[Congressional Record Volume 140, Number 1 (Tuesday, January 25, 1994)]
[Senate]
[Page S]
From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[Congressional Record: January 25, 1994]
From the Congressional Record Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
NUCLEAR TEST BAN TALKS
Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, today the Conference on Disarmament opens
in Geneva. The No. 1 item on its agenda is negotiation of a
Comprehensive Test Ban [CTB] Treaty. This treaty banning all nuclear
weapons tests has been the goal of U.S. Presidents back to Eisenhower.
Achieving a CTB has been a standing treaty commitment for the United
States and Russia--then the Soviet Union--since the Limited Test Ban
Treaty, which halted nuclear weapons explosions in the atmosphere, was
signed in 1963. But underground explosions continued for the three
following decades by the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China,
and eventually India.
The nuclear powers again committed to conclude a CTB Treaty when the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] was signed in 1968, and for 25
years the non-nuclear nations that signed the NPT have looked for
progress on a CTB. That is what they explicitly expected in return for
their compliance with the NPT. But although negotiations continued and
even neared completion during the Carter administration, CTB talks were
suspended with the invasion of Afghanistan.
Now, today, the Clinton administration is taking its effort to
finally conclude a CTB to the international stage. I believe there are
several reasons why the time is ripe for quick progress in these talks:
The NPT comes up for review and potential extension in the fall of
1995, and the non-nuclear signatories have made clear they expect a CTB
be in hand or near-at-hand if they are to support extension of the NPT.
There is now in place a voluntary, mutual moratorium on tests by all
the nuclear powers except China, which tested once last fall. As
President Clinton correctly observed last July, ``nuclear weapons in
the United States arsenal are safe and reliable,'' and the U.S. does
not need more testing at this juncture.
In yet another sign that the cold war is over, these CTB talks begin
with the two superpowers essentially on the same side, both voluntarily
halting their tests and seeking a permanent global halt to all tests.
Not since the end of World War II has a major arms treaty negotiation
begun with such common purpose and objectives.
Earlier today, John Holum, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, gave his opening address to the conference. I ask
unanimous consent that it be included in the Record at the conclusion
of my remarks, and I encourage my colleagues to read it.
Although there is no formal schedule or deadline for the CTB
negotiations, President Clinton recognizes that it would be in the
clear interest of the United States to conclude them as quickly as
possible.
Mr. Holum has noted that it is the goal of the United States to reach
multilateral agreement on a CTB Treaty well in advance of the 1995
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty extension conference. And his address
today restates U.S. policy to conclude the negotiation of a CTB Treaty
``at the earliest possible time.'' Holum continues, ``obviously, no
country can unilaterally set the pace. I assure you that as compared to
some past deliberation on this issue, the United States will be out
front pulling, rather than in the back dragging our heels.''
That declaration demonstrates true leadership and rededication to the
imperative of stemming proliferation of nuclear weapons as these talks
begin.
Mr. President, I believe these statements by Mr. Holum today reflect
substantial congressional sentiment, that the current multinational
moratorium on nuclear tests be converted into a permanent CTB Treaty as
soon as possible. We have demonstrated that intention through
legislation passed in 1992, and the administration has recognized that
with its statements today.
A strong CTB treaty, which will be a cornerstone of our nuclear non-
proliferation efforts for many years to come.
The address follows:
Statement of The Honorable John D. Holum, Director, U.S. Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency, Geneva, January 25, 1994
Thank you, Mr. President.
On behalf of the United States, may I first wish you every
success as you guide the work of this body to begin this
important year. You will have the complete cooperation of the
United States delegation. I thank your predecessor,
Ambassador Zahran of Egypt, for his wise and skillful
performance of the challenging duties of president. I would
also like to congratulate the new personal representative of
the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. Vladimir
Petrovsky, and express our confidence that we will have with
him the same close and productive relationship that we
enjoyed with his predecessor.
Mr. President, ladies and gentleman.
This is my first opportunity to address a session of the
Conference on Disarmament (CD) as the Director of the United
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. This forum serves
the cause of a safer and more stable world, and my presence
here today reflects the commitment of the Clinton
administration to the goals of arms control, disarmament and
non-proliferation. Upon my confirmation, the President
reiterated to me the high priority he personally gives to
making concrete, rapid progress on strengthening
international security through multilateral cooperation. The
end of the cold war has created particular opportunities for
the CD, and I am here today to pledge to you that the United
States will do everything in its power to make the most of
them. In this regard, I would like to read out to you a
message to the Conference from President Clinton:
``I am grateful for the opportunity to address all those
who are participating in the Conference on Disarmament. This
Conference has several important items on its agenda as the
1994 session begins, including transparency in armaments, and
it may assume others, such as a ban on fissile material
production for nuclear explosive purposes. None is more
important than the negotiations of a comprehensive and
verifiable ban on nuclear explosions. This challenging, but
crucial, objective is the conference's top priority. It
reflects our common desire to take decisive action that will
support and supplement the global nuclear non-proliferation
regime and will further constrain the acquisition and
development of nuclear weapons.
``Regional instabilities, the end of the cold war, and the
growing threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons have
created new and compelling circumstances to encourage
progress in disarmament. Accordingly, I decided last July to
extend the moratorium on the United States nuclear weapons
tests and committed the United States to achieving a
comprehensive test ban treaty. At the same time, I called on
the other nuclear weapon states to observe a testing
moratorium, and I do so again today.
``I am confident that Ambassador Ledogar and the U.S.
delegation will join with you in taking bold steps toward a
world made safer through the negotiation at the earliest
possible time of a comprehensive test ban treaty that will
strengthen the security of all nations. You have my best
wishes during this important conference.'' (End text of
President's message.)
The CD is the only multilateral forum to address global
arms control and disarmament issues on a continuing basis.
Its membership covers every region of the globe and reflects
a wide range of concerns and interests. We have all come to
accept the CD as both a marketplace of ideas and a place
where nations get down to practical business and conclude the
agreements that enhance international security.
The United States recognizes the importance of the CD as a
multilateral arms control body, and we have consistently
supported appropriate membership expansion. We do, however,
insist that it is inappropriate to elevate the status in the
CD of a state whose behavior continues to be flagrantly
opposed to the goals of the organization. It is our hope that
CD members will continue working together to forge a
consensus on an acceptable membership package.
The conclusion of the chemical weapons convention (CWC)
vividly demonstrates how the constructive competition of
ideas and the pursuit of diverse interests and concerns can
produce achievements to benefit the entire international
community. I congratulate you on that signal accomplishment.
However, this is not the time for us to rest. There is much
work to be done; the demands are immediate; and we have a
unique opportunity to help to shape the world constructively.
The end of the cold war actually has increased the need for
arms control. There are new sources of proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and the missiles used to deliver
them. Formerly contained ethnic tensions have emerged in
areas where adversaries are all too ready to use violence as
the instrument of first resort. Sadly, there is abundant
evidence that we still live in a world where technology
advances faster than human wisdom.
Arms control can help us meet the challenge of bringing
peace and stability to a troubled new world order. We can
limit and reduce destabilizing military forces. We can
prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the
missiles used to deliver them. We can contribute to
confidence and trust through greater transparency about our
military activities. Doing these things is not a sign of
weakness or of capitulation; it is a wise investment in the
future and a sure way to underwrite all of our vital national
interests.
Much is underway. Less than three weeks ago, the Presidents
of Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and the United States
signed a statement that opens the way to the elimination of
nuclear weapons in the Ukraine. It provides for the transfer
of all nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory to Russia for
their dismantlement, while recording agreement on
compensation for Ukraine, previewing the security assurances
that the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom will
provide Kiev once it accedes to the NPT and Start 1 enters
into force, and reiterating the U.S. commitment to assist in
eliminating strategic systems on Ukrainian territory.
This trilateral statement advances the interests of all
three countries and of the international community in
general. It will accelerate the entry into force and
implementation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(Start), bolster the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),
and lead to the dismantlement of thousands of nuclear
weapons. Equally important, this agreement should help
establish a pattern of stable political relationships. It can
contribute to an environment in which democratic reform,
economic vitality, and social harmony can be pursued without
dangerous distraction.
Arms control and confidence-building efforts are being
seriously pursued elsewhere at the regional level--including
the arms control and regional security (ACRS) working group
created as part of the Middle East peace process, the new
regional forum created by the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN), the historic progress on arms control and
non-proliferation in Latin America, and the agreement in
principle between India and Pakistan to establish a
multilateral dialogue on regional security and
nonproliferation. Similarly, we were encouraged when CSCE
ministers decided last December in Rome to begin discussions
in the forum for security cooperation of possible arms
control contributions for settling the conflicts in the
former Yugoslavia.
Manifestly, the arms control negotiating tables are now
located not only in the conference rooms of Washington and
Moscow and the committee rooms here in Geneva, but also in
Buenos Aires; in New Delhi and Islamabad; in Cairo and Tel
Aviv; and in many other places around the globe. While the
venues are varied, the objectives are closely linked. The CD
has been the proving ground of new ideas and has set in
motion a new dynamic and a new spirit of international
negotiations.
a challenging agenda
With this dynamic in mind, let me turn to some of the major
items of business that will occupy you in the days ahead.
comprehensive test ban treaty
In the short time I have been in Geneva, I have already
sensed the great anticipation of our forthcoming negotiations
of a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT). And we should be
excited. A CTBT is long overdue. We are beginning the final
steps in a journey of too many years.
Let me be clear at the outset: U.S. policy--announced by
President Clinton on July 3--is one of strong support for
concluding a CTBT at the earliest possible time. Now, in the
aftermath of the cold war, a CTBT becomes even more
important. A CTBT will be an important part of our efforts to
prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and will place a
major restraint on the nuclear-weapon states.
The United States has been working hard--as have many of
you--to ensure a smooth start to the negotiations. We were
pleased to be able to cosponsor the United Nations resolution
supporting the objectives of a CTBT. Its acceptance by
consensus provides a strong base from which to launch your
negotiations.
The consensus at the U.N. shows there is now virtually
universal support for a CTBT. While the issues are complex,
they are not beyond our immediate reach; we should be able to
work out the essential elements of a treaty expeditiously.
``At the earliest possible time'' means just that. Obviously,
no country can unilaterally set the peace, and we should
avoid arbitrary deadlines. But I assure you that, as compared
to some past deliberation on this issue, the United States
will be out front pulling, rather than in the back dragging
our heels.
A CTBT will be fully successful only with the participation
and support of the five nuclear-weapon states and with broad
international adherence. The nuclear-weapon states bear a
special responsibility to contribute to these negotiations,
and you have our commitment that the United States will meet
its responsibility. For the United States, a tangible
demonstration of our commitment to the CTBT is our continuing
moratorium on nuclear testing. In his message to you, which I
read to you just a few moments ago, the President has again
urged the other nuclear-weapon states to refrain from
testing.
strengthening the npt regime
With the end of the cold war, we have moved from a bipolar
world to a multipolar world. The threat of nuclear
proliferation remains, and with it the need to preserve the
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the primary bulwark
against the further spread of nuclear weapons. The NPT
reflects a broad consensus against nuclear proliferation.
The treaty also establishes a framework for preventing the
spread of nuclear weapons, and for facilitating and
regulating cooperation among states in the peaceful uses
of nuclear energy. And it has proved an important
instrument for enhancing the social and economic
development of its members.
The U.S. welcomes the substantial progress made at the
second meeting of the preparatory committee for the 1995 NPT
conference, including the decision to open its proceedings to
observers from both non-party states and non-governmental
organizations. The prepcom reaffirmed the importance of
consensus as its method of decision-making, and it agreed on
the background documentation the parties will need from the
United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), and other organizations to support their work. The
prepcom also unanimously endorsed the candidacy of Ambassador
Jayantha Dhanapala of Sri Lanka for the presidency of the
1995 conference. The work of the prepcom is all the more
important because of the end to which it is directed. The
United States is committed to make every effort to achieve
the NPT's indefinite and unconditional extension in 1995.
Without a stable and durable non-proliferation regime, which
includes a strong NPT, further arms control methods will be
jeopardized.
Indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 will ensure that
the many benefits the NPT provides to its parties will remain
available. By indefinite extension, the international
community will send to would-be proliferators the clearest
possible signal that their activities are not acceptable.
The threat of nuclear proliferation has diminished in some
regions, such as Latin America and Africa. We need to ensure
that for the future such regional security benefits provided
by the NPT are not mortgaged by a decision to limit its
extension. The full weight of the NPT membership behind a
treaty of unlimited duration would be a formidable political
force for non-proliferation. Moreover, it would provide an
essential foundation for building further on the historic
measures already taken to limit, reduce, and dismantle
nuclear weapon systems.
fissile material cut-off
Our objective of reshaping the nuclear contours of the
post-cold war security landscape does not end there. The
successful implementation of the Treaty on Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF), the implementation of unilateral
initiatives, such as reduction and dismantling of tactical
nuclear weapons, and strategic arms reduction agreements,
including Start I and Start II, were significant
contributions to the process of halting the spread of nuclear
arms. Now we can add not just the CTBT negotiations and NPT
extension, but also negotiations for a global agreement to
prohibit further production of highly enriched uranium and
plutonium for nuclear explosive purposes or outside of
international safeguards, as President Clinton urged in his
address to the United Nations last September.
Such an agreement should be formally negotiated here in the
CD. We were greatly encouraged by the consensus support at
the UN for such a convention. A non-discriminatory,
multilateral, and effectively verifiable fissile material
production ban could bring the unsafeguarded nuclear programs
of certain non-NPT states under some measure of restraint for
the first time. It would also halt the production of
plutonium and highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons in
the five declared nuclear-weapon states.
negative security assurances
Negative security assurances are also related to the cause
of non-proliferation. We adhere to a policy that has been
reiterated by several previous administrations, namely:
The United States will not use nuclear weapons against any
non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) or any comparable internationally
binding commitment not to acquire nuclear explosive devices,
except in the case of an attack on the United States, its
Territories or Armed Forces, or its allies, by such a state
allied to a nuclear-weapon state or associated with a
nuclear-weapon state in carrying out or sustaining this
attack.''
As we have stated repeatedly in this forum, the United
States is open to discussions on this issue.
We cannot disinvent nuclear weapons; but we can control
them. We can limit their impact and influence. Deep
reductions in nuclear weapons inventories, strengthened and
extended non-proliferation norms, conclusion of a CTBT, a
global ban on fissile material production, and other measures
will alter fundamentally the role of nuclear weapons in the
world of the twenty-first century. All these steps will
contribute to the important goal we all share--a safer and
more stable world.
the challenge of conventional weapons
The devastating destructive power of nuclear weapons and
the dangers posed by other weapons of mass destruction demand
that they remain high on our arms control agenda, but they
cannot be the only items. Another crucial element of the arms
control equation is conventional arms.
We are reminded daily that the end of the cold war has not
by any means removed all conflict and danger from the world.
Regional arms races and destabilizing accumulations of arms
well beyond those realistically needed for defense are all
too common. Reversing these trends is a global
responsibility. We can help reduce the sources of tension
that generate such accumulations. We must continue working
to discourage the use of arms in resolving disputes.
The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) is
a landmark in the reduction of conventional weapons. It
serves as the foundation for a post-cold-war security
architecture in Europe based on cooperation rather than
confrontation. We look forward to its full implementation in
1995, and note with satisfaction that tens of thousands of
items of equipment have already been destroyed.
The immediate challenge to this forum is to promote greater
transparency about security matters. Transparency in turn
fosters the greater confidence and trust upon which stable
political relationships can rest.
Last year the CD created the ad hoc Committee on
Transparency in Armaments (TIA). As the first new committee
established by the CD in a number of years, it demonstrated
the CD's ability to adapt to the challenges of the post-cold-
war era. It is important as well because it is the only item
on your agenda that addresses the conventional arms
challenge. I strongly encourage you to build on the very
useful work begun in the TIA ad hoc committee last year. I
also recommend the ideas put forward last year by the United
States to promote transparency regarding conventional arms.
Some object that we should instead pay even more attention
to weapons of mass destruction and the missiles used to
deliver them. Let us discuss those concerns seriously, but
let us not create yet another setting where we repeat
ourselves endlessly to the point where other important
business is neglected. If we slacken in our willingness to
address the conventional weapons problems that first gave
rise to the TIA initiative, we will not make much progress,
and we will begin to slide away from our global conventional
arms control objectives.
Just as in the nuclear area, the work done here in Geneva
on conventional arms will have a significant impact on
related efforts elsewhere. We share your pride in the
successful initiation of the UN Register of Conventional
Arms. The first year's experience with the register was
good--but not good enough. Eighty-two responses represent
answers from less than half the UN's membership. We must do
better; our goal should be universal participation, which
your work here at the CD can encourage.
The United States also looks forward to the experts'
meeting on these issues in New York next month. We will play
an active part in moving their efforts to a successful
conclusion.
Another conventional arms issue on which we have taken a
first step relates to land mines. These weapons continue to
wreak havoc on civilian populations whether or not they are
any longer in an active war zone. The UN has supported by
consensus the U.S.-initiated resolution calling for a
moratorium on the export of anti-personnel land mines. We
must now take the next step and make the global moratorium
a reality. In doing so, we not only protect the futures of
many innocent civilians, but we also draw attention to a
range of problems long thought too difficult for arms
control to solve.
This process will also be fortified by this year's experts'
deliberations leading to a review conference on the
convention on weapons that may be deemed to be excessively
injurious or have indiscriminate effects. Although not
presently a party to this convention, the United States will
closely follow the progress of the conference as an observer,
and the President intends to submit the convention to the
United States Senate this year for advice and consent to
ratification.
These positive developments can mutually reinforce one
another, forming a tide that can break down resistance to
progress on the conventional arms control agenda. The CD
should help swell that tide.
an extensive agenda remains
In my closing minutes, Mr. President, let me briefly touch
on the other developments and other issues that are part of
U.S. arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation
efforts.
Despite the fact that the chemical weapons convention has
now passed beyond the CD's purview, I know that many of you
remain keenly interested in its fate. In Washington this past
November, President Clinton submitted the CWC to the United
States Senate for advice and consent, and will push for
ratification early this year. The United States urges every
other signatory to do the same, so that the convention will
enter into force for the critical parties at the earliest
possible date.
The United States has also been pleased by the progress
made by the preparatory commission in The Hague on
elaborating the complex procedures that will guarantee the
convention's smooth and effective functioning.
The biological and toxin weapons convention (BWC) has been
strengthened since its entry into force by the increased
membership and by the confidence-building measures developed
by successive review conferences. We believe the world can go
further. President Clinton has announced that the United
States will promote new measures to increase transparency of
activities and facilities that could have biological and
toxin weapons applications. The United States also supports
the work of the ad hoc group of government experts convened
to identify and examine potential BWC verification measures
from a scientific and technical standpoint. We support an
early conference to consider the report and to discuss the
next steps to strengthen the international norm against
a scourge that could well become the next weapon of mass
destruction of choice.
The Clinton administration's non-proliferation policy also
attempts to find solutions where non-proliferation norms have
not taken hold. The United States has taken a strong stand
against any North Korean nuclear weapon ambitions. In
coordination with many other countries, we have made it clear
to North Korea that, to resolve the nuclear issue, it will
have to provide the international community with assurance
that it does not possess nuclear weapons and it will not
build them in the future. This means that North Korea must
remain a full party to the NPT, fully cooperate with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including
accepting regular and special inspections, and fully
implementing the denuclearization agreement reached by North
and South Korea. Our position remains unchanged: North Korea
will have to meet these obligations aimed at ensuring a
nuclear weapon-free Korean peninsula and a strong
international non-proliferation regime.
Proliferation threats are acute in South Asia and the
Middle East. The United States is encouraging India and
Pakistan to join in a multilateral effort to examine regional
security and arms control issues. We continue to support the
activities of the Middle East arms control and regional
security working group.
The diffusion of missile technology makes the world a more
dangerous place for all of us. The United States wants to
strengthen the missile technology control regime to ensure
that it continues to be an effective vehicle to combat
missile proliferation.
Conclusion
Mr. President, the Conference on Disarmament is
strengthened by its success with the chemical weapons
convention negotiations. It is energized by the prospect of
the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty. It is
challenged by the demands of enhancing transparency in
armaments. It is bolstered by important arms control
developments beyond these halls.
Our responsibility now is to make the most of the
opportunity before us. The task is immediate; but our results
will be long-lasting. The challenges are enormous; but they
are matched by the promise of profound results. The path will
be difficult; but it will be worth every effort when we
arrive at our destination. Let us get down to work.
Thank you.
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