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96th Congress
1st Session

JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT

REPORTS SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEAR 1979 (PUBLIC LAW 95-426)

SUBMITTED TO THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

AND

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

BY THE

UNITED STATES SENATE

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LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

THE SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington, January 19, 1979.

Hon. FRANK CHURCH,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In compliance with Public Law 95–426, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979 and the conference report on that act (House Report 95–1535), I am happy to transmit the enclosed reports.

Sincerely,

CYRUS VANCE.

Enclosures.
As stated.

FOREWORD

This joint subcommittee print is a compilation of required reports from the Department of State pursuant to Public Law 95–426 (Foreign Relations Authorization Act, fiscal year 1979) and the conference report and House committee report on the enacting legislation.

The findings of these reports are those of the Department of State and do not necessarily reflect the views of the members of the Committee on Foreign Relations or the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

GEORGE MCGOVERN,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa,
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate.

DANTE B. FASCELL,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Operations,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
U.S. House of Representatives.

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[1] The report on Section 611, Equitable Treatment of U.S. Citizens Abroad is being prepared by the Office of Management and Budget, and was not received at the time of publication. When the report is received by the Committee, it will be made public.

AMERICANS INCARCERATED ABROAD—CALENDAR YEAR 1978

During the past year, the Bureau of Consular Affairs completed an exhaustive internal analysis of its operations and functions, resulting in a reorganization which has greatly strengthened the Bureau's capabilities to provide the highest quality of services to Americans traveling or residing abroad and has enhanced its leadership role in providing guidance and support to United States consular officers abroad. One of the innovations resulting from the reorganization is the creation of the Citizens Emergency Center in Overseas Citizens Services. This Center, which includes among its organization the Arrest Unit, is dedicated to assisting Americans who encounter emergencies abroad.

The Bureau has been active in attempting to educate the American public on the "do's" and "don'ts" for conducting themselves abroad. A number of radio public service announcements warning against drug abuse abroad were produced and distributed to some 1,600 commercial radio stations (including Spanish language stations) throughout the country. Senior officers of the Bureau conducted over 100 television and radio "open line" interviews with local stations across the country in an effort to warn against the dangers of drug abuse abroad. During the spring, the Bureau hosted a national conference in an effort to increase public awareness of consular services in general and to enhance cooperation between the Department and the travel industry in serving the American traveler abroad. This "Conference on the American International Traveller" was attended by officials from the media and the travel industry.

The Bureau has continued its efforts to improve training of consular officers through the Foreign Service Institute ("Consulate General" Rosslyn) and other training media. At Regional Consular Conferences, and through other means, it has provided United States Foreign Service posts with clear and more precise guidelines on various aspects of consular work, including protection and assistance to Americans detained abroad.

The Treaty on transfer of penal sanctions with Mexico has now been in force for a full year and 321 Americans convicted of crimes in Mexico have been returned to the United States under its provisions. Another important humanitarian milestone was the return of four imprisoned Americans from Mexico who were not convicted but were determined by medical authorities in Mexico to be mentally incompetent and not responsible for their actions.

The exchange treaty with Bolivia, also a year old, has resulted in the return of 7 Americans. These transfers, coupled with the efforts made by the United States Embassy in La Paz to push for deportation

rather than incarceration of Americans found with minute quantities of drugs as well as closely monitor and expedite the judicial process for jailed Americans, have reduced the United States prisoner population in Bolivia to less than 20.

A similar treaty with Canada became effective at mid-year and so far 29 American prisoners from Canada have returned to the United States. After much difficult negotiation a final draft of an exchange of penal sanctions treaty with Turkey was initialed by Deputy Secretary Christopher during his visit to that country last month. It is anticipated that once this treaty has been signed and ratified it will resolve the plight of those Americans who have been incarcerated there for an extended period of time, facing lengthy prison terms.

An exchange treaty with Panama has been signed and is pending ratification. The Department has submitted a draft proposal to the Peruvian Government and this draft is in its final stages of deliberation by the legislative and judicial bodies there. The Department has also entered into preliminary discussions with countries such as Thailand, West Germany, and Denmark, and is exploring the possibilities of utilizing the existing European convention as a potential vehicle for establishing transfer of sanctions agreements with several European countries at once.

Posts abroad continue their efforts in areas such as conducting seminars for consular officers on the legal and judicial systems of the host country and preparing detailed fact sheets for distribution to new prisoners so that Americans arrested will at least have a fair idea of the type of judicial system with which they will be dealing. Certain posts are continuing to utilize the services of local attorneys on a contract basis to provide expertise and guidance in local law to United States consular officers. The Emergency Medical and Dietary Assistance Program continues to be a useful tool for consular officers abroad in their efforts to ensure that Americans incarcerated abroad have access to emergency medical treatment when needed and sufficient vitamins or other dietary supplements to maintain an adequate standard of health during incarceration.

During the year the Department dropped its rigid requirement that all Americans imprisoned abroad be visited by a consular officer on a monthly basis. This decision was made partly because of the strain on Department resources but primarily because of a number of convicted prisoners in the more advanced nations who neither desire nor derive any measurable benefits from a monthly consular visit as opposed to a bi-monthly or quarterly visit.

Each Ambassador or Chief of Mission was asked to survey the situation in each country, and to establish an appropriate visitation schedule. About 80 percent of our envoys decided to retain a policy of monthly visits, and in those areas where bi-monthly or quarterly visits were substituted, posts were instructed to devote as much of the manpower savings as necessary to more frequent visits during the arrest and interrogation stages, and greater attendence at trials and hearings. This slight shift in emphasis is both proper and important, particularly given the pattern of prisoner mistreatment discussed later in this report.

The Department has continued its efforts to develop bilateral consular agreements, particularly with nations which have significant

American populations or protection and welfare problems. Although progress in this area must be measured against the seemingly slow pace of detailed negotiations, the Department is making some progress and hopes to make more. Bilateral conventions are particularly important in the case of arrested Americans, because it is through such conventions that arrestees can best be provided the rights of prompt notification of arrest to embassies and consulates, and be assured rapid access by a consular officer.

The computerized Consular Arrest System in the Citizens Emergency Center has now completed its first full year of operation, and, as indicated by the attached statistical reports (5 segments), the system has proved to be an invaluable tool to consular officers both here and abroad and also to Management in evaluating and projecting trends in a given area, country or world-wide.

The first segment attached is a world-wide summary which indicates for each country of the world the number of Americans detained at the beginning of the year, the numbers arrested and released during the year, and the number under detention at the end of 1978. The totals reflect an increase of about 7 percent in the number of arrests during calendar year 1978 as opposed to calendar year 1977. However, the number of Americans actually detained abroad has shown a small but promising 2 percent decrease. This decrease in the number of Americans detained abroad is due largely to the transfer of sanctions agreements mentioned earlier, but also in part to continuing efforts to encourage the deportation of Americans arrested for minor drug offenses abroad, and to the efforts of Foreign Service posts to speed up the judicial process for arrested Americans.

This report also shows that approximately 50 percent of all arrests abroad of Americans in 1978 occurred in only five countries: Mexico, The Bahamas, Canada, The Federal Republic of Germany, and The Dominican Republic. In addition, close to 50 percent of all Americans detained abroad as of December 31, 1978 were in three countries, Mexico, Canada, and The Federal Republic of Germany. An encouraging note is the fact that the number of persons in custody in those three countries fell by about 15 percent in 1978.

The second segment, entitled "Prisoner Profile Report", outlines, by country, the average ages, sex and the drug vs. other charges for all Americans arrested in that country last year. It is interesting to note, for example, that the number of males arrested last year increased only 4 percent from calendar year 1977, while female arrests increased 11 percent. Males, however, still far outnumber females, constituting 86 percent of the Americans arrested. During 1978 females were arrested at an earlier average age (28.8 years) than males (30.8 years).

The number of charges filed against Americans is higher than the number of arrests due to the normal incidence of multiple charges filed in a number of cases. The total number of charges filed against Americans is up by about 10 percent, and the number of drug charges is higher. Despite these increases in the number of charges, the actual count of persons arrested on drug charges is declining. In 1977 drug charges accounted for approximately 46 percent of all arrests, while the percentage last year dropped to 43 percent. This promising reduction occurred primarily during the second half of the calendar year, after

media outreach programs were conducted by the Consular Affairs Bureau during the spring and summer months.

The third segment, entitled "Charges Report" indicates the types of crimes Americans were charged with last year and their frequency of occurrence. As mentioned above, narcotics violations constitute the largest single charge filed against Americans. There were some noticeable decreases in charges such as robbery, rape, espionage, smuggling and terrorism, which were in turn offset by increases in assault, contraband (primarily alcohol in Moslem countries), customs violations, serious traffic violations and vagrancy.

The fourth segment, entitled "Drug Charges Reports," provides an in-depth look at the categories of drug violations and the types of drugs involved. Marijuana remains the illegal substance most frequently involved in narcotics arrests abroad, 58 percent of all drug arrests in 1978. Additionally, of this number, over 38 percent involved less than one ounce of marijuana or cannabis. The Department has been making every effort to communicate this information to potential travelers, particularly younger travelers, who have the misconception that drug laws abroad are easier or not as rigidly enforced as they are in the United States.

While drug-related arrests occurred in 70 countries around the world, the top five countries continued to be the Bahamas, Mexico, The Federal Republic of Germany, The Dominican Republic and Canada. Well over half (57 percent) of the drug charges brought against Americans occurred in these five countries and 91 percent of all the drug-related charges are concentrated in only 10 countries. Another serious problem is the relatively large volume of arrests occurring in three Caribbean countries—The Bahamas, The Dominican Republic and Jamaica. These three countries accounted for 568 arrests in 1978 or about 20 percent of the total number of arrests of Amercians abroad in that year, a 6 percent increase over 1977. Most of these arrests were drug-related (76 percent) and 50 percent of these drug-related arrests were for the possession or consumption of less than one ounce of marijuana.

The fifth segment, entitled "Mistreatment Report" attempts to place some numerical perspective on the problems of mistreatment of prisoners. The Department is happy to report that incidents of mistreatment, both alleged and confirmed, decreased about 5 percent from last year. Of particular significance is the fact that instances of confirmed mistreatment, that is, those cases where consular officers were able to verify mistreatment from physical observation, medical reports, eyewitness accounts or host government investigations, decreased by over 60 percent from the 1977 estimates. As a case in point: in Mexico, where historically the largest number of mistreatment reports, both alleged and confirmed, originated, the number of confirmed cases of mistreatment during 1978 was only one-third of the 1977 figure.

Most instances of mistreatment occur during the arrest and interrogation stages (83 percent) as opposed to the later detention stages. For this reason, the Department continues to push for prompt notification by arresting officials, and for immediate access to American arrestees by consular officers.

It should be emphasized that this segment includes psychological harassment, as well as physical abuse, as mistreatment, and also con-

siders refusal on the part of incarcerating officials to notify or permit notification to the nearest American Embassy or Consulate as mistreatment. Posts abroad continue to vigorously protest any mistreatment of American arrestees. This segment indicates that these actions are having a positive effect in this area.

Assessment of Assistance Provided to American Citizens Incarcerated Abroad

To provide a meaningful assessment of the assistance rendered by embassy and consulate personnel to American citizens incarcerated in foreign countries, the Inspector General of the Department has been requested to provide a special evaluation of these services in regularly scheduled inspections of overseas posts. The Inspectors also evaluate the performance of the consular section and of the senior management of each post.

The Office of the Inspector General reviewed the reports of 27 inspection trips conducted during calendar year 1978 (involving 85 Missions, 57 Consulates/Consulates General, five Consular Agencies, two Branches of Embassy, two Interests Sections and one detached Consular Office), for the purpose of assessing the performance of these posts in providing assistance to American citizens imprisoned abroad.

During the periods of the inspections the Inspectors found American citizens incarcerated in 45 Consular Districts. Appropriate services were being rendered to these American citizens in 44 of the 45 districts; only in the case of the Consulate at Isfahan, Iran did the Inspectors recommend that the Consular Officers increase the rate of their visits to a monthly basis. The Inspectors noted that all posts were visited on a monthly or more frequent basis, with the exception of London, Reykjavik and Goteborg, Sweden; they recommended the latter two posts increase the rate of visits to a monthly basis; however, these recommendations were due to the regulations then in force, not to any belief that the lesser frequency was inappropriate. Inspectors recommended that Consular personnel at Bombay be more aggressive in seeking out information on American citizens arrested in the State of Goa (which does not automatically notify the Consulate General). They also instructed the Consular Sections at Addis Ababa, Hamilton and Isfahan to report on arrested American citizens as prescribed.

Generally, the Inspectors found during calendar year 1978 that all Consular personnel were well aware of requirements concerning American citizens imprisoned in their areas, and had commendably good attitudes toward meeting their responsibilities. The Inspectors remarked especially on the performance of personnel in Addis Ababa and Benin, where local authorities are generally uncooperative, and in Chad, Colombia, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria (Kaduna), Panama, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates and Zambia, where local bureaucratic practices sometimes result in delay of notifications of arrests. Other posts singled out for special commendation in regard to services to prisoners were Cameroon, Denmark, Greece, Iran (Tabriz), Italy (Naples), Liberia, Madagascar, Norway, Pakistan (Lahore), Seychelles, United Kingdom (Belfast and Edinburgh) and Venezuela (Caracas).

The Inspectors noted that Consular Conventions are being negotiated with Botswana, Lesotho and Turkey. They recommended also exploring the possibility of Consular Conventions with Colombia, Liberia, Nigeria, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tanzania and United Arab Emirates.

While not directly affecting the manner in which posts provide services to American citizens, Inspectors remarked on problems in the African and Near East regions that could potentially affect these services, especially the lack of sufficient experienced or trained back-up personnel for American Officers or Foreign Service national personnel in smaller posts, and the lack of appropriate language training for American Consular Officers, especially in the Near East area.

Attachments:

1. Tabulation of Assistance Provided by Posts to American Citizens Incarcerated Abroad—CY 1978.
2. Americans Arrested Abroad, CY 1978 Report (5 segments).[1]

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[1] The statistical summaries on the five segments (1. Worldwide Summary; 2. Prisoner Profile Report; 3. Charges Report; 4. Drug Charges, and 5. Mistreatment Report) are being retained in Committee files.

Tabulation of Assistance Provided by Posts to American Citizens Incarcerated Abroad—Calendar Year 1978

A. SERVICES TO PRISONERS

1. *Prisoners at time of Inspection visit: Services to prisoners appropriate:*

(*a*) Visited on more than monthly basis:

Cameroon
Colombia
Israel
Jordan
Liberia
Nepal
Syria
Turkey

(*b*) Visited monthly:

Afghanistan
Algeria
Belgium
Bermuda
Denmark
Finland
France
Greece
Hong Kong
Iran (Tabriz)
Italy
Madagascar
Morocco
Netherlands
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Portugal
Saudi Arabia
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Venezuela

(*c*) Visited on less than monthly basis:

Iceland
United Kingdom

2. *Prisoners at time of inspection visit: Improvements needed in services to prisoners:*

Iran (Isfahan)—should visit prisoners monthly.

3. *No prisoners at time of inspection visit: Rendered appropriate services in past and/or aware of all requirements:*

Bahrain
Benin
Central African Empire
Chad
China
Egypt
Ethiopia
Gabon
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
India
Ireland
Ivory Coast
Libya
Luxembourg
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mozambique
Niger
Nigeria
Oman
Qatar
Senegal
Seychelles
Tanzania
The Gambia
Tunisia
United Arab Emirates
Upper Volta
Zambia

4. *No prisoners at time of inspection visit: No comment necessary:*

Bangladesh
Burundi
Cyprus
Djibouti
Kenya
Kuwait
Lebanon
Malawi
Republic of Congo
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
Sri Lanka
Somalia
Sudan
Swaziland
Togo
Yemen
Zaire

B. RELATIONS WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES

1. *No automatic notification of arrest, but authorities cooperative on granting access to prisoners:*

Chad
Colombia (Bogota Consular District only)
France (at request of prisoners)
Ghana
India (State of Goa only)
Ivory Coast
Liberia
Netherlands (at request of prisoners)
Nigeria
Panama (narcotics arrests are generally notified only to the USDEA representatives)
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Sweden (at request of prisoners)
Syria
Tanzania
United Arab Emirates
Zambia

2. *Authorities uncooperative concerning both notification and access:*

Benin
Cuba
Ethiopia
Iraq (U.S. Interest Section, not recognized as having Consular status)
Mozambique (in past, but present relations likely to have improved)

C. CONSULAR CONVENTIONS SOUGHT

1. *Consular convention negotiations in process:*

Botswana
Lesotho
Turkey

2. *Inspectors recommended consular conventions be considered:*

Colombia
Liberia
Nigeria
Panama
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Tanzania
United Arab Emirates

Section 115

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C., March 28, 1979.

Dear Mr. Chairman: The fiscal year 1979 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, section 115, provided the establishment of an Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters. The Conference Report (No. 95–1535) accompanying that act, requested that I report to the Congress within 6 months of the legislation's enactment, progress in establishing that office.

When the Foreign Relations Authorization Act was signed into law, the Department of State began preparations for creation of a Bureau of International Narcotics Matters. During the congressional recess these preparations were completed, and the nomination of Ms. Mathea Falco to serve as Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters was submitted to the 96th Congress when it convened in January. On February 6, Ms. Falco was sworn in as Assistant Secretary of State. Concurrently the Department officially established the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM) under Ms. Falco's direction.

The mandate of the new Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters is essentially the same as that of her predecessor, the Senior Adviser for International Narcotics Matters. Assistant Secretary Falco will continue to be responsible for the following activities:

(*a*) Overseeing and coordinating all international narcotics control activities;

(*b*) Acting as the principal point of contact and adviser on international narcotics control matters for the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the National Security Council (NSC), and the Domestic Council and insuring implementation of U.S. policy in international narcotics control matters;

(*c*) Providing drug control direction to U.S. ambassadors and narcotics control coordinators abroad, and communicating, as appropriate, with foreign governments on drug control matters;

(*d*) Representing the United States on the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs and at other international drug meetings and conferences; and

(*e*) Supervising and directing the administration of the international narcotics control assistance program authorized by section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2291).

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The above mandate of official duties will be promulgated in the Foreign Affairs Manual.

International narcotics control activities and means of improving their effectiveness are under continual review within the Department of State in conjunction with the Congress and other concerned U.S. Government agencies. Assistant Secretary of State Falco has already begun to appear before Congress to present the Department of State's fiscal year 1980 budget request. As these hearings continue, we welcome fully the opportunity to present our overall strategies and policies, as well as the individual programs and activities which support them. We are confident that these hearings will provide a useful exchange between the Department and the Congress, allowing the necessary cooperation to make even more effective our narcotics control programs. I have included with this report a copy of Assistant Secretary Falco's remarks before the Foreign Relations Committee on the fiscal year 1980 international narcotics control authorization.

The international narcotics control program remains of deepest concern to me personally and to the Department as a whole. You may rest assured that we are giving this important work the highest priority within our foreign policy framework.

Sincerely yours,

CYRUS VANCE.

Testimony of the Honorable Mathea Falco, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I am pleased to have the opportunity to be here today and to discuss with you the Department of State's international narcotics control budget request for fiscal year 1980.

In keeping with Government-wide fiscal restraints, our fiscal year 1980 request of $37.8 million is lower than the $38.5 million which the Congress appropriated for the current fiscal year. Our requested budget is designed to maintain the momentum of current international narcotics control programs without undertaking major new initiatives.

During the past 2 years, the principal thrust of U.S. narcotics control efforts both domestically and abroad has been to control heroin, the most destructive of the illicit drugs entering the United States. In support of this total effort, our primary international narcotics control objective has been to prevent heroin from reaching our borders by curtailing its supply as close as possible to the source of origin. We have made considerable progress towards that goal.

Although exact statistics are impossible to obtain because of the illicit nature of the trade, our best intelligence estimates show a steady, significant decline in the actual amounts of heroin entering the United States over the past 2 years. According to Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) figures, street level heroin purity is at its lowest point this decade—averaging only 3.5 percent compared to 6.6 percent in 1976. Reflecting this scarcity, heroin's price has reached an historic high level of $2.19 per milligram, nearly twice the 1976 figure. These two criteria are the traditional means of measuring drug availability and are clear indications of significantly reduced supplies of heroin for American drug abusers.

Decreasing availability of heroin has contributed significantly to a parallel decline in its abuse. According to National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) estimates, the number of heroin addicts in the United States has declined steadily from more than 500,000 in 1976 to approximately 450,000 today. Moreover, due to greatly reduced purity levels, fewer of those abusing heroin are dying or being injured from overdose. U.S. heroin injuries have decreased from 5,200 in the first quarter of 1976 to 2,200 during the last quarter of 1978, a 58 percent reduction. During that same 2-year period, overdose deaths per month have declined 80 percent. In human terms, 1,000 fewer Americans died of heroin overdose in 1977 than in 1976. When final figures are compiled, we expect them to reveal a similar decline in 1978.

The Government of Mexico's narcotics control program, which we support, continues to contribute greatly to the marked reduction in heroin availability and abuse in the United States. A comparison of the situation in 1975–76 and 1977–78 will show how striking the prog-

ress in Mexico has been. The Drug Enforcement Administration estimates that more than 10.5 metric tons of heroin entered the United States from Mexico during the 2-year period 1975–76. During the comparable 1977–78 2-year period, that figure declined to approximately 6 metric tons. This reduction in heroin entering the United States from Mexico is attributable to the successful destruction of more than 47,000 poppy fields during the 1977 and 1978 narcotic eradication campaigns.

The Mexican effort has been costly in both financial and human resources. Since 1973 the United States has provided $80 million to support Mexico's program through aircraft, communications facilities, and other equipment necessary for opium poppy eradication in thousands of square miles of remote mountainous regions. We have also assisted the Government of Mexico in developing an effective operational and maintenance system which has contributed greatly to successful use of the eradication equipment. Mexico has also paid a price for its success, and has contributed many millions of dollars from its own budget. In 1979, for example, the Mexican Attorney General's office plans to use for narcotics control $30 million of its total $42 million budget. In addition, the Mexican share of the effort has been expensive in human terms. During recent years 33 Mexican officers have been killed and scores injured in the eradication campaign.

For fiscal year 1980 the Department of State is requesting $9.4 million to support the Mexican program, as compared to $11.6 million in fiscal year 1979. This does not reflect a diminution of our joint efforts or a shift in emphasis; rather, it is indicative of successes thus far achieved and of the equipment deliveries already accomplished—especially aircraft.

Of the $9.4 million requested for the Mexican program, approximately $5.35 million is operational and maintenance support of the 65 fixed and rotary wing aircraft already provided to the Attorney General's office. This will include improving aircraft maintenance and training facilities for the 240 pilots and mechanics which the Attorney General's office will have by 1980. Based upon successful trends in the current eradication program, we do not anticipate need for additional aircraft in fiscal year 1980. Another $650,000 will be used for completing and placing into operation the advanced poppy detection system being developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

Other projected expenditures for fiscal year 1980 will support expansion of Mexico's computerized narcotics intelligence data system ($260,000); eradication operations, including those of a U.S. civilian contract verification team ($775,000); and salaries and administrative support costs for 11 American and 6 Mexican narcotic control personnel at our Embassy ($800,000).

For fiscal year 1980 $600,000 for a separate herbicide research program is planned. This project will support official United States and Mexican government efforts, as well as private research, to identify alternative herbicides, marking substances, and possible alternative means of eradicating opium and marihuana crops.

We have long sought to insure that increasing success against Mexican heroin was not made meaningless by allowing Golden Triangle

heroin to replace it in the American market. Thus far, assistance to Thai and Burmese narcotics control efforts has been instrumental in preventing a sudden influx of Southeast Asian heroin from the estimated 400 tons of opium produced annually in that region. The amount of heroin entering the United States from Southeast Asia remained constant during 1977 and 1978 at approximately 2 metric tons yearly, which represents approximately one-third of the total. As Mexico's narcotics control efforts continue to reduce quantities of heroin available from that country, we expect further increases in the percentage and, possibly, the absolute amount of Southeast Asia heroin entering the United States.

The Department's cooperative narcotics control programs with Southeast Asian governments are aimed to curtail the heroin threat from that region. These programs do this by addressing the illegal drug problem in all its aspects; including eradication and interdiction of illicit narcotics, development of alternate sources of income for primary poppy producing areas; and reducing demand for illicit drugs.

The fiscal year 1980 request of $7.83 million for our Southeast Asian programs will maintain current levels of activity with Thailand and Burma, and allow new, limited assistance to other Southeast Asian countries as well as to regional organizations.

We propose to spend $4.6 million for assistance to Burma's interdiction and opium eradication efforts. This money will be used primarily for maintaining fixed and rotary wing aircraft already provided ($3.9 million), and training of aircraft pilot and maintenance personnel ($610,000).

For Thailand we propose a funding level of $2.9 million to support a full range of programs. Of that total, $800,000 will provide advisory support, vehicles, communications, helicopter maintenance, and training to continue implementation of the 5-year narcotics enforcement expansion program. Thai Customs is projected to receive $500,000 in assistance for advisory support, vessel maintenance, and development of a narcotics information system. Two separate demand reduction efforts, covering drug abuse treatment, rehabilitation, and prevention will receive $700,000 in support. Another $500,000 will be used to continue development of alternative crop in the poppy growing Mae Chaem watershed. The remainder of the funds for Thailand will be for personnel and administrative costs in support of our programs.

There are increasing indications that smuggling patterns in Southeast Asia are adjusting to enforcement pressures on traditional trafficking routes. To contain potential new routes bypassing Thailand, we initiated narcotic control programs with Malaysia and Indonesia during 1979, for which we have programed $135,000 in fiscal year 1980.

Illicit narcotics move freely across international boundaries, making effective control in one nation dependent in part upon the success of neighboring governments. Recognizing that East Asia is no exception, in 1979 we began supporting an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) project for training professional educators in the area of preventive drug education. For 1980 we have set aside $150,000 to continue United States-ASEAN narcotics control cooperation. Another $150,000 is proposed to allow continuation of the Colombo plan drug advisory program and its support of regional narcotics control activities.

Recent developments affecting the trans-Asia movement of heroin into Europe are, however, placing increasing strain on our efforts in Southeast Asia. One factor contributing to our successes thus far has been the reliance of European heroin addicts on Southeast Asia as their primary source of supply, thereby absorbing significant quantities of those narcotics which might otherwise have been destined for the United States.

Statistics of drug seizures by European law enforcement agencies indicate, however, that Southeast Asian heroin is being increasingly replaced in the European market by Middle Eastern heroin. A comparison of relevant heroin seizure data illustrates this trend. The figures in the percent column indicate percent of total seizures.

HEROIN SEIZURES IN EUROPE

	SEA		ME		Total (kilograms)
	Kilograms	Percent	Kilograms	Percent	
1976	535	97	15	3	550
1977	451	90	49	10	500
1978 [1]	350	82	79	18	429

[1] Figures for first 10 months.

Progress against Southeast Asian heroin in Europe has been the result of both positive and negative factors. While effective narcotics control by source countries such as Burma and Thailand has reduced the quantity of heroin available for export, increased vigilance by both Asian and European law enforcement bodies has made the smuggling of Southeast Asian heroin more difficult.

Unfortunately, progress against Southeast Asian heroin has been accompanied by a tremendous increase in the production of illicit opium in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has estimated that the 1978–79 season opium crop from these two countries might range as high as 800 metric tons, making that area the world's largest source of illicit opium. Through intelligence and recent laboratory seizures, we know that this opium is being converted increasingly into heroin, both where it is grown as well as to some extent in neighboring countries.

Given the ready availability of narcotic materials, the Middle East is becoming an increasingly important supplier of heroin to Europe. As this trend increases, traffickers of Southeast Asian heroin can be expected to turn their energies increasingly to supplying addicts here in this country. In so doing they will pose a greater challenge to our own narcotics control mechanisms as well as to those of both source and transit countries in East Asia. To contain this threat will require not only more effective international narcotics control efforts in Southeast Asia but also in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other Middle Eastern nations.

Since the United States cannot shoulder the entire burden of the trans-Asian heroin problem we are pursuing a determined effort to enlist increasingly greater support on both a bilateral and multilateral basis from industrialized nations for the global international narcotics control effort.

Since its establishment in 1971, the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) has been the major vehicle for multilateral narcotics control efforts. The task of enlisting full international support for the Fund's efforts has not been easy, and until recently, the United States provided the majority of contributions to the Fund. In 1977 this administration undertook an active campaign to increase support for UNFDAC from other developed countries, and results have been encouraging. Total contributions to the Fund during 1977 and 1978 increased 50 percent of the previous 2-year period, and the United States share of total contributions in 1978 dropped to 42 percent, from a high of 88 percent in 1973.

To encourage additional contributions from other governments, U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young convened a meeting of U.N. permanent representatives concerned with worldwide drug abuse problems in November 1978 at the United Nations in New York. Congressman Lester Wolff, chairman of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Control, and Congressman Benjamin Gilman of the select committee, effectively presented a case for giving greater priority and encouraging broader participation by U.N. member states in the international war on narcotics and drug abuse. Participants in the program expressed their willingness to bring this issue to the attention of their governments and considered this meeting a successful means of maintaining U.N. focus on the continuing problem of drug abuse control.

Although it is too early to project total contributions to the Fund for 1979, they already total $4.9 million. Australia has pledged $1.25 million over the next 3 years, the Federal Republic of Germany has agreed to contribute $260,000 to the UNFDAC general fund in addition to providing $300,000–$400,000 for a feasibility study of the UNFDAC-sponsored Upper Helmand Valley in crop substitution/agricultural development projects in Afghanistan.

For fiscal year 1980 we are requesting $3 million for UNFDAC, the same level of contributions as in the past 2 years. If the trend set so far this year continues, we believe that this sum will represent well under half of the total contributions.

In addition, the Department of State is continuing its effort to elicit support from industrialized nations to use their bilateral foreign developmental assistance funds in support of eliminating narcotics cultivation in primary producing areas of less developed nations. In 1978 United States efforts helped obtain the endorsement of such assistance from the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Many members of ECOSOC, most notably the countries of Scandanavia, are showing an increasing willingness to use their foreign aid funds to support narcotics control. We also cosponsored a General Assembly resolution appealing to governments for increased and sustained contributions to UNFDAC.

Multilateral developmental assistance is perhaps the most promising source for the large sums required to finance economic development programs in the opium producing regions of Asia. The Department of State has undertaken active initiatives to encourage increased bilateral Western European and multilateral development aid for primary opium-producing areas in developing countries such as Paki-

stan, Afghanistan, Burma, and Thailand. A similar effort is underway for multilateral aid to the coca-producing areas of South America.

Late last year I met with French and German officials to discuss means of coordinating bilateral assistance programs representing the United States at the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND) in Geneva, I continued these discussions with European counterparts.

Secretary of State Vance also has discussed this issue with his counterparts in developed countries. In addition, he has instructed U.S. Ambassadors in Western European capitals to keep the issue of economic assistance to poppy-producing regions before their host governments.

On a multilateral basis the Department of State is working closely with the Department of the Treasury to insure that multilateral developmental banks (MDB's) complement our international narcotics control objectives. Since most of the world's narcotic-producing areas are found in lesser developed countries, the primary recipients of developmental assistance from lending institutions such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Working with Treasury, we have briefed the U.S. executive directors of these institutions. Our American representatives have been instructed to work to insure that loans from their banks do not contribute to increased narcotics production, but instead provide poor populations with the economic alternatives to enable them to abandon narcotics production.

Closely related to the efforts of our executive directors, we are encouraging both multilateral and bilateral aid donors to consider the use of "poppy clauses" or similar provisions in their assistance agreements. Such clauses stipulate that as a condition for receiving assistance the recipient government undertakes not to permit narcotic production in the areas benefitting from such assistance. Last April the United States canceled an AID irrigation project in the Dau Jui area of Afghanistan because terms of an antiopium side letter to the project agreement were not being enforced. The World Bank is requiring recipients of its agricultural loans in Afghanistan to certify that they will not produce opium, and the ADB is considering use of a poppy clause in its joint project with UNFDAC in Afghanistan's Upper Helmand Valley project.

The trans-Asian heroin problem is immense, with great potential for harm to the United States as well as other regions of the world. It is therefore vital that we succeed in our efforts to marshal the resources of other industrialized countries to counter this threat.

In addition to the adverse health effects of drugs such as cocaine and marihuana, this administration has taken full cognizance of the destructive economic and social impact which their illicit trafficking can have on the United States and other countries, particularly our Latin American neighbors. We are especially concerned over the way in which the tremendous profits generated by this trade fuels criminal activities, distorts legitimate economies, and engenders political corruption. Thus, while maintaining our emphasis on heroin, we have over the past 2 years increased significantly efforts to control the international traffic in other drugs of abuse.

Interrupting the flow of cocaine and marihuana from Latin America into the United States is extremely complex and requires a multi-

faceted control strategy. Only within the past 2 years has this problem been addressed fully from the standpoint of controlling sources as well as interdicting the traffic on both the South American land mass and in the Caribbean region. However, the amounts of cocaine and marihuana being smuggled into the United States has kept pace with the steady rise in demand for them. As with heroin, exact statistics about the traffic and use of cocaine and marihuana are not possible to obtain. The Drug Enforcement Administration's best current estimates, however, indicate that in 1978, cocaine imports into the United States totaled between 19 and 25 metric tons. For marihuana, DEA believes the figure is close to 15,000 metric tons yearly. Interdicting this flow of drugs from entering our borders has been a high priority of our Government, and particularly of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard.

Although Peru and Bolivia are the source of coca for the manufacture of cocaine, the Drug Enforcement Administration estimates that as much as 70 percent of that cocaine coming into the United States transits Colombia. Moreover, DEA estimates that perhaps 70 percent of the marihuana entering this country comes from or through Colombia. As these illicit substances leave Colombia for this country, the problem becomes primarily one of interdiction. Because approximately three-quarters of that traffic moves through the Caribbean, that region has become a major focus of interdiction efforts by the U.S. narcotics control agencies.

Given the prevailing smuggling patterns, cooperation with the Government of Colombia is essential as we seek to interdict the traffic before it disperses over the entire Caribbean region. Within the past 2 years sustained high-level exchanges between our two governments have raised narcotics control to top priority in United States-Colombia bilateral relations. President Turbay and his administration have continued the drug control commitment of their predecessors and have made cooperation with us on that issue closer than ever before.

The most striking example of Colombia antinarcotics commitment has been the recent North Coast interdiction campaign focused on the Guajira Peninsula. This 6-month campaign designed to close down the Guajira as Colombia's major trafficking center achieved significant success. During the campaign Colombian authorities captured 27 aircraft and 59 vessels engaged in narcotics smuggling. Additionally, approximately 455 traffickers were arrested while authorities seized 1,034 tons of marihuana.

Perhaps the most significant elements of the Guajira effort has been the commitment of the Colombian military for the first time to sustained antinarcotics activity. Involvement of the military's greater material and personnel resources has created the potential for similar campaigns in other regions of the country, such as the Llanos, the Choco, and along the southern border, all of which are real or potential producing or transit areas.

The Colombian Government has taken measures to improve the efficiency of its own narcotics control and judicial apparatus. Creation of a central narcotics unit under the Attorney General has been a progressive step toward creating a professional drug enforcement agency. This centralization promises to improve coordination and reduce dupli-

cation of effort through combining the functions of five separate agencies. The Turbay administration has also undertaken a study of its judicial system in order to improve processing of narcotics related cases.

At the diplomatic level, Colombia has demonstrated its willingness to enter into international agreements relating to narcotics control. The Department of State, in cooperation with other Federal agencies, is working with the Colombian Government to negotiate procedures for or agreements covering extradition, maritime boarding and seizure, joint prosecution, banking, prisoner exchange, and return of aircraft.

Colombia is also demonstrating its interest in cooperating closely with its South American neighbors on the narcotics issue. In December Colombia and Venezuela signed an anti-narcotics agreement setting up a joint commission to further cooperative action. Negotiations are now underway between Colombia and Peru on a similar agreement.

For fiscal year 1980 the Department of State is requesting a total of $2,042,000 to support Colombian narcotics control organizations. Of this total, $1.3 million will be to provide support to the Attorney General's narcotics unit. Another $290,000 will defray the costs of two U.S. Customs advisers and limited equipment to enhance the narcotics interdiction capability of Colombia's Customs Service. The remainder of the request will provide administrative and program development support.

Of particular importance this past year have been the increasing emphasis on maritime narcotics interdiction, and the close, effective cooperation of U.S. law enforcement agencies with their counterparts from other governments in the region. Intelligence estimates indicate that approximately 70 percent of the marihuana and substantial quantities of cocaine entering the United States is moved by vessel through the Caribbean area.

Fortunately, our law enforcement agencies are becoming increasingly successful at intercepting smuggling vessels on the high seas. In 1978 the Coast Guard seized 1,700 tons of marihuana and 140 vessels engaged in marihuana smuggling. U.S. Customs seized an additional 222 vessels in our territorial waters, netting 1,000 tons of marihuana and 60.9 kilograms of cocaine.

The key to improved vessel interdiction is improved intelligence. Currently, approximately 20 percent of the smuggling vessels seizures are the result of previous intelligence, usually from the network of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents in the Caribbean area. Since last summer the U.S. Navy has been providing the Coast Guard additional intelligence by reporting sightings of suspect vessels. Additionally, during the Commandant of the Coast Guard's recent trip through the Caribbean and Latin America he proposed to his foreign counterparts a regional arrangement for reporting at sea sightings of possible smuggling vessels. The Latin American response was favorable and the Department of State is providing diplomatic and limited financial support as the Coast Guard moves to implement its plans.

By international law, the Coast Guard cannot board and seize suspected narcotics smuggling vessels on the high seas without first obtaining permission from the government under whose flag they sail. Such permission can usually be obtained through our embassies on an ad hoc basis. At times, however, unavoidable delays have enabled

smuggling vessels to jettison their illicit cargo or even escape capture. To address this problem the Department of State has opened negotiations with cooperating Caribbean area governments to institutionalize and expedite the granting of such permission.

We have responded to the growing threat of cocaine and marihuana smuggling in the Caribbean by developing small, carefully selected narcotics control assistance programs. In fiscal year 1980 we are requesting $270,000 to continue limited commodity support and training for the Bahamas ($100,000), Panama ($70,000), and Honduras ($100,000), important transit areas of narcotics destined for the United States. We are also reviewing the question of program assistance to Jamaica.

Over the long term, success in closing off existing transit routes is sure to be countered by opening new ones, although not without some disruption in the traffic and increased costs for the trafficking. The greatest promise for a lasting dimunition of drug trafficking lies in curtailing production of drugs at their source.

Controlling coca leaf production is a difficult challenge, but a course which is an essential ingredient of any long-term anticocaine strategy. The task is complicated, however, by the presence of extensive licit coca production alongside the illicit. Coca leaf is legally cultivated and consumed by large segments of Bolivian and Peruvian societies. Such consumption is traditional—usually chewed or brewed as a mild tea. Additionally, coca leaf is essential in the production of cocaine for legitimate medicinal purposes. Control is also made more difficult by the remoteness of areas where it is grown and by the economic and political problems endemic in Bolivia and Peru. Consequently, our cooperative efforts with those governments of necessity address the control of licit as well as illicit coca production and trafficking.

For Bolivia in fiscal year 1980 we are requesting $3.1 million to support efforts to continue development of alternative crops, marketing systems ($1.4 million), and projects to create institutions to insure that production is limited to legitimate needs and not diverted into illicit trafficking ($800,000). Most of these efforts are directed at eliminating coca production in the Chapare, primary source of Bolivia's illicit crop. The shift to coffee, tea, and other alternative crops will be encouraged by free distribution of Government-cleared land to those who give up coca.

The remainder of Bolivian coca is grown in the Yungas, an historical source for legitimate supplies. We are setting aside $410,000 to assist the National Directorate for Control of Dangerous Substances (DNSP) improve its control mechanisms designed to limit coca production to the Yungas, to reduce the level needed to meet licit demand, and to prevent displacement of coca production to other areas. Thus far, all coca farmers have been registered and licensed, and all new plantings have been prohibited. Registration of coca middlemen is now underway, and should be completed this year.

Last year we were able to reach cooperative assistance agreements with Peru, a country in which both licit and illicit coca production is believed to exceed that of neighboring Bolivia. The Peruvian Government has passed a strong anti-narcotics law. We are working closely with Peru to develop and implement workable narcotics control efforts that enforce the law against illicit production and we are studying

with the Peruvians, programs to control production and provide alternatives to small poor coca producers, along the pattern in Bolivia. These new initiatives in Peru are creating a balanced program for controlling cocaine traffic at its source. For fiscal year 1980 we are requesting a total of $1.7 million to continue support of this effort.

Of this total, in the field of crop control and reduction we are requesting $800,000 for programs in the Hunaco-Tingo Maria regions. These projects will be based upon studies now underway, and will require farmers to plow under illegal coca plantings and strictly limit the legal ones to legitimate requirements. Programs will be implemented to provide farmers affected with incentives and alternative means for income. Complementing this effort, the Agency for International Development (AID) recently signed an agreement with Peru which includes a clause prohibiting coca production in the project area.

Approximately $500,000 is planned to support Peruvian narcotics control agencies. These funds will help defray operational costs and provide limited equipment support, primarily for communications and transport purposes. Funds are also designated for a modest demand reduction program, primarily in the field of preventive education.

Mr. Chairman, the challenge of controlling the international illicit traffic and abuse of narcotics remains with us. The U.S. Government's international narcotics control programs, however, have demonstrated clear success in reducing the impact of that problem upon the people of this country, particularly in regard to heroin abuse.

Not all foreign governments have as yet been as successful as the United States in reducing the availability of drugs within their borders, and they still require our assistance. They have, however, demonstrated a growing awareness of the problem, and with that awareness has come an increasing commitment of resources to combatting it. We are confident that the assistance which we continue to provide the international effort is paying dividends which benefit not only our own citizens, but those of other countries as well.

The program which I have outlined for you today reflects the changing trends in international drug trafficking. Over the next 2-year period we will not relax our cooperative efforts with Mexico against heroin in order to insure a continued downard trend in its abuse. We will simultaneously place increased emphasis upon the heroin traffic from Asia, and redouble our efforts to enlist the full coordinated support of the entire international community in those efforts. Closer to home, we will continue to increase our commitment of resources to limiting the socially and economically destructive aspects of illicit cocaine and marihuana trafficking within this hemisphere. I am optimistic that over the next few years we will see the same kind of success against these drugs as we have seen against heroin in the past 2 years.

Section 121

ASSISTANCE TO BEREAVED UNITED STATES FAMILIES

Section 121 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, dated September 6, 1978 reads as follows:

"Section 121. (a) The Congress finds that the Department of State should, in the performance of its consular duties, render all reasonable administrative assistance to a U.S. citizen who is making necessary arrangements following the death of another U.S. citizen abroad.

"(b) The Secretary of State shall—

"(1) analyze alternative procedures by which the Department of State could, where necessary and appropriate, provide loans or other forms of assistance to facilitate such arrangements; and

"(2) not later than January 20, 1979, transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report describing fully and completely such alternate procedures, including associated costs, and presenting his views and recommendations with respect to such procedures."

Consular Officer's Present Role

When an American citizen dies abroad, the disposition of the remains is the responsibility of the next of kin or legal representative. If these persons do not or cannot assume this responsibility, and if there are insufficient funds found in the personal possession of the deceased and from which the U.S. consul may draw to cover the necessary expenses, the U.S. consul requests that the local foreign authorities in whose jurisdiction the death occurred assume the responsibility and expense of appropriate disposition according to local law.

The degree of assistance rendered to the next of kin or legal representative by the Department and its consular officers depends in large part on whether or not the deceased was accompanied by the next of kin or legal representative. If the deceased citizen was not accompanied by one of these persons, the consular officer notifies one or the other of them by a direct relay cable (from the post overseas directly to the family). Last year the Department arranged with Western Union to have these cables hand delivered to the addressee and to notify the Department promptly if for some reason the cable could not be delivered within 24 hours after its receipt.

The death notification cable expresses condolences, relates the circumstances of the death and informs the next of kin or designated emergency addressee how to transmit funds for disposition of the remains, that is, for local burial, cremation and disposal of the ashes, or preparing and shipping the body to the United States. When the

next of kin has made a decision, he or she deposits the funds with the Department, which then authorizes the consular officer to proceed with making arrangements in accordance with the next of kin's wishes. If the next of kin decides to have the remains shipped to the United States, the consular officer arranges with the local funeral director to embalm the body, or otherwise prepare it for shipment if embalming is not available, provide an appropriate coffin, procure required documentation, and ship the remains by commercial transportation to a funeral establishment in the United States with which the family or legal representative has already made arrangements for receipt of the remains. The consular officer also prepares a report of death, based on the death certificate issued by local authorities, and transmits it to the next of kin; takes temporary possession of the deceased's personal effects; and requests proof of entitlement and instructions from the next of kin or other legal claimant as to the disposition of these effects.

If the next of kin or legal representative was in the company of the deceased at the time of death, it is his or her responsibility to arrange for preparation of the body, purchase of a casket and shipment of the body to the United States if not buried locally or cremated. In these circumstances, the consular officer renders as much facilitative assistance as possible.

At present all expenses relating to the disposition of remains are the responsibility of the next of kin or other legal representative of the estate, as are all expenses for handling the deceased's effects.

Nature of the Problem

TIME FACTOR

Laws and regulations regarding the disposition of remains of a deceased person vary from country to country. In most Western European countries where embalming is available, these regulations are comparable to those in the United States. On the other hand, most countries in Africa and Asia and some in Latin America, where embalming and refrigeration facilities are either nonexistent or available only in the larger metropolitan areas, and where there is a danger of spreading infectious diseases, require burial (or cremation) of the body within 24 or 48 hours. For this reason, the next of kin, the Department and the consular officer must act quickly in making decisions, in transferring funds and in arranging for embalming and other preparations for shipment of the body if the deadlines set for local burial are to be met.

COST FACTOR

While the cost of local burial or cremation in most foreign countries is usually below the cost for comparable services in the United States, the cost of embalming or otherwise preparing a body for shipment, of purchasing a casket and lead or zinc container, and of transporting the body to the United States is generally much higher than the cost of a funeral here. This cost problem is compounded by the need for the next of kin to obtain funds for disposition of the remains without delay. Funeral directors in foreign countries, except in very unusual circumstances, will not grant credit for their services; they insist on having

cash in hand before they will make any arrangements for local burial, cremation, or preparation and shipment of a body. Because of the high expense involved, this attitude is especially troublesome when the next of kin opts for embalming and shipment of the remains. The problem of obtaining funds quickly for transfer abroad is especially difficult when the death notification cable is received over a weekend when banks and other credit institutions are closed.

MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM

In calendar year 1977, the most recent period for which accurate and complete statistics are available, 6,584 American citizens died in foreign countries, exclusive of Canada.[1] Of that number, the remains of 4,516 were buried locally; the bodies of 366 were cremated and the ashes returned to the United States; and the remains of 1,702 were embalmed or otherwise prepared and transported to the United States. Almost all of those whose bodies were buried locally were permanent residents of the locality, most of them naturalized American citizens who had returned to their native countries to live out their lives in retirement, usually beneficiaries of a social security check or some other annuity from the United States. The large proportion of local burial of American citizens who die in Greece, Italy, Mexico, Israel, and Poland reflects this social phenomenon. Many native-born Americans have also chosen to retire abroad and when they die, many of them are buried locally, for example, in Mexico, Spain, Germany, France, and Italy. The expense of preparing and shipping to the United States the bodies of these two categories of people has little or no bearing on the next of kin's choice of burial place. Almost all of the 1,702 American citizens who died abroad in 1977 and whose bodies were returned to the United States were tourists, businessmen or their dependents, contract workers, students or seamen. It should be noted that some countries, for example, Saudi Arabia, where thousands of American workers and their dependents reside, require by contract that companies doing business there return the bodies of their deceased employees and their dependents to the United States at the companies' expense.

In reply to a recent Department query, approximately 250 U.S. diplomatic and consular posts abroad estimated that of the 4,516 American citizens who died in their consular districts in 1977 and whose bodies were either buried or cremated and disposed of locally, the bodies of only 173 might have been returned to the United States had U.S. Government loans been available for this purpose.

COST OF DISPOSITION OF REMAINS SERVICES ABROAD

The cost of disposition of remains varies widely from country to country depending on charges for embalming, caskets, lead and zinc containers, local fees for death certificates, burial permits, burial plots, cremation charges, transit permits, export licenses and air freight

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[1] Funeral directors in Canada normally make arrangements directly with their American counterparts for the shipment of deceased Americans' bodies to the United States. Our Embassy and consular posts in Canada rarely become involved in any way in the disposition of the remains of American citizens who die in that country and hence no reliable statistics are available on this subject. None of the figures cited in this report, therefore, includes any data on American deaths in Canada.

charges. It should be noted that the costs cited below were those prevailing as of April–May 1978. Due to the decline of the dollar in world markets since then, today's costs would be higher in some countries.

LOCAL BURIAL

The cost of a medium-priced local burial, with a moderately priced casket, in the 10 foreign countries where the largest number of American citizens died in 1977 was as follows: West Germany $1,400, Mexico $1.075, U.K. $1,000, Norway $740, Israel $700, Italy $700, Ireland $550, France $500, Greece $500, and Spain $400. The lowest cost for a burial was $100 in Niger and the highest $1,700 in Argentina.

CREMATION AND SHIPMENT OF ASHES

Cremation facilities are not available in many countries, and in some countries cremation of a human body is illegal. In those countries where cremation is permitted and facilities are available, the costs range from $1,180 in Switzerland to $80 in Burma. The average cost of cremation worldwide is about $550.

The cost of shipping the ashes of a cremated body to the United States depends in large part on the weight of the container, (cardboard box, wooden box, cast iron urn, brass urn, et cetera) and the distance from the point of origin to destination in the United States. The cost of shipment of ashes in a strong wooden box from any place in the world to any place in the United States is less than $100.

PREPARATION AND SHIPMENT OF A BODY

There are three major factors in determining the cost of returning a body from a foreign country for burial in the United States: Embalming or other preparation of body charges; purchase of the required metal container and casket; and airfreight charges. This last, airfreight charge, is fixed by the Civil Aviation Board and international air transport agreements. Distance and weight determine the cost of shipping a body from abroad. A shipment to New York weighing 220 kilograms (440 lbs.) cost the following in the spring of 1978 from the 10 countries where the largest number of American citizens died last year: West Germany $1,112, France $1,000, Italy $889, Israel $840, Greece $750, Norway $680, United Kingdom $608, Spain $600, Ireland $500 and Mexico City $300. According to the Chief of the Tariffs Division, Office of International Air Transport Rates and Fares, Civil Aeronautics Board, who at the request of the Department recently reviewed international airfreight rates for shipping human remains, these rates are reasonable and do not warrant a revision at the present time. Rates for shipping human remains within the United States were also recently reviewed, found to be somewhat high and reduced accordingly.

The greatest variation in costs among foreign countries is for embalming and other preparations of the remains for shipment, including cost of the casket, ranging from $300 in India and Nepal to $2,987 in Zaire as of May 1978. In most Western European countries these costs range between $1,200 and $2,000, e.g., France $1,500, West Germany $1,800, Greece $1,200, and Spain $1,620. On the other hand, the cost of these services in Italy is $750 and in the United Kingdom, $608.

Casket and metal container costs also vary widely. In many of the less developed countries of Asia and Africa polished hardwood caskets are not available so that bodies must be shipped in plain wooden boxes, costs of which range from $50 to $150. In the more advanced countries of Europe and Latin America, caskets of polished hardwood with brass fittings are priced at $2,000 or more. Less expensive caskets are available in the $400 to $1,000 range in most advanced countries. In some of the more primitive countries no metal containers are available so that bodies must be transported to a neighboring country for encasement and transshipment to the United States.

While the costs of embalming and casketing a body are very high in many countries, airfreight charges often account for 50 percent to 75 percent of the total cost of shipping a body to its destination in the United States. For example, in Australia the preparation of the body and cost of the casket are under $1,000, while the shipping cost is $1,350.

FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO BEREAVED RELATIVES OF THE DECEASED

(a) *Individual cases*

The expense of arranging for the disposition of the remains of American citizens who die abroad places a heavy financial burden on the bereaved families of the deceased, especially if the embalmed remains are returned to the United States. While the Department and its Foreign Service posts have no real control over local mortuary costs or international airfreight rates, consular officers do monitor local mortuary and burial costs and each post must file a "Disposition of Remains" report annually. Our consular officers instruct local mortuaries to use the least expensive casket that meets international shipping requirements unless the family in the United States instructs the consular officer to do otherwise.

The Department of State and its posts abroad assess no fees for use of telecommunications facilities for transmission of death notification cables, for disposition instructions from families to posts, for transfer of funds, or for any consular services related to arranging for the disposition of remains, preparing the consular mortuary certificate, handling payment of the expenses incurred, or completing and forwarding to the next of kin the official report of death. Any unexpended portion of the funds deposited for the disposition of remains is returned to the depositor.

At the present time, Department of Defense regulations do not permit the use of aircraft under its control to transport the remains of private U.S. citizens who die abroad except when commercial airfreight facilities are not available and when a determination is made that shipment on a Government aircraft would be in the national interest. Such determinations are rarely made.

(b) *Major catastrophes*

In only two recent instances has the U.S. Government departed from the above established norm: (1) The Tenerife Pan Am-KLM air crash in March 1977; and (2) the Jonestown, Guyana tragedy in November 1978. In each instance there were a large number of casualties (over 500 in one and over 900 in the other) and a massive problem

of identification of remains for which commercial and local government facilities were inadequate. In these two catastrophic emergencies, the U.S. Government acted under the constitutional authority of the President as Chief Executive and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces in utilizing the equipment and facilities of the Department of Defense. In the Tenerife case, the air carrier and its insurers reimbursed the U.S. Government for its expenses, and in the Guyana instance the Department of Justice is taking all possible legal steps to recover the costs incurred from assets of the People's Temple here and abroad.

Alternative Procedures for Assisting Bereaved Families of Americans Who Die Abroad

LOAN PROGRAM—GENERAL CRITERIA

The Department does not have legal authority to make loans to families of Americans who die abroad to assist in arranging the disposition of remains of the deceased. Were the Department to be granted such authority by the Congress, an executed promissory note would have to be obtained from the next of kin or legal representative of the deceased and witnessed by another American citizen, or in lieu of actual receipt of the promissory note, assurance by telephone or cable from a reliable source that a promissory note had been duly executed and witnessed. The Department has identified several alternative procedures by which this might be done:

(a) Administrative cooperation of the U.S. Postal Service

In this alternative the death notification cable would inform the next of kin or legal representative that if he or she could not obtain, within the time frame required by local regulations, from his or her own resources or some other private source the amount of money required to dispose of the remains as desired, the next of kin or legal representative should go to the nearest U.S. Post Office and execute a promissory note for a U.S. Government loan for the amount needed for this purpose. An authorized postal official would identify the person as the next of kin or legal representative, witness the signing of the promissory note and notify the Department by the fastest means available (phone or cable) that the note had been executed for such and such an amount. Thereupon the Department would authorize the consular officer abroad to proceed with making arrangements for the disposition of the remains in accordance with the family's wishes. As soon as possible the postal official who witnessed the signing of the note would send the original and one copy to the Department of State. Collecting the loan would be the responsibility of the Department's Office of Finance.

ADVANTAGES

There is a U.S. Post Office in some 40,000 localities throughout the country and every American citizen has easy access to at least one of them. That the witness to the execution of the promissory note would be a U.S. Government official would be a plus both because of his or her reliability and because in many cases the witness would have access to U.S. Government-leased telephone and/or cable lines.

DISADVANTAGES

After studying this proposal carefully, the postal officials most knowledgeable about such matters came to the conclusion that for the following reasons it would not be practical or feasible for the U.S. Postal Service to undertake this service:

1. Each of the 40,000 post offices in the country would have to stock the promissory note forms, and each of them would have to have designated at least one ranking official to become familiar with the program and to witness the signing of the promissory note. This would require an extensive educational program.

2. Many of the post offices would never have occasion to witness such a promissory note; many others might have an occasional case, perhaps "once in a blue moon"; and others would have a few cases a year. The work and expense involved in the distribution of forms, designating the postal officials with authority to perform this service and educating them, would be disproportionate to the number of cases processed.

3. Most of the post offices throughout the country are not open evenings and very few of them are open weekends. Moreover, in most cases the person authorized to witness the promissory note would have to be the postmaster; in larger post offices, some other ranking official would have to do it. These people do not normally work evenings or weekends, and it would be very difficult to contact them for the required service when they were not actually on the job. In view of the emergency nature of the required service and the overriding considerations of urgency, the postal system could not make the program work due to the unavailability of the designated official at all times.

4. This promissory note service is quite different from the passport acceptance service which the Postal Service now performs for the Department: This latter service is performed at only about 800 post offices, it is performed exclusively during normal post office hours, most postal clerks can perform it, and there is no emergency involved requiring immediate action.

While all four of the post office experts' observations appear to the Department to have relevancy, that relating to the unavailability around the clock of an official who could witness the execution of a promissory note is the most telling. As noted earlier, the very nature of the Department's services in death cases requires urgent, immediate action. It does not appear the Postal Service is in a position to serve as a link in the chain of rapid actions that must be taken to perform this service with the required degree of expedition.

(*b*) *Administrative cooperation of local American funeral directors*

In this alternative, the funeral director in the locality where the next of kin or legal representative resides would perform the services that a postal official would perform in alternative (a) above: Stock the promissory note forms, witness the execution of the promissory note signed by the next of kin or legal representative, notify the Department of State by fastest means available when the promissory note had been executed, and promptly forward the signed original and one copy of the note to the Department. In this alternative, the death certification cable would inform the next of kin or legal representative that the local funeral director would perform this service if a U.S.

Government loan is needed to cover the expenses of disposing of the remains as desired.

ADVANTAGES

There is a funeral director located in or close to most inhabited areas in the United States, and one is almost always readily available. Since the funeral director who would witness the execution of the promissory note would also probably be the one who would handle the funeral arrangements for the body shipped from abroad, he would have an interest in performing this service well and expeditiously.

DISADVANTAGES

Except for the likelihood of ready availability, this alternative suffers from the disadvantages of the postal official alternative described above: Promissory note forms would have to be stocked in thousands of funeral directors' offices; the funeral directors would have to be educated in the procedures for witnessing the execution of the note, informing the Department, and forwarding the note and one copy. Most of these funeral directors would never have occasion to act on this information so that the time and effort involved in getting them the forms and instructing them would be largely wasted. Then, too, the funeral directors would not have access to U.S. Government-leased telephone and cable lines so that this alternative would involve some additional communications costs. There is also some question as to whether a non-U.S. Government employee would be acceptable as a witness to a promissory note for a U.S. Government loan. Finally, it could be argued that there would be a possible conflict of interest in that the funeral director would be the vendor of the service and therefore one of the interested parties. For these reasons this alternative procedure seems neither practical nor feasible.

(c) *Administrative cooperation of American Express or Western Union*

Neither of these alternatives offers any advantages that alternatives (a) and (b) do not offer. They suffer from all the disadvantages, and at least one additional disadvantage; namely, that as private sector companies, American Express and Western Union would want payment—and not just reimbursement—for the promissory note service and its related actions.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON PROMISSORY NOTE ALTERNATIVES

(1) None of the people that might perform the promissory note service would be in a position to verify the claimed indigency of the signee, nor could they be expected to pass judgment in this regard. The system would have to operate on an unvetted basis, with all the consequences of bad debt jeopardy.

(2) Next of kin who cannot afford to have remains of deceased family members returned to the United States might under emotional stress make a bad decision in this respect, opt for return of the remains, and regret that decision later when payment falls due. In these circumstances, the Government can expect a high percentage of defaults.

(3) Unless the loan was made on the going prime rate of interest basis, next of kin who might have sufficient funds available or be able to obtain funds from other private sources would be tempted to borrow from the U.S. Government at a reduced interest rate. The Government would then become a competitor of private lending institutions at the taxpayers' expense.

(4) Promissory notes now signed by Americans in foreign countries for loans to cover medical expenses and/or repatriation are notarized by the consular officer. There appears to be no feasible way, given the time constraints, that a promissory note signed by a next of kin for disposal of remains could be notarized.

(5) There would be inequity and discrimination in providing loans for disposition of remains of Americans who die abroad without doing so for Americans who die within the United States at a distance from their final resting place. For example, it can cost just as much, or more, to prepare and ship a body from Hawaii or Alaska to New York as it does from Europe to New York.

COSTS TO U.S. GOVERNMENT OF PROMISSORY NOTE LOAN PROGRAM

A promissory note loan program would involve two cost elements: (1) The funds that would have to be appropriated to provide the loans, and (2) the additional costs to administer the program. It is impossible to predict with accuracy the amount that would be needed to cover the loans. Based on the 1977 statistics, we can predict with some confidence that slightly more than two-thirds of the American citizens who die abroad, most of them naturalized Americans who had returned to their native land for retirement, will be buried or cremated and disposed of locally. Our experience would seem to indicate that most next of kin of these people will not need U.S. Government loan assistance to cover the expense of local burial or cremation. It would also be a rare case in which the next of kin of native Americans who die in retirement abroad will need a U.S. Government loan either for local burial or return of the remains to the United States for burial. Most of these native Americans, if not wealthy, would have sufficient financial resources for these purposes.

We estimate about 400 next of kin might apply for a Government loan to return the body of a relative to the United States. With the average cost of preparing a body for shipment (including casket), and airfreight charges of about $3,000,[2] an appropriation of about $1,419,000 would be needed to provide loans for returning remains to the United States. These estimates are very general because of many variables.

The cost of administering a promissory note loan program should not be great. Printing of the promissory note forms and distributing them, and printing and distributing instructions to whoever might witness the execution of the notes, would cost an estimated $40,000. There might be some small increase in communications cost, but we would anticipate that no additional funds would be necessary for new positions.

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[2] An estimate based on costs reported in the spring of 1978, inflation and fall of the dollar internationally in the interim, and known actual costs in cases during October and November 1978.

Guaranteed Bank Loan Program

In this alternative procedure the death notification cable would inform the next of kin or legal representative that if financing was required to dispose of the remains as desired, he or she could go to the nearest national bank or other lending institution and obtain a loan that would be guaranteed by the U.S. Government.

The loan transaction would be between the lending institution and the next of kin or legal representative, with the U.S. Government serving as guarantor for the repayment of the loan in the event the borrower defaulted within a stipulated time frame and the lender has exhausted his available legal remedies and has been unable to effect recovery of the debt. We would anticipate that the interest rate would be the going rate at the time the loan was executed. The lending institution would not be required to establish the credit-worthiness of the borrower.

Having obtained the loan, the next of kin or legal representative would transmit the funds to the Department through commercial channels and the Department in turn would authorize the consular officer to proceed with the arrangements for the disposition of the remains according to the next of kin's or legal representative's instructions. In short, the Department would handle the case as it now handles trust fund cases involving transmittal of funds abroad.

This alternative procedure would of course require a guarantee arrangement between the U.S. Government and the lending institutions that might agree to participate.

ADVANTAGES

National banks or lending institutions are readily accessible to most Americans, at least during the 5 normal workdays. There would be a minimum of administrative paperwork and few additional services would be required of either the Department or its consular officers abroad. The cost to the U.S. Government would be limited to covering defaulted loans, and the Government itself would not get into the loan collecting aspect of the transaction.

DISADVANTAGES

Assuming that national banks and other lending institutions would agree to participate in this alternative procedure, the major shortcoming would be the difficulty or impossibility of the next of kin's or legal representative's obtaining a loan on weekends or holidays. In view of the urgency involved in death cases, this lack of availability would be a serious impediment. Also, the default rate could be high.

COSTS

This guaranteed bank loan alternative would involve minimal administrative costs to the U.S. Government. Assuming that 400–500 next of kin or legal representatives might take advantage of such a loan guarantee program and that 40–50 percent of them might default (the present rate of default on repatriation loans) the total additional costs of the program to the U.S. Government could amount to as much as $500,000 to $625,000.

Private Company Insurance Policy

As an alternative procedure, a private insurance company, either a nonprofit organization or a standard insurance company, might market a policy covering the disposition of remains of deceased Americans abroad. The policy might be designed to cover local burial, cremation and disposal of the ashes, or preparation and shipment of the body to the United States. The Department would give the policy maximum publicity through the international travel industry. The policy might be sold at airports as are flight accident insurance policies now. This alternative has been discussed with several private insurance companies, which promised to take the proposal under advisement and come back to the Department of State with their views.

ADVANTAGES

Except for the publicity provided by the Department, this procedure would entail no additional costs whatever for the U.S. Government. All financial aspects would be kept in the private sector, among the insuring firm, the policy holder and the next of kin, with the U.S. Government through the Department merely acting as conduit for transmitting information.

DISADVANTAGES

Only persons who purchased a policy would be covered, thus leaving some persons uncovered, depending on marketing techniques and attractiveness of the policies.

COSTS

This alternative procedure would entail no significant additional cost to the U.S. Government. No additional positions and no additional appropriated funds would be required.

Compulsory Surcharge on Passport Fee

The present charge for a passport is $10, plus an execution fee of $3 for the initial application. If an additional $3 were charged and this surcharge were placed in a special "disposition of remains account," enough funds would be generated to defray the cost of preparing and returning the bodies of all Americans who die abroad each year and whose families wish the bodies or ashes to be returned.

Approximately 3,300,000 fee passports are issued each year so that the $3 surcharge would generate about $9,900,000 annually. As noted earlier, of the 6,584 Americans who died abroad (excluding Canada) in 1977, the bodies of 1,702 were returned for burial in the United States. The ashes of 366 were returned. Our posts estimate that an additional 173 bodies might have been returned had Government funds been available for this purpose, thus making 2,241 at most whose bodies or ashes would have been returned in 1977. To this figure should be added about 100 bodies (for calendar 1979) to account for the estimated increase in the number of American deaths abroad each year due to the greater number of Americans traveling internationally, and another 100 (necessarily a rough estimate) for Americans who die in Canada, for a total of 2,441. At an average cost of $3,000 for returning embalmed bodies, the total cost of returning all bodies of Americans

who die abroad whose next of kin desire such return would be about $7,323,000. The $9,900,000 generated by the $3 surcharge would be sufficient to cover this cost and any additional costs due to inflation, fluctuations downward in the value of the dollar in international markets, large numbers of American deaths due to disasters and any miscalculations in the variables.

The $3 passport surcharge would be a form of compulsory insurance which would be of potential benefit to the families of all Americans traveling or residing abroad.

ADVANTAGES

The problems of processing promissory notes would be eliminated since no loans would be involved. The time factor problem in the next of kin's obtaining and transmitting funds would also be eliminated since the cost for returning to the United States the remains of all Americans who die abroad would be automatically covered. The consular officer would proceed with arranging for the return of the remains immediately upon receiving information on the next of kin's desires and the Department could transmit the funds to cover the expenses, drawing on the funds in the special account generated by the $3 surcharge. The death notification cable would simply instruct the next of kin or legal representative to inform the Department of his or her desire with respect to disposition of remains, noting that if the choice is for embalming and shipment of the body, the U.S. Government would defray the cost, including that for a decent but a moderately priced casket. The discrimination element in providing for the return of bodies of Americans who die abroad while not providing for the return of bodies from one State in the Union to another would be eliminated because passport holders would be paying for this coverage with the $3 surcharge. While legislation would be required to authorize the surcharge, no additional appropriations would be necessary.

DISADVANTAGES

There are some countries—Canada, Mexico, and some of the Caribbean islands—that do not require American tourists to have valid passports for entrance. Large numbers of Americans travel to these countries each year. The question arises, therefore, whether Americans who visit these countries without a passport, and hence would not have paid the $3 surcharge, should be covered for the disposition of their remains should they die in one of these countries.

About 15 million Americans presently hold passports with validity up to a period of 5 years. Since these people would not have paid the $3 surcharge, should they be covered for return of their remains if they die abroad?

This alternative would require the consular officer to make every effort to assure that local funeral directors' charges for preparation of the body and for the casket are reasonable, and not inflated in the knowledge that the U.S. Government is defraying the costs.

This alternative would also involve certain additional administrative costs for collecting the $3 surcharge, for transmitting it to the special account and for accounting purposes.

The passport fee has traditionally been based on the cost of providing services and of the book itself. A surcharge to provide disposition-of-remains insurance would depart from this tradition.

Last, some Americans may object to the principle of compulsory insurance of this type and some may object to paying $3 for this service.

COSTS

The additional costs to the U.S. Government would be small. One additional position would be required in the Department to administer the program, but no additional positions would be required overseas.

Voluntary Surcharge on Passport Fee

This alternative would be identical to the previous alternative except that passport applicants would be given the option of paying the $3 surcharge for coverage or not paying it. The option would be clearly explained to all applicants.

ADVANTAGES

By making the surcharge voluntary, any objections based on the principle of compulsion would be eliminated.

DISADVANTAGES

Many passport applicants may not opt for coverage since few people about to travel abroad like to contemplate the possibility of their dying while on their trip.

There would be some administrative problems in operating this alternative. Some system would have to be devised to ascertain rapidly whether or not a deceased American is covered. Possibly a simple notation "Insured" or a symbol to that effect placed in all passports issued after a certain date and whose holders paid the surcharge would be sufficient. The death notification cable would inform the next of kin and the Department whether or not the deceased was insured, based upon the consular officer's examination of the passport, and if insured, the Department would authorize the consular to expend the funds required to comply with the next-of-kin's desires for preparation and shipment of the remains.

COSTS

As in the compulsory passport fee surcharge alternative, this voluntary surcharge alternative would entail only small additional costs to the U.S. Government, including one additional position in the Department.

Recommendations

Of the various alternative procedures described in this report, those that would provide loans to families of American citizens who die abroad for the disposition of remains have least to recommend them. The time, effort, and administrative costs would not be commensurate with the services rendered, and the lack of availability at all times of

an appropriate person to witness the execution of the required promissory note would militate against meeting the deadlines set by many foreign governments for disposition of remains. A sizable appropriation would be necessary, and the default rate on loans would probably be high.

The guaranteed bank loan alternative does not appear to be viable because of the impossibility of families of the deceased to obtain a loan on weekends or holidays. This lack of availability would be a very serious obstacle to the expeditious action required in processing disposition-of-remains cases. In this alternative, too, the default rate would probably be high with the result that the U.S. Government would have to repay considerable sums to the lending banks.

The private company insurance policy alternative has much to recommend it, but it has one limitation: Only those who purchase a policy would be covered. The voluntary passport fee surcharge suffers from this same deficiency.

The $3 compulsory passport fee surcharge would appear to be the simplest alternative. It is the least expensive, easily administered, meets the time constraints for disposition of remains, places little financial risk on the U.S. Government or American taxpayer, and could provide coverage for almost all Americans traveling or residing abroad.

It would entail, however, precedental legislation to increase the passport fee to cover expenses not related to the issuance of a passport, and would compel citizens to buy what they may not need or desire. Consequently, the Department believes that the Government should do its utmost to encourage the private sector of the economy to provide a viable alternative.

If the insurance industry can provide attractive, inexpensive coverage in conjunction with a vigorous marketing program, there should be no need for U.S. Government financial assistance. We have had several discussions with interested insurance companies in the United States as well as with a group from Lloyds of London. We hope to see some proposals in early 1979.

Section 122

SYSTEMATIC INFORMATION SHARING

In keeping with this administration's commitment to openness, candor, and cooperation with the Congress, and in response to the finding of Congress expressed in Section 122, Public Law 95–426, the Department of State proposes the systematic sharing of certain information of the Department with the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. This proposal is consistent with the Department's policy to provide the Congress with the information required to help it fulfill its constitutional role in foreign affairs.

The Department is prepared, on a regular basis, to share with the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate background information on international political and economic issues systematically prepared in the Department. The Office of Congressional Relations will have responsibility for assembling and delivering such information regularly. The Office also has been authorized to work out with the designated representatives of the committees satisfactory controls over the dissemination of information that is provided.

TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS ON FOREIGN CITIZENS

Historically, foreign travelers have been able to travel in the United States virtually unrestricted. This openness not only derived from an apparent assumption that we have nothing to hide, but from a conviction that to know us is at least the beginning of understanding.

The United States has long encouraged all countries to adopt policies of openness in the belief that doing so would promote international understanding. Efforts in this behalf have taken many forms, for example, exchange programs sponsored by civic and religious organizations and by the U.S. Government, legislation passed by the Congress, and policy statements. In the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the United States was a strong advocate of the removal of restrictions on the free movement of people and ideas. Since the signing of the CSCE Final Act at Helsinki in 1975, the United States has continued to work for the fulfillment of these and other provisions of this document.

Section 126 of Public Law 95–426 is a welcome new initiative in support of openness and provisions of international agreements calling for the removal of restrictions.

As a first step in implementing section 126, the Department of State has compiled information of existing restrictions on the travel of U.S. citizens by foreign governments. On the basis of this information and in accordance with the provisions of the law, the Department will advise appropriate governments of the general policy expressed in section 126(a) and continue efforts to remove existing restrictions. The Department will report on the progress of these efforts in subsequent annual reports required in this provision.

In compiling this information, the Department concentrated on restrictions of travel within countries of an arbitrary nature. Visas or immigration laws and regulations as such were not considered an unwarranted restriction of travel since they are generally accepted in international and U.S. law and usually control entry into countries. However, in some cases they are applied in such a way as to constitute an arbitrary restriction of internal travel. In such cases, the restrictive action of the application of visa laws is duly noted.

Section 126(a) and section 126(b)(2) also refer to restrictions imposed by the United States on the private travel of foreign nationals. Aside from the restrictions imposed by the United States on the travel of certain foreign diplomats in accordance with international law discussed below, the only other such restrictions are applied in accordance with the provisions of U.S. visa laws. Restrictions are imposed almost exclusively in conjunction with the issuance of waivers of various grounds of visa ineligibility. These restrictions are not

based on reciprocity or nationality but, as noted, on provisions of U.S. law. In the opinion of the Department, these restrictions are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. Numerically, they are a minute portion of the visas issued to nonofficial foreign travelers. The overwhelming remainder of visas are issued without restrictions on travel within the United States.

The United States restricts the travel of diplomats and other officials of certain countries assigned to embassies and consulates in the United States and to the United Nations in New York. In this case, the restrictions are imposed for reasons of reciprocity and national security in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, of which the United States is a party. In this regard, the Department notes that subsection (d) of section 126 does not permit subsection (a) to be construed as limiting restrictions of travel by foreign officials which are imposed on the basis of reciprocity.

The United States has offered to remove restrictions on the travel of foreign officials if their governments would reciprocate by removing restrictions on the travel of U.S. officials in their countries. In one notable case, the Soviet Union, the United States has never received a positive response to these approaches, although some progress toward the liberalization of restrictions has been made in the ebb and flow of the changes of Soviet policy. When the Soviet Government liberalized their restrictions somewhat in 1974, the United States reciprocated. However, at that time, the United States closed the entire area of several States in the continental United States in response to the informal closing of a number of border areas in the Soviet Union. In 1976, in an initiative connected with the Helsinki Final Act, the United States reopened these areas to travel by Soviet diplomats. The Soviet Government did not respond and the border areas remained closed to travel by U.S. diplomats. In January 1978, the Soviet Government issued an ostensibly liberalized set of travel regulations, although most attempts by members of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to travel in the areas newly opened by these regulations have so far been refused. At the same time, the border areas were formally closed to travel by U.S. diplomats.

In contrast to the almost unexceptional absence of restrictions on nonofficial foreign travel in the United States, a number of other governments impose restrictions on the nonofficial travel of U.S. citizens, and often of other foreigners as well. Based on the information available to the Department, following is a country-by-country description of those restrictions:

Afghanistan.—Tourists are welcome in Afghanistan but may not be permitted to travel to certain areas due to security conditions. Tourists are required to make in-country travel arrangements through Afghan Tours, the Government-owned travel agency. Precise travel regulations and procedures, however, have not been issued. Foreign officials must give a 2-day notice for travel beyond 50 kilometers of Kabul or for overnight stays.

Albania.—Seldom are U.S. citizens permitted to visit Albania. When they are, travel is severely limited. The United States does not have diplomatic relations with Albania.

Algeria.—Relations are imposed on the travel of all foreign officials within the country.

Benin.—Foreign residents are not permitted to leave their areas of residency without prior approval of the Government.

Bulgaria.—The Bulgarian Government has declared certain frontier zones closed to all foreign diplomatic personnel, including those of other Socialist countries, ostensibly for reasons of security. Some of these areas are open to foreign tourists.

Burma.—All tourists in Burma receive visas valid for a maximum of 7 days and subject to travel restrictions. Only Rangoon, Mandalay, and Taunggyi are normally accessible to travelers. These restrictions are justified on the basis of security.

Burundi.—A general curfew from midnight to sunrise, Sunday through Friday, has been in effect since 1976. The travel of all people within the country is subject to limitations.

China, Peoples Republic.—Controls on travel by foreigners are freer now than previously. However, travel is still generally restricted to itineraries and schedules submitted prior to the issuance of visas.

Ethiopia.—Restrictions on the travel of U.S. diplomats are justified on the basis of the prevailing security situation, although they do not appear to be applied to members of the East bloc missions.

Guinea Bissau.—Foreign diplomats are required to request permission to travel outside of the capital city.

Iraq.—Only business visas are issued. Prior permission, requiring 6 days, must be obtained for travel outside Baghdad.

Kampuchea.—U.S. citizens are not normally permitted entry into Kampuchea (formerly Cambodia). Foreigners who have been permitted entry have been subjected to very tight travel restrictions. The United States does not have diplomatic relations with Kampuchea.

Laos.—Foreign visitors to Laos must be sponsored by an official Lao body or organization, or by a foreign diplomatic mission accredited to the Government. Visitors generally must enter and leave Laos by air and may not travel outside the capital city without express permission. The Government states that this latter requirement is for the safety and convenience of foreign travelers.

Libya.—The travel of all foreign diplomats within the country is restricted. Tourists and nonofficial foreign workers are not subject to the same restrictions.

Mongolia.—U.S. citizens rarely visit Mongolia. When they are issued visas, their travel is limited to prearranged itineraries and schedules. The United States does not have diplomatic relations with Mongolia.

Nepal.—Permits are required for travel to several outlying areas of the country, but they are routinely issued.

South Africa.—Travel into the 10 designated black tribes homelands or numerous black residential areas is forbidden to all foreigners and to South Africans themselves unless they legally reside in the area.

Tanzania.—Foreign diplomats must submit diplomatic notes to travel beyond a 50-mile radius of the capital city.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.—Travel of foreigners is ostensibly not permitted in about 25 percent of the area of the Soviet Union. In actuality, up to 90 percent of the country is closed to foreign travelers as a result of close control of transportation and reservations

services and official denials of applications to visit allegedly open areas.

Vietnam.—Few Americans have visited Vietnam in recent years. Most such visits appear to result from invitations extended by the Vietnamese Government which set forth the purpose of the travel and areas to be visited. Travelers are usually accompanied by guides who have the final say over locations to be visited. The United States does not have diplomatic relations with Vietnam.

Yemen, Peoples Democratic Republic (South Yemen).— All foreign travel within the country is tightly controlled. The United States does not have diplomatic relations with the PDRY.

EMPLOYMENT OF FAMILY MEMBERS OVERSEAS

Section 401 of the Act of October 7, 1978, and section 413 of the Act of August 17, 1977, look toward the expansion of employment opportunities for family members of U.S. Government personnel assigned abroad. Section 401(c) directs that a report be submitted describing actions taken by the Department pursuant to these two sections.

CONVERSION OF ALIEN POSITIONS

The Department is keenly aware of the important impact that spouse employment is having on its personnel system. There is a growing trend toward preference for Washington assignment, fewer families are accompanying employees overseas and morale is down in many posts where employment is limited. Not only are Foreign Service spouses generally well educated professionals who seek challenging employment, they also increasingly find that they must work to meet the financial requirements of their children's education.

The Department has given considerable study to how it might help broaden employment opportunities for family members overseas. Progress depends not on a single solution but on seeking innovations in many areas, and we therefore appreciate the authority in section 401 of the 1978 Act to establish a program for the employment of family members in certain vacant alien positions. We want our response to be creative but equitable, and we have identified several potentially serious problems that we believe must be evaluated in a trial program so that they may be dealt with effectively when the program is placed into worldwide effect.

We have concern about the effect the program will have on the legitimate interests of our foreign national employees on whom we must continue to rely for many vital services. We believe some host governments may have concern about the reduction in employment opportunities for their nationals that will result from this program. Also, from the management standpoint, we need to insure that post managers abroad are able to keep all positions filled at all times by qualified employees.

In order to evaluate the above kinds of problems, we are establishing a pilot program with AID and ICA at a cross section of Foreign Service posts, currently 15 in number. To date, these posts have identified 36 foreign national positions which are, or are expected to become vacant within the next 6 months, and for which qualified family members are believed to be available.

During the pilot program, we will discuss procedures with other agencies for the inclusion of their positions and personnel in the pro-

gram. We have already discussed this with Department of Defense staff who have advised us that they are in the process of revising their program for the employment of family members of Defense personnel assigned abroad to provide opportunities for family members of personnel of other agencies. We believe this program can be operated most effectively on a cooperative basis by all agencies with all qualified family members being given equal consideration for the available jobs. We expect that all agencies will work toward this end.

The Department will send you a followup report on this program at the end of the pilot phase which we expect to complete in less than 1 year.

Reciprocal Arrangements With Foreign Governments

Section 401 of the 1978 Act also directed that the President seek to conclude agreements with other nations to facilitate employment of family members in foreign economies. The Department has developed and cleared proposed regulations providing for reciprocity on this matter with the House Judiciary Committee and with the Departments of Justice and Labor. The regulations are expected to be published in the Federal Register as a notice of proposed rulemaking within the next few days. The public will have 60 days to comment. Upon completion of the 60-day posting period, any public comments received must be studied and answered before a final ruling can be made putting the new regulations into effect.

Although we realize it is probable that only a limited number of countries will want to enter into reciprocal arrangements with us at this time, we hope these regulations will result in the granting of work permits to family members of U.S. Government employees in some countries that have withheld them in the past.

Employment in Non-Career Positions

Section 413 of the 1977 Act directs the Secretary to give equal consideration to qualified family members when filling non-career positions abroad. Although there are not many such positions, the Department continues to employ qualified family members in temporary positions abroad. We have recently updated our regulations governing such appointments to both define the kinds of positions appropriate for such staffing and to provide guidelines and cautions to our post managers to guard against the actual or apparent violation of the nepotism or conflict of interest statutes.

Activities of Family Liaison Office

On March 1, 1978, the Family Liaison Office was established with three full-time positions. Ms. Janet Lloyd is the Director and reports to the Under Secretary for Management. In addition, 35 branch offices have been established throughout the world. The Office functions as an information referral and counseling service for family members of State, ICA and AID. It also serves as a communication channel between individuals and management.

The Office is involved in the coordination of all management decisions that relate to family members, both overseas and domestically.

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The Family Liaison Office has worked with other areas of the Department to implement section 405 (Orientation and Language Training for Family Members) and section 401 (Employment of Family Members Overseas) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979. The Office is working on several inter-agency projects pertaining to such matters as mental health, employment, allowances, schooling and other areas of family concerns in an effort to make the foreign affairs community more cohesive.

In addition the Office established a centralized computer skills bank to facilitate the matching of family members seeking employment with available jobs. Questionnaires from about 300 family members have been returned and are being put into the system. A contract has just been let to establish liaison with international organizations and multinational corporations to make them aware of the skills of family members of Foreign Service employees and to give notice to the Family Liaison Office of their vacancies.

Two career counseling workshops for family members in Washington have been sponsored by this Office. These proved of such interest that regular monthly luncheons are being held for family members to exchange information and to acquaint family members returning from abroad with the program.

REVIEW OF FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS AND COMPENSATION

Section 413 of the Act of October 7, 1978, suggests that the Secretary conduct a thorough review of the personnel needs of the Foreign Service and of the suitability of the current compensation system. Section 413(c) directs that a report be submitted describing the results of this review.

PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS

The Department finds that it has been asked to perform more and more functions without comparable increases in its personnel resources. The reports accompanying section 413 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1979 point out that the United States has expanded its diplomatic representation abroad dramatically and that our consular workload has increased significantly while the total number of personnel of the Department has remained approximately the same. In addition, the Department has found it necessary to assume or strengthen a number of other responsibilities in recent years. These include activities in the science and technology, counterterrorism, human rights, narcotics, ethics oversight, declassification, and Freedom of Information and Privacy Act areas.

These pressures have caused a number of shifts in departmental personnel resources. Since 1970, the following trends have taken place: The number of positions (both overseas and domestic) for Americans doing political reporting and analysis has declined 18 percent; although the economic/commercial functions has increased sharply in importance during this period, the number of positions for Americans in this function has been increased by only 2 percent. In contrast, American positions in the consular function have increased by 26 percent. There has also been a substantial shift of positions as the Department converted reimbursable administrative positions to direct positions in fiscal year 1977 to cope more effectively with the increasingly large burdens of supporting other agencies overseas. Moreover, there has been an overall reduction of American positions in the regional bureaus as the Department sought to comply with mandated requirements for strengthening its functional bureaus.

The Department has reviewed its personnel requirements within the severe constraints imposed by the congressional mandate to reduce its personnel ceilings to 1977 levels (Leach amendment) and by the President's directive that all Government agencies seek ways to reduce expenditures. It is in this context that the Department, through the zero-based budget process, made the hard choices required in developing its 1980 budget request.

During the review, we searched for ways to achieve reductions and determined that the following would be necessary: Closing more than a dozen of the least essential Foreign Service posts; reducing the schedule for prison visits abroad; reducing the central management, personnel, and administrative positions of the Department; reducing the Foreign Service national positions abroad through tightening and curtailing of post operations; reorganizing domestic operations in consular affairs, reducing operations in the international organization affairs and intelligence and research areas; and reducing administrative support provided other agencies to the extent possible.

Personnel needs are reviewed not only in the determination of budget year programs but also on a daily basis both within the organizational components of the Department and at the central management level. However, we now believe that the Department is reaching the limit in terms of its ability to reprogram positions to meet new workload requirements with current personnel resources.

Accordingly, some very hard choices are going to have to be made concerning the Department's ability to continue performing certain of its basic functions. Specifically, in taking personnel reductions over the past several years the Department has had no choice but to focus on the most immediate demands placed upon it. This has tended to force resources from long-term and less measurable needs (such as indepth reporting and analysis) to more immediate and pressing requirements. Future central management review of the allocation of Department personnel resources must make provision to insure that valid long-term capabilities are not further eroded.

Compensation

The Department could not spare the personnel resources to conduct the in-depth study of the Foreign Service compensation system contemplated by section 413. Accordingly we have arranged to contract for such a study with the internationally respected consulting firm of Hay Associates.

The contract calls for the firm to review and evaluate the adequacy of all aspects of the existing Foreign Service compensation system in relation to other governmental and private organizations with overseas operations. The firm's report will include an overall analysis related to the overseas salary and benefit structure, viz, what is required to attract, retain, and motivate employees selected for overseas employment. The contract also calls for Hay Associates to present the Department optional approaches to the linkage problem—the appropriate relationship of the Foreign Service pay structure to other Government and private pay structures.

Since the contract has just been let, the results will not be known for several months. As soon as they are, we will send you the results along with recommendations which we now have under consideration to simplify and improve the Foreign Service salary structure.

SECTION 504(e)

REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

I. SUMMARY

The international activities of the Government relating to science and technology are now so extensive that almost no department or agency is unaffected. With the widening number of agencies involved and the growing complexity of interaction, new problems relating to the consistency between foreign policy and domestic science policy and resources have arisen.

There is, in fact, no sharp distinction between domestic and international aspects of science and technology. The National Science, Engineering, and Technology Policy and Priorities Act of 1976 lists as the first priority goal for U.S. science and technology,

> "fostering leadership in the quest for international peace and progress toward human freedom, dignity, and well-being by enlarging the contributions of American scientists and engineers to the knowledge of man and his universe, by making discoveries of basic science widely available at home and abroad, and by utilizing technology in support of U.S. national and foreign policy goals."

Title V of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act seeks to further these national objectives. The legislation sets forth certain responsibilities of the President and the Secretary of State in the interaction of science, technology, and foreign policy. The Department of State's analysis of the provisions of title V concluded that their impact would be felt most strongly in three areas:

—long-term planning related to the interaction of science, technology, and foreign policy;
—procedures for interagency coordination of international scientific and technological activities; and
—procedures for recruiting, training, and motivating personnel to carry out title V's objectives.

This report deals separately with these three topics.

LONG-TERM PLANNING

To strengthen its planning capabilities, the Department of State has established a policy assessment staff in the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Science Affairs (OES). This staff began operations this month and will be the focus of the Department's long-range science and technology planning efforts. It will work with

the OES operating offices, the Department's policy planning staff (S/P), and the planning offices of the Department's regional and functional bureaus. In addition, the staff will be responsible for improving the flow of information on planning and long-term objectives between the Department of State, other agencies, the Congress, and the public.

The Department will make use of the Committee on International Science, Engineering, and Technology (CISET) of the Federal Coordination Council on Science, Engineering, and Technology (FCCSET) as a vehicle for the review and evaluation of long-range planning with interagency significance.

The Department of State plans to establish pilot programs with a few key domestic agencies whose programs affect foreign policy objectives, to explore joint long-range planning initiatives. The effort will identify current or potential agency programs with foreign policy implications and relate these to foreign policy objectives and priorities in a country and regional framework.

To improve the use of experts and ideas from outside the Government, the Department of State plans to establish, subject to approval in accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, a Department of State Public Advisory Committee for Science and Technology. Discussions have begun with representatives of the academic, industrial, and other elements of the science and technological communities. The Department is also evaluating the adequacy of its research program in international science and technology.

Criteria and guidelines by which to measure the value of new science and technology initiatives both in terms of U.S. foreign policy and scientific and technical benefits will be established on a country, and where appropriate, regional basis. OES, in cooperation with technical agencies, will be responsible for developing such criteria.

A systematic interagency evaluation of U.S. Government international science and technology activities needs to be established. Provision for interim evaluations and periodic reviews should be built into international science and technology agreements.

OES will maintain close contact with the governmental and private sectors to identify new technologies and to assess their potential impact on foreign policy. The Department of State will explore with domestic agencies how they may strengthen the relations between those elements of their agencies engaged in technology development and those elements concerned with the planning of international programs. The Chairman of CISET will review the results of these discussions.

The information needs of the U.S. Government in this field will be periodically reviewed to insure that they fairly reflect priority requirements in the civil science and technology areas. OES will be the focal point for preparing, updating, and circulating reporting priorities to science counselors and attachés abroad with the concurrence of the geographic bureaus of the Department and in consultation with other agencies.

COORDINATION AND OVERSIGHT

The growing importance and complexity of international activities involving science and technology has required adaptation of current coordinating relationships and mechanisms and the creation of new ones. These activities involve North-South problems and the impact

of global energy, environmental, and other issues on our economic, political and security relationships with other countries and international organizations. The report describes the principal modalities for executive branch coordination and oversight of these international activities and identifies the existing problems and opportunities to improve performance.

Communication must be improved between State and the technical agencies, between Washington and the field, and between the executive branch, the Congress, and the public. The Department of State plans to develop an information system to provide necessary data about the purpose, participants or organization, duration, cost and agency responsibilities for selected international activities. There will be a special emphasis on information on international agreements in science and technology. Stress will be placed on early notification of an intent to negotiate agreements. The Department will review requirements for information on foreign scientific and technological developments and will ask overseas missions for requisite reporting and analysis. OES will establish a science attaché support unit to coordinate this and related tasks with the geographic bureaus.

The Department of State will strengthen coordination between OES and the geographic and functional bureaus. Using CISET as a vehicle, and in coordination with OSTP and the technical agencies, State will be responsible for the preparation of the annual report called for in section 503(b), will ask agencies to designate a central contact point for international activities relating to science and technology and will designate OES staff members to serve as central contact points for each of the agencies with which it deals.

PERSONNEL TRAINING

The Department of State believes that to carry out its responsibilities to coordinate and oversee the international science and technology activities of the Government both scientific and technical professionals and career Foreign Service personnel with background in foreign political and economic affairs will be required. The Director General's office in conjunction with OES is about to undertake a major survey to provide a detailed data base for future decisions on recruitment, training, and assignment of personnel in the science and technology area.

The adequacy of training resources has been the subject of several studies in recent years. There is a consensus that while existing training opportunities meet many of the needs of the Government, over the next several years present programs may need to be augmented. Increases in training programs should be introduced gradually, as resources permit and as career professionals become better motivated to acquire this training through a recognition of its relevance and a perception of career rewards in the field of science, technology, and foreign affairs.

Both in the Department of State and in a number of technical agencies there is support for an expansion of staff exchanges. Some 13 Foreign Service officers are currently working in such agencies as NASA, EPA, and the Council on Environmental Quality. Such programs offer Foreign Service personnel the opportunity to learn how major science and technology activities are planned and carried out.

The domestic agency, in turn, benefits from the foreign policy perspective that Department of State officers can provide, or which their employees can obtain from a Washington or foreign assignment with the Department of State. The Department of State is studying staffing requirements to support a program of interagency exchanges in international science and technology.

The Department of State is examining the establishment of a program to familiarize ambassadors and other senior officers with the scientific and technological subjects most relevant to their overseas mission.

RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

The recommendations contained in this report will be implemented in a phased way. In many cases they will be tested on a pilot basis. Thus, the initial stage of implementing the provisions of title V can be carried out within existing personnel and budgetary resources. Under current administration budget and employment policies, any additional resource needs would have to be accommodated within the current budget planning levels of the Department of State. In addition, the recently enacted "Leach amendment" to the Civil Service Reform Act mandates statutory limitations on the total number of civilian employees in the executive branch, with the result that September 30, 1979 employment will be about 20,000 below the level estimated in the President's 1979 budget. Therefore, in the period ahead even small increases in any area become difficult or impossible without additional resources.

The time available for the preparation of this report has not permitted the development of complete proposals for operating under the new mandate contained in the act. Therefore, we do not have a firm basis on which to project estimates of personnel and funding requirements. However, we have provided illustrative estimates which are not based on completed assessments of the scope of activities to be undertaken. As we gain experience and develop firm plans for implementing the provisions of title V, we will prepare the related estimates of resource requirements. These will be considered in the established executive branch budget review process and presented to the Congress in accordance with the regular authorization and appropriation procedures.

II. Introduction

This report on science and technology in international affairs is submitted in accordance with section 504(e) of the Public Law 95–426, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, which calls for a report "on the implementation of the responsibilities of the Secretary under this title." These responsibilities include "coordination and oversight with respect to all major science or science and technology agreements and activities between the United States and foreign countries, international organizations, or commissions of which the United States and one or more foreign countries are members." [1]

A large number of U.S. Government agencies take part in these agreements and carry out these activities. Consequently, this report

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[1] The full text of title V ("Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy") of the statute is contained in appendix A.

has been prepared with the participation of these agencies—see appendix B—using the Committee on International Science, Engineering and Technology of the Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering and Technology as the mechanism for coordination.

In addition, the Department of State officials responsible for the drafting of the report have consulted Members of Congress, their staff, prominent members of the nongovernmental science and technology community, leaders of industry, and U.S. embassies abroad.[2]

The Department of State expresses its appreciation to all those who participated in the preparation of this report for their invaluable assistance.

The Department of State's analysis of the provisions of Public Law 95–426 relating to science, technology, and foreign policy indicated that the impact of this legislation would be most strongly felt in three principal areas:

Long-term planning related to the interaction of science, technology, and foreign policy;

The procedures and mechanisms for the interagency coordination of international scientific and technology activities of the U.S. Government; and

The types of training and personnel procedures needed to support the implementation of the legislation.

The report is therefore divided into three sections, each dealing with one of the above topics. Each was felt to constitute a sufficiently well-defined cluster of issues to merit separate discussion in a separate section of the report. This separate treatment of the three themes should not obscure the close and manifold linkages between them.

The Department recognizes the importance of the existing institutions and modalities which have already been established to coordinate U.S. Government activities in international science and technology. The overall approach of this report is to use existing institutions to the maximum extent possible and to avoid duplicating functions that are already well performed elsewhere in the Government. The Development Coordinating Committee, for example, represents a functioning mechanism for approaching the development-related issues addressed in this report. Full utilization of such institutions is vital to the effective discharge of the responsibilities set out in title V. Where new or revitalized mechanisms are needed, they should be introduced as part of a careful, phased approach initially concentrating on areas where foreign policy considerations are particularly important.

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The emergence of science and technology as a major consideration of U.S. foreign policy is now widely acknowledged.[3] Science and

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[2] See appendix C for a summary of the views of selected U.S. embassies and missions on issues related to title V.

[3] Neither the statute nor this report attempts to state precise definitions of "science" and "technology." The report covers both science and technology, as they are commonly understood. The only areas which have been excluded are those relating to intelligence sources and methods (in accordance to section 503(c) of Public Law 95–426) and those relating to specific military applications. The latter have been discussed in a number of reports to the Congress required by other legislation, including the August 1978 report on the impact of the transfer of military-related technology required by section 24 of the International Security Assistance Act of 1977.

It is recognized, however, that it is normally technology which is more closely linked with foreign policy. The maintenance of the historic commitment of the United States to the free exchange of scientific ideas and freedom of travel and expression for scientists is a basic assumption of this report.

technology are at the heart of the economic development process and of international trade; they are the key to meeting national security requirements, to satisfying the world's vastly increased demand for food and mineral resources and to pursuing the goals of nonproliferation and disarmament. While much international activity in science and technology is carried out by universities, professional associations, nongovernmental organizations and private industry, the Government is involved to a considerable extent in the funding of such programs, and, of course, Government regulations and policies clearly influence international activities of the private sector.

The international activities of the Government relating to science and technology are now so extensive and varied that almost no department or agency is unaffected.[4] In the last 20 years, new technical agencies have become major components of Government, deeply involved in the planning and initiation of both domestic and international programs of fundamental significance. The decision of President Carter to propose a Foundation for International Technological Cooperation demonstrates the importance which this administration assigns to science and technology as elements of international relations and has been fully taken into account in preparing this report.

With the widening circle of agencies involved and the growing complexity of interaction, it is not surprising that new problems have arisen. The requirements of public policy and of efficient use of our resources demand that serious efforts be undertaken to assure a reasonable consistency between our foreign policy and other national goals. Indeed it would be a mistake to draw a sharp distinction between domestic and international aspects of science and technology. The National Science, Engineering and Technology Policy and Priorities Act of 1976 lists as the first priority goal for U.S. science and technology,

> "fostering leadership in the quest for international peace and progress toward human freedom, dignity and well-being by enlarging the contributions of American scientists and engineers to the knowledge of man and his universe, by making discoveries of basic science widely available at home and abroad, and by utilizing technology in support of United States national and foreign policy goals."

This statutory language serves as a reminder that domestic and foreign policy considerations are closely entwined. Domestic agricultural research, for example, can crucially affect the world's food supply as well as the U.S. balance of payments and the prosperity of American farmers. Energy research is critical to world stability and U.S. security as fossil fuel reserves become increasingly inadequate to cover growing demands. Space technologies have provided spinoff benefits in many fields, some of them with strong foreign as well as domestic policy implications.

Recognition of the importance of science and technology to foreign policy is not new to U.S. foreign policymakers. Both congressional

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[4] A catalogue of such activities is in appendix D. The activities are carried out under Government bilateral or multilateral agreements or, in many cases, under agreements between U.S. agencies and their foreign counterparts. A partial listing of such agreements, showing their enormous diversity and scope, is in appendix E.

and executive branch concerns have generated a series of studies of the relationship between science, technology, and foreign policy, of which the Berkner Report commissioned in 1949 was the precursor. Among more recent studies, those by the Murphy Commission, by Dr. T. Keith Glennan, and the report prepared by Dr. Franklin Huddle of the Congressional Research Service for Chairman Zablocki of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs are indispensable for understanding the issues raised in this report. Recently an interagency panel studied the nature and extent of U.S. bilateral relationships in science and technology and how they are initiated and carried out. The findings of this panel have influenced significantly the content of this title V report and it is our hope that they can soon be made available to Congress and the public.

The Department of State views this report as only the first step in what we intend to be a continuing process of improving our ability to apply national resources in science and technology in support of our foreign policy goals. There are several complex issues raised by title V, such as the establishment of more definite criteria for evaluating international scientific and technological activities which require further interagency study. The Department intends to submit a followup report to the Congress in about 6 to 9 months—June to September 1979—in which these and similar issues will be dealt with more fully and a status report provided on the actions and recommendations set forth in this report. Plans for the preparation of the first Presidential report to the Congress, stipulated in section 503(b) of the act will also be described in the followup report.

III. Long-Term Planning

A. INTRODUCTION

In section 501(4) of Public Law 95–426, Congress has stated that,

> "the effective use of science and technology in international relations for the mutual benefit of all countries requires the development and use of the skills and methods of long-range planning."

More broadly, Public Law 94–282, the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization and Priorities Act of 1976 calls for the maintenance of,

> "central policy planning elements in the executive branch which assist Federal agencies in . . . anticipating future concerns to which science and technology can contribute and devising strategies for the conduct of science and technology for such purposes."

It is clear that Congress intends long-range planning to be an essential component of policy formulation relating to the interaction of science, technology, and foreign policy.

Two other sections of Public Law 95-426 are relevant to long-range planning, and, indeed, to the entire range of issues dealt with in this report. In section 502(1) the Congress has stated that,

> "technological opportunities, impacts, changes, and threats should be anticipated and assessed, and appropriate measures should be implemented to influence such technological developments in ways beneficial to the United States and other countries."

This language underlines the intimate relationship between planning and evaluation. While the latter must equally be a part of ongoing operations, it is discussed principally in this section of the report.

Finally, section 501(3) of the statute states that:

> ". . . in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of the technological aspects of U.S. foreign policy, the U.S. Government should seek out and consult with both public and private industrial, academic, and research institutions concerned with modern technology."

While the primary focus of this report is on activities carried out within the executive branch,[5] the Department of State appreciates the fundamental role played by the private sector in furthering the interests of the Nation in international science and technology and, as noted below, intends to devote increased attention to exchanges of information and ideas with the nongovernmental scientific and technological community.

B. CURRENT LONG-TERM PLANNING RELEVANT TO INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ACTIVITIES

Science and technology are now widely accepted as significant components of U.S. diplomacy. They are, for example, important elements of the North/South dialog, East/West relations and relations with our allies. It is also recognized that systematic, long-term planning is essential if we are to insure that the international activities of the U.S. Government are conducted in a manner which insures maximum benefit to the United States and other countries.

Technical agency long-range planning

It is difficult to characterize the nature and level of long-term planning activities in international science and technology in view of the diversity of the various agencies which play a role in this area. In general, domestic agencies do not have staffs uniquely devoted to this aspect of long-range planning; rather they integrate the activities of program planners and project managers and international affairs staff personnel for long-term planning purposes. For example, NASA in its overall planning activities develops 5-year plans in each of its program offices. In this connection, NASA's International Affairs Division works closely with the key officials in each of the program offices to provide advice on the international implications of proposed projects and to identify opportunities for international cooperation.

Substantial research and analysis is undertaken by agencies and their contractors and consultants which bears on longer term U.S. objectives in the foreign policy area to which science and technology are relevant; however, it tends to be fragmentary and ad hoc. It generally is not undertaken in a framework designed to deal explicitly with longer range foreign policy problems.

Interagency planning

Recent interagency examination of critical problem areas, such as those carried out under the aegis of the National Security Council and the Office of Science and Technology Policy—for example, technology

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[5] Unless stipulated otherwise, whenever "international activities", or "agencies" are mentioned in this report, they are understood to be those of the U.S. Government.

transfer and North/South issues which have significant science and technology components—routinely have examined longer term factors as an integral part of the overall assessments. The Department of State has played a major role in their preparation and coordination.

While considerable attention has been devoted to examination of long-term aspects of specific subject areas, there is also a need for more systematic planning activities throughout the Government designed to assess future problems and opportunities as they relate to trends in science and technology and global politics. In this connection, there are some important efforts under way to look into the future more systematically. One of these is the pending "Global 2000" study which is a projection of the population, environment and natural resources at the beginning of the next century undertaken jointly by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) and the State Department at the direction of the President. There is also an assessment being done with the National Academy of Sciences under a contract by the National Science Foundation in connection with the first of the Foundation's biennial "Five-Year Outlook" reports on U.S. national goals in science and technology.

Department of State planning

Science and technology issues are included in the Department's policy assessment and planning process. These issues are treated along with other important policy questions in intensive interchanges between overseas posts and the Department in periodic policy messages and discussion designed to review past performance and to set future goals. Specific attention is given to issues with a science and technology component such as energy, technology transfer, nuclear nonproliferation, the environment, law of the sea, international telecommunications, and outer space.

The Secretary's policy planning staff (S/P), the primary policy planning office for the Secretary of State on all issues, includes three officers who concentrate on global issues or policies which have significant scientific and technological content. These comprise issues which overlap bureaus or focus on a significant foreign policy problem such as North-South relations.

There has been a general recognition that long-term planning functions in the Department of State related to science and technology must be strengthened. In the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) attention to long-term considerations has generally been the responsibility of operating offices where the burden of dealing with today's crisis diminishes the opportunity for staff members to devote sufficient thought to long-term problems. The lack of a long-range planning staff in OES has in the past detracted from a fully coordinated, structured, and systematic long-range planning effort for the Bureau.

In recognition of this deficiency, the Department authorized in late 1977 the establishment of a policy assessment staff in OES consisting of four professionals and two clerical positions. The office began operation this month and will play a key role in the Department's long-range planning efforts, working in close collaboration with the OES operating offices which will be expected to develop an expanded concern for long-range planning and policy considerations, the Depart-

ment's policy planning staff (S/P), and the planning offices of the regional and functional bureaus. The staff will be the centerpiece of a reinvigorated policy planning effort in OES centered around a policy planning council composed of the new policy assessment staff and the Bureau's Deputy Assistant Secretaries, an effort which is designed to catalyze the efforts of all the areas of the Bureau in long-range planning.

OES is now considering how best to establish a Public Advisory Committee for Science and Technology. Preliminary planning has gone forward with the participation of representatives of the academic, industrial, and other elements of the scientific and technological communities. Discussions to date have focused on several questions: (1) Organization and composition of the advisory structure; (2) charter or mandate for the advisory group; (3) interaction between the advisory group and OES policy assessment staff, the Secretary's policy planning staff, and principal functional units; (4) development of external research strategies; and (5) objectives of the advisory structure. We expect the advisory committee will assist OES and the Department of State in long-range planning activities by providing technical expertise and fresh viewpoints from outside the Government.

In addition, OES will continue to use existing advisory committees in connection with specialized areas of actvities. The Department's Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology and Development, of which the Assistant Secretary of OES is a member ex officio, deals with such issues as technology transfer and transnational data flow by transitional enterprises. The Ocean Affairs Advisory Committee, under the aegis of OES, meets regularly on issues such as fisheries, Antarctica, and marine science and technology. There are also such statutory advisory committees as the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Advisory Committee and the International North Pacific Fisheries Advisory Commission in which the Department plays an important role.

While the Department has had an active external research program in science and technology—fiscal year 1979 funding is at $500,000—it is currently reviewing the adequacy of funding of this program. It is clear that more use of research consultants and similar services would help to improve planning.

C. INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT AND EVALUATION

There is general agreement that inadequate attention has been devoted in the past to the need for systematic evaluations of international science and technology activities and agreements, to provide a sound basis for decisions concerning their possible modification or termination. In addition, despite some exceptions in the past few years, such evaluations as were done often lacked the thoroughness and depth of analysis required for enlightened decisionmaking.

We need a more systematic way to evaluate the foreign policy benefits of major international science and technology agreements. The Department of State has the responsibility for insuring an integrated assessment, including a careful study of foreign policy implications.

For this it looks to the domestic agencies [6] and technically qualified outside consultants. This activity is also important for long-range planning since such planning can only be built on reliable knowledge about existing programs and activities.

The evaluation process described above must be closely related to the resource allocation process. Domestic agency funding decisions are based on an assessment of the scientific and technical merits of a given program and its priority within available resources. Where international science and technology agreements need to be undertaken for primarily foreign policy purposes, alternative funding arrangements will be examined.

D. IDENTIFICATION OF DOMESTIC SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS WITH INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS

An essential component of long-term planning will be the effort to anticipate new developments in domestic technology which could have important implications for future U.S. foreign policy.

Scientific and technical staffs of domestic agencies working on domestic programs together with the agencies' international staffs are often able to identify opportunities for international cooperation. But, there does not seem to be a systematic effort to identify emerging new technologies and to explore their implications for U.S. foreign policy objectives. The establishment of the FITC can make a major contribution here.

E. IDENTIFICATION OF FOREIGN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY WITH DOMESTIC IMPLICATIONS

Knowledge of foreign developments in science and technology can make an important contribution to the strength of U.S. domestic programs, as well as providing information of significance for foreign policy.

We learn about important new foreign developments through a variety of means. Exchanges in the private sector—for example, scientist to scientist and international scientist gatherings—are generally considered adequate to keep the United States abreast of significant developments in the area of basic science. On the technology side, technical agencies seem able generally to stay abreast of foreign scientific and technological developments in their own fields.

The industrial and commercial sectors have less confidence in the adequacy of information. Better communication between Government and industry would be helpful in this regard.

U.S. collection assets in science and technology historically have tended to focus on military-related areas, and this has become even more prevalent because of resource constraints. Principal collectors of nonmilitary information are the U.S. scientific attachés who, because of their small number and the variety of tasks assigned to them,

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[6] It is worth noting that, whereas no organic ties exist between the Department of State and the domestic agencies, AID operates under executive authority delegated to the Secretary of State, who has statutory responsibility for continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance. Consequently, relations between the Department of State and AID are different in character from those between State and the domestic agencies.

have had limited capabilities to report on significant foreign developments. The domestic agencies, on the other hand, have become through their activities abroad an important source of information on foreign developments in their respective areas.

F. ACTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Long-term planning

1. The newly created OES policy assessment staff will develop procedures to improve the flow of information on planning and objectives between State and other agencies. It will seek ways of involving other agencies activity in the work of this office and explore the establishment of a fellowship program with the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

2. The Department of State will seek to broaden its utilization of outside expertise by: (a) Creating subject to approval in accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act, a Department of State Public Advisory Committee for Science and Technology, (b) increasing the use of studies and analyses prepared by scientists and other specialists in the nongovernmental community, and (c) studying the feasibility of alternative approaches, such as a contractual relationship with a Rand-type institution.

3. The Department of State will make use of CISET as a forum for the review and evaluation of long-range planning which has broad interagency significance. The Department will ask agencies with major international programs to inform the Chairman of CISET of steps they could take to strengthen joint long-range planning activities.

4. The Department of State will seek to establish small pilot programs with a few key domestic agencies where programs affect foreign policy objectives to explore possible approaches to systematic joint long-range planning activities. As part of this process, an effort will be made to identify the foreign policy implications of selected agency activities and relate these to foreign policy objectives and priorities in a country and regional framework. The effort will also try to identify emerging technologies and explore their implications for U.S. foreign policy objectives, as well as to promote joint evaluation of ongoing international scientific and technological activities. These programs will consist initially of small state-technical agency task forces to identify and analyze alternative approaches to meeting the above objectives.

5. The Department will work closely with the appropriate staff agencies of the Congress, such as the General Accounting Office (GAO), the Science Policy Research Division of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA). The Department will also draw upon the National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, the Institute of Medicine, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and similar organizations as possible sources of aid in planning and evaluation.

Program initiation and funding

6. Each domestic agency engaged in major international activities will be encouraged to develop an overall strategy with appropriate criteria and clearly defined objectives for its international activities.

This will be undertaken on a pilot basis with a few agencies selected for the potential impact of their activities on foreign policy objectives.

7. Criteria to measure new initiatives against U.S. foreign policy objectives should be established on a selective country-by-country basis, and where appropriate, regional basis. OES, in cooperation with the NSC, OSTP, OMB, as well as relevant technical agencies, and other concerned Bureaus in the Department of State should take responsibility for developing such criteria.

8. No new program should be initiated for which funding is not existent or clearly attainable. It is important, therefore, that the planning process establish a solid framework of objectives in a timely manner and identify financial and manpower questions at the earliest stages.

9. State will work with OSTP, OMB, AID, FITC, and other interested agencies to develop a policy for funding international science and technology programs. This will be based on a careful study of the following categories:

—funding international activities undertaken primarily in support of domestic agency missions;
—funding international activities of foreign policy significance;
—funding as part of development assistance;

10. Consideration will be given to a periodic conference among the agencies engaged in major international science and technology activities, to occur at an appropriate point during the annual budget cycle, which could provide information on major agency international program elements. The conference, called by the Department of State, would seek to insure rational planning and avoid program duplication.

Program review

11. A systematic evaluation and review of selected U.S. Government international science and technology activities and agreements on an interagency basis is needed. This should include the domestic science and technology agencies as well as the foreign policy agencies engaged in development aid. The proposed Foundation for International Technological Cooperation (FITC) could play a key role in this respect.

12. Each science and technology agreement should include specific plans for interim evaluations and periodic reviews and should address the matter of termination either by explicit provision for automatic termination or a clear expression of mutual expectation of termination in order to avoid easy renewal.

13. Reviews, at a minimum, should be conducted when an agreement is scheduled for renewal or termination or when political circumstances warrant a reevaluation. The annual report called for in section 503(b) of the statute should summarize the reviews carried out during the reporting year and their results.

14. The Department of State will provide more assistance to its overseas posts in the preparation of field evaluations. Such assistance will include provision of explicit guidance, consultation between the Department and field science and technology officers, and regional conferences for post science and technology officers.

Impact of new technologies

15. A key function of the OES functional offices and the policy assessment staff will be to maintain close contact with the governmental

and private science and technology sectors in exchange of information about new technologies and to assess their impact on foreign policy. A program to carry out this function will be developed in OEC and will include initially a pilot program designed to examine foreign policy implications of new technologies.

16. The Department of State will ask domestic agencies to review, and where necessary, strengthen the relationship between elements of their agencies engaged in technology development and those concerned with the planning of international activities. Each such department and agency will be requested to provide the chairman of CISET its action on this recommendation for the followup report to the Congress.

17. The CISET framework will be used as appropriate to address the question of early identification of new technology with foreign policy implications. Such activities as programmatic reviews should utilize program personnel and resources of relevant technical agencies.

Monitoring of foreign science and technology

18. Reporting requirements will be periodically reviewed to insure that they adequately reflect the priority interests of the Government for information on foreign science and technology developments. OES will be the focal point for preparing, updating, and circulating reporting priorities to science counselors and attachés abroad with the concurrence of the geographic bureaus of the Department and in consultation with other agencies.

19. The Department will review the workload of science and technology officers posted abroad to assure that the requirements for science and technology information in connection with U.S. foreign policy goals are taken into account.

20. OES will work more closely with U.S. Government organizations possessing a research and analysis capability, such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Department of State, in the identification and analysis of foreign science and technology developments and science policy.

G. RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

The recommendations contained in this report will be implemented in a phased way. In many cases they will be tested on a pilot basis. Thus, the initial stage of implementing the provisions of title V can be carried out within existing personnel and budgetary resources.

The time available for the preparation of this report has not permitted the development of complete proposals for operating under the new mandate contained in the act. Therefore, we do not have a firm basis on which to project estimates of personnel and funding requirements. However, the following chart provides illustrative estimates of resources which might be required to carry out some of the activities discussed in the preceding pages. These estimates are not based on completed assessments of the scope of activities to be undertaken. As we gain experience and develop firm plans for implementing the provisions of title V, we will prepare the related estimates of resource requirements. These will be considered in the established executive branch budget review process and presented to the Congress in accordance with the regular authorization and appropriation procedures.

ILLUSTRATIVE BUDGET.—RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPROVED INTERNATIONAL S. & T. PLANNING AND PROGRAM REVIEW IN DEPARTMENT OF STATE FISCAL YEAR 1980

Action	Present level	Minimum level	Optimum level	Comments
Consultants (fiscal year):				
1979	$95,500	$95,500	$150,000	Salary per day is at GS–15, step 10 level ($47,500).
1978	37,846			
1977	29,318			
External research for S. & T. (fiscal year):				
1979	500,000	1,500,000	2,500,000	Competing demands in department require fiscal year 1979 allocation to be limited to $500,000.
1978	845,424			
Public Advisory Committee on S. & T.	0	100,000	160,000	Minimum level would use existing OES staff for support. Optimum level would include support staff of 1 professional and 1 secretary.
"Rand"-type think-tank	0	[1] 1,200,000	[2] 3,600,000	Assumes $120,000 per year per senior researcher which ihcludes overhead and operating costs.
Additional OES personnel:				
(a) Professional		[3] 90,000	[4] 270,000	Needed for systematic review and evaluation of international S. & T. activities for which department has coordination and oversight responsibilities.
(b) Clerical		20,000	[5] 60,000	

[1] 10 professionals. [2] 30 professionals. [3] 3 at $30,000 each. [4] 9 at $30,000 each. [5] 3 at $20,000 each.

IV. Coordination and Oversight

The rapid expansion in numbers and the greatly increased scope and importance of international scientific and technological activities has required adaptation of existing governmental coordinating relationships and modalities and the creation of some new ones. The task is complex. It involves the gamut of North/South and East/West problems and the impact of global issues on our economic, political, and security relationships with other States and international organizations. In recognition of this, section 503(a) of Public Law 95–426 requires that the Secretary of State be informed and consulted before any agency takes any major action, primarily involving science and technology, with respect to any foreign government or international organization. Section 504 places on the Secretary of State primary responsibility for coordination and oversight of such activities. The following describes the principal modalities through which the executive branch coordinates its efforts in its international science and technology activities. It identifies some of the difficulties and problems and lists measures which should lead to improved performance.

A. MODALITIES OF COORDINATION AND OVERSIGHT

Information flow—Policy guidance

A fundamental requirement for effective cooperation is good communications; there must be a consciously designed system for assuring policy guidance and a flow of information between all concerned agencies and branches of Government. When problems arise requiring Presidential policy decisions, the existing NSC mechanism is used to obtain the required views from all affected agencies, to develop policy options and to take necessary implementing action. Similarly, when issues affecting several agencies develop which may require policy adjustment—for example, those associated with technology transfer—the

White House machinery can initiate appropriate inter-agency study and, if required, carry the matter on for Presidential decision.

In the provision of foreign policy guidance and information, the State Department distributes telegrams and airgrams originating at foreign posts to interested Washington agencies. Research reports are similarly distributed and significant policy changes and initiatives are subjected to a variety of formal and informal interagency clearance processes. These systems perform the necessary communication function, although there are difficulties. Distribution lists tend to favor agencies with which State interacts the most, for example, Defense, Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture. Sometimes legitimate agency interest is not perceived; in other cases developments may not be fully or adequately communicated because of their sensitivity or a lack of awarenes of their implications. Improvement can be made in this area.

The formal mechanisms for transmittal by State of foreign policy guidance and information to other Washington agencies are well established, and, when specific agency programs are identified, they can be fairly effective. The flow of this kind of information is institutionalized and relatively easy to adapt to changing needs or priorities. Even where systematic arrangements exist, however, problems of information management arise relating to volume, economy, sensitivity, and usefulness to the potential end-user.

While the institutionalized provision of foreign policy information and guidance can work reasonably well where the linkages between an activity and its foreign policy consequences are strong, this is not always the case where international science and technology activities are concerned. The implications of foreign policy developments for specific activities may not be fully recognized and failures to get the right information to the right people do occur, both in the distribution of messages by State and in their internal use by agencies. Large departments and agencies may not distribute foreign policy information to all internal units that need it. Thus, a telegram indicating a potentially significant change in the U.S. relationship with a given country may not get beyond the international affairs division in a given agency. While the agency leadership may be aware of the development and take it into account in its planning and operational thinking, program managers needing the information may not get it. This is a problem which will be difficult to resolve fully, although increased attention to it by both State and other agencies would help. For example, State should try to note implications for overseas science and technology activities of domestic agencies as clearly as possible in its messages. For their part, other agencies may need to reexamine their internal information distribution systems.

Beyond this, there are several kinds of information needed to engage in well coordinated international science and technology activities. Obviously, there needs to be information available about existing activities—and especially agreements—with each country and multilateral or international organization. Such information has not been available in the past and a practical system is needed to assure its ready availability to all agencies. Each agency should be able to find out what the totality of U.S. activities in science and technology are in a given country where it is contemplating a project.

There is also a need for information about major foreign science and technology activities. The setting of priorities for reporting of various kinds from our foreign posts has presented difficulties for both State and other agencies. For some subjects—for example, trade finance and economies—highly structured, formal interagency mechanisms are used to establish basic reporting requirements and relative priorities—for example, the comprehensive economic reporting program and the economic alert reporting lists. In other areas, more informal means are used. Careful consideration now needs to be given to requirements in the science and technology area.

Another area where more information is urgently needed is at the initial phase of program planning. It is essential that State and the technical agencies learn of each others' plans at a sufficiently early stage to provide the input required to assure a well conceived and coordinated program.

Field—Washington coordination—communications

An important part of the Secretary of State's coordinating and oversight role is his formal responsibility for management of communication with foreign governments and with our posts abroad. The State Department's operation of telegraphic communications between Washington and the field enables all agencies to communicate rapidly and securely with officials overseas while helping to insure that Ambassadors and other senior officials are aware of major activities of other agencies in foreign countries. Some agencies use their own communications channels to their representatives abroad and there is a certain amount of private communication where sensitive matters are under discussion. Where this occurs agencies should coordinate significant policy messages with State. In the field Chiefs of Mission have, and should use, the Presidential authority to insure that they are informed about other agency activities.

Science attachés

The science attachés assigned to our major posts abroad are often the principal point of contact between our Embassies and foreign scientific and technical communities. They are also the principal point of contact at our posts for many of the technical agencies in Washington. Whether in representing U.S. policies and interests to the foreign science community or participating in the management of visits or engaging in other activities, the science attachés clearly have a coordinating role which should be fully used. To a considerable extent their contribution to coordination depends on the effectiveness of the backstopping they receive from Washington. Responsibility for this support is in OES, which is acting to establish a small science attaché support office to enhance the Department's capability to make optimum use of our science attachés. As noted earlier, there is a need to develop agreed criteria for reporting by science attachés; this office will work with other bureaus to insure that these criteria adequately reflect international science and technology concerns.

Mechanisms for coordination relating to development assistance

Science and technology cooperation and assistance have held a significant place in the development assistance programs of AID. Such

activities as cooperative research and support of indigenous technical institutions are frequently an integral part of AID's project assistance programs. In addition to drawing on its own technical resources, AID also funds numerous projects carried out by the technical agencies.

Coordination of development assistance activities including programs involving science and technology, is carried out through the Development Coordination Committee (DCC) and by its specialized subcommittees. The DCC coordinating processes and those described elsewhere in this report are mandated by separate legislation and reflect overlapping U.S. interests. Through their interaction U.S. policies affecting the needs of developing countries will be harmonized with other foreign policy objectives, global issues, security and economic interests. The operation of these two processes will be closely interrelated.

The proposed Foundation for International Technological Cooperation (FITC) represents a new and innovative approach to the problem of mobilizing science and technology for development. The primary purpose of the Foundation will be to improve the availability and application of technology to problems of development, and to expand knowledge and skills needed to meet these problems. To serve this purpose, the Foundation would work with developing countries to improve their scientific and technological capabilities and to address with them critical problems of development and global concern. The Foundation may also have a responsibility for coordinating U.S. Government activity in this area.

Use of the budgetary process

Early awareness of the international activities which may have important foreign policy implications may be possible only through access to the planning and budgetary systems of a number of agencies. OMB, of course, has an overall coordination role which encompass all agencies and functions. The State Department is now consulted by many agencies as they develop programs which include significant international activities, for example, with the Department of Defense. In a few selected cases, normally acting under the direction of the NSC staff, arrangements have been made to review a portion of another agency's budget in order to provide foreign policy input, for example, with the Department of Energy (see appendix F). Such reviews have proved extremely beneficial in these areas, and State will study with OSTP, NSC, and OMB other potential areas of significant foreign policy concern for appropriate review.

Use of the clearance process

The most common method for obtaining the views of elements of the foreign policy and scientific and technical communities about plans and policy developments that may affect them is the circulation of documents for either formal or informal clearance. Though time consuming, this coordinating process is generally effective.

The promulgation of procedures to implement section 708, title VII of Public Law 95–426 (Case Act amendment re advance consultation on all international agreements) will help fill a gap in information available to assure adequate coordination and to assess the foreign policy impact of agency plans. These procedures as drafted include provision for agencies to provide the Department of State,

well in advance of the anticipated date for concluding an international agreement, the proposed text of the agreement as well as the legal authority on which it relies, and other relevant information.

State is also considering how existing procedures for advance coordination might be strengthened and institutionalized. For example, State's own internal procedures require advance coordination of legal, policy, and other aspects before any negotiation leading to an international agreement may be initiated with a foreign government—the Circular 175 procedure. Final approval of undertakings of major significance may only be given when the Secretary, Deputy Secretary or Under Secretary is satisfied that full coordination has taken place and that the agreement is consistent with U.S. interests and legal requirements.

The Circular 175 procedure avoids a multitude of problems and lessens the likelihood of delay caused by the later interjection of some unanticipated key factor in a negotiation or ongoing project. Many agencies participate in this procedure in developing and implementing their international activities. This coordination process takes a fairly long time and in some cases may be unnecessary, for example, where a given agreement may fit clearly in an already approved category of activity with a particular government. State is continuing to develop and formalize Circular 175 procedures, including the establishment of target review deadlines which it is believed can expedite and streamline the review process. However, the Department believes the basic intent of the Circular 175 process is sound and that, to insure adequate coordination, all major international activities with foreign relations or national security implications need to be examined in advance.

A difficulty perceived by a number of agencies is the absence of a central coordination or contact point for dealing with international science and technology matters in some agencies. OES has this responsibility in State, but the complexity of some activities and the varieties of interests they may affect can involve many elements of the Department. For example in the energy field several functional and geographic bureaus may all be deeply involved in certain activities. It is often difficult and sometimes impossible to devise policies which completely reconcile all the conflicting issues. This can pose problems in providing policy guidance.

These problems are, of course, not unique to the Department of State but are inherent in the complexity of the issues with which Government agencies must deal. Dealing with them successfully requires experience with issues and familiarity with each agency's organization, structure and policy concerns. This requires, at a minimum, considerable effort and a certain continuity of personnel. In some cases an international affairs office within an agency can handle internal coordination problems associated with international activities, but such an arrangement does not fit the needs of all agencies, e.g., those with large, semiautonomous functional units which run major programs. To deal with this, the Agriculture Department has recently appointed a Special Assistant for International Science and Technology in the Office of the Secretary whose responsibilities include acting as a central coordination point for dealing with other agencies. State recommends that other agencies also review their orga-

nizational arrangements or internal coordination in connection with international scientific and technological activities.

Committees—Interagency working groups

Next to the clearance process, the most common coordinating device is the interagency committee. Tightly structured coordinating and regulating roles are played by interagency groups, for example, in the fields of arms export controls, East-West trade and many others. An illustrative listing of committees that play some role in the coordination of international science and technology activities is attached as appendix G. In addition there are numerous ad hoc working groups that have been established to deal with specific problems, for example, the National Security Council (NSC) Ad Hoc Group on Non-Proliferation and an NSC Subcommittee on Nuclear Export Coordination. Committees can be very effective; "The International Fuel Cycle Evaluation" attached at appendix H offers a case study of successful interagency cooperation. At the same, it is recognized that use of committees can become a time-consuming and inefficient employment of scarce personnel resources. Committees also can outgrow or outlive the purpose for which they were originally established, and deserve frequent and careful review with an eye to eliminating those no longer of use.

Meetings, personal contacts, central direction

The use of meetings and personal contacts are an indispensable component of the coordinating process. Personal familiarity with agency operations, organization and programs is a necessity for those attempting a coordinating function. (Related problems of training and employment continuity are discussed in section V.)

The appointment of an individual to direct a special effort or deal with coordination problems arising out of a unique event is a flexible coordination device; for example, a special coordinator, with ambassadorial rank, was appointed to deal with preparation for the United Nations Conference on Science and Technology for Development which will take place in August 1979. Because of the range of issues and the numbers of institutions involved, it seemed essential to place responsibility for planning and coordination for this Conference in one place.

B. ACTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE COORDINATION AND OVERSIGHT

The growing numbers, complexity, and importance of the Government's international activities relating to science and technology have placed some stress on the capacity of Government agencies to coordinate their plans and programs with each other, the Congress, and nongovernmental organizations and institutions. While a great deal of effective coordination takes place routinely, using established channels of communication and procedures, the foregoing discussion has identified a number of areas needing improvement. The following measures are proposed:

Information flow

1. State intends to develop an information system to provide necessary data about the purpose, foreign government or organization in-

volved, costs, duration, and other pertinent aspects of international scientific and technological activities. Information developed by an interagency study on bilateral agreements and in connection with this report will be used to provide an initial data base. Basic data is also available through Case Act reporting requirements (section 708 of Public Law 95–426). Procedures will be developed to assure the maintenance and ready accessibility of this information which will also be required in the preparation of the annual report required by section 503(b) of the Public Law 95–426.

2. State will examine its current critera and procedures for distribution of messages from Foreign Service posts to Washington end-users. Existing arrangements have perhaps concentrated on the national security, economic, and financial agencies. They will be looked at with a view to changed agency requirements and better identification of messages which have implications for domestic programs. Distribution of field reports on foreign activities should be wide enough to insure that all interested agencies receive the information except when restrictions are necessary for reasons of national security or to protect sources. Domestic departments and agencies will be consulted on proposed changes and asked to review the adequacy of internal systems for providing foreign policy information and guidance to program managers.

3. Requirements for information on foreign programs in science and technology will continue to be periodically reviewed to insure that they adequately reflect those requirements of priority interest to the Government as a whole. The initial responsibility for placing reporting requirements on science attachés will lie in OES which will work through the geographic bureaus of the Department and cooperate with other agencies to establish current reporting priorities. The Department of State will establish a small science attaché support unit in OES to perform this and other tasks.

4. U.S. missions abroad will continue to take appropriate steps to insure the most efficient coverage of required information including the coordination of all science and technology reporting components.

5. A review of the workload of science and technology officers posted abroad will be undertaken to assure that it corresponds with the requirements for information and U.S. foreign policy goals.

Consultation, clearance and coordinating procedures

6. State, in coordination with OSTP and the technical agencies, under the aegis of the CISET, will take responsibility for the preparation of the annual report called for in section 503(b) of title V.

7. State will examine the means of improving internal coordination and strengthening the relationships between OES and the geographic and functional bureaus. It envisages use of such means as close cooperation between OES and the bureaus in planning and budgeting and the use of seminars and selective briefing sessions on major agency programs.

8. State plans to designate a full-time officer to serve as Executive Secretary to CISET with responsibilities to develop and put into operation an information system, to coordinate the preparation of the annual report referred to above, and to act as central point in OES for inquiries by other agencies about matters falling under the purview of the committee.

9. State will explore with other agencies the designation of a central contact and coordination point for international scientific and technological activities. This official should be in a position to be made aware of all such activities carried out by the agency. OES should likewise designate an official to serve as central contact point for each of the technical agencies. Where agencies have several large semi-autonomous elements engaged in international activities, for example, the National Bureau of Standards within the Department of Commerce, a coordinator may be appointed.

10. State, in consultation with interested technical agencies, will develop Circular 175 procedures applicable to international activities including those related to science and technology and will report on these procedures in the followup report. State will insure that no duplication with other reporting systems arises and will define with the other agencies the scope of activities subject to such procedures.

C. RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

The recommendations contained in this report will be implemented in a phased way. In many cases, they will be tested on a pilot basis. Thus, the initial stage of implementing the above recommendations can be carried out within existing personnel and budgetary resources.

The time available for the preparation of this report has not permitted the development of complete proposals for operating under the new mandate contained in the act. Therefore, we do not have a firm basis on which to project estimates of personnel and funding requirements. However, the following chart provides illustrative estimates of resources which might be required to carry out some of the activities discussed in the preceding pages. These estimates are not based on completed assessments of the scope of activities to be undertaken. As we gain experience and develop firm plans for implementing the provisions of title V, we will prepare the related estimates of resource requirements. These will be considered in established executive branch budget review process and presented to the Congress in accordance with the regular authorization and appropriation procedures.

RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS FOR IMPROVED COORDINATION AND OVERSIGHT CAPABILITY
ILLUSTRATIVE BUDGET

Action	Present level	Minimum level	Optimum level
To establish Science Attache Support Office in OES and to provide information and guidance to posts on S. & T. reporting.[1]	1 professional staff=$30,000.	1 professional staff=$30,000; 1 support staff=$20,000.	2 professional staff=$60,000; 1 support staff=$20,000.
To support CISET subcommittee[2]	½ professional staff=$15,000.	1 professional staff=$30,000; ½ support staff=$10,000.	2 professional staff=$60,000; ½ support staff=$10,000.
To develop and put information system into effect.[3]	½ professional staff=$15,000.	1 professional staff=$30,000; ½ support staff=$10,000.	3/2 professional staff=$45,000; ½ support staff=$10,000.
To develop criteria and procedures for preparation of 503(b) report.	----------	¼ professional staff=$7,500.	½ professional staff=$15,000.
To examine and monitor State criteria and procedures for distributing messages and providing foreign policy guidance to technical agencies.	----------	¼ professional staff=$7,500.	½ professional staff=$15,000.
Total resource requirement	2 staff=$60,000	6 staff=$145,000	9 staff=$235,000.

[1] Approximately 1 man-year of professional and support staff time in various parts of OES is now spent on backstopping science attaches.

[2] CISET will necessarily play an increased role in future.

[3] Even after a working information system is in place and functioning, it will require attention and should be adapted to management needs in State and other agencies.

V. Personnel and Training

A. INTRODUCTION

In Public Law 95–426, Congress asked the Secretary of State to report on existing and planned programs for training officers and employees of the U.S. Government in the application of science and technology to foreign policy. Congress has described the required training as (1) training in the use of science and technology as an instrument in international relations, and (2) insuring that employees engaged in formal and informal exchanges of scientific and technical information, personnel, and hardware are knowledgeable in international affairs.

Specifically in training officers and employees of the Department of State, one method cited by the Congress is detached service for in-depth graduate study at accredited colleges and universities, in addition to shorter courses or seminars at the Foreign Service Institute and other existing Federal facilities. The Congress also has called for information about existing and planned programs to use contracts, grants and consultants for assistance in training. Finally, Congress has requested an assessment of personnel requirements to carry out the responsibilities of the Secretary under title V.

The ability of the U.S. Government to apply science and technology effectively in the long-range planning and coordinated conduct of foreign policy will depend on the quality of its personnel and their training. In the pages to follow, current personnel policies and training procedures are described, problems identified, and recommendations offered.

B. PERSONNEL

Categories

Officers and employees of the U.S. Government concerned with the use of science and technology as "an instrument in international relations," in the language of Public Law 95–426, include:

—the Foreign Service Officer Corps as a whole, including its political and economic officers whose responsibilities in the Department of State and at Embassies overseas are affected by science and technology considerations in varying degree;

—those Foreign Service officers currently filling positions in the Department of State's science and technology bureau, the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES), or in science functions overseas, currently about 40;

—civil service employees and Foreign Service reserve officers working for the Department of State as specialists in OES or as science attachés or specialists abroad, currently about 80;

—civil service and Foreign Service reserve professionals working for AID and engaged in the use of science and technology in international development, currently about 35;

—senior Department of State and Foreign Service program direction officers, including Ambassadors, Deputy Chiefs of Mission, and Embassy counselors, who undertake and supervise activities with scientific or technological content;

—senior managers, planners, and policymakers in domestic agencies with international activities;
—middle level officials of these domestic agencies engaged in international exchanges.

Personnel policies

The Department of State believes that the fulfillment of its role in the interaction of science, technology, and foreign policy requires a mix of scientists, engineers, and other technical specialists recruited from outside the Department, and career Foreign Service officers with knowledge and skills in foreign political and economic affairs. A key issue is the optimum percentage of Foreign Service officers and others in this mix. At the present time, the majority of OES officers and science attachés are specialists recruited as Foreign Service reserve officers. Most possess advanced degrees in a physical or biological science discipline and are familiar with the broad spectrum of the scientific and technological activities of the U.S. academic, governmental, and industrial worlds.

Consultant T. Keith Glennan in his report on "Technology and Foreign Affairs" (1976) discussed the skills required of science attachés. His words apply equally to officials in Washington dealing with international science and technology issues.

It is now recognized that the Attaché's value depends more on his ability to relate scientific and technological developments to the political, economic or societal preoccupations of the embassy than on his scientific erudition or laboratory skills.

Since 1977 the Department of State has changed to a modest degree its examination procedures for career Foreign Service officers in ways intended to increase the number of new FSO's with scientific, engineering, or other technical backgrounds. It is expected that these changes will not bring many experienced specialists into a Foreign Service Officer Corps whose members must have the versatility to fill a variety of assignments worldwide. The effort is intended, instead, to promote a higher level of awareness of and sensitivity to science and technology considerations in foreign relations. A list of foreign affairs activities with a high science and technology component is furnished as appendix D to illustrate the variety of areas in which the Department of State needs both specialists and generalists.

The Department of State believes that its role in science and technology cannot be considered apart from its role in political, economic, security, and social areas. The issue arises whether science and technology ought to be considered an appropriate career specialization comparable to the traditional political, economic, consular, and administrative functions An immediate problem is the limited number of positions in the Department and the Foreign Service now identified as requiring such "S. & T." specialists, in contrast with the many hundreds of positions in each of the other areas of specialization. However, counting all officer level positions in the Department and overseas the number available in the future could increase significantly as positions occupied by non-Foreign Service officers become available.

This suggests the need to address at an early date the question of creating a subspecialty in science and technology for Foreign Service officers with primary political or economic specialties, similar to the

subspecialty in politico-military affairs which is now widely recognized. Such a group in the Foreign Service Officer Corps might do much to enhance the credibility and access of OES to the rest of the Department and make OES and science attaché assignments more attractive to Foreign Service Officers by broadening career opportunities. The Department will evaluate this issue in the light of the results of a survey now being prepared of the work content of all political, economic, commercial and scientific positions at posts overseas and within the Department of State in Washington. This survey is expected to provide a detailed data base for future decisions on recruitment, training and assignment of personnel. The target date for completion of this survey is June 1, 1979, a date that should permit preliminary discussion of its implications in the followup to this report.

C. TRAINING

Concept of training

Public Law 95–426 calls for appropriate measures to be taken by the U.S. Government to insure that individuals are trained in the use of science and technology as an instrument in international relations (section 502(3)). Most training specialists in the Government and academic communities would agree that such training cannot be transmitted in any single course or seminar. There appears to be a consensus that such training must be multidisciplinary, a continuing process, built partly on formal university study and partly on short seminars or workshops within and outside the Government. It is gained on the job and through interagency exchange details, and is inadequate if out of touch with the experiences of industry.

Inventory of training resources

In the course of preparing this report to the Congress, the Department of State and other cooperating departments and agencies of the U.S. Government have identified the following training opportunities currently available for use in attaining the training objectives called for in Public Law 95–426.

(*a*) Department of State/Foreign Service Institute (FSI) annual 5-day "awareness" seminars on science, technology and foreign affairs;

(*b*) Exchange details between the Department of State and domestic technical agencies.

(*c*) Annual details of mid-level Foreign Service Officers for full-year university studies on the interaction of science, technology and policy;

(*d*) State/FSI 2-week interdepartmental seminars offered four times a year on foreign policy formulation and execution, intended primarily to benefit employees of domestic or technical agencies whose jobs require that they be knowledgeable in international affairs, and to bring these employees and Foreign Service Officers into contact with each other;

(*e*) State/FSI 26- and 16-week economic and political/economic courses for Foreign Service Officers containing "modules" dealing with science and technology issues, and with global issues having significant science and technology components;

(*f*) State/FSI annual 1-week course on computers and foreign affairs;

(*g*) State/FSI basic orientation course for new Foreign Service Officers currently containing a 1-hour briefing on science and technology in the Department of State;

(*h*) State/FSI annual 9-month executive seminar in national and international affairs for senior officers from State and other executive departments and agencies, containing extensive segments on science and technology-related issues;

(*i*) State/FSI sponsorship and funding for Foreign Service officers to undertake evening courses in science, technology, and policy at universities in the Washington area;

(*j*) Office of Personnel Management 2-week courses at its Executive Seminar Centers in science, technology, and public policy and on environmental and resources issues;

(*k*) Department of Energy 2-day course on the nuclear fuel cycle and technical aspects of nuclear weapons proliferation, given every 2 months at Germantown;

(*l*) Department of Commerce 10-month science and technology fellowship program for its employees in which a regular work assignment in a Government department is combined with lectures, seminars, visits, field trips and interaction with appropriate people in the Government and private sectors;

(*m*) Attendance at ad hoc seminars and courses by research organizations, industry, universities, institutes or foundations;

(*n*) Orientation programs organized by domestic agencies, but open to attendance by officers of other departments;

(*o*) The education of Foreign Service Officers and other permanent employees of Government departments through on-the-job contact with scientists, technologists, scholars and other experts who enter the Government under limited appointments, and internships and "scholar-diplomat" programs.

(*p*) Exchange details between Government departments and industry, for example, the President's Executive interchange program, and between Government departments and the Congress.

(*q*) Academic year assignments for senior Government officers at the National War College, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, et cetera.

Adequacy of training resources

In the Department of State and other Executive agencies there is general agreement that existing training opportunities are meeting many of the needs of the U.S. Government. Over the next several years, however, present programs may need to be augmented.

The adequacy of training resources and procedures has been considered in three major studies undertaken at the initiative of the Department of State in 1976 and 1978. The first of these is the study commissioned to a consultant, Dr. T. Keith Glennan entitled "Technology and Foreign Affairs," cited earlier in this report. Dr. Glennan emphasized the value of exchange details among executive departments and also made the following general recommendation:

> As part of an effort to increase the awareness of the importance of technology in foreign affairs, seek improvement of the capacity of the Department of State and its overseas missions to deal ef-

fectively with problems involving the interaction of technology and foreign affairs: develop programs to enhance the 'technical literacy' of executive and professional personnel in other bureaus of the Department (note: meaning outside the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs) and in U.S. embassies and missions to international organizations.

In 1978, a study entitled "Strengthening the Science Attaché Program and the Department's Personnel Resources for Science and Technology" was carried out under the sponsorship of the Department's Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology. Lucy Wilson Benson. Its findings emphasized more the need to improve the level of scientific and technological "literacy" throughout the Foreign Service than the possible training needs of those relatively few officers serving as science attachés or in OES, the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.

The report recommended increasing the number of Foreign Service officers detailed to universities for advanced training in the interaction of science, technology and policy, and favored increasing the FSI 1-week course in science and foreign affairs to 4 weeks. The pros and cons of this recommendation continue to be debated and implementation is awaiting and will depend on the results of the position and activity survey described earlier.

A third study, conducted by the Foreign Service Institute in 1978, focused on future requirements for the training of FSO's for service in the Department's Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES). The study has been referred to as "the Armstrong report" after its principal drafter, Oscar V. Armstrong, a Foreign Service officer. The report foresaw a need for increased effort and funding for training, but without stating specific numbers. It also stressed that while an increasing number of foreign policy issues have a science and technology component, the difficulties in dealing with these issues arise from political, economic, security or sociological factors, rather than an inadequate understanding of or attention to the science and technology component.

Training objectives

The Department of State and other executive departments and agencies have identified the following goals in the training of both generalists and specialists in the interaction of science, technology and foreign affairs:

Knowledge of U.S. foreign policy, its goals, formulation and execution.

Knowledge on the part of professional, executive, political, economic and managerial generalists of the processes by which scientific and technological activities are organized and carried out by specialists in the public, business and academic sectors.

"Enough knowledge" on the part of generalists (and this is difficult to define precisely) about scientific and technological considerations to permit these generalists to evaluate sensibly the foreign policy implications of technical programs, research proposals, agreements for cooperation, et cetera.

Overview knowledge in each department or agency of the missions and programs of other departments and agencies whose activities impact on foreign policy and foreign relations.

Knowledge of scientific and technological developments and related political, economic and security policies, programs and trends in countries abroad, relevant to U.S. activities.

Skill in the advocacy and advancement of U.S. positions on scientific and technologically-related issues in bilateral, multilateral and international arenas.

Within the Department of State, training in the integration of science, technology and foreign affairs is of concern to three office areas: The Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES), the Bureau of Personnel, and the Foreign Service Institute. From a policy viewpoint, this training is also an important concern of the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology.

For the Foreign Service Institute, science and technology training is within the responsibilities of the Dean of the School of Professional Studies. He supervises political and economic training divisions. Both of these divisions are equally concerned with the integration of science and technology into their respective political and economic programs. For pragmatic reasons this training is currently the particular responsibility of the Coordinator for Political Training.

Within OES training has suffered to some degree from the familiar syndrome of having no father but many uncles. A possible solution would be to assign coordination of the Bureau's interests in personnel training to the officer in OES assigned responsibility to backstop the Department's overseas Science Attaché program. The Assistant Secretary and his principal deputies should monitor the career development of all OES personnel in close cooperation with the Bureau of Personnel.

Within the Bureau of Personnel, and under the Director of the Office of Foreign Service Career Development and Assignments, training is the responsibility of the Chief of the Training and Liaison Staff. Career development officers, organized on functional lines, are responsible for recommending the training of political, economic, consular and administrative officers. At the present time officers with experience in science and technology functions are not treated as a separate functional group. As part of the personnel survey mentioned above, the Department will assess the effect of this situation on staffing and career patterns in the international science and technology field.

With respect to the corps of career Foreign Service officers, the Department continues to treat scientific and technological skills as subskills of both the political and the economic functions. This approach has the drawback of giving science and technology training several uncles but no single father. This problem is currently receiving further study and will be discussed again in the follow-up to this report.

Training of Foreign Service officers

A recent syllabus for each of the two principal FSI courses in science, technology and foreign affairs is submitted in appendix I to this report. The first of these, entitled "Science and Foreign Affairs" is intended to make Foreign Service officers more aware of and sensitive to the relationships between science, technology, and foreign affairs. It appears in 1975 that the course might be dropped for lack of

interest on the part of Foreign Service officers, and also reluctance of supervisors to spare officers for training. This is not, however, a problem peculiar to OES in times of increasing workloads and decreasing personnel resources. Although there has been enough interest and support to assure continuation of the course, the problem of limited interest continues.

The second course deals with computers and foreign affairs. Also attached is a syllabus for the FSI Foreign Affairs Interdepartmental Seminar.

Motivation for training

As of 1975, the Department of State and the Congress, as evidenced in its report, were aware of the problem of motivating Foreign Service officer interest in science and technology. It is clear that an important obstacle continues to be the perception among Foreign Service officers that service in functions with a high scientific or technological component is not "career enhancing," and that available training is not relevant enough to job requirements.

The Department of State is currently considering ways to change these perceptions. Difficulties are compounded by pressures from the constituencies of all functional areas of the Foreign Service, whether consular, administrative, economic, or political, that their function be at least as career-enhancing as any other function. For reasons beyond the scope of this report, opportunity for promotion continues to be restricted whatever the functional specialty. Also, over the years, Foreign Service assignment procedures have changed from reliance on "open assignment" procedures in which the officer's own preferences are given greater consideration.

Despite these problems, motivation for FSO's to undertake science and technology training and assignments will be increased by assuring that science and technology qualifications receive due weight in selecting officers for senior positions and promotions.

Science and technology "modules" in economics courses

Reflecting the inseparability of economic, scientific and technological considerations, the Foreign Service Institute also includes scientific and technological "modules" or segments in two of its major training programs:

—An annual 26-week course in economic and commercial studies;

—An annual 16-week course of political and economic training.

The first course is designed for selected midlevel officers whose primary skill or functional interest is as economic officers. The second is aimed at increasing the economic and political awareness of officers whose primary functions are consular or administrative. Both courses include modules on quantitative analysis, computer applications, resource, and environmental issues.

Other Department of State training related to science and technology

The economic studies division of the Foreign Service Institute also arranges ad hoc training in the field of energy in cooperation with the Department's Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, the Defense Petroleum Institute, and representatives of the oil industry. From one to five officers undertake this training each year, traveling to Oklahoma and Texas for field studies.

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The Foreign Service Institute helps arrange 2- to 6-week orientation courses each summer for regional minerals and petroleum attachés. This program could be expanded. The substantive content is provided by the U.S. Geological Survey, the Bureau of Mines, and the Department of Interior. The only costs are those of travel and per diem for visits to mining regions.

The Foreign Service Institute offers an annual 5-day seminar on computers and foreign affairs. This is an elementary "awareness" program for nonspecialists, designed to acquaint foreign affairs personnel with current or anticipated impacts of revolutionary developments in communications technology. The course is open to personnel from all executive agencies at a fee of $341 as of 1978.

Other long-term training opportunities for FSO's include university programs in systems analysis and in multilateral diplomacy. Both strengthen the ability of the FSO to manage programs that combine science, technology and foreign affairs.

Details to universities for advanced training

Between 1968 and 1978 the Department of State detailed 10 officers to universities for advanced training in the area of science, technology, and public policy. Two were senior officers in the staff support category of personnel and six were midlevel or junior Foreign Service officers.

Procedures to date enable interested officers to request midlevel university training and to specify whether the training should be political, economic, scientific, or other. The officer also has the initiative with respect to choosing the university he wishes to attend, although his choice must be approved by personnel officers and by the Foreign Service Institute. Programs in science and technology chosen by Foreign Service officers have included those at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, George Washington University, the University of California at Berkeley, and Purdue. Suitable training programs exist also at Cornell, Stanford, and a number of other universities.

In most years, about 40 midlevel Foreign Service officers have been sent on all types of university details. The great majority of these details are for studies in economic and political areas without a strong scientific or technological emphasis. This puts into relief the relatively small number of FSO's undertaking science, technology, and foreign affairs training.

Training in foreign affairs of specialists from domestic technical agencies

The Foreign Affairs Interdepartmental Seminar at the Foreign Service Institute is designed to bring senior and mid-level officers of other departments and agencies into contact with Foreign Service officers also attending the course, and with major foreign affairs issues affecting the Department of State and domestic agencies alike. Subjects covered at this seminar include the foreign policy process, the role of Congress in foreign affairs, major international economic issues, arms control and disarmament, human rights, the problems of terrorism, food, energy and environmental issues, and population problems, among others. (See appendix I.)

Many executive departments and agencies send personnel to this 2-week course, at a cost of $320 per enrollee as of 1978. Greater par-

ticipation would be both desirable and possible, even within the budgetary constraints currently affecting the technical agencies. Foreign Service Institute officials are undertaking more active personal contacts with international offices and training officers of technical agencies, to back up the bureaucratic impersonality of distributing printed announcements.

The Foreign Service Institute as a multiagency resource

Under the guidance of the Director General of the Foreign Service, responsibility for furnishing training and instruction to Foreign Service officers of the Department of State is vested in the Foreign Service Institute, with facilities in Rosslyn, Va. Normally, officers and employees of the Department of State make up only about 50 percent of the total enrollment. The other 50 percent is made up of employees of some 27 other departments and agencies of the Federal Government, the largest number of whom usually represent the International Communication Agency, the Agency for International Development and the Department of Defense.

The interagency character of FSI training is thus well established, but it is also evident that even fuller use of FSI facilities by other departments and agencies could contribute to strengthening the ability of the Government as a whole to make effective use of science and technology in international relations.

Staff exchange details

Within the Department of State and among domestic technical agencies, a strong consensus emerged among contributors to this report in support of staff exchange details by which Foreign Service officers are detailed to work in domestic agencies and officers from the domestic agencies work at the Department of State. The duration of the sojourns has ranged from 6 months to several years. The Department of Energy is currently working closely with OES to establish a more regular program of exchanges in the energy field.

Some 13 FSO's are currently on detail in assignments with high scientific/technical content at the Department of Energy, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, NASA, Commerce, and the Council on Environmental Quality. In this way Foreign Service officers become acquainted with the planning and implementation of major science and technology programs whose primary purposes are in most instances domestic but which have important foreign affairs implications. The Foreign Service officers in turn contribute their foreign affairs insights to the domestic agency.

Training programs of domestic departments and agencies

Domestic departments of the U.S. Government conduct many in-house training programs, but none that could be explicitly described as training in the application of science and technology to foreign affairs. The widespread assumption is that such training is primarily the responsibility of the Department of State. In this spirit domestic agencies declare themselves ready and willing to receive from the Department of State:

—general briefings on United States foreign policy;
—advice as to the foreign policy implications of major U.S. and foreign science and technology programs;

—training in foreign languages;
—orientation in Department of State and Embassy administrative and communications procedures related to the overseas travel or assignment of their officers;
—cooperation in the exchange of personnel on details.

Domestic departments and agencies conduct in-house orientation programs on their own objectives, procedures and problems. Foreign Service and Department of State personnel are welcome at such sessions. The domestic agencies also conduct numerous presentations, workshops, and talks on technical topics, but at present there are no systematic procedures whereby interested Department of State and Foreign Service officers could be made aware of the scheduling of such sessions.

To increase the understanding of U.S. foreign policy among their employees, domestic departments make extensive use of such Foreign Service Institute courses as the interdepartmental seminars on foreign policy, and the annual seminar on science, technology, and foreign affairs, where half of the attendees are usually from domestic agencies. Many departments have expressed interest in increasing their utilization of training at the Foreign Service Institute.

It has long been evident that effective integration of science, technology, and foreign policy requires, beyond political awareness and scientific or technological competence, managerial, and leadership skills. Both State and the domestic agencies benefit from access to the range of 2-week seminars, including two which focus on science and technology related issues, conducted by the Office of Personnel Management at its four Executive Seminar Centers at Berkeley, Calif.; Kings Point, N.Y.; Oak Ridge, Tenn.; and Wilmington, Del. Curriculum areas include management; science, technology, and public policy; and environmental quality and natural resources.

An additional advantage characteristic of an interagency resource, of which the Foreign Service Institute is another example, is the opportunity provided for personal contacts between representatives of many Federal departments with common concerns and at comparable career stages.

U.S. Government utilization of nongovernmental training

The Department of State makes use of university training in many areas, including political, economic, managerial, and scientific. Such details total about 40 per year, of which only 1 or 2 are in the science, technology, and policy area.

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration provides grants for the support of programs that contribute to the training of employees, indirectly relevant to the interaction of science, technology, and foreign policy, notably at the universities of Rhode Island, Washington, and Hawaii.

A number of other agencies send personnel to various nongovernmental and technical training programs, such as the Sloan fellowship program, which consider as part of their curriculum the international dimension of science and technology programs.

New programs planned

The Department of State has under review the feasibility of establishing a consultation program for U.S. Ambassadors and other senior

Foreign Service officers designed to familiarize them with the elements of the scientific and technological community most relevant to their overseas mission. These consultations would take place prior to departure for post or during home leave or consultation visits to the United States.

The political training division of the Department of State's Foreign Service Institute anticipates introducing scientific and technologically related issues into sessions of 1- or 2-day "political workshop" seminars in 1979. The aim is to amplify the content of the basic 5-day seminar on science, technology, and foreign affairs to reach officers deterred by the 5-day format, but able to detach themselves for 1 or 2 days from daily responsibilities. Through exposure to different issues with a high science and technology quotient in successive sessions, attendees will be able gradually to accumulate exposure to the science and technology dimension of foreign policy.

Also under study are the possibilities and funding implications of a more structured and augmented program of interagency details. These could include short, for example, 2-week familiarization details as well as details for 2 or 3 years.

D. CONTRACTS, GRANTS, AND CONSULTANTS ON TRAINING

The Glennan report on "Technology and Foreign Affairs" is the principal example in recent years of a study by knowledgable persons outside the Federal Government dealing with science, technology, and foreign affairs. Another important report in this area is the study on "Public Policy and Technology Transfer" conducted in 1977 and 1978 cooperatively by the George Washington University, the Fund for Multinational Management Education, the Council of the Americas, and the United States Council of the International Chamber of Commerce, at the request of the Department of State. No domestic agencies have commissioned studies dealing specifically with the interaction of science, technology, and foreign affairs, or with training for this interaction.

E. ACTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. One principal conclusion regarding the training of U.S. Government personnel in the application of science and technology to foreign relations has emerged in preparing this report: While training resources and opportunities are less than ideal, they should be gradually increased as resources permit and as officers and employees become better motivated to acquire this training through recognition of its relevance and perception of clear career rewards in the field of science, technology, and foreign affairs.

2. Changes in current assignment and training procedures should be considered following completion of a survey of the activities of all political, economic, and scientific officers in the Department of State and at all Embassies and posts overseas to obtain an up-to-date "photograph" of the perceived scientific and technological content of these activities. The survey properly analyzed should help the Department of State assess the character and extent of necessary changes in recruitment, selection and training, and career development and assignment policies for political, economic, and commercial officers as well as for science and technology officers.

3. The following are additional actions and recommendations, some of which are being implemented, while others require further study and will be discussed in detail in the followup report:

(a) Increase the number of personnel exchanges conducted between the Department of State and domestic agencies with international programs;

(b) Establish a program of consultations in the science and technology area for Ambassadors, Deputy Chiefs of Mission, and other senior officers of the Department of State and Foreign Service;

(c) Interest greater numbers of Foreign Service officers in either attending short "awareness" seminars or presentations in science and technology related areas;

(d) Increase from one to two or three the number of midlevel FSO's attending advanced university training each year in the interaction of science, technology, and foreign policy, and assure that at the end of the academic year they are assigned to a science and technology related position;

(e) Allocate one science and technology slot in the senior university training program for a senior officer;

(f) Give further study to the advantages of lengthening the basic Foreign Service Institute course on science, technology, and foreign affairs from 1 week to 4 weeks;

(g) Give greater emphasis in Foreign Service recruitment and career advisory programs to the opportunities open to candidates who can combine a background in science and technology with aptitudes for applying it to the political, economic, and managerial responsibilities of the Department of State;

(h) Make domestic and technical agencies aware of the training opportunities available at the Foreign Service Institute.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS POLICY

I. INTRODUCTION

This report, submitted pursuant to Section 601 of Public Law 95–426, addresses overall United States policy with respect to major international communications issues. Specifically, these issues include:

—The recently adopted UNESCO mass media declaration and related UNESCO issues.

—The review of worldwide radio frequency allocations at the 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC 79).

—Consideration by the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space of principles to govern the international operations of direct broadcast satellites (DBS).

—International issues related to transborder flows of data between computers.

—Communications assistance to developing countries.

This report examines the relationships among these issues; describes U.S. interests, objectives, positions, and methods of coordination with respect to each.

THE IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNICATIONS ISSUES

Communications, used broadly to include the exchange of information, has assumed new importance in recent years. Although international conventions on the subject go back to the 19th century, the need previously was to reach technical accommodation. That need continues. In addition, communications issues are increasingly political and economic.

Ideological issues

Since the end of World War II, the United States and its democratic allies have strongly supported the free flow of information, as expressed by Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which asserts the right of everyone "to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers."

We consider this principle an important part of our renewed commitment to human rights as a central element of our foreign policy.

Many countries, however, resist the principle of Article 19. Communist and other totalitarian regimes are concerned that the unrestricted flow of information across their borders may erode their authority. Developing countries worry about the erosion of traditional values and culture and deplore their dependence on "foreign" (i.e., Western) information systems.

Political issues

The primary political issue is between North and South. In international communications, facilities and programming, as in other economic areas, the industrialized countries of the North are dominant. Developing countries lack planning, finances, technical, and administrative expertise, as well as trained journalists and editors to rapidly change this situation. They resent the perceived communications imbalance.

Third World attempts to reduce this imbalance and resistance to the principle of Article 19, affect primarily three international communications issues:

—Developing countries seek within UNESCO financial and promotional measures designed to improve their communications abilities.

—In the U.N. debate on direct broadcast satellites, Third World countries argue for a "prior consent" rule to enable them to prohibit transmissions to their home TV screens from foreign sources, and particularly from the relatively few developed countries that produce TV programs—even though technically such a "direct" transmission without communicating through centralized receiving facilities (under government regulation) is not practical.

—In preparation for the 1979 WARC, developing countries have indicated that they will seek a larger share of the world's radio frequencies and satellite parking spaces—the latter being an inappropriate topic for WARC.

Drawing on their experience in other international economic negotiations, these countries have become increasingly political and organized in pressing their positions.

UNESCO, the ITU, and the U.N. Outer Space Committee have also become forums for the ideological and political struggle between East and West. The Soviets initiated the effort to obtain a prior consent rule for DBS and the initial draft mass media declaration for restricting the media. Because developing countries share to varying degrees Soviet desires for restrictions on the free flow of information, their interests on information are often aligned, although clearly in the last U.N. Outer Space Committee debate over DBS, there were totally divided views and no emerging majority view.

Although we differ with some of our allies on the DBS issue, these differences are not essentially ideological. As reflected in disputes about international facilities planning and transborder data flows, differences with European countries involve primarily economic issues, approaches to planning, and perceptions of national goals.

U.S. INTERESTS

The United States has national security, political, ideological, economic, and technological stakes in international communications.

Our national security is dependent on advanced telecommunications systems. Politically, we are committed to a broad exchange of information both domestically and internationally.

Our economic interest is obvious: our industrial base relies on adequate communications; large corporations have become increasingly

dependent on world-wide computer circuits. Moreover, the United States is the world's largest producer and consumer of telecommunication equipment and services. (Exports of communications/computers and auxiliary hardware exceed $5 billion per year.)

Technologically, the United States holds a lead in most areas of satellite communications, in fiber optic communications (along with Japan) and in very large electronic switching systems. In other areas of basic communications technology, such as microwave transmission systems or satellite earth stations, the United States, Japan and Western Europe are roughly equivalent technologically. In computer and data communications and in their applications the United States is commercially dominant.

COORDINATION

Given the current dimensions of communications issues, the importance of these issues to the United States, and the increasing effectiveness of Third World countries in pressing their positions in international forums, the United States is paying more attention to this area than it has in the past. More Executive Branch resources are being allocated to communications issues; and policy is being coordinated at higher levels of government and approved at the highest level.

During 1977 and 1978, several steps were taken to provide an improved framework for coordinated policymaking in international communications:

—The National Telecommunications and Information Administration was established within the Department of Commerce;

—The International Communication Agency was established;

—Responsibility for the implementation of international communications policy was assigned by the Secretary to the Deputy Secretary of State, who is working closely with other interested agencies; the Deputy Secretary has established an intradepartmental group at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level to ensure systematic coordination of international communications issues;

—A Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference was named, and an initial delegation group formed;

—A public advisory committee was established to provide for comprehensive non-governmental, participation in preparations for the 1979 WARC;

—An overall policy review of international communications issues was undertaken by the Administration and awaits final approval;

—An NSC Working Group on International Communications Policy was formed to ensure the proper coordination among Executive Branch agencies on day-to-day international communications policy issues and activities, including U.S. participation in international communication conferences.

Many executive branch agencies have specific interests in international telecommunications. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), the Department of State and the International Communication Agency (ICA) have primary policy responsibility.

WARC, UNESCO, direct broadcast satellites, and transborder data flow are related, even though they are dealt with in separate forums and, to some extent, raise different issues. The U.S. approach to these negotiations is coordinated at the highest levels of the agencies described above. In addition, individual offices at State, Commerce, the FCC and elsewhere, working on different communications issues are in frequent contact—both formally through task forces and working groups, and informally.

This integrated structure for policymaking has already proved itself in action at the November 1978 UNESCO General Conference. General guidelines for the U.S. position were, after consultation with Congress, the public, and media leaders, laid down last summer by an interdepartmental group reporting to the Deputy Secretary of State. Detailed implementation was coordinated by an NSC working group. The Chairman of the U.S. Delegation in Paris was the Director of the International Communication Agency, reflecting his own Presidential mandate to help develop comprehensive international communication policies serving the interests of both the United States and other nations. Throughout the Conference Chairman Reinhardt worked in close partnership with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs and his backup team in Washington, who reviewed and obtained interagency clearance for negotiation positions being developed in Paris. As discussed in Part II of this report, the result both conformed to political realities and achieved key U.S. objectives.

II. UNESCO Issues

BACKGROUND

The North/South imbalance in communications affects three negotiations, but the political rhetoric has been most openly and sharply expressed within UNESCO. Third World leaders are concerned about an "imbalance in information flows" and about their lack of adequate communications and information facilities and skills. They note that the flow of information between North and South is one-sided; that the major news agencies (AP, UPI, Reuters, Agence-France Presse, and TASS) distribute far more news on developed countries than about the developing world; and that they are overwhelmingly passive recipients of news, entertainment and information, rather than producers.

They express frustration over their extremely limited access to the transmitting end of the global communications apparatus, which they see as controlled and exploited by the developed countries in their own interest.

Third World leaders believe that the Western news agencies emphasize the violent and sensational in covering events in developing countries, and they regard Western domination of the media as a threat to their ability to preserve traditional values and to develop national pride. Some even claim that allowing foreign journalists free rein will destabilize their government.

Some of these concerns are rhetorical, and some reflect different values and attitudes. In part, Third World concerns are real: We may disagree strongly with rhetorical claims of "cultural imperialism,"

but we can understand their cultural concerns, and we cannot fault the developing countries for their concerns on the need to develop indigenous communications and information capabilities.

THE MASS MEDIA DECLARATION

The issue of state authority over the media arises not only in a context of political oppression, but also in those countries that would "use" the media as a policy tool, i.e., to promote national economic, social and political objectives. The Soviet Union and many developing countries support restrictions on the media. For us that is unacceptable: state control of the media, no matter how subtle, violates basic human freedoms.

An early version of a Mass Media Declaration grew out of a Soviet initiative. Although non-binding it would have enunciated the principle that states are directly responsible for the behavior of media operating within their borders; prescribed "obligations" of the media with respect to racism, peace, economic development, etc.; and limited the rights of journalists to acting in accordance with the declaration.

The draft declaration had substantial support at the 19th General Conference at Nairobi in 1976. But, recognizing that UNESCO could be seriously weakened if a divisive declaration were approved, a number of Third World nations joined the United States, Canada and Western European countries in deferring the question to 1978.

The resolution which deferred consideration of the draft declaration invited the UNESCO Director General to hold "further broad consultations with experts" with a view to drafting a new text "which could meet with the largest possible measure of agreement" for submission to member states. He circulated widely a trial balloon text in 1977. Based on responses to it, last August 21 he submitted another draft text to member states.

The State Department in consultation with other agencies concluded that the August text was unacceptable because it retained language mandating responsibilities for the mass media, implying restrictions on some of their operations and endorsing state control. A letter to Director General M'Bow enumerated specific and severe U.S. objections.

The Department also instructed our diplomatic posts in 57 key countries to convey to host governments our concern with this draft and the threat it posed to global free flow of information. Department officers and members of the U.S. Permanent Delegation to UNESCO met with Western counterparts in Paris early in October to lay out common strategies for achieving another deferral of the draft declaration.

Soon after the General Conference convened on October 24, two things became apparent to our delegation:

—There was a strong and widespread preference of developing countries for adoption of some kind of media declaration, but not necessarily the one which had been submitted to Member States.

—The Director General and the UNESCO Secretariat were disposed to work for a consensus agreement through low-visibility negotiations, rather than endanger Western support for UNESCO by adopting a declaration over their objections.

Confronted with the assessment of our delegation that there was virtually no chance of further postponement of the item, we decided to negotiate for an acceptable text, always retaining the option of opposing one which did not meet our minimum requirements. The Department consulted extensively with media leaders who agreed that working to produce the best possible text was preferable to continued opposition to any text, a course that seemed likely to result in adoption by a large majority of an unacceptable declaration endorsing state control of the media.

The result of intensive negotiations was a text [Annex] not only stripped of all language implying state authority over the mass media, but which also included positive language on freedom of information. Instead of imposing duties and responsibilities upon journalists, as had previous drafts, it proclaimed the "necessity for them to enjoy the best conditions for the exercise of their profession." It recognized that the exercise of freedom of opinion, expression and information is an integral part of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and it asserted the public's right of access to information through a diversity of sources. It charged states with the responsibility of providing favorable conditions for the operation of the mass media. It affirmed the necessity to help the developing countries overcome their handicaps in communication development as a cooperative measure.

The developing countries overwhelmingly supported the new draft and successfully resisted communist bloc demands for extensive counter-amendments. The concerned U.S. media leaders, both within and outside the Delegation, declared the draft acceptable and it was adopted by consensus on the final day of the General Conference.

Cooperation and assistance programs

In his statement to the General Conference, the chairman of the U.S. delegation, Ambassador John E. Reinhardt, offered concrete proposals of cooperation and assistance to respond to developing countries' needs in communication development:

—Cooperation, through educational exchange programs, to improve the regional training institutions for mass communication and journalism in the developing world.

—In cooperation with INTELSAT or other appropriate satellite entities, provision of management, training and funding for demonstration projects for satellite delivery systems of health, education, population and agricultural information to rural audiences in poor areas lacking terrestrial telecommunications infrastructure.

—A planning conference, hosted by the United States, to explore formation of a consultative group on international communication assistance. The group would be formed from existing international bodies to respond to requests, provide counseling and seek funding for developing countries communication aid requests.

The United States sponsored a resolution, adopted by consensus, inviting the Director General to call this planning conference (now scheduled for Washington later in 1979). Another U.S.-sponsored consensus resolution urged the identification by the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems of concrete and

practical measures leading to "a more just and effective world information order."

"*New world information order*"

As one of its original objectives, UNESCO sought to promote the free flow of information and of international exchanges. As more developing countries came into being and joined the U.N. system, this objective became "a free *and balanced* flow of information;" a growing emphasis was placed on the *balancing* element. Third World Countries have sought recognition within UNESCO of their demand for a "New World Information Order," the rhetorical complement of the New International Economic Order.

A nonaligned resolution adopted by the 1978 UNESCO General Conference called for the establishment of a "new world information order (NWIO)." We abstained because NWIO, is an undefined concept, which may summarize non-aligned demands for a better balance in information flows and capacities, but which may also have suggested to some countries that steps restricting the free flow of information may be taken in order to achieve this balance.

However at the U.N. General Assembly in December, the United States did join in consensus adoption of a new world information order resolution because we had successfully achieved language tying a NWIO to the free flow of information and to practical measures to overcome the communication imbalance. The pertinent operative paragraph reads:

The General Assembly affirms the need to establish a new, more just and more effective world information and communication order, intended to strengthen international peace and understanding and based on a free flow and wider and better balanced dissemination of information.

By incorporating the concept of free flow of information, the resolution lays the foundation for both communications development and removal of all restrictions on the free flow of information.

POLICY/OBJECTIVES

U.S. objectives in UNESCO are:

1. To emphasize that the problems of developing countries can best be solved by increasing their ability to generate and disseminate information, not by strengthening state controls over the mass media or by restricting the flow of information among nations.

2. To build on the consensus we achieved at the November 1978 UNESCO General Conference for protecting the free flow of information and cooperation with the developing countries in realizing their information/communication goals.

3. To support UNESCO studies and technical assistance programs, along with efforts by other advanced countries, multilateral institutions and private sector information industries designed to strengthen the communications capabilities of developing countries.

4. To encourage direct contacts between developed and developing countries' media so that the private sector can assume a larger responsibility for technical and other assistance.

5. To reaffirm the principle of a free flow of information as an essential element of a new, more just and more effective world information and communication order, thus securing Western participation in the definition of a new information order and preempting Third World efforts to exclusively define the goals of communications development.

III. WARC 1979

BACKGROUND

The 1979 World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC 79) is a technical conference which will have strong political, economic, national security and commercial consequences. It will review and revise as necessary allocation of radio frequencies to different communications services. It will also review, and revise as necessary, procedures for international management of the spectrum. By directly affecting radio frequency allocations and use, WARC 79 will influence the overall pattern of United States telecommunications activities, here and abroad, through the end of the century.

WARC 79 will meet in Geneva under ITU auspices in September 1979. In size and complexity WARC 79 will be one of the largest international conferences in which the United States has ever participated. Eleven hundred delegates from over 130 countries are expected to gather for the ten-week session.

It is the first ITU conference in twenty years competent to review and revise the entire international table of radio frequency allocations and related technical criteria and coordination procedures. (Specialized conferences deal frequently with particular service regulations and provisions.) As with previous radio conferences, the product of WARC 79 will be a treaty.

In general terms the agenda for WARC 79 establishes the basis for, among other things:

—New and changed frequency allocations for various services to meet changing needs.

—Revision of technical standards for sharing and use of frequencies.

—Revision of general principles for allocations, orbital utilization and procedures for coordination, notification, registration, and enforcement of frequencies.

PRESENT STATUS OF U.S. WARC POLICY DEVELOPMENT

FCC/NTIA/State Department

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has responsibility for assigning frequencies to non-federal government users. It has been formed, chaired by the chairman of the U.S. WARC Delegaings for over four years and issued a Report and Order containing a recommended U.S. position on private sector needs in late 1978. The National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) has responsibility for assignment of freqeuncies to the Federal Government. Together the FCC and NTIA have developed the basic U.S. requirements for public and private sector users. Their

recommendations to the State Department are in general contained in a Report and Order issued by the FCC in December 1978. From this document the Department will draft U.S. proposals—reflecting national security, political and economic, as well as technical, considerations.

To ensure coordination in refining U.S. positions, an informal group has been formed, chaired by the chairman of the U.S. WARC Delegation, representing the Secretary of State, and including the Chairman of the FCC and the Administrator of NTIA. Other agencies participate when issues affecting them are discussed.

U.S. delegation

On January 6, 1978, Glen O. Robinson, Professor of Law at the University of Virginia, was named Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the WARC. He reports directly to the Deputy Secretary of State. Professor Robinson will hold the personal rank of ambassador during the Conference.

The delegation is being formed in two major stages. An initial delegation group of twenty persons has been formed with membership drawn from Federal Government agencies active in WARC preparations. This core group will be expanded to include Congressional and non-government members, that is, industry and general public interest advisers. The expansion of the delegation to its final size—presently envisaged at approximately sixty full-time delegates—will occur between now and mid-1979 and will include N/S and area specialists as well.

Advisory committee

In order to provide for comprehensive non-governmental participation, a public advisory committee was established in May 1978. Chaired by Glen Robinson, the committee's membership is drawn from industry and the general public. The committee is broken down into five working groups.

Domestic planning coordination

A number of political issues related to WARC 79 are the subject of discussion in other forums. For example, the U.N. Outer Space Committee consideration of whether consent should be obtained by one country before seeking to broadcast by satellite into another country's territory. UNESCO is considering the more general issue of information "dominance" by developed countries *vis-a-vis* developing countries. The OECD, the Council of Europe, the Nordic Council, and a number of individual countries, are considering regulation of transfer of computer-based personal data across national boundaries. WARC delegation staff members are monitoring and receiving regular reports on these activities, in addition to maintaining informal contacts and regular meetings with appropriate State Department offices and other agencies concerning related foreign affairs matters.

Foreign consultations

Since 1977 the United States has engaged in extensive international consultations on WARC with a view to explaining emerging U.S. positions for the Conference and obtaining information on foreign

needs and interests. To date, individual consultative meetings have been held with over thirty-five countries in Europe, the Pacific and Asia, South America, Africa and North America. In some cases, several rounds of discussions have been held.

In addition to bilateral discussions, the United States has participated in multilateral discussions in forums such as NATO, CEPT (European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations) and CITEL (Inter-American Telecommunications Conference), an arm of the OAS. The schedule for future consultations in the first half of 1979 includes meetings with officials in Latin America. Africa and Asia as well as Europe.

PROPOSALS AND ISSUES

Allocations issues

Low and medium frequencies.—In the low and medium frequency range in general terms we propose expansion of AM broadcasting to accommodate new broadcast stations. Coincident with this expansion, we are proposing a number of other changes in other services such as changes in radio-location and improved accommodation of amateur frequencies.

High frequency.—The United States proposes a significant increase in international broadcasting and maritime services plus some increased accommodation for amateur service.

UHF frequencies.—In the UHF band the major thrust of U.S. proposals is to increase allocations for land mobile services to be shared with the broadcast service.

Also noteworthy in this frequency range is a provision for land mobile satellite and also for satellite sound broadcasting. In addition, we propose a variety of other provisions to accommodate increased needs for amateur, maritime mobile services and aeronautical.

SHF and EHF frequencies.—Above the UHF band we have a large variety of different service needs and proposals are being developed to accommodate them.

Also within the fixed satellite service we are proposing very significant change in allocations for both the fixed service and the broadcast satellite service frequencies at 12 GHz.

We also have a very important requirement for a mobile satellite service in 7 and 8 GHz band which we are proposing to meet.

As we move higher in the spectrum the controversy over allocations leads into a general uncertainty as to what is practically important and what is mere speculation. In general, the upper reaches of the spectrum should be far less controversial than the lower, since the technology has yet to demonstrate what is feasible. There are a handful of countries, of which the United States is one, which have the requisite technology to utilize the spectrum at the higher extremes, notably in the EHF range above 30 GHz. We are proposing a number of specific allocations for advanced or experimental services.

Non-allocations issues

One of the most controversial, and most troublesome of all WARC issues centers on notification and coordination procedures.

The United States remains committed to the present system of flexible procedures, although we recognize that there is room for simplification and improvement in the application of these procedures. We are generally opposed to prefixed allotment plans which distribute frequencies to individual countries or regions without regard to present or demonstrated foreseeable need.

Despite our opposition to pre-fixed assignment plans or other proposals to abandon the present system of protection priorities, we do seek to provide reliable assurance to all nations that they can obtain access to the spectrum as and when their requirements develop. A number of concepts which would provide such assurances are being studied.

International climate

A detailed evaluation of the relationship of the U.S. position to that of other countries will not be possible until after January, when their proposals will be filed with the ITU.

U.S. POLICY/OBJECTIVES

The primary United States interest is to insure that necessary changes in ITU regulations governing allocation and use of the radio spectrum are made in the light of evolving U.S. economic, social and technical needs. Overall U.S. policy emphasizes:

—Support of the ITU. The United States regards the organization, despite its imperfections, as the best long-term means of maintaining order in international telecommunications.

—Incremental change. The United States does not believe its requirements or those of other nations, call for radical or wholesale changes in spectrum allocations or procedures. We seek many changes, but all are *incremental* changes as are required by present needs, and those that are reasonably foreseeable over the next twenty years.

—Flexibility. Closely tied to the policy of minimal change is the need for flexible management procedures regarding frequency allocations and regulatory controls.

—Accommodation of the needs of other nations. Consistent with our own essential requirements, the United States seeks accommodation of the needs of other developed and developing countries. In our view the WARC must, and can, achieve a broad consensus among different nations by adhering to flexible procedures and a spirit of international accord on technical requirements.

IV. Direct Broadcast TV Satellite (DBS)

BACKGROUND

Point-to-point television has been transmitted via satellite for over fifteen years. This arrangement entails a program being carried by conventional means to a sending earth station, then via satellite to a receiving earth station, and finally by conventional means to over-the-air broadcasting stations for dissemination to home receivers.

Direct broadcast satellite (DBS) technology is significantly different. In a direct broadcast system, television programs beamed from a sending earth station to the satellite will be received directly by a large number of receivers, using small antennas and equipment for converting frequencies (that is, types of home TV sets in use today could not be used without expensive conversion). The programs technically could be received directly by a home television set, or by a community receiver for distribution by cable to home sets or for display on a centrally located screen. The system whereby programs are received directly by home receivers (referred to as DBS) raises the most troublesome issues.

The U.S. Government has no specific plans for establishing a DBS system. However, the technology will be operating on a domestic level in some countries by the 1980's. Japan has a domestic experimental DBS system (built in the United States). The Soviet Union is reportedly nearing an operating domestic DBS capability, and Canada plans a domestic operational DBS system for the early 1980's.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROVERSY

The question of whether TV programs may be beamed via satellite from one country directly to the TV sets of another, without the approval of the "receiving" government, has been the subject of controversy in U.N. forums for the past six years. For the Soviets and many developing countries, "prior consent" means allowing the receiving state to examine and censor each program; for many Western states, "prior consent" would mean permitting the receiving state to license a DBS service before it commenced, with requests for such licenses evaluated on the basis of local standards.

As a practical matter, a 1977 ITU Regional Administrative Radio Conference, which assigned the frequencies in the Broadcast satellite Services bands of 11.7–12.5 gigahertz on a nation-by-nation basis in the Eastern Hemisphere, would require prior *technical* coordination before beaming DBS programs at the TV sets of another nation.

THE UNITED NATIONS

The DBS issue surfaced in the 1960's as a Soviet initiative to censor individual programs in any future DBS system. Since then the UN and its subcommittees and working groups have been wrestling with the question. Over the past six years, the Outer Space Committee (now 47 members) has agreed to a number of relatively non-controversial principles on DBS and has now reached the prior consent issue. The present draft text in the UN does not explicitly call for a "prior consent", but rather "arrangements and/or agreements" between broadcasting and receiving states before the initiation of a DBS service.

POLICY/OBJECTIVES

In dealing with the DBS issue, the U.S. objectives are:

1. To prevent the United Nations or other bodies from approving political principles on DBS that would derogate from the right "to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers".

2. To work for international arrangements in the United Nations and ITU which promote in practice the free exchange of information and ideas via DBS.

3. To preserve the consensus procedure of the UN Outer Space Committee, which has thus far served broad and important U.S. interests in space.

4. To demonstrate sensitivity to Third World concerns about the imbalance in world communications, and to offer to help developing countries to use DBS for social and economic development.

The United States strongly supports the principle of free flow of information across national borders. Within the context of our free flow policy, the United States opposes a "prior consent" regime. We have thus refused to accept the language in the present draft UN text. The United States is, however, willing to accept a principle committing states to non-binding consultations, if requested, with receiving states before initiating a DBS service.

V. Transborder Data Flows

BACKGROUND

The term "transborder data flows" refers to the transmission of data from computer to computer, using telecommunications circuits across national borders.

The United States is by far the largest exporter of computers and communications equipment and the largest provider of data services. Computer systems are critical to multinational corporations and the data service industry. They store, process and transmit information, and transfer funds, for aviation, banking, and other industries. Transborder data flows are thus important.

Although the principle of free flow of information is also applicable to transborder data flows, in contrast to DBS and UNESCO, the information involved is essentially economic and technical data or personal records rather than news or other forms of public communications.

THE RESTRICTIONS

European countries are uneasy about the computerization of their societies and the U.S. dominance of the computer and related markets. They are resisting the uncontrolled growth of the technology. Regulations, proposed or adopted, are directed at a number of social, economic, and security objectives.

Since 1973, Sweden, France, Germany, Norway, Denmark, Austria and Canada have enacted laws seeking to protect privacy by controlling the transmission of personal information across borders. Other European nations have draft laws awaiting parliamentary action. Australia, Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Japan and Switzerland are studying the issue. Some legislation protects the privacy of "legal persons", which would restrict the activities of multinational corporations.

The OECD Committee on Information, Computers and Communications Policy is now considering how differing national approaches to privacy legislation can be harmonized so that data flows will not be

restricted. Since European legislation is similar, harmonization is basically a problem of U.S. approach versus European approach.[1] The Council of Europe (the United States is not a member) is drafting a privacy connection which follows the European model of privacy laws and probably will be a document to which we could not adhere. Harmonization, therefore, is a real issue for the United States. Other regulations have been proposed for security, job protection or other reasons.

Many European concerns about computer dependency are similar to those expressed in the United States. We share European concerns for privacy, and we can understand why a nation may be concerned that data critical for its central economic planning is stored in computers in another country.

INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE

An interagency task force chaired by the Department of State, with NTIA providing primary technical support, is charged with developing policy on transborder data flows in consultation with the public, industry representatives, and Congress.

Within the OECD, the United States supports international arrangements on sensitive personal data that will assure adequate protection of such data with the least possible restriction of data flows. An OECD Group of Experts is now drafting international Guidelines for dealing with personal data flows, using the U.S. paper, prepared by the Task Force, as the principal basis for the Guidelines.

POLICY/OBJECTIVES

The Task Force has formulated some broad objectives.

1. To assure U.S. multinationals and others of nondiscriminatory access to low cost, efficient information systems.
2. To assure non-discriminatory commercial opportunity for U.S. firms that are marketing international data processing and data bank services.
3. To participate in developing international computer, data processing, software and encryption standards.
4. To protect the privacy of personal data of U.S. nationals.
5. To support general access to scientific and technical data bases.
6. To respond to international concern about U.S. domination of international computer and data processing and the reliability of access to U.S. data bases.
7. To encourage U.S. access to foreign advances in hardware and software technologies.
8. To encourage foreign governments to restrict their privacy laws to coverage of natural persons.
9. To provide a functional system for government-to-government exchange of data with due regard to national security and personal privacy.

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[1] European laws tend to rely on registration and licensing and apply to both the public and private sector but only with respect to automated systems. The United States Privacy Act applies only to information (automated *and* manual) held by the government. The Administration is developing legislation and guidelines tailored to specific categories of records held by the private sector. It is contemplated that legislation would be self-enforcing and would not require registration or licensing.

The most serious constraint on U.S. policymaking is the lack of knowledge about the dimensions of the real and potential restraints on transborder data flows. To make progress, we will: identify existing and potential restraints on transborder data flows; assess the impacts of these restraints on our companies and on our overall economic and foreign policy interests; and establish priorities on issues most affecting U.S. interests. The Task Force will be preparing specific policy recommendations responding to these questions by June 1979.

VI. Development Communications

BACKGROUND

Communications systems are a crucial part of the economic and social infrastructure of modern nations; developing countries need technical assistance both to modernize their internal communications systems and to establish links with global and possibly regional systems. In the words of the UNESCO Director General: "If the improvement of the means of communication between peoples tends to become a major subject of preoccupation, it is because communication has very rapidly been perceived to be coextensive with all aspects of development, of which it is a strategic factor." The United States is thus giving increased attention to development communications, as indicated, for example in Ambassador Reinhardt's statement to the UNESCO General Conference, discussed at pages 9–10.

U.S. COMMUNICATIONS AID

United States assistance to Third World communications has come either through bilateral channels—AID, ICA, ExIm Bank—or via multilateral channels—World Bank, regional international banks and U.N. functional agencies such as UNESCO.

Bilateral communications aid

Bilateral aid for communications through AID totaled $27 million in fiscal year 1978. Of this sum, $12 million was in Development Assistance Programs (1 percent of the Development Assistance Budget) and $15 million in Supporting Assistance, largely for Egypt. In fiscal year 1979, AID communications funding is expected to increase appreciably, to a total of between $35–$40 million, with Development Assistance funds accounting for $15 to $20 million.

In recent years, Congressional and AID emphasis on "new Directions" and on "basic human needs" has imposed some constraint on efforts to assist developing nations to modernize communications. The extent of this constraint should not, however, be overstated since communications assistance can provide important support for "basic human needs" objectives.

AID, operating from the view that communications should support programs in its basic human needs sectors, does not have a separate communications budget. AID programs are largely in support of innovative "software" development and utilization activities.

AID's activities have included technical assistance in the use of local mass media for basic education, family planning, nutrition, and agriculture; training in communications strategies; and substantial R&D pilot projects designed to improve radio and television programming for mass education. AID has also been involved in short-term communications satellite demonstrations and evaluations with a number of countries, and is considering a broader satellite program, discussed at page 9. In recent years, little assistance has gone to basic telecommunication infrastructure (though the ExIm Bank has supported such projects), except in the Supporting Assistance countries, which are primarily in the Middle East and Southern Africa.

ICA's communications-related exchange programs have accounted for about $1.2 million of its $373 million annual budget. About 3.8 percent of ExIm Bank's annual loans have been communications related, mostly for purchases of telecommunications equipment. This includes $145 million for satellite earth stations for twenty-four countries.

Reimbursable technical assistance

AID's reimbursable technical assistance program offers a channel for assisting upper tier and middle income developing countries which can afford to purchase communications systems (and related training), but which require technical assistance in identifying specific needs, determining feasibility, and weighing alternatives. To assist in this process, AID finances and makes available U.S. technical teams to help clarify and define development requirements or projects specifications, and to advise on the kinds and sources of applicable U.S. technology.

Communications has been among the areas of greatest demand for reimbursable technical assistance. In view of the influential role upper tier and middle income developing countries can play in influencing positions of the Third World on various communications issues, reimbursable technical assistance may be an especially valuable tool in developing more effective relationships with the United States and encouraging broader understanding of differing points of view.

Multilateral communications aid

The World Bank and its International Development Agency (IDA) have made communications expenditures averaging $82 million per year, primarily for long-distance lines, subscriber equipment, satellite terminals, and general telecommunications expansion. Both the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank are now considering support for communications in rural areas.

The north/south aspect

Expanded aid to communications will contribute generally to the climate of our several upcoming communications negotiations. Political benefits do not themselves justify launching a major aid program, but here there is ample justification on the merits. Delegations involved in communications issues are fully briefed on AID or ICA efforts in the communication field.

POLICY/OBJECTIVES

Our objectives in providing communications assistance are:

1. To assist developing nations expand their capacity to utilize effectively communications technology to meet basic human needs objectives.

2. To help developing nations strengthen indigenous communication and information systems.

3. To strengthen the ties between communications leaders and institutions in the United States and their counterparts abroad.

4. To expand foreign markets for U.S. communications expertise and products.

5. To demonstrate to developing nations the potential benefits of satellite communications.

6. To speed the modernization of communications structure in developing countries, and thus relieve the pressure on crowed radio frequency bands important to the United States.

7. To enlist the aid of other industrialized countries in the overall effort to help developing countries meet their communications needs.

Section 603

INTERNATIONAL JOURNALISTIC FREEDOM

Introduction

This report, submitted to the Congress pursuant to section 603 of Public Law 95–426, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, describes U.S. Government efforts internationally to safeguard the rights of journalists. The principal focus of this effort was our preparation for and participation in the recent UNESCO General Conference which adopted by consensus a mass media declaration affirming that "journalists must have freedom to report and the fullest possible facilities of access to information." Based upon the mass media declaration, the Department of State also made a concerted effort with individual foreign nations worldwide to convey U.S. concerns with interference with the rights of journalists.

I. Multilateral Efforts—The UNESCO General Conference

On the Final Day of the UNESCO General Conference (GC) 20th Session, the U.S. Delegation joined in consensus adoption of a declaration on the media's contribution to peace and understanding, promotion of human rights and countering racism, apartheid, and incitement to war. The text as adopted represented a remarkable turnaround from earlier versions. It not only removed those clauses calling for state control of the media, but added others guaranteeing freedom of information as essential to human rights and the right of journalists to freely report the news, as in Article II: (See Annex for full text)

"1. The exercise of freedom of opinion, expression and information, recognized as an integral part of human rights and fundamental freedoms, is a vital factor in the strengthening of peace and international understanding.

"2. Access by the public to information should be guaranteed by the diversity of the sources and means of information available to it, thus enabling each individual to check the accuracy of facts and to appraise events objectively. To this end, journalists must have freedom to report and the fullest possible facilities of access to information. Similarly, it is important that the mass media be responsive to concerns of peoples and individuals, thus promoting the participation of the public in the elaboration of information.

"3. With a view to the strengthening of peace and international understanding, to promoting human rights and to countering racialism, apartheid and incitement to war, the mass media throughout the world, by reason of their role, contribute effectively to promoting human rights, in particular by giving expression to oppressed peoples

who struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism, foreign occupation and all forms of racial discrimination and oppression and who are unable to make their voices heard within their own territories."

The original draft of the UNESCO Declaration on Mass Media Principles which was on the agenda of the 20th session of the General Conference (Paris, October 24–November 28) posed a serious threat to global journalistic freedom. The draft was the outgrowth of 1972 Soviet-sponsored resolution which had sought to "use" the media to promote peace and international understanding and to fight against war propaganda and racism. The idea of using the media as a tool of official policy implied the authority of the state or international community over the media and thus undermined the entire principle of press freedom and independence.

The draft declaration had gone through several versions over the years, all of them unacceptable to the United States and others that valued freedom of expression. (The item had been postponed in the 18th and 19th sessions of the General Conference.) A new text which had been drafted for the 20th session was likewise unacceptable.

Although the declaration would be non-binding upon Member States, we feared that endorsement of such a document by one of the United Nations' specialized agencies would give encouragement to those countries inclined to impose restrictions on journalistic freedom and thus set the stage for legitimizing such restrictions. The principal U.S. objections which were spelled out were:

—The draft declaration explicitly endorsed state control of the media, including informational content;

—Several rights enumerated in the draft were conditioned upon adherence to certain standards of practices;

—Several provisions supported the view that the media should not distribute dissenting views on certain subjects;

—Insufficient weight was devoted to the value of competing and critical information;

—Insufficient attention was given to the duties of states to protect and facilitate the free flow of information;

—It suggested that duties and responsibilities can or should be imposed on the mass media and journalists.

EARLY PREPARATION FOR 20TH GENERAL CONFERENCE

Prior to the 1976 General Conference in Nairobi, the Department of State in cooperation with the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO had established a working relationship with key members of the U.S. media community in order to coordinate positions and strategy for confronting the challenge that this issue represented. This effort was expanded and strengthened after Nairobi and a close partnership developed, involving not only frequent contacts with Department officers but periodic meetings with the Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary on substantive policy questions. These consultations led to the nomination of a prominent publisher, recommended by the media community, to the UNESCO General Conference Delegation.

U.S. DEMARCHES THROUGH UNESCO CHANNELS

Early in 1978, the Department learned that Director General M'Bow was studying a revised text which had been prepared pursuant to the mandate of the 19th General Conference in Nairobi, namely, to continue consultations on the mass media draft declaration with a view to producing a text "which could meet with the largest possible measure of agreement." The Department reviewed the text and, in consultation with key persons in the media and Congress, concluded that it, like all its predecessors, was unacceptable. This view, including a detailed legal analysis, was conveyed to the Director General.

The Department invited Director General M'Bow for his first official visit to the United States in July, and made it abundantly clear that the mass media draft declaration and the threat it posed to journalistic freedom was the chief U.S. concern with respect to the forthcoming General Conference.

Nevertheless the draft text issued by the Director General after his visit was a disappointment. The Department promptly conveyed its objections in writing to Director General M'Bow and recalled that his mandate from the previous General Conference was the pursuit of consensus (as opposed to a yes/no vote, which we believed would result in adoption of a declaration containing restrictions on press freedom.)

CONFERENCE NEGOTIATIONS

Negotiations at the UNESCO General Conference successfully amended the controversial draft text which had stirred such widespread opposition since it was issued by the Director General on August 21.

The United States was in the vanguard of nations (mostly Western democracies and some developing countries) determined to prevent its adoption, on grounds that it would sanction state authority over the media and erode the principle of press freedom worldwide. The product of the negotiations was a text not only stripped of language implying state authority over the mass media, but which also included positive language on freedom of information. Instead of imposing duties and responsibilities upon journalists, as various drafts attempted, it proclaimed that they must have freedom to report and the fullest possible facilities of access to information and be assured of protection guaranteeing them the best conditions for the exercise of their profession. It recognized that the exercise of freedom of opinion, expression and information is an integral part of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and it asserted the public's right of access to information through a diversity of sources. It charged states with the responsibility of providing favorable conditions for the operation of the mass media. It affirmed the necessity to help the developing countries overcome their handicaps in communication development as a means of helping correct the "information imbalance" worldwide.

II. Bilateral Efforts

While technically the UNESCO Declaration is a statement of principle and not a document binding on member states, it is significant

that it was adopted by all 146 UNESCO members by consensus. It thus represents a consensus among virtually the entire world community. The fact that the Declaration specifically points out the necessity for governments to respect the rights of journalists makes it an excellent vehicle for conveying U.S. concerns over conditions in a number of countries which restrict the full exercise of journalism, both for domestic and foreign journalists.

Based on the Declaration, the State Department dispatched a circular cable to all posts, specifying representations to be made based on the UNESCO Declaration. This had, in addition to voicing our strong objections to mistreatment and/or restriction of foreign journalists, the added benefit of (a) approving the global application of the principles in the UNESCO Declaration and (b) reiterating the longstanding U.S. commitment to press freedom.

Instructions to posts were issued only after the conclusion of the General Conference of UNESCO and a United Nations General Assembly debate on information issues in general—where it was thought the debate over Agenda Item 77 ("Information Items") might generate additional discussions of related topics bearing on the question of journalists' rights. However, as the General Assembly adjourned December 21, 1978, without having broken new ground in this regard, instructions to posts were prepared based principally on the outcome of the UNESCO General Conference, which produced the Mass Media Declaration.

For widest impact, these instructions were transmitted under the All Diplomatic Posts distribution (i.e., all U.S. Embassies worldwide). Recipient posts were divided into several categories, beginning with WEO ("Western European and Other") states. This grouping, encompassing Western Europe plus other dominantly democratic, liberal societies (Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Canada, etc.), received instructions urging the respective host governments to join the United States in reaffirming the principles of journalistic freedom embodied in the UNESCO Declaration, expressing our appreciation for the cooperation we received from WEO states in achieving a successful outcome on the UNESCO Declaration, and inquiring what steps they may be contemplating in furtherance of its principles.

The second group covered Eastern European posts, where the press is tightly restricted and where foreign correspondents have been subject to harassment and intimidation. Instructions to posts in this area sought to utilize two important documents: (1) the UNESCO Declaration, which was adopted by consensus vote that included all Eastern European states; and (2) the Helsinki Agreements of 1975, which likewise contained protective clauses for journalists, and to which the Eastern European states also acceded. Posts in these states were to convey the seriousness with which the United States views the obligation to protect journalists contained in these two declarations.

The third grouping of recipient posts covers the "Non-Aligned and Other" posts, encompassing the 86 members of the Non-Aligned Movement, and remaining Third World states. In this instance, instructions call for making a comprehensive list of points which spell out the rights of journalists and reaffirms the conviction of the United States as to the principles of journalistic freedom set forth in the UNESCO

Declaration. These points, also applicable in whole or part to other regions at the discretion of the U.S. Embassy, likewise enumerate the concrete steps which are necessary to implement the guarantees of journalistic freedom called for in the UNESCO Declaration.

Specific steps listed by the instructions to facilitate the free flow of information through improving the working conditions for journalists include:

—promptly and favorably reviewing journalists' requests for visas;
—granting multiple entry and exit visas;
—removing restrictions on the travel of journalists;
—promptly and favorably reviewing the requests for permission to travel, where such permission is needed;
—removing restrictions on access by journalists to sources, including organizations and official institutions as well as individuals on a personal basis;
—ensuring journalists the right to import technical equipment necessary for the exercise of their profession;
—removing restrictions on the ability of journalists to transmit completely, normally and rapidly the results of their professional activity, including tape recordings or film;
—ensuring that the legitimate pursuit of their professional activity will not lead to the expulsion, incarceration, ill-treatment or other penalization of journalists;
—ensuring that journalists enjoy freedom of expression, including freedom from censorship;
—providing for prompt review of all penalties imposed on journalists.

For those particular states [1] noted (based on Congressional hearings, consultation with media leaders, and reports by respected human rights organizations in particular *Freedom House*) for their abuse or restriction of journalists, special emphasis was laid on expressing the sensitivity of this issue to the United States, the seriousness with which we view it, and its potential for adversely affecting our bilateral relations, in addition to the other points made.

The UNESCO Mass Media Declaration is attached as Annex A and the Department's instructions to posts on journalistic freedom as Annex B. A supplemental report will be submitted when replies from Embassies on this subject have been received and compiled.

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[1] These countries are: Algeria, Argentina, Central African Empire, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, GDR, Haiti, Israel, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, PRC, Philippines, Somalia, Syria, Tanzania, Uruguay, U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, and Zaire.

Annex A

Draft Declaration on Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Racialism, Apartheid and Incitement to War

Preamble

The General Conference,

1. *Recalling* that by its Constitution the purpose of Unesco is to "contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms" (Art. I, 1), and that to realize this purpose the Organization will strive "to promote the free flow of ideas by word and image" (Art. I, 2).

2. Further *recalling* that under the Constitution the Member States of Unesco, "believing in full and equal opportunities for education for all, in the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth, and in the free exchange of ideas and knowledge, are agreed and determined to develop and to increase the means of communication between their peoples and to employ these means for the purposes of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each other's lives" (sixth preambular paragraph),

3. *Recalling* the purposes and principles of the United Nations, as specified in the Charter.

4. *Recalling* the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948 and particularly Article 19 which provides that "everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers"; and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1966, Article 19 of which proclaims the same principles and Article 20 of which condemns incitement to war, the advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred and any form of discrimination, hostility or violence.

5. *Recalling* Article 4 of the International Convention on Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1965, and the International Convention of the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime and Apartheid adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1973 whereby the States acceding to these Conventions undertook to adopt immediate and positive measures designed to eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, racial discrimination, and agreed to prevent any encouragement of the crime of apartheid and similar segregationist policies or their manifestations,

6. *Recalling* the Declaration on the Promotion among Youth of the Ideals of Peace, Mutual Respect and Understanding between Peoples, adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1965,

7. *Recalling* the declarations and resolutions adopted by the various organs of the United Nations concerning the establishment of a New International Ecomomic Order and the role Unesco is called upon to play in this respect,

8. *Recalling* the Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Co-operation, adopted by the General Conference of Unesco in 1966,

9. *Recalling* Resolution 59 (I) of the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted in 1946 and declaring

"Freedom of information is a fundamental human right and is the touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated;

* * * * * * *

Freedom of information requires as an indispensable element the willingness and capacity to employ its privileges without abuse. It requires as a basic discipline the moral obligation to seek the facts without prejudice and to spread knowledge without malicious intent;

* * * * * * *

10. *Recalling* Resolution 110(II) of the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted in 1947 condemning all forms of propaganda which are designed or likely to provoke or encourage any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,

11. *Recalling* Resolution 127(II), also adopted by the General Assembly in 1947, which invites Member States to take measures, within the limits of constitutional procedures, to combat the diffusion of false or distorted reports likely to injure friendly relations between States, as well as the other resolutions of the General Assembly concerning the mass media and their contribution to strengthening peace, thus contributing to the growth of trust and friendly relations among States,

12. *Recalling* resolution 9.12 adopted by the General Conference of Unesco in 1968 reiterating Unesco's objective to help to eradicate colonialism and racialism, and resolution 12.1 adopted by the General Conference of Unesco in 1976 which proclaims that colonialism, neocolonialism and racialism in all its forms and manifestations are incompatible with the fundamental aims of Unesco,

13. *Recalling* resolution 4.301 adopted in 1970 by the General Conference of Unesco on the contribution of the information media to furthering international understanding and co-operation in the interests of peace and human welfare, and to countering propaganda on behalf of war, racialism, apartheid and hatred among nations, and *aware* of the fundamental contribution that mass media can make to the realization of these objectives,

14. *Recalling* the Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice adopted by the General Conference of Unesco at its twentieth session,

15. *Conscious* of the complexity of the problems of information in modern society, of the diversity of solutions which have been offered to them, as evidenced in particular by consideration given to them within Unesco as well as of the legitimate desire of all parties con-

cerned that their aspirations, points of view and cultural identity be taken into due consideration,

16. *Conscious* of the aspirations of the developing countries for the establishment of a new, more just and more effective world information and communication order,

17. Proclaims on this _____ day of _____ 1978 this Declaration on Fundamental Principles concerning the Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Racialism, Apartheid and Incitement to War.

Article I

The strengthening of peace and international understanding, the promotion of human rights and the countering of racialism, apartheid and incitement to war demand a free flow and a wider and better balanced dissemination of information. To this end, the mass media have a leading contribution to make. This contribution will be the more effective to the extent that the information reflects the different aspects of the subject dealt with.

Article II

1. The exercise of freedom of opinion, expression and information, recognized as an integral part of human rights and fundamental freedoms, is a vital factor in the strengthening of peace and international understanding.

2. Access by the public to information should be guaranteed by the diversity of the sources and means of information available to it, thus enabling each individual to check the accuracy of facts and to appraise events objectively. To this end, journalists must have freedom to report and the fullest possible facilities of access to information. Similarly, it is important that the mass media be responsive to concerns of peoples and individuals, thus promoting the participation of the public in the elaboration of information.

3. With a view to the strengthening of peace and international understanding, to promoting human rights and to countering racialism, apartheid and incitement to war, the mass media throughout the world, by reason of their role, contribute effectively to promoting human rights, in particular by giving expression to oppressed peoples who struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism, foreign occupation and all forms of racial discrimination and oppression and who are unable to make their voices heard within their own territories.

4. If the mass media are to be in a position to promote the principles of this Declaration in their activities, it is essential that journalists and other agents of the mass media, in their own country or abroad, be assured of protection guaranteeing them the best conditions for the exercise of their profession.

Article III

1. The mass media have an important contribution to make to the strengthening of peace and international understanding and in countering racialism, apartheid and incitement to war.

2. In countering aggressive war, racialism, apartheid and other violations of human rights which are *inter alia* spawned by prejudice and ignorance, the mass media, by disseminating information on the aims, aspirations, cultures and needs of all people, contribute to eliminate ignorance and misunderstanding between peoples, to make nationals of a country sensitive to the needs and desires of others, to ensure the respect of the rights and dignity of all nations, all people and all individuals without distinction of race, sex, language, religion or nationality and to draw attention to the great evils which afflict humanity, such as poverty, malnutrition and diseases, thereby promoting the formulation by States of policies best able to promote the reduction of international tension and the peaceful and the equitable settlement of international disputes.

Article IV

The mass media have an essential part to play in the education of young people in a spirit of peace, justice, freedom, mutual respect and understanding, in order to promote human rights, equality of rights as between all human beings and all nations, and economic and social progress. Equally they have an important role to play in making known the views and aspirations of the younger generation.

Article V

In order to respect freedom of opinion, expression and information and in order that information may reflect all points of view, it is important that the points of view presented by those who consider that the information published or disseminated about them has seriously prejudiced their effort to strengthen peace and international understanding, to promote human rights or to counter racialism, apartheid and incitement to war be disseminated.

Article VI

For the establishment of a new equilibrium and greater reciprocity in the flow of information, which will be conducive to the institution of a just and lasting peace and to the economic and political independence of the developing countries, it is necessary to correct the inequalities in the flow of information to and from developing countries, and between those countries. To this end, it is essential that their mass media should have conditions and resources enabling them to gain strength and expand, and to cooperate both among themselves and with the mass media in developed countries.

Article VII

By disseminating more widely all of the information concerning the objectives and principles universally accepted which are the bases of the resolutions adopted by the different organs of the United Nations, the mass media contribute effectively to the strengthening of peace and international understanding, to the promotion of human rights, as well as to the establishment of a more just and equitable international economic order.

Article VIII

Professional organizations, and people who participate in the professional training of journalists and other agents of the mass media and who assist them in performing their functions in a responsible manner should attach special importance to the principles of this Declaration when drawing up and ensuring application of their codes of ethics.

Article IX

In the spirit of this Declaration, it is for the international community to contribute to the creation of the conditions for a free flow and wider and more balanced dissemination of information, and the conditions for the protection, in the exercise of their functions, of journalists and other agents of the mass media. Unesco is well placed to make a valuable contribution in this respect.

Article X

1. With due respect for constitutional provisions designed to guarantee freedom of information and for the applicable international instruments and agreements, it is indispensable to create and maintain throughout the world the conditions which make it possible for the organizations and persons professionally involved in the dissemination of information to achieve the objectives of this Declaration.

2. It is important that a free flow and wider and better balanced dissemination of information be encouraged.

3. To this end, it is necessary that States should facilitate the procurement, by the mass media in the developing countries, of adequate conditions and resources enabling them to gain strength and expand, and that they should support co-operation by the latter both among themselves and with the mass media in developed countries.

4. Similarly, on a basis of equality of rights, mutual advantage, and respect for the diversity of cultures which go to make up the common heritage of mankind, it is essential that bilateral and multilateral exchanges of information among all States, and in particular between those which have different economic and social systems be encouraged and developed.

Article XI

For this Declaration to be fully effective it is necessary, with due respect for the legislative and administrative provisions and the other obligations of Member States, to guarantee the existence of favourable conditions for the operation of the mass media, in conformity with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and with the corresponding principles proclaimed in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1966.

39-422—79——8

Annex B

Subject: International Journalistic Freedom.
Reference: State 296144.

1. At the biennial General Conference of UNESCO, held in Paris October 24–November 28, member states of the organization adopted by consensus a declaration on the mass media which, inter alia, reaffirmed the importance of a free flow of information and gave specific recognition to the need for protection of journalists in the exercise of their profession. The declaration is described in reftel.

2. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY79, signed in October, calls upon the Department for the first time to make a formal report of its efforts to improve the climate for journalists in countries which have a history of harassment or intimidation of foreign correspondents. Department believes that recent consensus adoption of the UNESCO Mass Media Declaration, in which WEO states were successful in obtaining specific recognition of the need to promote the rights of journalists, provides an excellent opportunity for posts to bring our concerns over conditions affecting the exercise of journalism to the attention of governments. Posts are accordingly requested to make representations on this subject.

3. Department recognizes that conditions affecting the press vary greatly from country to country and wishes posts to have an appropriate degree of discretion in making representations on this subject; therefore, points contained in paragraph four below may be drawn upon by posts subject to modifications as needed to adapt them to local circumstances. (Posts in countries where journalists are not, repeat not, harassed may prefer to forego specific representations on the need for journalists' freedom, although it is important to reiterate importance U.S. attaches to the principles enunciated in the UNESCO declaration.)

4. Points to be made by posts:

—The United States avails itself of the occasion of the recent adoption of the UNESCO Declaration on the Mass Media to invite the attention of host government to its provisions regarding the importance of a free flow of information and in particular Article II of the declaration, which states that "* * * journalists must have freedom to report and the fullest possible facilities of access to information" and "* * * it is essential that journalists and other agents of the mass media, in their own country or abroad, be assured of protection guaranteeing them the best conditions for the exercise of their profession."

—The United States notes that this declaration of principles was adopted by the delegates of all 146 UNESCO member states, thus representing the support of an overwhelming majority of the world community.

—United States considers it important that every nation recognize the importance of putting into practice the principles approved by its representatives at the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

—The United States notes that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights also affirms the freedom of individuals to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

—United States wishes on its own part to reiterate its conviction that journalists must have the maximum freedom from government interference in the performance of their professional duties.
—Specific steps which can be taken to facilitate the free flow of information through improving the working conditions for journalists include, inter alia:
—Promptly and favorably reviewing journalists' requests for visas;
—Granting multiple entry and exit visas;
—Removing restrictions on the travel of journalists;
—Promptly and favorably reviewing the requests for permission to travel, where such permission is needed;
—Removing restrictions on access by journalists to sources, including organizations and official institutions as well as individuals on a personal basis;
—Ensuring journalists the right to import technical equipment necessary for the exercise of their profession;
—Removing restrictions on the ability of journalists to transmit completely, normally and rapidly the results of their professional activity, including tape recordings or film;
—Ensuring that the legitimate pursuit of their professional activity will not lead to the expulsion, incarceration, ill-treatment or other penalization of journalists;
—Ensuring that journalists enjoy freedom of expression, including freedom from censorship;
—Providing for prompt review of all penalties imposed on journalists.
—The United State firmly believes that an ever wider knowledge and understanding of the various aspects of life in other states is essential to the growth of confidence between peoples and the development of mutual understanding between states. The United States would find disturbing any restriction, harassment or mistreatment of foreign journalists, which will necessarily interfere with the free flow of information and impede the development of mutual understanding between nations.

5. For WEO posts. In addition to drawing on paras 3 and 4, as appropriate, posts may wish to use the following:

—United States appreciates consultation and cooperation at Paris which led to adoption of UNESCO declaration.
—United States would be interested in steps which host governments may be planning to support the declaration whether in terms of furthering concepts of journalists' freedom or in assistance to developing country media programs in support of declaration.

6. For Eastern European countries: You can affirm importance of principle of journalistic freedom to U.S., our satisfaction that world community was able to agree on a declaration, and our view that it is not, repeat not, a pro forma exercise. You should refer to the provisions of the Helsinki Agreements on journalists as essential components of journalists' freedom.

7. For Soviet Union: Representations on this subject may await instructions which will follow by septel.

8. For non-aligned (and other) posts: As appropriate, suggest you note our satisfaction that it was possible for all countries to take a cooperative approach on a subject which is of importance to the non-aligned as well as to the United States. It is our preference and hope that this approach be the pattern for the future in dealing with information issues. You should note that the United States has indicated its willingness to contribute to developing the media capabilities of developing countries and has taken steps to that end. You should also indicate that free flow of information is fundamental value to U.S. and that our ability to continue to work with developing countries on communication issues is dependent on respect for that principle.

9. For Argentina, Algeria, Central African Empire, Czechoslovakia, Chile, Cuba, Ethiopia, GDR, Haiti, Israel, Libya, Laos, Lebanon, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, PRC, Philippines, Somalia, Syria, Tanzania, Uruguay, USSR, Yugoslavia, and Zaire. Our own reports, consultations with media leaders and organizations, and Congressional hearings have singled out these countries as ones where rights of journalists are frequently violated or restricted. Accordingly, in carrying out demarche in these countries, posts should make points in paragraph 4 with particular clarity (although, as para 3 notes, you may exercise an appropriate degree of discretion).

10. For Latin American posts: Countries included on para 9 list are those mentioned by IAPA in its annual report for 1978.

11. Reftel gives background information and the full test of the UNESCO media declaration, and may be drawn on as needed. The verbatim text of Section 603(b)(1) of the Fiscal Year 1979 Foreign Relations Authorization Act concerning bilateral representations on treatment of foreign journalists, is as follows: "It is the sense of the Congress that the President should * * * advise the appropriate officials of any foreign government which subjects foreign news correspondents to harassment and restrictions that the United States considers such mistreatment a significant and potentially damaging factor in overall relations of the United States with such country * * *."

12. Report to Congress is due January 20. Department would appreciate report from posts on results of their demarche before that date, if possible. Posts should assume that their reports or portions of them will be incorporated into the Department's report or supplementary reports to the Congress. Posts may, if they wish, consult with embassies of like-minded third countries who may have had instances of harassment or restriction of journalists. If for any reason, post believes that the demarche should not be made at this time, posts should so inform the Department.

13. Talking points in French and Spanish will follow to AF and ARA posts.

REPORT ON DISCRIMINATORY TRADE PRACTICES AFFECTING UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS

PUBLIC LAW 95-426—OCTOBER 7, 1978—FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL YEAR 1979

This report is mandated by Section 606 of the law cited above, which states:

"(a) The Congress finds that those provisions of United States statutes which authorize or require suspension of or discrimination with respect to all trade between the United States and a particular foreign country and which affect, directly and significantly, the conduct of the United States foreign relations should be periodically reevaluated by the President and the Congress.

"(b) Therefore, not later than January 20, 1979, the President shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and to the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations and the chairman of other appropriate committees of the Senate, a report which—

"(1) identifies all statutory provisions which provide for such discriminatory trade practices;

"(2) evaluates each such practice; and

"(3) recommends, in the form of draft legislation, such amendments to those provisions as the President certifies would in his judgment advance United States foreign policy interests."

LEGISLATION REQUIRING DISCRIMINATION ON ALL TRADE WITH A PARTICULAR FOREIGN COUNTRY

1. Section 5 of Public Law 95-435 (Authorization for U.S. Participation in IMF's Supplementary Financing Facility) requires the United States to embargo all import trade and all expect trade (except exports of cereal grains and additional food products) with Uganda. The embargo went into effect when the President signed the bill into law on October 10, 1978.

2. This embargo has not been in effect long enough to evaluate it. The condition specified in the law for lifting this embargo that "the Government of Uganda is no longer committing a consistent pattern of gross violation of human rights" has not been met.

3. The Administration has no legislative proposal to make at this time.

LEGISLATION REQUIRING DISCRIMINATORY TARIFFS FOR PRODUCTS OF MOST NONMARKET-ECONOMY COUNTRIES

1. Section 402 of Public Law 93–618 (Trade Act of 1974) prohibits nondiscriminatory (most-favored-nation) tariff treatment of imports from any nonmarket-economy country which was not eligible for such treatment on the date of the enactment of the Act, unless the President determines that the country does not deny its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate (and does not impose more than nominal taxes on emigration). Section 409 of the same Act makes the same prohibition with respect to nonmarket-economy countries which restrict the right or opportunity of such citizens to join permanently, through emigration, a very close relative in the United States. Section 402's prohibitions can be waived by the President only if he determines and reports to Congress that a waiver will substantially promote the objectives of freer emigration and further reports that he has received assurances that the emigration practices of that country will henceforth lead substantially to the achievement of freer emigration. And such waiver is subject to review and possible disapproval by the Congress each year. The prohibitions under Section 409 do not apply when a 402 waiver is in effect.

2. No nonmarket-economy country has been found eligible for nondiscriminatory treatment on grounds that it does not restrict emigration. Poland continues to receive nondiscriminatory tariff treatment, as it did on the date of the enactment of the Act. Romania and Hungary now receive nondiscriminatory tariff treatment on the basis of Presidential waivers. The Soviet Union has not been prepared to enter into nondiscriminatory trade relations with the United States on the basis of this legislation, on grounds that it would interfere in internal affairs. Other affected countries have not chosen to accept it. The effects of Sections 402 and 409 on U.S. foreign relations and on the objective of freer emigration remain under continuing review by the Administration.

3. Any legislation which the Administration might wish to propose would be the subject of prior consultations with the Congress.

LEGISLATION REQUIRING BILATERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS AS PREREQUISITES FOR NONDISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT OF THE PRODUCTS OF NONMARKET-ECONOMY COUNTRIES

1. Section 404 (b) and (c) of Public Law 93–618 (Trade Act of 1974) requires that the application of nondiscriminatory treatment to most nonmarket-economy countries be limited to the period of effectiveness of the obligations of the United States under a bilateral commercial agreement, and may be suspended or withdrawn by the President at any time. Section 405 sets forth specific requirements for the content of such agreements, requires Congressional approval, and limits the term of such agreements to three years, subject to renewal by the President if certain conditions are met.

2. Although these requirements are not applicable to market-economy countries (or to Poland, which was receiving nondiscriminatory tariff treatment on the date of the enactment of the Act), they reflect unusual difficulties which U.S. businessmen may encounter in doing

business with nonmarket-economy countries. These requirements also reflect the difficulty of obtaining satisfactory reciprocity for U.S. trade concessions from countries with centralized commercial, financial and planning systems, especially those which do not use a tariff system as an effective instrument of trade policy.

3. The Administration does not recommend a legislative change at this time.

LEGISLATION LIMITING NONDISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT FOR PRODUCTS OF NONMARKET-ECONOMY COUNTRIES TO PERIODS IN WHICH SUCH COUNTRIES ARE NOT IN ARREARS ON OBLIGATIONS UNDER LEND-LEASE AGREEMENTS

1. Section 404(b) of Public Law 93–618 (Trade Act of 1974) limits the application of nondiscriminatory treatment to the products of nonmarket-economy countries receiving such treatment under Title IV of the Trade Act to periods in which such countries are not in arrears on their obligations under lend-lease settlement agreements.

2. This provision has had no effect with respect to the Soviet Union. Under the bilateral lend-lease settlement agreement, the Soviet Union is not obliged to make further payments to the United States until the United States extends nondiscriminatory treatment to the Soviet Union.

3. The Administration has no legislative proposal to make on this provision at this time.

LEGISLATION REQUIRING RENEGOTIATION OF A CLAIMS SETTLEMENT WITH CZECHOSLOVAKIA PRIOR TO EXTENSION OF NONDISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT TO THE PRODUCTS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA

1. Section 408 of Public Law 93–618 (Trade Act of 1974) requires that a claims settlement agreement initialled by the United States and Czechoslovakia on July 5, 1974, be renegotiated and submitted to Congress as part of any commercial agreement entered into by Czechoslovakia under Title IV of the Trade Act.

2. The United States has not yet been able to reach agreement with Czechoslovakia on the terms of a new claims settlement.

3. The Administration has no legislative proposal to make at this time.

LEGISLATION AUTHORIZING DISCRIMINATION ON ALL TRADE WITH PARTICULAR FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Trading With the Enemy Act

1. Section 101(b), Public Law 95–223, enacted on December 28, 1977, amended the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917 to authorize continuation of existing Trading With the Enemy Act restrictions on trade with particular countries under Section 5(b) of that Act, subject to an annual review of currently exercised emergency authorities. Pursuant to this amendment and the National Emergencies Act of 1976 (P.L. 94–412) these authorities may be extended only pursuant to Presidential determinations that such extensions would be in the national interest of the United States.

2. On September 14, 1978, the President extended for another year the authorities for trade and financial embargoes against North Korea, Cuba, Vietnam and Kampuchea, setting forth the reasons therefor at that time. (The Cuban embargo is also authorized specifically by Section 620(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.)

3. The Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, as amended, has only recently been amended (1977), and the Administration does not recommend further amendments at this time.

Export Administration Act

1. The authority to restrict exports contained in the Export Administration Act of 1969, as amended, expires on September 30, 1979.

2. Such authority is needed for security, foreign policy, and short supply purposes.

3. The Administration will be working with the Congress on appropriate legislation to extend this authority.

International Emergency Economic Powers Act

1. Title II of Public Law 95–223 of December 28, 1977, has not yet been invoked.

2. The Administration worked with the Congress to develop this legislation.

3. The Administration has no legislative proposal to make at this time.

United Nations Participation Act

1. Section 5 of Public Law 79–264, The United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended, permits the President to regulate or prohibit any aspect of economic relations with any foreign country to the extent necessary to carry out decisions of the Security Council under Article 41 of the U.N. Charter. Under this Act, the United States is enabled to participate in the economic sanction against Rhodesia called for in United Nations Security Council resolutions passed in 1966 and 1968. The purpose of the comprehensive embargo in effect is to compel the illegal Rhodesian regime to renounce its unilateral declaration of independence and to accept a process leading to majority rule.

2. Although economic sanctions per se have not proven sufficient to accomplish the above objectives, they have made an important contribution to efforts to bring about an internationally acceptable solution to the Rhodesian problem.

3. The Administration recommends no amendments to this legislation. The lifting of sanctions prior to the attainment of a peaceful transition to majority rule would remove a major incentive for the regime and all interested parties to participate in good faith in on-going efforts to achieve a peaceful transition.

LEGISLATION AUTHORIZING DENIAL OF NONDISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT FOR PRODUCTS OF NONMARKET-ECONOMY COUNTRIES WHICH DO NOT COOPERATE IN LOCATING U.S. PERSONNEL MISSING IN ACTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

1. Section 403 of Public Law 93–618 (Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the President to deny nondiscriminatory treatment to the products of a nonmarket-economy country, unless that country was

eligible for nondiscriminatory treatment on the date of enactment of the Act, if the President determines that such country is not cooperating with the United States (1) to achieve a complete accounting of U.S. personnel who are missing in action in Southeast Asia, (2) to repatriate such personnel who are alive, and (3) to return the remains of such personnel who are dead.

2. The President has not made a determination with respect to any country under this provision. Vietnam and Kampuchea are embargoed under other legislation.

3. The Administration has no legislative proposal to make at this time.

SECTION 608

ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PURSUANT TO SEEKING A MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE USE OF NUCLEAR POWERED SATELLITES IN SPACE

This report is submitted in fulfillment of the obligation of the Secretary of State under section 608(c) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979.

I. INTRODUCTION

On the morning of January 24, 1978, a satellite containing a nuclear reactor reentered the atmosphere over northwestern Canada and deposited substantial amounts of radioactive debris on Canada. It is believed that the debris resulted from the satellite launched by the U.S.S.R. on September 18, 1977, known as Cosmos 954. To the best of our knowledge, up to the present time there has been no report of injury caused by this satellite.

The Canadian Government, with assistance volunteered by the U.S. Government, has conducted an extensive search and recovery operation aimed at cleaning up the radioactive debris. It is believed that most of the most dangerous debris has been located and recovered. It is possible, however, that some debris might have penetrated any of the many lakes in that area or otherwise become hidden. The remaining risk, if any, cannot be estimated with accuracy.

Several elements of the international legal regime dealing with outer space activities bear on this situation, although no element explicitly governs the use of nuclear power sources in space. The relevant elements existing today include:

(a) Treaty on Principles Governing Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (1967);

(b) Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1968);

(c) Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects (1972); and

(d) Convention on Registration of Ojects Launched into Outer Space (1976).

The Government of Canada may submit to the Soviet Union a claim for damages under the Liability Convention and this would be, to our knowledge, the first time this agreement has been called into play.

While the Liability Convention may prove sufficient to deal with international liabilities in cases such as this, no existing instrument deals with preventative measures.

The elements of the existing regime were formulated in the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. The efforts of the U.S. Government to seek a multilateral agreement governing the use of nuclear power sources in space likewise have been concentrated in this committee.

II. U.S. Government Steps in the U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space

The U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUS) has two subcommittees: A Scientific and Technical Subcommittee (STSC) and a Legal Subcommittee (LSC), each of which operates on the consensus principle. The STSC met from February 13 to March 2, 1978. The LSC met from March 13 to April 7, 1978. The full committee met from June 26 to July 7, 1978.

A. STSC MEETING

At the STSC meeting, which occurred shortly after the Cosmos 954 reentry, the U.S. delegation took the following actions:

1. The head of the delegation made a statement on the floor of the meeting on February 15 that:

(*a*) Supported the program of activity proposed by Canada and several other countries consisting of the establishment of a technical working group that would permit the presentation and consideration of the views of all interested States, that would examine the full range of implications and possibilities of a multilateral regime of standards, safeguards, and limitations pertaining to nuclear power sources in space and that would provide a sound basis for appropriate future action by the committee;

(*b*) Foresaw a binding multilateral regime based on:

(i) Establishment of safety requirements, including a safety analysis statement by the launching state with an opportunity provided for other states to comment and the setting of standards for nuclear power sources in space;

(ii) Establishment of requirements to provide notification, possibly to include notice of launch, of a nuclear power source, notice of its imminent reentry, and notice of the fact of impact; and

(iii) Provision of assistance in locating and cleaning up radioactive debris and in emergency treatment of affected persons.

2. Several members of the U.S. delegation made a technical presentation to the subcommittee explaining the uses that the United States has made of nuclear power in space. The presentation made use of slides, motion pictures, and a model of a particular space nuclear power source. The textual information was made available to all delegates in the U.N. document A/AC. 105/L. 102 of March 15, 1978.

3. The U.S. delegation supported the recommendations documented in the STSC report, A/AC. 105/216, March 6, 1978, that the subject be considered by the full committee even though it was not on the existing agenda for the committee meeting, and requested the U.N. Secretariat to compile and present information from states concerning the uses of nuclear power sources in space. Because of opposition by the U.S.S.R. and some Eastern European members, it was not possible to reach consensus on a course of action at this meeting.

B. LSC MEETING

At the LSC, the U.S. delegation took the following actions:

1. The head of the delegation stated on March 16, 1978, that: "The United States believes that the Outer Space Committee has the factfinding capability to support a competent international study of the use of nuclear power sources in space. Following completion of the factfinding inquiry, we can foresee discussion and negotiation of a binding multilateral regime * * *."

2. The U.S. delegation concurred in the inclusion of a working paper, sponsored by 15 states, in the report of the subcommittee. This paper calls for the start of substantive discussion on the legal aspects of issues relevant to a multilateral regime that do not require special scientific and technical study. Because of Soviet and Eastern European objections, no consensus was reached on adopting the recommendations of the paper.

C. FULL COMMITTEE MEETING

At the meeting of the full Committee in June/July 1978, the U.S.S.R. and other states continued to express considerable reluctance in pursuing the goal of a multilateral regime to govern the use of nuclear power sources in space. The U.S. delegation, as in the meeting of the Subcommittees, engaged in informal discussion of the subject with members of interested delegations in order to insure that progress would be made. In addition, the delegation took the following actions:

1. The head of the delegation reiterated the U.S. position on the issue during the debates on July 13.

2. The U.S. delegation supported and concurred in the recommendation by consensus of the Committee that:

(a) The STSC "should, unless it decided otherwise, create a working group of exports open to all its members * * * ."

(b) The LSC should include in its agenda an item entitled "Other Matters" under which this snbject may be raised at future meetings.

These actions taken by the U.S. Government have, we believe, set the stage for further progress toward a multilateral agreement governing the use of nuclear-powered satellites to be made in future meetings.

Section 609

WORLD ENERGY CONFERENCE

Both President Carter in his Sun Day speech, May 1978, in Golden, Colo., and Secretary Vance in his September 1978 speech before the U.N. General Assembly, have indicated their strong support for convening a World Alternate Energy Conference in 1981 as recommended in section 609 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1979.

We believe that renewable energy technologies can play an increasingly important role in facilitating the global transition from use of finite conventional energy sources to more abundant renewable energy sources. To achieve this, the United States has initiated a number of bilateral and multilateral programs to promote cooperation in research, development, and demonstration of renewable energy technologies. These programs meet a number of other objectives including: The easing of development constraints related to high-priced oil imports, discouraging an unnecessary or premature commitment to a large nuclear power program which could lead to the proliferation of a nuclear explosive capability, and the improvement in global energy balances through the development of indigenous energy resources.

A study on the feasibility of convening a U.N. conference on new and renewable energy sources was prepared by the U.N. Under Secretary General for International Economic and Social Affairs for consideration by the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) at its July 1978 meeting. When a resolution proposing that such a conference be convened in 1981 was introduced by the Kenyan delegate, it was strongly supported by the U.S. Representative. The United States did not offer to cosponsor the resolution because it was believed to be counterproductive to its passage. If the United States appeared to be actively promoting such a conference, it may have been perceived by the OPEC countries as a means of diminishing their influence or as an opportunity to discuss stability or price of oil supply. The United States did work for the resolution's endorsement by the ECOSOC. The U.S. delegation judged the draft resolution on the U.N. conference the most difficult ECOSOC agenda item considered by the G–77 in their caucus deliberations. Although the majority of the developing countries, the oil importers, would have approved the draft resolution in the ECOSOC, the OPEC countries opposed it, and the best that could be accomplished was the recommendation that the 33rd U.N. General Assembly "give favorable consideration to and take definitive action on convening a conference at the earliest possible time" and that the Assembly define its objectives, scope, nature, and timing as well as required preparatory arrangements.

In mid-November a draft-resolution on convening such a U.N. conference was circulated by the U.N. Center for Natural Resources, Energy and Transport. This superseded by a Kenyan draft resolution for convening a conference in 1981, which contains additional language which could change the nature of the proposed conference from a technical conference, primarily designed to discuss and exchange information about the development and application of new and renewable energy technologies, to a possible negotiating forum where the developing countries may attempt to make demands on the developed countries for massive resource and technology transfers. The administration expects similar confrontational exchanges at the U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development (UNCSTD) scheduled for August 1979, at which renewable energy may be a key topic in discussions of energy technology. In an attempt to defuse this situation, the administration has suggested changes in the language of the Kenyan resolution from "formulate concrete programs to ensure the transfer of these technologies" to "encourage the transfer and adoption of these technologies," but has emphasized its continued strong support for the conference itself.

If the resolution is approved, the intervening preparatory period will allow the continued development of renewable energy technologies and enable the results of practical demonstration projects using these technologies to provide a more informed basis for discussions of their possible applications.

This administration has stated that it is ready to lend its ideas and its active support to U.N. efforts in promoting more efficient use of energy and the greatest possible reliance on renewable energy resources in the future. We believe sharing of ideas is essential.

At the economic meeting in Bonn, all the participating countries indicated their commitment (1) to intensify bilateral energy assistance programs, and (2) to undertake a coordinated effort to bring renewable energy technologies into greater use.

Since 1974, the U.S. Government solar energy budget has grown from $54 million in 1975. to $826 million in 1977, and will be an estimated $500 million in 1979. This is an indication of this administration's dedication to the development and eventual utilization of renewable energy sources and technologies.

The United States now participates in over 25 projects with industrialized countries involving research, development and demonstration in solar, coal, wind, wave, geothermal, and biomass energy technologies under the auspices of the International Energy Agency. This work is open to developing countries that are in a position to contribute.

The United States participates in a number of bilateral nonnuclear energy cooperation arrangements with industrialized countries that have potential spinoff benefits for developing countries. Among these are:

—Soviet Union (1974): The agreement provides for exchange visits and joint research in energy, electrical transmission, magnetohydrodynamics (MHD), thermal powerplants, solar, and geothermal.

—Spain (1976): Several solar energy pilot projects have been identified.

—Italy: We are currently examining the advantages of expanding energy cooperation, now restricted to exchange programs in geothermal and desalting, to a broader based program. The prospective agreement would probably provide opportunities to work jointly on solar technology in Italy.
—Japan: We have agreed to expand energy cooperation with Japan to include research and development in fusion, coal liquefaction, solar, and geothermal.
—France (1977): This agreement enables cooperative work in the development of solar conversion systems.

Nonnuclear energy research and development arrangements are under discussion with Brazil and Iran. An agreement was concluded with Saudi Arabia in 1977 for the expenditure of $100 million over a 5-year period, shared equally by the United States and Saudi Arabia, to develop and apply solar energy technologies. We are exchanging information on national solar programs and have recently concluded a geothermal agreement with Mexico. In addition, we have recently signed an agreement with India for the development of four solar projects.

A U.S. Government program, the International Energy Development Program, was initiated in September 1977 to assist developing countries in the assessment of their energy resources, uses, and projected demand to make them aware of the energy development alternatives available to them reducing their dependence upon imported oil, and facilitating their use of indigenous, especially renewable, sources of energy. The fiscal year 1978 cooperative program assisted Egypt and Peru in this kind of energy assessment and in devising several possible strategies for energy development to meet the requirements of their social and economic development objectives. Similar energy assessments with other countries are proposed for fiscal year 1979.

Many new technologies, particularly solar, are being field tested in developing countries. In many instances, these activities are a part of broader based rural development efforts. Current projects include:

—Philippines: The United States has made a $7.1 million loan for the testing of solar, wind, biomass, and decentralized hydrotechnologies.
—Upper Volta: $125,000 has been provided to develop a photovoltaic pump and cereal grinder and $700,000 will finance a fiscal year 1979 project in forestry and land use planning.
—Haiti: $40,000 has been spent on the development of a solar cooker.
—Nepal: $40,000 has been spent on a project to generate methane gas from biomass.

The United States also supports the energy projects of the World Bank, and other U.N. agencies and projects of the various regional development banks. The IBRD funds a modest program to test the feasibility of solar energy applications including a 4-year effort in Bolivia to develop and adapt low-cost energy devices for domestic and agricultural use and a $1.7 million program of applied research in nonconvective ponds; and solar water heaters in teacher's housing in Liberia.

Since existing U.N. agencies appear capable of handling the renewable energy role, the administration does not believe that it is necessary to establish a new organization under U.N. auspices * * * "to assist countries to exchange information and technical assistance concerning energy-related programs and to disseminate information regarding renewable energy sources." The United States made an earlier attempt to introduce an organization (the IEI) with similar function into the U.N. system. It failed when the OPEC group made clear that it would not support such an effort—probably because they viewed it as a possible threat to their oil supply and pricing determinations. Over the past years, leading OPEC members have shown definite preference for bilateral or OPEC-oriented arrangements for assistance in this area.

In addition, there are a number of organizations already performing these functions; they include the International Energy Agency, the NATO Committee on Challenges to Man and Society (CCMS), the U.N. Environmental Program, the Regional U.N. Economic Commissions (such as ESCAP), UNESCO, the Organization of American States (OAS), and OLADE. Dr. Brown, Deputy Administrator of the U.N. Development Program (UNDP) has informed us the UNDP plans to inventory all existing and proposed bilateral and multilateral renewable energy programs to prevent duplication. Subject to the availability of funding, he added, the UNDP eventually will inventory programs by energy source and technology with an evaluation of the technology for its potential application to use in other countries or situations.

If the resolution to convene a U.N. conference is approved in the 33d U.N. General Assembly, preparations for the conference can proceed and will receive our support.

SECTION 610

ATROCITIES IN CAMBODIA AND UGANDA

UGANDA

As requested in section 610 of the State Department authorization bill the Department provides the following report on specific actions concerning Uganda:

"(1) Prohibit the export of military, paramilitary, and police equipment to Uganda."

The Department has not authorized the export of any military equipment to Uganda since the closure of our Embassy in Kampala in 1973. All other exports which could have a paramilitary or police application have been closely scrutinized to determine that they would not contribute to the violation of human rights in Uganda. With the imposition of an embargo on trade with Uganda signed into law on October 10, 1978, there will be no exports of any U.S. origin products with the exception of cereal and additional food items required for humanitarian purposes.

"(2) Direct that the visa application of any official or employee of the Government of Uganda seeking to enter the United States for the purpose of military, paramilitary, or police training, may be approved by a consular officer only after the appropriate official of the Department of State in Washington has reviewed the application and has determined that the Government of Uganda has demonstrated a proper respect for the rule of law and for internationally recognized human rights."

The Department of State policy on the issuance of visas for all Uganda officials or those traveling on behalf of the Ugandan Government requires that all such applications be submitted to the Department of State in Washington for review and approval. This policy also applies to Ugandan officials or those sponsored by the Ugandan Government seeking training in the United States. If it is determined that the Ugandan official applying for a U.S. visa has engaged in the abuse of human rights in Uganda or that the requested training would enhance the capabilities of Ugandan security forces the visa would be denied on the grounds issuance would be contrary to the best interests of the United States.

Section 610(b) urges the President to move aggressively to support multilateral action by the U.N. and other international organizations and to encourage bilateral action by countries having more extensive relations with Uganda in order to end its brutal and inhumane practices.

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In March 1978, the Chairman of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights announced that the Commission had taken decisions on Uganda during closed sessions. Pursuant to the procedures established by resolutions of the U.N.'s Economic and Social Council and by the Commission, the actual decision taken by the Commission must remain confidential. Under these procedures the Commission may examine situations in countries which may reveal a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights. The U.S. representative strongly supported such an examination of the situation in Uganda.

On December 6, 1978, on the occasion of Human Rights Day, President Carter cited Uganda, along with certain other states, as a gross violator of human rights. On December 7, 1978, during the 33d session of the UNGA, the U.S. representative stated:

> We have noted that the delegation of Uganda at this session of the General Assembly referred to cooperation by Uganda with the United Nations concerning the situation in their country. We hope that this approach will lead to useful results, and we look forward to further considerations of this subject at the coming session of the Commission.

While we are unsure of the results of the consideration of this issue by the upcoming session of the Commission on Human Rights, we will continue to work through it to exert pressure on Uganda to change its practices.

Section 610(d)(3) expresses the sense of the Congress that the President should instruct the permanent representative of the United States to the United Nations to submit to the SC for its consideration a resolution imposing a mandatory arms embargo on Uganda by all members of the U.N.

After soundings by the U.S. Mission to the U.N., the Department has concluded that any attempt to promote discussion of the matter of Uganda's human rights behavior in the U.N. Security Council would undoubtedly fail to gain the nine votes required for inscription. Furthermore, an unsuccessful effort to inscribe this issue would not contribute to improvement of the situation in Uganda and could provoke a decision by the Council that it lacks jurisdiction over what a majority of the members might view as a purely internal matter. Imposition of a mandatory arms embargo would require an international political consensus which does not now exist. It should also be noted that there are other human rights situations—for example, apartheid—where the international community, particularly western countries, has refused to support mandatory international sanctions. In addition, a number of countries interested in the human rights problem in Uganda are concerned that raising the issue in the SC might jeopardize the possibility of progress on this question through the Commission on Human Rights. Public action in the Security Council could detract from whatever chances remain to constructively address this issue at the Commission's upcoming session in February and March 1979. At present this is the most appropriate forum in which to address the question of Uganda. We will, of course, review this position in light of the results of that session.

Since Congress requested this report in June 1978, a new element has been introduced into the region as a result of the Ugandan attack on Tanzania in November. Following the outbreak of hostilities, the

Organization of African Unity has become involved in attempting to arrive at a peaceful resolution of this problem.

Under the terms of article 52 of the U.N. Charter, regional agencies such as the OAU "shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council." In addition, the article states that "the Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the SC." These charter provisions do not preclude the Council from taking action. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that a request for action would be approved while the OAU is involved in seeking a solution to the conflict since the OAU as an organization, a majority of OAU Member states, and also most other states would most likely be disinclined at this time to bring this matter before the Council. The fact that Uganda now has withdrawn its forces from Tanzania makes it even less likely that the Council would consider action in response to the Ugandan attack.

The Department will continue to seek opportunities to express U.S. concern and to work for change in Uganda's policies on human rights.

Cambodia (Kampuchea)

In response to Section 610 Conference Report of the Fiscal Year 1979 Authorization Act, requiring the President to "support multilateral activity and bilateral activity by countries with extensive relations with (Kampuchea) to bring about a lessening of inhumane practices" (in Kampuchea) the Department of State has undertaken the following actions:

I. multilateral actions

A. *The U.N. Human Rights Commission.*—At the annual session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights held earlier this year, the human rights situation in Kampuchea was raised by the United Kingdom delegation, with the strong support of the U.S. delegation. The Commission unanimously decided to request the U.N. Secretary General to inform the Government of Kampuchea of the charges which have been made before the Commission, and to seek its reply. It also requested the Secretary General to submit to the Commission, through its expert Subcommission on Discrimination and Minorities, additional information for renewed consideration at the next Commission session early next year.

Acting pursuant to the Commission's decision, the U.S. Government submitted to the Subcommission in July of this year extensive documentary evidence of the gross violations of human rights in Kampuchea. At the Subcommission, which met in Geneva for a 3-week session that ended September 15, members from the United States and the United Kingdom led the argumentation in favor of continued U.S. involvement. The subcommittee decided to appoint one of its members to analyze the extensive materials on the human rights violations in Kampuchea which it had received, and to present this analysis to the Commission. These materials included a 300-page docu-

ment submitted by the United States detailing human rights abuse in Kampuchea. This document included interviews with refugees who recently escaped from Kampuchea as well as statements of testimony before Congress. The Subcommission urged the Commission, at its next session (which opens in February 1979), to give the human rights situation in Kampuchea the highest priority. The way is now clear for definitive action by the Commission to deal with this pressing human rights problem.

B. *The U.N. Security Council.*—On November 1, the U.S.–U.N. Delegations submitted to the President of the U.N. Security Council a letter which called the Council's attention to the situation in Kampuchea including the "massive abuse of human rights there." The U.S. letter also noted the growing threat to security in the region posed by the conflict along the common border between Vietnam and Kampuchea. The letter called upon the Council members to consider how to deal with the situation.

C. *The U.N. Security General.*—The United States and other nations encouraged the Secretary General to accept the Kampuchean Government's invitation for him to visit Kampuchea, and also to visit Vietnam. This visit would serve to initiate a useful dialog on internal policies as well as addressing the security situation.

D. *The U.N. General Assembly.*—During the General Assembly's debate on human rights, we have and will continue to state our views forcefully on the gross abuses on human rights in Kampuchea as well as other Indochina countries. In addition to the loss of life and suffering caused to the population inside these countries, the abuses continue to provoke a massive outflow of refugees. As urged by Congress, we are consulting with the Attorney General on additional action to help bring Kampuchean refugees to the United States.

II. BILATERAL ACTIONS

A. *Contact with foreign governments.*—In September the U.S. Government instructed its Embassies in over 20 foreign countries with relations with Kampuchea to contact their host governments urging each to raise the issue of human rights in their bilateral contacts with the Kampuchean Government.

B. *The Norway Conference on Kampuchea.*—The United States encouraged an international conference on human rights in Kampuchea organized by political parties in Norway.

C. *Official statements by administration officials.*—The President and other U.S. leaders including senior Department of State officials have spoken out repeatedly in national and world fora on U.S. concern about human rights abuse in Kampuchea. Kampuchean leaders increasingly are displaying increased concern about reports of human rights abuse in Kampuchea in their meetings with the world press and in bilateral meetings with other governments. For example, the Kampuchean Foreign Minister has invited U.N. Secretary General Waldheim to visit Kampuchea so that he might "see with his own eyes" the human rights situation there. The Kampucheans have also indicated willingness to receive American and other journalists on similiar missions.

SECTION 613

U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA

I. U.S. POLICY PRIOR TO 1977

Fidel Castro came to power on January 1, 1959, with the stated objective of exporting his revolution to the rest of Latin America. He spoke of turning the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of South America and he made no secret of his desire to overthrow the established governments. Beginning in 1959, he launched armed expeditions against several nearby states, such as Panama and the Dominican Republic, and initiated substantial assistance to radical guerrilla movements throughout the hemisphere. By the mid-sixties, the governments of Guatemala, Colombia, Venezuela and Peru all faced serious threats from Cuban-backed guerrilla movements.

From the beginning, too, the Castro government embarked upon a policy of nationalizing U.S. investments in Cuba. During 1959, there were extensive losses to U.S. citizens through seizures and occupation of lands and other properties. In June 1960, when the U.S.-owned oil refineries and that of Royal Dutch Shell refused to process Russian crude oil, the Cuban government took them over. A week later, President Eisenhower announced that the balance of Cuba's sugar quota in the U.S. market had been suspended for 1960. Castro responded by beginning the wholesale nationalization of all American properties in Cuba.

On October 19, 1960, the United States by executive order prohibited all exports to Cuba except for medicines and non-subsidized foodstuffs. Finally, because of the atmosphere of intense hostility and unreasonable conditions imposed by the Cubans on the operation of our Embassy in Havana, on January 3, 1961, the United States broke diplomatic relations with Cuba.

The prohibitions implemented in October of 1960 had only barred *exports* to Cuba. Section 620(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 authorized the President to "establish and maintain a total embargo upon all trade between the United and Cuba." Imports as well as exports were thereby prohibited and as of May 15, 1964 exports of foods and medicines were also barred by Commerce regulations under authority of the Export Control Act of 1949. American subsidiaries in third countries were also affected by these prohibitions; that is, even though a subsidiary was incorporated in Canada, it was strictly forbidden, by both the Export Control Regulations and the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, from entering into any trade arrangements with Cuba.

Under the Cuban Assets Control Regulations issued on July 8, 1963, under the authority contained in Section 5(b) of the 1917 Trading With the Enemy Act, American citizens and entities were prohibited from entering into any commercial or financial transactions of any kind with any entity of the Cuban government without a specific Treasury license. Licenses were rarely granted except in cases of a compelling humanitarian nature.

All Cuban assets in the United States (today valued at some $33 million) were frozen by the Cuban Assets Control Regulations. All Federal benefits, such as social security payments, retirement annuities and veterans pensions, were blocked and remain so. All private inheritances, stock dividends or other kinds of monetary flows were barred without specific exception being made by the Treasury Department.

Section 620(a)(3) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 blacklisted third-country vessels in the Cuba trade and barred the governments under whose flag they sailed from receiving any assistance from the United States. It also prohibited third-country flag vessels which had called in Cuban ports from bunkering in the United States. Section 620(a)(1) of the same Act barred any U.S. assistance to Cuba and to countries which furnished assistance to Cuba.

The unilateral economic measures taken by the United States were very nearly total in their effect. For some seventeen years the United States and Cuba were to be economically and diplomatically isolated one from the other.

Nor was ours an isolated response. The other governments of the hemisphere which were, after all, the principal targets of Castro's aggressive policies, also took measures to defend themselves. Indeed, in February of 1962, a special meeting of the OAS adopted a resolution which mandated that member states should terminate all diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba. All but Mexico did so. In addition, U.S. embargo regulations and influence tended to restrict trade by Western European countries and Japan with Cuba.

II. Background of the 1977 Opening to Cuba

The policy of isolating Cuba served U.S. interests for many years and it was perceived by our friends and allies as cogent and reasonable. By the early 1970's, however, serious questions were raised as to its continued usefulness. First of all, the conditions to which it was addressed had changed. Castro's efforts to overthrow other Latin American governments failed, and by the end of the 1960's, he had begun to deemphasize export of revolution as a policy and armed struggle as a tactic. Instead, he shifted back to more traditional political and diplomatic approaches, seeking to break out of his isolation in the hemisphere. This did not, to be sure, take place overnight, but the trend was nonetheless clear and by 1970 Cuban assistance to guerrilla groups and other efforts to export revolution had been cut back to a very low level, especially in those countries which agreed to establish diplomatic relations with Cuba.

It was against this background of declining Cuban aggression that other governments of the hemisphere, including some who had once felt themselves to be the targets of Cuban policy, began to resume

diplomatic and trade relations with Havana and to insist that the multilateral sanctions imposed by the OAS be lifted.

Secondly, the old policy had become a growing source of disputes in our relations with third countries, most of whom are inherently reluctant to link trade to foreign policy objectives. In this Hemisphere, Canada, Argentina and Mexico had begun aggressively to promote their trade with Cuba, which had become an increasingly attractive market due to sharply rising world sugar prices. For example, Canadian exports to Cuba grew from $58 million in 1972 to $217 million by 1975. Western Europe and Japan also stepped up their sales efforts with Havana. Japan rapidly became Cuba's largest noncommunist trade partner as exports increased from $51 million in 1972 to $438 million by 1975.

A consequence of increased interest in trade with Cuba was growing resistance to U.S. laws under which foreign affiliates of American companies were prevented from doing business in accord with the declared trade policy of their host country governments. In some cases, participation of the American firm in its subsidiary operation was seriously threatened by adverse host governmental actions. Other governments refused to recognize the jurisdiction of U.S. laws over domestically incorporated firms, regardless of the extent of U.S. ownership.

Finally, both consolidated political control and relative economic progress had clearly demonstrated by the early 1970's that Castro was, and is, firmly in power. If we wished ever to see our citizens repatriated, divided families reunited and compensation paid for lost properties, and to have influence over Cuban policies, we had to begin to talk again.

U.S. policy began to respond to these new realities. On July 29, 1975, we voted with the majority in the OAS to lift the multilateral sanctions; it was left up to the discretion of each OAS government as to whether or not it wished to maintain diplomatic and trade relations with Cuba. Today 11 countries in the Western Hemisphere have such relations.[1]

Consistent with our stand at the OAS, in August of 1975, the United States modified controls which prohibited foreign affiliates of U.S. companies from trading with Cuba, thus averting growing problems with Canada, Mexico, and Argentina. U.S. affiliated firms in third countries are now generally granted licenses to trade with Cuba, provided that U.S. origin materials account for not more than 20 percent of the value of nonstrategic foreign-made commodities exported to Cuba.[2]

Also in 1975, in reference to third country concerns, restrictions on foreign flagships in the Cuba trade were also terminated, as were regulations prohibiting the bunkering of such vessels in U.S. ports.

In that same year, the United States initiated a series of confidential discussions with Cuban representatives to determine whether or not there were bases for a more substantive dialogue. Before much progress could be made, the large-scale Cuban military intervention in Angola of October 1975 soured the atmosphere for such talks. By the

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[1] See Appendix I for list of countries in this Hemisphere, in addition to Canada, which maintain such ties with Cuba.

[2] See Appendix II for discussion of trade resulting from these modified controls on U.S. subsidiaries abroad.

end of 1976, however, the climate had again improved. In April of that year, Castro indicated to Prime Minister Olaf Palme of Sweden that he intended to begin reducing Cuban troops in Angola. A drawdown did begin and continued until the fall of 1976. At that point it tapered off, but as 1977 began, the intention to reduce troop levels in Angola remained the articulated Cuban policy. There was hope, therefore, that Cuban military presence in Africa would continue to decline in importance as a matter of bilateral contention.

III. U.S. Objectives

The Carter Administration's opening to Cuba was predicated most fundamentally on the premise that nations cannot solve the problems among them unless they communicate with one another. The new Administration thus moved to open a dialogue with Cuba. But it was understood on both sides that after eighteen years of hostility and given the magnitude of the problems which stood between them, the process of normalizing relations would be protracted and often painful. It was made clear to the Cubans that while we wished to improve relations, resumption of full diplomatic and trade relations would have to await the solution of some of the major disagreements between the two countries: until human rights issues had been addressed, until Cuba demonstrated restraint in Africa, and its other international activities, and until there were assurances of an agreement to compensate American property owners for their losses.

Further, it was understood that given our essentially different systems of government and world views, we might expect to remain in something of an adversary relationship even after normalization had been consummated.

IV. Steps Toward Normalization

On January 31 of 1977, Secretary of State Vance indicated the United States hoped the normalization process could begin.

The Cubans responded by suggesting we begin negotiations on a maritime boundary and an agreement on fishing rights. A scenario for such talks was agreed upon and in March the two delegations opened discussions in New York. These were continued the next month in Havana and on April 27 a provisional boundary agreement and a Governing International Fishery Agreement were signed.

Meanwhile, beginning in January of 1977, the two sides initiated a number of measured and reciprocal steps to improve relations. On the U.S. side, these included the following:

—In January, the United States halted reconnaissance overflights of Cuba;

—On March 17, U.S. restrictions on travel to Cuba were allowed to lapse, thereby permitting Americans again to travel there. (U.S. Courts had already determined that travel controls could not be enforced.)

—On May 12, Treasury issued a general license to facilitate transactions involving the travel of Americans to Cuba, e.g. charter flights, use of travellers checks, business between travel agencies and the Cuban government, etc.;

—On January 3, 1978, the United States decided to allow, on a one-time basis, a license for a small shipment to Cuba of medicines Cuba was having difficulty obtaining elsewhere. In the end, however, because of the one-time nature of the sale, the Cubans decided not to exercise the option to buy.
—On January 4, Treasury issued a license to facilitate Cuban remittances of up to $500 per quarter from Cubans resident in the United States to their close family members in Cuba.

Cuba, for its part, took the following steps:

—On June 12, 1977, Cuba released ten American prisoners being held for common crimes and permitted them to return to the United States;
—On August 11, after conversations with Senator Frank Church, President Castro agreed to permit all single-source Americans to return to the United States and to bring with them all members of their household, even those of Cuban citizenship. On September 22, 1977, approximately 80 persons in this category arrived in the United States aboard a special flight, accompanied by 36 family members. The remainder arrived here aboard a second flight on February 28, 1978;
—On October 12, the Cuban government released Carmen Ruiz Mackowski, one of seven American political prisoners then in Cuba;
—In early December, after conversations with Congressmen Frederick Richmond and Richard Nolan, President Castro ordered that Carmen Ruiz Mackowski and Simon Porrata (another recently released U.S. political prisoner) be permitted to return to the United States immediately. Porrata returned in January. Carmen Ruiz Mackowski, accompanied by her husband, Haskell Mackowski, a prisoner of Polish nationality released by Castro specifically so that he could accompany his wife, returned to the United States on May 28, 1978;
—On December 31, 1977, the Cuban government released Frank Emmick, one of the remaining U.S. political prisoners. Emmick immediately returned to the United States;
—Castro had promised Congressmen Richmond and Nolan in December of 1977 that he would give sympathetic consideration to the departure of any of the some 500 dual nationals who wished to return to the United States, accompanied by their families. In June of 1978, when the matter was raised again by Congressman Steven Solarz, Castro replied that he had decided to permit their departure. Shortly thereafter, the Cuban government began processing this group for emigration. The first planeload arrived back in the United States on September 14. Two more planeloads have been brought back since then. There will be several additional flights during the weeks ahead to bring out the remainder.

In the summer of 1978, the Cubans indicated that they planned to begin releasing significant numbers of political prisoners; these and many prisoners already released would be authorized to emigrate to the United States if they so wished and the United States wished to accept them. On November 21, President Castro stated publicly that

he intends to release almost all of the more than 3,000 political prisoners he still holds at the rate of about 400 per month provided the United States would accept them. We have agreed to process these prisoners for parole as they are released.

In addition to the individual and reciprocal steps mentioned above, the United States and Cuba have taken several mutually beneficial steps to improve the channels of communication between them:

—On May 30, 1977, the two sides exchanged diplomatic notes agreeing to the establishment of Interests Sections in one another's capitals. On September 1 of that year, these sections were inaugurated. The mission of our Interests Section in Cuba is not only to provide an official channel to the Cuban government so that we can state our positions directly to them; it is also to provide expanded consular services to our citizens, such as making regular visits to American prisoners, intervening to effect the release of American small craft and their crews, organizing repatriation, etc. Because of the increased consular workload resulting from the release of political prisoners and our concomitant program to process them for entry into the United States, our staff in Havana has recently been augmented.

—In mid-January 1978, the U.S. Coast Guard and its Cuban counterpart held talks in Havana on topics of mutual interest, such as improved communications, cooperation in search and rescue operations in international waters, and curbing drug traffic and terrorism. A second round of talks is planned for early 1979, with greater emphasis given this time to cooperation in interdicting drug traffickers. This can be most useful to the United States since Cuba lies directly athwart the main drug routes from Colombia.

V. Problem Areas

The United States indicated in its initial talks with Cuba and continued to reiterate thereafter that the latter's military presence in Africa was a matter of concern to us which could not but impact on our bilateral relations. The United States made it clear that normal relations could not exist between Washington and Havana so long as major contingents of Cuban troops remained in Africa. As indicated above, as the United States had moved toward talks with Cuba, there had been reason to expect further Cuban troop reductions in Africa. This hope, however, was not to be realized.

In the wake of the first Katanganese invasion of Shaba in March of 1977, and of an attempted coup within the MPLA against President Neto in May, Cuba began to increase its troop strength in Angola again. Toward the end of 1977, Cuba's continuing military presence in Angola began to obstruct significantly the measured progress in United States-Cuban relations. Then, in late December of 1977, Cuban combat troops were sent to Ethiopa, in conjunction with a massive Soviet arms transfer to that government, to help repulse the Somali invasion of the Ogaden. Eventually, some 16–17,000 Cuban combat troops were deployed to Ethiopia. Operating as part of a joint Soviet-Cuban effort, these troops were the decisive element in driving the Somali forces out of the Ogaden.

In view of this second major Cuban intervention in an African conflict, the United States indicated forcefully to Havana that there could be no major new initiatives on our side and that relations could not much improve until we saw convincing evidence of Cuban restraint in Africa, including troop reductions. That remains our position.

We believe African political problems should be solved by Africans without outside interference. In our view, the use of Cuban forces to impose solutions in Africa simply heightens tensions and encourages military rather than diplomatic solutions. We continue to reiterate this concern to the Cubans and to emphasize that their continued involvement represents a major obstacle to an improvement in our bilateral relations.

Nicaragua is another possible area of contention between our two governments. We have expressed our concerns directly to the Cubans and will be closely watching for any evidence of intervention on their part.

The transfer of Soviet MIG–23's to Cuba is also a matter of concern to the United States. We are satisfied at this point that the planes now in Cuba are not configured for nuclear missions and that nuclear weapons have not been introduced. We still, however, continue to monitor the situation closely.

Puerto Rico represents another contentious issue between the United States and Cuba. Cuba insists Puerto Rico should be independent and has pressed the matter in the U.N. Our own position is that the U.N. does not have jurisdiction and that the initial decision is one for the Puerto Rican people themselves; as the President stated in his Proclamation of last July 25, the Administration will support whatever status the Puerto Rican people choose. There is, of course, room for divergent views in the U.N., but we believe Cuba has pursued the matter in an excessively abrasive manner little designed to improve the atmosphere between us.

VI. Recapitulation and Assessment: Where Do We Stand?

The more flexible policy toward Cuba pursued since January of 1977 has produced worthwhile gains. For one thing, our Cuba policy no longer represents a general irritant in our relations with third countries. Further, the dialogue and movement toward normalization are generally perceived by our most important friends and allies as reasonable and cogent and have considerable international support, as the old policy increasingly did not.

The new policy has also produced direct benefits, as suggested above. American citizens, both single-source and dual nationals, are being or have already been repatriated, something the United States had urged unsuccessfully for years prior to 1977. Several U.S. citizen political prisoners have been released and there is new hope for those remaining. The Cuban government has also said that it will release most of its own citizens still imprisoned on political grounds and has begun to do so.

The results of the new policy in terms of human rights confirm one of the premises on which it is based: that if there is to be a general loosening up in Cuba, with prisoners released and families reunited, this will come about as a result of dialogue and a concomitant easing of tensions, not as the result of inflexible hostility and a refusal to talk.

Our Interests Section, too, has proved its worth. Through it, we are now able to articulate our positions and concerns directly and forcefully to the Cuban government. Further, the section has been instrumental in securing the release of some U.S. prisoners and has brought aid and comfort to those who remain. We can now extend consular protection to other U.S. citizens traveling to Cuba. This is most important in view of the increasing numbers who have visited the island since the travel controls were lifted.

We succeeded in negotiating an acceptable maritime boundary with the Cubans and have cooperated in Coast Guard matters, thus lessening the chances of dangerous incidents in the waters between us.

Meanwhile, the steps taken on our side in the implementation of our new Cuba policy have been limited in nature. Multilateral economic sanctions were eased by Hemisphere consensus, for example, but the United States continues to maintain a full embargo on all direct trade with Cuba.

VII. Future Directions

We will continue to express our concern to the Cubans over their military activities in Africa and emphasize that these will condition the pace at which normalization moves forward, or, indeed, whether it moves forward at all. Improved relations will also depend upon a better atmosphere between us. In that context, we will be watching closely the manner in which Cuba refers to the United States and handles issues in which we are interested at this year's Non-Aligned Summit in Havana.

At the same time, we see no benefit in reverting to our pre-1977 policy. To do so would negate the important gains we have made in areas such as human rights while diminishing rather than increasing our useful communications with the Cuban government. Rather, our best course of action is to continue the dialogue and the activities of our respective Interests Sections, thus continuing to give our citizens protection, hopefully achieving new gains in terms of freeing political prisoners and reuniting families, and in achieving our other objectives.

In the trade area, any attempt to reimpose the multilateral trade embargo would require either O.A.S. or U.N. action and would surely provoke serious problems with many third country governments who refuse to link trade with foreign policy issues. Similarly, several countries, including Canada and Mexico, have continued to maintain strong opposition even to the more liberal rules in effect since 1975 on trade with Cuba by U.S. affiliated companies located in their countries. They would certainly oppose any retightening of the regulations as an unwarranted intrusion of U.S. laws. This could damage other more important bilateral economic understandings.

But while we cannot reimpose the multilateral sanctions, we will continue to indicate to the Cubans that we cannot consider a total lifting of the U.S. embargo on direct trade until (1) there is some dramatic improvement in their African posture and (2)we reach agreement on a formula for payment of compensation for expropriated U.S. properties. We should also continue to make it clear to them that we cannot consider reestablishing diplomatic relations until these major problems are solved.

Appendix I

Latin American Countries With Diplomatic Relations With Cuba

Argentina
Bahamas*
Barbados*
Colombia
Guyana
Jamaica
Mexico
Panama
Peru
Trinidad and Tobago*
Venezuela

Cuba also has consular and commercial relations with Costa Rica.

Appendix II

The resulting trade by U.S. foreign affiliates initially increased rapidly, but has since fallen off substantially, commensurate with the sharp drop in Cuba's overall trade with noncommunist countries resulting from depressed world sugar prices. The decline has probably also been reinforced by highly technical procedures for obtaining U.S. licenses, which make U.S. foreign affiliates relatively unreliable trade partners for Cuba. During the first year under the modified regulations, licenses were issued for $290 million in U.S. foreign affiliates' exports to Cuba. Of that, foreign-grown grain accounted for $180 million, the remainder being a wide variety of nonstrategic foreign manufactured goods, $18 million of which contained U.S. origin parts, components or materials valued at $2.5 million.

However, in contrast, the value of licenses issued as of December of 1978 had declined to $85 million for U.S. affiliate exports.

Overall, since 1975, offshore trade by U.S. affiliated companies has resulted in licenses for $583 million of exports, of which $393 million was foreign grain and $141 million of manufactured goods containing only $5 million of U.S. origin materials.

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*No resident Ambassador.

REPORTING AND COORDINATION OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

Section 708 of Public Law 95–426, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, requires that a report be transmitted annually by the President concerning agreements sent to the Congress after the expiration of the 60-day period specified in Public Law 92–403. Public Law 92–403 requires that international agreements other than treaties, hereafter entered into by the United States, be transmitted to the Congress within 60 days after the execution thereof. This report has been prepared pursuant to the requirement of Public Law 95–426.

I. In calendar year 1978, 132 of 520 international agreements were transmitted to the Congress after the expiration of the 60-day period specified in Public Law 92–403. The Department of State was responsible for the late transmittal of 45 of these agreements, including one classified agreement. The classified agreement was transmitted May 16, 1978, one day late, in the mistaken belief that the transmission was timely. A list of the unclassified agreements, arranged in order of date of entry into force, with the reasons for their late transmittal follows.

1. Resolutions by the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization amending articles IV, V, and VIII of the Constitution of the Organization, as amended. Adopted at Paris October 24 and 30, 1972, at the 17th session. Entered into force October 24, 1972, for amendments to article V and October 30, 1972, for amendments to articles IV and VIII. Transmitted February 2, 1978.

As a result of an inquiry made to the substantive office in the Department in connection with the updating of the publication *Treaties in Force*, the Treaty Office became aware of the existence of the 1972 and 1976 (see item 5) amendments to the UNESCO constitution. The Treaty Office was not aware that the amendments had been adopted, and the substantive office failed to bring the amendments to the attention of the Treaty Office.

2. Agreement between the United States and the Philippines for the transfer of agricultural commodities to the Philippines. Signed at Washington November 9, 1972. Entered into force November 9, 1972. Transmitted March 9, 1978.

At the time this agreement was concluded, it was not considered to be an international agreement within the meaning of Public Law 92–403. When a 1978 amendment to the agreement was received, however, the subject was reviewed and a determination was then made that this was an agreement which was subject to Public Law 92–403.

3. Agreement between the United States and the Philippines amending the agreement of November 9, 1972 for the transfer of agricultural commodities to the Philippines. Signed at Washington May 24, 1973. Entered into force May 24, 1973. Transmitted March 9, 1978.

See explanation under item 2.

4. Agreement between the United States and Haiti modifying the agreement of March 13 and April 2, 1953, as modified, relating to guaranties authorized by section 111(b)(3) of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince October 7 and 14, 1975. Entered into force April 4, 1978; effective November 4, 1976. Transmitted June 16, 1978.

The delay in transmitting this agreement resulted from a difference in interpretation between the two governments during the 60-day period concerning the entry into force date.

5. Resolution by the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization amending article V of the Constitution of the Organization, as amended. Adopted at Nairobi November 8, 1976, at the 19th session. Entered into force November 8, 1976. Transmitted February 2, 1978.

See explanation under item 1.

6. Project loan agreement between the United States and Zaire relating to North Shaba rural development. Signed at Kinshasa January 27, 1977. Entered into force January 27, 1977. Transmitted October 6, 1978.

The Department had difficulty in obtaining a legible text of this agreement. It should be noted that Zaire was undergoing periods of unrest during the time the Department's requests to the field were pending.

7. Project agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia for technical cooperation in procurement of electrical equipment. Signed at Riyadh March 26, 1977. Entered into force March 26, 1977. Transmitted August 3, 1978.

The substantive office in the Department inadvertently failed to transmit a copy to the Treaty Office.

8. Cooperative agreement between the United States and Iran relating to environmental protection and improvement, with annex. Signed at Tehran November 10, 1976. Entered into force April 1, 1977. Transmitted September 7, 1978.

The Department was not informed by the post that the necessary action had been taken to bring the agreement into force.

9. Agreement between the United States and the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization relating to a procedure for United States income tax reimbursements. Effected by exchange of letters at London May 18 and June 8, 1977. Entered into force June 8, 1977. Transmitted March 16, 1978.

Because of an oversight, the substantive office in the Department failed to bring this agreement to the attention of the Treaty Office until some time after the expiration of the 60-day period.

10. Agreement between the United States and Guinea amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of September 22, 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at Conakry June 13 and 15, 1977. Entered into force June 15, 1977. Transmitted March 6, 1978.

This agreement was delayed because the post failed to transmit the notes constituting the agreement to the Department in time to meet the deadline.

11. Implementing agreement for a program of research and development on energy conservation in heat transfer and heat exchangers, with annexes. Done at Paris June 28, 1977. Entered into force June 28, 1977. Transmitted January 13, 1978.

Initially this implementing agreement was not considered to be an agreement within the meaning of Public Law 92–403. A subsequent review, undertaken in connection with other such implementing agreements, resulted in the determination that it was an agreement subject to Public Law 92–403.

12. Agreement between the United States and Colombia amending the agreement of May 28, 1975 relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington July 29 and August 17, 1977. Entered into force August 17, 1977. Transmitted June 22, 1978.

This agreement was transmitted late because the substantive office failed to bring the agreement to the attention of the Treaty Office which discovered the existence of the agreement in connection with a later amendment.

13. Agreement between the United States and The Bahamas relating to United States participation in the National Insurance Scheme of The Bahamas, with related note. Effected by exchange of notes at Nassau October 27, 1976, May 6 and September 23, 1977. Entered into force September 23, 1977; effective October 7, 1977. Transmitted March 9, 1978.

This agreement was transmitted late because the post failed to send the notes constituting the agreement to the Department until after the expiration of the 60-day period.

14. Project grant agreement between the United States and Guinea relating to agricultural production capacity and training. Signed at Conakry September 27, 1977. Entered into force September 27, 1977. Transmitted May 18, 1978.

This agreement involved an Agency for International Development (AID) grant of less than $1 million and, in accordance with guidelines established for transmittal of AID agreements, was not transmitted to the Congress. Later an amending agreement was received which increased the grant by $1 million. Because the amendment was subject to transmittal, it was also necessary to transmit the basic agreement since without it the amendment was not meaningful.

15. Agreement between the United States and Afghanistan concerning the prohibition of opium poppy cultivation in the project area of the integrated wheat development project. Signed at Kabul September 29, 1977. Entered into force September 29, 1977. Transmitted January 13, 1978.

See explanation under item 9.

16. Agreement between the United States and Romania amending the agreements of June 2, 1975 relating to trade in cotton textiles and June 17, 1977 relating to trade in wool, and manmade fiber textiles. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington October 13 and 19, 1977. Entered into force October 19, 1977. Transmitted May 18, 1978.

See explanation under item 9.

17. Agreement between the United States and Canada extending the agreement of April 2 and May 9, 1974, as extended, relating to the construction, installation, and maintenance of a seismograph station at Kluane Lake, Yukon Territory. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa October 13 and November 7, 1977. Entered into force November 7, 1977. Transmitted February 15, 1978.

See explanation under item 10.

18. Agreement between the United States and Thailand amending the agreement of December 29, 1975, as amended, relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Bangkok November 14, 1977. Entered into force November 14, 1977. Transmitted February 22, 1978.

Although the Thai note was dated November 14, 1977, it was not received at the American Embassy until January 18, 1978.

19. Project agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia for technical cooperation in highway transportation. Signed at Riyadh and Washington August 16 and 26, 1977. Entered into force November 28, 1977. Transmitted February 10, 1978.

Because of an oversight by the substantive office, the Treaty Office was not informed of the date of the deposit of funds under article XIII which brought the agreement into force.

20. Agreement between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany relating to experimental implementation of low-cost air fares. Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn-Bad Godesberg and Bonn December 1 and 2, 1977. Entered into force December 2, 1977. Transmitted August 21, 1978.

Transmittal of this agreement, and agreements 22, 23, 25 and 28, was delayed because of failure of the substantive office to complete action necessary to obtain the required documentation in time to meet the deadline.

21. Agreement between the United States and Korea amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of February 18, 1976, as amended. Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul December 7, 1977. Entered into force December 7, 1977. Transmitted February 22, 1978.

The notes constituting the agreement were lost in transit. Duplicate copies had to be obtained from the post.

22. Agreement between the United States and Poland relating to experimental implementation of low-cost air fares. Effected by exchange of notes at Warsaw December 13 and 16, 1977. Entered into force December 16, 1977. Transmitted July 24, 1978.

See explanation under item 20.

23. Agreement between the United States and Iran relating to experimental implementation of low-cost air fares. Effected by exchange of notes at Tehran November 6 and December 19, 1977. Entered into force December 19, 1977. Transmitted August 21, 1978.

See explanation under item 20.

24. Agreement between the United States and the Dominican Republic amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of September 28, 1977. Effected by exchange of notes at Santo Domingo December 13 and 20, 1977. Entered into force December 20, 1977. Transmitted February 28, 1978.

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The agreement was not received in the Department until shortly before the expiration of the 60-day period and transmission was inadvertently delayed beyond the deadline.

25. Agreement between the United States and India relating to experimental implementation of low-cost air fares. Effected by exchange of notes at New Delhi December 23, 1977. Entered into force December 23, 1977. Transmitted August 21, 1978.

See explanation under item 20.

26. Agreement between the United States and the Republic of Korea extending the memorandum of understanding of December 19, 1975 and January 15, 1976 relating to the development of the Korea Standards Research Institute. Effected by exchange of letters at Seoul and Washington October 24 and December 12, 1977 and January 6, 1978. Entered into force January 6, 1978. Transmitted March 16, 1978.

Transmittal was inadvertently delayed because of oversight in the Treaty Office.

27. Agreement between the United States and The Bahamas extending application of the agreement of April 23, 1974, on preclearance for entry into the United States to Freeport. Effected by exchange of notes at Nassau December 28, 1977 and January 10, 1978. Entered into force January 10, 1978. Transmitted July 13, 1978.

See explanation under item 10.

28. Agreement between the United States and France relating to experimental implementation of low-cost air fares. Effected by exchange of notes at Paris February 10 and 21, 1978. Entered into force February 21, 1978. Transmitted August 21, 1978.

See explanation under item 20.

29. Air transport agreement between the United States and the Ivory Coast, with memorandum of understanding and exchange of notes. Signed at Abidjan February 24, 1978. Agreement entered into force provisionally February 24, 1978; memorandum of understanding entered into force March 31, 1978. Transmitted May 18, 1978.

The Ivory Coast note that confirmed acceptance of February 24, 1978, as the provisional entry into force date of this agreement was not received in the Treaty Office until after the expiration of the 60-day period.

30. Agreement between the United States and Bulgaria on exchanges and cooperation in cultural, scientific, educational, technological, and other fields. Signed at Washington June 13, 1977. Entered into force March 23, 1978. Transmitted August 3, 1978.

The cable informing the Department that this agreement had entered into force was not distributed to the Treaty Office.

31. Agreement between the United States and Tunisia relating to a small farmer supervised credit project with annexes. Signed at Tunis March 24, 1978. Entered into force March 24, 1978. Transmitted May 31, 1978.

This agreement, and agreements 33, 34, 35 and 36, were received from the Agency for International Development shortly before the expiration of the 60-day period and inadvertently were not processed by the Treaty Office in time to meet the deadline.

32. Agreement between the United States and Haiti amending the agreement of April 27, 1976, as amended, for the agricultural feeder

roads project. Signed at Port-au-Prince March 28, 1978. Entered into force March 28, 1978. Transmitted June 29, 1978.

Transmittal of this agreement was inadvertently delayed by the Treaty Office.

33. Project grant agreement between the United States and Egypt relating to technical and feasibility studies with annex. Signed at Cairo March 29, 1978. Entered into force March 29, 1978. Transmitted May 31, 1978.

See explanation under item 31.

34. Agreement between the United States and Ghana for managed input delivery and agricultural services project with annexes. Signed at Accra March 30, 1978. Entered into force March 30, 1978. Transmitted June 8, 1978.

See explanation under item 31.

35. Grant agreement between the United States and Indonesia for rural electrification project, with annexes. Signed at Jakarta March 30, 1978. Entered into force March 30, 1978. Transmitted June 16, 1978.

See explanation under item 31.

36. Grant agreement between the United States and Mali relating to the Action Riz-Sorgho project, with annex. Signed at Bamako March 30, 1978. Entered into force March 30, 1978. Transmitted May 31, 1978.

See explanation under item 31.

37. Agreement between the United States and Canada relating to space remote sensing for global crop information. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington March 31 and April 10, 1978. Entered into force April 10, 1978. Transmitted June 29, 1978.

This agreement was not sent to the Treaty Office until after the expiration of the 60-day period.

38. Agreement between the United States and Mexico amending the agreement of May 12, 1975, as amended, relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico and Tlatelolco April 26 and 29, 1978. Entered into force April 29, 1978. Transmitted August 10, 1978.

Though dated April 29, 1978, the Mexican note was not delivered to the American Embassy until July 13, 1978.

39. Agreement between the United States and Mexico for cooperation on environmental programs and transboundary problems. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico and Tlatelolco June 14 and 19, 1978. Entered into force June 19, 1978. Transmitted October 19, 1978.

See explanation under item 13.

40. Agreement between the United States and Syria amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of May 3, 1978. Effected by exchange of notes at Damascus July 25, 1978. Entered into force July 25, 1978. Transmitted November 16, 1978.

See explanation under item 13.

41. Agreement between the United States and Portugal for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of March 18, 1976, with minutes. Signed at Lisbon August 4, 1978. Entered into force August 4, 1978. Transmitted November 2, 1978.

The post delayed transmittal to the Department until minutes of the negotiating sessions could be initialed by the Portuguese

representative. Initialing was delayed by nomination and subsequent rejection of a new Portugese Government.

42. Agreement between the United States and Poland amending the air transport agreement of July 19, 1972, as amended and extended. Effected by exchange of notes at Warsaw June 19 and August 11, 1978. Entered into force August 11, 1978. Transmitted November 21, 1978.

See explanation under item 21.

43. Memorandum of understanding between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany extending and modifying the memorandum of Germany extending and modifying the momorandum of understanding of June 12, 1973 regarding cooperation of the development of advanced ground transportation. Signed at Washington and Bonn July 12 and August 30, 1978. Entered into force August 30, 1978. Transmitted November 2, 1978.

This amendment was received in the Department shortly before the expiration of the 60-day period and inadvertently was not processed by the Treaty Office in time to permit transmittal within the deadline.

44. Agreement between the United States and Portugal amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of August 4, 1978. Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon August 30 and 31, 1978. Entered into force August 31, 1978. Transmitted December 21, 1978.

See explanation under item 21.

II. The remaining 87 agreements, including 3 classified agreements, were transmitted late because they were received by the Department of State from the concluding department or agency or, in one case, from the international depositary organization after the expiration of the 60-day period. The three classified agreements, one of which was transmitted on August 17, 1978, and the other two on September 1, 1978, were received by the Department of State after the expiration of the 60-day period. A list of the unclassified agreements follows:

1. Loan agreement between the United States and Jordan for the village development project, with annex. Signed at Amman June 28, 1975. Entered into force June 28, 1975. Transmitted November 2, 1978.

2. Loan agreement between the United States and Jamaica for the rural education sector. Signed at Kingston November 13, 1975. Entered into force November 13, 1975. Transmitted October 6, 1978.

3. Loan agreement between the United States and Indonesia concerning technical assistance/consulting services. Signed at Jakarta July 28, 1976. Entered into force July 28, 1976. Transmitted October 6, 1978.

4. Amendment No. 1 to the memorandum of understanding of March 31 and April 22, 1971 between the United States and the Republic of Korea relating to the establishment of an M–16 rifle production program in Korea, with annexes. Signed at Seoul July 30, 1976. Entered into force July 30, 1976. Transmitted March 29, 1978.

5. Project grant agreement between the United States and Chad relating to development of irrigated agriculture in the polders area of Lake Chad, with annexes. Signed at N'Djamena January 25, 1977. Entered into force January 25, 1977. Transmitted March 21, 1978.

6. Memorandum of agreement between the United States and Venezuela concerning the provision of technical assistance to develop

and modernize Venezuela's civil aviation infrastructure. Signed at Washington and Caracas February 1 and 4, 1977. Entered into force February 4, 1977. Transmitted September 7, 1978.

7. Agreement between the United States and Bolivia for the narcotics control project, with annex. Signed at La Paz February 23, 1977. Entered into force February 23, 1977. Transmitted August 16, 1978.

8. Project agreement between the United States and Afghanistan amending the agreement of March 16, 1977 for national development training, with annex. Signed at Kabul May 22, 1977. Entered into force May 22, 1977. Transmitted March 29, 1978.

9. Multilateral memorandum of understanding for the cooperative support of the NATO Seasparrow surface missile system, with exhibit. Done May 20, 1977. Entered into force May 31, 1977. Transmitted February 10, 1978.

10. First amendment to the loan agreement of June 28, 1975 between the United States and Jordan relating to Jordan Valley village development. Signed at Washington June 9, 1977. Entered into force June 9, 1977. Transmitted March 16, 1978.

11. Agreement between the United States and Indonesia amending the loan agreement of July 28, 1976 concerning technical assistance/consulting services. Signed at Jakarta July 27, 1977. Entered into force July 27, 1977. Transmitted October 6, 1978.

12. Project grant agreement between the United States and Chad relating to human resources development, with annexes. Signed at N'Djamena August 25, 1977. Entered into force August 25, 1977. Transmitted January 19, 1978.

13. Project grant agreement between the United States and Afghanistan relating to Central Helmand drainage (phase II), with annexes. Signed at Kabul August 29, 1977. Entered into force August 29, 1977. Transmitted January 13, 1978.

14. Agreement between the United States and Afghanistan concerning the prohibition of opium poppy cultivation in the project area of the Central Helmand drainage project (phase II). Signed at Kabul August 29, 1977. Entered into force August 29, 1977. Transmitted January 13, 1978.

15. Agreement between the United States and Chad amending the project grant agreement of January 25, 1977 relating to development of irrigated agriculture in the polders area of Lake Chad, with annex. Signed at N'Djamena August 30, 1977. Entered into force August 30, 1977. Transmitted February 2, 1978.

16. Project grant agreement between the United States and Haiti relating to strengthening health services, with annexes. Signed at Port-au-Prince August 30, 1977. Entered into force August 30, 1977. Transmitted February 2, 1978.

17. Project grant agreement between the United States and Afghanistan concerning agricultural credit, with annexes. Signed at Kabul September 18, 1977. Entered into force September 18, 1977. Transmitted March 9, 1978.

18. Project agreement between the United States and Afghanistan concerning rural development, with annex. Signed at Kabul September 18, 1977. Entered into force September 18, 1977. Transmitted March 16, 1978.

19. Loan agreement between the United States and Syria relating to agricultural production and economic development. Signed at Damascus September 20, 1977. Entered into force September 20, 1977. Transmitted March 16, 1978.

20. Project grant agreement between the United States and Syria relating to technical services and feasibility studies, with annex. Signed at Damascus September 20, 1977. Entered into force September 20, 1977. Transmitted March 21, 1978.

21. Project loan agreement between the United States and Jordan concerning rural and urban electrification, with annex. Signed at Amman September 21, 1977. Entered into force September 21, 1977. Transmitted March 16, 1978.

22. Project loan agreement between the United States and Jordan relating to the Magarin Dam and Jordan Valley irrigation system design, with annex. Signed at Amman September 21, 1977. Entered into force September 21, 1977. Transmitted March 16, 1978.

23. Project grant agreement between the United States and Niger relating to range management and livestock production, with annexes. Signed at Niamey September 26, 1977. Entered into force September 26, 1977. Transmitted April 6, 1978.

24. Agreement between the United States and Afghanistan relating to basic health services, with annex. Signed at Kabul September 28, 1977. Entered into force September 28, 1977. Transmitted February 22, 1978.

25. Agreement between the United States and Chad amending the project grant agreement of January 25, 1977, as amended, relating to development of irrigated agriculture in the polders area of Lake Chad. Signed at N'Djamena September 28, 1977. Entered into force September 28, 1977. Transmitted February 2, 1978.

26. Project agreement between the United States and Kenya providing funding for the rural roads system project, with annexes. Signed at Nairobi September 30, 1977. Entered into force September 30, 1977. Transmitted May 18, 1978.

27. Agreement amending the agreement of February 11, 1977 between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany in the field of gas-cooled reactor concepts and technology. Done at Bonn September 30, 1977. Entered into force September 30, 1977. Transmitted January 19, 1978.

28. Multilateral agreement concerning helicopter pilot training in the United States under the scope of EURO/NATO training, with annexes. Opened for signature July 14, 1977. Entered into force October 10, 1977. Transmitted February 15, 1978.

29. Agreement between the United States and Canada relating to performance evaluation of a variable depth sonar system in conjunction with a high speed surface vessel, with annexes (Project Hytow). Signed at Washington and Ottawa September 12 and October 12, 1977. Entered into force October 12, 1977. Transmitted February 28, 1978.

30. Amendment No. 2 to the memorandum of understanding of March 31 and April 22, 1971, as amended, between the United States and the Republic of Korea relating to the establishment of an M–16 rifle production program in Korea, with annex. Signed at Seoul October 14, 1977. Entered into force October 14, 1977. Transmitted March 29, 1978.

31. Agreement between the United States and Nepal amending the agreement of September 2, 1970, as amended, for the airport development project. Signed at Kathmandu November 7, 1977. Entered into force November 7, 1977. Transmitted June 29, 1978.

32. Loan agreement between the United States and Sri Lanka concerning Mahaweli Ganga irrigation, with annexes. Signed at Colombo November 9, 1977. Entered into force November 9, 1977. Transmitted March 16, 1978.

33. Project loan agreement between the United States and Bolivia to finance the costs of goods and services required for the agriculture sector II project, with annexes. Signed at La Paz November 24, 1977. Entered into force November 24, 1977. Transmitted April 12, 1978.

34. Agreement between the United States and Jamaica amending the loan agreement of November 13, 1975 for the rural education sector. Signed at Kingston November 25, 1977. Entered into force November 25, 1977. Transmitted August 3, 1978.

35. Project loan agreement between the United States and Panama regarding integrated rural development, with annexes and appendices. Signed at Panama November 25, 1977. Entered into force November 25, 1977. Transmitted April 12, 1978.

36. Loan agreement between the United States and Honduras for the small farmer technologies project, with annexes. Signed at Tegucigalpa November 28, 1977. Entered into force November 28, 1977. Transmitted July 24, 1978.

37. Amendments to the constitution of the Food and Agriculture Organization, as amended. Adopted at the 19th session of the FAO Conference, Rome, November 12–December 1, 1977. Entered into force November 29, 1977. Transmitted February 2, 1978.

38. Amendments to the multilateral convention of November 19, 1959, as amended, placing the International Poplar Commission within the framework of the Food and Agriculture Organization. Adopted at Rome November 15, 1977. Entered into force November 30, 1977. Transmitted June 22, 1978.

39. Agreement between the United States and Mozambique relating to transfer of agricultural commodities to Mozambique. Signed at Maputo December 2, 1977. Entered into force December 2, 1977. Transmitted March 6, 1978.

40. Agreement between the United States and Israel concerning a cash grant to provide necessary foreign exchange to support the economic requirements of Israel. Signed at Washington December 5, 1977. Entered into force December 5, 1977. Transmitted March 9, 1978.

41. Loan agreement between the United States and Israel relating to the economic and political stability of Israel, with attachments. Signed at Washington December 5, 1977. Entered into force December 5, 1977. Transmitted March 9, 1978.

42. Loan agreement between the United States and Israel, relating to the economic and political stability of Israel, with attachments. Signed at Washington December 5, 1977. Entered into force December 5, 1977. Transmitted March 9, 1978.

43. Agreement between the United States and Israel concerning a program assistance grant to promote the economic and political sta-

bility of Israel. Signed at Washington December 5, 1977. Entered into force December 5, 1977. Transmitted March 9, 1978.

44. Agreement between the United States and Bolivia concerning the basic food production and marketing project, with annex. Signed at La Paz December 6, 1977. Entered into force December 6, 1977. Transmitted August 16, 1978.

45. Memorandum of agreement between the United States and Korea relating to the Kimpo International Airport expansion project, with attachments. Signed at Washington and Seoul August 12 and December 14, 1977. Entered into force December 14, 1977. Transmitted May 18, 1978.

46. Project agreement between the United States and Bangladesh for a rural electrification project, with annex. Signed at Dacca December 15, 1977. Entered into force December 15, 1977. Transmitted April 12, 1978.

47. Loan agreement between the United States and Jamaica to finance the foreign exchange costs of certain commodities and commodity-related services. Signed at Kingston December 15, 1977. Entered into force December 15, 1977. Transmitted April 12, 1978.

48. Agreement between the United States and Panama amending the loan agreement of November 19, 1975 for the education sector. Signed at Panama December 21, 1977. Entered into force December 21, 1977. Transmitted August 3, 1978.

49. Grant agreement between the United States and Jordan for budgetary assistance. Signed at Amman December 22, 1977. Entered into force December 22, 1977. Transmitted June 8, 1978.

50. Agreement between the United States and Tanzania for the agricultural research project, with annex. Signed at Dar es Salaam December 28 and 29, 1977. Entered into force December 29, 1977. Transmitted June 16, 1978.

51. Agreement between the United States and Egypt amending the grant agreement of June 30, 1976, as amended, for water use and management project. Signed at Cairo December 29, 1977. Entered into force December 29, 1977. Transmitted June 29, 1978.

52. Agreement between the United States and Egypt amending the grant agreement of September 30, 1976, as amended, for strengthening rural health delivery project. Signed at Cairo December 29, 1977. Entered into force December 29, 1977. Transmitted June 29, 1978.

53. Project loan and grant agreement between the United States and Tunisia for rural community health, with annexes. Signed at Tunis December 29, 1977. Entered into force December 29, 1977. Transmitted June 16, 1978.

54. Agreement between the United States and Bolivia for the small farmers organizations I project, with annex. Signed at La Paz December 30, 1977. Entered into force December 30, 1977. Transmitted August 16, 1978.

55. Agreement between the United States and Bolivia for the agricultural development in coca zones project, with annex. Signed at La Paz December 30, 1977. Entered into force December 30, 1977. Transmitted August 16, 1978.

56. Project grant agreement between the United States and Bangladesh for the operation of the cholera research laboratory. Signed at

Dacca January 3, 1978. Entered into force January 3, 1978. Transmitted May 18, 1978.

57. Agreement between the United States and Indonesia for the family planning development and services project, with annex. Signed at Jakarta January 3, 1978. Entered into force January 3, 1978. Transmitted June 8, 1978.

58. Agreement between the United States and Guinea-Bissau relating to the transfer of agricultural commodities to Guinea-Bissau. Signed at Bissau January 8, 1978. Entered into force January 8, 1978. Transmitted October 6, 1978.

59. Loan agreement between the United States and Bolivia for the agribusiness and artisanry project, with annexes. Signed at La Paz January 9, 1978. Entered into force January 9, 1978. Transmitted June 16, 1978.

60. Agreement between the United States and Pakistan amending the loan agreement of June 22, 1976 relating to a malaria control program. Signed at Islamabad January 12, 1978. Entered into force January 12, 1978. Transmitted May 31, 1978.

61. Agreement between the United States and Tunisia for the family planning services project, with annexes. Signed at Tunis January 12, 1978. Entered into force January 12, 1978. Transmitted June 16, 1978.

62. Loan agreement between the United States and the Philippines concerning a crop protection project, with annexes. Signed at Manila January 13, 1978. Entered into force January 13, 1978. Transmitted May 31, 1978.

63. Loan agreement between the United States and the Philippines concerning the rural electrification V project, with annexes. Signed at Manila January 13, 1978. Entered into force January 13, 1978. Transmitted May 31, 1978.

64. Loan agreement between the United States and the Philippines for the bicol integrated area development II project, with annexes. Signed at Manila January 13, 1978. Entered into force January 13, 1978. Transmitted June 8, 1978.

65. Project grant agreement between the United States and the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel for research and development of integrated pest management for basic crops in the Sahel, with annexes. Signed at Ouagadougou February 7, 1978. Entered into force February 7, 1978. Transmitted July 24, 1978.

66. Grant agreement between the United States and Chad amending the agreement of August 25, 1977 concerning the human resources development project. Signed at N'Djamena February 28, 1978. Entered into force February 28, 1978. Transmitted September 29, 1978.

67. Loan agreement between the United States and Jamaica for the integrated rural development project, with annexes. Signed at Kingston February 28, 1978. Entered into force February 28, 1978. Transmitted June 16, 1978.

68. Grant agreement between the United States and the Philippines amending the agreement for population planning II project of August 31, 1977, as amended. Signed at Manila March 6, 1978. Entered into force March 6, 1978. Transmitted June 8, 1978.

69. Agreement between the United States and Egypt amending the grant agreement of September 29, 1977 for integrated social work

centers project. Signed at Cairo March 7, 1978. Entered into force March 7, 1978. Transmitted May 31, 1978.

70. Project grant agreement between the United States and Lebanon concerning re-equipment of the Institute Pedagogique Nationale d'Education Technique, with annexes. Signed at Beirut March 21, 1978. Entered into force March 21, 1978. Transmitted August 3, 1978.

71. Memorandum of understanding between the United States and Jamaica concerning the utilization of Jamaican currency for high-priority development activities. Signed at Kingston March 23, 1978. Entered into force March 23, 1978. Transmitted August 3, 1978.

72. Memorandum of agreement between the United States and Canada relating to the provision of flight inspection services. Signed March 10 and April 1, 1978. Entered into force April 1, 1978. Transmitted September 15, 1978.

73. Multilateral implementing agreement for a program of research, development and demonstration on forestry energy, with annex. Done at Tokyo April 13, 1978. Entered into force April 13, 1978. Transmitted June 29, 1978.

74. Agreement between the United States and Abu Dhabi amending and extending the technical assistance agreement of January 18 and April 26, 1976 relating to a customs improvement program in Abu Dhabi. Signed at Washington and Abu Dhabi March 16 and April 19, 1978. Entered into force April 19, 1978. Transmitted October 26, 1978.

75. Loan agreement between the United States and Indonesia for the rural electrification project, with annex. Signed at Jakarta May 6, 1978. Entered into force May 6, 1978. Transmitted August 10, 1978.

76. Agreement between the United States and Cape Verde relating to the transfer of agricultural commodities to Cape Verde. Signed May 22, 1978. Entered into force May 22, 1978. Transmitted October 6, 1978.

77. Memorandum of understanding between the United States and France concerning a cooperative program into science and technology, with appendices. Signed at Paris May 30, 1978. Entered into force May 30, 1978. Transmitted September 15, 1978.

78. Loan agreement between the United States and Peru for the rural development—agribusiness fund project, with annexes. Signed at Lima May 31, 1978. Entered into force May 31, 1978. Transmitted August 10, 1978.

79. Grant agreement between the United States and Niger for the rural health improvement project, with annexes. Signed at Niamey June 1, 1978. Entered into force June 1, 1978. Transmitted August 10, 1978.

80. Agreement between the United States and Guinea relating to the transfer of agricultural commodities to Guinea. Signed at Washington and Conakry April 14 and June 5, 1978. Entered into force June 5, 1978. Transmitted October 6, 1978.

81. Agreement between the United States and Peru relating to the transfer of agricultural commodities to Peru. Signed at Lima July 19, 1978. Entered into force July 19, 1978. Transmitted October 6, 1978.

82. Agreement between the United States and Peru amending the agreement of July 19, 1978 relating to the transfer of agricultural

commodities to Peru. Signed at Lima July 19, 1978. Entered into force July 19, 1978. Transmitted October 6, 1978.

83. Project loan agreement between the United States and Jordan for Amman water and sewerage, with annex. Signed at Amman August 28, 1978. Entered into force August 28, 1978. Transmitted December 7, 1978.

84. Agreement between the United States and the Republic of China relating to the provision of flight inspection services. Signed at Washington and Taipei August 21 and October 1, 1978. Entered into force October 1, 1978. Transmitted December 7, 1978.

USE OF FOREIGN CURRENCIES

In greater or lesser degree, local currencies accrue to the account of the U.S. Government without purchase with dollars in most of the countries of the world. Policy and procedure governing their use vary according to categorizations based on the adequacy of accuring balances to the meeting of normal U.S. Government expenditure requirements for each currency. All foreign currencies are categorized according to adequacy of supply in one of three classes: (1) *Excess*, for those determined by the Secretary of the Treasury to be available in excess of two years or more of normal expenditure requirements; (2) *Near-excess*, for those determined by the Secretary of the Treasury to be available in amounts above normal expenditure requirements but not qualifying as excess; and (3) *Non-excess*, for those not qualifying as excess or near-excess.

Non-excess currencies are routinely used as official expenditures of U.S. Government agencies shortly after receipt, with the using agency making reimbursement to the Treasury Department for their equivalent value at prevailing rates of exchange in dollars chargeable only to regular agency dollar appropriations. Continuing balances do not develop. For this reason, special policy directives are not necessary to insure full and effective utilization, and departments and agencies do not plan or budget specifically for their use. Planning and budgeting necessarily is done in dollars. Treasury disbursement regulations do require that available local currency balances be used before U.S. Disbursing Officers purchase such currency with dollars.

Near-excess currencies, like non-excess currencies, are not specifically planned and budgeted for use by departments and agencies. While continuing balances may develop in these currencies, the balances generally cannot be relied upon over an entire budgetary cycle. Under existing policy and procedures, near-excess currencies may be sold only to regular agency dollar appropriations with equivalent dollar reimbursement at prevailing exchange rates to the Treasury Department. Consequently, agency planning necessarily is done with dollars under regular agency dollar appropriations. Under Office of Management and Budget directive, however, U.S. Government agencies are required to insure that obligations and expenditures in near-excess currency countries be made in the currencies of those countries in lieu of dollars to the maximum feasible extent. For fiscal year 1979, Morocco, Poland, Tunisia and Yugoslavia are designated as near-excess currency countries.

Excess currencies are also sold to regular agency dollar appropriations for expenditure requirements planned and budgeted in dollars

rather than in defined amounts of foreign currency, and U.S. agencies are required to make their obligations in excess currency countries payable in the currencies of these countries in lieu of dollars whenever feasible. In addition, agencies are permitted and encouraged to seek special foreign currency program appropriations providing funding for programs that are generally additive to, and may be of lower priority than, those which can be financed under regular agency dollar appropriations. The Department of State for its Foreign Buildings program, and the International Communication Agency for its communication, cultural, and educational exchange programs, use their special foreign currency program appropriations to fund their basic activities in the excess currency countries. These special appropriations are made in dollars which can only be used to reimburse Treasury for the expenditure of excess currencies. They represent planned usage of excess foreign currencies, but frequently amounts of particular currencies needed are not determined during the appropriations process. Agency plans for excess currency usage in total are fixed through the appropriations process, but determined for individual currencies during the execution of the budget. The following are designated excess currency countries for fiscal year 1979 and estimated excess for 1980: Burma, Egypt, Guinea, India, and Pakistan.

U.S. law requires that the Treasury Department be reimbursed with appropriated U.S. dollars for any U.S.-owned foreign currencies expended for U.S. Government agency programs. Therefore, the level of appropriations provided, as well as the availability of various foreign currency balances, directly affect and limit agencies planning for, and usage of, U.S.-owned foreign currencies in any fiscal year. Meaningful and reliable planning of foreign currency usage cannot be accomplished for years beyond the year of latest appropriation, and then only for excess currencies whose availability is assured. Appropriated dollars are provided in the form of regular agency dollar appropriations and of special foreign currency program appropriations.

Special foreign currency program appropriations include dollar requirements for the obligation (and expenditure) of excess foreign currencies only. Appendix I presents planned agency obligations for usage of currencies under these appropriations during fiscal year 1979 amounting to about $96 million in the five excess currencies, as follows:

Burmese kyats	$716,000
Egyptian pounds	61,947,000
Guinean sylis	288,000
Indian rupees	21,494,000
Pakistan rupees	11,118,000

Under regular agency dollar appropriations, all requirements are planned and budgeted in dollars. U.S.-owned foreign currency usage is determined principally during the expenditure of funds, depending upon availability. Inasmuch as excess currencies can be presumed to be available for official expenditure, the Department has estimated expenditure levels based on past levels for each excess currency for

all regular agency dollar appropriations during fiscal year 1979 amounting to about $61.6 million, as follows:

Burmese kyats	$660,000
Egyptian pounds	12,358,000
Guinean sylis	630,000
Indian rupees	36,000,000
Pakistan rupees	12,000,000

Appendix II reflects the balances of excess and near-excess foreign currencies reported by Treasury as of September 30, 1978. The $157.5 million planned use of excess currency in fiscal year 1979 estimated above represents about 13.4 percent of the total excess currency availability for United States use of $1,177 million appearing in Appendix II.

Under existing policy and regulation, excess and near-excess currencies are being used wherever feasible for the following types of expenses:

1. *In-Country Official Expenses.*—All official obligations in excess and near-excess currency countries are made payable in local currencies wherever feasible. This includes operational expenses of Foreign Service posts and U.S. Missions, and expenses of all activities and operations of agencies of the Federal Government within these countries. It includes salaries of local employees, allowances for American employees, travel within the country, and contractual expenses, even for contracts with American contractors.

2. *In-Country Personal Expenses.*—All persons traveling for the U.S. Government, including employees, consultants and grantees, while in one of these countries are required to acquire their local currency expenditure requirements from the accommodation exchange facility in the American Embassy, wherever possible. American employees assigned in these countries are required to avoid the expenditure of dollars, and to purchase local currency expenditure requirements from the Embassy accommodation exchange. American employees also have been encouraged to have a part of their salaries paid in local currencies.

3. *International Transportation.*—Arrangements have been made for the use of U.S.-owned currencies of seven excess and near-excess countries for payments to international carriers for official travel. Use of these currencies for travel is required wherever and whenever possible by all persons traveling for the U.S. Government. An exception to the basic "fly-American" policy is authorized to permit the use of these currencies on foreign-flag carriers when American carriers cannot or will not accept them.

4. *Procurement for Overseas Use.*—Procurement regulations governing the procurement of goods and services for overseas use require that, world-wide, first priority be given to procurement with excess foreign currencies when feasible.

5. *Sales to U.S. Citizens.*—Arrangements are currently operative for the sale of excess currencies in four countries to traveling U.S. citizens including tourists and businessmen. These currencies are available at American embassies in Egypt, Guinea, India, and at the Central Bank of Tunisia. The total volume of such sales in

India is limited by the terms of agreements with the government of this country.

6. *Payments to the U.S. Annuitants.*—Persons resident in excess and near-excess currency countries who receive annuities from U.S. Government agencies are paid in U.S.-owned local currencies wherever feasible. Such payments are currently being made to annuitants in seven countries: Burma, India, Morocco, Pakistan, Tunisia, Egypt and Yugoslavia.

7. *Contribution to International Organizations.*—Under a program initiated in 1964, the Department has been successful in persuading international organizations to accept several millions in U.S.-owned foreign currencies in lieu of dollars in payment on contributions assessed against the United States. In addition, many millions have been paid in lieu of dollars as voluntary contributions to international organizations.

Our excess currency holdings in Burma and Guinea are relatively small, and our ability to utilize the currencies is greatly restricted because of internal conditions in the two countries. Egyptian pound balances are declining, and it is anticipated that the excess designation will have to be dropped within three years. Our use of the currency of India is not far below the ceiling on annual expenditure established by bilateral agreement (at the average annual level reached in the three years ending June 30, 1972). We have been attempting to increase our usage of Pakistan rupees for all authorized purposes with limited success, inasmuch as Pakistan is the only excess currency where our local currency balances are increasing significantly. Among near-excess currency countries, large balances exist only in Poland; however, this is not a matter for concern since under existing agreements zlotys not used by the United States are being converted to dollars by the Poles for payment to us on an established schedule basis.

With respect to educational and cultural exchange programs, excess foreign currencies are used to the extent possible to pay for all program costs in the excess currency countries. Specifically, such currencies are used particularly in India, Egypt, and Pakistan to pay per diem and travel expenses for both foreign and American participants in the International Communication Agency exchange of persons program, to support American-sponsored academic research organizations and activities, and to assist American-sponsored schools. Given the small number of countries involved and the restrictions on the use of currencies for travel not originating or terminating in these countries, the present levels of expenditure are considered to be about optimum.

It should be noted that foreign currency-funded exchange programs involve some component of dollars costs for the U.S. phase of exchange. To increase foreign currency programs beyond the present annual level of about $1.6 million would divert available dollars from higher priority purposes.

We conclude that generally under existing arrangements, effective efficient use is being made of the United States Government's foreign currency holdings. Balance of payment benefitting interests, including regular programs of the Department of State and the International Communication Agency, are receiving first priority, special programs are making significant use of excess currencies to support additive pro-

grams beneficial to the United States but of lower priority than activities financed under regular appropriations, balances of excess currency are generally and gradually declining, and three countries were dropped from the near-excess list at the beginning of the current year: Sri Lanka, Syria, and Sudan. Appendix III presents our figures of the usage of U.S.-owned foreign currencies over fiscal years 1955 through 1977: $6,958.9 million for uses benefitting the U.S. balances of international payments, and $804.9 million for additive special foreign currency programs.

APPENDIX I

OBLIGATIONS PLANNED IN FISCAL YEAR 1979 FOR PAYMENT IN EXCESS CURRENCIES UNDER SPECIAL FOREIGN CURRENCY PROGRAM APPROPRIATIONS

[Expressed in thousands of U.S. dollar equivalents]

Agency and appropriation	Burmese kyats	Egyptian pounds	Guinean sylis	Indian rupees	Pakistan rupees	Total
RESEARCH ACTIVITIES						
Agriculture: Science and Education Administration, scientific activities overseas, SFCP–12X1404	100	3,250	100	1,000	1,600	[1] 6,350
Commerce: Special foreign currency program, 13X0160 (NBS and NOAA)	-------	430	----------	200	----------	630
Defense: Special foreign currency program 97X0800 (NAMRU–3)		11,612				11,662
Energy: International cooperation in nonnuclear technology, SFCP–89X0205		2,000				2,000
EPA: Scientific activities overseas, SFCP–68X0104		1,000	----------	1,000	500	2,500
HEW/Assistant Secretary for Health: Scientific activities overseas, SFCP–75X1100		11,500	----------	2,385	1,000	14,884
HEW/Human Development Services: Research and training activities overseas, SFCP–75X1638	30	1,270	45	900	755	3,000
Interior: Office of the Secretary, salaries and expenses, SFPC–14X0105 (NPS and FWS)		256	----------	392	202	850
NSF: Scientific activities, SFCP–49X0102	50	1,900	----------	1,200	900	4,050
Smithsonian Institution: Museum programs and related research, SFCP–33X0102	30	1,619	3	1,658	390	3,700
NONRESEARCH ACTIVITIES						
Agriculture: Foreign Agricultural Service, Salaries and expenses, SFCP–12X2901		458	----------	125	42	625
Commerce: Special foreign currency program, 13X0160 (Industry and Trade Administration		75				75
Defense: Special foreign currency program, 97X0800 (DIA)		450				450
HEW/Office of Education: Educational activities overseas, SFCP–75X0287		800	----------	1,100	100	2,000
Interior: Office of the Secretary, salaries and expenses, SFCP–14X0105 (library)		75	----------	75	----------	150
International Communication Agency, salaries and expenses, SFCP–67X0205	246	1,462	80	7,063	2,840	11,691
(Educational exchange program.)		(357)	----------	(733)	(510)	(1,600)
Labor: Departmental management, SFCP–16X0151		90				90
Library of Congress: Collection and distribution or library materials, 03X0144		737	----------	2,438	428	3,603
State: Administration of Foreign Affairs: Acquisition, operation and maintenance of buildings abroad, SFCP–19X0538	260	22,963	60	1,959	2,361	27,603
Grand total, special programs	716	61,947	288	21,494	11,118	95,863

[1] Currency not determined for 300.

APPENDIX II

ANALYSIS OF SELECTED BALANCES OF NONPURCHASED FOREIGN CURRENCIES, SEPT. 30, 1978

[In thousands of dollar equivalents]

Country (currency)	Available for U.S. use				Available for country use [3]			Advances of unfunded foreign currencies	Available cash balance
	Nonrestricted [1]		Restricted [2]	Total	Aid accounts	Other Government agency accounts	Total		
	Public Law 480	Other							
Excess currency: [4]									
Burma (kyat)	4,573	8,596		13,169	280		280		13,449
Egypt (pound)	151,434		14,508	165,942	17,074		17,074		187,016
Guinea (syli)	10,046	584		10,630	810		810		11,440
India (rupee)	25,613	[5] 778,093	12,091	815,798	3,998		3,998		819,796
Pakistan (rupee)	66,303	102,565	2,662	171,530	15,253		15,253		186,783
Total excess	257,969	889,838	29,262	1,177,069	37,415		37,415		1,214,484
Near-excess currency: [4]									
Morocco (dirham)	5,467			5,467	25	([6])	25		5,492
Poland (zloty)	158,714		1,480	160,194					160,194
Sri Lanka (rupee)	187	130		317					317
Sudan (pound)					910		910	—475	435
Syrian Arab Republic (pound)	441			441	5,391		5,391		5,832
Tunisia (dinar)	14,975			14,975	208	14	222		15,197
Yugoslavia (dinar)	799	3,699		4,498					4,498
Total near-excess	180,583	3,829	1,480	185,892	6,534	14	6,548	—475	191,965

[1] Nonrestricted currencies may be used for payment of official U.S. obligations in the countries concerned, for accommodation exchange for U.S. personnel, and for sale to American tourists and U.S. citizens in selected countries.

[2] Restricted by the terms of international agreements or by administrative determination to specific programs.

[3] Country-use currencies are U.S.-owned foreign currencies which are restricted to expenditure for loans and grants within the respective countries.

[4] Designated by OMB bulletin No. 78–4 dated Nov. 15, 1977, for fiscal years 1978 and 1979.

[5] Includes special dollar denominated account created pursuant to the Rupee Settlement Agreement convertible at the rate of $50,000,000 per year through 1984.

[6] Less than $500.

Note: Sri Lanka, Sudan and Syria were dropped from the list of near-excess currency countries effective Oct. 1, 1978.

Source: Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Government Financial Operations, Special Reporting Branch.

APPENDIX III

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS BENEFIT DERIVED FROM THE USE OF FOREIGN CURRENCY ACQUIRED WITHOUT PURCHASE WITH DOLLARS, FISCAL YEARS 1955–77

[In millions of dollars equivalent]

	1955–62	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	Totals
Foreign currency used under appropriations for U.S. programs [1]	2,022.5	287.0	321.8	341.2	327.3	476.8	437.4	405.9	379.8	357.8	5,357.5
Foreign currency used not requiring appropriations for U.S. programs	153.9	3.9	11.7	11.9	13.2	10.1	7.7	13.9	13.2	17.8	257.3
Total foreign currency used for U.S. programs	2,176.4	290.9	333.5	353.1	340.5	486.9	445.1	419.8	393.0	375.6	5,614.8
Less: Currency used under special foreign currency appropriations	67.7	45.6	29.2	41.4	42.4	53.4	49.2	33.8	44.6	44.4	451.7
Balance of payments benefit derived from foreign currency usage [2]	2,108.7	245.3	304.3	311.7	298.1	433.5	395.9	386.0	348.4	331.2	5,163.1

[1] Includes sales of foreign currency to U.S. personnel.

[2] This assumes that programs other than those authorized by special foreign currency appropriations would have been carried on at the same level had there been no U.S. foreign currency holdings.

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976 [3]	1977	Totals (1955–77)
Foreign currency used under appropriations for U.S. programs [1]	351.8	303.0	324.1	312.5	400.3	371.7	7,420.9
Foreign currency used not requiring appropriations for U.S. programs	22.3	16.2	18.1	4.9	17.5	6.6	342.9
Total foreign currency used for U.S. programs	374.1	319.2	342.2	317.4	417.8	378.3	7,763.8
Less: Currency used under special foreign currency appropriations	53.8	57.0	59.2	53.5	72.1	57.6	804.9
Balance of payments benefit derived from foreign currency usage [2]	320.3	262.2	283.0	263.9	345.7	320.7	6,958.9

[1] Includes sales of foreign currency to U.S. personnel.

[2] This assumes that programs other than those authorized by special foreign currency appropriations would have been carried on at the same level had there been no U.S. foreign currency holdings.

[3] Includes Transition Quarter.

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HOUSE REPORT, PAGE 11, (SEC. 101(a)(1))

COMPENSATION LEVELS OF PERSONS EMPLOYED BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

This report relates to those organizations which apply the "U.N. common system of salaries and allowances," namely: United Nations (including United Nations Development Program, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNEP, etc.), ILO, FAO, UNESCO, WHO, ICAO, UPU, ITU, WMO, IMCO, WIPO, GATT, IAEA. These organizations have staffs totalling over 35,000 persons, of whom about half are stationed in the seven countries where the organizations have their headquarters and the other half in over 150 countries and territories throughout the world.

The principal international body concerned with questions of salaries and benefits is the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC). This is a 15 member multi-national body whose members are appointed by the General Assembly in their personal capacity. These Commissioners are individuals of recognized competence who have had substantial executive responsibility in public administration, particularly in personnel management. The ICSC is responsible for making recommendations on:

(*a*) The broad principles for the determination of the conditions of service of staff of those organizations which apply the Common System;

(*b*) The scales of salaries and post adjustments for staff in the Professional and higher categories;

(*c*) Allowances and benefits of staff for approval by the General Assembly;

(*d*) Internal staff taxes.

Ersa H. Poston, a Commissioner of the United States Civil Service Commission, has been a member of the ICSC from January 1, 1978. Previously, Robert E. Hampton (Chairman, U.S. Civil Service Commission) served on the International Civil Service Commission.

The following comments regarding levels of remuneration relate only to the Professional and higher categories of staff, i.e., those who are internationally recruited and are subject to transfer to any duty station. (The remainder of the staff, the General Service category and other locally-recruited categories, are remunerated according to a different principle, that of comparability with "best prevailing conditions" in the locality. In this connection, the ICSC is engaged in a program of surveys in the headquarters duty stations with a view to making recommendations regarding the appropriate salary scales for the staff of these categories: the two surveys so far completed, in Geneva and in Paris, have resulted in recommendations for salary reductions averaging 17 percent in Geneva and 5 percent in Paris.)

1. THE PRINCIPLE

The principle governing the determination of the level of remuneration of the staff of the Professional and higher categories, known as the "Noblemaire principle" was taken over from the League of Nations and the pre-war International Labor Organization and has been in force since the creation of the United Nations. It holds that:

(*a*) The international organizations, in order to have the impartial and loyal staffs for which their charters call, must remunerate all their staff equally for equal work, irrespective of differences in pay levels in the countries from which the staff members are drawn; a secretariat in which one staff member coming from a wealthy country was earning twice as much as his colleague performing the same duties but who came from a poor country could never be a homogeneous international secretariat but at best a mere collection of national officials.

(*b*) The organizations must be able to recruit and retain staff members from any of their Member States.

(*c*) Therefore, the single uniform level of pay must be sufficient to attract staff including those from the Member State(s) where pay levels are highest. In practical terms this has consistently been interpreted to mean that the pay level must be based upon that of the national civil service of the Member State which is the best-paying (the decision to base the comparison upon the public service rather than the private sector was made at a time when a majority of the staffs of the international organizations were drawn from the national civil service—which is no longer the case—and having regard to a similarity of function between the international and national civil services).

The inconvenient consequence of this policy has always been recognized, namely that it means that staff from most countries other than the highest paying will be over-compensated by their own national standards. Nevertheless, countless review bodies over the years and most recently the International Civil Service Commission itself in 1976 have been forced to conclude that there is no workable alternative to this principle which would be compatible with the concept of a loyal, impartial and efficient international civil service.

2. THE CHOICE OF THE COMPARATOR COUNTRY

From 1945 until quite recently it was taken for granted that the United States Civil Service was the highest-paying in the world. The application of the Noblemaire principle requires however that the choice of the comparator be verified from time to time and that, if the civil service of another country is found to be paying markedly higher salaries over a period of time than the United States that it be taken as the comparator. The ICSC in 1975 found no convincing evidence which would have justified a change at that time; salaries of the two civil services then investigated, those of Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany, were found to be at certain grade levels and in certain circumstances very close to those of the United States. A new inquiry into this question is planned for 1980; it will require that grade equivalencies be established between the different civil serv-

ices being surveyed and that levels of remuneration be then compared between countries with possibly widely varying systems of taxation, social security, etc. Meanwhile, the United Nations reports that recruitment experience indicates that salaries based on those of the United States Civil Service no longer appear as attractive to recruits from a number of other Member States as they did before 1970.

In any case, until a decision is taken to the contrary, the United States Civil Service continues to be the comparator by reference to which the salaries of the staff of the Professional category of the international civil service are established.

3. THE COMPARISON OF REMUNERATION

The first step is to define the grades in the two services which are to be taken as equivalent for purposes of salary comparison. Several matching points had been established in the 1950's but were questioned by the United Nations' 1970-1972 Special Committee for the Review of the United Nations Salary System. In 1975-1976 the ICSC made a rapid study as a result of which revised matching points at three "core" grades of the Professional category were adopted. At the request of the General Assembly the ICSC has in 1978 completed a much more thorough study based on examination of the job content of a larger number of posts in the United States Civil Service and in the U.N. organizations. As a result the ICSC has recommended to the General Assembly the U.N. grading equivalents for U.S. grades from GS–9 to GS–16. (Because the United States and other Member States believed that grading equivalencies are needed also for comparing the most senior U.N. levels, the ICSC has been requested to study the matter and report its findings to the 34th UNGA.)

The pay comparison has traditionally been made in terms of net earnings (net rather than gross, because the U.N. scale of internal staff taxes—which determines the difference between gross and net salary, while similar to the scale of U.S. taxation, is not identical and is not applicable to post adjustment; the significant figure to the U.N. staff member is the total net takehome pay, which is compared to the net, after-tax pay of the U.S. civil servant). It has been recognized for some time that a comparison in terms of net cash remuneration alone is insufficient and that benefits such as pension, medical insurance and fringe benefits should be taken into account, in a comparison of "total compensation." However, the methodology for comparative evaluation of total compensation is notoriously difficult to establish; two years of studies by ICSC have not produced a satisfactory methodology. However, similar studies which the United States Civil Service Commission has been carrying on for ten years are expected to reach a conclusion in 1979 and ICSC hopes that the methodology which will then emerge—one intended for comparison of the public service with the private sector in the U.S.A.—will be capable of adaptation to comparison between a national public service and an international public service. Any need to modify U.N. benefits can be determined once a reliable methodology is developed.

Meanwhile, however, comparison continues to be made in terms of net remuneration. The earnings of a married official without children

are taken on both sides. A ratio between United Nations earnings and United States earnings at each of the matching grades is established; the overall ratio is established as the average of the ratios at the different grades, weighted by the numbers of U.N. staff in them.

The comparison is made between earnings of a United States civil servant in Washington, D.C. (using for tax deductions the average of taxes of Maryland, Virginia and D.C.) and of a United Nations official in New York (with the level of post adjustment payable in New York, at present one class higher than in Washington). The rationale for this, propounded by the ICSC and endorsed by the General Assembly, was that the comparison should be between the headquarters of the national civil service and the United Nations, as it would clearly be if any country other than the United States was the comparator. For example, if the comparator country was the Federal Republic of Germany, the comparison would evidently be between Bonn and New York; and, just as in that case, any difference in cost of living between the two cities would have to be taken into account in comparing the real value of earnings, so it is in the comparison between U.S.-Washington and U.N.-New York. At present, this cost of living differential represents about 8 percent in favor of New York.

Finally, the average ratio for all grades, adjusted for cost of living difference is averaged over a 12-month period from 1 October to 30 September. This is to smooth out the "seasonal" fluctuations which would otherwise appear due to the different dates at which remuneration on either side is adjusted. For example, on 1 October 1978 the ratio would have been 5 percent less than it was on 30 September, because of the increase in U.S. salaries which became effective on that date, with no corresponding increase at the same time on the U.N. side. It is to avoid the misleading impression created by such fluctuations that the ratio is "read" over a 12-month period.

4. THE RESULTS OF THE COMPARISON

The existence of a margin has been justified by the ICSC, as by previous review bodies, by the differences between the two services, e.g., the shorter average career in the international civil service and, above all, its expatriate character (approximately 90 percent of the staff of the Professional and higher categories are serving outside their home countries). While it is true that the salary which a United States civil servant receives for working at home would be perceived as adequate even for expatriate service by many staff members from countries with lower pay levels, it would certainly not be seen as fair by those from other countries where domestic pay levels are only slightly, if at all, below those of the United States. Still less would it be deemed fair by an American who was recruited by the United Nations system to serve outside of the United States; he would obviously expect more than what he could get for working at home for his own Government and, in fact, would compare with what he would get if sent abroad by his own Government.

It is in recognition of these factors that the United States position has been that a margin of no more than 15 percent in favor of United Nations (expatriate) remuneration over the (domestic) remuneration of the comparator civil service is acceptable. (The possibility of com-

pensating for the extra expenses of expatriation by a separate expatriation allowance has been explored several times but discarded as unduly cumbersome given that the allowance would, in principle, be payable to 90 percent of the staff.) The margin of United Nations remuneration over that of the United States is projected for 1978–1979 at 111 at the grade levels for which the ICSC has established equivalencies.

5. THE POST ADJUSTMENT SYSTEM

The logical corollary of the principle that U.N. staff should be remunerated equally for equal work is that they should also be remunerated equally wherever they are posted, in other words, that their remuneration should provide them with equivalent purchasing power in local currency in any of the 150 or more countries where they are stationed. It should be noted that the Washington post adjustment is included in the total new take-home pay of the U.N. staff member for purposes of comparison with the new after-tax pay of the U.S. civil servant.

6. OTHER BENEFITS

Other benefits provided to United Nations staff are as follows:

(*a*) The *pension scheme*, to which the staff member contributes 7 percent of pensionable remuneration and the organization 14 percent.

A comparative study of the benefits commissioned by the ICSC this year showed the U.N. pension benefits expressed as a percentage of net remuneration were approximately equal to those of the U.S. Civil Service. The ICSC is undertaking in 1979 a comprehensive examination of the level of pensionable remuneration, the way in which it is established and adjusted and its functions, in view of difficulties which have arisen as a result of currency instability and the marked depreciation of the United States dollar against the Swiss franc in particular. This study will be made in conjunction with the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Board.

(*b*) *Children's allowance*, conceptually equivalent to the tax benefit to which a United States civil servant is entitled on account of his dependent child. The present amount, $450 per child, is substantially lower than the present level of corresponding tax benefit.

(*c*) *Medical and dental insurance* for which staff member shares cost with organization.

(*d*) *Ad hoc entitlements* specifically tied to expatriate status:

Home leave (travel paid once every two years, but leave time taken from standard annual leave entitlement);

Education grant to reimburse part of the additional expenses incurred by the expatriate parent for the schooling of his or her children;

Moving expenses (or an assignment allowance in lieu thereof) and installation grant on appointment on re-assignment.

Repatriation grant to assist with expenses of relocation on separation.

The rates of these entitlements are similar to those granted by the United States Government in similar circumstances.

U.S. POSITION

The United States believes that so long as the U.S. Civil Service remains the comparator civil service, U.N. salaries for all grade levels should compare with those paid to U.S. officials holding positions of comparable importance and responsibility. The margin of difference between salaries of similar U.N./U.S. government officials should not exceed 15 percent in favor of the U.N. This difference represents the so-called expatriation factor intended to cover the extra financial expenses U.N. staff incur by virtue of living outside their own country.

The United States believes that comparison of remuneration should be based on total compensation, i.e., salary plus annualized value of all benefits, including working hours, leave, allowances, health and life insurance, and pensions.

The United States believes that if another country pays its government officials more than the United States pays to its officials, the General Assembly should consider selecting that country's civil service to be the comparator civil service. Until this happens, U.N. salaries for all grade levels should be kept in reasonable balance with U.S. Government salaries.

The United States is convinced that, although low and middle grade salaries of the U.N. and United States are in reasonable balance, salaries for senior U.N. officials too greatly exceed those paid to individuals holding comparable positions in the U.S. Government. For this reason the United States has insisted that the ICSC establish grading equivalencies at these higher levels. When these data become available (later in 1979) the United States Delegation will have a basis for persuading other member States to establish acceptable salary levels.

U.S. IMPACT

The remuneration of United Nations professional staff is established and set by the U.N. General Assembly's decision in which all members including the United States participate. Obviously, 150 members could not each set individual limitations on salaries and benefits. Moreover, once these salaries and benefits become expenses of the organization they are obligations borne by the Member States as apportioned by the General Assembly (Article 17 of the U.N. Charter). As a signatory to the Charter, the United States has obligated itself to pay its assessed share of the U.N. budget.

Although individual members cannot successfully set limits on salaries and benefits or determine the benefit/salary mix, there is much that an alert and well-informed individual delegation can accomplish. For example, U.S. leadership is at least partly responsible for the United Nations not having increased the basic salary level for professional employees since 1975. More importantly, the United States strongly supported the formation of the International Civil Service Commission which came into being in 1975. At that time U.N. salary levels exceeded U.S. levels by from 31 to 54 percent at the agreed matching points. As noted above the 1978–79 ratio is expected to be 11 percent.

Although U.S. policy on U.N. salary levels has, on the whole, been successful, the United States believes that salaries for senior level U.N. officials are still too high. Our Delegation to the 33rd U.N. General Assembly succeeded in putting this problem to the ICSC in order to establish the necessary data base for its resolution.

REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FUNDING OF THE INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION

In the conference committee report on the fiscal year 1979 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, the Secretary of State was requested to submit, no later than January 20, 1979, a report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The conference committee requested the Department's recommendations on ways to improve budgetary procedures governing U.S. participation in the activities of the International Joint Commission (IJC). The committee requested also that the Department's report take into account the recommendations of the General Accounting Office contained in its report on "How the United States Can and Should Improve Its Funding of International Joint Commission Activities," dated February 8, 1978.

In its report the GAO recommended:

"* * * that the Secretary of State with the concurrence of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget:

"1. Establish a separate fund to help insure availability of funds to promptly begin needed studies that had not been requested at the time the budget was prepared.

"2. Include direct funding of Commission board activities in the Department of State budget submission to the Congress. In this regard other agency budgets should no longer include separate funds for Commission studies."

In addition, the GAO stated that "in light of increasing use of the Commission by the Government we believe that a reassessment of the staffing needs of the U.S. Secretariat is needed to insure that the Secretariat can effectively perform its function."

With regard to the first GAO recommendation, a reference referral startup fund of $600,000 is being requested by the Department to enable the United States and Canada promptly to initiate studies needed to evaluate transboundary environmental impacts of construction projects along the common frontier. These construction projects often possess significant potential for environmental degradation in the United States-Canadian border area. Prompt initiation of these studies means that the IJC would be able to complete them in a more expeditious and timely manner.

This separate fund in the IJC's budget would be used solely for reference startup costs. It would only be available until other Government agencies were able to include the ongoing costs of the references in their budgets. Currently, if the IJC or other U.S. agencies are requested to conduct studies on references, the studies usually cannot

get underway until the IJC or other U.S. agencies are able to include the funding for such studies in their budgets. Due to the budget process as much as 18 months can be required until funds become available. A table of estimated budget obligations of U.S. Government agencies for IJC-related activities is attached.

Among the difficulties faced by the Commission and other U.S. Government agencies due to delays as long as 18 months are situations where the U.S. portion of a study, which is often the basic item needed to resolve a problem, cannot begin when the agreement is signed. The Canadian Government already has a funding mechanism to provide for immediate startup costs, so the problem is peculiar only to the U.S. side. Delays result in higher costs to resolve problems, less timely results, and the possibility that because of delay the problem might not be solved at all. In addition, other U.S. agencies must in many cases disrupt existing domestic programs in order to divert funds to fulfill U.S. commitments to IJC-related activities.

The following are examples of project delays:

(1) Champlain/Richelieu project of 1973 was delayed 4 months, and the Department of the Interior's Fish and Wildlife Service ultimately had to reprogram funds to cover the initial costs of the study.

(2) The diversion consumptive use project and the Lake Erie regulation project were delayed over a year due to lack of funding. The Army's Corps of Engineers, which was responsible for the two studies, was only able to achieve 20 percent of the first year's funding needs. The Environmental Protection Agency has also stated that it has experienced difficulties obtaining funds in a timely manner to perform IJC studies as a result of the budget process.

With regard to the second GAO recommendation, that direct funding of IJC board activities be included in the Department's budget, the Department believes that the disadvantages of centralization would greatly outweigh the advantages. Centralized funding would require a significant increase in the IJC's administrative staff to handle the additional workload. On the other hand, the other U.S. agencies' administrative staffs would not decrease, as they would continue to require substantial support staffs to carry out IJC projects.

The Environmental Protection Agency and the Army Corps of Engineers, which together account for the 78 percent of funding of IJC-related projects, believe that centralization of IJC funding would result in duplication, wasted resources, and decreased efficiency. IJC activities are often closely related to the domestic functions of these agencies.

Regarding the GAO comments on the staffing of the U.S. IJC Secretariat, after consultation with the IJC the Department included four new positions in its fiscal year 1979 budget submission. These positions have been authorized to the IJC and recruiting has now commenced. We believe these additional personnel resources will alleviate the IJC's staffing problems, and will continue to monitor the situation.

In addition to the views of the Department as noted above, there partment of External Affairs, is now reviewing the functions and staffing of the IJC's regional office in Windsor, Ontario. This review is being undertaken under provisions of the recently signed Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements of 1978. We expect that this review will result in measures to improve the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of that office.

In addition to the views of the Department as noted above, there is attached a breakdown of estimated U.S. Government obligations for activities of the IJC.

Attachment.

As stated.

U.S. GOVERNMENT OBLIGATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION ACTIVITIES BY AGENCY

[In thousands of dollars]

Agency	Estimate, fiscal year 1978	Estimate, fiscal year 1979	Estimate, fiscal year 1980
International Joint Commission (State)	1,263	1,629	2,283
Environmental Protection Agency	1,183	1,181	1,076
Department of the Army	694	1,086	887
Department of the Interior:			
U.S. Geological Survey	388	431	396
Bureau of Reclamation	20	22	18
Fish and Wildlife Service	10	10	10
Department of Agriculture	83	35	15
Department of Transportation	30	30	30
Department of Commerce	5	5	5
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission	5	5	4
Total	3,685	4,449	4,739

DETAILING OF STATE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL

Section 118 of Public Law 95–426, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, altered the conditions under which the Department can allow its personnel to serve on details in other Executive Agencies.

The accompanying Conference Report (House Report 95–1535) requires the Department to report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs details in excess of 90 days which are non-reimburseable and not made pursuant to an interagency exchange agreement.

There were two such details in calendar year 1978: one to the office of the Special Trade Representative and the other to the Department of Labor.

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CONDUCT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

Administration policy with respect to the purpose and meaning of diplomatic relations is in accord with the finding of Congress: that establishment and maintenance of relations do not involve approval or disapproval of governments or policies, but enable the United States to comunicate with other governments directly. Such communication is not an end in itself but serves to promote important national interests and other objectives, and helps to protect the rights of American citizens.

The United States currently maintains relations with more than 130 governments of states; it does not have normal diplomatic relations with about 30 countries and political entities for a variety of reasons stated below. President Carter has expressed the desire that the United States work toward establishment and maintenance of normal diplomatic relations with the governments of all states. Fully aware of the difficulties involved, the Department is taking steps to implement the President's objective.

In response to the request of the Committee of Conference of Public Law 95–426, there follows a list of countries and political entities with which the United States does not maintain normal diplomatic relations and information concerning the absence of such relations.

ALBANIA

The United States and the People's Socialist Republic of Albania do not maintain diplomatic relations because of the Albanian Government's refusal to establish such relations.

The United States severed relations with Albania in June 1939, when Italy took over the conduct of Albanian foreign affairs after Italian Armies had invaded Albania. An informal U.S. mission went to Albania in 1945 after the cessation of hostilities in the Balkans to study the possibility of establishing relations with the new Albanian Government. However, the Albanian Government refused to recognize the validity of pre-World War II treaties with the United States and placed the U.S. mission under increasing harassment. The mission was withdrawn in November 1946. Since then, the Albanian media and Government and party officials have regularly denounced the United States, attacking its leaders and policies.

Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush on April 4, 1973, stated publicly that if and when Albania wished to resume diplomatic relations with the United States, it "... will find us prepared to respond." The Albanian Government subsequently publicly rejected this offer and since then has continued propaganda attacks against the United States.

Andorra

The foreign relations of the Principality of Andorra are conducted by its two co-Princes, the President of France and the Bishop of Seo de Urgel in Spain. This arrangement stems from the 13th century. Although the United States and Andorra have not exchanged ambassadors, U.S. interests in Andorra are represented by the U.S. Consul General in Barcelona, who is also accredited to the co-Princes and visits Andorra periodically.

Angola

The United States has not extended diplomatic recognition to the Government in Luanda since Angola became independent in 1975. The continuing large Cuban military presence in Angola and the lack of progress toward reconciliation between the Luanda Government and opposition groups are elements in our decision not to establish relations.

In view of Angola's importance in South Central Africa, the United States has held fruitful consultations with the government in recent months on the issues of reconciliation between Angola and Zaire and a peaceful settlement with that government, and to working with it in more normal ways on matters of mutual interest, with a view to the eventual establishment of diplomatic relations when conditions permit.

Baltic States—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania

The United States does not maintain fully normal diplomatic relations with the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.

The United States has never recognized the Soviet Union's forcible incorporation of the three states in 1940. The United States continues to recognize and accredit diplomatic representatives of the three last free governments. These representatives are Charges d'Affaires for Latvia and Lithuania at Washington, and a Consul General in Charge of Legation for Estonia at New York.

Bhutan

In the India-Bhutan Treaty of Friendship of August 8, 1949, the Government of Bhutan agreed to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its international relations. No countries other than India maintain diplomatic missions in Bhutan. Events in Bhutan are followed by the United States Embassy in New Delhi, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations is also in contact with the Bhutanese Mission on U.N. Affairs.

Comoros

The U.S. Charge d'Affaires assigned to the Malagasy Republic is also accredited to the Comoros Islands. The absence of relations at the ambassadorial level results from conditions prevailing in the Malagasy Republic (see entry for that country below).

Cuba

Diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba were broken on January 3, 1961, because of the atmosphere of intense hostility between the two countries and because of conditions arbitrarily imposed by the Cuban Government which made the continued operation of the U.S. Embassy extremely difficult.

In 1962, the Organization of American States imposed multilateral sanctions against Cuba which required all member states to suspend diplomatic and trade relations with that country. In 1975, those sanctions were lifted; since then, it has been a matter for the decision of each member government as to whether or not to reestablish those relations.

In accordance with the administration's policy concerning the maintenance of open communications with all governments, the United States and Cuban Governments inaugurated Interests Sections in one another's capitals on September 1, 1977. Thus, the two Governments now have direct channels through which they can transact their business and communicate with one another. However, the reestablishment of full diplomatic relations awaits the solution of some major outstanding problems, such as compensation for expropriated U.S. properties.

Djibouti

The United States is currently represented in Djibouti by a resident Charge d'Affaires. An Ambassador has not been assigned to this small African nation which recently became independent.

Equatorial Guinea

The United States suspended diplomatic relations with Equatorial Guinea in 1976 after the American Ambassador resident in Cameroon had been declared persona non grata by the Government at the conclusion of a routine visit to the country. U.S. interests in Equatorial Guinea are marginal and trade is virtually nil. Reports from Embassy sources and private nongovernmental organizations such as Amnesty International and the Anti-Slavery Society indicate massive and ongoing violations of basic human rights including torture, arbitrary arrest, and execution of perceived political dissidents.

Iraq

Iraq broke diplomatic relations with the United States during the Arab-Israeli war of June 1967. The United States has maintained an Interests Section in Baghdad since 1972. In 1977, the United States indicated its desire to establish a more normal relationship on an unconditional basis. This offer remains valid, although Iraq has shown no indication that it is ready to pursue it at this time.

Kampuchea

The Government of the United States does not maintain diplomatic relations with the Government of Democratic Kampuchea (formerly

Cambodia). This is due to the serious and continuing abuse of human rights of the Kampuchean people.

North Korea

The United States has no diplomatic representation in Pyongyang, nor does North Korea have an accredited representative to the United States. The question of U.S. diplomatic recognition of North Korea is complicated by the continuing division of the Korean peninsula and the U.S. participation in armistice arrangement which halted the Korean war. In efforts to reduce tensions in the area and bring about more stable conditions for resolution of serious outstanding issues on the Korean peninsula, the United States has proposed that both Korean Governments be admitted to the United Nations and that the major powers recognize both Korean administrations without prejudice to eventual reunification. This has not been satisfactory to North Korea or its principal allies, however, and North Korea continues to insist that it is the only legitimate Government on the peninsula. The U.S. Government is prepared to deal directly with North Korea but only with the full and equal participation of the Republic of Korea.

Laos

The United States has maintained relations with the current Government of Laos since its establishment on December 2, 1975, as the successor Government to the Lao Provisional Government of National Union. However, both Governments have maintained relations at the level of Charges d'Affaires as chiefs of small missions. This relationship reflects the persistence of outstanding issues in our relations, such as unaccounted-for-Americans missing in action in Laos and Lao Government insistence on the U.S. Government's obligation to provide assistance.

Libya

The United States presently has an embassy in Tripoli but our relations with the Libyans have been on the Charge d'Affaires level since 1973. Libya's involvement with international terrorism, interference in the affairs of neighboring states, and extreme opposition to the Middle East peace process are policies harmful to U.S. interests in the region and worldwide.

The United States has been, and continues to be, willing to discuss these issues with Libya and to work toward a resolution of differences that could make the reestablishment of relations on the ambassadorial level possible.

Liechtenstein

The United States does not maintain diplomatic relations with Liechtenstein, a tiny country between Switzerland and Austria with a population of 25,000.

Through a series of treaties with Liechtenstein, Switzerland assumed responsibility for Liechtenstein's defense and routine foreign relations after World War I. Liechtenstein's only diplomatic mission abroad is at Bern, Switzerland. The Swiss Embassy in Washington is responsible for protection of Liechtenstein's interests in the United

States. The U.S. Consul General at Zurich, Switzerland, is also accredited to Vaduz, the capital of Liechtenstein.

Malagasy Republic

U.S. diplomatic representation in the Malgasy Republic has been maintained at the level of Charge d'Affaires since 1976 when conditions on the island forced the departure of the U.S. Ambassador. The restoration of full diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level depends on the creation of an atmosphere in which productive relations can take place.

Monaco

Although the United States does not exchange ambassadors with the Principality of Monaco, relations between the two countries have traditionally been cordial. Under a 1918 treaty, Monaco's independence and the defense of its territory are assured by France, while its political, military, and economic interests are alined with French policy. Monaco's foreign relations are closely coordinated with those of the French Government.

Mongolia

The United States has never recognized or had diplomatic relations with the Mongolian People's Republic. The United States proposed to the Mongols several years ago to enter into negotiations to establish diplomatic relations and has made it clear that the offer remains open. Mongolia welcomes this approach and its diplomats are cordial with U.S. diplomats, but no substantive response to the U.S. proposal has been received. Mongolia's reluctance presumably stems from deference to the views of its close allies.

Nauru

Nauru, a tiny Pacific island nation, and the United States have not exchanged diplomatic representatives. As a general rule, the United States does not accredit representatives to countries which do not accredit representatives to the United States. However, the U.S. Embassy in Canberra, Australia, has responsibility for relations with Nauru, and Nauru has an honorary consul general in San Francisco.

Southern Rhodesia

The United States does not recognize Rhodesia as a sovereign, legal entity, and therefore does not maintain diplomatic relations with Rhodesia. The United States continues to regard Great Britain as the constitutional sovereign of what legally remains the colony of Southern Rhodesia. Upon Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence in November 1965, the British Government withheld a grant of independence because of the ruling regime's policy of perpetuating white minority rule by effectively preventing the vast majority of its citizens from having a voice in the political process. Since that time, no nation has recognized the present Rhodesian regime. In 1966 and 1968, the United States supported United Nations Security Council resolutions which placed economic sanctions on Rhodesia and called for an end to minority rule.

Although the internal arrangement agreed to by Rhodesian leader Ian Smith and three black Rhodesian nationalists in March 1978 contain some positive features, they have not satisfied the criteria established by either the British Government or the United Nations for the granting of legal independence. Until a government has been installed in the territory through free and fair elections under impartial international supervision, in which all political groups are allowed to participate equitably, recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations would be contrary to U.S. obligations under international law.

San Marino

San Marino, a tiny republic surrounded by Italy, depends on Italy to represent its interests at the international level. As a result, neither the United States nor other nations exchange ambassadors with San Marino. Nevertheless, the United States does recognize its legally independent status and maintains formal diplomatic contacts through the U.S. consulate in Florence, Italy, for the purpose of conducting infrequent bilateral business.

Tonga

Tonga is not diplomatically represented in the United States at the present time but plans to accredit its representative to the United Kingdom to the United States. The U.S. Ambassador in New Zealand is also accredited to Tonga.

Tuvalu

Tuvalu recently became independent and the question of representation has not yet been addressed. Currently, the U.S. Embassy in Fiji has responsibility for relations with Tuvalu.

Uganda

The United States closed its Embassy in Kampala, Uganda, in late 1973 and withdrew all official American personnel. This action was taken because of generally difficult operating conditions and harassment by Ugandan authorities. Communications with Ugandan Government continue to be maintained through its Embassy in Washington on behalf of residual American interests in Uganda, principally a U.S. missionary presence.

One essential prerequisite for a normalization of United States-Uganda relations would be a fundamental improvement in the human rights conditions in Uganda.

The Vatican

The absence of all diplomatic relations between the United States and the Vatican dates from the termination of the Pope's status as head of the Papal States in 1870, when those territories were forcibly integrated into the new nation of Italy. Although Italy and more than 70 other nations accept the Vatican as a sovereign state and maintain formal diplomatic relations with it, the United States has viewed the question of Vatican sovereignty with some ambivalence. Territorial

considerations aside, there has been consideration that diplomatic relations with the Vatican might imply a possible unconstitutional church-state relationship. However, in view of the Vatican's important international political role, the United States has sought to maintain a productive relationship with it through an unofficial, personal representative of the President of the United States. The representative and his staff are separate from the American Embassy to Italy, which the Vatican does not recognize for protocolary or substantive purposes.

Vietnam

The United States does not maintain diplomatic relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Formerly the United States had relations with the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) which ceased to exist in 1975. Negotiations between the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on establishing relations began in May 1977. These negotiations have not yet succeeded in establishing a basis for diplomatic relations.

South Yemen

The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen) broke diplomatic relations with the United States in 1969. The Government of the PDRY has been made aware in the past that the United States would be receptive to improving relations and of the administration's desire to normalize relations with all countries of the world.

In June 1978 a scheduled U.S. mission to Aden to discuss the substantial policy differences impacting on the prospects for improving relations was postponed when the PDRY apparently was implicated in the assassination of the President of the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen). Subsequently a number of Arab league members, including all the other states of the Arabian Peninsula, met to unanimously condemn the PDRY's involvement and to "freeze" relations with the PDRY.

APPENDIX A

TITLE V—SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

FINDINGS

SEC. 501. The Congress finds that— 22 USC 2656b.

(1) the consequences of modern scientific and technological advances are of such major significance in United States foreign policy that understanding and appropriate knowledge of modern science and technology by officers and employees of the United States Government are essential in the conduct of modern diplomacy;

(2) many problems and opportunities for development in modern diplomacy lie in scientific and technological fields;

(3) in the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of the technological aspects of United States foreign policy, the United States Government should seek out and consult with both public and private industrial, academic, and research institutions concerned with modern technology; and

(4) the effective use of science and technology in international relations for the mutual benefit of all countries requires the development and use of the skills and methods of long-range planning.

DECLARATION OF POLICY

SEC. 502. In order to maximize the benefits and to minimize the adverse consequences of science and technology in the conduct of foreign policy, the Congress declares the following to be the policy of the United States: 22 USC 2656a.

(1) Technological opportunities, impacts, changes, and threats should be anticipated and assessed, and appropriate measures should be implemented to influence such technological developments in ways beneficial to the United States and other countries.

(2) The mutually beneficial applications of technology in bilateral and multilateral agreements and activities involving the United States and foreign countries or international organizations should be recognized and supported as an important element of United States foreign policy.

(3) The United States Government should implement appropriate measures to insure that individuals are trained in the use of science and technology as an instrument in international relations and that officers and employees of the United States Government engaged in formal and informal exchanges of scientific and technical information, personnel, and hardware are knowledgeable in international affairs.

(4) In recognition of the environmental and technological factors that change relations among countries and in recognition of the growing interdependence between the domestic and foreign policies and programs of the United States, United States foreign policy should be continually reviewed by the executive and legislative branches of the Government to insure appropriate and timely application of science and technology to the conduct of United States foreign policy.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PRESIDENT

Consultation.
22 USC 2656c.

SEC. 503. (a) The President, in consultation with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy and other officials whom the President considers appropriate, shall—

(1) notwithstanding any other provision of law, insure that the Secretary of State is informed and consulted before any agency of the United States Government takes any major action, primarily involving science or technology, with respect to any foreign government or international organization;

(2) identify and evaluate elements of major domestic science and technology programs and activities of the United States Government with significant international implications;

(3) identify and evaluate international scientific or technological developments with significant implications for domestic programs and activities of the United States Government; and

(4) assess and initiate appropriate international scientific and technological activities which are based upon domestic scientific and technological activities of the United States Government and which are beneficial to the United States and foreign countries.

Presidential report, transmittal to Congress.

(b) The President shall study and not later than January 31, 1980, and not later than January 31 of each year thereafter, shall transmit to the Congress a report containing recommendations with respect to—

(1) personnel requirements, and standards and training for service of officers and employees of the United States Government, with respect to assignments in any Federal agency which involve foreign relations and science or technology; and

(2) the continuation of existing bilateral and multilateral activities and agreements primarily involving science and technology, including (A) an analysis of the foreign policy implications and the scientific and technological benefits of such activities or agreements for the United States and other parties, (B) the adequacy of the funding for and administration of such activities and agreements, and (C) plans for future evaluation of such activities and agreements on a routine basis.

(c) Except as otherwise provided by law, nothing in this section shall be construed as requiring the public disclosure of sensitive information relating to intelligence sources or methods or to persons engaged in monitoring scientific or technological developments for intelligence purposes.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE

22 USC 2656d.

SEC. 504. (a) In order to implement the policy set forth in section 502 of this title, the Secretary of State (hereafter in this section referred to as the "Secretary") shall have primary responsibility for coordination and oversight with respect to all major science or science and technology agreements and activities between the United States and foreign countries, international organizations, or commissions of which the United States and one or more foreign countries are members.

Contracts and grants.

(b) The Secretary shall, to such extent or in such amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts, enter into long-term contracts, including contracts for the services of consultants, and shall make grants and take other appropriate measures in order to obtain studies, analyses, and recommendations from knowledgeable persons and organizations with respect to the application of science or technology to problems of foreign policy.

(c) The Secretary shall, to such extent or in such amounts as are provided in appropriation Acts, enter into short-term and long-term contracts, including contracts for the services of consultants, and shall make grants and take other appropriate measures in order to obtain assistance from knowledgeable persons and organizations in training officers and employees of the United States Government, at all levels of the Foreign Service and Civil Service—

(1) in the application of science and technology to problems of United States foreign policy and international relations generally; and

(2) in the skills of long-range planning and analysis with respect to the scientific and technological aspects of United States foreign policy.

(d) In obtaining assistance pursuant to subsection (c) in training personnel who are officers or employees of the Department of State, the Secretary may provide for detached service for graduate study at accredited colleges and universities.

Report to congressional committees.

(e) Not later than January 20, 1979, the Secretary shall transmit to the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives, and to the Committee on Appropriations and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, a report on the implementation of the responsibilities of the Secretary under this title. Such report shall include the following information: an assessment of the personnel required in order to carry out such responsibilities; existing and planned programs for research and analysis to support long-range planning for the application of science and technology to foreign policy; existing and planned programs for training officers and employees of the United States Government pursuant to subsection (c) of this section; and existing and planned programs to enter into long-term contracts with academic and other organizations for assistance in training and in obtaining studies analyses, and recommendations with respect to the application of science or technology to problems of foreign policy.

APPENDIX B

Participating Agencies

Agency for International Development.
Central Intelligence Agency.
Department of Agriculture.
Department of Commerce.
Department of Defense.
Department of Energy.
Department of Health, Education and Welfare.
Department of Housing and Urban Development.
Department of the Interior.
Department of Labor.
Department of State.
Department of Transportation.
Environmental Protection Agency.
Foundation for International Technological Cooperation Planning Office.
International Communications Agency.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
National Science Foundation.
Office of Management and Budget.
Office of Personnel Management.
Office of Science and Technology Policy.
Smithsonian Institution.
Veterans Administration.

APPENDIX C

Preliminary Survey of Selected Foreign Service Posts on Title V—Related Issues

As noted in the body of the report, the Department is planning to conduct a survey of the Foreign Service's workload and needs in the science and technology area. The results of that survey, which will be conducted over the next few months, will be drawn on in subsequent reports to the Congress. In order to incorporate in the present report the preliminary views of U.S. Embassies and Missions significantly involved in science and technology related issues the Department surveyed twenty-nine posts representing a mix of developed, developing and middle-tier countries with a broad geographic range. The personal views of the Ambassador and other senior State Department officials were sought on a series of questions, summarized along with responses below. While the results of this survey must be considered preliminary and subject to correction in light of information developed by the survey, it does provide an indication of how the workload and needs in the science and technology related areas are viewed by senior U.S. officials.

Posts were requested to provide "descriptive and impressionistic, not statistically supported or carefully researched responses" to a series of questions concerning such matters as long-range planning, distribution of workload among the principal issues dealt with, problems of coordination and oversight, and training needs.

Two general points which emerged from the responses are especially noteworthy:

Science and technology related issues generally received top-level attention and are considered an important part of overall relations with foreign governments and international organizations; and

There is a science and technology content in many facets of our foreign relations, for example, political economic, and cultural. Many elements at posts besides the science attache and his staff commonly are engaged in issues with science and technology comments.

Most of the twenty-nine posts were involved in from one to several issues with a significant science and technology content, such as energy, environment, oceans and fisheries, space, bilateral relations in science and technology, etc. There is a wide variety of post "profiles" of the types of issues which receive emphasis. This is understandable and desirable in view of the diversity of national situations with which posts deal. There is also a substantial spillover of issues. For example, many activities under the rubric of "energy" could also be considered as "technology transfer", "S&T cooperation", or "environment".

Fifteen of the posts indicated they carried out planning activities through the conduct of policy reviews, periodic reviews of bilateral agreements, planning reports, budget reviews and staff discussion.

Sixteen posts reported "special problems" in coordination and oversight. The most frequently mentioned problems were:

failure of agencies to keep posts adequately informed of visits and other activities; and

duplication of effort and other coordination problems attributable to the number and variety of agencies involved and the absence of sufficient coordination in Washington.

A large majority of posts stated that some training relating to science, technology and foreign policy would be helpful to post personnel.

The responses of this preliminary survey will be studied further in the light of information which will be obtained from the survey and will be drawn on as appropriate in the followup report to the Congress.

APPENDIX D

Illustrative List of Areas of Science and Technology Policy Having Foreign Policy Significance

a. Nuclear energy: technologies relevant to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons; nuclear power development, waste disposal and other related matters.

b. Non-nuclear energy: in energy conservation; alternative energy technologies and the search for additional fuel resources.

c. Oceans and the atmosphere: resources management, scientific research, marine pollution, Law of the Sea, climate and weather modification.

d. Environmental protection: transborder pollution, environmental assessment, protection of endangered species and the control and distribution of toxic and hazardous substances.

e. Health and nutrition: development assistance and biomedical research.

f. Population: sociological aspects, medical research relating to family planning and contraceptive technologies.

g. Agriculture and food technology: agricultural research, utilization of new food sources, and prevention of post-harvest food losses.

h. Space technology: satellites for communications, weather and surface feature monitoring as well as for scientific research.

APPENDIX E

Bilateral Technical Agreements Listed by Lead Agency

Many agency-level service or "housekeeping" agreements, though necessary for technical operations, are not included, and because of their special nature the Defense agreements are not listed.

(JC) = Joint Commission or Committee oversight

(SFC) = Special Foreign Currency program

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (USDA)

Egypt.—Under S&T Agreement (JC) (SFC) : Agriculture.
India.—Under Economic and S&T Subcommissions (JC) (SFC) : Agriculture and water resources research.
Israel.—Under Binational Science Foundation (Binational Board of Governors) : Agricultural R&D.
Under Binational Agricultural Research and Development Fund (in process of being established, with a binational Board of Governors) : Agricultural R&D.
Japan.—Under Natural Resources Agreement, for which the Agricultural Research Service coordinates non-marine activities (JC) : Development and utilization of natural resources.
Mexico.—Under S&T Agreement and Mixed Commission (JC) : Agricultural Research.
Pakistan.—Research services agreement (AID loan) : assistance with developing agricultural research capabilities.
Poland.—Under S&T Agreement (JC) (SFC) : Agricultural research.
Romania.—Under Joint Economic Commission (JC) : Agriculture.
Saudi Arabia.—Under Technical Cooperation Agreement (JC) (Saudi funds) : Broad assistance on water and agricultural development.
Spain.—Under Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, administered by State (State transfers funds to USDA) (JC) : Agricultural production, and research methodology and administration.
USSR.—Executive agency for government-to-government Agriculture Agreement (JC) : Agricultural research, economics research, exchange of information.
Yugoslavia.—Under S&T Agreement (JC) (SFC) : Agriculture and forestry.

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID)

Brazil.—Government-to-State low interest S&T block grant (Completed in FY 1977).
Egypt.—Agency-to-Government S&T grant.
Ghana.—Informal Agency-to-Government S&T cooperative agreement.
Indonesia.—Agency-to-Ministry S&T loan/grant.
Korea.—Government-to-Government S&T block grant (completed).
Tunisia.—Agency-to-Government S&T development grant.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE (DOC)

Brazil (NBS).—Chemical analysis; reference program; measurement services; building research; laboratory accreditation; metallurgy; fire technology; acoustics and noise; program management (AID Funds).
Egypt (NBS).—Under S&T Agreement: Standards; building information; building codes and standards (JC) (SFC).
France (NBS).—Computer science and technology; metrology; materials research; building technology.
(NOAA).—Oceanographic research and technology; man-in-the-sea; ocean instruments; manganese nodules; buoy technology; marine pollution; agriculture; coastal processes.

Iran (NOAA).—Oceanography (JC); Developing a national weather system (Iranian funds).
Israel (NBS).—Industrial applied science; Israel-U.S. Binational Industrial Research and Development Foundation (Foundation funds); "Hard" sciences; U.S.-Israel Binational Science Foundation (Foundation funds).
Japan (NOAA).—Under Natural Resources Agreement, for which NOAA coordinates marine activities (JC): Marine resources and related research.
Korea (NBS).—Technical assistance on design and construction of laboratories; procurement of equipment, instruments, staff recruitment (AID Funds).
USSR (MARAD).—Under Transportation Agreement; safety of life at sea; ice transiting; ports and cargo handling; ship equipment, crew handling and human factors; sea spectral analyses.
(NBS).—Metrology (in S&T agreement).
(NOAA).—Executive Agency for government-to-government Oceanography Agreement: Oceanographic research and technology (JC).

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE)

France.—Liquid metal-cooled fast breeder reactors (LMFBR), gas cooled reactors (GCR).
FRG.—Radioactive waste management, LMFBR, GCR.
Italy.—Geothermal R&D, assessment of geothermal resources.
Japan.—Geothermal, LMFBR.
Mexico.—Geothermal energy under S&T Agreement (JC).
Poland.—Under S&T Agreement: Coal liquefaction, magnetohydrodynamics, Executive Agency (JC) (SFC).
Saudi Arabia.—Solar Energy (JC).
UK.—LMFBR.
USSR.—Energy Agreement: Non-nuclear energy research in MHD, oil, gas, solar, coal, etc.; transmission, pollution, energy information and forecasting: Executive Agency (JC).

The United States currently has agreements for cooperation in the civil uses of atomic energy in the fields of research (1) and research and power (2) with the following countries: Argentina (2), Australia (2), Austria (2), Brazil (2), Canada (2), Republic of China (2), Finland (2), India (power only), Indonesia (1), Iran (1), Ireland (1), Italy (2), Korea (2), Norway (2), Philippines (2), Portugal (2), South Africa (2), Spain (2), Sweden (2), Switzerland (2), Thailand (2), Turkey (1), Venezuela (2), and Vietnam (1) (status under review, U.S. fuel withdrawn).

Agreements have also been concluded with the European Atomic Energy Community for a joint nuclear power program and with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the supply of materials and other purposes.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA)

Canada.—Great Lakes water quality.
Egypt.—Under S&T Agreement: Environmental hazards to humans (JC) (SFC).
FRG.—Environmental Affairs Agreement. Executive Agency; Solid and hazardous waste, air quality, toxic substances, environmental impact analysis, noise, environmental specimen bank.
India.—Under S&T Agreement: Environmental projects (JC) (SFC).
Iran.—Agency-to-Agency agreement under Joint Commission (JC) (Iran pays).
Japan.—Executive Agency; Environmental Agreement: Water, air, solid waste, toxic substances, epidemiology.
Mexico.—Under Memorandum of Understanding: Environmental programs and transboundary pollution problems.
Poland.—Under S&T Agreement: Wastewater treatment (JC) (SFC).
USSR.—Under Environmental Protection Agreement: Waste, air, oceans, seismology, urban environment, nature biology, administration; Executive Agency (JC).
Yugoslavia.—Under S&T Agreement: Environmental research (JC) (SFC).

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE (HEW)

Argentina (NIH).—Under agency-to-agency agreement, cooperation on primatology.

Belgium (FDA).—Under agency-to-agency agreement, consumer protection/regulation.
Canada (FDA).—Under agency-to-agency agreement, consumer protection/regulation.
Egypt (PHS & RSA).—Under Health Agreement, biomedical research, health services improvement, environmental health, drugs and biologicals, health manpower development and medical education (JC) (SFC).
France (PHS).—Under S&T Agreement, biomedical research and other cooperation in health sciences.
(FDA).—Under agency-to-agency agreement, consumer protection/regulation.
FRG (PHS).—Under Health Agreement, biomedical research and other health sciences.
Hungary (PHS).—Under S&T Agreement, biomedical research and exchanges.
India (PHS & RSA).—Under Joint Cooperation Commission, health and biomedical sciences, including rehabilitation (JC) (SFC).
Iran (PHS).—Under Joint Cooperation Commission, consultation in health field, including food and drug consumer protection (JC).
Iraq (NIH/NCI).—Under Agreement between NCI and GOI, testing of possible anticancer agents.
Italy (PHS).—Under Health Agreement, health cooperation including cancer, heart disease, drug abuse, biomedical communications and others.
Japan (NIH).—Under Joint Communique (1/13/65) and agreement with Department of State cooperation on major health problems of Asian countries.
(NIH/NEI).—Under agency-to-agency agreement, exchanges and other cooperation in vision research.
(NIH/NCI).—Under agency-to-agency agreement, exchanges and other cooperation in cancer research.
(FDA).—Under agency-to-agency agreement, consumer protection/regulation.
Korea (FDA).—Under agency-to-agency agreement, consumer protection/regulation.
Mexico (FDA).—Under agency-to-agency agreement, consumer protection/regulation.
(PHS).—Through US-Mexico Border Health Association, cooperation on border health problems.
Netherlands (FDA).—Under agency-to-agency agreement, consumer protection/regulation.
New Zealand (FDA).—Under agency-to-agency agreement, consumer protection/regulation.
Pakistan (PHS & RSA).—Under SFCP, cooperation on biomedical research, health statistics, and rehabilitation research (SFC).
Poland (PHS & RSA).—Under Health Agreement, cooperation in broad range of biomedical and health sciences (JC) (SFC).
Romania (PHS).—Under Education, Cultural and S&T Agreement, exchanges of health professions and other agreed collaboration.
Saudi Arabia (PHSE).—Under Joint Cooperation Commission, consultation in health sciences and health resources development (JC).
Sweden (FDA).—Under agency-to-agency agreement, consumer protection/regulation.
Tunisia (PHS).—Under SFCP, collaborative health research (SFC).
USSR (PHS).—Under Health Agreement, cooperation and professional exchanges in medical sciences and public health (JC).
Under Artificial Heart Agreement, artificial heart R&D (JC).
Yugoslavia (PHS).—Under S&T Agreement, collaborative research, principally in the biomedical sciences.
Canada.—National urban strategies; center city revitalization; housing finance; energy in urban planning; native housing.
France.—New Towns: Housing policies, urban development.
FRG.—Housing finance; housing management; housing for the elderly; quality of urban life.
Iran.—Under Joint Commission; Housing needs of Iran (JC).
Japan.—Housing and urban development; new towns.
Spain.—Under 1970 Friendship and Cooperation Agreement: Housing needs of Spain.
Sweden.—Construction: Land use planning and policies.
UK.—Housing management; new towns; housing subsidies.

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USSR.—Executive Agency; Housing and Other Construction Agreement (JC).
Urban Environment (in Environmental Protection Agreement).

DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR (INTERIOR)

Algeria (USGS).—Applications of remote sensing (Algeria pays).
Bolivia (USGS).—Mineral exploration and development techniques (Bolivian funds); Seismic risk study (NSF funds).
Brazil (USF&WS).—Wildlife conservation and management (JC).
Canada (BuMines).—Health and safety in uranium mining; aluminum recovery from non-bauxitic materials.
(Park Service).—U.S.-Canada Joint Commission on National Parks.
Egypt (USF&WS).—Conservation of threatened and endangered species (JC) (SFC).
(USGS).—Metallogenic and mineral resources data compilation (AID pays).
France (BuMines).—Mineral supply/demand; solid waste recycling; chlorine metallurgy.
FRG (USGS).—Mineral geology; energy; water resources; environmental and engineering geology; marine geology; coastal studies.
(BuMines).—Mineral data bank and mineral availability system; coal mining safety.
India (USF&WS).—Conservation of threatened and endangered species (JC).
Iran (USGS).—Seismic project (ARPA funds).
Japan (Park Service).—Parks and natural resources (in Environmental Cooperation Agreement).
(BLM).—Joint Resource Agreement.
Jordan (USGS).—Technical services and feasibility studies; mineral identification and assessment (AID pays).
Kenya (USGS).—National range and ranch development; water supply studies AID pays).
Malaysia (USGS).—Petroleum regulation and development techniques (Malaysia pays).
(BuRec).—Flood mitigation (Malaysia pays).
Mexico (USGS).—Techniques of geochemical exploration; hydrogeologic study (NSF funds); Subsidence and crustal research—Mexicali Valley (JC) (DOE funds).
(USF&WS).—Wildlife conservation and management (JC).
(Park Service).—National park management; coordinated planning and management of border areas.
Morocco (USGS).—Applications in remote sensing (AID pays).
New Zealand (USGS).—Groundwater simulators.
Nicaragua (BuRec).—Water resources development (Nicaragua pays).
Nigeria (BuRec).—Federal capital project (Nigeria pays).
Pakistan (USF&WS).—Conservation of threatened and endangered species.
Peru (USGS).—Geological study of a mining district; economic assessment; Prepare regional hazard evaluation for Bayovar and seismic map for a new city Peru funds).
Poland (BuMines).—Under S&T Agreement: Coal mining safety research (JC) (SFC).
USGS).—Under S&T Agreement: Geochemistry of coal and computerization of coal data; comparative research on characteristics of coal basins; research on base metal deposits (JC) (SFC).
Saudi Arabia (USGS).—Under Joint Commission: Mineral resources investigation; training and development of institutions (JC) (Saudi funds); Water resources advisory services (JC) (Saudi funds).
(OWRT).—Desalination research and training (JC) (Saudi funds).
(Park Service).—National Parks (JC) (Saudi funds).
(USF&WS).—Wildlife conservation and management (JC) (Saudi funds).
(BuRec).—Reclamation projects (JC) (Saudi funds).
Spain (Park Service).— Under Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation: Conservation of natural and cultural resources and reserves (JC).
(BuMines).—Solid waste utilization (JC).
Sweden (BuMines).—Rapid excavation and rock tunneling.
U.K. (BuMines).—Mine health and safety; coal mine productivity.
United Arab Emirates (BuRec).—Water resources development (UAR pays).
USSR (Park Service).—Parks and related reserves; historical preservation in urban environment (both in Environmental Protection Agreement).

(USF&WS).—Conservation of threatened and endangered flora and fauna; protection of ecosystems (both in Environmental Protection Agreement).
(USGS).—Field seismological investigations (in Environmental Protection Agreement).
(BLM).—Renegotiated and reclamation of mined and disturbed land; Northern ecosystems; and Rangeland and grassland ecosystems (in Environmental Protection Agreement).
Venezuela (USF&WS).—Parks and wildlife management.
Yemen (USGS).—Water and mineral survey of North Yemen (AID pays).
Yugoslavia (USGS).—Under S&T Agreement: Research on rare metal mineralization; Earthquake reconstruction and urban renewal; and Research on crustal structure in relation to earthquakes, instrusives, and metallogenic provinces (JC) (SFC).
Zaire (BuRec).—Extra-high-voltage D–C transmission line (Zaire pays).

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA)

Argentina.—LANDSAT ground station agreement.
Brazil.—LANDSAT ground station agreement.
Canada.—Communications technology satellite research; remote manipulator systems for the space shuttle; LANDSAT ground station agreement.
Chile.—LANDSAT ground station agreement.
Denmark.—Flight on third High Energy Astronomy Observatory (HEAO): space physics and astronomy.
France.—Flight on third High Energy Astronomy Observatory (HEAO): space physics and astronomy.
India.—LANDSAT ground station agreement.
Iran.—LANDSAT ground station agreement.
Italy.—LANDSAT ground station agreement.
USSR.—Under Space and Applications Agreement: meteorology; natural environment; near-earth space; moon and planets; space biology and medicine (JC) Executive Agency. Manned Flight Agreement.
Zaire.—LANDSAT ground station agreement.
European Space Agency.—Spacelab cooperative project.

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION (NSF)

Argentina.—Cooperative research; seminars; scientific visits; Executive Agency S&T Agreement.
Australia.—Visiting scientists; cooperative research; seminars; balloon-launching; Executive Agency S&T Agreement.
Brazil.—Materials science; astronomy; mathematics; tropical pathogens; nonconventional energy; chemistry; physics; botany; climatology (JC), Executive Agency S&T Agreement.
Bulgaria.—Agency-to-agency memorandum of Understanding under S&T agreement; basic and applied sciences.
ROC—S&T research; seminars; visiting scientists; Executive Agency S&T Agreement.
Egypt.—Basic and applied sciences (JC) (SFC): Under S&T Agreement.
France.—All sciences (research; seminars; and exchange of post-doctoral fellows).
Hungary.—Cooperative research; visiting scientists, Executive Agency.
India.—Basic and applied sciences (JC) (SFC); Exchange of senior scientists and engineers, Executive Agency (SFC in part).
Iran.—Under Joint Commission, Basic and applied sciences (JC) (Iran funds).
Italy.—Cooperative research; seminars; Executive Agency S&T Agreement.
Japan.—Cooperative Science Program; Executive Agency.
Korea.—Agency-to-agency memorandum of understanding under S&T Agreement: basic and applied sciences.
Mexico.—Energy; meteorology; tropical biology and agriculture; mineral resources; marine resources; standards and quality control; S&T information; ecology and wildlife (JC); Executive Agency for S&T Agreement.
New Zealand.—All fields, but priority for energy (mostly geothermal); Executive Agency for S&T Agreement (shared with DOE).
Poland.—Under S&T Agreement: All S&T fields (JC) (SFC).
Romania.—Various S&T fields.

Saudi Arabia.—General S&T; development of science education; science information; other infrastructure (JC) (Saudi funds).
USSR.—Under S&T Agreement: Basic and applied sciences; application of computers; chemical catalysis; electrometallurgy; microbiology; physics; science policy; S&T information.

OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY (OSTP)

USSR.—Coordinates S&T Agreement (JC).

SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION

Panama.—Operation of Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute.
Tunisia.—Archeology; systematic biology; environmental biology; other basic research (SFC).
Yugoslavia.—Under S&T Agreement: natural science; cultural history (JC) (SFC).

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (DOT)

Canada.—Civil aviation; wake vortex project.
France.—Intercity rail service and automated guideway; transit assessments.
FRG.—Six projects, mostly related to rail transport.
Israel.—Transport planning and highway safety; driver performance; other information exchanges.
Japan.—Crash tests; dummy program, information exchanges.
Poland.—Under S&T Agreement: pedestrian behavior; road construction; rail safety; rail fasteners; human factors (JC) (SFC).
Romania.—Selection of railroad workers; information exchanges.
Saudi Arabia.—Under Joint Commission: Highway system; development and management (JC) (Saudi funds).
U.K.—Urban traffic management; crash dummy tests; air traffic control; other information exchange.
USSR.—Transportation Agreement, Executive Agency (JC).
Yugoslavia.—Under S&T Agreement: Special bus service; tunneling; cement strength (JC) (SFC).

DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

Saudi Arabia.—Coordinates all programs under US-Saudi Arabian Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation including S&T Agreement (with NSF), Desalination Agreement (with Interior), and Solar Energy Agreement (with DOE).

APPENDIX F

The NSC Ad Hoc Sub Group on Non-Proliferation Budgets: A Case Study of Inter-Agency Cooperation in Budget Preparation Related to International Science and Technology Activities

The Sub Group was formed in the summer of 1977, under the auspices of the NSC Ad Hoc Group on Non-Proliferation, which had been established to coordinate the implementation of various aspects of the Administration's non-proliferation policy. The Department of State has a leading role in both the parent committee and the Sub Group, in that Department of State officials chair both groups.

The purpose of the Sub Group is to review the current and emerging research and development programs and budget proposals related to long-term planning of various agencies (especially the Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)) from the standpoint of non-proliferation objectives. Most of the attention is focused on the Department of Energy budget, which, because of its size, greatly overshadows the other two agencies' budgets. In addition to Department of State officials, representatives from the following agencies regularly participate in the Sub Group's work: Department of Defense, Department of Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Council on Environmental Quality, and the Office of Science and Technology Policy.

The Sub Group has helped to shape both the orientation of the Department of Energy budget (primarily in the nuclear research and development area) and the dollar amounts proposed for various programs. For example, at least partially due to the work of the Sub Group, a number of programs have been expanded (e.g., the Light Water Reactor Improvements Program, the International Uranium Resource Evaluation Program and the Away From Reactor facility in the area of Spent Fuel Storage); introduced (e.g., a feasibility study for a conceptual design study for a Light Water Reactor demonstration plant); or salvaged (e. g., the High Temperature Gas Reactor Program).

The relative success of the Sub Group can be attributed to a number of factors, including:

(1) The Sub Group has visibility due to the fact that it is under the National Security Council;

(2) The Sub Group has the active cooperation of the Department of Energy and the Office of Management and Budget;

(3) The Sub Group did not try to over-extend its role—for example, the committee did not try to review the entire Department of Energy budget on the grounds that everything in the energy field has foreign policy implications. Rather, the Sub Group confined itself to examining one segment of the Department of Energy budget from the standpoint of one particular foreign policy objective (non-proliferation);

(4) The members of the Sub Group had the technical background needed to examine the Department of Energy budget and to work with the Office of Management and Budget Officials.

APPENDIX G

Inter-Agency Coordinating Committees

The following listing of inter-agency committees dealing with aspects of international science and technology is partial and intended for illustrative purposes only.

Antarctic Policy Group.
Arctic Policy Group.
Bilateral Cooperation in Science and Technology Group.
Committee on International Environmental Affairs.
Committee on the International Geodynamics Project.
Committee on Ocean Dumping.
Committee on UNESCO's International Hydrological Program.
Inter-Agency Committee on Biological and Climatic Effects Research.
Inter-Agency Committee on Marine Environmental Prediction.
Inter-Agency Committee on Marine Mammals Programs.
Inter-Agency Committee on Marine Science and Engineering.
Inter-Agency Committee on Population Research.
Inter-Agency Committee on Technology Transfer.
Inter-Agency Committee on Toxic Chemicals.
Inter-Agency Committee for the World Weather Program.
Inter-Agency Group on Fisheries Negotiations.
Federal Committee on Stratospheric Monitoring.
National Committee for UNESCO's Man and the Biosphere Program.
Panel on International Programs and International Cooperation in Oceans Affairs.

APPENDIX H

The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE): A Case Study of Inter-Agency Cooperation in International Science and Technology Activities

Review of the United States involvement in the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) may help to illustrate how the expertise of several Departments and Agencies is being employed to address a complex range of issues associated with the application of science and technology to problems of foreign policy. The fuel cycle evaluation was proposed by President Carter in his statement of nuclear energy policy on April 7, 1977. INFCE was formally established at an Organizing Conference in October 1977. The United States is one of fifty-three countries and four international organizations participating in the evaluation.

INFCE is an exploration of the ways in which nuclear energy can be made available to meet world energy needs while at the same time minimizing the risk of further nuclear weapons proliferation. The Organizing Conference decided that INFCE is to be a technical and analytical study rather than a negotiation, which means that no government will be bound by the results of the evaluation. Through careful study and evaluation of the security, economic, technical, and environmental considerations associated with the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the INFCE participants are attempting to establish a sound framework for subsequent policy decisions by governments.

The Organizing Conference established the structure and scope of the evaluation. Eight basic areas of study were defined, each roughly corresponding to a single part of the full cycle. A working Group was established to study each subject area. A Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC) provides guidance to and integration of the Working Group studies. The TCC reports to a Plenary Conference.

The eight Working Groups are as follows:

1. Fuel and Heavy Water Availability.
2. Enrichment Availability.
3. Assurances of Long-Term Supply of Technology, Fuel and Heavy Water and Services in the Interest of National Needs Consistent with Non-Proliferation.
4. Reprocessing, Plutonium Handling, Recycle.
5. Fast Breeders.
6. Spent Fuel Management.
7. Waste Management and Disposal.
8. Advanced Fuel Cycle and Reactor Concepts.

The United States is an active participant in all aspects of INFCE. Responsibility for the overall direction and inter-agency coordination of U.S. involvement in INFCE is assigned to the Department of State. An inter-agency Management Committee, chaired by the State Department and including representatives of the Department of Energy and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, guides the work of U.S. technical experts.

The Department of Energy provides a major portion of the technical work, drawing on the Non-Proliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP). In addition to the three principal agencies, the U.S. INFCE organization utilizes the expertise of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Executive Office of the President, and individual experts from industry and universities.

In the first year of the evaluation, INFCE prepared studies of such key issues as: the worldwide demand for nuclear energy; the extent of uranium resources available and producible over the next several decades, including emphasis on lower grade resources; the proliferation risks of various nuclear systems; the possibility for greater efficiency in the utilization of uranium in light water reactors; and the technical and economic advantages and diasadvantages of various nuclear systems. In the first year of the evaluation, the United States contributed some thirty major studies dealing with these and other key issues related to the fuel cycle.

The evaluation is roughly half completed. Although it is too early to be certain about the results of INFCE, it is clear that the evaluation is one of the most comprehensive efforts ever undertaken on an international basis to address the connection between providing energy and limiting proliferation risks associated with the nuclear fuel cycle. The ad hoc U.S. inter-agency structure for INFCE enables us to make a major contribution to these studies.

APPENDIX I

School of Professional Studies, Foreign Service Institute

SCIENCE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS—AUGUST 7–11, 1978

MONDAY, AUGUST 7, 1978

Room 1114, SA–3

9:15 a.m.	Introduction Mr. David W. McClintock, Coordinator, Political Studies, Foreign Service Institute.
9:30–10:45 a.m.	Science and Foreign Policy—an overview Mr. Clyde McClelland, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, OES, Department of State.
11:00–11:45 a.m.	Film—To be announced.
1:30–2:45 p.m.	The White House Perspective Dr. Gene Skolnikoff, Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology Policy.
3:00–4:30 p.m.	The Communications Revolution: Computers and Foreign Affairs Mr. Roy Gulick, Decisions and Designs Inc.

TUESDAY, AUGUST 8, 1978

9:00–10:30 a.m.	Information Exchange on the Domestic and International Levels Mr. Robert L. Chartrand, Senior Specialist on Information Science, Library of Congress.
10:45–12 Noon	Tour to IBM Computer Development Facility, Gaithersburg, Maryland Mr. Randy Lumb, IBM.
1:30–2:45 p.m.	Technology and the Energy Problem Mr. Edward Heller, Gulf Oil Company.
3:00–4:30 p.m.	Ocean Resources Mr. David Wallace, Policy Adviser in International Marine Affairs, National Marine Fisheries Service.

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1978

9:15–10:30 a.m.	International Environmental Problems Dr. Martha Sager.
10:45–12 Noon	Nuclear Issues in U.S. Diplomacy Mr. Michael Guhin, OES, Department of State.
1:30–2:45 p.m.	Technology Transfer in the Politico-Military Sphere Dr. Brenda Forman, Policy Plans, DOD/ISA.
3:00–4:30 p.m.	Technology Transfer in the Development Sphere Mr. John Dardis, OES, Department of State.

THURSDAY, AUGUST 10, 1978

9:15–10:30 a.m.	Synthetics, Raw Materials, and the North-South Dialogue Mr. Russel Drew, Systems Control Inc.
10:45–12 Noon	The Population Issue Ambassador Marshall Green, Coordinator for Population Affairs, Department of State.
1:30–4:30 p.m.	Field Trip to Goddard Space Flight Center Mr. William O'Leary, NASA.

FRIDAY, AUGUST 11, 1978

9:15–10:30 a.m. International Scientific Cooperation
Dr. Bodo Bartocha, Director, Division of International Programs, National Science Foundation.

10:45–12 Noon USG Links with the Scientific Community
Dr. Murray Todd, National Academy of Science.

1:30–2:45 p.m. S&T in Intelligence
Dr. Julian Nall.

3:00–4:30 p.m. Science and Foreign Policy—The Road Ahead
Dr. Rodney Nichols, Vice President, Rockefeller University; the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

COMPUTERS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

October 16–19, 1978

MONDAY, OCTOBER 16

(Room 1115, SA–3)

9:00–9:15 a.m. Introduction
David W. McClintock, Coordinator for Political Training, Foreign Service Institute.

9:15–9:45 a.m. Films.

10:00–11:50 a.m. Computers in Crisis Management, Lebanon Evacuation Case.
Roy Gulick, Decisions and Designs, Inc.

12:00–1:15 p.m. Lunch at American University.

1:15–4:30 p.m. "Hands-On" Exercises.
Dr. Llewellyn Howell, American University.

Session at American University

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 17

Meet in Room 6320, New State

9:15–12 Noon Computer Applications at State: Part I, Introduction to On-Site Briefings.
William W. Francis, O/ISO.
Small group briefings on SS; Operations Center; FADRC; Library systems; ISO.

12:00–1:15 p.m. Lunch at American University.

1:15–4:30 p.m. "Hands-On" Exercise.
Dr. Llewellyn Howell, American University.

Session at American University

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 18

Meet in Room 1921, New State

9:15–10:45 a.m. Computer Applications at State: Part II.
Small group briefings on: mini-computers, consular applications, word processing, and personnel applications.

11:00–12 Noon Public Opinion Sampling; Cross-Tabular Analysis, Room 6320.
Dr. Alvin Richman, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State.

12:00–1:10 p.m. Lunch.

1:10 p.m. Board chartered bus at Diplomatic Entrance (22nd and C Streets).

1:30–4:30 p.m. Computer Applications at CIA.
Dr. Fred Schuyler.

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 19

Meet at ARPA facility, 1600 Wilson Boulevard, Arlington—around corner from FSI.

9:00–12 Noon — The Computer in Crisis Management and Decision-Making.
Dr. Stephen Andriole, Advanced Research Projects Agency.

12:00–1:30 p.m. — Lunch (return to Room 1115, FSI).

1:30—4:00 p.m. — Computer Applications at the Department of Defense.
Introduction of overview of ADP Management in the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Capt. Robert J. Coontz, USN.
Overview of Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WMMCCS)—ADP by Mr. Herb Goertzel, DOD.

BREAK

National Military Command System ADP Applications by Col. Donald Bludworth, USA.
ADP Analysis, War Gaming, and the Decision Process by Lt. Col. Donald Berg, USAF.

4:00—4:15 p.m. — Course Critique.

THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS INTERDEPARTMENTAL SEMINAR[1]

10th Session, January 8–9, 1979

MONDAY, JANUARY 8

8:15–8:45 a.m. — Registration.
8:45–9:15 a.m. — Welcome and Administrative Announcements.
9:15–10:30 a.m. — The Information Revolution.
Dr. Robert L. Chartrand, Senior Specialist, Congressional Research, Library of Congress.
10:30–10:45 a.m. — Break.
10:45–12 Noon — The Human Rights Controversy.
Dr. Margaret Galey, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives.
Reference: Department of State Current Policy: "Human Rights—A World Prospective."
12:00–1:15 p.m. — Lunch.
1:15–2:30 p.m. — Policy Priorities: A New Year's Assessment.
Maj. Robert M. Kimmitt, National Security Council.
2:30–2:45 p.m. — Break.
2:45–4:30 p.m. — Regional Studies.

TUESDAY, JANUARY 9

9:15–10:30 a.m. — Interfacing With Congress.
Mr. Charles W. Whalen, Jr., President, New Directions.
10:30–10:45 a.m. — Break.
10:45–12 Noon — The Military Dimension (S).
General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
Reference: Department of State Current Policy: "U.S. Defense—Our State of Readiness."
12:00–1:15 p.m. — Lunch.
1:15–2:30 p.m. — The U.S. and the Third World.
Dr. Morris Blachman, Department of Government and International Studies, University of South Carolina.
Reference: GIST: "U.S. Prosperity and the Developing Countries."
2:30–2:45 p.m. — Break.
2:45–4:30 p.m. — Regional Studies.
4:30–6:00 p.m. — FAIS Reception (Spouses Invited).

[1] Lecture classification: (S) secret; (C) confidential.

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 10

9:15–10:30 a.m. The Economic Sphere: Part I—Foreign Assistance.
Mr. Robert H. Nooter, Deputy Administrator, Agency for International Development.
References: GIST: "Why Foreign Assistance" and SECSTATE Statement: "U.S. Foreign Assistance Programs for Fiscal Year 1979."

10:30–10:45 a.m. Break.

The Economic Sphere: Part II—

10:45–12 Noon The U.S. and International Trade.
Dr. Eugene Stanaland, Chairman, Department of Economics, Auburn University.
References: Department of State Current Policy: "Export Policy;" Department of State Special Report: "Trade Patterns of the West, 1977;" and Department of State Special Report: "Indicators of Comparative East-West Economic Strength, 1977."

12:00–1:15 p.m. Lunch.

1:15–2:30 p.m. A Middle East Update.

2:30–2:45 p.m. Break.

2:45–4:00 p.m. Foreign Policy Making: Structures and Realities.
Dr. William Lewis—Department of Political Science, George Washington University.
References: Chart: "Factors Influencing American Foreign Policy" and Department of State publication. "Foreign Policy and the State Department."

THURSDAY, JANUARY 11

9:15–10:30 a.m. The Economic Sphere: Part III—

9:15–10:30 a.m. International Monetary Issues.
Dr. Robert Dunn, Department of Economics, George Washington University.
Reference: GIST: "The U.S. Dollar."

10:30–10:45 a.m. Break.

10:45–12 Noon The Economic Sphere: Part IV—Labor Issues.
Mr. Gus Tyler. Assistant resident, International Ladies Garment Workers Union.

12:00–1:15 p.m. Lunch.

1:15–2:30 p.m. The Economic Sphere: Part V—Multinational Operations.
Mr. Walter A. Slowinski, Resident Partner, Baker and McKenzie.
Reference: GIST: "Multinational Corporations."

2:30–2:45 p.m. Break.

2:45–4:30 p.m. Regional Studies.

FRIDAY, JANUARY 12

9:15–12 Noon Visit to Department of State (Detailed schedule published separately).

12:00–2:45 p.m. Luncheon/Lecture at Ft. Myer Officers' Club.
The Media and Foreign Policy—
Mr. Robert Goralski, Director, Public Relations, Gulf Oil Company.

2:45–3:00 p.m. Travel/Break.

3:00–4:30 p.m. Regional Studies.

MONDAY, JANUARY 15

9:15–10:30 a.m.	The Politics of International Terrorism. Mr. John D. Elliott, Private Consultant on International Security Affairs. Reference: GIST: "Terrorism."
10:30–10:45 a.m.	Break.
10:45–12 Noon	SALT II Update and the Nuclear Arena. Dr. Harland D. Moulton, National War College.
12:00–1:15 p.m.	Lunch.
1:15–2:30 p.m.	U.S. Soviet Relations: A New Year's Perspective. Dr. Dimitri K. Simes, Director, Soviet Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies. References: Department of State Current Policy: "A Clear Look at the Soviet Union and U.S.-USSR Relations" and Department of State Pamphlet: "Eastern Europe—An Overview."
2:30–2:45 p.m.	Break.
2:45–4:30 p.m.	Regional Studies.

TUESDAY, JANUARY 16

8:45–10:00 a.m.	The Arms Transfer Debate. General Richard G. Stillwell, USA (Ret.), Senior Advisory Consultant, Stanford Research Institute. Radm Gene R. LaRocque, USN (Ret.), Director, Center for Defense Information
10:00–10:45 a.m.	Break.
10:45–12 Noon	Undocumented Aliens: A Growing Dilemma. Mr. Leonel Castillo, Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service. Reference: Department of State Current Policy: "U.S.-Mexican Relations and the Undocumented Alien Problem."
12:00–1:15 p.m.	Lunch.
1:15–2:30 p.m.	The Southern African Time Bomb. Dr. Michael Nwanze, Associate Professor of Political Science, Howard University. Reference: GIST: "Southern Africa-U.S. Policy."
2:30–2:45 p.m.	Break.
2:45–4:30 p.m.	Regional Studies.

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 17

9:15–10:30 a.m.	China. Dr. Kenneth Lieberthal, Swarthmore College.
10:30–10:45 a.m.	Break.
10:45–12 Noon	Planet Earth: Part I—The Politics of American Food. The Hon. Bob Bergland, Secretary of Agriculture.
12:00–1:15 p.m.	Lunch.
1:15–4:30 p.m.	Visit to CIA. Detailed schedule published separately.

THURSDAY, JANUARY 18

9:15–10:30 a.m.	Planet Earth: Part II—Population Dilemmas. Dr. Andre E. Hellegers. The Kennedy Institute. Reference: Department of State Bulletin: "Silent Explosion."
10:30–10:45 a.m.	Break.
10:45–12 Noon	Planet Earth: Part III—The Energy "Super Issue." Mr. Stephen W. Bosworth, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International Resources and Food Policy, Department of State. Reference: Article: "The Politics of Energy."
12:00–1:15 p.m.	Lunch.
1:15–2:30 p.m.	Planet Earth: Part IV—International Environmental Affairs. Mrs. Alice Popkin, Associate Administrator, Office of International Activities, Environmental Protection Agency.
2:30–2:45 p.m.	Break.
2:45–4:30 p.m.	Regional Studies.

FRIDAY, JANUARY 19

9:15–10:30 a.m.	Communications and Feedback in the Policy Sphere. Mr. Michael Pistor, Assistant Director for Public Information, International Communication Agency.
10:30–10:45 a.m.	Break.
10:45–12 Noon	A Foreign Ambassador Observes. To be announced.
12:00–1:30 p.m.	Lunch.
1:30–3:00 p.m.	Regional Studies.
3:00–3:15 p.m.	Break.
3:15–4:15 p.m.	Closing Address—"On Implementing Foreign Policy." The Hon. U. Alexis Johnson, Former Ambassador-at-Large.

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