[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 2 (Wednesday, January 26, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: January 26, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
          STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

      By Mr. GRAMM (for himself, Mr. Helms, Mr. Smith and Mr. Burns):
  S. 1800. A bill to protect the personal security of Americans by 
ensuring the imprisonment of violent criminals; to the Committee on the 
Judiciary.


             THE PREDATOR CRIMINAL IMPRISONMENT ACT OF 1994

  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, today I am going to introduce a bill 
entitled ``The Predator Criminal Imprisonment Act of 1994.''
  This bill contains the toughest provisions from the anticrime bill 
which we adopted in the Senate last year and which I believe contained 
the nucleus of an effective program to grab violent criminals by the 
throat and not let them go to get a better grip.
  I want to explain to my colleagues and to the American people why I 
am introducing this bill and what my plans are in regard to it.
  We have not passed comprehensive and effective anticrime legislation 
in the U.S. Congress in 9 years. For 9 years we have passed strong 
provisions in the Senate. Sometimes we have passed strong provisions in 
the House. But what has happened is that when those bills have gone to 
conference, passing through that bottleneck where decisions are made by 
a small number of people who hold views on crime quite different from 
the views held by the average American, where the conference seems to 
blame society and not the criminal for crime, what has happened is that 
those tough provisions have ended up being stripped out of the bills.
  A perfect example was in the last Congress. We passed a provision in 
the Senate that allowed us to strengthen law enforcement and to make it 
possible for us to carry out tough sentences, the most important of 
which was the death penalty, the so-called habeas corpus reforms. That 
provision was adopted in the Senate. We went to conference with the 
House on that crime bill, and not only did the members of that 
conference committee in a dark room somewhere in this great old Capitol 
strip out the get-tough provision of the Senate bill, but they 
substituted a provision that would have actually weakened law 
enforcement.
  All of us last night listened to the President endorse the three-
time-loser provision. I have personally offered that provision on the 
floor of the Senate a number of times. It has been offered by others. 
And I have obviously supported it when I offered it, and I supported it 
when they offered it. And I am delighted that the President has 
endorsed that provision.
  But I am concerned about two things. First of all, I am concerned 
that last year in his first address to the Nation in a Joint Session of 
Congress, the President talked about getting tough on crime. But later 
when we got his budget he cut prison construction by $580 million. The 
President and the Attorney General have spent the entire last year 
trying to repeal mandatory minimum sentencing. Now the President has 
done a 180, and he says he is for the three-time-loser provision.
  I want the President to support the Senate crime bill. We passed a 
tough crime bill. The House has not yet dealt with that legislation. 
But I have not heard the President say that he supports the funding 
mechanism that would cut existing programs to build prisons, to 
institute a truth-in-sentencing provision, to have 10 years in prison 
without parole for possessing a firearm during the commission of a 
violent crime or a drug felony, 20 years for discharging it, life 
imprisonment for killing somebody, the death penalty in aggravated 
cases, to have 10 years in prison for selling drugs to a child no 
matter who your daddy is or how you think society has done you wrong, 
get-tough provisions that the American people want.
  So I have offered this bill today because I am afraid that the House 
is not going to adopt our funding mechanism, that we are not going to 
build the prisons, that our get-tough minimum mandatory sentences will 
not become the law of the land, that our partnership with the States to 
build regional prisons and to incarcerate repeat offenders will not be 
put into effect.
  So today, I wanted to put the Senate on notice that I am offering a 
bill that has the get-tough provisions of the Senate bill in it. If by 
May 1 the House has not passed a crime bill, if by May 1 we have not 
taken action to give the American people something they desperately 
want but have been denied for 9 years in a row in getting, I am going 
to begin in the month of May offering these get-tough provisions as an 
amendment to the bills under consideration in the Senate.
  It would not be my objective to tie up the Senate. I do not think we 
would need a lengthy debate. We have already voted by large margins for 
the provisions of this bill.
  The provisions of the bill include: Mandatory minimum sentences for 
gun offenses, the death penalty in aggravated cases for murder with a 
gun, mandatory minimum sentencing for selling drugs to a child, life 
imprisonment on a second offense, imprisonment for individuals who 
commit violent crimes and drug felonies and on the third offense put 
them in prison for life and keep them there and do not engage in plea 
bargaining on that third offense and direct prosecutors to go for life 
in prison.
  Basically, these are get-tough provisions that build prisons; that 
enter into a partnership with the States; that guarantee that when 
somebody is put in prison for 10 years for a violent crime, they serve 
almost every single day in prison of those 10 years; that use existing 
prison space by setting a higher standard on the Federal courts because 
today 43 of our States are limited by the Federal courts in terms of 
their ability to keep violent predator criminals off the streets, even 
though many of these criminals are committing 100 violent crimes a 
year.
  Mr. President, our bleeding Nation demands that we act. For 9 years 
we have not acted. The President, last night, got on America's team on 
this issue. I urge him to do several things: Endorse the Senate bill. 
If there are areas of the Senate bill the President cannot support, 
tell us what they are, give us an opportunity to sit down and work out 
a viable compromise. Urge those in the House who still blame society 
for crime to recognize that the American people, this year, will not be 
denied. The purpose of this legislation is to guarantee that we are not 
denied. I will introduce this bill today.
  I ask unanimous consent that this two-page outline be printed in the 
Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

             The Predator Criminal Imprisonment Act of 1994


                           TITLE 1. FINDINGS

       The Congress makes the following findings:
       (1) The most important domestic function of the Federal 
     government is the protection of the personal security of 
     individual Americans through the enactment and enforcement of 
     laws against criminal behavior.
       (2) The criminal justice system in America is failing to 
     achieve its basic objective of protecting the innocent and 
     punishing the guilty.
       (3) In America today, there exists crime without 
     punishment. Failure to remedy this imperils the public 
     safety, disrupts domestic tranquility, and threatens the rule 
     of law.


         title 2. effective mandatory minimum prison sentences

       A. Provide for a mandatory term in prison of at least 10 
     years for any individual who possesses a firearm while 
     committing a crime of violence or drug felony, not less than 
     20 years in prison if the weapon is discharged and either 
     life imprisonment or the penalty of death in aggravated 
     circumstances if the gun is used to kill a person during the 
     commission of such a crime.
       B. Provide for a mandatory, minimum term in prison of 10 
     years for any adult who sells drugs to a minor or who 
     involves a minor in drug trafficking operations; provide for 
     not less than life imprisonment upon conviction for a second 
     such offense.
       C. Provide for not less than life imprisonment for any 
     individual who commits a serious drug felony or violent crime 
     after two prior convictions for such offenses.

     The Senate agreed by voice vote to include these penalties in 
     H.R. 3355, the 1993 Senate passed anti-crime bill after 
     voting 58-42 to modify the Gramm amendment with the D'Amato 
     proposal to apply the gun penalties to State as well as 
     Federal offenses.


    title 3. construction of regional prisons for violent criminals

       A. Authorize the construction of at least 10 regional 
     prisons with each housing at least 2500 inmates. Such 
     regional prisons would house violent criminals convicted in 
     either state or federal court. In order to be eligible to use 
     the regional prisons, each participating state must insure 
     that violent criminals serve at least 85% of their sentence; 
     must adopt pre-trial detention policies similar to those in 
     the Federal system; must adopt sentences for firearms 
     offenders that are at least as long as those imposed under 
     Federal law; and must allow recognition of the rights of 
     victims of crime. The Senate voted to include such provisions 
     in H.R. 3355 when it voted 94-4 in November 1993 and passed 
     the Byrd amendment.


            title 4. increased use of existing prison space

       A. Currently, too many violent criminals serve too little 
     of their sentences because the Federal courts have placed 
     population limits or ``caps'' on prisons to remedy a variety 
     of prison conditions deemed unsuitable by the court. Title 4 
     would limit such ``cap'' orders to those circumstances where 
     an individual plaintiff inmate has proven that crowded 
     conditions have violated the Constitution.
       Thus, court ordered limits on prison inmate population 
     levels would be used only to remedy Constitutional violations 
     created by overcrowding. In addition, other remedies, such as 
     improved health care, would have to be exhausted prior to the 
     imposition of a prison population cap.
       The Senate voted 68-31 to include this Helms-Gramm-Mack-
     Graham language as Section 5139 in H.R. 3355, the Senate 
     passed anti-crime bill.


    title 5. establishment of ``violent crime reduction trust fund''

       A. The Senate voted 94-4 to adopt the Byrd amendment which 
     would establish a new ``Violent Crime Reduction Trust Fund''. 
     The $22 billion fund would be created by reducing over a 
     period of 5 years the level of federal employment by 252,000. 
     The reduction in federal personnel levels was recommended by 
     Vice-President Gore in the Report of the National Performance 
     Review. During consideration of the 1993 Unemployment 
     Compensation bill the Senate had voted 82-14 in favor of such 
     a personnel reduction as proposed in the Gramm amendment; the 
     House had approved the proposal 275-146.
                                 ______

      Mr. RIEGLE (for himself and Mr. D'Amato):
  S. 1801. A bill to apply certain minimum standards to the conversion 
of savings associations and savings banks from the mutual form to the 
stock form, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs.


    mutual depository institution conversion protection act of 1994

 Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. President, today I am introducing the Mutual 
Depository Institution Conversion Protection Act of 1994. I am pleased 
that Senator D'Amato is joining me as an original cosponsor. This 
important legislation is designed to address problems that have arisen 
as mutually held depository institutions have converted to stock 
ownership form.
  While mutual to stock conversions are not a new phenomenon, they have 
become the subject of outrageous insider abuse. Conversions have 
historically been an effective means for ailing mutuals to raise 
capital. More recently, however, management and insiders at well 
capitalized institutions have used the conversion process to unfairly 
profit by obtaining stock and options, and by generally underpricing 
the institutions themselves. Where Federal regulations governing 
conversions have proven too effective in limiting abuse, the 
institutions have switched to State charters in order to take advantage 
of more lenient State regulations.
  By way of example, I am including with my statement an article from 
the American Banker describing a conversion recently proposed by an 
institution that had switched from a Federal to a State charter. In 
this case, management and insiders would obtain all the shares offered 
in the conversion. The depositors, who theoretically own the 
institution, would receive nothing. To make matters worse, the 
institution would end up with less capital as a result of the 
transaction because the proceeds of the proposed conversion would be 
less than the cost of the deal. In the end, the depositors/owners would 
have a smaller stake in a more poorly capitalized institution.
  The conversion games have clearly gotten out of hand. A recent issue 
of Money Magazine urged readers to open deposit accounts in mutuals in 
order to cash in on future conversions, stating, ``Just $500 in an 
account at the right institution will buy you your very own place at 
the trough. You won't be able to scarf up as much as the insiders, but 
you'll do okay.''
  This self-dealing should stop, and stop now. These outrageous 
conversions are not victimless crimes. To the extent that management 
and insiders are skimming off the net worth of the institution through 
a conversion, they are doing so at the expense of the institution and 
its account holders. Significantly, such transactions also siphon 
capital that ultimately protects the deposit insurance system.
  The legislation that I introduce today will ensure that management 
and trustees fulfill their obligations to act in the interest of the 
institution. My intention is not to abolish conversions, but to ensure 
that proper incentives drive these transactions.
  First, the bill eliminates the incentives for institutions to switch 
to State charters by establishing the Federal regulations as the 
starting point for all conversions. The Office of Thrift Supervision 
would enforce the Federal regulations for all depository institutions, 
but the States would retain authority to impose more stringent 
protections against abuse. The Federal regulations would simply serve 
as a floor.
  Second, the bill forbids management and insiders from receiving 
benefits through the transactin except in their role as depositors. If 
they are depositors, they may receive the same preferential terms that 
all depositors are offered and no more--no free stock, no preferential 
purchase rights. Otherwise, management and insiders are treated as the 
general public is treated. Further, the Director of the Office of 
Thrift Supervision is required to set both a percentage and dollar cap 
on the ownership stake acquired by insiders.
  Third, incentive compensation such as stock options cannot be 
conferred during the first year following the conversion. Decisions 
concerning such incentive programs are better made by established 
stockholders who can evaluate the costs and benefits of such a program, 
rather than mutual depositors contemplating a conversion proposal.
  Finally, the bill mandates a study of the conversion process by the 
Secretary of the Treasury. This study will determine the adequacy of 
existing Federal law and regulations in ensuring an equitable 
conversion process, the accuracy of the stock appraisals employed in 
conversions, and the adequacy of disclosure to the depositors and the 
public required in conversions. The Secretary will report his findings 
to the Congress within 1 year.
  Mutual to stock conversions are complex transactions in which the 
problems are far easier to identify than the solutions. It is 
essential, however, that we stop insiders from putting their own best 
interest ahead of their depositors, and this bill will do so. I look 
forward to working with Senator D'Amato and the rest of the Banking 
Committee to improve the bill as we move through the legislative 
process.
  Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that additional material be 
printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

    An Insiders-Only IPO Would Lower Net Worth of a Milwaukee Mutual

                          (By Robyn Meredith)

       Washington.--In a new twist on the controversial trend of 
     mutual thrifts selling stock for the first time, Wisconsin's 
     largest mutual plans a deal that for the first time ever 
     would leave a thrift with lower net worth after it issues 
     stock.
       Milwaukee's Mutual Savings Bank would still have capital 
     equal to about 9.5% of assets, high by industry standards.
       But Mutual's offerings is also unusual in that no 
     depositors will be allowed to buy the stock, which is being 
     reserved solely for company insiders.


                      Congress Hearing the Critics

       Mutual's plans to sell stock for the first time come as 
     Congress is holding hearings on conversions.
       Key members of the House Banking committee, including 
     Chairman Henry B. Gonzalez, D-Tex., have introduced 
     legislation that would require federal regulators to tighten 
     state laws that permit large blocks of the new thrift stock 
     to be given or sold to insiders.
       With the transaction, Mutual plans to keep the majority of 
     the company depositor-owned while selling a minority share of 
     stock. It will do so by forming a mutual holding company.


                            Preferred Stock

       The $1.24 billion-asset thrift would form a holding 
     company-owned by the thrift's depositors--which in turn will 
     be the parent of the savings bank.
       The savings bank will issue stock, at least 80% of which 
     will be held by the mutual holding company. The minority 
     share--a preferred stock class paying a 6% annual dividend--
     will be given and solid to the thrifts' executives and 
     employees.
       President and chief executive Michael T. Crowley Jr. 
     defended the deal, saying the thrift needs a holding company 
     to acquire other institutions in the future.
       He said the shares were offered only to insiders because a 
     traditional stock offering, in which roughly $129 million in 
     stock would have been sold to the public, would have raised 
     too much capital for the thrift to safely deploy.
       Mr. Crowley said that although the depositors who own the 
     thrift can't buy stock in the deal he is protecting their 
     interests. By granting employees and managers large blocks of 
     stock and stock options, he is giving them incentives to 
     boost the thrift's performance, he said.
       All the officers are 60 years old or less including Mr. 
     Crowley, 51, who is also a director. One of the other six 
     directors is below retirement age. Chairman Michael T. 
     Crowley Sr. is 80.


                     Incentives Called Appropriate

       The thrift president said paying the directors performance 
     incentives is appropriate. ``They are certainly going to be 
     staying with the company as long as they are functioning and 
     contributing to the company,'' Mr. Crowley said. ``I don't 
     think that I would categorize any of the directors as old.''
       By creating a holding company that can make acquisitions, 
     ``We are creating more value for the depositors, not less,'' 
     by protecting depositors' ability to buy stock should the 
     thrift later go fully public, he added.
       In standard stock conversions, insiders often wind up with 
     large blocks of the new stock--up to 25%, according to Mr. 
     Crowley. By doing a mutual holding company conversion, ``We 
     are preserving 80%'' for depositors, Mr. Crowley said.


                     `Nothing Is Being Taken Away'

       Depositors ``will own the institution when it is done and 
     they will own the institution in the same proportion as if we 
     had done a stock offering,'' he said. ``Nothing is being 
     taken away from them at all.''
       As a result of Mutual's stock issuance, its capital will 
     decline from $129 million, or 10.4% of assets, to $117 
     million, or 9.5%. The stake going to insiders amounts to 
     1,787,000 shares valued at about $15 each.
       If the stock were sold at $15 a share, Mutual would raise 
     its capital by roughly $26.8 million.


                        Free Stock, Plus Bonuses

       The deal will produce just $2.34 million in income--the 
     amount sold to the 10 directors and officers--while costing 
     Mutual roughly $17.8 million.
       In addition to the stock they purchase. Mutual executives 
     will share $2.34 million in free stock, along with $1.8 
     million in cash bonuses to offset taxes they would otherwise 
     face.
       In addition, $8.3 million of the stock will go to a tax-
     qualified employee stock ownership plan. Mr. Crowley's 
     supplemental pension plan will be funded through $341,000 in 
     the stock.
       And 900,000 shares in stock options valued at roughly $4.5 
     million will be issued. Fees for the transaction will be 
     $432,000.
       Kip A. Weissman, a partner who specializes in thrift stock 
     conversions at the Washington-based law firm Silver, Freedman 
     & Taff, said, ``As currently structured, the cost of the 
     stock programs appears to offset the amount of capital raised 
     in the private placement.''
       The deal could raise hackles in Congress, which held 
     hearings Thursday in North Carolina to consider depositors' 
     complaints about such deals. A second hearing will be held 
     Wednesday on Capitol Hill. ``If the transaction does result 
     in a capital drain, I would think it could be subjected to 
     criticism on Capitol Hill,'' Mr. Weissman said.
       Reid Nagle, president of Charlottesville, Va.-based SNL 
     Securities, said Mutual's deal, ``obviously benefits 
     insiders, and exclusively insiders.''
       If executives were solely interested in enriching 
     themselves, ``They probably could have done equally well in a 
     standard conversion, but in a mutual holding company 
     conversion, they retain control,'' he said.
       Because the depositor-owned holding company would control 
     at least 80% of the company, outside stockholders could not 
     unseat the board. ``They have the comfort of going home at 
     night knowing that they can remain as directors and officers 
     as long as they choose,'' Mr. Nagle said. ``This is self-
     enrichment without loss of control.''
       The deal would not be allowed under Office of Thrift 
     Supervision rules, which govern stock conversions for all 
     savings and loans and for federally chartered savings banks. 
     In 1992, Mutual changed its charter from an OTS-regulated, 
     state-chartered savings and loan to a state-chartered savings 
     bank.
       The differences are important because the proposed 
     legislation would force Mutual's deal to follow standards 
     similar to those imposed by the OTS.


                         State Approval Needed

       Mutual filed its conversion plan Jan. 4 with its state 
     regulator, which must approve the deal. Although the deal 
     would result in a lower net worth, Mutual said in the 
     documents that it planned to use the proceeds from the 
     transaction ``to increase its regulatory capital and for 
     general corporate purposes.''
       Harold N. Lee Jr., the Wisconsin savings and loan 
     commissioner, refused to comment on the deal. Mr. Lee last 
     year was chairman of the American Council of State Savings 
     Supervisors, the trade group that represents regulators.
       In the past, he supported deals that have awarded thrift 
     executives large blocks of free and low-priced stock. He has 
     said executives deserve to be rewarded for successfully 
     steering thrifts through the S&L crisis.
       Asked why he would pursue a deal that would lower net 
     worth, Mr. Crowley Jr. said that Mutual is already 
     overcapitalized.
       ``I guess if we were at 4%, we would be more concerned 
     about it,'' he said. ``I don't know that 9\1/2\% is a bad 
     number--last time I looked,'' that was a very good capital 
     ratio to have, he said. ``It makes a lot more sense not to 
     force a glut of capital into a very highly capitalized 
     institution.
       ``If we wanted to just increase our salaries over the next 
     10 years or five years, it wouldn't be an issue--It wouldn't 
     be news,'' Mr. Crowley said. This way, employees will own a 
     stake in the company as well. Selling stock will ``start to 
     create a change in our corporate culture, which has been a 
     mutual for 101 years,'' he said.

 Mr. D'AMATO. Mr. President, I am pleased to cosponsor S. 1801, 
legislation designed to regulate mutual to stock conversions of savings 
associations.
  This is an issue that causes me great concern. It represents nothing 
less than the plunder of our Nation's depositors by some unscrupulous 
managers and officers of mutual savings institutions.
  In our depository system, there are two types of savings 
institutions. Stock savings banks are incorporated institutions owned 
by their shareholders, and managed by an elected board of directors. 
Mutual savings banks have no shareholders. These institutions are owned 
by the depositors, and managed by a board of trustees, acting in a 
fiduciary capacity, who often nominate and elect themselves to these 
positions.
  Recently, some of these mutual savings banks have discovered a quick 
way to enrich their own officers and managers at the expense of 
depositors. While there are excellent reasons for conversions--to raise 
capital, for example--the conversion process has been misused, and 
depositor funds misappropriated, by sharp operators. In too many 
instances, insiders simply convert the mutual to a stock institution, 
providing themselves with lucrative stock options, or even outright 
grants of stock, in the new institution. The depositors, the actual 
owners, get disproportionately little of the benefits of the 
conversion, while the insiders get rich.
  One glaring example of this attempted abuse occurred in my own State 
of New York. The trustees of the Green Point Savings Bank wanted to 
convert the institution to a stock savings bank, and in the process 
would have given themselves stock worth an estimated $85 million, money 
that rightly belongs to the institution's depositors.
  Fortunately, the New York State Banking Department, under able 
leadership of Superintendent Derrick Cephas, stepped in and prevented 
this deal from going forward under the original egregious terms. On 
Monday, Mr. Cephas issued an order requiring Green Point to cancel all 
stock grants to insiders, eliminate other personal benefits for the 
trustees, and appoint three new independent outside directors who will 
report directly to the banking department.
  However, this problem is far from solved. While Mr. Cephas has taken 
forceful and decisive action in New York, conversions of this nature 
are going on across the Nation. Only yesterday I was advised that 
Wisconsin's largest mutual savings bank is planning to convert to stock 
form, without allowing any depositors to purchase stock in the new 
bank. Worse yet, the conversion would actually lower the capital of the 
institution.
  Mr. President, this abuse of depositors must stop. It is clear to me 
that many of these transactions are nothing less than bank robbery. 
Federal legislation is needed to correct these abuses now and on a 
nationwide basis, as well as to tighten up existing Federal regulation 
of the conversion process. That is why I am joining with Senator Riegle 
in introducing legislation to set basic depositor protection standards 
for mutual to stock conversions. These new Federal standards will set a 
floor, not a ceiling. State regulators will be free to provide 
additional protection. But if the States do not act, or do not provide 
sufficient protection on their own, our legislation will establish 
fundamental depositor rights needed to protect our citizens from this 
type of financial abuse.
  Mr. President, I hope that the Banking Committee will be able to 
consider this proposal as soon as possible, and that Senate passage of 
this important consumer protection measure will occur soon 
thereafter.
                                 ______

      By Mr. DOLE (for himself, Mr. Pressler, Mr. Domenici, Mr. 
        Nickles, Mr. Cochran, Mr. Helms, Mr. Simpson, Mr. D'Amato, Mr. 
        Coverdell, Mr. Gregg, Mr. Gorton, Mr. Thurmond, and Mr. 
        Kempthorne):
  S. 1803. A bill to amend the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 
to facilitate coordination between the executive and legislative 
branches of Government regarding U.S. participation in, or the use of 
U.S. funds for, United Nations peacekeeping activities; to the 
Committee on Foreign Relations.


                        peace powers act of 1994

  Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, last year's congressional uproar over United 
States blunders in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti, has prompted some to 
call for a review of the War Powers Act. However, in my view, at the 
root of Congress' balking about these foreign policy flops and flip-
flops is not the relationship between the Congress and the Executive, 
but the relationship between the United States and the United Nations--
and the lack of a statutory congressional role in that relationship.
  The problem in Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti was not the unilateral 
pursuit of United States national interests. Each of these foreign 
blunders was the result of the administration deferring to or depending 
on the United Nations to define U.S. policy. Our policy in Somalia went 
awry when the mission changed from carrying out humanitarian aid 
deliveries to carrying out the U.N.'s vendetta against General Aideed, 
and when feeding people turned into nation-building.
  Instead of supporting Bosnia's right to self-defense under article 51 
of the U.N. charter, at the urging of fellow members of the U.N. 
Security Council the administration tentatively pledged 25,000 troops 
to implement a U.N.-mediated plan which would reward aggression and 
dismember Bosnia-Hercegovina, a U.N. member state. In the case of 
Haiti, only a mob scene prevented the commitment of United States 
troops to a U.N.-commanded deployment with a murky mission and 
inadequate security.
  The administration has reviewed or altered these ill-conceived, U.N.-
driven policies as a result of congressional pressure--not as a result 
of congressional oversight or authority. The reality is that Congress 
plays no formal role in U.N. peacekeeping decisions and so, the usual 
checks and balances do not exist. In contrast to the foreign aid 
process--where Congress must be notified of minor dollar changes in 
assistance programs--hundreds of millions of dollars are committed for 
U.N. peacekeeping without the Congress ever receiving even copies of 
the relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions or reports. The Congress 
is expected to pay the bills, no questions asked, and after the fact.
  The process by which U.N. peacekeeping missions are recommended and 
decided upon are shrouded in secrecy, and appear based on inconsistent 
criteria. Nevertheless, once the U.N. Security Council votes to approve 
a peacekeeping operation, the United States is automatically obligated 
to pay nearly one-third of every operation. By the end of this fiscal 
year, the United States will owe roughly $1 billion beyond the $401 
million already appropriated for U.N. peacekeeping--and this does not 
count hundreds of millions spent in support of U.N. peacekeeping 
objectives.
  At a time when the American people are calling for budgetary 
restraint at home, U.N. peacekeeping has become an exploding 
international entitlement program--with some 20 operations currently 
underway. On September 27, 1993, when President Clinton laid out 
criteria for U.N. peacekeeping operations, he also said the United 
Nations ``must know when to say no'' to peacekeeping. Yet, since late 
September, the Security Council--with the United States casting ``yes'' 
votes--has begun, continued, or modified peacekeeping operations in 
Mozambique, the Iraq/Kuwait border, Somalia, El Salvador, Cyprus, 
Lebanon, Georgia, Haiti, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, and Liberia--
and is considering new operations in Angola, Tajikistan and other hot 
spots in the former Soviet Union. Yet, the Security Council has only 
said ``no'' to peacekeeping in Burundi.
  Meanwhile, there has been minimal consultation with Congress on 
peacekeeping matters, despite serious funding shortfalls and 
congressional concerns about administration policy in this regard. With 
peacekeeping costs and deployments mushrooming, peacekeeping 
environments increasingly dangerous and hostile, and this 
administration's increasing reliance on the United Nations for policy 
direction, the Congress is compelled to take action.
  Therefore, together with Senators Pressler, Domenici, Nickles, 
Cochran, Helms, Simpson, D'Amato, Coverdell, Gregg, Gorton, Thurmond, 
and Kempthorne, I am introducing the Peace Powers Act of 1994, to bring 
U.S. interests, as well as greater openness and accountability, into 
the peacekeeping decisionmaking process.
  The United Nations Participation Act was passed in 1945 and has only 
been amended twice--the last time nearly 30 years ago. Traditionally, 
Congress has paid little attention to U.N. peacekeeping activities 
because they were low-cost and low-risk. In recent years, however, as 
U.N. peacekeeping activities proliferated and as U.S. commitments to 
these operations increased, Congress has taken a closer look, and 
thanks to the leadership of some of my Republican colleagues, Congress 
has begun to impose some limits on U.N. peacekeeping.

  The Peace Powers Act of 1994 is largely the product of those earlier 
legislative efforts to get a handle on U.N. activities. This 
legislation was intended as an umbrella--to cover the concepts and 
ideas of many Senators. My distinguished colleagues, Senators Domenici, 
Pressler, Nickles and Cochran deserve special mention for their 
efforts. Numerous provisions they have sponsored in other bills are 
included in this legislation.
  Senator Pressler has a long and distinguished track record in 
pressing for U.N. reform. In the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he 
offered four provisions on notifications, reporting, and reimbursement 
which were incorporated into S. 1281, the State Department 
authorization bill, which the Senate will begin to consider today. All 
four provisions are included in this legislation. Senator Pressler also 
will offer an amendment on an inspector general at the U.N., and that 
concept is also included in the Peace Powers Act.
  Senator Domenici has authored provisions on accountability, buy 
America, and cost savings in his work on the Appropriations Committee--
all of which are reflected in the Peace Powers Act. And, Senators 
Nickles and Cochran raised the issue of foreign command of U.S. forces 
last fall during debate on the Defense Appropriations bill; this 
critical issue is also addressed in this legislation in a manner which 
should meet the key concerns raised about the Nickles/Cochran amendment 
last year. I appreciate all of my colleagues efforts and their 
cosponsorship of this legislation.
  Let me just highlight some of the key provisions of the Peace Powers 
Act of 1994:
  First, no U.S. troops under foreign command for United Nations 
peacekeeping activities. American troops should not be placed under 
foreign command in U.N. operations. When I went to war, it was for the 
stars and stripes not for the blue banner of the United Nations. Our 
military personnel should only be asked to risk their lives in support 
of U.S. interests in operations led by U.S. commanders. The tragedy in 
Somalia illustrates the unacceptable danger to U.S. military personnel 
of serving with multinational units with different equipment and levels 
of expertise, under untested command structures. The Peace Powers Act 
does, however, address some of the criticisms leveled against the 
Nickles-Cochran amendment. The restriction on foreign command only 
applies to U.N. peacekeeping activities--not to all actions taken under 
NATO or the U.N. charter--so Desert Storm-type scenarios would not be 
affected. Furthermore, the bill allows the President to place American 
troops under foreign command if he determines it is in the U.S. 
national security interest and is constitutional.
  Second, no U.S. forces for a U.N. army without congressional 
approval. The men and women in the U.S. Armed Forces voluntarily enlist 
to protect and defend U.S. interests, and should not be turned over to 
a U.N. standing army at the beck and call of the U.N. Secretary 
General--who is an unelected international bureaucrat ill-prepared to 
run military operations as is so painfully evident in the former 
Yugoslavia. The Peace Powers Act clarifies that any article 43 
agreement for a standing U.N. army must be subject to congressional 
approval.
  Third, put Congress in the loop. Congress needs to be in the loop 
before the U.S. casts its vote on peacekeeping activities in the 
Security Council. Rarely are these emergency decisions, and they always 
lead to a pledge of U.S. funds or U.S. military personnel. The 
distinguished Senator from Nebraska, Senator Kerrey, stated in a New 
York Times op-ed last fall that, ``every decision to participate in a 
U.N. peacekeeping operation should be subject to congressional 
approval.'' While I would not go so far--nor does this legislation--we 
must insure that the Congress is consulted and informed prior to 
Security Council action on peacekeeping matters. Relevant U.N. 
documents must be provided in a timely fashion so that the Congress can 
offer input before a decision is made and before we receive the bill. 
Right now the Congress relies on the good will of the administration or 
the United Nations to get Security Council resolutions, cost 
information, or answers to other questions our constitutents ask.
  Fourth, truth in budgeting for U.N. peacekeeping. At present, U.S. 
funding for peacekeeping comes from a number of sources, and 
increasingly from the Department of Defense. Continued raids on the 
U.S. defense budget to finance U.N. peacekeeping will guarantee a 
return to the hollow forces of the late 1970s. Instead, the 
administration should submit a complete funding request for 
peacekeeping with the rest of the fiscal year budget request, and 
request supplemental funding for new operations, if necessary. 
Furthermore, the United Nations should be put on notice that the United 
States will not continue to pay an ever-escalating assessed 
contribution for U.N. peacekeeping--already at 31.7 percent--without 
congressional input. It is high time to cut off the U.N.'s unlimited 
credit line.

  Fifth, bring accountability to the U.N. process. There is no 
independent inspection capability at the United Nations and U.S. 
efforts to establish an inspector general are being essentially ignored 
by the entrenched, highly paid, bloated U.N. bureaucracy. I am not 
talking about adding another bureaucrat with a fancy title who answers 
to Boutros Boutros-Ghali--that's just window-dressing; I am talking 
about an independent inspector general who can provide a thorough 
accounting of U.N. operations to those who pay the bills. It's time for 
us to use our financial leverage as the U.N's largest donor to achieve 
fundamental reform.
  Finally, give full credit where credit is due. The U.N. must give 
full and prompt credit for U.S. non-cash or in-kind contributions such 
as personnel, transport, and equipment. While the U.S. has spent 
roughly $1.5 billion in Somalia, the U.N. will give us a bill for an 
additional $500 million for U.N. peacekeeping in Somalia. The U.S. 
taxpayer can no longer afford this kind of warped U.N. accounting which 
does not reflect the totality of what we provide.
  The Peace Powers Act of 1994 includes limitations on intelligence-
sharing with the United Nations; I think that most of my colleagues 
would agree that providing intelligence to the U.N. is like giving it 
directly to the news media. Our intelligence committee needs to be 
brought into the U.N. intelligence loop, as well.
  This bill requires steps to ensure the safety of Americans captured 
during U.N. peacekeeping operations. In addition, it requires access 
for American companies to U.N. peacekeeping contracts--to prevent what 
happened in Cambodia, where American car makers were shut out.
  The Peace Powers Act of 1994 will not solve all the problems 
associated with U.S. involvement in U.N. peacekeeping activities, but 
it should help increase accountability, control costs and start 
bringing U.S. interests into the decisionmaking equation.
  Some may argue that the Peace Powers Act is congressional intrusion 
into the executive's power--that it places undue limits on the 
President's powers as Commander in Chief. My response is simple: the 
Peace Powers Act only places limits on our participation in some United 
Nations activities. It has no impact on decisions involving American 
forces acting in support of American interests--whether unilaterally or 
in a coalition under the U.N. charter or the NATO treaty.
  I would like to quote from an article written by the distinguished 
President pro tempore for the New York Times last summer, ``Congress' 
ability to support or deny financing is critical to insuring its voice 
in policy making. Until a clear consensus is reached regarding the U.S. 
role in all peacekeeping matters, Congress should not hand off its 
constitutional responsibility.''
  Let me make it clear: this act would not limit Presidential power to 
act under article 43 of article 51 of the U.N. charter in defense of 
American interests--in Somalia, in Bosnia, in Haiti or anywhere else--
unless the President chooses to involve U.S. forces in a U.N. 
peacekeeping operation.
  Mr. President, the American people rallied in support of the 
President during Desert Storm; they knew that U.S. interests were at 
stake and that U.S. forces were defending these interests under the 
command of the President, our Commander in Chief. However, the American 
people are tired of spending money--and risking lives--for operations 
conceived by and run from U.N. headquarters in New York.
  Because I believe we cannot afford to wait on this matter, I intend 
to offer this legislation as an amendment to S. 1281, the State 
Department authorization bill.
  I ask unanimous consent that a section-by-section analysis of this 
legislation, as well as the articles by the distinguished President pro 
tempore and Senator Kerrey which support many principles included in 
this bill, be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

         Peace Powers Act of 1994--Section-by-Section Analysis


                         section 1: short title

       Section 1 states the short title for this legislation is 
     the ``Peace Powers Act of 1994.''


                    section 2: statement of purposes

       Section 2 states five purposes for the Act:
       (1) To maintain and ensure primacy of U.S. national 
     security interests.
       (2) To strengthen Congressional ability to oversee 
     peacekeeping and other U.N. activities.
       (3) To provide for Congress to be notified in advance 
     regarding anticipated U.N. peacekeeping activities.
       (4) To ensure U.N. peacekeeping assessments made to the 
     United States are fair and equitable.
       (5) To facilitate coordination between legislative and 
     executive branches regarding U.S. participation in U.N. 
     peacekeeping.


                         section 3: definitions

       Section 3(a) amends the U.N. Participation Act of 1945 
     (UNPA) by adding a new section 10 with definitions.
       Section 10(1) defines ``appropriate congressional 
     committees'' as the Committees on Appropriations, Armed 
     Services, Foreign Relations of the Senate, and Committees on 
     Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs of the 
     House of Representatives.
       Section 10(2) defines ``Permanent Representative'' means 
     the Permanent Representative of the United States to the 
     United Nations.
       Section 10(3) defines ``United Nations peacekeeping 
     activities'' to mean any international peacekeeping, 
     peacemaking, peace-enforcing, or similar activity involving 
     the use of nationals from member countries authorized under 
     chapter VI or VII of the United Nations Charter.
       Section 3(b) applies the definitions in subsection (a) to 
     provisions in the Peace Powers Act which do not amend the 
     U.N. Participation Act.


 section 4: limitation on placement of u.s. armed forces under foreign 
                control for u.n. peacekeeping activities

       Section 4 amends Section 6 of U.N. Participation Act of 
     1945 as follows:
       Section 6(a) requires approval by Congress of any special 
     agreement or agreements negotiated by the President with the 
     U.N. Security Council under Article 43 of the U.N. Charter, 
     providing for the numbers and types of U.S. forces, their 
     degree of readiness and general locations, or nature of 
     facilities and assistance, including rights of passage.
       Section 6(b) provides that the President may not place U.S. 
     armed forces under the command or operation control of 
     foreign nationals in United Nations peacekeeping activities 
     unless:
       (1) The President satisfies requirements of subsection (c); 
     or
       (2) Congress enacts an Act or a joint resolution 
     specifically authorizing such subordination.
       Section 6(c)(1) requires the President to submit to the 
     appropriate congressional committees the following documents:
       (A) A determination that:
       (i) The proposed subordination of U.S. armed forces under 
     foreign command is in the national security interest of the 
     United States;
       (ii) U.S. unit commanders proposed for subordination to the 
     command of foreign nationals will at all times retain the 
     ability to report independently to higher U.S. military 
     authorities;
       (iii) The United States retains the authority to withdraw 
     U.S. armed forces from the operation at any time and to take 
     such actions as it deems necessary to protect the forces if 
     they are endangered; and
       (iv) U.S. armed forces subordinated to foreign command will 
     at all times remain under U.S. administrative command for 
     such purpose as discipline and evaluation.
       (B) The justification for the determination pursuant to 
     paragraph (A)(i).
       (C) A memorandum of legal points and authorities explaining 
     why the proposed foreign command arrangement does not violate 
     the U.S. Constitution.
       Section 6(c)(2) requires the documents described in section 
     6(c)(1) to be submitted to the appropriate congressional 
     committees 15 days in advance of any subordination to foreign 
     command, unless the President determines an emergency exists 
     which prevents 15 day notice, in which case the documents 
     must be submitted no later than 48 hours after such 
     subordination.
       Section 6(d) provides that, except as authorized by Section 
     7 of the UNPA, nothing contained in the act shall be 
     construed as an authorization to the President, by the 
     Congress to make available to the U.N. Security Council U.S. 
     armed forces, facilities, or assistance.


 section 5: notice to congress of proposed U.N. peacekeeping activities

       Section 5 amends section 4 of the U.N. Participation Act of 
     1945, by adding a new section 4(b), and makes technical and 
     conforming changes.
       Section 4(b)(1) provides that, except as provided in 
     paragraph 2, 15 days before a U.N. Security Council vote to 
     authorize a peacekeeping activity (including extension, 
     modification, suspension, or termination of previously 
     authorized peacekeeping activities) which would involve the 
     use of U.S. Armed Forces or the expenditure of U.S. funds, 
     the President shall modify the appropriate congressional 
     committee. The notification shall include a cost assessment 
     of the participation (including total estimated costs and the 
     U.S. share), mission and objectives, duration, estimated 
     termination date and the source of funding for the U.S. share 
     of costs (whether in an annual budget request, reprogramming 
     notification, a budget amendment, or a supplemental budget 
     request).
       Section 4(b)(2) provides that if the President determines 
     an emergency exists which prevents submission of the 15-day 
     advance notification and that the proposed action is in the 
     national security interests of the United States, the 
     President may provide the notification in a timely manner, 
     but not less than 48 hours after the vote.


   section 6: transmittal to congress of u.n. resolutions and reports

       Section 6 amends Section 4 of the U.N. Participation Act of 
     1945 by adding a new section 4(c).
       Section 4(c)(1) requires the Permanent Representative to 
     transmit the text of a resolution authorizing international 
     peacekeeping activities or other actions under the U.N. 
     Charter and any supporting documentation to appropriate 
     congressional committees not later than 24 hours after its 
     adoption.
       Section 4(c)(2) requires the Permanent Representative to 
     promptly transmit to the appropriate congressional committees 
     any report prepared by the United Nations on proposed, 
     ongoing or concluded peacekeeping activity.


    section 7: Notice to congress regarding contributions for U.N. 
                        peacekeeping activities

       Section 7 amends Section 4 of the U.N. Participation Act by 
     adding a new section 4(d).
       Section 4(d)(1) requires the President to notify 
     appropriate Congressional committees not later than 15 days 
     after the United Nations submits billing requesting payment 
     by the United States for any contributions for U.N. 
     peacekeeping activities.
       Section 4(d)(2) requires the President to notify the 
     appropriate congressional committee 15 days before the United 
     States obligates funds for U.N. peacekeeping activities, 
     unless the President determines an emergency exists and a 
     contribution is in the national security interests of the 
     United States, in which case the notification must be 
     provided within 48 hours after the obligation.


   section 8: notice to congress regarding U.S. assistance for U.N. 
                        peacekeeping activities

       Section 8 amends Section 7 of the U.N. Participation Act by 
     adding a new section 7(e).
       Section 7(e)(1) requires the President to notify the 
     appropriate congressional committees at least 15 days before 
     any agency or entity of the U.S. government makes available 
     assistance to the United Nations for U.N. peacekeeping 
     activities.
       Section 7(e)(2) provides that if that President determines 
     there is an emergency that prevents compliance with section 
     7(e)(1) and that he determines such assistance is in the 
     national security interests of the United States, 
     notification shall be provided in a timely manner but not 
     after than 48 hours after such assistance is made available.
       Section 7(e)(3) defines assistance for the purposes of this 
     section to mean assistance of any kind, including logistical 
     support, supplies, goods, services (including command, 
     control, intelligence assistance and training) and the grant 
     of rights of passage, and assistance provided through in-kind 
     contributions or through the provision of goods and services 
     on any basis, including grant, lease or reimbursable basis 
     but does not include the payment of voluntary or assessed 
     contributions.


     Section 9: U.S. Contributions for U.N. Peacekeeping activities

       Section 9 amends Section 4 of the U.N. Participation Act by 
     adding a new section 4(e).
       Section 4(e)(1) provides that the President shall, at the 
     time of the annual budget submission, submit a report to 
     Congress, on the anticipated budget for U.S. participation in 
     U.N. peacekeeping activities for the fiscal year.
       Section 4(e)(2) requires the report to contain the 
     aggregate amount of funds available to the United Nations for 
     that fiscal year which may be made available to U.N. 
     peacekeeping activities, including assessed and voluntary 
     contributions, and the aggregate amount of funds (from all 
     accounts) and the aggregate costs of in-kind contributions 
     that the United States proposes to make available to the 
     United Nations for that fiscal year for U.N. peacekeeping 
     activities.
       Section 4(e)(3) requires the President to include in his 
     budget submission for FY 1996 a projection of all U.S. costs 
     for international peacekeeping activities for fiscal years 
     1996, 1997 and 1998.


                       Section 10: Annual Report

       Section 10 creates an annual reporting requirement by 
     adding a new section 4(f) of the U.N. Participation Act.
       Section 4(f)(1) requires the Secretary of State, after 
     consultation with the heads of other relevant Federal 
     agencies including the Secretary of Defense, not later than 
     90 days after enactment of this section and at the time of 
     the President's annual budget submission thereafter to submit 
     a report to the appropriate congressional committees on U.S. 
     contributions to U.N. peacekeeping activities.
       Section 4(f)(2) requires each report to include the 
     following information:
       (A) The number and nature of ongoing U.N. peacekeeping 
     activities.
       (B) The priority accorded to ongoing peacekeeping 
     operations and their anticipated duration.
       (C) An assessment of the effectiveness of each operation, 
     its relation to U.S. national security interests, the efforts 
     of the United Nations to resolve the relevant armed 
     conflicts, and projected termination date for each activity.
       (D) The total costs of each U.N. peacekeeping activity, 
     both ongoing and concluded, and the total cost of all such 
     activities.
       (E) The amount of U.S. assessed and voluntary contributions 
     to each activity, and the total of such contributions.
       (F) The incremental costs incurred by the Department of 
     Defense for each such activity, and for all such activities.
       (G) Any other assistance (as defined in this Act) made 
     available by the United States to the United Nations, 
     specifying assistance provided on a reimbursable and non-
     reimbursable basis.
       (H) An assessment of the U.N.'s management and support for 
     peacekeeping activities, including all recommendations for 
     improvements made by the United States and any action to 
     implement such recommendations by the United Nations.
       (I) A detailed description of efforts by the United States 
     to seek and receive credit towards the U.S. assessment for 
     all assistance provided in support of U.N. peacekeeping 
     objectives.


      section 11: reimbursement to the United States for in-kind 
             contributions to u.n. peacekeeping activities

       Section 11 amends Section 7 of the U.N. Participation Act, 
     by adding new sections 7(e) and 7(f).
       Section 7(b) is amended to provide that the Secretary of 
     Defense may waive reimbursement for goods and services 
     provided to the United Nations if, after consultation with 
     the Secretary of State and the Director of the Office of 
     Management and Budget, he determines an emergency exists 
     which justifies the waiver. Any waiver shall be submitted to 
     the appropriate congressional committees 15 days before it 
     takes effect unless the President determines an emergency 
     exists which prevents compliance with the 15 advance notice 
     and that the nonreimbursable provision is in the national 
     security interests of the United States, in which case 
     notification shall be provided not later than 48 hours after 
     the waiver takes effect.
       Section 7(e) provides that no funds may be used during any 
     fiscal year for any U.S. contribution for U.N. peacekeeping 
     activities until the Secretary of Defense certifies to 
     Congress that, for the preceding fiscal year, the United 
     Nations has reimbursed the Defense Department directly for 
     goods and services provided to the United Nations on a 
     reimbursable basis.
       Section 7(f)(1) requires the Secretary of State to ensure 
     that goods and services provided to the United Nations are 
     reimbursed at the appropriate value as determined by the 
     Department of Defense.
       Section 7(f)(2) requires the Permanent Representative to 
     submit a report not later than one year after enactment of 
     this subsection to the appropriate congressional committees 
     on actions taken by the U.S. mission to the United Nations to 
     achieve the objectives of section 7(f)(1).


 section 12: limitation on use of department of defense funds for u.n. 
                        peacekeeping activities

       Section 12 provides that, beginning October 1, 1995, funds 
     made available to the Department of Defense (including funds 
     for ``Operations and Maintenance'') shall not be available 
     for U.S. contributions for U.N. peacekeeping activities or 
     for the incremental costs of U.S. Armed Forces in U.N. 
     peacekeeping activities unless Congress has by law 
     specifically made those funds available for such purposes.


  section 13: assessed contributions for u.n. peacekeeping activities

       Section 13(a) provides that the Permanent Representative 
     should make every effort to ensure that the United Nations 
     completes an overall review and reassessment of each nation's 
     assessed contribution for U.N. peacekeeping activities. As 
     part of this review, the Permanent Representative should make 
     every effort to advance the concept that host governments and 
     other governments in the region where a U.N. peacekeeping 
     activity is carried out should bear a greater burden of its 
     financial cost.
       Section 13(b)(1) provides that the Permanent Representative 
     should make every effort to obtain agreement by the United 
     Nations to a U.S. assessed contribution for U.N. peacekeeping 
     activity that is no greater a percentage than the U.S. share 
     of assessed contributions for other U.N. activities.
       Section 13(b)(2) states that Congress declares that, 
     effective for fiscal year 1996, it does not intend to make 
     available funds for payment of U.S. contributions for U.N. 
     peacekeeping activities that exceed 25% of the total amount 
     assessed for such activities.
       Section 13(b)(3) requires the Permanent Representative to 
     inform the Secretary General of the intent expressed in 
     section 13(b)(2).


                section 14: ``buy america'' requirement

       Section 14 provides that no funds may be obligated or 
     expended to pay the U.S. share of U.N. peacekeeping unless 
     the Secretary of State determines and certifies to 
     appropriate congressional committees that U.S. manufactures 
     and suppliers are being given the same opportunities to 
     provide equipment, services, and material as foreign 
     manufactures and suppliers.


  section 15: united states personnel taken prisoner while serving in 
                    multilateral peacekeeping forces

       Section 15(a) contains findings on U.S. personnel serving 
     in multilateral peacekeeping forces.
       Section 15(b) expresses the Sense of Congress that the 
     President should take immediate steps, unilaterally and in 
     appropriate international bodies, to assure that U.S. 
     personnel serving as part of a multilateral force when 
     captured are accorded the protection accorded to prisoners of 
     war, and that the President should take all necessary steps 
     to bring to justice all individuals responsible for 
     mistreatment, torture or death of U.S. military personnel who 
     are captured during such service.
       Section 15(c) provides that, as part of the report required 
     by section 4(e) of the U.N. Participation Act of 1945 (as 
     added by this act), the President shall include a separate 
     section setting forth:
       (1) the status under international law of members of 
     multilateral peacekeeping forces, including the legal status 
     of such persons if captured, missing or detained;
       (2) the extent of the risk for captured U.S. personnel in 
     multinational forces where their captors fail to respect the 
     1949 Geneva Conventions and other international agreements 
     intended to protect prisoners of war; and
       (3) the specific steps taken to protect U.S. military 
     personnel, together (if necessary) with any recommendations 
     for enactment of legislation to achieve that objective.


      section 16: provision of intelligence to the united nations

       Section 16 places limits on the provision of U.S. 
     intelligence to the United Nations.
       Section 16(a) states that the United States may provide 
     intelligence to the United Nations only pursuant to a written 
     agreement between the President and the Secretary General of 
     the United Nations specifying the type of intelligence to be 
     provided, the circumstances under which the intelligence is 
     to be provided, the procedures of the United Nations 
     concerning access to and protection of the intelligence. 
     Section 17(a) further provides that any such agreement shall 
     be effective for a period not to exceed one year.
       Section 16(b) states that the agreement shall be effective 
     only if the President has transmitted the agreement to the 
     Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the 
     Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of 
     Representatives not less than 30 days before it enters into 
     force.
       Section 16(c) states that the President may delegate the 
     authority to enter into an intelligence agreement with the 
     United Nations only to the Secretary of Defense or the 
     Director of Central Intelligence.
       Section 16(d) states that section 17(a) shall not apply to 
     the provision of intelligence only to and for the use of 
     intelligence by U.S. Government personnel serving with the 
     United Nations, or essential for the protection of nationals 
     of the United States including military personnel and 
     civilian personnel of the U.S. Government.
       Section 16(e) states that the provisions of section 17 do 
     not impair or affect the authority of the Director of 
     Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods from 
     unauthorized disclosure and do not supersede or affect Title 
     V of the National Security Act of 1947 or section 112B of 
     title 1 of the United States Code.
       Section 16(f) makes the provisions of this section 
     effective 60 days after enactment.


     section 17: u.n. peacekeeping budgetary and management reform

       Section 17(a) requires the withholding of 50% of the amount 
     made available for U.S. assessed contributions for U.N. 
     peacekeeping activities and prohibits payment of any 
     voluntary contributions unless a certification has been made 
     under section 17(b).
       Section 17(b) provides that the certification referred to 
     in section 17(a) is a certification by the President to the 
     Congress that:
       (1) The United Nations has established an independent 
     Office of Inspector General to conduct audits, inspections 
     and investigations relating to U.N. peacekeeping activities;
       (2) the Secretary General has appointed an I.G., with the 
     consent of the General Assembly, solely on the basis of 
     integrity and ability;
       (3) the U.N. Office of Inspector General: is authorized to 
     investigate and report on administration of U.N. peacekeeping 
     activities; has access to relevant records and documents; and 
     has direct access to relevant officials of the United 
     Nations;
       (4) the U.N. Office of Inspector General is keeping the 
     Secretary General and the Security Council fully informed of 
     problems and the need for corrective action;
       (5) the United Nations has established measures to protect 
     the identities and prevent reprisals against staff members 
     who cooperate with the I.G.; and
       (6) the United Nations has enacted procedures to ensure 
     compliance with I.G. recommendations.
                                  ____


                [From the New York Times, Aug. 19, 1993]

                       The Perils of Peacekeeping

                          (By Robert C. Byrd)

       The news that the Clinton Administration is considering an 
     expanded role in United Nations peacekeeping operations is 
     cause for concern. The plan would allow American soldiers to 
     serve under foreign commanders on a regular basis. Before 
     adopting any directive embracing this policy, the 
     Administration should allow Congress to debate it thoroughly.
       If the plan is carried out, we would face more than the 
     dubious prospect of sending U.S. troops into battle under 
     foreign command. We might also become militarily involved in 
     operations that the American people don't properly understand 
     or support.
       Unless there is a national consensus in favor of U.S. 
     involvement, any such military endeavors could be disastrous.
       U.N. intervention in Somalia is a case in point. The 
     operation was initially commendable. Its goal was to see that 
     humanitarian aid was delivered to needy Somalis, and U.S. 
     troops performed admirably. But now, with the humanitarian 
     mission successfully completed, the U.N. is trying to rebuild 
     the nation's political structure. This risky experiment could 
     include thousands of U.S. troops.
       The deaths of four American soldiers in Mogadishu this 
     month and the overt hostility of Somalis toward U.N. troops 
     show that the operation is quickly crumbling. It is not worth 
     American lives lost and injuries sustained.
       Congress has never approved, or even considered, U.S. 
     participation in forcing a political reconciliation in 
     Somalia. And there is certainly not a consensus among 
     Americans that such an effort is worth any price in our 
     soldiers' blood. Without a consensus, the likely result of 
     such an operation could be a cut-and-run failure similar to 
     the Beirut disaster of 1982 to 1984.
       Lacking Congressional and popular support, U.S. combat 
     forces in Somalia should be removed as soon as possible.
       Dedication to U.N. Security Council resolutions and 
     peacekeeping missions should not be used by any 
     Administration to escape the hard job of consensus-building 
     in Washington. Despite a Security Council resolution 
     authorizing member nations to do battle against the marauding 
     Iraqi Army in Kuwait in 1990, the Bush Administration 
     sensibly sought Congressional approval before committing 
     American forces.
       The humanitarian mission in Somalia has now been totally 
     eclipsed by a gang war in which the U.S. is taking sides 
     under the U.N. umbrella. In October, the U.N.'s initial six-
     month mandate there expires. If the mission is extended, 
     additional money will be required.
       The U.S. is expected to pay about 30 percent of the U.N.'s 
     peacekeeping bill. The U.N. intervention in Somalia and 
     Bosnia is far more expensive than more traditional 
     peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations. Congress is 
     already being asked to provide billions of dollars to support 
     the mushrooming ambitions of the U.N. in peacekeeping 
     operations around the world.
       On Capitol Hill there is a growing reluctance to write such 
     large checks. Congress has even been reluctant to pay our 
     currently overdue peacekeeping bill. This shows that the 
     Administration will have a tough time in gaining support for 
     more money. Where will these funds come from? We certainly 
     should not cut spending on domestic needs to pay for foreign 
     adventures.
       Yet the White House has requested almost $1 billion for 
     U.N. obligations in fiscal 1994. By setting aside this huge 
     sum, the Administration could avoid having to come to 
     Congress to get approval for every peacekeeping endeavor it 
     wants to get involved in.
       Congress's ability to support or deny financing is critical 
     to insuring its voice in policy making. Until a clear 
     consensus is reached regarding the U.S. role in all 
     peacekeeping matters, Congress should not hand off its 
     constitutional responsibility.
                                  ____


                [From the New York Times, Oct. 7, 1993]

                         Not So Fast on Somalia

                            (By Bob Kerrey)

       Washington.--The horror of American bodies being dragged 
     through the streets of Somalia and the shock of Army Rangers 
     being ambushed have left Americans furious and numb. The 
     disaster has brought an understandable instant response: get 
     our troops out now. However, as President Clinton said 
     yesterday, before a hurried pullout, we must think hard about 
     the meaning of what we're doing in Somalia.
       Nobody argues we should stay in Somalia any longer than 
     minimally necessary. But the way we leave is crucial.
       We will not leave Mogadishu until we get our hostages back 
     and every American serviceman is accounted for. Beyond that, 
     the Somalis don't have any thing we want. Apart from the 
     humanitarian problem that brought us there, Somalia isn't a 
     security concern. But it does matter that the world learn how 
     to act when countries or regions fall apart.
       Countries participating in United Nations operations must 
     persevere in them. America's example has the most to do with 
     whether such operations succeed.
       We want the operation in Haiti to succeed because failure 
     could send us another flood of impoverished immigrants. I 
     call that defense of the United States. We want the operation 
     in Bosinia to succeed because we don't want the European 
     countries and Russian and Turkey coming to blows. I call that 
     defense of the United States.
       For the U.N. to succeed in these operations, other 
     countries need confidence, training and leadership. That's 
     where we come in. If the U.N. can learn from our military how 
     to do things right, we won't have to go to every fire. Other 
     countries will pull their full load and won't look for the 
     U.S. to lead every operation. But we are still providing 
     leadership by example so that others will commit themselves 
     and U.N. peacekeeping and peacemaking will succeed.
       If we left Somalia prematurely, that example, which our 
     military has burnished for months by its conduct under 
     pressure would be tarnished--and with it the idea of a 
     collective response to regional problems. A retreat by any 
     name is still a retreat.
       But we need to lay down some guidelines for U.S. 
     participation in all U.N. operations. First, the U.S. should 
     be called upon for its unique strengths--intelligence 
     collection, logistics, medical support, communications--but 
     not for infantry units, which many countries have available. 
     Our superpower status and the reputation of our combat units 
     give thugs like Gen. Mohammed Farah Aidid a target to us use 
     to build prestige.
       Second, we should insure that U.S. forces are always under 
     U.S. command and have sufficient U.S. back up for protection. 
     The need to call on foreign armored units to help rescue our 
     Rangers was shameful.
       Third, our participation should be proportional. I object 
     to sending thousands of U.S. combat troops to Bosnia when 
     wealthy, well-armed European countries can do more in a cause 
     whose failure will have more immediate consequences for them 
     than is.
       Fourth, every decision to participate in a U.N. 
     peacekeeping operation should be subject to Congressional 
     approval.
       Because our departure from Somalia will affect future U.N. 
     operations, we should leave with dignity and only when 
     properly relieved, As Nebraska's senior Senator, J. James 
     Exon a Democrat said in the Senate yesterday, America might 
     well regret a precipitous decision taken at this time of 
     stress.
       In the meantime, we should have no illusions that we, or 
     anyone, will ever create a democratic government there. The 
     military in Somalia should lower its profile. The diplomats 
     should get the Somali factions together, declare a Somalia 
     government and pronounce the U.N operation over. And soon.
                                 ______

      By Mr. WARNER:
  S. 1804. A bill to amend title X, United States Code, to eliminate 
the disparity between civilian and military retiree cost-of-living 
adjustments caused by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993; to 
the Committee on Armed Services.


                 cost-of-living adjustments act of 1994

 Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I introduce legislation to correct 
an inequity that occurred in the budget process last year. While 
Congress has historically treated Federal civilian and military 
retirees equally under the law, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1993 that was recently signed into law contains a disparity in the 
schedule of future cost of living adjustments [COLA's] for civil 
service and military retirees.
  The problem of military retiree pay inequity arose out of decisions 
made in the budget process last year to reduce COLA's for both retired 
military and retired Federal employees. Instead of reducing COLA's, a 
decision was made to continue with full COLA's but delay the effective 
dates of the COLA's each year to achieve the directed reductions over 5 
years.
  Funds were available in civilian accounts to alleviate the impact on 
civilian retirees but no additional funds were available in the 
military retiree accounts. As a result, Federal civilian retirees will 
have their COLA's delayed until April for the next 3 years. Military 
retirees, on the other hand, will have their COLA's delayed until April 
1994, but in 1995-98, their COLA's will be delayed until October.
  In total, Federal civilian retirees will have their COLA's delayed 
for 9 months while military retirees will have their COLA's delayed for 
39 months.
  Mr. President, this is clearly an unfair situation. We have an 
obligation to ensure that military retirees are treated equitably with 
their civilian counterparts. Therefore, I am introducing legislation 
that will restore equity by placing military retiree COLA's on the same 
schedule as those for Federal civilian retirees. Inflation does not 
discriminate between military and civilian Federal retirees and neither 
should we.
  I recognize that funds will have to be identified to pay for this 
change in the schedule for military retirees. It is not my intent that 
all of these funds should come from the defense budget. I do intend to 
work with the leadership of the Budget Committee, the Appropriations 
Committee, and the Governmental Affairs Committee to find suitable 
offsets and reach a satisfactory solution to this problem.
  I urge my colleagues to join me in this legislation to provide fair 
and equitable treatment for all our Federal employees, both military 
and civilian.

                          ____________________