[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 2 (Wednesday, January 26, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: January 26, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
DEPARTMENT OF STATE AUTHORIZATION ACT
The Senate continued with the consideration of the bill.
Amendment No. 1257
(Purpose: To state the sense of the Senate on United States policy
concerning nuclear weapons proliferation by the Government of North
Korea)
Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I have an amendment that has been
cleared on both sides.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from South Dakota is recognized.
Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I send to the desk an amendment on
behalf of myself.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment.
The bill clerk read as follows:
The Senator from South Dakota [Mr. Pressler] proposes an
amendment numbered 1257.
Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the reading
of the amendment be dispensed with.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The amendment is as follows:
S. 1281
On page 179, below line 6, add the following new section:
SEC. 714. SENSE OF SENATE ON UNITED STATES POLICY ON NUCLEAR
WEAPONS PROLIFERATION BY NORTH KOREA.
(a) Findings.--The Senate makes the following findings:
(1) North Korea is a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
(2) The International Atomic Energy Agency is charged with
ensuring that signatories to that treaty meet their
obligations under the treaty.
(3) The agency fulfills that mission principally by
inspections of nuclear facilities and by other legitimate
means necessary to ensure that signatories are in compliance
with the terms and obligations of the treaty.
(4) North Korea is the location of seven declared nuclear
sites whose inspection is provided for under the terms of the
treaty.
(5) The International Atomic Energy Agency suspects that
North Korea is also the site of at least two additional
undeclared nuclear sites at which liquid and solid nuclear
waste is being stored.
(6) Inspection of the undeclared nuclear sites is necessary
to ensure the compliance of North Korea with the terms of the
treaty.
(7) The Government of North Korea is attempting to place
significant restrictions on inspections of its declared
nuclear sites and is refusing any inspections of its
undeclared nuclear sites.
(8) The national security interests of the United States
require the curtailment of the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons.
(9) To ensure advancement of the goal of nuclear
nonproliferation, a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons must permit inspections of
its facilities and comply with any other legitimate requests
of the International Atomic Energy Agency that are necessary
to ensure that the country is in compliance with the terms
and obligations of the treaty.
(b) Sense of Senate.--It is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) the President should not engage in negotiations
connected with normalization of relations with the Government
of North Korea until that government meets its full
obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, including any inspection of nuclear sites
located in North Korea sufficient to ensure the full
compliance by the Government of North Korea with the terms
and obligations of the treaty; and
(2) the President undertake such diplomatic activity with
respect to the People's Republic of China as is appropriate
to enlist the assistance of that country in gaining the
compliance of the Government of North Korea with its
obligations under the treaty.
(c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``normalization
of relations'' means the following:
(1) Disbanding the United Nations Forces Command and
withdrawing United States troops from the Republic of Korea.
(2) Lifting restrictions on trade with and investment in
North Korea that are imposed pursuant to United States law on
trade with hostile states.
(3) Expanding economic cooperation with North Korea.
(4) Assisting the entry of the North Korea Government into
international organizations relating to economic activity.
(5) Granting the diplomatic recognition of the United
States to the Government of North Korea.
Mr. PRESSLER. Mr. President, this amendment springs from the recent
situation in North Korea wherein the North Koreans have agreed to seven
inspection sites, but they will not let the IAEA go anyplace anywhere
to inspect.
I had the humor of accompanying a Senate delegation to South Korea.
Also, we ended up talking with Hans Bliz, the head of the IAEA, the
group that is supposed to inspect for nuclear weapons. The
international agency for the inspection, headed by Hans Bliz, needs to
have the authority to go anyplace anywhere in the country. That was the
position taken by President Clinton in December. But I was absolutely
amazed to read in the papers that the administration had agreed to let
the North Koreans off with only seven inspection sites.
That means they could have a bomb elsewhere. This sets a very bad
precedent for other countries. We have not allowed this in other
countries. We should back up the IAEA.
This amendment is a sense of the Senate expressing that the President
should not engage in negotiations connected with normalization of
relations with North Korea until that government meets its full
obligation under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons.
It further expresses the sense of the Senate that the President
undertake such diplomatic activity with respect to the People's
Republic of China as is appropriate to enlist the assistance of that
country in gaining the compliance of the Government of North Korea
under the NPT.
It was the feeling of many of us that probably North Korea has the
bomb and probably the administration realizes this and they did not
want to confront North Korea. I am not picking on the administration
here, per se. But that would have meant a great deal of diplomatic
activity with China to get China to help us out.
I have been active in this nonproliferation thing. My amendment on
Pakistan is the only nonproliferation law that has any teeth in it and
the administration wants to repeal that now, or at least in the
interest of cleaning up the foreign policy act.
So, I would say that we are headed down the road of letting these
countries do whatever they want to do if we let North Korea get by with
just seven inspection sites. That is my feeling. It is very hard to get
at this legislatively. I am frustrated. I would like to offer something
stronger.
Mr. President, this amendment is a simple one. It would put the
Senate on record in support of a foreign policy that would not allow
for negotiations connected with normalization of relations between the
United Nations and North Korea until such time as the North Korean
Government agrees to meet fully its responsibilities as a signatory to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [NPT]. Under the
terms of my amendment, normalization of relations is defined to
include: disbanding U.N. Forces Command and withdrawing United States
troops from the Republic of Korea; lifting restrictions on trade with
and investment in North Korea that are imposed pursuant to United
States law on trade with hostile states; expanding economic
cooperation; assisting North Korea's entry into international
organizations relating to economic activity; and granting the
diplomatic recognition of the United States to North Korea.
In addition, my amendment puts this body on record in support of the
President undertaking such diplomatic activity with respect to the
People's Republic of China as is appropriate to enlist the assistance
of that country in gaining the compliance of North Korea with its
obligations under the NPT.
Why is this necessary? Because, Mr. President, I feel President
Clinton has failed to make nuclear nonproliferation a true priority.
The situation in North Korea stands as exhibit A. In early November,
President Clinton declared, ``North Korea cannot be allowed to develop
a nuclear bomb.'' Earlier this month, unnamed White House sources
claimed the President misspoke. What he really meant to say is ``North
Korea cannot be allowed to become a nuclear power.''
This abrupt shift in rhetoric coincided with an agreement made with
the North Koreans that our two countries would conduct talks about a
one-time inspection of North Korea's seven declared nuclear sites. The
agreement makes no mention of additional inspections or of what is to
be done in connection with at least two other undeclared but suspected
nuclear sites in North Korea.
The International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] is charged with
ensuring that NPT member countries meet their obligations under the
treaty. By signing the NPT, North Korea agreed to submit to monitoring
by the IAEA. The agency fulfills its mission principally through
inspections of nuclear facilities and other legitimate means necessary
to ensure member countries are in compliance with the terms and
obligations of the NPT. Mr. President, the new agreement between the
United States and North Korea seriously jeopardizes the ability of the
IAEA to fulfill its mandate.
What does all this mean? First, the possibility of a nuclear weapon
in the hands of the North Korean Government raises profound concerns
over the safety of our military forces in South Korea and our allies in
Seoul. North Korea has developed into one of the most dangerously
aggressive regimes in the world. According to Secretary of Defense
Aspin, 70 percent of the country's military resources are within a very
short distance of the South Korean border.
In addition, for the last four decades the United States has placed a
high priority on a policy that would ensure the democratic countries of
North Asia do not develop nuclear weapons. A nuclear bomb in the hands
of North Korea seriously jeopardizes that successful policy. It
certainly must raise in the minds of North Asian defense planners the
question of whether their countries also should go nuclear. Several
have the capacity to do so in short order.
There also is a question that reaches far beyond the North Asia
region. The North Koreans have sold every modern weapons system they
have developed, including ballistic missiles, to Iran. With the demise
of the Soviet Union came the elimination of support creating a serious
strain on North Korea's economy. Will its historic proclivity for
weapons proliferation, coupled with an economy strained to the limit
entice North Korea to sell nuclear weapons to the highest bidder? Who
might that be? Lybia? Iran? Syria? Iraq?
I mentioned earlier that I met with IAEA Director Hans Bliz in
Vienna. His request was simple. ``Don't sell out the IAEA. Don't take
away the agency's authority under the NPT. We must be able to inspect
anywhere in North Korea at any time.'' If North Korea gets away with
anything less than meeting its full obligations under the NPT, Iran and
other rogue governments will be uncontrollable.
Mr. President, my amendment simply puts this body on record in
support of nuclear nonproliferation once again. It does nothing else.
To ensure the goal of nuclear nonproliferation is being advanced, a NPT
member country must allow for facility inspections and comply with any
other legitimate requests made by the IAEA necessary to ensure the
member country is in compliance with the terms and obligations of the
NPT. North Korea has refused to do its duty as a NPT member country,.
We can and should demonstrate our resolve that such an attitude will
not be tolerated. My amendment would do this. Mr. President, I ask
unanimous consent that an article I wrote on this subject that appeared
recently in the Washington Times, be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:
Nuclear Proliferation Obfuscation
(By Larry Pressler)
In early November, President Clinton declared, ``North
Korea cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb.'' In
January, unnamed White House sources claim the president
``misspoke.'' What he really meant to say is, ``North Korea
cannot be allowed to become a nuclear power.''
What this probably means is that North Korea has, in fact,
developed a nuclear bomb ton President Clinton's watch. The
administration is clearly afraid to say so and is splitting
bureaucratic hairs in an attempt to obfuscate. Having come
into office critizing President Bush's handling of
proliferation matters, they don't want their own failures to
come into public focus.
What does this mean, and what is the administration doing
about it? The easy answer is it means a lot, and the
administration, in its panic, is creating even more strategic
security problems for the future.
First, what is the significance of North Korea having a
nuclear weapon? Without question it raises a concern for the
safety of our military forces in South Korea and our allies
in Seoul. Since its creation by Stalin in 1945, the North
Korean government has developed into one of the most
dangerously aggressive regimes in the world. The North Korean
economy is totally geared for war. According to Defense
Secretary Les Aspin, 70 percent of its military might is
within a very short distance of the South Korean border.
Further, for 40 years it has been a high U.S. policy
priority to ensure that the democratic countries of North
Asia do not develop nuclear weapons. A nuclear bomb in North
Korean hands seriously jeopardizes that successful policy. It
raises in the minds of North Asian defense planners the
question of whether their countries should go unclear, too.
The rule of thumb among nuclear experts in Washington is that
Japan could produce a nuclear device in 30 days if it so
chose. Taiwan and South Korea would take a little longer, but
probably less than a year.
Finally, there is the question no one wants to ask: Would
the North Koreans sell their bomb(s) to the highest bidder?
Moammar Gadhafi? Iran? Syria? Iraq? The North Koreans have
sold every other modern weapons systems they have developed,
including ballistic missiles, to Iran. No longer favored with
economic subsidies from the Soviet Union, the North Korean
economy is strained to the limit.
On Dec. 18, in Vienna, International Atomic Energy Agency
Director Hans Bliz emphasized his position to three visiting
Republican U.S. senators: Don't sell me out. Don't take away
my authority under the Non-proliferation Treaty. We must be
able to inspect anywhere in North Korea, at anytime. If North
Korea gets away with anything less than meeting its full
obligations under the NPT Iran and the other problem nations
will be uncontrollable.
But the Clinton administration has done exactly what the
IAEA opposes. It has declared victory and gone home. The
victory in question is an agreement with the North Koreans
for talks about a one-time inspection of seven declared
nuclear sites in North Korea. There is no agreement to even
talk about two other suspected undeclared sites. IAEA
spokesman David Kyd has disputed this reported deal. The big
question in Washington is whether the IAEA will succumb to
pressure from the Clinton administration and bless the
agreement.
Far better, in my view, for the Clinton administration to
walk away from a bad deal. At least one doesn't establish a
potentially lethal precedent.
Best of all would be for the Clinton administration to make
nuclear non-proliferation truly the priority it claims it is.
Make an example of North Korea. That, however, would require
the fortitude to put serious pressure on China to cooperate
on international sanctions against North Korea. Nobody else
has any comparable influence over North Korea. Unfortunately,
the Clinton administration appears to lack the political will
to press the Chinese on this point.
At the 1992 Democratic National Convention, candidate
Clinton complained about President Bush coddling tyrants
``from Baghdad to Beijing.'' Now we know that was nothing but
campaign rhetoric.
Mr. PRESSLER. In conclusion, Mr. President, I am very concerned that
this administration is backing away from a nonproliferation policy.
They want to repeal my amendment regarding Pakistan which is the only
piece of nonproliferation legislation that has ever made it into law.
There have been all sorts of speeches made on eliminating the weapons
of mass destruction. There have been all sorts of speeches made about
nuclear nonproliferation. But we really have not done anything about it
except in the case of Pakistan.
A lot of authorities say that sent signals to Brazil and South Africa
and to Egypt and other countries that are in the preliminary process of
developing nuclear weapons that have since backed off. But if we allow
North Korea to get by with seven inspection sites, we are setting a new
precedent. The IAEA no longer has the teeth to inspect anywhere,
anytime, as Hans Bliz wants it to and as it is supposed to under the
NPT.
Now, as a supporter of that treaty and that concept, I have been very
concerned that the North Korean example will set a new precedent in
other countries insisting on just inspections at certain sites.
So this amendment is an attempt to speak. It is hard to get at this
legislatively. We have tried. I wish I could do more than a sense of
the Senate.
I do not know who is making nonproliferation policy in this
administration, but it seems contrary to everything Bill Clinton has
said in public. And I am very, very concerned why they would want to
repeal the amendment on Pakistan; why they would want to lessen the
standard for the IAEA is very puzzling to me. At a time when we should
be working very hard in this new world order for the nonproliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and the nonproliferation of nuclear
weapons, I am astounded at the position this administration has taken
in the last 2 or 3 months.
Mr. President, I yield the floor and at the proper time I will ask
that the amendment be agreed to.
Mr. KERRY addressed the Chair.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Mathews). The Senator from Massachusetts.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I would like to both agree and disagree
with my friend from South Dakota. I clearly want to agree with him
about our concern on the issue of proliferation. There are many in the
U.S. Senate who have worked throughout their careers in the Senate in
an effort to try to augment the United States focus on proliferation
issues.
I disagree with my colleague very strongly on his interpretation of
this administration and on his fairly strong condemnation of the
administration's efforts with respect to this.
I would remind my colleague that the proliferation issue did not just
start when Bill Clinton was inaugurated. And the problem with North
Korea certainly is not a problem that just emerged in the last year.
Under the administration of President Bush, under the administration
of President Reagan, these people were four-square and headlong
proceeding down the road of nuclear development. Very little was done
on the issue of proliferation for those 12 years or so. In fact, ACDA
and other nonproliferation efforts were gutted by the prior
administration. What you have now is a resurgence of effort by the
Clinton administration to focus on proliferation.
It is this administration's effort that has succeeded in getting
seven sites inspected which we knew existed under the Bush and Reagan
administrations, but which they never pushed.
So let us understand squarely: I am happy to play the process here,
of trying to augment the efforts on proliferation and I am delighted to
accept this amendment which will help do that. But I am not going to do
it in the context that it is somehow a recognition that this
administration is not doing what it ought to do.
As all those who have been following this issue closely know, the
administration has made it extremely clear that the seven sites is not
the end game. It is the first play, and it is a significant first step.
But to suggest that the administration is somehow content or sanguine
with respect to unexamined sites at this point in time, or to the
potential for North Korean chicanery, is simply to ignore the reality
of what the administration is trying to do.
I have personally just come back from a trip in that region of the
world. I was in China, talking with Chinese leaders on this subject as
well as others. I can assure my colleague this is very much on the
table in our dialog with China, as well as China's own efforts in
foreign policy. If the Senator thinks that China wants to have a
nuclear power as its next door neighbor, threatening the equilibrium of
the region as well as other interests of China, he has another thinking
process coming. I do not think he believes that. The Chinese are
engaged. We are engaged. And we are only at the initial steps of trying
to deal with what is a very tricky problem.
But as the Senator well knows, North Korea is a special case in the
world today in terms of proliferation problems and other problems we
face. It is, indeed, in many regards, one of the most renegade of
renegade nations. And it is not complying on a whole host of items. It
is the most closed society of many of those with which we are currently
trying to deal. It is not very easy for the United States simply to sit
there and say, ``Do this,'' when they are not going to do this when
they have interests at stake. It is going to take a consortium of
countries. It is going to take a combined effort of various and sundry
diplomatic tools and economic tools that we have at our disposal. I can
assure the Senator from South Dakota, this administration is deeply
focused on this issue and is concerned about it.
So I am willing to support this. I am not only willing, I think this
is a good amendment. But I also want to point out this amendment talks
about a normalization process and expresses the sense of the Senate
that we should not engage in a normalization process until we have
adequate IAEA controls and oversight. I totally agree with that. We are
not proceeding down the road of normalization. Normalization is the
furthest thing from the administration's mind at this point in time,
until we have ironed out a host of other problems, most predominant
among them this question of proliferation.
So I am happy to join with my colleague in accepting this amendment,
but I want to do so with clear understanding of this administration's
concern and this administration's own dissatisfaction with the current
situation and with this administration's success in achieving a first
step of getting those seven site inspections and this administration's
determination to continue further to guarantee that the international
atomic energy oversight process is indeed upheld.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no further debate, the question is
on agreeing to the amendment.
The amendment (No. 1257) was agreed to.
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.
Mr. PRESSLER. I move to lay that motion on the table.
The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who seeks recognition?
Mr. KERRY. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
order of procedure
Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I might
proceed as if in morning business for 10 minutes. No one is on the
floor doing this. If someone comes to the floor with some great mission
on the public's behalf, I will be glad to step down and let them have
the floor. But within that constraint, I would like to have an
opportunity to talk about a bill that I am introducing today.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
The Senator from Texas [Mr. Gramm] is recognized.
Mr. GRAMM. I thank the Chair.
(The remarks of Mr. Gramm pertaining to the introduction of Senate
bill S. 1800 are located in today's Record under ``Statements on
Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions.'')
Mr. GRAMM. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.
The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for
the quorum call be rescinded.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
____________________