[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 1 (Tuesday, January 25, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]


[Congressional Record: January 25, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

 
                         NUCLEAR TEST BAN TALKS

  Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, today the Conference on Disarmament opens 
in Geneva. The No. 1 item on its agenda is negotiation of a 
Comprehensive Test Ban [CTB] Treaty. This treaty banning all nuclear 
weapons tests has been the goal of U.S. Presidents back to Eisenhower. 
Achieving a CTB has been a standing treaty commitment for the United 
States and Russia--then the Soviet Union--since the Limited Test Ban 
Treaty, which halted nuclear weapons explosions in the atmosphere, was 
signed in 1963. But underground explosions continued for the three 
following decades by the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, 
and eventually India.
  The nuclear powers again committed to conclude a CTB Treaty when the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] was signed in 1968, and for 25 
years the non-nuclear nations that signed the NPT have looked for 
progress on a CTB. That is what they explicitly expected in return for 
their compliance with the NPT. But although negotiations continued and 
even neared completion during the Carter administration, CTB talks were 
suspended with the invasion of Afghanistan.
  Now, today, the Clinton administration is taking its effort to 
finally conclude a CTB to the international stage. I believe there are 
several reasons why the time is ripe for quick progress in these talks:
  The NPT comes up for review and potential extension in the fall of 
1995, and the non-nuclear signatories have made clear they expect a CTB 
be in hand or near-at-hand if they are to support extension of the NPT.
  There is now in place a voluntary, mutual moratorium on tests by all 
the nuclear powers except China, which tested once last fall. As 
President Clinton correctly observed last July, ``nuclear weapons in 
the United States arsenal are safe and reliable,'' and the U.S. does 
not need more testing at this juncture.
  In yet another sign that the cold war is over, these CTB talks begin 
with the two superpowers essentially on the same side, both voluntarily 
halting their tests and seeking a permanent global halt to all tests. 
Not since the end of World War II has a major arms treaty negotiation 
begun with such common purpose and objectives.
  Earlier today, John Holum, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, gave his opening address to the conference. I ask 
unanimous consent that it be included in the Record at the conclusion 
of my remarks, and I encourage my colleagues to read it.
  Although there is no formal schedule or deadline for the CTB 
negotiations, President Clinton recognizes that it would be in the 
clear interest of the United States to conclude them as quickly as 
possible.
  Mr. Holum has noted that it is the goal of the United States to reach 
multilateral agreement on a CTB Treaty well in advance of the 1995 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty extension conference. And his address 
today restates U.S. policy to conclude the negotiation of a CTB Treaty 
``at the earliest possible time.'' Holum continues, ``obviously, no 
country can unilaterally set the pace. I assure you that as compared to 
some past deliberation on this issue, the United States will be out 
front pulling, rather than in the back dragging our heels.''
  That declaration demonstrates true leadership and rededication to the 
imperative of stemming proliferation of nuclear weapons as these talks 
begin.
  Mr. President, I believe these statements by Mr. Holum today reflect 
substantial congressional sentiment, that the current multinational 
moratorium on nuclear tests be converted into a permanent CTB Treaty as 
soon as possible. We have demonstrated that intention through 
legislation passed in 1992, and the administration has recognized that 
with its statements today.
  A strong CTB treaty, which will be a cornerstone of our nuclear non-
proliferation efforts for many years to come.
  The address follows:

 Statement of The Honorable John D. Holum, Director, U.S. Arms Control 
            and Disarmament Agency, Geneva, January 25, 1994

       Thank you, Mr. President.
       On behalf of the United States, may I first wish you every 
     success as you guide the work of this body to begin this 
     important year. You will have the complete cooperation of the 
     United States delegation. I thank your predecessor, 
     Ambassador Zahran of Egypt, for his wise and skillful 
     performance of the challenging duties of president. I would 
     also like to congratulate the new personal representative of 
     the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Vladimir 
     Petrovsky, and express our confidence that we will have with 
     him the same close and productive relationship that we 
     enjoyed with his predecessor.
       Mr. President, ladies and gentleman.
       This is my first opportunity to address a session of the 
     Conference on Disarmament (CD) as the Director of the United 
     States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This forum serves 
     the cause of a safer and more stable world, and my presence 
     here today reflects the commitment of the Clinton 
     administration to the goals of arms control, disarmament and 
     non-proliferation. Upon my confirmation, the President 
     reiterated to me the high priority he personally gives to 
     making concrete, rapid progress on strengthening 
     international security through multilateral cooperation. The 
     end of the cold war has created particular opportunities for 
     the CD, and I am here today to pledge to you that the United 
     States will do everything in its power to make the most of 
     them. In this regard, I would like to read out to you a 
     message to the Conference from President Clinton:
       ``I am grateful for the opportunity to address all those 
     who are participating in the Conference on Disarmament. This 
     Conference has several important items on its agenda as the 
     1994 session begins, including transparency in armaments, and 
     it may assume others, such as a ban on fissile material 
     production for nuclear explosive purposes. None is more 
     important than the negotiations of a comprehensive and 
     verifiable ban on nuclear explosions. This challenging, but 
     crucial, objective is the conference's top priority. It 
     reflects our common desire to take decisive action that will 
     support and supplement the global nuclear non-proliferation 
     regime and will further constrain the acquisition and 
     development of nuclear weapons.
       ``Regional instabilities, the end of the cold war, and the 
     growing threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons have 
     created new and compelling circumstances to encourage 
     progress in disarmament. Accordingly, I decided last July to 
     extend the moratorium on the United States nuclear weapons 
     tests and committed the United States to achieving a 
     comprehensive test ban treaty. At the same time, I called on 
     the other nuclear weapon states to observe a testing 
     moratorium, and I do so again today.
       ``I am confident that Ambassador Ledogar and the U.S. 
     delegation will join with you in taking bold steps toward a 
     world made safer through the negotiation at the earliest 
     possible time of a comprehensive test ban treaty that will 
     strengthen the security of all nations. You have my best 
     wishes during this important conference.'' (End text of 
     President's message.)
       The CD is the only multilateral forum to address global 
     arms control and disarmament issues on a continuing basis. 
     Its membership covers every region of the globe and reflects 
     a wide range of concerns and interests. We have all come to 
     accept the CD as both a marketplace of ideas and a place 
     where nations get down to practical business and conclude the 
     agreements that enhance international security.
       The United States recognizes the importance of the CD as a 
     multilateral arms control body, and we have consistently 
     supported appropriate membership expansion. We do, however, 
     insist that it is inappropriate to elevate the status in the 
     CD of a state whose behavior continues to be flagrantly 
     opposed to the goals of the organization. It is our hope that 
     CD members will continue working together to forge a 
     consensus on an acceptable membership package.
       The conclusion of the chemical weapons convention (CWC) 
     vividly demonstrates how the constructive competition of 
     ideas and the pursuit of diverse interests and concerns can 
     produce achievements to benefit the entire international 
     community. I congratulate you on that signal accomplishment.
       However, this is not the time for us to rest. There is much 
     work to be done; the demands are immediate; and we have a 
     unique opportunity to help to shape the world constructively.
       The end of the cold war actually has increased the need for 
     arms control. There are new sources of proliferation of 
     weapons of mass destruction and the missiles used to deliver 
     them. Formerly contained ethnic tensions have emerged in 
     areas where adversaries are all too ready to use violence as 
     the instrument of first resort. Sadly, there is abundant 
     evidence that we still live in a world where technology 
     advances faster than human wisdom.
       Arms control can help us meet the challenge of bringing 
     peace and stability to a troubled new world order. We can 
     limit and reduce destabilizing military forces. We can 
     prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the 
     missiles used to deliver them. We can contribute to 
     confidence and trust through greater transparency about our 
     military activities. Doing these things is not a sign of 
     weakness or of capitulation; it is a wise investment in the 
     future and a sure way to underwrite all of our vital national 
     interests.
       Much is underway. Less than three weeks ago, the Presidents 
     of Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and the United States 
     signed a statement that opens the way to the elimination of 
     nuclear weapons in the Ukraine. It provides for the transfer 
     of all nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory to Russia for 
     their dismantlement, while recording agreement on 
     compensation for Ukraine, previewing the security assurances 
     that the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom will 
     provide Kiev once it accedes to the NPT and Start 1 enters 
     into force, and reiterating the U.S. commitment to assist in 
     eliminating strategic systems on Ukrainian territory.
       This trilateral statement advances the interests of all 
     three countries and of the international community in 
     general. It will accelerate the entry into force and 
     implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
     (Start), bolster the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 
     and lead to the dismantlement of thousands of nuclear 
     weapons. Equally important, this agreement should help 
     establish a pattern of stable political relationships. It can 
     contribute to an environment in which democratic reform, 
     economic vitality, and social harmony can be pursued without 
     dangerous distraction.
       Arms control and confidence-building efforts are being 
     seriously pursued elsewhere at the regional level--including 
     the arms control and regional security (ACRS) working group 
     created as part of the Middle East peace process, the new 
     regional forum created by the Association of Southeast Asian 
     Nations (ASEAN), the historic progress on arms control and 
     non-proliferation in Latin America, and the agreement in 
     principle between India and Pakistan to establish a 
     multilateral dialogue on regional security and 
     nonproliferation. Similarly, we were encouraged when CSCE 
     ministers decided last December in Rome to begin discussions 
     in the forum for security cooperation of possible arms 
     control contributions for settling the conflicts in the 
     former Yugoslavia.
       Manifestly, the arms control negotiating tables are now 
     located not only in the conference rooms of Washington and 
     Moscow and the committee rooms here in Geneva, but also in 
     Buenos Aires; in New Delhi and Islamabad; in Cairo and Tel 
     Aviv; and in many other places around the globe. While the 
     venues are varied, the objectives are closely linked. The CD 
     has been the proving ground of new ideas and has set in 
     motion a new dynamic and a new spirit of international 
     negotiations.


                          a challenging agenda

       With this dynamic in mind, let me turn to some of the major 
     items of business that will occupy you in the days ahead.


                     comprehensive test ban treaty

       In the short time I have been in Geneva, I have already 
     sensed the great anticipation of our forthcoming negotiations 
     of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT). And we should be 
     excited. A CTBT is long overdue. We are beginning the final 
     steps in a journey of too many years.
       Let me be clear at the outset: U.S. policy--announced by 
     President Clinton on July 3--is one of strong support for 
     concluding a CTBT at the earliest possible time. Now, in the 
     aftermath of the cold war, a CTBT becomes even more 
     important. A CTBT will be an important part of our efforts to 
     prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and will place a 
     major restraint on the nuclear-weapon states.
       The United States has been working hard--as have many of 
     you--to ensure a smooth start to the negotiations. We were 
     pleased to be able to cosponsor the United Nations resolution 
     supporting the objectives of a CTBT. Its acceptance by 
     consensus provides a strong base from which to launch your 
     negotiations.
       The consensus at the U.N. shows there is now virtually 
     universal support for a CTBT. While the issues are complex, 
     they are not beyond our immediate reach; we should be able to 
     work out the essential elements of a treaty expeditiously. 
     ``At the earliest possible time'' means just that. Obviously, 
     no country can unilaterally set the peace, and we should 
     avoid arbitrary deadlines. But I assure you that, as compared 
     to some past deliberation on this issue, the United States 
     will be out front pulling, rather than in the back dragging 
     our heels.
       A CTBT will be fully successful only with the participation 
     and support of the five nuclear-weapon states and with broad 
     international adherence. The nuclear-weapon states bear a 
     special responsibility to contribute to these negotiations, 
     and you have our commitment that the United States will meet 
     its responsibility. For the United States, a tangible 
     demonstration of our commitment to the CTBT is our continuing 
     moratorium on nuclear testing. In his message to you, which I 
     read to you just a few moments ago, the President has again 
     urged the other nuclear-weapon states to refrain from 
     testing.


                      strengthening the npt regime

       With the end of the cold war, we have moved from a bipolar 
     world to a multipolar world. The threat of nuclear 
     proliferation remains, and with it the need to preserve the 
     Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the primary bulwark 
     against the further spread of nuclear weapons. The NPT 
     reflects a broad consensus against nuclear proliferation. 
     The treaty also establishes a framework for preventing the 
     spread of nuclear weapons, and for facilitating and 
     regulating cooperation among states in the peaceful uses 
     of nuclear energy. And it has proved an important 
     instrument for enhancing the social and economic 
     development of its members.
       The U.S. welcomes the substantial progress made at the 
     second meeting of the preparatory committee for the 1995 NPT 
     conference, including the decision to open its proceedings to 
     observers from both non-party states and non-governmental 
     organizations. The prepcom reaffirmed the importance of 
     consensus as its method of decision-making, and it agreed on 
     the background documentation the parties will need from the 
     United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency 
     (IAEA), and other organizations to support their work. The 
     prepcom also unanimously endorsed the candidacy of Ambassador 
     Jayantha Dhanapala of Sri Lanka for the presidency of the 
     1995 conference. The work of the prepcom is all the more 
     important because of the end to which it is directed. The 
     United States is committed to make every effort to achieve 
     the NPT's indefinite and unconditional extension in 1995. 
     Without a stable and durable non-proliferation regime, which 
     includes a strong NPT, further arms control methods will be 
     jeopardized.
       Indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 will ensure that 
     the many benefits the NPT provides to its parties will remain 
     available. By indefinite extension, the international 
     community will send to would-be proliferators the clearest 
     possible signal that their activities are not acceptable.
       The threat of nuclear proliferation has diminished in some 
     regions, such as Latin America and Africa. We need to ensure 
     that for the future such regional security benefits provided 
     by the NPT are not mortgaged by a decision to limit its 
     extension. The full weight of the NPT membership behind a 
     treaty of unlimited duration would be a formidable political 
     force for non-proliferation. Moreover, it would provide an 
     essential foundation for building further on the historic 
     measures already taken to limit, reduce, and dismantle 
     nuclear weapon systems.


                        fissile material cut-off

       Our objective of reshaping the nuclear contours of the 
     post-cold war security landscape does not end there. The 
     successful implementation of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range 
     Nuclear Forces (INF), the implementation of unilateral 
     initiatives, such as reduction and dismantling of tactical 
     nuclear weapons, and strategic arms reduction agreements, 
     including Start I and Start II, were significant 
     contributions to the process of halting the spread of nuclear 
     arms. Now we can add not just the CTBT negotiations and NPT 
     extension, but also negotiations for a global agreement to 
     prohibit further production of highly enriched uranium and 
     plutonium for nuclear explosive purposes or outside of 
     international safeguards, as President Clinton urged in his 
     address to the United Nations last September.
       Such an agreement should be formally negotiated here in the 
     CD. We were greatly encouraged by the consensus support at 
     the UN for such a convention. A non-discriminatory, 
     multilateral, and effectively verifiable fissile material 
     production ban could bring the unsafeguarded nuclear programs 
     of certain non-NPT states under some measure of restraint for 
     the first time. It would also halt the production of 
     plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons in 
     the five declared nuclear-weapon states.


                      negative security assurances

       Negative security assurances are also related to the cause 
     of non-proliferation. We adhere to a policy that has been 
     reiterated by several previous administrations, namely:
       The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any 
     non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Nuclear Non-
     Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or any comparable internationally 
     binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, 
     except in the case of an attack on the United States, its 
     Territories or Armed Forces, or its allies, by such a state 
     allied to a nuclear-weapon state or associated with a 
     nuclear-weapon state in carrying out or sustaining this 
     attack.''
       As we have stated repeatedly in this forum, the United 
     States is open to discussions on this issue.
       We cannot disinvent nuclear weapons; but we can control 
     them. We can limit their impact and influence. Deep 
     reductions in nuclear weapons inventories, strengthened and 
     extended non-proliferation norms, conclusion of a CTBT, a 
     global ban on fissile material production, and other measures 
     will alter fundamentally the role of nuclear weapons in the 
     world of the twenty-first century. All these steps will 
     contribute to the important goal we all share--a safer and 
     more stable world.


                 the challenge of conventional weapons

       The devastating destructive power of nuclear weapons and 
     the dangers posed by other weapons of mass destruction demand 
     that they remain high on our arms control agenda, but they 
     cannot be the only items. Another crucial element of the arms 
     control equation is conventional arms.
       We are reminded daily that the end of the cold war has not 
     by any means removed all conflict and danger from the world. 
     Regional arms races and destabilizing accumulations of arms 
     well beyond those realistically needed for defense are all 
     too common. Reversing these trends is a global 
     responsibility. We can help reduce the sources of tension 
     that generate such accumulations. We must continue working 
     to discourage the use of arms in resolving disputes.
       The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) is 
     a landmark in the reduction of conventional weapons. It 
     serves as the foundation for a post-cold-war security 
     architecture in Europe based on cooperation rather than 
     confrontation. We look forward to its full implementation in 
     1995, and note with satisfaction that tens of thousands of 
     items of equipment have already been destroyed.
       The immediate challenge to this forum is to promote greater 
     transparency about security matters. Transparency in turn 
     fosters the greater confidence and trust upon which stable 
     political relationships can rest.
       Last year the CD created the ad hoc Committee on 
     Transparency in Armaments (TIA). As the first new committee 
     established by the CD in a number of years, it demonstrated 
     the CD's ability to adapt to the challenges of the post-cold-
     war era. It is important as well because it is the only item 
     on your agenda that addresses the conventional arms 
     challenge. I strongly encourage you to build on the very 
     useful work begun in the TIA ad hoc committee last year. I 
     also recommend the ideas put forward last year by the United 
     States to promote transparency regarding conventional arms.
       Some object that we should instead pay even more attention 
     to weapons of mass destruction and the missiles used to 
     deliver them. Let us discuss those concerns seriously, but 
     let us not create yet another setting where we repeat 
     ourselves endlessly to the point where other important 
     business is neglected. If we slacken in our willingness to 
     address the conventional weapons problems that first gave 
     rise to the TIA initiative, we will not make much progress, 
     and we will begin to slide away from our global conventional 
     arms control objectives.
       Just as in the nuclear area, the work done here in Geneva 
     on conventional arms will have a significant impact on 
     related efforts elsewhere. We share your pride in the 
     successful initiation of the UN Register of Conventional 
     Arms. The first year's experience with the register was 
     good--but not good enough. Eighty-two responses represent 
     answers from less than half the UN's membership. We must do 
     better; our goal should be universal participation, which 
     your work here at the CD can encourage.
       The United States also looks forward to the experts' 
     meeting on these issues in New York next month. We will play 
     an active part in moving their efforts to a successful 
     conclusion.
       Another conventional arms issue on which we have taken a 
     first step relates to land mines. These weapons continue to 
     wreak havoc on civilian populations whether or not they are 
     any longer in an active war zone. The UN has supported by 
     consensus the U.S.-initiated resolution calling for a 
     moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land mines. We 
     must now take the next step and make the global moratorium 
     a reality. In doing so, we not only protect the futures of 
     many innocent civilians, but we also draw attention to a 
     range of problems long thought too difficult for arms 
     control to solve.
       This process will also be fortified by this year's experts' 
     deliberations leading to a review conference on the 
     convention on weapons that may be deemed to be excessively 
     injurious or have indiscriminate effects. Although not 
     presently a party to this convention, the United States will 
     closely follow the progress of the conference as an observer, 
     and the President intends to submit the convention to the 
     United States Senate this year for advice and consent to 
     ratification.
       These positive developments can mutually reinforce one 
     another, forming a tide that can break down resistance to 
     progress on the conventional arms control agenda. The CD 
     should help swell that tide.


                      an extensive agenda remains

       In my closing minutes, Mr. President, let me briefly touch 
     on the other developments and other issues that are part of 
     U.S. arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation 
     efforts.
       Despite the fact that the chemical weapons convention has 
     now passed beyond the CD's purview, I know that many of you 
     remain keenly interested in its fate. In Washington this past 
     November, President Clinton submitted the CWC to the United 
     States Senate for advice and consent, and will push for 
     ratification early this year. The United States urges every 
     other signatory to do the same, so that the convention will 
     enter into force for the critical parties at the earliest 
     possible date.
       The United States has also been pleased by the progress 
     made by the preparatory commission in The Hague on 
     elaborating the complex procedures that will guarantee the 
     convention's smooth and effective functioning.
       The biological and toxin weapons convention (BWC) has been 
     strengthened since its entry into force by the increased 
     membership and by the confidence-building measures developed 
     by successive review conferences. We believe the world can go 
     further. President Clinton has announced that the United 
     States will promote new measures to increase transparency of 
     activities and facilities that could have biological and 
     toxin weapons applications. The United States also supports 
     the work of the ad hoc group of government experts convened 
     to identify and examine potential BWC verification measures 
     from a scientific and technical standpoint. We support an 
     early conference to consider the report and to discuss the 
     next steps to strengthen the international norm against 
     a scourge that could well become the next weapon of mass 
     destruction of choice.
       The Clinton administration's non-proliferation policy also 
     attempts to find solutions where non-proliferation norms have 
     not taken hold. The United States has taken a strong stand 
     against any North Korean nuclear weapon ambitions. In 
     coordination with many other countries, we have made it clear 
     to North Korea that, to resolve the nuclear issue, it will 
     have to provide the international community with assurance 
     that it does not possess nuclear weapons and it will not 
     build them in the future. This means that North Korea must 
     remain a full party to the NPT, fully cooperate with the 
     International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including 
     accepting regular and special inspections, and fully 
     implementing the denuclearization agreement reached by North 
     and South Korea. Our position remains unchanged: North Korea 
     will have to meet these obligations aimed at ensuring a 
     nuclear weapon-free Korean peninsula and a strong 
     international non-proliferation regime.
       Proliferation threats are acute in South Asia and the 
     Middle East. The United States is encouraging India and 
     Pakistan to join in a multilateral effort to examine regional 
     security and arms control issues. We continue to support the 
     activities of the Middle East arms control and regional 
     security working group.
       The diffusion of missile technology makes the world a more 
     dangerous place for all of us. The United States wants to 
     strengthen the missile technology control regime to ensure 
     that it continues to be an effective vehicle to combat 
     missile proliferation.


                               Conclusion

       Mr. President, the Conference on Disarmament is 
     strengthened by its success with the chemical weapons 
     convention negotiations. It is energized by the prospect of 
     the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty. It is 
     challenged by the demands of enhancing transparency in 
     armaments. It is bolstered by important arms control 
     developments beyond these halls.
       Our responsibility now is to make the most of the 
     opportunity before us. The task is immediate; but our results 
     will be long-lasting. The challenges are enormous; but they 
     are matched by the promise of profound results. The path will 
     be difficult; but it will be worth every effort when we 
     arrive at our destination. Let us get down to work.
       Thank you.

                          ____________________