96Y4
F 76/2
Ov 2/5

96th Congress
1st Session } COMMITTEE PRINT

GOVERNMENT
Storage

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES AND OVERSEAS MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

PREPARED FOR THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

BY

THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE DIVISION
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

KSU LIBRARIES
A11900 921490

APRIL 1979

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
35-995 O WASHINGTON : 1979

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

Stock Number 052-070-04773-9

AUTHENTICATED U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION GPO

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

FRANK CHURCH, Idaho, *Chairman*

CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
GEORGE McGOVERN, South Dakota
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
JOHN GLENN, Ohio
RICHARD STONE, Florida
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine
EDWARD ZORINSKY, Nebraska

JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois
HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr., Tennessee
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
S. I. HAYAKAWA, California
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

WILLIAM B. BADER, *Staff Director*

FOREWORD

An inherent tension exists between the extensive network of U.S. bases overseas and American foreign policy.

Overseas facilities must be constructed over long periods of time and tend to become self-perpetuating. On the other hand, U.S. foreign policy is evolutionary, and capable of dramatic change to reflect international developments.

Accordingly, without regular and comprehensive review, there is a danger that U.S. foreign bases will reflect historic, rather than current and emerging needs. The result, at worst, could a be a facade of military power which was, in fact, no longer relevant to American foreign policy objectives and, even, in some cases, counterproductive.

A number of recent developments in American foreign policy underscore the present need for such a thorough review. As of this writing, prospects appear favorable for a new SALT treaty in the near future. Senate action on that new treaty will shape the strategic environment which the United States faces in the next decade. At the same time, President Carter has moved dramatically to restore our relationship with China, and Congress has approved legislation insuring the continuation of commercial, cultural and other relations with Taiwan through the private American Institute on Taiwan. Clearly, these and other developments are prelude to considerable change in the political environment in Asia in the years ahead. In the Middle East, the conclusion of a treaty between Egypt and Israel could lead to a more general settlement with attendant economic, political and security benefits. Many of these recent developments could have tremendous impact on the rationale for specific force deployments and the bases which support those forces. These changing circumstances, combined with declining military manpower and strong budget pressures, pose a tremendous challenge. The executive branch and the Congress must work together to insure the development of a bases policy which recognizes and deals with the new political realities of the world, and makes the best possible use of our available military resources. We must be prepared to examine all of our deployments to make certain that we are prepared to deal with a new decade which will be fraught with challenge.

This study by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress for the Committee on Foreign Relations examines U.S. foreign policy objectives in each region of the world, identifies and assesses the major U.S. overseas military installations, and analyzes the effectiveness of those installations in supporting U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives. Attention is also paid to alternate means and approaches.

I believe that this volume will serve as an underpinning for efforts to develop a rational and coherent overseas military structure in the years ahead. It should prove particularly useful as various base arrangements—especially those involving the Philippines, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey—are reviewed, but a greater purpose will be served if this study can help lead to the making of decisions on individual base issues with a far better understanding of the total framework of U.S. foreign policy interests.

The study was prepared by analysts of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of the Congressional Research Service. Its drafting was coordinated by Dr. Richard F. Grimmett, an analyst in national defense, under the overall direction of Dr. William W. Whitson, Chief of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division. Individual authors are indicated on the following page. I wish to thank them all for what I believe will prove a valuable endeavor.

FRANK CHURCH, *Chairman.*

Authors of the Study

Robert G. Bell, Analyst in National Defense, Congressional Research Service.
Raymond W. Copson, Analyst in African Affairs, Congressional Research Service.
Richard P. Cronin, Analyst in National Defense, Congressional Research Service.
Edmund J. Gannon, Analyst in National Defense, Congressional Research Service.
Richard F. Grimmett, Analyst in National Defense, Congressional Research Service.
Clyde M. Mark, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Congressional Research Service.
Larry A. Niksch, Specialist in Asian Affairs, Congressional Research Service.
Richard M. Preece, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, Congressional Research Service.
Herbert Y. Schandler, Specialist in National Defense, Congressional Research Service.
Stanley R. Sloan, Specialist in European Affairs, Congressional Research Service.

CONTENTS

	Page
Foreword	III
Introduction and overview	1
A significant policy choice	11
Considerations for Congress	12
Europe and NATO:	
The centrality of Europe to U.S. interests	13
U.S. foreign policy objectives in Western Europe	13
U.S. military installations in Canada	16
U.S. military installations in Greenland	23
U.S. military installations in Iceland	25
Major U.S. installations in Western Europe	28
United Kingdom: U.S. installations, units, and missions	28
Netherlands: U.S. installations, units, and missions	31
Belgium: U.S. installations, units, and missions	33
Federal Republic of Germany: U.S. installations, units, and missions	35
U.S. foreign policy objectives in Southern Europe	44
Major U.S. military installations in Southern Europe	47
Major U.S. military installations in Portugal	50
Major U.S. military installations in Spain	53
Major U.S. military installations in Italy	56
Major U.S. military installations in Greece	59
Major U.S. military installations in Turkey	62
Effectiveness of the current base structure in supporting U.S. objectives in Southern Europe	65
Alternative instruments to promote U.S. objectives	66
Southern Mediterranean and Middle East:	
Perspectives	71
Background	71
Available basing sites in the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East	78
The Indian Ocean, Arabian Peninsula, and Persian Gulf:	
The Indian Ocean region	84
Major foreign policy and defense objectives in the Indian Ocean region	85
Major U.S. facilities in the Indian Ocean and other types of military presence	94
Utility of the base structure and the U.S. military posture in the Indian Ocean to U.S. objectives	97
Alternative instruments or approaches	102
The Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf region	105
Major U.S. interests and policy objectives in the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf region	110
Major U.S. facilities and other forms of presence in the region	111
Utility of U.S. facilities and other forms of military presence and influence to U.S. objectives in the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf region	114
Policy alternatives	116
Summary conclusions	118
Africa south of the Sahara:	
U.S. foreign policy objectives in the region	122
U.S. bases and missions in the region	128
Effectiveness of the U.S. military base structure in the region	128
Alternative approaches	131
Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific:	
Major U.S. political, economic and military objectives in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific	134

Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific—Continued — Page

Major American military installations in Southeast Asia — 144
Effectiveness of the U.S. base structure in meeting U.S. objectives — 150
Effectiveness of U.S. bases in achieving political objectives — 153
Effectiveness of U.S. bases in achieving economic objectives — 155
Effectiveness of U.S. bases in achieving military objectives within the region — 155
Effectiveness of U.S. bases in meeting military objectives outside the area — 157
Alternative instruments to promote U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific — 158
Summary conclusions — 162

Northeast Asia:

Major U.S. political, economic and military objectives in Northeast Asia — 165
U.S. bases and force structure in Northeast Asia — 176
Effectiveness of current U.S. military base structure in supporting U.S. objectives — 179
Alternative instruments or approaches that could more effectively promote American objectives in Northeast Asia — 187
Summary conclusions — 192

Latin America:

Overview: The rise of hemispheric interdependence — 195
Current U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America — 197
Major U.S. military installations in Latin America — 198
Summary — 205

Appendix 1.—Estimated DOD annual operating costs of maintaining U.S. military forces in foreign countries and areas — 207

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW*

In 1979, United States policymakers are confronted with key questions that are at the heart of this nation's national security concerns. What is America's strategic global vision to be in the final part of this century? What perception of the American role in international affairs will provide guidance in the design and execution of its foreign policy? In support of its international role, to what degree should American power be directly involved in global or regional crisis management? Finally, what should be the role of American *military* power in this context, and, more specifically of American overseas bases?

Between 1945 and 1978, profound changes in the global political and economic environment dictated partial answers to the foregoing questions. During the early post-World War II years, military power—and the means to project it—was seen as a pre-eminent agent of influence in international affairs. By the early 1950's, the United States was perceived as a superpower, not only because it had overwhelming military strength but also because it had the world's most vibrant economy at a time when most other countries were still recovering from the economic devastation wrought by the war. This combination of military and economic power, buttressed by highly visible American commitments to regional defense organizations—such as NATO—gave the United States virtually unchallengable *political* authority among the nations of the non-Communist world. In this context, American military outposts were seen as a necessary instrument in a larger politico-military strategy intended to contain the spread of Communist power throughout the world.

By the mid-1970's, however, significant changes in the international political, economic and military environment had altered the once unquestioned status of the United States as *the* superpower in the world and had challenged the utility of *purely* military power for resolving crises involving superpowers and other states. Foremost among these major changes was the achievement by the Soviet Union in the 1970's of nuclear parity with the United States—a development of strategic significance surpassing the American loss in 1949 of its monopoly over nuclear weapons, and subsequently, over inter-continental systems for delivering them. In the 1970's these changes at the strategic force level were accompanied by an increasing asymmetry between U.S. and Soviet conventional force strengths. By 1978, the combination of shifts in the superpower military balance appeared to constrain the ability of the United States to use its military power in support of American foreign policy objectives.

---

* Prepared by Richard F. Grimmett. Analyst in National Defense.

Another major change by 1970 was the emergence of nearly 100 new nation states from what, in most cases, had been former colonial empires. Such states treasure their recently won independence and have demonstrated their desire to remain non-aligned, avoiding—so far as is possible—direct involvement in superpower conflicts. By the 1970's, the rise of Communist China had provided third world states with an alternative model for national development, different from that of either western capitalist democracy or the Soviet Union. China's assertive independence after the 1960 Sino-Soviet split dramatized the trend toward a diffusion of political and military power in the international arena.

Another significant change in the international environment by 1973 was a perceived scarcity of critical raw materials—particularly those upon which the industrial nations are especially dependent. Correlated with this change have been efforts by the developing nations to secure a systematic arrangement between developed and developing nations for the distribution and pricing of these resources. The growing reliance of the United States on foreign sources of vital raw materials—of which oil is the most obvious example—appeared to diminish the relative *economic* status and power of the United States.

Faced by burgeoning constraints on American political, military and economic power in the late 1970's, American policymakers were also confronted by the prospect of multi-regional instability and crises in the context of a proliferation of modern conventional weaponry. These developments raised a fundamental question regarding the extent to which American power should be brought to bear to deal with these crises.

At one extreme, the answer might reflect the continued application of the strategy of global containment. At the other extreme, it could reflect a strategy of reliance on the United Nations, and, ultimately, a world government—thus indicating an American decision to withdraw substantially from direct involvement in local crises. Between those two extremes, responsible policymakers might argue for partial reductions of American involvement from the fullest posture of global containment, without going so far as to rely exclusively on the United Nations or other international institutions for the resolution of regional conflicts.

It has been the assumption of this study that the United States cannot suddenly, and radically, reduce its commitment of resources to the management of the global political system. Thus two visions of grand strategy at higher levels of American involvement are given detailed attention in this introduction: "global containment" and "regional partnership."

The first ("global containment") had its genesis during the period immediately following World War II. Its basic tenet is that the United States has the *primary* responsibility for preventing regional instability and for containing the spread of Soviet influence globally. Proponents of this strategy believe that U.S. national interests are best served by the maintenance of tangible elements of power throughout the world—a perspective that has tended to mean the maintenance of strong and visible U.S. *military* assets in nearly every region.

Under the "containment" strategy, the United States must be prepared, physically and psychologically, to confront the Soviet Union

whenever it makes a bid for influence in any sector of the world, whether the Soviet effort is made through political, economic or military means. Finally, the "containment" perspective places continuing emphasis on regional alliances throughout the globe, but with the United States obligated to be the unquestioned *leader* of these alliances, and their primary agent of power.

The second of the two basic perspectives could be termed "regional partnership." This strategy is premised on the view that changes in the international environment since World War II may be positive, are irreversible in the foreseeable future, and contain realistic opportunities to diffuse responsibility for the maintenance of regional stability around the globe. A central tenet of this strategy is that the United States should be a true partner in assisting with problems within the regions instead of *the* dominant leader that solves them.

Proponents of this strategy seek the development of regional powers and/or institutions which would have the *primary* responsibility for resolving local disputes, thereby obviating the need for superpower involvement. Proponents also believe that if this strategy were to be successfully implemented, it would be possible to deter Soviet interventionism while at the same time provide the United States with greater flexibility to use its finite resources selectively anywhere in the world as required.

The "regional partnership" approach clearly envisions a diminution of a *predominant* American role in regional affairs. It is not intended to represent or indicate a U.S. lack of concern for a given region, or a return to "isolationism," or a loss of will to oppose Communist expansionism. Rather, it envisions a willingness on the part of the United States to forego its traditional role as the nation *primarily* responsible for resolving local conflicts as individual nations, institutions or arrangements in a given region develop to the point that they can demonstrate a capacity to assume the political, economic and military burdens once carried for the region essentially by the United States.

The implications of these two grand strategic perspectives for the American overseas base structure are quite different. With the "containment" strategy (in its purest form) as a guide, what would likely emerge would be an alliance system and a base network potentially more sophisticated than the one which currently exists. Certainly it could rationalize an augmentation of existing facilities.

Quite substantial changes in the base structure might ultimately occur, however, if the "regional partnership" strategy (in its purest form) were to guide American foreign policy. Should strong regional military and non-military arrangements and institutions be successfully developed, there could be a notable reduction in the requirement for a large United States overseas military presence in many parts of the world.

The chapters of this study underscore the divergent perspectives in 1979 among both American and foreign leaders regarding grand strategic designs, the preferred American international role, the utility of American military power and especially the utility of American military bases. Given the absence of any unifying *long-term* vision of global grand strategy, American deployments of power in 1979 are representative of a host of short-term considerations. The view of the importance of these deployments varied according to the observer's

position regarding the proper degree of involvement in global (and regional) crisis management. Thus, in the post-Vietnam era, a diverse range of strategic options bedevils the American policy community as technological and budgetary factors are adding fuel to the debate over the proper American course.

One factor that could tilt the balance toward adoption of the "regional partnership" strategy—at least in some regions—is the prospect that new technological or logistical innovations may increase the capability of the United States to respond to short-term crises from a distance, and thereby reduce somewhat the need to rely so greatly on forward bases to project military power. Such new developments could, in turn, reinforce a willingness to accept the reduction of "on-site" U.S. military presence on the grounds that American military power could always be brought to bear should the requirement to do so present itself.

Illustrations of such innovations would include the deployment of the Advanced Tanker Cargo Aircraft (ATCA), a wide-bodied DC–10 commercial jet modified to serve as either a cargo transport or as a long-range air re-fueling aircraft for most planes in the U.S. inventory. This aircraft can have a notable impact on American strategic mobility requirements, providing flexibility in the deployment of military forces and equipment that is not currently available. While the ATCA will not solve all problems in this regard, it can contribute to a reduction in the reliance of the United States on fixed forward bases for certain military operations. Similarly, new generations of satellites may notably reduce the requirements for some intelligence and communications installations abroad.

In addition, the "regional partnership" strategy might be viewed with great favor by some American policy makers because of the increasing costs in maintaining the current U.S. foreign military base complex. Successful implementation of this strategy could enable the United States to reduce some expenditures associated with overseas military installations without undermining the security and stability of important regions in the process.

The fundamental question in the continuing debate over the appropriate American grand strategy, however, is not the time involved in pursuing some form of the "regional partnership" strategy, but whether attaining some such vision would be realistically possible and worth the risks involved in seeking its fulfillment. Achieving such an end would not be possible very quickly. Indeed, it would likely take many years if set as a firm goal, and would entail a variety of risks, some substantial. These risks, which in large measure, constitute the case for the continuation of the "containment" strategy, are discussed in the individual regional chapters that follow.

This study is an effort to aid in answering the above question. It assesses the utility of United States foreign military bases on a region-by-region basis in an attempt to determine those places where this instrument of U.S. foreign policy still appears to be effective, in what form it appears to be most effective, and as appropriate, to indicate what alternative instruments of foreign policy might be better suited to more effective achievement of American policy ends in the given regions.

The regional chapters herein examine United States foreign policy objectives in the light of changes that have occurred since the end of World War II. They address a variety of regional considerations that are important in determining whether U.S. military power is still useful in supporting American foreign policy objectives in the specific regions examined, thereby assisting in defining the logical role of American military installations in each of these regions. For a detailed discussion of all pertinent issues in a specific region the reader is referred to that chapter of interest.

Some of the key points that have emerged from the analysis contained in the regional chapters are set forth below. The relationship between these points and the two major strategies described earlier is also discussed.

Europe and NATO

The relationship between the United States and Western Europe, in all of its political, economic and strategic aspects is the most important relationship maintained by the United States with any region or group of countries in the world. It is in recognition of this fact that in Europe, the East-West confrontation is most directly and practically symbolized by the concentration of the military forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the presence of the largest overseas complex of American military installations in the world.

Given the centrality of Europe to United States interests, the practical as well as the symbolic significance of the U.S. bases in the European theater is, and is likely to remain, great. Whether the actual military value of every major base in the region is the same may be reasonably debated. However, the fact that these bases are broadly perceived in Europe as a very *tangible* expression of the U.S. commitment to defend its European allies is not open to reasonable dispute. In this context, even relatively minor withdrawals of U.S. forces from bases in Europe would likely be cause for alarm within the European community, unless undertaken pursuant to a negotiated arms control agreement. *Major* U.S. withdrawals from the bases would have a profound effect on NATO and U.S. relations with Europe generally. As a consequence, barring some significant change in the political, economic and military environment in Europe, the United States presumably would maintain its current military presence in that region for the foreseeable future. Such an action would be consistent with current American foreign policy objectives in this region, and the tenets of the "containment" strategy.

A full implementation of the "regional partnership" strategy, as articulated above, would require—at the minimum—the buildup of European military forces in the region to a substantial degree. At the present time there does not appear to be a single nation or combination of nations in NATO that could substitute for the military power of the United States and balance the military strength of the Soviet Union. This military situation, of course, does not preclude the development of "regional partnership" arrangements that increase the share of the defense burden of U.S. allies in the region and help promote the resolution of other political and economic issues of concern to the United States and the nations of the European region.

Indeed, given the importance of trade with Europe and its impact on the U.S. economy, cooperation on non-military issues alone is likely to become increasingly essential in the years to come to promote the economic well-being of all nations within the NATO orbit. If the "regional partnership" strategy were adopted as the guide for U.S. policy, efforts in these non-military areas would likely be emphasized at first, with an enhanced allied role and contribution in the military area as circumstances permitted.

Southern Mediterranean and Middle East

At present, the United States does not have a land or sea base along the Southern or Eastern littoral of the Mediterranean Sea. Because of their strong feelings of independence and anti-colonialism, it is doubtful if any of the states in the region would be willing to invite the United States to establish a military base in the area except to counter a permanent Soviet base or to guarantee temporarily an Arab-Israeli settlement.

United States objectives in the area are to secure a continuous supply of oil, to maintain the political status quo and to protect Israel. It is not clear at this time that a permanent U.S. military base in the region would aid the United States in meeting any of these objectives. In fact, it is possible that an American base could be detrimental to U.S. interests. Under current political circumstances, it would seem beneficial for the United States to rely on the Sixth Fleet to "show the flag" when desirable and to provide a military capability when it is required. This approach is generally consistent with the "containment" strategy.

The successful implementation of the "regional partnership" strategy, should the United States choose to pursue it, requires the achievement of an Arab-Israeli settlement, and the establishment of normal political and economic ties between the Arabs and Israelis. Given the range of collective endeavors that could be fruitfully conducted by the states in the region should peace be achieved, it does not appear farfetched to conclude that the key argument against a reduction in the U.S. military presence in the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East region, such as it is, is the absence of an Arab-Israeli peace agreement. Once such an agreement is concluded, the overriding rationale that presently exists for the United States to play the key role in maintaining stability in the region would be substantially undermined, and the local states in a better position to assume this obligation in an effective manner. At that point, the United States would be able to pursue the "regional partnership" strategy to the fullest extent in all areas of mutual concern, barring a direct Soviet venture in force.

Indian Ocean, Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf

While the Indian Ocean region itself is somewhat peripheral to primary U.S. strategic military concerns, the importance of Persian Gulf oil to the United States and its allies makes the security of the sea lines of communication through the Indian Ocean—Persian Gulf region vitally important to the national interest of the United States.

So long as the U.S. economy is dependent upon the oil of the region the United States requires close political ties with the area's oil producing states, and the ability, in a crisis, to maintain or promptly regain access to the region's oil resources.

Due to the circumstances that led to the withdrawal of the European colonial powers from the Indian Ocean littoral states, military bases per se have only limited utility today as instruments of influence for the United States in the region, inasmuch as most local states are strongly opposed to the establishment of a permanent shore presence by an outside military power. Accordingly, the only permanent U.S. military installation in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf area is at Diego Garcia in the British Indian Ocean Territory. The United States recently lost previously held home-porting rights at Bahrain, but still retains the option of making periodic use of Bahraini facilities. Existing American military forces in the region serve primarily to maintain a nominal presence, patrol the vital sea lanes and maintain communications between U.S. military forces world-wide.

In light of the political sensitivities of local states it is unlikely that the United States could easily acquire rights to new bases in the Indian Ocean-Persian Gulf region, and there are, additionally, practical limitations on the expansion of facilities at Diego Garcia. When one considers, further, that a primary threat to the oil resources of the region comes from potential internal political instability of the oil producing states it becomes clear that the basic instruments of influence available to the United States in the region are the maintenance and/or development of strong political and economic ties to key nations there. Controlled and measured military sales as well as technical and logistical training and support to friendly governments can also aid in the achievement of such American policy goals in the region. However, the recent experience of Iran indicates the serious potential pitfalls in using military sales and/or aid as an instrument of U.S. policy.

Given these circumstances in the area, and its importance to the U.S. and its allies, implementation of the "containment" strategy to its fullest extent might require, for example, increasing U.S. naval deployment and coverage of the area's vital sea lanes by whatever means available.

On the other hand, if the United States chose to pursue the "regional partnership" strategy, it would logically make a concerted effort to assist the local states in strengthening their own capacity to resolve their disputes in a peaceful manner, and to enhance *their* ability to guarantee that the vital oil trans-shipment routes in the area would be kept open, instead of emphasizing a major U.S. military buildup in this region.

Africa South of the Sahara

The most important American interests in Africa are the security of the shipping lanes from the Persian Gulf, which lie close to Africa's coast at several points. and continued access to some key African minerals, particularly the chromium deposited in Southern Africa. The United States has also shown a strong interest in the economic and political development of the African countries, and concern with the effect of Soviet and Cuban military involvement in Africa has been

growing in recent months. American trade and investment on the continent, though limited, has been growing.

American military operations in Africa are likely to be limited in scope, unless a decision were made to take military action against the Soviet Union and Cuba in the region. Otherwise, the most likely U.S. military operations in Africa would include evacuations of American civilians in countries undergoing political turmoil, rescues of hostages, displays of force in support of friendly regimes, and the logistical support of international peacekeeping operations.

The United States has no military bases in Africa, but bases are not essential for military operations of the kind mentioned above. Such operations can be staged from offshore naval vessels, from facilities made available by friendly governments, and from bases within the United States. At the present time, efforts to establish permanent American bases in Africa would probably be counterproductive for American interests on the continent as a whole in light of the negative political reaction among African states such an action would likely evoke.

In Africa today, the United States is confronted with the opportunity to seek the fulfillment of its policy objectives with or without reliance on the classic "containment" strategy whereby it must involve itself directly in most internal disputes or conflicts. If the United States chooses to use "containment" as its policy guide, it would likely be required to use its resources and military forces to support a number of non-Communist governments against insurgent movements, or to support insurgent groups against Communist states.

However, if the United States chooses to stress the "regional partnership" strategy it could, for example, encourage its European allies which have had previous colonial ties with the African states to continue to lead and participate in peacekeeping operations after local conflicts in Africa have broken out—operations in which the United States would play, as it has in the recent past, a secondary, albeit, important role. Under this strategy, the United States could support the efforts of European allies to provide, as necessary, a stabilizing military presence on the African continent until such time as the African states themselves could develop viable institutions or arrangements for effectively resolving African regional disputes.

At the same time the United States would, under the "regional partnership" strategy pursue non-military means of promoting the economic and political well-being of Africa through selective and creative use of development capital, and American technical assistance and training. In the end, if African states can be made economically self-sustaining to a reasonable degree, political stability is more likely to follow, thereby undermining the prospects for internal discord which tends to create targets of opportunity for those powers which wish to foment instability and conflict in the region.

Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific

Among the major objectives of U.S. foreign policy in the Southeast Asian and Southwest Pacific region are the maintenance of a balance of power in the region, the enhancement of the political and economic stability of the non-Communist countries there, ensuring American access to the resources and markets in the area, and keeping open the

major sea passages between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean. The largest U.S. bases in the region are in the Philippines at Clark Air Force Base and at the Subic Bay Naval complex. Of the two, Subic Bay is the most important and vital support element for American military operations in the region. The Philippines bases, however, only serve United States political objectives in the area in an indirect manner.

In the wake of the Vietnam war, these Philippines bases have become politically symbolic to a degree that would have been unanticipated a decade ago. Today they stand as a tangible representation of continued American interest in the region to ASEAN countries, to Japan, and even to the People's Republic of China.

While the Philippines bases do not serve as a vehicle for deterring an immediate, identifiable military threat to United States interests and objectives in the Southeast Asian and Southwest Pacific region—inasmuch as no such threat currently exists—the bases do provide an important contingent capability for supporting U.S. policy ends in areas beyond this immediate region, such as protecting the sea lines of communication between Japan and the Persian Gulf—all goals that are consistent with the strategy of "containment". Although a strong rationale exists for retaining the Subic Bay complex, a strong rationale also exists for reducing the size and functions of Clark Air Base—to emphasize, at most, logistics support for Subic Bay and operations of the United States—Philippines air defense system.

If the United States chose to terminate its base rights in the Philippines it could support most of its military objectives in the region under the "containment" strategy through construction of military facilities in Japan and/or the U.S. Pacific Trust Territory, or through arrangements with Singapore or possibly Australia for access to their military facilities to support a continued, and substantial, U.S. naval presence in the area.

Should the United States choose to pursue the "regional partnership" strategy it would likely seek an enlarged military role for the allies in the region, increase United States—ASEAN diplomatic contacts and cooperation, and support trade policies designed to aid ASEAN states meet their development goals. This strategy implies placing greater emphasis in the future on encouraging and enhancing the capabilities of local institutions such as ASEAN to take the lead in developing intra-regional cooperation on a variety of fronts in an effort to advance the cause of region economic and political stability in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific. Establishing a long-range plan for transferring greater responsibility for the military security of at least portions of the sea lanes in the region to local states such as Australia and Japan might also be part of such a strategy in order to promote a greater sense of regional cohesion and help to reduce the current obligation (and expense) involved for the United States in attempting to maintain unilaterally the military stability of this vast expanse of ocean and land mass.

Northeast Asia

In the Northeast Asian region, United States foreign policy objectives are centered on preserving its close relationship with, and the independence of, Japan—given the fundamental importance of that country to American political and economic interests in the area. An

35-995 O - 79 - 2

overriding concern of the United States is maintaining the general balance of power in Northeast Asia, a region which has become a locus of direct Soviet-American military confrontation only exceeded in its scope by the NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe.

Soviet military power near Japan is presently challenging the military superiority of the United States has held in the area since World War II. Only the United States is currently capable of balancing Soviet military strength in the region.

At present the complex of American bases in the Northeast Asian region consists of major air and naval installations in the Japanese home islands, and major air and ground installations in South Korea. These bases currently support most U.S. policy objectives in the area, although some modifications could take place in the status quo without destroying the ability of the United States to carry out its policy ends under the "containment" strategy. However, if the United States withdraws its ground troops from South Korea, additional reductions from area bases, under the prevailing circumstances, would make it very difficult for the United States to support its objectives in the area as defined by the strategy of "containment."

Over time the United States will likely be faced with the fundamental issue of what the future role of Japan should be in maintaining the military balance of power in the region. In the past, the United States has assumed the role of guarantor of military stability in the region, with Japan spending no more than 1 percent of its GNP for defense purposes. Given the strength of the Japanese economy and its close ties with other regional states, it is possible to envision Japan, at some point, assuming a key role in maintaining the security of the vital sea lanes in the area, from the home islands to Indonesia. Such a development would be a major goal for the United States if it chose to pursue the "regional partnership" strategy.

It is also possible to envision a time when Japan and the People's Republic of China might come to a common understanding regarding the need to prevent conflict within the region and measures to ensure that outside powers do not threaten the peace and stability of the area. Greater emphasis on cooperation for the purpose of promoting the economic development of the region by Japan, the PRC and other area states also seems possible in the long term. These ends might also be pursued by the United States under the "regional partnership" strategy.

Fundamental changes in the American military role within Northeast Asia will likely be held in check until the Japanese willingness to assume a greater military burden is clarified, and the U.S. Korean troop withdrawal matter is settled. But the basis for a substantial evolution of U.S. strategy from "containment" to "regional partnership" in the northeast Asian region exists, and could be brought about if U.S. policymakers choose to promote this change in strategy.

Latin America

While Latin America has decided strategic significance to the United States, this significance is manifested much more in the potentiality of various worst-case scenarios which might transpire rather than the actuality of current trends or threats. The United States

has long regarded the principal threat to its security interests in Latin America as developing in the guise of internal subversion, most likely exacerbated by social or economic chaos, and not in the form of an overt threat by the Soviet Union or proxy forces to invade the region. As a result, the United States has in recent decades deemed economic development, political stability, and an orderly transition to more democratic rule as the best weapons for guaranteeing hemispheric security.

Given the absence of a significant outside threat or a substantial Soviet military presence in the region, the United States has not seen the need for countervailing military power. It has not dedicated specific U.S. forces of any magnitude for the defense of its southern flank and has not undertaken major forward defense deployments in the region. With the exception of the few military installations remaining in the Caribbean, the United States has judged military bases to be essentially irrelevant, and most likely inimical, to U.S. security interests in Latin America.

Summary

In summary, these regional chapters *collectively* demonstrate the difficulties involved in attempting to construct and co-ordinate a global foreign policy that is based on a rigidly formulated grand strategy design—whether it is "containment" or "regional partnership". Political and military circumstances vary from region to region and new factors may be introduced from time to time that can undermine the utility of any existing strategy. Consequently, in the real world of international politics, the politico-military strategy that can enable policymakers to take into account significant variances from one region to another may very well be one which carefully melds the key elements of the "containment" and "regional partnership" strategies into a logical whole—applying greater emphasis to one or the other from time to time as regional circumstances warrant.

A Significant Policy Choice

In reviewing the degree to which American overseas military installations serve U.S. foreign policy objectives in each of the regions under study, one is struck by the extent to which the "containment" strategy still appears to serve as the underlying rationale for the present base structure, even though there are identifiable regions in the world where "containment" has arguably lost its validity—or is in the process of doing so—as the most effective guide, in terms of costs and results, for American foreign policy. This circumstance confronts Congress with a significant policy choice. It can continue to aid in the implementation of various military programs and activities throughout the world that are based—at least to an important degree—on the "containment" strategy, or it can insist that the foreign policy strategy of the United States and the programs to implement it be modified, as events require, to more clearly reflect an awareness of current international realities.

12

CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESS

In view of the changes that have occurred in the politico-military environment in every area of the globe since the Second World War, Congress may find it advisable to closely monitor developments within the various regions of the world so as not to miss emerging opportunities to encourage and permit regional states and/or institutions to assume greater or even primary responsibility for resolving regional disputes and issues.

In view of the variations in the utility of American military installations as an instrument of United States foreign policy from one region of the world to another, Congress may find it advisable, when reviewing American overseas base requirements in any given region in the future, to rigorously evaluate how effectively the given installations support, *current and emerging*—as opposed to historic—U.S. foreign policy objectives in the particular region. In this manner Congress can ensure that funds are expended only for the maintenance of those military bases and facilities which continue to be essential for the successful achievement of contemporary American foreign policy ends.

EUROPE AND NATO*

The Centrality of Europe to U.S. Interests

The relationship between the United States and Western Europe, in all of its political, economic, and strategic aspects, is the most important relationship maintained by the United States with any region or group of countries in the world. In Europe, the United States finds the countries and societies with which it most closely shares cultural and political traditions, the rewards and problems of the international economy, and a perception of common security interests. It is in Europe that the East-West confrontation is most acutely expressed by counterposed Warsaw Pact and NATO forces.

Interdependence between the United States, Canada and the countries of Western Europe is so thoroughly developed that it is virtually impossible for one member of the Atlantic Alliance to act in the political, economic, or military sphere without affecting the interests of the other members of the alliance. The policies and actions of the United States—as the largest and most powerful member of the alliance—have a particularly forceful impact on the interests of the West European countries.

United States Foreign Policy Objectives in Western Europe

GENERAL OBJECTIVES

U.S. objectives in its relationship with Western Europe are quite clear, even though they are not always expressed in particularly clear or simple terms. For the purposes of this report, the general foreign policy objectives of the United States in Western Europe are

(1) To preserve and expand friendly and collaborative political economic, and military ties between the United States and West European countries, individually and collectively.

(2) To minimize opportunities for the Soviet Union to increase its political, economic, or military influence over or control of Western Europe or any single West European country.

These two objectives are equally important inasmuch as they are complementary. A statement of general objectives would not be complete, however, if it did not express the U.S. concern with lessening the tensions that currently are the potential source of instability and conflict in Europe. And so, it should be added that the United States also seeks

(3) To promote the amelioration of East-West tensions.

---

* Prepared by Robert G. Bell, Analyst in National Defense ; Richard F. Grimmett, Analyst in National Defense ; Stanley R. Sloan, Specialist in European Affairs.

These three objectives then, express what is accepted by most observers as the key general objectives of U.S. foreign policy in Europe. They provide the general criteria by which specific policies relating to Western Europe are evaluated.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

At a less general level, there is a wide range of objectives that fall within the framework outlined above, but express much more specifically the rationale for U.S. policies and actions. It is not the intent here to catalogue all of those more specific objectives, but to suggest a number of them in abbreviated form. Even though, for clarity's sake, they are herein termed "political," "economic," and "military" objectives, it must be recognized that there is virtually no political objective without economic and military ramifications, no economic objective without political and military ramifications, and no military objective without political and economic ramifications.

Political Objectives

1. To protect and enhance Western democratic principles and practices.

The expansion of democratic government in general, and particularly in Europe—as has occurred in recent years in Greece, Portugal, and Spain—tends to create a more favorable international environment for the survival of American democracy. If democracy in Europe were to be undermined by either left or right wing dictatorial regimes, the resultant narrower area of democratic states would be a less hospitable environment for American democracy.

2. To encourage and facilitate the process of West European cooperation and integration.

It has been a fundamental principle of U.S. policy for nearly 30 years that a more politically cohesive Western Europe would be a more stable foundation for peace and security in Europe, constraining hostile nationalism within Western Europe and providing a stronger bastion against Soviet power. Although many hopes and expectations about the depth and timing of progress in this area have been dashed by events, the progress that has been recorded is a definite plus for U.S. interests.

3. To expand in general the sense of shared interests between the United States, Canada, and the countries of Western Europe; and to promote the development of parallel policies with West European countries on questions which relate to the Atlantic Community and, to the extent possible, to other areas of the world.

U.S. support for West European integration has always been couched in the anticipation that the process would proceed within an Atlantic framework. No matter what formulas for the U.S.-European relationship have been in vogue (Atlantic Community, partnership, etc.), a basic premise of U.S. policy has been that Europe would essentially develop in a framework of friendly and close cooperation with the United States and Canada. Close consultations between the United

States and Western Europe—bilaterally and multilaterally in NATO, the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], etc.—tend to promote the development of a sense of shared interests.

Economic Objectives

1. To support European economic stability and well being.

Europe's political strength and stability are highly dependent on the individual and collective economic health of the European nations. The United States has a strong interest in cooperating with Western Europe to promote economic conditions in the Atlantic area that will provide a firm underpinning for the West's political and military strength.

2. To maintain and improve the international trading system and to encourage a propitious environment in Europe for American trade and investment.

The trading system of the free world has been developed and maintained by the combined efforts of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan for most of the last 30 years. The United States and Western Europe have a common interest in expanding the mutual benefits of that system which involves extensive trade and investment interdependencies.

3. To maintain international monetary stability.

Economic interdependence between the United States and Western Europe also translates into a shared interest in minimizing disruptions to the international monetary system. The functioning of the world economic system is dependent on the effective management of the international monetary system, and the United States shares that management responsibility with the West European countries and Japan.

4. To reduce American and European vulnerability to price and supply conditions in critical raw materials, particularly oil.

The United States and Western Europe are the world's foremost consumers of raw materials. In spite of the logical common interest of the United States and Western Europe in assured supplies at affordable prices, fundamental anomalies in resource roles and dependencies pose obstacles to cooperation. Failure of the United States and Europe to minimize differences and to collaborate in the natural resource area strengthens the position of those suppliers who choose to take economic or political advantage of the situation and weakens the Western position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

5. To expand cooperation in science and technology, including environmental protection.

Increasingly, the modern industrial world faces problems which go well beyond national boundaries. Insofar as science and new technologies can ameliorate these problems, it is in the interest of the United States to cooperate closely with its West European allies in seeking solutions to the problems of modern society.

Military Objectives

1. To support a Western defense effort that will be sufficient to deter a Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe and to deny the Soviet Union the ability to translate excessive military power into increased influence over European affairs.

The most important U.S. military objective in Europe is to prevent war from breaking out and at the same time not to yield political or economic leverage to the Soviet Union. Over the years, deterrence has depended heavily on the U.S. nuclear forces, and the belief that the Soviet Union would not risk a strategic nuclear war by initiating conventional hostilities in Europe. As the Soviet Union has achieved nuclear parity with the United States, however, the credibility of the West's will to initiate nuclear war in response to a conventional attack has diminished, increasing the importance of a credible NATO conventional defense capability.

2. Should deterrence fail, to be prepared to mount a Western defense effort sufficient to deny victory to the Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces.

The United States continues to base its policy on flexible response and forward defense. In effect, this implies maintaining capabilities to respond to potential Warsaw Pact aggression at the conventional, tactical nuclear, and strategic nuclear levels, with the objective of stopping any Pact attack as far forward in the NATO areas as possible.

3. To decrease tensions that could lead to the outbreak of war by seeking the elimination of specific points of East-West conflict and achieving a more stable East-West military balance at lower levels of armaments.

The pursuit of this objective to date has resulted particularly in a four-power agreement on Berlin, the convening of a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and pursuing negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions. These undertakings have tended in some ways to diminish East-West tensions, for example over Berlin, but have also had some tension-creating effects as well, for example over the human rights provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. They have had little impact on the military confrontation in Europe.

It is against this complex of U.S. objectives/interests that the military presence of the United States in Northern and Central Europe must be evaluated. The following sections will describe the U.S. military presence in this region and assess its effectiveness in serving these objectives.

U.S. Military Installations in Canada

MAJOR DEFENSE AGREEMENTS

As neighbors and allies, the United States and Canada have conducted their postwar defense relationship within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty. Article 6 of the Treaty designates North America part of the NATO defense area, and NATO tasks the Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group (CUSRPG) with responsibility

for developing and recommending plans to the Military Committee for the defense of this region. In organizational terms, the CUSRPG occupies a position within the NATO military structure equivalent to that of the three military commands (European, Atlantic, and Channel).

Pursuant to their NATO regional defense responsibilities, the two countries have entered into a number of bilateral agreements. Among these, the most significant has been the arrangements for the integrated air defense embodied in the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). The formal establishment of NORAD in 1958 reflected the two countries determination that:

> It was essential . . . to have in existence in peacetime an organization, including the weapons, facilities, and command structure, which could operate at the outset of hostilities in accordance with a single air defense plan approved in advance by national authorities.[1]

In 1958, manned bombers were the only long-range, nuclear-capable delivery systems in the Soviet inventory.

Following renewals in 1968 and 1973, a new NORAD agreement between Canada and the United States entered into force in 1975. While this five-year agreement retained the concept of an integrated command structure, it reordered NORAD's defense objectives to take into account the "significant changes in the character of strategic weapons and the threat they pose to North America" that had occurred since 1958.[2] Specifically, the new agreement recognized that the threat posed by bombers had been eclipsed by that of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).

In explaining the U.S. Defense Department's decision to downgrade the strategic aid defense mission significantly, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger in 1974 declared:

> Without an effective anti-missile defense, precluded to both the U.S. and USSR by the ABM treaty of 1972, a defense against Soviet bombers is of little practical value.[3]

Accepting this rationale, the 1975 NORAD agreement established the following defense objectives:

—peacetime surveillance and control of airspace (protection of sovereignty);
—warning of bomber or missile attack;
—limited bomber defense (denial of a "free-ride)."

INSTALLATIONS, UNITS, AND MISSIONS

The 1975 agreement provides that NORAD "will include such combat units and individuals as are specifically allocated to it by the two governments." U.S. forces currently dedicated to NORAD include 314 interceptors, 10 airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, and numerous radar installations and command centers.[4] Among

---

[1] TIAS 4031; 9 UST 538.
[2] TIAS 8085; 26 UST 973.
[3] U.S. Congress. Senate: Committee on Armed Services. DOD Authorization for Fiscal Year 1975, Hearings on S. 3000. Part 1; 93d Cong., 2d sess., Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974, p. 26.
[4] U.S. Congress. Senate: Committee on Armed Services. DOD Authorization for Fiscal Year 1978 Hearings on S. 1210, Part 6; 95th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, p. 4396.

these forces, however the only U.S. military facilities under the aegis of NORAD located on Canadian soil are 21 radar stations in the Distant Early Warning (DEW) system. (See table 1.)

TABLE 1.—*U.S. DEW Line Stations in Canada*

Code Name:	*Location*
BAR 1	Komakuk, Yukon Territory
BAR 2	Shingle Point, Yukon Territory
BAR 3	Tukoyaktuk, NW Territories (NWT)
BAR 4	Nicholson Peninsula, NWT
PIN Main	Cape Parry, NWT
PIN 1	Clinton Point, NWT
PIN 2	Cape Young, NWT
PIN 3	Lady Franklin Point, NWT
PIN 4	Byron Bay, NWT
CAM Main	Cambridge Bay, NWT
CAM 1	Jenny Lind Island, NWT
CAM 2	Gladman Point, NWT
CAM 3	Shepherd Bay, NWT
CAM 4	Pelly Bay, NWT
CAM 5	Mackar Inlet, NWT
FOX Main	Hall Beach, NWT
FOX 2	Longstaff Bluff, NWT
FOX 3	Dewar Lakes, NWT
FOX 4	Cape Hooper, NWT
FOX 5	Broughton Island, NWT
DYE Main	Cape Dyer, NWT

The DEW line stretches 4,000 miles roughly along the 70 N parallel from Alaska to the east coast of Greenland. Operational since 1957, it is tasked with providing NORAD 40,000-foot high-altitude and 500-foot low-altitude radar surveillance throughout the assigned area.[5] A total of 31 DEW line radars in Alaska, Canada, and Greenland are operated by 654 U.S. and 393 Canadian civilians, under a contract monitored and supported by 20 U.S. and 20 Canadian military personnel. Under the terms of the original 1955 agreement establishing the DEW line, the United States has assumed the full costs of the construction and operation of the radars.[6]

The other U.S. military facilities in Canada are much more limited in scale. The U.S. military presence at Goose Bay Air Base, Labrador has been greatly reduced in recent years, and there are no longer any U.S. Strategic Air Command [SAC] aircraft operationally deployed at that location. Under the terms of a 1976 agreement, the United States is permitted to maintain approximately ten military personnel at the base to service "peacetime rotation of military aircraft to Europe and to support NATO/NORAD activities in time of emergency."[7] The latter activity could include dispersal of American aircraft to Goose Bay in wartime or during a crisis. The 1975 NORAD agreement authorizes "[t]emporary reinforcement from one area to another, including the crossing of the international boundary, to meet operational requirements."

The United States also owns and operates various navigational and communications facilities in Canada, including tactical air navigation (TACAN) aide near Sept Isles and a ground-to-air-radio facility at

---

[5] Ibid. p. 4399.
[6] TIAF 3218; 6 UST 3217.
[7] International Canada, vol. 7, No. 11, November 1976, p. 276.

Melville Air Station, Labrador. The Melville facility is part of SAC's GREENPINE communications network and is operated under contract by civilians. Lastly, the U.S. Navy operates an oceanographic research facility at Argentia, Newfoundland. The Argentia Naval Facility operates acoustic hydrophones planted off-shore in the Atlantic as part of a continuing Navy program designed to provide more detailed information on the factors which comprise the ocean environment and affect the transmission of sound in sea water.[8]

TABLE 2.—*U.S. Military Personnel in Canada*[1]

Army	7
Air Force	255
Navy	386
Marine Corps	8
Total	656

[1] All personnel strength figures current as of Dec. 31, 1978. Provided by Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Mar. 6, 1979.

ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS

The Defense Department concedes that NORAD is currently ill-equipped to perform its bomber warning and air defense missions. In testimony before Congress in 1977, a senior Air Force official stated:

> It is important to note that current U.S. defenses have a very limited capability to detect and engage a bomber attack against any part of the United States or Canada. Our surveillance system has serious deficiencies, especially radar detection at low altitude, and our interceptor force is limited in size and performance to counter the increasing threat.[9]

Air Force officials testified that because of gaps in low altitude radar coverage and improvements in Soviet bomber performance at low altitudes, "The possibility exists that they could penetrate the DEW line gaps at low levels, cruise through central Canada at high altitude, and make the target penetration at low level or launch a cruise missile."[10] It was also revealed that Soviet bombers "have the capability . . . to end run the DEW line as it currently exists without a great penalty in flight time."[11] The state of the Air Force's 20-year-old interceptor fleet was termed "block obsolescence."[12]

Because of these and other deficiencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff determined that, "Modernization of our strategic air defense force in the light of the resurging Soviet bomber threat is an increasingly urgent requirement."[13] To remedy current NORAD shortcomings, the Defense Department has proposed a comprehensive air defense modernization program, including:

—a new joint civil/military radar network, called the Joint Surveillance System (JSS);

---

[8] Information on Argentina provided by Office of the Oceanographer of the Navy.
[9] FY 1978 DOD Authorization Hearings, op cit, pp. 4433–4434.
[10] Ibid., p. 4400.
[11] Ibid., p. 4399.
[12] Ibid., 4407.
[13] United States Military Posture for FY 1978. Statement by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. to the Congress on the Defense Posture of the United States for FY 1978, January 20, 1977, p. 26.

—modification of an existing advanced fighter aircraft to perform as a Follow-on Interceptor (FOI);
—assignment of E3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft to NORAD;
—deployment of an over-the-horizon, backscatter radar (OTH–B) to provide air defense surveillance of the east and west coasts of North America and protect against end runs of the DEW line;
—enhancement of the DEW line to overcome current deficiencies and reduce operating costs.

Within this package, only the DEW line enhancement program affects the U.S. military presence in Canada. The Canadian JSS radars will be Canadian owned and operated. There are no plans to deploy FOI units to Canada on a permanent basis; in fact, Canada will soon select its own advanced interceptor aircraft, called the New Fighter Aircraft (NFA). Candidates for the NFA procurement program are the U.S. F–16 and F–18A aircraft. Both proposed OTH–B sites are in the United States. Lastly, while it has been decided that one AWACS will be stationed at each of the five NORAD Regional Operations Control Centers (RACCs) in the United States, it is not currently anticipated that any AWACS will be permanently stationed at the two NORAD ROCCs in Canada.[14]

It is expected, however, that Canada will contribute personnel and funding to the NORAD AWACS program.[15]

Alternatives being studied for the DEW line enhancement program include proposals for minimally attended or unattended radars. Although a final decision has not yet been reached, it is possible that the winning proposal will reduce the number of DEW line radar sites in Canada, and certain that it will result in some reductions of personnel on the line. Canada has agreed to participate in this research and development program. Whether ownership of the new DEW line radars in Canada might at some future date be assumed by Canada would be more an economic than a political or military issue.

The objective of the NORAD modernization program is not to create a force capable of turning back a determined bomber attack on North America. Rather, it is to restore the command's ability to deny enemy bombers a "free ride," i.e., an uncontested attack on the continent. While this limited military objective is consistent with the low priority assigned by the two countries to the strategic air defense mission, it has provoked questions from some quarters as to whether NORAD may have outlived its usefulness. During the 1975 debate in Canada on the question of renewing the NORAD agreement, it was suggested that Canadian interests might be better served were the integrated command to be dissolved and such U.S. military facilities in Canada as the DEW line closed or transferred to Canadian ownership. In short, the argument was made that while Canadian forces could continue to cooperate with U.S. forces, they should not be subordinated to a joint command.

In rejecting this point of view, the Canadian government stressed that the significance of NORAD transcended a narrow calculation of its military value. Instead, the government maintained that NORAD

---

[14] FY 1978 DOD Authorization Hearings, op. cit. p. 4435.
[15] Ibid., p. 4436.

served as an unmistakable symbol of shared national security interests and underscored the two countries' commitment to the fundamental NATO principle of collective security. In this regard, the observations of a key committee of the Canadian House of Commons are of particular interest. In its 1975 report on this question, the committee argued:

> A Canadian decision against renewing the Agreement with the United States could create doubt as to Canada's reliability and even its friendliness, with long-term effects that are difficult to gauge but impossible to ignore.[16]

Thus regardless of the military significance of NORAD, the committee concluded that the current integrated command structure should be maintained because, "The United States does value the co-operation and solidarity which NORAD signifies.[17]

The significance of the political dimension of NORAD was also stressed by Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs. In an appearance before the defense committee, the Secretary argued not only that NORAD was an appropriate military solution to the requirement to defend North America from air attack, but also that NORAD engendered a climate of co-operation and harmony that could serve to limit conflict between the states over political or economic issues.[18]

In summary, despite acknowledged deficiencies in its military capabilities, NORAD continues to serve U.S. and Canadian national security interests. In this regard, the fact that there are a limited number of U.S. military facilities on Canadian soil is incidental compared to the larger importance of the joint defense structure within which the U.S. and Canadian components of NORAD are virtually interchangeable.


---

[16] Report by the Board of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defense on Canadian policy with respect to the future of the NORAD agreement, summarized and excerpted in International Canada, Vol. 6, No. 4, April 1975, p. 92.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Ibid., p. 89.

U.S. MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN CANADA, GREENLAND AND ICELAND



U.S. Military Installations in Greenland

MAJOR DEFENSE AGREEMENTS

The basic documents governing the U.S./Danish defense relationship are the North Atlantic Treaty and the 1951 bilateral agreement on the defense of Greenland (an island district of Denmark). Under the terms of the latter, the United States and Denmark agreed to establish and operate jointly "such defense areas" deemed necessary to "the defense of Greenland and the North Atlantic Treaty area." [19] Although Denmark prohibits the stationing of foreign troops on the soil of Denmark proper, this injunction has not been applied in the case of Greenland.

INSTALLATIONS, UNITS, AND MISSIONS

The U.S. military presence in Greenland is comprised of the air bases at Sondrestrom and Thule and the four easternmost radars of the DEW line. Sondrestrom serves principally as a logistics staging point in support of the DEW radars in Greenland. Ski-equipped C–130 transports deployed at Sondrestrom from Alaska in summer months are the only fixed-wing aircraft in the U.S. inventory capable of landing on the packed-ice fields adjacent to the two DEW radars built on the Greenlandic icecap. Sondrestrom is also an important link in the chain of air bases used to ferry short-range military aircraft across the North Atlantic. Lastly, an air force communications squadron at Sondrestrom provides enroute, non-radar air traffic control services to civil and military air traffic transiting the upper North Atlantic and polar air routes, as well as approach control services to civil and military aircraft landing at Sondrestrom.

At Thule Air Base, the U.S. Air Force's 12th Missile Warning Group operates one of three long-range radars in the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS). In tandem with the BMEWS radars in Alaska and Great Britain, the Thule facility is tasked with providing NORAD with an accurate characterization of an enemy ICBM attack, including the trajectory of in-coming missiles and their predicted impact area. There are no combat units stationed at either Sondrestrom or Thule for the defense of the island itself.

TABLE 3.—*U.S. Military Personnel in Greenland*

Army	0
Air Force	277
Navy	0
Marine Corps	0
Total	277

ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS

When the BMEWS radar at Thule became operational in 1961, NORAD for the first time acquired the capability to detect a Soviet ICBM attack against North America. Throughout the 1960's, NORAD depended on BMEWS to flash the alert that a missile attack

[19] TIAS 2292, 2 UST 1485.

was in progress. In 1971, however, the United States orbited its first early warning satellite, providing NORAD with the capability to detect missile launches much sooner than possible with BMEWS. Current early warning satellites can employ their infrared sensors to detect the energy emitted by the missile's booster stage, thus enabling confirmation of launch within 90 seconds of lift-off.[20]

Although BMEWS is no longer responsible for the initial missile attack alert, its mission is still indispensable. Because the surveillance satellites lose track of the missile after burnout, but before its warhead separates, NORAD must rely on BMEWS for midcourse tracking and accurate computation of impact areas. The Air Force has recently undertaken a BMEWS enhancement program. New computers and improvements in radar resolution will permit a more timely identification of the threat vehicle and a more accurate determination of its target.

Research has been conducted for a number of years on sensors that might lead to new methods of providing midcourse surveillance of ICBM trajectories. A satellite system employing sensors would not, however, be cost effective compared with BMEWS. Current sensors capable of tracking the ICBM after burnout would have to be aimed away from the earth, thus necessitating a space-based system of numerous satellites orbiting at low altitudes. Since low-altitude orbits cannot be maintained for lengthy periods, replacement satellites must be launched regularly—greatly increasing costs.

In short, barring a technological breakthrough that would permit the midcourse surveillance and attack characterization functions to be performed by high-altitude, geostationary satellite, BMEWS is likely to remain an essential element of NORAD's missile warning system. Even if a space-based substitute for BMEWS were to be perfected, emerging Soviet anti-satellite capabilities could justify the retention of BMEWS as a back-up. Moreover, an operational space-based midcourse surveillance system would have to be reconciled with the SALT I ABM provision prohibiting the deployment of ABM systems or their components other than those permitted by the treaty.

As is the case with BMEWS, the Greenland DEW line radars and their support base at Sondrestrom are likely to remain vital to the accomplishment of NORAD's warning mission. The DEW line enhancement program may reduce the number of personnel or radars associated with the Greenland portion of the network, but some logistics capability at Sondrestrom would still be needed. In short, the strategic geography of Greenland continues to dictate a requirement for basing elements of NORAD's warning system on the island. While satellites have in some cases assumed warning roles, they have not eliminated the need for the ground-based systems.

The U.S./Danish military partnership in Greenland has also effectively served Denmark's political and economic interests. Many of the functions provided by U.S. personnel at Sondrestrom and Thule (e.g., air traffic control, airport operations, and helicopter medical evacuation

---

[20] Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 2, 1974, p. 18.

services) have civil applications useful to Denmark's efforts to develop the island. More importantly, by granting the United States base rights on the island, Denmark has been able to make a substantial contribution to NATO's nuclear shield without violating its own injunction against the stationing of foreign troops on the soil of Denmark proper. In this regard, Greenland's remoteness has permitted a U.S. military presence that otherwise might conflict with Danish perceptions of national sovereignty. Whether this harmonious relationship will in the future be strained by the emergence of an increasingly developed and autonomous native Greenlandic population remains to be seen.

U.S. Military Installations in Iceland

MAJOR DEFENSE AGREEMENTS

Although Iceland is a member of NATO, it maintains no armed forces. In order to provide for the defense of the island, Iceland in 1951 granted the United States responsibility for Iceland's defense on behalf of NATO, including the use of such facilities in Iceland as were mutually agreed to be necessary.[21] The 1951 bilateral agreement was most recently extended in 1974. Under the terms of this renewal, the United States retained the responsibility for Iceland's defense and use of existing military facilities; however, it promised to seek to reduce the number of U.S. military personnel assigned to the Iceland Defense Force.[22]

INSTALLATIONS, UNITS, AND MISSIONS

Except for one tactical air defense radar site at Hofn, on the east coast of the island, the U.S. military presence in Iceland is concentrated at the Keflavik naval base. While Keflavik provides limited port facilities, its principal asset is its runway. A squadron of 12 F–4C fighters under command of the U.S. Aerospace Defense Command is stationed at the field, providing an air intercept capability either in defense of the island or in support of allied naval operations in North Atlantic. The interceptors are directed by ground-based radars at Keflavik and Hofn and by airborne radar patrols flown by a detachment of three EC–121 AEW aircraft. The AEW detachment is maintained at Keflavik on rotation from its home base at Homestead, Florida.

The Navy operates a squadron of nine P–3 patrol aircraft from Keflavik. The squadron is maintained at Keflavik on rotation from its home field at Brunswick, Maine. The P–3's provide long-range surface surveillance and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities throughout the strategic sea approaches to the North Atlantic located between Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom (the GIUK gap). The aircrafts' ability to pinpoint the location of submerged enemy submarines is aided by localization data provided by the Navy's underwater acoustic detection systems (called SOSUS, for Sonar Surveillance System) located in the region. Keflavik is also another vital link in the chain of airfields used to ferry short-range aircraft across the North Atlantic.

---

[21] TIAS 2266; 2 UST 1198.
[22] TIAS 7969; 25 UST 3079.

35-995 O - 79 - 3

TABLE 4.—*U.S. Military Personnel in Iceland*

Army	2
Air Force	1,127
Navy	1,273
Marine Corps	130
Total	2,532

ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS

Any assessment of the adequacy of U.S. military facilities in Iceland must be pursued within the larger context of NATO's ability to control the Atlantic during wartime. In his most recent report to the control the Atlantic during wartime. In a report to the Congress on U.S. military posture, General George S. Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commented on the sea control mission:

> Since the founding of NATO, we have proceeded on the assumption that the NATO Alliance would be able to control and use the high seas. Up to the present, we have planned on the ability to carry out the full range of assigned tasks. These tasks include conducting sea control operations, containment of Soviet ballistic missile and attack submarines, countering Soviet surface/air forces, protecting the transit of high value task groups, including amphibious forces and strategic reserves, defending the strategic island bases, and finally, protecting transit lines so that merchant shipping can deliver military and economic cargo.[23]

In General Brown's estimation, however, "Current U.S. and Allied commitments to the maritime defense effort in the Atlantic total about 50 percent of the forces required for a sustained conventional war at sea." [24] Because of this deficiency, General Brown concluded:

> It is clear that if the Soviet Union makes a maximum effort to interdict the Atlantic sea lines of communication and is able to predeploy a large portion of its submarines, there will be heavy attrition to early reinforcement and supply elements.[25]

Although Iceland's geographic position makes it extremely important to NATO's accomplishment of the sea control mission, the ceiling on U.S. troop strength imposed by the 1974 U.S./Icelandic bilateral agreement limits significantly the degree to which improvements in the U.S.-manned Iceland Defense Force could contribute to correcting the larger deficiencies in NATO's North Atlantic sea control capabilities. Since the agreement effectively precludes bolstering the number of troops permanently stationed in Iceland, improved capabilities must be sought by upgrading the types of equipment deployed on the island and the effectiveness of their supporting systems. In this regard, the principal candidates for replacement are the F–4C fighters and the EC–121 AEW aircraft. In General Brown's words, "[T]here is a need for improved early warning and defense capability against the increased Soviet air threat." [26]

---

[23] U.S. Military Posture for FY 1978, op. cit., pp. 53–54.
[24] Ibid., p. 52.
[25] Ibid., p. 54.
[26] Ibid., p. 53.

A study by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) focused on both of these replacement requirements.[27] With respect to the choice of an interceptor, the CBO study concluded that replacing the current F–4C's with modern fighters, such as the F–14, F–15, F–16 or even the F–4E, could significantly increase the air defense squadron's capabilities. Of these options, the F–4E was termed a stopgap measure, while the F–16 was ruled least attractive due to inadequate air-to-air weaponry. The F–15 was considered both less capable and expensive than the F–14. The study concluded:

> Since the requirement for improving the interceptor force is clearly a pressing one, choices of an interceptor will depend as much upon immediate availability as upon cost and effectiveness.[28]

The study also examined the alternative of replacing the land-based air defense squadron with an aircraft carrier deployed permanently in the GIUK region; however, the costs associated with the procurement of a carrier, its air wing, and associated escorts were deemed to be far in excess of the land-based improvement options.

The CBO report found that the EC–121 AEW aircraft operated out of Keflavik were equally in need of replacement as the F–4C fighters. The study noted that these aircraft had seen, on the average, over 21 years of service life and were thus "hardly equal to the variety of airborne threats embodied in the Soviet Naval Air Force . . ." [29] Of the two possible AEW replacement options, the E–3A Airborne Warning and Control System [AWACS] and the U.S. Navy's E–2C, the study concluded that the AWACS was the more cost effective alternative. In testimony before the Congress in March 1977, Air Force officials indicated that they intend to replace the EC–121s at Keflavik with AWACS aircraft. In describing an "illustrative deployment" of the currently planned AWACS force, Brig. Gen. Mele Vojvodich stated, "[This deployment] would give us [deleted] in Iceland to cover the maritime gap and also the bomber routes coming into North America." [30]

In summary, Iceland remains of vital strategic importance to the NATO Alliance. While U.S. force improvement programs possible within the constraints of the 1974 agreement cannot solve NATO's sea control shortcomings in the North Atlantic, they would be an essential element of a broader Alliance-wide naval enhancement effort. Perhaps more importantly, Iceland's military partnership with NATO denies the Soviet Union use of the island as a base of operations. For these reasons, the United States and NATO have maintained a special interest in responding as fully as possible to conditions established by the Icelandic Government prescribing and controlling the NATO presence at Keflavik. By this policy of cooperation and accommodation, NATO has hoped to forestall the emergence of a political concensus in Iceland that would lead it to carry through on previous threats to order the closing of this facility.

---

[27] The U.S. Sea Control Mission: Forces, Capabilities, and Requirements. Congressional Budget Office, Washington, D.C.; June 1977, pp. 21–34.
[28] Ibid., p. xi.
[29] Ibid., 13.
[30] FY 1978 DOD Authorization Hearings, op. cit., p. 4206.

Major U.S. Military Installations in Western Europe

MAJOR DEFENSE AGREEMENTS

Because of the scale of the U.S. military presence in Western Europe, it is not practical to detail all defense agreements related to this region to which the United States is a party. In addition to basic bilateral agreements pertaining to joint defense, a large number and variety of executive agreements and arrangements exist, concerning such specific matters as:

—U.S. force deployments, including communications, logistics, and housing facilities;
—U.S. military exercises;
—the legal and administrative status of U.S. forces;
—intelligence activities;
—operations plans for U.S. forces; and
—operations plans for joint force commands.[31]

The cornerstone of all such agreements is the North Atlantic Treaty. Article VI of the Treaty designates Europe as part of the NATO defense area, and Article III provides the basic authority for U.S. military facilities in this region:

> In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Under Article V, the NATO allies agreed that "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all . . ."

United Kingdom: U.S. Installations, Units, and Missions

The preponderance of U.S. forces in the United Kingdom belong to the U.S. Air Force. The 3rd Air Force, a subordinate command of the United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), is headquartered at RAF Mildenhall. In peacetime or during a non-NATO contingency, USAFE is subordinate to the U.S. European Command. Should a war or crisis involving NATO occur, however, command of USAFE units would pass to the Commander, Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE) if the United States so decided. Currently, the same individual, a U.S. Air Force General, commands both USAFE and AAFCE.

---

[31] For a comprehensive description of the nature of these agreements see the testimony the Hon. Robert Ellsworth, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Printed in: U.S. Congress. Senate: Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Separation of Powers. Congressional Oversight of Executive Agreements—1975; Hearings, 94th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975, pp. 81–114.

MAJOR U.S. MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM



The following chart lists units and facilities of 3rd AF:

Unit	Base	Aircraft type	Mission
10th TRW	RAF Alconbury	RF–4C	Tactical reconnaissance.
		F–5E	Air combat training.
48th TFW	RAF Lakenheath	F–111F	Strike/interdiction.
20th TFW	RAF Upper Heyford	F–111E	Do.
81st TFW	RAF Bentwaters	F–4D	Close air support/intercept.
	RAF Woodbridge	F–4D	Do.
513th TAW	RAF Mildenhall	C–130	Tactical airlift.
		KC–135	Tactical air refueling.

The Air Force also operates a number of major communication facilities in the United Kingdom, including the following sites: RAF Barford St. John; RAF Barkway; Botley Hill Radio Relay; Bovington Radio Relay; RAF Chicksands; RAF Christmas Common Radio Relay; Cold Blow Radio Relay; RAF Croughton; Daventry Radio Relay; RAF Dunkirk Communications Station; Great Bromley Radio Relay; High Wycombe Air Station; Hillingdon; RAF Martlesham Heath Radio Relay; Mormond Hill Communications Station (Scotland); RAF St. Mawgan Communications Station; RAF Swingate Communications Station; RAF Wethersfield.

These sites are in addition to other U.S. communications facilities located on USAFE airfields in the United Kingdom. Lastly, the Air Force also operates a major communications facility at Flyingdales Moor, Great Britain. This complex includes one of the three radars in the BMEWS network, providing NORAD with ICBM attack warning and assessment.

The only U.S. Navy combatant ships homeported in the United Kingdom are the ten nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN's) assigned to Squadron 14 at Holy Loch, Scotland. The SSBN's are serviced by one submarine tender, the USS Holland. Although the submarines are permanently deployed to Holy Loch, their crews are not. Each SSBN has two crews of 12 officers and 125 enlisted personnel, one onboard the SSBN and the other on leave or undergoing training in the United States. Only about three SSBN's are actually at the Holy Loch facility at any one time.[32] Other U.S. Navy facilities in the United Kingdom include communications sites at Edzell, Scotland, and Thurso, Great Britain, an oceanographic observation facility at Brawdy Wales, and logistics centers at RAF Mildenhall and in London. U.S. Army facilities in the United Kingdom are very limited, the principal site being the Burtonwood Army Depot in Great Britain.

TABLE 5.—*U.S. Military Personnel in the United Kingdom*

Army	141
Air Force	19,617
Navy	2,133
Marine Corps	310
Total	22,201

[32] Information regarding Holy Loch provided by Department of Navy, Office of Legislative Affairs, September 20, 1977.

Netherlands: U.S. Installations, Units, and Missions

As is the case with the United Kingdom, most U.S. military personnel in the Netherlands belong to the U.S. Air Force. The principal U.S. military facility in Holland is the air base at Soesterberg, home of the 32nd TFS. This unit is equipped with F–4E's, an air combat and ground support aircraft, and is scheduled to be joined in 1978 by a wing of F–15 air superiority fighters.[33] The 32nd TFS is under the command of 17th Air Force, which, like the 3rd Air Force, would come under the command of AAFCE during a NATO war or crisis, if the United States decided to transfer its European forces to NATO command.

[33] Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 1, 1977, p. 38.

U.S. MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS



U.S. Army facilities in Holland include communications sites at Hoek Van Holland, Steenwijkerwold, and Tharde and a logistics center at Schinnen Emmar Mine, near Brussun. The latter facility supports Headquarters, Allied Forces Central Europe (NATO), located at Brussun. There are no U.S. Navy facilities in the Netherlands.

TABLE 6.—*U.S. Military Personnel in the Netherlands*

Army	599
Air Force	1,539
Navy	21
Marine Corps	9
Total	2,168

BELGIUM: U.S. INSTALLATIONS, UNITS, AND MISSIONS

Although over 2,000 U.S. military personnel are stationed in Belgium, there are very few U.S. military facilities in that country. Most American servicemen in Belgium are assigned to various NATO headquarters. Army facilities at Daumerie Caserne and Chievres Air Base provide logistics and air transportation support for the headquarters of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), known as the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), near Brussels. In addition, the Air Force operates a major communications terminal at Flobecq.

U.S. MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN BELGIUM




TABLE 7.—*U.S. Military Personnel in Belgium*

Army	1,295
Air Force	616
Navy	107
Marine Corps	30
Total	2,048

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: U.S. INSTALLATIONS, UNITS, AND MISSIONS

Of the approximately 273,000 U.S. troops stationed in European NATO countries, over 239,000 are located in the Federal Republic of Germany. Of these, over 85 percent belong to the U.S. Army, under the command of Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR). In the event of a war or crisis involving NATO, most elements of USAREUR would come under the command of the Central Army Group, a NATO subordinate command of Allied Forces Central Europe, if the United States so elected. Army air defense elements in Germany would in this case be directed by the Commander, 4th Allied Tactical Air Force, a NATO subordinate command of AFFCE. In addition, the Army armored brigade at a station near Bremerhaven would fall under NATO's Northern Army Group.

MAJOR U.S. MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN WEST GERMANY



Because of the number and variety of U.S. Army units and facilities located in West Germany, this report will detail only the major commands:

TABLE 8.—PRINCIPAL USAREUR COMMANDS IN WEST GERMANY[1]

Type of unit	Unit	Location
1. Headquarters (approximately 650 personnel each).	HQ, USAREUR	Heidelberg.
	HQ, V Corps	Frankfurt.
	HQ, VII Corps	Moehringen.
	7th Army Training Command	Grafenwoehr.
2. Armored Division (approximately 16,000 personnel each).	1st Armored Division	Ansbach.
	3d Armored Division	Frankfurt.
3. Infantry Division (approximately 15,000 personnel each).	3d Infantry Division	Wurzburg.
	8th Infantry Division	Bad Kreuznach.
4. Armored Cavalry Regiment (approximately 3,600 personnel each).	2d Armored Cavalry Regiment	Nuernberg.
	11th Armored Cavalry Regiment	Fulda.
5. Artillery (approximately 5,000 personnel each).	V Corps Artillery	Frankfurt.
	VII Corps Artillery	Moehringen.
	56th Artillery Brigade	Schwaebisch-Gmuend.
6. Commands (approximately 5,000 personnel each).	2d Support Command	Nellingen.
	3d Support Command	Frankfurt.
	21st Support Command	Kaiserslautern.
	Medical Command Europe	Heidelberg.
	U.S. Command Berlin (includes Berlin Brigade).	Berlin.
7. Brigades (approximately 4,000 personnel each).	3d Brigade, 2d Armored Division	Garlstedt.[2]
	4th Brigade, 4th Infantry Division	Wiesbaden.
	3d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division	Goeppingen.
8. Air Defense (approximately 12,000 personnel).	32d Air Defense Command	Darmstadt.

[1] Information provided by Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, September 16, 1977.
[2] Recently relocated from Grafenwoehr

Most U.S. Air Force units in West Germany are under the command of 17th Air Force, a subordinate command of USAFE with headquarters at Sembach Air Base. As is the case with the 3rd Air Force in Great Britain, elements of 17th Air Force would come under the direction of AAFCE in the event of a war or crisis involving NATO. The following chart lists units and missions of 17th Air Force:

Unit	Base	Aircraft type	Mission
26th TRW	Zweibrucken	RF–4C	Tactical reconnaissance.
36th TFW	Bitburg	F–15	Air superiority.
50th TFW	Hahn	F–4E	Close air support/intercept.
52nd TFW	Spangdahlem	F–4C/F–4D	Do.
86th TFW	Ramstein	F–4E	Do.
435th TAW	Rhein-Main	C–130/C–9	Tactical airlift.
601st TCW	Sembach	OV–10/CH–53	Command, control and communications.
	Lindsey AS	None	Do.
	Hessicholdendord AS	None	Do.
350th ABG	Tempelhof	None	Support.

In addition, the Air Force plans to station a wing of A–10 close air support fighters at Sembach in 1978 and locate the 606th TCS, a tactical air control squadron, to a station near Bremerhaven in support of the Army armored brigade there.[34] Not listed here are numerous Air Force communications and support facilities.

[34] Air Force Magazine, May 1977, p. 84 and Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 1, 1977, p. 38.

TABLE 9.—*U.S. Military Personnel in West Germany*

Army	204,636
Air Force	34,448
Navy	275
Marine Corps	149
Total	239,508

ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS

In testimony before the Congress in March 1977, General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., SACEUR and Commander-in-Chief, U.S. European Command, provided an estimate of America's contribution, on a proportionate basis, to the NATO Alliance:

> . . . the land and air forces which would come under my command in time of crisis are primarily European. For example, 90 percent of the ground forces, 75 percent of the air forces, and 80 percent of the naval forces would be European contributions.[35]

Because U.S. military forces in Western Europe make up only a portion of the forces available to the NATO command, it is appropriate to address their effectiveness within the larger context of NATO's overall conventional and tactical nuclear capabilities.

In recent years, there has been growing concern within military and political circles in Western Europe and the United States over what General Haig has termed "a relentless growth in sheer Soviet military power."[36] In SACEUR's estimation, improvements in the Warsaw Pact's conventional capabilities over the last decade have included:

> 130,000 men added to their force structure, a 40-percent increase in their tanks, a 50- to 100-percent increase in their conventional artillery, a dramatic increase in their sustaining capability and their mobility.[37]

In addition, the Soviet Union has greatly improved the range and payload capability of its tactical air forces.

While most military analysts agree that the level and capability of Warsaw Pact conventional forces have been substantially bolstered in recent years, there is considerable disagreement over the implications of this development for the credibility of NATO's deterrence and the appropriateness of its defense strategy and posture. Principally, the debate has centered on two issues: the probability of a "no-notice attack" and the likelihood of a "short" (vs. "long") war in Europe.

Traditionally, the U.S. defense strategy for NATO has presumed several weeks warning of attack and a distinct, non-nuclear phase of battle. Accordingly, the United States has planned on a staged mobilization and redeployment of forces from the United States to Europe followed by a protracted war. While a certain portion of the U.S.

---

[35] FY 1978 DOD Authorization Hearings, op. cit., p. 3381 [Part 5].
[36] Ibid., p. 3367.
[37] Ibid., p. 3375.

strategic reserve could be quickly airlifted to the European theater, the preponderance of U.S. reinforcements are still dependent upon sealift, with mobilization and transport time measured in weeks or months.

In a report released early in 1977, two members of the Senate Armed Services Committee contended that Soviet forces deployed in Eastern Europe had attained the capability to launch a devastating conventional attack from a standing start.[38] The report concluded that this contingency could compel the Allies to choose between surrender or the use of tactical nuclear weapons on their own soil. Although the senators recommended that NATO retain hedges against a protracted, or "long," war, they insisted that the standard planning assumption should be a short, intense war initiated without advance notice. To correct what the senators regarded as a current NATO vulnerability to surprise attack, they recommended vastly augmented firepower, improved command and control, increased air defense assets, greater reinforcement responsiveness, more extensive weapons standardization, and a selective redeployment of forces eastward.[39]

The criticism of NATO's planning assumptions and defense posture contained in the Nunn/Bartlett report was not without precedent. Since NATO adopted the doctrines of flexible response and forward defense in 1967, numerous articles in military and academic journals have contended that a significant gap existed between NATO's declared strategy and its actual capabilities. For example, a 1974 Brookings Institution study concluded, "NATO has postured its forces to fight the wrong war and, in so doing, may have stripped itself of the capacity to wage the one it will probably have to face."[40] In a book published in 1976, a Belgian general charged that a Soviet surprise attack could capture West Germany within 48 hours.[41] The Senate report itself was based largely on a field inspection of NATO conducted by Lt. Gen. James F. Hollingsworth shortly before his retirement in 1976. Also, the principal themes of the Senate report were previewed in an address by Senator Nunn in September 1976.[42]

The effect of the Nunn/Bartlett report has been far-reaching. Issued under the imprimatur of a key congressional committee, the report became the focus of extensive professional and public interest and precipitated a major re-examination of NATO's assumptions regarding warning time. Participants in the ensuing debate have included Senators Nunn and Bartlett, other congressmen, the Defense Department, and the SACEUR himself.

---

[38] U.S. Congress. Senate: Committee on Armed Services. NATO and the New Soviet Threat: Report of Senator Sam Nunn and Senator Dewey F. Bartlett. 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, January 24, 1977.

[39] Regarding this last recommendation, the Senators cautioned that proposals to relocate additional U.S. Army brigades to northern Germany "must be approached with political caution," since such redeployments could be interpreted by those countries currently responsible for the defense of that sector as evidence of an American willingness to assume their military responsibilities and serve as an excuse for troop reductions. Ibid., p. 19.

[40] Richard D. Lawrence and Jeffrey Record. U.S. Force Structure, in NATO: An Alternative. The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1974, p. 48.

[41] Robert Close. L'Europe Sans Defense? (Is Europe Defenseless)? Editions Arts & Voyages Collection [Series] "Inedits," distributed by Gamma, Paris, 1976.

[42] Senator Sam Nunn. "Gearing Up To Deter Combat in Europe: The Long and Short of It." Address before the New York Militia Association. Printed in the Congressional Record, September 13, 1976. pp. S15660–15662 (daily edition).

One of the first challenges to the Nunn/Bartlett report was offered by Congressman Les Aspin. In speeches on the floor of the House and in magazine articles, Representative Aspin has contended that while many of the reforms contained in the Nunn/Bartlett report are commendable, the threat of a no-notice attack has been overstated. The congressman agreed that, "Further improvements [in NATO's short-war capability] should be achieved by shifting additional resources from activities oriented toward a long war," however, he maintained:

> For the Warsaw Pact to launch a short notice or no-notice attack with any chance of success requires more than a handfull of divisions. It is not clear that given all the Pact's problems—political, geographical, readiness, quality of equipment, manning levels, logistics etc.,—there are more than a handful of divisions that could launch a short notice attack.[43]

Given the low likelihood (in the Congressman's estimation) of a surprise attack, Representative Aspin suggested that the costs of implementing all the reforms recommended in the Nunn/Bartlett report—estimated by Mr. Aspin to be in the order of $46 billion—may be unacceptable.[44]

The Defense Department has argued that it has not been standing still, that the United States has initiated a number of force augmentation programs in response to the expansion of Warsaw Pact conventional forces. Complying with Section 302(a) of Public Law 93–365 the "Nunn Amendment", the Defense Department in Fiscal Years 1975 and 1976 converted approximately 14,000 support troops in Europe to combat billets. In March 1976, the Army announced that it would move a 3,800-man armored brigade stationed in the southern part of West Germany to the Bremerhaven area astride the most likely avenue of attack from the East. Also, the Air Force is in the process of deploying new F–15 and F–111 wings to Europe.

All of these programs are designed to enhance NATO's ability to deter, and if necessary defeat, a short-warning Soviet conventional attack. Nevertheless, the Defense Department still maintains that the standard planning assumption must be that "NATO would have fairly clear warning of Pact intentions to attack, would begin its mobilization and deployment within a few days after the Pact's, and would, accordingly, have time in which to build up its defenses."[45] While conceding "there is not reason to give careful attention and emphasis to the possibility of an unreinforced attack which minimizes warning time," DOD insists, "It would make little sense to strengthen U.S. short-war capabilities at the expense of staying power only to discover that the enemy could outlast us."[46]

In his testimony before Congress, General Haig agreed that NATO is "experiencing a compression in what we have heretofore anticipated to be our warning prior to attack . . ."; however, he stressed that working against that trend was "the improvement in the West's ability to detect preparatory steps as a result of techno-

---

[43] Les Aspin. A Surprise Attack on NATO: Refocusing the Debate. NATO Review, No. 4 (August), 1977, pp. 6 and 10.

[44] Congressman Aspin. Threat of a Red Blitzkreig in Europe. Congressional Record, March 16, 1977, pp. H2211–2216 (daily edition).

[45] Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1978, January 17, 1977, p. 95.

[46] Ibid., p. 94 and 97.

logical refinements in overhead photography, sophisticated electronic intrusion capabilities, and very detailed definitization of the indicators of Soviet attack." [47] Nonetheless, he stated that for planning purposes NATO had adopted "a warning time something in the neighborhood of 48 hours," which was characterized as "at the extreme edge of the kind of warning we can anticipate." [48]

Gen. Haig agreed with Congressman Aspin's assessment that, "For a substantial attack, the Pact needs preparation, and preparation means warning time." [49] The general argued that warning indicators that would develop on the flanks (such as the Soviet navy being put to sea) or in the Soviet homeland (such as the implementation of civil defense plans) would provide unmistakeable warning of an impending attack in the Central Region. It has since been reported that as a result of a recent NATO study. SACEUR now believes that the Alliance could count on eight to fifteen days warning, although this more sanguine estimate is reported contested by some U.S. intelligence officials.[50]

In testimony before Congress in August 1977, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown stated:

> I am convinced that an adequate conventional leg of the NATO Tripod of strategic, theater nuclear, and conventional forces is within our reach, if we work hard at it . . . We can adequately meet the threat of short-warning attack . . . We can retain a qualitative edge. And we can do all this at a cost the Allies can readily afford if all the members of the Alliance pull together more effectively than before.[51]

The Secretary listed three key tasks before the Alliance: (1) higher readiness states; (2) faster reinforcement times; and (3) a more coordinated coalition warfare capability, and he detailed an extensive set of initiatives designed to accomplish these tasks. In the Secretary's estimation, the United States and NATO programs "are paying attention to almost all the measures proposed in [the Nunn/Bartlett] report." [52]

At issue in the debate over warning time is not the question of whether NATO faces the possibility of a surprise attack, since all parties are agreed that a certain "no-warning" capability exists. Rather, the dispute centers on the question of whether the balance of Warsaw Pact surprise attack capabilities relative to NATO "in-place" defenses has become so assymetric that Allied vulnerabilities invite attack, or more generally, whether they weaken the Alliance politically in the face of possible Soviet ambitions.

The Defense Department contends that a substantial augmentation of forward defense could occur only at the expense of the flexibility of the U.S. strategic reserve and NATO's long-war capabilities. On the other hand, the Nunn/Bartlett report recommends that short-war capabilities be augmented "without weakening hedges in NATO force structure against a protracted war." [53] Thus the issue is whether suf-

---

[47] FY 1978 DOD Authorization Hearings, op. cit., p. 3378 [Part 5].
[48] Ibid.
[49] Aspin. NATO Review article. op. cit.. p. 10.
[50] Armed Forces Journal. October 1977, p. 16.
[51] Prepared Statement of Honorable Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense, Before the Manpower and Personnel Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, August 3. 1977. pp. 1–2.
[52] Ibid. p. 9.
[53] Nunn/Bartlett Report, op. cit., p. 18.

35-995 O - 79 - 4

ficient resources can be made available to protect against both contingencies, and if not, toward which scenario should NATO hedge? In the course of addressing this issue, however, it may be useful to examine the broader issues of the status of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) negotiations and the overall credibility of NATO's conventional/tactical nuclear/strategic "Tripod."

If current NATO tactical nuclear forces (TFN's) are excessive to that actually needed for deterrence or war-fighting, it might be appropriate to "trade" U.S. TNFs for reciprocal cuts in Soviet *conventional* forces. Just such an offer was tendered (but never accepted by the Warsaw Pact) by the West at the MBFR talks in December 1975. If MBFR-directed cuts in Soviet conventional forces reduced Warsaw Pact forces to a level below that required for a realistic surprise attack capability, the financial burden of an extensive augmentation of NATO's forward defenses might be obviated. Against this opportunity must be weighed the possibility that movement in the MBFR talks may be achieved only at the price of clear indications that the Congress is prepared to support a substantial augmentation of short-war defense capabilities.

Conversely, if the balance of NATO/Warsaw Pact TNF capabilities clearly favor the Soviet Union, or the NATO TNF posture lacks credibility, this asymmetry could increase the probability that the Soviets would employ tactical nuclear strikes in conjunction with a conventional assault. If deficiencies in NATO's TNF posture and weaponry invite a Soviet first-use of tactical nuclear weapons, or more broadly, weaken the Alliance politically in the face of possible Soviet threats, the Congress may judge that the first priority for increased NATO related expenditures rests with restoring a credible tactical nuclear deterrent. In this regard, it is interesting to note that House and Senate action in funding the production of "enhanced radiation" components for NATO's nuclear-capable Lance missiles was accomplished despite arguments from some quarters in Congress that the monies would be better used to provide NATO with additional conventional firepower.

Despite the range of opinions expressed within the Alliance on current conventional defense and tactical nuclear force issues, a general consensus is evident in regard to the near-term future of the U.S. military posture in Western Europe. While there is no serious consideration of reducing the U.S. military presence in Europe, neither is there much enthusiasm for significantly bolstering the in-place U.S. force deployment.[54] Rather, the current emphasis is on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of forces already deployed. In furtherance of this approach, the NATO Defense Ministers in 1977 agreed that NATO should develop a long-term defense program, designed to correct problems in 10 key areas, and that the NATO Military Authorities should recommend short-term measures, to be taken by NATO countries, aimed at early correction of critical deficiencies in the areas of antiarmor, war reserve munitions, and force readiness/reinforcement.

---

[54] In a January 6, 1978 address to the North Atlantic Council, President Carter announced that the United States would deploy 8,000 troops to Europe over the next year and a half. The purpose of this deployment, however, is not to increase the authorized U.S. troop strength in NATO, but rather to bring currently deployed units up to their authorized strength levels.

Three questions remain, however. First, to what degree will the United States take the political lead in promoting full NATO support of these "force enhancement" programs? Will the U.S. role be one of aggressive leadership or measured consensus-building? Recent history suggests that while the United States is prepared to forego "arm-twisting" in the name of quiet diplomacy, it nonetheless intends to continue to exert strong leadership within the Alliance, albeit leadership by example.

This political approach has been illustrated by the U.S. decisions to station an armored brigade on the North German plain, to deploy an additional F–111 wing to Great Britain, and to improve significantly its "tooth-to-tail" troop ratios in Europe. In addition, the United States has taken a position strongly in support of improved NATO weapons standardization, including a pledge by President Carter to improve the ratio of U.S./European military trade on the "two-way street" by increasing U.S. procurement of European weapons systems.

In an article on NATO, Martin Hillenbrand discussed the importance of American leadership for the attainment of the most challenging Alliance objectives. Noting that, with the exception of the French, there has been "a constant cry" from the Europeans for a strong assertion of American leadership, Hillenbrand concluded:

> It was sometimes difficult to know exactly what American leadership was supposed to mean in the concrete, but it is certainly true that, in the past, the great moments of NATO were those when American policy and American personalities seemed to provide the kind of guidance and stimulation which the alliance needed. It is not enough that we give a shot in the arm at ministerial or summit meetings, where the atmosphere is artificial and often conducive to euphoria. There must be persistent support of the objectives we proclaim and follow-through to maintain momentum when we announce new initiatives.[55]

Hillenbrand's analysis suggests that NATO's effort to match the expansion of Warsaw Pact capabilities by improving the efficiency and effectiveness of existing forces may well depend on the extent to which "American policy and American personalities" under the Carter administration can lead NATO to another "great moment."

The second question concerns the extent to which funding for these programs will be forthcoming. In May 1977, largely in response to a U.S. initiative, the NATO defense ministers pledged to seek to increase their individual countries' military spending by 3 percent per year (in real terms) starting in 1979.[56] Whether this decision by NATO's military chiefs will be backed up by all NATO members remains to be seen; however, the trend of NATO military spending is already moving upward. In December 1977, NATO released figures showing that the European members of NATO increased their defense expenditures by approximately $4 billion in 1977 over the previous year.[57]

---

[55] Martin J. Hillenbrand. NATO and Western Security in an ERA of Transition. International Security, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Fall 1977), p. 23.
[56] New York Times, May 18, 1977, p. 12.
[57] Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 12, 1977, p. 19.

Whether or not all NATO countries match the May 1977 pledge, it is evident that even a 3 percent increase in real spending could not solve all of NATO's force deployment and effectiveness maladies. For example, in discussing the problems of malpositioning and maldeployment of NATO forces, Gen. Haig estimated that, "It costs between $30 and $35 million to provide new facilities for just one . . . battalion, and we are talking about something over half a hundred." [58] As a result, NATO has determined that there are definite fiscal constraints limiting a more forward repositioning of deployed forces.

Finally, will those programs which can be accomplished within current fiscal constraints be enough? Will incremental readjustments and enhancements of existing forces correct what is generally perceived as a troubling asymmetry in the NATO/Warsaw Pact conventional force balance, or will more NATO forces have to be deployed in-place on the Central Front? In short, beyond what point do qualitative and managerial improvements fail to redress marked quantitative deficiencies?

The answer to these questions may well depend as much upon NATO's future success in achieving its short and long-term program objectives as upon Soviet decisions regarding the continued augmentation of Warsaw Pact capabilities. If further increases in Warsaw Pact forces should outpace NATO's force enhancement initiative, thus widening current asymmetries rather than closing them, NATO could have to choose between (1) accepting the asymmetry, thus perhaps conceding the Soviets certain political or diplomatic leverages; (2) adding new "nuclear sweetner" elements to its basic MBFR proposal in order to gain Soviet agreement on conventional force parity: or (3) bearing the economic, social, and political costs of a new NATO troop build-up. Before confronting these hard choices, however, NATO will in all likelihood allow the current force enhancement initiative a reasonable period to succeed.

U.S. Foreign Policy Objectives in Southern Europe

GENERAL OBJECTIVES

The general foreign policy objectives of the United States in Southern Europe are identical with those major policy objectives specified for Western Europe, namely:

(1) To preserve and expand friendly and collaborative political, economic and military ties between the United States and Southern European countries, individually and collectively;

(2) To minimize opportunities for the Soviet Union to increase its political, economic, or military influence over or control of Southern Europe or any single Southern European country; and

(3) To promote the amelioration of East-West tension.

These considerations can further be expressed as specific objectives which illustrate more completely the political, economic, and military factors that constitute United States interests in Southern Europe.

---

[58] DOD FY 1978 Authorization Hearing, op. cit., p. 3375, [Part 5].

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

The specific objectives of the United States in Southern Europe parallel those objectives specified in the previous section for Europe as a whole. They are ennumerated here again, but discussed specifically in terms of their application to Southern Europe.

Political Objectives

(1) To protect and enhance Western democratic principles and practices.

Since World War II, Southern European countries have been governed by a combination of instable democracies and "stable" but undemocratic regimes. For a number of years, U.S. policy generally accepted the stability of authoritarian right wing regimes in some Southern European countries as preferable to the possibility of political chaos. In 1977, democracy emerged in Southern Europe, with the demise of authoritarian regimes in Greece, Portugal, and now Spain. It is in the interest of the United States to support the strengthening of democracy and national independence for all the countries of Southern Europe, hopefully precluding the advent of new authoritarian regimes of either the left or right.

2. To encourage and facilitate the process of West European cooperation and integration.

It is in the long-term interest of the United States for the countries of Southern Europe which are not now members of the European Community to become increasingly linked to and part of the process of European economic and political integration. Such links should tend to enhance the political and economic underpinnings of democracy throughout Southern Europe and generally strengthen Western security in the Mediterranean area.

3. To expand in general the sense of shared interests between the United States, Canada, and the countries of Western Europe; and to promote the development of parallel policies with West European countries on questions which relate to the Atlantic Community, and, to the extent possible, to other areas of the world.

With regard to Southern European countries, it is particularly important that the United States attempt to develop a sense of shared interests not only with respect to European and Atlantic questions but also with respect to Mediterranean and Middle Eastern issues as well.

Economic Objectives

1. To support European economic stability and well-being.

Political stability in Southern Europe—and democratic practices there—depend heavily on economic well-being. Most of the economic "trouble-spots" in Europe are Southern European countries, and it is in the interest of the United States to help provide the support necessary to steer Southern European countries away from economic chaos.

2. To maintain and improve the international trading system and to encourage a propitious environment in Europe for American trade and investment.

The Southern European countries do not in general have a decisive input with respect to the management of the international trading system. Italy, and increasingly Spain, however, are two major industrial powers which cannot be ignored as important members of the Western economic system.

3. To maintain international monetary stability.

This is more important with regard to the major European countries, but as mentioned above, the role of Italy and Spain cannot be overlooked.

4. To reduce American and European vulnerability to price and supply conditions in critical raw materials, particularly oil.

The countries of Southern Europe are generally resource-poor and therefore are seriously affected by price and supply conditions in critical raw materials. These dependencies make these countries vulnerable to political pressure for suppliers. Because the United States depends on military facilities in a number of Southern European countries to support its objectives in the Middle East, the United States has a distinct interest in helping Southern European countries limit their vulnerability in this area.

5. To expand cooperation in science and technology, including environmental protection.

U.S. science and technology could be of great value to the countries of Southern Europe, both with regard to modernization of their economies and protection of their natural environment. Such assistance cannot help but contribute to the longer term prospects for economic health and political stability in these countries.

Military Objectives

1. To support a Western defense effort that will be sufficient to deter a Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe and to deny the Soviet Union the ability to translate excessive military power into increased influence over European affairs.

The ability of the NATO alliance to sustain a credible defense on the Southern flank tends to discourage Soviet adventures in Southern Europe and also contributes to deterrence in Central and Northern Europe. It is in the interest of the United States that Southern European countries maintain defense capabilities, commensurate with their means, sufficient to help sustain deterrence and to prevent increased Soviet political leverage resulting from regional imbalances in military power.

2. Should deterrence fail, to be prepared to mount a Western defense effort sufficient to deny victory to the Soviet/Warsaw Pact forces.

If war came, Southern European armies, navies, and air forces would be important in helping maintain NATO's control of the Mediterranean and in enhancing the ability of the United States to get supplies and reinforcements to the Central Front. It is also in the interest of the United States for Western forces to maintain control of the air, sea, and land routes in Southern Europe in the event of a war.

3. To decrease tensions that could lead to the outbreak of war by seeking the elimination of specific points of East-West conflict and achieving a more stable East-West military balance at lower levels of armaments.

Given the limited ability of Southern European countries to support large and modern military forces and the tensions between Greece and Turkey that have had a debilitating effect on the contributions of these two countries to NATO, reductions in East-West tensions and the negotiated control of armaments could make deficiencies in the defense efforts of Southern European countries less important in the efforts to maintain the security of the NATO area.

Because of the serious implications for political and military strength of NATO in Southern Europe, the United States has a particularly strong interest in the reduction of tensions between Greece and Turkey, including a peaceful settlement on Cyprus and resolution of the disputes over the Aegean. It is against this complex of objectives/interests that the military presence of the United States in Southern Europe must be evaluated. The following section will describe the U.S. military presence in this region and assess its effectiveness in serving these objectives.

Major U.S. Military Installations in Southern Europe

Nature of U.S. military installations in the area and their relation to NATO

To support the fundamental military objectives of the United States in the Southern European area the United States, since the end of World War II, has developed or participated in the development of a large number of defense-related installations and facilities in the Mediterranean region. The most important of these will receive specific examination in this section. Currently the United States maintains 199 military facilities in an active status in Mediterrean area countries.[59] A number of the facilities in this total are elements that are actually part of, or associated with, a larger installation. Although these bases are scattered throughout a number of countries they are linked together through a U.S. military command structure and through the necessity to coordinate various military activities throughout the Mediterranean area in order to achieve proper levels of effectiveness. These outposts collectively engage in defense missions that range from basic logistics and supply operations to highly sophisticated communications and intelligence-collecting activities. Some of these Mediterranean installations and facilities are associated with specific NATO commands. Nearly all have been established through bilateral defense agreements that are justified on the basis of article III of the North Atlantic Treaty.[60]

---

[59] This total includes 60 facilities in Turkey, 24 in Greece, 52 in Italy, 27 in Spain, 2 in Morocco, 4 in France, 22 in Portugal. (Figures are from U.S. overseas military real property inventories—as of Sept. 30, 1977.)

[60] Article III of the North Atlantic Treaty reads as follows: "In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."

In the event of war involving the NATO Alliance, most of these installations and facilities in NATO countries would come under the direction of NATO's military leadership, and would be available to the military forces assigned to NATO commands. In peacetime most of these outposts, as a rule, are used by the United States exclusively or in association with the particular host country under guidelines laid down by specific bilateral defense agreements. For the purposes of this section, discussion will center on key United States military installations in Spain and on the four Southern European NATO states—Portugal, Italy, Greece and Turkey.

APPROACHES TO THE MEDITERRANEAN



Major U.S. Military Installations in Portugal


Portugal, an original signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty, has permitted U.S. forces to use its territory for military operations for decades. Portugal controls the Azores, an archipelago of islands located approximately 850 nautical miles west of Lisbon, and a convenient way station for air traffic en route from the United States to the Mediterranean and other points in Europe. The most significant bases in Portugal utilized by the United States are located in the Azores. The major base complex in the Azores group is at Lajes Air Base on the island of Terceira. Other facilities exist on San Miguel Island (a radio relay annex used for military communications activities), and on Graciosa Island (a radio beacon annex used for navigational assistance purposes). In addition, various Portuguese military facilities that were built or improved with NATO common infrastructure funds are located throughout the Azores chain, on the Portuguese mainland and on the other parts of Portuguese territory. These facilities could be made available for NATO military purposes should the alliance become involved in a war.[61]

---

[61] NATO common infrastructure facilities are those fixed military facilities which are constructed at the request of international commanders of NATO for the training of international forces in peacetime and for their wartime operational use. These facilities are financed collectively by NATO member governments after NATO's supreme commanders have established requirements for installations through coordinated planning with the major subordinate NATO commanders and the host nation—the nation in which the facility will be located. NATO common infrastructure military facilities include airfields, harbor and naval installations, radio navigational aids, signals and telecommunications facilities, training areas, radar warning installations, petroleum storage tanks and distributing pipelines, and missile installations.

Those military facilities that are developed solely for the use of national forces which are not committed to NATO are paid for out of national budgets and are not eligible for NATO infrastructure funding. U.S. Department of Commerce, Doing Business with NATO, August 1975. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Separation of Power, Congressional Oversight of Executive Agreements—1975, hearings (94th Cong., 1st sess.) p. 93. NATO: Facts and Figures, Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1976, pp. 149–158.

AZORES


40
39
38
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
37
SAN MIGUEL
Ponta Delgada
Ponta Delgada to Strait of Gibraltar (964 nm)
SANTA MARIA
Vila do Porto
TERCEIRA
Lajes
Praia da Vitoria
Angra do Heroismo
SAN JORGE
Velas
PICO
GRACIOSA
Dover, Del. to Lajes (Terceira Is.) (2,229 nm)
Praia da Vitoria to Norfolk, Va. (2,402 nm)
FAIAL
Horta
CORVO
FLORES
Atlantic Ocean
Airfield
Naval facility
City
NATO acoustic range
0 10 20 30 Miles
0 25 50 Kilometers
Locations of symbols are approximate.
AZORES
Norfolk, Va. to Ponta Delgada (San Miguel Is.) (2,402 nm)

MAJOR MILITARY MISSIONS SERVED BY INSTALLATIONS IN PORTUGAL

The U.S. installations in the Azores are involved in two major military missions: staging and logistic support, and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations. To a lesser extent the Azores are important for their role in the U.S. Defense Communications Systems (DCS). The Lajes Air Base serves as a refueling facility for U.S. military aircraft, particularly C–5A and C–141 transports, en route to Mediterranean and European destinations. In July 1970, executive branch officials stated that each month an average of 560 flights land at Lajes, the bulk of them being transport planes. During the 1973 Middle East war, the U.S. Military Airlift Command (MAC) was able to route 42 flights through Lajes in a 24-hour period. Due to the fact that the bulk of the airlift flights in 1973 were made by C–141 aircraft, which could not fly nonstop to Israel from U.S. bases, the use of Lajes Air Base was essential for the airlift mission to go forward to the extent that it did.[62]

The antisubmarine warfare support mission served by the Azores installation is considered to be the more vital of those performed at these facilities. American military components in the island group are a valuable element in a broad based effort to monitor activities of Soviet submarines in the eastern Atlantic and western Mediterranean. The Azores are very strategically located for the support of such a mission.

TABLE 10.—*United States Military Personnel in Portugal*

Army	60
Air Force	980
Navy	310
Marine Corps	8
Total	1,358

From facilities in the island chain it is possible to track Soviet submarines operating within a 1,000 mile-radius. Thus the Azores bases enable ASW units of the United States stationed there to keep watch over the midpoint of the 4,000-mile sea lane that links the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean with its major supply depots on the American east coast. The Azores installations also permit the United States to maintain extensive surveillance over Soviet activity in and around such a strategic "choke point" as the Strait of Gibraltar. Furthermore, these installations would enable the United States to conduct specific antisubmarine search and destroy missions which may be necessary in the event of war.[63]

To support the ASW mission of American forces in the Azores, the United States has provided these units with the most sophisticated monitoring equipment and antisubmarine weapons in the U.S. arsenal.

---

[62] U.S. General Accounting Office. Report to the Congress. Airlift Operations of the Military Airlift Command During the 1973 Middle East War (LCD–75–204), Apr. 16, 1975, pp. 1, 7–11, 17, 30–31. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad. United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Spain and Portugal. Hearings, part 11, Mar. 11, Apr. 14, 1969, and July 17, 1970 (91st Cong., 2d sess.) pp. 2404–2407, 2412.

[63] Howard B. Dratch. "High Stakes in the Azores," Nation, vol. 221, Nov. 8, 1975, pp. 455–456. Tactical and Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare: A SIPRI Monograph, the MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1974., p. 80. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Executive Agreements with Portugal and Bahrain, hearings, Feb. 1, 2, and 3, 1972 (92d Cong., 2d sess.) p. 12. "NATO Fixed Sonar Range Commissioned" Armed Forces Journal, vol. 109, August 1972, pp. 29, 52, 60–61.

U.S. Navy P–3 Orion antisubmarine aircraft, for example, stage operations out of Lajes Air Base on the island of Terceira. These planes carry a variety of detection and destruction ordnance, including sonobuoys, depth charges, mines, and torpedoes. Sonobuoys are small electronic devices, equipped with hydrophones, that can detect underwater signals and transmit them back to aircraft and/or land based computers. P–3's sow sonobuoys through an expanse of ocean to help fix submarine locations. Once such locations are established the P–3's (or other ASW aircraft such as carrier based SH–3 helicopters and S–3A planes), destroyers or hunter-killer submarines can utilize various weapons to destroy the enemy submarine. Other ammunition, fuel and petroleum storage, and communications facilities used by the U.S. military are also located on the island of Teceira, most of them associated with Lajes Air Base. This includes a Defense Satellite Communications System earth terminal (near Lajes base) which transmits messages back to the naval air station at Lakehurst, N.J.[64]

Major U.S. Military Installations in Spain

Spain is not a member of NATO. However, through its bilateral military agreements with the United States, Spain has served the military interests of the Atlantic Alliance in the Mediterranean area. Through the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which entered into force on September 21, 1976, Spain and the United States agreed to work mutually toward harmonizing their bilateral defense relationship "with existing security agreements in the North Atlantic area." In this regard the treaty created a United States-Spanish Council that is to oversee the treaty's implementation and to work "toward development of appropriate coordination" between that Council and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Spain, of course, has given the United States the right to continue to use various military facilities on Spanish territory which serve United States and NATO ends. The major facilities utilized by the United States at this time under existing agreements are the naval base at Rota; Torrejon, Zaragoza, and Moron Air Bases (the latter currently on standby status), the Cadiz-Zaragoza Pipeline, and the Bardenas Reales Firing Range. The United States also has rights to other minor facilities in Spain, including a Navy POL (petroleum, oil, lubricants) depot and a Navy ammunition storage depot at Cartagena, two LORAN stations [65]—one at Estaca de Vares and the other at Estartit (Gerona)—and a number of military communications facilities.[66]

---

[64] Tactical and Strategic Antisubmarine Warfare, pp. 21–30. Dratch, "High Stakes in the Azores," p. 456. Inventory of Air Force Military Real Property Overseas (30 June 1976, prepared by Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. Inventory of Real Military Property, Navy NAVFAC P–77 (30 June 1976), prepared by Department of the Navy, Navy Facilities Engineering Command. Inventory of Army Military Real Property Outside of the United States (30 June 1976) prepared by the Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Engineers. Communications data provided by Defense Communications Agency, Department of Defense, Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Computer Enhances P–3C Effectiveness," Aviation Week and Space Technology, vol. 105. Nov. 15, 1976, pp. 34–36. Clarence A. Rovinson, Jr., "S–3A Strengths Carriers' ASW Role", Aviation Week and Space Technology., vol. 105, Nov. 22, 1976, pp. 30–31, 33, 39, 41.

[65] LORAN stations are long-range aides to navigation.

[66] U.S. Congress. Senate. Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain. Executive E. Message from the President of the United States transmitting the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and Spain, signed at Madrid on Jan. 24, 1976, together with its seven supplementary agreements and its eight related exchanges of notes. Feb. 18, 1976 (94th Cong., 2d sess.).

TABLE 11.—*U.S. Military Personnel in Spain*

Army	34
Air Force	5,007
Navy	3,507
Marine Corps	198
Total	8,746


MAJOR MILITARY MISSIONS SERVED BY INSTALLATIONS IN SPAIN

Foremost among the major U.S. installations in Spain is the Rota Naval Base complex near Cadiz, located approximately 70 nautical miles west of Gibraltar. Rota has been used as the home port for a tender that services U.S. nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN's); however, a supplementary agreement to the 1976 U.S./Spanish treaty requires that the U.S. begin a phased withdrawal of its SSBNs from Rota on January 1, 1979 and complete the withdrawal by July 1, 1979. A major airbase, also located at Rota, supports the U.S. Navy's airborne antisubmarine warfare and ocean surveillance operations. ASW aircraft staging out of Rota are in a geographically superb position to cover the western approaches to Gibraltar, the western Mediterranean, as well as the eastern Atlantic. Rota is also a major terminal that supports the U.S. Defense Communications System (DCS) throughout the western Mediterranean. The Rota Naval Base is linked with a number of radar and microwave communication stations located throughout Spain. The military communications system in which Rota plays a key part permits continuous contact with the U.S. 6th Fleet afloat as well as the key DCS centers at Nea Makri and Kato Souli on the Greek mainland as well as with Bouknadel and Sidi Yahia in Morocco. This system in the western Mediterranean is coordinated with NATO's early-warning network through Naples, Italy. Rota further provides storage facilities for POL and ammunition used by the U.S. military forces in the region.[67]

Another major U.S. facility in Spain is Torrejon Air Base, located just east of Madrid. Torrejon is the headquarters of the U.S. 16th Tactical Air Force of USAFE (U.S. Air Forces, Europe). This installation maintains, on a permanent basis, a tactical fighter wing that has a strike mission assigned to it—a mission that would be launched from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey and Aviano Air Base in Italy. Torrejon further serves as a major staging, reinforcement, and logistic airlift base for U.S. forces, as well as a communications center. Zaragoza Air Base, located in northeast Spain near the city of Zaragoza, is used by USAFE as a tactical fighter training base. It is situated near the Bardenas Reales Firing Range where gunnery and bombing practice by USAFE takes place. Approximately 70 percent of the air-to-ground and 50 percent of the air-to-air weapons training conducted by USAFE takes place at Zaragoza, and its associated facilities. Moron

[67] U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs. Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain, hearings, June 8 and 16, 1976 (94th Cong., 2d sess.) pp. 3–5, 35, 55. Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain. Executive E. Supplementary Agreement on Facilities (No. 6). Data on DCS sites in Spain provided by Defense Communications Agency. Department of Defense. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad. United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad. Spain and Portugal. hearings. part 11 (91st Cong., 2d sess.). pp. 2305–2306, 2353, 2402, 2411. Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Computer Enhances P–3C Effectiveness" Aviation Week and Space Technology, vol. 105, Nov. 15, 1976, pp. 34–36, 41–45.

MAJOR UNITED STATES MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN SPAIN



Air Base, located near Seville in southwest Spain, serves as a support base for units of USAFE. Moron also houses a terminal for naval communications which connects it and Rota with major DCS terminals in Greece and Morocco. Moron Air Base is currently maintained in a standby status. All three air bases noted above provide facilities that could permit augmentation of U.S. military force capabilities in the Mediterranean and European areas should such action be required at a future date. The 468-mile-long Cadiz-Zaragoza Pipeline provides a valuable means of conveyance for aviation fuel, motor gasoline, and diesel fuel required for operations at major bases in Spain.[68]

Major U.S. Military Installations in Italy

Italy, an original signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty, has been of noted value to the Atlantic Alliance because of its geographic location—at the midpoint of the Mediterranean Sea—and because Italy has provided a substantial number of installations, large and small, to support U.S.- and NATO-related missions and operations. Because of its location, Italy enhances the capability of the U.S. military to conduct effectively antisubmarine warfare, sea reconnaissance, and surveillance activities throughout the Mediterranean. Operational flexibility for American military forces in the region is a quality that Italian installations capably provide.

The major military installations provided by Italy to the United States and to NATO include the naval complex located at Naples, naval facilities at Sigonella, Sicily, and La Maddalena, Sardinia. U.S. Air Force facilities are located at Aviano Air Base, northwest of Trieste at Roveredo In Piano, and at San Vito Air Station located at San Vito dei Normanni near Brindisi in the extreme southeast portion of the Italian Peninsula. The U.S. Army utilizes facilities at Camp Darby, near Livorno, located on Italy's west coast, roughly 200 miles north of Rome, and installations at Camp Ederle located at Vicenza, which is located approximately 40 miles west of Venice. Other smaller installations and facilities throughout Italy are associated with these major bases. Ten separate NATO NADGE (NATO Air Defense Ground Environment) early-warning sites are also located in strategic places throughout the country, as are a number of military communications stations that are a part of the U.S. Defense Communications Systems (DCS). Details regarding nuclear weapons stored in Italy are classified.[69]

---

[68] U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs. Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain, hearings, pp. 4–6. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad. United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Spain and Portugal, hearings, part 11 (91st Cong., 2d sess.) pp. 2305–2306, 2353, 2398, 2402–2403, 2411. Jesse W. Lewis, Jr., The Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. Washington, D.C., 1976, p. 20. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Spanish Base Treaty, hearings on Executive E, Mar. 3, 12, and 24, 1976 (94th Cong., 2d sess.) p. 13.

[69] U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad. United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: United States Forces in Europe, hearings. part 10, May 25–26, June 16 and 24, July 15, 1970 (91st Cong. 2d sess.) pp. 2018, 2029, 2108–2109, 2228, 2290–2292. New York Times, Oct. 2, 1972, p. 14. Admiral Stansfield Turner, "The Southern Region", NATO's Fifteen Nations, vol. 21. February–March 1976, pp. 89–91. Lewis, Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean, pp. 20–23. Washington Post, Apr. 18, 1976, pp. 1ff. NADGE data provided by Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Installations and Logistics, Department of Defense. Official Correspondence, September and October 1976. Air Force Magazine, vol. 59, May 1976, pp. 82–83. Communications data provided by Defense Communications Agency, Department of Defense. Los Angeles Times, May 30, 1976. p. 1. Washington Post, Apr. 18, 1976, pp. 1ff.

MAJOR UNITED STATES MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN ITALY




TABLE 12.—*Military Personnel in Italy*

Army	4,057
Air Force	3,957
Navy	3,078
Marine Corps	265
Total	11,357

MAJOR MILITARY MISSIONS SERVED BY INSTALLATIONS IN ITALY

Naples is generally regarded as the single most important Italian city associated with U.S. military forces in Italy. Naples provides facilities for the headquarters of NATO's Allied Forces Southern Europe, and it houses a major support complex utilized by the U.S. 6th Fleet—the flagship of which is located at Gaeta, north of Naples proper. Naples is the headquarters of Task Force 69, composed of nuclear powered hunter-killer submarines (SSN). That city also provides a homeport for a U.S. Navy destroyer tender, and serves as a major terminal for the U.S. Defense Communications System. A naval air facility is located at Sigonella, Sicily, from which aerial anti-submarine warfare operations are staged. This base is located near the east coast of Sicily, close to the port of Catania. La Maddalena, a small island off the northeast coast of Sardinia, provides a homeport for a submarine tender that services U.S. nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarines that operate in the Mediterranean.[70]

The U.S. Air Force utilizes Aviano Air Base as the home base for a rotational tactical fighter group assigned to U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE). Strike missions would be launched from this base in the event of war. The U.S. Air Force Security Service, a component of the National Security Agency (NSA) maintains a support base for intelligence operations at San Vito Air Station located at San Vito dei Normanni near the port city of Brindisi. The two major bases in Italy used by the U.S. Army are Camp Ederle and Camp Darby. Camp Ederle serves as the home base for NATO's 5th Allied Tactical Air Force. It is also the base utilized by the 1st Airborne Battalion Combat Team/509th Infantry and the 2d Battalion/30th Field Artillery. Camp Darby is a major command headquarters and storage facility for the USAEUR (U.S. Army in Europe). The 8th Logistics Command is located at this base. The Southern European Task Force in Italy (SETAF), elements of which are located at both of the above Army installations, has the primary mission of providing support to Italian ground forces, and the secondary mission of providing a logistic base

[70] U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on United States Agreements and Commitments Abroad. United States Agreements and Commitments Abroad: United States Forces in Europe, hearings, part 10 (91st Cong., 2d sess.) pp. 2029, 2288, 2290–2292. Air Force Magazine, vol. 59, May 1976, pp. 82–83. New York Times, Oct. 2, 1972. p. 14. Lewis, Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean, pp. 20–23. Washington Post, Apr. 18, 1976, p. 1ff. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services Military Posture and H.R. 11500 [H.R. 12438] Department of Defense Authorization for Fiscal Year 1977, hearings part I (94th Cong., 2d sess.), p. 503. Wynfred Joshua, "The Mediterranean and Italy: Global Context of a Local Problem," printed in The Political Stability of Italy: Conference Report, Georgetown University: The Center for Strategic and International Studies, Apr. 2, 1976, pp. 23–36. Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Computer Enhances P–3C Effectiveness," Aviation Week and Space Technology, vol. 105, Nov. 15, 1976, pp. 34–36, 41–45.

for the support of any operations deemed necessary in the NATO Southern Region. Verona, located in northeastern Italy, serves as the headquarters for NATO's Allied Land Forces Southern Europe.[71]

Major U.S. Military Installations in Greece

Greece became a member of NATO as a result of a protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty which entered into force on February 15, 1952. Because of its location in the eastern Mediterranean, Greece is able to provide facilities, on the Greek mainland and on the island of Crete, which strengthen the strategic capabilities of the United States and NATO forces that operate in the area. Greek facilities help guard the Aegean Sea approach to the Mediterranean, provide important communications links between NATO and U.S. Military forces, provide staging centers and supply depots for United States and NATO air and naval forces, and permit surveillance and monitoring of the activities of the Soviet Union's military forces in the eastern Mediterranean area.


The major installations utilized by the United States in Greece include Hellenikon (Athenai) Air Base near Athens, and Nea Makri Communications Station on the Greek mainland near Marathon Bay. Major facilities of the island of Crete include Iraklion Air Station, located on the north central coast of the island, and the Souda Bay complex located on the northwestern coast near Canea (Khania). Other U.S. communications facilities and five NATO NADGE sites are spread throughout the country. Nuclear weapons storage sites serving both United States and NATO purposes also exist in Greece, but details regarding this category of facility are classified.[72]

---

[71] U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad. United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: United States Forces in Europe, hearings, part 10 (91st Cong. 2d sess.), pp. 2018, 2108–2109, 2288, 2290–2292. Lewis, Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean, pp. 20–30. Washington Post, Apr. 18, 1976. 1ff. Air Force Magazine, vol. 59, May 1976, pp. 82–83. Admiral Stansfield Turner, "The Southern Region," NATO's Fifteen Nations, vol. 21, February-March 1976, pp. 89–91. NATO: Facts and Figures Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1976, p. 220. U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs. Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain, hearings (94th Cong., 2d sess.) p. 4.

[72] U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad. United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Greece and Turkey, hearings, part 7, June 9 and 11, 1970 (91st Cong., 2d sess.) pp. 1781, 1803–1804. Ibid., United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: United States Forces in Europe, hearings, part 10 (91st Cong., 2d sess.) pp. 2029, 2291–2292. Inventory of Air Force Military Real Property Overseas (30 June 1976). Inventory of Military Real Property, Navy (30 June 1976). Communications data on DCS sites provided by Defense Communications Agency, Department of Defense. NADGE data provided by Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Installations and Logistics. Official Correspondence, September 1976. Air Force Magazine, vol. 59, May 1976, pp. 82–83. Lewis, Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean, pp. 23–24, 28. John M. Collins and John S. Chwat, Greece and Turkey: Some Military Implications Related to NATO and the Middle East. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs, Special Subcommittee on Investigations, committee print, Feb. 28, 1975, passim.

MAJOR UNITED STATES MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN GREECE



Foremost among the major facilities utilized by U.S. military personnel in Greece is the Souda Bay complex on the northwest side of the island of Crete. Souda Bay is a major support center that houses fuel and ammunition used by the U.S. Navy as well as forces of NATO member states. Souda has fine port facilities and an anchorage nearly large enough to accommodate the entire U.S. 6th Fleet. Besides serving as a supply center, the Souda Bay complex provides an excellent airfield, which is used for staging military reconnaissance operations by U.S. forces. Also associated with the Souda Bay complex is the NATO missile firing range at nearby Namfi, where military training and testing exercises are conducted by U.S. forces and those of other NATO member states. Iraklion Air Station, located on the north central coast of Crete, supports air reconnaissance flights and air tanker refueling operations of U.S. military forces. Also associated with Iraklion is an electronic surveillance station manned by the U.S. Air Force Security Service, (USAFSS)—a component of the National Security Agency (NSA). This sophisticated listening post is charged with monitoring military activities of the Soviet Union in the eastern Mediterranean, and other activities of interest to U.S. military planners.[73]

TABLE 13.—*U.S. Military Personnel in Greece*

Army	742
Air Force	2,206
Navy	415
Marine Corps	12
Total	3,375

On the Greek mainland, Hellenikon (Athenai) Air Base, located at Athens, is used as a headquarters and support installation for other USAFE facilities in Greece. This base serves as a staging point for air transport operations of USAFE and as a support base for the U.S. Military Airlift Command (MAC). Electronic and photographic reconnaissance missions performed by U.S. C–130 aircraft are also deployed from this airbase. Five early-warning sites of NATO's NADGE system are dispersed at strategic points throughout northern continental Greece for the purpose of monitoring military activity of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations.

A major military communications center which is part of global U.S. Defense Communications System (DCS) is located at Nea Makri, situated near Marathon Bay, 27 miles northeast of Athens. Nea Makri is tied into the Licola terminal of the U.S. military communications complex at Naples, Italy, and the Moron communications terminal in Spain. Kato Souli terminal situated 7 miles northwest of Nea Makri, is linked with the U.S. 6th Fleet afloat, with the Lago di Patri terminal of the Naples communications complex, and with the Rota Naval Base in Spain. Mt. Pateras terminal, located roughly 200 miles west of Athens, serves to connect Greece with the Yamanlar terminal near Izmir, Turkey, on the Turkish west central coast. The Mt. Pateras terminal, located 19 miles north of Athens serves to interconnect a number of U.S. military communications terminals throughout northern and southern Greece.[74]

---

[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.

Major U.S. Military Installations in Turkey

Turkey joined the NATO alliance through the February 15, 1952, protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty. Because of its physical proximity to the Soviet Union and its control over the straits which govern passage into the Mediterranean from the Black Sea, Turkey has been a valued member of NATO as well as an important ally of the United States. The military facilities which Turkey has made available to the United States in the past have permitted the establishment of useful intelligence collecting posts which have enabled the United States to keep track of Soviet air and naval activities, missile and nuclear weapon tests, and general military activities in the Near Eastern area surrounding Turkey proper.* Other facilities provided by the Turks include air fields for tactical fighter aircraft, as well as defense communication stations for the United States, and supply and ammunition depots for U.S. air and naval forces which operate in the eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, Turkey has provided NATO with 14 NADGE early-warning radar sites which are spread throughout the country.


Major facilities that have been utilized by the United States in Turkey include a U.S. Navy LORAN station at Kargabarun, located in European Turkey, intelligence collection sites at Sinop on the Black Sea coast, Belbasi in central Turkey, Diyarbakir in southeastern Turkey, and Karamursel in northwestern Turkey, on the coast of the Sea of Marmara. Other major facilities include Incirlik Air Base, Iskenderun and Yumurtalik supply depots located in south central Turkey near the Syrian-Turkish border, Ankara Air Station in the Turkish capital; Izmir Air Station, and Cigli Air base located in west central Turkey on the Aegean coast. In addition, Turkey houses other military facilities which serve both United States and NATO purposes such as command and control and logistics support.[75]

---

*Turkey, due to geography, provides a convenient point for tracking Soviet missile shots from Kapustin Yar (located east of Volgograd) and the range at Tyuratam (near the Aral Sea). The latter site has been a center for MIRV testing of Soviet SS–18 and SS–19 ICBM's. It has been estimated that in the past approximately 25 percent of the hard information regarding Soviet missile launches obtained by the U.S. has come from the intelligence facilities in Turkey. Philip J. Klass, *Secret Sentries in Space,* New York: Random House, 1971, pp. 15–16, 19, 26–27, 47. Soviet Missile Development, *Intelligence Digest,* October 1974, p. 29. *Facts on File Yearbook 1971,* New York, pp. 904–905. Collins and Chwat, *Greece and Turkey,* pp. 13, 16. *Aviation Week and Space Technology* vol. 103. Aug. 4, 1975, p. 23. *Wall Street Journal,* July 28, 1975, p. 4. Official correspondence, William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence to Hon. William Broomfield, July 31, 1975. This letter was made public after its receipt in 1975 by Representative Broomfield. Testimony of the Hon. Philip C. Habib, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Department of State, and testimony of the Hon. Robert Ellsworth, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense, U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, *United States-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement,* hearing on S.J. Res. 204. Sept. 15, 1976 (94th Cong., 2d sess.). Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, pp. 6, 13.

[75] U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad. United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: United States Forces in Europe, hearings, part 10 (91st Cong., 2d sess.) pp. 2279, 2282, 2285, 2289, 2291. Ibid., United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Greece and Turkey, hearings, part 7 pp. 1821–1822, 1832, 1860–1864. Air Force Magazine, vol. 59, May 1976, p. 152. Newsweek, vol. 87, Aug. 11, 1975, pp. 37–38. Aviation Week and Space Technology vol. 104, Aug. 4, 1975, p. 23. Inventory of Air Force Military Real Property Overseas (30 June 1976), prepared by Headquarters, USAF. Inventory of Army Military Real Property Outside the United States (30 June 1976) prepared by Department of the Army, Office of Chief of Engineers. Lewis, Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean, pp. 28–32. NATO NADGE data provided by Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, Installations and Logistics. Official Correspondence, September 1976. Communications data on DCS sites provided by Defense Communications Agency. Department of Defense. Collins and Chwat, Greece and Turkey, passim. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance. International Security Assistance Programs, Hearings on S. 2846, April 25, 26, May 1, 2, 1978 (95th Cong., 2d sess.), pp. 176–178.

MAJOR UNITED STATES MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN TURKEY



MAJOR MILITARY MISSIONS SERVED BY INSTALLATIONS IN TURKEY

Most of the key installations used by the United States in Turkey are electronic in nature and are associated with intelligence collecting of one kind or another. Two of the largest outposts involved with intelligence activities in Turkey are Sinop, on the Black Sea coast in north-central Turkey, and Karamursel,* located on the southeast shore of the Sea of Marmara. Sinop, a radar monitoring and communications facility, manned by personnel from the Army Security Agency (ASA), a component of the National Security Agency (NSA), collects data on the Soviet Union's air and naval activities in the Black Sea area, as well as that nation's missile testing activities. Associated with Sinop is the Samsun communications site which is manned by personnel of the U.S. Air Force Security Service (USAFSS), also a component of NSA. Karamursel Air Station is a U.S. communications and monitoring installation which tracks Soviet naval traffic in the western Black Sea area and the area surrounding the straits. U.S. Air Force Security personnel are stationed at Karamursel.[76]

TABLE 14.—*U.S. Military Personnel in Turkey*

Army	1,080
Air Force	3,463
Navy	22
Marine Corps	19
Total	4,584

Another important intelligence collecting facility is Diyarbakir Air Station, a long-range radar and communications complex in east-central Turkey that tracks Soviet military activities. Associated with Diyarbakir's activities is nearby Pirinclik Air Base. Intelligence activities are carried out at the Diyarbakir complex by personnel of the U.S. Air Force Security Service (USAFSS). Belbasi Station, located near Ankara in central Turkey, is a U.S. seismographic detection base charged with monitoring Soviet nuclear tests. Numerous U.S. Defense Communications System (DCS) terminals and 14 NATO NADGE early-warning sites are distributed throughout Turkey, some of them near or at intelligence related facilities such as those mentioned above.[77]

Other important Turkish installations utilized by the United States include the Incirlik Air Base located near the city of Adana in southeastern Turkey, and Iskenderun and Yumurtalik storage depots on the southeast Mediterranean coast near the Syrian border. Incirlik is the major tactical fighter base in Turkey. It houses rotational USAFE aircraft from Torrejon Air Base in Spain and Aviano Air Base in Italy. U.S. fighters located at Incirlik are the most forward deployed land-based American aircraft in the eastern Mediterranean that are capable of launching a tactical nuclear strike in the event of conflict in the region. Iskenderun and Yumurtalik are the most important supply, POL, and storage centers for U.S. military forces in the extreme eastern Mediterranean. Kargabarun, located on the northern

*Recently, Defense Department officials have stated their intention to phase out U.S. operations at Karamursel.

[76] Ibid. New York Times, July 25, 1975, p. 2. Baltimore Sun, July 27, 1975, p. 2, Washington Post, July 29, 1975, p. A10. New York Times, Aug. 3, 1975, section IV. New York Times, Oct. 20, 1975, p. 3.

[77] Ibid. NATO NADGE data provided by Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense Installations and Logistics, Official Correspondence, September 1976.

shore of the Sea of Marmara, is a U.S. Navy LORAN station—an installation which assists U.S. military craft in fixing their positions in the Mediterranean from long ranges through electronic radio-navigational devices. Ankara, in central Turkey, is the site of an air station and TUSLOG, the U.S. Logistics Group, Turkey, which is the central logistical and support command for all U.S. military supply services throughout Turkey. Izmir, on the west central coast of Turkey, is the site of an air support base for USAFE, as well as the headquarters of NATO's LAND-SOUTHEAST command and the 6th Allied Tactical Air Force (SIXATAF). Cigli, a USAFE tactical airbase, is located to the north of Izmir proper.[78]

Effectiveness of the Current Base Structure in Supporting U.S. Objectives in Southern Europe

One can make a convincing case that the current base structure in Southern Europe is sufficient to enable the United States to fulfill its European-oriented *military* objectives, if it can be assumed that all U.S. and NATO installations and facilities presently in existence in this region will be available for use. Although the military presence of the United States in Southern Europe is not as massive in terms of personnel as it is in the case of Northern and Central Europe, it is still substantial—with the U.S. Sixth Fleet being the most notable expression of this presence. The chain of military facilities from Portugal through Spain and Italy to Greece and Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean provides effective and necessary support for the important "floating base" constituted by the Sixth Fleet, which in turn represents, and adds credence to, the *political* commitment of the United States to play a major role in the maintenance of *political* and *military* stability in the area.

To the extent that the continued presence of U.S. bases in Southern Europe fosters a closer political and economic relationship between the United States and its allies in Western Europe generally, these installations can be said to support current U.S. *non-military* objectives in the region. Cooperation and association in the defense area can help strengthen cooperation and association in the political and economic spheres. Indeed, given the economic problems of most of the Southern European nations, and the threat to their political stability these problems pose, it can be argued that the United States and other European nations have a particular responsibility to assist their less developed allies. By doing so they can serve the common interest by reducing a potentially serious weakness that could be successfully exploited by unfriendly powers. The continued concern for the physical security of these countries as expressed by the U.S. military presence in the Mediterranean further provides a foundation upon which closer

---

[78] U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad. United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad : United States Forces in Europe, hearings, part 10 (91st Cong., 2d sess.) pp. 2279, 2282, 2285, 2289, 2291. Ibid., United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad : Greece and Turkey, hearings, part 7, pp. 1821–1822, 1832, 1860–1864. Air Force Magazine, vol. 59, May 1976, p. 152. Newsweek, vol. 87, Aug. 11 1975, pp. 37–38. Aviation Week and Space Technology, vol. 104, Aug. 4, 1975, p. 23. Inventory of Air Force Military Real Property Overseas (30 June 1976), prepared by Headquarters, USAF. Inventory of Army Military Real Property Outside the United States (30 June 1976), prepared by the Department of Army, Office of Chief of Engineers. Lewis, Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean, pp. 28–32.

and mutually beneficial economic and political ties and cooperation can be built.

It must be noted, however, that the newly emerging democracies in Southern Europe have witnessed within their midst a questioning of the wisdom of continued military association with the United States in the manner developed years ago. This questioning has generally been led by opposition parties—usually leftist in nature. However, it has also been supported by some center-right nationalists as well. Should the point be reached in a Southern European country where U.S. bases are such an issue of contention between the host government or its people on the one hand and the United States on the other that they constitute a substantial political problem for both governments, it would be prudent at that juncture to re-evaluate their overriding importance in light of the circumstances. Sensitive handling of the political issues and concerns related to the use by the U.S. of bases in each of the Southern European nations should enable the United States to avoid such debilitating disagreements over this question, and thus maintain the utility of these installations as instruments for the support of all U.S. foreign policy objectives in this region.

Alternative Instruments To Promote U.S. Objectives

Meeting the objectives of the U.S. cited at the outset of this chapter without the current American military presence and base structure could, *in theory*, be accomplished under certain circumstances. The U.S. presence could be drastically reduced, re-structured or totally withdrawn *if* there were either (1) an all-European settlement; (2) the development of a self-sufficient, unitary Western Europe; (3) the formation of an Atlantic Union; or (4) emphasis on U.S.-West German bilateral security arrangements.

1. ALL-EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT

The United States presumably would not have to maintain a major force presence in Western Europe if an East-West settlement were achieved based on moderated ideological differences, an accommodation between the two Germanies, establishment of relatively free and open relations between Eastern and Western Europe, and effective constraints on military (particularly Soviet) force levels and postures.

Such European conditions are, in fact, among the declared long-term objectives of Western policies today. They are not, however, anywhere near realization. It is possible to suggest that a beginning has been made in this direction through the various East-West negotiations and agreements of the early and mid-1970's. It is not possible to conclude that the path is yet firmly established. And, it seems reasonable to suggest that such dramatic changes in East-West conditions are likely to occur only over a very long period of time, even with the very best of intentions on all sides.

The Warsaw Pact countries have for a number of years proposed the dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and the replacement of the bloc-to-bloc confrontation with a pan-European collective security system. As Elliot Goodman has argued,[79] serious analysis of the

---

[79] Goodman, Elliot, R. The Fate of the Atlantic Community. New York, Praeger Publishers, 1975, pp. 258–261.

Eastern proposal leads one to the conclusion that either war or Soviet domination of Western Europe would result. Goodman points out that war could come as a result of a build-up of German military—possibly including nuclear—power that might follow U.S. withdrawal from the continent. Or, recalling the observations of former NATO Secretary General Manlio Brosio, a collective security system in Europe "without a united Western Europe and without the guarantee of the United States, would lead to the inevitable predominance of the Soviet Union over all the continent."

2. SELF-SUFFICIENT WESTERN EUROPE

A second set of circumstances under which the United States presumably would not have to maintain a large force presence in Western Europe would be in the case of integration developing to the point of political, economic, and military unity so that a European community would have the will and ability to defend itself against Soviet power. Such a united Western Europe might still be allied with the United States and could depend to one degree or another on the deterrent effect on U.S. power. But the European entity would provide the conventional forces required to blunt a Warsaw Pact attack and would possess tactical and strategic nuclear weapons sufficient to have some deterrent effect of their own.

In the late 1960's, Alastair Buchan suggested how a federal Western Europe in partnership with the United States might evolve; [80]

> In order to become partners in their own right and to claim equality of status, if not of strength, in this new relationship with the United States, the . . . European countries decide that they must construct an intimate community which will be sufficiently independent not to become a satellite, and sufficiently powerful and cooperative to sustain the role of an equal partner. . . .
>
> Their final objective is the creation of the United States of Europe. This is a federal structure with a federal parliament and a federal government to which the component states surrender powers of decision in the fields of economic, monetary, defence, and foreign policy. . . .
>
> At an early stage in the process of federation the West European governments, faced with a substantial reduction by the United States of her military presence in Europe, set about the construction of an integrated European Defence Community (EDC). . . . It comprises the following elements: A European General Staff with integrated planning staffs, the integration of national forces at divisional level, standardization of equipment and methods of training, and a single European logistics system. . . .
>
> In the first stages of the EDC's construction, the residual British and French nuclear forces remain outside the EDC system under national control, representing national defence insurance policies without any European pretensions. If,

---

[80] Buchan, Alastair, Europe's Futures, Europe's Choices. Models of Western Europe in the 1970's. New York, Columbia University Press, 1969, pp. 90–92. Buchan's book remains a valuable think-piece on the future organization of Western Europe and the Atlantic Alliance.

however, they have been maintained and still represent a significant military potential when the Federation's political and defence structure is nearing completion, they will have to be absorbed into the EDC.

Such a vision, in fact, lay behind the "Grand Design" that the Kennedy Administration enunciated for the Atlantic Community in the early 1960's and to a certain degree still provides a significant backdrop for American and European policies in the late 1970's.

As mentioned earlier, U.S. policy has supported the development of a more united Western Europe which would include a more cohesive West European defense effort. Progress toward this goal, however, has been slight. Most analysts accept that West European military integration can only follow the process of political integration, and must be underpinned by more extensive economic integration. While economic integration has made significant strides in the European Community over the last 25 years, the political will has been lacking to move beyond a free trade area toward full economic and monetary union. And while there have been steps taken to coordinate foreign policies among the members of the European Community, the consultative approaches developed are still in their infancy. In addition, evolution of a self-sufficient Western Europe presumably would require Anglo-French nuclear cooperation, and many difficult problems currently stand in the way of such cooperation, most particularly the question of how to provide an acceptable role for West Germany in the creation of a "European" nuclear capability.

It has been suggested (particularly by the supporters of Congressional efforts to reduce unilaterally U.S. force levels in Europe) that one way of forcing Europe to coalesce would be to pull out American forces, thereby driving the West Europeans toward greater integration and a common defense effort. It was more commonly believed more recently, however, that unilateral U.S. withdrawals would not likely overcome all the obstacles that stand in the way of rapid West European integration, and that the crisis precipitated by such an action could further divide, rather than unify the West European states. On balance, there are currently few observers who believe that a unilateral withdrawal would serve the major U.S. objectives in the region.

3. ATLANTIC UNION

A federation of the members of NATO has for years been regarded by some as the desirable model for the future of the Atlantic Alliance. There seems no question but that agreement on an Atlantic federation would serve American objectives as outlined in this chapter. But it also seems clear that the obstacles to such a union are, for all intents and purposes, insurmountable in the near future.

An Atlantic Union anytime in the next 10–20 years would either be dominated by the United States, because Europe would not have coalesced sufficiently to act as an "equal," and therefore would be unacceptable to our European allies; or, such a union would require that the United States relinquish more sovereignty than it is likely to be prepared to do within this time frame.

As one author has observed,[81] there are "formidable difficulties" lying in the way of any "organic fusion" between the United States and Western Europe, and it requires "a great deal of optimism to imagine that the emergence of this new 'Super-superpower' is possible. And so NATO is still an indispensable instrument for Western defence. Europe still needs America and they both need each other."

It is conceivable that some time in the more distant future, presuming the development of a united Western Europe, some formula for Atlantic federation—or trilateral community with Japan—could become acceptable on both sides of the Atlantic. This would require, however, a highly developed sense of interdependence at all levels of government and society, a considerably constrained sense of nationalism, and some form of external threat more severe than what has already been posed by the Soviet Union or by the oil producers. Such circumstances seem unlikely to combine in this century. In fact, as long as the members of NATO are successful in keeping the Alliance relevant to the requirements of their internal and external interests, they are unlikely to see an Atlantic Union as a compelling alternative.

4. U.S.-WEST GERMAN BILATERAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

If one were to add together all the possible adverse developments that could come to pass for the Atlantic Alliance, a very dim picture could be painted indeed. Turkey, Greece, Italy, Portugal and France—the southern tier of the Alliance—could be immobilized by internal political trends or choose, by consequence of deteriorating relations with the United States, to follow neutralist foreign policies. The nations of Northern Europe could likewise drift away from their commitments to the Alliance as, in fact, they seemed to be doing at the peak of expectations for detente with the East. Energy prices could once again lead to stultifying recession, making it impossible for the weaker economies in the Alliance to sustain defense expenditures.

Should some or all of these conditions converge, the Alliance could become little more than a bilateral defense relationship between the United States and West Germany—presuming that these two countries continued to see a defense against Soviet power in Central Europe as important to their interests. While these two powers could in theory sustain a defense effort sufficient to deter a Warsaw Pact attack, it is more likely that the reduction of the Atlantic Alliance to its "irreducible minimum" would be the last step before the final unraveling of Western European stability and the military balance between East and West.

Most Western observers agree that West Germany deserves a role in the Alliance more commensurate with that country's strength and record of stability. But tendencies toward excessive dependence on the U.S.-West German link are not desired by the West Germans, who want to deal with the United States in concert with the other European allies, and would, on balance, be injurious to U.S. interests in Europe. In short, an Atlantic Alliance which is exclusively dependent on a

---

[81] Williams, Geoffrey. The Permanent Alliance: The European-American Partnership 1945–1984. Leyden, the Netherlands, A. W. Sijthoff, 1977. p. 361.

U.S.-West German relationship offers no more attractive alternative to the current European security structure than those discussed above.

Given the centrality of Europe to United States interests, the practical as well as the symbolic significance of the U.S. bases in the European theater is, and is likely to remain, great. Whether the actual military value of every major base in the region is the same may be reasonably debated. However, the fact that these bases are broadly perceived in Europe as the *tangible* expression of the U.S. commitment to defend its European allies is not open to reasonable dispute. In this context, even relatively minor withdrawals of U.S. forces from bases in Europe would likely be cause for alarm within the European community, unless undertaken pursuant to a negotiated arms control agreement. *Major* U.S. withdrawals from the bases would have a profound effect on NATO and U.S. relations with Europe generally. As a consequence, barring some significant change in the political, economic and military environment in Europe, the United States presumably would maintain its current military presence in that region for the forseeable future. Such an action would be consistent with current American foreign policy objectives in this region.

SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST*

Perspectives

Two caveats temper the following discussion; first, that the emergence from any quarter of a clearly defined, major military threat could change policies and perceptions of the United States and any or all of the states of the region toward a U.S. presence in the area. And, second, a U.S. presence or base will be effective only if the threat of U.S. action is creditable. Unless potential adversaries believe the United States will use its power if challenged, a U.S. presence is meaningless at best, an inviting vulnerability at worst.

Background

Many United States' interests in the southern and eastern littoral of the Mediterranean Sea[1] date from the earliest days of the Republic: the Founding Fathers reverence for their Judeo-Christian heritage; the signing of a treaty of friendship and commerce with Morocco in 1786; the U.S. Navy protection of American shipping from "Barbary Pirates" at the turn of the 19th century; the formation in 1810 of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions and its subsequent establishment of schools, hospitals, and missions in the region; American philanthropy to victimized Syrians in the 1840's; American Civil War veterans training the Egyptian army in the 1870's; the founding of the Syrian Protestant College, now the American University of Beirut, in 1862; American concern and aid for Armenians in the 1890's—and many more such examples could be cited.[2] However, United States interests in the Mediterranean area, episodic in some instances, long lasting in others, did not constitute a major concentration of interest that would focus American attention and policy on the region in the same manner that the United States focused its attention on Europe, Latin American, or Japan. The southern littoral of the Mediterranean and the Middle East remained a secondary area of American foreign policy until the post War II era. United States military involvement in the region in World War II (the North Africa campaign, the Middle East Supply Center at Cairo, for example), evolved into a shared interest with the British and the French to act as political overseers, and a political confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union developed in the area in the post war years. Since World War II, United States interests in the area traditionally have been grouped under the following four categories.


---

*Prepared by Clyde R. Mark, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs.

[1] The states of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. Mauretania and Jordan, although not Mediterranean, are included in the scope of this chapter. Iraq and Saudi Arabia will be considered because of their oil outlets on the Mediterranean.

[2] See James A. Field, Jr., America and the Mediterranean World, 1776–1882, Princeton. Princeton University Press, 1969, 485 p.

THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN



CULTURAL INTERESTS

Cultural interests encompass the many U.S. ties to the region which have been generated more often by emotional attachments than by measurable quantities such as treaties or trade deficits. The American sympathy for a Jewish homeland in Palestine, American philanthropic contributions to victims of war or natural disaster, the ethnic ties of an Arab-American community in Detroit, Toledo, or other American cities, or an abiding interest in scholarly pursuits from archeological digs to viewing the "King Tut" exhibition, are indicative of the intangible cultural connection between the United States and the Middle East-North African area.

ECONOMIC INTERESTS

From the days of the "Yankee Clippers" to today's modern multinational corporations, the United States has enjoyed favorable balances of payments and trade with countries on the southern and eastern littoral of the Mediterranean, in spite of the deficit payments balances with Libya and Algeria caused by the recent oil price increases. American technology, American goods, American services, and the forthright American style of doing business have found ready markets in the area, although at times those trade relations have been clouded or interrupted by political differences. The United States exports heavy machinery, manufactured products, chemicals, transportation equipment, electronic gear, and food to the region. Oil dominates imports to the United States, followed by food products, textiles, raw materials, and small manufactures. American tourists and American arms and military hardware sales also figure prominently in U.S. trade relations with North Africa and the Middle East.

At present, oil dominates U.S. economic interests in the region. International financial problems associated with oil are the recycling of petrodollars, arranging safe, acceptable investment opportunities for oil producing states with excess revenues, managing oil-financed development schemes, and generating the cash needed to pay for oil deliveries. Equally important is maintaining access to oil supplies, the life blood of the industrialized West (and Japan). Oil vital to Western Europe flows from the fields of Algeria and Libya, to the pipeline terminals in Turkey, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Egypt, and through the Suez Canal.

POLITICAL INTERESTS

Nineteenth century contacts with American businessmen and educators influenced Middle Eastern and North African national leaders. American democratic principles and institutions and the American revolution became models for national movements seeking independence from colonial rule. The fifth and twelfth of Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points, calling for self determination and independence, became the mottoes of area nationalists even after the United States turned away from the League of Nations. In the post World War II years, the United States actively supported independence and statehood movements in Morocco, Libya, Israel, and Jordan.

35-995 O - 79 - 6

U.S. political interests in the southern Mediterranean and Middle East added another dimension during the "cold war" era. The "battle for men's minds" engaged a U.S.-led, free enterprise/democratic Western block against a Soviet-led, socialist-communist/prolitarian dictatorship Eastern bloc in a competition to enlist to their respective causes the region's nations. Each side used persuasion and promises of military and economic assistance to win clients, but most states preferred neutrality as a protection for their new-found independence.

STRATEGIC MILITARY INTERESTS

The eastern Mediterranean is the land, sea, and air bridge between Europe, Asia, and Africa—the natural corrider for intercontinental communications and transportation. Even in this age of satellites, supertankers, and long-range jet aircraft, maintaining open communications and transportation depends upon free access to the area. The United States has a strategic interest, both for itself and its allies, in maintaining that free access, and in ensuring that no one power dominates the area and closes the Middle East to international traffic.

A second, but no less important, strategic interest is oil. A real or threatened interruption of the flow of oil across the Mediterranean could mean disaster for the industrial and defensive strength of the West. It is crucial for the United States to ensure that no nation or bloc of nations will interdict the oil flow, dominate the political decisions of the oil producing states which could impede oil production, or hold hostage the producing fields.

U.S. "REAL" INTERESTS IN THE SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST

The "traditional" interests cited above remain valid and continue to contribute to the rationale for maintaining an effective presence in the area. But they are, for the most part, generalized, long-term interests which may not reflect more immediate concerns of shifting focus. If viewed from a current, and possibly more realistic, viewpoint, U.S. interests might appear differently, and the reasons for or against maintaining U.S. military bases to support economic or political interests may change also.

OIL

The most immediate U.S. concern about oil is to negate the use or threat of the so-called oil weapon by the Arab nations. While the industrialized nations were not crippled by the embargo and production restrictions of 1973–1974, the experience suggested that a rigidly enforced and universally applied embargo in the future could seriously and decisively injure the industrialized West and Japan. The prospect of future embargoes raises several questions. First, will the Arabs embargo oil to the West in the event of another Middle East war? Second, does the West have any response to an embargo? Third, would an embargo alter the Arab-Israeli balance? And, fourth, can an embargo be avoided?

Since the Arab nations have friends among the industrialized states—not all of which support Israel—and the Arabs would be hesitant to sacrifice all their oil revenues, it appears likely that another

embargo would be concentrated on the one country that strongly supports Israel and has the power to influence Israeli decisions—the United States. It also appears possible that the United States would stand alone against an Arab embargo, in spite of the existence of the emergency sharing plan under the International Energy Agency [3] because it would be in the interests of the other industrialized nations to abrogate that agreement rather than face economic ruin for the sake of a United States position with which they did not agree. But, even with United States support for Israel in another Middle Eastern war, it is not certain that the Arabs would embargo the United States. An embargo would inconvenience or disrupt the United States, but not cripple it, and it is doubtful if the United States would abandon Israel under any set of circumstances.

Yet, if the Arabs embargoed the Western nations, or the United States alone, there are responses available to counter the effects of the embargo. The industrialized nations could stop trade with the oil producers, freeze financial assets invested in the West, or use military force to regain access to oil fields. While the feasibility of seizing oil fields is open to question,[4] an interruption of trade and financial arrangements would in many cases be as damaging to the oil producers as the oil embargo would be to the oil consumers. In short, each side holds the other hostage, is dependent upon the other for maintenance of the international economic system, and cannot afford to threaten their own survival by indiscriminately applying embargoes—either oil or economic.

An oil embargo would not alter the Arab-Israeli military balance. Israel maintains its military superiority over the Arabs, and is likely to win the next round of any renewed conflict fought within 5–7 years. Israel's military strength gives it a greater capability than the Arabs, of picking the time, place, and duration of the military contest, an advantage the Israelis could use to ensure that another war is short, devastating, and fought on Arab territory.[5] Such a war would likely be over before the effects of an oil embargo are felt, thus limiting the effectiveness of the embargo to the period of post-war negotiations where such pressure would be of more limited though perhaps considerable impact.

And, finally, another embargo can be avoided, either by removing the most probable cause for an embargo, the Arab-Israeli conflict, or by creating ties between oil producers and oil consumers that would guarantee oil supplies even if the Arab-Israeli dispute continued. The United States, with the encouragement of most of the world's nations, continues its search for acceptable compromises that could lead to a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli problem. Meanwhile, the United States has pursued bilateral diplomatic, economic, and political ties with several Arab states which, while intended to better relations in several areas, could have the effect of increasing mutual dependence

---

[3] The 19 member-states of the I.E.A. agreed to reduce their oil consumption and to share available oil supplies in the event of an oil emergency, such as another oil embargo. I.E.A. was formed in November 1974, under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. See: Mason Willrich and Melvin Conant, The International Energy Agency: an interpretation and assessment, American Journal of International Law, vol. 71, April 1977: 199–223.

[4] U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on International Relations, Special Subcommittee on Investigations. Oil Fields as Military Objectives, a feasibility study, Committee Print. 94th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, August 21, 1975, 111 p.

[5] Cordesman, Anthony H. How Much Is Too Much? Armed Forces Journal, October 1977.

and cooperation and reducing the possibilities of another embargo. For example, recent improvements in U.S.-Egyptian relations could have several positive effects; supplanting Soviet influence, easing Arab-Israeli peace negotiations, opening new markets for U.S. goods and services, and gaining a sympathetic voice in Arab councils where decisions to institute an embargo could be made or confirmed.

POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

The stated political objective of the United States in the Middle East is achieving a stable peace. Another, less visible political objective of the United States appears to be maintaining the status quo; that is, to support and maintain in power those governments which do not threaten to disrupt regional tranquility or international order, and which remain friendly to and in agreement with, the United States. It is axiomatic that a policy of maintaining a pro-Western status quo is also a policy of limiting the influence of the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean basin. Apparently, maintaining the status quo does not require specific forms of government, or specific persons running the government.

There are numerous examples of U.S. willingness to adjust to circumstances. Between 1944 and 1955, Syria went through a series of coups and government changes. But U.S. relations with Syria remained good during that decade, probably because the succession of Syrian regimes remained friendly to the West and did not involve themselves too deeply in the affairs of other Arab states.[6] Despite its domestic instability, Syria was a status quo country. But in 1955 another coup and a series of government crises replaced the pro-Western, isolationist Syrian government with neutralist, pan-Arab leaders. Given the choice between the pro-Western Baghdad Pact or the Arab Collective Security Pact, the new leaders chose Arab unity.[7] Pro-Western leanings shifted toward neutralism. U.S.-Syrian relations soured.

Although opposed to colonialism in principle and supportive of independence movements, the United States did little to support or encourage the Algerian rebellion against France, in the period from 1954 to 1962. Apparently, the United States chose the reality of good relations with NATO ally France over the idealism of anti-colonialism and independence.[8] The war disrupted the status quo in metropolitan France, in other North African countries which offered sanctuary or support to the Algerians, and among other colonies where the pan-Arabist and neutralist Algerian leaders threatened to carry their independence movement. From 1962 on, United States relations with Algeria have remained proper and distant.

The opposite was true in Libya in 1952, where the United States supported the independence movement of King Idris, despite his history as a "rebel" against the Italians. Idris was a friend of the West, and was not pan-Arabist, and had no ambitions beyond his own borders. U.S. Libyan relations remained good until the revolutionaries

---

[6] See : Copeland, Miles. The Game of Nations. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1969, chapter 2.

[7] Torrey, Gordon H. Syrian Politics and the Military, Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1964. p. 269–279.

[8] Gallagher, Charles F. The United States and North Africa, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963. p. 242–243.

who overthrew Idris in 1969 began to preach pan-Arabism, neutralism, and anti-imperialism, and in general to disrupt the status quo. Since gaining their independence in the early 1950's, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia have been among the most stable countries in the Middle East. U.S. relations with Morocco and Tunisia have remained good, but over the same 25 years relations with Egypt have been poor, which may be explained by Egypt's several foreign adventures, its leadership role in Arab unity, and its international prominence among non-aligned third world countries. Egypt was a threat to the status quo while Tunisia and Morocco were not. The United States has maintained good relations with Jordan and Lebanon, despite the two countries' relative instability—attempted coups, assassinations, government changes, economic problems, foreign invasions, and civil wars. Jordan and Lebanon have also remained friendly to the West.

ISRAEL—A SPECIAL CASE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The United States is committed to maintain Israel's existence and security. Although no formal commitment exists—no treaty or agreement approved by the Congress, no document or declaration describing what the United States will or will not do to protect Israel—the repetition of statements claiming that the United States supports Israel has created a *de facto* commitment that may have a force comparable to treaty or law. Another widely accepted truism is that it is in the best interests of the United States to support Israel, although specific interests served are rarely defined. This commitment is rooted not only in the many common interests of two democratic societies with technologically sophisticated economies, and many shared cultural, religious and intellectual traditions, but also in a strong American concern for the continued security of a country that has provided refuge and a national home to a people that has been widely persecuted.

Because of the close association between the two countries, the advantages and costs of a possible U.S. base in Israel to strengthen American capability for action in support of Israel have been the subject of recurrent conjecture. From both countries' perspectives the disadvantages have seemed imposing indeed. Israel has preferred, even during major confrontations with surrounding countries, to retain control of its own defenses, and not to seriously consider accepting the constraints on its freedom of action that would result from an American base on its territory. U.S. concerns have been numerous:

1. It would expectably be difficult to convince other states in the region that the only purpose of a United States installation was to defend Israel. Neighboring states could view an American presence either as support for Israeli aggressive intentions or as a threat of direct U.S. action against them, particularly against oil fields. Such a perceived American threat would injure U.S. relations with the Arab states.

2. A base intended to support Israel would likely be perceived by the Arabs as conclusive proof that the United States did not intend to be "even handed" and that the United States was totally on Israel's side in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Such a base could end the U.S. role as a peace arbitor and reduce the chances for peace.

3. In the event of another Arab-Israeli war, regardless of which side was the aggressor, a U.S. base with the mission of supporting Israel could become a target in the conflict. A U.S. base increases the chances of the U.S. becoming directly involved in a war.

4. For nations sensitive to their colonial past and protective of their current independence, an American installation may have the appearance of a colonial outpost, an attempt to establish a physical presence that could lead to American hegemony.

5. Arab states which have heretofore resisted Soviet requests for base rights might well decide to grant Soviet base rights to balance, or in retaliation for, an Israeli base.

6. Growing Arab economic significance for the U.S. economy makes the risk of alienating Arab leaders by establishing a base in Israel a matter of considerable import.

The security requirements of Israel, the strategic needs of the United States and the dynamics of Arab diplomacy could change, of course, in ways that would make the merits of a U.S. base in Israel seem more compelling to both countries. Were Israel's relations with Egypt and other moderate Arab countries to improve, the costs of establishing such a base might be substantially diminished. Speculations on such prospects, however, would have to be tentative indeed.[9]

Available Basing Sites in the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East

Along the southern and eastern littoral of the Mediterranean Sea, there are several areas where the United States could establish permanent bases—providing the United States deemed such bases desirable and necessary, and providing the nations of the region would permit the United States to establish bases.

Morocco.—The United States occupied the naval facilities at Port Lyautey (now Kenitra) during the Allied invasion of North Africa in late 1942. Kenitra, along with three Strategic Air Command (SAC) bases and an air supply depot, became permanent U.S. installations through a secret treaty between France and the United States in 1950. Following independence in 1956, Morocco requested the United States and France to vacate their bases because their presence was inconsistent with Morocco's nonaligned policies and its independence. The United States and Morocco signed an agreement in 1959 calling for U.S. withdrawal by 1963. France withdrew in 1960. The United States maintained a communications facility at Kenitra, which was also used as a training base for the Moroccan armed forces, but the Kenitra base currently is being phased out. Since neither Morocco's nonaligned policies nor its determination to remain independent have changed, it

---

[9] It should be noted that the experience of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war strongly suggests that it is very unlikely that European nations would permit the use of military bases within their boundaries for support of Israel in the event of a renewed conflict. No NATO ally, except Portugal, permitted the use of their bases by the U.S. for the re-supply of Israel in 1973. Although a direct request was not made for permission to use such bases in other NATO and European countries during the 1973 Middle East crisis for the purpose of assisting Israel, it was presumed by the United States that any such request would have been denied. See testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Arthur A. Hartman before the Subcommittees on Europe and the Near East and South Asia, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States—Europe Relations and the 1973 Middle East War. Hearings. 93d Cong. 2d sess., Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1, 1973 and February 19, 1974, p. 39.

is unlikely that Morocco would invite the United States to re-establish a base.

Algeria.—Until its independence in 1962, France maintained several bases in Algeria, among them the naval facilities at Mers al-Kabir (Oran) considered to be one of the best anchorages in the Mediterranean. According to reports, repeated Soviet requests for access to Mers al-Kabir have been rejected by the Algerians. In Arab, African, and third world circles, Algeria is an outspoken advocate of independence, nonalignment, and anti-imperialism. There is little evidence to suggest that Algeria will change its posture and invite any country to establish a base on its territory.

Tunisia.—France maintained bases in Tunisia after independence in 1956, the most important of which were the sea and air facilities at Bizerte and Gabes. But the French "hot pursuit" of Algerian rebels into Tunisian territory, the French bombing of Sakiet (claimed to be an Algerian rebel base), and the change in the French Government, all in 1958, led to a Tunisian-French agreement to close all bases except Bizerte. Renewed Tunisian requests for French withdrawal and an incident in 1961 when some 1200 Tunisians were killed trying to storm the French installation at Bizerte led eventually to a French withdrawal in 1964. Tunisia has maintained a posture of moderation and compromise, a policy which has kept it on good terms with its neighbors and other foreign governments. Unless there were serious, long-term threats to Tunisian sovereignty, there would appear to be little reason for the Tunisians to invite another power to establish bases on its territory.

Malta.—At independence in 1964, Malta and the United Kingdom signed a ten-year defense treaty which included British and NATO rights to air and sea bases. In recent years, Malta has broadened its foreign relations, turning less to Europe and more toward its North African neighbors. In 1969, Britain withdrew the five-ship fleet which had been stationed in Malta. In 1971, Malta abrogated the 1964 treaty and asked for new negotiations with the British. At the same time, the Maltese announced that no other power—the Italians, Americans, or Russians—would be given basing rights in Malta. A new seven-year treaty was signed with Britain in 1972, but the Maltese also said that at its termination, no foreign bases would be allowed in Malta.

Libya.—Britain and France occupied Libya after World War II, until it gained independence in 1952. In 1953, Britain and Libya signed an agreement for a 20-year lease of bases in Benghazi, al-Adam, and Tubruk. In 1954, the United States and Libya signed an agreement for U.S. use of Wheelus air base near Tripoli. The French kept troops and an airfield in Cyrenaica until 1955. Following a coup d'etat in September 1969, Libya opened negotiations with the British and Americans for evacuation of their bases. Agreements were signed in December 1969, and the bases turned over to Libya in June 1970. Periodically, the Libyans had announced that the foreigners would be asked to leave, usually in the wake of deteriorating Arab-Western relations, such as the Egyptian-American diplomatic crisis of 1964, the West German recognition of Israel in 1965, or the June war of 1967, but these announcements were viewed as Libyan attempts to cement Arab unity rather than as serious breaks with the West. Similarly, Libya responded favorably to Arab appeals to the Libyans to

open their bases to the Eastern bloc countries, but no direct action was ever taken. Until the coup of 1969, Libya used the foreign bases as part of its policy of appeasing its stronger neighbors. Since the coup, Libya has denounced all "imperialism," naming both the United States and the Soviet Union as imperialist nations, and stated that it would never again allow foreign bases on its soil.

Egypt.—At independence in 1936, Egypt and Britain signed an agreement providing for British bases along the Suez Canal. Britain occupied Egypt in World War II, but at the end of the war, relinquished its bases at Alexandria, al-Alamayn, and Mersa Matruh. Following the coup d'etat in 1952, Egypt sought an abrogation of the 1936 treaty and a withdrawal of British forces from Suez. In 1954, Britain and Egypt signed an agreement calling for a British withdrawal in June 1956. British, French, and Israeli forces occupied parts of the Suez Canal and Sinai Peninsula in October 1956, but withdrew under a United Nations-sponsored agreement. U.N. forces patrolled the Egyptian-Israeli border, with Egyptian permission from 1957 until June 1967, after which the Israelis reoccupied the Sinai up to the east bank of the Suez Canal. In 1974, following the war of 1973, the Israelis withdrew from parts of the Sinai and another U.N. force patrolled a buffer zone between Egyptian and Israeli forces. A U.S. civilian observer station was added to the U.N. force after a second Israeli withdrawal in 1975. The installations serving the United Nations forces and the U.S. civilian contingent should not be considered foreign military bases. The Soviet Union did have access to an air field near Alexandria, used for reconnaisance flights over the Mediterranean Sea, and a materials depot at Alexandria for its Mediterranean fleet between 1967 and 1972. It is possible that Egypt would allow a U.S. presence in Egypt on a temporary basis, but currently improbable that Egypt would grant the U.S. permanent bases.

Israel.—Since independence in 1948, Israel has not had any foreign troops or foreign bases on its soil other than in connection with United Nations truce observer activities. Assuming that Israel and the United States agreed to establish a base in Israel, it is possible in current circumstances that U.S.-Arab relations could suffer. The Arabs might interpret a U.S. base in Israel as U.S. support for Israeli territorial "expansionism" or "aggression," as a threat against Arab oil fields, or as proof of U.S. "imperialist" intentions in the regions. But it is possible that Israel would allow a base in Israel as part of a guarantee in an Arab-Israeli peace agreement. Indeed, such an eventuality was suggested in the Camp David accords.

There are numerous sites for the construction of air bases, both in Israel and in the occupied territories, but only a limited number of naval facilities. The port of Ashdod has an open sea anchorage and is shallow. Haifa could handle everything up to aircraft carriers, has an oil refinery and airfields nearby, but is already congested with commercial traffic.

Lebanon.—Lebanon has tried to maintain a posture of neutrality among the Arab states and avoid confrontation with Israel. Lebanon is too weak militarily to withstand any of its immediate neighbors or, even to maintain internal order, its former position as a financial, trade, banking, and cultural entrepot for the region has been devas-

tated by continued internal disruption and warfare. In the longer term, it is conceivable that an effective state can be rebuilt in Lebanon. The country has maintained good relations with France and the United States, partly because of historical friendship and partly to enhance its role as entrepot for the region.

In 1958, Lebanon requested and received U.S. troops to protect the Government from a possible insurrection. The U.S. forces were withdrawn within six months, after order was restored. Syrian and Arab League forces are currently in Lebanon to maintain a truce in the Lebanese civil war, but as in the case of American intervention in 1958, the present Arab League intervention is not supposed to be a permanent foreign military presence. Israeli troops have entered Lebanon on several occasions, most recently in March 1978, but to date have not established a permanent base. A United Nations force, formed in March 1978, patrols the Lebanese-Israeli border. Lebanon might tolerate a permanent foreign base in order to help gain security and stability.

Syria.—The port of Latakia is adequate, and reportedly is used by the Soviet Union as a bunkering station. Air base sites, particularly in the interior, are plentiful. Soviet advisors and technicians apparently have access to many Syrian installations, but do not appear to have a permanent base.

Syria may not fear its neighbors (despite several reverses at Israeli hands) and therefore may not feel the need for the protection of a foreign base. In addition, the Syrians remember well their colonial experience with the French after World War I and would be hesitant to threaten their independence by inviting foreign troops to establish bases on their territory. Also, the Syrians consider themselves to be the cultural center of the Arab world, the leading advocates of Arab independence, and the protectors of Arab heritage, and are unlikely to risk "losing face" before their Arab brethren by inviting foreigners to place bases in their land.

Cyprus.—Under the 1960 agreement providing for Cypriot independence, Britain maintains two air bases on the southern coast of Cyprus, Akrotiri near Limassol and Dhekelia near Larnaca. In the past, these bases have been used by other forces, such as the French during the 1956 invasion of Egypt and the United States for intelligence-collecting flights, and conceivably could be used again by allied forces in emergencies. The commercial port facilities at Famagusta, Limassol, and Larnaca would be adequate for limited military use.

Since independence in 1960, Cyprus has been locked in a complicated political and military confrontation involving Greece, Turkey, Great Britain, the United Nations and the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. In 1974, a Turkish intervention divided the island into Greek and Turkish enclaves. Given the present unsettled state of affairs on the island it is impossible to predict how any of the communities involved in the Cyprus tangle would react to a United States request for a permanent base.

PROSPECTS FOR A U.S. BASE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN BASIN

It is unlikely at this time and under current conditions that any of the states of the southern and eastern Mediterranean littoral would invite the United States to establish a permanent air or sea base on their

territory. Most of the states value their symbols of independence too highly to risk even the slightest suggestion that they would sacrifice any of their sovereignty to a foreign power. The socialist countries are even less likely to consider granting base rights to the United States. Because of the competitive political climate, many states would be reluctant to give their neighbors or internal rivals the opportunity to label them as clients of a great power. In some cases, the states do not need the protection offered by a great power base on their soil. And many states of the region fear being drawn into a great power struggle or becoming targets in a great power confrontation.

Yet there are certain conditions under which the United States could establish a base in the region. A comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace agreement could include a United States guarantee of national sovereignty, and as part of that guarantee, a U.S. base or bases could be established in Israel or Egypt, or possibly elsewhere. Such a presence might be limited to the guarantee of sovereignty; i.e., not be used by the United States for any purpose beyond the immediate protection of the signatories to the peace treaty. Under another theoretical circumstance, the United States could be invited to establish a base in the region for protection against aggression. One of the weaker, smaller states may seek an American presence as protection against a developing long-term threat from one or more of its neighbors. The advantage of an American base under these circumstances would have to be weighed against the possibility of becoming involved in a local conflict. A third condition which could lead to a U.S. base in the area is a serious threat to regional security posed by another great power. If, for example, the Soviet Union were to establish a permanent base in the region that created a threat to other states, those other states could request a U.S. base to counter the Soviet base.

WOULD A U.S. BASE SUPPORT U.S. OBJECTIVES?

If the prime U.S. objective is maintaining peace in the region, and a U.S. base was an integral part of a guarantee of an Arab-Israeli peace agreement accepted by all parties to the conflict, then a U.S. base would support this objective. A base established in Israel that was not part of a peace agreement could be interpreted by the Arab nations as U.S. support for, and possible complicity in, what the Arabs believe is Israeli "expansionism" and "aggression." Under those circumstances, a U.S. base could well prove injurious to U.S. interests.

If the prime objective of U.S. policy is to ensure the free flow of oil in times of international emergency, the calculus of benefits from a U.S. base is far from clear. Oil producing states could view a U.S. presence as a threat to seize oil fields. Oil producers might not embargo the United States if they thought they would lose their oil fields. But they might counter the seizure threat by preparing to sabotage the oil fields when and if the United States invaded. Another outside power considering a plan to seize oil fields could view an American base as a counter to their seizure attempt, and conclude that since seizure would not work or would result in a prolonged ground war with the United States, an alternative course would be to destroy the oil fields. Either way, through sabotage or destruction, the oil would stop flowing.

If the prime objective is to maintain regional stability, an American base probably would not, on balance, support the objective. While an American presence might support and protect nations friendly to the United States and therefore enhance the stability of those nations, it is likely that neutral and unfriendly states would view the American military presence as a direct threat, an attempt to divide the Arab world, or a first step toward an ultimate goal of colonialism. Adversaries of the United States either would likely band together to oppose the American presence and to threaten, perhaps through guerrilla and irregular military action, the states the base was intended to protect, or choose to counter the American presence by inviting the Soviet Union to establish a base. The mere presence of foreigners is unsettling to most Middle Eastern peoples and represents to them a challenge to their sovereignty and independence. The construction of a base in the area, in short, would be viewed by many as an intrusion into the domestic affairs of the region.

THE ALTERNATIVE TO A PERMANENT BASE

The U.S. Sixth Fleet is a suitable alternative to a permanent land base. Unlike a land base, the Sixth Fleet is mobile, and can withdraw expeditiously during times when the United States would prefer a low profile, can appear near a trouble spot to demonstrate U.S. interest or a show of force, as happened during the 1970 Jordanian crisis, can be used as a goodwill ambassador, and can mount limited military operations if the need should arise. The Sixth Fleet cannot sustain extended military operations, cannot support certain logistical operations, such as the military resupply of Israel in 1973, and is tied to a home port for periodic resupply and maintenance. Even with these limitations, the Sixth Fleet may offer more advantages than a land base in supporting U.S. objectives in the region. While a land base may infer permanence and stability, the Sixth Fleet may represent, quite literally, a floating symbol in a region of the world where symbols and gestures may mean more than immutable realities.

But the utility of the Sixth Fleet must be measured against Soviet operations in the Mediterranean. Is the Sixth Fleet adequate given the combined Soviet naval and air power of the region? Should the Sixth Fleet be buttressed to better perform its role?

THE INDIAN OCEAN, ARABIAN PENINSULA, AND PERSIAN GULF*

The Indian Ocean Region

This section will address U.S. political, economic and military objectives in the Indian Ocean region and the utility of the current military base structure, U.S. forces deployed in the region and other instruments of presence or influence, to the achievement of these ends. For the purposes of this report the Indian Ocean region is defined as the area from South Africa in the West to Australia in the East, and including the adjoining water bodies of the Mozambique Channel, the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Laccadive Sea, the Bay of Bengal, the Andaman Sea, the Strait of Malacca, and the Great Australian Bight.

The primary regional groupings in the Indian Ocean area include: the African littoral states, including the Horn of Africa; the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf region; South Asia; Southeast Asia and Australia. Many littoral countries cannot be neatly categorized into regions. Kenya, for instance interacts with both the Southern Africa littoral countries and with the countries of the Horn of Africa. Pakistan is culturally and ethnically part of South Asia but also has political, cultural and ethnic ties with Iran. Burma is normally classified as a Southeast Asian country, but in fact has little intercourse with its neighbors or the outside world.

The Indian Ocean area has acquired great significance to the United States due to the oil resources of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula. The importance of these resources, which are essential to meeting current and mid-term future short falls in domestic energy production, has raised the U.S. interest in access to the region's petroleum to that of a vital national interest. This interest thus has important potential military aspects and, hence, great relevance to the issue of the utility of overseas bases and other instruments of presence or influence.

Aside from the interest in maintaining access to the region's petroleum resources, the Indian Ocean has limited military importance to the United States. It does not figure directly in the forward defense of the United States in the way that the Atlantic and Pacific oceans do, nor does sea power deployed in the ocean have much effect on the alignments of littoral states, most of whose vital interests are primarily influenced by adjacent littoral states or inland states. Moreover, the growth of the naval power of important littoral states such as Iran and India, and the substantial naval forces of South Africa, France, Australia, and potentially, Indonesia, greatly reduces the feasibility of the control of the Indian Ocean by a single outside power.

---

*Prepared by Richard P. Cronin, Analyst in National Defense, Richard M. Preece, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, and Herbert Y. Schandler, Specialist in National Defense.

Because of the importance of the oil resources of the region a number of schools of thought have emerged concerning the means of protecting U.S. interests and achieving regional foreign policy objectives. A basic dichotomy exists between those who argue for a forward military strategy in the region as a counter to the perceived threat to the oil fields and sea lanes posed by the Soviet Navy and radical, Soviet-supported states in the region, and those who argue that U.S. interests can be served best through the encouragement of military self-sufficiency by friendly states and the development of regional systems for containing intrusive or disruptive influences. Both these relatively antithetical positions and various combinations and permutations thereof are discussed below. The findings of the report, however, are largely supportive of the view that the inherent practical and political limitations on the so-called forward strategy limit its usefulness to the U.S. and that more subtle and less visible forms of influence are more conducive to the achievement of U.S. objectives.

Major Foreign Policy and Defense Objectives in the Indian Ocean Region

Important U.S objectives in the Indian Ocean region include access to the oil resources of the Persian Gulf area, trade, security of the air and sea routes through the region, accessibility of the ocean as an operating and transit regime for warships, and a favorable military balance between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

Political objectives in the Indian Ocean region include good relations with states with important resources such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, countering Soviet influence in the region, minimizing conflicts which might undermine U.S. interests or bring about superpower conflict, and obtaining support for U.S. objectives from littoral states. Significantly, most states on the Indian Ocean littoral have some important areas of mutual interest with the United States. All of the states whose shores are washed by the Indian Ocean or its adjacent seas and gulfs are developing countries for whom U.S. markets, technology, manufactured goods, agricultural products, aid and/or investment are potentially important. Even in the absence of active government-to-government programs or an "official" presence the United States would be important to most of these countries.

Probably the salient political factor having implications for the U.S. military posture in the region is the existence of several militarily weak and lightly populated states in the Persian Gulf that possess extremely high value resources and, for geographical reasons, strategic importance. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Abu Dubai and Qatar, which together possess more than 40 percent of the world's "free" proven oil reserves, have a very limited self-defense capability. The independence of these countries is protected primarily by the regional power balance, a network of financial support to economically weak but militarily stronger neighbors, and Western political and military support. These same countries supply the U.S. with some 29 percent of its total current crude oil imports and supply 52 percent of Japan's crude oil imports. With the addition

of Iran, which does possess a significant but U.S.-dependent defense capability, the respective figures are 36 percent of U.S. crude petroleum imports, and 70 percent of Japan's imports, and 57 percent of the combined crude oil imports of the U.K., West Germany, France and Italy.[1] The significance of the region's petroleum production and the importance of the Indian Ocean oil routes can be seen in Chart I.

An additional crucial factor for the United States is the inherent weakness of the internal political structures of these states, all of which have serious problems of regionalism and/or tribalism, and weak vertical linkages between the rulers and the governed. None of these states has achieved anything like a Western-style political system. At the same time, the existing monarchial and other traditional systems are under severe challenge from forces set in motion by (or capitalizing on) rapid and often chaotic socio-economic change.

A major point of controversy, and one currently being debated with respect to Iran, is the relevance of American military power to the internal problems of regimes in this region, and the extent to which, in an internal crisis, the United States can or should lend military and/or political support to existing friendly regimes.

Another important political factor is the relationship of the Indian Ocean region to the superpower balance. The U.S. has an important interest in minimizing Soviet influence in the littoral states and in preventing either the appearance or the reality of Soviet military domination of the ocean itself. This objective relates both to the states of the littoral and to other countries, such as Japan, which look to the United States to help protect their access to critical raw material resources.

ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES


The overriding economic objective in the Indian Ocean area is access to the resources of the region, foremost being the petroleum of the Persian Gulf area, and the security of the ocean shipping lines over which this resource is carried. This objective heavily influences U.S. political objectives in the region, as well. Depending on how the U.S. chooses to pursue its goals the objective has a potentially large military aspect. These objectives are discussed in more detail below.

Second in importance is the economic objective of balancing the heavy dollar cost of oil imports with sales of goods and services to the oil states. All of these states offer a large potential for U.S. firms to sell their products and expertise, including both non-military and military exports.

---

[1] Above figures are based on 2d quarter 1977 data. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. National Foreign Assessment Center. International Energy Biweekly Statistical Review. February 8, 1978.

CHART I



SOURCE: Annual Department of Defense Report, FY 1978

The U.S. also has an interest in the resources of the rest of the littoral. While these resources are considerably less important than petroleum, they include minerals such as bauxite (India and Indonesia); manganese ore (India); nickel (Indonesia); tin (Malaysia and Indonesia); iron ore (India); and mica (India). At present the U.S. does not rely heavily on the Indian Ocean littoral countries as sources for non-petroleum minerals and other raw materials.[2]

Other countries of the littoral also have significant or important petroleum and/or natural gas deposits, including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh (natural gas) and Indonesia.[3] Of these, however, Indonesia, is the only significant petroleum exporter.

Total U.S. trade interests in the Indian Ocean basin are about two-thirds the size of U.S. trade with Europe but exceed the value of U.S. trade with Japan. Exports to and imports from all countries of the littoral (including the Red Sea and Persian Gulf) totaled $40.0 bil-

---

[2] K. P. Wang and Staff, U.S. Bureau of Mines, Department of the Interior. Far East and South Asia (Mineral Perspectives, MP–1), Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977 pp. 4–5.

[3] Ibid., pp. 13, 35, 39.

lion in 1977. Of this amount the Persian Gulf region accounted for some $20.6 billion, or about one half.

The total of $40.0 billion in trade with Indian Ocean countries compares with $61.2 billion with Western Europe and $29.1 billion with Japan during the same year. The trade figures are shown in detail in Table 1.

TABLE 1.—U.S. TRADE WITH INDIAN OCEAN LITTORAL COUNTRIES:[1] 1977

[In millions of dollars]

Subregion and largest trade partner	Exports to	Imports from	Combined value
Africa	2,335.5	1,890.0	4,225.5
South Africa	(1,054.4)	(1,268.8)	(2,323.2)
New East Asia	9,778.8	10,842.2	20,610.0
Saudi Arabia[2]	(3,575.3)	(6,358.5)	(9,933.8)
South Asia	1,281.0	963.8	2,244.8
India	(778.6)	(781.1)	(1,559.7)
Southeast Asia/Australia	5,374.3	7,244.8	12,599.1
Indonesia[2]	(763.2)	(3,491.3)	(4,254.5)
Total Indian Ocean littoral	18,769.6	20,920.8	39,690.4
Western Europe	33,751.8	27,414.2	61,166.0
Japan	10,522.1	18,622.7	29,144.8

[1] Includes all countries touched by the Indian Ocean and subsidairy bodies of water including the Red Sea, Gulf of Aqaba, Persian Gulf, Bay of Bengal, Andaman Sea, and Strait of Malacca. Data does not include land locked countries whose trade must pass through Indian Ocean ports but includes countries whose primary trade links are other water bodies.

[2] Petroleum exporter.

Source of data: U.S. Department of Commerce, Highlights of U.S. Exports and Import Trade, FT 990/December 1977 (issued February 1978), imports are for transaction value at the port of exportation (F.A.S.).

In addition to trade and access to petroleum the U.S. also has an economic interest in the substantial seabed resources of the region. These include offshore oil and manganese-rich mineral nodules. Some of these mineral resources lie in the 200 mile "economic zones" claimed by littoral states. Other seabed resources lie in deep waters off the continental shelves. Both categories of resource locations are currently the subject of negotiations in various international forums, including the Law of the Sea Conference. This issue has large "North-South" overtones, as the developed countries are in a much better position to exploit continental shelf and deep sea-bed resources than the relatively less developed littoral states.

MILITARY OBJECTIVES

The U.S. has both a conventional and perhaps a strategic nuclear military interest in the Indian Ocean region. Military objectives for U.S. conventional forces include the capability to: (1) protect U.S. economic interests in the Persian Gulf region; (2) employ or threaten force in support of U.S. diplomatic objectives in the Middle East; (3) secure the Indian Ocean air and sea routes against harassment or interdiction; (4) intervene in support of other objectives in the littoral; and, related to all of these, (5) balance Soviet forces in the region and attain superiority in a crisis. The United States also possesses a potential strategic nuclear military objective of deploying, when necessary or convenient, ballistic missile submarines (SSBN's) targeted on the U.S.S.R.

1. Support U.S. Economic Objectives in the Oil Producing Region

This is a long standing objective whose roots go back to at least the end of World War II and the eclipse of British power in the re-

gion. This objective lay at the heart of the postwar military assistance programs in the Persian Gulf region, U.S. support for the Bagadad Pact (now CENTO), and the establishment of the small Middle East naval squadron (MIDEASTFOR) which, until mid-1977, was "home-ported" at Bahrain. U.S. economic interests in the region are now far more important in dollar terms and in terms of resource-dependency than in the immediate postwar era.

In some respects the most overt military threats to the region have declined since the critical period of the late 1940's and 1950's, but new threats have emerged in the form of a Soviet naval presence in the region and radical Soviet-backed States on the flanks and borders of the principal oil-exporting countries.

2. Support of U.S. Diplomatic Objectives in the Middle East

American military power lies at the heart of U.S. influence over the complex Arab-Israeli dispute. It is the use or threat of force which backs up U.S. efforts to contain or encourage the settlement of the 30-year confrontation without sacrificing either U.S. commitment to Israel's security or U.S. economic interests in the Arab world. Formerly the Indian Ocean had little relevance to this objective, but the steady erosion of the U.S. position in the Mediterranean has tended to enhance the importance of the Indian Ocean. During the October 1973 Mideast War and the United States deployed a task group including the aircraft carrier *Hancock* into the Western Indian Ocean from regular duty with the Pacific Fleet. Subsequently the U.S. rotated other aircraft carriers and capital ships into the region and thereby maintained a continuous presence until April 1974.[4]

The exact mission of the *Hancock* and its subsequent replacements has never been clarified. For practical purposes the theater of war was beyond the range of the carrier's aircraft (presumably the Navy would be loath to sail a carrier into the Red Sea). It would seem that the force was used in a vaguely coercive fashion, though Department of State spokesmen took pains to avoid this characterization.[5]

3. Secure the Air Routes and Sea Lanes in the Indian Ocean From Harrassment or Interdiction

The threat in this case could include either a hostile littoral country, the U.S.S.R. or a terrorist group. The fulfillment of this mission

---

[4] U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Diego Garcia 1975: the Debate Over the Base and the Island's Inhabitants. Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations, June 5 and November 4, 1975. Testimony of George S. Vest, Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975 (94th Cong., 1st Sess.) p. 33.

[5] A Department of State spokesman identified the mission in the following terms in testimony before a congressional committee:

"In the first instance, it was a reinforcement for the signally successful efforts of Secretary Kissinger to bring the parties in the conflict to the peace table. It impressed upon both sides that the United States was interested in a resolution of the conflict. In short, it played the traditional role which military power should play, that of supporting diplomatic initiatives. By this I do not mean to suggest that military power was used to lend coercive force to our diplomacy. Rather, our visible military presence in the area demonstrated the importance we attached to our diplomatic objective of bringing the parties together to seek a peaceful resolution of the issues that have produced so much discord and strife in the Middle East." Statement of Seymour Weiss. Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, March 6, 1974. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Proposed expansion of U.S. military facilities in the Indian Ocean; Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, February 21, March 6, 12, 14, and 20, 1974. Washingon, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974. (93d Cong., 2d Sess), p. 25.

35-995 O - 79 - 7

is normally carried out by the three ship Middle East Force and by patrolling the sea routes with long range aircraft such as the P–3 reconaissance aircraft which operate out of, among other places, Diego Garcia. A related objective is providing security or a sense of security for U.S. and foreign shippers during troubled times. This point was made by a Department of State spokesman during testimony before Congress:

> One of the lessons we should have learned from our recent experience is that oil production and distribution is a delicately balanced system which is vulnerable to instability and military uncertainty. Last fall, there was a period of a month or more—well after the end of the actual fighting—when oil was available in eastern Mediterranean ports but tankers were unwilling to risk the danger of picking it up.
>
> In other words, it is not always necessary to sink tankers in order to disrupt the flow; the mere prospect of losing an expensive item of capital equipment may suffice.
>
> In my view, the proper role for our defense forces is not to wait until a threatening situation occurs and then attempt to find military solutions. Rather, our role is to prevent such situations whenever possible and thus avoid any need for military solutions which tend to be costly and dangerous.[6]

4. Intervene in support of other objectives in the littoral

As a major military power the United States has historically placed a high value on the capability to intervene in regional or local conflicts to preserve or enhance U.S. interests, especially in cases involving non-communist states threatened by communist or communist backed states. In December 1971, during the Indo-Pakistan War, the U.S. deployed a task force into the Bay of Bengal including the carrier *Enterprise*, an amphibious assault ship with a battalion of Marines, seven destroyers and an oiler. The general purpose of the controversial deployment apparently was to deter India from attempting the complete dismemberment of Pakistan. Since no evidence has been produced to indicate Indian intentions in this regard the positive result of the U.S. action remains unclear. Presumably, the deployment of the force was also intended to show solidarity with China (which backed Pakistan) and thus to reinforce the ongoing bid for a new U.S.-China relationship.

The U.S. has subsequently deployed forces in the region in support of friendly countries, including the previously discussed operations during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. More recently, the United States deployed naval forces off the East coast of Africa, first in the wake of the Israeli raid on Entebbe airport to rescue aircraft highjacking hostages, and later during a period of threats by President Idi Amin against Americans residing in Uganda.[7] In the case of the Entebbe raid deployment the object seems to have been to reassure Kenya, which had facilitated the raid by refueling Israeli aircraft.

The margin of superiority that the United States (or, for that matter, the U.S.S.R.) can bring to bear in a third world area, including the Indian Ocean littoral, has been increasingly limited by the expanding military capabilities of regional powers. The prospects of the

---

[6] Ibid. Statement of James H. Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, March 12, 1974, p. 53.
[7] Washington Star, July 14, 1976.

United States playing any kind of policeman role in the Indian Ocean are limited.[8]

The increasing capabilities of the Soviet Navy also place limits on the potential role of the United States for intervention in the region. Previous events have shown that each surge of U.S. military power into the Indian Ocean has been matched by a temporary surge of Soviet forces and a larger long term Soviet naval presence. With a Navy that is still declining in numbers of ships, the United States, in the opinion of many military authorities is ill-equipped to engage in a naval race in the region with the U.S.S.R.[9] On the other hand, there are many positive reasons for the United States maintaining a presence in the region sufficient to establish the United States as a credible obstacle to any Soviet efforts to intervene militarily in the littoral.

5. Balance Soviet Naval Power in the Region and Attain Naval and Air Superiority in a Crisis

In March 1968, shortly after the British announcement of its phased withdrawal "East of Suez," the Soviet Union deployed three combatant ships and a supporting oiler to the Indian Ocean from Vladivostok. This deployment marked the beginning of a combatant presence in the Indian Ocean which, except for a brief period in mid-1968, has been continuous. Until 1973, the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron did not maintain a consistent force level. The deployment pattern had been for major task groups to remain on-station for five or six months, then to be relieved by a smaller interim group which maintained the presence until the next major task group arrived. It was standard for major deployments to occur during the cooler winter months, with an interim deployment occurring during the less comfortable summer months when temperatures regularly exceed 100 degrees Fahrenheit.

Although the Soviet naval force regularly fluctuated from 1968 to 1973, the size of both major and interim groups steadily increased. In the summer of 1973, the Soviets deployed twice as many surface combatants to the Indian Ocean as they had previously done during the summer. Moreover, they sent a submarine, and, instead of departing after the usual five or six months, most of the interim group remained in the Indian Ocean for almost a year. This increased naval presence was the beginning of what is now a continuous year-round force level with units normally relieved on a one-to-one basis. Units generally assigned to the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron presently number between 20 and 22 ships. The force is usually composed of one or two major combatants, four minor combatants, one to two amphibious units, one submarine, and various support, research, and space related ships. The amphibious ships are the only continuous naval infantry force deployed by any power in the Indian Ocean and could provide a

---

[8] The limitations on this role are discussed by William J. Barnds in an Oct. 14, 1972 article, "Arms Race or Arms Control in the Indian Ocean," reprinted in U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Proposed Expansion of U.S. Military Facilities in the Indian Ocean; Hearing before the Subcommittee on Near East and South Asia, Feb. 21, Mar. 6, 12, 14, 20, 1974. Washington. Government Printing Office, p. 182.

[9] In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in July 1974 William E. Colby, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, maintained that the Soviet naval presence would likely grow gradually in any event, but that based on past experience they could be expected to match or exceed any steps by the U.S. to expand its permanent establishment in the region. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Disapprove construction on the island of Diego Garcia; hearings on Senate Resolution 160, June 10, 1975. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975. 94th Cong., 1st Sess. p. 31.

timely, although limited, military presence reflecting a larger Soviet commitment to a client state.

Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron force levels regularly fluctuate and reflect a reaction to an increased U.S. presence as well as responses to increased regional tensions or a buildup associated with a world-wide Soviet naval exercise. The Soviets have taken advantage of the reopening of the Suez Canal to temporarily augment the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron with new construction units.[10]

The Soviet force is supported by Soviet naval aviation units. Prior to the eviction of Soviet forces in 1977 TU–95 BEAR aircraft and IL–38 MAY ASW aircraft deployed to Somalia for periods of operations over the Indian Ocean. TU–95 and MIG–25 aircraft stage from the south central U.S.S.R. and overfly eastern Iran to and from Indian Ocean operations.

The Soviets formerly maintained an extensive installation at Berbera, Somalia, which included facilities for ship resupply and repairs, storage of antiship missiles, communications and an airstrip. Due to the deepening Soviet involvement with the Marxist military regime in Ethiopia, the Somali government, in November 1977 ordered all Soviet personnel out of the country.[11] Most of the Berbera forces have been transferred to Aden, across the Straits of Hormuz [12] and Iraq. Reportedly, the Soviets were rebuffed in an attempt to obtain a long term lease on the Island of Gan, in the Maldives, formerly a British RAF staging base. A significant factor was India's support for the Republic of the Maldives government in its decision to reject the Soviet offer of $1 million for the lease rights.[13]

One Soviet naval operation in the Indian Ocean is especially worthy of note with respect to the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf area. In April 1973, when Iraqi armed forces crossed into Kuwait to occupy portions of Kuwaiti, territory claimed by Iraq (land areas commanding the Iraqi naval base at Umm Qasr), the Soviets deployed naval forces in an area in an apparent effort to deter any outside interference in the Iraqi operation.

If the objective of balancing Soviet military power in the region is self evident, the degree to which the United States is achieving it, and the utility of bases to this end, are hotly debated subjects. In this region the small permanent force of the United States, whose function has been defined as "political, psychological, and symbolic," is obviously outgunned by Soviet naval forces.[14] However, during the three or four

---

[10] Soviet Indian Ocean ship days totaled 4,936 in 1970, 4023 in 1971, 8,854 in 1972, 8,895 in 1973 and 10,501 in 1974. The 1972–74 figures include about 2,500 ship days per year attributable to vessels clearing mines in Bangladesh and the Red Sea. Testimony of Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger, ibid., p. 26. Soviet ship-days in the Indian Ocean totaled 7,335 in 1976 and 6,712 in 1977. Of the latter approximately 2,900 ship days were logged by combatants and 3,800 by auxiliaries. Telecon with Office of Naval Intelligence, June 7, 1978.

[11] Washington Post, November 14, 1977, p. A1.

[12] Don Shannon, "U.S., Russ to Renew Indian Ocean Talks", Los Angeles Times, February 5, 1978, p. 7.

[13] Seymour Friedin, "Superpowers Wooing Maldives," Baltimore News American, November 6, 1977, p. 10.

[14] The MIDEASTFOR flotilla does not even have the capability of keeping the Persian Gulf open let alone making any significant contribution to achieving military objectives in the greater Indian Ocean region. Defense of the gulf and protection of the shipping lanes is primarily the responsibility of the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and Iran. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. The Persian Gulf, 1975: the Continuing Debate on Arms Sales; hearings before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations. Testimony of Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, June 18, 1975, p. 36.

months a year during which the United States operates a carrier task group in the Indian Ocean, or when it deploys forces in a crisis, the United States can still bring superior power to bear in this area.

The United States recently lost its special "home port" privileges at at Bahrain, but a new agreement with the Bahrain government will allow the Middle East Force to carry out its mission, though less conveniently. This is discussed in more detail below. The Diego Garcia facility is immune to local political developments and in that sense, as well as in respect to its capabilities, the utility of the base exceeds that of any single facility available to the Soviet fleet. This was true even before the Soviets lost their access to Berbera.

The degree to which the forces of other western powers assist in countering the Soviet presence is difficult to assess. As a member of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), the United Kingdom deploys naval units to the region on occassions; for example, the British assigned nine naval units and seven aircraft for the MIDLINK–76 exercise. France maintains a permanent Indian Ocean naval contingent which often is augmented by short-term Indian Ocean deployments and by French units transiting to and returning from Pacific Ocean operations. Although France has commitments to its foreign possessions in the Indian Ocean and a recognized need for free access to the Persian Gulf oil, French interest in the Indian Ocean can be explained by the existence of an overseas department of France in the region (Reunion) and its intention not to allow its regional interests to be controlled by Soviet, United States, or British presence. In terms of annual ship-days, France has the largest non-littoral Naval presence.

6. Strategic Force Objective

The United States also has a potential strategic nuclear objective in the Indian Ocean region, that of deploying, when necessary or convenient, ballistic missiles submarines (SSBN's) targeted on the Soviet Union. This objective is seldom discussed by U.S. officials and in fact the official public position of the U.S. Government is that the Navy does not regularly operate SSBN's in the Indian Ocean. The official U.S. position would appear to be generally borne out by the range and capabilities of the Polaris type boats now normally operated from Guam. Given the 2500 nautical mile range of the Polaris A–3 missile and a normal 60-day cruise, Polaris boats deployed into the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea would be within range of Soviet targets for a relatively small portion of their cruise period.

In the longer term the Indian Ocean offers a potential hedge against any Soviet advances in developing an anti-ballistic missile capability, in that the Soviets would have to defend against three avenues of attack instead of two, i.e., Atlantic, Pacific and Indian Ocean. With the inception of the Trident system, with the longer range Trident I missile, operations in the Indian Ocean could become more feasible.[15]

---

[15] Dale R. Tahtinen, Arms in the Indian Ocean: Interests and Challenges, Washington, D.C.: American Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977, p. 20.

Major U.S. Facilities in the Indian Ocean and Other Types of Military Presence

The U.S. has only two facilities in the Indian Ocean proper—a small USAF satellite tracking station on Mahe Island in the Republic of the Seychelles, and the communications, logistics and airfield facility on Diego Garcia, a British owned atoll in the Chagos Archipelago. Both facilities were acquired as a consequence of the British withdrawal from the Indian Ocean. The Diego Garcia site is the far more important one and the only facility that has been the subject of significant controversy.

DESCRIPTION OF FACILITIES


USAF satellite tracking station, Mahe Island

Mahe Island, lying about 1200 nautical miles East of the African coast and at about the latitude of Zanzibar Island, Tanzanai, is the largest island in the Seychelles group. The 86 islands of the group are scattered over 150,000 square miles. Formerly a British colony, the islands became the independent Republic of Seychelles in June 1976. The country has a total population of 50,000 the bulk of which is concentrated on Mahe. The economy is dominated by plantation crops and tourism. More than half of the country's export income derives from the sale of copra to India.[16]

The U.S. maintains a satellite tracking system on Mahe staffed with USAF and NASA personnel. The station also functions as a communications link between Diego Garcia and other U.S. bases. The United States holds a ten year lease on the station site for which it pays an annual rent of $1 million.[17]

---

[16] Central Intelligence Agency, Indian Ocean Atlas (Aug. 1976, pp. 48–50.
[17] When a Tiny New Nation is Thrust into a Power Broker's Role, U.S. News & World Report, September 13, 1976.


Red Sea
SUDAN
SAUDI ARABIA
OMAN
YEMEN(S)
Sana
YEMEN(A)
Aden
Gulf of Aden
DJIBOUTI
Djibouti
Berbera
SOCOTRA
(Yemen, Aden)
Addis Ababa
ETHIOPIA
SOMALIA
KENYA
Mogadiscio
Nairobi
Arabian Sea
LACCADIVE ISLANDS (India)
MALDIVES
Gan
Diego Garcia to Aden (2,116 nm) by sea.
INDIA
Madras
Bay of Bengal
Colombo
SRI LANKA
Laccadive Sea
BURMA
Rangoon
THAILAND
Bangkok
ANDAMAN ISLANDS (India)
Andaman Sea
NICOBAR ISLANDS (India)
MALAYSIA
Kuala Lumpur
Singapore
SUMATRA
INDONESIA
Mombasa
PEMBA
ZANZIBAR
Dar es Salaam
TANZANIA
SEYCHELLES
Desroches Islands
Mahe Island
Platte Island
Amirante Isles
Coetivy Island
BRITISH INDIAN OCEAN TERRITORY (B.I.O.T.)
Chagos Archipelago
Diego Garcia
ALDABRA ISLANDS
Cosmoledo Group
Farquhar Group
AGALEGA ISLANDS
Iles Glorieuses (Fr.)
Comoro Islands
Diego-Suarez
MAURITIUS
Indian Ocean
COCOS ISLANDS (Australia)
Ile Tromelin (Fr.)
Majunga
Cargados Carajos Shoals
MOZAMBIQUE
Mozambique Channel
Tananarive
MADAGASCAR
Rodrigues Island
Mauritius
Reunion (Fr.)
Legend:
Airfield
Naval Facility
Communications Facility
Capital
City
0 300 600 Miles
0 300 600 Kilometers
Locations of symbols are approximate.
Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative.
45
60
75
90
15
0

The potential strategic value of the Seychelles has been appreciated for some time. In 1965 the British joined the lightly populated Seychelles island groups of Aldabra, Desroches and Farquhar of the Crown Colony of Mauritius with the Chagos Archipelago (including Diego Garcia) into a new Crown Colony called the British Indian Ocean Territory. This action was taken in conjunction with the general reduction of Britain's military position "East of Suez," with the objective of providing locations for joint U.K./U.S. bases. Part of the plan was for an air staging facility on Aldabra, an atoll which also contained a good protected anchorage. The Aldabra plan, however, fell victim to environmentl objections—the coral atoll possesses some unique plant and animal species—and U.K. defense budget cuts. The anchorages available at Ile Desroches and at the Farquhars also were not developed. Britain transferred the Seychelles islands from the British Indian Ocean Territory back to the Republic of the Seychelles upon independence in 1976.[18]

Diego Garcia Island, Chagos Archipelago

The now uninhabited [19] Chagos Archipelago, the only remaining part of the original British Indian Ocean Territory, is the site of a controversial U.S. base. Now nearing completion, the facility at Diego Garcia is intended to fill a number of requirements that the Department of Defense and the Navy deem important. Diego Garcia is an atoll located about 1,000 nautical miles south of the tip of India and in the very center of the Indian Ocean. The island has a large natural harbor protected on three sides by coral formations. The base includes a highly classified intelligence and communications facility. When completed, in about 1980 it will have a 12,000 foot runway capable of handling four-engine transports, a protected harbor capable of containing an aircraft carrier and support ships (i.e., a carrier task group) and fuel storage capacity for 380,000 barrels of aviation fuel and 320,000 barrels of fuel oil, enough to supply a carrier task group for about 30 days. The harbor will contain both an anchorage and 550 feet of berthing for loading and unloading fuel.

Current plans envision only the occasional use of the facility as a port for U.S. warships, and in fact the facility is seldom used by Navy ships as it is not convenient to normal sailing patterns. The fuel stored at Diego Garcia is primarily for contingency use. Under current plans the port would not be used as a "home port" or primary support base for permanent naval forces in the Indian Ocean, though the facility could certainly be upgraded to assume this role should this be deemed necessary or desirable. Coincident with the opening of U.S.-U.S.S.R. negotiations on limiting military deployments in the Indian Ocean, and in response to a congressional directive to report on the progress of the talks prior to going ahead with aspects of the FY 1978 program the Administration delayed certain construction activities related to the kind and level of operations to be conducted at the facility. In early 1978, after the U.S. had made clear its intention not to build up Diego Garcia beyond the currently authorized program, and upon notification to

---

[18] Indian Ocean Atlas, *op. cit.*, pp. 48–51.

[19] In an action that later aroused considerable criticism, the British Government, during the mid-1960's, bought up the existing plantation lease-holds and relocated about 1,000 residents of the archipelago to Mauritius. For details of this very complex story see U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations, "Diego Garcia, 1975: the Debate Over the Base and the Island's Former Inhabitants"; hearings before the Subcommittee on Investigations, June 5 and November 4, 1975 (94th Cong., 2d sess.).

the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Navy was authorized to proceed with the complete FY 1978 program.[20]

The communications facilities on the island may be the most important asset. Reportedly, the facilities provide a relay for submarine communications traffic, a real-time link with reconnaissance satellites, and general communications support for forces operating in the Indian Ocean.[21]

OTHER TYPES OF U.S. PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

Despite the absence of any major military bases in the Indian Ocean the United States has maintained the appearance and reality of a major Indian Ocean naval power. This role, which has been described in some detail above, has been primarily accomplished by routine visits (including port visits in littoral countries) and crisis deployments of units from the Pacific Fleet. Normally Pacific Fleet deployments involve a task group formed around an aircraft carrier or other capital ship. These visits and deployments serve to highlight U.S. capabilities and to perform the usual "show the flag" duties and friendly port visits which many strategists consider important adjuncts to U.S. foreign policy.

The U.S. also makes use of limited landing rights at Mombassa, Kenya; and Singapore to facilitate patrol flights by its P–3 reconnaisance aircraft that track surface ships and submarines in the Indian Ocean.

Finally, the United States extends its influence through foreign military sales and military education and training programs, and conducts military exercises with littoral states. These activities are very significant in the Arabian Peninsula/Persian gulf region, but much less important in the Indian Ocean proper. Prior to 1965 the United States had a foreign military sales credit program in Pakistan and extensive military relationships via training and joint exercises, including exercises under the auspices of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Since the 1965 India-Pakistan War, however, the United States has ended credit sales of military equipment to Pakistan and has enforced an embargo or partial embargo on cash sales of "lethal" weapons.[22] U.S. arms exports and military training are now an insignificant factor outside the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf region.

Utility of the Base Structure and the U.S. Military Posture in the Indian Ocean to U.S. Objectives

The utility of the Diego Garcia facility, and the implied expansion of the U.S. naval presence to U.S. objectives in the region, has been a contentious issue for some years. As noted earlier, the United States

---

[20] Work had continued on projects authorized and funded by Congress for FY 1975 and 1976, including the harbor dredging and runway extension projects. These should be completed by 1980. The Administration held up approval for the procurement of materials relating to the construction of aircraft shelters and Bachelor Enlisted Quarters (BEQ's) which were authorized and funded in FY 1978. Telecon with Naval Facilities Engineering Command. February 16, 1978; December 20, 1978.

[21] George McArthur. "Secrecy Curtain Opens at Diego Garcia Base Being Built by U.S. in Indian Ocean." Los Anegles Times, April 7, 1977: Revi Kaul. "The Indo-Pakistańi War and the Changing Balance of Power in the Indian Ocean," Naval Review, 1973, p. 194.

[22] U.S. military sales policy in South Asia is detailed in Stephen P. Cohen, "U.S. Weapons and South Asia: A Policy Analysis," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 49, no. 1 (Spring 1976). See also CRS report of September 22, 1977 "Implications of President Carter's Conventional Arms Transfer Policy" (Multilith No. 77–223F).

has several objectives in the region and the impact of any increased military presence varies according to the criteria being considered. Moreover, the regional context is considerably different than in some other regions in which the U.S. has an interest, and the question of military bases cannot be considered without reference to other, possibly more important, forms of military influence or presence.

POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

Generally the existence of U.S. bases enhances the achievement of U.S. political objectives in countries that depend on the United States as a guarantor of their security and adversely affects the relationship between the United States and countries which seek non-alignment or alignment with the U.S.S.R. A Department of State survey which was cited in testimony before Congress in 1974, for instance, claimed a favorable reaction to the U.S. buildup of the Diego Garcia facility on the part of South Africa, Malawi, Ethiopia, Yemen, Abu Dhabi, Pakistan and Singapore. Unfavorable reactions were found in the cases of Malagasy, India, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Malaysia and Australia. The attitude of some other countries has been circumspect.[23] These include Iran, which depends on the United States for its current military buildup but clearly has mixed feelings about a large U.S. military presence in what it sees as its zone of security interest. So long as the Soviets retain sizeable forces in the region, however, Iran does not oppose the U.S. presence.[24] It must also be noted that the 1974 findings have, in some cases, been invalidated by political changes, notably in the coming to power of the pro-Marxist military regime in Ethiopia and the electoral victory of the Country Party (Conservative) in Australia.

The effect of the U.S. presence on general regional stability, another U.S. political objective, is problematical. On the one hand the U.S. presence enhances the visible value of U.S. guarantees to the few countries that the United States attempted to secure against Soviet or other aggression. On the other hand, many sources of potential interregional conflict do not, for one reason or another, lend themselves to the use or threat of U.S. military force.

For political as well as military reasons the U.S. Navy places high value on a "show-the-flag" function and in countering any impression of Soviet naval predominance. Traditionally the show the flag function was performed by the three-ship MIDEASTFOR contingent. That force was, and still is, quite active. During 1976 MIDEASTFOR ships made port calls at 18 ports in 15 countries in the Red Sea, Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean area. MIDEASTFOR ships spent 20 or more port days during 1976 in the following countries: the Seychelles (23);

---

[23] House. Committee on Foreign Affairs (now HIRC). Proposed Expansion of Facilities in the Indian Ocean, testimony of Seymour Weiss, DOS, March 6, 1974, 93rd Congress, 2nd session, p. 45. Also, other testimony has produced somewhat different lists, including the use of the term "balanced" instead of favorable.

[24] Reportedly, during an October 1974 visit to Australia the Shah responded to a question about Diego Garcia as follows:

> I am not opposing the Diego Garcia base as long as there are other powers in the Indian Ocean. That would be silly. I have not positive figures, but some people say that the Russians have 9,000 ship-days presence in the Indian Ocean. [In that case] how could we tell the Americans to keep away? But we could ask both of them to keep away from the Indian Ocean simultaneously.

Quoted in Ramazani, "Emerging Patterns of Regional Relations in Iranian Foreign Policy," Orbis, Winter 1975, p. 1064.

Saudi Arabia (24); Pakistan (23); Djibouti (30); Kenya (32) and Bahrain (232).

These figures do not include port calls made by other U.S. ships when deployed into the Indian Ocean from the Pacific Fleet. The United States now operates a carrier task group or other major combatants in the Indian Ocean for about one third of the year and these ships are also active in making port calls.

Another factor when weighing this issue in the political context is that the United States voluntarily denies itself access to excellent port facilities that it might otherwise use. In the entire Indian Ocean region the ports of only two countries—Iraq and South Yemen—are not open to U.S. warships. The United States, however, has voluntarily denied itself access to the ports of India and South Africa. South Africa ports are not used by U.S. ships because that country's racial laws result in discrimination against American seamen. The Navy has not called at Indian ports since mid-1971, when India instituted a requirement that naval vessels specify whether they are carrying nuclear weapons. In 1972 India modified this policy via a circular note simply requesting that host facilities in Indian ports not be sought for vessels carrying nuclear weapons.[25] Since U.S. policy precluded the acknowledgement that nuclear weapons were or were not aboard U.S. vessels, the Navy ceased visiting Indian ports.[26]

The implications of U.S. and Soviet bases, facilities and forces in the region have a broader political context as a result of a United Nations General Assembly resolution, adopted first in 1971 that declares the Indian Ocean a "Zone of Peace." The resolution calls for great power negotiations to eliminate "all bases, military installations, logistical supply facilities, . . . nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction . . . conceived in the context of great power rivalry." Additionally the resolution calls for consultations among users of the Indian Ocean, littoral and hinterland states and U.N. Security Council members to insure that the Indian Ocean would not be used as an avenue for military threats against states of the region. Subject to these conditions the resolution upholds the right of free transit and navigation for the warships of all nations. This resolution has been approved annually since 1971 and since 1975 no littoral state has abstained. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union have declined to support this resolution.[27]

The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has also subscribed to an Indian Ocean "zone of peace, freedom and neutrality," and the Shah of Iran proposed an Indian Ocean Common Market and Security Group including the littoral states from Iran to Singapore and eventually, perhaps. Australia.

Despite the stated opposition of some littoral states there seems to be little reason to assume that the Diego Garcia base, in its present configuration, is a major impediment to good relations with any country in the region. This, however, is true only so long as the base fulfills

---

[25] U.S. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. United States Interests in and Policies Toward South Asia; Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia. March 12, 15, 20, and 27, 1973. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973. (93rd Cong., 1st sess.) Statement of James H. Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs) for Near Eastern, African, and South Asian Affairs, March 20, 1973. p. 90.

[26] Based on telcon with an official in the Politico Military Policy Division. Deputy Chief of Naval Operatons (Plans, Policy and Operations), Department of the Navy, July 12, 1977.

[27] Central Intelligence Agency, Indian Ocean Atlas, pp. 24–25.

the relatively modest objectives which are claimed for it. Should the Diego Garcia facility be used to support a larger permanent or semi-permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean in the absence of a further build-up by the Soviet Union, the United States would have to weigh the likelihood of a generally adverse reaction among many, if not most, littoral states.

In spite of the disparity between United States and Soviet naval strength in the Indian Ocean, a rough power balance currently exists. The balance derives from the fact that U.S. Pacific forces deployed at Subic Bay have the capability, on relatively short notice, to marshal superior strength anywhere in the Indian Ocean. The Diego Garcia facility will enhance this capacity without necessarily requiring a larger permanent naval presence. At the same time, however, the equation would change were the United States to lose its base rights at Subic Bay in the Philippines. Without the Bay, presumably the Navy would then fall back to Guam and thereby incur some of the disadvantages of the Soviets, i.e., not having facilities for major repairs and overhauls, dependency on large support and replenishment forces, and having reduced capabilities for rapid reinforcement. Under these circumstances the Diego Garcia facility would become more important. Even then, however, the current relatively higher importance of the Pacific area and the continuing decline in the numbers of the U.S. surface fleet would probably militate against a permanent naval deployment at Diego Garcia.

Much has been made in the United States and other seafaring countries of the doctrines of Admiral Mahan. What is often overlooked by both the old and new sea powers, is that Admiral Mahan's doctrines were developed during the peak of the colonial era, when the oceans of the world and the littoral states were dominated by essentially five major navies. To ascribe inordinate weight to Admiral Mahan's strategic thinking is to risk ignoring the profound changes which have taken place in Asia and Africa during this century, i.e., the rise of the nationalism and the end of colonialism. Admiral Gorshkov, architect of the modern Soviet navy, would have us believe that these new considerations have been taken into account in Soviet naval strategy. In fact, however, Gorshkov offers the same kind of selective "lessons of history" (reflected in Mahan's writings) to justify the mission of the navy and highlight its services to the State and the cause of world Communism.[28]

The salient factor for the United States and its European and Japanese allies is that the most important nations of the Indian Ocean region are naturally inclined toward a fairly close integration with the Western economic system. The markets of the Western industrialized states, and western technology and capital are crucial to the developing countries of the region. The resources of the region are no longer extracted at the point of a gun—rather, the economic relationship is grounded in mutuality of benefit. To cite but one example: the oil of the Persian Gulf could not command anything near its current market price were it not for Western demand.

---

[28] Several translations are available of Admiral Gorshkov's *Sea Power of the State* including an abridged Department of the Navy review which, for copyright reasons, is not in the public domain. The point made above derives from a section entitled "Navies in Time of Peace," which is a part of Chapter IV, "Problems of the Art of Naval Warfare: Fleet Against Fleet and Fleet Against the Shore."

In the Indian Ocean region therefore the United States has only a limited need of seapower to influence the desired economic and political orientation of littoral states. Moreover, the use of U.S. military power has been increasingly limited by congressional legislation and other domestic political constraints, so that during the immediate future at least its employment can only come about in situations which present grave and clear threats to American interests. The United States does, however, require the ability to bring superior power to bear in the case of threats to U.S. allies or other serious threats to U.S. interests from the Soviet Union or local powers. These capabilities are not necessarily required in the Indian Ocean on a permanent basis, but so long as the U.S.S.R. retains a major presence in the Ocean some degree of regular U.S. military presence is required to give credibility to U.S. capabilities and will to use military power in support of its friends.

ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES

In the Indian Ocean only the Diego Garcia base has any connection with U.S. economic objectives in the region, and that principally in the broader sphere of politico-economic objectives discussed in the previous section. The entire littoral is occupied by highly nationalistic states and military bases have almost no current relevance to trade or the access to the resources of the region.

In the future island bases like Diego Garcia could have some importance to economic objectives such as deep seabed mining. This would be especially true in the absence of a universally accepted legal regime governing the extraction of seabed resources, such as that which was intended to emerge from the current—but deadlocked—Law of the Sea Conference. Similar problems are posed in other areas such as the North Sea oil and gas fields—i.e., how to protect the oil rigs and pipelines against military action by a hostile power or sabotage. In the Indian Ocean the U.S. could conceivably find itself in a position where American-owned mining operations faced harassment or other action from littoral states. In such a case a facility such as Diego Garcia would have obvious utility. Usually, the best solution to this kind of a situation is its avoidance through diplomacy and good political relations with the countries of the region; but military power can be important both to influence negotiations favorably—i.e., as a visible sign of the U.S. stake in an issue, and should diplomacy fail.

MILITARY OBJECTIVES

The military utility of Diego Garcia and other Indian Ocean islands has been realized ever since the former colonial powers lost their footholds on the Indian Ocean littoral. Diego Garcia itself is admirably situated to observe air and sea traffic transiting the Indian Ocean.

A base such as Diego Garcia would be quite vulnerable in major conflict, but for peacetime military purposes or for warfare against an opponent with limited capabilities, these vulnerabilities are of no great importance. It is, after all, more indestructable than an aircraft carrier or a fleet oiler.

Essentially, Diego Garcia makes periodic military operations in the Indian Ocean, and especially in the Western region and the Arabian

Sea, more convenient. The base can also—and this is the main point of contention—facilitate a larger permanent naval presence, including the basing of carriers and SLBM's. It is also well located for certain specialized purposes such as communications, and for this purpose it partly fulfills the functions of the Asmara, Ethiopia facility from which the United States was ejected in 1976. The base also facilitates patrols by P–3 reconnaissance aircraft and, in an emergency, could accommodate a B–52 bomber. There are other possibilities such as a last resort type reinforcement of Israel by air (with potentially very hazardous flights up the Red Sea corridor). Finally, the island itself, being British Indian Ocean Territory and uninhabited, is virtually invulnerable to the kind of political developments which lead to the ejection of the United States from bases in host countries or the extraction of what the United States may regard as exhorbitant rental or user rights payments.

The main issues concerning the Diego Garcia facility do not involve its importance to the achievement of military objectives, narrowly conceived. Rather the issues relate to larger questions, including the tradeoff between political liabilities and military gains from the existence of the facility, and the effect on U.S. political, economic and military objectives which might result from larger permanent naval force levels in the Indian Ocean.

Alternative Instruments or Approaches

more ambitious use of diego garcia

Conceivably, Diego Garcia could be used as a deployment point for tactical air units, as a base for a permanent surface naval force, or as a support facility for SSBN's. All of these potential uses go beyond the stated missions of the facility, and meet no present military requirements. Moreover, a more ambitious use of the facility would risk stimulating a further Soviet buildup and would create adverse political reactions among many littoral states.

From a purely practical point of view the permanent stationing of U.S. surface forces would, in the absence of a significantly larger U.S. Navy, seem to divert resources from the most important naval wartime missions, i.e., the destruction of the Soviet fleets in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Pacific Oceans. Without increasing the size of the Navy, additional deployments of U.S. forces in the Indian Ocean may not enhance security of the sea lanes very much since the Soviets have more opportune locations from which to cut the oil sea lanes (i.e., from points nearer to the Soviet Union). At present the Soviets only deploy one or two attack submarines in the Indian Ocean at any given time.

a u.s.-soviet agreement to limit or reduce forces in the indian ocean

In June 1977 the United States and the U.S.S.R. began discussions on limiting Naval bases in the Indian Ocean. Because of developments on the Horn of Africa, these talks have been in recess since February 1978 and their outcome remains uncertain. Were, however, the talks to be resumed and reach agreement, it could offer definite advantages

for the U.S. provided the agreement did not stipulate a U.S. withdrawal from Diego Garcia or otherwise restrict its presently conceived role. With that proviso, the following advantages might accrue:

—A reduction or limitation on the size of the Soviet presence thus reducing political liabilities stemming from perceptions that Soviet power exceeds that of the United States in the area.
—Better relations with littoral states based on a mutual reduction or limitation of the superpower naval presence.
—Some marginal increase in security of important sea lanes.
—Avoidance of the monetary cost of a naval buildup in the region.

WITHDRAWAL FROM DIEGO GARCIA

This option would currently appear to have few advantages. Opposition to the buildup of Diego Garcia was based in large part on the presumed provocative nature of that step, and the resultant danger of a U.S.-U.S.S.R. naval race in the region. In fact, a naval race did not occur, partly due to limitations on the facility imposed by Congress and by a disinclination of both the Executive branch and Congress to make available—through new ship construction—the naval forces necessary to augment the current Indian Ocean force without abandoning or reducing deployments elsewhere. Soviet naval deployments peaked in 1974 in the region and have since stabilized at lower levels.

To date the United States has invested less than $200 million in construction funds for the base. This is less than the cost of two fleet oilers. Other functions, such as communications with satellites, could, presumably, only be performed with great difficulty and cost. The withdrawal from Diego Garcia would reap few political advantages and could incur many disadvantages. The critical issue politically is not the use of the island, but the extent and nature of its usage.

OBTAINING OTHER BASES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN OR LITTORAL STATES

There are, realistically, few visible opportunities for other bases nor—given current U.S. objectives in the region—would there appear to be any requirement for them.[29] The former British base at Gan, in the Maldives, has military advantages but obvious political liabilities. Use of it would require an agreement with the Maldives government and would create extreme consternation in India and elsewhere. A Soviet bid for a base for its "fishing fleet" in the Maldives was rebuffed by the Maldives government, with support from the United States, Britain, India and Sri Lanka.[30] In the current circumstances a bid by the United States would likely meet the same fate as the Soviet proposal.

From time to time there have been press reports that the Government of Pakistan, under former Prime Minister Bhutto, had held

---

[29] As the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy and Operations, Vice-Admiral Crowe, recently noted in a talk at the Naval War College, "Every country in the area is accessible from the sea, but local sensitivities dictate that we not put a permanent presence ashore, that the visibility of our forces be carefully controlled and that we be prepared to assist, not replace, the forces of allies when and where help is needed." William Crowe, Jr., "Oil U.S. Navy vs. the Soviets," Christian Science Monitor, May 18, 1978, p. 24.

[30] Baltimore News American, November 6, 1977, p. 10.

out the possibility of U.S. bases or special accesses privileges. Bearing in mind the factors which led to the eviction of the United States from air bases and intelligence monitoring sites in the past, and the current chaotic state of Pakistan's political situation, securing renewal of base rights in that country seems a remote prospect. Moreover, successful re-establishment of U.S. bases in Pakistan would antagonize India and possibly Iran.[31]

Other possibilities include a more extensive Indian Ocean base system with anchors at both the East and West. Such a system might run from the natural port of Diego Suarez, in the Malagasy Republic (Madagascar) to Indonesia or Western Australia. This policy, however, would have to be a predicated on a new order of priorities in the U.S. defense planning due to the high cost in ships and shore facilities that would be required. Such a base system would, at the present time, face grave if not insurmountable practical problems. The Malagasy Republic, for instance, has evicted the French fleet and barred foreign warships from all of its ports. Some accommodation might be made with Indonesia, but that country's public views on the superpower presence in the region would make such a reversal politically embarrassing. Serious opposition could be expected in this country over issues such as Indonesia's lackluster record on human rights. Finally, all facilities in Australia, including current facilities, rest on fragile political ground. The prospects of any major new U.S. base would appear doubtful.

MORE EXTENSIVE RELIANCE ON UNDERWAY REPLENISHMENT CAPABILITIES

Such a course, which would probably presuppose a larger naval presence in the Indian Ocean, would be extremely expensive. While having certain political advantages stemming from less reliance on bases and shore facilities in the region, the loss of flexibility and operational capabilities (as contrasted with operational advantages of the Diego Garcia facility and other local logistical support) would tend to exact a cost to U.S. political, economic and military objectives. The fuel storage and other logistical support facilities at Diego Garcia provide a hedge against the one circumstance in which the U.S. can expect to be denied bunkering and other logistical support from otherwise friendly countries in the region—i.e., during a new Middle East war between Israel and one or more Arab states. In almost every other circumstance, and especially in circumstances related to U.S. economic ties to Gulf states and defense support relationships, the reliance on an extensive underway replenishment fleet would amount to "carrying coals to New Castle."

---

[31] Conceivably the recent leftist military coup in Afghanistan could cause the Pakistan Martial Law Administration to take a favorable attitude toward the extension of some kind of base rights to the United States. Both Iran and a number of Western observers have seen the hand of the Soviet Union in the coup, while other observers, including India, have characterized the coup as largely an internal political development. In any event the change of government could result in a renewal of Afghan irridentist pressures on areas of Pakistan and Iran that contain populations ethnically related to Afghan groups, notably the Pathan and Baluchi Peoples. At this point, however, there is no basis for assuming that Pakistan or Iran would desire to meet this essentially political and local military threat by seeking the military presence of the U.S. as a counter to Soviet influence in Afghanistan. For various views of the Afghan coup see: "Cockpit of Asia," The Economist, May 6, 1978; Denzil Peiris, "Second Thoughts in Kabul, Far Eastern Economic Review," May 19, 1978; and Simon Winchester, "Afghan Leaders Seem Determined to Stay Independent." The Washington Post, May 8, 1978; "New Regime Moving Afghanistan Deeper into Orbit of Soviet Union," New York Times, Nov. 18, 1978, pp. 1, 45.

The Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf Region


Background to Consideration of U.S. Interests and Policy Objectives

Geo-strategic Factors

The Arabian Peninsula, together with the Horn of Africa, occupies the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean. Connected to mainland Asia on its north by the Syrian and Iraqi deserts, the Peninsula, is bounded on its west by the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea, on its south by the Gulf of Aden and the Arabian Sea, and on its east by the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf. As a part of the greater Middle East region, the strategic significance of the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf arises primarily from three factors: (1) the region's geographical location as a bridge between three continents; (2) the region's proximity to the Soviet Union; and (3) as a supplier of petroleum to the non-Communist world and the site of more than half the world's proven crude oil reserves.

The Persian Gulf, separating the Arabian Peninsula and the coast of Iran, is connected to the Gulf of Oman by the Strait of Hormuz. It is through this narrow Strait that a loaded tanker exits every eleven minutes, making it a chokepoint which conceivably could be threatened by a hostile power or insurgent group controlling either shore. Part of the Strait falls within the overlapping 12-nautical-miles territorial sea claims of Iran and Oman. Iran's concern for assuring the security of passage through the Strait has been a major consideration in its naval modernization and expansion program.

APPROACHES TO THE PERSIAN GULF REGION



The Political and Economic Context

The Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf region comprises a number of national units of varying ethnic, linguistic and religious compositions, differing political systems and ideologies, and a widely uneven distribution of economic and human resources. Over the past several years, the region has experienced rapid changes of uncertain consequences within its constituent states. These changes have not yet played themselves out.

The political and economic consequences of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war appeared to be more profound for the Middle East region and the world than any following from previous regional conflicts. The oil-producing countries began to acquire vast new wealth as a result of the dramatic 1973–1974 increase of oil prices and the prospect of a powerful concentration of financial power in the Middle East seemed a certainty. To some, such a prospect has appeared as a threat to the economic and financial stability of the Western industrialized world.

The United States faces a situation in the region in which countries that are in many ways politically and economically weak states nonetheless command immense amounts of liquid funds that could be utilized to serve specific economic or political purposes. These rich states cannot be compared to developed states in terms of real wealth—the means of production, accumulated skills and standards of living—although their basic objectives are to establish such foundations in the shortest possible time in anticipation of when the oil runs out.

The United States is not without significant advantages in dealing with these states. On the one hand, the Islamic states see in the United States the principal supporter, financier and arms supplier of Israel. On the other hand, the proximity and increasing power of the Soviet Union presents the United States to the conservative Arab governments as a counterweight to Soviet influence. Furthermore, the United States is the largest single consumer of the region's oil exports. Moreover, the United States has the capacity to supply modern weapons systems, badly needed education and technical training, and attractive capital and consumer goals. The United States has a food surplus. American multinational corporations are more efficient to carry out some of the projects regional governments are eager to implement. United States and multinational oil companies still have important roles to play in the petroleum industry of the Gulf region. Of particular importance, however, are U.S. financial institutions—banks, brokerage houses and other firms operating in the region; and American technology.

The economic and political relationship between the United States and the Gulf oil-producing countries is, therefore, generally one involving reciprocal benefit. The United States needs the oil, but the large U.S. demand alone guarantees the maintenance of current price levels. The Persian Gulf oil-producers, for their part, require access to Western (and especially United States) technology and the assurance of continued supplies of essential industrial products.

Regional Relationships

Until the end of World War II, the Arabian Peninsula and the Arab Gulf states were relatively isolated from the external world and, to a considerable degree, from the rest of the Middle East. This situa-

tion was due in large part to the presence of the United Kingdom and its treaty relationships, and its role as a protecting power. With the development of the region's vast oil resources, the Gulf after World War II was transformed from one of the world's poorest areas to one of the wealthiest. Politically, the consequences of this transformation did not become manifest until the early 1960's when the Gulf states began to be drawn gradually into the wider circle of Arab politics; and, after 1967, into the Arab-Israeli conflict and great-power diplomacy.

The British withdrawal from the Gulf at the end of 1971 terminated the era of protection. Since that time, the Gulf states have remained in a condition of uneasy equilibrium, sustained by the wealth derived from petroleum production and by the deference of a concerned industrial and developing world. While becoming the richest oil-producing area in the Middle East, the Arab Gulf states, in contrast to the Maghreb and Fertile Crescent, have remained the center of traditional. conservative, tribal-dynastic systems of role. The smaller states only recently have emerged as independent of a protecting power.

Within the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf region, a number of conditions affect inter-Arab relations. There is a basic division between the wealthy oil-producing states—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, and Iraq—and those not so naturally endowed—the two Yemens, and the Red Sea littoral states, including Egypt, the Sudan, and Jordan. Large numbers of expatriates from the less well-endowed Arab countries are employed in the developing economies of the oil-producing states, particularly Egyptians, Palestinians, Lebanese, Omanis and Yemenis.[32] Structural differences exist between Arab economies, including state-controlled systems and private enterprise. The accumulation of enormous money reserves from oil revenues has afforded some Gulf states greater influence in inter-Arab relations than they would otherwise possess. Such influence, however, reflects vulnerable power in that financial power is not based upon the credible infrastructure normally associated with a powerful state. The disparity between rich and poor Arab states could initiate a new phase of inter-Arab conflict.

Given the size of its population and resources, Iraq conceivably could develop a high degree of economic self-sufficiency. Iraq stands, however, as a continuing threat to the conservative, traditional regimes in the region with its radical regime and its close relationship with the Soviet Union. In recent years, Iraq has sought to establish better relations with the other conservative Gulf states, including Iran, and has sought to diversify its economic relations by establishing ties with Western oil-consuming countries.

Iran's relations with its Gulf Arab neighbors have been marked both by cooperation and by some degree of tension and conflict. In working to achieve ambitious economic, social and military programs, Iran has displayed the potential of becoming the paramount power in the region. Its principal objectives in the Persian Gulf in recent years—preservation of regional political stability, preservation of Gulf security, and denial of a dominant position to external powers in

---

[32] The oil producition countries are also host to large numbers of workers and technicians from South. Southeast and East Asia, especially from India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Malaysia, and South Korea.

the region—have favored the maintenance of friendly relations with the Arab states. Nevertheless, Iranian attempts at hegemony would likely be challenged by the Arab states, particularly Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

The Iranian Perspective

Two principal factors have strongly influenced the Iranian perception of threats to its security—the geographical location of the country, and its oil resources. Throughout its 2,500 years of history, Iran has faced a succession of invasions, interventions and occupations, and the process has continued into the twentieth century.

With a long memory of Russia aggrandizement at Iran's expense, the Soviet Union remains a major, if not central, concern, but by no means the only one. The vulnerability of Iran's petroleum-based economy, has resulted in a partial redirection of primary foreign policy attention to the future of the Persian Gulf, particularly since the mid-1960's. As a consequence of a growing accommodation with the Soviet Union, reflected in a series of economic and trade agreements that included "non-sensitive" supplies of Soviet anti-aircraft guns, trucks, and armored personnel carriers, Tehran was able to turn its attention from its 1,250-mile northern frontier with the Soviets toward the security of its interests in the Gulf.

Iran in the past has stressed its determination to keep the vital sea lanes open either by undertaking the task alone or, preferably, in collaboration with other littoral Gulf states. Ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz could be vulnerable to a number of types of attack, including mines or artillery and missile attack from land or by sea. The relationship of Iran's determination to counter threats to shipping traversing the Strait and the Iranian defense programs is reflected in the stated major mission of the Iranian armed forces to protect this strategic passage.

In recent years a growing internal threat to the Shah's government developed from three principal sources: a revived Islamic fundamentalist movement, secessionist movements (e.g., the Baluchis of southwestern Iran and Pakistan), and Marxist guerrilla groups. Until mid-1978, the threat appeared containable by the armed forces and security forces in Iran. There had been little popular support for these groups, and the general populace had been antipathetic toward them. The strains created by the Shah's ambitious goals for rapid modernization of the country, however, widened the inequalities and imbalances existing in the political and social fabric of Iran and gave increased opportunities for popular support to dissident elements. The major opposition groups represented a spectrum of viewpoints that ranged from advocacy of a liberalized constitutional government, support for an Islamic republic adhering strictly to traditionalist Shiite Muslin practices, and various leftist or Marxist political formulas. In view of the unsettled conditions in Iran, the prospects for a rapid restoration of order and renewal of oil production and exports from the country are very uncertain.

The Saudi Arabian Perspective

During the past several years, Saudi Arabia has evidenced increasing concern for its security. The country covers some 900,000 square miles of territory and possesses more than 2,000 miles of coastline

on the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. It has perceived significant threats from politically radical regional states with which the Soviet Union has had strong ties—including Iraq, the PRDY, and, until quite recently, Somalia. To counter these threats, the Saudi Government has embraced two principal strategies: first, the reduction of Soviet influence in the region; and second, the development of a creditable defense structure.

Saudi perception of threat has basically emanated from regimes possessing opposing ideologies. During the past two decades, the country has faced hostile action from external forces only twice. In the 1960's, during the Yemeni civil war, Egyptian aircraft from the Yemen bombed Saudi villages in the southern part of the country; and in 1969 and 1973, units from the PDRY attacked Saudi border posts. These incidents were major factors in the decision by the Saudi Government to commence and accelerate a military modernization program in the mid-1960's.

Stability in Saudi Arabia in the near future will in large measure be dependent upon regional political and economic factors. During the past four years, political, economic and social pressures on the Al Saud ruling family stemming from the Middle East region and elsewhere have been considerable. To date, the Saudi system has been resilient and relatively open and accessible. The threat to the country and its present policies lie in the Middle East political situation in general. At the same time, the Al Saud ruling family will need to maintain an equilibrium between the forces of traditionalism and modernization within the country—forces not unlike those which have contributed notably to the current turmoil in Iran.

Major U.S. Interests and Policy Objectives in the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf Region

In June 1973, in a statement before the House Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco described the Persian Gulf as an area in which the United States had "very, very significant political-economic-strategic interests." [33] He defined these interests as being: (a) support for indigenous regional collective security efforts to provide stability and to foster orderly development without outside interference; (b) peaceful resolution of territorial and other disputes among the regional states and the opening up of better channels of communication among them; (c) continued access to Gulf oil supplies at reasonable prices and in sufficient quantities to meet our growing needs and those of our European and Asian friends and allies; and (d) enhancing of our commercial and financial interests.[34]

U.S. security interests and policy objectives in the region were more specifically defined in the same hearings by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) James H. Noyes. These were: (a) containment of Soviet military power within its present borders; (b) access to Persian Gulf oil; and (c) continued free movement of U.S. ships and

---

[33] U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia. New perspectives in the Persian Gulf. Hearings, 93rd Congress, 1st session, June 6, July 17, 23, 24, and November 28, 1973. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973. p. 6.

[34] Ibid. p. 7.

aircraft into and out of the area.[35] There is no indication that these basic objectives have changed in the intervening five years.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES

In the context of the Middle East region as a whole, the *political* importance of the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf area derives in large measure from its oil and from the basic U.S. policy goal of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict that has affected virtually every other issue of major U.S. concern in the Middle East.[36] While maintaining a long-standing commitment to the security and survival of Israel, the United States also has a broadly defined commitment to peaceful relations and stability within the entire region. The character of Soviet intentions likewise is extremely important in defining U.S. policy options, particularly in light of the potential for superpower confrontation in the event of renewed Arab-Israeli hostilities, suspicion of Soviet objectives with respect to Middle East oil and the Indian Ocean and the developing Soviet military capability for interfering with the free flow of ocean transport, disrupting fuel supplies, and inhibiting the projection of power from sea to land by Western forces.

The *economic* importance of the region derives from the central concern that the vitality of the United States—and ultimately, the global—economy could be adversely affected by the collapse, or the threat of collapse, of the international financial system and the consequent potential for restrictive monetary, fiscal, and trade measures stemming from regional strategems and tactics with respect to oil availability, prices, and profits. U.S. policy objectives have included: (a) maintenance of continued access to the region's petroleum supplies at tolerable [37] prices and in sufficient quantities to meet U.S. needs and those of its allies; and (b) the expansion of diplomatic, cultural and technical, commercial, and financial ties with, and activities in, the region; and (c) influencing oil-exporting countries to use their rapidly growing revenues in constructive ways, supportive of the international financial system. Trade with the region and the interdependence which it fosters between oil-producing and consumer countries have been balance of payments factors of considerable significance to the United States.

Major U.S. Facilities and Other Forms of Presence in the Region

BAHRAIN

Since the disestablishment of the United States Army Persian Gulf Command in early 1946 following the end of World War II,[38] the

---

[35] U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia. New perspectives in the Persian Gulf. Hearings, 93rd Congress, 1st session. June 6, 17, 23, 24, and November 28, 1973. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973. p. 6.

[36] Ibid. p. 39.

[37] Clearly the U.S. conception of tolerable price has changed considerably in the period since the October 1973 Mid-East war. Nonetheless the United States has made the minimization of new price increases a major foreign policy goal, and a key aspect of its relationship with Iran and Saudi Arabia, including its military relationship with these states.

[38] For details of the activities of the Persian Gulf Command, see T. H. Vail Motter, *U.S. Army in World War II; The Middle East Theater; The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1952).

United States military presence in the Persian Gulf has been modest. A small naval force, the Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR), consisting generally of a flagship and two destroyers, has been assigned to the Persian Gulf since 1949. These U.S. naval vessels enjoyed access to port and support facilities at Jufair in Bahrain under informal agreements with the United Kingdom. The command flagship was homeported at Jufair.

With the end of the British treaty relationship in the area, the United States, on December 23, 1971, concluded an executive agreement with the Government of the State of Bahrain (GSB) for the continued use of these facilities. This marked the first direct formal contact between the United States and the new Government of the State of Bahrain. The agreement reflected no change in the facilities available to the United States in Bahrain. The executive agreement provided for continued United States use of part of the former British facilities in order to continue to enjoy the same logistic support which had been available to the Middle East Force over the years. The command flagship continued to be homeported in Bahrain, and the United States retained access to a commercial pier on those occasions when the Middle East Force commander's flagship or one of the two destroyers normally assigned to him was in port in Bahrain. It also included warehousing, cold storage, communications, and recreation facilities. Also with the ending of British jurisdiction over foreigners in Bahrain, a formal arrangement with that nation was required to define the status of U.S. naval personnel ashore there.[39] The cost to the United States for these facilities was $4 million annually.[40]

During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, when the United States provided material support to Israel, the Government of the State of Bahrain found itself embarrassed in the Arab world by the fact that it was the only Arab state which provided an operational base for U.S. forces. At that time, Bahrain threatened to abrogate the agreement and/or to raise the rental fee. The Government of the State of Bahrain later indicated that continued use of the facility would depend upon "the United States attitude toward the Arab cause in the Middle East."


Subsequent negotiations allowed the two nations to reach an accommodation. A new agreement between the United States and the GSB was implemented by an exchange of diplomatic notes on June 28, 1977. The agreement resulted from negotiations conducted over a year between the two governments and accommodated the GSB's desire to cease "homeporting" of the Middle East Force in Bahrain. The agreement terminated the "homeporting" of the Middle East Force in Bahrain but provided for a Department of Defense Administrative Support Unit to be stationed in Bahrain to carry out administrative functions, including support of ship and aircraft visits. Further, the GSB agreed to extend the status of forces protection accorded under the 1971 agreement to Department of Defense personnel who reside in or visit Bahrain for purposes related to functions of the DOD Administrative Support Unit.

---

[39] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *Executive Agreements with Portugal and Bahrain,* hearings, 92d Cong., 2d sess., February 1–3, 1972, pp. 17–18.

[40] U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, *Review of Recent Developments in the Middle East,* hearings, 95th Cong., 1st sess., June 9, 1977, p. 106.

ARABIAN PENINSULA AND PERSIAN GULF



The new agreement allows the leasing of essentially the same pier and airfield facilities that the Middle East Force formerly occupied. The Government of the State of Bahrain has indicated it will welcome visits by Middle East Force units, and the agreement states that Berth Number 1 at the Mina Sulman pier will be available to U.S. naval vessels on a priority basis for no fewer than four months (120 days) per year, and for additional periods as requested by the United States and approved by the G.S.B. Annual rent for all facilities was established at $2 million, and the lease is renewable annually.[41]

MASIRAH

In addition to the facility at Bahrain, the United States has arranged with Great Britain for the occasional use of Masirah airfield in Oman for the purpose of refueling U.S. Navy Maritime Patrol aircraft flying out of Diego Garcia. Since the British gave up this airfield in March 1977, the United States has indicated to the Government of Oman an interest in continuing this practice of occasional landings at Masirah to refuel. The Omani Government has indicated willingness in principle to allow United States and other friendly aircraft to visit their air facility, but no definite arrangements have been worked out and no landings have been made since March.[42]

SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN

The United States maintains no operating bases within Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, because of our close and friendly relations and through mutual security assistance agreements with those countries, American military aircraft are not normally inhibited from rather routine periodic use of airfields in those countries upon proper notification and approval. For a number of years, the United States has also covertly utilized some sites in Iran for the purpose of monitoring Soviet activities.[43]

Utility of U.S. Facilities and Other Forms of Military Presence and Influence to U.S. Objectives in the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf Region

Any discussion of the utility of bases and facilities to the furtherance of U.S. political, economic and military objectives in the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf region must be prefaced by a reiteration of the fact that in this part of the world the psychological significance of the U.S. military presence, and the web of military and economic ties with regional states carries far more importance than military installations. The U.S. now has no bases in the region in the strictest sense, though it does have access to foreign controlled facilities that may be deemed the partial equivalent of bases—the Department of Defense would probably consider them bases if the Soviets enjoyed the same rights in lieu of the United States. What is far more im-

---

[41] Lease Agreement between the United States of America and the Government of the State of Bahrain, June 28, 1977.

[42] Review of Recent Developments in the Middle East, p. 108.

[43] U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, *United States Military Installations and Objectives in the Mediterranean,* Committee Print, 95th Cong., 1st sess., March 27, 1977, p. 46.

portant to the United States is the symbolic importance of the small Middle East force and the U.S. role in training and supplying weapons and other hardware to the military forces of the Gulf states, especially Iran and Saudi Arabia.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES

The present nature of the U.S. presence in the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf region appears to serve U.S. political objectives well, if the key to the success of the U.S. presence is that it increases the sense of security of the Gulf states without compromising their sense of independence and nationalism. These states never envisioned having the United States substitute an American presence for that of the British. Saudi Arabia and Iran in particular (allowing for their own regional rivalry) see themselves as determining the direction of development of the Persian Gulf and are anxious to develop their own political and military influence in the region.

U.S. economic objectives are inextricably connected with political objectives. The extent and significance of the political and economic relationship, and the role of U.S. military power in the region was highlighted in a recent series of reports carried by the *Washington Post* on the U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia. The report noted in part:

> In the West, the Saudis [are] placing their wealth in a manner calculated to tie them more tightly to the nations that can protect them militarily, provide markets for their oil and petrochemical exports, and ship the materials and technology they need to develop their wastelands and scattered desert tribal villages. In practice this means the United States.[44]

The article noted that the Saudis had invested large sums in the United States, some estimates being as high as $40 billion, primarily in U.S. Treasury notes. These investments have not only lessened some of the harmful effects of the post-1973 oil price increases, but they have also enabled the United States to finance recent budget deficits in the $60 billion range without drying up domestic sources of investment capital.[45] These phenomenon far overshadow the small U.S. military presence in the region. On the other hand, however, the same economic and political relationship with Saudi Arabia would not likely prevail were it not for the capability of the United States to offer military protection and support and to play a role as the principle supplier of weapons, hardware, logistical support and training.

MILITARY OBJECTIVES

Clearly, the United States Middle East Force has little combat capability either offensively or defensively. Its primary mission has been to provide an American "presence" in the Persian Gulf by showing the flag through a series of port calls, visits, and people-to-people activities. The Department of Defense views this force as an acceptable

---

[44] Jim Hoagland and J. P. Smith, "Practicing Checkbook Diplomacy" (second of three articles) the Washington Post, December 21, 1977, p. A8.

[45] Ibid.

symbolic American presence in the area, at a low cost in force level, personnel, expenditure, or regional resentment.

This pattern of U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf is likely to continue in the future, with the United States negotiating and enjoying periodic and rather routine access to facilities in the area on a continuing basis in order to support American forces as needed, but with no desire or inclination for a continuous American presence other than at Bahrain (in which case only the logistical support presence is continuous).

The degree to which U.S. military relationships with Gulf countries support any specific U.S. objectives is limited. Beyond reinforcing political and military ties with the Gulf states (which are not primarily military objectives) access to airfields and ports in the region facilitates general military objectives of keeping track of Soviet operations in the region, world-wide military communications and logistical support, and patrolling the sea and air routes in the entire Indian Ocean region.

Policy Alternatives

MAINTENANCE OF STATUS QUO: UNITED STATES MIDDLE EAST FORCE (MIDEASTFOR)

There exist a number of significant aspects relating to the continued presence of MIDEASTFOR that deserve consideration. The most important of these include the following:

(1) The supply factor probably is the most important aspect of United States use of facilities in Bahrain. The logistical function permits a capability which, if circumstances dictated, could support the presence of an increased number of ships—particularly a surface task force—in the operational area on a cost-effective basis.

(2) Goodwill visits by the Commander, MIDEASTFOR, have a significant and favorable impact on relations with regional navies, and give the United States access to posts in regional countries, including Iran, the Persian Gulf Arab states, and Kenya.[46] In this respect the flag aircraft of the MIDEASTFOR command has been more instrumental in accomplishing the goal of showing the flag than the flagship because of its greater versatility.

(3) The function of coordinating individual shipboard training exercises for personnel of regional country navies has been significant in U.S.-regional country relations.

(4) The inherent communications capability aboard MIDEASTFOR provides command and control communications that include general series, secure voice and special intelligence features. It should be noted that because of ionospheric conditions in the Indian Ocean region, deadzones create communications outages lasting as much as five to six hours.

(5) The MIDEASTFOR intelligence capability is significant in light of the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean.

---

[46] The MIDEASTFOR Commander reportedly represents an additional, and in some cases more potent source of influence with the political leadership of a country than military representatives in the U.S. advisory missions. The latter officials are often regarded as merely diplomatic functionaries with little real authority or influence on American policy.

(6) Although it is a modest force, MIDEASTFOR does have a deterrence value in the face of the Soviet presence or other potentially hostile forces, and the threat of hijacking by radical or terrorist elements of American or friendly merchant ships, especially tankers. Units of MIDEASTFOR have provided, on request, protection for underwater survey ships in the Indian Ocean off the coasts of unfriendly littoral countries.

THE OPTION OF NON-INVOLVEMENT

It has been suggested by some that the withdrawal of the U.S. presence in the region would generate a Soviet withdrawal from the Indian Ocean and would reduce the risk of American involvement in any regional crises. By removing the United States from the politics of the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf/Horn of Africa, it would be up to American private enterprise to make its own arrangements with local governments and individuals to maintain oil supplies without any commitment on the part of the U.S. Government to the support of regional regimes on their policies. Regional disputes would be dealt with by regional institutions, such as the League of Arab States, or by the United Nations. Such an option which deliberately avoids commitment and involvement in ways that regional countries friendly to the United States have come to expect will not, however, thereby remove restraints on local conflict or the intervention of other external powers, particularly the Soviet Union. It also raises the question of whether market forces, unsupported by active diplomacy and political commitment, would be adequate to assure vital energy interests.

Given U.S. objectives, regional relationships do not appear sufficiently stable to make a non-involvement option feasible. The ties which bind the United States to the oil producing states are so strong and complex that the absence of some kind of military presence and defense relationship would be extremely risky. The United States is vitally important to the present delicate balance in the region, especially between Saudi Arabia, which has the largest oil reserves and production capacity but the smallest defensive capability, and Iran. Finally the absence of some kind of military presence would further reduce the already limited U.S. military option in the event of a new Middle East war and any resultant oil embargo. By the end of the century or even earlier, assuming the oil resources of the region become relatively less important, the United States could have a much greater interest in encouraging, and relying on intraregional security arrangements.

NEW U.S. BASES IN THE REGION

The two most important states in the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf Region, Saudi Arabia and Iran, are in a strong position to determine the nature of their relationship with the United States, to influence the policies of the weaker states in the region, and to almost unilaterally set limits on the nature of U.S. peaceful access to the littoral. For reasons that have been dealt with at length, a new major U.S. base in the region does not seem to be currently within the realm of the feasible. Such a facility would compromise the highly valued images of independence and self-determination of these states. Moreover, an actual U.S. base in either Iran or Saudia Arabia, were

that otherwise feasible, would appear threatening to the other in the sense of conveying a decision to back one rival power against the other.

For similar reasons these states desire to keep the U.S. presence in adjacent countries at a low level of visibility. The delicate maneuvering that resulted in the new basis for U.S. access to Bahrain is representative of this attitude on the part of the Gulf states.

Having noted the general considerations governing current opportunities for new U.S. bases or facilities in the region, the following sites are listed purely in terms of their potential military utility. Specific limitations, including overriding political limitations, are so noted.

Chah Bahar, Iran.—This is a new port at which Iran's U.S.-built Spruance-class destroyers will be based. Situated as it is, well out in the Gulf of Oman toward the Pakistan border, Iran could conceivably have fewer objections to a U.S. presence at Chah Bahar, particularly, since large numbers of U.S. advisors and technicians will be needed to make the U.S.-built Spruance-class destroyers operational.

Masirah, Oman.—The United States is now attempting to negotiate the continuance of limited landing rights at the former British air base. Iran would probably not object to some more permanent U.S. presence.

Mattrah, Oman.—This port located outside the Persian Gulf and has possibilities as a naval facility and Iran would not likely raise objections.

Berbera, Somalia.—Conceivably the United States might obtain access to the former Soviet facilities at Berbera. Thus far, however, the United States has not been willing even to sell military equipment to Somalia, let alone enter into the kind of military relationship which a base would entail. Moreover, U.S. access would carry the same political risks that led to the expulsion of the Soviets, would create an awkward situation with Kenya and would possibly involve the United States in the Ethiopia-Somalia struggle.

Mombasa, Kenya.—Mombasa has a fine harbor and might be seen to have military advantages. Even though Kenya is one of the countries of black Africa with whom the United States enjoys the closest relations, access to Mombasa for any kind of permanent military facilities is a very remote possibility due to the onerous cost to Kenya in prestige and political influence with neighboring countries.

Summary Conclusions

Currently the salient feature of the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean region seems to be the relatively small direct utility of military bases and facilities to U.S. objectives, but the large indirect significance of the broader military relationship, including bases and facilities, a naval presence, and extensive foreign military sales, training and technical assistance, to U.S. goals. For the immediate future, the symbolic aspects of the U.S. presence seen more important than the actual military capabilities which the U.S. possesses in the region. The true locus of U.S. power—which can, if necessary be brought to bear in the region—lies at some distance principally at Guam and Subic Bay.

Essentially, the United States would seem to have two broad alternatives for pursuing its political, economic and military objectives in

the region: (1) reliance on regional systems to secure U.S. objectives and, (2) a resources oriented forward naval strategy. The first alternative could involve a range in the size of the U.S. military presence from a slightly increased version of the present situation, including perhaps a beefed up MIDEASTFOR with access to additional ports or airfields, to a complete military withdrawal from the region. The second alternative would likely involve a permanent tactical air and naval presence at Diego Garcia, perhaps built around a carrier or other capital ship, and additional facilities or bases in the Indian Ocean or littoral.

The present situation in the Persian Gulf region amounts to one variation of the first alternative. In this instance the nature of the U.S. presence is closely attuned to the current political realities of the region, including strong political forces favoring local self-determination and recognition that in the inextricable relationship between politics, economics and military power, the economic factor is the determining one. The current nature of the U.S. presence in the region also corresponds to domestic political realities, including congressional sentiment against new military involvements or entanglements.

The present situation in the Persian Gulf area is not without serious present and potential liabilities. These risks have been made more evident by the crisis in Iran and the yet unforeseeable direction and consequences of Islamic revivalism and other manifestations of Nationalist and anti-Western feelings. Notable also is the question of the long-term impact of arms transfers to this region as an instrument of policy. In relatively close geographical juxtaposition in the Persian Gulf there are ten Sheikhs, a King, and a Sultan, as well as a radical Baathist President. The political aspirations of many of the local peoples are only just beginning to emerge, and, as indicated by the case of Iran, there are radical pressures at work that suggest that the stability of some of these regimes cannot be counted on very strongly. As oil incomes rise so, too, will the aspirations of the "have-nots", and not all people in that category are natives of the area—over half of Kuwait's population is foreign born, including many of the Palestinians now living and working in the Gulf area. Some of these immigrants may have no political power, but they can be a force for disaffection.

As arms become more widespread, political violence is arguably made easier, and any conflict that might result will be more bloody. The current willingness to supply arms therefore may be enhancing the danger of increased political instability. Further, these large quantities of sophisticated armaments could at some point in the future end up in the hands of radical successors to the current governments, successors who might not share the current community of interests with the United States.

Also important is the current limited capability of Iran and Saudi Arabia to absorb the sophisticated armament and the technology represented by the armaments they have purchased. Thus, a large American support element has existed in Iran and still exists in Saudi Arabia to assist in the absorption and proper utilization of these new sophisticated weapons.[47] There is also the possibility that these arms might

---

[47] U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Military Sales to Iran, 94th Cong., 2d sess., July 1976, pp. 49–53.

be used in ways inimical to other American interests. At some point, the threat of another Arab-Israeli War carries the additional threat of Saudi Arabia finding itself torn between supporting the Arab cause and maintaining its relationship with the United Sates.

It was hoped that the growng military strength of Iran and Saudi Arabia, along with their growing nationalism and their sense of the necessity of cooperation in the Persian Gulf would have exactly the opposite effect—that of helping to bring about stability and peace in an area vastly important to the United States and the world at large. Given the nature of the recent developments in Iran, it is very difficult to predict whether, in the future, Iran's potential military power will contribute to the maintenance of regional stability.

The weakness of the present means of securing U.S. interests thus lies in the unstable nature of the regional system, if it can be truly called a system, and the inordinately high U.S. dependency on the resources of the region. The latter weakness, however, is not something that can be solved via U.S. policy toward the region, and barring major changes in the United States and elsewhere it will remain a weakness in any U.S. approach to the region.

The second alternative is predicated on the belief that a significant Soviet naval threat exists to U.S. interests in the region, especially the sea-lines of communication and, perhaps unstated, an assumption that as at a last recourse the United States can or should use military power to obtain badly needed resources.

Former Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. (Ret.), for instance, cites the Soviet naval presence and the importance of U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf and Middle East as the rationale for a naval buildup by the United States in the area. Zumwalt considers the announced plans for the Diego Garcia facility as "a bare binimum of prudence." [48] Robert J. Pranger of the American Enterprise Institute also argues for a forward, resource-oriented naval strategy in Asia. Pranger recommends the deployment of roving task forces consisting of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and "associated amphibious elements" that "should be on constant patrol in areas where armed intervention with *definitive* American power would secure access to vital resources and waterways, should these be closed by the force of any power." In addition, Pranger proposes the deployment of lesser naval forces "operating out of bases and homeports" that would patrol the sea-lanes connecting the United States and "resource rich areas." Pranger notes that "these forces should have base support in the Indian Ocean and in Western and South Pacific." [49]

The second alternative has costs and in current circumstances several weaknesses, some of which could prove severe. These include: (1) A heightened U.S. presence runs counter to the politics of the region—the ability of the United States to obtain additional facilities and points of access is very problematical and a larger naval presence based on the Diego Garcia facility would tend to antagonize the two largest regional naval powers, India and Iran and could seem to legitimatize further increases in the Soviet presence; (2) Given the current

---

[48] Admiral E. R. Zumwalt, Jr., "A New Base in the Indian Ocean?" (with a contrary view by Admiral G. R. La Rocque (Ret.)). Baltimore Sun, July 11, 1975.

[49] Robert J. Pranger, "The Evolving Role of Asia in American Policy, Donald C. Hellmann (ed.) South Asia: The Politics of Poverty and Peace. Critical Choices for Americans, Vol. XIII (Lexington, Mass., 1976), p. 225.

nature of the Soviet military presence in the region the immediate threat to U.S. interests is not self-evident; (3) The real utility of military power to securing economic objectives has not been established given the ease with which oil fields and port facilities could be put out of action during any attempt by an external power to obtain resources through military means—the current shutdown of Iran's oil exports shows the near impossibility of getting oil flowing by coersion, whether external or internal; and (4) The carrying out of such a policy would require a considerable shift in attitudes within the United States and the Congress, and a substantial expansion of U.S. naval capabilities and/or a realignment of priorities away from the Pacific and into the Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region.

35-995 O - 79 - 9

AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA*

The United States has few essential security interests in Africa South of the Sahara. There is a security interest, discussed in the chapter dealing with the Indian Ocean, in seeing that the shipment of Persian Gulf oil along the East Coast of Africa and around the Cape of Good Hope to Western Europe and the United States is not threatened. The United States also has a very strong security interest in assuring that it is not permanently denied access to the chrome ore deposits of southern Africa and to some other African minerals. But apart from these concerns, there are no plausible contingencies in Africa that would involve vital American national security interests.

Though it has few vital security interests in Africa, however, the United States does have several important foreign policy interests on the continent. The security of access to the Suez Canal, Nigeria's oil, and the opportunities for trade and investment in the continent are among these interests.[1] Consequently, Africa merits discussion in this study. This chapter will deal with basing issues in sub-Saharan Africa, defined to include all African countries except Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco.

United States Foreign Policy Objectives in the Region

POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

The United States has had a long-standing interest in the political evolution of the developing nations. This interest reflects a genuine moral concern, as well as the practical realization that a congenial world political environment is more likely to further American interests generally than an uncongenial one. American policy-makers have usually explained Africa policy in terms of promoting economic prosperity, human rights, and peace and stability on the continent,[2] and these objectives reflect the American vision of a desirable political evolution in Africa.

The general international orientation of the African countries is of some immediate political importance to the United States because nearly one-third of the countries represented at the United Nations General Assembly are African countries. As a voting bloc at the United Nations or in other international forums, the sub-Saharan countries have considerable potential. Another political concern for many ana-

---

*Prepared by Raymond W. Copson, Analyst in African Affairs.

[1] Soviet and Cuban involvement in Angola and the Horn of Africa raises a question as to whether an American interest in denying hegemony to these two countries in Africa might not become predominant in the years ahead. Soviet and Cuban hegemony in Africa still seems a remote possibility at present, however, so that this interest is not given separate attention here. Nonetheless, such a development would clearly affect the political, economic, and military interests of the United States in Africa, which are discussed.

[2] Lake, Anthony. Africa in Global Perspective. Christian A. Herter Lecture at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, October 27, 1977. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services.

lysts of U.S. policy toward Africa is the fear that the racial confrontation in southern Africa will have repercussions in the United States itself, damaging race relations here.

American political objectives in Africa have led to special interests in two key regions. Southern Africa has become something of a focus for American diplomacy in recent years. In this region, human rights issues, as well as questions involving U.S. politics, international peace, and the U.S. position at the United Nations are interwoven in complex and often contradictory ways. African attention is drawn to the region, and American policy is closely watched. In East Africa, both the Executive and Legislative branches have shown a continuing interest in the problem of human rights violations in Uganda and Ethiopia. Kenya, a prosperous country with a relatively good record on human rights, has come to be regarded as an American friend.

Throughout Africa, the United States has had an interest in maintaining access for American ideas and points of view. A Voice of America transmitter in Liberia relays programs to the continent, and the United States Information Service has more than thirty information centers in African cities and towns. Cultural interchange with Africa is facilitated by the large number of African students in the United States. The Nigerian contingent of 20,000 students is the largest.

United States political objectives in Africa have served as one basis for American opposition to growing Cuban and Soviet influence on the continent. Many of those concerned with Africa policy have felt that where the Soviet Union and Cuba have become involved, U.S. political influence has been lessened while human rights, economic development, and peace have suffered. Bayard Rustin and Carl Gersham have argued that the victory of the Soviet and Cuban backed MPLA in Angola has "increased Africa's vulnerability to a fate considerably worse than colonialism."[3] This is a view, however, that is by no means universally accepted. Some have argued that the Soviet Union and Cuba may be able to make a contribution to African political stability and economic development and that African nationalism, although it may limit U.S. influence on the continent, will also restrict Soviet and Cuban gains.

ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES

Africa is economically important to the United States primarily as a source of several key minerals. Eighteen percent of America's imported crude oil comes from Nigeria,[4] making Nigeria the second most important source of imported petroleum after Saudi Arabia. Nigerian oil is economically attractive because of its low sulfur content, and politically attractive because it is only marginally entangled with the Middle East confrontation. Nigeria did not participate in the oil embargo which followed the 1973 October War. There are deposits of oil in Angola, Gabon, and elsewhere along the West African coast, although sub-Saharan reserves are currently estimated at less than 4 percent of the world's total.[5]

---

[3] Rustin, Bayard and Carl Gersham. Africa, Soviet Imperialism and the Retreat of American Power. Commentary, vol. 64, number 4, October 1977 : 33.

[4] This figure is for the 1973–1976 period, U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines. Mineral Commodity Summaries, 1978 [Washington, 1978] p. 122.

[5] Calculated on the basis of data published in U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center. International Energy Biweekly Statistical Review [Washington, February 8, 1978] p. 4.

According to data published by the Bureau of Mines,[6] more than 90 percent of the world's chromite reserves are deposited in South Africa and Rhodesia compared with an estimated one-half of one percent in the Soviet Union, the principal alternative source. Chromite is used in the production of stainless steel and other high quality ferroalloys in which chromium is an essential ingredient. It is generally agreed that the industrial economies would be severely damaged if chromite became unavailable.

South Africa is also an important supplier of gold, industrial diamonds, the platinum group metals, vanadium, manganese, and antimony, and its reserves of several of these minerals constitute a very large portion of the world's total (Table 1). The United States imports essential metals from other African countries, including cobalt from Zaire, manganese from Gabon, bauxite from Guinea, and copper from Zambia. Clearly, the United States has a very strong interest in maintaining access to Africa's minerals.

TABLE 1.—AFRICAN MINERALS SUPPLIERS

Country and minerals (selected)	Percent of U.S. imports, 1973–76	Percent known world reserves
South Africa:		
Chromite	30	74
Ferrochromium	34	----------
Industrial diamond	23	7
Vanadium	56	[1] 19
Manganese	10	37
Platinum group	33	71
Gold	[2] 22	49
Rhodesia:		
Chromite	----------	22
Ferrochromium	24	----------
Zaire:		
Cobalt	47	31
Industrial diamond	----------	73
Copper	----------	6
Zambia:		
Cobalt	----------	8
Copper	7	6
Guinea: Bauxite	13	33

[1] 75 percent of the world's known vanadium reserves are located in the Soviet Union.
[2] This is the figure given for Switzerland, but it is reported that most of the amount is of South African origin.

Source: U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Mineral Commodity Summaries, 1978 (Washington, 1978).

In view of the political instability which characterizes so many African countries, however, it is altogether likely that from time to time the United States will find access to one or more of its African mineral supplies interrupted. Increases in the prices of the affected minerals and other economic dislocations would be the probable result. Nonetheless, supply interruptions need not be catastrophic, since there are means by which such contingencies can be managed. These include turning to alternative suppliers, using natural or synthetic substitutes, recovering metals from scrap, and drawing down stockpiles.[7]

Increasing dependence on alternative suppliers is not an attractive option in the case of chromium, however, because the Soviet Union

[6] U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines. Mineral Commodities Summaries, 1978, p. 35.

[7] U.S. Government stockpiles of several of the minerals imported from Africa are currently in deficit. These include chromite, cobalt, the platinum group metals, and vanadium. U.S. General Services Administration, Federal Preparedness Agency. Stockpile Report to the Congress, October 1976–March 1977 [Washington, October 1977].

is the principal alternative source. Since almost all the world's known chromite is deposited in Rhodesia and South Africa in any case, long term dependence on alternative sources does not seem possible. Nor is there a currently available substitute for chromium in some military applications and in other uses requiring high-temperature ferroalloys. Consequently, extended denial of access to the chromium of southern Africa would be a very serious matter indeed.

The mineral wealth of southern Africa is a second source of Western concern with respect to the Soviet-Cuban presence in Africa. A recent report to the North Atlantic Assembly considered the importance of these minerals and noted, "(S)hould the Soviet Union ever be in a position to control their cost or to deny their production to the West, they would have succeeded in striking a blow that could well cripple Europe's industrial economy as well as gravely damage that of the United States." [8]

Africa's importance as a market for American exports and investment is limited but growing. Only about $3.2 billion in exports went to sub-Saharan Africa in 1977,[9] or approximately 3 percent of total exports. One-third of exports to the region went to South Africa, and slightly less than one-third to Nigeria. Exports to Nigeria are growing rapidly, and may approach $1 billion in 1978.[10] By September 1978, exports to Nigeria were running ahead of exports to South Africa,[11] perhaps foreshadowing a general reorientation of U.S. trade patterns with Africa. The sums involved in exports to Africa are small, but in an era of serious balance of payments deficits, any expanding market is helpful.

United States direct investment in Africa is also small, totalling about $4.6 billion, or 3 percent of total U.S. direct foreign investment as of the end of 1977.[12] Again, South Africa ranked at the top, with about 39 percent of the African total. Nigeria, with 7 percent of total U.S. direct investment in Africa, was regarded as a profitable area for future investment.

MILITARY OBJECTIVES

Since American political and economic interests in Africa are limited, there are few military missions that the United States might want to carry out on the continent. The most likely potential missions are (1) evacuation of American civilians in countries undergoing political turmoil; (2) rescue of hostages; (3) and displays of force to shore up friendly regimes, such as those in Kenya and Liberia. Other possible missions include participation in international peace-

---

[8] General Report on the Security of the Alliance, presented by Mr. Patrick Wall (United Kingdom), general rapporteur. Appearing in U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Twenty-third Meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly, Held at Paris, France, September 18 through September 23, 1977: Report of the U.S. Delegation. (Committee Print) Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. p. 106.

[9] Calculated on the basis of data appearing in U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Highlights of U.S. Export and Import Trade, December 1977 [Washington, March 1978]. pp. 36 and 38.

[10] U.S. Department of Commerce. Commerce America, Vol. 3, Number 3, January 30, 1978 [Washington, 1978]. p. 45.

[11] U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. Highlights of U.S. Export and Import Trade, September 1978. [Washington, November 1978], p. 40.

[12] Calculated on the basis of 1977 data appearing in U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis. Survey of Current Business, August 1978, Vol. 58, Number 8 [Washington, 1978]. p. 28. Direct investment is defined as the net book value of U.S. investor's equity in, and outstanding loans to, foreign affiliates. U.S. bank branches in South Africa were reported to have assets of $1.5 billion on September 30, 1978. U.S. Federal Reserve System, statistical release, December 19, 1978.

keeping operations and naval action along Africa's coasts to protect international shipping. It is also possible, under certain circumstances, that the United States would wish to consider a military response to Soviet and Cuban involvement in Africa.

The evacuation of civilians can be a very difficult military operation, particularly in a tumultous period of political upheaval when communications are difficult and armed resistance is likely. In Africa, American teachers, engineers, missionaries, Peace Corps volunteers and others are dispersed outside major population centers—a complicating factor that was cited when Americans in Uganda seemed to be in danger in February 1977. Military rescue operations can cause violent reactions resulting in loss of life. An estimated thirty civilians were killed in Stanleyville in 1964, when Belgian paratroops, who had been transported in American planes, landed on a rescue mission. These problems suggest that evacuations are usually best handled by diplomatic and not military means. Nonetheless, there are significant numbers of Americans in several African countries today, including at least 4000 in Kenya, 3300 in Nigeria, 5700 in South Africa, and 2500 in Zaire.[13] A possible need for the rescue of these and other American communities will be a continuing concern.

The rescue of hostages has become the function of elite military units, such as the one used by Israel at Entebbe in 1976, or the one sent into action by West Germany at Mogadishu in October 1977. Using long-range aircraft and in-flight refueling, these units can operate at long distances from any base. However, they are vulnerable to attack from hostile forces while in transit and also after landing, as the fate of the Egyptian rescue force on Cyprus has recently shown. An occasion may arise, however, in which the United States would choose to deploy a military rescue team against terrorists in Africa.

There are two countries in Africa, Kenya and Liberia, with which the United States has especially cordial relations, and there may be other special American friends in the future. Liberia is the only African country with a formal defense agreement with the United States.[14] The regimes in friendly countries will inevitably have their internal and external enemies, and it may be that the U.S. will wish to show its support when threats from these enemies become especially acute. After the Entebbe crisis, the United States parked a Navy P–3 reconnaissance aircraft in plain sight at Nairobi airport, docked a frigate at Mombasa, and moved a carrier task force off the coast. These actions eased Kenyan fears of a Ugandan attack.

The participation of U.S. armed forces in international peacekeeping operations in Africa is not a likely possibility at present. African governments are particularly sensitive to great power actions that can be seen as "imperialist" or "neo-colonialist." American military participation in peacekeeping operations would be so interpreted in many African capitals, with consequent harm to the peacekeeping effort and to U.S. foreign policy. It is conceivable, however, that the United

---

[13] These are the approximate numbers of American citizens registered at consulates as of March 31, 1977. Tourists, most notably in Kenya, would boost the totals, particularly during vacation periods. Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs.

[14] Under an agreement signed in Washington, on July 8, 1959, Liberia and the United States have agreed, in the event of aggression against Liberia, to "immediately determine what action may be appropriate for the defense of Liberia." U.S. Department of State. United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, Volume 10, Part 2 [Washington, 1959]. p. 1598.

States would be asked to provide financial, transport and technical assistance to peacekeeping forces in Rhodesia, Namibia, or elsewhere.

There are, along Africa's coasts, certain passages that are important to the shipment of petroleum from the Persian Gulf and to world commerce generally. One of these is the approach to the Suez Canal and the Israeli port of Elat through the Bab-al-Mandab strait and the Red Sea. The African coast and adjacent regions along this route are politically unstable, with revolutionary forces operating in the Eritrean region of Ethiopia and with tension still high between Ethiopia and Somalia in the wake of the Ogaden war. According to recent estimates, there are more than 17,000 Cuban soldiers and 1,000 Soviet military specialists assisting Ethiopia. Conflict might also break out between Ethiopia and Somalia over the small but strategically located country of Djibiouti, and fighting between Sudan and Ethiopia is a continuing possibility.

Hostile forces or rebels along the Bab-al-Mandab and Red Sea route using aircraft, artillery, or anti-ship missiles, could disrupt or even sever shipping through Suez. Attacks on shipping on this route would have military as well as economic consequences, since the U.S. capability to deploy naval vessels from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean would be affected.

The importance of the Red Sea route need not be exaggerated, however. The Suez Canal was closed from June 1967 until June 1975, without serious apparent economic or military consequences for the United States. Israel could be supplied with oil from the Mediterranean, and American ships could move into the Indian Ocean from the Atlantic or the Pacific. The Canal is of only limited military value in any case since it can be so easily closed by military action in a crisis. But it is preferable for the United States that the Red Sea Bab-al-Mandab route be open rather than closed, and keeping it open may constitute a military mission for the United States in Africa in the future. Other coastal regions that are of military importance include the Mozambique Channel, between the African coast and Madagascar, through which Persian Gulf oil shipments move; and the Cape of Good Hope, where tankers from the Persian Gulf are again close to shore.

An American military response to the Soviet-Cuban presence in Africa is unlikely at the present time because this presence has not yet endangered vital American interests. Soviet reconnaissance flights over the South Atlantic from Guinea and Angola were once reported,[15] but these flights were of little military consequence. The Cuban presence in Angola, where there may be as many as 20,000 Cuban troops, together with recent reports of Cuban advisers in the Zimbabwe liberation forces under the command of Joshua Nkomo, now stationed in Zambia, may raise questions about the security of the mineral resources of southern Africa and Zaire, but the answers to these questions are by no means clear at the present time.

---

[15] According to one report, the flights from Guinea were halted in November 1977, as part of a bid on Guinea's part to improve relations with the United States. New York Times, November 19, 1977, p. 2. One analyst has noted, however, that Soviet amphibious vessels and naval infantry now appear to be based in Guinea. Dornan, James E., Jr. Africa's Turn. Sea Power, Volume 20, Number 12, December 1977, p. 15. On Soviet reconnaissance flights from Angola, see Bagley, Worth H. Sea Power and Western Security: The Next Decade. Adelphi Papers, Number 139. London, International Institute for Strategic Studies [1977], p. 28.

Angola, it is interesting to note, has kept up oil exports to Western countries despite the presence of Cuban troops. Indeed, Cuban troops are actually guarding Gulf Oil installations in Cabinda. No doubt the Angolan Government is anxious to retain the income its resource exports produce, and this motive may be an important one with other resource-rich countries in the future.

In any event, there is an inherent weakness in the Soviet and Cuban presence in Africa in that Soviet advisors and Cuban troops there are thousands of miles from their own home bases and sources of supply. Their supply lines extend over the Atlantic, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East, and these lines are vulnerable to attack by forces based entirely outside Africa.

United States Bases and Missions in the Region

The United States has no military bases in Africa. Robertsfield, in Liberia, was used to ferry aircraft to Europe in World War II, but longer range planes rendered this base obsolete after the war. Under an agreement with Britain, a similar base was established at Wide-awake Airfield on Ascension Island, which is about 1000 miles south of Liberia and 1800 miles east of Angola, in 1942. This airfield has been reoccupied by the United States and is used as a missile tracking station.[16] Military planners have suggested that the facilities on Diego Garcia could be useful in projecting American power into Africa. The Kagnew strategic communications base at Asmara, in Ethiopia, was closed by Ethiopia in April 1977. However, satellite communications had made this base obsolete, and its scheduled closing by the United States in 1978 had already been announced.

The United States does have a standby satellite tracking station in South Africa, manned by an American airman along with some private contract personnel from the United States and South African technicians. This staff is augmented by additional U.S. personnel when the station is activated for specific tracking activities. In Liberia, in addition to the Voice of America transmitter noted above, there is an important navigational station as well as the American diplomatic communications relays for Africa.

Effectiveness of the U.S. Military Base Structure in the Region

The very low military profile assumed by the United States in Africa is functional given the nature of American interests there and the sensitive political climate. Political and ideological considerations would prevent most African governments from accepting an American military installation. However, it is conceivable that a few countries,

---

[16] U.K. Foreign and Commonwealth Office. A Year Book of the Commonwealth, 1974. London. Her Majesty's Stationery Office [1974], p. 584. See also, Europa Year Book, 1977. A World Survey, volume II. London, Europa Publications [1977]. p. 250.

under particular internal or external threats, might be willing to do so. Liberia, for example, might seek the assurance a base can offer if relations deteriorated with one of its neighbors. Perhaps Kenya, under worsening threats from Somalia or Uganda, would seek the same sort of protection. In December 1974, after Britain announced that it would terminate the agreement under which it used the facilities of the naval base at Simonstown, South Africa stated that Simonstown, and all the other facilities it had to offer, were available to friendly Western countries.[17]

African political realities suggest that the United States would not accept such offers even if they should be made in the future. The establishment of a base in South Africa, of course, would entail serious political penalties for the United States on the African continent. American business interests and government personnel would no doubt be expelled from many, if not most, African countries as a result, and damage at the United Nations, where the African nations constitute the largest General Assembly voting bloc, would be severe.

Elsewhere, even the discussion of an American base would be counterproductive for friendly governments, since such a discussion would antagonize nationalist and radical elements, perhaps precipitating a coup or other anti-government violence. Africa's leftist nations, who would see the presence of an American base as brazen cooperation with the "imperialists," would probably work for the overthrow of governments that cooperated with the United States in this way. In any case, on a continent where political change can be sudden and unexpected, the economic risks of base construction are high indeed.


The infeasibility of establishing United States bases in Africa today is not a serious setback for American foreign policy, since there are few American objectives that would be served by African bases. A low military profile is probably essential for the present to the advancement of American political and economic objectives in Africa. Bases would generally promote hostility toward the United States and lead to greater exclusion than access. If the United States wants access to African mineral supplies, as well as to African export and investment markets, it cannot behave in a way that will recall African colonial experiences.

A special case might seem to be posed by southern Africa, whose chromium and other minerals are so important. But it is difficult to perceive a scenario in which the United States might use military forces in Africa itself to assure access to these mineral resources. It appears unlikely now that American public opinion could be brought to support intervention in southern Africa against a revoluntionary upheaval, even if mineral supplies were threatened. Nor is it likely that American policy-makers would wish to commit U.S. armed forces in such a difficult military situation.

---

[17] Africa Research Bulletin, volume 11, number 12, January 15, 1975, p. 3478.

AFRICA



Legend:

- ◉ **Capital**
- • **City**

0 500 1000 Miles

0 500 1000 Kilometers

Locations of symbols are approximate.

Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative.

If the threat to mineral supplies included Soviet and Cuban contingents, the situation would be more ominous for all concerned. In this circumstance, the United States might apply pressures on the Soviet Union and Cuba outside Africa, and extend assistance short of armed intervention to local friendly forces. But whatever the American response might be, the political and military arguments against armed intervention on the scene would probably still be persuasive, given the current national disposition against distant military actions.

This assessment of the effectiveness of the low military profile of the United States in pursuing its political and economic objectives in Africa is based, it should be emphasized, on current political realities in the United States and Africa. These realities might change in time if the Soviet Union and Cuba embarked on an expanded, systematic campaign of subversion and intervention on the continent. Opinion in the United States and Africa might become more receptive to an American military role in Africa should this occur. But at present, the American reluctance to intervene in Africa and the corresponding African hostility toward Western interventions seems likely to persist for some time.

Turning finally to American military objectives in Africa, it must be said that these objectives could be more easily met if there were American military bases on the continent. This is hardly surprising. Clearly it would be easier to evacuate American citizens, rescue hostages, carry out displays of force, and attack hostile coastal installations if bases were close by. But the political difficulties involved in establishing African bases indicate that attention must be given to the alternative means by which these objectives can be realized.

Alternative Approaches

The United States is in a fair position to use other than military means in achieving its foreign policy objectives in Africa. Africa today is in great need of the development capital, technological capability, and skilled personnel that the United States has to offer. African governments, whatever their ideology, can deny themselves and their people these American resources for long periods of time only at substantial cost. Even the leftist regimes in Guinea and Angola are reported to be interested in expanding their ties with the United States. It seems unlikely, then, that other African regimes would wish to exclude American influence altogether or for very long.

Since practical considerations are likely to dissuade African regimes from permanently severing ties to the United States, American political and economic interests in Africa need not be in serious danger if American diplomacy is conducted with reasonable skill. The need for capital will mean that most African governments most of the time will be willing to sell raw materials to the United States and to accept productive investments. The need for rapid development will mean continued acceptance of useful American exports and of skilled technical personnel. Economic relations should result in diplomatic relations that will be cordial at least, and this cordiality will permit continued access for American ideas and points of view.

The proviso that American diplomatic relations with the African states be conducted with reasonable skill needs special emphasis. The best way for the United States to avoid political and economic exclu-

sion from Africa is to avoid diplomatic errors that would force African governments to take exclusionary steps. Clearly the United States can become tied to the perpetuation of white interests in southern Africa only at severe cost in the rest of the continent. This is the one eventuality that would jeopardize most American policies throughout Africa. American economic interests in southern Africa would be best protected if the racial confrontation in the region resolved itself in peaceful non-Marxist evolution toward majority rule rather than in violent change, and current American policy is directed toward promoting this kind of evolution. If increasing violence should occur, however, the United States will face very hard choices.

There are a variety of actions, not requiring bases, which the United States might take to further its objectives in Africa. Economic development assistance can of course be used to advance political and economic interests on the continent. If American aid were increased, its effectiveness for these purposes would in most instances be enhanced. Certainly the United States is able to offer Africa invaluable assistance in agriculture, industrial technology, education, and other fields. American capacity to help in these fields far exceeds that of the Soviet Union.

Military assistance and sales can be selectively used to aid friendly regimes in Africa. The United States is going ahead with plans to sell 12 F–5 fighter aircraft to Kenya. Sudan will be receiving F–5's as well as C–130 transports. These sales are a response to the Soviet buildup in Ethiopia, as well as to past Soviet assistance to Uganda and Somalia.

The U.S. Navy, particularly its aircraft carrier task forces, can be useful in achieving U.S. military objectives in Africa. The carrier, and its planes, can make an impressive show of support. U.S. Marine jets were used for this purpose in December 1976, when they flew in the Kenyan independence day celebration in Nairobi. President Amin's hostility toward Americans in Uganda in February 1977 seemed to moderate after reports circulated of naval movements off the East African coast. Carrier task forces can also be useful in the evacuation of American civilians from politically unstable countries and in launching anti-terrorist squads. The facility at Diego Garcia may be useful for these same purposes, as may the airfield on Ascension Island. The Belgian-American rescue at Stanleyville in 1964 was staged from Ascension.

Naval forces, perhaps operating in conjunction with aircraft from Diego Garcia, retain responsibility for protecting the sea lanes along Africa's coasts. In the event of a confrontation with the Soviet Union and Cuba over their role in Africa, these naval and air forces, which can threaten supply lines, would play a major role.

The United States can expect to receive some assistance from its NATO allies in furthering its African objectives. French forces have helped Zaire to meet the invasions of the mineral-rich Shaba province by Zairian rebels based in Angola. French military contingents are stationed in some African countries, notably Djibouti and Senegal, and an airborne force designated for intervention in Africa is kept in readiness in France itself.

Britain has worked closely with the United States on proposals for peace in Rhodesia and it has a defense pact with Kenya, where British

military personnel are to be seen on occasion. If Kenya were attacked from Somalia or Uganda, Britain could be expected to offer assistance. France, Britain, and West Germany have shown some interest in protecting Somalia against Soviet and Cuban-backed Ethiopian forces. Other countries friendly to the United States, particularly Morocco and Saudi Arabia, have been willing to cooperate with the United States in the Africa area.

It should be noted, however, that the interests of allied and friendly countries will not always coincide with those of the United States, and that the policies of these countries may change with political shifts. France's role in Africa is not supported by the French political left, and an electoral victory by a leftist coalition in France might end France's military role in Africa altogether. A Conservative victory in Britain might lead to dramatic changes in Britain's Africa policies, particularly toward southern Africa.

CONCLUSIONS

The United States has little need for bases in Africa in current circumstances. To station American armed forces in Africa would at this point be counterproductive for American objectives there. American objectives in Africa are at present far better met by skillful diplomacy, by economic and military assistance, and by other forms of cooperation with allied and friendly countries. When U.S. armed forces must be used, bases outside Africa can be employed.

SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC*

Major U.S. Political, Economic and Military Objectives in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific

FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS OF U.S. FAR EASTERN POLICY

Throughout the 20th century American policy makers have viewed U.S. interests in the Far East in the context of the "Open Door" policy. Generally, this has entailed an interest in American access to the East Asia region, the prevention of hegemony over the region by a hostile power or coalition of hostile powers and inclusion of East Asia in a global balance of power. Within Southeast Asia and the adjacent Southwest Pacific region, this perception has resulted in a progression of important policy decisions leading to growing American intervention in the region. Among these were the colonization of the Philippines; confrontation with Japan in 1940–41 when that nation penetrated Indochina and sought to control the oil of the Netherlands Indies; the formation of the ANZUS and SEATO alliances in the 1950's; and military intervention in Vietnam.

In short, this perception of fundamental American interests in East Asia has persisted despite a rapidly changing regional environment. During World War II, American intervention was based on reversing Japanese hegemony over the region. American intervention reached its zenith during the 1950–1968 period in an environment dominated by the perception of a Communist China bent on dominating the region through "proxies" and allies like North Vietnam, Indonesia under Sukarno, and communist insurgent movements.

The American base structure was established during 1950–68. The 1947 Military Base Agreement with the Philippines grew out of the post-colonial Filipino-American relationship, but it also was one of several agreements reached during that time designed to commit American resources to help the Government of the Philippines defeat the communist Huk insurgency. Subsequent steps—including the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty of 1954, and the commitment of American forces to Vietnam and Thailand in the 1960's—were aimed exclusively against the communist threat, perceived as guided by China.

OVERVIEW OF SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC IN THE POST-VIETNAM PERIOD

The defeat of the United States in Vietnam has halted the trend toward American intervention in Southeast Asia. U.S. forces and bases are no longer on the Southeast Asian mainland. Southeast Asia

*Prepared by Larry A. Niksch, Specialist in Asian Affairs, and Edmund J. Gannon, Analyst in National Defense.

today finds itself in a period of uncertainty over future U.S. policy and intra-region relationships.

American strategy will have to be formulated against important changes which have taken place in the balance of forces in Southeast Asia, both among the indigenous states and also among the major powers with interests in the region. These changes can be summarized as follows:

(1) The emergence of Vietnam as the strongest military power in Southeast Asia: Communist Vietnam, now officially called the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV), emerged from the Indochina conflict with large, well equipped armed forces with formidable conventional warfare capabilities as demonstrated during the 1975 offensive against South Vietnam. In addition to large stocks of Soviet-supplied weaponry and equipment, Hanoi acquired an estimated $5 billion in U.S. arms and equipment when South Vietnam collapsed. Since the end of the war, the SRV has demobilized several army divisions, but its armed forces still number 615,000.[1] In sheer numbers, the SRV armed forces are roughly of equal strength to the combined armed forces of the five member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines), are better equipped, and have far more combat experience.

Laos and Cambodia are essentially client states of Vietnam. At least 40,000 Vietnamese troops have been reported in Laos, including six combat divisions. A treaty signed in July 1977 amounted to an alliance (the treaty referred to a "special relationship") with each side pledging to cooperate in defending the territorial integrity of the other. Hanoi has overthrown the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia and installed a pro-SRV communist government in its place.

(2) The antagonistic relations between Vietnam and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations): Tension between the SRV and ASEAN arose quickly after the communist takeovers in Indochina. Its origins lay in ideological hostility, SRV military superiority, and the outright support or at least underlying sympathy given by the individual ASEAN states to the U.S. war effort. ASEAN uncertainty concerning Vietnam's intentions remains strong though less alarmist than during the immediate post-April 1975 period. The establishment of diplomatic and/or trade relations between Vietnam and the ASEAN states and the Sino-Vietnamese conflict apparently have eased ASEAN's fears of overt Vietnamese military acts against them. Important Vietnamese material aid to the Thai insurgency reportedly continues.[2] Vietnam's expressed support for communist insurgencies in ASEAN countries and periodic attacks on ASEAN at international meetings and in propaganda have been unsettling factors in the ASEAN-Vietnam relationship.

In June 1978, Vietnam began to moderate its public attitude toward ASEAN, probably as a result of its conflicts and disputes with China and Cambodia. SRV officials have stated that they are willing to discuss with ASEAN the concept of Southeast Asia becoming a zone

---

1 International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance: 1978–79. London, 1978; 68.

2 In September 1978, Socialist Republic of Vietnam Premier Pham Van Dong visited Bangkok and made statements widely interpreted as a pledge that Vietnam would not aid the Thai communist insurgency.

of neutrality. The ASEAN governments have expressed interest in Hanoi's overture, but they also stress the need for caution in dealing with the Vietnamese on this question. Individual ASEAN governments, especially the Malaysian government, have described to the Vietnamese government ASEAN's aims and the organization's own proposal for a Southeast Asian zone of neutrality.[3]

(3) The emergence of ASEAN as a genuine regional bloc: Before April 1975, it would have been inaccurate to speak of major policy initiatives by ASEAN, but the communist takeovers in Indochina and the shifting balances of power in Southeast Asia have prompted a new mood of unity among the five member states. Government officials of the individual countries are clearly "thinking ASEAN" more than ever, and these officials increasingly present an ASEAN viewpoint on major issues rather than a Filipino position or a Singaporean position, etc.

Substantively, this trend has spawned policy initiatives in several directions. Economically, intra-regional economic cooperation has increased, particularly with the recent agreements for the establishment of ASEAN economic projects and ASEAN-wide tariff reductions. A major thrust of this economic unity is being directed at the Western industrial countries, which take up about 60 percent of ASEAN's total trade. The basic ASEAN aim toward the West is to create more favorable market conditions for ASEAN exports.

Bilateral security cooperation among the ASEAN states has increased considerably since April 1975. This cooperation is not within ASEAN itself, since ASEAN is not a military alliance. Nevertheless, ASEAN has provided a political-psychological climate for security cooperation on a bilateral basis. Cooperation has grown in four areas: exchange of intelligence, regularized meetings of military staffs, joint operations against communist insurgents, and combined training exercises.

(4) Intensified Sino-Soviet rivalry: China has moved toward closer state to state relations with the ASEAN countries, supports ASEAN as a regional bloc, and has reduced (but not ended) its support for communist insurgencies in line with its main policy objective of countering Soviet penetration of the region. However, China continues to claim extensive areas of the South China Sea basin, and this is a source of apprehension to both the ASEAN countries and Vietnam. Vietnam's Chinese population has played a prominent role in the deterioration of SRV-PRC relations; and in the view of the ASEAN states, this points up a troublesome ambiguity in China's policy toward the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia.

The Soviet presence in Indochina has grown substantially since the end of the Indochina War. Relations with Vietnam remain close on all three levels of contact (government, party, and armed forces). In June 1978, Vietnam joined CMEA, the Soviet-sponsored economic bloc of communist countries. Moscow reportedly has a strong advisory presence in both Vietnam and Laos,[4] provides Vietnam with large quantities of arms, and reportedly urged Vietnam to launch a

---

[3] Malaysia originally proposed a Southeast Asian zone of "peace, freedom, and neutrality"; and ASEAN endorsed it in 1971. Little has come of it because of the Vietnam War, subsequent SRV–ASEAN hostility, Vietnamese attacks on the proposal, the ambivalent attitude of the major powers toward it, and differing interpretations among the ASEAN states themselves over the proposal's meaning.

[4] 4,000 technicians and advisers in Vietnam and at least 1,000 advisers in Laos.

Czechoslovakia-type invasion of Cambodia.[5] There have been rumors and charges that Vietnam has granted the Soviet Union a naval base at Camrahn Bay.

The U.S.S.R. reportedly has supplied arms and money to Thai communist insurgents.[6] Soviet links with the Thai communist movements are tenuous, however, given the historical pro-China orientation of the Thai Communist Party. Moreover, Soviet influence on communist parties in the other ASEAN states is not great. Elsewhere in the region, the U.S.S.R. continues to promote aid and trade but with only limited success. Moscow also continues to seek support for the Brezhnev Asian collective security plan, but with no apparent success. In short, unless the Soviet Union is able to increase its direct influence on either ASEAN governments or communist parties, its role in Southeast Asia will be tied almost exclusively to Vietnamese policy.

(5) Uncertainty over the future U.S. role in Southeast Asia: Asian governments perceive a trend toward U.S. disengagement from Southeast Asia and East Asia generally, except for Japan. ASEAN leaders view a progression of U.S. troop withdrawals beginning with Vietnam (1969–73), Thailand (1973–76), and now South Korea, coupled with the end of the U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan and the recent debate over the retention of U.S. bases in the Philippines. Officials of the ASEAN governments believe that, at best, American policy is in limbo and under strong pressure by advocates of further withdrawal. Australian officials share some of these same perceptions.[7] Although recent statements by the Carter Administration have been somewhat reassuring to them, misgivings still exist.

BROAD AMERICAN POLICY OBJECTIVES

U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific in the post-Vietnam period has been unclear. Major policy pronouncements of the Ford and Carter administrations suggest certain broad policy objectives in common toward the region. Nevertheless, there is no clear indication that the American government or the American people give high priority to these objectives. Moreover, there remains the question of the political, economic, and military instruments or strategies to be used in efforts to achieve the goals. Within all of these areas there appears to be disagreement both inside and outside the U.S. Government.

Certain objectives must be seen in a context that is broader than Southeast Asia. The U.S. role in this region has always been part of the overall American presence in the Western Pacific. Because the region bridges the Pacific and Indian Oceans, it also has implications for American policy toward the Indian Ocean region.

---

[5] Chanda, Nayan, Peking Escalates the War of Nerves, Far Eastern Economic Review, March 17, 1977 : 10–11. Asian Wall Street Journal, May 23, 1978.

[6] In March 1977, Thai officia's and refugees from Laos claimed Soviet involvement. In a feature article on the "KGB in Asia", the *Far Eastern Economic Review* of December 31, 1976, cited both financial and material assistance to the Thai insurgents from the USSR.

[7] An authoritative description of ASEAN views of U.S. policy may be found in Jusuf Wanandi's article on "Politico-Security Dimensions of Southeast Asia" in Asian Survey, August 1977. Wanandi is a senior member of Indonesia's Centre for Strategic and International Studies and a close adviser to Indonesian government leaders. For similar portrayals of ASEAN attitudes, see : U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. Security Assistance to Asia for Fiscal Year 1978. Report of a Special Study Mission to Asia, April 8–21. 1977. 95th Congress, 1st Session. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Troop Withdrawal From Korea. A report by Senators Hubert H. Humphrey and John Glenn. 95th Congress, 2d sess. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978. See also : Richardson, Michael. How the Five see Indochina. Far Eastern Economic Review, December 30, 1977 : 7–8.

POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

1. *Maintain a Balance of Great Power Involvement in Southeast Asia.*—In light of the geographic proximity of China to Southeast Asia and the growing Soviet and Japanese roles, this objective is implicit in the assurance of the Ford and Carter administrations that the United States will remain an Asian and Pacific power and will remain involved in Asia.[8] It currently has two aspects: U.S. involvement to correspond with or offset the involvement of the other major powers; and a balanced use of political, economic, and military instruments with a shift from the direct military role of the Vietnam War era to the employment of less direct military instruments.[9]

2. *Preservation of Japan's Orientation to the United States.*—With the rise of Japanese economic power in the 1960's, this has become the fundamental American policy objective throughout East Asia.[10] U.S. strategy to maintain that relationship concentrates on Northeast Asia, where Japan's fundamental security interests lie. Nevertheless, Southeast Asia has become increasingly significant to this objective because of Japan's dependence on oil from the Persian Gulf and Indonesia,[11] the geographical location of Southeast Asia straddling sea lines of communication (SLOC's) from the Persian Gulf and Australia to Japan, the growth of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, and the extensive Japanese economic role in the region and adjacent Australia.

3. *Security and Stability for the Non-Communist Countries of Southeast Asia.*—This has been a major U.S. objective since the formation of SEATO in the 1950's. With the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine and the American defeat in Vietnam, the thrust of this objective has shifted toward supporting the emergence of a regional system oriented toward the West but able to balance regional communist power and deal with internal problems increasingly with its own resources. ASEAN is now central to the goal, and stated American policy is to support the growth and unity of this organization.

The ASEAN countries are considered important to realization of several U.S. economic and military objectives. A strong, increasingly self-reliant ASEAN would be able to bear the responsibility for its own defense against all but the major powers. Close ties between ASEAN and the United States help assure Western access (naval and commercial) to the straits between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and enhance the security of SLOC's to Japan. They also would promote U.S. and Japanese access to the region's resources and markets.

Aside from military and economic considerations, two political-ideological rationales are cited by some proponents of this objective. First, it is pointed out that in the context of the current "North-South"

---

[8] For Carter Administration statements emphasizing continued U.S. involvement in Asia, see Secretary of Defense Brown's Los Angeles speech of February 20, 1978, and Secretary of State Vance's speech to the Asia Society of June 29, 1977.

[9] For U.S. perceptions of the changing nature of the American role in Southeast Asia, see Secretary Vance's Asia Society speech and Secretary of State Kissinger's Seattle address of July 22, 1976.

[10] For example, Secretary of State Kissinger declared in an Asia policy speech of July 22, 1976, that "No relationship is more important to the United States than our alliance with Japan." Secretary Vance voiced similar views in his Asia Society speech of June 29, 1977: "Of our allies and old friends, none is more important than Japan. Our mutual security treaty is a cornerstone of peace in East Asia."

[11] Japan's consumption of 5.7 million barrels of oil daily in 1978 ranks second to the United States in the non-communist world. Over 99 percent of Japan's oil comes from overseas. The chief foreign sources are: Persian Gulf region—77 percent; Southeast Asia (Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia)—20 percent; and China—3 percent.

debate over economic and trade issues, the ASEAN countries' approach has been moderate in comparison with the radical states within the "Third World." Second, the ASEAN states follow economic policies more in line with "Western" theories of development with emphasis on private sector initiative and liberal trade policies. In contrast, it is argued, much of the "Third World" leans toward statist, autarchic economic policies; and these policies, in turn, receive strong support from the Soviet Union.[12]

Nevertheless, it is pointed out that the ASEAN nations presently face serious challenges in alleviating economic problems (unemployment, food shortages, substandard health and education, overpopulation, and rural-urban economic disparities) and in establishing viable and effective political and governmental institutions and armed forces. ASEAN leaders and numerous outside observers believe that these conditions, if unrelieved, could breed future political instability and heightened insurgencies as well as opportunities for great power meddling.

4. *Democratic Political Development.*—U.S. political and ideological objectives toward Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific are reflected in the strong interest shown by the Carter Administration and some elements in Congress in the status of human rights in the region.

There is considerable disagreement and uncertainty within the U.S. government and the American body politic over the priority that should be given to democratic political development and human rights in U.S. policy toward Asia. Among those who favor it as an objective, there appears to be three schools of thought. The first focuses on U.S. allies and friends in the region and advocates a strategy of isolating authoritarian governments from American support through denial of aid and/or withdrawal of troops and bases from countries such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and South Korea. In recent years, this approach has been reflected in legislation that provides for sanctions (mainly suspension of aid) against countries whose governments consistently engage in gross violations of the human rights of their citizens.

Advocates of the second view are reluctant to impose sanctions on the governments of countries where the United States has security interests, including South Korea and the Philippines. In such cases, questions of bases, force levels, and security assistance should be divorced from human rights considerations. Nevertheless, this school of thought advocates diplomacy to pressure the rightist, authoritarian governments in East Asia to liberalize their political systems. Generally, the Carter Administration follows this approach.

The third school of thought, while not rejecting sanctions outright, would offer increased forms of support—military and economic—to countries whose governments are democratic or are liberalizing political and civil liberties. Advocates of this view would also couple criticism of human rights violations in the authoritarian systems with strong criticism of the violation of human rights in East Asian communist states.

5. *Normalization of Relations with Vietnam.*—A political goal separate from the objective of political-ideological linkage with

---

[12] For an analysis of Soviet emphasis on Third World" development strategies see: U.S. Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress, The Soviet Union and the Third World: A Watershed in Great Power Policy. Report to the House International Relations Committee, 95th Cong., 1st sess. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977.

ASEAN is the Carter Administration's attempt to normalize relations with Vietnam, the other regional power center in Southeast Asia. The Administration has not spelled out a complete rationale for this goal; but, aside from domestic considerations (i.e., the President's stated goal of "healing the wounds" of the Vietnam War), the rationale appears to be: (1) normalization would give the United States the means to influence Vietnam to adopt less hostile policies toward its regional neighbors; and (2) it could influence Vietnam to lessen its ties with the Soviet Union.

6. *Non-Proliferation.*—This world-wide objective applies principally to Australia in the region. Australia presently has about 20 percent of the non-communist world's uranium supplies. The objective, as applied to Australia, would consist of two elements: (a) to persuade Australia to join with the United States in a policy of not selling uranium to any state that is considering the production of nuclear weapons; and (b) in the long run, to influence Australia to maintain its present policy of not manufacturing such weapons.

ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES

1. *Access to Resources and Markets.*—It is generally accepted that Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific have some economic importance to the United States. The United States imports much of its bauxite from Australia, tin from Malaysia and Thailand, palm oil from Malaysia, and natural rubber from Malaysia and Indonesia. Approximately nine percent of U.S. foreign oil imports comes from Indonesia,[13] and California is expected to receive large quantities of natural gas from Indonesia over the next 20 years.[14] In short, economic access to the region is important though probably not vital to the United States.

Southeast Asia is also a market for U.S. products ($3.9 billion in exports to the ASEAN countries in 1977) and an area of sizable U.S. business investment,[15] but the value of U.S. exports to and investments in the region is small in comparison with Japan and Western Europe. Outside of bilateral U.S.-Southeast Asia economic ties, the United States is also concerned over the region's direct, growing economic importance to Japan.

2. *Development.*—Economic development has been a primary U.S. economic objective toward the Southeast Asian region since the early 1950's, and American economic aid programs have been the principal instrument of policy. Since the late 1960's, aid strategy has changed from emphasis on infrastructure-related projects and commodity import programs for indigenous industries to priority for "basic human needs" programs in education, health, population control, and food production. U.S. Government encouragement of American private investment through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and tax deferral provisions related to overseas profits has been another instrument intended to promote development.

The priority to be given the goal of development is now under question. First, U.S. aid programs now appear to aim primarily at es-

---

[13] U.S. C.I.A. International Oil Developments: Statistical Survey, August 1977: 6.
[14] Asian Wall Street Journal, July 25, 1977.
[15] About $4 billion in direct U.S. investment in Southeast Asia and $4.7 billion in Australia. Far Eastern Economic Review, July 2, 1976: 45.

tablishing a minimum floor for living standards among the poorest segment of the populations of the ASEAN countries. Some officials in the ASEAN countries doubt that this "human needs" emphasis of U.S. economic aid contributes significantly to overall economic growth.[16] Moreover, economic conditions in the United States have called into question the strategy of promoting private investment and opening up U.S. markets to the products of Asian countries. The most controversial issues in U.S.-East Asian trade today apply to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Nevertheless, imports of palm oil, sugar and other tropical products from the ASEAN countries are increasingly controversial. Also, as the ASEAN states develop export-oriented industries in textiles, electronics, and shoes, access to the American market increasingly will emerge as an issue in U.S.-ASEAN trade relations. This will be especially true if American and Japanese firms invest in these lines of production in the ASEAN countries similar to the manner in which they have invested in South Korea and Taiwan.

MILITARY OBJECTIVES

1. *Avoid Combat Involvement on the Southeast Asian Mainland and Ground Combat Involvement Throughout the Region.*—The objective appears explicit in the Ford and Carter Administration's policy statements, and this sentiment appears to predominate in Congress. Its origins lay in the 1969 Nixon Doctrine and the opening of relations with China in 1972. A fundamental tenet of the Nixon Doctrine was that in cases involving conventional attack or guerrilla warfare against a friend or ally of the United States, the nation threatened would assume the responsibility for providing the manpower for its defense while the United States would provide arms and economic assistance. The Nixon Doctrine was also based on the assumption that China was less willing and/or less inclined to launch a conventional attack against Southeast Asia or give active support to communist insurgencies in the region. Since the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine, the United States has withdrawn forces from Vietnam and Thailand and plans to withdraw ground forces from South Korea by 1982. American military power is now concentrated in the offshore areas of Asia.[17]

2. *Containment and Defeat of Communist Insurgencies in ASEAN Countries.*—This objective has been downplayed in recent years in official U.S. policy statements; but it remains, nevertheless, as part of the general political objective of a secure ASEAN. American security assistance and training programs are largely intended to enhance the ASEAN states' capabilities to deal with insurgencies.

In the post-Vietnam climate, security assistance and training apparently are the maximum, acceptable instruments to achieve this objective. There appears to be minimal support in the U.S. body politic for committing U.S. combat forces against a communist insurgency or a SRV-Laos-sponsored invasion of Northeast Thailand. Even the concept of an advisory force has little support. In short, the predominant view in the United States is that this objective must not

---

[16] Asian Wall Street Journal, January 16, 1978.

[17] For analysis of the "offshore strategy" of the Carter Administration, see New York Times. August 26, 1977; Carter's Offshore Strategy for Asia. Internews International Bulletin. September 26, 1977: 1; Again, United States is Gearing Up for Brush-fire Wars. U.S. News and World Report, February 27, 1978.


conflict with the goal of avoiding combat involvement on the Southeast Asian mainland and ground combat involvement throughout the region.

3. *Access to the Major Passages Between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean and Protection of Japan's Sea Lines of Communication.*—A major mission requirement of the United States military forces stationed at installations in Southeast Asia is the support of American and Japanese interests in the Persian Gulf and, to a lesser extent, locations in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. This specifically involves protection of Japan's SLOC's to its major sources of energy and other vital raw materials: the Middle East, Indonesia, and Australia. In order to fully meet these requirements, access from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean by American air and afloat (and possibly, submerged) assets is essential. Access would also be essential for the deployment in the Indian Ocean of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN's) targeted against the Soviet Union.[18]

---

[18] This objective is seldom discussed by U.S. officials, and, in fact, the official public position of the U.S. Government is that the Navy does not regularly operate SSBNs in the Indian Ocean. Nevertheless, there is a widespread belief that the United States uses the Indian Ocean for SSBN patrols. With the development of the Trident I missile system, the Soviet Union will become even more vulnerable to SSBNs deployed in the Indian Ocean.

ASIA AND INDIAN OCEAN



In broad terms, there are several passages between the Pacific and Indian Oceans; the major ones are the Malacca Strait (between the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra), the Sunda Strait (between Sumatra and Java), the Lombok Strait (off the east coast of Bali) and the Ombi Strait (off Timor). Other passages exist (e.g., the Torres Strait, between New Guinea and Cape York, Australia); however these lie outside the regular steaming routes of American naval ships stationed in the Philippines and Guam.

The major passages are of sufficient depth to allow for the transit of the largest American naval combatants (i.e., large aircraft carriers). Only the Lombok Strait, however, is of sufficient depth to allow for the passage of large submarines with a reasonable margin of safety.

Recent conferences on the Law of the Sea (LOS) have raised questions regarding abbreviation of passage rights above, upon, and below the surface of straits waters in territorial seas. While differences have yet to be resolved by treaty, it appears that a number of options may eventually be available to states wishing to place limitations on warships transiting their territorial seas.[19]

Major American Military Installations in Southeast Asia

MAJOR AMERICAN INSTALLATIONS IN THE AREA

The United States maintains a number of military facilities in the Philippines, the most important being Clark Air Base, Subic Bay Naval Base, and the Naval Communications Station at San Miguel. The security relationship between the two nations is defined in three major agreements: the 1947 Military Bases Agreement, as amended; a Military Assistance Agreement of the same date (revised in 1953); and the 1952 United States-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty. These installations are discussed below.

In addition, the United States maintains and operates a Naval Communications Station at Northwest Cape, Australia, and a comparable facility at Alice Springs, Australia. These installations are also discussed below.

1. Subic Bay Naval Base

The Subic Bay Naval Complex, located about 50 miles west of Manila, includes the Naval Station (Port Olongapo), the Naval Air Station (Cubi Point), and the Naval Magazine (Camayan Point).

The Naval Station facilities include:

POL (petroleum, oil, lubricants) storage capacity approximately 110 million gallons.

Four floating drydocks with sufficient capacity to allow for the drydocking of all major combatants except for aircraft carriers.

Considerable pier and harbor support facilities and craft.

Water, fuel, and electricity available at pierside.

Complete range of military personnel support facilities ashore.

Large public works contingent.

---

[19] For thoughts on the passage of surface and submerged warships, see Nolta, Frank. Passage Through International Straits: Free or Innocent? The Interests at Stake. San Diego Law Review, May 1974. For a broad-based study of the applications of law of the sea to naval missions, see Knight H. Gary. The Law of the Sea and Naval Missions. United States Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1977. For proposed language to treaties under consideration, see U.S. Department of State. Office of the Law of the Sea Negotiations. Third United National Conference of the Law of the Sea, September 20, 1976.

The Naval Air Station, Cubi Point, facilities include:

POL storage capacity of 1.68 million gallons.

Apron aircraft parking spaces of 313,000 square yards.

200,000 cubic feet of ammunition storage space.

The large apron area allows for the parking of the entire aircraft complement of an aircraft carrier (CV) using only 48 percent of the available space. Thus, in a surge situation, NAS, Cubi Point, can accommodate all aircraft from a CV and still support other aircraft using the facility. It should be added that the CV piers are located directly adjacent to and parallel with the aircraft taxiways so that aircraft can be parked immediately alongside the carrier and be serviced by shops on the ship.

The Naval Magazine, Camayan Point, facilities include:

3.8 million cubic feet of ammunition storage in nine buildings.

An ammunition wharf that can accommodate all major combatants.

2. Clark Air Base, Angelo City, Philippines

Clark Air Base, located about 50 miles northwest of Manila, is the largest U.S. military installation in Asia. Its assets include:

Runways that allow for the operation of any aircraft in the U.S. Air Force or Naval inventory;

590,000 square yards of apron parking;

POL storage capacity of 25 million gallons (approximately equal to the capacity of New York's Kennedy International Airport);

Approximately 200,000 square feet of ammunition storage space (located in 34 "igloos"); and

A large bombing range.

3. Naval Communications Station, San Miguel

The Naval Communications Station (NAVCOMMSTA), San Miguel, is located approximately 100 miles northwest of Manila. The normal range of high frequency radio transmission is about 1,500 nautical miles (a range that can be extended or reduced by external factors such as solar radiation activity, troposcatter, and the like).

4. Other Communications Facilities

Northwest Cape.—The Harold Holt Naval Communications Station, located at Northwest Cape, Australia, is a relay center for Naval messages originating from the United States, the Indian Ocean, and intermediate points. As in the case of NAVCOMMSTA, San Miguel, it has a normal range of about 1,500 nautical miles.


Alice Springs.—The North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) maintains a ground control station near Alice Springs, Australia, for the reception of information from satellites in orbit over the Indian Ocean. This facility can communicate through intermediate stations with the United States. Thus the Alice Springs facility could function as a communications station (albeit a limited one) for the relay of Naval messages.

U.S. military personnel in the Philippines

Army	28
Air Force	8,005
Navy	4,594
Marine Corps	786
Total	13,413

35-995 O - 79 - 10

FAR EAST


U.S.S.R.
Sea of Okhotsk
Pacific Ocean
Novosibirsk
Lake Baikal
Irkutsk
Khabarovsk
Hokkaido
Vladivostok
Sea of Japan
Honshu
JAPAN
Ulaanbaatar
MONGOLIA
Lake Balkhash
Wu-lu-mu-ch'i
Shen-yang
NORTH KOREA
Tokyo
Pyongyang
Peking
Tien-chin
Seoul
K'o-shih
SOUTH KOREA
Kyushu
PAK.
Indian Claim
Chinese line of control
Islamabad
CHINA
Shang-hai
Yellow Sea
Ch'ung-ch'ing
Tokyo to Manila (1,758 nm) by sea.
Guam to Tokyo (1,352 nm) by sea.
New Delhi
NEPAL
La-sa
Kathmandu
BHUTAN
Taipei
Taiwan
BANGLADESH
Kuang-chou (Canton)
Hong Kong (U.K.)
Calcutta
Hanoi
Philippine Sea
Guam
INDIA
BURMA
LAOS
Bay of Bengal
Vientiane
South China Sea
Luzon
Guam to Manila (1,499 nm) by sea.
Guam to San Diego, U.S.A. (5,379 nm) by sea.
Rangoon
Manila
THAILAND
VIETNAM
PHILIPPINES
Madras
Bangkok
CAMBODIA
Andaman Islands
Phnom Penh
Ho Chi Minh City
Mindanao
Manila to Jakarta (1,559 nm) by sea.
SRI LANKA
Celebes Sea
Papua New Guinea
Colombo
Nicobar Islands
Brunei
Sabah
Kuala Lumpur
Sarawak
MALAYSIA
Irian Jaya
Singapore
Sulawesi
Darwin to Manila (1,834 nm) by sea.
Banda Sea
Arafura Sea
Sumatra
INDONESIA
Jakarta
Java
Darwin
Timor Sea
Indian Ocean
North West Cape
AUSTRALIA
Perth
Adelaide
Melbourne
Legend:
Capital
City
0
1200 Miles
0
1200 Kilometers
Locations of symbols are approximate.
Names and boundary representation are not necessarily authoritative.

MAJOR MISSONS OF AMERICAN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

There are several missions that American bases, especially those in the Philippines, support or, according to U.S. military officials, could support:

1. Support of U.S. forces in Northeast Asia: As a support center for Seventh Fleet operations in the Western Pacific, Subic plays a role in supporting the Seventh Fleet presence around Japan and South Korea. Clark Air Base has a stated mission in the defense of South Korea.

2. Provide Support for Operations in the Western Indian Ocean and South China Sea: A key mission for Subic is to support Seventh Fleet operations in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean.

3. Support of U.S. Military Operations During a Middle East Crisis: U.S. Air Force officials suggest that in the event of another Middle Eastern war, Clark Air Base might be used to resupply Israel. Such an aerial resupply route would be by way of the Pacific Ocean to Clark Air Base, thence to Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, and thence to Israel via the Red Sea. In his annual report for FY 1979, Secretary of Defense Brown implied a role for U.S. bases in the Philippines as a refueling and supply base for U.S. aircraft and ships ferrying U.S. forces and equipment from the United States to the Persian Gulf oil states if a threat arose to oil supplies vital to the United States, NATO, and Japan.

1. Logistic Support

The overall U.S. naval use of the Philippines has not changed since Rear Admiral Draper L. Kaufmann, USN, then Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Philippines, testified in 1969 regarding facilities at Subic Bay:

> The naval base at the Subic Bay has a mission to provide logistic support, primarily to the 7th Fleet units, but also to locally assigned vessels and activities, transient naval vessels, aircraft and other naval activities in the Philippines located in the Subic Bay-Cubi Point complex. As you know Subic Bay is just outside of the Manila Bay.[20]

Currently, Subic performs 60 percent of all Seventh Fleet repair work, and it is the operational base for one of the two forward-deployed aircraft carriers with the fleet.[21]

A factfinding mission of the House International Relations Committee visited the Far East in November 1976. The report of the mission

---

[20] U.S. Congress, Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: the Republic of the Philippines. Hearings. Part I. 91st Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office. 1969) : 79.

[21] U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance. United States-Philippines Base Negotiations. Staff Report. 95th Congress. 1st Session. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977 : 12.

MAJOR U.S. MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES



described the logistic support function of Clark Air Base in the following terms:

> At Clark Air Base, a short helicopter hop from Subic, it seemed clear that the major mission of Clark was similar and complementary to that of the Subic Base. While Clark is home for the 3d Tactical Fighter Wing and its F–4E's, the prime function is as a U.S. air logistics hub for the Southwest Pacific. It is an aerial port through which supplies, aircraft, and men flow, from which activities supportive of the fleet can be mounted, and at which important links of the defense communications teams for the Western Pacific converge.[22]

Clark also serves as an operation center for a joint U.S.-Philippine air defense system. Two squadrons of F–4's at Clark are currently committed to air defense of the Philippines.

2. Command and Control

NAVCOMMSTA, San Miguel, has the mission—

> to manage, operate and maintain those facilities, equipment, devices and systems necessary to provide requisite communications for the command, operational control and administration of the naval establishment, operate and maintain those facilities of the Defense Communications Systems as assigned. This is one of our principal communications stations world-wide and is essential to the Seventh Fleet.[23]

The facilities at Northwest Cape and Alice Springs in Australia also contribute to the satisfaction of this mission.

3. Personnel Support

The Naval Station at Subic Bay has considerable facilities ashore for the support of residential personnel as well as those in transit. These include messing and berthing facilities, hospital and outpatient facilities, administrative working spaces, and the like. Similar facilities are available at Cubi Point and Clark Air Base.

4. Emergency Repair

As noted above, the Subic Bay facilities can perform drydocking of all major combatants (except aircraft carriers). The nearest facility under U.S. jurisdiction with anything approaching that capability is at Apra Harbor, Guam, some 1,600 miles to the east.

5. On-going Military Training

A major function of the bombing range at Clark Air Base is the training of American pilots assigned to duty in the Far East. A report of the House International Relations Committee stated that:

> Clark Base also provides the only location now available to the United States in the Western Pacific with enough area for realistic combat training. The Crow Valley gunnery range at Clark has been developed to give U.S. Air Force, Navy, and

---

[22] U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations, Outlook in the Far East, November 1976. 94th Congress, 1st session. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office. 1976 : 16.

[23] United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, the Republic of the Philippines, p. 91.

Marine tactical combat aircrews simulated battle conditions. The value of such training is greatest for airmen without previous combat experience, we are told, because casualties among aircrews in wartime run highest during their first 8 to 10 missions. A growing proportion of U.S. airmen have no combat experience.[24]

Effectiveness of the U.S. Base Structure in Meeting U.S. Objectives

PERCEPTIONS OF THE BASES

In order to analyze the effectiveness of American bases in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific in the post-Vietnam period, one must have some idea of how the other major interested powers view these facilities in terms of their own interests and their relations with the United States. These perceptions are discussed below.

ASEAN PERCEPTIONS

Most observers of the ASEAN countries note that, in private, officials of Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia strongly desire a continued U.S. base presence in the Philippines, until and if, genuine neutralization of the region is accomplished. On June 6, 1977, Theodoro Valencia, a Filipino columnist with close ties to the Marcos family, wrote that the other ASEAN governments were pressuring the Philippines government to seek a compromise with the Carter Administration that could allow the bases to remain.[25] Another indication of this attitude was the disclosure in May 1978 that Singapore was permitting the United States to use its military airfield at Tengah for reconnaissance flights over the Indian Ocean.[26] Given the fact that Singapore is the smallest of the ASEAN states, sandwiched between Malaysia and Indonesia, it is doubtful that it would have agreed to this without the acquiescence and understanding of at least Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur. Moreover, the Malaysian government reportedly has discussed the American bases with Vietnam, emphasizing that the bases do not represent an American design to dominate the region.[27]

ASEAN's uncertainty over future American policy was summarized in a secret report, prepared in mid-1977 by the five ASEAN foreign ministers, which was disclosed by the *Far Eastern Economic Review:*

> It is clear that as a result of the Indochina wars and significant changes in U.S. attitudes towards the Southeast Asian region, the U.S. would no longer be involved physically in any local conflict in Southeast Asia. What is unclear, despite assurances of the new American Administration, is the future role and extent of political and economic commitment of the United States in the region.[28]

---

[24] Outlook in the Far East, November 1976, p. 16.
[25] Hong Kong AFP, June 6, 1977.
[26] Richardson, Michael. U.S. Sub Spotters Win Singapore Assent. Far Eastern Economic Review, May 19, 1978 : 10.
[27] Tasker, Rodney. A Game of Friends and Neighbors. Far Eastern Review, June 30, 1978 : 19.
[28] Richardson, Michael. How the Five See Indochina. Far Eastern Economic Review, December 30, 1977 : 8.

In varying degrees, the ASEAN leadership elites view a continued American role in Southeast Asia as important to their attempts to deal with the issues facing them in the aftermath of the Indochina War. Several forms of support are considered especially important. First, United States arms and military equipment are valued since defense capabilities are strengthened. Second, it is held that a U.S. military presence will help deter a major projection of Soviet or Chinese military power in the region. Third, American economic aid, expanded trade, and American private investment are thought to be important to the growth of the export-oriented economies of the ASEAN states. Fourth, a strong, overall American role is believed to enhance the ability of the ASEAN states to deal politically with the Soviet Union and China, especially with the growing pressures placed on them to take sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

ANZAC PERCEPTIONS

The current governments of Australia and New Zealand strongly favor a continued U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia, the Southwest Pacific and the Indian Ocean. In their view, the U.S. presence under the ANZUS alliance serves several purposes: (1) it is a visible symbol of U.S. commitments to the two countries underlining the credibility of that commitment; (2) it serves to protect Australia's sea lines of communication with the Middle East, Japan, and the United States; and (3) it promotes regional stability in the Southeast Asian region, where the two countries have "defense connections." [29] Consequently, the Government of Australia has publicly endorsed the continuation of American bases in the Philippines.[30] It also supports continued U.S. use of facilities in Australia but favors increased Australian participation in the operation of those facilities.

The opposition labor parties of Australia and New Zealand take a more ambivalent view of the U.S. military presence. In particular, the Australian Labor Party vigorously opposed the American roles in Vietnam and the Indian Ocean during its period of power prior to December 1975. However, the Labor Government did not advocate the termination of American bases in the Philippines and did not move to end America's use of the facilities in Australia. It would appear that future labor governments would not take a totally hostile view toward American bases in the region.

VIETNAM'S PERCEPTIONS

Vietnam's perceptions of the American military presence in Southeast Asia is heavily influenced by the Vietnam War experience and Hanoi's ideological goals in Southeast Asia. Hence, SRV propaganda has emphasized such themes as an American design to turn ASEAN into an anti-Vietnam military pact and American operations in Thailand to subvert the communist governments of Indochina. With regard to U.S. bases, Vietnam's attitude appears to be a by-product of its relations with the ASEAN countries. For example, in negotiating the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Philippines in July 1976, it did not insist on termination of the U.S. bases. Instead, it settled for a joint communique in which the two parties promised not to allow a third party to use their territory for "direct or indirect aggres-

---

[29] Government of Australia, Australian Defense. Canberra : Australian Government Publishing Service, 1976 : 1–14.
[30] Hong Kong AFP, April 18, 1977.

sion and intervention against the other country or other countries in the region." However, the SRV subsequently made the bases an issue in its dealings with ASEAN countries. Hanoi leaders emphasized that greater regional cooperation between ASEAN and Vietnam was impossible unless it was carried out in a "new form" and a "new spirit" that specifically bars American bases from the region. During discussions in January 1978 between the Vietnamese and Filipino foreign ministers, SRV foreign minister Nguyen Duy Trinh advocated termination of the bases. More recently, Vietnam has relaxed its attitude on the bases largely because of its efforts to improve relations with ASEAN and the United States.

SOVIET AND CHINESE PERCEPTIONS

The Soviet Union has been consistently critical of U.S. bases in the Western Pacific and has urged the East Asian host countries to reconsider their positions. The Soviet view appears to be based on two considerations. First, American bases and the American alliance system in East Asia are hindrances to the growth of Soviet influence in these countries.

A second consideration may be that Subic is a major installation supporting U.S. naval operations in the Western Pacific at a time the Soviet Union is expanding its naval presence in that region. When put in relation to Soviet attempts to draw Japan away from its alliance with the United States, the U.S.S.R. apparently believes that the loss of its base structure in the Western Pacific would result in a substantial reduction of the U.S. naval presence in that region.[31]

Until the late 1960's, the PRC took a similar hostile line toward U.S. bases in the Philippines. However, in recent years, it has adopted a different attitude as a result of the sharpening of Sino-Soviet hostility and the opening of U.S.-China contracts. PRC strategy in Southeast Asia now seeks to counter the growth of Soviet military power and political influence, and parallels U.S. policies. On the Philippines bases, specifically, PRC officials have dropped demands that the United States withdraw, and they have indicated that Peking favors the basis.[32]

Taiwan, has said little about U.S. bases in the Philippines. However, given the geographical proximity of the Philippines to Taiwan, there can be little doubt that the Taiwan leadership views the bases as a symbol of a continuing U.S. military presence in the region. One may also conclude that the symbolic importance of the facilities will increase when the United States formally normalizes relations with the PRC and terminates the defense treaty with Taiwan.

---

[31] For an analysis of Soviet policy toward the Philippines and the U.S. bases, see: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. The Soviet Union and the Third World: A Watershed in Great Power Policy: 92–94. See also: Bonavia, David. Security, the Soviet Way. Far Eastern Economic Review, May 20, 1977: 16–17.

[32] For press account of these statements, see Christian Science Monitor, September 7, 1973; Washington Post, June 10, 1975; New York Times June 10, 1975. See also: Horn, Robert C. Moscow and Peking in post-Indochina Southeast Asia. Asian Affairs, Sept.-Oct. 1976: 17–19. In October 1977, PRC Vice Foreign Minister Yu Chan told American journalists that Peking understood the "practical reasons" for the United States military presence in Japan and the Philippines. In February 1978, PRC officials criticized Vietnam's recent demands for termination of U.S. bases in the Philippines. PRC officials described Vietnam's position as in accord with the Soviet line. See: Soviet Pincer Alarms China. Far Eastern Economic Review, March 3, 1978: 12.

JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS

Prime Minister Fukuda stated in Manila in August 1977 that there should be no change in the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia;[33] and in private conversations Japanese officials stress the importance of U.S. bases remaining in the Philippines. The new Ohira Government will likely share this view. The Government of Japan views as important to Japanese security the U.S. Navy's missions of protecting Japan's SLOC's in the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea and maintaining a naval presence in the waters around Japan.[34]

PHILIPPINES PERCEPTIONS

Tensions and mixed feelings have always been present in Filipino-American relations and these reached a high point early in 1977 over the issue of the future of the American bases. Part of this stemmed from long standing nationalist demands for greater Filipino control over the bases (or greater role in how the bases are used) coupled with dissatisfaction over what some nationalists describe as American economic domination of the Philippines. Part of it also resulted from Filipino uncertainty over the American defense commitment in the wake of Vietnam: an uncertainty enhanced by U.S.-Philippines differences over the human rights issue and the tendency of American military officials to rationalize Subic and Clark on the basis of a number of missions and objectives unrelated to an American role in the defense of the Philippines.

Consequently, early in 1977, President Marcos and other Filipino officials warned that the future of the facilities could be in doubt if the United States did not agree to fixed rental payments, greater Filipino sovereignty over the bases, and new assurances concerning the defense commitment. Since then, however, Marcos has received advice from his partners in ASEAN and possibly from Japan[35] that the bases should remain, and similar urgings may have come from the military and civilian bureaucracies in the Philippines government. U.S.-Philippines negotiations resumed in September 1977 and an agreement was reached in January 1979.

Effectiveness of U.S. Bases in Achieving Political Objectives

1. *Maintenance of a Balance of Great Power Involvement in Southeast Asia.*—On the whole, American bases in the Philippines probably do contribute to this objective. Given the American military withdrawals from Vietnam and Thailand and the absence of Japanese forces in the region, the bases represent the only Western military presence in Southeast Asia. In contrast, China, by reason of geography, has a permanent military presence; and the USSR military advisory contingent in Laos and Vietnam represent what may be the

---

[33] Tasker, Rodney. The Balance Sheet. Far Eastern Economic Review, September 2, 1977: 14.

[34] Japanese officials have expressed support for the bases in several conversations with the authors. For additional description of the Japanese government's view see: Stockwin, Harvey. Basis for the Bases. Far Eastern Economic Review, May 13, 1977: 29–37. Tasker, Rodney. The Balance Sheet, p. 14.

[35] Marcos discussed Southeast Asia issues with Prime Minister Fukuda during his visit to Japan in April 1977.

basis of a long term presence. Consequently, the Philippines bases do provide a balance to Soviet and Chinese military involvement.

2. *Preservation of Japan's Orientation to the United States.*—Given the Japanese perceptions described above, the bases, particularly Subic, are a positive factor in the U.S.-Japan alliance.

3. *Security and Stability for the Non-Communist Countries of Southeast Asia.*—Since the U.S. withdrawals from Vietnam and Thailand, American bases in the Philippines appear to have no direct role in dealing with threats from insurgencies, political instability, border conflicts, the Vietnam-Cambodia war, the intensified Sino-Soviet rivalry in Indochina, and potentially from an aggressive Vietnam. Offshore, the bases act as a deterrent to a major Soviet or PRC naval thrust into the South China Sea.

4. *Democratic Political Development.*—American bases, themselves, do not have a direct relationship to the internal political policies of Southeast Asian governments. Other non-communist states of Southeast Asia—where there are no U.S. bases—have authoritarian leaning systems with restrictions on political and civil liberties similar to those in the Philippines. Malaysia's multi-party parliamentary system has fewer restrictions than do the other ASEAN countries, and there have been foreign bases (British, Australian, New Zealand) there since independence in 1957.

U.S. bases in the Philippines may have had a negative impact on democratic political development in the Philippines in cases where concern over retention of the facilities affected U.S. human rights diplomacy in a limiting fashion. There is evidence that specific policies toward the Philippines are formulated with consideration of the bases in mind.[36] Consequently, the bases may have been an influencing factor in the Nixon and Ford Administrations' unwillingness to press the Marcos government for restoration of democracy, and some observers believe that the current U.S.-Philippines base negotiations have restrained the Carter Administration's diplomacy on human rights questions.

On the other hand, the American presence in Southeast Asia—which the bases represent—does have some impact in a region where the ASEAN states clearly see advantages to a continuation of that presence. The release of political prisoners in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Taiwan since 1976 appears connected to the emphasis placed on human rights by Congress and the Carter Administration. Because of open differences between the U.S. and Philippines governments over human rights, there undoubtedly is little perception among informed Filipinos that the bases signify Carter Administration support for the internal political policies of the Marcos government. Bases, in fact, are often a source of controversy in the host countries and become an issue of contention between the host government and local political elements.

---

[36] U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Korea and the Philippines: November 1972. Staff Report. 93rd Cong., 1st sess. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973: 45–47. For example, this report concluded that U.S. officials in the Philippines appeared to believe at the time President Marcos imposed martial law that "military bases and a familiar government in the Philippines are more important than the preservation of democratic institutions which were imperfect at best." It also observed that "virtually every program we have there is justified, at least in part, in terms of the importance of retaining the Clark and Subic bases."

5. Non-Proliferation.—At present Japan, South Korea, and Australia probably could be influenced in their decisions to produce or not to produce nuclear weapons by the American presence in East Asia. In large part, the Japanese and South Korean decisions will probably be influenced by events outside the Southeast Asian area. Although Australia perceives no immediate threat to its security, there remains an underlying and longstanding fear in the future the relatively underpopulated and resource rich Australian continent might prove attractive to the overpopulated and "politically unstable" states of Southeast Asia. A sense of extreme insecurity over a military threat from the North is the one condition that conceivably could move Australia towards nuclear weapons production. To the extent that the U.S. military bases in the region (and the U.S. defense commitment under ANZUS) would allay these fears in the future, the U.S. presence will contribute to non-proliferation.

Effectiveness of U.S. Bases in Achieving Economic Objectives

It is difficult to discern a direct relationship between American bases and success in achieving American economic objectives in the Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific regions. American security ties with indigenous states probably reenforces the dominant trade patterns of these states with the United States and Japan and the willingness of host governments to accept American and Japanese private investment. Nevertheless, American traders and investors probably would have entered the region at a level close to the present level if there were no bases, given the demand for certain tropical products in the United States after World War II and the most recent upsurge in resources exploitation. International trade conditions, host country policies toward foreign investment, and general political stability probably have as much if not more influence on U.S. multinational corporations than do American bases.

However, it should be noted that a strong belief exists in the ASEAN governments that U.S. political and military involvement in Southeast Asia is necessary to ensure a satisfactory flow of American and Japanese investment and a relationship conducive to expanded trade over the long term. Some American businessmen agree; and a view sometimes heard in the Executive branch is that the American military presence, in symbolizing the region's importance, retards protectionist pressures that would affect U.S. markets and American investment.

Effectiveness of U.S. Bases in Achieving Military Objectives Within the Region

1. *No Combat Involvement on the Mainland of Southeast Asia or Ground Combat Involvement Throughout the Region.*—Current naval missions supported by U.S. bases in the Philippines are generally consistent with this objective. On the other hand, the bases potentially could support combat involvement on mainland Southeast Asia or ground combat anywhere in the region. During the Vietnam War, Subic and Clark helped satisfy logistics requirements for American forces in Vietnam and Thailand.

Moreover, Clark base, in particular, is located close to operational areas of Filipino communist guerrillas. Although for years, the guerrillas have consciously avoided any action against Clark, a serious potential exists for attacks upon Clark that could involve the United States more directly in the anti-insurgency effort.

2. *Containment and Defeat of Communist Insurgencies in ASEAN Countries.*—The Philippines bases have no direct role in the current American strategy (based on security assistance and training) for assisting ASEAN governments in combatting communist insurgencies. The bases could support an advisory contingent in a ASEAN state. In past years, Clark served as a base for American support of Filipino counterinsurgency campaigns, but this apparently is not done now.

3. *Access to Major Passages Between the Pacific and Indian Oceans and Protection of Japan's Sea Lines of Communication.*—The naval facilities at Subic Bay provide a base for the rapid reinforcement of the South China Sea and Indonesian areas in the event that the shipping lanes or passages are threatened. The following table shows the response time of a carrier task force (CTF) operating out of Subic Bay responding to an emergency in Indonesian/Malaysian area.

TABLE 1.—STEAMING TIME OF A CARRIER TASK FORCE OPERATING FROM SUBIC BAY, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, TO VARIOUS STRAITS BETWEEN THE INDIAN AND PACIFIC OCEANS[1]

Destination	Number of days at—	
	15 knots	20 knots
Lombok Strait	4	3
Sunda Strait	4	3
Singapore (Malacca Strait)	3½	2½

[1] Information derived from U.S. Defense Mapping Agency, Distances Between Ports, 1976.

A major constraint on sustained carrier operations is the availability of a daily resupply of equipment. Recent studies have indicated that:

> * * * estimated daily resupply demands for a deployed carrier during wartime would average 27,000 pounds—an increase of 10,000 pounds since 1969. Peacetime daily averages will probably exceed 13,500 pounds. Since the optimum COD [carrier on-board delivery] mission cycle per carrier is three a day, the cargo capacity of the new COD should be in the range of 9,000 to 10,000 pounds to satisfy the maximum demand.[37]

The current COD aircraft is the C–2A *Greyhound*. It has a range of about 1,400 nautical miles and a payload of 9,000 to 10,000 pounds. A C–2A operating out of NAS, Cubi Point, can respond to the daily resupply demands of a CTF operating northeast of any of the three straits mentioned in the preceding table.

The facilities at NAS, Cubi Point, and Clark Air Base allow for sustained air surveillance of the ocean area between Singapore and Darwin, Australia. For example, a P–3C *Orion*, primarily an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft but capable of performing afloat ocean surveillance as well, can conduct ocean surveillance missions of

[37] Higgins, T. G. "Lifeline to the Fleet." Wings of Gold, v. 2, no. 2, Spring 1977, page 21.

up to three hours duration in the straits areas operating from Cubi Point or Clark Air Base.

Effectiveness of U.S. Bases in Meeting Military Objectives Outside the Area

1. *Provide Support for Operations in the Western Indian Ocean.*—Missions in the Indian Ocean, supported by base facilities at Subic Bay, are presently performed. However, they are of limited duration. It would be particularly difficult to maintain sustained carrier operations in the western Indian Ocean from Philippines bases. The distance from the advance base (NAS, Cubi Point) to the CTF is simply too great for the COD aircraft. Sustained carrier operations would almost certainly have to be supported from an advance base fronting on the Indian Ocean.[38]

2. *Provide Support to Allies in Northeast Asia.*—The role of air installations in Southeast Asia for the support of Northeast Asian allies is secondary to such bases as Guam and Okinawa. The 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing, composed of two squadrons of F–4E *Phantom II* aircraft (approximately 72 unit equipment aircraft), is stationed at Clark Air Base. These aircraft are available for duty in Korea should they be needed there. However, F–4 aircraft, operating from the Philippines, do not have the combat radius to allow for combat operations on the Korean peninsula. They would have to be ferried to Okinawa or South Korea from which points they could conduct combat operations without inflight refueling.[39] The F–4E's do have the combat radius to reach Taiwan for combat operations.

Subic's logistic support for the Seventh Fleet is important to the U.S. naval presence in Northeast Asia, since the Fleet has operational responsibility for that region. If the United States forward deployed a third aircraft carrier to the Western Pacific to increase U.S. military assets in Northeast Asia, a third carrier could be homeported at Subic (minus drylocking).

3. *Support of U.S. Military Operations During a Middle East Crisis.*—It is reasonably certain that the Philippines government would not favor U.S. use of Clark Air Base to support Israel in the event of another Middle East War. In recent years, the Philippines government has given priority to strengthening relations with the Arab states. Arab countries provide the Philippines with most of its oil, and they are playing the role of an intermediary (along with other Islamic states) in the "civil war" between the Philippines government and Muslim insurgents in the southern Philippines. In such a contingency, the Philippines government might exercise a veto under the Bohlen-Serrano agreement. That agreement provides that missions supported from the bases, other than those conducted under the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty and the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, are subject to prior consultations with the Philippines Government.

---

[38] For a discussion of this subject, see chapter dealing with the Indian Ocean.

[39] The 3rd Tactical Fighter Wing is based at Clark Air Base for a number of reasons: availability of an air base, maintenance facilities, personnel support, training facilities, etc. Moving the wing to facilities in South Korea or Japan would involve expenses beyond those now being incurred (e.g., construction of support facilities to accommodate the influx of new equipment and personnel).

Political problems of this nature might not prevent the use of U.S. bases—especially Clark—to transport men and supplies into the Persian Gulf oil-producing states if a threat arose to their security from Soviet-sponsored forces. The Philippines would probably be affected like other oil-consuming countries. Although Clark could have such a role, the United States could also dispatch forces from bases in Europe through Israel or friendly Arab states with a much shorter geographical distance to traverse. Moreover, sustained operations would require extensive naval support; and, as already noted, it would be particularly difficult to maintain a continuous carrier presence in this region supported from Subic.

Alternative Instruments to Promote U.S. Objectives in Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific

ALTERNATIVE INSTRUMENTS AND APPROACHES TO PROMOTE U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES

In terms of support for U.S. policy objectives, several other instruments or strategies could have some effectiveness either in the absence of bases or with a modification of the present base structure.

Militarily, a periodic (but not permanent) American naval presence could be supported from new bases in Japan and Micronesia. This might require an expansion of facilities in Japan or the construction of new naval facilities in Guam or the U.S. Pacific Trust Territory. Frequent naval sorties into Southeast Asian waters from Japanese or Micronesian bases would symbolize a continuing American interest and involvement in the region.

Aside from strictly military instruments, the United States has three basically political and/or economic approaches available (in conjunction with the alternative military instruments described above). Broadly, they are: (1) support for an enlarged role for allies; (2) increased U.S.-ASEAN diplomatic contacts; and (3) economic policies designed to help ASEAN meet its developmental goals.

Japan, Australia, and Indonesia have potential to fill some of the vacuum if the American military role were reduced. Japan already has embarked on a policy of increased economic support for ASEAN, and the United States could encourage this through the alternative naval presence outlined above, and through persuasive diplomacy. In the past, some American military and civilian officials have advocated that the Japanese navy eventually assume patrolling responsibility down to the Malacca Straits. Although internal Japanese politics makes this unlikely in the near future, it could still be an option if conditions change.

Australia has defense commitments and relationships with Malaysia, Singapore, and Papua New Guinea. It has a substantial military aid program in Indonesia and has embarked on major economic commitments to the mini-states of the Southwest Pacific (Western Samoa, Tonga, and Fiji) where Canberra has shown concern over increased Soviet activities. Australia thus has a role in supporting the stability and security of the non-communist countries of the region.[40] The United States conceivably could encourage this type of Australian role

---

[40] Government of Australia: *Australian Defense,* Canberra, Australia, Government Publishing Service, 1976, pp. 1–9.

through a combination of diplomacy; initiation of economic aid programs in Papua New Guinea and the mini-states to supplement (but not replace) Australian efforts; provision of technology and equipment for Australia's plans to strengthen its defense capabilities; cooperation with Australia in Indian Ocean defense planning; and emphasis on the ANZUS alliance.

Indonesia is the largest state in Southeast Asia and has leadership ambitions in ASEAN. It could also play an expanded role in regional security—particularly on the Malay peninsula where Indonesia has given an implicit security guarantee to Malaysia. U.S. willingness to sharply increase security assistance in response to Indonesia's substantial needs (particularly in terms of the Indonesian armed forces' equipment, logistics and mobility, and training) would enhance this potential role.[41] On the other hand, an expanded regional security role for Indonesia would undoubtedly increase existing fears of "Indonesian expansionism" in such neighboring states as Papua New Guinea and Australia and could be a source of instability. A U.S. policy to enhance the Indonesian role undoubtedly would require greater American efforts to alleviate such tensions between Jakarta and its neighbors.

In September 1977 and August 1978, the United States and ASEAN held the first official U.S.-ASEAN conferences. This type of diplomatic contact has potential positive benefits in terms of U.S. objectives, but the real impact will be influenced by the American response to ASEAN's economic needs. At the September 1977 conference, ASEAN delegates made proposals designed to increase the U.S. market for ASEAN products, stabilize ASEAN's export earnings, encourage U.S. private companies to invest in the ASEAN region, and promote aid for ASEAN industrial projects. The U.S. response has been limited because of protectionist pressures, the "basic human needs" requirement of U.S. aid programs, the question of exclusive economic arrangements with regional blocs, and, in the view of some, the continued low priority given to the ASEAN countries in American foreign policy.

ALTERNATIVE BASES FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF MILITARY MISSIONS NOW SATISFIED BY THE INSTALLATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES

Although the United States on January 7, 1979, concluded a new agreement permitting the retention of the Philippines bases, this 1979 amendment to the 1947 Military Bases Agreement calls for a review of the accord every five years to assure that the Agreement continues to serve the mutual interests of both parties. This first review would occur in 1984.

In considering alternative sites for U.S. installations in the Philippines, two basic considerations arise—geography and facilities. Both considerations are directly related to the basic mission area supported by bases in the Philippines (i.e., west and south of Subic Bay). The United States could seek alternative sites closer to the general mission area or, conversely, seek them further away. It should be recognized that a decision to relocate some or all of the air and naval capability

---

[41] The Carter Administration has proposed that security assistance to Indonesia under FMS credits be increased from $23.1 million in FY 1977 to $40.0 million in FY 1978 and $40.0 million in FY 1979.

now in the Philippines to some other location would involve considerations that go beyond the time/distance factors or the specific assets/facilities at certain locations; these include diplomatic and political feasibility, change in American commitments to other nations, and domestic American political considerations.

In the event that the United States were to opt for sites *closer* to the general mission area (i.e., south and/or west of Subic Bay), not only would response time be reduced, but the shorter distance between the advance base (military installations available to the United States in the Philippines constitute advance bases) and the actual contingency would reduce logistic problems considerably. For example, in the event that U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean or Persian Gulf should assume greater importance, an installation closer to the mission area might have greater value than the ones presently available to the United States in the Philippines. However, by moving closer to the mission area, U.S. forces would be that much further away from supporting installations between the United States mainland and the advance base. As is shown below, none of the alternative sites to the south and/or west of the Philippines currently has adequate facilities to fully meet requirements of U.S. missions as currently defined. Thus, a posture based on such facilities would require support for further development of existing sites, or combined use of more than one site. or a redefinition of mission, or a combination of these approaches.

To illustrate these factors, five sites that are possible alternatives to those now occupied by the United States in the Philippines are compared below. They are: Darwin (Australia), Cockburn Sound (Australia), Surabaya (Indonesia), Penang (Malaysia), and Singapore (Republic of Singapore).

TABLE 2.—COMPARISON OF ASSETS/FACILITIES AT VARIOUS PORTS AND RELATED AREAS IN THE FAR EAST AND AUSTRALIA

Assets/facilities	Philippines	Darwin	Cockburn	Sura Baya	Penang	Singapore
Wharfage/anchorage	A	I	S	I	S	A.
Port support	A	I	A	I	S	A.
Fuel supplies/storage	A	S	A	S	S	A.
Water	A	S	A	I	A	A.
Ammunition magazines	A	N	I	N	N	I.
Electricity (shore power)	A	I	S	I	S	A.
Work shops	A	I	N	I	I	A.
Drydocks	S	N	S	S	N	S.
Personnel support ashore	A	I	S	I	S	A.
Naval communications	S	S	S	S	N	S.
Public works capability	S	I	D	I	S	N.
Runways (types of A/C)	All	Some	Some	Some	Some	All.
Apron parking	A	I	I	I	I	I.
POL storage	A	I	I	I	I	S.
Aircrew training	A	A	A	I	I	N.


Note: A (abundant): the asset/facility more than adequately meets the general mission requirement; S (sufficient): the asset/facility adequately meets the general mission requirement under most conditions; I (insufficient): the asset/facility does not adequately meet the general mission requirement under most conditions; N (none): the asset/facility is not existent; All: the nearby runway can accommodate all U.S. military aircraft; Some: the nearby runway can accommodate most U.S. military aircraft; (B–52's, C–141's. and C–5's are specifically excluded).

From the foregoing table, it is evident that Singapore has the most favorable concentration of facilities. Of the other port areas considered among the group closer to the mission requirement area, only Penang and Cockburn Sound appear to meet more than a few of the requirements for satisfactory support of air and naval operations.

Cockburn Sound, Darwin, and Surabaya are within the 1,500 nautical mile operational radius of the Harold Holt Naval Communications Station at Northwest Cape, Australia, which could satisfy most naval communication requirements. In the event that any of these sites were selected as an alternative to the facilities in the Philippines, it is likely that supporting relay stations would have to be constructed. In the event that either of the other sites was selected as an alternative to the Philippines facilities, provisions would have to be made for the development of adequate communications support.

The following chart shows the time to station of a CTF with speed of advance of 15 knots operating from Subic Bay, Philippines Islands.

CRS-297



Point A (15 degrees North/115 degrees East) is a central point for the support of operations in Southeast Asia. Point B (Okinawa) is the general area from which operations in support of Japan and/or Korea can be mounted. Point C (on the Equator/80 degrees East is in the general area to support operations in the Bay of Bengal (to the north or the Chagos Archipelago (to the south), as well as protect the Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC's) from the Persian Gulf. Point D in the Arabian Sea is a central point for the support of operations in the Persian Gulf, in support of Pakistan (a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement partner), as well as defend the SLOC's from the Persian Gulf area.

The following table compares sailing times from alternative sites for U.S. installations with the sailing time from Subic Bay in the Philippines to points described in the above chart.

TABLE 3.—COMPARISON OF SAILING TIMES FOR VARIOUS PORTS TO 4 SPECIFIC POINTS WITH A SPEED OF ADVANCE (SOA) OF 15 KNOTS

	Days of sailing time to points—			
	A	B	C	D
Ports of departure: Subic Bay, Philippines	1	3	9	13
Alternatives:				
Darwin, Australia	7	10	9	15
Cockburn Sound, Australia	9	11	9	14
Surabaya, Indonesia	4	7	6	10
Penang, Malaysia	4	7	4	7
Singapore, Republic of Singapore	3	6	5	8

The tabular data illustrate that of those sites closer to the mission requirement area, Singapore provides the best location as an alternative to Subic Bay. Its location provides the shortest response time to points in the China Sea. It provides the second shortest response times to points in the Indian Ocean. Both of the Australian alternatives are too far away from the four established points. In fact, from the point of view of location, Australia is the least attractive alternative to the Philippines assets.

Summary Conclusions

From the preceding analysis, certain conclusions may be drawn concerning U.S. military installations in the Philippines.

First, the bases fulfill or are intended to fulfill military missions far beyond the Southeast Asia-Southwest Pacific area. Some of these extra-regional missions may be of dubious validity (support for Israel) or could be performed elsewhere (training and maintenance of air units for use in South Korea), but protection of SLOC's and general support for the Seventh Fleet has strong relevance for Japan's security and the security of South Korea and Taiwan.

Second, it would appear that Subic Bay Naval Base and other U.S. naval facilities in the Philippines are essential or at least very important to the total fulfillment of the key extra-regional missions. Some of these missions could be supported elsewhere but only at tremendous financial costs for new installations, training of local personnel, and much higher wages to these personnel.

Third, Clark Air Base's role as a logistics supply base for Subic is a particularly important function of that base. However, Clark's training function probably could be done elsewhere at moderate cost without impairing military missions west and south of the Philippines and probably those in Northeast Asia as well. Moreover, Clark's mission to support U.S. military operations in South Korea is definitely subsidiary to the role played by U.S. bases in Japan and South Korea.

Fourth, with regard to military missions of the bases within the Southeast Asia-Southwest Pacific region—protection of SLOC's and securing access to the strategic Southeast Asia straits—these functions are mainly supported by Subic and other U.S. naval facilities in the Philippines. Clark Air Base, on the other hand, has a much less important role, except for its function as a logistics support base for Subic. Clark does retain the function of operating the U.S.-Philippines air defense system, which gives credibility to the role of the bases in the U.S. defense commitment to the Philippines under the

mutual defense treaty. Although there is no immediately perceived military threat to the Philippines, the air defense system is important politically to the Washington-Manila relationship upon which, of course, all the bases are dependent.

Fifth, none of the intra-regional military missions performed by either Subic or Clark are in relation to a clear immediate, identifiable military threat to U.S. interests in the Southeast Asia-Southwest Pacific region. In this, there apparently is a sharp difference between the *in region* missions performed by the Philippines bases and in region missions performed by U.S. bases in Japan and Korea where actual distinct threats appear to be identifiable; i.e., North Korea and Soviet military power. Protecting SLOC's, securing access to the straits, and maintenance of the U.S.-Philippines air defense system are predicated militarily upon the uncertainty of future developments over the long term, particularly in relation to Vietnam, Soviet naval power, Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea, and the general world situation.

Sixth, in contrast to the Vietnam War period, the bases support only indirectly important intra-region political objectives and the military goal of defeating communist insurgencies. Other political, economic and military instruments of the types discussed above potentially have a more direct bearing on these goals.

Seventh, the outcome of the Vietnam War, coupled with the American withdrawal from Thailand and the prospective withdrawal of American ground forces from South Korea, have given the bases a political significance that probably would have been unanticipated ten years ago. This political significance extends beyond Southeast Asia to include the three other major powers (Japan, the PRC and the U.S.S.R.) with interests in the East Asian region. To all of these countries, U.S. bases and troops have been, for nearly three decades, the chief visible symbol of the willingness of the United States to play a prominent role in the region. The indigenous states of Southeast Asia and the major powers essentially consider the Philippines bases as one of four remaining components of American commitment and involvement in East Asia; the other three being the American military presence in Japan, American forces in South Korea and U.S. support for Taiwan.

Today, in the eyes of most East Asian elites, only the American military presence in Japan is certain to continue; the longevity of the others is considered in doubt. These components now are believed to interact with one another to such an extent that if one or more are removed, the value of the others as symbols of American credibility goes up in Tokyo, Peking, Jakarta, Canberra, and the other capitals.

Eighth, for the ASEAN states, Australia, Japan and even the PRC, the political symbolism of the bases has been enhanced by a perceived trend of a growing unwillingness of the United States to employ other policy instruments in the region (that could be alternatives to the bases). This trend includes attempts in Congress to cut security assistance to specific countries, the linkage of security and economic assistance to human rights performance, termination of Military Assistance Advisory Groups, "protectionist" attempts to restrict U.S. markets to ASEAN and other East Asian products, proposed disincentives to U.S. overseas private investment, and U.S. unwillingness to directly

assist ASEAN's industrial development and participate in arrangements to stabilize ASEAN's export earnings. The fear among these governments is that, without the bases to symbolize American interests in the region, this trend will accelerate and result in a general U.S. disengagement. Consequently, in this climate, other instruments of American policy are perceived to flow from the military presence.

Given the basic U.S. policy objectives described in this analysis and the above eight considerations, a strong rationale appears to exist for retaining Subic Bay Naval Base and other U.S. naval installations in the Philippines. Subic directly contributes to the attainment of major American military objectives both within the region and outside the region. Its military missions make an important contribution to the U.S.-Japan alliance. Subic has symbolic importance in relation to other American political goals within the region. It apparently also has some relevance to the U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China (See chapter on Northeast Asia).

The above factors also suggest that a rationale exists for reducing the size and functions of Clark Air Base to emphasize, at most, logistics support for Subic and operation of the U.S.-Philippines air defense system. Some territorial reductions have been made in the recent agreement. Clark's contribution to major political and military objectives—both intra and extra regional—appears to be much less than that of Subic. It would appear that a military rationale exists to phase out the U.S. F–4 fighter contribution to the air defense system, especially if it were decided to transfer aircraft to South Korea and/or Japan; but for political purposes, a rationale could be made for retaining one of the two F–4 squadrons at Clark. Complete termination of Clark Air Base could probably be justified if (1) an alternative arrangement could be worked out with the Philippines government for logistic support for Subic and (2) a cooperative or joint use arrangement could be made for U.S. tactical aircraft to be stationed at Filipino bases.

Future termination of all the bases in the Philippines could have a less direct effect on intra-region U.S. objectives, but this would be conditional upon successfully alleviating the serious "credibility" or "loss of confidence" problem that would certainly be felt in ASEAN, Japan, and Australia and could affect the willingness of those countries to adopt certain policies and roles in line with American policy. Over time, this might be accomplished by an American naval presence supported from new facilities in Japan, Singapore, or the Trust Territories of the Pacific. It would also require new or expanded political, economic and military instruments such as support for an enlarged role for allies, increased U.S.-ASEAN diplomatic contacts, and aid and trade policies designed to help ASEAN meet its developmental goals.

If the American body politic proved politically unwilling to employ such instruments and provide facilities to support a continued though reduced naval presence, American strategists would probably have to abandon most political and military objectives, and emphasize a basic goal of preserving a U.S.—Japanese bilateral security relationship in Northeast Asia.

NORTHEAST ASIA*

Major U.S. Political, Economic and Military Objectives in Northeast Asia

FUNDAMENTAL AMERICAN INTERESTS AND AN OVERVIEW OF NORTHEAST ASIA

After nearly three quarters of a century, the fundamental interests of American Far Eastern policy, as embodied in the "Open Door," remain central to the current role of the United States in Northeast Asia. In the wake of Vietnam and substantial U.S. withdrawal from the Southeast Asian mainland, American involvement in Northeast Asia remains at a high level. Recent administrations in Washington have continued policies designed to promote access to the region; prevention of hegemony over the region by hostile powers; and inclusion of East Asia in a global balance of power.

An overview of Northeast Asia in the post-Vietnam period finds five major elements: involvement of the four major powers, the U.S.-Japan alliance; the growth of Soviet military power; the Sino-Soviet dispute and Chinese policies; and the roles of South Korea and Taiwan.

One look at a map demonstrates the deep involvement of the four major powers in Northeast Asia. Japan, China, and the Soviet Union come together geographically in the Manchuria-Siberia-Sahkalin-Hokkaido region. All three have important and often vital military, political, and economic interests which interact. Each power has fought the other two in the region at least once in the 20th century, (if one includes the 1969 Soviet-Chinese border fighting). The fourth power, the United States, has been drawn into the region from the time of its independence. Later, the Open Door policy opened an era of intimate American involvement in the 20th century, including two wars.

The United States-Japan alliance remains the closest bilateral relationship among the four major powers. It is based on a common democratic ideology, intimate economic ties,[1] and perceived common security concerns. Since the late 1960's and especially since the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969, both countries have emphasized increasingly that the alliance is a central element in their foreign policies. In some areas (Okinawa reversion, defense coordination and consultation, and international economic and energy problems) cooperation has grown. Problems and/or disagreements exist, however, such as security policies toward Korea, bilateral trade, Japanese defense preparedness.

---

*Prepared by Larry A. Niksch, Specialist in Asian Affairs.

[1] The United States is Japan's number one trading partner, and Japan is the United States number two trading partner.

and relations with China. Moreover, the alliance still relies on U.S. military power, as Japan remains militarily weak.

The Government of Japan views the alliance as crucial to the attainment of major Japanese policy objectives with regard to security interests and broader regional and economic interests. First, the alliance is the central guarantee of Japan's physical security in a Northeast Asian atmosphere dominated by two nuclear giants, China and the U.S.S.R. Second, the alliance allows Japan room for diplomatic maneuver in dealing with countervailing policies and pressures from Moscow and Peking and thus helps to stabilize political relationships in the region. Third, the alliance reinforces the close economic relationship with the United States that is so vital to Japan's economic well-being. Fourth, the alliance is one basis for an American role in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean as well as the Pacific that protects Japan's economic interests and sea lines of communications over which essential food, raw materials and energy resources flow to Japan from the Middle East, Australia, Southeast Asia, and the United States. Fifth, the alliance reinforces U.S. commitments to South Korea, a country that recent Japanese governments have cited as important to Japan's own security.

Militarily, the major change in Northeast Asia in the last decade is the growth of Soviet forces. In the mid-1960's, the Soviet Union began to build up its ground units in Siberia facing the People's Republic of China. Presently, 45 divisions, nearly 25 percent of Soviet ground forces, are on the Sino-Soviet border, compared to 15 divisions in 1965. The headquarters of the Far East military district, which encompasses the area around Vladivostok and Sakhalin Island, has command of over 30 of these ground divisions (300,000 men). These forces are directed primarily against Manchuria, and Pentagon experts believe that the Soviets posses capabilities which exceed the requirements for defense against a Chinese attack. The amphibious warfare capability of some units also indicates a mission against Japan.[2]

The Soviet Pacific Fleet contains about 30 percent of the U.S.S.R. navy. Its major components are 125 submarines, including about 50 nuclear-powered submarines, and 67 surface combatants including 6 cruisers, 27 destroyers, and 25 frigates. Although capable of operations against China, its primary mission appears to be directed against U.S. forces in the Pacific and Japan. According to the Japanese Defense Agency, the Soviet Pacific Fleet has made "remarkable" expansion and improvement in nuclear attack capability, strike capability against opposing ships, blockade capability against sea lanes, and amphibious landing capability.[3] A key component of the fleet's arsenal is anti-ship missiles, including cruise missiles, which can be launched from both surface ships and submarines. Exercises in and around Japan have been frequent, and Soviet naval maneuvers have extended as far south as the Philippine Sea. One major problem for the Soviets is the adequacy and security of the long supply routes from European Russia across Siberia to the Pacific. Rapid reinforcement of combat power

---

[2] U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development. United States-Soviet Union-China: the Great Power Triangle. Parts I and II. Hearings, 94th Congress. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976: 185. Japan Defense Agency. Defense of Japan (1976). Tokyo, 1976: 16.

[3] Japan Defense Agency. Defense of Japan (1977). Tokyo, 1977: 29.

would be limited to air transportation. The location of Soviet naval ports facing the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk inhibits the Soviet Pacific Fleet because of the narrow exit points to the Pacific. These ports also freeze over with ice in winter. The Soviet Union currently is attempting to partially offset these disadvantages by building a second railroad across Siberia and by establishing major air and submarine facilities at Petropavlosk on the Kamchatka peninsula directly facing the Pacific. An official of Japan's National Defense College stated in February 1978 that 90 percent of the Soviet Pacific Fleet's submarines were operating from Petropavlovsk. Moreover, the bulk of Soviet surface combat ship deployment is north of the Philippines and west of Hawaii. Consequently, Soviet naval power is concentrated in Northeast Asia and the immediately adjacent regions.[4]

Soviet aircraft in the Far East number about 1,825 combat planes. These include 550 interceptor aircraft, 1,000 attack fighters, and 275 medium range bombers. Many of these are older aircraft such as MIG 17s, 19s, 21s, and Bear and Badger bombers. The U.S.S.R. is upgrading its air strength with new aircraft such as the SU–19 and MIG 23 fighter-bombers and MIG 25 interceptors. Although mainly directed against China, some units are stationed on Sakhalin Island and other areas near Japan. Soviet air activity near Japan has increased markedly in recent years; and the deployment of the SU–19's and MIG–23's pose an advanced threat to Japanese air defense because of their longer range, increased payload (including the capability to deliver nuclear weapons), and capability for low-altitude intrusion, based on highly advanced electronics. The expected assignment of the Backfire bomber to the Soviet Far East will give the U.S.S.R. a long range air threat to U.S. aircraft carriers and other naval forces throughout most of the Western Pacific west of Hawaii, and north of the Straits of Malacca.[5]

Since the beginning of 1978, the Japanese Defense Agency has reported Soviet deployment or plans to deploy additional weapons systems, ships, and aircraft in Northeast Asia. According to the Defense Agency, recent Soviets moves include (1) deployment of a new air to surface missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead; (2) deploymet of modern MIG–23's and MIG–25's around Vladivostok and on new airfields in southern Sakhalin; (3) plans for the construction of large naval ports in Kamchatka and Sakhalin; (4) plans to dispatch one of two Moskva class cruisers (with submarine hunting helicopters) to the Pacific. In addition, the U.S.S.R. is expected to deploy a KIEV class aircraft carrier to the Western Pacific within two years. The KIEV class carrier is designed primarily for anti-submarine warfare, but its aircraft and anti-ship missiles also give it limited capabilities for attack against enemy navy vessels, interdiction of SLOC's, and air support of ground operations.

Based on emerging Soviet military capabilities near Japan and analyses of Soviet naval and air maneuvers in the region (including the major OKEAN 75 maneuvers held in April 1975), the U.S.S.R. ap-

---

[4] Zumwalt, Elmo and Worth H. Bagley. Strategic Deterioration in the Pacific: the Dilemma for the U.S. and Japan. Pacific Community, January 1978: 118–119.

[5] Defense of Japan (1976), p. 20. Defense of Japan (1977), p. 34. U.S. Congressional Budget Office. Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces: Forces Related to Asia. Washington. 1977: 32. Tokyo Kyodo, August 12, 1978. The Soviets reportedly plan to deploy the Backfire in the Far East during the latter half of 1979, but some Japanese defense officials believe that actual deployment may occur earlier.

pears intent on developing a multifaceted air and sea capability to act in a general war to destroy American military power in Northeast Asia and the immediately adjacent areas in the Western Pacific, gain military dominance over Japan, and force a rapid Japanese capitulation. The Soviet Union would seek this objective apparently by: employing air power and missile-firing submarines and surface ships to knock out U.S. naval and air installations and forces in Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, thus establishing air supremacy over Japan; sink carriers and other surface ships of the 7th Fleet, using missile-firing submarines, surface ships, and air power; establish control over sea lines of communication from the United States and the Middle East to Japan, thereby denying Japan military reinforcement and strategic supplies of oil; and possibly invading the northernmost Japanese island of Hokkaido and destroying the core units of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces stationed there.[6]

These probable Soviet military missions in relation to Japan and China are in the context of overall Soviet policy in Northeast Asia, which focuses primarily on these two countries. Broadly, Soviet political objectives in Northeast Asia appear to be: (1) Isolate China and, particularly, prevent military cooperation among China, the United States and Japan or between China and Japan; (2) Defend the status quo regarding borders and territorial disputes with China and Japan; (3) Draw Japan into broader areas of cooperation, both politically and economically; (4) Weaken and, if possible, eliminate the U.S. military role in the region; (5) Influence the preservation of the status quo on the Korean peninsula, at least over the short term (mainly because war in Korea involving the United States could heighten U.S.-Soviet tensions), but retain, at the least, North Korea's neutrality in the Sino-Soviet dispute; and (6) Promotion of a Soviet "collective security" system in Asia, which the U.S.S.R. views as serving several of the preceding goals.

Three general points can be stated about these objectives. First, there are contradictions among them. In particular, the Soviet Union's hard line stance on the territorial question negates the goals of drawing Japan into greater cooperation with the U.S.S.R. and weakening the U.S.-Japan alliance. It also impacts adversely on Soviet attempts to prevent a closer Sino-Japanese relationship and on Japan's reaction to the Asian collective security scheme.[7] A contradiction may also exist between the objectives of preventing Sino-Japanese military cooperation and weakening the American military presence in Northeast Asia. Many observers believe that a reduced or absent American military

---

[6] McGwire, Michael and McDonnell, John. Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions. New York, and London, Praeger (1977). p. 253, 261, 280. Currently, the Soviet Union appears capable of landing one or two divisions in Japan, although this could be augmented by one of the seven Soviet airborne divisions. Given the relatively small size of this force, a successful invasion would be conditional upon neutralization of U.S. and Japanese forces by Soviet air and naval forces. At least some Japanese defense experts believe the Soviets may one day have a much greater amphibious warfare capability. Osamu Kaihara, Japanese military affairs expert and former Secretary-General of the National Defense Council of the Japanese Cabinet (1967–72), has spoken of a Soviet commitment of ten divisions to an invasion of Japan. See his manuscript "A Defense White Paper for Japan."

[7] Brezhnev first proposed an Asian collective security system in 1969. The USSR has never given a detailed description of the system; and at times it has indicated that it could involve both multilateral agreements and bilateral arrangements, such as the Soviet treaty relationship with India. Brezhnev's proposal does appear to involve a multilateral agreement to freeze current territorial boundaries and possibly non-aggression agreements. Its real importance may lie in its use as a tool by Moscow to promote Soviet influence in East Asia.

presence would, over time, make closer security ties with China and Japanese rearmament more attractive options for Japan.

Second, current Soviet policy does give priority to certain of the objectives. Soviet diplomacy emphasizes opposition to closer Sino-Japanese military relations, and Moscow strongly opposes the Tokyo-Peking peace and friendship treaty, which was signed in August 1978. Moscow's uncompromising position on territorial issues with Japan and China is also a major feature of current diplomacy. The Soviet position has hardened since the early 1970's when Japan failed to respond to Soviet proposals linking the question of the "northern territories" to Japanese policy toward China and the Asian collective security system, and when China linked Japan's territorial claims to its own. Initiatives still come from Moscow to increase Soviet-Japanese cooperation, especially in the economic area. The U.S.S.R. gives periodic attention to the Asian collective security scheme and maintains only a moderate profile on the Korean question. Since 1972 there has been little direct Soviet pressure aimed at removing the American military presence, perhaps reflecting the apparent contradiction between this objective and the prevention of Sino-Japanese security cooperation. The Soviet government may have concluded that a short term American military presence centering on the U.S.-Japan alliance is a preferable situation and that progress in realization of the other objectives, coupled with growing "contradictions" in the U.S.-Japan relationship, will lay the groundwork for the gradual erosion of the alliance over the long run.

Third, nearly all of the objectives focus on Japan. Soviet diplomacy, therefore, concentrates on Japan. Unfortunately for Moscow, its diplomacy towards Tokyo has been, in the eyes of one expert, "characterized more by harshness and heavy handedness than by skill and sensitivity." [8] This style has been represented by Moscow's unconciliatory approach in fishing negotiations with Japan during the first half of 1977, aggressive policing of Japanese fishing boats, stiffening Soviet terms for economic cooperation in the development of Siberian resources, repeated warning of Soviet retaliation if Japan concluded a peace and friendship treaty with China containing a (presumably anti-Soviet) anti-hegemony clause, and unwillingness to negotiate seriously on the "northern territories."

Soviet military power in the region plays a role in this intimidating Soviet political approach to Japan. The frequent displays of Soviet air and naval forces close to and sometimes within Japanese air and sea space undoubtedly has an objective of impressing the Japanese body politic with the specter of Soviet power, thereby seeking to influence Japan to respond in a more accommodating fashion to Moscow's objectives. The actual result, however, has been consistent tension in Soviet-Japanese relations and greater Japanese public support for the U.S. alliance. On the other hand, the Japanese are nervously aware of the close presence of Soviet military power; and although Japan signed a peace and friendship treaty with China, it has tried to dilute any anti-Soviet interpretation given to that treaty. In short, Soviet military power is conditioning Japan to take the U.S.S.R. into major account in its foreign policy deliberations.

---

[8] Horelick, Arnold. Soviet Policy Dilemmas in Asia. Asian Survey, June 1977 : 506.

The Sino-Soviet dispute continues unabated despite the death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung; and, the current Chinese leadership has gone to some lengths to emphasize that Soviet-Chinese relations are unlikely to improve at least in the near future. The hostility today encompasses various elements: ideological hostility; military confrontation along their long and disputed border, and rivalry for power and influence increasingly in a global setting. Since 1969, Soviet and Chinese forces have faced each other across their border, and periodic clashes have been reported. Of China's 140 main force army divisions (3 million men), about 75 are deployed along the Soviet border or the frontier with pro-Soviet Mongolia (where the U.S.S.R. reportedly stations three divisions). China's air force also gives primary emphasis to a possible conflict with the U.S.S.R. From time to time, PRC leaders have stated openly that China was threatened with a Soviet attack.

The "Soviet threat" continues as the chief determining factor in Chinese policies toward Japan, the United States, and the West in general. The PRC seeks improved relations with the United States. The PRC advocates a strong NATO and encourages the United States to retain military power in the Western Pacific. Toward Japan, the PRC encourages the U.S.-Japan alliance and some Japanese defense buildup. PRC leaders constantly warn the West of the dangers of Soviet expansionism and have voiced alarm over "appeasement" tendencies in the United States. The PRC does not want an actual alliance with the United States and Japan, but it views close ties with Washington and Tokyo as giving it (1) a threat to the U.S.S.R. of a two front war (in East and West) should the Soviet Union attack China; (2) countervailing U.S. power in relation to the Soviet Pacific fleet and Soviet attempts to penetrate Japan and Southeast Asian countries; (3) prospects for access to American and Japanese technology; and (4) possible coordination with the United States in policies designed to counter Soviet penetration of various "third world" areas.

Despite this common interest in preventing expansion of Soviet power and influence, China remains far apart from the United States and Japan in terms of political values and ideology. Specific issues of importance also separate them, including Korea, territorial claims in the potentially oil rich East China Sea (between China and Japan); and international economic, law, and environmental issues. The question of the PRC's long term aims in Asia, although apparently dormant today, is a potentially troublesome element in the relationship. Recent Chinese political instability raises the issue of Chinese reliability. In short, China is probably the most uncertain factor in the East Asian power balance.

Economically, South Korea and Taiwan represent two of the most successful elements of U.S. policy in Northeast Asia since the end of World War II, but are yet focal points of potential conflict because they still are part of divided states. U.S. assistance has helped both to develop from backward, agrarian societies to the verge of prosperous mid-level industrial states, a status that both should reach by the mid-1980's. Economic success has contributed to political stability but not yet to democratic political systems more amenable to the United States. Their futures are clouded by proclaimed intentions of the PRC and North Korea to unify the Chinese and Korean nations under communist systems.

BROAD AMERICAN POLICY OBJECTIVES

American policies currently attempt to deal with four basic issues in U.S. relations with Northeast Asia: (1) growing Soviet military power in the region; (2) the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance; (3) the U.S. role in the defense of South Korea; and (4) the role of the PRC in the Asian power balance. These issues affect the spectrum of political, economic, and military objectives. Major policy pronouncements of the Ford and Carter Administration suggest certain broad goals in common. Unlike Southeast Asia, the American government and body politic appear to give some priority to those objectives. Nevertheless, there often is disagreement over the proper policy instruments to apply.

POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

1. *A secure alliance with Japan.*—Maintaining the U.S.-Japan alliance is the most important U.S. policy objective in East Asia. A consensus on this goal cuts across practically the entire American political spectrum. It is widely agreed that the alliance brings benefits to the United States militarily, politically, and economically. Japanese economic power [9] is felt both regionally and globally, and behind it lies tremendous political and military potential. In short, Japan's future foreign policy orientation will greatly affect the ability of the United States to achieve Asian and global policy objectives.

2. *Non-hostile relations with the People's Republic of China.*—There appears to be a general, if vague, consensus in the American body politic that non-hostile relations with the PRC is in the interest of the United States. It is asserted that such a relationship, at the least, relieves military pressure on the United States in Asia. Carter Administration officials and many U.S. defense planners increasingly view the PRC as an important military counterweight to the Soviet Union in Northeast Asia. It is also argued that non-hostile relations reinforce the PRC's anti-Soviet policy in that the absence of an antagonistic United States removes an incentive for Peking to improve relations with Moscow. Some argue it would be in the U.S. interest to provide the PRC with military technology and/or military equipment. Anti-Soviet cooperation among the United States, China, and Japan could then increase in Asia and elsewhere.

Opponents of this strategy argue that stressing political cooperation with the PRC gives the United States adequate leverage in dealing with the U.S.S.R. Others who favor continued détente with the U.S.S.R. are fearful that overt military cooperation with China would stir Soviet hostility and open the door to a renewed "Cold War." Basically, they view normalization as aimed more toward U.S. détente with China and preventing a Sino-Soviet reconciliation than towards a de facto Washington-Peking-Tokyo axis against Moscow.

Other elements believe that U.S.-PRC ties, while tactically useful against the U.S.S.R., should not obscure fundamental ideological and policy differences between the United States and the PRC which make long term cooperation or détente unlikely. They fear that military aid to the PRC would only add to the strength of a future adversary.

---

[9] Japan's Gross National Product of $642 billion (1977 estimate) places it behind only the United States and the Soviet Union.

Until December 1978, security for Taiwan was considered a major American policy objective, but the extent of U.S. interest is now uncertain because of President Carter's decision to establish diplomatic relations with the PRC, break relations with Taiwan, and terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. The President has said that the United States will maintain commercial and cultural relations with Taiwan, and Administration officials have stated that the United States will provide arms to Taiwan on a limited basis. Of course, if the PRC decides in the future to use military force against Taiwan, a basic issue for the United States will be whether or not to use its forces in the Western Pacific to help prevent a PRC takeover of the island.

3. *Adequate security for South Korea.*—With regard to the objective of security for South Korea, sharp disagreement in the United States exists over strategy; and some aspects of this disagreement appear to extend to the objective itself. In reaction to President Carter's announced plan to withdraw American ground forces from South Korea, three viewpoints have emerged in Congress and elsewhere concerning the American military role on the Korean peninsula. First, there are advocates of retaining ground forces. They contend that withdrawal of these troops, especially the U.S. Second Infantry Division, will weaken the deterrent against a North Korean attack and possibly result in a new Korean War with a highly destabilizing effect on the great power balance in Northeast Asia and, especially, on Japanese confidence in the United States.

The second viewpoint supports the President's plan. Proponents cite the Administration's rationale that South Korean military and economic strength and a credible U.S. defense commitment, symbolized by air and naval forces, will provide an adequate deterrent in the absence of ground troops, and thus insure regional stability and U.S. credibility with Japan. Some also voice additional rationales including avoidance of another ground war on the Asian mainland, flexibility in responding to a North Korean attack and a lower profile of support for the authoritarian government of Park Chung Hee.

A third school of thought favors policies looking toward a total U.S. military disengagement from South Korea. Some proponents of this viewpoint propose direct negotiations with North Korea aimed at total disengagement, and others suggest unilateral U.S. action. Their rationale is that total disengagement would end any chance of the United States being drawn into another Asian war. They also advocate withdrawal of support for the "oppressive" South Korean government. This school of thought tends toward a view that the "threat from the North" is not as great as commonly believed and that reunification of Korea under Pyongyang would not be disastrous to the American position in East Asia. Proponents generally would have U.S. Asia policy focus entirely on the alliance with Japan.

4. *Democratic Political Development.*—President Carter has made human rights abroad a major goal of his foreign policy. However, wide disagreement exists in the United States over what priority to give the objective and the strategy to be followed. Opinions range from dropping the goal entirely to ending all security ties with Seoul. Many strong supporters of South Korea believe that emphasis on human rights will hinder their cause. Other individuals and groups strongly

criticize South Korea but are silent on the totalitarian systems in the PRC and North Korea.

The problem of human rights strategy is complicated by a second political objective: stability. While favoring democratic political development in principle, the United States sometimes has shown reluctance to interfere in the internal policies of South Korea, fearing that such interference would destabilize the country and open the way for communist initiatives. The Nixon and Ford Administrations placed particular emphasis on political stability; and, despite the commitment to human rights, the Carter Administration apparently shares the concerns of its predecessors on this question. Needless to say, any trend in Japan toward political instability would also draw the attention of American policymakers.

5. *Non-proliferation.*—This world-wide objective applies principally to Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, Japan, and probably Taiwan, have the capability to produce nuclear weapons in a short space of time, and most experts believe that South Korea could manufacture nuclear weapons in the 1980's if it set out to do so. Generally, it is believed that development of nuclear weapons by any of these parties would have a destabilizing impact on the balance of power in East Asia and would harm non-proliferation initiatives in other parts of the world. The Carter Administration as a general rule opposes efforts to develop nuclear weapons manufacturing capabilities as a byproduct of the construction of nuclear power facilities.

ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES

A liberal and expanding U.S.-Japan economic relationship, cooperation with Japan on global economic and energy issues, and the continued development of the South Korean and Taiwan economies along liberal, free market principles have been the principal economic objectives of the United States since the early 1950's. Generally, they remain intact. U.S. trade with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan in 1977 totaled $39 billion or nearly 60 percent of the U.S. trade total with all of Western Europe.

These objectives are threatened by growing protectionist trends in the United States. The unprecedented U.S. trade deficit with Japan ($5.6 billion in 1976 and $8 billion for 1977) is a major component of the current U.S. worldwide trade deficit. The protracted 6–7 percent unemployment level in the United States has led to charges that Japanese imports are a major cause of high unemployment. Japanese products such as steel, television sets, and automobiles have made major inroads into the U.S. market, and American business firms and labor unions have begun to press for restrictions on Japanese imports. A less intense but similar reaction has occurred with regard to shoes, television sets, and textiles from South Korea and Taiwan. Until the latter part of 1977, the Carter Administration opposed unilateral restrictions. Since then, it has sought to limit imports from the three countries through "orderly marketing arrangements" and pricing formulas for foreign steel. Administration officials have warned that Congress would impose unilateral restrictions on Japanese imports unless the Government of Japan acted quickly to reduce the trade surplus with the United States.

MILITARY OBJECTIVES

1. *Maintenance of a Balance of Military Power in Northeast Asia.*—This goal appears to have broad political support in the United States. Both the Ford and Carter Administrations have cited it in major policy statements on Asia [10] and most other political factions (including those in the Congress) endorse it in a broad sense. However, substantial disagreement exists over the proper American strategy or role to achieve a suitable balance of power. Advocates of increased American navy strength in the Western Pacific contend with individuals and groups who argue that present force levels are more than adequate.

Increasingly, U.S. definitions of the "balance of power" in Northeast Asia have centered on the Soviet military presence, and the definition has been placed in both a regional context and extra regional context. Regionally, U.S. defense planners emphasize the U.S.-Soviet naval balance in the Western Pacific, but they also suggest that U.S. tactical air units in Northeast Asia are a factor in the Sino-Soviet military balance, particularly in the Manchuria region. This second element is also extended to the U.S.-Soviet military balance in Europe. U.S. officials and defense planners believe that a war in Europe would increase the threat of a Soviet attack in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific against U.S. naval forces and sea lines of communication. Japanese defense planners also increasingly hold this view. Some U.S. officials have suggested that advantages exist in presenting the Soviet Union with the prospect of a two-front war if the U.S.S.R. launched an attack in Europe. It is argued that, in case of a European war, U.S. forces in Northeast Asia would, along with Chinese forces, tie down the Soviet divisions in the Far East and could even be used to hinder or interdict the movement of Soviet divisions from the Far East to Europe.[11]

2. *Avoid Another Ground War on the Asian Mainland.*—The origins of this objective lay in the 1969 Nixon Doctrine and the opening of relations with China in 1972. A fundamental tenet of the Nixon Doctrine was that in cases involving conventional attack or guerrilla warfare against a friend or ally of the United States, the nation threatened would assume the responsibility for providing the manpower for its defense while the United States would provide arms and economic assistance. The Nixon Doctrine was also based on the assumption that China was less inclined to launch a conventional attack against Korea and Southeast Asia or give active support to communist insurgencies in the region. By and large, the sentiment behind the Doctrine (in Nixon's words, "to avoid another war like Vietnam")[12] still prevails as well as this assumption concerning China.

In Southeast Asia, the Doctrine has been implemented through military disengagements from Vietnam and Thailand and the establishment of an offshore military role based largely on sea power. The Nixon Administration made clear that the Doctrine also applied to Korea and that the United States intended to place more defense responsibility on the shoulders of South Korean forces. In 1971, the United States

---

[10] See President Ford's "Pacific Doctrine" speech of December 7, 1975: Secretary Kissinger's Seattle speech of July 22, 1978; and Secretary Vance's speech to the Asia Society of June 29. 1977.

[11] Annual Defense Department Reports, FY 1776 and FY 197T, February 1975: III–10, 30. Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1978, January 1977: 38, 99.

[12] New York Times, July 26, 1969.

withdrew 20,000 troops from South Korea, including the 7th Infantry Division.

In citing various rationale for its policy of withdrawing U.S. ground forces from South Korea by 1981–82, the Carter Administration has not spoken openly of the goal of avoiding another land war on the Asian mainland. Nevertheless, much evidence exists that this is a major Administration objective and also a strongly held personal goal of President Carter himself.[13]

3. *An Enlarged Military Capability and Responsibility for Japan.*—The U.S.-Japan security relationship involves: (1) the U.S. obligation under the Security Treaty to respond to an armed attack on Japan (unlike other defense treaties in East Asia, the obligation is not mutual) and (2) the granting of base rights to the United States by Japan, including the use of such bases for operations elsewhere in East Asia subject to prior consultation with Japan. Japan, itself, remains a relatively insignificant military factor in East Asia. Japanese policy explicitly disavows the utilization of the Self-Defense Forces beyond the territorial boundaries of Japan. Since 1965, the Government of Japan has followed a policy of devoting less than one percent of GNP to defense spending annually, ($7.9 billion for Japanese fiscal year 1978). In contrast, the U.S. defense budget is 6–7 percent of GNP, and other NATO countries spend generally in the range of 4–5 percent of GNP on defense. In addition, Japanese defense budgets allocate less than 20 percent to construction and procurement of ships, aircraft and other capital equipment compared to allocations of around 35–45 percent for these purposes in the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany.

There is strong sentiment in the United States Government that Japan should assume greater defense responsibilities;[14] and there appears to be growing U.S. public sentiment, reflected in the Congress, that is critical of Japan's "free ride" on defense. However, there is no clear consensus on the extent to which Japan should increase its military capabilities. The Ford and Carter Administrations have advocated that Japan enlarge its capabilities in anti-submarine surveillance and warfare and air defense and surveillance. Another proposal would have Japan develop the capacity for a completely indigenous conventional defense of the home islands. Certain U.S. military officials have suggested that Japan go beyond these tasks and establish a major regional naval presence including patrolling south to the Malacca Straits. Secretary of Defense Brown and Japan Defense chief Kanemaru held discussions in July 1978 over increased Japanese responsibility for securing sea lines of communication between Japan and Guam and Japan and Taiwan.[15]

---

[13] See Zagoria, Donald. Why We Can't Leave Korea. New York Times Magazine, October 2, 1977; Washington Post, June 12 and September 7, 1977; and Mainichi Shimbun, March 7, 1977. Presidential aide Stuart Eizenstat has stated that briefings by the Brookings Institution were "a significant development" in Carter's thinking on the Korean troop question prior to his assumption of office; and the Brookings analysts stressed to Carter that withdrawal of ground troops would remove the possibility of automatic involvement in a ground war on the Korean peninsula. The President reportedly told James Schlesinger that he was determined to avoid the mistakes of Presidents Truman, Johnson, and Nixon of being involved in Asian land wars. Finally, the widely reported PRM (Presidential Review Memorandum) 10 and PRM 13 cited avoidance of automatic involvement in a ground combat situation (and generally in a war in Korea) as a primary reason for the Administration's policy. PRM 10 analyzed U.S. global strategy, and PRM 13 dealt exclusively with Korea.

[14] Defense of Japan (1976), p. 36, Spurr, Russell. Japan Digs In. Far Eastern Economic Review, August 26, 1977: 20–23.

[15] Tokyo Kyodo, July 2, 1978; Japan Times Weekly, July 8, 1978.

U.S. Bases and Force Structure in Northeast Asia

MILITARY PERSONNEL LEVELS IN EAST ASIA AND THE WESTERN PACIFIC

As of December 31, 1978, the level of U.S. military personnel stationed in the Western Pacific and East Asia was 123,812, compared to 251,000 at the end of fiscal year 1964, the last year before the U.S. buildup in Vietnam. Excluding U.S. troop withdrawls from South Vietnam and Thailand, the greatest personnel reductions have occurred in the Japanese home islands with smaller reductions in Okinawa, Taiwan, and Korea. The following table shows current personnel levels in Japan and South Korea.

U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL

	Japan (including Okinawa)	Korea
Army	2, 562	31, 279
Air Force	14, 117	7, 904
Navy	6, 680	248
Marine Corps	20, 785	1, 269
Total	44, 144	40, 700

U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE IN SOUTH KOREA: COMPONENTS AND MISSIONS

U.S. Second Infantry Division.—The Division is considered by nearly all observers to be the most important component of U.S. ground forces in South Korea. The Second Division is part of the I Corps Group, a joint Korean-U.S. command located between Seoul and the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The primary military mission of I Corps is to defend the Seoul area from a North Korean attack. United States, South Korean, and some Japanese officials have stated that a key role for the Division is to deter North Korea from launching an attack, in that its location is a signal to Pyongyang that the United States would be automatically involved if it attacked South Korea. This is often called a "trip wire" situation. In the same sense, it is asserted that the Division deters the PRC and the U.S.S.R. from encouraging or supporting a North Korean attack.

314th Air Division.—Located at Osan, the Division is part of the 5th Air Force, which is headquartered in Japan. It controls two U.S. Air Force tactical wings: the 8th Tactical Wing, at Kunsan; and the 51st Composite Wing at Osan. In total there are 72 F–4 fighters in this Division for defending against North Korean air attacks.

U.S. FORCE STRUCTURE IN JAPAN (INCLUDING OKINAWA): COMPONENTS AND MISSIONS

U.S. Army, Japan (USARJ).—USARJ has no assigned combat forces. Its missions include command of forces when assigned to Japan, logistical support to U.S. Army forces in the Western Pacific, and liaison with the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force.

U.S. Naval Forces, Japan.—With headquarters at Yokosuka on Tokyo Bay, the command has been designated by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, as his representative for naval matters throughout Japan.

Yokosuka/Yokahama Complex.—This group of facilities has the primary mission of supporting and logistic servicing of U.S. naval forces, Japan, and operating forces assigned to the 7th Fleet in the Western Pacific. Since 1973, the U.S. aircraft carrier Midway and ten other U.S. naval vessels have been homeported at Yokosuka. Major facilities at Yokosuka/Yokohama include a naval ordnance facility, a communications station, a navy hospital, a naval ship repair facility (including drydocking), and a naval supply depot.

Sasebo.—U.S. facilities at Sasebo provide logistics services for U.S. naval vessels, including drydocking. It also has a naval ordnance facility. Sasebo's importance has declined in recent years in relation to Yokosuka.

Iwakuni.—Most of the First Marine Aircraft Wing is at Iwakuni including about 170 planes and helicopters. The remainder of the wing is at Kadena on Okinawa. The Wing has about 45 tactical fighter aircraft. The Chief mission of this unit is rapid reaction to a "brush fire" conflict in East Asia outside of Korea in support of Marine ground units. Nevertheless, the Aircraft Wing provides in-theater tactical air assets for use in Korea if necessary.


Yokota.—The headquarters and some units of the 5th Air Force are located at Yokota Air Base. Four squadrons of tactical aircraft (about 90 F–4's) are at Kadena Air Base on Okinawa. The 5th Air Force's basic mission are: (1) air operations for the defense of Japan and South Korea; (2) assist with air defense training of the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force; (3) conduct air reconnaissance missions during peace time and limited and general war; and (4) transport ground combat troops to theatre of operations in limited and general war (16 C–130 E transports are at Yokota and 4 C–130 E's are at Kadena).

Third Marine Division (Okinawa).—Two thirds of the Third Marine Division is on Okinawa. The division is a combat reserve force maintained for amphibious or other operations throughout the U.S. Pacific Command areas. These would include evacuations, such as the Division helped perform in Phnom Penh and Saigon in April 1975 or short term operations, such as the rescue of the Mayaguez in May 1975. The Division could also be expected to act as a rapid response reinforcement in South Korea in case of a North Korean attack.

Misawa Air Force Station.—Located in northern Honshu, a primary mission of this base is to conduct anti-submarine and electronic intelligence coverage of Soviet operations in the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk and the Kurile Islands. Nine P–3C anti-submarine aircraft are at Misawa.

35-995 O - 79 - 12

MAJOR U.S. MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN JAPAN AND KOREA



Effectiveness of Current U.S. Military Base Structure in Supporting U.S. Objectives

Effectiveness in supporting political objectives

1. *A secure alliance with Japan.*—In the wake of the communist victories in Indochina, the announced plan to withdraw U.S. ground troops from South Korea, and the Soviet military buildup in Northeast Asia, American bases in Japan and Okinawa, and especially the American naval presence in Northeast Asia, have assumed increased importance among those factors that influence the stability of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The Japanese government views U.S. sea and air power in and around Japan as vital to the defense of Japan in case of a Soviet attack and important to the security of South Korea. U.S. carriers, in particular, have come to symbolize to the Japanese government the U.S. naval presence in Northeast Asia. The carrier presence apparently does constitute, in the eyes of some Japanese officials, a kind of "trip wire" insuring U.S. commitment and support in the event of a Soviet attack on Japan. Since presidential candidate Carter announced in the spring of 1976 his intention to withdraw ground troops from South Korea, Japanese government apprehension over the direction of American security policy in Northeast Asia has been well documented and has been stated directly to many Americans, including the author. Moreover, polls in Japan now show majority Japanese opinion in favor of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty,[16] whereas this view was in a minority throughout the 1960's and into the early 1970's. The major opposition parties have modified their previous positions which called for immediate abrogation of the treaty. Japanese public pressure to terminate American bases has abated substantially since the late 1960's.[17]

There appears to be a correlation between increased Japanese public support for the American military presence and growing doubts about that presence and the commitment behind it. A *Yomiuri Shimbun* poll published in April 1977 showed a sharp decline in the number of Japanese who believe that the United States would defend Japan if it were attacked by another country.[18]

---

[16] Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan (1976), p. 57.

[17] Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan (1976), p. 52–53. Wakaizumi, Kei, Consensus in Japan. Foreign Policy, Summer 1977 : 167–168.

[18] According to the poll 28 percent of the respondents answered "no" to the question: "Do you think that the United States would really defend Japan in case of emergency?" 21 percent answered "yes". The same poll in 1969 had 29 percent answering "no" and 37 percent answering "yes".

2. *Non-hostile relations with China.*—Until the Nixon Administration's successes in opening up contacts with China, the PRC strongly opposed U.S. bases in the Western Pacific. Now, improved relations with Washington and the emergence of what Peking considers a genuine Soviet military threat have caused China to modify its stance. The Hua-Kuo Feng-Teng Tsiao-ping regime has openly stated that it recognizes the "practical" necessity of American bases in Japan and the Philippines.[19] Chinese officials now lecture visiting Japanese about the virtues of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the face of growing Soviet power in Northeast Asia. In short, so long as the PRC maintains that U.S. policy toward the USSR is a central factor in U.S.-PRC relations, the American military presence in Japan and the Philippines, plus the U.S. Seventh Fleet, will be a positive element in influencing the maintenance of non-hostile U.S. relations with China.[20]

American forces in Korea are a more ambivalent element in the U.S.–P.R.C. relationship. Prior to 1977, PRC officials had indicated, at least in private, that they were not opposed to an American military presence in South Korea.[21] Now, following President Carter's confirmation of his Korea troop withdrawal policy, the PRC has supported North Korea's demand that the United States withdraw all troops from South Korea. The PRC may share the uncertainty in Japan over the future American role in Korea; and consequently China is now attaching a greater importance to its position in North Korea where it competes with the U.S.S.R. for influence with a "fraternal" communist state.[22] Nevertheless, a White House adviser told reporters on April 21, 1977, that China wanted the United States to keep its forces in Korea.[23]

3. *Adequate security for South Korea.*—The absence of conflict on the Korean peninsula would appear to testify to the effectiveness of the American forces in this area in meeting this objective. North Korea constantly cites the American presence as the major roadblock to the reunification of South Korea. However, this view is predicated on the assumption that Pyongyang would attack if U.S. forces were absent. Another view is that North Korea is not inherently aggressive in this sense.

---

[19] See interview with Yu Chan, People's Republic of China Vice Foreign Minister, in Asian Wall Street Journal, October 3, 1977.

[20] "Pentagon planners" stated that if war between the United States and the Soviet Union erupted in the Pacific, the United States might provide logistic support for Chinese forces. U.S. bases in Japan presumably would be involved in such an operation. New York Times, April 9, 1978.

[21] U.S. Congress. House of Representatives. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development. United States—Soviet Union—China : The Great Power Triangle : Parts I and II. Hearings. 94th Congress. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976 : 133–134. (Testimony of Michael Oksenberg and Ross Terrill). See also Hinton, Harold C. The Foreign Policy of the Hua Kuo-Feng Administration. Paper presented to the Sino-American Conference. Washington D.C. June 1976.

[22] China has consistently supported North Korea's political objectives and has spurned South Korea's attempts to establish contacts as well as U.S. diplomatic initiatives on Korea. Nevertheless, the PRC apparently believes that a war in Korea could strengthen Soviet-North Korean relations, as Pyongyang would likely require large infusions of sophisticated Soviet arms and equipment. With the emergence of apparent PRC uncertainty over the future U.S. role, China may have concluded that stronger support for the North Korean position is necessary to influence Pyongyang against increased military cooperation with the Soviet Union.

[23] Washington Post, April 22, 1977.

4. *Democratic political development.*—U.S. bases and forces probably give the United States some leverage in dealing with the political elites of East Asian countries when the United States has chosen to use it. South Korea represents the best example of this bases-leverage link. During the period from the fall of the Syngman Rhee government in 1960 to the promulgation of the 1963 Korean constitution, both the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations put open pressure on South Korean authorities to institute a democratic political system.[24]

On the other hand, the Nixon Administration chose not to interfere when President Park Chung Hee abrogated the 1963 constitution and put into effect the current 1972 constitution and emergency decrees, which have sharply limited political and civil liberties. In fact, the 1969 Nixon Doctrine emphasized both a declining military role and political role for the United States in East Asia.

Today, the situation is more complex owing to the prospective withdrawal of American ground forces from South Korea. In Korea, the Carter Administration opposes any linkage between the troop/security issue and human rights.[25]

Unanimously, South Korean dissident leaders have opposed President Carter's plan to withdraw ground forces, and many fear that the plan may result in increased restrictions on political and civil liberties, justified by the government on grounds of additional security requirements.[26] Opposition elements in Taiwan have been much less vocal on this issue, but none appear to favor termination of the U.S.-Taiwan mutual defense treaty or withdrawal of U.S. air and naval forces from areas and bases near Taiwan.

Linkage between the American military presence in Northeast Asia and political stability of host governments is more difficult to establish. South Korea went through three years of political turmoil and changes of government during the 1900–1963 period; but aside from that period, it has been relatively stable. Taiwan has had political stability since the Chinese Nationalists fled the mainland in 1949. The U.S. military presence has probably given the governments in Seoul and Taipei greater flexibility in allocating limited resources between socio-economic and defense programs, but U.S. military and economic aid also has been important in this respect.

A paradox exists with regard to the impact of U.S. forces and bases on political stability in Japan. Until the post-Vietnam War period, the U.S.-Japan security system was a major source of political instability and ideological polarization in Japan proper and Okinawa. On the other hand, some observers believe that termination of the security system would cause such controversy in Japan over future pol-

---

[24] Oh, John K. C. Role in the United States in South Korea's Democratization. Pacific Affairs. Summer 1969 : 164–177.

[25] President Carter emphasized the separation of these issues in a meeting with members of Congress shortly before taking office. See Washington Post. January 14, 197 . See also New York Times, February 24, 1977, for Secretary Vance's testimony on this question.

[26] U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. Security Assistance to Asia for Fiscal Year 1978. Report of a Special Study Mission to Asia, April 8–21, 1977. 95th Congress, 1st Session. Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977 : 41. See also : U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. U.S. Troop Withdrawal from the Republic of Korea. A Report by Senators Hubert H. Humphrey and John Glenn. 95th Congress, 2d Session. Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978 : 61–62.

icy choices that political instability could result on a scale larger than that of the 1960's.

5. *Non-proliferation.*—The U.S. military presence and base structure would appear to have a deterrent impact on the development of nuclear weapons by governments in Northeast Asia where several states perceive distinct, direct military threats to their security backed by potential overwhelming military power of the U.S.S.R. or China. To date, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have based their security against these threats almost exclusively upon American military power. All three have forgone high defense expenditures and thus have avoided the indigenous manufacture of certain sophisticated conventional weapons. Japan is the most pronounced example of this; but until very recently, South Korea kept its defense expenditures well below 5 percent of annual GNP. Taiwan's annual defense expenditure has ranged from 7–10 percent of GNP. The same principle has applied to the manufacture of nuclear weapons, although political factors in Japan and technological limitations in Taiwan and South Korea have also been important considerations.

There can be little doubt that the increasing interest (including research) shown in nuclear weapons development by the governments in Seoul and Taipei since the early 1970's is directly related to growing doubts in these countries concerning the durability of the American military presence and the credibility of U.S. security commitments. This increased interest in nuclear weaponry is in the context of attempts by both governments to achieve increased self-sufficiency in defense production. South Korean officials have been particularly blunt in stating that future decisions on nuclear weapons development will depend on their perception of the credibility of the U.S. security guarantee.

EFFECTIVENESS IN SUPPORTING ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES

As indicated previously, U.S. bases and forces in and around Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have allowed these governments to concentrate resources into economic development that, in the absence of these forces, would probably have gone into defense. The American security commitments have undoubtedly influenced their economic policies in the direction of liberal, free market development both internally and in foreign trade. Moreover, it is likely a factor in Japan's willingness to cooperate with the United States on global economic and energy issues.

This being said, it would also appear that the influence of the American military presence on economic objectives relating to Japan is waning. Japan and the United States have become so interdependent economically that American forces in Northeast Asia no longer have an appreciable impact on bilateral economic relationships. Japan's status as an economic superpower gives it considerable independence in economic policy making, as indicated by its stance during the recent U.S.-Japan negotiations over nuclear power development, the current dispute with the United States over trade, and differing views on global energy and economic problems.

The same situation applies to South Korea and Taiwan with certain qualifications. Both countries have advanced economically to the

point where any sharp change away from liberal, free market economic strategies would be counterproductive. It can be argued, however, that the U.S. military presence does contribute to general economic confidence, which, in turn, influences the decisions of both domestic and foreign investors. This factor could be increasingly important, because both South Korea and Taiwan now look toward long term investment in heavy industry as the main vehicle for growth into the 1980's.

EFFECTIVENESS IN SUPPORTING MILITARY OBJECTIVES

1. *Maintenance of a Balance of Military Power in Northeast Asia.*—Assuming that permanent Soviet naval power continues to grow in the Western Pacific, only the United States can sustain a comparable presence in that region. The state of affairs also applies to Soviet land-based aircraft in relation to U.S. naval and land based tactical air assets. American bases in Japan proper and Okinawa have been important in supporting these assets; but U.S. bases in Korea contribute much less, as they are more related to the Korean situation itself.

A view has recently emerged that the present military balance in Northeast Asia is shifting in favor of the Soviet Union to such an extent that Soviet forces in the region could, in the future, attain military superiority. A close reading of the Japanese Defense "White Papers" for 1976, 1977, and 1978 and recent statements by Japanese defense officials [27] show a growing concern among Japanese government defense planners that this is, indeed, the case. Japanese government and defense experts have also expressed concern over the emphasis given to Europe and the Persian Gulf in recent Carter Administration statements on U.S. defense strategy. Increasingly, they believe that, in the event of war, Japan could not depend entirely on the United States to defend it or carry out offensive action in the Western Pacific because of the Carter Administration's emphasis on the defense of Europe and its strategy of transferring forces from the Pacific to Europe in case of war. Defense Agency sources stated that such a strategy would allow the United States to defend only the supply routes between the U.S. mainland and Hawaii and Alaska.[28]

The PRC government may also hold similar views. Chinese commentary has emphasized U.S. inferiority in the overall balance of military power with the U.S.S.R.[29] The PRC has pointed to Soviet military superiority in Western Europe; but Peking is also apprehensive over the balance in Northeast Asia. Since the beginning of 1978, PRC media have reported information on the Soviet buildup by the Japan Defense Agency, the U.S.-Japan security conference held in Honolulu in January, and Secretary of Defense Brown's Los Angeles speech on February 20 in which he pledged no further U.S. military withdrawals from the Western Pacific and modernization of existing U.S. forces in the face of the growing Soviet capabilities. Reportedly, Chinese officials reacted favorably to the Brown speech.[30]

---

[27] In particular, see Defense Agency Director General Mihara's speech on August 12 1977. Yomiuri Shimbun, August 13, 1977.

[28] Daily Yomiuri, May 9, 1978; New York Times, August 6, 1978; Christian Science Monitor. August 16, 1978.

[29] See People's Daily, August 20, 1977; see also the interview with PRC Vice Premier Wang Chen in Dagens Nyheter (Stockholm), November 10. 1977.

[30] Soviet Pincer Alarms China. Far Eastern Economic Review, March 3, 1978: 12–13. Knowledgable Executive branch officials have given the author a similar description of the PRC attitude toward the speech.

Nevertheless, the Hong Kong communist newspaper, *Ta Kung Pao*, which is considered to reflect authoritatively the views of the PRC government, noted in its May 12, 1978, issue the growing uneasiness in Japan over U.S. defense policy in the Western Pacific, particularly the emphasis given by the Carter Administration to Europe, and that "the conclusion of Japan's defense experts is that the defense ability of the U.S. 7th Fleet is unreliable" in the face of the Soviet buildup. "This conclusion," the newspaper declared, "is a realistic estimate of the practical situation." [31]

Several American military experts have voiced alarm over the Soviet military buildup in Northeast Asia and American ability to defend Japan in case of war. These include General George Brown, late Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Admiral James Holloway; Chief of Naval Operations; Admiral Elmo Zumwalt (ret.), former Chief of Naval Operations; and Professor Martin Weinstein, Asian military affairs expert and former special assistant to the U.S. Ambassador to Japan.

This view is apparently supported in part by a 117 page report titled "Military Strategy and Force Posture Review." As part of PRM (Presidential Review Memorandum) 10, the report was approved in June 1977 by the Carter Administration. Although classified, the *New York Times* secured a copy and ran an article describing it on January 6, 1978. According to the *Times*, the report concluded that "the overall ability of American and allied forces to prevail against Soviet forces outside of Europe is uncertain" and that American bases in Japan and South Korea "are offset by the difficulty of establishing effective antiair and antisubmarine barriers in the face of intense Soviet opposition." In the event of a Soviet-U.S. war in the Western Pacific, the report stated that essential military shipping to Japan could probably be maintained but "the possibility exists that the Soviet Union could cut the economic and resupply lines to Japan, endangering Japan's continued support of American military operations."

The Congressional Budget Office presented a counterview in a June 1977 report titled "Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces: Forces Related to Asia." Generally, this report downgraded Soviet capabilities, though citing Japanese concerns. It concluded:

> At first glance, the United States appears to have forces in East Asia and the Pacific considerably in excess of the needs generated either by the Korean contingency, assuming no Soviet or PRC combat involvement, or by the relatively small portion (30 percent) of the Soviet Navy represented by its Pacific fleet.

---

[31] For similar commentary from Peking, see People's Daily, August 14, 1978; Radio Peking, August 25, 1978.

The report added that the rationale for U.S. forces in the region was "avowedly political" and not military. It placed much emphasis on the role of the PRC in limiting Soviet military capabilities that could be employed against American and Japanese forces.

Secretary Brown, Admiral Holloway, and General Brown offered somewhat differing estimates in their annual reports to the Congress early in 1978. Secretary Brown was cautiously optimistic. Acknowledging that in the event of war, the Soviet Union would likely attack U.S. forces in the Western Pacific and would contest sea lanes to Northeast Asia and other regions and that "both U.S. and Allied shipping would suffer serious losses in the early stages," he concluded that "we believe that the minimum necessary military and economic cargoes could be delivered to the theaters of combat, and that both the submarine and the air threats could be brought under control within an acceptable time." However, he added that the growth of Soviet air and naval forces made this outcome "uncertain" in the future.[32] Admiral Holloway testified that if U.S. Pacific Fleet assets were shifted to Europe in a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, remaining U.S. forces could protect only military lines of communication to U.S. allies in the Western Pacific. Holloway omitted any reference to U.S. ability to keep SLOC's open for economic supply of Japan from the Persian Gulf, Southeast Asia, and the United States. General Brown declared that in case of a European war, the United States would probably have to shift a significant portion of Pacific naval forces to the Atlantic and, consequently, it could control the sea lanes between the continental United States and Hawaii and Alaska but that "broad sea control beyond those lanes would be a difficult challenge."

Admiral Maurice Weisner, U.S. Pacific Commander in Chief, offered another assessment in a statement to the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (May 5, 1978). Admiral Weisner stated that if war broke out, U.S. forces in the Pacific would have an "even chance" of defeating Soviet forces but that "the balance of power is tipping towards the Soviets" and that the U.S.S.R. could gain a preponderance of military power in the Western Pacific in eight or ten years.[33]

The following chart shows the statistical balance between U.S. and Soviet forces in the region:

---

[32] Japan Times Weekly. July 8, 1978; Tokyo Kyodo, July 2, 1978. In the July 1978 Brown-Kanemaru meeting, the U.S. Secretary reportedly stated that the United States alone could not cope with the Soviet naval buildup in the Pacific and that greater efforts by U.S. allies were necessary.

[33] See also Admiral Weisner's article in Strategic Review, Summer 1978: 41–47.

UNITED STATES/SOVIET STATISTICAL BALANCE: NORTHEAST ASIA AND THE WESTERN PACIFIC

	United States	[1] U.S.S.R.
Divisions:		
Army	1	31
Marine	⅔	0
Total	1⅔	31
Naval infantry regiments	0	2
Bombers:		
Air Force:		
Strike:		
Heavy	14	60
Medium	0	100
Total	14	160
Support:		
Heavy	0	15
Medium	0	50
Total	0	65
Navy:		
Strike:		
Heavy	0	0
Medium	0	90
Total	0	90
Support:		
Heavy	0	20
Medium	0	55
Total	0	75
Grand total	14	390
Fighter/Attack aircraft:		
Air Force	192	800
Marine	52	0
Navy	117	0
Total	361	800
Naval ships:		
Surface combatants:		
Carriers	2	0
Cruisers [2]	4	9
Destroyers	8	29
Frigates	7	35
Total	21	73
Submarines:		
Strategic	10	30
Attack	5	80
Total	15	110

[1] All Soviet figures are confined to forces stationed in or operating from the Transbaikal and Far East Military Districts.
[2] Cruisers with the Soviet Pacific Fleet include 1 Kresta I, 3 Kresta II's, 2 Kyndas, and 3 Sverdlov class.

2. *Avoid Another Ground War on the Asian Mainland.*—The current base/force structure does not appear to contribute to this goal if war should erupt in Korea. Most observers believe that the position of the Second Division just below the DMZ astride the main invasion route to Seoul would insure U.S. ground combat involvement if North Korea attacked South Korea. As stated previously, this appears to be a principle motive of President Carter in ordering the withdrawal of the Division by 1981–1982.

The location of the 3rd Marine Division on Okinawa does not directly work against the objective, but its in-theatre presence may add to the psychological pressure to intervene with ground combat forces should a Korean War break out.

Supporters of the present base/force structure in Korea argue that it successfully deters North Korea from launching a war and thereby prevents a situation in which the United States would face the choice of committing or not committing ground forces into combat. However, this argument assumes that the present structure would constitute an adequate deterrent into the future, and advocates of withdrawing ground forces are not willing to take that risk.

3. *An Enlarged Military Capability and Responsibility for Japan.*—The more specific objective of a greater Japanese defense contribution has not been significantly advanced by the present U.S. base/force structure. U.S. bases and forces in and around Japan still give Japan a "free ride" on the defense issue, as the 1976 Japanese Government's defense "White Paper" indicated with the statement that "Adoption of this defense concept is conditional on effective maintenance of the Japan-U.S. security system for years to come . . ." [34] On the other hand, the U.S.-Japan Security system should give the United States greater influence over the direction and scope of a Japanese defense buildup, should the Government of Japan decide upon that course. This is indicated by the agreement of November 1978 setting up guidelines for joint action of the United States and Japanese armed forces in time of military emergency.

Alternative Instruments or Approaches That Could More Effectively Promote American Objectives in Northeast Asia

American policy objectives in Northeast Asia are so interrelated and, in some cases contradictory, that it is doubtful that any single alternative base structure or alternative strategy could accomplish all of them. Against this background, a number of proposed alternative base/force structures or instruments will be examined in order to indicate which objectives might be effectively promoted by each alternative and which probably cannot be.

1. *Withdrawal of American ground forces from South Korea.*—This alternative, which the Carter Administration began implementing in 1978, involves the withdrawal of approximately 30,000 ground troops, including the Second Infantry Division from South Korea over a four-five year period. Remaining in Korea after 1982 would be a residual force consisting of an air force contingent of 8,000 and a logistics force of reportedly 3,000–6,000 men.

Other major U.S. objectives would be deeply affected by the successful or failure of the Administration's policy in preserving South Korea's security. War in Korea in the wake of the withdrawal of U.S. ground troops would place considerable strain on the U.S.-Japan alliance, particularly if North Korea took over the South. It would also be detrimental to the goal of non-hostile relations with the PRC. China would certainly support North Korea at least to offset Soviet involvement, and Peking likely would question the ability of the United States to successfully manage an Asian security policy. Failure of the Carter policy to prevent war in Korea could increase the pressure on Taiwan to produce nuclear weapons, altogether a direct impact in Japan is less likely. Moreover, during the period of withdrawal, South Korean perceptions of the likely outcomes of the withdrawal could influence Seoul's decisions on nuclear weapons.

---

[34] Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan (1976), p. 38.

A reunited Korea under communist control would be a new military factor in the Northeast Asian balance of power. There is the question of what impact the outcome of the Administration's policy would have on the military roles of the U.S.S.R. and the United States in the region. Japanese defense policy could be substantially affected by events in Korea. A North Korean military takeover of South Korea could result in a Japanese decision to substantially build up the size and strength of the Self-Defense Forces; [35] but it is uncertain whether, in these circumstances, such a buildup would take place in cooperation with the United States. On the other hand, continued stability in Korea probably would influence an evolution of Japanese defense policy in accord with U.S. perceptions of the kind of military role Japan should undertake.

In evaluating the troop withdrawal policy, a key question is what elements have combined or interreacted together since the Korean War to enhance stability in the Korean peninsula, especially through their influence on the policy decisions of North and South Korea, the U.S.S.R., China, and Japan. Besides the presence of American forces, other "elements of stability" appear to be:

(1) the military balance between North and South Korea, particularly the South Korean ability to defend Seoul, 25 miles from the demilitarized zone;

(2) political stability in South Korea (including the human rights situation and the attitudes of the South Korean public toward the Park Chung Hee government);

(3) the state of the South Korean economy (which affects political stability and South Korean public attitudes);

(4) the credibility of the U.S. defense commitment, particularly congressional and American public support for the defense commitment, security assistance, and the residual U.S. military force that will remain in South Korea after 1982;

(5) U.S. perceptions of Japanese views on Korea;

(6) the Japanese role in Korea;

(7) Soviet and Chinese restraint on North Korea.

Given the assumption of a potentially aggressive North Korea (the assessment probably held by a majority of the American body politic), the success of the Administration's troop withdrawal plan may depend on how its implementation affects these elements of stability. If, through a combination of skilled political, military, and diplomatic policies, the Administration prevents erosion of the elements of stability or even succeeds in strengthening some of them, the withdrawal of ground troops may not damage the goal of security for South Korea. On the other hand, if erosion of these elements takes place, a danger of war or increased subversion may occur in the early 1980's with potential detrimental impact on several U.S. policy objectives cited above.

2. *Withdrawal of all American Forces from South Korea.*—It has been proposed that this policy be carried out either unilaterally or through direct negotiations with North Korea. The alternative would basically serve the objective of avoidance of another land war in Asia.

---

[35] In Japan, a major debate on defense policy has taken place in 1978, and the Government increasingly shows signs of favoring some expansion of defense capabilities. The Korea question and the Soviet military buildup in Northeast Asia appear to be the major contributing factors to this situation.

Once all troops had departed Korea, the chances of American involvement in a Korean War would be less than if a U.S. residual force remained in the country.

Many proponents of total American troop withdrawal argue that North Korea does not desire a solution to the Korean problem based on aggression or subversion and is sincere in the professed goal of "peaceful reunification" of Korea. If the assumption of an essentially non-aggressive North Korea is correct, other U.S. objectives in Northeast Asia may not be damaged. Negotiations with North Korea, coupled with the opening up of other forms of contact such as trade, could reinforce any peaceful inclinations on Pyongyang's part.

On the other hand, if North Korea is prepared to resort to force to unify Korea under its auspices, a total American withdrawal with little likelihood of re-intervention could seriously weaken security for South Korea with impact on other U.S. policy objectives in Northeast Asia.

This alternative would appear to erode several of the "elements of stability" discussed above. The military balance undoubtedly would shift in favor of the North. Political stability and economic growth could deteriorate in the South. North Korea, South Korea, and the other major powers most likely would interpret a total withdrawal to mean that the United States would not return forces to South Korea to support the defense commitment.

For the alternative to be successful in terms of existing policy goals, the United States would be primarily dependent on the intentions of North Korea and on preserving the "element of stability" involving Soviet and Chinese restraint of North Korea. This probably would require that Washington undertake major diplomatic initiatives toward North Korea, the U.S.S.R. and China with the goal of reinforcing any conciliatory tendencies that may exist in Pyongyang and also Sino-Soviet restraint.

3. *Withdrawal of the Third Marine Division from Okinawa.*—This alternative points up the competing nature of the goals of adequate security for South Korea and avoidance of another ground war on the Asian mainland. Its purpose would be to remove the unit most likely to be deployed in ground combat on the Asian mainland following the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces from Korea. Withdrawal of the Marine Division would remove the only remaining in-theatre U.S. ground combat unit in Northeast Asia.

The drawback would be the effect on stability in Korea, since it would be carried out in close time proximity with the withdrawal of ground forces from South Korea and likely would be interpreted by both Koreas and the other powers as a clear sign that the United States would not commit ground troops to South Korea to meet a North Korean attack. As such, it could also be detrimental to Japanese confidence in U.S. assurances concerning the American commitment to South Korea and thus injurious to the stability of the alliance.

Withdrawal of the full Division would not eliminate the capability to conduct "brushfire" operations such as evacuations and rescue, given the two afloat Marine battalion landing teams in the Western Pacific. In order to maintain additional capability and yet eliminate the Division as a potential long-term ground combat force on the Asian mainland, the Division's strength on Okinawa could be reduced from two regiments to one.

4. *Re-deployment of U.S. carriers in the Western Pacific.*—There are at least two alternatives available for re-deployment of aircraft carriers. They would cover the spectrum from reduction of carrier assets in Northeast Asia to a strengthening of carrier assets.

One alternative is to reduce the number of carriers forward deployed in the Western Pacific from two to one. The chief rationale for this alternative would be financial savings, reducing the vulnerability of a carrier to Soviet attack in the "close-in" Northeast Asian region and shifting the carrier to the European theatre. However, it would appear that several U.S. objectives would not be served by this action. The Japanese government would be particularly unhappy over any further reduction of U.S. naval power in the region. One may also assume that the alternative would have a negative impact on PRC perceptions of the direction of U.S. security policy in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific. Security for South Korea might also be affected negatively, since the Administration has pledged to maintain strong naval forces around Korea to compensate for the withdrawal of U.S. ground forces. Finally, the in-theater balance of military power would change as a result of a decrease of the U.S. carrier presence. All of these effects would be enhanced if removing one of the two forward deployed carriers involved ending the homeporting arrangement at Yokosuka.

A second alternative would be to forward deploy a third aircraft carrier to the Western Pacific with Northeast Asia as its primary area of operations. This would reverse the 1975 decision of the Ford Administration to reduce the number of forward deployed carriers from three to two. A third carrier would be drawn from one of the four carriers currently with the Third Fleet east of Hawaii. It could be homeported in Japan (if new facilities were constructed or existing facilities expanded) or at Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines (minus drydocking). If one of the carriers were deployed primarily in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean, the other two could be concentrated near Japan and Korea and the general location of Soviet bases facing Japan. A third carrier would add approximately 36 attack fighter-bombers to U.S. tactical air assets in the region.

Given the current security concerns in Japan, China, and South Korea, the alternative would likely enhance U.S. objectives in relation to those states.[36] The Japanese government, in particular, would probably be disposed.

There are three conceivable drawbacks to forward deployment of a third aircraft carrier. The first is the financial cost. The second is the possibility of Soviet countermeasures to match the increase of U.S. in-theatre assets. Finally, would a third carrier act as an incentive or disincentive to the Japanese government in moving toward a greater defense role for Japan?

5. *Increase tactical air assets in Japan and Korea.*—This would involve the transfer to Japan and/or Korea of one or more of the 45 attack fighter squadrons presently deployed in the United States. To fully approximate the added tactical air strength a third carrier would add in Northeast Asia, two squadrons would have to be sent to the region. At maximum strength, they would add 48 attack fighters to U.S. assets in the region. Given the rapidity with which the United

---

[36] Washington Post, July 10, 1978. "Military sources" in Tokyo stated that China was so concerned over the growth of Soviet military power in Asia that it would accept an increased U.S. naval presence in the Western Pacific.

States constructed air force facilities in Thailand in 1964–1965 to accommodate increased tactical aircraft in that country, a buildup in Japan presumably could be undertaken quickly. One squadron could be deployed in South Korea in line with the Carter Administration's promise to augment U.S. air strength as ground troops are removed. The military purpose of the alternative would be related to both Korea and to the growth of Soviet air and sea power in Northeast Asia.

A move with somewhat less impact would be the transfer of one and possibly both F–4 tactical fighter squadrons in the Philippines to South Korea or Japan. If one squadron (24 F–4 attack fighters) were transferred, South Korea would be the logical place of deployment in view of Carter Administration promises to augment U.S. air strength in that country.

Like an increase in carrier strength, this alternative would likely enhance U.S. political objectives in relation to Japan, China, and South Korea. However, although the Government of Japan would likely favor it in theory, additional American bases and forces is a difficult and controversial political issue in Japan. Moreover, an increase in U.S. tactical air strength may serve as a disincentive for the Japanese government to enlarge its own defense role.

6. *Enhanced role of Allies and Associates.*—U.S. support of greater military capabilities for the PRC and Japan would have several advantages. First, it would add potential military assets against the Soviet Union in time of war. Second, in Soviet eyes, it would probably increase the possibility of a two front war if the U.S.S.R. attacked NATO. As such, it could act as a deterrent against an attack and strengthen the balance of power. Third, it would give the United States greater flexibility in adjusting its force levels in the Western Pacific, particularly in relation to force requirements in Europe.

On the negative side, a number of Asian nations have qualms about any major increase in Chinese or Japanese military strength.[37] Japan, itself, does not favor transfer of substantial arms or military technology to the PRC.[38] Finally, as the Carter Administration has indicated, the alternative could jeopardize the policy of detente if the Soviet Union reacted by escalating tensions with the United States.

A Sino-Japanese entente against the Soviet Union may eventually emerge but probably not immediately. A Sino-Japanese alliance conceivably could take two forms: (1) as part of a tripartite U.S.-PRC-Japan cooperation against the Soviet Union or (2) a Sino-Japanese alliance without the participation of the United States. The former would likely come about through active promotion by the United States within the framework of the U.S.-Japan alliance, but the lack of firm consensus in the United States over China policy currently acts against the development of such a strategy. The latter, it is often speculated,

---

[37] Asian reaction to the idea of a Japanese defense buildup appears somewhat more sophisticated today as memories of World War II fade. Asian governments would be alarmed over major Japanese rearmament. but they probably would be less concerned over a buildup of forces for the purpose of defense of the Japanese home islands.

[38] Recent visits to China by Japanese military officers may or may not indicate the beginning of a change in this attitude; but there is substantial feeling in Japan that overt U.S arms transfers to the PRC would complicate and possibly endanger Japan's policy of remaining equi-distant from Moscow and Peking and seriously antagonize the Soviet Union. The Government of Japan may also fear a militarily powerful China in its own right, given the "natural rivalry" between the two countries in East Asia. disputes over territorial sea boundaries and certain island groups (especially the Senkakus) in the potentially oil rich East China Sea, and Japan's extensive economic interests in Taiwan.

would probably result from a Japanese decision to seek independently alternative security guarantees if Japan concluded that the United States was withdrawing militarily from the Western Pacific. On the other hand, it appears possible that a U.S. withdrawal would prompt Japan to seek accommodation with the U.S.S.R. Moreover, it would probably take at least a decade or longer before a Sino-Japanese alliance could develop the military assets comparable to Soviet assets in the region.

Summary Conclusions

In drawing any conclusions concerning the utility of American bases in Northeast Asia in supporting U.S. policy objectives in the region, one central point must be kept in mind: the fundamental importance of Japan to U.S. interests in the region. Practically every U.S. political, economic, and military objective cited above is related to preserving the intimate U.S.-Japan relationship that exists today. (The only exception appears to be the goal of non-hostile relations with the PRC.) There also is a close relationship between most U.S. policy objectives in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia and major Japanese security and regional interests. Moreover, given the increasingly high priority Japan has in Soviet and Chinese policy objectives, a major challenge for U.S. foreign policy in the coming decade will be to influence Japanese decision-making so that changes in the Sino-Japanese or Soviet-Japanese relationships will not be contrary to U.S. interests.

A second central point is the growing commonality of Japanese and Chinese security views. Both governments now perceive Soviet military power in Northeast Asia as a potential threat to their security. Peking and Tokyo also share that view that the presence of American military power in the Western Pacific is necessary to counter the Soviet threat.

A third point is that Northeast Asia has become a region of direct Soviet-American military confrontation, exceeded in scope and intensity only by NATO-Warsaw Pact balance in Europe. Soviet military power near Japan has grown to a point where it appears to challenge the supremacy which the United States has enjoyed in the region for the last 30 years. The decided trend in American policy toward disengagement from Asian regional conflicts has resulted in a redefinition of U.S. security interests with greater emphasis on deterring aggressive Soviet behavior in Northeast Asia.

The geographic realities of Northeast Asia gives special importance to the actual U.S. and Soviet force deployments within the region. In case of war, both sides would have considerable difficulty in reinforcing and supplying their in-region forces over long and vulnerable lines of communication and supply. Given the capabilities and advances in military technology by both sides, these vulnerabilities are more likely to increase than decline in the future. Moreover, if a conflict in Northeast Asia resulted from a Soviet-American war in Europe (the most likely scenario), military requirements in the European theatre would add to the difficulties in reinforcing and supplying forces in Northeast Asia. In short, the balance in war as well as peacetime would depend, for an indefinite time, on the forces at hand.

In examining the relationship between the American force/base structure and U.S. policy objectives in Northeast Asia, the above analysis strongly suggests that the military missions and functions of the central elements of the U.S. force structure in the region (U.S. forces in Korea, the Marine Division on Okinawa, tactical air assets in Japan, and Seventh Fleet units) give direct support to most U.S. political objectives. Economically, the U.S. force/base structure has little relation to American economic objectives toward Japan, but it may still have some impact on the South Korean and Taiwan economies.

The effect of the U.S. force/base structure on military objectives is decidedly mixed. Certainly, U.S. tactical air and Seventh Fleet assets are essential for the maintenance of the overall balance of power in Northeast Asia. U.S. forces have assets and capabilities that South Korean forces do not have and thus have been an integral part of the balance of power on the Korean peninsula. The Seventh Fleet and U.S. tactical air units on Okinawa potentially contribute to the balance in the Taiwan area. The present force/base structure has contributed to Japan's avoidance of large defense capabilities and responsibilities, and U.S. ground troops in South Korea insure American involvement in another ground war on the Asia mainland if North Korea attacked.

It appears that in Northeast Asia, alternative political and economic instruments cannot replace in the near future the U.S. force/base structure's support of most U.S. political objectives. So long as the countries of the region view security as a key element of their relations with the United States, U.S. objectives will be closely linked to the American military presence and the credibility of that presence. The central question becomes one of alternative military instruments or "how much is enough" to convince Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the PRC (and also the U.S.S.R. and North Korea) that the United States has the will and means to deter attack, balance Soviet military power, and effectively carry out military operations and missions in case of war. Two related questions are: how much is enough to realize both the objectives of adequate security for South Korea and avoidance of another land war in Asia; and can the U.S. force/base structure be altered in a manner that would bring about an enlarged Japanese defense posture?

In response to these questions, the following can be concluded about the central elements of the U.S. force structure in Northeast Asia. Assuming the withdrawal of American ground forces from South Korea by 1982, further reductions of air and sea forces would not appear to support most U.S. political and military objectives. The Soviet buildup, the U.S. troop withdrawal from South Korea and the termination of the U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty, increase the importance of U.S. air and sea forces to the balance of power, and mission capability in Northeast Asia. The current views in Tokyo, Peking, and Seoul suggest that further reductions would erode American credibility and very possibly result in policy decisions by these governments—as well as North Korea and the Soviet Union—that would not be conducive to American interests. Most likely, it would spur the interest in nuclear weaponry that already exists in Taiwan and South Korea. PRC skepticism would increase over the U.S. will to adopt a strong anti-Soviet stance in Asia: and if this skepticism reached a certain level, the PRC would have several options to strengthen its own position in Northeast Asia:

35-995 O - 79 - 13

(1) accommodation with the Soviet Union in order to lessen the military confrontation along the Sino-Soviet border; (2) increased pressure on Japan to move toward an "antihegemony" front against the U.S.S.R. and possibly also the United States; (3) initiation of military pressure against Taiwan; and (4) increased support of North Korea's aims toward South Korea in order to offset Soviet influence in Pyongyang.

Japan's options appear to be fewer, and the extent of U.S. withdrawal would likely have to be more extreme before the Government of Japan would exercise any of them. Still, several options exist: (1) independent, large scale rearmament and/or the manufacture of nuclear weapons; (2) an alliance with China outside the general framework of the U.S.-Japan security system; (3) neutralization and accommodation with the U.S.S.R.

Maintenance of the central elements of the U.S. force/base structure at current levels (minus ground forces from South Korea) with modernization of weaponry (such as suggested by Secretary of Defense Brown in his February 20, 1978, Los Angeles speech) is better suited to reinforcing U.S. policy objectives. At the least, it assures Japan, the PRC, and South Korea that the United States contemplates no further withdrawals from the region and will act to preserve the existing balance of military power. It also notifies North Korea and the Soviet Union of this intention.

Whether the strategy would achieve this result for very long would depend largely on Soviet decisions regarding its military buildup. If recent signs of continued Soviet force deployments prove to be accurate, the balance of power in Northeast Asia may further shift toward the U.S.S.R. If so, a strategy of maintenance may be sufficient only in the immediate future.

In the face of continued Soviet force buildup in the region, the Korean withdrawal, selective increases of U.S. air and/or naval forces may be the best strategy in the future to support major U.S. policy objectives. Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea would view this as enhancing U.S. strength in Northeast Asia that potentially could be brought to bear in situations affecting their security. It probably would help strengthen U.S.-PRC relations. It would balance recent increases in Soviet military strength, pose additional threats to the Soviet Pacific Fleet and Soviet air force contingents in Eastern Siberia, and give additional protection to SLOC's approaching Japan from the south and east.

Selective increases of U.S. air and naval assets, carried out unilaterally, might not be conducive to successfully encouraging Japan to increase its defense strength, and it could act as a disincentive. Growing criticism in the United States of Japan's "free ride" could make selective increases politically unfeasible; and over time even maintenance of the existing central elements of the U.S. force structure may be more difficult to justify politically, especially if the United States continues to suffer sizeable deficits in its trade with Japan. In short, it appears that selective increases of U.S. air and naval forces would have to be carried out in full consultation with Japan and in the context of agreement that Japan would correspondingly act to increase its own force capabilities in a complementary manner and pay an increased share of the costs of any new military facilities constructed in Japan for U.S. forces.

LATIN AMERICA*

Overview: The Rise of Hemispheric Interdependence

Any assessment of the role of U.S. military power in Latin America, and more specifically, the utility of existing U.S. military facilities in this region, must be conducted within the context of the profound shifts in global priorities and power that have characterized the current era. In recent years, the advent of interdependence has occasioned fundamental changes in the traditional environment of hemispheric relations and eclipsed what was once unchallenged U.S. domination of the region.

The growth in power of Latin American nations can be measured in economic, military, and political terms. Latin America supplies over 50 percent of total U.S. imports of 6 strategic materials, 9 percent of total U.S. crude oil imports, and 50 percent of its refined oil imports.[1] In addition, Latin America serves as an important market for U.S. goods. In the last 10 years, U.S. exports to Latin America have more than tripled, from $5 billion to almost $18 billion annually. The United States now sells more machinery, consumer goods, and chemical products to Latin America than to the rest of the Third World combined—as much, in fact, as to the entire European Common Market, and more than to Japan.[2]

Although Latin America continues to spend less on defense than any other region of the world except South Asia, the nature of its military expenditures has changed significantly. There is a trend toward increased sophistication in the weaponry being procured for Latin American armed forces, such as the sales to Peru and Ecuador of fighter aircraft capable of flight at more than twice the speed of sound. Moreover, there has been a radical diversification in the source of arms supplied to Latin America, a regional arms market once dominated by the United States.

In 1977, U.S. arms deliveries to Latin America totaled $187 million; by comparison, Communist countries (principally the Soviet Union) delivered approximately $400 million worth of arms during the same period (the largest amount of which went to Cuba and Peru); and free world suppliers other than the United States (principally Western European states) delivered about $350 million in weaponry.[3] It should also be noted that Brazil and Argentina are developing their own considerable capabilities as arms producers and exporters.

---

*Prepared by Robert G. Bell, Analyst in National Defense.

[1] U.S. Military Posture for fiscal year 1979, Statement by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 7, 1978, p. 64.

[2] Address by Terence A. Todman, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs at the Center for Inter-American Relations, New York, February 14, 1978, p. 3.

[3] Prepared statement of John A. Bushnell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. House International Relations Committee, June 27, 1978, as corrected by data provided by the Departments of Defense (DSAA) and State (OMC), August 1978.

As Latin American nations have grown in economic power and reduced significantly their dependence upon the United States for military sales, assistance, and counsel, they have assumed positions of leadership in international forums, and employed their voting strength with increasing effectiveness in the pursuit of common interests. One consequence of these changes has been a new consciousness of power and influence on the part of Latin Americans. As expressed by one U.S. official, "The other countries of the hemisphere affect us increasingly—and they know it." [4]

Although there is great diversity in the needs and interests of the countries of this region, there is at the same time a common agenda which frames Latin American demands for a U.S. response to the changed circumstances. A State Department official has identified the following "common threads" of these diverse demands:

> They want expanded and preferred access to our markets and guarantees of stabilized earnings from their exports. They want financial backing for their heavy debt burdens.
>
> They insist that we not intervene in their internal affairs.
>
> They also want our respect and our appreciation of their dignity, independence, and sovereignty. They want our understanding and our attention.[5]

Despite the emergence of a new competitiveness in inter-American relations, the nations of this hemisphere remain closely tied by historic bonds of cultural affinity and their common outlook on fundamental issues of security and sovereignty. The basic multilateral institutions established over three decades ago still serve as highly visible manifestations of this commonality of interests and ideals, and continue to define the collective political alignment of the hemisphere.

The Organization of American States (OAS) continues to play an important role in addressing and solving common hemisphere problems, particularly in the areas of peacekeeping and human rights. The United States views the OAS as a principal mechanism for the peaceful resolution of local disputes. Under the terms of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty), the United States and most Latin American countries have maintained their commitment to the principle of collective self-defense. Article III of the Rio Treaty states: ". . . an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States. . . ." [6] Although the states of Latin America do not perceive a direct and immediate threat of external attack, they recognize that within the framework of the Rio Treaty their security remains ultimately linked to the strategic shield provided by the United States.

This overview has discussed the main elements of continuity and change which characterize contemporary inter-American relations. The following section examines the foreign policy formulated by the Carter administration in response to this evolving relationship, as well as U.S. perceptions of its security interests in this region.

---

[4] Address by Terence A. Todman, op. cit., p. 2.

[5] Prepared statement by William H. Luers, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, House International Relations Committee. March 24, 1977, printed in the Department of State Bulletin, vol. LXXVI, No. 1972. p. 348.

[6] 62 Stat. 1681 ; TIAS 1838 ; 21 UNTS 70 ; 4 Bevans 559.

Current U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Latin America

In an address before the Eighth General Assembly of the OAS on June 21, 1978, President Carter described U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America in the wake of the signing of the Panama Canal treaties as "the beginning of a new era of inter-American understanding, reflecting a new spirit of commitment and cooperation." [7] The President stated that in the process of reaching agreement on these historic treaties, the United States, Panama, and other Latin American states that supported this policy initiative "breathed new life into some old principles: principles of nonintervention, mutual respect, partnership, and multilateral cooperation."

While the Carter administration believes that ratification of the Panama Canal treaties has confirmed a new U.S. willingness to deal with Latin American states as sovereign equals, it recognizes that nonintervention alone is hardly a basis upon which to build effective foreign relationships. Having accepted the sovereignty and independence of Latin American countries, the administration has resolved to deal with Latin America not as a single, monolithic area viewed through a lens colored by East-West concerns, but rather as a grouping of nations with individual and distinct goals, aspirations, and importance to the world community and to the United States.[8]

In his remarks to the OAS, President Carter cited three basic goals that would guide U.S. policy as his administration followed through with the practical implications of a transformed American perspective: to promote peace and discourage intervention and aggression; to encourage respect for human rights and an end to repression and terrorism; and to progress toward a more just and equitable hemispheric economic system.

Commenting on his specific agenda for achieving these broad objectives, the President:

> Endorsed the peaceful settlement of regional disputes, including the question of Bolivian access to the sea, the Honduras-El Salvador border dispute, and the future of Belize;
>
> Urged completion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which bans nuclear weapons from Latin America;
>
> Called upon Latin America to respond to the U.S. policy of arms sale restraint with reciprocal restraint;
>
> Condemned any intrusion of foreign troops into local disputes;
>
> Declared that he would not be deterred from open and enthusiastic promotion of respect for human rights;
>
> Vowed to resist protectionism and give increased emphasis to those economic issues which most directly affect Latin America, particularly trade and aid.

Through this ambitious program, the administration hopes to engender a pattern of collective problem-solving that will facilitate efforts to solve the complex economic, social, and political issues confronting the hemisphere. In turn, the continued achievement of U.S. security objectives in this region is directly related to the extent to which cooperation and goodwill, rather than conflict and antagonism,

---

[7] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 14, No. 25 (June 26, 1978), pp. 1141–1146. (Footnote applies to all subsequent quotes by President Carter from this address.)

[8] Address by Terence A. Todman, op. cit., p. 4.

distinguish inter-American relations in the coming decade, as well as the success or failure of the American republics in advancing the economic, social, and political development of their peoples.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) define the primary security objectives of the United States in Latin America as precluding the establishment of military power bases hostile to U.S. interests, maintaining access to regional resources, ensuring the security, availability, and use of the Panama Canal, and avoiding interregional hostilities and the involvement of U.S. forces in internal security.[9] In addition, the Department of Defense has expressed the view that the ability of the United States to control the sea lines of communication which pass through the South Atlantic and connect NATO with the Middle East is affected by the general state of U.S./Latin American relations.[10]

While Latin America has decided strategic significance to the United States, this significance is manifested much more in the potentiality of various worst-case scenarios which might transpire rather than the actuality of current trends or threats. The United States has long regarded the principal threat to its security interests in Latin America as developing in the guise of internal subversion, most likely exacerbated by social or economic chaos, and not in the form of an overt threat by the Soviet Union or proxy forces to invade the region. As a result, the United States has in recent decades deemed economic development, political stability, and an orderly transition to more democratic rule as the best weapons for guaranteeing hemispheric security.

Given the absence of a significant outside threat or a substantial Soviet military presence in the region, the United States has not seen the need for countervailing military power. It has not dedicated specific U.S. forces of any magnitude for the defense of its southern flank and has not undertaken major forward defense deployments in the region. With the exception of the few military installations remaining in the Caribbean, the United States has judged military bases to be essentially irrelevant, and most likely inimical, to U.S. security interests in Latin America.

Major U.S. Military Installations in Latin America

CUBA (GUANTANAMO)

Although the United States severed diplomatic relations with Cuba on January 3, 1961, it has consistently maintained that the diplomatic break has no effect on the legal status of the U.S. military base at Guantanamo. Under the terms of the 1934 treaty which reaffirmed U.S. base rights at Guantanamo, there can be no change in the status of the base without mutual agreement. The United States continues to pay a nominal rent for the base (in 1978 it was $4,085), although Cuba has not cashed any of these payments since 1960.[11] Guantanamo is located on the southeast tip of Cuba, approximately 500 miles from Miami. The base encompasses 19,621 acres of land and 9,196 acres of water.[12]

---

[9] Military Posture Report for fiscal year 1979, op. cit., p. 64.

[10] Prepared statement by Rear Admiral Gordon J. Schuller, Director, Inter-American Region, OASD/ISA, before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, House International Relations Committee, June 28, 1978, p. 4

[11] Gary L. Maris. International Law and Guantanamo. Journal of Politics, vol. 29 (Mar. 1967), p. 262.

[12] Roberto E. Socas. U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba: Background Analysis. Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service Report, January 31, 1961, p. 2.

FACILITIES, UNITS AND MISSIONS

The following U.S. military facilities and/or units are located at Guantanamo:

Guantanamo Naval Base. No major surface combatants or submarines are permanently stationed at the base; however, the naval base contains substantial port and logistics facilities which support recurring navy training operations, and could be utilized in support of naval task force deployments during contingencies.

Guantanamo Naval Air Station (Leeward Field). A VC–10 composite aircraft squadron composed of transport, cargo, and other mission aircraft permanently operates from this field in support of fleet training activities. This field and another, shorter airfield (McCalla Field) are capable of supporting additional fleet and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) patrol aircraft during a contingency.

Fleet Training Group. Responsible for training transient fleet personnel in a wide range of mission tasks.

Fleet Marine Ground Defense Force. Tasked with the primary ground defense of Guantanamo.

Naval Security Group Detachment. Performs various navy security functions.

As of December 31, 1978, there were a total of 1,841 Navy and 432 Marine personnel assigned at Guantanamo.[13]

ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS

The U.S. defense community is agreed that the naval base at Guantanamo has strategic significance. The JCS Military Posture Report for fiscal year 1979 states, "The strategic location of the U.S. naval Base at Guantanamo Bay affords protection of sea lines of communication and serves as a support base for sea surveillance and regional contingency operations." [14] In congressional testimony in January 1978, Admiral James L. Holloway, Chief of Naval Operations, declared that "one of the great advantages of the location of Guantanamo is that we have excellent surveillance in control of the Windward Passage." [15] In Admiral Holloway's estimation, the importance of Guantanamo increased as a result of the passage of the Panama Canal treaties.[16]

The military value of Guantanamo rests more in its availability in the event of a contingency requiring large-scale fleet and naval air deployments in the Caribbean than in its day-to-day peacetime training function, a function which presumably could, if necessary, be performed at other bases with training responsibilities. Were Guantanamo itself to be attacked, its effective defense would require rapid reinforcement by forces normally stationed in the United States.[17] Since the harbor and airfield facilities at Guantanamo would be highly vulnerable to damage or disruption from Cuban artillery, rockets, patrol craft, or aircraft in the event of an outbreak of hostilities, estimates of

---

[13] News Release No. 98–79. Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), March 6, 1979.

[14] Military Posture Report for fiscal year 1979, op. cit., p. 64.

[15] U.S. Congress. Senate: Committee on Armed Services. Defense, Maintenance and Operation of the Panama Canal, Including Administration and Government of the Canal Zone. Hearings; 95th Cong., 2d sess., January 24, 31, February 1, 1978. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978, p. 132.

[16] Ibid., p. 63.

[17] Military Posture Report for fiscal 1979, op. cit., p. 66.

Guantanamo's value in support of possible Caribbean contingencies must necessarily presume no direct Cuban military involvement.

Despite agreement within the U.S. defense community that Guantanamo has military value, defense officials concede that the base is not indispensible. General George S. Brown, former Chairman of the JCS, declared in testimony before Congress in 1977 that although Guantanamo "enhances our ability to surveil the approaches to the Panama Canal through the Caribbean sea," the base "is not essential to perform that function." [18] In a similar vein, Admiral Holloway testified in 1978 that while control of the strategic Caribbean sea passages would be difficult without Guantanamo, "I would still count on our being able to operate out of Puerto Rican bases." [19] The admiral stressed, though, that such operations would have to be conducted over longer distances, and therefore would be more expensive and less efficient.

Because defense officials have stated for the record that U.S. security interests in the Caribbean are not strictly dependent upon maintenance of the Guantanamo facility, the question arises whether the future of the U.S. military presence on the island may be subject to political developments related to a possible restoration of normal diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba. On September 27, 1977, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown testified that in the administration's planning for negotiations with Cuba related to a possible normalization of relations, "there has been no discussion of changing the U.S. position on Guantanamo." [20] In response to a direct senatorial inquiry, Secretary Brown and General Brown affirmed that it was the intention of the United States to maintain this base.[21]

Were the administration's policy initiative on this issue to regain the movement that had been established prior to Cuba's military interventions in Africa, and were further informal contacts to lead to substantive negotiations, it is certainly conceivable that Guantanamo could become an issue in the negotiations. In this case, it is likely that the administration's position on Guantanamo would be taken strictly within a bilateral context, i.e., in accord with specific U.S. objectives vis-a-vis Cuba.

Despite some fears voiced during the Panama Canal debate that passage of the treaties would cause a "domino effect" leading to the surrender of Guantanamo, it is improbable that the states of Latin America would unite to bring multilateral pressure upon the United States to abandon this facility. Rather, the emergence of hemispheric sympathy and support for possible Cuban demands that the United States withdraw from Guantanamo would be inconsistent with prevailing Latin American attitudes toward current Cuban ideology and foreign policy.

---

[18] U.S. Congress. Senate: Committee on Foreign Relations. Panama Canal Treaties. Hearings; 95th Cong., 1st sess., September 26, 27, 29, and 30 and October 19, 1977. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. p. 159.

[19] U.S. Congress. Senate: Committee on Armed Services. Panama Canal hearings, op. cit., p. 132.

[20] U.S. Congress. Senate: Committee on Foreign Relations. Panama Canal treaty hearings, op. cit., p. 167.

[21] Ibid., p. 168.

PUERTO RICO

Since Puerto Rico is a self-governing commonwealth of the United States, U.S. military facilities on the island cannot be classified as foreign military bases. The United States retains responsibilty for the foreign policy and defense of Puerto Rico, and hence U.S. military installations in the commonwealth are entirely consistent with Puerto Rico's political association with the United States. However, since the nature of this association has been subject to anticolonialist pressures from some quarters in the United Nations and within Puerto Rico itself, the bases are included in this chapter for the sake of discussion.

FACILITIES, UNITS, AND MISSIONS

Fort Buchanan. The Army maintains this installation in San Juan for primarily administrative logistic functions. In addition, the Army operates a number of Reserve training centers on the island.

Ramey Air Force Base. The Air Force has largely withdrawn from this airfield; however, a Puerto Rican National Guard fighter squadron is still based at Ramey.

Naval Security Group (Sabana Seca). Performs various naval security functions.

Marine Corps Training Facility (Vieques). Supports Marine maneuvers and training exercises.

Navy Communications Station (Ponce). Major Navy communications center in the Caribbean.

Roosevelt Roads Naval Station. Roosevelt Roads is a principal Navy staging base for conducting training, supporting fleet deployments in the Caribbean, and testing weapons systems. In addition, this naval station provides necessary port, airfield, and logistics facilities for supporting fleet and naval air operations during a contingency.

As of December 31, 1978, a total of 2,933 Navy; 173 Marine; 344 Army; and 46 Air Force personnel were stationed in Puerto Rico.[22]

ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS

It is the position of the Department of Defense that U.S. military installations on Puerto Rico are important to the defense of the commonwealth and support U.S. security interests throughout the Caribbean. Over the last several years, the Navy has increased its manning at Roosevelt Roads due to relocation of forces on the island.[23] Secretary Brown has expressed his belief that criticism from within the United Nations is not shared by the majority of Puerto Ricans, and accordingly, the United States has no intention of closing Roosevelt Roads.[24] Barring a dramatic reversal of the current political consensus in Puerto Rico favoring a continuation of commonwealth status, it is not likely that U.S. military installations on the island would become a disruptive issue in inter-American relations.

---

[22] DOD News Release, op. cit.

[23] U.S. Congress. Senate: Committee on Foreign Relations. Panama Canal treaty hearings, op. cit., p. 168.

[24] Ibid.


UNITED STATES
Los Angeles
San Diego
Dallas
Hermosillo
New Orleans
Norfolk
Charleston
Jacksonville
Bermuda (U.K.)
Atlantic
Ocean
Norfolk to Guantanamo (1,117 nm)
Norfolk to Roosevelt Roads (1,275 nm)
Monterrey
Gulf of Mexico
Miami
THE BAHAMAS
Mazatlan
MEXICO
San Diego to Panama (2,834 nm)
Havana
Cienfuegos
Camaguey
Turk and
Caicos Is. (U.K.)
Tampico
Guadalajara
CUBA
Puerto Rico
(U.S.)
Virgin Is. (U.S., U.K.)
Anguilla (U.K.)
St. Christopher (U.K.)
Antigua (U.K.)
Nevis (U.K.)
Guadeloupe (Fr.)
Dominica (U.K.)
Martinique (Fr.)
St. Lucia (U.K.)
St. Vincent
(U.K.)
Barbados
Grenada
Trinidad
and Tobago
Cayman Is.
(U.K.)
Guatanamo Naval Base
HAITI
DOM.
REP.
Ramey
Mexico
Veracruz
JAMAICA
Kingston
Port-au-Prince
Santo
Domingo
Roosevelt
Roads
LEEWARD IS.
WINDWARD IS.
Acapulco
GUATEMALA
BELIZE
Caribbean Sea
Panama to
Guantanamo
(732 nm)
Panama to Roosevelt Roads (1,054 nm)
HONDURAS
Tegucigalpa
Guatemala
San Salvador
EL SALVADOR
NICARAGUA
Managua
Netherlands Antilles
Curacao
Port-of-Spain
Caracas
Pacific
Ocean
COSTA RICA
San Jose
Canal Zone
(U.S. Admin.)
Panama
PANAMA
VENEZUELA
GUYANA
COLOMBIA
Bogota
Canal Zone Complex
Legend:
Airfield
Naval Facility
Communications Facility
Army Command Headquarters
Capital
City
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 Miles
0 200 400 600 800 Kilometers
Locations of symbols are approximate.
NOTE: All distances indicated are by sea.
Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative.

Bermuda, Bahamas, and the Eastern Caribbean

facilities, units, and missions

Naval Air Station (Saint Georges, Bermuda). Serves in support of naval air operations in the Atlantic and as an important refueling facility for trans-Atlantic flights. P–3 ASW patrol aircraft operate from Bermuda on a rotational basis from naval air stations in the United States.

Oceanographic research naval facilities (NAVFAC's) are located at Bermuda, Eleuthra (Bahamas), Grand Turk (Turks and Caicos), Antigua, and Barbados. NAVFACs monitor various ocean phenomena, such as currents, and operate acoustic hydrophones planted offshore as part of a continuing Navy program designed to provide more detailed information on the factors which comprise the ocean environment and affect the transmission of sound in sea water.[25]

Eastern Test Range (ETR) support facilities are located at Grand Bahamas Island, Grand Turk, and Antigua. These facilities support U.S. military and space missile program tests launched from Cape Kennedy, Fla.

Long-range navigation (LORAN) facilities are located at San Salvador and South Caicos. These facilities are part of the Navy's at-sea navigation network.

Atlantic Underseas Test and Evaluation Center (Andros, Bahamas). This facility conducts research and development on ASW weapons systems.

U.S. military personnel strength on these islands is as follows: [26]

Island	Army	Air Force	Navy	Marines	Total
Antigua		1	116		117
Bahamas		2	175	5	182
Barbados			105	6	111
Bermuda			807	79	886
Turks Island			114		114

ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS

In many cases, technological advances are eliminating the requirement for certain military support facilities on these islands. For example, The NAVFACs at Eleuthra, Grand Turk, Antigua, and Barbados are scheduled for closure due to improved technologies, such as new types of oceanographic buoys which relay data to satellites. Most of the LORAN sites in the Caribbean are being phased out, and the LORAN facilities at San Salvador and South Caicos are scheduled to be closed in December 1980. The Air Force now intends to keep only the three ETR facilities cited above, although this network was once far more extensive. Of the remaining military installations in this grouping, the United States will maintain a strong interest in continuing to operate the facilities in Bermuda and on Andros Island.

---

[25] Description of NAVFAC function provided by the Oceanographer of the the Navy.
[26] DOD News Release, op. cit.

PANAMA CANAL ZONE [27]

On April 18, 1978, after many weeks of intense debate, the Senate consented to the ratification of the Panama Canal Treaty by a vote of 68–32—one more than the required two-thirds vote—after earlier approving the Neutrality Treaty by the same vote on March 16, 1978.

Under the Panama Canal Treaty, the United States will retain operating control and the right to defend the Canal until December 31, 1999, after which Panama will assume sole control. Once the Treaty goes into effect, Panama will assume general territorial jurisdiction over the present Canal Zone. Under the Neutrality Treaty, the United States and Panama are granted rights to permanently maintain the neutrality of the Canal. As clarified by two amendments introduced by the Senate leadership, the Treaty provides that "each of the two countries . . . shall have the right to act against any aggression or threat directed against the Canal or against the peaceful transit of vessels through the Canal" and to provide that "in case of need or emergency" the war vessels of the United States and Panama would be permitted "to go to the head of the line of vessels in order to transit the Canal rapidly." [28]

Following the termination of the Panama Canal Treaty on December 31, 1999, only the Republic of Panama will operate and maintain defense sites and facilities within its territory. Under a Condition to the Neutrality Treaty introduced by Senator Nunn with 13 cosponsors or co-authors and adopted by a vote of 82–16 on March 15, 1978, nothing in the treaty shall preclude the two states from conducting negotiations towards a maintenance of U.S. military facilities in Panama after 1999.

Total U.S. military personnel strength as of December 31, 1978; was 9,284.[29]

FACILITIES, UNITS, AND MISSIONS*

U.S. facility	Principal units	Major function
Quarry Heights	Headquarters, U.S. Southern Command	Unified command.
Albrook Field	210th Aviation Battalion	Helicopter support.
	Inter-American Air Forces Academy	Training.
Curundu	Headquarters, Inter-American Geodetic Survey	Cartographic survey activities.
Fort Clayton	4th Battalion, 20th Infantry	Canal defense.
Corozal	U.S. Army Communications Command—South	Communications.
Fort Kobbe	Headquarters, 193 Infantry Brigade (Tactical Headquarters).	Canal defense.
Rodman Naval Station	U.S. naval support activities	Transit fleet support.
Canal Zone	Marine barracks	Transit guards/security.
Howard AFB	USAF Southern Air Division	Air support, facilities for support of airlift and tactical air operations.
Fort Amador	Headquarters, 193 Infantry Brigade (Canal Zone)	Command element.
Canal Zone (Navy)	470th Military Intelligence Group	Intelligence.
	Headquarters, U.S. naval station, Canal Zone	Command.
Canal Zone (Navy)	U.S. naval communications station, Balboa	Communications.
Fort Gulick	U.S. Army School of the Americas	Professional and technical training.
Fort Davis	4th Battalion, 10th Infantry	Canal defense.
Galeta Island	U.S. Navy Security group	Telecommunications collection.
Fort Randolph	Caretaker status	
Fort Sherman	Jungle operations training center	Training.
Empire Range		Bombing and live firing range.

*Information provided by OASD/ISA, May 14, 1976.

[27] Sections of this chapter excerpted from Panama Canal Treaties: Consideration by the Congress, CRS Issue Brief IB–78026, updated periodically.

[28] Leadership amendment No. 20, introduced by Senator Byrd, on behalf of Senator Baker and 76 other senators, adopted by a vote of 84–5 on March 10, 1978; and leadership amendment No. 21, introduced by Senator Byrd, on behalf of Senator Baker and 76 other Senators, adopted by a vote of 85–3 on March 13, 1978.

[29] DOD News Release, op. cit.

ASSESSMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS

The passage of the Panama Canal treaties reflected the judgment of the United States Senate that U.S. security interests related to the Panama Canal required access to, but not ownership of, the Canal. The Panama Canal is a lock canal highly vulnerable to sabotage; sabotage that would have been likely had Panamanian nationalism been frustrated by a Senate rejection of the treaties. In short, it was the sense of the Senate that the security of the Panama Canal would be best served by responding to the national aspirations of the Panamanian people. In large measure, then, the signing of the Panama Canal treaties reflected the assessment of the United States that no reasonable number of U.S. troops in the Panama Canal Zone could guarantee the security of the Canal in the face of open Panamanian hostilities.

Summary

Given the American desire to achieve an environment of comity and stability in Latin American relations, there will be an interest on the part of the United States in acceding, whenever possible, to the wishes of given states in the area for a reassessment of the U.S. military presence in the region. Indeed, there is widespread agreement that by relinquishing control of the most ardently criticized bases in Latin America, those located in the Panama Canal Zone, the U.S. has made a considerable contribution toward improving its relations with its hemisphere neighbors, without materially undermining the ability of the United States to support its foreign policy objectives in the region.

Thus the challenge which faces the United States in Latin America in the future stems from nearly a century of dominant influence within the region, with all the benefits and problems which such a relationship necessarily bestows. The search for appropriate answers to the questions raised by this historic relationship will be difficult, and it will undoubtedly be a number of years before they are resolved to the satisfaction of all the parties in the area concerned with them.

APPENDIX 1

ESTIMATED DOD ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS OF MAINTAINING U.S. MILITARY FORCES IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND AREAS

[In millions of dollars [1]]

Country	Fiscal year—		
	1977	1978 [2]	1979 [2]
Belgium	33	35	35
Denmark (Greenland)	6	6	7
France	1	1	1
Germany	3, 564	3, 982	4, 154
Greece (including Crete)	57	59	59
Iceland	59	69	75
Italy (including Sicily and Sardinia)	179	203	209
Netherlands	36	42	42
Norway	3	3	3
Portugal (including Azores)	22	25	25
Spain	151	159	164
Turkey	87	87	88
United Kingdom	340	389	466
Forces Afloat, Western and Southern Europe (6th Fleet)	501	499	527
Other Western and Southern Europe	2	2	2
Australia	15	17	17
Japan/Okinawa	753	811	857
New Zealand	1	1	1
Philippines	242	247	257
South Korea	680	717	693
Taiwan	25	22	22
Thailand	3	4	4
Forces Afloat, East Asia and Pacific (7th Fleet)	530	548	546
Other East Asia and Pacific	6	3	3
Bahrain Island	7	4	4
British Indian Ocean (including Diego Garcia)	12	14	15
Ethiopia	([3])	([3])	([3])
Iran	17	20	22
Saudi Arabia	7	8	8
Forces Afloat, Africa Near East, South Asia	10	12	12
Other Africa, Near East and South Asia	18	17	12
Bahamas	2	2	2
Brazil	1	2	2
Canada	52	58	62
Forces Afloat, Western Hemisphere	10	----	----
Other Western Hemisphere	38	39	40
Other	3	3	3
Total	7, 473	8, 110	8, 439

[1] DOD accounting records are not maintained to reflect total U.S. costs on an area basis. Operating costs for all years, therefore include estimates developed by the use of appropriate factors. Incuded are the salary costs of all-military and civilian personnel located overseas and the cost of operating and maintaining facilities overseas. These estimates do not include indirect logistic and administrative costs for support from outside of the country, nor do they include major procurement or military construction costs.

[2] Estimates include military and civilian salary rates in effect on Oct. 1, 1977.

[3] Less than $500,000.

Source: Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Apr. 13, 1978.

○