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THE MODERNIZATION OF NATO'S LONG-RANGE THEATER
NUCLEAR FORCES
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REPORT

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND
THE MIDDLE EAST

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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FOREWORD

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.


This study was prepared by the Library of Congress for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, chaired by Hon. Lee H. Hamilton. It has been submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The study examines the political and military factors surrounding the decision by the NATO alliance to deploy long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF) in Western Europe. It also contains a discussion of the history of alliance nuclear strategy; the reaction on the part of the Soviet Union; and prospects for arms control.

The findings of this study are those of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, *Chairman.*

(III)



LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., December 31, 1980.

HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,
*Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I enclose a study prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress.

This study is part of the subcommittee's effort to examine United States-Western European relations in the wake of developments in Iran and Afghanistan. The subcommittee conducted a series of hearings during 1980 on United States-Western European relations and the state of the alliance. In October, a CRS report entitled "NATO After Afghanistan" was published. It examined the reasons behind some of the apparent strains within the alliance and what can be done about them. Hopefully, these efforts, taken together, will help to provide a better understanding of the issues confronting the alliance.

The present study analyzes the circumstances surrounding the decision taken by NATO in December 1979 to modernize its long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF). That decision was hailed as a demonstration of alliance unity in the face of the Soviet deployment of advanced theater nuclear forces of its own, the SS-20 missile and the Backfire bomber. It is clear, however, that many unresolved issues concerning the implementation of the decision remain. This study also attempts to examine some of the problems and prospects of implementation.

The report contains a thorough review of the historical context of the decision as well as the political and the military factors that led to it. It also reports on the Soviet and European perspectives on the decision.

I hope this document will be useful in assessing the importance and consequences as well as some of the implications of LRTNF modernization.

This report was written by Simon Lunn, Director of the Military Committee, North Atlantic Assembly (Brussels, Belgium). Mr. Lunn, a British citizen, was on detail to the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, as a specialist in European security, from May 1979 to September 1980. Final preparation of the report was coordinated by Stanley R. Sloan, Specialist in U.S. Alliance Relations for CRS and head of the Europe/Middle East/Africa section of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division. Theresa E. Varela was responsible for production of the final copy and was assisted by Betty Ann Bell and Mary Jane Berens.

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The analysis presented here is that of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of the Congressional Research Service and does not necessarily represent the views of the members of the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East.

LEE H. HAMILTON,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe
and the Middle East.*

PREFACE

For over two decades NATO's theater nuclear strategy has been the source of controversy and strain within the alliance. These tensions have been based in large part on differing perceptions in the United States and in Europe concerning whether theater nuclear weapons are principally to serve as tools of deterrence or as instruments of a war-fighting capacity. Furthermore, in recent years, U.S. and European attitudes toward arms control and détente have tended to diverge, aggravating already serious differences about nuclear weapons deployments and limitations. When NATO decided in December 1979 to add new long-range theater nuclear systems to its arsenal—principally in response to Soviet deployment of new SS-20 missile systems and the Backfire bomber—these fundamental differences within the alliance were not resolved. This study traces the evolution of NATO's nuclear strategy and, against this backdrop, assesses the implications of and prospects for NATO's decision to modernize its long-range theater nuclear forces.

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SUMMARY

In December 1979, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization decided to modernize the Europe-based U.S. nuclear arsenal by deploying (in 1983, at the earliest) a total of 572 new ground-launched systems capable of reaching Soviet territory from West European sites. The agreed deployment would consist of 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles, all with single nuclear warheads.

At the same time, NATO expressed its willingness to negotiate limits on this deployment in exchange for reciprocal Soviet limitations, particularly on the new mobile and accurate SS-20 missile system based in European Russia.

Prior to the NATO decision, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev had, on October 6, 1979, offered to limit deployment of SS-20 missiles if NATO would defer a decision to deploy new Western systems. When NATO went ahead with its decision, Moscow said that the action, combined with nonratification of the SALT II accord, invalidated the Brezhnev offer. Then, after 6 months of posturing against the NATO approach, the Soviet Union took the opportunity of the Moscow visit of West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt on July 1, 1980, to reverse its position and agree to begin negotiations.

Preliminary United States Soviet talks on theater nuclear systems opened in Geneva in mid-October 1980 and lasted for about a month. Going into these talks, the U.S. preference was for negotiations limited almost exclusively to the projected new Western systems and, on the Eastern side, the SS-20 missile system and the Backfire bomber; the Soviets declared their preference for a much broader agenda to include existing American "forward-based systems," such as American aircraft based in Europe and on carriers in the Mediterranean which are capable of striking Soviet territory with nuclear weapons. As was anticipated, no substantive agreements were reached in these initial discussions.

The outlook for the theater nuclear negotiations remains highly uncertain. The SALT II agreement, as currently written, apparently will not be ratified by the U.S. Senate. The Reagan administration reportedly intends to seek renegotiation of this accord, and the Soviet Union has suggested that it is willing to enter new talks. Until it is clear whether strategic arms limitations will result from this process, however, no agreement on theater nuclear limitations seems likely. As long as there is no agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on a stable balance of strategic nuclear forces, it will be difficult for either side to determine what would be an acceptable balance in medium- and long-range systems in Europe.

This uncertainty about the arms control component of the NATO theater nuclear modernization decision raises complex political prob-

lems for the alliance. The NATO decision, while "unanimous," was in reality somewhat qualified—at least in the view of two small NATO countries that are scheduled to provide sites for some of the new American systems. Both the Netherlands and Belgium said that their ultimate willingness to accept deployment of new theater nuclear systems on their territory would depend on the prospects for East-West limitations on such systems. The Dutch qualification was scheduled to be reviewed at the end of 1981. The Belgian decision was up for review in mid-1980, but now has been left as a more or less open question in parallel with the Dutch position. (In the Netherlands and Belgium there is a strong aversion to nuclear weapons. The Belgian situation is further complicated by deep internal divisions on unrelated political and constitutional issues.)

In the event that neither Belgium nor the Netherlands agrees to deployment, NATO would have to decide whether to deploy 96 fewer launchers or to ask the other states scheduled to receive systems (the United Kingdom, Italy, and West Germany) to accept additional missiles.

Because Belgium and the Netherlands would not be due to receive their quota of missiles until 1985–86, their current positions do not affect the ongoing implementation of the NATO plan. There is no requirement to begin the necessary preparatory work on sitings and construction there that is already underway in the other three NATO countries.

But, the continuing reluctance—or political inability—of the Belgian and Dutch Governments to agree to deployment could substantially increase tensions within the alliance. Alliance officials, and West German officials in particular, continually emphasize that NATO is an alliance of shared risks and responsibilities in which every partner must play an equitable part. Many Dutch, Belgian, and Scandinavian officials nonetheless resent the fact that they are expected to participate in difficult decisions whose primary purpose appears to be to deal with concerns about the reliability of the American nuclear guarantee which they do not share.

Implementation of the NATO decision could also affect relations between the United States and Europe. A substantial degree of frustration currently exists among American officials and observers at what is perceived as European reluctance to accept and support needed improvements in NATO's defense posture. This perception fuels an already widely held belief that the Europeans are unwilling to assume realistic responsibility for their own security. Opposition in Europe to the deployment decision in 1979 and 1980 clearly added to already mounting American concern about "burden sharing" in the alliance.

Recent analyses of the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance have begun to emphasize Soviet improvements in their short-range nuclear forces, suggesting that the next area of focus for Western force improvements may be in NATO's battlefield nuclear systems. Efforts to modernize these systems could intensify political strains within the alliance, particularly if they included reintroduction of the proposal to deploy enhanced radiation warheads, or neutron bombs, as they are known.

Western policy toward arms control negotiations could provide a further area of friction. Thus far, Western positions toward the United

States-Soviet negotiations on theater nuclear forces have been carefully coordinated within the alliance. Nevertheless, there appear to be profound differences between the American and European approaches to arms control. The direction in the United States, apparently fortified by the election outcome, is toward considerably less influence for arms control considerations in defense planning decisions. Continuing European support for arms control—even in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—is seen by most U.S. observers as a blind faith which threatens to undermine Western strength. Thus, while the alliance presumably will continue to coordinate its position closely through the special group established for that purpose, differences over both pace and content of the negotiations may well emerge.

The implications for East-West relations and the future stability of Central Europe could also be substantial. The impact of the actual deployment by NATO of new long-range theater nuclear systems obviously will depend on the Soviet reaction and whether or not arms control talks have succeeded in providing some stable formula for limitations on both Western and Eastern systems. Without a comprehensive agreement, however, it is a fair bet that deployment by NATO of cruise missiles would be followed by Soviet deployment of similar new systems. Such an escalation in the European theater would severely complicate future arms control efforts.

Finally, the NATO modernization decision constitutes a pragmatic compromise between those who believe that European-based nuclear forces have a functional war-fighting role to play and those who argue that their role is purely to enhance deterrence. The decision, therefore, left unresolved a number of deep-seated issues concerning the appropriate role of nuclear weapons in alliance strategy. It did not fully satisfy those who believe that nuclear weapons should be usable to be credible; and it displeased those who regard nuclear weapons as political instruments of deterrence and who believe that the political costs of the modernization far outweigh the gains in military capabilities.

In sum, the end result of the NATO decision to modernize nuclear systems is far from certain. The outcome will depend on the evolution of the United States-Soviet strategic nuclear dialog; on the overall direction of East-West relationships within the Western alliance, particularly between European governments and the new Reagan administration; and on domestic political considerations affecting a number of alliance countries. In any case, it is clear that the unfolding drama could have far-reaching consequences for the Western alliance and for East-West relations for the rest of this century.

INTRODUCTION

On December 12, 1979, NATO Ministers reached agreement on a proposal to modernize NATO's long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF) through the deployment in Europe of American ground-launched systems. These systems would include 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles all with single warheads. This decision was accompanied by an offer to establish limitations on theater nuclear forces through arms control negotiations. The NATO decision, therefore, comprised an integrated or dual-track approach involving both modernization and arms control.

The communique issued following the December 12 decision stated that "all the nations currently participating in the integrated defense structure will participate in the program." The consensus represented by this statement had been achieved through a process of intense preparation and consultation during the 2 years preceding the decision, and reflected favorably both on alliance solidarity and American leadership. However, the apparent unanimity of the communique concealed serious reservations on the part of several smaller countries, caused by widespread uneasiness among significant sections of their public and parliamentary opinion toward the introduction of additional nuclear systems into Europe. Two of the countries selected for deployment, Belgium and the Netherlands, agreed to the decision, but each submitted reservations concerning the deployment of missiles on their territory. These last minute doubts and hesitations demonstrated the political sensitivity surrounding the NATO proposal. In fact, the proposal to modernize NATO's LRTNF revived two basic issues that have confronted NATO since its inception. First, the question of the continuing credibility of the American nuclear guarantee to Europe and the precise role of nuclear weapons in alliance strategy; and second, the problem of reconciling the frequently conflicting demands of NATO's dual policy of defense and détente, particularly the appropriate role for arms control negotiations in insuring alliance security interests.

This study first outlines briefly the historical and contemporary background to the LRTNF decision, indicating the continuity of several of the problems that surfaced during the LRTNF debate. It then proceeds to an analysis of the military and political factors that determined the evolution of the LRTNF proposal; a discussion of the preparatory work that preceded the December 12 decision; an examination of the various rationales advanced to support the NATO proposal and some of the criticism; and a description of the circumstances surrounding the December 12 decision and its immediate consequences. Finally, it assesses the problems and prospects of the decision, with particular emphasis on the arms control component.

THE CONTEXT FOR DECISION

1. ALLIANCE STRATEGY¹

Almost since its inception the alliance has grappled continuously with the problem of extending the protection of American strategic nuclear power to the defense of Western Europe. In doing so, NATO has faced seemingly irreconcilable conflicts of interest. Such differences are inherent in the nature of the alliance because the United States, militarily far superior to and geographically very distant from its European allies, is committed to assist in the defense of those allies, though the ultimate fulfillment of this commitment could result in the destruction of American society. This situation has inevitably produced different attitudes and perceptions between Europe and the United States concerning what constitutes an appropriate and credible strategy of deterrence, and the forces needed to support it.

Conscious of the potential devastation of any war, nuclear or conventional, for their territory, Europeans have tended to advocate a strategy of absolute deterrence through the immediate threat of all-out nuclear war, and have looked with unease and suspicion at any development that appears to distract from this ultimate threat, or that threatens to "decouple" Europe from the American strategic nuclear guarantee.

The United States, on the other hand, equally conscious of the awesome consequences for American territory of strategic nuclear war, has sought to avoid being faced with the choice of all-out nuclear war or defeat. While maintaining the ultimate threat of strategic nuclear retaliation, American officials have increasingly emphasized the need to deter conflict at all possible levels through the provision of a wide range of capabilities and options. They have endeavored to look "beyond" deterrence, and, in the event that deterrence should fail, to facilitate the termination of any conflict short of all-out nuclear war. The desire for greater flexibility has been clearly visible in the development of American strategic forces. Presidential Directive 59 (July 1980), putting increased emphasis on attacking military targets in the Soviet Union in addition to Russian cities and industrial complexes, is a recent manifestation of the move toward a more discriminating nuclear strategy. In his book, "White House Years," Henry Kissinger confirms that this trend commenced officially in the late 1960's:

We therefore developed in 1969 new criteria of "strategic sufficiency" that related our strategic planning to the destruction not only of civilians but of military targets as well. They gave us at least the theoretical capability to use forces for objectives other than the mass exterminations of populations.²

¹ It should be noted that it is not possible here to provide a detailed account of the development of nuclear strategy within the alliance or of the events where major debates occurred. The main purpose of this brief review is to illustrate the continuity of several of main issues that emerged during the LRTNF debate.

² Henry Kissinger, "White House Years" (Little, Brown & Co., 1980).

This search for greater credibility through more usable options has been reflected at all levels of alliance strategy.

American insistence on the need for flexibility in alliance strategy has been endorsed by the Europeans through the adoption by NATO in the mid-1960's of the strategy of flexible response. But this endorsement concealed a substantial degree of unease on the part of the Europeans concerning the implications of this strategy. Many Europeans viewed the retention of capabilities sufficient to permit a limited or flexible response as inevitably diminishing the automaticity of American strategic retaliation, and even facilitating the outbreak of a limited conflict in Europe. Commenting on the problems that hindered the adoption of flexible response during the 1960's Helmut Schmidt has written:

First, to renounce what was earlier imagined to be the automaticity of nuclear response to aggression seemed to increase the dangers of a war which, though regarded as a "limited" war by the superpowers, would be no less than a war of annihilation for the countries of the battlefield. For this reason people clung to the deceptive hope that such a war could be made impossible by holding firm to what was thought to be an absolute deterrent.³

Thus, while American officials argue that flexibility strengthens deterrence by insuring a continuum of capabilities which "couple" Europe to the strategic guarantee, many Europeans continue to suspect that the consequence of flexible response will be precisely the opposite—the containment of any future conflict to European territory. Henry Kissinger has summarized this transatlantic divergence as follows:

* * * the early use of strategic nuclear weapons, which means a United States-Soviet nuclear war fought over their heads. This was precisely what was unacceptable to American planners. Our strategy—then and now—must envisage the ultimate use of strategic nuclear weapons if Europe can be defended in no other way. But it must also seek to develop other options, both to increase the credibility of the deterrent and to permit a flexible application of our power should deterrence fail.⁴

Faced by these conflicts of interest, the alliance has attempted a series of adjustments and innovations in order to produce a mutually acceptable solution. While political and technological conditions have changed, the basic issue remains the same—unwilling or unable to produce conventional forces sufficient to deter Soviet aggression, or to create an independent integrated European nuclear deterrent, Europeans continue to rely for their ultimate protection on the American strategic nuclear guarantee. As this guarantee is based on confidence and trust, and as American and European attitudes concerning what constitutes effective deterrence diverge, the perennial problem for the alliance has been to evolve a nuclear strategy that sustains both European confidence and American national interests. In this sense the LRTNF debate represents the latest chapter of a continuing saga. It is not an isolated episode, but is part of a broader and long enduring problem of achieving a credible and mutually acceptable role for nuclear weapons in alliance strategy.

As the following historical account demonstrates, efforts to produce a mutually acceptable strategy have pursued two separate but related

³ Helmut Schmidt "The Balance of Power" (William Kimber, London, 1969).

⁴ Kissinger, *op. cit.*

approaches: First, the provision of capabilities that insure direct, visible, and mutually acceptable linkage between a conventional war in Europe and the American strategic nuclear guarantee; second, increased participation by the Europeans in the operation and planning of alliance nuclear strategy.

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

NATO was established during a period of clear and unchallenged American nuclear superiority. The United States possessed a substantial force of long-range bombers, a comprehensive system of bases that effectively ringed the Soviet Union, and a substantial number of aircraft carriers equipped with nuclear capable aircraft. Thus, the superiority of Soviet conventional forces was countered by the U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC) equipped with atomic weapons. NATO conventional forces provided the "shield" of Western defense, designed to hold Soviet aggression until the "sword," represented by SAC, could deliver its counterblow of massive retaliation. While the Soviet Union detonated an atomic device in 1949 and a hydrogen bomb in 1953, it initially lacked the means of delivery. Moscow did not possess bombers of intercontinental range, and missiles were still in the development stage. But, by the mid-1950's, development by the Soviet Union of a long-range bomber force, though limited in size and capability compared with that of the United States, and rapid advances in missile technology, dramatically illustrated by the Sputnik launching in 1957, began to cast doubts on the credibility of the strategy of massive retaliation.

Inevitably, the question began to form in European minds—if the Soviet Union possessed the means to cause unacceptable damage to American cities—how realistic was it to expect the United States to use its strategic nuclear forces in the event of Soviet aggression against Europe?

European concern over this issue was intensified, particularly in NATO military circles, when in the late 1950's the Soviet Union began to deploy substantial numbers of medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles, SS-4's and SS-5's, targeted on Europe. These missiles almost certainly had the dual purpose of countering the U.S. nuclear threat while the development of Soviet intercontinental missiles was completed. With the deployment of Soviet ICBM's, the Soviet justification became the threat posed by the nuclear forces of the United Kingdom, France, and China.

In 1957, the NATO Council decided to deploy American medium-range ballistic missiles in Europe: 60 Thor missiles in England, and 45 Jupiter missiles in both Italy and Turkey. These systems were deployed in the spring of 1959 under dual operation and SACEUR command, but the warheads remained in American custody. The Eisenhower administration made it clear that the final decision to fire would be in American hands. These deployments were pressed by the United States in order to offset the perceived threat posed by Soviet deployment of long-range ballistic missiles. A number of factors contributed to this rationale: The need to bolster American deterrent forces; to restore the diminishing confidence of European governments in the ef-

ficacy of massive retaliation; and to respond to the military pressure, mainly from the SACEUR, General Norstad, that Europe needed a nuclear missile force capable of striking the Soviet Union. The vulnerability of these missiles, however, limited their political and military value. They were phased out in 1963 as new technologies (land- and sea-based intercontinental ballistic missiles) facilitated the adoption of more distant and survivable basing strategies. Technological and procedural developments, therefore, satisfied many of the arguments for original Western MRBM deployments, but the idea that the alliance required a European-based force capable of striking the Soviet Union remained alive.

It is interesting to note that the duality of policy toward the Soviet Union concerning the balance between deterrence and reassurance that emerged during the LRTNF debate was also present during this period. In 1961, Helmut Schmidt, justifying the installation of Thor and Jupiter missiles as enhancing the credibility of American strategy, wrote that—

The installation of American IRBM's in Europe also has the object of making it clear that NATO can defend itself against threats of nuclear blackmail exclusively and expressly directed against Europe and Europe alone.⁵

At the same time, however, he drew attention to the provocative nature of the deployments—

Nevertheless, everyone capable of objective reasoning must concede that the stationing of enemy IRBM's, so to speak, on its very threshold (Turkey) must produce the psychological effect of a provocation on any great power. One need only imagine how the Americans would react if the Soviets were to station IRBM's in Cuba.

Schmidt noted that the military value of the Thors and Jupiters was very small, and was only of transitory significance "until the Americans close the so-called missile gap and eliminate the Soviet lead in ICBM production." Furthermore, he argued that these deployments and other plans for the deployment of missiles in Europe then under discussion, had done nothing to restore the confidence of European governments in the strategy of nuclear retaliation by U.S. forces.

In 1959, General Norstad advocated a force of MRBM's in addition to the Thors and Jupiters then being placed in Europe and began to speak of the need to extend the nuclear authority of NATO. This military pressure for the deployment of a separate European based nuclear force, in which the Europeans would have a greater say, coincided with pressure from other areas. In addition to their diminishing confidence in the American strategic commitment, some Europeans were growing increasingly restive at their lack of participation in alliance nuclear strategy and were eager to find a formula that would remedy this situation. The Americans, for their part, were becoming concerned at the trend toward independent national deterrent forces in the United Kingdom and France.

The United Kingdom had exploded an atomic bomb in 1952, and its independent deterrent in the form of its V-bomber force had existed since 1955. In 1958 the British Government announced an increased emphasis on its nuclear forces, a policy which culminated with

⁵ Helmut Schmidt, "Defense and Retaliation" (1961).

the purchase of Polaris missiles from the United States under the terms of the Nassau Agreement in 1962. The French Government had also made clear its plans to develop an independent deterrent, a decision confirmed by Gen. Charles de Gaulle on his accession to power. The French independent deterrent, consisting initially of 50 Mirage IV bombers, came into operation in 1964.

The congruence of these political and military pressures, the perceived need to enhance the American nuclear guarantee and to offset Soviet MRBM deployment, the European requirement for greater participation in nuclear matters, and the American desire to head off the development of independent nuclear forces, produced a number of schemes between 1959 and 1963 for the creation of some form of NATO nuclear force. These schemes included: General Norstad's proposal for making NATO a fourth atomic power by evolving multinational responsibility for a system of land-based MRBM's; the Bowie report which recommended the strengthening of NATO's conventional capability and suggested NATO-command strategic nuclear submarines with Polaris missiles as an alternative to land-based IRBM's in Europe; Secretary Herter's proposal in his last NATO Ministers' meeting that the United States would commit to NATO 5 nuclear submarines with 80 SLBM's, provided agreement could be reached on a shared mechanism of control; the proposal by Secretary of Defense Gates for the deployment of Polaris missiles on barges and flatcars in Europe, and some modification of control arrangements over nuclear warheads stockpiled in Europe to increase the powers of SACEUR; and finally the idea for a multilaterally owned and controlled seaborne force, the MLF.

Despite the variety of ideas represented by these schemes, none, save the MLF, made any significant progress. Under the Kennedy administration, Secretary of Defense McNamara was strongly opposed to relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and linked the concept of nuclear sharing to an augmented commitment to conventional forces. In a speech to NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers in Athens in 1962, McNamara specifically reaffirmed the ability of U.S. strategic forces to fulfill an IRBM role in Europe and criticized the perceived need for independent nuclear forces. This declaratory policy, however, did not check the momentum toward a NATO nuclear force, and hopes for a mutually acceptable solution became increasingly focused on the concept of the MLF.

3. THE MULTILATERAL FORCE (MLF)⁶

It is not necessary here to provide a detailed account of the initiation and eventual failure of the MLF concept,⁷ but merely to note several characteristics of the episode which are of direct relevance to the LRTNF debate 20 years later.

(1) The military rationale for the MLF was centered on a NATO requirement stated by SACEUR General Norstad, and reaffirmed by his successor General Lemnitzer, for MRBM's stationed on or near the

⁶ The MLF concept envisaged 25 surface ships, each ship carrying eight Polaris A-3 missiles, and manned by multinational crews. The fleet would be assigned to SACEUR.

⁷ For a detailed discussion of the MLF episode see "The Cybernetics of Decision Making" by John Steinbrunner.

European Continent to replace obsolescent, vulnerable strike bombers, and to counter the increasing number of Soviet MRBM's capable of striking Europe. This requirement was initially developed during a period when some observers were concerned that the United States might in a few years be in a position of nuclear inferiority due to Soviet long-range missile development and medium-range missile deployment.

(2) A number of American analysts were critical of the military rationale for the MLF as they pointed out that existing and programmed American strategic systems both land based and sea based were more than sufficient to cover Soviet targets.

(3) It was acknowledged that political concerns provided the driving impetus behind the MLF proposal; namely, increasing European frustration over exclusive American control of nuclear affairs, and also concern that, at a time when European-based nuclear strike bombers were being phased out, American systems based in the United States did not provide a high enough degree of visible commitment.

(4) West German political agitation and a general desire within the alliance to defuse pressure in the Federal Republic to achieve nuclear status was prominent in the political rationale for the MLF.

(5) On the question of basing for a European nuclear force, promoters of the sea-based MLF argued strongly against land-based systems.

The public sight of dozens of nuclear-tipped missiles of strategic range moving around Germany and elsewhere on the crowded Continent would be disturbing—putting it mildly—to domestic and allied opinion.⁸

(6) Finally, in the same vein, it is interesting to note that contrary to arguments during the LRTNF debate concerning the credibility of Polaris SLBM's assigned to NATO, the Polaris missile was considered by some U.S. analysts to be an effective counterforce weapon system,

The MLF's long range Polarises would indeed have the yield and accuracy to destroy all but the most hardened fixed Soviet missiles in addition to airfields and other stationary interdiction targets in the rear of the battle area.⁹

The MLF proposal was aimed at preserving American operational control over nuclear weapons systems while simultaneously enabling European allies to participate in the management of a Western nuclear deterrent assigned to NATO. However, as a compromise formula trying to satisfy highly ambiguous and frequently divergent aims, its chances of success were always limited. The final demise of the project led to a search for alternative and less ambitious formulas to accommodate the conflicting transatlantic requirements.

Following the failure of the MLF, the alliance adopted a number of measures which, with varying degrees of success, addressed the dual problem of creating more credible linkage and of facilitating greater European participation in alliance nuclear affairs. The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG)¹⁰ was established to provide a forum in which

⁸ Robert E. Osgood, "The Case for the MLF: A Critical Evaluation," the Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research, 1964, p. 17.

⁹ Ibid., p. 15.

¹⁰ The Nuclear Planning Group was originally composed of four permanent members, the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, and West Germany and three members rotated at 18-month intervals. Since 1979 it has been composed of all members in the Defense Planning Council, that is, all NATO members except France and Iceland.

alliance members could participate and jointly exercise influence over the planning for, and the conduct of, the use of nuclear weapons. The American President agreed to assign 64 Polaris SLBM's directly to NATO which, along with the British Polaris force, would be directly responsive to NATO and thus SACEUR's requirements,¹¹ in this sense replacing the obsolescent Thors and Jupiters. The United States deployed F-111 medium range all-weather nuclear strike aircraft to the United Kingdom to be likewise responsive to SACEUR's requirements. Finally, and most significantly, following the departure of France from the integrated military command, NATO adopted the strategy of flexible response.

4. FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

The adoption of the strategy of flexible response represented the culmination of a series of efforts within the alliance to accommodate highly divergent and virtually irreconcilable interests and attitudes concerning the role of nuclear weapons. Under this doctrine—known as MC-1413—the alliance signaled its determination to resist Soviet aggression at any level it should occur, and its willingness to escalate the conflict to whatever level necessary for its termination. A ladder of escalation options would subsequently exist from conventional to strategic forces, via the nuclear forces deployed in the European theater, both those for battlefield use and those longer range systems assigned to SACEUR.

Flexible response represented an uneasy compromise between the conflicting transatlantic perspectives. While theoretically sound, it left considerable latitude for differences concerning the levels of forces necessary at each stage to insure credible deterrence. This ambiguity permitted the accommodation of conflicting American and European interests, but it did not represent their reconciliation. Divergences have continued to reappear over the capabilities necessary to sustain the credibility of flexible response.

American officials have argued that, because deterrence rests on the possession of credible means, NATO's capabilities at all levels should be made compatible with the doctrine they support. This has led to an emphasis on the importance of conventional forces and on the war-fighting characteristics of nuclear weapons. Europeans have accepted the theoretical logic of the American position concerning the credibility of deterrence, but in practice most have looked uneasily at any American proposal that appears to offer the prospect of containing a conflict to European territory. While accepting the need for stronger conventional forces, they have practiced, in the words of one European defense analyst, a policy of "conventional insufficiency."¹² At the nuclear level Europeans have been reluctant to look beyond deterrence to the actual requirements for nuclear weapons in a conflict situation. In this sense, for many Europeans, the adoption of flexible

¹¹ These arrangements were in accordance with the Nassau agreement under which it had been agreed that the British Polaris force would be assigned to NATO subject to withdrawal when "supreme national interests are at stake."

¹² Brigadier Kenneth Hunt, "European Military Postures, paper presented at the Wilson Center International Security Studies Core Seminar Session, February 1980.

response has represented a continuation of the doctrine of massive retaliation in another guise.

The ambiguity in NATO's doctrine of flexible response and the difference in views between Americans and Europeans concerning "how" and "when" nuclear weapons would be used is most apparent in the field of tactical or battlefield nuclear weapons.

5. TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS (TNW)

The NATO Council decided in 1954 to introduce tactical nuclear weapons into Europe in order to compensate for Soviet conventional superiority and to signal the intention of fighting any war that might arise with the tactical nuclear weapons from the very outset. Any initial advantage that was gained by this decision, however, was soon negated by Soviet acquisition of tactical nuclear systems. In the meantime, a substantial number of nuclear warheads¹³ of various sizes and for a wide range of delivery systems were accumulated in Europe and had to be absorbed into NATO doctrine. From the outset of their deployment, perceptions concerning the use of tactical nuclear weapons were never very clear and the passage of time has not produced greater clarity. A clear conflict of interest exists. Europeans have traditionally viewed tactical nuclear weapons as obviating the necessity of providing conventional capabilities sufficient for credible conventional defense, and as providing a nuclear trigger to American strategic systems. They have favored an "early use" of TNW and, therefore, a relatively low nuclear threshold, in order to signal decisively the political resolve to escalate to all-out nuclear war, and to minimize collateral damage to German territory. They have, therefore, emphasized the political, symbolic, and essentially deterrent value of these nuclear systems.

American officials, on the other hand, obviously prefer to delay a decision to use nuclear weapons as long as possible in order to avoid the possibility of escalation to the strategic level. American officials also argue that, in order to be credible, TNW must be usable, and that NATO's TNW posture should provide a range of credible options. They have increasingly stressed the functional utility and, therefore, warfighting characteristics, of tactical nuclear systems, as for example, in the development of the enhanced radiation warhead (ERW).

A current defense adviser to President-elect Reagan summarized, in 1972, the paradox in Western thinking in the use of nuclear weapons as follows:

On the one hand, we had TNW's deployed for deterrence of attacks on Allies: on the other hand, avoidance of nuclear usage always had at least as high a priority or value as deterrence. Western thought became again focused on the avoidance of nuclear war and this became translated into avoidance of usable weapons, usable doctrines, usable strategies, avoidance of what would make war "thinkable" since to avoid nuclear war required that it be kept unthinkable and the way to keep it unthinkable is to base nuclear strategy not on military effec-

¹³ Tactical nuclear weapons are deployed with both American and European forces. In the case of European systems, the nuclear warhead is always held in American custody. This is the so-called dual key system under which American political authorization is necessary before the warhead can be released for use. In the case of nuclear weapons deployed with U.S. Forces the Athens guidelines state that the United States will consult with its allies "time and circumstances permitting."

tiveness and limiting damage but on propositions of the utmost destructiveness and on threats of escalation.¹⁴

NATO doctrine has absorbed these deep-rooted differences concerning the use of tactical nuclear weapons by making the precise terms of their employment deliberately ambiguous. According to one NATO official,

The NATO doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons is clear, concise, simple, and direct. It is that, when required, the alliance would respond with nuclear weapons on the scale appropriate to the circumstances.¹⁵

While this position may be simple and clear it certainly allows room for considerable differences concerning potential usage. Perhaps a better summation of official policy toward the use of tactical nuclear weapons would be "as soon as necessary and as late as possible."

6. THE FRG's SPECIAL ROLE

Finally, in this brief review of alliance nuclear history, it is important to note the prominent role played by the Federal Republic of Germany. Awareness of its vulnerability as NATO frontline and the Federal Republic of Germany's renunciation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, with the consequent dependence on the American strategic guarantee, has given the Federal Republic of Germany a particular interest in the evolution of alliance strategy. At the same time, the legacy of the FRG's immediate past and more particularly its long-term interest in developing good relations with the East has made German leaders sensitive to the potential implication of any changes in NATO defense doctrine. These historic and geographic factors have produced an awareness of the need to maintain a balance between the military preparations necessary for deterrence and the dialog and negotiation necessary to diminish tension between East and West.

The overriding objective in German security policy has been to prevent the outbreak of war, conventional or nuclear, on German territory. This has led to a strong emphasis on the deterrence aspect of alliance strategy and great sensitivity to any development that appears to weaken the credibility of deterrence.

The prevention of any kind of war is of vital importance to us since even an intensive area-covering conflict would have devastating consequence in our densely populated area. This is why we are so vitally interested in the operability of the alliance's strategy of war prevention through credible deterrence.¹⁶

Similarly, the Federal Republic of Germany has always stressed the collective nature of the alliance and the need for shared risk taking on the part of all its partners. Equally, German actions and attitudes have been a constant preoccupation for Germany's allies, the traditional concern being to avoid the possibility of German acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Thus, while West German anxieties concerning the Federal Republic of Germany's own security have guaranteed an active, and sometimes prominent role in debates over alliance strategy, political reali-

¹⁴ William van Cleave, LASH panel on Tactical Nuclear Warfare (Toc-5) April 5-6, 1977. Informal Report LA-6908-MS.

¹⁵ Richard Shearer, Director for Nuclear Planning, NATO. Statement on the role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy to the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly, September 1975.

¹⁶ General Tandeki. Address to the North Atlantic Assembly's Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation, April 1978.

ties have always conditioned the West German response and participation.

In 1957, the Adenauer government expressed support for the deployment of MRBM's in Europe, but would not permit their stationing in West Germany. This refusal was based on a number of factors: the fierce domestic debate over the Government's decision to equip the Bundeswehr with tactical nuclear systems; Bulganin's suggestion to Adenauer that the Soviet Union would link the reunification issue to the stationing of MRBM's in the Federal Republic; and the fear that deployment of MRBM's could provide a rationale for the withdrawal of American troops.

Likewise, German concern to a large extent stimulated and fueled the LRTNF modernization debate; yet German participation in the proposal was made conditional on the satisfaction of a number of political criteria.

Concern over the appropriate role for nuclear weapons in NATO strategy has produced a number of difficult and testing periods during alliance history.

The collapse of the MLF proposal was followed by a brief period of continuing American nuclear superiority. The perception of this superiority and the somewhat piecemeal arrangement undertaken to satisfy European anxieties provided a lull in the preoccupation with the credibility of the strategic guarantee. This ended, however, with the commencement of the debate over LRTNF. Certain of the original themes such as the European desire for greater participation in the control of nuclear weapons were no longer present; but others, notably the questions of linkage and coupling, of deterrence and warfighting, and defense and détente, reappeared with renewed force.

EVOLUTION OF THE DECISION

1. ALLIANCE CONCERN

The formation of the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) in 1967 facilitated the discussion and study within the alliance of various aspects of NATO's nuclear posture. The work of the NPG, and public attention generally, concentrated on the short range or battlefield nuclear systems which formed the preponderant part of NATO's nuclear arsenal. In 1977, however, attention began to focus on the long or medium range component. This change of emphasis was the result of several separate but related factors: first, the perception that strategic parity as codified by the SALT process accentuated existing imbalances at lower levels of forces; second, the development of cruise missiles which, many argued, had considerable potential for NATO defense, particularly as a counter to Soviet theater capabilities; and third, suspicion on the part of many Europeans that the American administration, in order to secure a SALT II agreement, would accept constraints on cruise missiles that would prevent their utilization in the European theater. None of these factors was conclusive. But, in combination, they produced a powerful momentum that led to the process of LRTNF modernization.

European concern over implications for the alliance of developments in the SALT negotiations was catalyzed by West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. As previously noted, the Chancellor had long demonstrated an interest in, and understanding of, strategic issues. In his book "Defense and Retaliation," his discussion of graduated deterrence anticipated the evolution of NATO's doctrine of flexible response, and he consistently stressed the need for NATO to maintain a balance of forces with the East. Writing in 1970, he emphasized the direct relationship between the theater and strategic forces.

Soviet superiority in the Central Sector is further reinforced by about 750 medium range ballistic missiles that have no NATO counterpart. This point more than any other drives home the lesson that, looked at in general and from the theoretical point of view of a conflict extended over a long period of time, there can only be an overall balance in Europe's central sector if strategic nuclear weapons are drawn into the equation.¹

By the mid-1970's Schmidt had become convinced that this linkage and therefore the credibility of NATO's strategy was being undermined. In a speech to the North Atlantic Council on May 10, 1977, Chancellor Schmidt expressed his concern that,

* * * the SALT process may lead to a paralyzation of the Soviet and American central strategic forces and that the strategic nuclear component will become increasingly regarded as an instrument of last resort, to serve the national interest and protect the survival of those who possess these weapons of last resort.²

¹ Helmut Schmidt, "The Balance of Power."

² "Survival," July/August 1977, p. 178.

During his speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in October 1977, Schmidt extended his concern to the implication of SALT for other levels of forces, by noting that SALT neutralized the strategic capabilities of the two superpowers and therefore magnified the significance of the disparities between East and West in nuclear tactical and conventional weapons. He emphasized that strategic arms limitations confined to the United States and the Soviet Union would inevitably impair the security of the West European members of the alliance vis-a-vis Soviet military superiority in Europe unless the disparities of military power in Europe were removed in parallel with the SALT negotiations.

The main purpose of the Chancellor's speech was to make public his concern that under the bilateralism of the SALT process, certain aspects of European security were being ignored. Although he nowhere directly referred to theater nuclear forces, his comments focused public attention on the concept that a gap was appearing in NATO's deterrent capability.

The analysis underlying the Chancellor's remarks had been in circulation for some time. Much of the criticism of the SALT process and particularly the emerging SALT II treaty was directed at its implications for the alliance. Critics maintained that Europe was being neglected at two levels: First, they argued that strategic parity as codified by SALT must inevitably undermine the American strategic guarantee; and second, they pointed to the emergence of Soviet systems, notably the Backfire bomber and the SS-20 missile, that were outside the SALT process but were highly relevant to Europe, and of American cruise missiles which would assist Europe, and yet were under discussion in the SALT negotiations. While concern over this neglect was voiced predominantly by American analysts, it also found an echo among a number of European observers.

The Soviet "gray area" systems that attracted attention were the Backfire bomber, first deployed in 1974, and most significantly the SS-20 missile. Reference to the existence of the SS-20 emerged in official Western statements during 1975. The 1976 Department of Defense posture statement noted the SS-20 as a new and unique development, the 1977 statement saw its deployment as impending, and the 1978 statement assessed it to be operational.

Public attention was first drawn to the SS-20 in September 1976, when Fred Ikle, who was then the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, commented:

The specter of such weapons grows like a towering cloud over Europe and Asia. Why are they adding to this arsenal? What must we ask with deep concern is the possible political purpose.³

The SS-20 represented a clear increase in capability over the SS-4's and SS-5's. However, differences existed within the alliance concerning the implication of these improvements for alliance strategy. Despite these differences, the SS-20 took on substantial political significance as it became the symbol of NATO's deficiencies in theater nuclear forces and of the need for positive action on the part of the alliance.

³ Quoted in "The Security of the Alliance" by Patrick Wall, M.P., a report to the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly, Brussels, November 1976. Ikle's speech had not been authorized and the State Department did not circulate the next.

At the same time that Soviet theater force modernization became a matter of Western concern, American technology was producing a system which many observers believed offered almost unlimited application to the alliance—the cruise missile. The characteristics of the cruise missile—accuracy, invulnerability, and relative low cost—were said to permit its utilization in a wide range of roles. In one of the first analyses to deal in detail with the implications of cruise missile development, Richard Burt, then Assistant to the Director of the IISS, described some of the potential roles:

In the performance of tactical missions, cruise missiles may provide an attractive replacement for increasingly expensive strike aircraft in the performance of many missions. On land, where aircraft undertaking deep penetrative strikes are increasingly vulnerable to SAM defenses, cruise missiles could become a more cost effective instrument for interdiction and counter air operations. At sea, they might possibly supplant the need for aircraft carriers with their large complements of attack aircraft. Perhaps even more intriguing than the cost advantages that might stem from the tactical use of cruise missiles was that they could carry out tasks now assigned to tactical nuclear weapons.⁴

The 1976 Strategic Survey noted that the U.S. Air Force had commenced studies on the possibility of replacing the F-111's stationed in England with GLCM's. In January 1977, the report by the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Malcom C. Currie, commented:

The advent of long range, highly accurate cruise missiles is perhaps the most significant weapon development of the decade * * * the cruise missile represents a high leverage investment which can be fielded at relatively low cost by utilizing existing launch platforms while at the same time forcing the Soviets to divert resources to costly air defense systems.⁵

It was argued that cruise missiles would be of particular interest to France and the United Kingdom in their future planning for the renewals of their independent strategic deterrents. Much of this analysis was based on speculation. Cruise missile development was insufficiently advanced to establish whether performance was as good as claimed and little work had been done to evaluate the cost effectiveness and efficiency of potential application. Nevertheless, Soviet anxieties and American ambivalence concerning the U.S. negotiating position in SALT served to intensify European determination that their options should be safeguarded. In this sense, cruise missile application in the theater nuclear role provided the most politically visible and immediately justifiable rationale for their exclusion from negotiating constraints and became the means for safeguarding the technology for future application.

Suspicion concerning American attitudes toward cruise missiles was not without foundation. Since the Vladivostock agreements which had excluded both the Backfire and cruise missile problems, the Soviet Union had been pressing hard for permanent constraints on cruise missiles, particularly a nontransfer clause.

A number of observers feared that in order to achieve a SALT II agreement, the Ford administration would make a deal including restrictions on cruise missiles.

⁴ "The Cruise Missile and Arms Control," Richard Burt, *Survival*, January/February 1976.

⁵ "Program of Research Development Test and Evaluation, Fiscal Year 1978," statement by the Honorable M. R. Currie, Director, DRE, to the 95th Congress.

This suspicion increased when the new Carter administration took over in 1977 with a commitment to proceed rapidly to a SALT II agreement. Some U.S. officials were in favor of restrictions on cruise missiles. Strobe Talbot, discussing the preparation of the Carter administration March 1977 SALT proposals in his book on the SALT II negotiations, comments that the chief SALT negotiator, Paul Warnke:

Urged that the United States SALT position contain at least one provision that the Kremlin would welcome and some Pentagon planners would resist. This was to impose strict limits on the range of cruise missiles, particularly ground-launched cruise missiles * * * Warnke could not imagine the Kremlin accepting any new U.S. proposal that left long-range, ground-launched cruise missiles unconstrained.⁶

A number of observers were quick to point out the implications for the alliance of an agreement that included restrictions on cruise missiles. Richard Burt drew attention to the American predicament.

The most interesting military option available to the West for countering the expansion of Soviet Eurostrategic capabilities is already under discussion at SALT—the long-range precision-guided cruise missile. In deciding whether to exploit cruise missile technology in this manner, the United States must therefore once again choose between placing priorities on strengthening the alliance ties and quickly obtaining a SALT agreement.⁷

Burt developed this approach in a later article, concluding that:

Over time, many Europeans may conclude that the United States—in order to reach an agreement—has mortgaged systems that are most likely to serve Western rather than American interests.⁸

Concern that the United States should not negotiate away what appeared to be a substantial technological advantage was also expressed in official circles. The 1978 Department of Defense Report commented that:

Cruise missiles may be tempting candidates for arms control, but because of their versatility and the verification issues they raise, considerable caution needs to be exercised in how they are treated within the framework of SALT.⁹

The efforts of the Carter administration to solve the cruise missile problem through the mechanism of the protocol failed to satisfy the anxieties of either its domestic critics or those of its allies. Confirmation was continually sought that the duration of the protocol would be finite and under no circumstances would be extended. Similar assurances were sought for the ability of the United States to transfer technological "know-how" to its allies. As a U.S. Senate report noted:

In the 19 formal North Atlantic Council consultations on the progress of the SALT negotiations before the Vienna summit—and in a number of bilateral discussions, especially with the British—the United States was repeatedly asked to clarify the noncircumvention position and regularly reminded of NATO's concern about it.¹⁰

Allied concern over the American position was reinforced by the initial reluctance of American officials to admit that a theater nuclear

⁶ Strobe Talbot, "Endgame, the Inside Story of SALT" (Harper and Row) 1979, p. 57.

⁷ Richard Burt, "The SS-20 and the Strategic Balance," *The World Today*, January/February 1977.

⁸ Richard Burt, "The Scope and Limit of SALT," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1978.

⁹ Annual Defense Department Report Fiscal Year 1978, p. 56.

¹⁰ "SALT and the NATO Allies," a staff report to the Subcommittee on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, October 1979.

problem existed. The reaction of many American officials to European concern over the theater imbalance was to attempt to persuade them that the problem was illusory. These officials argued that it was unrealistic to isolate the theater balance from the overall strategic balance and they stressed that the United States had more than enough central strategic forces to cope with the Soviet medium-range threat. They also made efforts to strengthen existing theater forces by deploying an extra wing of F-111's to the United Kingdom and doubling to 400 the number of submarine-launched reentry vehicles assigned to SACEUR.

During hearings on the SALT II negotiations in October 1977, Secretary of State Vance confirmed that the alliance was taking a close look at its theater nuclear posture, but said that with Polaris and existing forward-based systems no additional long-range ground- or sea-launched systems were required. But, such assurances on the sufficiency of American strategic capabilities were interpreted by several of the allies as self-serving and an attempt to divert European attention from the theater nuclear problem and thus allow the SALT negotiations to proceed undisturbed. Chancellor Schmidt's speech was a warning signal that European interests could no longer be ignored in the strategic negotiations between the superpowers. In fact, his speech reflected a development that was already underway. As a result of European persistence, the United States agreed that the issue needed special examination and a "High-Level Group" was established as the forum for this study.

2. THE HIGH-LEVEL GROUP: ORIGINS AND MANDATE

The High-Level Group (HLG) had its origins in the May 1977 summit of NATO leaders, a meeting at which President Carter called for increased allied efforts across a wide spectrum of defense areas, including TNF modernization. The action program which sprang from this initiative, the long-term defense program (LTDP), included a separate functional area, designated Task Force 10, dedicated to identifying needed remedial measures in the TNF field. NATO assigned the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) responsibility for managing Task Force 10. At its October 1977 meeting at Bari, Italy, the NPG established the HLG as a subordinate body. The HLG's mandate was to examine the need for NATO TNF modernization, and the technical, military and political implications of alternative NATO TNF postures.

The HLG's work concentrated on the implications of three factors for NATO's strategy of deterrence through flexible response: First, the condition of strategic parity; second, the ongoing modernization of Soviet theater forces; and third, the growing obsolescence of existing NATO theater forces.

The HLG was made up of national officials from 11 member states of the alliance: the United States, United Kingdom, Italy, West Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Canada, Turkey, Belgium, Denmark, and Greece. It was chaired by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and had no standing staff as such. Rather, it relied on existing NATO Defense Ministry staffs, with most

staff work in advance of meetings done in Washington. Members of the HLG were drawn from the senior echelons of ministries of defense and were from diverse backgrounds in terms of functions.

In the course of HLG's examination, a number of important guidelines emerged:

- The LRTNF decision should reflect an "evolutionary" rather than radical change in NATO's defense posture. Thus it would not entail any increase in importance in the role of nuclear weapons in allied defense or any change in the strategy of flexible response; nor would it produce any change in the overall total of nuclear weapons in the European theater.
- A direct matching capability to the SS-20 was not considered necessary, but merely an offsetting capability to provide a credible response; this requirement determined that the systems chosen should have range sufficient to strike targets in the Soviet Union from Western Europe.
- To satisfy public perceptions concerning the credibility of response, it was considered that the systems should have as much visibility as possible. Hence a preference for land-based systems.
- Survivability—and thus mobility—penetrability, and high accuracy were also emphasized.
- Finally, it was assumed that a mix of systems would provide an optimal synergistic effect. While it was recognized that visibility inevitably compromises survivability, the need to enhance the credibility of response was considered sufficiently important for this aspect to be given priority.

Beginning in late fall 1977, the HLG conducted an exhaustive examination of the various technical options, the cost effectiveness of the specific force mixes, and their associated penetration and survivability factors. The HLG examined the possibility of modernizing and/or augmenting existing aircraft and SLBM types. By mid-1978 the HLG had reached a consensus that TNF modernization should include the deployment on the continent of additional improved long-range nuclear weaponry specifically capable of reaching Soviet soil. Its attention then focused on force mixes drawing upon the following three LRTNF weapons systems:

A. PERSHING II EXTENDED RANGE (ER) MISSILE ¹¹

The Pershing II was originally planned as a replacement for the Pershing 1A (P-1A)¹² currently deployed with the United States and West German forces. 108 P-1A launchers are deployed with American Army units in the Federal Republic and 72 launchers with the Air Force of the Federal Republic.

Initially the Pershing modernization program had as its objective improved accuracy and lower yield in order to reduce collateral damage and provide a more credible theater nuclear interdiction capa-

¹¹ This study provides a general description of the technical characteristics of the LRTNF systems. A more detailed technical study is currently being prepared by the General Accounting Office for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East.

¹² The Pershing missile was first deployed in Europe in 1962 to provide medium range nuclear support to NATO forces. The original Pershing was a mobile system with a large 60-400KT warhead and a range of about 100-400 nm. Deployment of an improved system—the P-1A—was carried out from 1969 to 1971.

bility. In 1977 following recommendations from the Secretary of Defense and SACEUR—then General Haig—the requirement for a substantial increase in range was generated. The range of the Pershing II ER will be close to 1,000 miles as opposed to 400 miles for the 1A.

The Pershing II ER will have a new two-stage missile and reentry vehicle (RV) and will use a modified version of the present erector/launcher and other ground support equipment. Following SACEUR's recommendation, the Pershing II will resemble the 1A as closely as possible. The main physical difference will be weight, the new missile being approximately 15,500 lbs as opposed to approximately 10,000 lbs for the 1A.

Unlike the Pershing 1A, which follows a ballistic trajectory from RV separation to the target, the P-II's RV will be terminally guided to the target by an onboard radar. The all-weather radar will be activated during the terminal phase of flight to correlate radar returns from the area surrounding the target with a prestored reference map of the target area. Successive corrections during RV descent are expected to achieve accuracies of between 20 to 40 meters CEP compared with 400 meters CEP for the Pershing 1A.

The Pershing II will use either the W-85 or W-86 warheads either of which can employ selectable yields. The higher accuracy of the P-II will allow the use of lower yields for a given mission.

During peacetime, Pershing II's will be deployed in casernes at quick reaction alert (QRA) sites, and will disperse during crisis conditions to their firing positions. While the Pershing II continues to be support and manpower intensive, its reaction time and deployment time on the move has been considerably speeded up.

The basic Pershing II firing unit is a platoon consisting of three erector launchers with one missile per launcher and associated ground equipment. The Pershing II is still in the development stage and thus expected improvements remain to be achieved. The earliest initial operational capability (IOC) for the system is August 1983.

The United States is preserving a short-range version of the P-II to meet FRG or other NATO requirements. U.S. officials have indicated that while no formal demand has been made, they expect the FRG to buy the single-stage version of the P-II particularly as the FRG has bought all previous improvements to the Pershing and as the FRG has budgeted out-year funds to upgrade its Pershing force.¹³

B. THE GROUND-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE (GLCM)

Many observers believe that the evolution of cruise missile technology in terms of accuracy, penetration, and survivability offers substantial potential for improving NATO's defense capabilities.¹⁴ Having examined the air, ground, and sea-launched options for cruise missiles, the HLG decided that the ground-launched version offered the optimum solution.

¹³ See the statement by Dr. Percy A. Pierre, Assistant Secretary of the Army, to the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, Apr. 15, 1980.

¹⁴ For discussion of the potential application of cruise missiles within NATO, see the forthcoming Brookings Institution study on cruise missiles.

The GLCM will be a version of the Tomahawk cruise missile adapted for launch from air transportable, ground mobile platforms. It is powered by a turbofan engine. Guidance is by inertial navigation with terrain contour matching (Tercom) updates at periodic intervals. Flying at a speed of around .8 mach at an altitude of below 100 meters, the GLCM's operational range will be approximately 2,500 kms with an anticipated terminal accuracy of less than 80 meters CEP.

GLCM's will be deployed with American Air Force units. The missiles will be transported four to a launch platform. Four transporter/erector/launchers (TEL) with 16 missiles controlled by two launch control centers will constitute a fire control unit or flight.

The GLCM will use the W-84 warhead which provides selectable yields.

Similar to the Pershing II, the prelaunch survivability of the GLCM derives from the system's mobility. Unlike the Pershing, the GLCM will be deployed during peacetime at permanent sites in hardened shelters capable of withstanding blast effects at up to 2,000 p.s.i. Given warning time, the GLCM could move from its main operating base to a field location.

As with Pershing, many of the performance objectives of the GLCM have still to be fulfilled in testing. Reports have suggested two particular problems regarding the Tercom guidance system: First, to date the cruise missile has not been tested over terrain representative of potential operational areas—much of the terrain which the missile would almost certainly traverse—western parts of the Soviet Union—are very flat and lack the distinctive contours for which Tercom is best suited; second, the provision of the maps necessary for Tercom may be a more difficult problem than previously assumed.

The IOC for the GLCM in Europe has been given as December 1983. However, Department of Defense officials have recently indicated a 6-month delay in the testing of GLCM due to technical difficulties in the computer and communications equipment. This raises the question of a slippage in the IOC.

C. THE SEA-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE (SLCM)

While it was acknowledged that the land attack sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) had a number of advantageous characteristics, particularly in terms of survivability and deployment flexibility, it was thought to lack the political visibility considered essential for TNF modernization. Furthermore, the cost of providing dedicated platforms seemed likely to make the SLCM option too expensive. However, substantial interest in the SLCM option continues to be demonstrated and further LRTNF deployments by the alliance could involve SLCM deployment. The United States has continued development of several versions of the Tomahawk SLCM (antiship and land attack, nuclear and conventional) for deployment on both submarines and surface ships. The DOD has programed the eventual procurement of 243 antiship SLCM's and 196 land attack SLCM's for deployment on 33 688-class attack submarines and 15 963-class destroyers. For fiscal year 1981 Congress authorized the procurement of 50 Tomahawk

SLCM's. The DOD is also conducting a critical review of the possibility of converting eight Polaris submarines into cruise missile launch platforms.

D. A NEW MOBILE MEDIUM-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE (MRBM)

The Department of Defense developed a detailed plan for a mobile MRBM in the spring of 1979. However, after congressional criticism of unnecessary duplication in TNF programs, the MRBM was dropped from the Air Force budget.

3. THE HLG'S PROPOSALS

During the meeting of the NPG in Florida in the spring of 1979, NATO Defense Ministers agreed in principle to the concept of a deployment in the early 1980's of some 200 to 600 warheads for long-range theater delivery. It was agreed that a final decision would be taken in December 1979. In the intervening months, final details concerning numbers and types would be established, the program would be integrated with an arms-control approach and acceptance of the plan by all allies achieved.

The final HLG recommendation was for the deployment of a total of 572 nuclear missiles in 5 European countries; 108 Pershing II launchers and 24 GLCM launchers (96 missiles) in the Federal Republic of Germany; 40 GLCM launchers (160 missiles) in the United Kingdom; 28 GLCM launchers (112 missiles) in Italy; 12 GLCM launchers (48 missiles) in Belgium; and 12 GLCM launchers (48 missiles) in the Netherlands.

There has been considerable speculation concerning the choice of the number 572. NATO officials have stressed that the figure was not "drawn from a hat" as some observers have suggested, but was an informed judgment based on a number of widely assorted factors such as system availability, in-flight reliability, penetration capability, risks on the ground, target coverage, cost, the need to make a major impact on Soviet perceptions, and arms control considerations.

NATO officials have also emphasized that the deployment of a mix of Pershing II's and GLCM's not only offered a force of high accuracy with great improvements in reliability and accuracy, but also that each system possessed distinctive characteristics that complemented those of the other. Pershing II offers a very high assurance of penetrating Soviet air defenses, the capability of striking time-urgent targets, and particularly important, the opportunity to take advantage of the existing Pershing I-A infrastructure. GLCM will have lower life-cycle costs and longer range, providing the capability of attacking a wider range of targets from several different bases thereby increasing the opportunity for participation among member countries through deployment on their soil. In addition, it was pointed out that the deployment of a mixed ballistic/cruise missile force hedges against the failure of one type of system, provides the flexibility to select the best weapon for a given mission while complicating enemy planning.

While the cost of the development and production of these systems (estimated at \$5 billion) will be paid for by the United States, the

NATO allies will contribute to the infrastructure and support of the systems through their contributions to the NATO Infrastructure Fund.

The possibility of participating in the operational control of these systems through the "dual key" system, as with the Lance and Pershing missiles currently deployed, was offered by the United States. However, the Federal Republic said from the beginning that it was not interested in dual control, and none of the other prospective host countries finally indicated an interest in purchasing the launch vehicles and sharing in the control. The new systems will therefore be deployed with American forces only and under American command and control. It is possible that the United States will reach bilateral understandings with host governments concerning appropriate consultation in the event of a requirement to fire. But such consultation does not imply any actual inhibition on the capability of the United States to operate the systems.

4. THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF MODERNIZATION

It is essential to view NATO's decision to modernize its long-range theater nuclear forces within its political context. The evolution of the proposal and the December 12 decision were heavily influenced by a number of political criteria, notably, the question of the nature of deterrence, the condition of East-West relations, European attitudes to nuclear weapons, and the mechanics of alliance cohesion.

The question of strengthening the linkage between the U.S. strategic guarantee and a conflict in Europe was one of the primary considerations behind the modernization proposal. Inevitably, this revived the perennial question concerning deterrence. What level of forces, what degree of certainty, what degree of credibility are sufficient for the purposes of the alliance? Does the strategy of flexible response require a matching capability at every level or merely a capability sufficient to convince a potential aggressor that the risks are not worth the gains?

The conflicting interpretations of deterrence and particularly of the need to enhance the American guarantee to Europe through LRTNF modernization were illustrated in speeches in the autumn of 1979 by Henry Kissinger and McGeorge Bundy.

Speaking to an international conference in Brussels on the future of NATO on September 1, Dr. Kissinger declared that under current strategic conditions, the American strategy of mutual assured destruction no longer afforded a credible deterrent for Europe.

We must face the fact that it is absurd to base the strategy of the West on the credibility of the threat of mutual suicide * * * if there is no theater nuclear establishment on the continent of Europe, we are writing the script for selective blackmail in which our allies will be threatened, and we will be forced into a decision where we can respond only with a strategy that has no military purpose but only a population destruction purpose.¹⁵

Kissinger argued, therefore, that in order to restore the credibility of the strategic guarantee, the United States must develop strategic counterforce capabilities and credible theater nuclear forces.

McGeorge Bundy, in a keynote address to the IISS conference a week later, took a somewhat different approach, stressing that as nu-

¹⁵ Dr. Kissinger's remarks as quoted in *Survival*, November/December 1979, the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

clear weapons are very different from other weapons, their deterrent value rests on the unacceptable and unpredictable threat of their use, something that is not affected by marginal changes in overall numbers. Moreover, the credibility of the American deterrent rested chiefly on the presence of 300,000 American troops in Europe.

The strategic protection of Europe is as strong or as weak as the American strategic guarantee, no matter what American weapons are deployed under NATO * * * The enduring effectiveness of the guarantee has not depended on strategic superiority. It has depended instead on two great facts: the visible deployment of major American military forces in Europe, and the very evident risk that any large scale engagement between Soviet and American forces would rapidly and uncontrollably become general, nuclear, and disastrous * * * no one knows that a major engagement in Europe would escalate to the strategic nuclear level. But the essential point is the opposite; no one can possibly know it would not. Precisely because these weapons are different, and precisely because the existing balance in Europe is endurable to both sides, even a small risk of a large nuclear exchange is much too much.¹⁶

These speeches summarized the different perspectives that dominated the debate over the need for LRTNF modernization. On the one hand, it was argued that extended deterrence could no longer rely on a strategy of mutual assured destruction and that credible war fighting options were now required, particularly at the theater nuclear level. On the other, it was maintained that deterrence continued to rest on the awful and unpredictable nature of nuclear weapons which would insure that the risks entailed in their use would always outweigh the gains. Marginal adjustments, as in the addition of nuclear weapons to European territory, would not affect the bipolar nature of deterrence. Much of the argument for and against LRTNF modernization centered around these different propositions—but as neither are provable, both depended on subjective interpretations of intentions and capabilities as well as the essential nature of deterrence.

The LRTNF proposal also focused attention on the problem for the alliance of striking a correct balance between the military demands of a credible deterrence strategy and the political requirements of assuring a stable and harmonious environment with which all aspects of the East-West relationship must operate.

The adoption by NATO of the twin tenets of defense and détente has meant a continual adjustment between the insurance and reassurance elements of its defense doctrine. The level of military preparations necessary to deter the Soviet Union and to “insure” the alliance is continually influenced by the need to demonstrate and “reassure” the Soviets of the nonaggressive and reactive nature of these military actions. The defense and détente platform has meant that in the search for greater stability, considerable emphasis has been placed on dialog and negotiations. NATO nations acknowledge the need to upgrade their armed forces in order to maintain a credible deterrent, and also to deny the Soviet Union a “droit de regard” over such actions. But at the same time, they are aware of the advantages of maintaining a balanced and harmonious relationship with the East, and of the adverse consequences a deterioration in East-West relations would bring. In this respect LRTNF modernization has posed a classic dilemma between the conflicting demands of defense and détente.

¹⁶ Ibid.

NATO attempted to resolve this dilemma by stressing that in the December 12 decision, it was not provoking a further escalation in the nuclear arms relationship between East and West, but was "closing the gap" in theater nuclear forces—a gap created by Soviet TNF modernization. This emphasis on the reactive nature of the NATO modernization proposal necessitated a parallel declaration by the alliance of the willingness to establish an acceptable balance in theater nuclear forces through arms control negotiations.

The general aversion to nuclear weapons that existed among important sections of public opinion in several European countries was also an important factor in the evolution of an arms control approach. The arms control element was considered essential in order to gain parliamentary and public support for the NATO proposal in several countries, particularly those where the system would be based. A clear indication of the likely public reaction to the introduction of the new missiles had already been given by the widespread opposition to the proposed introduction of the enhanced radiation warhead (ERW). While the issue of LRTNF modernization was of a different nature than that of the "neutron bomb," substantial opposition could be anticipated in the leftwing of the SPD, on a widespread basis in the Netherlands and to a lesser but unpredictable extent in Belgium. Moreover, it could be expected that the traditional "no nuclear" policies of Norway and Denmark would complicate their endorsement of the proposal. Three of these governments, Belgium, Denmark, and the Netherlands, had relatively fragile coalition governments which could be vulnerable to an issue such as deployment of nuclear missiles.

The likelihood of strong public reaction against the deployment of additional land-based nuclear missiles indicated one of the paradoxes of the modernization proposal—while the technical experts argued that visibility was necessary in order to enhance deterrence, it was precisely this visibility that would cause the adverse public reaction.

While concern over the situation in theater nuclear forces was expressed in a number of alliance quarters, German officials, as previously discussed, were preeminent in voicing their anxieties. They adopted a positive and at times forceful attitude on the question of modernization and on the duty of all members to act decisively and responsibly on this issue. However, the West German Government qualified its position regarding modernization with a number of conditions aimed at minimizing any adverse effect in the political sphere.

These conditions reflected Germany's sensitivity concerning its position in the alliance and its position vis-a-vis its Eastern neighbors. In other words, the desire to enhance German security through modernization was matched by an acute awareness of the need not to jeopardize the political gains Bonn had achieved in terms of improved relations with the East.

The terms of "political burden sharing" on which the Federal Republic of Germany made its participation conditional were:

- That NATO should decide on new systems on the basis of a unanimous decision—no negative votes and no abstentions.
- That the plan for LRTNF deployment plan must include, at a minimum, one continental nonnuclear state in addition to the Federal Republic; this criterion was termed the nonsingularity principle.

- That the Federal Republic had no intention of becoming a nuclear state or of playing any leadership role in questions of nuclear strategy. In this respect, German officials stressed that it was the responsibility of the United States to take the lead in nuclear decisions within the alliance.
- That any systems capable of striking Soviet territory and based in the Federal Republic would remain exclusively under American control with Germany providing only financial support and operating facilities. Unlike the arrangements for Pershing 1A, there would be no dual key arrangement for Pershing II.

Bearing in mind the nuclear status of the United Kingdom and France, the no-nuclear-weapons policies of Norway and Denmark and current domestic problems in other member countries, the German participation criteria clearly focused attention on the Netherlands, Belgium, and Italy.

German officials referred frequently to the collective responsibility inherent in membership of the alliance and of the duty of all members to share equitably the risks and burdens of collective defense. However, given the political conditions in Belgium and the Netherlands, the German criteria were bound to cause difficulties for both governments. In view of the German role in instigating the need for modernization and then imposing its own conditions, a degree of resentment on the part of the smaller countries was inevitable—equality of risk, it was argued, should not necessitate equality of paranoia.

In the case of the United States, the LRTNF decision became a test of American leadership within the alliance. Given perceptions of American vacillation and uncertainty in other fields and the legacy of the ERW episode, LRTNF modernization was viewed as an opportunity for the United States to demonstrate its ability to lead the alliance, particularly in the crucial area of nuclear weaponry, and for the alliance to show its ability to respond to this leadership. While initially reluctant to concede to European urgings on the need for modernization, once the process had begun American officials were determined that it should succeed.

This determination was also reflected among NATO and national officials alike, partly the result of a similarly strong resolve that LRTNF modernization should not follow the same course as the ERW. Agreement on the modernization proposal was increasingly viewed in terms of NATO's ability to cope with the challenges of coalition decisionmaking, and to act responsibly and with unanimity on an issue of great significance and sensitivity. In this respect, the proposal eventually developed a momentum of its own as officials stressed that the process was so far advanced that failure to achieve a positive consensus would represent a serious set back for the alliance. As one observer has noted:

In its extreme form, this view held that whatever military program was eventually decided on would, in the long run, be less important than the taking of the decision itself.¹⁷

¹⁷ "The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Alliance Strategy," Klaas de Vries, report to the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly, November 1979.

Considerable pressure was exerted in the months immediately preceding the December 12 decision by American and NATO officials in order to sustain the official consensus. Consultations and meetings at a variety of levels were intensified to insure that a unanimous decision would be obtained.

The preparatory work done by the HLG on the strategic, military, and technical considerations of LRTNF and the degree of consultation involved, was extremely thorough and reflected well on the ability of the alliance to develop a collective and coherent response on such a complex and sensitive issue. But, the irony of the LRTNF modernization process was that this success was restricted to the level of government officials and did not extend to parliamentary and public opinion. The consultation and cooperation had been at the level of bureaucratic and technical experts, whose mandate had not extended to the political implications of a modernization proposal. As a result, a gap existed between what military and civilian officials believed to be the most appropriate solution and what political circumstances were likely to permit. Only when a precise formula emerged from the HLG for Ministerial and Cabinet approval was serious attention given to public and parliamentary opinion. In several countries, the NATO proposal was introduced into the official governmental and parliamentary domain at a relatively short period before the NATO decision was due to be taken. When the modernization proposal did become an issue of public debate, it was clear that domestic opposition existed in several countries, particularly the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark, each of which had relatively fragile coalition governments.

Thus the consensus that had been carefully developed at the official level was seriously threatened by domestic political reaction in several countries. This situation illustrates one of the problems that NATO must face in dealing with nuclear issues—the appropriate point at which questions of nuclear strategy and capabilities should become issues of public discussion.

Finally, the Soviet reaction was an important element in the political context within which the modernization decision was taken. The issue of American nuclear systems based on the periphery of the Soviet Union—the so-called forward based systems (FBS)—had long been a major source of concern to the Soviet Union, and predictably, Soviet officials reacted forcefully to the suggestion that new and more accurate systems capable of striking Soviet territory would be deployed in Europe.

While Soviet officials provided a variety of arguments against the NATO proposal, their statements consistently stressed three points: That a balance of forces existed in the European theater, which the NATO proposal would disturb; that ongoing Soviet TNF modernization did not represent any change in the current equilibrium, and further that the number of Soviet medium-range carriers in the European sphere had decreased overall; that the Soviet Union was prepared to make further reductions in its medium-range carriers and negotiate limitations but only if NATO did not approve the modernization proposal.

Soviet officials focused considerable attention on the European members, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, stressing

that a modernization decision would inevitably have an adverse impact on East-West relations. They also asserted that the modernization proposal was being forced on the Europeans by the United States and was part of an American design to achieve strategic superiority and create another spiral in the arms race.

The Soviet campaign both helped and hindered the course of the LRTNF proposal. In one sense, the Soviet campaign had the reverse effect of what Soviet officials intended and strengthened the position of those in the alliance in favor of a modernization decision. Soviet pressure enabled alliance officials to argue that NATO must not allow its decisionmaking process to be influenced by Soviet tactics and propaganda.

In another sense, however, the Soviet campaign indirectly hindered the NATO decision as it tended to obscure the deep-seated opposition that existed in several European countries, not only toward nuclear weapons in general, but also toward what was seen by many as an unnecessary escalation in the arms race. Domestic opposition in several European countries was frequently dismissed as purely Soviet-inspired with the result that the genuine problems that several governments faced were underestimated.

Despite the persistence and the intensity of the Soviet campaign against modernization, Soviet officials do not appear to have realized until very late that NATO was likely to reach agreement on the modernization proposal. The major speech by Brezhnev on October 6, 1979, which not only summarized the Soviet position but also contained several arms control initiatives, was a case of too little too late. It lacked the one proposal that might have successfully diverted NATO from the December LRTNF decision—an offer to freeze deployment of the SS-20. Had the Soviets made that offer, the December consensus would have been extremely unlikely.

As it was, alliance reaction to the Brezhnev proposals varied from highly skeptical in the United States to mildly positive in several European capitals. The Soviet move nonetheless strengthened the hand of those who argued that the evident extent of Soviet concern would enable the alliance to win substantial concessions in the forthcoming negotiations. The Brezhnev initiative therefore had little or no impact on the course of alliance policy. In the words of a senior British official,

Mr. Brezhnev may perhaps reflect that the ERW success was, in the end, dearly won, in that it perhaps taught the NATO Allies sharp lessons which they applied successfully to a much larger issue.

5. THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL GROUP (SG)

While the HLG was conducting its examination and alliance members were formulating their political criteria for participation in an eventual LRTNF decision, a growing body of opinion within the alliance came to recognize that NATO should not embark upon a major nuclear weapons program in isolation of arms control considerations. Public and parliamentary support for modernization could only be assured if the alliance demonstrated a willingness to close the gap through arms control negotiations. It was important to underline the continued commitment of the alliance to the twin objectives of defense and détente. In addition, alliance officials perceived that it would not

be in the NATO's interest to engage in an unrestrained arms race with the Soviet Union in theater systems.

German officials in particular stressed that achieving limitations on Soviet theater forces should be a primary objective for the alliance.

In April 1979, NATO established a special group (SG) to examine the arms control implications of a LRTNF decision in parallel with the work at the HLG. The SG consisted of arms control specialists from all alliance countries except France, and was chaired by the Director of Political-Military Affairs of the U.S. State Department.

The task of the SG was to develop an approach parallel to the work of the HLG so that the defense decisions of the HLG were not held hostage to expectations on arms control agreements, but also so that arms control itself had a reasonable chance of success. It was accepted that the work of the HLG constituted the basic point of reference for the SG.

The SG developed the following principles as basic guidelines for the United States in arms control negotiations involving TNF:

(1) LRTNF arms control negotiations should be complementary to and not a substitute for LRTNF modernization. The HLG had identified the need for an evolutionary upward adjustment in LRTNF and this modernization requirement existed independently from arms control. Arms control negotiations would be neither realistic nor possible without an agreed modernization plan and a decision to implement it.

—A decision in principal on modernization but suspending implementation temporarily, pending progress in arms control, would not be in NATO's interest. Postponement of the decision was proposed in a number of the small countries, particularly by certain sections of the social democratic parties. It was countered, however, by the argument that a postponement on these terms would mean that NATO defense planning was dependent on Soviet willingness to negotiate—an unacceptable position.

—Arms control negotiations could lead to a downward adjustment in NATO's LRTNF requirements, but, as negotiations were unlikely to eliminate the Soviet LRTNF threat, NATO LRTNF modernization would be necessary. If and when arms control results were achieved, the alliance could decide whether to modify the scale of its LRTNF deployments. This guideline acknowledged the position of those who sought the so-called zero option or at least wished to minimize the deployments. However, it made it clear that such an outcome was not likely.

(2) LRTNF arms control negotiations should be conducted within a SALT III framework.

(3) Negotiations in SALT III on LRTNF should involve close and regular consultation within the alliance in an appropriate manner.

(4) LRTNF negotiations and MBFR should be consistent and mutually supportive.

(5) LRTNF negotiations should insure de jure equality in ceilings and in rights. It was particularly important for the alliance to maintain the principle of equality with the East even if it chose not to exercise this right.

(6) LRTNF reductions or limitations should be verifiable.

The special group also reached a number of tentative conclusions concerning the immediate objective for LRTNF negotiations:

(1) The negotiations should be a step-by-step process focusing on narrow and selective areas, rather than attempting a comprehensive approach which would multiply the difficulties and complexities involved and minimize the chance of progress.

(2) The first step of this approach would be to focus on limiting and reducing the most serious and immediate threat to NATO, the Soviet land-based missile force, particularly the SS-20.

(3) The aim should be to achieve a reduction in the overall threat of the land-based missile force by limiting SS-20 deployment, and insuring the retirement of the SS-4's and SS-5's.

(4) The effective unit of limitation should be the numbers of warheads on launchers; thus an SS-20 launcher would count as three because its missile carries three warheads, and a GLCM launcher would count as four because each launcher has four missiles each with one warhead.

(5) Limitations should apply to worldwide land-based LRTNF deployments, but with regional subceilings on systems located within striking range of NATO.

(6) To avoid complex and prolonged negotiations, long-range aircraft would not initially be included, but serious consideration should be given to addressing this problem in future negotiations. Backfire, however, did pose a particularly serious problem and careful consideration should be given to ways in which Backfire could be constrained in the SALT III context, without jeopardizing the possibility of obtaining limits on the long-range missile threat.

The SG's work contained a number of significant ambiguities which would clearly require further study and clarification:

(1) The adoption of a very restrictive step-by-step approach which concentrates on land-based missiles is the most practical formula and the one most likely to achieve visible progress. But it is argued that such an approach distracts attention from the wider and more serious question of the across-the-board Soviet TNF modernization; criticism of a different nature suggests that isolating a specific category of systems will effectively formalize the existence of a separate regional balance, a development which Europeans, particularly the Germans, are anxious to avoid.

While negotiations which dealt comprehensively with all nuclear systems in Europe and aimed for a collective parity in overall totals of all nuclear warheads, including strategic, would be politically desirable, it would be the most difficult to achieve.

(2) The precise level of SS-20's that the alliance could tolerate or "live with" has not been established, nor the corresponding numbers of NATO LRTNF then required.

(3) Establishing a de jure right to equal ceilings may create pressure on NATO to build up to those ceilings rather than accept permanent de facto asymmetry.

(4) It is not clear whether the ceilings on land-based LRTNF would be SS-20 only or whether it would also include SS-4's and SS-5's.

6. RATIONALE FOR THE NATO PROPOSAL

Before examining the December 12 decision and its immediate consequences, it is worthwhile to review in detail the various rationales

underlying the HLG's proposal—many of which have already been alluded to—as well as the criticisms directed at the NATO position.

During the course of the LRTNF debate, a number of separate but related rationales were advanced to justify deploying additional long-range systems in Europe. These included: to compensate for the consequences of strategic parity on the theater balance; to close the gap in theater nuclear forces caused by the substantial ongoing modernization of Soviet theater nuclear forces, particularly deployment of the SS-20 missile and the Backfire bombers; to replace existing obsolescent alliance systems; to reinforce the alliance strategy of deterrence through flexible response thereby provide additional political reassurance concerning the credibility of NATO's capabilities; and finally to demonstrate the ability and willingness of the alliance to act effectively and cohesively in the face of Soviet force expansion, and of the United States to exert its leadership role within the alliance.

The central argument for LRTNF has been based on the changing strategic relationship between the two superpowers, the perceived consequences of strategic parity as codified by the SALT process. Under conditions of strategic parity it is suggested that the functions of central strategic systems are confined to deterring either side from their use. In the current strategic environment, the U.S. guarantee to employ strategic systems in response to aggression against Europe is inevitably weakened. Accordingly, it is argued that under strategic parity existing asymmetries at the theater and conventional levels become more significant and should be rectified.

In this respect, the theater balance is now regarded by many as being adversely asymmetrical due largely to recent Soviet modernization of its theater forces with the SS-20 mobile missiles, the Backfire bomber, and a new generation of Soviet tactical aircraft capable of carrying larger payloads over greater ranges. While it is obvious that these Soviet medium- and long-range nuclear systems represent a clear improvement in capability over existing systems, what is in dispute is precisely the question of whether they represent such a quantum jump in capability as to necessitate a response from the West.

Proponents of LRTNF modernization argue that the SS-20 gives the Soviet Union an in-theater "selective" targeting capability that it previously lacked. The improved accuracy and reduced yield of the SS-20's warheads would permit the missile to be used against selective military (counterforce) targets in Western Europe, whereas the SS-4's and SS-5's could only be used against cities (countervalue). Furthermore, the mobility of the SS-20 makes it invulnerable to a counter-strike and gives the Soviet Union added flexibility in usage. Last, the reload capability of the SS-20 suggests to some observers that this weapon system, unlike the SS-4's and SS-5's, is designed for a sustained military campaign.

A more pragmatic case for LRTNF modernization arguably lies in the deficiencies of NATO existing LRTNF systems—SLBM's and long-range aircraft. The limitations of SLBM's have been said to include those of accuracy, flexibility of yield, and targeting; the firing of a single missile would reveal the position of the submarine; and they would not facilitate a "single shot" selective response because of the number of RV's on each missile. More significantly, SLBM's are considered too closely associated with the central strategic systems, a factor which might inhibit an American President from using them.

The long-range aircraft which currently complement the SLBM force apparently also have serious deficiencies. They are aging, vulnerable to preemptive attack, and would have difficulty penetrating Soviet air defenses. Under current circumstances, it is argued that NATO's LRTNF lack flexibility and thus do not provide a credible response to the threat posed by the new Soviet systems.

The combination of these factors, it is believed, creates a gap in the deterrence spectrum which the Soviet Union could exploit during a crisis. With its new capability to strike selectively at Europe, the Soviet Union has the potential in a conflict situation to escalate to a level at which NATO, deprived of the American strategic guarantee, would have no credible response. Accordingly, some observers argue that the Soviet Union might be tempted to engage in a preemptive strike disabling NATO's current theater systems trusting that the United States would be self-deterred from retaliating with central strategic systems or with NATO-dedicated Poseidons, thus maintaining a sanctuary status for Soviet territory. For example, Secretary of Defense Brown cautioned that.

In the face of improving Warsaw Pact forces, we must be alert to the possibility that the Soviets might seek a first strike capability with LRTNF's.¹⁸

The advantages accruing from this situation are more frequently presented in political/psychological terms than in direct military action. Few observers believe that the Soviet Union would actually use its SS-20's in a first strike role, but they argue that the possession of the capability and the perception of superiority it affords would permit the Soviet Union to extract political concessions from Europe in a crisis.

Finally, while the military rationale, and particularly the threat of the SS-20, was used consistently to gain public support for LRTNF modernization, political and psychological factors provided the predominant criteria for the final proposal. Most officials conceded that the strictly military rationales—other than the renewal of old systems—were not convincing. It is argued that little military advantage, in terms of the total numbers of weapons available and the additional targets that could be covered, would be gained by the deployment of an additional 572 warheads. This aspect was confirmed during a dialog between Senator John Culver and Walter Slocombe, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Internal Security Affairs. Asked by Senator Culver what military targets that are not now covered would be covered by the longer range capability, Slocomb replied:

It is not a question of reaching additional targets * * * I want to be quite clear. The requirement for TNF modernization is not principally an issue of hitting new targets.¹⁹

He went on to emphasize that the main emphasis for LRTNF modernization lay in the psychological aspect of deterrence.

7. CRITICISMS OF THE NATO PROPOSAL

Attitudes toward the proposal to modernize NATO's LRTNF can be divided into four broad categories: Those who believe there is

¹⁸ Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1980, p. 85.

¹⁹ Hearing before the Subcommittee on Research and Development of the Committee on Armed Services, Apr. 10, 1979.

an urgent requirement for a serious NATO LRTNF capability and view the 572 warheads as a totally inadequate response; those who believe that NATO needs a credible LRTNF capability but more for political than military reasons; those who are generally skeptical of the rationales for LRTNF but believe the modernization decision was necessary in order to achieve results in arms control negotiations; and those who reject the rationales underlying LRTNF modernization and argue that the costs of modernization will outweigh any marginal gains. Criticism of the NATO proposal has emanated largely from the first and the last groups.

The first group has criticized the NATO proposal as a totally inadequate response to a serious deficiency and further as hindering serious progress in bringing about the changes necessary to rectify the current imbalance. These critics argue that the NATO LRTNF modernization proposal has focused on a single element of the theater nuclear spectrum, and has thus distracted attention from the real problem facing the alliance in this respect—the across-the-board modernization of all Soviet theater nuclear forces.

Moscow's nuclear modernization program is not centered around a single system but consists of several new weapons, including the SS-21, SS-22, and the SS-23 battlefield nuclear support missiles, the Backfire medium range bomber, and the SU-19 Fencer attack aircraft * * * a comprehensive approach to theater nuclear modernization must be taken in replacing the alliance's increasingly obsolete nuclear posture rather than taking the piecemeal and ad hoc steps now underway.²⁰

Accordingly, these critics contend that the alliance can no longer choose between defense and deterrence. Because of the seriousness of the Soviet military threat and the wide range of military options the Soviet Union now has available, NATO, it is argued, must possess credible capabilities at all levels. This involves strong conventional forces but it also means usable theater and tactical nuclear forces capable of carrying out a wide range of military options. In this sense, the 572 warheads should be seen as only the beginning of a thorough reshaping of NATO's theater nuclear forces.

Criticism of the NATO proposal has been directed at three levels:

(1) In terms of numbers, the introduction of 572 warheads is totally inadequate, representing in General Haig's words, "only political expediency and tokenism."²¹

(2) It is argued that the NATO proposal has distracted attention from the real problem of making the alliance undertake a thorough reappraisal of its theater nuclear strategy in order to evolve a coherent and credible doctrine based on usable nuclear capabilities at all levels.

(3) The offer of arms control negotiations is considered a serious error because: first, NATO has no bargaining leverage and, therefore, the current imbalance can hardly be improved through negotiation; and second, negotiations could produce a number of constraints that could prevent the alliance from carrying out the modernization measures necessary to rectify the current imbalance.

²⁰ Richard Burt, "Washington and the Atlantic Alliance," *Strength to Weakness, National Security in the 1980's* (The Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1980).

²¹ *Atlantic News*, Sept. 12, 1979.

The following comments by William Van Cleave and Charles Marshall illustrate this school of thought:

Those Pershing II's are going to be distributed among 15 airfields. They have got to be an easy target. They have no reach. This isn't adequate, it seems to me, to compete with what is being proliferated against them. Hoping to make use of them in a tradeoff seems to me the equivalent of a high school football coach hoping to make a player deal with the Dallas Cowboys. (Charles Marshall)²²

It just doesn't equate with the type of theater nuclear modernization the Soviet Union has engaged in * * *. Cruise missiles are worthless unless they are deployed in large enough numbers and a large enough variety of purposes to saturate defenses because they are easily defended against. And less than 200 cruise missiles between now and the end of 1985 is no threat whatsoever.

Pershing II's merely replace a very old system in small numbers with a new system with very old technology and the same small numbers * * *. Pershing II isn't mobile enough to be survivable * * *. I don't regard these moves as modernization in any way whatsoever. (William Van Cleave)²³

At the other extreme, there are a number of critics who believe that 572 new warheads are unnecessary. These critics do not accept the thesis that strategic parity neutralizes the deterrent effect of central strategic systems for all situations except a direct attack on the homeland. They believe that the current and projected capabilities of the United States, plus its pronounced willingness to defend Western Europe, are sufficient to deter any Soviet leader from a move that could result in the destruction of Soviet society. For those Europeans who doubt the American commitment, it is difficult to see why a small increment of weapons should make any difference or why they should have more confidence that an American President would release a missile from Europe than from the United States. If indeed this is the case, they argue that rather than strengthening the escalation ladder, such deployments would weaken it by making possible the containment or limitation of a nuclear exchange to European territory.

Concerning Soviet views of the present balance, these critics argue, because the Soviet Union is faced by four major nuclear powers (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and China), it has specific regional concerns for which it has designed regional forces. However, there is nothing to suggest that the Soviet Union would perceive anything but a continuum of options ranged against itself, from the presence of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe to U.S. central strategic systems. It is therefore difficult, from this perspective, to see why Soviet leaders should perceive an exploitable gap in Western capabilities unless Western critics manage to persuade them.

With regard to the more precise question of the increase in military potential represented by the SS-20, these critics point out that the West has lived under the shadow of 600 MRBM's and IRBM's and hundreds of medium-range bombers for 20 years. They question whether the military characteristics of these systems represent a quantum jump in capability sufficient to justify NATO's LRTNF proposal. Concerning the "selective capability" afforded the Soviet Union by the increased accuracy and reduced yield of the SS-20, they argue that the term "selective" is difficult to appreciate when used to describe the use of 150 KT warheads (each 10 times the yield of the bomb used against

²² From *Strength to Weakness—National Security in the 1980's*, op. cit.

²³ *Ibid.*

Hiroshima) on a heavily urbanized and densely populated Europe. Any attempt by the Soviet Union to preempt NATO's nuclear assets would comprise, to all intents and purposes, a strategic strike of the most devastating nature.

Under these circumstances, they ask what political advantage could possibly be achieved that would make such an action, with the attendant risk of American strategic retaliation, worthwhile. Thus, if such an action is politically and militarily incredible, why erect a hypothesis of escalation dominance which, in reality, does not exist. These critics therefore believe that, as with "the window of vulnerability," the "escalation gap" in theater forces is visible only to those preoccupied with the narrow and selective world of targeting criteria.

These critics also argue that, as with other areas of technology, the Western advantage in cruise missiles will be short-lived and NATO will then face new problems when the Soviet Union also develops cruise missiles. Furthermore, the introduction of cruise missiles into Europe will severely complicate efforts to obtain limitations on theater nuclear systems.

In summary, then, critics of the LRTNF proposal do not accept that Western perceptions of, and confidence in, the nuclear capabilities of the alliance are being weakened by recent developments at the strategic and theater levels, or that the Soviet Union perceives a theater imbalance which it could manipulate for political advantage. They argue that it is unlikely that any amount of juggling with the geographic location of American nuclear capabilities could ever satisfy the permanent doubters of the American guarantee. This doubt is inherent in the geostrategic structure of the alliance and the physical detachment of the chief guarantor from its allies.

Two final comments should be made concerning criticism of the NATO proposal. First, a number of observers who were sympathetic to the need for LRTNF modernization disagreed with the choice of land-based systems. They have argued that land-based systems were a bad choice because public opinion frequently reacts negatively to the appearance of new nuclear bases and thus sitings could prove difficult in several countries. Furthermore, despite the emphasis on survivability through mobility, the realities of peacetime deployment mean that they remain vulnerable to preemption. Many observers doubt whether, during times of tension, the necessary permission to deploy would be given because of the escalating consequences implicit in such a move.

Second, while skeptical of many of the arguments put forward to justify LRTNF modernization, few of these critics believe that Soviet actions should go unnoticed or unchecked. They would prefer, however, to introduce control and stability through negotiation and would have preferred that these negotiations be tried before the NATO decision. Given Soviet concern and apprehension over the new American systems, they argue that the existence of the programs would have provided a sufficient basis for negotiations.

THE NATO DECEMBER 12 DECISION AND AFTERMATH

1. THE DECISION

In November 1979, the Defense Ministers of the Nuclear Planning Group approved the findings of the HLG for an "upward evolutionary adjustment" in NATO's LRTNF and forwarded them to the NATO Foreign Ministers for a final decision at the December meeting of the NATO Council.

The realization that a decision to introduce additional long-range systems into Europe would be taken in December caused a flurry of activity in a number of the smaller member countries. In the Netherlands, public debate over the NATO proposal had been underway for a considerable period, and it had long been evident that the Government, faced by opposition within its own party, would have serious problems in supporting the NATO proposal.

The NATO proposal did not cause as intense a public debate in Belgium, although some opposition did surface, particularly within the Flemish Socialist Party. However, the Government was preoccupied with its linguistic and constitutional problems that constantly threaten to divide the country. These issues and the equally pressing economic problems meant that it was always unlikely that the fragile Government would be willing to take a decision on such a sensitive issue as the introduction of new nuclear missiles into Belgian territory. If the last minute hesitation on the part of the Belgians took many American officials by surprise, it was probably because they had assumed that the authority of Foreign Minister Henri Simonet, who had been a strong advocate of modernization, would be sufficient to produce a Belgian endorsement.

The other two countries whose support showed signs of wavering, Norway and Denmark, were in a different position because, due to their "no nuclear weapons" policies, neither country was a candidate for deployment. Nevertheless, because of the principle of unanimity, it was equally important that both these countries agree to the modernization decision.¹ The grassroots reaction that surfaced in several of the parties in both countries apparently reflected a deep-rooted aversion to nuclear weapons and perception that the modernization proposal represented an unnecessary escalation by NATO of the arms race. The opposition in Norway was less threatening than in Denmark, but was serious enough to cause the Norwegian Prime Minister to fly to Washington in order to seek the personal assurance of President Carter concerning the seriousness of the arms control component. The Foreign Minister of Denmark and the Prime Minister of the Netherlands made similar visits. In Denmark, opposition to the NATO proposal was

¹ Both countries would be required to contribute to the operations and maintenance of the new systems through the common infrastructure fund.

sufficiently strong for the Government to propose formally to its NATO partners a deferment of the December 12 decision.

Neither this suggestion, nor the Dutch proposal to separate the production and deployment decisions and postpone the deployment decision pending progress in arms control negotiations, were accepted by the other NATO members. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany were adamant that the decision be taken and that there could be no delay. It was argued that to postpone any part of the decision would make NATO modernization plans hostage to the whims of the Soviet Union. In addition, a decision was needed in order to obtain congressional support for continued funding of the programs it was believed that 1980 would be a more difficult year because of elections in the United States and the Federal Republic.

The communique of the December 12 decision² reported that all Ministers had agreed to the modernization proposal, but it did not mention the reservations submitted by Belgium and the Netherlands. The Netherlands Government agreed to the reasons for LRTNF modernization, but said it would be unable to decide on deployment in the Netherlands until December 1981. Its decision at that time would be taken in the light of progress made in arms control negotiations on medium range systems.

The Belgian Government, according to the official minutes, noted the consensus of the meeting and endorsed the decision but emphasized that the application of the decision to Belgian territory would have to be confirmed in 6 months. The Belgian confirmation, as with the Dutch, would be taken in the light of progress in arms control.³

The position of Belgium remains unclear. Owing to a variety of domestic problems, including a change in the governing coalition in March 1980, Belgium was unable to give its NATO allies a definite decision after 6 months. In September, the coalition reached an agreed position which reiterated that Belgium's decision would depend on progress in the arms control negotiations, but that if the negotiations should fail, Belgium, "In concert with its Allies, will take all measures agreed upon by the NATO partners."

This phrasing was sufficiently ambiguous to allow both supporters and opponents of cruise missile basing to claim victory. While the future course of action by the Belgian Government on cruise missiles is impossible to predict, it is clear that economic conditions will continue to dominate the Government's attention. In this case, the Government's priority will be to insure the continuity of the coalition and avoid any measure that could alienate any of its major partners, including the Flemish Socialists, who have made opposition to cruise missiles a major plank in their platform.

The communique also contained the recommendation that ongoing arms control efforts should now include certain United States and Soviet long-range theater nuclear systems, and the United States should propose to the U.S.S.R. to begin negotiations as soon as possible. A special consultative body at a high level would be constituted within the alliance to support the U.S. negotiating effort.

² For full text, see app. 4.

³ For a detailed discussion to the background of the Belgian position, see Belgium, app. 3.

The communique also announced the withdrawal during the course of 1980 of 1,000 warheads. This development was partly a response to the Brezhnev initiative of October 6, 1979, when he announced certain unilateral withdrawals and partly to demonstrate that LRTNF modernization will not result in an increase of nuclear warheads in Europe.

2. THE AFTERMATH ⁴

The December 12 decision has been acclaimed as an outstanding success for the alliance and a clear illustration of NATO's ability to act cohesively. A closer analysis reveals that such claims may be somewhat premature. The reservations submitted by the Netherlands and Belgium remain to be resolved and could yet hinder the implementation of the modernization decision. Furthermore, the positions adopted by these two countries reflect the existence of a significant body of opinion in Europe which remains uneasy concerning the introduction of additional nuclear missiles. The continued existence of this sentiment and ambiguity surrounding how arms control proposals and negotiations will be managed are further elements of uncertainty regarding the future of the LRTNF program.

The weapons systems are still under development. Implementation details, such as costings, still need to be fleshed out. Thus far, sitings for the new systems have only been decided in the United Kingdom; but those for the Federal Republic and Italy are expected to be announced shortly. Meanwhile, the HLG continues to meet in order to consider other aspects of NATO's nuclear posture. Part of the HLG's mandate was that the 572 LRTNF warheads would be accommodated in the NATO posture without an increase in numbers. The HLG is therefore considering the impact of LRTNF modernization on the rest of the nuclear arsenal and is conducting a systematic review of NATO's nuclear forces. This aspect of the HLG's work has been referred to as the shift study. This concept was initially introduced in an attempt to persuade the Netherlands to support the NATO proposal by suggesting that acceptance of long-range systems could mean a reduction in shorter range tasks for certain countries. But, the current work of the HLG reportedly does not suggest any radical change in the balance between long- and short-range systems in NATO's nuclear posture.

On the arms control side, the strong Soviet reaction to the NATO December 12 decision—they took the position that the NATO decision canceled the basis for negotiations on theater arms control—and their subsequent invasion of Afghanistan with its adverse consequences for United States-Soviet relations appeared temporarily to have closed the door on potential negotiations. Ratification of SALT II, which was looking increasingly questionable even before the invasion of Afghanistan, became a forgotten issue in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet action.

For a period, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and American determination to make the Soviet Union pay a heavy price for its actions dominated the political scene, and arms control faded into the

⁴ The following section provides a general review of the events following the Dec. 12 decision. For more detailed coverage of developments and attitudes in individual countries, see the appendixes on European and Soviet perspectives.

background. European nations, however, were for the most part uneasy about the direction of American policy and reluctant to support actions which in their view would seriously undermine the East-West relationship, particularly the degree of stability in Europe that had been carefully nurtured over the past decade. Several countries were conscious that their support for the modernization proposal had been based on an explicit commitment to arms control and in anticipation that the SALT II Treaty would be ratified. Failure to demonstrate any progress in the arms control part of the decision could complicate their continued support for modernization. Contrary to what might have been expected, Soviet actions in Afghanistan had not diminished the opposition in Europe to LRTNF, nor has it produced any lessening in the belief that arms control remains an indispensable element of Western security.

In the transatlantic divergences that emerged over the implications of Afghanistan and what policies the alliance should be following, the FRG was prominent in insisting that dialog and communication with the East should continue. The commitment of the FRG to the arms control objectives of the December 12 decision was demonstrated when, in several campaign addresses, Chancellor Schmidt reiterated the idea of a freeze by both sides on new deployments. As NATO deployment could not begin until 1983, this meant asking the Soviet Union to freeze the deployment of the SS-20. These proposals, and confirmation that the Chancellor was prepared to go to Moscow for talks with Brezhnev, increased the mutual dissension and suspicion already existing between Washington and Bonn. This friction culminated in a letter from President Carter to Chancellor Schmidt cautioning him against taking action that might undermine the NATO decision. As one of the architects of the December decision and as someone who had been preoccupied with this aspect of Western security for many years, the Chancellor reportedly was antagonized by this incident. It was viewed by some as a decidedly low point in relations between the Carter administration and the Bonn Government.

Relations between the two administrations were reportedly improved after the meeting between Carter and Schmidt during the Venice Summit in June 1980, when Chancellor Schmidt clarified his objectives in going to Moscow.

The discussions between Schmidt and Brezhnev breathed new life into the prospects for LRTNF arms control negotiations. The Soviets dropped their rigid insistence that NATO cancel or rescind the December decision, and agreed that preliminary discussions on limiting medium range systems could begin without SALT II being ratified. However, they have made it clear that they did not believe substantial progress was possible without the ratification of SALT II and they stated that American forward based systems (FBS) must be included in the negotiations. Preliminary discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union on the question of negotiating limitations on medium-range arms in Europe commenced in Geneva on October 27.

3. THE SOVIET REACTION

As has been noted the Soviet reaction to the NATO decision was swift and abrupt. Soviet spokesmen denounced the decision, declaring

that it destroyed the basis for negotiations and rejected the NATO offer of arms control negotiations. Since December they have continued to criticize the NATO decision using arguments similar to those advanced during 1979. They have also accused the United States of using the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan as an excuse to begin a new arms race.

However, those Western observers who had predicted an eventual softening of the Soviet position were vindicated when, during Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow on June 30–July 1, 1980, the Soviets accepted the principle of beginning negotiations, dropping their insistence that the NATO decision must first be rescinded.

Since the Schmidt-Brezhnev meeting, a number of articles have confirmed the current Soviet position.⁵ Soviet spokesmen have stated that they would prefer to commence negotiations on medium-range nuclear systems, according to the proposals submitted by Brezhnev in his October 6 speech. In this respect, they have emphasized that these proposals still stand, but only if conditions are restored to those existing at that time; in other words, only if NATO rescinds its December 12 decision or at least officially suspends its implementation. The other possible forum, in their view, for these negotiations is SALT III and the avenue is obviously blocked now by the nonratification of SALT II.

Under these conditions, the Soviet leaders have proposed a third variant, to begin preparatory talks on medium-range systems without waiting for SALT II ratification and without NATO changing its decision, but with two conditions: first, that American forward-based systems are included and, second, that no understanding can be implemented before the ratification of SALT II. In Gromyko's words,

* * * the U.S.S.R. recently came forward with the initiative of embarking on a discussion of the question of the medium-range nuclear missiles simultaneously and in organic connection with the question of American forward-based nuclear weapons. It is meant here that possible accords on these questions may be realized in practice only with the entry into force of the SALT II treaty.⁶

Soviet commentators have stressed that, contrary to allegations by certain Western observers, the Soviet Union has not reconciled itself to the NATO LRTNF modernization decision nor has it accepted to negotiate on Western terms. They maintain that the initiative does not represent a change in position, and Soviet articles continue to attack the NATO decision on the ground that the West is attempting to upset the current equilibrium in its own favor.

Two additional points of interest have emerged. First, the Soviets have apparently decided what forward-based systems they would like included in future negotiations. The Pravda editorial of July 15, 1980, states that "hundreds and hundreds of various American carriers of nuclear weapons and bases at which they are deployed are involved." The article refers to American aircraft stationed at airbases in a number of West European countries and on American aircraft carriers and American missile-carrying submarines placed at the disposal of the European NATO Command. Other articles have calculated that

⁵ See particularly a July 15, 1980, Pravda editorial and the Gromyko article in the August edition of *Kommunist*.

⁶ A. Gromyko, "Disarmament—An Urgent Present-Day Problem," *Kommunist* (August 1980).

the number of NATO's nuclear arsenal in this respect totals about 1,500 units.

Second, Soviet officials have continued to downplay the significance of the SS-20 arguing that its deployment does not represent a quantum leap in capability but only the long overdue modernization of obsolescent systems. According to an interview with General Chervov, chief of the Soviet staff,

Obsolete types of missiles have come to the end of their serviceable life and are being replaced by SS-20 missiles, which are designed to carry out the same tasks. Of course, it would be strange if the new missiles were worse than the old ones, but their tasks and combat potential have remained basically the same.⁷

General Chervov referred to Western allegations that the Soviet Union was not withdrawing older missiles as it deployed the SS-20, and emphasized that in fact one or two obsolete missiles were being withdrawn as one SS-20 was deployed.

Soviet spokesmen have also confirmed that, during the preparatory talks on medium-range negotiations, the Soviet Union was not interested in French and British nuclear forces.

While the Soviet willingness to negotiate has been welcomed by Western leaders, its implications have yet to be fully thought through. Clearly, the potential inclusion of FBS broadens the scope of the negotiations beyond NATO's original concept and will inevitably complicate and prolong negotiations. From the Soviet perspective, prolonged negotiations might appear to offer one way of frustrating implementation of the NATO decision.

⁷ General Chervov, July 21, 1980, interview with "Rude Pravo" (Prague), as reported by the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Soviet Union Daily Report, July 24, 1980.

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

A number of serious questions remain to be answered concerning the NATO LRTNF modernization decision and its implications for the future of the alliance. The most immediate issues concern the implementation of both parts of the decision—modernization and arms control—and the closely related positions of Belgium and the Netherlands. In the longer term, the implementation of the NATO decision, and the circumstances under which it is carried out, promise to have significant implications for NATO on a number of levels: for the cohesion of the alliance, for relations between the United States and Europe, and for the broader context of East-West relations. Finally, it could provide the catalyst needed to spur frank and open discussion of the appropriate role for nuclear weapons in alliance strategy in order to form the political consensus that will be needed to support future developments.

The Netherlands is not due to make a decision on deployment until December 1981; and hopes that the Belgian Government would make a positive decision in the near future have now faded. Besides very general references to progress in arms control, neither country has specified the criteria on which it will make its decision. Their future participation in the deployment program must remain very uncertain.

While any prophecy concerning the future action of either country would be pure speculation, few observers are optimistic. Political conditions are not encouraging in either country. Although the constitutional settlement in Belgium has removed one of the Government's major preoccupations, the current Government probably still lacks the political strength to act decisively in such a sensitive area. In the Netherlands, the only chance for a decision in favor of deployment would appear to be the return of a strong conservative coalition in the elections next spring. According to current trends, however, this is not likely.

In the event that neither country agrees to deployment, NATO will have to decide whether to deploy 96 fewer launchers or to ask the other states scheduled to receive systems (the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic, and Italy) to accept additional missiles.

Because Belgium and the Netherlands would not be due to receive their quota of missiles until 1985–86, their current positions do not affect the ongoing implementation of the NATO plan. There is no requirement to begin the necessary preparatory work on sitings and construction that is already underway in the other three NATO countries.

On the arms control side, the recent negotiations in Geneva have been generally welcomed as much needed momentum in this field. But the Soviet condition of including American FBS greatly complicates the situation. The alliance position on arms control evolved by the

Special Group is based on a step-by-step approach focusing on the most threatening and easily identifiable TNF component, land-based missiles, an approach which it is believed is most likely to facilitate positive results. The inclusion of FBS broadens and complicates the negotiations in such a way as to make rapid progress almost impossible.

The question of inclusion of forward-based systems in the TNF negotiations remains a major issue. If NATO maintains its current advocacy of narrowly based negotiation, given traditional Soviet preoccupation with FBS, negotiations might not even be able to agree on an agenda for the talks. On the other hand, if NATO agrees to widen the negotiations and asks for reciprocal inclusion of additional Soviet theater systems, the negotiations could become hopelessly complicated. This choice may be one of the more difficult ones confronting the new Reagan administration.

Irrespective of the problem of FBS, the arms control position evolved by the Special Group contains a number of ambiguities that require clarification: Notably, what level of Soviet medium-range missiles is considered acceptable, and will the limitations apply to all Soviet medium-range missiles or just the SS-20's? What allowance will be made for Soviet non-NATO regional concerns? On what basis are NATO's 572 warheads negotiable?

The continued reluctance of the Belgian and Dutch Governments to agree to deployments could substantially increase intra-alliance tension. Alliance officials, and West German officials in particular, continually emphasize that NATO is an alliance of shared risks and responsibilities in which every partner must play an equal part. However, the smaller countries apparently resent the fact that they are expected to participate in politically difficult decisions whose primary purpose appears to many of their leaders to be to deal with concerns about the reliability of the American nuclear guarantee which they do not share.

The progress of the LRTNF decision could also affect relations between the United States and Europe. A substantial degree of frustration currently exists among American officials and observers at what is perceived as a reluctance by the European Allies to accept and support changes to NATO's defense posture which are considered essential. This perception fuels an already widely held belief that the Europeans are unwilling to assume a realistic responsibility for their own security. Reactions to the Dutch and Belgian reservations in LRTNF deployments have manifested such sentiments. This tension could be increased if further efforts to modernize NATO's nuclear arsenal meet with continued opposition from a number of European members. Current analytical writings and press reports are beginning to discuss Soviet improvements in their short-range nuclear forces, indicating that the next area of emphasis will be NATO's battlefield nuclear systems. Efforts to modernize NATO's battlefield systems could arouse a similar response as that evoked by LRTNF modernization, particularly if it involves the reintroduction of the proposal to deploy the neutron bomb.

Arms control could provide a further area of friction. Thus far, the alliance position toward prospective negotiations on LRTNF has been

carefully coordinated. However, as previously noted, differences between Europe and the United States concerning the appropriate emphasis to be placed on further arms control negotiations surfaced in early 1980. These differences were the result of the no-business-as-usual approach of the United States in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and of the nonratification of SALT II. During the past year, arms control assumed a lower profile in American security considerations. American officials suggest that they are now adopting a more realistic approach to arms control both concerning its objectives and its role in insuring alliance security. In contrast, the current European commitment to arms control is viewed as almost a blind faith which, it is believed, could have results that are counterproductive. Thus, while the alliance will continue to coordinate its position closely through the special consultative group, differences over both pace and content of the negotiations may well appear. A major uncertainty in this area is the change of administrations in the United States. How the Reagan administration shapes its policies toward NATO and arms control issues could either solidify or split the alliance on the TNF question.

The implications for East-West relations and the continued stability of central Europe could also be substantial. The implementation of the NATO decision will likely take place against the background of a number of efforts aimed at reducing tension and increasing military stability in Europe. These include the ongoing Vienna talks on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR), the discussion of a variety of confidence building measures at the Madrid followup meeting on security and cooperation in Europe, and negotiations on theater nuclear systems themselves. The implications of the actual deployment by NATO of additional LRTNF will obviously depend on how serious the Soviet reaction is and how successful the arms control negotiations are in obtaining meaningful limitations on either side. But it is a fair bet that deployment by NATO of cruise missiles will be followed by Soviet deployment of similar new systems. Such an escalation in the European theater would severely complicate future arms control efforts.

Finally, the LRTNF modernization decision constitutes a pragmatic compromise between those who believe that European-based nuclear forces have a functional war-fighting role to play and those who argue that their role is purely to enhance deterrence. The decision, therefore, left unresolved a number of deep-seated issues concerning the appropriate role of nuclear weapons in alliance strategy. It did not satisfy those who believe that to be credible, nuclear weapons should be usable; and, it displeased those who regard nuclear weapons as political instruments of deterrence and who believe that the political costs of LRTNF modernization far outweigh the gains in military capabilities. This disagreement on NATO strategy now is more likely to become a public debate. Those who believe that theater nuclear weapons are unnecessary must be prepared to examine and accept the consequences of a strategy without them. If they are necessary, then the alliance must agree to a posture that can be sustained by public opinion. Unless such a consensus is obtained, the alliance

will find it increasingly difficult to sustain the credibility of its strategy.

In sum, the end result of the NATO decision to modernize its long-range theater nuclear systems is far from certain. The outcome will depend: On the evolution of the United States-Soviet strategic nuclear dialog; on the overall direction of East-West relations; on the dynamic of relationships within the Western alliance, particularly between European governments and the new Reagan administration; and, on domestic political considerations affecting a number of alliance countries. In any case, it is clear that the unfolding drama could have far-reaching consequences for the Western alliance and for East-West relations for the rest of this century.

APPENDIX I

NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE EUROPEAN THEATER*

A. THE THEATER BALANCE

A direct comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces assigned to theater or continental strategic missions is a complex proposition as it involves a number of assumptions concerning the characteristics and missions of a variety of systems. Given geostrategic realities and the advanced technological means at the disposal of the two alliances, any attempt to separate the theater from the strategic balance is bound to produce an artificial picture which has little to do with the realities of a potential confrontation.

The following examples indicate the difficulties inherent in attempting to define a precise theater balance.

- U.S. central strategic systems clearly overlap in target coverage with the nuclear systems based in Europe. Likewise a number of Soviet ICBM's are known to be targeted against Western Europe.
- The official allocation of strategic systems to "theater" missions also causes problems. Several theater force comparisons do not include the 400 Poseidon RV's allocated to NATO because they are included in the SALT II aggregates.
- The characteristics of several systems make their precise categorization difficult. For example, the ranges of aircraft vary substantially according to their mission and payload. Many are capable of performing in either a nuclear or conventional role.
- A considerable proportion of Soviet theater forces are oriented against China. Yet they could be switched in a crisis situation. Similarly, long-range strike aircraft such as the FB-111 based in the United States could be dispatched to Europe during a crisis.
- Geographic asymmetries mean that even Soviet short-range nuclear systems represent a strategic threat to the Federal Republic of Germany as they could strike German territory if deployed in Eastern Europe.

The validity and usefulness of any comparison of theater forces is entirely dependent on the assumptions that have been made concerning a wide range of variables. This divergence in fundamental assumptions explains why a number of apparently conflicting theater force calculations have appeared in several authoritative sources:

- The German white paper on defense states that NATO has 386 medium-range nuclear systems and the Warsaw Pact 1,370. Its calculations are based on the inclusion only of systems with ranges of 1,000 miles over and exclusion of the 400 Poseidon warheads dedicated to NATO.
- The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) gives the total number of NATO nuclear forces available for theater missions as 2,045 and the Warsaw Pact as 5,364.

The IISS lists all systems capable of performing theater missions against the other side irrespective of likely mission orientation. Both sources appear to include all Soviet intermediate and medium-range missiles, even those targeted on China. With these qualifications in mind, the following assessment will provide a broad description of the theater nuclear forces available to both sides.

B. NATO'S THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

As previously noted, Thor and Jupiter missiles capable of striking the Soviet Union were deployed in Europe from 1959 to 1963. The Matador cruise missile (range 1,400 miles) was also deployed with American forces in the Federal Republic of Germany in the late 1950's.

*Prepared by the author. Much of the data is derived from the 1979-80 edition of the IISS military balance. That assessments of the balance can differ dramatically, according to the assumptions chosen, is illustrated by the fact that the IISS 1980-81 analysis of the theater nuclear balance suggests a more disadvantaged position for the West than did the 1979-80 edition.

The Thors and Jupiters were withdrawn in 1963 because of their vulnerability. The theater nuclear component then consisted of the more survivable Poseidon SLBM's, allocated to SACEUR's strike plan, and medium-range aircraft, particularly the American F-111's based in the United Kingdom.

The theater nuclear forces available to NATO commanders in time of conflict would include the 4 British Polaris submarines (64 missiles), the Vulcan bomber force (48), the U.S. F-111's based in the United Kingdom (156), the Poseidon missiles dedicated to SACEUR (40 missiles, 400 warheads), and a substantial number of aircraft capable in varying degrees of striking the Soviet Union. In addition, there are the French independent strategic forces, comprising the land-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles (18), the 4 nuclear submarines (64 missiles) with a fifth strategic submarine being added, and Mirage IV-A strike aircraft (33). Finally, NATO has a substantial number of tactical or battlefield nuclear systems at its disposal.

The following table indicates those NATO systems which could conceivably perform theater missions:

TABLE 1.—NATO LONG- AND MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS FOR THE EUROPEAN THEATER¹

Category and type	Range (nautical miles)	Inventory	Operating countries
SLBM:			
Polaris A-3.....	2,880	64	Britain.
M-20.....	3,000	64	France.
IRBM: SSBS S-2.....	1,875	18	Do.
SRBM: Pershing.....	450	180	United States, West Germany.
Land-based aircraft:			
Vulcan B-2.....	2,000	48	Britain.
Buccaneer.....	500	50	Do.
Mirage IV-A.....	2,000	33	France.
F-4.....	1,400	175	West Germany, Greece, Turkey.
F-111 E/F.....	2,925	156	United States.
FB-111A.....	3,000	66	United States (assumes half United States inventory moved to Europe).
F-4.....	1,400	324	United States.
F-104.....	750	367	Belgium, West Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Turkey.
Jaguar.....	1,000	177	Britain, France.
Mirage 5F.....	650	94	Belgium, France.
Mirage IIIE.....	650	105	France.
Carrier-based aircraft:			
A-6E.....	800	20	United States.
A-7E.....	1,200	40	Do.
Etendard IVM.....	350	24	France.
U.S. central systems: Poseidon.....	2,800	40	United States (assumes 400 warheads allocated to SACEUR).
Total.....		2,045	

¹ Source: "The Military Balance 1979/1980." The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1979, p. 119.

C. THE SOVIET UNION'S THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

The Soviet Union has deployed a force of intermediate and medium-range missiles targeted against Western Europe since the late 1950's. This regional force has been comprised of SS-4 Sandal missiles and SS-5 Slean missiles in fixed "soft" and therefore vulnerable locations. They are very inaccurate and have excessively large warheads. The majority have been based near the western border of the Soviet Union and the remainder east of the Urals targeted on China. Since 1968, the total number of SS-4's and SS-5's has been reduced from 750 to 440 and according to the 1980 Department of Defense posture statement all remaining SS-4's and SS-5's are facing Europe.

Since 1977, the Soviet Union has been deploying its new SS-20¹ IRBM, a mobile missile with three MIRV warheads, each of approximately 150 kilotons and with a range of 3,000–4,000 miles. As the SS-20 deployment has proceeded, some SS-4's and 5's have been retired, although at a slower rate than had been expected. At

¹ Most analysts agree that the modernization of the 4 and 5 force is long overdue. The SS-20 is in fact a derivative of the SS-16, an unsuccessful ICBM program.

present, U.S. Defense Department officials estimate that there are approximately 100 SS-20's deployed, one-third are targeted against Europe, one-third against China, and one-third can swing either way. The current production rate is estimated to be 50 per year and, by 1985, American officials expect about 200 SS-20's to be targeted against Europe. The SS-20 is estimated to be three times as accurate as the SS-5 and six times as accurate as the SS-4.

Since 1974, the Soviet Union has been deploying the TU-22 M Backfire B bomber as an eventual replacement for the older TU-16 Badger medium-range bomber. At present, the Defense Department counts 40 to 60 Backfires assigned against Europe, with a small number assigned against China. Over 100 Backfires are expected to be targeted against Europe by 1985.

The addition of more capable strike aircraft such as the Mig 23/27 Flogger, SU-17/20 Fitter and SU-19 Fencer have substantially increased the effectiveness of Soviet theater forces.

The following table indicates those Warsaw Pact systems which could conceivably perform theater missions.

TABLE 2.—WARSAW PACT LONG- AND MEDIUM-RANGE NUCLEAR SYSTEMS FOR THE EUROPEAN THEATER¹

Category and type	Range (nautical miles)	Inventory	Operating countries
IRBM:			
SS-5-----	2,300	90	U.S.S.R.
SS-20-----	3-4,000	120	U.S.S.R.
MRBM:			
SS-4-----	1,200	500	U.S.S.R.
SS-N-4-----	300	27	U.S.S.R. (in Baltic Sea).
SLBM:			
SS-N-5-----	700	54	Do.
SS-N-8-----	4,800	6	Do.
SRBM:			
Scud B-----	185	400	U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Romania.
SS-12-----	500		U.S.S.R.
Scud B-----	185	16	U.S.S.R., German Democratic Republic.
Aircraft:			
TU-22M Backfire B-----	3,000	50	U.S.S.R. (excludes naval air force).
TU-16 Badger-----	1,650	318	U.S.S.R.
TU-22 Blinder-----	1,750	135	U.S.S.R.
SU-19 Fencer-----	600	230	U.S.S.R.
SU-17 Fitter C/D-----	325	640	U.S.S.R.
Mig-23/27 Flogger B/D-----	450	1,400	U.S.S.R.
Mig-21 Fishbed-----	350	1,000	U.S.S.R.
SU-7 Fitter A-----	275	325	U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, Poland.
SU-20 Fitter C-----	325	35	Poland.
Il-28 Beagle-----	1,400	5	Do.
Mig-23 Flogger B-----	450	3	Czechoslovakia.
Total-----		5,364	

¹ Source: "The Military Balance 1979/1980." The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1979, p. 118.

APPENDIX 2

THE SOVIET PERSPECTIVE*

The Soviet Union has long insisted that the United States nuclear systems based in Europe and capable of striking the Soviet Union constitute a fourth arm of the American strategic forces. In addition, Soviet leaders have increasingly registered serious apprehension concerning American development of cruise missiles and the possibility that these systems would be deployed in Europe, particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany. Hence they have made strenuous efforts to obtain permanent constraints in the development and deployment of cruise missiles, particularly the ground-launched version.

Soviet apprehension of and opposition to the NATO plans to deploy new long-range nuclear systems mounted steadily throughout 1979. On March 1, 1979, Soviet Premier Kosygin warned the European members of NATO, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, that it would jeopardize economic relations with the Soviet Union if they pursued a "building of military preparations," while Brezhnev called for East-West negotiations on medium-range missiles in Europe. The Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers meeting in Budapest on May 14-15 saw "particular danger" in NATO deployment plans and called for the convening of an all-European conference, along with the United States and Canada, to discuss the transformation of political into military détente.

The Soviet campaign reached a crescendo in October with a number of substantial speeches or articles by leading figures, most importantly a major address by Brezhnev in East Berlin on October 6, and a series of unpublished letters from Brezhnev to the governments of Western Europe.

The Brezhnev initiative of October 6 consisted of an announcement of the unilateral withdrawal from the German Democratic Republic within the following 12 months of up to 20,000 Soviet troops, 1,000 tanks and a certain amount of military hardware; the offer to discuss limiting types of armaments other than intercontinental within the framework of SALT III, and a proposal for the further expansion of confidence-building measures in Europe.

During the period prior to the NATO December 12 decision, the approach adopted by Soviet officials and commentators consisted of a markedly similar mixture of assertions concerning the basic defensiveness of the Soviet Armed Forces, the existence of a balance of forces in the European theater, and the fact that rather than an increase in the numbers of their medium-range nuclear carriers, there had actually been a reduction; accusations that the United States was fueling a new spiral in the arms race and attempting to circumvent SALT II; warnings that the Soviet Union would be forced to respond to NATO deployments, that European countries basing these missiles, particularly the Federal Republic of Germany, would have to bear the consequences for their actions that the climate of East-West relations would inevitably be adversely affected, and the chances of future negotiations undermined; criticism of the inadequate Western response to the Brezhnev initiatives; and conciliatory gestures indicating that the Soviet Union was willing to negotiate limitations on theater systems, and that as a contribution to military détente, the Soviet Union would make unilateral reductions in its Armed Forces.

The following provides a brief summary of these major themes that have predominated in Soviet statements and articles.¹

The Soviet Union is not seeking military superiority and its armed forces are basically defensive in nature.

"* * * as for the Soviet Union I repeat again and again, that we do not seek military superiority. We have never intended and do not intend to threaten any

*Prepared in December 1979 by author.

¹Quotations as reported by the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

state or a group of states. Our strategic doctrine is purely defensive in nature." (Soviet Premier Brezhnev, Berlin, Oct. 6, 1979.)

The United States both in its strategic plans and its plan to deploy new nuclear systems in Europe is fueling a new spiral in the arms race, and in the latter case, attempting to circumvent SALT II.

"* * * However, the question arises: What has the United States been driving at lately and are not its practical steps since the signing of SALT II treaty leading to serious complications which will make the prospect of SALT III more remote and will burden Soviet American relations?

"* * * Just recently the debate about the expediency of delivering in certain circumstances a preventive strike employing strategic weapons against military targets on the Soviet Union's territory has been revived in the United States." (Soviet Minister of Defense Ustinov, Pravda, Oct. 25, 1979.)

"* * * This is the path toward aggravating the situation in Europe, a path toward whipping up the arms race. This is the start of a new stage, a new spiral in the arms race. This does not involve as you know some sort of toy, but nuclear missile weapons." (Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, Press Conference, Bonn, Nov. 23, 1979.)

"* * * It is a question of creation and deployment in Europe's territory of new systems of weapons for the solution of new strategic tasks. Let us ask the simple question how the United States would have reacted if we, the Soviet Union, upon concluding the SALT II Treaty with them started bringing medium-range weapons closer to their territory and were virtually solving by means of these weapons the goals which are now increasingly difficult to solve by means of the strategic weapons covered by the SALT II Treaty." (Valentin Falin, former Soviet Ambassador to Bonn, Tass, Oct. 15, 1979.)

"* * * The United States has signed the SALT II Treaty with us wherein the principle of maintaining parity is stated. Are these (new) plans not so much for saving Europe, as they say in America, but plans to circumvent the SALT II Treaty and to create a superiority to the benefit of the United States after all? This is in fact a violation of the SALT II Treaty." (Vadim Zagladin, First Deputy Chief of the International Department of CPSU Central Committee, Moscow Television, Oct. 20, 1979.)

As a balance of forces currently exists in Europe the deployment of new American missiles would alter the situation in NATO's favor.

"* * * The dangerous plans for the deployment of new types of American missile-nuclear weapons in the territory of Western Europe—about which Western propaganda is trumpeting already now—give cause for serious concern. To put it straight, implementation of these designs would change essentially the strategic situation in the continent. Their aim is to upset the balance of forces that has taken shape in Europe and to try to insure military superiority for the NATO bloc." (Brezhnev, Berlin, Oct. 6, 1979.)

"* * * What is meant is the principle of equality and equal security. When Leonid Illich Brezhnev and President Carter met in Vienna and signed the SALT II treaty, satisfaction was expressed by both sides at the fact that the talks were conducted on the basis of the aforementioned principle. And how many statements were made regarding the fact that at present there exists an approximate equality in strength between the East and West. And now, suddenly, the representatives of the Western countries, including the United States are alleging that there is no equality. Equality, they say, will be achieved only after the NATO plans about which we are talking are implemented.

"One asks oneself: When did the U.S. President state the true U.S. position—today or at Vienna? One position contradicts the other. In reality, the implementation of the plans to deploy new types of nuclear missile weapons in West Europe would lead to an upsetting of the equilibrium of forces, the existence of which has been stated on dozens of occasions by the leaders of the NATO countries." (Gromyko Press Conference, Bonn, Nov. 23, 1979.)

Ustinov argued that implementation of the NATO plan would have the aim of supplementing the existing American FBS and the French and British nuclear forces,

"* * * but also thereby of altering the strategic situation in Europe in NATO's favor. This would place the Soviet Union at a disadvantage in comparison with the United States, would entail an increase in the might of the United States strategic nuclear forces and would force the Soviet Union to adopt the appropriate retaliatory measures." (Ustinov, Pravda, Oct. 25, 1979.)

The geographic factor, which is permanently in the Soviet Union's disadvantage, has never been included in the concept of equality—a situation that will be aggravated by the deployment of new missiles in Europe.

Commenting that, despite Soviet pressure, the United States had flatly refused to discuss American forward based weapons, Gromyko stated,

"* * * The Soviet Union, let us say this straight out, made a concession. It consented that the treaty be concluded without this geographic factor being taken into account, a factor which is of advantage only to the West, for the United States. The Soviet Union does not have anything analogous that would balance the importance of this factor." (Gromyko, press conference, Bonn, Nov. 23, 1979.)

"* * * There are the U.S. strategic missiles and they are located on U.S. territory, on U.S. submarines, and have a flight time of about 20–40 minutes. This period of time * * * enables us first to track it and then to telephone Washington, or London, or Paris, using the hot line, and ask whether it is an attack or something unexpected. In the latter case, both sides can take measures to avoid the worst. If it is war, it is war. And there is time to push the button. The Pershing II flies for 4–5 minutes. Therefore, either one pushes the button right away or it is all over. As far as we are concerned, this is the change." (Zagladin, La Stampa, Nov. 25, 1979.)

Soviet medium range nuclear carriers have been modernized but their totals have not increased, in reality, numbers of missiles and aircraft have decreased.

"* * * As chairman of the defense council of the U.S.S.R., I am most definitely stating that the number of medium-range carriers of nuclear arms on the territory of the European part of the Soviet Union has not been increased by a single missile, by a single plane during the past 10 years. On the contrary, the number of nuclear changes of these missiles have even been somewhat decreased. The number of medium-range bombers, too, has diminished." (Brezhnev, Berlin, Oct. 6, 1979.)

"* * * Indeed the Soviet Union is renewing the medium range nuclear devices which have been in its inventory for some decades now. However, the number of medium range nuclear weapons delivery vehicles on the European territory of the U.S.S.R. has not been increased by us over the last 10 years by a single missile or by a single aircraft. There has even been a reduction in the number, as in the yield of their nuclear charges." (Ustinov, Pravda, Oct. 25, 1979.)

"* * * The SS-20 * * * is intended for carrying out the same tasks as medium-range missiles of old types which it now replaces. The deployment of our medium range missiles was caused by the presence in the territories of NATO countries in Europe of a powerful grouping of American forward based means and of corresponding arms systems of Great Britain and France capable of reaching the territory of the Soviet Union." (Pravda editorial based on an interview with Brezhnev, Nov. 17, 1979.)

Confirming that the modernization of existing types of missile installations is taking place, Gromyko argued that the Soviet Union has been modernizing certain weapons for at least 5 years and does not hide this:

"* * * Over the past 1–4 years it has been doing nothing new; it is only continuing the modernization that it began." (Gromyko press conference, Bonn, November 1979.)

The Soviet Union is prepared to make further reductions in its medium range nuclear forces, but deployment of new missiles by NATO would necessitate an opposite response.

"* * * We are prepared to reduce the number of medium range nuclear means deployed in Western areas of the Soviet Union as compared to the present level but, of course, only in the event no additional medium range nuclear means are deployed in Western Europe. (Brezhnev, Berlin, Oct. 6, 1979.)

"* * * The Soviet Union is prepared as a good will gesture to cut unilaterally, in comparison with the present level the amount of medium range means employed in Western regions of the U.S.S.R. provided that no medium range nuclear means are deployed additionally in Western Europe." (Pravda editorial, Nov. 17, 1979.)

"* * * The socialist countries would not, of course, watch indifferently the efforts of the NATO militarists. We would have in such a case to take the necessary extra steps to strengthen our security. There would be no other way out left for us." (Brezhnev, Berlin, Oct. 6, 1979.)

"* * * The implementation of this plan * * * would force the Soviet Union to adopt the appropriate retaliatory measures. (Ustinov, Pravda, Oct. 25, 1979.)

"* * * Fulfillment of NATO plans will mean further spiralling of the arms race in Europe * * * Surely the Soviet Union and its Allies could not overlook this and would have to take measures in answer." (Pravda editorial, Nov. 17, 1979.)

The Soviet Union is willing to negotiate limitations on theater systems, according to Gromyko, even outside of SALT.

"* * * Lying ahead, as is known, are also important talks on SALT III—we are for commencing them immediately after the entry into force of SALT II. Within the framework of these talks we agree to discuss the possibilities for limiting not only intercontinental but also other types of armaments, but with due account, of course for all related factors and strict observance of the equal security of the sides." (Brezhnev, Berlin, Oct. 6, 1979.)

"* * * The Soviet state suggests starting talks without delay concerning reduction of medium range nuclear means deployed in Europe. The earlier proposals for withdrawal from the Mediterranean in ships of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. capable of carrying nuclear weapons remain in force" (Pravda editorial, Nov. 17, 1979.)

"* * * There are no types of weapons and military problems which the Soviet Union wishes to place outside the limits of any settlement on the condition that other countries too adhere to just such an approach." (Ustinov, Pravda, Oct. 25, 1979.)

"* * * We stated: Good, if anyone has any doubts then let us start talks. Let us go to the negotiation table. Moreover we said that we are ready to discuss even the question of reducing our missile launching installations and of reducing their numbers. I ask that you pay attention to this and remember." (Gromyko, press conference, Bonn, Nov. 23, 1979.)

Gromyko stressed Soviet desire to obtain negotiated limitations on medium-range systems and warned that if the SALT III talks attempted to negotiate both strategic weapons and medium range nuclear missile weapons then they could be of very lengthy duration and added,

"* * * And I wonder whether there lurks here a huge threat both for Europe and not only Europe—negotiations going on but no solution achieved. We propose that talks be started immediately without waiting for SALT III."

However, Gromyko indicated that he did not believe SALT III could start quickly. "It seems there is no way that the talks on SALT III will start quickly." He pointed to a number of difficulties that had to be resolved.

"* * * Do you know there is still no agreement on which countries are to take part in the SALT III talks? I can say, of course, that the Soviet Union and the United States will participate, but one asks oneself: only the United States and the Soviet Union? You see, other countries also have strategic weapons. Why does the Soviet Union always have to proceed from the premise that this should only concern parity between the United States and the Soviet Union? And what about the U.S. allies which have nuclear weapons at their disposal? This question also arises and all this has still not been agreed upon." (Gromyko, press conference, Bonn, Nov. 23, 1979.)

A decision by NATO to develop and deploy new medium-range systems will undermine any chance of negotiations.

"* * * We are proposing that talks start immediately in the situation that exists without deciding on deploying new types of missile nuclear weapons in West Europe; that is, without putting into motion that whole mechanism for producing and deploying these weapons. * * * We have openly stated that such a formulation of the matter means political preconditions. This destroys the basis for talks. I repeat: such a position by certain NATO countries destroys the basis for talks." (Gromyko press conference, Bonn, Nov. 23, 1979.)

"* * * It is vitally important now to insure that no hasty actions that can complicate the situation and prevent achievement of positive results should be taken." (Pravda editorial, Nov. 17, 1979.)

A decision by NATO to develop and deploy new medium-range systems will lead to a deterioration of East-West relations and involve serious consequences for those European countries accepting the missiles.

"* * * As for Europe, they are planning to plant a mine under the edifice of peace, under its very foundation * * * realization of NATO's plans would inevitably aggravate the situation in Europe and vitiate in many respects the international atmosphere in general." (Brezhnev, Pravda, Oct. 25, 1979.)

"* * * Those people who solicit military advantages and superiority and banish their weapons must know this: they may burn their fingers badly. If, in de-

fense of commonsense and disregard of the goodwill of the Socialist countries, the NATO countries transform Western Europe into a launching pad for strategic weaponry, then they will encounter the firm and convincing responses of the other side." (Ustinov, Pravda, Oct. 25, 1979.)

The campaign directed at West European countries involved two additional aspects. In addition to stressing that all countries basing these systems become automatic targets for Soviet missiles Soviet spokesmen suggested that, through its new development plans, the United States was attempting to deflect the locus of any nuclear conflict from the United States to Europe. Referring to a Presidential directive to August 25, 1977, which states strategic parity makes the risk of nuclear conflict with the U.S.S.R. unacceptable for the United States, V. Falin commented:

"* * * Hence the conclusion that the Americans should concentrate on confrontation with the Soviet Union at the regional level and involve their allies in this confrontation more directly."

Second, the Federal Republic of Germany was singled out for special warnings. West German leaders, it was said, were faced with a clear choice of contributing to peace or aggravating the situation in Europe by accepting deployment of U.S. missiles targeted against the Soviet Union.

"* * * It is clear that in this latter case the position of the Federal Republic of Germany itself would worsen. It is not hard to see what consequences the Federal Republic of Germany would have in store for itself if these new weapons were put to use by their owners one day." (Brezhnev, Berlin, Oct. 6, 1979.)

Soviet spokesmen were also very critical of the Western nations for their inadequate reaction and response to Soviet arms control initiatives.

Additional points that emerged from what has been termed a Soviet peace initiative were:

A statement that "the Soviet Union will never use nuclear weapons against those states that refuse to manufacture and acquire such arms and do not have them in their territories";

A pledge by CSCE participants not to be the first to use their nuclear or nonnuclear arms against each other;

Proposals for several confidence-building measures involving the notification and limitation of military maneuvers and movements: First, the notification of ground force exercises to be made earlier and from the level of 20,000 rather than the existing 25,000 men; second, no exercises to be held involving more than 40,000-50,000 men; and finally, the notification of movements of ground forces of more than 20,000 men;

An emphasis on the fact that the Soviet Union does not deploy nuclear weapons outside its territory.

APPENDIX 3

EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES*

In order to understand the full range of views existing in Europe concerning the LRTNF decision and the various domestic problems facing member governments in dealing with the NATO proposal, it is necessary to examine each country individually.¹

A. THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The West German preoccupation with the imbalance in theater forces has been instrumental in developing the TNF modernization proposal, and German political criteria have been important in establishing the essential parameters of the NATO proposal. The position adopted by the German Government is based on an effort to maintain a balance between the demands of military security and those of détente. While both defense and détente are acknowledged as equally important elements in assuring Germany security policy, they frequently present conflicting demands which require reconciliation or balancing. The NATO decision linking modernization and arms control achieves this reconciliation and it avoids, temporarily at least, the choice between military and political factors by making one dependent on the other.

According to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, the fundamental problem facing NATO has arisen from the rapid qualitative increases in medium-range missiles on the Eastern side, plus,

"* * * the fact that in the intercontinental strategic sector, parity has been fixed by SALT II, so that there is no longer any U.S. 'surplus' in that respect, which formerly covered the deficit in continental strategic balance and which could have compensated for this deficit now * * *. Under the leadership of the United States, the alliance wants in this situation to create the option of restoring the balance in the continental strategic field by closing the arms gap." (Speech to SPD faction, Nov. 15, 1979.)

In the Chancellor's view, the December decision was to determine first how the balance in the medium-range sector could be restored through the closure of the arms gap and, second, how it could be restored through arms control negotiations. As the implementation of the first part of the decision would take 4 years, the alliance should emphasize that this implementation would depend on progress in the negotiations.

"* * * concrete measures for closing the arms gap * * * can be kept limited to the same degree as we succeed in achieving an effective limitation of the continental strategic systems in East and West at arms control negotiations, for instance SALT III." (Interview with German Press, Oct. 14, 1979.)

In order to emphasize the arms control potential, the Chancellor stated that, "* * * if these negotiations turn out to be successful, all that is aspired to under part 1 (of the decision) need not be fully implemented, perhaps only much less, and in the ideal case, not at all. This would require, however, that the Soviet Union ideally likewise be prepared to go back to zero level with its armament which it has not only decided but in fact already produced in this field."

Defense Minister Apel similarly emphasized that,

"* * * the necessity to modernize exists because the others have run away from us. We would prefer it if the others exerted limitation, if they negotiated with us and curtailed their arms. What we need is parity, similar chances * * *."

We want to make the influx of arms that will be available in 1983-84 at the earliest dependent on the results of negotiations with the Soviet Union. It means

*Prepared by author.

¹Quotations as reported by the U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

that the Soviet Union should be brought down as close to zero as possible." (Apel, TV discussion, Nov. 8, 1979.)

Chancellor Schmidt stated that even a result in which fewer than the proposed number of 572 NATO missiles were deployed, and in which Soviet missiles were controlled would contribute to stability. Before and after the December 12 decision, both he and Foreign Minister Genscher consistently suggested that the Soviet Union stop its present rate of modernization as a stabilizing measure that would also help negotiations.

In evolving his government's position, the Chancellor succeeded in melding the natural tendencies of a significant section of his own party which placed a higher priority on negotiations, with those of his coalition partners and elements of his party who tended to emphasize the necessity of modernization in order to achieve a balance. He achieved this by acknowledging and accommodating the strong feelings within his party that every effort be made to safeguard relations with the East. At the 1979 SPD Congress, he received a clear mandate for the Government's position supporting the NATO proposal. His personal success was demonstrated when he was elected chairman by a vote of 360 to 24 with 16 abstentions. Observers noted that for the first time he received greater support than Willy Brandt, who was reelected deputy chairman 365 to 34 with 17 abstentions.

Statements by leading members of the SPD indicated the preference of a substantial number of the party for a solution to the current theater nuclear problem through negotiations rather than modernization. Willy Brandt, in particular, represented this point of view. Speaking to the SPD Presidium, he said that Soviet readiness to negotiate as signified in Brezhnev's Berlin speech must be used "for concrete and constructive talks." He expressly opposed the idea that such negotiations should be conducted only after NATO's planned "counter arming." He advised that NATO and the Western governments, "take the Soviet leaders at their word and negotiate on appropriate measures for equilibrium between the security systems."

The Free Democratic Party (FDP), namely through Foreign Minister Genscher, tended to place a higher priority on the necessity to modernize in order to equal the balance. In Genscher's view, Moscow bore responsibility for the arms spiral,

"It has become necessary because the Soviet arms lead with regard to medium range arms is endangering the balance."

He also stressed the importance for the alliance.

"I believe the important thing about the December decision is the fact that the Western Alliance will muster the political strength to make a decision that is necessary for security, it will be a sign showing that the Western democracies are prepared to stand their ground."

The opposition parties, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) have supported the Government's position on the NATO proposal but have given a much stronger emphasis than the governing coalition to the need for NATO to modernize in response to the Eastern buildup. According to CDU Bundestag foreign policy expert Alois Mertes,

"There is now nothing left for the West but the bitter necessity of reestablishing the balance of strength which makes our security and peace credible."

The opposition was more skeptical than the Government about Brezhnev's proposals, seeing them as propagandist and designed solely to divert NATO from its course. CSU spokesmen expressed their disagreement with the non-singularity aspect of the Government's policy, arguing that the position of West Germany was too important and precarious to be made dependent on the decisions of other countries.

The German Government continually emphasized the need for a decision in December, acknowledging that some countries, particularly the Netherlands, were having difficulties. Apel nevertheless stated,

"We will fully participate in supporting the NATO decision and it seems that the conditions we have named will be accepted * * * Everybody knows what important NATO political decisions are involved. A decision on the fate of NATO will also be made. In the end, democracies will be in a position to do their duty and live up to the necessary demands." (Apel, radio interview, November 14, 1979.)

He emphasized that there could be no postponements.

"We cannot accept any postponements * * * We need the decision in order to negotiate with the Soviet Union. Loss of time means also loss of time in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union in the field of medium-range missiles."

Despite the German desire for unanimity, it was made clear that the abstention of the Netherlands or any of the other smaller countries would not be allowed to prevent a decision being taken.

The Federal government also stressed the role it was playing within the alliance in providing a serious initiative for disarmament and arms limitation. Speaking to the FDP Presidium, Genscher explained that the German initiative would concern three main areas:

- The proposal for stepping up the negotiation on troop reductions in Central Europe in which the West would strive for an interim agreement;
- The preparation of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe review session in Madrid in 1980, where confidence-building measures in Europe are to be discussed; and
- Negotiations on medium-range weapons.

In his speech to the SPD Bundestag faction on November 13, 1979, Chancellor Schmidt announced that a proposal pending before NATO to withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe was a German initiative.

"We are presently engaged in making a new proposal for a unilateral Western announcement namely, to withdraw unilaterally 1,000 Western nuclear warheads from Europe. It is clear that this would also alleviate the FRG. I expressly promoted this suggestion in a talk with President Carter 2 weeks ago. * * * The alliance is presently dealing with it."

With regard to negotiations on medium-range missiles, German officials stressed that these should be between the United States and the Soviet Union and should take place as soon as possible. Consultation mechanisms would be created to allow European participation.

"* * * (in my reply to Brezhnev) I shall express my view that negotiations should begin as soon as possible between the Soviet Union and the United States. The idea that Germany would have any part in these negotiations is well meant I think but I consider it adventurous. We must not allow the impression that we want or have to have a say at the table of the nuclear powers. (Chancellor Schmidt speech to the SPD convention, November 15, 1979.)

"The superpowers would negotiate * * * Naturally consultation mechanisms must be created where the European would have a say because medium-range potentials in Europe are involved." (Apel, TV discussion, November 8, 1979.)

German spokesmen also stressed that the ultimate goal must be overall parity in nuclear forces between East and West.

"In the end there must be an approximate parity on both sides with respect to the nuclear forces in East and West from the short to the long ranges. We must not try for intercontinental parity, Eurostrategic parity, theater weapons parity separately as this will tempt a potential aggressor to say: Well, well, we are not running the ultimate risk." (Apel, TV interview, Nov. 8, 1979.)

However, German officials consider the idea of trying to negotiate all nuclear issues in SALT III as impractical;

"The whole affair must be negotiated in stages * * * anyone setting out to negotiate in SALT III the whole worldwide problem all at once could not finish this in 3 years and would likely get bogged down. But I think if we, let's say, negotiate one stage, then 3 years is a realistic period." (Apel, radio interview, Sept. 30, 1979.)

In order to gain results, therefore, it was asserted that negotiations must concentrate on specific sectors.

"We will make the Soviet Union a concrete offer, namely negotiating on specific weapons systems against the new systems which the Soviets have acquired." (Apel, TV interview, Nov. 8, 1979.)

German officials were confident that the Soviet Union had a strong incentive to negotiate and that despite Gromyko's warning at his press conference, in Brandt's words, "this was not the last word from the Soviet side." The Chancellor pointed to Brezhnev's use of the word "implementation" during his Oct. 6 speech, to suggest that Brezhnev's intimidation attempts referred to the actual deploying of NATO systems. Therefore, the Soviet leader might be willing to use the interim period for negotiations. Officials also pointed to the joint communique after the Gromyko visit which reaffirmed that both sides saw no reasonable alternative to the policy of détente.

While emphasizing their total support for the SALT II treaty, German officials avoided making any direct linkage between ratification and the TNF decision.

Federal Government officials expressed general satisfaction with the Dec. 12 decision although there was disappointment that neither Belgium nor the Netherlands had been able to give their unqualified approval. German spokesmen have subsequently expressed the view that they expect these countries to live up to their responsibilities.

In the months following the invasion of Afghanistan, the German Government was placed in a difficult position. For the sake of alliance cohesion and to demonstrate solidarity with the United States, it felt obliged to support the American reaction. Yet, it was equally determined that the cooperation with the East and the stability in Europe should not be undermined. Therefore the Federal Republic of Germany gave its support to several of the American initiatives, despite considerable misgivings concerning their utility, while refusing to interfere with well-established patterns of cooperation with the East.

The Chancellor was particularly concerned that the growing skepticism about arms control in the United States and the Carter administration's insistence that there could be no "business as usual" until Soviet troops were out of Afghanistan, precluded the possibility of negotiations. The hostile Soviet reaction also made negotiations appear a distinctly remote contingency. Chancellor Schmidt feared that the NATO decision could become unraveled if TNF arms control, an integral part of the decision itself, did not show visible signs of progress. He needed, therefore, to keep the arms control option open.

In April 1980, the Chancellor made a series of speeches in which he reemphasized the growing disparity in medium-range systems caused by the ongoing Soviet modernization. This, he said, was increasing the problems of negotiating an acceptable balance, and he recommended that:

"A step in the right direction could be for both sides to simultaneously forgo the deployment of new or additional medium-range missiles for a certain number of years. I admit that the Soviet Union's presently existing lead would remain for that period of time. But that would be the case anyway at least for the next 3 years." (Speech by Chancellor Schmidt in Essen, Apr. 11, 1980.)

This proposal was in fact a repeat of his pre-December suggestions that both sides agree to a freeze. In effect it would amount to a unilateral gesture on the part of the Soviet Union as NATO could not deploy its systems before 1983 anyway.

He repeated this suggestion in another campaign speech the following day, but referred to the production rather than the deployment of new systems:

"A first possible step for solving this crisis could be for both sides to simultaneously renounce for a certain number of years the production of new additional or more modern medium-range missiles, so that this interim period of years can be used for negotiations on bilateral limitation—limitation to a balance on a lower level."

These speeches touched off a flurry of speculation both in Bonn and Washington that the Chancellor was altering his position on the December decision. His use of the phrase "a certain number of years" led some observers to speculate that he was suggesting that the NATO deployment could be put off beyond 1983. Nor was it clear what implications his reference in his second speech to production rather than deployment had for the NATO modernization plan.

Federal Republic of Germany Government spokesmen denied that the proposal in any way represented a change in the position adopted by NATO in December. They insisted on the contrary that the Chancellor was promoting NATO's offer of negotiations by urging the Soviet Union to halt its modernization program as a positive gesture to enable these negotiations to commence.

The Chancellor clarified his position in a third speech in which he specifically referred to 1983 as the time when NATO was due to introduce its new systems. Stressing again that the Soviet's ever-increasing lead in theater nuclear systems was making negotiations more difficult he said:

"Since it will take the West until 1983 anyway to put out the first modern Western medium-range arms—we knew this when we made our decision in Brussels in December—and because these arms will by far not have the range of the Soviet missiles—they are in part still being developed and, at any rate, are not even being produced yet—since at least 3 years will pass until they will be deployed in the West, it is desirable that no deployment take place on both sides for 3 years and that one should start negotiations immediately—regardless

of whether SALT II is ratified or not." (Speech by Chancellor Schmidt in Cologne, Apr. 20, 1980.)

Despite obvious signs of unease in Washington toward the general drift of German policy, West German officials continued to stress the importance of maintaining the option for arms control negotiations. American suspicions intensified when it was announced that the Chancellor had been invited to Moscow for discussions with Premier Brezhnev and that Schmidt was willing to accept the invitation.

Misperceptions between Bonn and Washington multiplied. The Federal Republic of Germany Government feared that American intransigence with regard to negotiations with the Soviet Union could undermine the NATO LRTNF decision. German frustration and unease at American strategy was compounded by the apparent insensitivity and clumsiness of American tactics, much of which appeared to some to be motivated by domestic considerations. For its part, the Carter administration saw German insistence on cooperation and dialog with the East as weakening American policies and giving the Soviet Union the opportunity to divide the alliance. Some American observers alleged that the Federal Republic of Germany was moving to a more independent position within the alliance, based on accommodation with the Soviet Union.

The American-German friction reached a climax when President Carter wrote a personal letter to the Chancellor cautioning him against making any proposal that might weaken the NATO December decision. As one of the architects of the NATO proposal and as someone who had long studied defense problems and, particularly, the problem of nuclear weapons in the alliance, Chancellor Schmidt was reportedly extremely angry over the letter. Relations between the two leaders apparently improved following their meeting at the Venice summit and the Chancellor clarified his objectives in going to Moscow.

The Schmidt visit to Moscow has introduced a new impetus into the search for a way to begin LRTNF arms control negotiations. In a speech to the Bundestag following his return, the Chancellor reported that Brezhnev had repeated a firm Soviet stand on three issues:

- (1) The Soviet Union cannot be prepared to open negotiations on SALT III before it has gained clarity about the destiny of SALT II;
- (2) The negotiating offer outlined by Brezhnev on October 6, 1979, stands only if the implementation of NATO's December decision is suspended;
- (3) The Soviet Union is not prepared to accept unilateral limitations of its nuclear potentials not even for a limited period of time.

The Chancellor revealed that, despite these positions, the Soviet leadership had put forward a constructive new proposal:

"The Soviet leadership declared its preparedness to enter bilateral talks with the United States prior to the ratification of SALT II on the limitation of nuclear arms. In these talks, bilateral medium-range arms should be discussed and all factors bringing influence to bear on the strategic situation in this field considered. He (Brezhnev) pointed out that in this connection the so-called 'forward-based systems' ought to be included. Please excuse me for using this international term of experts. I will translate it: It means those American nuclear arms which have already been stationed in Europe and which can reach the Soviet Union. He added that the agreements resulting from such talks, however, could be implemented only—that is what he, the general secretary said—after the ratification and implementation of SALT II." (Speech by Chancellor Schmidt to the Bundestag, July 3, 1980.)

The Chancellor commented that in reply to the proposal to include American forward-based systems (FBS), he had stated that in such a case, corresponding Soviet arms should be included in the talks.

In a later interview, he confirmed that the Soviet leadership had stated that they were not at this stage interested in including British and French nuclear systems, only American FBS.

In the Chancellor's view, a new situation had been created as a result of his visit to Moscow. The Soviet demand to suspend the NATO decision no longer hindered the talks on the mutual limitation of medium-range systems.

B. THE UNITED KINGDOM

The Conservative government of Mrs. Thatcher has consistently adopted a hard-line position toward the Soviet Union, her actions running closely parallel

to current American policy. In keeping with this approach, her government fully supported the NATO proposal to respond to the Soviet buildup.

"By extending her own armanents efforts, the Soviet Union compels others to do likewise. We must see those who could threaten us as they are and not as we would like them to be." (Prime Minister Thatcher, Guildhall speech, Nov. 12, 1979.)

The United Kingdom had played an extremely active role in the work of the "High Level Group" and in the evolution of the NATO modernization proposal. British officials were prominent in urging the importance of the December decision and in stressing the dangers of a failure by the alliance to act decisively.

Prior to the December 12 decision, Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington warned that Soviet appeals to talk about the limitation of Soviet arms were "transparent."

According to press reports, Defense Minister Pym also argued forcefully for a unanimous decision in December. He called for military considerations to take priority over political ones, and stressed that arms limitation talks should be negotiated from positions of strength. He rejected the Dutch request for a 2-year delay on the deployment decision as "unrealistic." He also pointed out that NATO's entire long-range theater nuclear force consisting of American F-111's and British Vulcans was based in the United Kingdom. The NATO plan would spread these weapons more widely throughout Europe, which would give enhanced strength to the United Kingdom and the whole alliance.

The United Kingdom is the only one of the five prospective host countries where sitings for the deployment of the new systems have been carried out, and two main operating bases (MOB) have been selected there. Under the NATO proposal, 40 cruise launchers—160 missiles—will be deployed in the United Kingdom. In answer to a preliminary question, Defense Minister Pym has indicated that the United Kingdom will have a degree of say in the authorization for the use of the new systems. However, the precise implications of his statement are unclear.

The decision to accept cruise missiles and the more recent announcement of the purchase of the Trident missile to replace the Polaris deterrent force has sparked a new wave of antinuclear feeling in the United Kingdom. Opposition to the possession of nuclear arms and the location of American nuclear bases on British soil is reported to be running higher than in the days of the "campaign for nuclear disarmament (CND)" in the 1950's. The movement has produced a spate of literature and articles arguing for and against the Government's current position. Much of the argument has been evoked by the publication of a Government handbook on Civil Defense, "Protect and Survive," which provoked a critical review of Government policy by Oxford historian E. P. Thompson called "Protest and Survive."

Within the political parties, the antinuclear sentiment has been restricted largely to the left. The Labor Party, however, is split between unilateralists who want Britain to take the lead in nuclear disarmament, and the multilateralists who prefer that disarmament is carried out in the context of multilateral negotiations. The recently-elected leader Michael Foot, has declared for unilateralism and has said he would ask for the withdrawal of cruise missile bases.

C. ITALY

To the surprise of many observers, the Christian Democrat government of Francesco Cossiga was able to adopt a favorable position on the NATO TNF modernization proposal and on the deployment of 24 cruise missile launchers (96 missiles) on Italian territory. This government position was endorsed by the Italian parliament when it approved the plan by 328 votes to 230.

The Communist Party (PCI) found itself in a predicament as the other parties suggested that its position on the TNF issue would be an appropriate test of its independence of Moscow and its support for NATO. The PCI therefore adopted a position that, while opposed to the NATO proposal, acknowledged the existence of a problem concerning the military balance and suggested certain courses of action.

"The objection raised is that this is essential for restoring parity to the military balance which in Europe has allegedly been altered to the U.S.S.R.'s advantage. We do not have sufficient information to confirm this assumption. The problem of balance does exist and we are therefore in favor of a serious and

rigorous verification of the real nuclear strength on both sides. But even admitting that this were the case, if we want to work effectively for disarmament and détente, the path we must follow is certainly not that of reestablishing parity at higher levels, but quite the opposite; that is, eliminating the cause which presumably led to the alleged unilateral alteration. And, if this cause is called SS-20, we have no hesitation in demanding that the cause be eliminated." (PCI Foreign Section Chief Antonio Rubbi, Nov. 7, 1979.)

The party Directorate issued the following statement on November 28 in which the PCI proposed:

(1) To suspend any decision on the manufacture and deployment of new missiles, or at least postpone the question for 6 months or more.

(2) To call on the U.S.S.R. to suspend the manufacture and deployment of its SS-20 missiles.

(3) To open negotiations immediately on fixing a lower ceiling for the military balance which would guarantee mutual security.

The change of coalition has not resulted in any change in the position of the Italian Government regarding the basing of cruise missiles. However, the choice of sites in Italy is expected to be made soon and it is believed that this could produce strong local reaction against government policy.

D. THE NETHERLANDS

The issue of new nuclear deployments was the subject of intense public and parliamentary debate in the Netherlands. Like the proposal to introduce the ERW, it fanned the deep-rooted opposition among much of the Dutch population toward nuclear weapons. This opposition was broadly based and represented a force that the Government could not ignore.

The present Dutch Government is a coalition of the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), an alliance of three parties (the Anti-Revolutionary, Catholic People, and Protestant Parties), and the Liberal Party (VVD), in fact the most conservative of the Dutch parties.

While the political leaders, Prime Minister Van Agt, Foreign Minister Van der Klaauw, and Defense Minister Scholten, and their Liberal partners favored the NATO modernization proposal, a substantial number of CDA members were opposed. The main opposition party, the Labor Party (PvdA), the single largest party in the Netherlands, was almost unanimously opposed to the decision and recommended that the NATO decision be postponed.

During party discussions before the December decision, the CDA established a number of starting points which the Government was to use in formulating its position. These included limiting the numbers of new systems (that is, less than the 572) and that the eventual decision involve production only. Under this approach, the deployment decision would be postponed for 2 years while it was determined if arms control negotiations with the Soviets were successful. This approach was presented at the November meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group, but was rejected by the other countries.

In a nonbinding vote on December 6, the Dutch parliament rejected by 76 votes to 69 the plan for the production and deployment of new systems. The Government was thus placed in a difficult position. Acquiescence in the NATO decision risked defeat in a vote of confidence, as it possessed a majority of only 2 in the 150-member parliament. In this case, the Government's survival would depend on how many of its own CDA members voted against it. On the other hand, if the Government followed Parliament's wishes and voted against deployment, or abstained, then it risked isolation within NATO, as the other countries had declared their intention of going ahead irrespective of the Dutch position.

In addition, the Liberals had stated that if the Government took this course of action then they would leave the coalition and thus cause the fall of the Government.

The Government's decision to support the final communique announcing the agreement of all members for the modernization proposal, while adding a reservation that the Netherlands would not agree to participate in deploying the new systems for 2 years, was an attempt to mollify both its partners and the opposition. This compromise position was successful as the Government survived a parliamentary vote, with the CDA "rebels" finally voting with the Government.

The status of the SALT II Treaty makes the Dutch position even more difficult. The Foreign Minister talked of a direct link with the NATO decision, point-

ing out that negotiations on SALT III cannot begin unless the U.S. Senate ratifies SALT II. He reiterated that the Dutch Government cannot make "any unconditional promises on the NATO proposal without ratification of SALT II."

Since the December decision, there has been no sign of a change in the mood of the country or parliament and, therefore, of the Government's position. New elections are expected next spring. A positive Dutch decision would appear likely only if the current government is returned to power with fully supportive members. In this respect, a number of the CDA rebels have been given low ranking on their party list making their reelection more difficult. The election of a Labor government would almost certainly rule out a decision favoring deployment.

Two further aspects concerning the position in the Netherlands should be noted: first, a number of Dutch observers believe that Dutch acceptance of deployments would have been made more possible if there had been a clear reduction in the number of other nuclear tasks performed by Dutch forces; second, it is feared that undue NATO pressure concerning deployments will serve to strengthen those elements who question Dutch membership in the alliance.

E. BELGIUM

For the past few years, Belgium has been preoccupied with a number of internal problems directly related to the friction between the Flemish and Walloon communities. This tension has been exacerbated by steadily worsening economic conditions.

During the period of preparation and consultation that preceded the NATO December 12 decision, American officials appeared confident that the Martens coalition government would endorse the proposal and accept the deployment of cruise missiles on Belgian territory. This optimism was based on two factors. First, key Belgian officials, including both the Defense and the Foreign Ministers, had expressed their support for the proposal. The support of the latter, Mr. Henri Simonet, was considered particularly significant, owing to his reputation and his position in the Socialist Party. Second, in comparison with Holland, domestic opposition in Belgium was relatively restrained. NATO attention and concern had thus been focused on the fierce public debate in Holland.

But domestic opposition to the deployment of cruise missiles had manifested itself in Belgium particularly among the Flemish socialists. The Belgian socialist members of the European Parliament stated in a communique that they had learned "with concern" of the recommendation made at the NPG meeting in The Hague. They insisted that no decision should be made "within the unduly short limits suggested by NATO."

Close analysis of the domestic situation and of the fragility of the Martens government might have indicated that the official optimism regarding the Belgian position was misplaced, and that despite its official leanings, the Government would have great difficulty in agreeing to such a contentious issue. Prior to the December 12 NATO ministerial meeting, the issue of cruise missiles had scarcely been debated in the Government (then consisting of the Flemish and Walloon sections of the Christian Democrats and Socialist parties and the Francophone Front. The Cabinet met on the morning of December 12 in order to reach a decision. Their decision was presented to the NATO ministers by Foreign Minister Simonet and the official NATO minutes record that the Belgian Government, noting the consensus of the meeting, endorsed the modernization decision, but said that it would confirm the application of the decision for Belgian territory in 6 months in the light of progress on arms control. However, Belgian officials have confirmed that the Cabinet endorsed the modernization decision but said it would take its decision on the application to Belgian territory in 6 months in the light of progress on arms control. Belgian observers believe that the Foreign Minister, a strong supporter of modernization, saw this more optimistic interpretation as the best means of securing an eventual Belgian deployment decision without provoking a Government crisis. They maintain that Simonet felt his personal authority in the Cabinet would be sufficient to obtain Government confirmation after the 6-month period.

However, following a Government crisis in April, Simonet ceased to be Foreign Minister. The coalition collapsed in April 1980. After month-long negotiations, the leaders of six political groups (the Flemish and Walloon sections of the Liberal, Christian Democrats, and Socialist parties) agreed to form a new government under Mr. Martens. The new Government was again totally preoccupied with the linguistic issue and the deteriorating Belgian economy. Consequently,

during the meeting of the NATO Foreign Ministers in Ankara, the Foreign Minister, Mr. Nothomb, said that he had not had sufficient time to make a decision and requested an extension.

In September 1980, the Government issued a declaration which it said established its position regarding the deployment of cruise missiles on Belgian territory. The operative paragraphs of this declaration read:

"The Government hopes that the talks will lead to positive results and that, more especially, the balance of theater nuclear weapons will be maintained at the lowest possible level. Belgium will spare no effort to make the maximum contribution to this end.

"In order to facilitate the conduct of the negotiations, the Government declares that Belgium is here and now prepared to accept the outcome of the negotiations with the U.S.S.R. and to execute its role within the context of the alliance.

"Should the negotiations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. not succeed, Belgium, in concert with its allies, will take all the measures agreed upon by the NATO partners.

"For this purpose, the Government will examine the state and progress of the negotiations every 6 months in conjunction with its allies and draw the necessary conclusions in the context of the alliance. Parliament will be kept informed regularly."

The ambiguous wordings of the declaration allowed both the supporters and opponents of deployment to claim victory. The foreign press tended to interpret the declaration as a sign that Belgium would accept deployment of cruise missiles. The domestic press was more cautious, pointing out that nowhere did the declaration explicitly say that Belgium would accept deployment. The declaration satisfied the Prime Minister's objective which was to keep Belgium's options open in order to keep faith with its NATO allies while maintaining his Cabinet intact. The top priority for Mr. Martens remains the severe economic problems and in order to tackle these, he needs a united Cabinet.

The Flemish Socialists continue to be the Cabinet group most strongly opposed to deployment. They have made opposition to deployment one of the points on which they participate in the Government and their political leaders now have considerable political investment in the issue. The French Socialists, for the most part, do not oppose deployment but would find it difficult to remain in the Government if the Flemish Socialists walked out. The latest coalition formed in October between the Flemish and French Christian Democrats and Socialists saw the departure of the Liberals who were strong supporters of deployment.

Because of the fragility of coalition politics and the still deteriorating economic condition of the country, it is difficult to see how the Government will be in a position to take a firm decision on cruise missile deployment in the near future.

F. DENMARK

While the vote of Denmark, as a country which does not allow nuclear weapons on its soil, did not carry so much weight as other members, its endorsement of the decision was important in order to satisfy the German condition of unanimity.

As a result of pressure from a substantial number of members of the Social Democratic Party the minority Social Democratic government of Prime Minister Erhard Jorgensen was forced to review its position on the NATO proposal. The Government decided that it would not reject modernization and said it would suggest to its NATO allies that the proposal to replace existing systems with new ones should be deferred for 6 months. In the event that this deferment proposal was refused, the Government said it would reconsider its position.

The objective of the Danish proposal was to give the Soviet Union a 6-month period in which to announce its readiness to discuss the problem of medium-range missiles. During these negotiations, it was hoped that the Soviet Union would halt the production and deployment of its SS-20 missiles and Backfire bomber. If this Danish initiative failed to evoke a response in the Soviet Union within the 6-month period, the Danish Government agreed that it would join the talks on NATO modernization on terms decided by the alliance.

At the December 12 meeting, the NATO Ministers refused to accept this Danish initiative. The Danish Government then endorsed the modernization proposal. In order to seek assurances on the arms control component of the NATO

proposal the Danish Foreign Minister had flown to Washington shortly before for consultations with American officials.

The issue of new nuclear missiles provoked widespread public debate in Denmark, particularly concerning what was seen as an unnecessary escalation of nuclear arms in Europe. Public interest in the NATO proposal was particularly focused when three private American analysts were invited to Denmark to speak against the NATO decision. During elections in 1979, two right of center parties who suffered serious losses attributed their reverses to the fact that they had advocated Denmark accept nuclear weapons on its soil.

Observers have pointed to two significant consequences of the LRTNF debate in Denmark: first, that it focused public attention on defense issues and Denmark's role in NATO to an unprecedented level; and second, that, for the first time, public and parliamentary pressure forced the Danish Government to reassess its position.

It should be noted that, as in the case of Belgium, Danish expenditure on defense has been affected by economic trends. The Government has announced that defense expenditure will be allowed to rise only to account for inflation.

The Danish Government welcomed the results of the Schmidt-Brezhnev meeting stating that this was the sort of development envisaged by the Danish deferment proposal in December. At the same time the Chairman of the Labor Party went to Moscow for discussions with Soviet leaders.

G. NORWAY

The Norwegian Government was also supportive of the NATO proposal. In his foreign policy statement to the Storting (parliament) on October 25 Foreign Minister Frydenlund said that:

"* * * in its response to the proposal the Norwegian Government would emphasize that the proposals would not affect Norwegian policy on nuclear weapons on Norwegian soil. However, because of the self-imposed limitation inherent in this policy, Norway would have to give particular consideration to the points of view of other members of the alliance that would be directly affected by a possible decision to deploy the new medium-range missiles."

The ensuing debate in the Storting revealed different views as to the deployment of medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe, but the majority of the speakers gave support to the viewpoint expressed by Mr. Frydenlund.

However, in the weeks immediately preceding the December 12 decision a substantial number of members of the ruling Labor Party manifested a growing concern with the NATO proposal. But as the Labor Party was split on the issue and as the Conservative Party, the second largest party, was in favor of the NATO proposal, parliamentary support for the Government's position was assured.

The dissatisfaction from within his own party was sufficient, however, for Prime Minister Odvar Nordli to fly to Washington to confer with President Carter in order "to emphasize the importance of having real negotiations" with the Soviet Union on the reduction of missile arsenals in Europe. Any doubts on issue of arms control negotiations were presumably satisfied as Norway endorsed the NATO proposal at the December meeting.

Foreign Minister Frydenlund welcomed Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow and the possibility that arms control could begin. He has also expressed the hope that the talks would reach the so-called zero option, that is, they would make it unnecessary to deploy new missiles either in East or West.

Both Norway and Denmark are sensitive to the views of their Nordic neighbors, Sweden and Finland. In this respect they are generally reluctant to support moves that could be interpreted as escalatory, and which could, therefore, have adverse consequences on the general stability in the northern region.

APPENDIX 4

COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT A SPECIAL MEETING OF THE NATO FOREIGN AND DEFENSE MINISTERS IN BRUSSELS ON DECEMBER 12, 1979

1. At a special meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers in Brussels on December 12, 1979:

2. Ministers recalled the May 1978 Summit where governments expressed the political resolve to meet the challenges to their security posed by the continuing momentum of the Warsaw Pact military build-up.

3. The Warsaw Pact has over the years developed a large and growing capability in nuclear systems that directly threaten Western Europe and have a strategic significance for the Alliance in Europe. This situation has been especially aggravated over the last few years by Soviet decisions to implement programs modernizing and expanding their long-range nuclear capability substantially. In particular, they have deployed the SS-20 missile, which offers significant improvements over previous systems in providing greater accuracy, more mobility, and greater range, as well as having multiple warheads, and the Backfire bomber, which has a much better performance than other Soviet aircraft deployed hitherto in a theater role. During this period, while the Soviet Union has been reinforcing its superiority in Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) both quantitatively and qualitatively, Western LRTNF capabilities have remained static. Indeed these forces are increasing in age and vulnerability and do not include land-based, long-range theater nuclear missile systems.

4. At the same time, the Soviets have also undertaken a modernization and expansion of their shorter range TNF and greatly improved the overall quality of their conventional forces. These developments took place against the background of increasing Soviet intercontinental capabilities and achievement of parity in intercontinental capability with the United States.

5. These trends have prompted serious concern within the Alliance, because, if they were to continue, Soviet superiority in theater nuclear systems could undermine the stability achieved in intercontinental systems and cast doubt on the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent strategy by highlighting the gap in the spectrum of NATO's available nuclear response to aggression.

6. Ministers noted that these recent developments require concrete actions on the part of the Alliance if NATO's strategy of flexible response is to remain credible. After intensive consideration, including the merits of alternative approaches, and after taking note of the positions of certain members, Ministers concluded that the overall interest of the Alliance would best be served by pursuing two parallel and complementary approaches of TNF modernization and arms control.

7. Accordingly ministers have decided to modernize NATO's LRTNF by the deployment in Europe of U.S. ground-launched systems comprising 108 Pershing II launchers, which would replace existing U.S. Pershing I-A, and 464 ground launched cruise missiles (GLCM), all with single warheads. All the nations currently participating in the integrated defence structure will participate in the program: the missiles will be stationed in selected countries and certain support costs will be met through NATO's existing common funding arrangements. The program will not increase NATO's reliance upon nuclear weapons. In this connection, ministers agreed that as an integral part of TNF modernization, 1,000 U.S. nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible. Further, ministers decided that the 572 LRTNF warheads should be accommodated within that reduced level, which necessarily implies a numerical shift of emphasis away from warheads for delivery systems of other types and shorter ranges. In addition they noted with satisfaction that the Nuclear Planning Group is undertaking an examination of the precise nature, scope and

basis of the adjustments resulting from the LRTNF deployment and their possible implications for the balance of roles and systems in NATO's nuclear armory as a whole. This examination will form the basis of a substantive report to NPG Ministers in the autumn of 1980.

8. Ministers attach great importance to the role of arms control in contributing to a more stable military relationship between East and West and in advancing the process of détente. This is reflected in a broad set of initiatives being examined within the Alliance to further the course of arms control and détente in the 1980's. Ministers regard arms control as an integral part of the Alliance's efforts to assure the undiminished security of its member States and to make the strategic situation between East and West more stable, more predictable, and more manageable at lower levels of armaments on both sides. In this regard they welcome the contribution which the SALT II Treaty makes toward achieving these objectives.

9. Ministers consider that, building on this accomplishment and taking account of the expansion of Soviet LRTNF capabilities of concern to NATO, arms control efforts to achieve a more stable overall nuclear balance at lower levels of nuclear weapons on both sides should therefore now include certain United States and Soviet long-range theater nuclear systems.

This would reflect previous Western suggestions to include such Soviet and U.S. systems in arms control negotiations and more recent expressions by Soviet President Brezhnev of willingness to do so. Ministers fully support the decision taken by the United States following consultations within the Alliance to negotiate arms limitations on LRTNF and to propose to the U.S.S.R. to begin negotiations as soon as possible along the following lines which have been elaborated in intensive consultations within the Alliance:

A. Any future limitations on U.S. systems principally designed for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems.

B. Limitations on United States and Soviet long-range theater nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT II framework in a step-by-step approach.

C. The immediate objective of these negotiations should be the establishment of agreed limitations on United States and Soviet land-based long-range theater nuclear missile systems.

D. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. Therefore, the limitations should take the form of de jure equality both in ceilings and in rights.

E. Any agreed limitations must be adequately verifiable.

10. Given the special importance of these negotiations for the overall security of the Alliance, a special consultative body at a high level will be constituted within the Alliance to support the U.S. negotiating effort. This body will follow the negotiations on a continuous basis and report to the Foreign and Defense Ministers who will examine developments in these negotiations as well as in other arms control negotiations at their semiannual meetings.

11. The Ministers have decided to pursue these two parallel and complementary approaches in order to avert an arms race in Europe caused by the Soviet TNF buildup, yet preserve the viability of NATO's strategy of deterrence and defense and thus maintain the security of its member States.

A. A modernization decision, including a commitment to deployments, is necessary to meet NATO's deterrence and defense needs, to provide a credible response to unilateral Soviet TNF deployments, and to provide the foundation for the pursuit of serious negotiations on TNF.

B. Success of arms control in constraining the Soviet buildup can enhance Alliance security, modify the scale of NATO's TNF requirements, and promote stability and détente in Europe in consonance with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defense and détente as enunciated in the Harmel Report. NATO's TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results reached through negotiations.

APPENDIX 5

COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MINISTERIAL MEETING IN BRUSSELS ON DECEMBER 14, 1979

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial session in Brussels on December 13 and 14, 1979.

Ministers accepted with pleasure the invitation of the Turkish Government to hold the next Ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council in Ankara in the spring of 1980.

Ministers renewed their faith in the North Atlantic Treaty which guarantees the freedom, security and well-being of the peoples and the preservation of peace and international stability. Because their governments are based on the consent of their peoples, on democratic institutions and on the principle of equality and the rule of law, the members of the Alliance have the strength, enhanced by the will to assist each other, to face the challenges which lie ahead. Looking forward to the 1980's, Ministers expressed their confidence that, by maintaining the strength and cohesion of their Alliance and pursuing the complementary goals of arms control, disarmament, and the improvement of relations between East and West in general, their governments would continue to make a major contribution to peace and stability in Europe and the world.

Reviewing developments in East-West relations since they last met, Ministers noted that the conclusion of the study undertaken in 1978 remain valid. They recalled their commitment to détente and stressed the defensive nature of the Alliance. Events since their previous meeting showed the continuing influence of forces not conducive to the consolidation of international stability and security. They expressed concern over the direct or indirect actions of the Soviet Union and some of its Allies in a number of troubled areas concurrently with a very considerable build-up, both qualitative and quantitative, in Warsaw Pact military strength, and particularly with growing Soviet theatre nuclear and conventional capabilities. Ministers noted that these developments were a cause for legitimate disquiet and were not compatible either with assurances by the Warsaw Pact countries that they do not seek military superiority or with their publicly-declared intention to promote détente, particularly in the military sphere. Ministers reiterated their view that détente must be worldwide and indivisible in character.

Ministers confirmed that their governments were resolved to take steps to reduce the growing imbalance of forces by improving their military capabilities and thus maintain an adequate level of deterrence and defense cross the full spectrum. They recalled the determination of their governments to achieve, as a key element in conventional force modernization, more effective use of available resources through cooperative equipment programs and increased standardization and interoperability of weapons systems. They noted with satisfaction the initial progress that has been achieved in these respects, they repeated that through the transatlantic dialog they would continue to work toward more balanced relations among the European and North American members of the Alliance in the field of armaments development and production in order to enhance the availability and quality of new defense equipment. They noted the contribution which is being made by the Conference of National Armaments Directors in this respect, and the need to bear in mind the interests of the less industrialized members of the Alliance.

Ministers believed that efforts to achieve agreement in fields of arms control, disarmament and confidence building should go hand in hand with defense efforts of the Allies. They noted that recent proposals put forward by the Eastern countries echoed in part the Western proposals and they saw in them a hopeful indication of the evolution of these countries toward a more positive attitude in the search for common ground. Ministers considered ways of advancing appropriate discussions and negotiations.

Ministers recalled that the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) signed by the United States and the Soviet Union on June 18 reflected their desire for genuine arms control measures which should contribute to the stability of East-West relations. Ministers observed that the treaty makes it possible to maintain a strong U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent, which remains vital to the defense of the alliance. Thus this treaty, which will have the effect of curbing the buildup of strategic nuclear weapons in the world, improves the prospects for détente without jeopardizing the security interests of the members of the alliance. Ministers expressed the hope that the treaty would soon come into force. They looked forward to the early continuation of the SALT process, on the basis of further close consultations within the alliance, leading to additional United States and Soviet reductions and qualitative limitations in the nuclear field. They also expressed the belief that ratification of the treaty would contribute to other possibilities of progress in the field of arms control.

Ministers believed that the process initiated by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe made a most valuable contribution to the strengthening of détente, and offered further opportunities to develop existing and new areas of dialog in the search for agreement. They expressed the hope that the CSCE followup meeting to be held at Madrid in 1980 will be a major step forward in that process. Tangible progress in the meantime in implementing the principles and provisions of the Final Act and adequate preparation are of great importance for the success of the Madrid meeting and could provide a basis for participation at the political level. Although there have been certain welcome measures of relief, in particular the granting of amnesty, and some improvement in other fields, Ministers noted with concern that in certain countries the situation remained unsatisfactory or had even deteriorated as regards respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including cases where citizens continue to be subject to harassment and imprisonment for no reason other than their efforts to bring about the full implementation of the Final Act. Ministers also noted that process in the field of human contacts was uneven and expressed their concern that the level of implementation of the provisions dealing with a freer flow of information and working conditions for journalists had remained low and, in some cases, had deteriorated. They noted with satisfaction, however, that the Final Act increasingly has become the standard by which the actions of signatory states are judged.

Ministers expressed their intention to devote increasing efforts to preparations for the Madrid meeting during the period ahead, emphasizing the importance of consultations among allies as well as with the other participating states and of maintaining balance among all sections of the Final Act. They confirmed that they intended to approach and conduct the Madrid meeting in a constructive frame of mind and in a manner which would permit a thorough, frank and measured review of the implementation of all provisions of the Final Act. In this spirit, they will be ready to put forward new proposals and to discuss proposals from other participants calculated to bring concrete and balanced progress in all fields covered by the Final Act and thereby contribute to the vitality of the CSCE process. Ministers recognized the importance for the alliance of developing the confidence-building measures and the other provisions of the Final Act relating to certain aspects of security and disarmament, and hoped for concrete results in this regard at the Madrid meeting.

They reviewed with interest the proposals made in these fields by different CSCE participants, whether Western, neutral and nonaligned, or Warsaw Pact countries, including those made by the latter in May and December 1979. They considered that the proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe put forward by France in a useful concept providing a basis upon which to continue developing their approach in this field to bring about such a conference.

They agreed to work toward the adoption during the Madrid meeting, as part of a balanced outcome, of a mandate for further negotiations under the aegis of the CSCE on military significant and verifiable confidence-building measures, applicable to the entire continent of Europe. These, if agreed, would help create conditions conducive to limitation and reduction of arms in the same geographical area. This process should take account of both the varied aspects of the existing security situation and of the current negotiations on other aspects of arms control and disarmament concerning the European continent.

The Ministers of countries participating in the negotiations and mutual and balanced force reductions reemphasized their determination to work for a suc-

cessful outcome which would enhance stability, peace, and security in Europe. They noted, however, their concern that despite representations made at the highest level by Western leaders to the Eastern participants, the East has made no effort to resolve the data question. These Ministers noted that agreement on the starting size of forces to be reduced is not only an essential prerequisite to any reductions, but can also serve to build confidence that a reduction agreement is being observed and that mutual security is being enhanced.

In order to advance the negotiations toward an early result, these Ministers approved a proposal for an interim phase I agreement consistent with the objectives of their governments in the negotiations, in particular the establishment of parity in the form of a common collective ceiling on ground force manpower and agreement on a combined common collective ceiling on air and ground force manpower of each side in the area of reductions. Their new initiative aims at simplifying existing proposals for a phase I agreement by focusing on United States and Soviet manpower withdrawals and limitations, based on agreed United States-Soviet data, and on associated measures applied on a multilateral basis. This interim phase I agreement would open the way for a subsequent phase II agreement, based on agreed overall data, providing for a common collective ceiling on ground force manpower for each side at approximately 700,000 and for agreement on a combined common collective ceiling on air and ground force manpower for each side at approximately 900,000.

These Ministers called attention to the package of associated measures which forms an integral part of their proposal for an interim phase I agreement. This package of measures is designed to promote military stability and confidence, to insure adequate verification of an MBFR agreement, and to help safeguard undiminished security for flank countries.

These Ministers urged Eastern participants to give prompt and serious consideration to their initiative, which takes account of negotiating proposals of both sides and which is in accordance with the agreed aim of the negotiations to contribute to the creation of a more stable relationship and to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe. They view this new Western initiative as an integral part of the arms control initiatives agreed upon during this ministerial meeting.

Turning to the question of negotiations on disarmament and arms limitation in other forums, Ministers reaffirmed the importance which they attached to the adoption of effective, balanced, and verifiable measures. They welcomed as positive elements the discussions during the first session of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and the deliberations of the Disarmament Commission in New York. They attached importance to the frequent and active consultation on these questions within the permanent machinery of the alliance.

Ministers discussed developments with regard to Berlin and Germany as a whole. They noted that since their last meeting the climate in and around Berlin had continued to remain relatively calm. Ministers reaffirmed their conviction that an undisturbed situation in Berlin and on the access routes is an essential element of détente, security, and cooperation in Europe, and noted the continuing relevance of the London declaration of May 9, 1977, and the Tokyo declaration of June 29, 1979. Ministers noted with satisfaction the improved climate in the relations between the two German states after a period of reserve and welcomed the conclusion of new agreements and the continuation of negotiations. Ministers consider this as a positive element in the process of détente in Europe, having at the same time beneficial effects for Berlin.

Ministers noted the report on the situation in the Mediterranean prepared on their instructions and underlined again the necessity of maintaining the balance of forces in the whole area. They requested the council in permanent session to continue to consult on the question and submit a further report at their next meeting.

Ministers welcomed the continuation of the dialog between Greece and Turkey in search of a peaceful solution to the differences between the two countries and they expressed the hope that in this manner positive results could be attained in the near future.

Ministers considered a report by the Secretary General on the particular problems faced by the economically less advanced member countries which constitutes a sound basis for action. While noting with satisfaction the special efforts that had been made over recent months, they stressed the need to give further momentum to the efforts to provide, in the spirit of article 2 of the North Atlantic

Treaty, assistance to those countries, so as to reach concrete and timely results. They reaffirmed their continuing political support for this process which will, indeed, constitute an essential element for the fulfillment of the contribution by those countries to collective defense.

With respect to the Middle East, the Ministers affirmed the importance of elaborating and implementing a just, lasting, and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israel conflict on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338 and with the participation of all the parties concerned, including representatives of the Palestinian people. Ministers noted with satisfaction the progress achieved by Egypt and Israel in the implementation of Resolution 242 insofar as their mutual relations are concerned. They reaffirmed that a lasting peace requires the solution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects and the achievement of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in the context of a negotiated settlement that insures the security of all states in the region including Israel.

Ministers warmly welcomed the agreement reached in the constitutional conference on Rhodesia. They expressed the hope that the cease-fire proposals agreed at that conference would quickly become fully effective, and that peace would return to Rhodesia and the neighboring countries. Ministers looked forward to the day when the independent Republic of Zimbabwe would take its place as a full member of the international community.

Ministers, recalling that the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) having been set up in 1969, took note of the Committee's achievements during its first 10 years. They commended its innovative and flexible approach to many problems of the human environment in fields such as energy conservation, alternative energy sources and pollution. Ministers noted the studies launched in 1979, including those of the restoration and conservation of monuments, and on man's impact on the stratosphere, as well as projected studies on the management of technology.

The Ministers who participated in the special meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers on December 12, 1979, noted with satisfaction that the decisions taken today by the North Atlantic Council in their opinion complemented those adopted at that meeting. Taken together, along with continuing activities flowing from decisions reached at the London and Washington meetings, they constitute a comprehensive program of action. This program comprises measures to reduce the military imbalance through concrete improvement and modernization of long-range theater nuclear and conventional forces, and the following wide range of initiatives particularly in the fields of confidence building and arms control designed to improve mutual security and cooperation in Europe:

An offer to negotiate for substantial reductions in the level of long-range theater nuclear forces as well as intercontinental strategic forces within the framework of SALT III;

Unilateral withdrawal of 1,000 U.S. nuclear warheads from Europe as part of the December 12 decision;

A proposal for an interim phase I agreement for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, designed to give fresh impetus to the MBFR negotiations;

A proposal for a package of associated measures in MBFR designed to insure compliance with the agreement and to make military activities more transparent, thereby improving mutual confidence;

In furtherance of the CSCE process, readiness to examine proposals concerning Confidence-Building Measures and a Conference on Disarmament in Europe.

These Ministers are determined that the 1980's should see a fundamental change for the better in the situation between East and West and will make every effort to bring this about. The program of action which they envisage offers the best opportunity for creating more constructive relations between East and West for which their citizens have hoped for so long.

These Ministers considered that this program represents a major new opportunity for the countries of the Warsaw Pact to translate into action the interest they have signaled in improving the situation in Europe. They call on the Warsaw Pact governments to respond to this offer by making a determined effort in all available negotiating forums, to achieve substantial results which will enhance security and mutual trust.

APPENDIX 6

SPEECH BY CHANCELLOR HELMUT SCHMIDT BEFORE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, LONDON (OCTOBER 1977)

THE 1977 ALASTAIR BUCHAN MEMORIAL LECTURE*

The Alastair Buchan Memorial Lectures have been established as a tribute to the Institute's first director. The 1977 lecture was delivered by Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, on October 28, 1977.

In his address the chairman of the Institute's Council, Professor Ernst van der Beugel, welcomed the speaker as follows: "Mr. Chancellor, to govern implies a keen sense of priorities, the priorities you have chosen in delivering the second Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, is a very high tribute to Alastair's memory and a great privilege for this Institute. Our welcome is twofold. We, of course, welcome you as head of government of the Federal Republic. We are, however, proud to welcome you also as Helmut Schmidt, member of this Institute since 1959. In welcoming you as Federal Chancellor, we would like to express our conviction that what happens in the Federal Republic will, to a very great extent, determine the fate of Europe and of the Western Alliance. We admire your achievements; we trust your policies; we share your concerns; you inspire our confidence, not in the least with regard to that central moral problem of government: To strike a just and effective balance between freedom and authority. In welcoming our member, Helmut Schmidt, we think of the many intellectual contributions you have made to the work of this Institute by preparing papers and by participating in our discussions. In spite of the enormous burden of your high offices—parliamentary leader of your party, Federal Minister of Defense, Federal Minister of Finance and, finally, Federal Chancellor—you have always found time for this Institute.

Alastair was primarily a scholar, but, at the same time, deeply interested in acts of policy. * * * It is, therefore, more than fitting that a man of action, dedicated to the conceptional basis on which policy should rest, honors with his lecture this afternoon, the scholar, who never lost his link with concrete acts of policy."

It is a privilege and a challenge for me to deliver to you today the 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial lecture.

I consider it a very special privilege because in this way I can pay tribute to Alastair Buchan and at the same time indicate my appreciation and admiration for the work carried out by the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Alastair was a brilliant thinker on subjects concerning war and peace. He was an outstanding journalist. He was also a good pedagogue. When I first participated in an international meeting organized by the IISS there were several working groups among which was one on nuclear strategy and another on conventional warfare. I had volunteered for the latter but Alastair said, "No, you go to the first one because this is what you have to learn." And so I did. He was the fine Director of the Institute when I became a member 18 years ago; I came to be his friend because I shared his deep concern about maintaining world peace and global security as a major prerequisite for human freedom and happiness.

*Source: "Survival," The International Institute for Strategic Studies, January/February 1978.

At the same time I consider it a challenge to try to analyze within the short space of this memorial lecture some important aspects of Western security. I know that there are many in the audience today who have devoted more time and intellectual power to the dimensions of Western security about which I propose to speak: Strategic and political aspects on the one hand, economic and social aspects on the other.

NEW DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY

In preparing for this lecture I picked up again Alastair Buchan's book "Power and Equilibrium in the 1970's."¹ It is an important and a very thoughtful book in which Alastair analyzed the structure of world politics only 5 years ago. His main concern was with the balance of power between the United States, Western Europe, Japan, the Soviet Union, and China. Brilliant thinker though he was, he did not at that time devote much attention to the economic, the social and the internal aspects of Western security, which I will discuss today as new dimensions of security. These aspects do not replace the earlier models of balance and imbalance of power around the globe. But I believe that they must be added to those concepts which, in time, they will change and modify. I know, of course, that Walter Bagehot once stated: "One of the greatest pains of human nature is the pain of new idea." Yet I believe that it is in the best interest of a tradition established and promoted by Alastair to try to understand these new dimensions of security now rather than to discover in the future that we made the wrong decisions because we failed to understand them and take them into consideration.

What are these new dimensions? First, economic development. By this I mean the necessity to safeguard the basis of our prosperity, to safeguard free trade access to energy supplies and to raw materials, and the need for a monetary system which will help us to reach those targets. There was a feeling not too long ago that we had few problems in this field. However, the oil crisis, the phasing out of the Bretton Woods agreement, worldwide inflation, unemployment and inadequate economic growth, have together changed the picture and have created widespread feelings of insecurity.

Second, social security. By this I mean the necessity to achieve and maintain social peace at home, making goods and jobs available for our people and at the same time telling them bluntly that there are limits to what the state can do for them. It is in this connection that I would like to congratulate my friends Jim Callaghan and Denis Healey on their success in fighting inflation and restoring confidence in Sterling. The battle is not yet over, but you, the British, have come a long way since last year and I firmly believe that the outlook is good.

Third, domestic security. By this I mean the necessity to strengthen and defend our society against terrorists whose sole aim is to destroy its fabric with acts of brutal killing and kidnaping. You have had your share of terrorist activity in this country and you have faced up to it. Now we in Germany are faced with a different, but equally ugly, form of terrorism. So are the Dutch and other nations. We are determined to put an end to it without sacrificing the liberal qualities of our society. In connection with this I would like to point to and applaud the work done by the IISS in analyzing terrorism, and I want to urge more international cooperation to stop terrorist activities.

J. B. Priestly in his book "The English" quotes himself—because he believes his idea is important, and I fully agree—to the effect that foreigners often only see the walls around the gardens of Britain and fail to appreciate the beauty of what lies within them. Here indeed is one of the main reasons why many foreigners misjudge Britain and the British. But in the framework of this lecture the analog has another application: In the past we have all worked toward maintaining and mending our outward defenses but have possibly neglected the economic structure of our gardens, the importance of the well-being of its plants and the threats to their roots. Therefore, while I do not mean to suggest that we should drop our guard of outward defense, I shall devote most of this lecture to the internal considerations of Western security. I shall concentrate on the economic dimensions, but first I shall analyze some current strategic and political issues.

¹ "Power and Equilibrium in the 1970's" (London and New York: Praeger, 1972). The Russell C. Leffingwell Lectures, 1972.

THE NECESSITY OF ARMS CONTROL

Most of us will agree that political and military balance is the prerequisite of our security, and I would warn against the illusion that there may be grounds for neglecting that balance. Indeed, it is not only the prerequisite for our security but also for fruitful progress in East-west détente.

In the first place we should recognize that—paradoxical as it may sound—there is a closer proximity between a hazardous arms race, on the one hand, and a successful control of arms, on the other, than even before. There is only a narrow divide between the hope for peace and the danger of war.

Second, changed strategic conditions confront us with new problems. SALT codifies the nuclear strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States. To put it another way: SALT neutralizes their strategic nuclear capabilities. In Europe this magnifies the significance of the disparities between East and West in nuclear tactical and conventional weapons.

Third, because of this we must press ahead with the Vienna negotiations on mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR) as an important step toward a better balance of military power in Europe.

No one can deny that the principle of parity is a sensible one. However, its fulfilment must be the aim of all arms-limitation and arms-control negotiations and it must apply to all categories of weapons. Neither side can agree to diminish its security unilaterally.

It is of vital interest to us all that the negotiations between the two super-powers on the limitation and reduction of nuclear strategic weapons should continue and lead to a lasting agreement. The nuclear powers have a special, an overwhelming responsibility in this field. On the other hand, we in Europe must be particularly careful to insure that these negotiations do not neglect the components of NATO's deterrence strategy.

We are all faced with the dilemma of having to meet the moral and political demand for arms limitation while at the same time maintaining a fully effective deterrent to war. We are not unaware that both the United States and the Soviet Union must be anxious to remove threatening strategic developments from their relationship. But strategic arms limitations confined to the United States and the Soviet Union will inevitably impair the security of the West European members of the alliance vis-à-vis Soviet military superiority in Europe if we do not succeed in removing the disparities of military power in Europe parallel to the SALT negotiations. So long as this is not the case we must maintain the balance of the full range of deterrence strategy. The alliance must, therefore, be ready to make available the means to support its present strategy, which is still the right one, and to prevent any developments that could undermine the basis of this strategy.

At the meeting of Western heads of state and government in London last May I said that the more we stabilize strategic nuclear parity between East and West, which my Government has always advocated, the greater will be the necessity to achieve a conventional equilibrium as well.

Today, again in London, let me add that when the SALT negotiations opened we Europeans did not have a clear enough view of the close connection between parity of strategic nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and tactical nuclear and conventional weapons on the other, or if we did, we did not articulate it clearly enough. Today we need to recognize clearly the connection between SALT and MBFR and to draw the necessary practical conclusions.

At the same meeting in May I said that there were, in theory, two possible ways of establishing a conventional balance with the Warsaw Pact states. One would be for the Western Alliance to undertake a massive buildup of forces and weapons systems; the other for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to reduce their force strength and achieve an overall balance at a lower level. I prefer the latter.

The Vienna negotiations have still not produced any concrete agreement. Since they began the Warsaw Pact has, if anything, increased the disparities in both conventional and tactical nuclear forces. Up to now the Soviet Union has given no clear indication that she is willing to accept the principle of parity for Europe, as she did for SALT, and thus make the principle of renunciation of force an element of the military balance as well.

Until we see real progress on MBFR, we shall have to rely on the effectiveness of deterrence. It is in this context and no other that the public discussion in all member states of the Western alliance about the "neutron weapon" has to be

seen. We have to consider whether the "neutron weapon" is of value to the alliance as an additional element of the deterrence strategy, as a means of preventing war. But we should not limit ourselves to that examination. We should also examine what relevance and weight this weapon has in our efforts to achieve arms control.

For the first time in history, arms control negotiations are being conducted when there exists a weapon capable of destroying all living things. Failure of such negotiations can no longer be compensated for by banking on military victory. That is why it is of such crucial importance that all should realize the seriousness of the Vienna negotiations, and why results must be achieved there. I would like to list seven "musts" and "must nots" for these negotiations:

1. Both sides, all participants in the MBFR negotiations, must state their willingness to bring the negotiations to a positive conclusion and to be party to reductions on an equal basis.
2. Priority must be given to the aim—and it must be achieved without delay—of preventing any further increase in the military confrontation, and thus dispelling apprehensions.
3. The threat of a surprise attack must be eliminated.
4. The confidence-building measures voluntarily agreed at the CSCE must be accepted with binding effect.
5. It must remain the principal objective of MBFR to achieve, by means of reductions, a balance of forces at a lower level.
6. Force reductions must be oriented to the principle of parity and must be verifiable. Parity and collectivity must be recognized as the fundamental and determining principles.
7. The capability of both alliance systems to organize their defense must not be impaired.

We should also consider whether it is necessary to extend the confidence-building measures beyond the agreed scope. Even if we should achieve conventional parity within the MBFR reduction area, this will still fall considerably short of parity of conventional forces in Europe as a whole. This is underlined by the fact that the Soviet Union has substantially increased her strategic reinforcement capabilities and could rapidly bring forward forces concentrated outside the reduction area whereas American forces, if reduced in MFBR, would be cut off from Europe by the Atlantic.

Since the West formulated its double strategy of deterrence and détente 10 years ago, progress along the road to détente has been respectable. The "Ostpolitik" of the Federal Republic of Germany, based firmly on the Alliance, has promoted and helped to shape this development. The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin has been another step toward stability and security in Europe, Berlin, once a major source of crisis, is not the problem it was. Security in Europe has been reinforced by bilateral agreements in which the parties undertake not to resort to force.

The American commitment to Europe no longer stems solely from rights and obligations arising from World War II. Rather, that commitment rests on the security interests of the United States and Western Europe alike. The Soviet Union and her allies have explicitly recognized this fact by putting their signatures to the Final Act of the CSCE in Helsinki. For us in Germany, the German question remains open; we are called upon to achieve the reunification of Germany. But the German question cannot, and must not, have priority over peace. This is a contribution of the Federal Republic of Germany to stability in Europe.

WORLD ECONOMY AND SECURITY

The need for deterrence and détente cannot, however, detract from the fact that a sound economy—and for me this includes full employment just as much as social justice—is the foundation of all security. This is true in two ways: unless our economy flourishes, we can maintain neither the military equilibrium nor the stability of our free and democratic institutions. The Western economies have been profoundly shaken by the serious recession following worldwide inflation, the collapse of the international monetary system, and the oil crisis. Today, our primary task is to restabilize the economic foundations of the democratic state and thus, not least, the foundations of our common security policy. Let me stress what Henry Kissinger said in his 1976 Alastair Buchan Memorial lecture before this Institute:

"A world that cries out for economic advance, for social justice, for political liberty, and for a stable peace needs our collective commitment and contribution."²

Today, just as in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the economic and military aspects of our security policy are again on a par with each other. In 1947, George Marshall called for a working economy to establish the political and social conditions under which free institutions can exist. That task presents itself anew today under different conditions. Since the end of World War II, the Western democracies, favored by constant economic growth, have experienced the full effects of democratic equality; they have transformed themselves into open societies with more social justice. For the individual citizen, the State is today the guarantor of social security and social justice. Never before has the working population had so large a share of the nation's economic prosperity.

We have to ask ourselves, however, whether this redistribution process has not cut profits unreasonably and this caused the decline in investment and capital expenditure in recent years. One cause of our economic problem—that of insufficient investment and capital expenditure—lies, I believe, in the greater risks for companies arising from the faster rate at which the world economic structure is changing, rising oil and energy prices, and the partial saturation of important markets in the industrial countries.

Owing to the development of the social security network, public expenditure in this area has risen at a faster rate from year to year than the gross national product. Today, we have, I believe, reached the load limit in many of our countries, at least for the time being.

On top of this, the developing countries are stepping up their demands on the Western industrial world. They demand both full control over their raw materials and higher prices; they demand more development aid; they demand the biggest possible share of the benefits of Western investment in the Third World; and they demand unrestricted access for their industrial products into our markets. In the last analysis, these are claims on the gross national product of the Western industrial countries.

For years, the Western countries have been exposed to the pressure of inflation, the result of excess demands on their GNP. It was the monetary crisis of 1971 that exposed challenges, which existed earlier, in concrete form. In the following years, inflation was fueled by an unprecedented boom in the commodity sector, and ultimately by the price policy of the OPEC cartel. All this led to a structural upheaval in the global balances of payment network, to a structural upheaval in world trade, in world demand, and thereby in employment.

The dangers of inflation are still with us today. Throughout the world, the days of cheap energy and raw materials are over: prices are very likely to continue to rise in real terms, and this means relative to the price of the goods which the industrial countries manufacture and export.

The answer to our problems cannot lie in dismantling our social achievements, in rolling back social progress. The stability of liberal democracy depends on the extent to which we can secure greater social justice. If the Federal Republic of Germany is today enjoying considerable stability, it is because she has made social justice a broad reality.

There are three problems which the West will have to resolve in the economic sector, not least for the sake of its security.

The first is to construct and safeguard a liberal, flexible and, hence, working world economic system. The international economic order we created after 1945 enabled the Western democracies—and also some developing countries—to expand their economies at a speed and with a constancy which have no parallel in economic history. Through their free trade and capital transactions, the Western countries have grown more and more into one vast market. The ever-increasing international division of labor was, and still is, the main source of progress and prosperity. National economies have thus become increasingly interdependent. But this interdependence, of a hitherto unknown degree, has not only provided stronger impulses for growth in an expanding world economy, but has also now led to greater inflation and recession. The effects of the world recession have been greatest for those countries whose economic structure is least flexible and whose political management has been least able to adjust to the new situation. This

² "The 1976 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture, "Survival," September/October 1976 (London: IISS), p. 194.

crisis has deepened the disparities between the Western countries. It has exacerbated the divergence of rates of inflation, and created payments imbalances which have grown steadily worse.

The recession has thus become a great threat to our world economic system: the tendency to try to solve problems unilaterally with protectionist measures has increased, and is increasing daily. We must ward off this threat in a united effort.

Protectionism offers no solutions. World economic interdependence has led to a synchronization of economic fluctuations between all nations. Where, as in the countries of Western Europe, exports in important branches of industry account for half or more of total production, no single country can free itself from the vortex of world economic recession by its own efforts. In practice, nations have lost their economic autonomy. An attempt to return to unilateral national measures would be disastrous. The only way out is through closer economic cooperation.

The Western democracies are about to embark on this road. Since the beginning of the recession, we have successfully intensified our efforts to coordinate economic policy. We have agreed to pursue growth and full employment without repeating the old inflationary mistakes.

To achieve this consensus is essential. Let me make this point clear: there are no economic panaceas which can be recommended to, or prescribed for, governments by majority decisions, as it were. Each government must, in consultation with its partners, take those steps which take into account the special situation of its country.

In this joint effort a major aim must be to restore foreign trade equilibrium. The present payments imbalances originate only partly from the oil price explosion. In the 3 years 1974-76, the accumulated OPEC surplus amounted to 145 billion U.S. dollars, whereas the deficit countries were in the red on current account to the amount of \$210 billion. The oil price explosion can, therefore, explain only part of the deterioration of the global balance of payments network.

The current account deficits of the oil-consuming industrial and developing countries in relation to OPEC cannot be rectified by traditional instruments of adjustment. The prime remedy is to consume less oil. Other measures are the development of alternative sources of energy and the stepping up of exports to the oil-exporting countries in line with their own development and the increase in their capacity to absorb goods from the industrial oil consumers.

In the meantime we must provide adequate facilities for financing these deficits but in a way which does not delay the reduction of nonoil deficits. The creation of the Witteveen facility is an important step to this end.

Today, the structural modification caused by the progressive international division of labor coincides with other structural changes, such as in demand, or technical changes on the supply side. This has no doubt led to an aggravation of the employment situation and a strengthening of protectionist forces.

However, we must realize that trade policy cannot serve as a national instrument for creating jobs. Such a solution could only have short-term success—that is, only until such time as the trade partners take countermeasures. These considerations apply to Europe in particular. The European Community, being the world's biggest exporter and importer, depends on open markets. To yield to protectionist temptations would be suicidal for Europe.

Markets must be kept open for industrial exports from the Third World as well. The Western countries need cooperation with the Third World on a basis of trust, and it is in their own uppermost interest to integrate the developing countries fully into the system of world trade.

What is more, in view of saturation in our own markets, the markets of the developing countries with their unlimited demand potential could become an important pillar of our future growth. However, if one wants to export, one must import as well. We should therefore enable the developing countries, by more imports and greater transfers of capital, to buy more from us.

The OECD countries have so far, on the whole, withstood the temptation of protectionism and kept their markets open. This success is of crucial importance. It contrasts our present situation with that of the 1930's when the Western countries, by destroying free world trade, drove each other into a state of permanent depression and permanent unemployment.

As far as my own country is concerned, we are resolved to continue to keep our markets open. On July 1, 1977, the West-European Free Trade Zone was

implemented. It is the world's largest free trade area for industrial products. The open system of world trade must be maintained.

ACCESS TO RAW MATERIALS

The second major task which confronts us is to insure our raw material and energy supplies. Let us bear in mind that whereas the Eastern industrial countries are self-sufficient as a group, at least in raw material and energy supplies for the time being, the West, apart from foodstuffs, consumes more raw materials and oil than it produces. The Western countries depend on massive imports from the Third World.

There are thus two sources of danger for our raw material supplies. These supplies can be endangered, for one thing, by the outbreak of war or civil war in Third World regions, and, for another, by insufficient production due to insufficient investment in the Third World.

We have all been conscious of the first source of danger since the Middle East war of 1973 and the oil crisis. Another region which is of vital importance to the security of our raw material supplies and which has become a trouble spot in international affairs is southern Africa.

Conflicts in the Third World give the Soviet Union an opportunity to expand her influence. Imagine the implications for Western economic security if the Soviet Union, with South Africa and Rhodesia, as her allies, were to monopolize, for example, world chromium supplies. To avert the dangers arising out of Third World instability, the West has to pursue a policy aimed at the peaceful solution of conflicts and a peaceful conciliation of interests in those regions.

The conflicts in the Middle East and southern Africa have long attracted the attention of Western foreign policy. The United States is making every effort to mediate in the Israel-Arab conflict. Europe supports this by an effort of its own and by its willingness to play an active part in the economic reconstruction and development of the region following a peace settlement. In Rhodesia, London and Washington in particular are trying to bring about a peaceful transfer of power to the black majority; in Namibia the five Western members of the Security Council are trying to find a solution. The Federal Republic of Germany is playing an active part there. The Western powers are endeavoring to convince South Africa of the need for fundamental and rapid reforms.

Even if political stability can be assured, however, one can only import what has been previously produced. Here lies the second source of danger for our raw material supplies.

Raw material investment in developing countries is no longer financed and promoted as it once was. In the mining sector in particular, exploration and prospecting in the Third World have largely come to a standstill. There can be no doubt about the long-term consequences. Henry Kissinger warned at UNCTAD IV against an explosion of raw material costs—he should rather have said prices—should the current investment trends continue. The leadtime for large-scale mining projects is 6 to 8 years and sometimes more. In other words, the said danger to our raw material supplies does not hit us today—but it is today that we must act.

The indispensable cooperation between industrial and developing countries in the exploitation of raw material resources must be restored and intensified. To provide stable and close cooperation between industrialized and developing countries it is, I believe, necessary and justified that guarantees for those private investments should be given by the host countries. This should become a general rule and, in the framework of the North-South dialog, a necessary *quid pro quo*.

How should we insure our energy supplies? If there is a cardinal problem for the economic security of the West, it is that of energy. More than half of the Western world's energy requirements is at present being met by mineral oil. But we must face a fact which no policy can change: This is the exhaustion of world oil reserves which is now becoming apparent. Recent studies by the OECD, MIT and Exxon agree that predictable oil supplies may not even suffice to cover requirements in the 1980's. And I am afraid this fundamental fact will not be notably changed even by the new oil fields which you in Britain have discovered in the North Sea.

The main consequence is that the wasteful use of energy, of which we have made a habit, must stop. We must be quick to make decisive progress on energy conservation and the development of new types of energy.

In this situation the industrial countries cannot afford to forgo any option for energy policy. This is particularly true for nuclear energy. But I would add that a key role in this respect falls to the United States who uses half of the energy consumed by the Western world. It is therefore in our interest that President Carter should be successful with his energy conservation program.

TRADE WITH THE EAST

The third major task of Western security policy in economic terms is to establish balanced and stable economic relations with the Communist state trading countries of the East.

Since 1970 East-West trade has practically quadrupled. The Federal Republic of Germany is the most important Western trade partner of each of the Communist Eastern countries. This strong intensification of trade and cooperation is the result of political détente and also of the economic interests of both sides. The economies of the Communist East have reached a stage of development where their growth also depends more and more on an increase in productivity. That is why the East has a strong and lasting interest in importing Western technology.

The East, due to its large potential of raw materials and energy, affords the West the possibility of diversifying to a certain extent, its raw material and energy imports. At the same time it offers markets which are especially attractive for the West because they are not, or not fully, involved in the synchronization of Western business cycles. In 1975, for instance, due to the world recession, German exports dropped by almost 4 percent in nominal terms whereas the exports of the Soviet Union rose by 46 percent, thus making a valuable contribution toward improved use of capacities and a better employment situation in my country.

Who, then, derives the greater benefit from East-West trade? There are critics in the West who say that the West, by its technology exports, indirectly helps the Soviet military buildup. Critical voices in the East will probably object that helping the West to preserve jobs is supporting the capitalist system. I believe that these conflicting arguments in themselves indicate that East-West trade benefits both sides. And so after all, it should and must be.

A couple of decades ago the American writer Ambrose Bierce said: "Calamities are of two kinds: misfortune to ourselves and good fortune to others." I do not think that this applies in modern economic conditions of interdependence. I would say today: economic misfortune to others will cause calamity to ourselves. And good fortune to others will also cause good fortune to ourselves.

If the Western countries act jointly, the development of trade relations and of industrial cooperation with the East can, I am convinced, be essential for both our own economic security and the safeguarding of peace.

Another urgent task I have often mentioned is to get the East to assume a constructive role in the North-South issue. So far, the Soviet Union and her allies have supported verbally the demands of the developing countries, but as regards financial support they have been trying to pin the responsibility entirely on the West. The development aid of the East is negligible compared with its economic potential, and even more so compared with Western contributions. In 1976, for instance, the amount of official development assistance transferred by the Federal Republic of Germany alone was two and a half times as high as the total transfer made by the Soviet Union plus all the other Eastern bloc countries together. Or to give you another example: the official development assistance of all the OECD countries in 1976 was 27 times as high as that of the Comecon countries including the Soviet Union.

The integration of the Eastern countries into the world economic system has already progressed so far that they can feel the direct impact of inflation and recession in the Western industrial countries. They should recognize, therefore, that world economic stability is in their own interest. But this stability, and ultimately the stability of world peace, can no longer be insured unless hunger and distress in the Third World are overcome. This is a goal which requires the joint efforts of all industrial countries. The Eastern bloc countries can no longer retain the role of disinterested onlookers in the North-South dialog, limiting their support to the supply of military weapons.

TERRORISM

Finally, let me say a few words about the deep shock we have all felt over the last 4 weeks as a result of terrorist action. The focal point of the events

themselves was my country, but from day to day it became increasingly clear to people in all corners of the world that terrorism is not a problem of exclusively German concern but an international problem of global dimension.

In my country, we have experienced with gratitude what it means in such a situation when other countries rally round with advice, with active assistance. And it has been an exercise and a very fine experience in practical solidarity. During those days, gestures were made, I feel, for cooperation among the world's nations and for a common stand, a common effort to overcome the plague of international terrorism with its contempt for human life and with its aim of destroying democratic society.

I would like to express the hope that this terrible experience will prompt the United Nations to adopt quickly the convention which we have proposed against the taking of hostages. Nobody today can any longer make light of terrorist violence as the work of people who have simply been led astray by allegedly political motives, and on top of that grant them political asylum. Jonathan Carr in the *Financial Times* wrote the other day: "The German terrorist cannot really be classed with any political wing. If they can be compared to anything it is to Dostoevski's devils, people who by their own admission are ready even to throw acid into a child's face if it will help their cause. What is that cause? Beyond destroying society it is impossible to say".³ I think he is right. Moreover, the effect is not only on domestic policies. In extreme circumstances terrorism might even trigger off international conflict.

Therefore, we should act together to confront the blindness of terrorist killers with the steadfastness of our democratic convictions. Let us together continue to defend human dignity and human rights as inviolable and inalienable values; and let us defend the right to live and to enjoy personal freedom, rights we all identify as inalienable principles.

Ladies and gentlemen, I have tried to outline the dimensions of a policy aimed at establishing and maintaining a state of affairs in which our free democratic institutions can survive and prosper.

The industrial democracies of the West produce 65 percent of the world's goods and their share in world trade is 70 percent. They are the motive force of world economic growth and technological progress. The power and moral superiority of our belief in the freedom and dignity of man is evident.

This is why, inspired by a constructive will for reform, all of us endeavor perpetually to renew democracy. Only in this way can we remove weaknesses, obsolete conditions, and injustices.

The industrial democracies of the world must further intensify their cooperation; in the European Community, in the Atlantic Community and in the Trilateral Community formed by Europe, North America, and the Pacific region embracing Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. This cohesion is of crucial importance for peace, for economic growth and the cause of freedom, justice and human dignity.

No less decisive, however, is the relationship between the two big powers, because on them depends how much of the surface of our globe will be covered by the policy of détente and to what extent its substance will be strengthened by a policy aimed at preserving peace. We feel encouraged by the statements made by the two leading personalities of both sides.

Jimmy Carter gave the assurance that in the search for world peace the United States will be found in the forefront and stand by her commitment to the freedom of man. The following passage from his speech before the United Nations on October 4, 1977 appears to me to be of particular significance.

"We must look beyond the present, and work to prevent the critical threats and instabilities of the future. If the principles of self-restraint, reciprocity and mutual accommodation of interests are observed, then the United States and the Soviet Union will not only succeed in limiting weapons, but will also create a foundation for better relations in other spheres of interests."⁴

Leonid Brezhnev said early this year:

"The allegations that the Soviet Union goes beyond its defense requirements and is seeking military superiority to be able to deal the first blow are malicious and unfounded."

³ The *Financial Times*, Oct. 24, 1977, p. 16.

⁴ Address by President Carter to the U.N. General Assembly, Oct. 4, 1977 (USIS).

And in the same speech, Brezhnev rightly stated :

"There is no more burning and vital task than that of making peace durable and indestructible."

He added :

"As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we shall not be found wanting."⁵

In our quest for security and peace in Europe and worldwide, we shall take the two statesmen by their word. For, in the last resort, the survival of mankind depends on the strengthening of world peace.

⁵ Leonid Brezhnev, "Outstanding Exploit of the Defenders of Tula," Pravda, Jan. 19, 1977.



