[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 2 (Wednesday, January 26, 1994)]
[Extensions of Remarks]
[Page E]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: January 26, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
        DON'T FORGET OUR PRISONERS OF WAR AND MISSING IN ACTION

                                 ______


                         HON. ROBERT K. DORNAN

                             of california

                    in the house of representatives

                      Wednesday, January 26, 1994

  Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to enter into the Record the 
following editorial by Al Santoli which calls for immediate action, 
including public release of Government files, on American POW's and 
MIA's from Southeast Asia. I highly recommend this article to all of my 
colleagues and all Americans who are committed to finally getting the 
truth on these brave American servicemen.

               [From the Washington Times, Jan. 24, 1994]

                      Open the ``Cold Spot'' Files

                            (By Al Santoli)

       In the last battle of the Vietnam War, surviving American 
     families and veterans are fighting to learn the fate of 
     missing servicemen. Similar to victims of secret nuclear 
     tests, they are trying to pry the truth from an entrenched 
     bureaucracy that lacks adequate congressional or 
     administrative oversight.
       Many veterans now look to the new chairman of the Joint 
     Chiefs, Gen. John Shalikashvili, to resolve the MIA tragedy 
     with integrity and honor.
       In an orchestrated campaign, U.S. civilian and military 
     officials--supported by business consultants and publicists--
     praise Hanoi for ``excellent cooperation'' and ``not holding 
     anything back.'' Hundreds of live sightings of American 
     prisoners by Vietnamese, Lao and even a Japanese monk have 
     been trivialized.
       Pentagon analysts have debunked Soviet documents 
     independently supported by testimony from unrelated sources. 
     A tepid State Department statement admits that prisoners 
     could have been held back in Laos under control of Hanoi. 
     More poignantly, documents from still-secret Defense and CIA 
     archives point to a multi-agency coverup.
       Example: ``Cold Spot'' was a joint CIA-Air Force program to 
     intercept North Vietnamese and Laotian Communist radio 
     communications from 1971 to 1975. Americans flew electronic 
     spy planes, and indigenous soldiers with CIA advisors 
     conducted land-based operations. Some intercepts describe the 
     movement and detention of U.S. prisoners--long after 
     Operation Homecoming.
       An Oct. 8, 1973, communique from the governor of Nghia Lo 
     to the Minister of Defense in Hanoi confirmed the transfer of 
     ``112 USA pilots'' from Lai Chau [near the Laotian border]. 
     The ``USA prisoners'' were taken to a prison that previously 
     held ``Thai [captured in Laos] and Vietnamese'' prisoners. 
     And, ``their snapshots were finished and I will send them to 
     Hanoi to register with the Ministry of Defense . . . and 
     names and ages of all will be attached.''
       On Nov. 11, 1973, the governor of Sontay Province reported 
     to the Minister of Defense in Hanoi: ``112 USA prisoners in 
     prison in Sontay Province.'' He named a doctor who treated 10 
     prisoners with ``pain in their hearts. . . . They are not in 
     a good way. Therefore, I quickly send this cable for you to 
     decide what to do.''
       There is no record of U.S. officials cross-referencing 
     these and other ``Cold Spot'' records with in-person 
     interviews of Vietnamese officials, prison commanders and 
     doctors named in the communiques.
       In the past, intelligence analysts have debunked such 
     documents using a Murphy's Law gambit--that because the U.S. 
     government had declared all prisoners returned, any 
     contrary evidence must be false.
       This ``unprofessional . . . mindset to debunk'' was harshly 
     criticized in 1985-86 DIA internal evaluations. However, 
     rather than replace the chastised analysts, the Clinton 
     administration refused to investigate detailed accusations, 
     and the same entrenched bureaucrats have been promoted to 
     wrap up MIA investigations.
       In the field, the most experienced U.S. expert, Garnett 
     Bell--who has a near-photographic memory of the Vietnamese 
     prison and military systems--was replaced as chief of the 
     Pentagon's Hanoi office by young infantry officers lacking 
     intelligence backgrounds, historical knowledge or language 
     proficiency. These novices must deal with devious Vietnamese 
     political officers, many of whom had decades of experience 
     playing a shell game with French MIAs.
       Media junkets are taken to observe groups of American 
     soldiers digging for crash sites. On the other hand, 
     dissenting intelligence officers state that during the war it 
     was communist policy to scavenge crash sites and warehouse 
     hundreds of U.S. remains that are continuously doled out as 
     political chips.
       Former investigators describe the Pentagon's Joint Task 
     Force Full Accounting (JTFFA) as a $100 million per year 
     ``boondoggle manipulated by Vietnamese security officers'' 
     who accompany all JTFFA teams to interview villages.
       In 1992, the JTFFA chief, Maj. Gen. Thomas Needham, 
     shredded 20 years worth of original U.S. investigative files 
     in Bangkok. And in a slick political maneuver, Sen. John 
     Kerry had 120 boxes of potentially explosive National 
     Security Agency files reclassified before Senate 
     investigators could study them.
       Clinton State Department pointmen Winston Lord and Ken 
     Quinn are classic conflict-of-interest cases. In 1970, Mr. 
     Lord helped to create the coverup of U.S. casualties in Laos. 
     Henry Kissinger claims in ``White House Years'' (page 455) 
     that Mr. Lord coordinated a National Security Council study 
     that purposely misled President Nixon on U.S. forces lost in 
     Laos.
       CIA documents from 1967-68 show U.S. captives by name in 
     specific Laotian prisons. In 1970 at CIA headquarters in 
     Laos, Pat Mahoney, an Air Force expert in special operations, 
     discussed photos of American prisoners and a wall map of 
     prison sites. The CIA station chief said, ``The politicians 
     have tied our hands for launching rescues.''
       The Vietnamese commander of the Ho Chi Minh Trail area of 
     Laos who oversaw the movement and detention of U.S. prisoners 
     there between 1964-72 was Gen. Tran Van Quang (quoted in the 
     infamous Soviet document). Yet, neither Gen. John Vessey nor 
     Winston Lord raised the issue of prisoners in Laos when they 
     met with Gen. Quang.
       On Jan. 18, 1993, a delegation from the American Legion met 
     with Pentagon and administration officials and mentioned the 
     ``Cold Spot'' archives. The officials gave no response. The 
     Legion has filed a Freedom of Information Act request to gain 
     access to the records and to prevent another shredding party 
     by Gen. Needham or his inter-agency peers.
       Before the administration rewards Hanoi's duplicity with 
     any more political or economic concessions, Gen. 
     Shalikashvili should make sure that all POW/MIA files--such 
     as ``Cold Spot''--are made public. He should meet with Mr. 
     Smith and representatives of the major veterans and family 
     organizations to review charges of malfeasance and coverup.
       To conclude the Vietnam War with honor, a new team of 
     experienced investigators of unimpeachable integrity must be 
     appointed.

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