funds or U.S. military personnel. The
distinguished Senator from Nebraska, Senator Kerrey, stated in a New
York Times op-ed last fall that, ``every decision to participate in a
U.N. peacekeeping operation should be subject to congressional
approval.'' While I would not go so far--nor does this legislation--we
must insure that the Congress is consulted and informed prior to
Security Council action on peacekeeping matters. Relevant U.N.
documents must be provided in a timely fashion so that the Congress can
offer input before a decision is made and before we receive the bill.
Right now the Congress relies on the good will of the administration or
the United Nations to get Security Council resolutions, cost
information, or answers to other questions our constitutents ask.
Fourth, truth in budgeting for U.N. peacekeeping. At present, U.S.
funding for peacekeeping comes from a number of sources, and
increasingly from the Department of Defense. Continued raids on the
U.S. defense budget to finance U.N. peacekeeping will guarantee a
return to the hollow forces of the late 1970s. Instead, the
administration should submit a complete funding request for
peacekeeping with the rest of the fiscal year budget request, and
request supplemental funding for new operations, if necessary.
Furthermore, the United Nations should be put on notice that the United
States will not continue to pay an ever-escalating assessed
contribution for U.N. peacekeeping--already at 31.7 percent--without
congressional input. It is high time to cut off the U.N.'s unlimited
credit line.
Fifth, bring accountability to the U.N. process. There is no
independent inspection capability at the United Nations and U.S.
efforts to establish an inspector general are being essentially ignored
by the entrenched, highly paid, bloated U.N. bureaucracy. I am not
talking about adding another bureaucrat with a fancy title who answers
to Boutros Boutros-Ghali--that's just window-dressing; I am talking
about an independent inspector general who can provide a thorough
accounting of U.N. operations to those who pay the bills. It's time for
us to use our financial leverage as the U.N's largest donor to achieve
fundamental reform.
Finally, give full credit where credit is due. The U.N. must give
full and prompt credit for U.S. non-cash or in-kind contributions such
as personnel, transport, and equipment. While the U.S. has spent
roughly $1.5 billion in Somalia, the U.N. will give us a bill for an
additional $500 million for U.N. peacekeeping in Somalia. The U.S.
taxpayer can no longer afford this kind of warped U.N. accounting which
does not reflect the totality of what we provide.
The Peace Powers Act of 1994 includes limitations on intelligence-
sharing with the United Nations; I think that most of my colleagues
would agree that providing intelligence to the U.N. is like giving it
directly to the news media. Our intelligence committee needs to be
brought into the U.N. intelligence loop, as well.
This bill requires steps to ensure the safety of Americans captured
during U.N. peacekeeping operations. In addition, it requires access
for American companies to U.N. peacekeeping contracts--to prevent what
happened in Cambodia, where American car makers were shut out.
The Peace Powers Act of 1994 will not solve all the problems
associated with U.S. involvement in U.N. peacekeeping activities, but
it should help increase accountability, control costs and start
bringing U.S. interests into the decisionmaking equation.
Some may argue that the Peace Powers Act is congressional intrusion
into the executive's power--that it places undue limits on the
President's powers as Commander in Chief. My response is simple: the
Peace Powers Act only places limits on our participation in some United
Nations activities. It has no impact on decisions involving American
forces acting in support of American interests--whether unilaterally or
in a coalition under the U.N. charter or the NATO treaty.
I would like to quote from an article written by the distinguished
President pro tempore for the New York Times last summer, ``Congress'
ability to support or deny financing is critical to insuring its voice
in policy making. Until a clear consensus is reached regarding the U.S.
role in all peacekeeping matters, Congress should not hand off its
constitutional responsibility.''
Let me make it clear: this act would not limit Presidential power to
act under article 43 of article 51 of the U.N. charter in defense of
American interests--in Somalia, in Bosnia, in Haiti or anywhere else--
unless the President chooses to involve U.S. forces in a U.N.
peacekeeping operation.
Mr. President, the American people rallied in support of the
President during Desert Storm; they knew that U.S. interests were at
stake and that U.S. forces were defending these interests under the
command of the President, our Commander in Chief. However, the American
people are tired of spending money--and risking lives--for operations
conceived by and run from U.N. headquarters in New York.
Because I believe we cannot afford to wait on this matter, I intend
to offer this legislation as an amendment to S. 1281, the State
Department authorization bill.
I ask unanimous consent that a section-by-section analysis of this
legislation, as well as the articles by the distinguished President pro
tempore and Senator Kerrey which support many principles included in
this bill, be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Peace Powers Act of 1994--Section-by-Section Analysis
section 1: short title
Section 1 states the short title for this legislation is
the ``Peace Powers Act of 1994.''
section 2: statement of purposes
Section 2 states five purposes for the Act:
(1) To maintain and ensure primacy of U.S. national
security interests.
(2) To strengthen Congressional ability to oversee
peacekeeping and other U.N. activities.
(3) To provide for Congress to be notified in advance
regarding anticipated U.N. peacekeeping activities.
(4) To ensure U.N. peacekeeping assessments made to the
United States are fair and equitable.
(5) To facilitate coordination between legislative and
executive branches regarding U.S. participation in U.N.
peacekeeping.
section 3: definitions
Section 3(a) amends the U.N. Participation Act of 1945
(UNPA) by adding a new section 10 with definitions.
Section 10(1) defines ``appropriate congressional
committees'' as the Committees on Appropriations, Armed
Services, Foreign Relations of the Senate, and Committees on
Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs of the
House of Representatives.
Section 10(2) defines ``Permanent Representative'' means
the Permanent Representative of the United States to the
United Nations.
Section 10(3) defines ``United Nations peacekeeping
activities'' to mean any international peacekeeping,
peacemaking, peace-enforcing, or similar activity involving
the use of nationals from member countries authorized under
chapter VI or VII of the United Nations Charter.
Section 3(b) applies the definitions in subsection (a) to
provisions in the Peace Powers Act which do not amend the
U.N. Participation Act.
section 4: limitation on placement of u.s. armed forces under foreign
control for u.n. peacekeeping activities
Section 4 amends Section 6 of U.N. Participation Act of
1945 as follows:
Section 6(a) requires approval by Congress of any special
agreement or agreements negotiated by the President with the
U.N. Security Council under Article 43 of the U.N. Charter,
providing for the numbers and types of U.S. forces, their
degree of readiness and general locations, or nature of
facilities and assistance, including rights of passage.
Section 6(b) provides that the President may not place U.S.
armed forces under the command or operation control of
foreign nationals in United Nations peacekeeping activities
unless:
(1) The President satisfies requirements of subsection (c);
or
(2) Congress enacts an Act or a joint resolution
specifically authorizing such subordination.
Section 6(c)(1) requires the President to submit to the
appropriate congressional committees the following documents:
(A) A determination that:
(i) The proposed subordination of U.S. armed forces under
foreign command is in the national security interest of the
United States;
(ii) U.S. unit commanders proposed for subordination to the
command of foreign nationals will at all times retain the
ability to report independently to higher U.S. military
authorities;
(iii) The United States retains the authority to withdraw
U.S. armed forces from the operation at any time and to take
such actions as it deems necessary to protect the forces if
they are endangered; and
(iv) U.S. armed forces subordinated to foreign command will
at all times remain under U.S. administrative command for
such purpose as discipline and evaluation.
(B) The justification for the determination pursuant to
paragraph (A)(i).
(C) A memorandum of legal points and authorities explaining
why the proposed foreign command arrangement does not violate
the U.S. Constitution.
Section 6(c)(2) requires the documents described in section
6(c)(1) to be submitted to the appropriate congressional
committees 15 days in advance of any subordination to foreign
command, unless the President determines an emergency exists
which prevents 15 day notice, in which case the documents
must be submitted no later than 48 hours after such
subordination.
Section 6(d) provides that, except as authorized by Section
7 of the UNPA, nothing contained in the act shall be
construed as an authorization to the President, by the
Congress to make available to the U.N. Security Council U.S.
armed forces, facilities, or assistance.
section 5: notice to congress of proposed U.N. peacekeeping activities
Section 5 amends section 4 of the U.N. Participation Act of
1945, by adding a new section 4(b), and makes technical and
conforming changes.
Section 4(b)(1) provides that, except as provided in
paragraph 2, 15 days before a U.N. Security Council vote to
authorize a peacekeeping activity (including extension,
modification, suspension, or termination of previously
authorized peacekeeping activities) which would involve the
use of U.S. Armed Forces or the expenditure of U.S. funds,
the President shall modify the appropriate congressional
committee. The notification shall include a cost assessment
of the participation (including total estimated costs and the
U.S. share), mission and objectives, duration, estimated
termination date and the source of funding for the U.S. share
of costs (whether in an annual budget request, reprogramming
notification, a budget amendment, or a supplemental budget
request).
Section 4(b)(2) provides that if the President determines
an emergency exists which prevents submission of the 15-day
advance notification and that the proposed action is in the
national security interests of the United States, the
President may provide the notification in a timely manner,
but not less than 48 hours after the vote.
section 6: transmittal to congress of u.n. resolutions and reports
Section 6 amends Section 4 of the U.N. Participation Act of
1945 by adding a new section 4(c).
Section 4(c)(1) requires the Permanent Representative to
transmit the text of a resolution authorizing international
peacekeeping activities or other actions under the U.N.
Charter and any supporting documentation to appropriate
congressional committees not later than 24 hours after its
adoption.
Section 4(c)(2) requires the Permanent Representative to
promptly transmit to the appropriate congressional committees
any report prepared by the United Nations on proposed,
ongoing or concluded peacekeeping activity.
section 7: Notice to congress regarding contributions for U.N.
peacekeeping activities
Section 7 amends Section 4 of the U.N. Participation Act by
adding a new section 4(d).
Section 4(d)(1) requires the President to notify
appropriate Congressional committees not later than 15 days
after the United Nations submits billing requesting payment
by the United States for any contributions for U.N.
peacekeeping activities.
Section 4(d)(2) requires the President to notify the
appropriate congressional committee 15 days before the United
States obligates funds for U.N. peacekeeping activities,
unless the President determines an emergency exists and a
contribution is in the national security interests of the
United States, in which case the notification must be
provided within 48 hours after the obligation.
section 8: notice to congress regarding U.S. assistance for U.N.
peacekeeping activities
Section 8 amends Section 7 of the U.N. Participation Act by
adding a new section 7(e).
Section 7(e)(1) requires the President to notify the
appropriate congressional committees at least 15 days before
any agency or entity of the U.S. government makes available
assistance to the United Nations for U.N. peacekeeping
activities.
Section 7(e)(2) provides that if that President determines
there is an emergency that prevents compliance with section
7(e)(1) and that he determines such assistance is in the
national security interests of the United States,
notification shall be provided in a timely manner but not
after than 48 hours after such assistance is made available.
Section 7(e)(3) defines assistance for the purposes of this
section to mean assistance of any kind, including logistical
support, supplies, goods, services (including command,
control, intelligence assistance and training) and the grant
of rights of passage, and assistance provided through in-kind
contributions or through the provision of goods and services
on any basis, including grant, lease or reimbursable basis
but does not include the payment of voluntary or assessed
contributions.
Section 9: U.S. Contributions for U.N. Peacekeeping activities
Section 9 amends Section 4 of the U.N. Participation Act by
adding a new section 4(e).
Section 4(e)(1) provides that the President shall, at the
time of the annual budget submission, submit a report to
Congress, on the anticipated budget for U.S. participation in
U.N. peacekeeping activities for the fiscal year.
Section 4(e)(2) requires the report to contain the
aggregate amount of funds available to the United Nations for
that fiscal year which may be made available to U.N.
peacekeeping activities, including assessed and voluntary
contributions, and the aggregate amount of funds (from all
accounts) and the aggregate costs of in-kind contributions
that the United States proposes to make available to the
United Nations for that fiscal year for U.N. peacekeeping
activities.
Section 4(e)(3) requires the President to include in his
budget submission for FY 1996 a projection of all U.S. costs
for international peacekeeping activities for fiscal years
1996, 1997 and 1998.
Section 10: Annual Report
Section 10 creates an annual reporting requirement by
adding a new section 4(f) of the U.N. Participation Act.
Section 4(f)(1) requires the Secretary of State, after
consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal
agencies including the Secretary of Defense, not later than
90 days after enactment of this section and at the time of
the President's annual budget submission thereafter to submit
a report to the appropriate congressional committees on U.S.
contributions to U.N. peacekeeping activities.
Section 4(f)(2) requires each report to include the
following information:
(A) The number and nature of ongoing U.N. peacekeeping
activities.
(B) The priority accorded to ongoing peacekeeping
operations and their anticipated duration.
(C) An assessment of the effectiveness of each operation,
its relation to U.S. national security interests, the efforts
of the United Nations to resolve the relevant armed
conflicts, and projected termination date for each activity.
(D) The total costs of each U.N. peacekeeping activity,
both ongoing and concluded, and the total cost of all such
activities.
(E) The amount of U.S. assessed and voluntary contributions
to each activity, and the total of such contributions.
(F) The incremental costs incurred by the Department of
Defense for each such activity, and for all such activities.
(G) Any other assistance (as defined in this Act) made
available by the United States to the United Nations,
specifying assistance provided on a reimbursable and non-
reimbursable basis.
(H) An assessment of the U.N.'s management and support for
peacekeeping activities, including all recommendations for
improvements made by the United States and any action to
implement such recommendations by the United Nations.
(I) A detailed description of efforts by the United States
to seek and receive credit towards the U.S. assessment for
all assistance provided in support of U.N. peacekeeping
objectives.
section 11: reimbursement to the United States for in-kind
contributions to u.n. peacekeeping activities
Section 11 amends Section 7 of the U.N. Participation Act,
by adding new sections 7(e) and 7(f).
Section 7(b) is amended to provide that the Secretary of
Defense may waive reimbursement for goods and services
provided to the United Nations if, after consultation with
the Secretary of State and the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget, he determines an emergency exists
which justifies the waiver. Any waiver shall be submitted to
the appropriate congressional committees 15 days before it
takes effect unless the President determines an emergency
exists which prevents compliance with the 15 advance notice
and that the nonreimbursable provision is in the national
security interests of the United States, in which case
notification shall be provided not later than 48 hours after
the waiver takes effect.
Section 7(e) provides that no funds may be used during any
fiscal year for any U.S. contribution for U.N. peacekeeping
activities until the Secretary of Defense certifies to
Congress that, for the preceding fiscal year, the United
Nations has reimbursed the Defense Department directly for
goods and services provided to the United Nations on a
reimbursable basis.
Section 7(f)(1) requires the Secretary of State to ensure
that goods and services provided to the United Nations are
reimbursed at the appropriate value as determined by the
Department of Defense.
Section 7(f)(2) requires the Permanent Representative to
submit a report not later than one year after enactment of
this subsection to the appropriate congressional committees
on actions taken by the U.S. mission to the United Nations to
achieve the objectives of section 7(f)(1).
section 12: limitation on use of department of defense funds for u.n.
peacekeeping activities
Section 12 provides that, beginning October 1, 1995, funds
made available to the Department of Defense (including funds
for ``Operations and Maintenance'') shall not be available
for U.S. contributions for U.N. peacekeeping activities or
for the incremental costs of U.S. Armed Forces in U.N.
peacekeeping activities unless Congress has by law
specifically made those funds available for such purposes.
section 13: assessed contributions for u.n. peacekeeping activities
Section 13(a) provides that the Permanent Representative
should make every effort to ensure that the United Nations
completes an overall review and reassessment of each nation's
assessed contribution for U.N. peacekeeping activities. As
part of this review, the Permanent Representative should make
every effort to advance the concept that host governments and
other governments in the region where a U.N. peacekeeping
activity is carried out should bear a greater burden of its
financial cost.
Section 13(b)(1) provides that the Permanent Representative
should make every effort to obtain agreement by the United
Nations to a U.S. assessed contribution for U.N. peacekeeping
activity that is no greater a percentage than the U.S. share
of assessed contributions for other U.N. activities.
Section 13(b)(2) states that Congress declares that,
effective for fiscal year 1996, it does not intend to make
available funds for payment of U.S. contributions for U.N.
peacekeeping activities that exceed 25% of the total amount
assessed for such activities.
Section 13(b)(3) requires the Permanent Representative to
inform the Secretary General of the intent expressed in
section 13(b)(2).
section 14: ``buy america'' requirement
Section 14 provides that no funds may be obligated or
expended to pay the U.S. share of U.N. peacekeeping unless
the Secretary of State determines and certifies to
appropriate congressional committees that U.S. manufactures
and suppliers are being given the same opportunities to
provide equipment, services, and material as foreign
manufactures and suppliers.
section 15: united states personnel taken prisoner while serving in
multilateral peacekeeping forces
Section 15(a) contains findings on U.S. personnel serving
in multilateral peacekeeping forces.
Section 15(b) expresses the Sense of Congress that the
President should take immediate steps, unilaterally and in
appropriate international bodies, to assure that U.S.
personnel serving as part of a multilateral force when
captured are accorded the protection accorded to prisoners of
war, and that the President should take all necessary steps
to bring to justice all individuals responsible for
mistreatment, torture or death of U.S. military personnel who
are captured during such service.
Section 15(c) provides that, as part of the report required
by section 4(e) of the U.N. Participation Act of 1945 (as
added by this act), the President shall include a separate
section setting forth:
(1) the status under international law of members of
multilateral peacekeeping forces, including the legal status
of such persons if captured, missing or detained;
(2) the extent of the risk for captured U.S. personnel in
multinational forces where their captors fail to respect the
1949 Geneva Conventions and other international agreements
intended to protect prisoners of war; and
(3) the specific steps taken to protect U.S. military
personnel, together (if necessary) with any recommendations
for enactment of legislation to achieve that objective.
section 16: provision of intelligence to the united nations
Section 16 places limits on the provision of U.S.
intelligence to the United Nations.
Section 16(a) states that the United States may provide
intelligence to the United Nations only pursuant to a written
agreement between the President and the Secretary General of
the United Nations specifying the type of intelligence to be
provided, the circumstances under which the intelligence is
to be provided, the procedures of the United Nations
concerning access to and protection of the intelligence.
Section 17(a) further provides that any such agreement shall
be effective for a period not to exceed one year.
Section 16(b) states that the agreement shall be effective
only if the President has transmitted the agreement to the
Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives not less than 30 days before it enters into
force.
Section 16(c) states that the President may delegate the
authority to enter into an intelligence agreement with the
United Nations only to the Secretary of Defense or the
Director of Central Intelligence.
Section 16(d) states that section 17(a) shall not apply to
the provision of intelligence only to and for the use of
intelligence by U.S. Government personnel serving with the
United Nations, or essential for the protection of nationals
of the United States including military personnel and
civilian personnel of the U.S. Government.
Section 16(e) states that the provisions of section 17 do
not impair or affect the authority of the Director of
Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods from
unauthorized disclosure and do not supersede or affect Title
V of the National Security Act of 1947 or section 112B of
title 1 of the United States Code.
Section 16(f) makes the provisions of this section
effective 60 days after enactment.
section 17: u.n. peacekeeping budgetary and management reform
Section 17(a) requires the withholding of 50% of the amount
made available for U.S. assessed contributions for U.N.
peacekeeping activities and prohibits payment of any
voluntary contributions unless a certification has been made
under section 17(b).
Section 17(b) provides that the certification referred to
in section 17(a) is a certification by the President to the
Congress that:
(1) The United Nations has established an independent
Office of Inspector General to conduct audits, inspections
and investigations relating to U.N. peacekeeping activities;
(2) the Secretary General has appointed an I.G., with the
consent of the General Assembly, solely on the basis of
integrity and ability;
(3) the U.N. Office of Inspector General: is authorized to
investigate and report on administration of U.N. peacekeeping
activities; has access to relevant records and documents; and
has direct access to relevant officials of the United
Nations;
(4) the U.N. Office of Inspector General is keeping the
Secretary General and the Security Council fully informed of
problems and the need for corrective action;
(5) the United Nations has established measures to protect
the identities and prevent reprisals against staff members
who cooperate with the I.G.; and
(6) the United Nations has enacted procedures to ensure
compliance with I.G. recommendations.
____
[From the New York Times, Aug. 19, 1993]
The Perils of Peacekeeping
(By Robert C. Byrd)
The news that the Clinton Administration is considering an
expanded role in United Nations peacekeeping operations is
cause for concern. The plan would allow American soldiers to
serve under foreign commanders on a regular basis. Before
adopting any directive embracing this policy, the
Administration should allow Congress to debate it thoroughly.
If the plan is carried out, we would face more than the
dubious prospect of sending U.S. troops into battle under
foreign command. We might also become militarily involved in
operations that the American people don't properly understand
or support.
Unless there is a national consensus in favor of U.S.
involvement, any such military endeavors could be disastrous.
U.N. intervention in Somalia is a case in point. The
operation was initially commendable. Its goal was to see that
humanitarian aid was delivered to needy Somalis, and U.S.
troops performed admirably. But now, with the humanitarian
mission successfully completed, the U.N. is trying to rebuild
the nation's political structure. This risky experiment could
include thousands of U.S. troops.
The deaths of four American soldiers in Mogadishu this
month and the overt hostility of Somalis toward U.N. troops
show that the operation is quickly crumbling. It is not worth
American lives lost and injuries sustained.
Congress has never approved, or even considered, U.S.
participation in forcing a political reconciliation in
Somalia. And there is certainly not a consensus among
Americans that such an effort is worth any price in our
soldiers' blood. Without a consensus, the likely result of
such an operation could be a cut-and-run failure similar to
the Beirut disaster of 1982 to 1984.
Lacking Congressional and popular support, U.S. combat
forces in Somalia should be removed as soon as possible.
Dedication to U.N. Security Council resolutions and
peacekeeping missions should not be used by any
Administration to escape the hard job of consensus-building
in Washington. Despite a Security Council resolution
authorizing member nations to do battle against the marauding
Iraqi Army in Kuwait in 1990, the Bush Administration
sensibly sought Congressional approval before committing
American forces.
The humanitarian mission in Somalia has now been totally
eclipsed by a gang war in which the U.S. is taking sides
under the U.N. umbrella. In October, the U.N.'s initial six-
month mandate there expires. If the mission is extended,
additional money will be required.
The U.S. is expected to pay about 30 percent of the U.N.'s
peacekeeping bill. The U.N. intervention in Somalia and
Bosnia is far more expensive than more traditional
peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations. Congress is
already being asked to provide billions of dollars to support
the mushrooming ambitions of the U.N. in peacekeeping
operations around the world.
On Capitol Hill there is a growing reluctance to write such
large checks. Congress has even been reluctant to pay our
currently overdue peacekeeping bill. This shows that the
Administration will have a tough time in gaining support for
more money. Where will these funds come from? We certainly
should not cut spending on domestic needs to pay for foreign
adventures.
Yet the White House has requested almost $1 billion for
U.N. obligations in fiscal 1994. By setting aside this huge
sum, the Administration could avoid having to come to
Congress to get approval for every peacekeeping endeavor it
wants to get involved in.
Congress's ability to support or deny financing is critical
to insuring its voice in policy making. Until a clear
consensus is reached regarding the U.S. role in all
peacekeeping matters, Congress should not hand off its
constitutional responsibility.
____
[From the New York Times, Oct. 7, 1993]
Not So Fast on Somalia
(By Bob Kerrey)
Washington.--The horror of American bodies being dragged
through the streets of Somalia and the shock of Army Rangers
being ambushed have left Americans furious and numb. The
disaster has brought an understandable instant response: get
our troops out now. However, as President Clinton said
yesterday, before a hurried pullout, we must think hard about
the meaning of what we're doing in Somalia.
Nobody argues we should stay in Somalia any longer than
minimally necessary. But the way we leave is crucial.
We will not leave Mogadishu until we get our hostages back
and every American serviceman is accounted for. Beyond that,
the Somalis don't have any thing we want. Apart from the
humanitarian problem that brought us there, Somalia isn't a
security concern. But it does matter that the world learn how
to act when countries or regions fall apart.
Countries participating in United Nations operations must
persevere in them. America's example has the most to do with
whether such operations succeed.
We want the operation in Haiti to succeed because failure
could send us another flood of impoverished immigrants. I
call that defense of the United States. We want the operation
in Bosinia to succeed because we don't want the European
countries and Russian and Turkey coming to blows. I call that
defense of the United States.
For the U.N. to succeed in these operations, other
countries need confidence, training and leadership. That's
where we come in. If the U.N. can learn from our military how
to do things right, we won't have to go to every fire. Other
countries will pull their full load and won't look for the
U.S. to lead every operation. But we are still providing
leadership by example so that others will commit themselves
and U.N. peacekeeping and peacemaking will succeed.
If we left Somalia prematurely, that example, which our
military has burnished for months by its conduct under
pressure would be tarnished--and with it the idea of a
collective response to regional problems. A retreat by any
name is still a retreat.
But we need to lay down some guidelines for U.S.
participation in all U.N. operations. First, the U.S. should
be called upon for its unique strengths--intelligence
collection, logistics, medical support, communications--but
not for infantry units, which many countries have available.
Our superpower status and the reputation of our combat units
give thugs like Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid a target to us use
to build prestige.
Second, we should insure that U.S. forces are always under
U.S. command and have sufficient U.S. back up for protection.
The need to call on foreign armored units to help rescue our
Rangers was shameful.
Third, our participation should be proportional. I object
to sending thousands of U.S. combat troops to Bosnia when
wealthy, well-armed European countries can do more in a cause
whose failure will have more immediate consequences for them
than is.
Fourth, every decision to participate in a U.N.
peacekeeping operation should be subject to Congressional
approval.
Because our departure from Somalia will affect future U.N.
operations, we should leave with dignity and only when
properly relieved, As Nebraska's senior Senator, J. James
Exon a Democrat said in the Senate yesterday, America might
well regret a precipitous decision taken at this time of
stress.
In the meantime, we should have no illusions that we, or
anyone, will ever create a democratic government there. The
military in Somalia should lower its profile. The diplomats
should get the Somali factions together, declare a Somalia
government and pronounce the U.N operation over. And soon.
______
By Mr. WARNER:
S. 1804. A bill to amend title X, United States Code, to eliminate
the disparity between civilian and military retiree cost-of-living
adjustments caused by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993; to
the Committee on Armed Services.
cost-of-living adjustments act of 1994
Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I introduce legislation to correct
an inequity that occurred in the budget process last year. While
Congress has historically treated Federal civilian and military
retirees equally under the law, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1993 that was recently signed into law contains a disparity in the
schedule of future cost of living adjustments [COLA's] for civil
service and military retirees.
The problem of military retiree pay inequity arose out of decisions
made in the budget process last year to reduce COLA's for both retired
military and retired Federal employees. Instead of reducing COLA's, a
decision was made to continue with full COLA's but delay the effective
dates of the COLA's each year to achieve the directed reductions over 5
years.
Funds were available in civilian accounts to alleviate the impact on
civilian retirees but no additional funds were available in the
military retiree accounts. As a result, Federal civilian retirees will
have their COLA's delayed until April for the next 3 years. Military
retirees, on the other hand, will have their COLA's delayed until April
1994, but in 1995-98, their COLA's will be delayed until October.
In total, Federal civilian retirees will have their COLA's delayed
for 9 months while military retirees will have their COLA's delayed for
39 months.
Mr. President, this is clearly an unfair situation. We have an
obligation to ensure that military retirees are treated equitably with
their civilian counterparts. Therefore, I am introducing legislation
that will restore equity by placing military retiree COLA's on the same
schedule as those for Federal civilian retirees. Inflation does not
discriminate between military and civilian Federal retirees and neither
should we.
I recognize that funds will have to be identified to pay for this
change in the schedule for military retirees. It is not my intent that
all of these funds should come from the defense budget. I do intend to
work with the leadership of the Budget Committee, the Appropriations
Committee, and the Governmental Affairs Committee to find suitable
offsets and reach a satisfactory solution to this problem.
I urge my colleagues to join me in this legislation to provide fair
and equitable treatment for all our Federal employees, both military
and civilian.
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