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COMMITTEE PRINT

NATO AND WESTERN SECURITY IN THE 1980'S: THE EUROPEAN PERCEPTION

REPORT

OF A

STAFF STUDY MISSION TO SEVEN NATO COUNTRIES AND AUSTRIA

JANUARY 2–18, 1980

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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FOREWORD

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., April 9, 1980.

This report has been prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs by staff members Ivo J. Spalatin, Robert T. Huber, Ronald L. Soriano, and William H. Fite, who undertook a staff study mission to Europe from January 1 through January 18, 1980.

The findings in this report are those of the staff study mission and do not necessarily reflect the views of the members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, *Chairman.*

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., April 9, 1980.

Hon. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Transmitted herewith is a report of a staff study mission which went to Europe January 1–18, 1980, to examine Western European perceptions of major Western security, political, and military issues with primary focus on European views on the Soviet military threat, the effectiveness of NATO's defense capabilities, and the role of détente and arms control in preserving Western security. The study mission conferred with officials in eight Western European countries. The scope of the study is outlined in the introduction to the report.

The undersigned would like to express their thanks and appreciation for the assistance, cooperation, and hospitality extended during the course of the study mission.

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INTRODUCTION

Since its establishment 30 years ago, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been a mainstay of vital security interests for the United States and the countries of Western Europe. NATO has helped to preserve Western European political independence and has contributed toward assuring the economic vitality and growth of the Western World. In recent years, however, the modernization of Soviet conventional and nuclear forces have called into question NATO's military capability to continue to deter this growing Soviet threat, and political differences between NATO allies have raised the specter of Soviet influence and disruption of the political and military cohesiveness of the NATO alliance.

The purpose of the staff study mission was to examine Western European perceptions of the effectiveness of NATO in meeting Western security needs in the future, the Soviet military threat, the opportunities for defense cooperation within NATO, the role arms control and détente play in contributing toward maintaining Western European security, and the future of relations between the United States and its Western European NATO allies.

To that collective end, the staff study mission met officials in foreign and defense affairs and key legislative officials in each of the countries visited as well as with various individuals in private research organizations with expertise in international security and military issues.

The staff study mission's itinerary and schedule of meetings appears in appendix 1 to this report.

The members of the staff study mission wish to express their appreciation for the gracious and cooperative reception they received from host countries and U.S. Government officials and private citizens in the countries visited.

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OBSERVATIONS

During the staff study mission's 18-day visit to eight countries of Western Europe, lengthy discussions were held with key political, military, and legislative officials in each country. The study mission also benefited greatly from briefings provided by U.S. Ambassadors and Embassy staffs. In addition, whenever possible, the study mission met with private observers of Western European and international security issues. On the basis of these extensive contacts, the following major observations are presented, reflecting the views expressed to the staff study mission:

—There was unanimity among all European officials and private observers interviewed that since its establishment 30 years ago the U.S.-Western European military alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been a mainstay of the West's vital security interests. NATO has helped to preserve Western European political independence and has contributed to assuring the economic vitality and growth of the Western World;

—More than ever before, however, Europeans view NATO as essentially a political as well as military alliance which enables both European defense and East-West détente efforts to continue satisfying the security needs of all the members. While constant vigilance and a strong commitment to defense in the face of growing Soviet military might will be required, no NATO member perceives the military balance in Europe as having reached a point where it cannot pursue its foreign policy and national security interests without courting or seeking the approval of the Soviet Union;

—Continued identification with and participation in the NATO alliance, coupled with a commitment to détente and arms control efforts, are basic and complementary pillars of the ultimate security of all the NATO countries visited;

—Détente has brought tangible benefits to the Western European allies, benefits which have contributed to the economic well-being and social stability of Western European nations. The desire to preserve the benefits of détente does not mean that NATO member nations are any less committed to Western defense and the maintenance of a strong security and alliance system in Western Europe. As perceptions of the Soviet military capabilities in Europe and growing Soviet expansionism outside the treaty area are increasing, there is a corresponding desire to retain the positive aspects of détente;

—Europeans regard the U.S.-security guarantee to Western Europe as continuing, viable, and credible and view public questioning of that commitment as counterproductive. Such questioning tends to raise unnecessary doubts among West Europeans and, more importantly, in the minds of Soviet decisionmakers, about the credibility of the U.S.-security guarantee of Western Europe;

—U.S. response to international crises and problems will always to some extent draw private and/or public praise or criticism from one or all of the NATO allies. Criticisms, however, do not necessarily threaten NATO's political cohesion but rather can strengthen it. In an alliance of democracies with different perspectives, Europeans feel U.S. foreign policy should strive for consistency and resolve on important issues and not necessarily seek full consensus with European NATO members;

—On the issue of a NATO coordinated role and strategy to address Soviet military activities outside the NATO area, most Europeans believe that the vital interests of NATO members outside the treaty area must be preserved and that NATO could, on a case-by-case basis, serve as a forum of political support for coordinated actions by various members in defense of Western interests. Any coordinated action, either political or military, would have to avoid the perception of a NATO stamp of approval if France is to participate. For example, there exists a widespread consensus in NATO with regard to the need to address the Soviet threat and on the means (3 percent increase in real terms in defense spending; long-term defense program (LTDP)[1]; theater nuclear force (TNF)[2] modernization deployment decision) to address that threat in Europe. At the same time, there is more ambivalence toward and difference of views over the types of action to be taken to deal with Soviet aggression in the Third World, particularly if they are undertaken under the aegis of NATO;

—Soviet military power and its potential use as an instrument of political coercion in Western Europe remain a threat which tends to enhance NATO's political cohesion. Short-term shocks to the international political system, like the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, increase this cohesion. Aside from these shocks, however, Europeans recognized the long-term nature of both the Soviet threat in central Europe and NATO's importance as a counter to that threat;

—Europeans expressed strong condemnation of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and at the same time emphasized the need to preserve détente and pursue arms control efforts with the Soviet Union. Europeans saw the need to pursue détente more than ever, recognizing both its limitations and advantages;

—Europeans saw unique opportunities to increase Western influence in the Third World, particularly among Arab States, in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Such opportunities cannot be pursued, however, if the United States and the NATO allies cast the Afghanistan crisis solely in terms of an East-West confrontation;

—Europeans maintain an ambivalent attitude toward political and economic sanctions against the Soviet Union in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While all officials interviewed took the position that their countries would not "fill the void" left by U.S. economic sanctions, independent European sanctions were generally viewed with skepticism;

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[1] See app. 2 on p. 62.
[2] See app. 3 on p. 64.

—Regular and systematic consultation between the United States and its NATO allies in areas of defense and arms control cooperation are essential to effective and reliable leadership by the United States and European acceptance of such a U.S. role;

—Europeans view strong U.S. leadership as desirable and necessary. In this regard, U.S. participation in the December 1979 TNF decision was seen as positive, sensitive to European concerns, and crucial to the European decision;

—Just as there was an overriding desire to go ahead with theater nuclear force modernization, an equally strong feeling existed that arms control negotiations on TNF ought to be pursued and that SALT III need not necessarily be the forum for such negotiations as long as SALT II was not ratified. However, Europeans generally preferred pursuing TNF arms control in the SALT framework. European officials interviewed also expressed unanimous support for SALT II ratification;

—Firm support for TNF modernization was evident in all European countries visited except Belgium and the Netherlands. Belgian reservations are expected to be withdrawn. However, the Dutch decision to postpone its decision to accept new theater nuclear weapons for 2 years is likely only to delay a negative decision. The fact that there is little chance of Dutch acceptance of TNF will pose a serious foreign policy dilemma for the United States;

—While not discounting the militarily useful aspects of TNF modernization in helping to restore balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact at the theater nuclear level, Europeans viewed the TNF decision as motivated by political requirements, including the need to demonstrate NATO resolve in the face of growing Soviet deployment of intermediate range nuclear weapons and the need to provide still another example of the strength of the U.S. commitment to the security of Western Europe;

—Contrary to what is normally perceived, the mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) negotiations have progressed significantly since their inception. While the two sides remained deadlocked over the number of Warsaw Pact troops in the area of proposed reductions, neither side seems unequivocally locked into its position on this issue. Resolution of this and other contentious issues will largely depend on the Soviet political will to achieve agreement. Even in the absence of an agreement, MBFR has contributed to NATO's political cohesion by requiring alliance-wide consensus on negotiating positions and has enhanced the prospect for greater international security by providing both sides with a greater appreciation of each other's security concerns in potentially volatile central Europe;

—European defense officials view the long-term defense program (LTDP) as a practical and meaningful demonstration of NATO's political resolve to improve its military capabilities. In all the countries visited, long-term defense planning was seen as generally complimentary to national defense programs and an effective political device in obtaining legislative and public approval of certain defense efforts which otherwise may not have been approved. The LTDP was also seen as contributing to effective military postures by the NATO countries;

—U.S. efforts to enhance rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI)[3] in NATO through a triad of potential cooperative efforts is viewed positively by the Europeans and with a combination of hope and skepticism. While "Perry's triad"[4] is not regarded as a "buy American" ploy, Europeans are skeptical of the U.S. Department of Defense's ability to convince U.S. industry and Congress of its merits and intend to watch U.S. actions closely in coming years;

—European defense officials cited U.S. legal restrictions on third-country transfer of defense equipment involving U.S. input of any kind as one of the main inhibitions to increasing NATO-wide defense cooperation and potential cooperation in conventional arms transfer restraint;

—Because of European perceptions of a continuing imbalance in the "two-way street" in defense trade, which favors the United States, the political and economic obstacles associated with trans-Atlantic defense cooperation, differing defense industry capabilities, and past experiences which have soured the desire for defense cooperation, Europeans view NATO standardization pragmatically with a realization that the best weapons system in every situation is not necessarily a standardized one. At the same time, NATO standardization remains a long-term objective and an important consideration of the defense procurement process of European nations. For the short-term, the more easily attainable goal of interoperability is unanimously supported;

—European support for the President's arms transfer policy was highest primarily among smaller NATO members which do not engage in substantial arms exports. Little enthusiasm could be detected among British or French officials who cited important economic and political benefits to arms sales, and viewed reductions in conventional arms sales unlikely. On the other hand, the third largest European arms exporter, Italy, pointed to the need for a multilateral forum like the U.N. Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) as a viable forum to discuss conventional arms restraint where both recipient as well as suppliers could pursue potential conventional arms restraint arrangements;

—Increased Soviet military activity, key Soviet access routes to the North Atlantic, and the vast economic potential of the Arctic make NATO's northern flank of growing importance to the security interests of all its members. The defense of the northern region is a difficult challenge and will require both a strong NATO military commitment and a sophisticated understanding of the political equilibrium of a region composed of culturally similar states not all of which have chosen NATO membership as the means to guarantee their security;

—There have been strong expressions of support for and solidarity with the U.S. position vis-a-vis Iran and its efforts to obtain the safe release of the hostages in Iran. The U.S. response to the crisis, a mixture of restraint and perseverance, was viewed by European allies as a sign of strength and reassurance.

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[3] See app. 4, p. 66.
[4] See app. 5, p. 67.

BELGIUM

In addition to a series of background briefings on various European security issues at NATO headquarters in Brussels on January 2 and 3, the staff study mission had the opportunity, on January 3, to discuss the Belgian perspective on these issues with officials of the Belgian Foreign Ministry.

NATO as an Instrument of Defense and Détente

Belgian officials interviewed saw the present state of international relations as having become more and more dangerous because of the military buildup which has occurred in both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. In addition, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and its recently increasing tendency to pursue a more globally oriented foreign policy in other regions of the world are posing new difficulties for and threats to Western security. The intervention in Afghanistan represents a qualitatively new step in the use of Soviet power for political purposes since it is the first time the Soviet Union has intervened directly with its own troops in an area outside of its immediate sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. This alteration in Soviet tactics has raised the issue of some type of coordinated strategy on the part of NATO member nations outside the boundaries of Western Europe as a means to enhance Western security generally. Officials interviewed stressed, however, that the importance of French participation in such coordinated actions would necessitate the avoidance of any NATO label. Such a strategy will require close consultation among the allies.

On TNF, Belgium decided to deploy ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) on its soil but suspended for 6 months the implementation of those decisions pending an assessment of progress on potential arms control negotiations on such systems. Belgium, however, has expressed support in principle for the NATO decision, which it considered an appropriate response not only to the Soviet deployment of the SS–20 and the Backfire bomber, but also to the growing military power of the Soviet Union in general. Because modernization of NATO theater nuclear forces had not occurred for several years, and the Soviet Union had proceeded with the modernization of its theater systems, Belgian officials pointed out that perceptions of increased NATO vulnerability at this level of armaments had arisen. However, some officials also stated that such a vulnerability existed in the past without NATO efforts to correct them, and the recent TNF decision, in their view, served a primarily political function, the demonstration of alliance cohesion and resolve vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could only facilitate the likely acceptance of new theater nuclear weapons by Belgium after this 6-month period.

Finally, Belgian officials asserted their country's unequivocal belief in the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee to Western Europe. They were particularly critical of perennial and recent public questioning of the U.S. nuclear guarantee as an action which unnecessarily

eroded the perception of confidence in U.S. leadership and of the U.S. commitment to the defense of Western Europe. While Europe must always be concerned with this ultimate question and what it can do to increase its own defense capabilities, Belgian officials emphasized the level of doubt as one confined to the abstract and not highly regarded.

Arms Control

Belgian officials felt that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had affected the prospects for détente and arms control and that progress in MBFR, SALT, and any alternate potential forum for TNF arms control was unlikely for the time being. These officials nevertheless suggested that arms control efforts needed to be pursued regardless of the Soviet invasion and the deferral of SALT II ratification. The political requirement in most NATO countries for TNF arms control is sufficiently urgent to merit discussions on TNF with the Soviet Union outside the SALT framework. While Belgium supports SALT II and prefers the SALT framework for TNF arms control, discussions should begin as soon as possible even if some type of forum other than SALT is necessary to do so. Belgian officials interviewed also seemed less concerned than their counterparts in many other European countries about the need to negotiate U.S. theater nuclear systems and central strategic systems in the same negotiating forum. While a SALT framework was more desirable and realistic, Belgian officials stressed the need for a relatively rapid initiation of TNF arms control as necessary to insure popular support in Belgium for eventual TNF deployment in that country and suggested that ultimate failure to ratify SALT II would impact negatively on an eventual Belgian deployment of modernized TNF.

Like the other smaller NATO member-nations, Belgium has expressed her support for the President's conventional arms transfer policy and considers it a useful initiative in attempting to limit the sale of sophisticated weapons to the developing world. Belgium herself exercises restraint by closely scrutinizing Third World arms sales on a case-by-case basis. However, Belgian officials pointed out that Belgium was not a major arms exporter and that the major European arms exporters, with important economic and political stakes in arms sales, would accede with great difficulty to any multilateral agreements to reduce arms sales to various regions of the world.

Defense Cooperation

Belgian officials expressed their support for continued and growing defense cooperation with the United States. U.S. efforts to enhance rationalization, standardization and interoperability within NATO, including "Perry's triad," [1] have received a positive response from Belgium. In fact, Belgian officials regarded prospects for defense cooperation to be better with the United States than with the Western European nations. Lower unit-costs of Belgian purchases from the United States—due to economies of scale generated by longer U.S. production lines—and greater relative opportunities for Belgian defense industry

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[1] See app. 5, p. 67.

to coproduce U.S. systems have reinforced this perception. Belgian officials were not optimistic about the development of greater intra-European defense cooperation. Identification of common requirements and subsequent proposals for a common weapons systems among European nations, to be accomplished through the Independent European Program Group (IEPG), had achieved little progress to date because of national disagreements about the best candidate for any one requirement.

Due to across-the-board budgetary reductions to reduce their budget deficit, Belgium has been unable to meet the 3-percent NATO-wide commitment for real annual growth in defense expenditures. Belgium's defense expenditures are projected to show little or no growth in 1980. Belgium has also had difficulties with the attainment of the LTDP's required measures, mainly because of budgetary constraints. Belgium's problems in contributing its proportional share of the acquisition costs of aircraft under the NATO AWACS program have been due to budgetary constraints caused by purchases of other equipment. Nevertheless, Belgium regards the 3-percent commitment and the LTDP as desirable political and military tools in NATO's defense efforts.

NORWAY

The staff study mission regarded its visit to Norway on January 4 as presenting an opportunity to gain a unique perception of European political and security issues. As a key country bordering on the Soviet Union in NATO's vital, albeit less publicized, northern flank, Norway faces difficult security challenges in defending its territory with respect to a credible wartime scenario involving the deployment of Soviet forces across central and northern Europe. In addition, as an original part of its membership in NATO, Norway has put conditions on its NATO membership. These conditions include a peacetime renunciation of nuclear weapons and of permanent foreign bases and troops on Norwegian soil. These conditions must be seen in the light of complex, sensitive relations with the Soviet Union and Norway's Nordic neighbors, who share the reality of proximity to the Soviet Union but who, unlike Norway, do not share the perception that NATO membership is the best approach to maintain ultimate freedom of action in pursuit of foreign policy and national security interests.

The Northern Flank: Growing Importance in NATO Strategy

The northern flank is an area of growing political, economic and military significance to NATO. NATO strategy involves control of the northern flank, Norway and the area around Norway, to maintain NATO's sea lines of communication between North America and Western Europe in the event of war. Norway's strategic position in the north makes her uniquely suited to carry out maritime surveillance of Soviet air and naval forces seeking to enter the North Atlantic. Northern Norway is a vital source of intelligence on Soviet activities in the Kola Peninsula. At the same time, the northern region has also become of even greater security interest and concern to the Soviet Union. The Soviet northern fleet makes extensive use of its Kola Peninsula facilities. Over 70 percent of the Soviet SLBM force is contained in the northern fleet assets. The development of the Soviet *Delta*-class submarine with its longer range missile makes the Barents Sea a likely sanctuary, increasing Soviet sensitivity to military activity in the area and, correspondingly, Norway's strategic importance. The Port of Murmansk, the only year-round, ice-free port in the Soviet Union is located on the Kola Peninsula. The Peninsula, as well as the whole Arctic region in general, holds great reserves of oil and gas, making the region of growing interest to both NATO countries and the Soviet Union. In short, the growing strategic importance of the Nordic region, combined with massive Soviet seapower in the region, makes Norway's security ever more vital.

Given Norway's "base policy," discussed later, her long coastline, and her small population (4 million) and standing armed forces (50,000), Norway's defense depends primarily on two factors: Rapid

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mobilization (of a potential force of 250,000 men) and external reinforcement (by United States, British, and Canadian forces). Norway's mobilization capability, based on rapid conversion of civilian assets to military use and the involvement of a substantial portion of the population as Home Guard reservists, was described by U.S. officials as one of the best in NATO.

The improvement of reinforcement capabilities is a high priority for Norway and will be a difficult task. Norway's ability to defend its territory and deter attack is premised on the need for a good reinforcement capability.

Forces from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada would primarily be involved in reinforcing Norway in the event of Soviet attack. NATO's seven-nation Allied Mobile Force (AMF) would also play a role in the defense of Norway. Norwegian defense ministry officials pointed out that only Canada's Air/Sea Transportable Combat Brigade is committed exclusively to the defense of Norway.

Norwegian officials suggested that a most likely attack scenario would involve two standing Soviet divisions threatening northern Norway. However, these divisions would require prior reinforcement, thus producing sufficient warning time for NATO forces. Presently, Norway lacks sufficient local air defense capabilities to establish air superiority in northern Norway to facilitate reinforcement of the area and to intercept Soviet naval and long-range aviation that will project out of the Kola area to attack allied shipping facilities. In addition, transportation for British and Canadian forces is not dedicated to defense of Norway alone, increasing the time it may take for reinforcements to reach northern Norway. The use of the multilateral AMF is hindered by a lack of standardization and interoperability of equipment among national components in the force. Even if reinforcements were to arrive in time, the vulnerability of airfields and early warning stations is high and has been a cause of concern for U.S. officials.

In light of these serious problems, United States and Norwegian officials have taken a number of steps to be better able to deter Soviet attack and prevent any political influence arising out of a perception of overwhelming Soviet superiority. Norway is currently undertaking efforts to improve its ability to receive reinforcements. Although some pre-positioning of NATO equipment (mainly fuel and ammunition) has already occurred, prestocking of heavy allied equipment in Norway is presently being considered to reduce the transfer time for reinforcement forces. Since 1977 informal talks have been conducted between the United States and Norway on prestockage of heavy military equipment and personnel. Norwegian defense officials expressed strong and particular interest in the use of a U.S. Marine brigade for reinforcement of Norway.

An effective reinforcement capability serves to heighten deterrence against potential attack. According to a Norwegian Ministry of Defense report to Parliament,

> The assurance that reinforcements can be transported to Norway in an emergency situation within the containment period of the Norwegian forces is essential for the credibility of the Norwegian defense and security policy, and consequently of the conflict preventing effect of Norway's security policy.

Norway considers its efforts to improve reinforcement capabilities and increase equipment prepositioning to be consistent with its policy of not allowing permanent foreign bases on its soil (a policy in effect since 1949), despite Soviet interpretations to the contrary. The Norwegian Ministry of Defense has declared that "The base policy is no hindrance to the establishment in Norway of stockpiles of ammunition, equipment, supplies, et cetera for allied forces."

An "umbrella" lines-of-communication (LOC) agreement, addressing the ground rules and establishing procedures for rapid reinforecement by U.S. forces, is due to be signed. Norwegian procurement of the F–16 should substantially remedy Norway's air defense deficiencies, although commitment of over 80 percent of Norway's defense equipment expenditures to the F–16 program has hindered the capability of the Government of Norway to meet other defense needs (such as purchase of the Roland II missile for airbase defense). The United States and Norway have concluded several colocated operating base (COB) agreements to enhance Norway's defenses in the event of war. Agreements have been concluded to pre-position full aircraft repair facilities on four Norwegian bases.

U.S. officials also assured the staff study mission that defense of the Norwegian Sea in wartime has not been abandoned by the U.S. Government. At the same time, Norwegian officials pointed out that either land-based or carrier-based U.S. aircraft would be essential to Norway's defense in any lengthy war scenario. British Royal Marines have been training in Norway for several years already.

Despite the difficulties faced by Norway in the defense of its territory, defense officials there felt the situation was manageable because of Norway's and its NATO allies' concerted efforts to improve defense capabilities while also enabling Norway to pursue its foreign policy and national security interests without courting or seeking the approval of the Soviet Union. Norway's unquestioned NATO membership and NATO's commitment to Norway constitute vital security guarantees in the event of Soviet military aggression against Norway.

NATO as an Instrument of Defense and Détente

Any assessment of the security balance in the northern region and its effects on Norway must take into account political as well as military factors and requirements. The various relationships that have developed in that region have been referred to as the "Nordic balance." While a somewhat nebulous concept, one observer of the European security scene has described it as a sensitive recognition by all five Nordic countries (Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, and Finland) that, because of their similarities in size, population, cultural heritage, and historical experience, they have a "commonality of interests," and that actions taken by one state have implied or potential effects on another. The concept of the Nordic balance also involves a recognition of the legitimate security interests and concerns of the Soviet Union in the area and a desire therefore to avoid undue provocation.

Norway's interest in preserving the Nordic balance plays a major role in Norway's policy and relationship toward NATO. Norway's "self-imposed restrictions" are integral parts of that policy and rela-

tionship. Norway does not accept the presence of permanent foreign bases and troops on its soil; forbids the deployment of nuclear weapons there; and places certain limits on allied activities in Norway. Despite considerable criticism from the Soviet Union, Norway interprets its foreign base policy liberally, allowing for extended training visits by NATO member forces. Complementing their opposition to permanent foreign bases in Norway, Norwegian officials speculated that a change in this policy could result in the Soviets trying to establish bases in northern Finland, thereby not only undermining Finnish independence, but also making Norway's security position more precarious and upsetting the Nordic balance.

Norway's security policy and the preservation of the Nordic balance are based on the principles of "insurance" and "reassurance." Insurance entails Norwegian participation in NATO and adherence to its objectives and policies. NATO was described by a foreign ministry official as the "cornerstone" of Norwegian foreign and defense policy. NATO provides Norway with the insurance that sensitivity to the Nordic balance does not involve automatic compliance to Soviet foreign policy objectives in the Nordic region. Reassurance is based on the adoption of the self-imposed restrictions and involves providing no opportunity for the Soviet Union to take actions endangering the security of Norway or her Nordic neighbors. Norwegian policy is premised on a special appreciation of Soviet interests in the region and a recognition of the shortcomings of deliberate and direct provocation of the Soviet Union in the area, coupled with a commitment to the goals and strategies of the alliance, expressed in its approval of the TNF deployment decision and participation in coordinated actions vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in the wake of its invasion of Afghanistan.

Finally, Norwegian officials stressed that Norway does not doubt, and that no European country has reason to doubt, the U.S. security guarantee to Western Europe. That guarantee is one which is in the U.S. interest. It is based on the view that a credible defense of the United States must begin in Western Europe and that the defense of Western Europe must be inextricably linked to the defense of U.S. territory in order to be credible.

Arms Control

The presence of large numbers of Soviet forces in the northern region, in areas close to the Norwegian-Soviet border, makes Norway sensitive to the need to limit the arms race and support arms control efforts, including SALT II. Norway expressed its unqualified support for NATO's decision to upgrade its theater nuclear forces as a necessary precondition for arms control negotiations on these weapons. Norway, officials told the study mission, played an active role in shaping NATO's arms control position with respect to TNF, and thus wholeheartedly subscribes to the current Western position on TNF arms control negotiations.

Although arms control prospects are dim at the present time, Norwegian officials stressed the need to pursue arms control because it is in the interest of the West to do so. One Norwegian stated that while there is a strong feeling in favor of disarmament in Norway, the re-

cent Soviet action in Afghanistan has had such an impact on the Norwegian-Soviet relationship that only with a clear demonstration by the Soviet Union that it is willing to play "by the rules" of détente will prospects for TNF arms control be heightened.

Norway favors SALT II ratification and the SALT process because they help stabilize the relationship between East and West. A Norwegian official believed that, in addition to the general deterioration of East-West relations, the lack of a SALT forum for negotiations on theater nuclear systems was problematic, largely because of the need also to include consideration of strategic systems in the negotiations. At the same time, he speculated that the Western position may have been strengthened because of the need by the Soviet Union to compensate for the political costs incurred by its action in Afghanistan.

Moreover, Norwegian officials interviewed by the staff study mission expressed an interest in a continuing U.S. policy of détente with the Soviet Union, although the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan demonstrated that it was unsound in the West to expect détente to influence Soviet foreign policy objectives in the Third World and to limit Soviet opportunism. In addition, political détente was bound to be affected by the lack of progress in military détente, that is, arms control.

Defense Cooperation

Norwegian defense officials were generally satisfied with defense cooperation efforts with the United States to promote RSI among NATO member countries. The signing of a reciprocal Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the United States on defense procurement was seen as a positive first step in the achievement of a more equitable "two-way street" of exports and imports of defense equipment between the United States and the other NATO allies. Like other NATO members, Norway hopes for tangible results from "Perry's triad" and is not fundamentally suspicious of the effort as a "buy American" program.

Norway's primary experience with dual production of a U.S. weapon system is the F–16. Norway would have preferred the program to have extended over a longer period of time than is called for in the multinational agreement, but feels its participation, while costly (over 80 percent of the 1979 defense equipment budget), was worth the effort because of the benefits to Norwegian industry through industrial collaboration, offset guarantees, and technology transfer.

Norway has responded reasonably well to the NATO-wide commitment for a 3 percent real increase in defense. The Norwegian defense budget for calendar year 1979 recorded a 2.6 percent real increase. A 3 percent real annual increase is planned for the years 1980–82. Norway has attempted to use the 3-percent goal as a basis for its defense planning. Reasons for failure to meet the target in 1979, which could recur in subsequent years, has been economic constraints. While Norwegian officials admitted that not all of the 123 defense measures contained in the 10 major areas are likely to be achieved, the long-term defense program has provided a major impetus in the areas of reinforcement, logistics, and force readiness. The heavy commitment of funds to the F–16 program has severely affected Norway's ability to meet LTDP objectives, a situation which will not be remedied until 1984.

Bilateral Discussions With the Soviet Union

Norway is presently involved in a series of bilateral problems with the Soviet Union relating to economic interests in the northern region and to the resolution of various territorial questions such as the Barents Sea boundary, appropriate guidelines for Norwegian and Soviet fishing activities, and the issue of the extent of economic protection Norway can develop around the Svalbard Archipelago. Rich fishing stocks and potentially great reserves of mineral resources (oil and gas), as well as questions of sovereignty and security, make agreement in such negotiations difficult.

Negotiations between Norway and the Soviet Union on a continental shelf boundary in the Barents Sea area have been going on since 1974. The last round of talks occurred in 1976, and a new round is tentatively scheduled for April 1980.

The two countries have agreed that up to the 12-mile territorial limit, the boundary follows a line equidistant from both coastlines, called the median line. Beyond this point, however, the Soviet Union contends that the boundary should follow a line, called the sector line, running from a point slightly east of the Norwegian-Soviet border to the North Pole, adjusted to avoid cutting across the Svalbard Treaty area. Norway contends the median line should be used for the entire area in question. The area in question is estimated to be about 155,000 square kilometers and is believed to hold great mineral resources. Despite Norwegian willingness to compromise, the talks have achieved little progress.

The impasse over an appropriate shelf boundary between Norway and the Soviet Union, Norway's 1977 declaration of a 200-mile economic zone, and the Soviet Union's declaration of a fisheries jurisdiction zone led to the decision by the two countries to establish guidelines to control fishing in the disputed area. In 1978, the two countries agreed to a "gray zone" agreement which established joint control of fishing in an area overwhelmingly west of the median line and partially west of the sector line.

Norway has come under criticism for concluding this agreement by both domestic and foreign observers who argue that Norwegian agreement to the gray zone compromises its position in the Barents Sea boundary negotiations. When asked about this charge, Norwegian officials argue that the gray zone agreement was concluded to protect the fishing industry in Norway from depletion of fishing stocks in the eastern sectors of the Barents Sea by the Soviet fisheries industry. The migratory patterns of many fish in the area are such that the younger fish are primarily found in the eastward areas of the Barents Sea. By focusing fishing activities westward, depletion of younger stocks of fish by Soviet fishermen in the eastern Barents Sea would be lessened, thus strengthening the future security of the Norwegian fishing industry. As one Norwegian official put it, "oil in the Continental Shelf can wait, fish cannot."

Norwegian officials also stressed that the agreement is temporary, deals only with one specific activity, does not apply to the entire region under negotiation in the boundary shelf discussions, nor can it be construed as establishing a precedent for future agreement in those discussions. Whether Norway can withstand likely Soviet inclinations to

regard the "gray-zone" agreement as a precedent for the boundary shelf negotiations remains to be seen.

The 1920 Svalbard Treaty recognized Norway's full and absolute sovereignty over the islands of the Svalbard Archipelago. Signatories to the treaty are given equal liberty of access and entry to the waters around the islands and may carry out industrial, mining, and maritime operations without impediment and on the basis of absolute equality.

Norwegian administration of the Svalbard Archipelago, located in the far north, has been facing new challenges as new interests in the economic potential of the Arctic region develop. To avoid isolation of Norway in its dealings with the Soviet Union on these matters, NATO member nations will have to continue maintaining an active interest in the area, lest the Norwegians fall victim to Soviet political intimidation. In recent years, Soviet activities on Svalbard have increasingly challenged Norway's sovereignty there and resulted in greater sovereignty over Svalbard, resulting in increased friction with the Soviets who are engaged in coal mining and other projects on Svalbard.

A potentially serious challenge to Norwegian sovereignty in the Svalbard area has arisen over the question of the jurisdiction of the Svalbard Treaty. Norway contends that the jurisdiction extends only to the islands within the designated treaty area and the 4-mile territorial waters adjacent to these islands. The right to unimpeded commercial operations by other signatory parties does not extend, Norway contends, to the continental shelf around Svalbard. To enforce this position and strengthen its sovereignty over the Svalbard Archipelago, Norway claims the right to establish a 200-mile economic zone around Svalbard and has established a limited fishery protection control zone. The Soviet Union has disputed Norway's claims and has a mixed record of compliance with fishing regulations established by Norway in the area. The United States and other NATO allies have reserved their position on the question of jurisdiction although they have no problem with the nondiscriminatory application of the regulations. Norwegian officials interviewed did not view this reservation as a major problem, regarding it as an indication of continuing interest in the area and preventing Norway from becoming isolated in its dealings with the Soviets on this issue.

The plentiful oil and gas deposits in the Arctic region, substantial and lucrative fishing areas there, and the likely Soviet challenges Norway will face in its administration of the Svalbard Archipelago will make the various Norwegian-Soviet negotiations of growing importance to NATO. Continuing interest by NATO in these delicate and difficult negotiations will be required if Norway is to maintain a firm, confident position consistent with its considerable economic and strategic interests in the northern region.


NORWAY
Economic Zone Proposal
Norwegian proposed economic zone
Treaty boundary
Equidistant line
Sector line
200 nautical mile limit
Bathymetry
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Nautical miles
CANADA
NORTH POLE
ARCTIC OCEAN
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FRANZ JOSEF LAND
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SVALBARD (Norway)
Longyearbyen
Barentsburg
BARENTS SEA
Bear I.
Spitzbergen Treaty
GREENLAND (DENMARK)
GREENLAND SEA
Jan Mayen (Norway)
Nordkapp (North Cape)
Kirkenes
Murmansk
U.S.S.R.
Arctic Circle
Denmark Strait
NORWEGIAN SEA
ICELAND
REYKJAVIK
Tromsø
SWEDEN
FINLAND
NORWAY
Gulf of Bothnia
HELSINKI
30W
Faeroe Islands (Denmark)
Shetland Is.
NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN
Bergen
OSLO
STOCKHOLM
BALTIC SEA
Ekofisk Oilfield
DENMARK
COPENHAGEN
NORTH SEA
UNITED KINGDOM
IRELAND
DUBLIN
LONDON
NETH.
FED. REP. OF GER.
AMSTERDAM
Berlin
E. GER.
WARSAW
POLAND
The United States Government has not recognized the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into the Soviet Union. Names and some other boundaries are not necessarily authoritative.
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
ARCTIC OCEAN
Canada
Queen Elizabeth Islands
North Pole
U.S.S.R.
Severnaya Zemlya
Kara Sea
Franz Josef Land
Canada-Greenland 1973 Continental Shelf Boundary
Greenland (Denmark)
Novaya Zemlya
Barentsburg
Svalbard (Norway)
Greenland Sea
Barents Sea
Bjornoya
1920 Spitzbergen Treaty Limits
Murmansk
Norwegian Sea
Jan Mayen (Norway)
Denmark Strait
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U. S. S. R.
Iceland
Sweden
Finland
ARCTIC CLAIMS
kilometers
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nautical miles
International land boundary
Treaty limit
Theoretical sector line
Equidistant line
200 nautical mile limit
"Gray Zone"
3123 9-78 STATE(RGE)

UNITED KINGDOM

The staff study mission was in the United Kingdom on January 7 and conducted meetings with British officials in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. In addition, the mission met with professional staff members of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). The following represents the views expressed to the staff study mission while in the United Kingdom.

NATO as an Instrument of Defense and Détente

British officials pointed to a number of subtle, but evident changes in the NATO alliance since the mid-1960's on questions of defense and détente, changes which have created opportunties for both cohesiveness and divisiveness among alliance member nations, although they felt that the overall cohesion of the alliance had improved in recent years. First, member-nations seem more deeply involved in and committed to the process of détente. Preserving détente has become a more prominent objective than in earlier years. Second, as an aspect of détente policy, arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union have begun more directly to affect European security interests. Future discussions on TNF arms control, for example, involving Europe-based nuclear systems, will impact upon the security interests of the European nations more than ever before. Third, a growing perception of a greater Soviet threat and of the need for a strong and adequate collective defense has been fostered. Increasing defense costs, however, and uncertain or declining economies in Western Europe have periodically created disagreements on how best to address the need for a strong, collective defense.

The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has helped to focus attention within the alliance on the need to deal with contingencies outside the treaty area affecting Western interests. British officials lamented the fact that the policies of the NATO countries outside the NATO Treaty area lack coordination.

For example, British officials contend that where possible, as in the case of the holding of hostages in Iran, NATO as an alliance should be able through advance consultations to foster support for actions on the part of individual members. Although such political and diplomatic support from allies was considered imperative to assure the maintenance of Western interests, British officials cautioned against a coordinated response outside the treaty area that would bear the NATO stamp. Rather British officials felt member nations should make each other more aware of actions taken by individual nations in support of Western interests in strategic areas outside Europe.

Finally, British officials pointed out that despite inevitable disagreements inherent in an alliance of democracies, enduring political/military support for NATO among its member nations is stronger

than in recent years and is not contingent upon Soviet aggressive action abroad.

British officials viewed NATO as essentially a political alliance which enables both European defense and East-West détente to continue. These officials added their belief that no NATO member perceives the military balance in Europe as having reached a point where it cannot pursue its foreign policy and national security interests without courting or seeking the approval of the Soviet Union.

An essential element that contributes to alliance cohesiveness according to some British foreign ministry officials, is the need for the United States to assert forceful and "skillful" leadership. After negative European perceptions of that leadership, following the presence of the Soviet brigade in Cuba (August 1979) and the deferment of deployment of the "neutron bomb" (1978), the United States has learned a lot about the proper management of the alliance. The process leading to the TNF deployment decision with its arms control component was cited as an illustration of proper management. Perceptions of proper U.S. leadership and management of NATO are enhanced by consultations with the NATO allies on the TNF decision and other issues. Although the West Europeans may often be seen as "a difficult lot to lead," in large part due to a difference in perceptions of interests among Europeans and different relationships with the Soviet Union, regular and systematic consultation between the United States and its NATO allies was seen as an essential process contributing to positive European perceptions of effective and reliable leadership by the United States.

Officials interviewed strongly supported the TNF decision as ultimately one which "couples" rather than "decouples" theater nuclear systems to U.S. central strategic systems by increasing the options available to the U.S. President in the event of war in Europe. It does so by bringing U.S. involvement in the crucial decision to make a nuclear response earlier in time at a lower level of deterrence than may have been the case in the absence of long range theater nuclear forces.

British officials continue to regard the U.S. security guarantee to Western Europe as viable and credible. In the view of United Kingdom foreign ministry officials, U.S. forces remaining on the European continent are a tangible expression that the defense of Europe is in the U.S. national security interest and that the United States will not hesitate in using all of its military power if necessary. These officials pointed out that aside from the question of whether Europeans believe in the U.S. security guarantee, an even more important question is whether it is believed by the Soviet Union. The degree of uncertainty is now seen as sufficient in Soviet decisionmakers minds to deter military action against Western Europe. Moreover, the British independent nuclear deterrent, consisting of a Polaris submarine force, adds to that uncertainty, thereby justifying its very existence.

Arms Control

There is more skepticism in the United Kingdom toward arms control than perhaps in any other Western European country. Nevertheless, officials interviewed expressed their support for SALT II, as well as an understanding of the political requirement in the United

States to defer a Senate vote on ratification. TNF arms control, for example, is not the political requirement in the United Kingdom that it is on the European continent and is not as necessary to enhance support for TNF deployment among the population.

Future TNF arms control negotiations, however, are viewed as important by British officials because they are important to the other allies and are perceived as contributing to alliance-wide security. United Kingdom officials interviewed preferred that discussions in TNF arms control be within the SALT III framework, even if this would mean a delay in the beginning of such discussions given the delay in SALT II ratification. Such an approach would leave no doubt as to the "coupling" of U.S. central strategic and theater nuclear systems since such systems would be negotiated in the same forum (SALT III).

Should this preferred approach not be possible initially, however, United Kingdom officials found acceptable the notion of an ad hoc forum to negotiate TNF and strategic arms control together pending the beginning of SALT III.

While supportive of the MBFR negotiations, British officials were pessimistic about the prospects for progress. Seeing Soviet objectives in MBFR as centered principally on preserving Warsaw Pact (WP) advantages in manpower and in some types of equipment, these officials believed present Western negotiating objectives at MBFR to redress these imbalances and establish essential equivalence at the conventional level between NATO and WP would be difficult to achieve though desirable to pursue.

While expressing "understanding" of the motivation and concepts underlining the U.S. Government's efforts to restrain the transfer of conventional arms to developing countries, British officials pointed out that, unlike the United States, the primary motivation behind United Kingdom arms exports was economic. As one official said, "We trade unless there is good reason not to." Economies of scale benefits in domestic military production facilities as well as the economic benefits to the United Kingdom's balance of payments helped justify arms sales. British officials also cited the motivation of gaining access and influence with a potential recipient as another reason for arms exports, although this was viewed as limited in scope and secondary to economic motivations.

Defense Cooperation

The United Kingdom, while preferring to collaborate more closely with the United States in arms production and procurement because of the size of the U.S. market, nevertheless considers defense cooperation among European nations as much more practical. British defense officials pointed out that European defense cooperation has a longer history since pressure on research and development budgets arose much earlier in Europe than in the United States. Furthermore, defense costs and the relatively low demand for weapons systems in any one European country have stimulated joint production efforts among several European countries in order to benefit from economies of scale. United Kingdom officials argued that joint development and/or production of a given weapon system by the United States and the United Kingdom inevitably leads to U.S. dominance in that effort because of

the scale of U.S. market demand. A private observer added that "in order to survive, European defense industries will need to cooperate among themselves and maintain and develop markets in Europe." Given differing requirements which affect weapons system design and increase unit costs, the United States is seen by British officials as not likely to pursue joint development unless investment pressures are substantial. In addition, one must take into account political pressures to preserve employment levels in the defense industry, the need to maintain a high technological capability in a variety of weapons development areas, a basic preference to collaborate with nations which have the same "technological wherewithal," and potential disagreements between the United States and European nations concerning exports of codeveloped systems. Such factors, in the view of British officials, drive major European arms producers to seek cooperation among themselves. Such cooperation, one official admitted, was "not more preferable, but easier."

On the other hand, standardization within NATO and defense cooperation with the United States remain principles to which the United Kingdom is committed. United Kingdom officials regarded the "Perry triad" of cooperative proposals positively. Such efforts, receiving the support of the highest levels of the U.S. Government, were perceived by British officials as a sign of an improving U.S. attitude toward the need for defense cooperation with the Europeans. "Perry's triad" is a positive first step in what United Kingdom officials see as a long-term effort to pursue NATO standardization more equitably. The feeling among officials that "the United States has had a change of heart, although the flesh needs to be put on the bones of Perry's triad" is indicative of United Kingdom attitudes toward standardization. Reciprocal MOU's between the United States and individual NATO countries cannot but help defense cooperation, although some concern was expressed that removal of national legislative restrictions could lead to even further U.S. domination of British and other European defense markets. Both United Kingdom defense officials and private experts felt that penetration of the U.S. defense market would essentially involve the use of British subcontractors on U.S.-manufactured weapons systems. However, British officials emphasized that the success of future standardization efforts will also depend on the willingness of the U.S. Government in some instances to procure European weapons systems. U.S. Government decisions on the possible procurement of the British-made Rapier missile will be watched closely. Although it was pointed out that most present dual production efforts involve European production of a U.S. system rather than vice versa, it was considered more politically acceptable than direct purchase of a U.S. system.

The "family of weapons" concept, was seen as a promising proposal for the future, although one NATO official predicted major difficulties in deciding the appropriate division of labor under such a concept.

Other than natural, intrinsic economic and attitudinal barriers, United Kingdom officials noted that two U.S. legislative restrictions constitute obstacles to defense cooperation: the annual authorization and appropriation process, and restrictions on third-country sales. Multiyear memorandums of understanding signed among European nations, establishing the guidelines for and national commitment to

the development and production of a weapons system, like the multi-role combat aircraft (MRCA), for example, are not possible with the United States because its participation is subject to annual rather than multiyear authorization and appropriation by the Congress. Given this reality, United Kingdom officials believed major European producers are more reticent about pursuing cooperative projects with the United States because of the potential for U.S. withdrawal from the project at any given time, resulting in great potential losses to the other participants.

United Kingdom defense officials pointed out that the U.S. administrative and legal requirement that it have a veto power over sales of weapons systems which contain some U.S. input or component, no matter how small, has been a continual irritant in defense cooperation. Such stipulations are not a standard requirement with respect to cooperative projects among European suppliers and has been an additional incentive toward intra-European rather than trans-Atlantic defense cooperation.

In summary, United Kingdom officials perceive the effort toward NATO standardization through defense cooperation as a slow, long-term process which must overcome significant political and economic barriers to be successful. The objective must be viewed pragmatically, considering factors of economic gain, political imperatives, as well as military effectiveness. Weapons collaboration can best succeed on a case-by-case basis, with the recognition that the best choice of a weapons systems may not always be a standardized one. A balanced combination of economic necessities as well as the need to demonstrate political cohesion and greater military effectiveness in the NATO alliance will drive European nations to cooperate with the United States and other European nations. These objectives will become long-term realities if the U.S. commitment to a more equitable defense cooperation symbolized by Perry's triad is maintained.

United Kingdom defense officials regarded the LTDP as an important NATO commitment demonstrating political resolve and providing important priorities for NATO's conventional defense. Although there were some areas of the LTDP where the United Kingdom undertook some adjustments and changed some priorities to meet its objectives, the LTDP served in large part to underscore improvements already being or about to be undertaken by the United Kingdom. NATO officials described the United Kingdom as one of the countries most likely to achieve most of the 123 measures called for over the 15-year course of the LTDP. The United Kingdom is also committed to the NATO-wide objective of a 3-percent real annual increase in defense spending. Its 1979 defense spending increased by 4.2 percent in real terms. The projected 1980 budget involves a 3 percent increase in real defense spending.

IISS Assessment of the Military Balance in Europe

While in the United Kingdom, the staff study mission had the opportunity to discuss the question of the present and future military balance in Europe at both the theater nuclear and conventional levels with staff members of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).

IISS staff described the theater nuclear balance in Europe as relatively stable at the present time, but becoming relatively unstable in the near future. If the Soviets proceed with the deployment of their SS–20's at the current rate, 270 SS–20's will be deployed by 1985. Even with the planned NATO deployment of theater nuclear forces, NATO will be "worse off" in terms of numbers than the Soviet Union in the theater nuclear field. This "imbalance," however, can be dismissed because such a "bean count" comparison is very arbitrary, positing that a one-for-one match of NATO theater systems with Soviet theater systems does not adequately reflect NATO's deterrence capabilities. Rather, IISS staff emphasized that such factors as survivability and increased penetrability would increase significantly as a result of NATO TNF deployment, significantly offsetting a worsening numerical imbalance at the theater nuclear level.

In terms of nuclear doctrine, NATO's TNF decision augments deterrence by improving the credibility of NATO's nuclear response and increasing the U.S. President's nuclear options without removing the option of eventually using U.S. central strategic systems. While IISS staff agreed that the prospects of limiting nuclear war to the European theater were doubtful in the event Soviet and NATO TNF were involved, they considered the greater availability of choices and a potentially more gradual escalation as contributing overall to a more credible NATO defense posture and thereby enhancing deterrence.

IISS staff emphasized however that the TNF decision was primarily a political one, designed to demonstrate NATO resolve to respond to the SS–20 deployments and provide a more "visible" and credible demonstration of the U.S.-security guarantee to Europe. The presence ("visibility") of the TNF systems on Western European soil contributes significantly to the credibility of the U.S. deterrent, particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany, although the control of the theater forces will be strictly American.

IISS staff regarded NATO's present conventional defenses as sufficient to deter attack and defend existing territory if dynamic procurement policies are pursued. However, IISS officials expressed concern that NATO may not be prepared to fight a long conventional war, because, in addition to the Soviet Union's intrinsic geographical advantages over the United States and the capability to harass or interfere with U.S. reinforcement efforts, NATO needs to improve its capability to mobilize forces and provide reserves.

IISS staff dismissed the hypothesis of a "no-warning, standing start" attack on Western Europe by the Warsaw Pact. They argued that any such attack by the Warsaw Pact would involve at most the 31 Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe, because of the political unreliability of Eastern European forces. Together with the conservative nature of Soviet military planning, even some of these 31 Soviet divisions might be held back to insure stability in Eastern Europe during such an attack. Under such circumstances, NATO's present defenses are sufficient to deter the Soviets from engaging in such a military venture.

When asked as to the effects of the Soviet advantage in a long conventional war in Europe being transferred into political effects on the NATO countries, IISS staff contended that no NATO country today feels constrained by Soviet military power from pursuing its national security and foreign policy interests.

It has proven difficult to define the actual "power utility" of perceived Soviet superiority and its translation into political advantage in Europe. At the same time, it was argued that NATO, to avoid perceptions of military weakness, must "keep its guard up" and pursue defense policies of a nature to provide a credible deterrent and prevent Soviet use of perceived imbalances to pursue diplomatic confrontation and intimidation. The LTDP is therefore regarded as militarily and politically significant. Improvements in antitank systems, for example, are an important step in improving NATO's deterrent capabilities against a probable Soviet armored attack. NATO defense efforts, like the 3-percent commitment and the LTDP, were viewed as important political tools to encourage and maintain support for a vigilant attitude on defense in the NATO countries. Finally, IISS experts cautioned that even with the LTDP and other measures, NATO can never be totally confident about its conventional deterrent, even if highly upgraded, and that the nuclear option must always be contemplated.

THE NETHERLANDS

The staff study mission visited The Hague on January 8 and was briefed by the Embassy staff led by Ambassador Geri M. Joseph. Additional meetings were also conducted with officials of the Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense as well as with professional staff of a private research organization specializing in international security issues. What follows are the highlights of Dutch views on the major Western political and security issues discussed with the staff study mission during its visit to The Hague.

The Dutch Role in NATO

Dutch participation in and commitment to NATO is affected by a variety of factors, many of which are not present in other member-nations of the alliance. These include: The existence of a large well-organized antinuclear minority with great political influence; a moralistic strain in Dutch foreign policy; a deep-seated feeling that, albeit a threatening military power, the Soviet Union needs to be approached with expressions of "good will" and with perseverance; the still powerful, although slightly dwindling, influence exercised on the population by both Catholic and Protestant churches, which advocate opposition to nuclear weapons and confrontational diplomacy; a strong pacifist strain among the population; and a different perception of the Soviet threat which, while recognizing its magnitude, is considered with more equanimity than in the United States.

To add to these factors are more common characteristics of some other NATO member nations. These include: The "little country syndrome," reflective of an attitude that United States and Soviet military power is so overwhelming that any Dutch military contribution will make little difference in the East-West military balance; an instinctive fear of war and confrontation based on experience in World War II; a corresponding solid commitment to détente and arms control; and a previous history of neutralism, making participation in an alliance a relatively new and uncertain political reality.

The Dutch made the same analysis with regard to those factors that contribute to the cohesion of the alliance that was made in other European capitals: The Soviet presence in Eastern Europe and commitment to democratic systems of government and Western values. Basic perceptions on how to deal militarily with the Soviet threat, through increased defense spending and improvements in conventional and nuclear capabilities and in readiness, do not differ between the Netherlands and the other NATO allies, including the United States. However, there is a latent feeling that the imminence of the threat ought not to be exaggerated and that the threat itself cannot lead to political and psychological dominance of the Netherlands on the part of the Soviet Union.

Confidence in the U.S. strategic deterrent and growing faith in America's ability to fulfill its worldwide security commitments are

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considered complementary and essential to Dutch security policy. However, Dutch officials and U.S. Embassy officials indicated their desire for closer, more systematic consultations between the United States and the Netherlands and among NATO members on issues of mutual concern. Dutch officials urged greater use of the NATO Council in crisis situations affecting NATO members as a means of increasing a more collective defense attitude. Furthermore, Dutch private experts emphasized that while the principle of U.S. leadership in NATO is not questioned, individual assertions of that leadership sometimes are, as in the case of Vietnam.

It is in light of all these factors that the Dutch decision to postpone a final decision on the deployment of theater nuclear forces on its soil must be considered. Within the context of the December 1979 NATO ministerial meetings, the Netherlands, while agreeing with the reasons for and need to proceed with TNF modernization, decided to postpone its own decision to deploy long-range TNF on its own soil until December 1981. It stated that its ultimate decision would be premised on what progress would have occurred on arms control negotiations during the interim 2-year period. The Dutch position was essentially taken to address domestic political concerns, including those expressed by the Dutch Parliament, largely motivated by anti-nuclear and pro-arms control sentiments.

At the same time, Dutch Government officials advised the staff study mission that there can be no doubt that the Netherlands is committed to remaining in the NATO alliance and participating to the fullest extent possible in the various initiatives designed to improve the conventional capabilities of the alliance. NATO remains the framework within which the Dutch military operates. Furthermore, Dutch officials pointed out the Netherlands exceeded the target of 3 percent in defense spending in real terms for 1979 and the parliament has pledged that it would be met in the coming year.

Nonetheless, skepticism was expressed to the staff study mission by private Dutch experts and representatives of several political parties about the nature of the Dutch commitment to NATO in future years. The strength of the various antinuclear, antimilitary groups to influence Dutch defense policy was seen by these individuals as stronger than ever before. The prospects for Dutch acceptance of long-range TNF on its soil were judged to be dim, even if SALT II were ratified. Some expressed the judgment to the staff study mission that the success of the "disarmament lobby" in the Dutch TNF debate could spur erosion of the Dutch commitment to NATO in other areas, including the 3-percent real annual defense increase, implementation of the LTDP and possibly to an eventual rejection of nuclear weapons on its soil. While individuals interviewed saw no chance of the Netherlands leaving NATO, an erosion of the presently strong commitment was judged a serious possibility.

Dutch Government officials reiterated their commitment to NATO and stated they could not conceive of a Dutch or European defense outside NATO. While some contamination of domestic political support for NATO in the course of the TNF debate was acknowledged, recent polls in the Netherlands have shown that over 75 percent of the population supports NATO, while only 10 percent support unilateral withdrawal. Dutch Government officials asserted that its reservation

on the TNF decision be viewed as an isolated phenomenon and not as an erosion of public support for NATO. However, given the power of the disarmament pressure groups, future Dutch Governments may have to confront what one expert called "the loss of a broad consensus of enduring support for NATO among the major political parties."

The likely Dutch rejection of modern theater nuclear weapons on its soil poses a difficult policy dilemma for the United States. While it must continue to seek Dutch support for TNF modernization over the course of the next 2 years, it must also be concerned about maintaining strong Dutch commitments to conventional defense and not letting Dutch resistance to TNF modernization become the beginning of a long-term "antidefense" attitude. [Security deletion.]

In short, the Netherlands is a democratic country where, in a political setting that tilts leftward and is influenced heavily by religious traditions and forces, a well organized vocal minority in favor of disarmament and opposed to nuclearization has enjoyed widespread support and has begun to sow the seeds of what some see as a drift toward neoneutralism.

Arms Control

Moral abhorrence to nuclear weapons and a strong bias in favor of disarmament among the Dutch population have given the pursuit of arms control a high priority in Dutch foreign policy. There appears to be a greater awareness of the risk of nuclear war in the Netherlands than in any other nation in Western Europe. These factors, plus previous experience with the potential deployment of the Enhanced Radiation Weapon—neutron bomb—have sensitized Dutch public opinion in such a way that made unconditional acceptance of nuclear weapons difficult and unlikely.

Perhaps more than in any other single nation of NATO, the Netherlands has placed greater emphasis on the necessity of pursuing arms control efforts with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. A condition for full acceptance of theater nuclear forces by the Dutch Parliament and people will require the pursuance of arms control negotiations. Government officials have indicated that without SALT II ratification, lack of progress in MBFR talks and absence of negotiations on theater nuclear forces, full acceptance of the TNF modernization and eventual TNF deployment would be highly unlikely. In other words, without movement on TNF limitation negotiations, skepticism with regard to TNF deployment will increase and opposition to it intensify. As one official put it, there is a sense of "urgency in arms control" for the Netherlands. While acceptance of the need for modernization exists in principle, the need for TNF arms control was judged to be more important.

Dutch officials contended that opposition to nuclear weapons deployment in the Netherlands is not based on an assessment that the Soviet threat, however expressed, is not real and should not be addressed at all levels of armaments. The Netherlands fully participates in the LTDP and expects to meet its pledge to increase defense spending in real terms by 3 percent in 1980. At present, little opposition has been expressed toward improvements in Dutch conventional capabilities within the context of the NATO initiatives. In addition, the deep-seated Dutch commitment to arms control and détente has not pre-

vented the Government from sharply criticizing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and supporting U.S. actions at the U.N. with respect to the invasion.

On the subject of TNF negotiations, certain differences of opinion within the governmental bureaucracy were expressed to the staff study mission on how to proceed with these negotiations. Although agreement is strong that if a SALT III forum is not available, arms control negotiations on theater systems should go forward in another forum, there appear to be certain differences of opinion as to what role the consideration of strategic systems ought to play in negotiations on theater systems. Some officials indicated that negotiations to control theater nuclear systems could be conducted without at the same time discussing the further control and/or reduction of strategic systems. These same officials suggested, however, that strategic systems had to be taken into consideration when negotiating reduction on theater nuclear systems. Other officials opined that reductions of theater and nuclear systems would have to be negotiated together, to avoid the risk of decoupling Western strategic and theater nuclear capabilities.

Prior to the decision to proceed with TNF modernization, it had been thought that because the arms control component of the TNF decision needed to be strong and should be negotiated under the context of SALT III, and since as long as SALT II had not been ratified and SALT III could not therefore be initiated, it would be difficult to arrive at a decision on TNF modernization on a consensus basis. The December 12, 1979, communique of NATO foreign and defense ministers stated that "limitations on United States and Soviet long-range theater nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT II framework in a step-by-step approach."

Dutch officials were unanimous in their views that TNF negotiations could and should proceed without SALT II ratification and the existence of a SALT III forum. They regarded any negotiating forum established to discuss TNF as one that could later be fused with eventual SALT III negotiations, once SALT II had been ratified. Ultimate failure to ratify SALT II was viewed as destabilizing to the Netherlands security as well as to NATO's.

Some Dutch officials were critical of the latest Western offer at the MBFR negotiations.[1] These officials regarded the proposal as minimalist, designed to bring about only token troop reductions. They were also distressed by the removal from the proposal of the so-called Option III, which contained an offer to reduce 54 F–4 nuclear-capable aircraft, 36 Pershing theater nuclear launchers and 1,000 nuclear weapons. The removal of the nuclear option from the MBFR negotiations was viewed by officials interviewed as a potential step backward, although hope was expressed that the latest offer might lead to a basis for agreement as NATO pressed for further troop reductions.

Defense Cooperation

The Netherlands have responded favorably and enthusiastically to the long-term defense program approved by the NATO countries in May 1978. According to Dutch officials, the LTDP has helped to stimulate arms cooperation and military improvement and

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[1] See app. 6, p. 69.

to focus attention on weak spots in the common defense, to alter priorities in defense spending, and to undertake long-term planning. While many LTDP objectives would have been sought without the existence of the LTDP under regular force goal procedures, it did help to prioritize some of NATO's force goals and help assure their approval by the Dutch Parliament. While not all of the measures may be achieved, progress in clearing up major defense deficiencies will have been achieved, thus enhancing NATO's defense capabilities.

The Dutch army is purchasing the highly effective German Leopard tank. The Navy will be procuring 12 new frigates, as well as two conventional submarines and has already purchased several P–3 Orion reconnaissance aircraft. The Air Force is concentrating its efforts on replacing aging F–104's with the F–16. The Netherlands are a participant in the four-nation consortium established to coproduce the F–16 with the United States. Dutch officials interviewed seemed satisfied with the coproduction arrangement.

While the Dutch do not expect to fulfill 100 percent of the goals set out by the LTDP, the LTDP measures will help prioritize certain areas where deficiencies have been identified. Dutch officials identified, as a particular concern, the availability, storage, handling, and interoperability of NATO munitions. The LTDP Readiness Task Force addressed the munitions problem and has helped to improve the situation in this area of endeavor. NATO officials identified the Netherlands as one of the NATO countries making major progress in LTDP implementation. The Dutch expressed their satisfaction with the proposals for NATO RSI initiated by Dr. William Perry, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. An MOU on reciprocal defense procurement has already been signed with the United States and Dutch officials were enthusiastic about upcoming seminars sponsored by the U.S. Government to instruct Dutch armaments industries on the U.S. defense market. Some concern was expressed, however, about the termination of U.S. Government guaranteed offset arrangements in the implementation of dual production agreements. Although the issue of offsets had not yet come up as a severe subject of contention, Dutch officials felt strongly that offsets will continue to be important considrations in future procurement decisions. If offsets are no longer to be guaranteed, their elimination would have to be accompanied by broader U.S. Government commitments to purchase Dutch and/or Dutch-German equipment.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

While in Bonn, January 9–11, the staff study mission met with Embassy officials, representatives from the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs, as well as with a parliamentarian and several staff members of the West German Bundestag. The following issues were discussed.

NATO as an Instrument of Defense and Détente

German officials interviewed saw the Soviet challenge as an important factor contributing to NATO's political cohesion. NATO was seen as a unique and strong alliance. Despite differences in military strength, size, and different historical experience among its members, no permanent factions within the alliance have occurred. However, disagreements among members are a fact of life in an alliance of democracies. German officials cited differing European and U.S. reactions to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as an example of this process. To the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), détente has not been a one-way street favoring the Soviets and fears of the "death of détente" because of U.S. reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are a cause of serious concern.

At the same time, U.S. leadership and its security guarantee over Europe are regarded as facts of life by German officials. The visibility of U.S. troops in Germany, American leadership of NATO's integrated military structure, and other factors make U.S. security guarantees credible. German officials emphasized that whatever lingering doubts exist about U.S. willingness to defend Western Europe should remain outside public discussion in order to maintain enough certainty in the minds of Soviet decisionmakers that the United States would use its military power, thereby enhancing deterrence.

The Soviet military threat was recognized more for its political consequences on Western Europe than for its possible use in an actual Soviet military invasion. German officials emphasized the need, through a high degree of defense readiness, to avoid the "bit-by-bit" process by which European countries accommodate their policies to the reality of Soviet power. While these officials felt FRG foreign policy had not become a victim of this process, one official stressed that no European country was immune from it and that all NATO members must avoid crossing the "borderline" between détente and appeasement.

FRG security policy has been characterized by an equal emphasis on the maintenance of a strong defense and on the commitment to the pursuance of arms control. That policy is affected by her geographical location in Central Europe and her proximity to Warsaw Pact forces. According to the Federal Republic of Germany's 1979 white paper on defense, which outlines FRG security policy, NATO "combines defense capability with preparedness for détente to form a well-

rounded concept." The FRG contribution to the defense of Western Europe is the largest of any country in Western Europe. The German Bundeswehr provides 50 percent of the NATO land forces. Her military role in the defense of Western Europe is critical and essential. According to the defense white paper, the Bundeswehr "provides in Central Europe 50 percent of the NATO land forces, 50 percent of the ground-based air defense resources, 30 percent of the combat aircraft, and, in the Baltic, 50 percent of the naval forces and 100 percent of the naval air forces."

Détente and the Federal Republic of Germany's own Ostopolitik have provided a variety of benefits to the people of Germany. According to West German officials, these policies have preserved peace; reduced the risk of military confrontation in Europe; initiated family visits; substantially increased the number of Germans leaving Eastern Europe; stabilized the always potentially volatile situation in Berlin; promoted increased trade; developed cultural contacts; and generally created a climate of relaxed tension in Europe. German officials thus noted that it would be politically unwise and morally unacceptable for the Federal Republic of Germany to abandon all that had been gained through détente. At the same time, they recognized that alliance solidarity needs to express itself in responding to Soviet challenges not only in Europe but also in the Third World.

Because détente has provided the German people with tangible benefits, the Federal Republic of Germany has seen the value of trying to pursue its détente policy in spite of world crises that could seem to threaten the very nature of détente. On the other hand, as numerous FRG officials reminded the staff study mission, its détente policy is "realistic." "Realistic" détente, in the German view, means that sincere measures of accommodation must be matched by an equally strong willingness to address Soviet threats and challenges, particularly in Western Europe. "Realistic" détente entailed Soviet adherence to a certain set of "rules of the game" in the international system, such as the renunciation of the use of military force to pursue power politics. It also presupposes a strong defense commitment and a recognition of the need to make clear to the Soviets that selective definitions of détente should not be tolerated. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, not U.S. reactions to it, was seen as inimical to détente.

Supporting the NATO decision to deploy U.S. TNF and permitting elements to be based in the Federal Republic of Germany illustrate the desire on the part of the Federal Republic of Germany to meet a specific Soviet threat in the area of intermediate-range nuclear missiles. FRG officials viewed the NATO decision to deploy TNF as based both on political and military rationales. Politically, the alliance needed to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that its deployment of SS–20's and the Backfire bomber was a threat to the alliance as a whole and therefore should be addressed by the alliance as a whole. Militarily, FRG Defense Ministry officials explained, the "gap" in long-range theater nuclear systems on the part of NATO could lead the Soviet Union to think, however incorrectly, that it could use its own intermediate-range systems on Western Europe without eliciting a strategic nuclear response from the United States. The perception on the part of the Soviet Union that NATO has the capacity to respond

by means of nuclear weapons based in Europe capable of reaching Soviet soil, to a Soviet theater system attack, eliminates the possibility that the Soviet Union could believe that the United States would not respond by nuclear means, and therefore increases deterrence. NATO long-range theater nuclear forces provide the missing element in the ladder of escalation to the use of strategic nuclear systems. Ministry of Defense officials added that long-range theater nuclear systems also offered the option, in the "selective phase" of any war in Europe, to destroy enemy aircraft by targeting airfields.

All FRG officials with whom the staff study mission met expressed the view that how to deal with the Soviets outside the NATO treaty area presented difficulties for the FRG and might lead to a rift among alliance members, particularly between the United States and some of the European allies. The entire issue of how to deal with challenges to Western interests outside the alliance, FRG officials repeatedly stressed, was perhaps the major challenge facing the alliance today and in the future, and could have a noticeable effect on overall alliance cohesion.

Although the perception of alliance cohesion was an essential ingredient in any effective response to Soviet aggression in the Third World, the crisis in Afghanistan had clearly demonstrated that there could not necessarily be total agreement on how to respond to such actions. The FRG's position as a nonnuclear power, restrictions on the role of the Bundeswehr, and self-imposed restrictions on arms sales, West German officials told the study mission, limited its capability to respond to Soviet challenges in the Third World. The FRG could not be reasonably expected to respond in the same fashion or play the same role as the United States, the only world power besides the Soviet Union with worldwide interests and military capabilities, or even other allies such as the United Kingdom and France. As to economic sanctions in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, U.S. Embassy officials stressed that the export-minded German economy, the Soviet provision of 16 percent of the FRG's natural gas consumption, and the political clout of German industry would make such actions difficult for the FRG. The study mission was assured, however, that the FRG would not "fill the void" left by U.S. decisions to limit grain sales and high-technology exports. In addition, different perceptions of the benefits of détente and of what could be lost should détente be swept aside completely, can only make any reaction on the part of the FRG more cautious, although not necessarily less forceful.

Some FRG officials claimed that the crisis in Afghanistan might best have been handled outside the East-West context, and that the security and the interests of the Third World were at least as much in jeopardy as those of the West because of the Soviet invasion. They viewed the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan as an issue of "East-South" relations as well as one of "East-West" relations. German officials suggested that there would be diplomatic and political problems in eliciting a unanimous response on the part of the Western allies to crises in areas outside of NATO's areas of responsibility. Disagreements among allies on the nature and elements of responses to such crises and the concomitant need to demonstrate alliance solidarity is a dilemma that will

continue to confront the alliance in the future. This is not to say that the FRG, and other nations, would not take what they considered "appropriate" steps to express opposition to Soviet expansionism. FRG officials cited economic assistance to states on the periphery of conflict areas, aid to NATO members in economic difficulty (Portugal and Turkey), commitments to increased defense spending, and assumption of greater military responsibilities in the NATO theater as ways U.S. actions to resist Soviet aggression in the Third World could be supported and complemented.

According to these same officials, while disagreements on how to react to Soviet actions were bound to occur, they did not entail a lessening of support for the alliance concept. On the contrary, continuing consultations and discussions at the highest and working levels of NATO on the wide range of responses to Soviet threats around the world would create the conditions for a series of coordinated and complementary measures which would have the effect of coalescing the alliance members even more and rendering their potential actions more effective and thereby contributing to the overall security of all NATO member countries.

Arms Control

Arms control is an integral part of West German foreign policy and is perceived as contributing to the FRG's national security. The role that arms controls plays in the context of FRG security policy cannot be overstated. Although the recent Soviet invasion in Afghanistan will have a negative impact on arms control negotiations in the short term, FRG officials recommended that NATO continue to pursue arms control as a priority objective. Despite present world political conditions which make arms control prospects difficult, a senior FRG arms control official stated that "the rationale—that is, the need to maintain a 'stable balance' in armaments with the Soviet Union— for arms control has not changed." Arms control is "an instrument of dialog between the two superpowers, taking place against a background of world rivalry," a West German official told the study mission, "to manage a conflictual situation." Arms control policies should have two basic objectives: arriving at concrete results in reducing or stabilizing levels of armaments; and providing a "machinery for contact" to defuse East-West tensions. In addition, arms control between East and West must be conducted because it brings concrete results to both sides and is in the interest of both the Western Alliance and the Eastern bloc.

German Foreign Ministry officials stressed that arms control and defense are two equal parts of German security policy. While the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has made arms control more difficult and has placed the burden of future progress in this area on the Soviets, arms control remains important and should not be viewed as a favor to the Soviets. Accordingly, German officials stressed that meaningful arms control agreements must be pursued, in unison with strong defense efforts to maintain an East-West military balance. These officials saw the SALT II agreement as an example of enhanced security through both arms control and the pursuit of defense efforts to maintain a military balance.

The FRG has been an active participant in the MBFR negotiations and agrees with the NATO position on these talks. Furthermore, FRG

officials expressed their continuing interest in pursuing the negotiations. Although no concrete agreements have been achieved to date, the MBFR negotiations have had what the 1979 defense white paper calls a "stabilizing effect" on East-West relations. These negotiations, if nothing else, have helped to convince the Soviet Union that NATO is, as one official put it, "a vital and coherent affair." The perception of solidarity in NATO, also reflected in the TNF decision, is an important prerequisite for effective arms control negotiations.

While FRG officials stressed to the study mission that much progress still had to be achieved in the MBFR talks, they pointed to several factors which gave grounds for some cautious optimism. In June 1978, the Soviet Union made a counterproposal to the April 1978 Western proposal, accepting the Western principle of parity in Warsaw Pact and NATO forces, although this was made conditional upon acceptance of the data provided by the Soviet Union, which revealed a discrepancy of 150,000 men over what the West believed to be total Warsaw Pact forces to be in reductions area. Soviet acceptance of the principle of parity, which has been a foremost goal of MBFR, is viewed as a significant development. The resolution of the data issue now becomes a critical goal for further progress and is a *sine qua non* of any agreement on overall troop reductions. Some progress has been achieved, however, since the number of Czechoslovakian and East German troops are now known. Discrepancies to be reconciled affect the numbers of Soviet and Polish troops.

Another area of change in the MBFR negotiations has been the modifications in the proposal made by the West in 1975 with regard to withdrawing certain nuclear weapons from the reductions area. This proposal, called Option III, offered the withdrawal of 1,000 nuclear warheads, 54 nuclear-capable F–4 aircraft, and 36 Pershing 1–A missile launchers in exchange for the Warsaw Pact withdrawing a Soviet tank army—approximately 5 divisions—and some 1,700 tanks. The United States has decided to unilaterally withdraw 1,000 warheads; and, since the Pershing II will replace the Pershing I–A, following the recent decision to deploy long-range TNF in Europe, arms control offers on that system will occur in the context of TNF arms control negotiations, rather than in the context of MBFR. Since two components of the "Option III" proposal are no longer operative, German officials, in response to criticism of the NATO decision to drop Option III in its latest MBFR offer, argued that, Option III was not dropped, but simply "used up" by actions taken in the course of the NATO TNF decision.

German officials interviewed lauded the latest NATO MBFR offer [1] as a package designed to emphasize the possible. By deferring some of the more contentious issues such as data on non-U.S., non-Soviet forces in the NATO guidelines area, these officials felt some progress might be stimulated without compromising NATO's basic objectives in the negotiations. They also stressed that the offer gave NATO a coherent arms control proposal at the conventional level.

To eventually achieve agreement at MBFR, German officials believe a political decision on the part of the Soviet Union to be more forthcoming on the data problem and remove its desire for some type of subceilings on the forces of individual participants will be required.

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[1] See app. 6, p. 69.

The FRG believes that the deployment of U.S. long-range theater nuclear forces must be accompanied by an arms control effort to seek limitations in such systems. Such a "parallel approach" to the TNF decision secured a broad consensus of support for TNF deployment in the FRG. FRG officials declared their strong support for undertaking an arms control negotiating effort for TNF. Although the FRG would have preferred to see SALT II ratified before proceeding with tne decision to deploy TNF, it sees no reason why preliminary discussions with the East on theater systems negotiations cannot proceed. However, conducting negotiations outside the context of SALT II presents a dilemma for the FRG because such negotiations are both necessary, since the FRG committed itself to TNF arms control, and raise the specter of "de-coupling," since strategic systems would then be negotiated in a separate framework. There is some uncertainty at this time on how to proceed on TNF negotiations without SALT II ratification. Since it appears likely that the SALT framework will not be available for negotiations for the time being, the FRG may be compelled to consider alternatives to the SALT framework for the negotiation of TNF reductions. However, it is important that some reference to the SALT process be maintained in any discussions of TNF reductions, because of the need to maintain the link between theater and strategic nuclear capabilities. In any event, the FRG is determined to use the period preceding actual deployment to encourage the achievement of an arms control agreement.

The FRG was one of the European nations visited which supported President Carter's initiative to restrain the transfer of conventional arms and favors its continuance. However, FRG officials did point out that its positive attitude toward conventional arms sales restraint was conditioned by its low level of arms sales to non-NATO countries. The FRG itself has a strict arms export policy, which forbids sales to areas of conflict and tension outside of NATO. FRG officials recognized that economic rationales for arms sales by France and the United Kingdom made their skeptical position on arms sales restraint understandable.

Defense Cooperation

FRG Ministry of Defense officials considered the LTDP a very positive initiative for the NATO alliance, not only because of the impact it had on improvement of military capabilities, but also because of the expression of political will it demonstrated vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact. Many of the improvements called for in the LTDP were already part of FRG national plans for its Armed Forces. As for most other NATO countries, the LTDP has helped to focus attention on particular improvements, prioritize objectives, and justify defense programs to national parliaments. German officials did acknowledge that measures in those areas identified in the LTDP which were not part of national planning goals would be difficult to undertake. However, these officials indicated that the LTDP had been instrumental in adding electronic warfare to the list of improvements being undertaken by the FRG. The LTDP was also seen as militarily as well as politically useful to NATO, particularly in measures related to air defense and command and control.

FRG officials emphasized that there was no link in their minds between the FRG's commitment to pursue the objectives of the LTDP

and the objective of raising defense spending by 3 percent annually in real terms. The FRG did not raise its defense spending in real terms by 3 percent in 1979, but has committed to do so in 1980.

FRG defense officials did report that the FRG, albeit not fully meeting the 3-percent goal in 1979, invested much of its defense funds for procurement of new weapons systems; had a per capita defense spending that ranked third among NATO nations; had the highest absolute defense spending of any nation in the alliance except for the United States; and had increased its defense spending in real terms by 25 percent between 1970 and 1978.

FRG defense officials argued forcefully that the major impetus for RSI was the need to improve military effectiveness. Without a perceived military need, cooperation in arms production and procurement would not occur. Military requirements have made interoperability a priority objective because it was perceived as being more achievable.

German officials did not view standardization as practical or desirable in some cases. Because of different industrial capacities and military requirements, disparities in the two-way street of arms sales between the United States and European countries, and political pressures to "buy national," standardization will be difficult to achieve. Officials interviewed stressed that NATO could not wait for standardization; it needed greater interoperability in the near term, particularly in the area of petroleum, oil, lubricants (POL), ammunition, telecommunications, and equipment cross-servicing. At the same time, German officials continued to regard standardization as an important long-term objective.

The FRG has responded positively to the "triad" of defense cooperation efforts enunciated by U.S. Under Secretary of Defense William Perry to promote NATO RSI. The "family of weapons" concept appeals the most to defense officials because it helps to solve some of the problems that have been associated with dual production initiatives; namely, compensation for coproduced items and transfer of technology. In addition, it helps to save research and development costs and reduces incentives to develop a defense technology base in all fields of defense activity.

While supported in principle, the various elements of the "Perry triad" raise some fundamental questions for the future of defense cooperation. The compensation issue must be thoroughly addressed, for example. Countries participating in cooperative arrangements must be assured of a fair share of the production and of the potential sales market. Also, the technology transfer issue will have to be resolved so that countries participating in cooperative arrangements can be assured of maintaining adequate technology bases (perhaps through reciprocal technology transfers). Finally, the issue of third-country transfers remains a substantial obstacle to cooperation in the development and production of weapons systems for NATO. The FRG wants more flexibility to transfer weapons produced in Europe which are entirely U.S. made or contain U.S. components.

Sec. 3(d) of the Arms Export Control Act presently permits third-country transfers of U.S.-sold defense articles and services only after notification to Congress and a 30-day period for possible legislative veto by concurrent resolution. The Carter administration has reemphasized this control in the implementation of its arms transfer policy, stating that as a condition of sale for certain weapons, equipment, or

major components, it will not entertain requests for retransfers. This restriction is particularly irksome to the FRG since its arms export policy is even stricter than that of the United States. German officials stressed that, in its defense cooperation efforts within France over the last 10 years, the issue of third-country transfer or systems codeveloped by the two countries has not proven to be a problem. FRG policy virtually prohibits sales to countries other than NATO or "NATO-related" countries. U.S. policy on third-country transfers is particularly troublesome in seeking greater defense cooperation with France and to a lesser extent with the United Kingdom, whose economic and political interests in arms exports are substantial. Without a more flexible U.S. policy on this issue, U.S. efforts to promote RSI in NATO through Perry's triad could become bogged down. The production of the Franco-German developed Roland missile is a case in point, in which the addition of American components has made it impossible for the European nations to sell what is essentially their system to potential recipients without U.S. permission.

The FRG has been particularly active in promoting intra-European defense production. German defense officials told the study mission that the FRG attempts to find European partners to develop and/or produce many of its weapons systems and itself welcomes intra-European cooperative projects such as the multirole combat aircraft (MRCA), the Alpha-jet, the Milan and HOT missiles, in which several countries produce different components of a single weapon system.

FRG officials, while raising a wide range of actual and potential problems impacting on defense cooperation, nevertheless, did not question its viability as a requirement for enhanced NATO defense capability. In anticipation of a broader based resolution of such problems, FRG officials expressed optimism that many such obstacles could be overcome on a case-by-case basis. The concept of RSI, both as a political goal and as a military necessity, was not to be maligned. German officials also emphasized it was an integral and vital element of NATO's commitment to improve its defensive capabilities, and was to be encouraged and pursued pragmatically and purposefully.

ITALY

During its stay in Rome, Italy, January 12–14, the staff study mission was briefed by the Embassy staff led by Ambassador Richard Gardner. In addition, various meetings were held with officials in the Italian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense as well as with professional staff members of the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), a private Italian research group specializing in international security issues. The following is a summary of the Italian perception on major Western political and security issues shared with the staff study mission during these briefings and meetings.

NATO as an Instrument of Defense and Détente

Italy plays a unique role within NATO. This role is characterized by its geographical position, away from the strategic center of the alliance in central Europe, and close to the Mediterranean theater. The necessity of Italy's participation in NATO has been an unchallenged element of Italian participation in NATO. In fact, if any concern is to be expressed about Italy's role in NATO, it would be based more on a low level of interest in, rather than opposition to, the alliance. This low level of interest, one private observer revealed, created the conditions for the Italian left to progressively reduce its opposition and ultimately accept participation in the alliance. The Italian Community Party's (PCI) acceptance of NATO has not been a political liability to it. Enrico Berlinguer, Secretary-General of the PCI, has stated that he considered Italy's participation in NATO and the maintenance of a balance between East and West as an important part of Italian foreign policy.

This lack of interest does not mean that Italy is in any danger of reducing its support for the alliance or heading in a "neutralist" direction. Italy was the only Western European nation on the continent, besides the FRG, to approve the deployment of TNF on its soil without conditions, thus making the FRG's decision possible, a position based on the principle of nonsingularity of deployment. The TNF debate in the Italian Parliament was a thorough and sophisticated one, officials in Italy said, and helped renew interest in the alliance's contribution to Western security and defense.

Three basic principles dictate Italy's relationship to NATO and its views on détente and East-West cooperation.

First, for over 30 years now, Italy has maintained a firm commitment to NATO, while NATO has helped guarantee Italy's position as a sovereign and independent country in Western Europe. Italy has made important contributions to the defense of NATO's southern flank. The various naval support bases for NATO located along the Mediterranean coastline of Italy are essential elements of that contribution. U.S. Embassy officials stressed that the U.S. 6th Fleet, for example, could not operate without these bases. Italian defense offi-

cials pointed out that the need for a vital Italian contribution to the defense of NATO's southern flank served as the primary motivation behind the Italian Government's decision to embark on modernization of its air and naval forces and facilities which serve to support NATO missions in the area, including those of the U.S. 6th Fleet. The strategic importance of Italy and of the bases has been enhanced by the growing economic difficulties in Turkey and Greece's withdrawal from NATO's integrated command, thereby making Italy a vital "link" between the central front and southern flank of NATO.

Second, NATO is perceived to be the only viable and effective organization for maintaining a balance of power on the European Continent and assuring mutual deterrence. The Italian decision to agree to TNF deployment was an expression of Italy's realization that a military imbalance in theater nuclear arms in favor of the Soviet Union had to be offset within the NATO context by the West. In addition, the TNF decision was generally viewed in Italy as primarily a European one as opposed to one imposed by the United States and as an essential message to the Soviets of NATO's commitment to restoring and preserving a nuclear theater balance.

The third basic principle identified by Italian officials is Italy's commitment to the concept of détente. Italian officials see détente as a recognition by both East and West of respect for sovereignty and independence. Détente should be indivisible and applied globally. In commenting on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which Italy has strongly condemned, Italian officials expressed concern that the Soviets viewed détente on a selective and regional basis. In order to underscore disagreement over such a Soviet perception of détente, a strong assertion of the Western view of détente must be made through increased cohesion and solidarity among the Western countries and the preservation of a strong defense.

How to deal with contingencies outside the treaty area was also a concern expressed by most observers of the Italian political scene. While NATO was almost taken for granted as the means to assure defense and détente in the wider European theater, severe doubts existed about NATO's ability to address Soviet challenges in the Third World. Extensive use of the military support facilities in Italy, in cooperation with the United States, outside traditional or perceived NATO areas of interest, for example, was viewed as unlikely, due to internal political constraints as well as the general Italian disposition to encourage a European-wide strategy regarding defense of NATO members' interests outside Europe.

Italian private officials expected that Italy would not pursue separate sanctions against the Soviet Union for its invasion of Afghanistan. While it has strongly condemned the Soviet invasion and will support and not interfere with U.S. actions, strong action on the part of Italy would only be possible within the context of a common European response. At the same time, however, the preservation of détente remains an objective of Italian foreign policy. The basic structure of East-West relations, including détente, should not be changed, Italian officials asserted. The Soviet invasion was a temporary setback to détente, which both sides should seek to correct.

Although there was a widespread consensus in Italy that NATO provided a very practical means of maintaining an independent Italy

and of fostering Western cooperation, private Italian experts cited a number of factors which must be considered in assessing Italy's continuing support for NATO. The question of PCI participation in the Italian Government, which has confronted Italy at least since 1976, is an issue which raises concern in some quarters about possible future changes in Italy's relationship to NATO. Second, actions taken by NATO as an alliance must be consistent with and be reflective of a common decision by Europe to act in defense of what it perceives to be its own interests, not a unilateral U.S. decision which Europeans must automatically follow. Third, if Italy moves to increase its role in the defense of NATO's southern flank, domestic support of such actions as increased defense spending will be required. The need to seek some sort of political consensus will involve dealing with opposition parties to neutralize their potential objections or gain their quiet acquiescence. While the potential for a neutralization of Italy is low, the question for the future, as one U.S. Embassy official put, it is "not whether Italy will be a member of NATO but what kind of NATO member Italy will be."

On the question of the credibility of the U.S. guarantee, the staff study mission was told that such doubts are inevitable, normal, and useful. Evaluation and subsequent reaffirmation of confidence in the reliability of the United States is inherent to the maintenance of the defense and independence of Italy. Such periodic evaluations have not raised any serious doubts about U.S. commitment to Italy's security or erosion of public support for NATO. To the contrary, the U.S. commitment to deploy TNF demonstrated that the U.S. commitment is reliable and firm. Moreover, the presence of U.S. troops in Europe provides tangible, physical evidence of the U.S. security guarantee. U.S. control of nuclear weapons in Europe also allayed any doubts about the U.S. security guarantee in the minds of Soviet policymakers, thus enhancing deterrence. Some Italian observers interpreted the President's handling of the Iran crisis as a demonstration of the high value the U.S. places on human lives, and, by extension, on the fate of its troops in Europe, thereby reinforcing the perception that the United States is committed to becoming involved in a war in Europe.

Private Italian officials also alluded to a phenomenon which the staff study mission experienced throughout Europe. This is the ambivalent attitude held by Europeans vis-a-vis the exercise of U.S. leadership in the NATO alliance. Whatever U.S. action is taken, be it military or political, in defense of Western interests, some European public officials or countries will criticize the action. Either the U.S. action is seen as one of overreaction and overcommitment—for example, U.S. policy in Vietnam—or lack of resolve—U.S. reaction to Soviet moves in Angola or Ethiopia. While all Europeans recognize the need for U.S. leadership, their support for individual U.S. responses is often given with a healthy dose of skepticism. This phenomenon, however, does not have dangerous implications for the cohesion of the NATO alliance and is seen as somewhat inevitable in an alliance of democracies.

Finally, a traditional concern about the future position of Yugoslavia was expressed by Italian officials. The need for consultations between Italy, the Eastern European countries, the United States,

and Yugoslavia on the continued security of Yugoslavia in the post-Tito period was emphasized. Soviet capabilities to influence events in Yugoslavia were not underestimated, although a confidence in that country to withstand Soviet political intimidation was evident along with the need for the West to support Yugoslavia's independence.

The ability of Yugoslavia to maintain its independent posture in Eastern Europe in the post-Tito period will have significant implications for the security balance in NATO's southern flank. In the view of private Italian experts, if Yugoslavia is able to maintain this posture, the balance remains more stable. Given the fact that Soviet troops in Hungary and the Caucasus are at low readiness and that no Soviet troops are in Romania or Bulgaria, the prospects for a "no-warning" attack on Greece and Turkey remain dubious. While Soviet sea and air power is significant, Italian officials believed that NATO forces in the area were sufficient to deter attack, given adequate warning time.

Arms Control

Italian attitudes toward arms control efforts are premised on the two aforementioned principles of the maintenance of a balance of power and pursuance of détente.

Italians see arms control as equally important as defense modernization efforts. The pursuit of arms control is considered necessary both to preserve détente and to respond to domestic political requirements. Arms control in Italy is seen as an effort to achieve a relative balance of power through a negotiated reduction by both parties. Since arms control is not viewed as a favor to the opposite party, but rather as a process that must prove mutually beneficial to both sides, Italy opposes any Western withdrawal from ongoing arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

Italian officials expressed support for SALT II while indicating understanding of the political requirement for the United States to defer a Senate vote on ratification. President Carter's policy of continuing to respect the limits of SALT I and II is considered an important symbol of the U.S. commitment to arms control. However, such a policy line is ultimately contingent upon continued adherence by the Soviets.

While indicating preference for TNF arms control discussions within the SALT framework, Italian officials expressed interest in other fora as long as they do not result in "decoupling" U.S. theater and central nuclear systems, since "decoupling" is believed to be destabilizing to Italian and alliancewide security interests. Italy, as all the other European NATO allies, considers arms control discussions as an important element of the TNF modernization decision. Italian officials indicated that they were not discouraged by the initial Soviet rejection of the NATO offer to negotiate, seeing it as logical, given earlier Soviet statements that NATO TNF modernization would "destroy the basis for negotiations," and believed Soviet willingness to negotiate would eventually develop.

Although Italy is only an observer in the MBFR negotiations, Italian officials interviewed characterized MBFR as "complementary to Italian foreign policy interests." Of special interest to the Italians were the seven associated measures contained in the West's latest proposal, which they consider to be contributory to détente.

Italian officials expressed strong support for the concepts underlying the President's May 1977 policy to restrain the transfers of conventional arms worldwide. The essential elements of the President's policy are consistent with Italian arms sales policy. Italy herself has made proposals on conventional arms control in the last two sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. Italy is proposing the establishment of a machinery for discussion along regional areas in which suppliers and recipients would be represented and which would seek to develop criteria and guidelines for controlling and limiting arms transfers with "the objective of stabilizing and, possibly, strengthening, current regional balances at a lower level of armaments."[1]

Defense Cooperation

Italian officials reacted favorably in principle to "Perry's triad." While reciprocal MOU's offered the opportunity to enter the U.S. market, U.S. Embassy officials suggested that reciprocal waiving of "buy national" restrictions could be perceived as creating further technological dependence on the United States and further U.S. penetration of the Italian market. The "family of weapons" proposal has appealed the most to Italians because of the possibilities for European industrial collaboration and arms exports.

As in other countries, standardization and interoperability were seen as valuable objectives in NATO defense cooperation. Rationalization has a much lower priority, since it is likely to bring about the closing of "inefficient" arms industries and further penetration of European markets by "efficient" U.S. arms industries.

While Italy is interested and has pursued defense cooperation efforts with other European countries as evidenced by its participation in the multirole combat aircraft defense collaboration program, Italy seems to be generally more inclined toward greater arms defense cooperation with the United States than other major European arms producers. This inclination largely stems from the fact that much of what is produced by the Italian arms industry is under U.S. license. Italian officials, however, cited technological disparities between the United States and European countries, different planning procedures and assessments of needs, and inadequate consultation between European nations and the United States in the defense procurement field as the major obstacles to defense cooperation.

Italian officials expressed confidence that the work of the IEPG to develop and identify the future defense requirements of its members would help improve consultation on defense matters among European NATO members and with the United States. The IEPG is not viewed, however, as an organization designed to encourage a "buy European" attitude in defense procurement and discourage or prevent U.S. sales to its European allies. The establishment of the transatlantic dialog, involving the United States, Canada, and IEPG members, stimulates formal discussions on various issues of NATO-wide defense cooperation.

Italian defense officials view the LTDP as a positive development and complementary to Italy's own efforts through "promotional laws" adopted by the Italian Parliament to improve defense effectiveness.

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[1] See app. 7, p. 74.

These "promotional laws" are a series of appropriations passed by the Italian Parliament between 1975 and 1978 which are intended to modernize Italy's three military services over the next 10 years, and, in effect, incorporate many of the aims of the LTDP. The LTDP has assisted defense officials in prioritizing defense programs and achieving support for them in the Italian Parliament, which has been hesitant to increase defense expenditures at the expense of domestic social programs. The first 3 years of the promotional laws' implementation have permitted a 3-percent annual real growth in defense expenditures. Italian officials warned, however, that a major challenge of the future will be to convince large elements of the Italian public that a 3-percent real growth in Italy's defense budgets in the 1980's is needed.

AUSTRIA

The staff study mission visited Vienna, Austria, on January 15 and met with U.S. delegation officials to receive an update on the status of the MBFR negotiations as the delegations prepared for the reconvening of the talks on January 28. Upon its return to Washington, the staff mission also met with U.S. Ambassador to the MBFR negotiations, Jonathan Dean, on January 22.

In addition, the staff study mission met with officials of Austria's Foreign Ministry to discuss Western European security issues. As a militarily neutral country in Western Europe, Austria offers a unique perspective on these issues.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions

The mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) negotiations have been underway since October 1973. Twelve NATO allies and seven Warsaw Pact (WP) countries are involved. Eleven of these countries are called "direct participants" (the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg on the NATO side; the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, and Poland on the Warsaw Pact side) since they have forces in the area designated as the "area of reductions" (Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and Czechoslovakia).

Since the beginning of the negotiations, a number of proposals have been tabled by both sides.[1] Contrary to what is normally perceived about the MBFR negotiations, some progress has been achieved, particularly with respect to the scope and objectives of the negotiations.

Both sides have agreed in principle to the scope of reductions. In an initial phase of U.S. and Soviet troop reductions, each side would reduce to a ceiling of 900,000 air and ground forces. The East has accepted in principle the Western concept of parity in military manpower, involving common ceilings of 900,000 for ground and air forces and of 700,000 for ground forces. These concessions are significant, since they have brought the East considerably closer to one of the NATO objectives in the negotiations, a more stable East-West relationship of forces in Central Europe at a lower and equal level of manpower. The earlier Eastern position had called for equal percentage reductions on both sides, reflecting a perception that the present defense capabilities and Eastern manpower advantage had maintained peace and stability in Europe since World War II.

While several other contentious issues still await resolution, the principal obstacle to progress is the data problem. The data dispute involves disagreement between NATO and Warsaw Pact participants

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[1] See app. 6, p. 69.

on the accurate number of Warsaw Pact air and ground forces. NATO estimates show an Eastern manpower superiority of more than 150,000 men over NATO military manpower in the area while the East claims that present levels are roughly equal. The West has sought to discover the source of the discrepancy by asking the East for more detailed ("disaggregated") manpower data. Such efforts have produced exchange of more detailed data on ground and air forces. This data has permitted the West to localize approximately 80 percent of the discrepancy (mainly among Soviet and Polish troops) between the Eastern data and Western estimates. However, the East remains adamant in sticking to its tabled figures.

In an effort to stimulate further progress, the NATO side tabled a proposal in December 1979. The proposal provides for initial-phase Soviet and U.S. ground force reductions of 14,000 and 32,000 respectively, assuming agreement on data on these forces is achieved; deferment of agreement on troop data for other direct participants until the second phase of the negotiations, at which time these participants would undertake reduction commitments; deferment of the question of armaments reduction and limitation, previously a part of both NATO and Warsaw Pact negotiating proposals; a time limit on the phase I agreement until agreement on data and reductions to a common ceiling is reached; and inclusion of a package of associated measures designed to enhance mutual knowledge and understanding of military dispositions on both sides to reduce the risks of miscalculation and misperception.

The package of associated measures, while always conceptually a part of the MBFR negotiations and previous Western proposals, has received greater prominence in the latest NATO offer because such measures improve the capability to verify numbers of troops and provide increased "insurance" against surprise attack and greater warning time for Western forces. The need for reducing misperceptions about the intentions of the other side with respect to its military operations is also a consideration. Specifically, the latest proposal contains seven associated measures:

—prior notification of out-of-garrison activity by one or more division formations;
—exchange of observers to these out-of-garrison activities;
—prior notification of movements of 25,000 or more ground forces of direct participants into the area of reduction;
—annual quota of inspections on the territory of the other side in the area of reductions;
—observation of exit-entry points through which forces would move into and out of the area;
—information exchange on forces to be withdrawn or reduced, as well as continuing periodic exchanges of information on personnel strengths and organization of forces remaining in the reduction area;
—noninterference with national technical means of verification.

The WP negotiators have offered no associated measures in the past and have tended to view such measures as secondary in importance to manpower reductions, thus making agreement on these measures difficult.

U.S. officials in Vienna and Washington offered a number of observations concerning the conduct and value of the MBFR negotiations. The MBFR negotiations are a unique effort to reduce the forces of the two most powerful alliances in the world, both of which have amassed the heaviest concentration of peacetime forces in the history of mankind in a given geographical area. Both sides have similar and differing interests in the negotiations. Gaining a measure of assurance against surprise attack is vitally important for the West. Gaining some influence and control over the Bundeswehr is a paramount objective for the East. Both sides, however, share a desire to reduce confrontation in Central Europe and reach an agreement which they perceive as contributing to stable, peaceful relations with equal security for both sides.

Despite a lack of agreement, the MBFR negotiations, U.S. officials believe, have produced a number of valuable side benefits. Coordination of MBFR policy, approved on a NATO-wide basis in Brussels, has permitted the alliance to gain greater experience in intra-alliance consultation and cooperation. The negotiations have also provided both sides with a greater appreciation of each other's security interests and concerns.

Achieving progress in the MBFR talks has been difficult for a number of reasons. U.S. officials cited "historical" experience, which drives the Soviet objective in using MBFR to control the Bundeswehr and the West German objection to Soviet interference in Federal Republic of Germany internal affairs. These "historical" considerations become particularly significant with respect to associated measures. Understandable Federal Republic of Germany concern about the presence of Soviet inspectors and observers on its territory and traditional Soviet resistance to onsite inspection, may hinder agreement to many associated measures. Nevertheless, despite some misgivings, the Federal Republic of Germany has agreed to the latest NATO offer. Similarly, U.S. officials expected less Soviet resistance to onsite inspection because the inspections would occur on East German, Polish, and Czech rather than Soviet territory.

The Soviets have also attempted to influence individual NATO participants in the MBFR talks. The Soviet delegation, for example, has contacted various Western delegations on occasion, seeking to "educate" them on the problem of controlling the Bundeswehr. U.S. officials pointed out, however, that such attempts to "split the alliance" by trying to disrupt the consultation process often backfire, leading to greater solidarity among NATO members in negotiating with the Soviets. The Soviet Union must also be wary about such tactics, since some of their allies could challenge the consensus on the Eastern side. The data problem, although seemingly intractable at this time, is not considered to be insoluble. While U.S. officials admitted that both sides had demonstrated too much rigidity in defending the "integrity" of their figures, the West has always referred to the East's figures as "incomplete," rather than "falsified." Further Eastern disaggregation of its figures, including figures on divisions and division size, and other steps to help reconcile data discrepancies, could make room for further negotiation. Moreover, a strong feeling exists that if the political will exists, the groundwork laid by 7 years of detailed negotiations will make final agreement easier to achieve. These officials, however, believe that "the East would have to come a long way."

U.S. officials continue to believe in the value of MBFR and were skeptical about the need to change its focus. SALT II, after all, which involved only two countries, took 7 years to negotiate. In that case, the United States did not have to contend with the difficulties in developing the consensus required in a multilateral negotiation involving six other direct NATO participants and with the relatively more complex question of evaluating the capabilities of conventional weapons and factoring them into proposals for armament reductions. While a shift of focus toward armament reductions could bring some advantages, U.S. officials believed negotiating on manpower was more practical and that the present proposals emphasized troop levels that would stabilize military competition in central Europe. In any event, even if such a shift of focus were envisaged, it would not be acceptable to the East, unless it were in conjunction with manpower reductions. Furthermore, the latest Western package on associated measures is designed to address the significant issues of warning time, surprise attack, and misperception in conjunction with manpower issues.

No nation, on either side, favors terminating the MBFR negotiations, even in the light of recent events in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union, without MBFR, could face an even stronger Bundeswehr and ironically wishes to pursue MBFR as a way of insuring a U.S. troop presence in Europe, which is perceived to be less threatening. The FRG, while cautious about MBFR, nonetheless, sees it as an important forum for reducing the risk of confrontation on its territory.

U.S. officials could not concur with an assessment that the recent NATO proposal was a step backward because it no longer included nuclear systems. The December 1975 NATO proposal which offered to reduce the presence of some U.S. nuclear systems stationed in Europe (Option III), however, can no longer be considered applicable in the wake of the TNF modernization decision.

Since the 36 Pershing IA launchers offered in Option III will be replaced by Pershing II launchers and would be the subject of TNF arms control talks, and since NATO, following the October 1979 Soviet announcement of the withdrawal of 1,000 Soviet tanks and 20,000 Soviet troops from East Germany, already has agreed to withdraw unilaterally 1,000 nuclear weapons, all that remains of Option III is the offer to reduce 54 F–4 aircraft. These aircraft would still be the subject of possible NATO armaments reductions in phase II. Some viewed the reductions called for in the recent NATO proposal as small, token reductions and not very relevant to the troop levels of both sides. U.S. officials pointed out, however, that this recent NATO proposal was virtually the same as proposed by the Soviets in their June 1978 MBFR offer and, along with the deferment to phase II of the data issue for non-U.S. and non-Soviet troops and of armament reductions, constituted an effort to simplify phase I negotiations and thereby help to foster progress.

Finally, U.S. officials interviewed were convinced that if the NATO offer were accepted, it would be verifiable. The associated measures proposed would significantly improve U.S. capabilities and knowledge of Warsaw Pact force posture and manpower and aid verification of a future MBFR agreement.

Austria's Security Policy

Given its geopolitical position, the primary objectives of Austria's foreign and defense policies are the preservation of peace, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. As a neutral country between two powerful military and political alliances, Austria is particularly conscious of the ongoing rivalry between East and West and the need to reduce tensions and the risks of confrontation. Support for détente is deep seated. Austrian officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs believed that the West had misunderstood détente and its implications for Soviet foreign policy. The West's failure to understand that the Soviet definition of détente never excluded ideological competition for influence throughout the world, helped to explain the present dismal state of East-West relations.

Although militarily neutral, Austria is ideologically tied to the West. Détente is an important factor in Austrian foreign policy because it seals this ideological bond, enhances Austria's independence and security, and decreases external pressure to erode its ties with the West. At the same time, the Austrian commitment of détente and neutrality does not signify appeasement. Austrian officials characterized their nation's foreign policy as one of "active neutrality." For them, détente should be indivisible and not confined only to Europe. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had dismayed Austria and had poisoned the atmosphere of détente and arms control.

Although the Soviet action had made Austria uneasy, and present and future Soviet aggression in other areas of the world would be the basis for Austrian cooperation with the West, Austria would not join any alliance, nor would it change the commitment to neutrality as the basis of its foreign policy. Austria would continue to adhere to its policy of avoiding conflict, encouraging cooperation between East and West, and developing contacts at all levels between NATO and Warsaw Pact members. While the Soviet action in Afghanistan was viewed as destabilizing, Austrian officials urged caution as to the appropriate U.S. response. Interpreting the invasion of Afghanistan as largely "defensive" in character, Austrian officials advised that the West should be wary of not "losing its cool" over the invasion by taking actions which might be detrimental to the West's long-term interests.

Arms Control

Austrian officials were pessimistic about the future prospects of arms control and disarmament efforts. Failure to ratify SALT II and the lack of progress in other fora were the basis for this attitude. In light of this "crisis" in arms control, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has acquired a new significance. In particular, Austrian officials believed that the apparent Soviet lack of interest in the upcoming meeting in Madrid made its pursuance all the more important for the West. A degeneration of the CSCE process would "play into the hands" of Communist leaders who had been taken to task by the human rights emphasis at the Belgrade Conference. Moreover, if arms control efforts remained static,

the upcoming CSCE meeting in Madrid should be used as a forum to seek a wider range of confidence-building measures (CBM's), especially in the area of prior notification of troop maneuvers. Austria's geographic position and vulnerability to potential Soviet pressure make such an interest logical.

Despite their current skepticism about arms control and especially disarmament prospects, Austrian officials favored continued negotiations in such fora as MBFR and SALT, which constitute efforts to maintain a "balance of forces" and are a precondition to the maintenance of Austria's security. A balance of forces at higher levels implies a greater potential for miscalculation and confrontation and increases the likelihood of outside pressure on Austria's neutrality. In addition, negotiating fora, especially MBFR, have been valuable and useful vehicles for exchange of information and better understanding of the military establishments and security concerns of the adversary bloc. Arguing that MBFR has been more successful than generally believed, one Austrian official described MBFR as "a CBM in itself."

Difficulty in achieving arms control and disarmament was largely due, according to officials interviewed, to the belief by both the United States and the Soviet Union that superiority in nuclear and conventional arms was preferable to parity. The arms race had been fueled because of worst-case assumptions about potential military advantages to be gained by an adversary, leading to development of new weapons systems, which are in turn matched by the adversary. The Soviet SS–20 deployment, for example, created the need for a NATO TNF modernization effort, thereby potentially leading to further Soviet theater nuclear improvements. This cycle needed to be broken and the momentum toward arms control resumed. While still somewhat skeptical of eventual progress, Austria is actively preparing for the upcoming CSCE meeting in Madrid, where it will actively seek to extend the scope of confidence-building measures.

Finally, Austrian officials expressed their concern about the future stability of Yugoslavia in the post-Tito period. Although a gradual growth of Soviet influence in Yugoslavia was considered likely in coming years, Soviet invasion of that country was ruled out. Austrian officials concluded that Western interest in and expressions of support for a sovereign and independent Yugoslavia were therefore imperative.

FRANCE

The staff study mission was in Paris January 16–18. In addition to briefings by the Embassy staff, the mission met with officials in the French Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, Members of Parliament, and nongovernmental observers of French foreign policy. The following information represents a summary of the views shared with the staff study mission.

The Role of France in the Atlantic Alliance

France's role in the Atlantic Alliance since its withdrawal from the integrated command of NATO in 1966 has been a very special one. That role has been characterized both by a desire to maintain an independent defense posture in Western Europe and by a commitment to participate in Western European defense on terms that it would be free to determine itself. As one French Foreign Ministry official put it, "France is part of the defense of the West but is not integrated into it," emphasizing, however, that this position does not mean that French security objectives are at odds with those of NATO.

The fundamentals of French defense policy are the maintenance of an independent, national strategic deterrent and nonparticipation in the integrated NATO command structure. In addition, conditions of world détente and perceptions of a lesser threat, as one private observer remarked, have made independent action more feasible and permissible. At a time of heightened tension, such as in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there is an increasing tendency for cooperation and closeness to the alliance.

French officials also pointed out that it is important to remember that France remains a member of the North Atlantic Alliance. She has reaffirmed her commitment to NATO as a political alliance and to the purpose of the alliance, as stated in the North Atlantic Treaty, "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization" of the member-nations and to "promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area." France has affirmed its solidarity with the alliance, while at the same time preserving its freedom to participate or not to participate in its initiatives. Such a position should not be construed as a neutralist nor as one that seeks to take France out of any conflict in Western Europe. The French continue to state their acceptance of the need to respond collectively to threats to the security of Western Europe. French officials reiterated that France would, in most cases, be willing to participate in a conflict in Western Europe; however, they could not adhere to a position of automaticity of response to an attack. French officials cited a March 1966 letter to President Johnson from Gen. Charles de Gaulle asserting that although France would cease to participate in the NATO integrated command, it would "fight on the side of her Allies in the event that one

of them should be the object of an unprovoked aggression." These officials assured the study mission that this statement of support remains valid.

On the practical level, there is a consensus in the government and in the public at large that France's "intermediate" position in the alliance contributes positively to the defense of Western Europe. French cooperation with NATO has been increasing, especially since 1974, but was never precluded even following its withdrawal from the military component of NATO in 1966. There is a feeling that a lot can be done privately by France, through military and diplomatic channels, to maintain a strong European defense without the need for an institutional structure like the integrated military command of NATO. French military cooperation with its NATO Allies is conducted with a view toward low visibility, but is nonetheless extensive. France plans to increase defense spending by 4 percent in real terms in 1980 and implements, on a case-by-case basis, defense measures recommended in the LTDP. France supports the objectives of the LTDP, because it helps the other Western Allies improve their defense capabilities.

With regard to coordinated actions amongst the Allies outside the alliance area, the French have maintained a noticeable ambivalence. While they recognize the need for the West to demonstrate that it will not tolerate Soviet aggression throughout the world, they do not feel that any actions should be undertaken under the NATO aegis outside the NATO area. In the view of some French officials, coordinated NATO actions would not only raise some questions as to NATO's mandate outside the treaty area, but might also not prove to be productive unless the United States was willing to take the necessary political and military steps and was perceived to have the required military wherewithal and political will to assert its power abroad. In addition, some critcism was made to the study mission about what was perceived as somewhat of an overreaction to Soviet actions in Afghanistan on the part of the United States. It was not that the Soviet invasion was not to be condemned and not to cause some reevaluation of the East-West relationship and détente. Rather, there was a belief that, although the Afghanistan crisis could not but have a detrimental effect on East-West relations, it would have an even greater impact on the Soviet Union's position in the Third World, and that the crisis should be couched not so much as a test of the East-West relationship but rather more as an expression of a growing confrontation between the Soviet Union and the Third World and as a demonstration of the Soviet Union's disregard for the independence of nonalined nations.

Officials told the study mission that they felt France in many ways had been misunderstood with regard to her role in the defense of Europe, because of her withdrawal from the integrated NATO command, her commitment to a national defense policy premised on a national nuclear deterrent, and her generally independent views on various foreign policy issues of interest to the United States. However, in this respect, they pointed to their belief that their independence and institutional distance from NATO have given the West an alternative way of dealing with certain world crises, such as in Zaire. On an independent basis, furthermore, the French Government has

increased real defense spending by over 3 percent since 1976, predating the commitments made by the other members of the alliance at the 1977 London summit. France has also embarked upon a major program to improve the capabilities and readiness of her conventional forces. Several decisions with regard to the strategic deterrent such as the construction of a sixth nuclear submarine and the development of a cruise missile and new submarine-launched missile also demonstrate her commitment to maintain an appropriate level of deterrence and defense capability.

French political and psychological requirements for independence and freedom of action are greater than any other nation in Western Europe. According to one private expert, these requirements stem primarily from historical experiences which dictate to France the need to balance a number of challenges to her security and/or independence, be they Soviet, German, or even American. By balancing a number of options in dealing with these challenges and maximizing freedom of action in dealing with any one of them, French security is enhanced. For other NATO nations, the German threat has subsided, and the Soviet threat has led to a virtual disappearance of any perceived American threat of political or economic domination. For France, while the Soviet threat is potentially the most dangerous, a latent apprehension about United States-German domination fuels the need for an independent but not necessarily antagonistic defense and security policy within the NATO alliance.

A variety of conditions have engendered improved cooperation between France and the NTAO alliance. According to one French observer, "cooperation has been improving, because many people in the U.S. administration are convinced that the French deterrent contributes to Western stability." This recognition is a marked shift from the attitude by the United States in the 1960's that the French independent deterrent was a detriment to the defense of the West.

The perception that the bilateral relationship between the United States and France was improving, particularly in the midseventies, and that France's nonparticipation in the NATO military structure was not an impediment to relations nor believed to be contrary to Western interest, helped to "de-dramatize" the security relationship between France and nations of the Atlantic alliance, especially the United States. In addition, the development of the Franco-German relationship, politically, economically, and militarily, according to one private observer, has helped to insure French participation in Western security.

French officials believe that France has taken great pains to demonstrate her loyalty as an ally and her commitment to Western security. While, for a variety of domestic political and cultural reasons, it is highly unlikely that France will ever reintegrate the NATO command structure, this attitude should in no way be construed as an expression of a lack of commitment to participate in the common defense of the Western world. French assertions of independent action are based on a strict evaluation of what her own interests are, interests which in most cases are not detrimental to the goals of the alliance. In fact, the study mission was told that one of the fallouts from French foreign and defense policy independence was its ability to pursue an active détente policy toward the Soviet Union and the People's Re-

public of China. As Assistant Secretary of State Gorge Vest said in 1979 before a Foreign Affairs Committee subcommittee, "French and United States objectives in the world are similar, while we sometimes seek their achievement along different but parallel paths."

While the existence of the French nuclear deterrent is testimony to a questioning by France of total reliance on the United States nuclear guarantee of Western Europe, France does not question the need for United States leadership within the NATO alliance on vital security issues. French officials did express a concern about the consistency, and resolve, of United States policy. French officials argued that perceptions of United States weakness in Europe are often intensified by elements of public opinion in the United States which emphasize weaker aspects of United States defense posture to such an extent as to call United States political power into question. These officials pointed out that while few Europeans doubt U.S. military capabilities and commitment in Europe, American doubts about those capabilities and commitments harm the perception of U.S. military strength and commitment which is generally viewed by Europeans as adequate and reliable.

An American source in Paris saw a positive trend in French informal cooperation with NATO. [Security deletion.]

In addition, France believes that its increased defense spending, which will lead to greater conventional and nuclear capabilities, is a positive factor in the French contribution to Western security and puts it on at least an equal basis with the integrated members of NATO.

Arms Control

France's position on arms control is heavily affected by her independent stand in defense policy. In France, there has generally been a skeptical attitude toward arms control. There is less of a poiltical necessity in France than in the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, for arms control initiatives to be a part of defense decisions, such as the deployment of theater nuclear weapons. France does not participate in the MBFR negotiations, the conventional arms transfer talks, has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and has expressed the view that its nuclear systems should not be the subject of any SALT III or other negotiations on nuclear systems.

France, however, is not opposed to arms control. President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing has voiced approval of the SALT II Treaty. The French position on arms control was outlined in the French President's address before the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament in May 1978. Of all the proposals made at that time, the most promising, and the one which since then has become in a sense the centerpiece of French arms control policy, is the proposal for a conference on disarmament in Europe. In President Giscard d'Estaing's own words:

> Accordingly, France is proposing to all the countries which are concerned with the future of European security and which participated in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that they should meet in conference to discuss disarmament in Europe * * *.
>
> The conference advocated by France would aid in the first stage at building trust among all the countries of Europe by instituting measures to provide appropriate information and notification and in the second stage at achieving a genuine reduction in weapons within the geo-strategic complex of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Although confidence-building measures (CBM's) were discussed during the negotiations leading to the signing of the Helsinki Final Act and included in the act itself (1975), it is only recently that more attention has been focused on them. France has made emphasis on CBM's the main pillar of its arms control strategy. Confidence-building measures, however, are not to be a substitute for manpower and armaments reductions. They are to be a first step in the process of troops and armaments reductions in Europe. In a second phase reduction, although not clearly defined thus far, French officials preferred an approach that would seek equipment rather than manpower reductions. (France has argued that the MBFR objectives for troop reductions are not militarily significant.)

The French proposal for a conference on disarmament in Europe (CDE) and on CBM's (which are classified) were discussed by the NATO Foreign Ministers at their December 1979 meeting in Brussels. Following the meeting, in the North Atlantic Council December 14 communique,[1] the French proposal was given Allied support.

* * * They considered that the proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe put forward by France is a useful concept providing a basis upon which to continue developing their approach in this field to bring about such a conference. They agreed to work towards the adoption during the Madrid Meeting, as part of a balanced outcome, of a mandate for further negotiations under the aegis of the CSCE on militarily significant and verifiable confidence-building measures, applicable to the entire continent of Europe. These, if agreed, would help create conditions conducive to limitation and reduction of arms in the same geographical area. This process should take account of both the varied aspects of the existing security situation and of the current negotiations on other aspects of arms control and disarmament concerning the European continent.

The relationship between the proposed conference on disarmament in Europe and the MBFR negotiations in Vienna is unclear. France has from the beginning had a negative attitude vis-a-vis the MBFR talks on the grounds that it could not agree to a bloc-to-bloc approach; that the zone of proposed negotiations was too narrow; and the negotiations had been launched for political rather than military-security reasons.

French officials interviewed do not seem discouraged by the considerable negotiations difficulties that would be inherent in a 35-nation conference on disarmament. They argue that size did not ultimately hinder agreement on voluntary confidence-building measures in the Helsinki Final Act. Furthermore, French officials argue that the CDE proposal is an important diplomatic tool in East-West relations since it demonstrates to the Soviets that they are not the only advocates of disarmament and military détente. By taking the disarmament "high-ground" and proposing ambitious proposals for European disarmament, the Soviets will not have the benefit of a most effective propaganda tool which they have utilized successfully in the past.

The French, however, indicated to the study mission that they would not seek to undermine the MBFR talks as long as French troops and armaments were not involved. The mission was also told that France considered the most recent proposals made by the West on associated measures at the MBFR negotiations not to be incompatible with the French proposal. In addition, French officials made

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[1] See app. 8, p. 75.

clear to the study mission that their disarmament strategy would maintain a link to the CSCE process.

The French have seen their proposal for a disarmament conference and for discussion of CBM's on a European-wide basis (35 nations) legitimized by their inclusion as a subject of discussion at the Madrid CSCE meeting in late 1980. France intends to seek a mandate to discuss CBM's in a forum convened subsequent to the Madrid meeting. According to a senior U.S. official, the United States wants to insure that CBM's and other security-related matters continue to be discussed within the CSCE framework, for fear that a separate forum would undermine the discussion of human rights in the context of CSCE. The United States attaches a high priority to the human rights component of CSCE and would like to see it progress further. In order to keep the CSCE process strong in the human rights area, more attention will have to be paid to European desires to see the security-related and disarmament measures discussed in the context of CSCE at Madrid and thereafter.

With regard to nuclear systems, French officials reiterated to the staff study mission that nuclear weapons, including those considered as 'theater" systems, should not be included in any disarmament conference in Europe. This conference on disarmament in Europe would limit itself to a discussion of conventional capabilities. For France, all nuclear systems are strategic, and there can be no differentiation between theater and strategic nuclear systems. In the French view, by separating the conventional forces from the nuclear systems in a clear way, the nuclear "threshold" is raised and stability in central Europe enhanced.

Defense Cooperation

France has no *a priori* objections to defense cooperation. However, French officials with whom the staff study mission spoke were unhesitatingly critical of the United States dominance in the European arms market. Standardization of alliance weapons is considered an unacceptable objective by France because it merely signifies that one country; namely, the United States, will be selling all the weapons to alliance members. Standardization was perceived as "a Warsaw Pact-type concept" implying political and economic domination on defense questions. France produces the entire gamut of weapons, from small arms to nuclear weapons, and values its ability to do so in the face of American domination of the arms market. Furthermore, the French believe that their country has technology which is equal to that of the United States in many defense industries, particularly in aerospace. French officials did, however, see much merit in the objective of interoperability and praised it as a laudable and achievable goal.

In fact, the idea of a commonly selected system for all NATO members to meet a certain defense requirement was not rejected. Defense cooperation without the name "standardization," but nonetheless bearing its fruits, seemed accectable to French officials interviewed.

French officials believed that European-wide cooperation in the development and production of weapons, such as was being undertaken under the aegis of the IEPG or in various intra-European ventures, was an important objective that should be pursued. For the transatlantic dialog to bring about equity, if not equality, in the arms

trade between the United States and its European allies, the development of an extensive and sufficient European arms industry is an essential precondition. While France recognized the need to continue to purchase U.S. weapons in some cases, there could be no doubt that French arms producers as well as producers from other European nations would want to maintain a domestic capability to produce a wide variety of weapons systems. Indeed, it was argued that commitments for increased defense spending would not be easily accepted domestically if such a domestic capacity did not exist. French officials added that a conscious policy to develop one's own arms industry should not be construed as a deliberate decision not to purchase U.S. weapons systems, but as an attempt to redress the imbalance in the transatlantic arms traffic.

Officials emphasized that France's commitment to the IEPG and European defense cooperation was not a "buy European" attitude. In some cases U.S. technology transfers through arms sales or coproduction would be desirable and further discussions were welcome in the framework of the transatlantic dialog.

Because of her attitude toward arms production, France was most favorable to the "family of weapons" approach in arms procurement production proposed by U.S. Under Secretary William Perry.

Finally, French officials were fairly optimistic that defense cooperation could be achieved, although they decried some of the political motives in the United States hampering greater procurement of European weapons systems (as in the case of the Roland missile). Also cited as a problem was current U.S. policy concerning U.S. controls over third-country transfers of weapons and components, however insignificant. Cooperation in intra-European arms development and production was a stated objective of many European allies, and there exists a firm belief that positive benefits could be achieved as a result of arms cooperation on both sides of the Atlantic.

Conventional Arms Transfers

The issue of arms production in Europe is closely linked to French policies on conventional arms transfers and restraint in such transfers. French Foreign Ministry officials as well as nongovernmental experts on security issues stated to the study mission that a more equitable transatlantic arms trade would create better conditions for arms restraint on France's part. Greater sales in European markets, currently dominated by U.S. arms producers, could have the effect of reducing incentives to sell to less developed countries.

Disarmament officials in the French Foreign Ministry stated that political considerations were at least as great as economic considerations in determining French arms export policies. The role of arms sales as an instrument of political and diplomatic leverage on recipients and in exercising French influence in a particular region is one that cannot be underestimated. However, the large export component in French arms production and the threat that restricted arms sales might have on selected industries in France are probably ultimately the most compelling argument precluding French participation in attempts to undertake conventional arms transfer restraint.

French objections to participation in conventional arms transfer talks has been couched in the following terms: When the Soviet Union

agrees to initiate limits, France will consider participation; U.S. arms sales have not shown a noticeable downward trend overall and raise the question of U.S. sincerity in achieving that objective; agreements between suppliers will not be effective unless there are parallel commitments from recipients and negotiations are carried out on a regional basis. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that France will participate in conventional arms restraint in the near future. At the same time, French officials pointed out that a greater willingness by the United States to purchase or coproduce European weapon systems would brighten the prospects for further defense cooperation and progress in conventional arms restraint.

APPENDIX 1

Itinerary

(Times shown are local times)

Tuesday, January 1, 1980

Departed JFK Airport at 8:00 p.m.

Wednesday, January 2, 1980

In Brussels, Belgium:
Briefing with U.S. Chargé Mike Glitman and U.S. Mission officers in defense and military areas
Working lunch with Norwegian Deputy Permanent Representative Kjell Ostrem, Canadian Deputy Permanent Representative Barry Mawhinney, and U.S. Mission officers
Meeting with John Walsh, Assistant Secretary General, Defense Support Division, NATO
Meeting with Rinaldo Petrignani, Deputy Secretary General, NATO
Meeting with A. K. King-Harmon, Plans and Policy Section, Division of Defense Planning and Policy, NATO
Dinner with North Atlantic Assembly staff members (Simon Luen and Douglas Mitchell)

Thursday, January 3, 1980

Meeting with Netherlands Permanent Representative, Carl D. Barkman
Meeting with Federal Republic of Germany Permanent Representative, Rolf Pauls
Meeting at the Belgian Foreign Ministry with Alfred Cahen, Director General for Political Affairs
Meeting with Danish Permanent Representative, Anker Svart
Meeting with Dr. J. D. Martin, Director for Nuclear Planning
Meeting with United Kingdom Permanent Representative Sir Clive Rose

Friday, January 4, 1980

In Oslo, Norway:
Briefing at American Embassy
Meeting with General Sven Hauge and other officials at Ministry of Defense
Meeting with Johan Jorgen Holst, Deputy Under Secretary and other officials at Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Informal dinner at residence of Chargé d'Affaires, Richard Barkley with Norwegian Defense officials, nongovernmental experts in defense and foreign affairs, and parliamentary staff members

Monday, January 7, 1980

In London, United Kingdom:
Briefing at American Embassy by Acting Deputy Chief of Mission (and Economic Minister) Robert Morris
Meeting with Lawrence Friedman at Chatham House
Round table discussion at International Institute for Strategic Studies
Working lunch at American Embassy with staff of the Defence and Foreign Affairs Committees, staff of Overseas Office (House of Commons)
Meeting at Ministry of Defence with Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Michael Quinlan and Assistant Under Secretary for International and Industrial Policy Ken McDonald

Meeting at Foreign and Commonwealth Office with Assistant Under Secretary Ewen Fergusson and David Gilmore, Head of the Defense Department

Tuesday, January 8, 1980

In the Hague, the Netherlands:
Briefing at American Embassy led by Ambassador Geri M. Joseph
Meeting with Henk Neuman, Director of the Netherlands Institute for Peace and Questions
Lunch with Laurens Brinkhorst, former State Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Klaas de Vries, Chairman of the Defense Committee of Parliament
Roundtable discussion with officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Defense Ministry
Reception at residence of Ambassador Geri M. Joseph to meet with officials of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense, Members of Parliament and others

Thursday, January 10, 1980

In Bonn, Germany:
Briefing by Vladimir Lehovich, Deputy Chief, Political Section, American Embassy
Meeting with Ambassador Friedrich Ruth, Foreign Office Commissioner for Arms Control and Disarmament
Meeting with Dr. Wilfried Hofmann, Foreign Office Director of NATO Affairs
Working lunch at American Embassy with embassy officials.
Meeting with officials of the Federal Ministry of Defense
Dinner hosted by Vladimir Lehovich, Deputy Chief, Political Section, American Embassy, with West German parliamentary staff

Friday, January 11, 1980

Meeting with Dr. Klaus Citron, Foreign Office Director for Arms Control and Disarmament and members of the Policy Planning Staff
Briefing by Charles T. York, Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs, American Embassy
Lunch with SPD staff member
Meeting with Dr. Heinz Gleaser, Federal Ministry of Defense Assistant Secretary for Arms Cooperation
Meeting with Dr. Manfred Woerner, Chairman of the Bundestag Defense Committee

Monday, January 14, 1980

In Rome, Italy:
Briefing at American Embassy led by Ambassador Richard Gardner
Meeting with officials of the Foreign and Defense Ministries
Working lunch with Dr. Claudio Boccia, Staff Director, Chamber of Deputies Defense Commission
Meeting with members of the Institute for International Affairs, Dr. Stefano Silvestri, Vice Director and Dr. Maurizio Cremasco

Tuesday, January 15, 1980

In Vienna, Austria:
Briefing by Aurelius Fernandez, Adviser and Joseph Presell, Political Officer, U.S. MBFR Delegation
Meeting at Ministry of Foreign Affairs with Frank Ceska, Minister, Chief of the Office of Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and associates

Thursday, January 17, 1980

In Paris, France:
Briefing at American Embassy with John H. Kelly, Politico-Military Officer
Meeting at Foreign Ministry with Jacques Laureau, Deputy Director for Strategic and NATO Affairs, and others
Meeting at Embassy with Professor Pierre Hassner, National Political Science Foundation
Meeting at Foreign Ministry with Benoit d'Aboville, Deputy Director for Disarmament
Meeting at Embassy with Deputy Chief of Mission, Christian A. Chapman

Meeting with Jean-Marie Daillet, Vice President of the Defense Committee of the National Assembly
Dinner with Mr. and Mrs. Stuart White, Defense Counselor, Assembly of the Western European Union

Friday, January 18, 1980

Meeting with Jean-Pierre Cot (Socialist Deputy) and Huga Sada, journalist
Meeting at the French Institute of International Relations with Professor Dominique Moisi, Assistant Director, and Jean Klein, defense expert
Working lunch at American Embassy with Embassy officials
Meeting with RPR staff official Michel Schneider

APPENDIX 2

GOALS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM (LTDP) (FROM FIFTH ANNUAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT ON RATIONALIZATION/STANDARDIZATION WITHIN NATO, JANUARY 1979)

NATO LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM

In historic perspective the 1977 London Summit of NATO Heads of State and Government may turn out to be a watershed in NATO's development. There, President Carter's call for immediate attention to needed short-term improvements, development of a long-term planning program, and closer armaments cooperation set in train an unprecedented effort to revitalize the Alliance. The results of the past year of positive action fully justify the renewed U.S. effort related to NATO.

The need to confront the alarming year-by-year growth in Warsaw Pact capabilities had long been recognized. The Major NATO Commanders had already identified deficiencies and recommended solutions, but political attention was needed. President Carter's strong statement, followed by his positive actions to strengthen the US commitment to NATO, proved to be the galvanizing ingredient. Allied Heads of State and Government joined him in calling for action to offset the negative trends in the balance of conventional forces.

Alliance-wide short-term initiatives in the areas of antiarmor, readiness/reinforcement and war reserve munitions were identified and have, in large part, been implemented in national defense plans, providing an immediate display of Alliance resolve to correct its deficiencies. NATO's 1978 fall review of national defense plans evaluated progress in meeting these short-term measures. Only a few will not be achieved though others, particularly those related to ammunition procurement, will not be fulfilled until end-1979 or later.

But the centerpiece of NATO activity during 1978 was the response to the President's call for Long-Term Defense Program (LTDP). Ten high level international task forces made an in-depth analysis of Alliance problems in ten vital functional areas: readiness; reinforcement; reserve mobilization; maritime posture; air defense; command, control, and communications; electronic warfare, rationalization; logistics; and theater nuclear force modernization.

The resulting Long-Term Defense Program, approved by NATO Heads of State and Government at the May 1978 Summit in Washington marks a significant milestone for NATO through its projection of Alliance defense planning into a longer-term framework and its emphasis on cooperative efforts to strengthen Alliance defense through the 1980's. The LTDP was developed as a means of coping with the challenge to Alliance security posed by the continuing momentum of the Warsaw Pact military build-up. NATO's leaders recognized the need to finally address this imbalance between the conventional forces of the Warsaw Pact and the Alliance. The LTDP is designed to meet this challenge. It provides for force improvements in certain selected areas and for a far greater degree of Alliance cooperation, leading to an increase in overall defensive capability from the national resources already made available or planned for the Alliance. Further improvements are to be made to the readiness and combat capabilities of NATO's military forces and in the capability to reinforce those forces. The program recommends a series of detailed actions to improve NATO capabilities in certain priority areas. A hallmark of the Washington Summit was the call for "vigorous follow-through action" on the part of national authorities and at NATO and international military headquarters in the priority areas.

The initial action taken within NATO was to allocate responsibility for each LTDP measure approved by Ministers to national and NATO civil and military authorities as "action bodies." A second step was the appointment of "program monitors" designated by Secretary General Luns for each of the nine conventional areas. These monitors are high-level civil and military officials within

NATO who keep track of progress, identify problem areas, and provide periodic reports on their functional areas of responsibility. The NATO Nuclear Planning Group is carrying on work in the tenth field, Theater Nuclear Force Modernization. After assessing the normal evolution and changes in NATO operations and the requirements associated with the LTDP, certain staff realignments have been approved, and modest staff increases in the NATO organization are under consideration by the North Atlantic Council. The NATO Military Authorities have provided their initial assessment of staffing and organizational needs to meet increased work loads resulting from the Long-Term Defense Program.

In December 1978 NATO Defense Ministers reviewed the initial steps taken to implement the LTDP, reaffirmed the importance of vigorous follow-through action, including the necessary organizational support, and recognized that this would call for continued efforts at both the national and international levels of the Alliance. These efforts cover a number of areas, and much remains to be done. We are, after all, looking some ten to fifteen years downstream. Many of the approved programs are conceptual and must be fleshed out by nations and NATO organizations into concrete, funded programs. Most measures require further refinement or elaboration to facilitate implementation. Some must be studied further before they can be approved and implemented.

NATO needs to establish an LTDP baseline against which progress in implementation can be measured. Without such a baseline, it will be difficult to ensure coordinated action and to monitor implementation. The action bodies responsible for implementing the LTDP measures must spell out in greater detail the implementation actions required, e.g., specific program definition to include quantities, milestone dates, costs, and set realistic time schedules for those actions; and track implementation and report progress. Program monitors must be provided the information they require to carry out their responsibilities to measure and assess progress, to facilitate coordination of NATO and national LTDP efforts, and to assess priorities and identify problem areas, providing appropriate recommendations for Ministerial decisions.

We are working with our Allies to move forward together in this regard. One of the bright spots in the LTDP process has been the growing sense of Alliance solidarity and pride in the efforts of each individual nation to revitalize and strengthen the Alliance. The spirit of cooperation and interdependence among Allies is heartening and needs to be nurtured. We recognize that greater effort must go into the implementation phase of LTDP. We want to keep the momentum going. The President has unleashed a powerful idea that has been readily accepted by the Alliance.

APPENDIX 3

Communique Issued at a Special Meeting of the NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers in Brussels on December 12, 1979

1. At a special meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers in Brussels on December 12, 1979:

2. Ministers recalled the May 1978 Summit where governments expressed the political resolve to meet the challenges to their security posed by the continuing momentum of the Warsaw Pact military build-up.

3. The Warsaw Pact has over the years developed a large and growing capability in nuclear systems that directly threaten Western Europe and have a strategic significance for the Alliance in Europe. This situation has been especially aggravated over the last few years by Soviet decisions to implement programmes modernizing and expanding their long-range nuclear capability substantially. In particular, they have deployed the SS–20 missile, which offers significant improvements over previous systems in providing greater accuracy, more mobility, and greater range, as well as having multiple warheads, and the Backfire bomber, which has a much better performance than other Soviet aircraft deployed hitherto in a theatre role. During this period, while the Soviet Union has been reinforcing its superiority in Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) both quantitatively and qualitatively, Western LRTNF capabilities have remained static. Indeed these forces are increasing in age and vulnerability and do not include land-based, long-range theatre nuclear missile systems.

4. At the same time, the Soviets have also undertaken a modernization and expansion of their shorter-range TNF and greatly improved the overall quality of their conventional forces. These developments took place against the background of increasing Soviet inter-continental capabilities and achievement of parity in inter-continental capability with the United States.

5. These trends have prompted serious concern within the Alliance, because, if they were to continue, Soviet superiority in theatre nuclear systems could undermine the stability achieved in inter-continental systems and cast doubt on the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent strategy by highlighting the gap in the spectrum of NATO's available nuclear response to aggression.

6. Ministers noted that these recent developments require concrete actions on the part of the Alliance if NATO's strategy of flexible response is to remain credible. After intensive consideration, including the merits of alternative approaches, and after taking note of the positions of certain members, Ministers concluded that the overall interest of the Alliance would best be served by pursuing two parallel and complementary approaches of TNF modernization and arms control.

7. Accordingly Ministers have decided to modernize NATO's LRTNF by the deployment in Europe of U.S. ground-launched systems comprising 108 Pershing II launchers, which would replace existing U.S. Pershing I–A, and 464 Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM), all with single warheads. All the nations currently participating in the integrated defence structure will participate in the programme: the missiles will be stationed in selected countries and certain support costs will be met through NATO's existing common funding arrangements. The programme will not increase NATO's reliance upon nuclear weapons. In this connection, Ministers agreed that as an integral part of TNF modernization, 1,000 U.S. nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible. Further, Ministers decided that the 572 LRTNF warheads should be accommodated within that reduced level, which necessarily implies a numerical shift of emphasis away from warheads for delivery systems of other types and shorter ranges. In addition they noted with satisfaction that the Nuclear Planning Group is undertaking an examination of the precise nature, scope and basis of the adjustments resulting from the LRTNF deployment and their

possible implications for the balance of roles and systems in NATO's nuclear armoury as a whole. This examination will form the basis of a substantive report to NPG Ministers in the Autumn of 1980.

8. Ministers attach great importance to the role of arms control in contributing to a more stable military relationship between East and West and in advancing the process of détente. This is reflected in a broad set of initiatives being examined within the Alliance to further the course of arms control and détente in the 1980's. Ministers regard arms control as an integral part of the Alliance's efforts to assure the undiminished security of its member States and to make the strategic situation between East and West more stable, more predictable, and more manageable at lower levels of armaments on both sides. In this regard they welcome the contribution which the SALT II Treaty makes towards achieving these objectives.

9. Ministers consider that, building on this accomplishment and taking account of the expansion of Soviet LRTNF capabilities of concern to NATO, arms control efforts to achieve a more stable overall nuclear balance at lower levels of nuclear weapons on both sides should therefore now include certain U.S. and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems.

This would reflect previous Western suggestions to include such Soviet and U.S. systems in arms control negotiations and more recent expressions by Soviet President Brezhnev of willingness to do so. Ministers fully support the decision taken by the United States following consultations within the Alliance to negotiate arms limitations on LRTNF and to propose to the U.S.S.R. to begin negotiations as soon as possible along the following lines which have been elaborated in intensive consultations within the Alliance:

A. Any future limitations on U.S. systems principally designed for theatre missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theatre systems.

B. Limitations on U.S. and Soviet long-range theatre nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT II framework in a step-by-step approach.

C. The immediate objective of these negotiations should be the establishment of agreed limitations on U.S. and Soviet land-based long-range theatre nuclear missile systems.

D. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. Therefore, the limitations should take the form of de jure equality both in ceilings and in rights.

E. Any agreed limitations must be adequately verifiable.

10. Given the special importance of these negotiations for the overall security of the Alliance, a special consultative body at a high level will be constituted within the Alliance to support the U.S. negotiating effort. This body will follow the negotiations on a continuous basis and report to the Foreign and Defence Ministers who will examine developments in these negotiations as well as in other arms control negotiations at their semi-annual meetings.

11. The Ministers have decided to pursue these two parallel and complementary approaches in order to avert an arms race in Europe caused by the Soviet TNF build-up, yet preserve the viability of NATO's strategy of deterrence and defense and thus maintain the security of its member States.

A. A modernization decision, including a commitment to deployments, is necessary to meet NATO's deterrence and defence needs, to provide a credible response to unilateral Soviet TNF deployments, and to provide the foundation for the pursuit of serious negotiations on TNF.

B. Success of arms control in constraining the Soviet build-up can enhance Alliance security, modify the scale of NATO's TNF requirements, and promote stability and détente in Europe in consonance with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defence and détente as enunciated in the Harmel Report. NATO's TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results reached through negotiations.

APPENDIX 4

Department of Defense Definitions of Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI) (From Sixth Annual Department of Defense Report on Rationalization/Standardtion/Standardization Within NATO, January 1980)

Term and Definition

INTEROPERABILITY

The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.

RATIONALIZATION

Any action that increases the effectiveness of allied forces through more efficient or effective use of defense resources committed to the Alliance. Rationalization includes consolidation, reassignment of national priorities to higher allied needs, standardization, specialization, mutual support, improved interoperability or greater cooperation. Rationalization applies to both weapons/materiel resources and nonweapons military matters.

STANDARDIZATION

The process by which member nations achieve the closest practicable cooperation among forces; the most efficient use of research, development, and production resources; and agree to adopt on the broadest possible basis the use of (a) common or compatible operational, administrative, and logistics procedures; (b) common or compatible technical procedures and criteria; (c) common, compatible, or interchangeable supplies, components, weapons, or equipment; and (d) common or compatible tactical doctrine with corresponding organizational compatibility.

APPENDIX 5

Department of Defense Description of "Perry's Triad" (From Sixth Annual Department of Defense Report on Rationalization/Standardization Within NATO, January 1980)

Achieving Alliance Standardization/Interoperability of Weapons

In view of the Soviet expenditure of resources on weapons development at a rate that has now reached the equivalent of some $20B a year, the Alliance must seek maximum effectiveness from its combined annual total of $18B a year. Greater cooperation in armaments development and production has a double payoff, increasing the scope and output from R&D resources and providing a higher degree of weapons standardization/interoperability in the field. Moreover, achieving improved military capability through cooperative arms (in concert with the LTDP) effectively demonstrates our collective determination to respond to the growing Soviet threat.

The U.S. continues to pursue three primary approaches for increasing cooperation with allies: (1) reciprocal defense procurement agreements, (2) dual production of weapons systems already developed, and (3) sharing the development tasks required for new families of next generation weapons. Fortunately the Alliance Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) includes all 13 Allies with armaments programs including France (only Iceland and Luxembourg are not members). The CNAD is moving ahead with a new Periodic Armaments Planning System which should provide an improved framework for Alliance-wide cooperation. In addition, CNAD has established additional cooperative programs, and the NATO AWACS program negotiated over several years has moved into production.

DOD PRIMARY APPROACHES TO ARMS COOPERATION

Reciprocal Defense Procurement MOUs [1]

We have now negotiated reciprocal defense procurement MOUs with ten of our NATO Allies and two more are under review. These agreements waive "buy national" and other restrictive provisions impeding defense trade, making it possible for each nation to seek the best equipment for its money without artificial barriers. The first of these agreements was signed with the UK in 1975 and a US/UK committee has met at least annually to review problems in implementing the agreement. The UK MOU has served as a model for subsequent MOUs with Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway and Portugal. Agreements are under discussion with Greece and Turkey. A United States/Canadian defense agreement, signed in 1956, provided for reciprocal procurement. To assist in the implementation of these more recent agreements, we have sponsored seminars to inform European and US government and industry representatives about the DoD acquisition process and procedures and to facilitate direct industry-to-industry contact. The UK has held a similar seminar for US industry.

Major programs under the US/UK MOU include UK procurement of submarine launched HARPOON, helicopter mounted TOW and CH 47 CHINOOK helicopters. The US, for its part, has authorized UK participation in the SINCGARS tactical radio program, has contributed to the funding of a UK development program for runway attack munitions, has proceeded with development of an advanced HARRIER aircraft, and is evaluating the UK 81mm mortar and UK bridging equipment.

Dual Production

In the case of weapons systems already developed or in development, the Alliance should consider licensed production as one means of providing standardization and saving R&D funds that would otherwise be spent to develop similar

[1] Memorandums of understanding.

systems. The US has initiated dual production of the French/German ROLAND short-range anti-air missile and the Belgian MAG–58 armored vehicle machine gun and is proposing to produce the German 120mm tank gun. Belgium, Denmark, The Netherlands and Norway are participating in coproduction of the F16. Italy, The Netherlands and Belgium are participating in production of the M–113 personnel carrier family. Germany is leading a consortium to produce the AIM 9L air-to-air missile, will form similar consortia to produce the Modular Thermal Imaging System (MOD FLIR) and plans to do so for the STINGER (shoulder-launched surface-to-air missile).

Families of Weapons

The families of weapons approach involves mission areas where harmonization of requirements is feasible, followed by specialization in development tasks, thus saving resources for additional advanced development in other armaments areas. In October 1979 US, Germany, France and UK reached agreement in principle on the broad outlines of a family of advanced air-to-air missiles and a family of antitank guided weapons. In the family of advanced air-to-air missiles, the US would develop the medium range missile while the Europeans would develop the short range missile. In the family of antitank guided weapons, the US would develop the man-portable indirect fire system while the Europeans would develop the vehicle mounted system. This division of labor, under the family concept, should save hundreds of millions of dollars by eliminating duplicative research and development efforts. Programs will allow for participation by industries from both sides of the Atlantic to insure that the best and most economical technology is incorporated. The fully-developed, complementary systems will probably be produced on both sides of the Atlantic.

CONFERENCE OF NATIONAL ARMAMENTS DIRECTORS

Periodic Armaments Planning System (PAPS)

During the past year the CNAD began a test of a new Periodic Armaments Planning System. The PAPS involves the consideration of mission need documents submitted by NATO or national military authorities followed by development of detailed military requirements statements, including technology and cost parameters, and finally the establishment of ad hoc steering groups made up of nations cooperating on particular programs. Military authorities have submitted nine mission need documents for use during the trial and ten programs already in progress will be used to test PAPS procedures at later program milestones.

Supplementing PAPS a NATO Armaments Planning Review (NAPR) was initiated in 1979 to assess national equipment plans and identify areas where the potential for standardization/interoperability exists or where divergence is beginning to occur.

PAPS and NAPR are designed to give the CNAD a management tool it needs to further Alliance standardization and interoperability.

APPENDIX 6

Factsheet: Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Negotiations [1]

1. BACKGROUND

On October 30, 1973, 12 NATO Allies and the 7 Warsaw Pact countries began negotiations in Vienna on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in central Europe.

NATO countries had previously proposed mutual force reductions at the meeting of their Foreign Ministers at Reykjavik in June 1968. In preparatory talks in the spring of 1973, the two sides agreed that:

The general objective of the negotiations should be to contribute to a more stable relationship and to the strenghening of peace and security in Europe without diminishing the security of any party to the negotiations.

The subject matter of the negotiations would be the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments and associated measures in central Europe.

The area of reductions would consist of the territory of seven countries: the Benelux countries, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, Poland and Czechoslovakia. See map attached.

The preparatory talks also established two categories of participants in the negotiations:

11 Direct Participants

Countries which have forces in central Europe and are possible participants in reductions.

8 Special Participants

Countries which *do not* have forces in central Europe and would not participate in reductions under an agreement.

The participants are listed on the attached map.

The Allies have reserved the right to raise the question of the extent of Hungary's inclusion in future agreements. It was also agreed that any country could participate in all or any part of an agreement by mutual consent of the other parties.

2. NATO OBJECTIVE

To move toward a more stable East-West relationship of forces in central Europe through reducing ground force manpower to parity and through associated measures, thereby reducing the risk of armed conflict in the area and strengthening security.

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[1] Prepared by the Department of State, January 1980.

3. COMPARISON OF FORCES

Though NATO possesses substantial and well-equipped conventional forces within the area of reductions, there are significant disparities between the ground forces of the two sides, as shown by the following Western figures presented in November 1973. While more refined Western calculations now show somewhat larger manpower figures for both sides, the large disparity between Eastern and Western manpower strength in the area still remains.

Ground force manpower

NATO	777,000
Warsaw Pact	925,000
Disparity	148,000

Of the NATO ground force manpower total, the United States in 1976 made up 25 percent, or 193,000 men. The Soviet Union made up about 50 percent of the Warsaw Pact total or about 460,000 men. Moreover, as regards reinforcement capability in central Europe, the very large Soviet forces in the U.S.S.R. are only some 400 miles away from the border between East and West Germany. Since Soviet territory is located outside the area of reductions, Soviet forces in the U.S.S.R. will not be reduced or limited in size by an agreement. The territory of the United States is 3,200 miles away. This circumstance gives the Soviet Union a significantly greater rapid reinforcement capability in the event of possible conflict in central Europe. In the Western view, any agreement must take into account these Eastern advantages in force levels and geography.

4. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATO POSITION

The original Western proposal of November 1973 called for reduction of the ground force manpower of both sides to parity in the form of a common collective ceiling, in two phases, with the United States and the Soviet Union reducing in Phase I and other direct participants in Phase II. There would be specific limits on U.S. and Soviet manpower in the area in both phases. NATO also called for the reduction of a Soviet tank army of 68,000 men and 1,700 tanks in Phase I.

NATO's position has been developed significantly since then. The most important additions and changes include:

In December 1975, NATO added to the above proposal an offer, inter alia, to reduce certain U.S. nuclear armaments in Phase I (36 Pershing ballistic missile launchers, 54 nuclear capable F–4 aircraft, and 1,000 nuclear warheads), to set the level of the common collective ceiling on ground force manpower under a combined collective ceiling of 900,000 on ground force and air force manpower.

That position was further developed in April 1978, when NATO offered on a reciprocal basis to specify, in a Phase I agreement, the size and timing of overall Western reductions to be made in Phase II. NATO also modified its proposal for Soviet withdrawals in Phase I, proposing that Soviet reductions be in the form of five divisions rather than an integral tank army.

In December 1978 Western participants made a further move regarding the treatment in Phase I of reductions of military manpower in Phase II, designed to meet Eastern desires to know, in Phase I, the size of Phase II reductions by individual Western direct participants.

5. THE CURRENT WESTERN POSITION

The latest Western proposals were presented on December 20, 1979. In an effort to simplify the negotiation and to deal with long-standing obstacles, including the issue of agreeing on data for Warsaw Pact military manpower, the West has proposed an interim Phase I agreement which would:

Provide for Soviet Phase I ground force manpower reductions of the same size offered by the East itself in its proposals of June 8, 1978. These Soviet reductions would be considerably smaller than those originally

sought by the West; they would be based on agreement on data on Soviet and U.S. ground force manpower in the area; agreement on data for other participants would be postponed to Phase II, when these participants would undertake reduction commitments;

Defer consideration of the controversial question of armament reduction and limitation, which could be addressed in Phase II if judged desirable;

Provide for a limited duration for the Phase I agreement in the absence of agreement on overall data and reductions to the common ceiling;

Contain a significant package of specific associated measures, designed to enhance mutual knowledge and understanding of military dispositions and activities on both sides. These associated measures would be an essential element in an agreement, in that they would reduce the risks of miscalculation and misperception and make the reductions and limitations viable.

This Western proposal is the most recent proposal made by either side in the Vienna negotiations.

6. WARSAW PACT POSITION

In November 1973, the Warsaw Pact proposed that all forces in the area be reduced by approximately 17 percent in three annual stages, in which all direct participants would be equally involved. The East also proposed that all types of forces and armaments—ground, air and nuclear—be included in reductions and their residual level limited. Acceptance of this approach would have contractualized in an international agreement the East's numerical superiority in manpower and armaments.

In February 1976, the Warsaw Pact revised its proposal in reaction to the Western move of December 1975, to provide for staging of reductions, with only the U.S. and U.S.S.R. reducing in the first stage. However, the scope and timing of subsequent reductions would still have been determined in Phase I according to a percentage formula. The East also proposed that the U.S. and the Soviet Union reduce an equal number of several designated types of armaments.

In June 1978, in response to the Western proposals advanced in April 1978, the Warsaw Pact accepted in principle the Western proposal for an outcome of parity in military manpower in the form of common collective ceilings. The East also agreed that Phase I armament reductions, rather than being identical for the U.S. and the Soviet Union, should focus on Soviet tanks and U.S. nuclear elements as in the West's December 1975 proposals. However, these proposals were made contingent upon Western acceptance of Eastern data on Warsaw Pact forces in the area of reductions, which the West considers inaccurate, and which would make impossible attainment of genuine parity. Moreover, the East proposed a system of limitations in Phase II which would in practice undermine the collectivity of manpower limitations and seriously restrict Western flexibility. At the same time, the East did not provide for a specific post-reduction limit on U.S. and Soviet manpower in Phase II. In June 1979 the East modified the form but not the substance of its position on the handling of Phase II reduction commitments in Phase I.

7. MAJOR OPEN ISSUES

(a) *Data.*—The large discrepancy or difference between Eastern and Western figures on Eastern military manpower in the area has increasingly come to represent the central open issue of the Vienna talks. Without agreement on data on the manpower which is to be reduced and limited, no agreement would be possible. Without agreement on data, it would be impossible for both sides to calculate and monitor agreed residual levels. The requirement for agreed data exists both in Phase I—when only the U.S. and the Soviet Union will reduce their manpower—and in Phase II, when all direct participants will reduce.

At the opening of the talks in November 1973, the West presented its figures for NATO and Pact ground force manpower in the area, as well as for U.S. and Soviet forces. It called upon the East to do the same. However, it was not until June 1976, that the East presented some data on Eastern ground and air force manpower in the area, valid as of January 1, 1976. In December of that year, Western participants tabled updated figures on their ground and air force manpower, also valid as of January 1, 1976.

Eastern figures for 1976 show 805,000 Pact ground force manpower and a combined air and ground total of 987,300. Western figures on Warsaw Pact forces,

however, show an Eastern manpower superiority of more than 150,000 men as compared with NATO military manpower in the area. The result is a large discrepancy between Eastern and Western figures on Warsaw Pact manpower in the area.

To assist in finding the source of this discrepancy, the West proposed a further exchange of data in July 1977. The East subsequently accepted some but not all of the elements of the Western proposal and, as a result, further data was exchanged in March and April of 1978. Intensive discussion of these figures failed to show the reasons for the difference between Western and Eastern figures. Later in 1978 and in 1979, the Western participants made available to the East a large number of items of Western data on Warsaw Pact military manpower. The West believes that the only way to resolve the discrepancy is to identify cases where the two sides may have counted specific types of Eastern forces differently. This can only be done by comparison of the figures of both sides on particular force categories. The West is making a major effort to clarify the reasons for the discrepancy, but the effort requires Eastern cooperation to present its figures for the same force elements, so that the distribution of the difference within the forces of individual Eastern participants will become apparent as a basis for further discussion of the reasons for these differences.

(b) *Phasing.*—At the outset of the negotiations, East and West took diametrically opposed positions on the phasing of reductions. The West proposed that the US and Soviet Union agree to reductions in a Phase I agreement, which would be followed by separate negotiations for a Phase II agreement involving reductions by all direct participants leading to the common ceiling. The East proposed that all participants agree in a Phase I agreement on equal percentage reductions for all participants.

As noted above, the West modified its initial position, to provide additional links between a Phase I agreement and the Phase II negotiations. The East modified its formal position on phasing, accepting that the US and Soviet Union would take their reductions first, followed by the other direct participants. But the East continued to insist, through its proposals of February 1976, June 1978, and June 1979, that all essential elements of the Phase II agreement be resolved in Phase I.

In its latest proposals of December 1979 for an interim Phase I agreement, the West has attempted to simplify the question, by focusing on US and Soviet Phase I manpower reductions and limitations, but specifying that these would be for a limited duration only. The Western proposals also provide a framework for a Phase II negotiation leading to the common ceiling, but do not specify the timing or amounts of Phase II reductions, since significant issues, including agreement on data for the forces of direct participants other than the US and USSR, will remain to be resolved in the Phase II negotiations.

(c) *Operation of Phase II Ceilings.*—The Western position calls for a collective common ceiling on the ground force manpower and the combined ground and air force manpower of direct participants of both sides in the area of reductions at the end of Phase II. In addition, the West calls for specific ceilings on the residual level of US and Soviet manpower in the area within the overall common collective ceilings. Collectivity of post-reduction limitations is needed to ensure Western direct participants the flexibility needed to provide for Alliance defense under all circumstances. At the same time, a specific post-reduction limitation on that portion of the forces of the Soviet Union stationed in the reduction area is required because of the geographic location of the Soviet Union. The USSR has very large forces on its own territory directly adjacent to the area of reductions, which could be introduced into Central Europe rapidly in the event of conflict or crisis.

The East accepted in principle the concept of collective manpower ceilings in its proposals of June 1978. However, this acceptance was coupled with conditions which would in practice severely restrict the flexibility of the Western direct participants in maintaining their agreed common collective ceiling levels. At the same time, the Eastern proposals provided no specific ceiling on Soviet forces, which would mean that Soviet forces could in some circumstances return to the level they had prior to reductions. Either of these situations would obviously be very damaging to Western security.

(d) *Armaments.*—The East initially argued that all types of armaments in the area should be reduced, and that all direct participants should agree to participate in reduction of armaments. This Eastern position was modified, in June 1978, to provide that Phase I armament reductions would focus only on US reductions of selected nuclear elements and Soviet reductions of tanks. The East, however, has maintained its position that all direct participants should commit themselves in principle in Phase I, to reduce armaments in Phase II, with the

specific types and amounts of armament reductions to be determined in Phase II.

The initial Western proposals focused on the need to reduce Soviet main battle tanks, which posed the primary offensive threat in Central Europe. In December 1975, the West indicated that, as a one-time offer, it would be prepared to withdraw certain US nuclear elements (Option III : 36 Pershing ballistic missile launchers, 54 F–4 nuclear capable aircraft, 1000 nuclear warheads) in return for Eastern agreement to the overall Western negotiating position, including not only tank withdrawals but also the full reductions of Eastern manpower needed to arrive at the common collective ceiling according to Western data.

Since it has not been possible to arrive at agreement on the overall size of these Eastern manpower reductions to the common ceiling, the West has not included armament reductions for either the US or the Soviet Union in its latest proposals of December 1979 for a simplified interim Phase I agreement. The West has indicated, however, that the question of armament reductions might be taken up in Phase II if judged desirable.

(e) *Associated Measures.*—In the preparatory talks for the Vienna negotiations in 1973, it was agreed that in addition to reductions and limitations, participants would consider associated measures. In 1974 Western participants advanced some proposals for stabilizing measures under this heading. In its proposals of December 1979, the West replaced these earlier suggestions with a more comprehensive set of proposals. These measures are designed to enhance the security of all participants and to support an agreement on reductions and limitations through exchanging certain information on the military dispositions and activities of the other side. Given the unusually large concentration of military force in and around Central Europe, it is particularly important that countries not make decisions on the basis of misperceptions or inadequate information. The package of measures which the West has proposed would work together to reduce the risk of miscalculation and to provide the added assurance as to the nature of force movements of the opposite side that would make reductions and limitations acceptable.

The East has advanced no proposals for associated measures in the talks.

MBFR PARTICIPATION



APPENDIX 7

Document Describing the Italian Proposal to Control Conventional Arms Transfers Worldwide [1]

Italy believes that as soon as possible an appropriate body within the United Nations should be established for the purpose of effectively monitoring and limiting, at a regional level, international arms transfer.

Such a body could be articulated into a number of regional Committees corresponding to the areas taken into consideration for transfer restraints, in which both the major arms-suppliers and recipients of a given region should be represented.

The regional approach seems particularly appropriate, in order to fully take into account specific situations related to specific regional areas.

The body could be entrusted with the task of :

Shaping basic principles and broad guidelines for control and limitation measures ;

Elaborating legal, technical and military criteria for the adoption of such measures (identification and implementation of relevant international norms, classification of types of weapons and weapons systems, consideration of the relationship between weapon requirements and regional security balance) ;

Ensuring adequate verification of the agreed measures ;

Keeping a register of transactions.

Specific arrangements concerning different areas should be worked out within the framework of regional Committees, bearing in mind above mentioned principles and guidelines.

Such arrangements should pursue the objective of stabilizing and, possibly, strengthening current regional balances at a lower level of armaments.

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[1] Received by the staff study mission from the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

APPENDIX 8

Communique Issued at North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting in Brussels on December 14, 1979

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial session in Brussels on 13th and 14th December 1979.

Ministers accepted with pleasure the invitation of the Turkish Government to hold the next Ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council in Ankara in the spring of 1980.

Ministers renewed their faith in the North Atlantic Treaty which guarantees the freedom, security and well-being of their peoples and the preservation of peace and international stability. Because their governments are based on the consent of their peoples, on democratic institutions and on the principle of equality and the rule of law, the members of the Alliance have the strength, enhanced by the will to assist each other, to face the challenges which lie ahead. Looking forward to the 1980's, Ministers expressed their confidence that, by maintaining the strength and cohesion of their Alliance and pursuing the complementary goals of arms control, disarmament, and the improvement of relations between East and West in general, their governments would continue to make a major contribution to peace and stability in Europe and the world.

Reviewing developments in East-West relations since they last met, Ministers noted that the conclusions of the study undertaken in 1978 remain valid. They recalled their commitment to détente and stressed the defensive nature of the Alliance. Events since their previous meeting showed the continuing influence of forces not conducive to the consolidation of international stability and security. They expressed concern over the direct or indirect actions of the Soviet Union and some of its Allies in a number of troubled areas concurrently with a very considerable build-up, both qualitative and quantitative, in Warsaw Pact military strength, and particularly with growing Soviet theatre nuclear and conventional capabilities. Ministers noted that these developments were a cause for legitimate disquiet and were not compatible either with assurances by the Warsaw Pact countries that they do not seek military superiority or with their publicly-declared intention to promote détente, particularly in the military sphere. Ministers reiterated their view that détente must be worldwide and indivisible in character.

Ministers confirmed that their governments were resolved to take steps to reduce the growing imbalance of forces by improving their military capabilities and thus maintain an adequate level of deterrence and defence across the full spectrum. They recalled the determination of their governments to achieve, as a key element in conventional force modernization, more effective use of available resources through co-operative equipment programmes and increased standardization and interoperability of weapons systems. They noted with satisfaction the initial progress that has been achieved in these respects, they repeated that through the transatlantic dialogue they would continue to work towards more balanced relations among the European and North American members of the Alliance in the field of armaments development and production in order to enhance the availability and quality of new defence equipment. They noted the contribution which is being made by the Conference of National Armaments Directors in this respect, and the need to bear in mind the interests of the less industrialized members of the Alliance.

Ministers believed that efforts to achieve agreement in fields of arms control, disarmament and confidence building should go hand in hand with defence efforts of the Allies. They noted that recent proposals put forward by the Eastern countries echoed in part the Western proposals and they saw in them a hopeful indication of the evolution of these countries towards a more positive attitude in the search for common ground. Ministers considered ways of advancing appropriate discussions and negotiations.

Ministers recalled that the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) signed by the United States and the Soviet Union on 18th June reflected their desire for genuine arms control measures which should contribute to the stability of East-West relations. Ministers observed that the Treaty makes it possible to maintain a strong US strategic nuclear deterrent, which remains vital to the defence of the Alliance. Thus this treaty, which will have the effect of curbing the build-up of strategic nuclear weapons in the world, improves the prospects for détente without jeopardizing the security interests of the members of the Alliance. Ministers expressed the hope that the Treaty would soon come into force. They looked forward to the early continuation of the SALT process, on the basis of further close consultations within the Alliance, leading to additional United States and Soviet reductions and qualitative limitations in the nuclear field. They also expressed the belief that ratification of the Treaty would contribute to other possibilities of progress in the field of arms control.

Ministers believed that the process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe made a most valuable contribution to the strengthening of détente, and offered further opportunities to develop existing and new areas of dialogue in the search for agreement. They expressed the hope that the CSCE follow-up meeting to be held at Madrid in 1980 will be a major step forward in that process. Tangible progress in the meantime in implementing the principles and provisions of the Final Act and adequate preparation are of great importance for the success of the Madrid meeting and could provide a basis for participation at the political level. Although there have been certain welcome measures of relief, in particular the granting of amnesty, and some improvement in other fields, Ministers noted with concern that in certain countries the situation remained unsatisfactory or had even deteriorated as regards respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including cases where citizens continue to be subject to harassment and imprisonment for no reason other than their efforts to bring about the full implementation of the Final Act. Ministers also noted that process in the field of human contacts was uneven and expressed their concern that the level of implementation of the provisions dealing with a freer flow of information and working conditions for journalists had remained low and, in some cases, had deteriorated. They noted with satisfaction, however, that the Final Act increasingly has become the standard by which the actions of signatory states are judged.

Ministers expressed their intention to devote increasing efforts to preparations for the Madrid meeting during the period ahead, emphasizing the importance of consultations among Allies as well as with the other participating states and of maintaining balance among all sections of the Final Act. They confirmed that they intended to approach and conduct the Madrid meeting in a constructive frame of mind and in a manner which would permit a thorough, frank and measured review of the implementation of all provisions of the Final Act. In this spirit, they will be ready to put forward new proposals and to discuss proposals from other participants calculated to bring concrete and balanced progress in all fields covered by the Final Act and thereby contribute to the vitality of the CSCE process. Ministers recognized the importance for the Alliance of developing the confidence building measures and the other provisions of the Final Act relating to certain aspects of security and disarmament, and hoped for concrete results in this regard at the Madrid meeting.

They reviewed with interest the proposals made in these fields by different CSCE participants, whether Western, neutral and non-aligned or Warsaw Pact countries, including those made by the latter in May and December 1979. They considered that the proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe put forward by France is a useful concept providing a basis upon which to continue developing their approach in this field to bring about such a conference.

They agreed to work towards the adoption during the Madrid meeting, as part of a balanced outcome, of a mandate for further negotiations under the aegis of the CSCE on military significant and verifiable confidence building measures, applicable to the entire continent of Europe. These, if agreed, would help create conditions conducive to limitation and reduction of arms in the same geographical area. This process should take account of both the varied aspects of the existing security situation and of the current negotiations on other aspects of arms control and disarmament concerning the European continent.

The Ministers of countries participating in the negotiations and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions reemphasized their determination to work for a successful outcome which would enhance stability, peace and security in Europe. They noted, however, their concern that despite representations made at the

highest level by Western leaders to the Eastern participants, the East has made no effort to resolve the data question. These Ministers noted that agreement on the starting size of forces to be reduced is not only an essential prerequisite to any reductions, but can also serve to build confidence that a reduction agreement is being observed and that mutual security is being enhanced.

In order to advance the negotiations toward an early result, these Ministers approved a proposal for an interim Phase I agreement consistent with the objectives of their governments in the negotiations, in particular the establishment of parity in the form of a common collective ceiling on ground force manpower and agreement on a combined common collective ceiling on air and ground force manpower of each side in the area of reductions. Their new initiative aims at simplifying existing proposals for a Phase I agreement by focussing on US and Soviet manpower withdrawals and limitations, based on agreed US-Soviet data, and on associated measures applied on a multilateral basis. This interim Phase I agreement would open the way for a subsequent Phase II agreement, based on agreed overall data, providing for a common collective ceiling on ground force manpower for each side at approximately 700,000 and for agreement on a combined common collective ceiling on air and ground force manpower for each side at approximately 900,000.

These Ministers called attention to the package of associated measures which forms an integral part of their proposal for an interim Phase I agreement. This package of measures is designed to promote military stability and confidence, to ensure adequate verification of an MBFR agreement, and to help safeguard undiminished security for flank countries.

These Ministers urged Eastern participants to give prompt and serious consideration to their initiative, which takes account of negotiating proposals of both sides and which is in accordance with the agreed aim of the negotiations to contribute to the creation of a more stable relationship and to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe. They view this new Western initiative as an integral part of the arms control initiatives agreed upon during this Ministerial meeting.

Turning to the question of negotiations on disarmament and arms limitation in other fora, Ministers reaffirmed the importance which they attached to the adoption of effective, balanced and verifiable measures. They welcomed as positive elements the discussions during the first session of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and the deliberations of the Disarmament Commission in New York. They attached importance to the frequent and active consultative on these questions within the permanent machinery of the Alliance.

Ministers discussed developments with regard to Berlin and Germany as a whole. They noted that since their last meeting the climate in and around Berlin had continued to remain relatively calm. Ministers reaffirmed their conviction that an undisturbed situation in Berlin and on the access routes is an essential element of détente, security and cooperation in Europe, and noted the continuing relevance of the London declaration of 9 May 1977 and the Tokyo declaration of 29 June 1979. Ministers noted with satisfaction the improved climate in the relations between the two German states after a period of reserve and welcomed the conclusion of new agreements and the continuation of negotiations. Ministers consider this as a positive element in the process of détente in Europe, having at the same time beneficial effects for Berlin.

Ministers noted the report on the situation in the Mediterranean prepared on their instructions and underlined again the necessity of maintaining the balance of forces in the whole area. They requested the council in permanent session to continue to consult on the question and submit a further report at their next meeting.

Ministers welcomed the continuation of the dialogue between Greece and Turkey in search of a peaceful solution to the differences between the two countries and they expressed the hope that in this manner positive results could be attained in the near future.

Ministers considered a report by the Secretary General on the particular problems faced by the economically less advanced member countries which constitutes a sound basis for action. While noting with satisfaction the special efforts that had been made over recent months, they stressed the need to give further momentum to the efforts to provide, in the spirit of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, assistance to those countries, so as to reach concrete and timely results. They reaffirmed their continuing political support for this process which will, indeed, constitute an essential element for the fulfillment of the contributions by those countries to collective defence.

With respect to the Middle East, the Ministers affirmed the importance of elaborating and implementing a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338 and with the participation of all the parties concerned, including representatives of the Palestinian people. Ministers noted with satisfaction the progress achieved by Egypt and Israel in the implementation of Resolution 242 insofar as their mutual relations are concerned. They reaffirmed that a lasting peace requires the solution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects and the achievement of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in the context of a negotiated settlement that ensures the security of all states in the region including Israel.

Ministers warmly welcomed the agreement reached in the constitutional conference on Rhodesia. They expressed the hope that the cease-fire proposals agreed at that conference would quickly become fully effective, and that peace would return to Rhodesia and the neighboring countries. Ministers looked forward to the day when the independent Republic of Zimbabwe would take its place as a full member of the international community.

Ministers, recalling that the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) have been set up in 1969, took note of the Committee's achievements during its first ten years. They commended its innovative and flexible approach to many problems of the human environment in fields such as energy conservation, alternative energy sources and pollution. Ministers noted the studies launched in 1979, including those of the restoration and conservation of monuments, and on man's impact on the stratosphere, as well as projected studies on the management of technology.

The Ministers who participated in the special meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers on 12th December, 1979 noted with satisfaction that the decisions taken today by the North Atlantic Council in their opinion complemented those adopted at that meeting. Taken together, along with continuing activities flowing from decisions reached at the London and Washington meetings, they constitute a comprehensive programme of action. This programme comprises measures to reduce the military imbalance through concrete improvement and modernization of long-range theatre nuclear and conventional forces, and the following wide range of initiatives particularly in the fields of confidence building and arms control designed to improve mutual security and co-operation in Europe:

An offer to negotiate for substantial reductions in the level of long-range theatre nuclear forces as well as inter-continental strategic forces within the framework of SALT III;

Unilateral withdrawal of one thousand U.S. nuclear warheads from Europe as part of the 12th December decision;

A proposal for an interim Phase I agreement for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, designed to give fresh impetus to the MBFR negotiations;

A proposal for a package of associated measures in MBFR designed to ensure compliance with the agreement and to make military activities more transparent, thereby improving mutual confidence;

In furtherance of the CSCE process, readiness to examine proposals concerning Confidence-Building Measures and a Conference on Disarmament in Europe.

These Ministers are determined that the 1980's should see a fundamental change for the better in the situation between East and West and will make every effort to bring this about. The programme of action which they envisage offers the best opportunity for creating more constructive relations between East and West for which their citizens have hoped for so long.

These Ministers considered that this programme represents a major new opportunity for the countries of the Warsaw Pact to translate into action the interest they have signalled in improving the situation in Europe. They call on the Warsaw Pact Governments to respond to this offer by making a determined effort, in all available negotiating fora, to achieve substantial results which will enhance security and mutual trust.

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