[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 2 (Wednesday, January 26, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: January 26, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                 DEPARTMENT OF STATE AUTHORIZATION ACT

  The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.


                           Amendment No. 1257

  (Purpose: To state the sense of the Senate on United States policy 
  concerning nuclear weapons proliferation by the Government of North 
                                 Korea)

  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I have an amendment that has been 
cleared on both sides.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota is recognized.
  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment on 
behalf of myself.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
  The bill clerk read as follows:

       The Senator from South Dakota [Mr. Pressler] proposes an 
     amendment numbered 1257.

  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading 
of the amendment be dispensed with.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The amendment is as follows:

                                S. 1281

       On page 179, below line 6, add the following new section:

     SEC. 714. SENSE OF SENATE ON UNITED STATES POLICY ON NUCLEAR 
                   WEAPONS PROLIFERATION BY NORTH KOREA.

       (a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
       (1) North Korea is a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-
     Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
       (2) The International Atomic Energy Agency is charged with 
     ensuring that signatories to that treaty meet their 
     obligations under the treaty.
       (3) The agency fulfills that mission principally by 
     inspections of nuclear facilities and by other legitimate 
     means necessary to ensure that signatories are in compliance 
     with the terms and obligations of the treaty.
       (4) North Korea is the location of seven declared nuclear 
     sites whose inspection is provided for under the terms of the 
     treaty.
       (5) The International Atomic Energy Agency suspects that 
     North Korea is also the site of at least two additional 
     undeclared nuclear sites at which liquid and solid nuclear 
     waste is being stored.
       (6) Inspection of the undeclared nuclear sites is necessary 
     to ensure the compliance of North Korea with the terms of the 
     treaty.
       (7) The Government of North Korea is attempting to place 
     significant restrictions on inspections of its declared 
     nuclear sites and is refusing any inspections of its 
     undeclared nuclear sites.
       (8) The national security interests of the United States 
     require the curtailment of the proliferation of weapons of 
     mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons.
       (9) To ensure advancement of the goal of nuclear 
     nonproliferation, a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-
     Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons must permit inspections of 
     its facilities and comply with any other legitimate requests 
     of the International Atomic Energy Agency that are necessary 
     to ensure that the country is in compliance with the terms 
     and obligations of the treaty.
       (b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that--
       (1) the President should not engage in negotiations 
     connected with normalization of relations with the Government 
     of North Korea until that government meets its full 
     obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
     Nuclear Weapons, including any inspection of nuclear sites 
     located in North Korea sufficient to ensure the full 
     compliance by the Government of North Korea with the terms 
     and obligations of the treaty; and
       (2) the President undertake such diplomatic activity with 
     respect to the People's Republic of China as is appropriate 
     to enlist the assistance of that country in gaining the 
     compliance of the Government of North Korea with its 
     obligations under the treaty.
       (c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``normalization 
     of relations'' means the following:
       (1) Disbanding the United Nations Forces Command and 
     withdrawing United States troops from the Republic of Korea.
       (2) Lifting restrictions on trade with and investment in 
     North Korea that are imposed pursuant to United States law on 
     trade with hostile states.
       (3) Expanding economic cooperation with North Korea.
       (4) Assisting the entry of the North Korea Government into 
     international organizations relating to economic activity.
       (5) Granting the diplomatic recognition of the United 
     States to the Government of North Korea.

  Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, this amendment springs from the recent 
situation in North Korea wherein the North Koreans have agreed to seven 
inspection sites, but they will not let the IAEA go anyplace anywhere 
to inspect.
  I had the humor of accompanying a Senate delegation to South Korea. 
Also, we ended up talking with Hans Bliz, the head of the IAEA, the 
group that is supposed to inspect for nuclear weapons. The 
international agency for the inspection, headed by Hans Bliz, needs to 
have the authority to go anyplace anywhere in the country. That was the 
position taken by President Clinton in December. But I was absolutely 
amazed to read in the papers that the administration had agreed to let 
the North Koreans off with only seven inspection sites.
  That means they could have a bomb elsewhere. This sets a very bad 
precedent for other countries. We have not allowed this in other 
countries. We should back up the IAEA.
  This amendment is a sense of the Senate expressing that the President 
should not engage in negotiations connected with normalization of 
relations with North Korea until that government meets its full 
obligation under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons.
  It further expresses the sense of the Senate that the President 
undertake such diplomatic activity with respect to the People's 
Republic of China as is appropriate to enlist the assistance of that 
country in gaining the compliance of the Government of North Korea 
under the NPT.
  It was the feeling of many of us that probably North Korea has the 
bomb and probably the administration realizes this and they did not 
want to confront North Korea. I am not picking on the administration 
here, per se. But that would have meant a great deal of diplomatic 
activity with China to get China to help us out.
  I have been active in this nonproliferation thing. My amendment on 
Pakistan is the only nonproliferation law that has any teeth in it and 
the administration wants to repeal that now, or at least in the 
interest of cleaning up the foreign policy act.
  So, I would say that we are headed down the road of letting these 
countries do whatever they want to do if we let North Korea get by with 
just seven inspection sites. That is my feeling. It is very hard to get 
at this legislatively. I am frustrated. I would like to offer something 
stronger.
  Mr. President, this amendment is a simple one. It would put the 
Senate on record in support of a foreign policy that would not allow 
for negotiations connected with normalization of relations between the 
United Nations and North Korea until such time as the North Korean 
Government agrees to meet fully its responsibilities as a signatory to 
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [NPT]. Under the 
terms of my amendment, normalization of relations is defined to 
include: disbanding U.N. Forces Command and withdrawing United States 
troops from the Republic of Korea; lifting restrictions on trade with 
and investment in North Korea that are imposed pursuant to United 
States law on trade with hostile states; expanding economic 
cooperation; assisting North Korea's entry into international 
organizations relating to economic activity; and granting the 
diplomatic recognition of the United States to North Korea.
  In addition, my amendment puts this body on record in support of the 
President undertaking such diplomatic activity with respect to the 
People's Republic of China as is appropriate to enlist the assistance 
of that country in gaining the compliance of North Korea with its 
obligations under the NPT.
  Why is this necessary? Because, Mr. President, I feel President 
Clinton has failed to make nuclear nonproliferation a true priority. 
The situation in North Korea stands as exhibit A. In early November, 
President Clinton declared, ``North Korea cannot be allowed to develop 
a nuclear bomb.'' Earlier this month, unnamed White House sources 
claimed the President misspoke. What he really meant to say is ``North 
Korea cannot be allowed to become a nuclear power.''
  This abrupt shift in rhetoric coincided with an agreement made with 
the North Koreans that our two countries would conduct talks about a 
one-time inspection of North Korea's seven declared nuclear sites. The 
agreement makes no mention of additional inspections or of what is to 
be done in connection with at least two other undeclared but suspected 
nuclear sites in North Korea.
  The International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] is charged with 
ensuring that NPT member countries meet their obligations under the 
treaty. By signing the NPT, North Korea agreed to submit to monitoring 
by the IAEA. The agency fulfills its mission principally through 
inspections of nuclear facilities and other legitimate means necessary 
to ensure member countries are in compliance with the terms and 
obligations of the NPT. Mr. President, the new agreement between the 
United States and North Korea seriously jeopardizes the ability of the 
IAEA to fulfill its mandate.
  What does all this mean? First, the possibility of a nuclear weapon 
in the hands of the North Korean Government raises profound concerns 
over the safety of our military forces in South Korea and our allies in 
Seoul. North Korea has developed into one of the most dangerously 
aggressive regimes in the world. According to Secretary of Defense 
Aspin, 70 percent of the country's military resources are within a very 
short distance of the South Korean border.
  In addition, for the last four decades the United States has placed a 
high priority on a policy that would ensure the democratic countries of 
North Asia do not develop nuclear weapons. A nuclear bomb in the hands 
of North Korea seriously jeopardizes that successful policy. It 
certainly must raise in the minds of North Asian defense planners the 
question of whether their countries also should go nuclear. Several 
have the capacity to do so in short order.

  There also is a question that reaches far beyond the North Asia 
region. The North Koreans have sold every modern weapons system they 
have developed, including ballistic missiles, to Iran. With the demise 
of the Soviet Union came the elimination of support creating a serious 
strain on North Korea's economy. Will its historic proclivity for 
weapons proliferation, coupled with an economy strained to the limit 
entice North Korea to sell nuclear weapons to the highest bidder? Who 
might that be? Lybia? Iran? Syria? Iraq?
  I mentioned earlier that I met with IAEA Director Hans Bliz in 
Vienna. His request was simple. ``Don't sell out the IAEA. Don't take 
away the agency's authority under the NPT. We must be able to inspect 
anywhere in North Korea at any time.'' If North Korea gets away with 
anything less than meeting its full obligations under the NPT, Iran and 
other rogue governments will be uncontrollable.
  Mr. President, my amendment simply puts this body on record in 
support of nuclear nonproliferation once again. It does nothing else. 
To ensure the goal of nuclear nonproliferation is being advanced, a NPT 
member country must allow for facility inspections and comply with any 
other legitimate requests made by the IAEA necessary to ensure the 
member country is in compliance with the terms and obligations of the 
NPT. North Korea has refused to do its duty as a NPT member country,. 
We can and should demonstrate our resolve that such an attitude will 
not be tolerated. My amendment would do this. Mr. President, I ask 
unanimous consent that an article I wrote on this subject that appeared 
recently in the Washington Times, be printed in the Record.
  There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in 
the Record, as follows:

                   Nuclear Proliferation Obfuscation

                          (By Larry Pressler)

       In early November, President Clinton declared, ``North 
     Korea cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb.'' In 
     January, unnamed White House sources claim the president 
     ``misspoke.'' What he really meant to say is, ``North Korea 
     cannot be allowed to become a nuclear power.''
       What this probably means is that North Korea has, in fact, 
     developed a nuclear bomb ton President Clinton's watch. The 
     administration is clearly afraid to say so and is splitting 
     bureaucratic hairs in an attempt to obfuscate. Having come 
     into office critizing President Bush's handling of 
     proliferation matters, they don't want their own failures to 
     come into public focus.
       What does this mean, and what is the administration doing 
     about it? The easy answer is it means a lot, and the 
     administration, in its panic, is creating even more strategic 
     security problems for the future.
       First, what is the significance of North Korea having a 
     nuclear weapon? Without question it raises a concern for the 
     safety of our military forces in South Korea and our allies 
     in Seoul. Since its creation by Stalin in 1945, the North 
     Korean government has developed into one of the most 
     dangerously aggressive regimes in the world. The North Korean 
     economy is totally geared for war. According to Defense 
     Secretary Les Aspin, 70 percent of its military might is 
     within a very short distance of the South Korean border.
       Further, for 40 years it has been a high U.S. policy 
     priority to ensure that the democratic countries of North 
     Asia do not develop nuclear weapons. A nuclear bomb in North 
     Korean hands seriously jeopardizes that successful policy. It 
     raises in the minds of North Asian defense planners the 
     question of whether their countries should go unclear, too. 
     The rule of thumb among nuclear experts in Washington is that 
     Japan could produce a nuclear device in 30 days if it so 
     chose. Taiwan and South Korea would take a little longer, but 
     probably less than a year.
       Finally, there is the question no one wants to ask: Would 
     the North Koreans sell their bomb(s) to the highest bidder? 
     Moammar Gadhafi? Iran? Syria? Iraq? The North Koreans have 
     sold every other modern weapons systems they have developed, 
     including ballistic missiles, to Iran. No longer favored with 
     economic subsidies from the Soviet Union, the North Korean 
     economy is strained to the limit.
       On Dec. 18, in Vienna, International Atomic Energy Agency 
     Director Hans Bliz emphasized his position to three visiting 
     Republican U.S. senators: Don't sell me out. Don't take away 
     my authority under the Non-proliferation Treaty. We must be 
     able to inspect anywhere in North Korea, at anytime. If North 
     Korea gets away with anything less than meeting its full 
     obligations under the NPT Iran and the other problem nations 
     will be uncontrollable.
       But the Clinton administration has done exactly what the 
     IAEA opposes. It has declared victory and gone home. The 
     victory in question is an agreement with the North Koreans 
     for talks about a one-time inspection of seven declared 
     nuclear sites in North Korea. There is no agreement to even 
     talk about two other suspected undeclared sites. IAEA 
     spokesman David Kyd has disputed this reported deal. The big 
     question in Washington is whether the IAEA will succumb to 
     pressure from the Clinton administration and bless the 
     agreement.
       Far better, in my view, for the Clinton administration to 
     walk away from a bad deal. At least one doesn't establish a 
     potentially lethal precedent.
       Best of all would be for the Clinton administration to make 
     nuclear non-proliferation truly the priority it claims it is. 
     Make an example of North Korea. That, however, would require 
     the fortitude to put serious pressure on China to cooperate 
     on international sanctions against North Korea. Nobody else 
     has any comparable influence over North Korea. Unfortunately, 
     the Clinton administration appears to lack the political will 
     to press the Chinese on this point.
       At the 1992 Democratic National Convention, candidate 
     Clinton complained about President Bush coddling tyrants 
     ``from Baghdad to Beijing.'' Now we know that was nothing but 
     campaign rhetoric.
  Mr. PRESSLER. In conclusion, Mr. President, I am very concerned that 
this administration is backing away from a nonproliferation policy. 
They want to repeal my amendment regarding Pakistan which is the only 
piece of nonproliferation legislation that has ever made it into law. 
There have been all sorts of speeches made on eliminating the weapons 
of mass destruction. There have been all sorts of speeches made about 
nuclear nonproliferation. But we really have not done anything about it 
except in the case of Pakistan.
  A lot of authorities say that sent signals to Brazil and South Africa 
and to Egypt and other countries that are in the preliminary process of 
developing nuclear weapons that have since backed off. But if we allow 
North Korea to get by with seven inspection sites, we are setting a new 
precedent. The IAEA no longer has the teeth to inspect anywhere, 
anytime, as Hans Bliz wants it to and as it is supposed to under the 
NPT.
  Now, as a supporter of that treaty and that concept, I have been very 
concerned that the North Korean example will set a new precedent in 
other countries insisting on just inspections at certain sites.
  So this amendment is an attempt to speak. It is hard to get at this 
legislatively. We have tried. I wish I could do more than a sense of 
the Senate.
  I do not know who is making nonproliferation policy in this 
administration, but it seems contrary to everything Bill Clinton has 
said in public. And I am very, very concerned why they would want to 
repeal the amendment on Pakistan; why they would want to lessen the 
standard for the IAEA is very puzzling to me. At a time when we should 
be working very hard in this new world order for the nonproliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction and the nonproliferation of nuclear 
weapons, I am astounded at the position this administration has taken 
in the last 2 or 3 months.
  Mr. President, I yield the floor and at the proper time I will ask 
that the amendment be agreed to.
  Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Mathews). The Senator from Massachusetts.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I would like to both agree and disagree 
with my friend from South Dakota. I clearly want to agree with him 
about our concern on the issue of proliferation. There are many in the 
U.S. Senate who have worked throughout their careers in the Senate in 
an effort to try to augment the United States focus on proliferation 
issues.
  I disagree with my colleague very strongly on his interpretation of 
this administration and on his fairly strong condemnation of the 
administration's efforts with respect to this.
  I would remind my colleague that the proliferation issue did not just 
start when Bill Clinton was inaugurated. And the problem with North 
Korea certainly is not a problem that just emerged in the last year.
  Under the administration of President Bush, under the administration 
of President Reagan, these people were four-square and headlong 
proceeding down the road of nuclear development. Very little was done 
on the issue of proliferation for those 12 years or so. In fact, ACDA 
and other nonproliferation efforts were gutted by the prior 
administration. What you have now is a resurgence of effort by the 
Clinton administration to focus on proliferation.
  It is this administration's effort that has succeeded in getting 
seven sites inspected which we knew existed under the Bush and Reagan 
administrations, but which they never pushed.
  So let us understand squarely: I am happy to play the process here, 
of trying to augment the efforts on proliferation and I am delighted to 
accept this amendment which will help do that. But I am not going to do 
it in the context that it is somehow a recognition that this 
administration is not doing what it ought to do.
  As all those who have been following this issue closely know, the 
administration has made it extremely clear that the seven sites is not 
the end game. It is the first play, and it is a significant first step. 
But to suggest that the administration is somehow content or sanguine 
with respect to unexamined sites at this point in time, or to the 
potential for North Korean chicanery, is simply to ignore the reality 
of what the administration is trying to do.
  I have personally just come back from a trip in that region of the 
world. I was in China, talking with Chinese leaders on this subject as 
well as others. I can assure my colleague this is very much on the 
table in our dialog with China, as well as China's own efforts in 
foreign policy. If the Senator thinks that China wants to have a 
nuclear power as its next door neighbor, threatening the equilibrium of 
the region as well as other interests of China, he has another thinking 
process coming. I do not think he believes that. The Chinese are 
engaged. We are engaged. And we are only at the initial steps of trying 
to deal with what is a very tricky problem.
  But as the Senator well knows, North Korea is a special case in the 
world today in terms of proliferation problems and other problems we 
face. It is, indeed, in many regards, one of the most renegade of 
renegade nations. And it is not complying on a whole host of items. It 
is the most closed society of many of those with which we are currently 
trying to deal. It is not very easy for the United States simply to sit 
there and say, ``Do this,'' when they are not going to do this when 
they have interests at stake. It is going to take a consortium of 
countries. It is going to take a combined effort of various and sundry 
diplomatic tools and economic tools that we have at our disposal. I can 
assure the Senator from South Dakota, this administration is deeply 
focused on this issue and is concerned about it.
  So I am willing to support this. I am not only willing, I think this 
is a good amendment. But I also want to point out this amendment talks 
about a normalization process and expresses the sense of the Senate 
that we should not engage in a normalization process until we have 
adequate IAEA controls and oversight. I totally agree with that. We are 
not proceeding down the road of normalization. Normalization is the 
furthest thing from the administration's mind at this point in time, 
until we have ironed out a host of other problems, most predominant 
among them this question of proliferation.
  So I am happy to join with my colleague in accepting this amendment, 
but I want to do so with clear understanding of this administration's 
concern and this administration's own dissatisfaction with the current 
situation and with this administration's success in achieving a first 
step of getting those seven site inspections and this administration's 
determination to continue further to guarantee that the international 
atomic energy oversight process is indeed upheld.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is 
on agreeing to the amendment.
  The amendment (No. 1257) was agreed to.
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
  Mr. PRESSLER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
  The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?
  Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.


                           order of procedure

  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I might 
proceed as if in morning business for 10 minutes. No one is on the 
floor doing this. If someone comes to the floor with some great mission 
on the public's behalf, I will be glad to step down and let them have 
the floor. But within that constraint, I would like to have an 
opportunity to talk about a bill that I am introducing today.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
  The Senator from Texas [Mr. Gramm] is recognized.
  Mr. GRAMM. I thank the Chair.
  (The remarks of Mr. Gramm pertaining to the introduction of Senate 
bill S. 1800 are located in today's Record under ``Statements on 
Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')
  Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
  The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
  Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for 
the quorum call be rescinded.
  The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

                          ____________________