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BY THE

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
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FOREWORD

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

This study was prepared by the Library of Congress at the request of the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, chaired by Hon. Lee H. Hamilton, and has been submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

This work is designed to serve as a useful reference document for members. It contains key statements and agreements related to the Middle East peace process. The compilation does not pretend to be all inclusive, but it does seek to provide major documents and key statements which are continually referred to as the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East continues.

The commentary provided and the decision regarding the documents and statements to be chosen are those of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, *Chairman.*

(III)

FOREWORD

History of the United States
The history of the United States is a story of the growth of a great nation from a small colony of English settlers to a powerful republic. The story begins in 1492 when Christopher Columbus discovered the New World. The first English settlers came to the United States in 1607, and the first American Revolution was fought in 1776. The United States has since grown into a great nation, and its history is a story of the growth of a great nation.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

WASHINGTON, D.C., *December 19, 1979.*

Hon. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI
*Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I enclose a study prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress.

This report is designed to serve as a useful compendium of key documents and statements relating to the Middle East peace efforts since the 1967 Middle East war. The study does not contain all statements that have been made concerning the peace process but it does seek to provide the statements and all documents which are often referred to as the peace process in the Middle East proceeds.

The work is divided into five sections covering the 1967-79 period and chronological and subject indexes of the documents are provided in order to enhance the utility of the compilation.

It is our intent that this volume serve as a useful and concise reference document for Members of Congress and interested individuals to assist in their assessment of the U.S. role in the Middle East and of the ongoing peace process.

The documents contained in this study were selected and edited by Clyde Mark and Ellen Laipson of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, with the research assistance of Bonnie Koenig.

The analysis presented here is that of the Congressional Research Service and does not necessarily represent the views of the members of the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East.

LEE H. HAMILTON, *Chairman,
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East.*

PREFACE

"The Search for Peace in the Middle East: Documents and Statements, 1967-79" was prepared at the request of the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The compilation does not pretend to be all inclusive; rather it is an effort to show the major views of principal actors and observers of the Middle East peace process.

The document begins with a section containing the five major peace achievements of the 1967-79 period. Other sections include United Nations, multilateral peace efforts 1967-73, multilateral peace efforts 1973-79, Israel, Egypt, Palestinians, other Arabs, United States, and a section on the situation in Lebanon. The multilateral efforts sections contain proposals by one or more sovereign governments as well as peace initiatives or peace statements by major international organizations and institutions. Within the country sections, efforts have been made to reflect changes in policies of successive governments within the time period. Complete representation of minority political views was not possible within the scope of the project.

Lengthy documents were edited to focus on the most salient and pertinent statements on peace. The project concludes with two indexes, one a chronological listing of the documents and one by subject.

The compilation was prepared by Ellen B. Laipson, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs, Clyde R. Mark, Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs, and Bonnie L. Koenig, Research Associate, of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.

THE

CHAPTER

The first of the three parts of the present work is devoted to a general survey of the history of the subject, and to a consideration of the principles which govern its development. The second part is devoted to a detailed examination of the various methods which have been employed in the study of the subject, and to a comparison of their relative merits and demerits. The third part is devoted to a consideration of the various applications of the subject to the various branches of science, and to a discussion of the various problems which have arisen in the course of its development.

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INTERNATIONAL PEACE AGREEMENTS

1. Sinai Disengagement Agreement, Egypt and Israel, January 18, 1974

Text of Disengagement Agreement Signed Jan. 18

[A]

Egypt and Israel will scrupulously observe the cease-fire on the land, sea and air called for by the U.N. Security Council and will refrain from the time of the signing of this document from all military or paramilitary actions against each other.

[B]

The military forces of Egypt and Israel will be separated in accordance with the following principles:

1. All Egyptian forces on the east side of the canal will be deployed west of the line designated as line A on the attached map. All Israeli forces including those west of the Suez Canal on the Bitter Lakes will be deployed east of the line designated as line B on the attached map.

2. The area between the Egyptian and Israeli lines will be a zone of disengagement in which the United Nations Emergency Force will be stationed. The UNEF will continue to consist of units from countries that are not permanent members of the Security Council.

3. The area between the Egyptian line and the Suez Canal will be limited in armament and forces.

4. The area between the Israeli line, line B on the attached map, and the line designated as line C on the attached map, which runs along the western base of the mountains where the Gidi and Mitla passes are located, will be limited in armament and forces.

5. The limitations referred to in paragraphs 3 and 4 will be inspected by UNEF. Existing procedures of the

UNEF, including the attaching of Egyptian and Israeli liaison officers to UNEF, will be continued.

[C]

The detailed implementation of the disengagement of forces will be worked out by military representatives of Egypt and Israel, who will agree on the stages of this process. These representatives will meet no later than 48 hours after the signature of this agreement at Kilometer 101 under the aegis of the United Nations for this purpose. They will complete this task within five days. Disengagement will begin within 48 hours after the completion of the work of the military representatives, and in no event later than seven days after the signature of this agreement. The process of disengagement will be completed not later than 40 days after it begins.

[D]

This agreement is not regarded by Egypt and Israel as a final peace agreement. It constitutes a first step toward a final, just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 and within the framework of the Geneva Conference.

For Egypt:

MOHAMMED ABDEL GHANY AL-GAMASY
Major General

For Israel:

DAVID ELAZAR
Lieut. Gen., Chief of Staff of Israel Defense Forces

2. Golan Heights Disengagement Agreement, Israel and Syria, May 31, 1974

Text of Agreement and Protocol Signed May 31

THE AGREEMENT

[A]

Israel and Syria will scrupulously observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and will refrain from all military action against each other from the time of the signing of this document, in implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 338 dated Oct. 22, 1973.

[B]

The military forces of Israel and Syria will be separated in accordance with the following principles:

1. All Israeli military forces will be west of the line designated as Line A on the map attached hereto except in the Quneitra area where they will be west of Line A-1.

2. All territory east of Line A will be under Syrian administration and Syrian civilians will return to this territory.

3. The area between Line A and the line designated as Line B on the attached map will be an area of separation. In this area will be stationed the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force established in accordance with the accompanying protocol.

4. All Syrian military forces will be east of the line designated as Line B on the attached map.

5. There will be two equal areas of limitation in armament and forces, one west of Line A and one east of Line B as agreed upon.

Air forces of the two sides will be permitted to operate up to their respective lines without interference from the other side.

[C]

In the area between Line A and Line A-1 on the attached map there shall be no military forces.

[D]

This agreement and the attached map will be signed by the military representatives of Israel and Syria in Geneva not later than May 31, 1974, in the Egyptian-Israeli military working group of the Geneva peace conference under the aegis of the United Nations, after that group has been joined by a Syrian military representative and with the participation of representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union.

The precise delineation of a detailed map and a plan for the implementation of the disengagement of forces will be worked out by a military working group who will agree on the stages of this process.

The military working group described above will start their work for this purpose under the aegis of the United Nations within 24 hours after the signing of this agreement. They will complete this task within five days.

Disengagement will begin within 24 hours after the completion of the task of the military working group. The process of disengagement will be completed not later than 20 days after it begins.

[E]

The provision of paragraphs A, B and C shall be inspected by personnel of the United Nations comprising the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force under this agreement.

[F]

Within 24 hours after the signing of this agreement in Geneva all wounded prisoners of war which each side holds of the other as certified by the I.C.R.C.—International Committee of the Red Cross—will be repatriated. The morning after the completion of the task of the military working group, all remaining prisoners of war will be repatriated.

[G]

The bodies of all dead soldiers held by either side will be returned for burial in their respective countries within 10 days after the signing of this agreement.

[H]

This agreement is not a peace agreement. It is a step toward a just and durable peace on the basis of Security Council Resolution 338 dated Oct. 22, 1973.

THE PROTOCOL

Israel and Syria agreed that: The function of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force under the agreement will be to use its best efforts to maintain the cease-fire and to see that it is scrupulously observed. It will supervise the agreement and protocol thereto with regard to the areas of separation and limitations.

In carrying out its mission, it will comply with generally applicable Syrian laws and regulations and will not hamper the functioning of local civil administrators.

It will enjoy freedom of movement and communication and other facilities that are necessary for its mission. It will be mobile and provided with personal weapons of a defensive character and shall use such weapons only in self-defense.

The number of the U.N.D.O.F. shall be about 1,250, who will be selected by the Secretary General of the United Nations in consultation with the parties from members of the United Nations who are not permanent members of the Security Council.

The U.N.D.O.F. will be under the command of the United Nations vested in the Secretary General under the authority of the Security Council. The U.N.D.O.F. shall carry out inspections under the agreement and report thereon to the parties on a regular basis not less often than once every 15 days and in addition when requested by either party.

It shall mark on the ground the respective lines shown on the map attached to the agreement. Israel and Syria will support a resolution of the U.N. Security Council which will provide for the U.N.D.O.F. contemplated by the agreement. The initial authorization will be for six months subject to renewal by further resolution of the Security Council.

3. Second Sinai Disengagement Agreement, Egypt and Israel, September 1, 1975

A. Egyptian-Israeli Accord

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel have agreed that:

ARTICLE I

The conflict between them and in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means.

The agreement concluded by the parties Jan. 18, 1974, within the framework of the Geneva peace conference constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of Oct. 22, 1973; and they are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338, this agreement being a significant step towards that end.

ARTICLE II

The parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other.

ARTICLE III

(1) The parties shall continue scrupulously to observe the cease-fire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or paramilitary actions against each other.

(2) The parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the annex and, when concluded, the protocol, shall be an integral part of this agreement.

ARTICLE IV

A. The military forces of the parties shall be deployed in accordance with the following principles:

(1) All Israeli forces shall be deployed east of the lines designated as lines J and M on the attached map.

(2) All Egyptian forces shall be deployed west of the line designated as line E on the attached map.

(3) The area between the lines designated on the attached map as lines E and F and the area between the lines designated on the attached map as lines J and K shall be limited in armament and forces.

(4) The limitations on armament and forces in the areas described by paragraph (3) above shall be agreed as described in the attached annex.

(5) The zone between the lines designated on the attached map as lines E and J will be a buffer zone. On this zone the United Nations Emergency Force will continue to perform its functions as under the Egyptian-Israeli agreement of Jan. 18, 1974.

(6) In the area south from line E and west from line M, as defined in the attached map, there will be no military forces, as specified in the attached annex.

B. The details concerning the new lines, the redeployment of the forces and its timing, the limitation of armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance installations and the use of the roads, the U.N. functions and other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of the annex and map which are an integral part of this agreement and of the protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the annex and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of this agreement.

ARTICLE V

The United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall continue its functions, and its mandate shall be extended annually.

ARTICLE VI

The parties hereby establish a joint commission for the duration of this agreement. It will function under the aegis of the chief coordinator of the United Nations peace-keeping missions in the Middle East in order to consider any problem arising from this agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of its mandate. The joint commission shall function in accordance with procedures established in the protocol.

ARTICLE VII

Nonmilitary cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal.

ARTICLE VIII

(1) This agreement is regarded by the parties as a significant step toward a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

(2) The parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva peace conference in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

ARTICLE IX

This agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the protocol and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement.

(3)

B. U.S. Proposal for an Early Warning System

In connection with the early-warning system referred to in Article IV of the agreement between Egypt and Israel concluded on this date and as an integral part of that agreement (hereafter referred to as the basic agreement), the United States proposes the following:

[1]

The early-warning system to be established in accordance with Article IV in the area shown on the attached map will be entrusted to the United States. It shall have the following elements:

A. There shall be two surveillance stations to provide strategic early warning, one operated by Egyptian and one operated by Israeli personnel. Their locations are shown on the map attached to the basic agreement. Each station shall be manned by not more than 250 technical and administrative personnel. They shall perform the functions of visual and electronic surveillance only within their stations.

B. In support of these stations, to provide tactical early warning and to verify access to them, three watch stations shall be established by the United States in the Mitla and Gidi passes as will be shown on the agreed map.

These stations shall be operated by United States civilian personnel. In support of these stations, there shall be established three unmanned electronic-sensor fields at both ends of each pass and in the general vicinity of each station and the roads leading to and from those stations.

[2]

The United States civilian personnel shall perform the following duties in connection with the operation and maintenance of these stations:

A. At the two surveillance stations described in paragraph 1A, above, United States personnel will verify the nature of the operations of the stations and all movement into and out of each station and will immediately report any detected divergency from its authorized role of visual and electronic surveillance to the parties to the basic agreement and the UNEF.

B. At each watch station described in paragraph 1B above, the United States personnel will immediately report to the parties to the basic agreement and to UNEF any movement of armed forces, other than the UNEF, into either pass and any observed preparations for such movement.

C. The total number of United States civilian personnel assigned to functions under these proposals shall not exceed 200. Only civilian personnel shall be assigned to functions under these proposals.

[3]

No arms shall be maintained at the stations and other facilities covered by these proposals, except for small arms required for their protection.

[4]

The United States personnel serving the early-warning system shall be allowed to move freely within the area of the system.

[5]

The United States and its personnel shall be entitled to have such support facilities as are reasonably necessary to perform their functions.

[6]

The United States personnel shall be immune from local criminal, civil, tax and customs jurisdiction and may be accorded any other specific privileges and immunities provided for in the UNEF agreement of Feb. 13, 1957.

[7]

The United States affirms that it will continue to perform the functions described above for the duration of the basic agreement.

[8]

Notwithstanding any other provision of these proposals, the United States may withdraw its personnel only if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary. In the latter case the parties to the basic agreement will be informed in advance in order to give them the opportunity to make alternative arrangements. If both parties to the basic agreement request the United States to conclude its role under this proposal, the United States will consider such requests conclusive.

[9]

Technical problems including the location of the watch stations will be worked out through consultation with the United States.

C. Annex to the Sinai Agreement

Within five days after the signature of the Egypt-Israel agreement, representatives of the two parties shall meet in the military working group of the Middle East peace conference at Geneva to begin preparation of a detailed protocol for the implementation of the agreement. In order to facilitate preparation of the protocol and implementation of the agreement, and to assist in maintaining the scrupulous observance of the cease-fire and other elements of the agreement, the two parties have agreed on the following principles, which are an integral part of the agreement, as guidelines for the working group.

1. Definitions of Lines and Areas

The deployment lines, areas of limited forces and armaments, buffer zones, the area south from line E and west from line M, other designated areas, road sections for common use and other features referred to in Article IV of the agreement shall be as indicated on the attached map (1:100,000—U.S. edition).

2. Buffer Zones

(a) Access to the buffer zones shall be controlled by the UNEF, according to procedures to be worked out by the working group and UNEF.

(b) Aircraft of either party will be permitted to fly freely up to the forward line of that party. Reconnaissance aircraft of either party may fly up to the middle line of the buffer zone between E and J on an agreed schedule.

(c) In the buffer zone, between line E and J, there will be established under Article IV of the agreement an early-warning system entrusted to United States civilian personnel as detailed in a separate proposal, which is a part of this agreement.

(d) Authorized personnel shall have access to the buffer zone for transit to and from the early-warning system; the manner in which this is carried out shall be worked out by the working group and UNEF.

3. Area South of Line E and West of Line M

(a) In this area, the United Nations Emergency Force will assure that there are no military or paramilitary forces of any kind, military fortifications and military installations; it will establish checkpoints and have the freedom of movement necessary to perform this function.

(b) Egyptian civilians and third-country civilian oil-field personnel shall have the right to enter, exit from, work and live in the above-indicated area, except for buffer zones 2A, 2B and the U.N. posts. Egyptian civilian police shall be allowed in the area to perform normal civil police functions among the civilian population in such numbers and with such weapons and equipment as shall be provided for in the protocol.

(c) Entry to and exit from the area, by land, by air or by sea, shall be only through UNEF checkpoints. UNEF shall also establish checkpoints along the road, the dividing line and at other points, with the precise locations and number to be included in the protocol.

(d) Access to the airspace and the coastal area shall be limited to unarmed Egyptian civilian vessels and unarmed civilian helicopters and transport planes involved in the civilian activities of the area, as agreed by the working group.

(e) Israel undertakes to leave intact all currently existing civilian installations and infrastructures.

(f) Procedures for use of the common sections of the coastal road along the Gulf of Suez shall be determined by the working group and detailed in the protocol.

4. Aerial Surveillance

There shall be a continuation of aerial reconnaissance missions by the U.S. over the areas covered by the agreement following the same procedures already in practice. The missions will ordinarily be carried out at a frequency of one mission every seven to 10 days, with either party or UNEF empowered to request an earlier mission. The U.S. will make the mission results available expeditiously to Israel, Egypt and the chief coordinator of the U.N. peace-keeping mission in the Middle East.

5. Limitation of Forces and Armaments

(a) Within the areas of limited forces and armaments the major limitations shall be as follows:

(1) Eight (8) standard infantry battalions.

(2) Seventy-five (75) tanks.

(3) Sixty (60) artillery pieces, including heavy mortars (i.e., with caliber larger than 120 mm.), whose range shall not exceed twelve (12) km.

(4) The total number of personnel shall not exceed eight thousand (8,000).

(5) Both parties agree not to station or locate in the area weapons which can reach the line of the other side.

(6) Both parties agree that in the areas between lines J and K, and between line A (of the disengagement agreement of Jan. 18, 1974) and line E, they will construct no new fortifications or installations for forces of a size greater than that agreed herein.

(b) The major limitations beyond the areas of limited forces and armament will be:

(1) Neither side will station nor locate any weapon in areas from which they can reach the other line.

(2) The parties will not place antiaircraft missiles within an area of 10 kilometers east of line K and west of line F, respectively.

(c) The U.N. Force will conduct inspections in order to insure the maintenance of the agreed limitations within these areas.

6. Process of Implementation

The detailed implementation and timing of the redeployment of forces, turnover of oil fields and other arrangements called for by the agreement, annex and protocol shall be determined by the working group, which will agree on the stages of this process, including the phased movement of Egyptian troops to line E and Israeli troops to line J. The first phase will be the transfer of the oil fields and installations to Egypt. This process will begin within two weeks from the signature of the protocol with the introduction of the necessary technicians, and it will be completed no later than eight weeks after it begins. The details of the phasing will be worked out in the military working group.

Implementation of the redeployment shall be completed within five months after signature of the protocol.

D. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Governments of Israel and the United States

September 1, 1975

The United States recognizes that the Egypt-Israel Agreement initialed on September 1, 1975, (hereinafter referred to as the Agreement), entailing the withdrawal from vital areas in Sinai, constitutes an act of great significance on Israel's part in the pursuit of final peace. That Agreement has full United States support.

United States-Israeli Assurances

1. The United States Government will make every effort to be fully responsive, within the limits of its resources and Congressional authorization and appropriation, on an on-going and long-term basis to Israel's military equipment and other defense requirements, to its energy requirements and to its economic needs. The needs specified in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 below shall be deemed eligible for inclusion within the annual total to be requested in FY76 and later fiscal years.

2. Israel's long-term military supply needs from the United States shall be the subject of periodic consultations between representatives of the United States and Israeli defense establishments, with agreement reached on specific items to be included in a separate United States-Israeli memorandum. To this end, a joint study by military experts will be undertaken within 3 weeks. In conducting this study, which will include Israel's 1976 needs, the United States will view Israel's requests sympathetically, including its request for advanced and sophisticated weapons.

3. Israel will make its own independent arrangements for oil supply to meet its requirements through normal procedures. In the event Israel is unable to secure its needs in this way, the United States Government, upon notification of this fact by the Government of Israel, will act as follows for five years, at the end of which period either side can terminate this arrangement on one-year's notice.

(a) If the oil Israel needs to meet all its normal requirements for domestic consumption is unavailable for purchase in circumstances where no quantitative restrictions exist on the ability of the United States to procure oil to meet its normal requirements, the United States Government will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel to meet all of the aforementioned normal requirements of Israel. If Israel is unable to secure the necessary means to transport such oil to Israel, the United States Government will make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport.

(b) If the oil Israel needs to meet all of its normal requirements for domestic consumption is unavailable for purchase in circumstances where quantitative restrictions through embargo or otherwise also prevent the United States from procuring oil to meet its normal requirements, the United States Government will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel in accordance with the International Energy Agency conservation

and allocation formula as applied by the United States Government, in order to meet Israel's essential requirements. If Israel is unable to secure the necessary means to transport such oil to Israel, the United States Government will make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport.

Israeli and United States experts will meet annually or more frequently at the request of either party, to review Israel's continuing oil requirement.

4. In order to help Israel meet its energy needs, and as part of the overall annual figure in paragraph 1 above, the United States agrees:

(a) In determining the overall annual figure which will be requested from Congress, the United States Government will give special attention to Israel's oil import requirements and, for a period as determined by Article 3 above, will take into account in calculating that figure Israel's additional expenditures for the import of oil to replace that which would have ordinarily come from Abu Rodeis and Ras Sudar (4.5 million tons in 1975).

(b) To ask Congress to make available funds, the amount to be determined by mutual agreement, to the Government of Israel necessary for a project for the construction and stocking of the oil reserves to be stored in Israel, bringing storage reserve capacity and reserve stocks now standing at approximately six months, up to one-year's need at the time of the completion of the project. The project will be implemented within four years. The construction, operation and financing and other relevant questions of the project will be the subject of early and detailed talks between the two Governments.

5. The United States Government will not expect Israel to begin to implement the Agreement before Egypt fulfills its undertaking under the January 1974 Disengagement Agreement to permit passage of all Israeli cargoes to and from Israeli ports through the Suez Canal.

6. The United States Government agrees with Israel that the next agreement with Egypt should be a final peace agreement.

7. In case of an Egyptian violation of any of the provisions of the Agreement, the United States Government is prepared to consult with Israel as to the significance of the violation and possible remedial action by the United States Government.

8. The United States Government will vote against any Security Council resolution which in its judgment affects or alters adversely the Agreement.

9. The United States Government will not join in and will seek to prevent efforts by others to bring about consideration of proposals which it and Israel agree are detrimental to the interests of Israel.

10. In view of the long-standing United States commitment to the survival and security of Israel, the United States Government will view with particular gravity threats to Israel's security or sovereignty by a world power. In support of this objective, the United States Government will in the event of such threat consult promptly

with the Government of Israel with respect to what support, diplomatic or otherwise, or assistance it can lend to Israel in accordance with its constitutional practices.

11. The United States Government and the Government of Israel will, at the earliest possible time, and if possible, within two months after the signature of this document, conclude the contingency plan for a military supply operation to Israel in an emergency situation.

12. It is the United States Government's position that Egyptian commitments under the Egypt-Israel Agreement, its implementation, validity and duration are not conditional upon any act or developments between the other Arab states and Israel. The United States Government regards the Agreement as standing on its own.

13. The United States Government shares the Israeli position that under existing political circumstances negotiations with Jordan will be directed toward an overall peace settlement.

14. In accordance with the principle of freedom of navigation on the high seas and free and unimpeded passage through and over straits connecting international waters, the United States Government regards the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb and the Strait of Gibraltar as international waterways. It will support Israel's right to free and unimpeded passage through such straits. Similarly, the United States Government recognizes Israel's right to freedom of flights over the Red Sea and such straits and will support diplomatically the exercise of that right.

15. In the event that the United Nations Emergency Force or any other United Nations organ is withdrawn without the prior agreement of both Parties to the Egypt-Israel Agreement and the United States before this Agreement is superseded by another agreement, it is the United States view that the Agreement shall remain binding in all its parts.

16. The United States and Israel agree that signature of the Protocol of the Egypt-Israel

Agreement and its full entry into effect shall not take place before approval by the United States Congress of the United States role in connection with the surveillance and observation functions described in the Agreement and its Annex. The United States has informed the Government of Israel that it has obtained the Government of Egypt agreement to the above.

Yigal Allon
Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs

For the Government of Israel

Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State

For the Government of
the United States

E. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Governments of Israel and the United States on the Geneva Peace Conference

1. The Geneva Peace Conference will be reconvened at a time coordinated between the United States and Israel.

2. The United States will continue to adhere to its present policy with respect to the Palestine Liberation Organization, whereby it will not recognize or negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization so long as the Palestine Liberation Organization does not recognize Israel's right to exist and does not accept Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The United States Government will consult fully and seek to concert its position and strategy at the Geneva Peace Conference on this issue with the Government of Israel. Similarly, the United States will consult fully and seek to concert its position and strategy with Israel with regard to the participation of any other additional states. It is understood that the participation at a subsequent phase of the Conference of any possible additional state, group or organization will require the agreement of all the initial participants.

3. The United States will make every effort to ensure at the Conference that all the substantive negotiations will be on a bilateral basis.

4. The United States will oppose and, if necessary, vote against any initiative in the Security Council to alter adversely the terms of reference of the Geneva Peace Conference or to change Resolutions 242 and 338 in ways which are incompatible with their original purpose.

5. The United States will seek to ensure that the role of the cosponsors will be consistent with what was agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding between the United States Government and the Government of Israel of December 20, 1973.

6. The United States and Israel will concert action to assure that the Conference will be conducted in a manner consonant with the objectives of this document and with the declared purpose of the Conference, namely the advancement of a negotiated peace between Israel and each one of its neighbors.

Yigal Allon
Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs

For the Government of Israel

Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State

For the Government of
the United States

F. Assurances From the United States to Israel

On the question of military and economic assistance to Israel, the following conveyed by the U.S. to Israel augments what the Memorandum of Agreement states.

The United States is resolved to continue to maintain Israel's defensive strength through the supply of advanced types of equipment, such as the F-16 aircraft. The United States Government agrees to an early meeting to undertake a joint study of high technology and sophisticated items, including the Pershing ground-to-ground missiles with conventional warheads, with the view to giving a positive response. The U.S. Administration will submit annually for approval by the U.S. Congress a request for military and economic assistance in order to help meet Israel's economic and military needs.

G. Assurances From the United States to Egypt

1. The United States intends to make a serious effort to help bring about further negotiations between Syria and Israel, in the first instance through diplomatic channels.
2. In the event of an Israeli violation of the Agreement, the United States is prepared to consult with Egypt as to the significance of the violation and possible remedial action by the United States.
3. The United States will provide technical assistance to Egypt for the Egyptian Early Warning Station.
4. The U.S. reaffirms its policy of assisting Egypt in its economic development, the specific amount to be subject to Congressional authorization and appropriation.

H. Public Law 94-110: To Implement the Early Warning System, October 13, 1975

Joint Resolution

To implement the United States proposal for the early-warning system in Sinai.

Whereas an agreement signed on September 4, 1975, by the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel may, when it enters into force, constitute a significant step toward peace in the Middle East;

22 USC 2441
note.

Whereas the President of the United States on September 1, 1975, transmitted to the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and to the Government of Israel identical proposals for United States participation in an early-warning system, the text of which has been submitted to the Congress, providing for the assignment of no more than two hundred United States civilian personnel to carry out certain specified noncombat functions and setting forth the terms and conditions thereof;

Whereas that proposal would permit the Government of the United States to withdraw such personnel if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary; and

Whereas the implementation of the United States proposal for the early-warning system in Sinai may enhance the prospect of compliance in good faith with the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli agreements and thereby promote the cause of peace: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is authorized to implement the "United States Proposal for the Early Warning System in Sinai": *Provided, however*, That United States civilian personnel assigned to Sinai under such proposal shall be removed immediately in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between Egypt and Israel or if the Congress by concurrent resolution determines that the safety of such personnel is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary. Nothing contained in this resolution shall be construed as granting any authority to the President with respect to the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations wherein involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances which authority he would not have had in the absence of this joint resolution.

Sinai agreement.
Early-warning
system.
U.S. civilian
personnel.
22 USC 2441
note.

SEC. 2. Any concurrent resolution of the type described in the first section of this resolution which is introduced in either House of Congress shall be privileged in the same manner and to the same extent as a concurrent resolution of the type described in section 5(c) of Public Law 93-148 is privileged under section 7 of such law.

22 USC 2441
note.

SEC. 3. The United States civilian personnel participating in the early warning system in Sinai shall include only individuals who have volunteered to participate in such system.

50 USC 1544,
1546.
22 USC 2441
note.

SEC. 4. Whenever United States civilian personnel, pursuant to this resolution, participate in an early warning system, the President shall, so long as the participation of such personnel continues, submit written reports to the Congress periodically, but no less frequently than once

Reports to
Congress.
22 USC 2441
note.

Hearings;
report to
Congress.

22 USC 2441
note.

every six months, on (1) the status, scope, and anticipated duration of their participation, and (2) the feasibility of ending or reducing as soon as possible their participation by substituting nationals of other countries or by making technological changes. The appropriate committees of the Congress shall promptly hold hearings on each report of the President and report to the Congress any findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

SEC. 5. The authority contained in this joint resolution to implement the "United States Proposal for the Early Warning System in Sinai" does not signify approval of the Congress of any other agreement, understanding, or commitment made by the executive branch.

Approved October 13, 1975.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:

HOUSE REPORT No. 94-532 (Comm. on International Relations).

SENATE REPORT No. 94-415 accompanying S.J. Res. 138 (Comm. on Foreign Relations).

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 121 (1975):

Oct. 8, considered and passed House.

Oct. 9, considered and passed Senate, in lieu of S.J. Res. 138.

WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Vol. 11, No. 42:

Oct. 13, Presidential statement.

89 STAT. 573

4. Camp David Frameworks for Peace, September 17, 1978

A. Framework for Peace in the Middle East

Text of Agreements Signed September 17, 1978

A FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AGREED AT CAMP DAVID

Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Menachem Begin, Prime Minister of Israel, met with Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America, at Camp David from September 5 to September 17, 1978, and have agreed on the following framework for peace in the Middle East. They invite other parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict to adhere to it.

Preamble

The search for peace in the Middle East must be guided by the following:

—The agreed basis for a peaceful settlement of the conflict between Israel and its

neighbors is United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, in all its parts.

—After four wars during thirty years, despite intensive human efforts, the Middle East, which is the cradle of civilization and the birthplace of three great religions, does not yet enjoy the blessings of peace. The people of the Middle East yearn for peace so that the vast human and natural resources of the region can be turned to the pursuits of peace and so that this area can become a model for coexistence and cooperation among nations.

—The historic initiative of President Sadat in visiting Jerusalem and the reception accorded to him by the Parliament, government

and people of Israel, and the reciprocal visit of Prime Minister Begin to Ismailia, the peace proposals made by both leaders, as well as the warm reception of these missions by the peoples of both countries, have created an unprecedented opportunity for peace which must not be lost if this generation and future generations are to be spared the tragedies of war.

—The provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the other accepted norms of international law and legitimacy now provide accepted standards for the conduct of relations among all states.

—To achieve a relationship of peace, in the spirit of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, future negotiations between Israel and any neighbor prepared to negotiate peace and security with it, are necessary for the purpose of carrying out all the provisions and principles of Resolutions 242 and 338.

—Peace requires respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force. Progress toward that goal can accelerate movement toward a new era of reconciliation in the Middle East marked by cooperation in promoting economic development, in maintaining stability, and in assuring security.

—Security is enhanced by a relationship of peace and by cooperation between nations which enjoy normal relations. In addition, under the terms of peace treaties, the parties can, on the basis of reciprocity, agree to special security arrangements such as demilitarized zones, limited armaments areas, early warning stations, the presence of international forces, liaison, agreed measures for monitoring, and other arrangements that they agree are useful.

Framework

Taking these factors into account, the parties are determined to reach a just, comprehensive, and durable settlement of the Middle East conflict through the conclusion of peace treaties based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in all their parts. Their purpose is to achieve peace and good neigh-

borly relations. They recognize that, for peace to endure, it must involve all those who have been most deeply affected by the conflict. They therefore agree that this framework as appropriate is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis. With that objective in mind, they have agreed to proceed as follows:

A. West Bank and Gaza

1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:

(a) Egypt and Israel agree that, in order to ensure a peaceful and orderly transfer of authority, and taking into account the security concerns of all the parties, there should be transitional arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza for a period not exceeding five years. In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government. To negotiate the details of a transitional arrangement, the Government of Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations on the basis of this framework. These new arrangements should give due consideration both to the principle of self-government by the inhabitants of these territories and to the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved.

(b) Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza. The delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority

to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza. A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations. The agreement will also include arrangements for assuring internal and external security and public order. A strong local police force will be established, which may include Jordanian citizens. In addition, Israeli and Jordanian forces will participate in joint patrols and in the manning of control posts to assure the security of the borders.

(c) When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiations will take place to determine the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and its relationship with its neighbors, and to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan by the end of the transitional period. These negotiations will be conducted among Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Two separate but related committees will be convened, one committee, consisting of representatives of the four parties which will negotiate and agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and its relationship with its neighbors, and the second committee, consisting of representatives of Israel and representatives of Jordan to be joined by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, to negotiate the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into account the agreement reached on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The negotiations shall be based on all the provisions and principles of UN Security Council Resolution 242. The negotiations will resolve, among other matters, the location of the boundaries and the nature of the security arrangements. The solution from the negotiations must also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements. In this way, the Palestinians will participate in the determination of their own future through:

1) The negotiations among Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the representatives of the

inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to agree on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza and other outstanding issues by the end of the transitional period.

2) Submitting their agreement to a vote by the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza.

3) Providing for the elected representatives of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to decide how they shall govern themselves consistent with the provisions of their agreement.

4) Participating as stated above in the work of the committee negotiating the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan.

2. All necessary measures will be taken and provisions made to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transitional period and beyond. To assist in providing such security, a strong local police force will be constituted by the self-governing authority. It will be composed of inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. The police will maintain continuing liaison on internal security matters with the designated Israeli, Jordanian, and Egyptian officers.

3. During the transitional period, representatives of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the self-governing authority will constitute a continuing committee to decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern may also be dealt with by this committee.

4. Egypt and Israel will work with each other and with other interested parties to establish agreed procedures for a prompt, just and permanent implementation of the resolution of the refugee problem.

B. Egypt-Israel

1. Egypt and Israel undertake not to resort to the threat or the use of force to settle disputes. Any disputes shall be settled by peaceful means in accordance with the provisions of Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. In order to achieve peace between them, the parties agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three

months from the signing of this Framework a peace treaty between them, while inviting the other parties to the conflict to proceed simultaneously to negotiate and conclude similar peace treaties with a view to achieving a comprehensive peace in the area. The Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel will govern the peace negotiations between them. The parties will agree on the modalities and the timetable for the implementation of their obligations under the treaty.

C. Associated Principles

1. Egypt and Israel state that the principles and provisions described below should apply to peace treaties between Israel and each of its neighbors—Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

2. Signatories shall establish among themselves relationships normal to states at peace with one another. To this end, they should undertake to abide by all the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Steps to be taken in this respect include:

- (a) full recognition;
- (b) abolishing economic boycotts;
- (c) guaranteeing that under their jurisdiction the citizens of the other parties shall enjoy the protection of the due process of law.

3. Signatories should explore possibilities for economic development in the context of final peace treaties, with the objective of contributing to the atmosphere of peace, cooperation and friendship which is their common goal.

4. Claims Commissions may be established for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

5. The United States shall be invited to participate in the talks on matters related to the modalities of the implementation of the agreements and working out the timetable for the carrying out of the obligations of the parties.

6. The United Nations Security Council shall be requested to endorse the peace treaties and ensure that their provisions shall not be violated. The permanent members of the Security Council shall be requested to underwrite the peace treaties and ensure re-

spect for their provisions. They shall also be requested to conform their policies and actions with the undertakings contained in this Framework.

For the Government
of the Arab
Republic of Egypt:

A. SADAT

For the Government
of Israel:

M. BEGIN

Witnessed by:

JIMMY CARTER

Jimmy Carter, President
of the United States of America

B. Framework for a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel

FRAMEWORK FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

In order to achieve peace between them, Israel and Egypt agree to negotiate in good faith with a goal of concluding within three months of the signing of this framework a peace treaty between them.

It is agreed that:

The site of the negotiations will be under a United Nations flag at a location or locations to be mutually agreed.

All of the principles of U.N. Resolution 242 will apply in this resolution of the dispute between Israel and Egypt.

Unless otherwise mutually agreed, terms of the peace treaty will be implemented between two and three years after the peace treaty is signed.

The following matters are agreed between the parties:

(a) the full exercise of Egyptian sovereignty up to the internationally recognized border between Egypt and mandated Palestine;

(b) the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the Sinai;

(c) the use of airfields left by the Israelis near El Arish, Rafah, Ras en Naqb, and Sharm el Sheikh for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use by all nations;

(d) the right of free passage by ships of Israel through the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888 applying to all nations; the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba are international waterways to be open to all nations for unimpeded and nonsuspendable freedom of navigation and overflight;

(e) the construction of a highway between the Sinai and Jordan near Elat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage by Egypt and Jordan; and

(f) the stationing of military forces listed below.

Stationing of Forces

A. No more than one division (mechanized or infantry) of Egyptian armed forces will be stationed within an area lying approximately 50 kilometers (km) east of the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal.

B. Only United Nations forces and civil police equipped with light weapons to perform normal police functions will be stationed within an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf of Aqaba, varying in width from 20 km to 40 km.

C. In the area within 3 km east of the international border there will be Israeli limited military forces not to exceed four infantry battalions and United Nations observers.

D. Border patrol units, not to exceed three battalions, will supplement the civil police in maintaining order in the area not included above.

The exact demarcation of the above areas will be as decided during the peace negotiations.

Early warning stations may exist to insure compliance with the terms of the agreement.

United Nations forces will be stationed: (a) in part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 km of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the international border, and (b) in the Sharm el Sheikh area to ensure freedom of passage through the Strait of Tiran; and these forces will not be removed unless such removal is approved by the Security Council of the United Nations with a unanimous vote of the five permanent members.

After a peace treaty is signed, and after the interim withdrawal is complete, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel, including: full recognition, including diplomatic, economic and cultural relations; termination of economic boycotts and barriers to the free movement of goods and people; and mutual protection of citizens by the due process of law.

Interim Withdrawal

Between three months and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, all

Israeli forces will withdraw east of a line extending from a point east to El Arish to Ras Muhammad, the exact location of this line to be determined by mutual agreement.

For the Government
of the Arab
Republic of Egypt:

For the Government
of Israel:

A. SADAT

M. BEGIN

Witnessed by:

JIMMY CARTER

Jimmy Carter, President
of the United States of America

C. Letters on the Sinai Settlements

SEPTEMBER 17, 1978

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I have the honor to inform you that during two weeks after my return home I will submit a motion before Israel's Parliament (the Knesset) to decide on the following question:

If during the negotiations to conclude a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt all outstanding issues are agreed upon, "are you in favor of the removal of the Israeli settlers from the northern and southern Sinai areas or are you in favor of keeping the aforementioned settlers in those areas?"

The vote, Mr. President, on this issue will be completely free from the usual Parliamentary Party discipline to the effect that although the coalition is being now supported by 70 members out of 120, every member of the Knesset, as I believe, both on the Government and the Opposition benches will be enabled to vote in accordance with his own conscience.

Sincerely yours,

(signed)

Menachem Begin

The President
Camp David
Thurmont, Maryland

SEPTEMBER 22, 1978

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I transmit herewith a copy of a letter to me from Prime Minister Begin setting forth how he proposes to present the issue of the Sinai settlements to the Knesset for the latter's decision.

In this connection, I understand from your letter that Knesset approval to withdraw all Israeli settlers from Sinai according to a timetable within the period specified for the implementation of the peace treaty is a prerequisite to any negotiations on a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.

Sincerely,

(signed)

Jimmy Carter

Enclosure:

Letter from Prime Minister Begin (Letter at Tab A)

His Excellency

ANWAR AL-SADAT

*President of the Arab**Republic of Egypt**Cairo*

SEPTEMBER 17, 1978

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

In connection with the "Framework for a Settlement in Sinai" to be signed tonight, I would like to reaffirm the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt with respect to the settlements:

1. All Israeli settlers must be withdrawn from Sinai according to a timetable within the period specified for the implementation of the peace treaty.

2. Agreement by the Israeli Government and its constitutional institutions to this basic principle is therefore a prerequisite to starting peace negotiations for concluding a peace treaty.

3. If Israel fails to meet this commitment, the "Framework" shall be void and invalid.

Sincerely,

(signed)

Mohamed Anwar El Sadat

His Excellency JIMMY CARTER
President of the United States

SEPTEMBER 22, 1978

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

I have received your letter of September 17, 1978, describing how you intend to place the question of the future of Israeli settlements in Sinai before the Knesset for its decision.

Enclosed is a copy of President Sadat's letter to me on this subject.

Sincerely,

(signed)

Jimmy Carter

Enclosure:

Letter from President Sadat (Letter at Tab C)

His Excellency

MENACHEM BEGIN

Prim. Minister of Israel

D. Letters on Jerusalem

17 SEPTEMBER 1978

SEPTEMBER 17, 1978

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

I am writing you to reaffirm the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt with respect to Jerusalem:

1. Arab Jerusalem is an integral part of the West Bank. Legal and historical Arab rights in the City must be respected and restored.

2. Arab Jerusalem should be under Arab sovereignty.

3. The Palestinian inhabitants of Arab Jerusalem are entitled to exercise their legitimate national rights, being part of the Palestinian People in the West Bank.

4. Relevant Security Council Resolutions, particularly Resolutions 242 and 267, must be applied with regard to Jerusalem. All the measures taken by Israel to alter the status of the City are null and void and should be rescinded.

5. All peoples must have free access to the City and enjoy the free exercise of worship and the right to visit and transit to the holy places without distinction or discrimination.

6. The holy places of each faith may be placed under the administration and control of their representatives.

7. Essential functions in the City should be undivided and a joint municipal council composed of an equal number of Arab and Israeli members can supervise the carrying out of these functions. In this way, the City shall be undivided.

Sincerely,
(signed)

Mohamed Anwar El Sadat

His Excellency JIMMY CARTER
President of the United States

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

I have the honor to inform you, Mr. President, that on 28 June 1967—Israel's Parliament (The Knesset) promulgated and adopted a law to the effect: "the Government is empowered by a decree to apply the law, the jurisdiction and administration of the State to any part of Eretz Israel (land of Israel—Palestine), as stated in that decree."

On the basis of this law, the Government of Israel decreed in July 1967 that Jerusalem is one city indivisible, the Capital of the State of Israel.

Sincerely,
(signed)

Menachem Begin

The President
Camp David
Thurmont, Maryland

SEPTEMBER 22, 1978

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I have received your letter of September 17, 1978, setting forth the Egyptian position on Jerusalem. I am transmitting a copy of that letter to Prime Minister Begin for his information.

The position of the United States on Jerusalem remains as stated by Ambassador Goldberg in the United Nations General Assembly on July 14, 1967, and subsequently by Ambassador Yost in the United Nations Security Council on July 1, 1969.

Sincerely,
(signed)

Jimmy Carter

His Excellency
ANWAR AL-SADAT
President of the Arab
Republic of Egypt
Cairo

E. Letter on Implementing the Comprehensive Settlement

SEPTEMBER 17, 1978

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

In connection with the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East", I am writing you this letter to inform you of the position of the Arab Republic of Egypt, with respect to the implementation of the comprehensive settlement.

To ensure the implementation of the provisions related to the West Bank and Gaza and in order to safeguard the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, Egypt will be prepared to assume the Arab role emanating from these provisions, following consultations with Jordan and the representatives of the Palestinian people.

Sincerely,
(signed)

Mohamed Anwar El Sadat

His Excellency
JIMMY CARTER
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, DC

F. Letter on Definition of Terms

SEPTEMBER 22, 1978

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

I hereby acknowledge that you have informed me as follows:

A) In each paragraph of the Agreed Framework Document the expressions "Palestinians" or "Palestinian People" are being and will be construed and understood by you as "Palestinian Arabs."

B) In each paragraph in which the expression "West Bank" appears, it is being, and will be, understood by the Government of Israel as Judea and Samaria.

Sincerely,
(signed)
Jimmy Carter

His Excellency
MENACHEM BEGIN
Prime Minister of Israel

G. Letter on Airbases

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SEPTEMBER 28, 1978

DEAR MR. MINISTER:

The U.S. understands that, in connection with carrying out the agreements reached at Camp David, Israel intends to build two military airbases at appropriate sites in the Negev to replace the airbases at Eitam and Etzion which will be evacuated by Israel in accordance with the peace treaty to be concluded between Egypt and Israel. We also understand the special urgency and priority which Israel attaches to preparing the new bases in light of its conviction that it cannot safely leave the Sinai airbases until the new ones are operational.

I suggest that our two governments consult on the scope and costs of the two new airbases as well as on related forms of assistance which the United States might appropriately provide in light of the special problems which may be presented by carrying out such a project on an urgent basis. The President is prepared to seek the necessary Congressional approvals for such assistance as may be agreed upon by the U.S. side as a result of such consultations.

(signed)

Harold Brown

The Honorable
EZER WEIZMAN
Minister of Defense
Government of Israel

5. Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, March 26, 1979

A. Treaty of Peace Between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of the State of Israel;

PREAMBLE

Convinced of the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338;

Reaffirming their adherence to the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David," dated September 17, 1978;

Noting that the aforementioned Framework as appropriate is intended to constitute a basis for peace not only between Egypt and Israel but also between Israel and each of its other Arab neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with it on this basis;

Desiring to bring to an end the state of war between them and to establish a peace in which every state in the area can live in security;

Convinced that the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel is an important step in the search for comprehensive peace in the area and for the attainment of the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in all its aspects;

Inviting the other Arab parties to this dispute to join the peace process with Israel guided by and based on the principles of the aforementioned Framework;

Desiring as well to develop friendly relations and cooperation between themselves in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the principles of international law governing international relations in times of peace;

Agree to the following provisions in the free exercise of their sovereignty, in order to implement the "Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty Between Egypt and Israel":

ARTICLE I

1. The state of war between the Parties will be terminated and peace will be established between them upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

2. Israel will withdraw all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai behind the international boundary between Egypt and mandated Palestine, as provided in the annexed protocol (Annex I), and Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over the Sinai.

3. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal provided for in Annex I, the Parties will establish normal and friendly relations, in accordance with Article III (3).

ARTICLE II

The permanent boundary between Egypt and Israel is the recognized international boundary between Egypt and the former mandated territory of Palestine, as shown on the map at Annex II, without prejudice to the issue of the status of the Gaza Strip. The Parties recognize this boundary as inviolable. Each will respect the territorial integrity of the other, including their territorial waters and airspace.

ARTICLE III

1. The Parties will apply between them the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the

principles of international law governing relations among states in times of peace. In particular:

- a. They recognize and will respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;
- b. They recognize and will respect each other's right to live in peace within their secure and recognized boundaries;
- c. They will refrain from the threat or use of force, directly or indirectly, against each other and will settle all disputes between them by peaceful means.

2. Each Party undertakes to ensure that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory, or by any forces subject to its control or by any other forces stationed on its territory, against the population, citizens or property of the other Party. Each Party also undertakes to refrain from organizing, instigating, inciting, assisting or participating in acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, subversion or violence against the other Party, anywhere, and undertakes to ensure that perpetrators of such acts are brought to justice.

3. The Parties agree that the normal relationship established between them will include full recognition, diplomatic, economic and cultural relations, termination of economic boycotts and discriminatory barriers to the free movement of people and goods, and will guarantee the mutual enjoyment by citizens of the due process of law. The process by which they undertake to achieve such a relationship parallel to the implementation of other provisions of this Treaty is set out in the annexed protocol (Annex III).

ARTICLE IV

1. In order to provide maximum security for both Parties on the basis of reciprocity, agreed security arrangements will be established including limited force zones in Egyptian and Israeli territory, and United Nations forces and observers, described in detail as to nature and timing in Annex I, and other security arrangements the Parties may agree upon.

2. The Parties agree to the stationing of United Nations personnel in areas described in Annex I. The Parties agree not to request withdrawal of the United Nations personnel and that these personnel will not be removed unless such removal is

approved by the Security Council of the United Nations, with the affirmative vote of the five Permanent Members, unless the Parties otherwise agree.

3. A Joint Commission will be established to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty, as provided for in Annex I.

4. The security arrangements provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article may at the request of either party be reviewed and amended by mutual agreement of the Parties.

ARTICLE V

1. Ships of Israel, and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall enjoy the right of free passage through the Suez Canal and its approaches through the Gulf of Suez and the Mediterranean Sea on the basis of the Constantinople Convention of 1888, applying to all nations. Israeli nationals, vessels and cargoes, as well as persons, vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from Israel, shall be accorded non-discriminatory treatment in all matters connected with usage of the canal.

2. The Parties consider the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba to be international waterways open to all nations for unimpeded and non-suspendable freedom of navigation and overflight. The Parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

ARTICLE VI

1. This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty.

3. They further undertake to take all the necessary measures for the application in their relations of the provisions of the multilateral conventions to which they are parties, including the submission of appropriate notification to the Secretary General of the United Nations and other depositaries of such conventions.

4. The Parties undertake not to enter into any obligation in conflict with this Treaty.

5. Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.

ARTICLE VII

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Treaty shall be resolved by negotiations.

2. Any such disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations shall be resolved by conciliation or submitted to arbitration.

ARTICLE VIII

The Parties agree to establish a claims commission for the mutual settlement of all financial claims.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall enter into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty supersedes the Agreement between Egypt and Israel of September, 1975.

3. All protocols, annexes, and maps attached to this Treaty shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.

4. The Treaty shall be communicated to the Secretary General of the United Nations for registration in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

[Facsimile of signature page of Treaty as executed]

DONE at Washington, D.C. this 26th day of March, 1979, in triplicate in the English, Arabic, and Hebrew languages, each text being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

חברת פז וואשטון די. סי. פז 26 מרס 1979, 27 רביע האול 1399 ה
 מן ثلاث نسخ باللغات الانجليزية والعربية والعبرية وتعتبر جميعها متساوية
 الحجية، وفي حالة الخلاف حول التفسير فيكون النص الانجليزي هو الذي يعتد به.

נעשה בוואשינגטון, די.סי. ביום זה כ"ז באדר לשנת תשל"ט, 26 במרץ 1979, בשלושה
 עותקים בשפות האנגלית, הערבית והעברית וכל נוסח אמין במידה שווה. במקרה של הבדלי
 פרשנות, יכריע הנוסח האנגלי.


For the Government of the
 Arab Republic of Egypt:

عن حكومة
 جمهورية مصر العربية :


For the Government
 of Israel:

عن حكومة
 اسرائيل :

בשם ממשלת הרפובליקה הערבית
 של מצרים :




בשם ממשלת ישראל :



Witnessed by:

شهد التوقيع :

הועד על-ידי :



Jimmy Carter, President
 of the United States of America

جيمس كارتر، رئيس
 الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية

ג'ימי קארטר, נשיא
 ארצות הברית של אמריקה

B. Annex I—Protocol Concerning Israeli Withdrawal and Security Arrangements

Article I Concept of Withdrawal

1. Israel will complete withdrawal of all its armed forces and civilians from the Sinai not later than three years from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

2. To ensure the mutual security of the Parties, the implementation of phased withdrawal will be accompanied by the military measures and establishment of zones set out in this Annex and in Map I, hereinafter referred to as "the Zones."

3. The withdrawal from the Sinai will be accomplished in two phases:

a. The interim withdrawal behind the line from east of El Arish to Ras Muhammed as delineated on Map 2 within nine months from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

b. The final withdrawal from the Sinai behind the international boundary not later than three years from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

4. A Joint Commission will be formed immediately after the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty in order to supervise and coordinate movements and schedules during the withdrawal, and to adjust plans and timetables as necessary within the limits established by paragraph 3, above. Details relating to the Joint Commission are set out in Article IV of the attached Appendix. The Joint Commission will be dissolved upon completion of final Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.

Article II Determination of Final Lines and Zones

1. In order to provide maximum security for both Parties after the final withdrawal, the lines and the Zones delineated on Map I are to be established and organized as follows:

a. Zone A

(1) Zone A is bounded on the east by line A (red line) and on the west by the Suez Canal and the east coast of the Gulf of Suez, as shown on Map I.

(2) An Egyptian armed force of one mechanized infantry division and its military installations, and field fortifications, will be in this Zone.

(3) The main elements of that Division will consist of:

(a) Three mechanized infantry brigades.

(b) One armored brigade.

(c) Seven field artillery battalions including up to 126 artillery pieces.

(d) Seven anti-aircraft artillery battalions including individual surface-to-air missiles and up to 126 anti-aircraft guns of 37 mm and above.

(e) Up to 230 tanks.

(f) Up to 480 armored personnel vehicles of all types.

(g) Up to a total of twenty-two thousand personnel.

b. Zone B

(1) Zone B is bounded by line B (green-line) on the east and by line A (red line) on the west, as shown on Map I.

(2) Egyptian border units of four battalions equipped with light weapons and wheeled vehicles will provide security and supplement the civil police in maintaining order in Zone B. The main elements of the four Border Battalions will consist of up to a total of four thousand personnel.

(3) Land based, short range, low power, coastal warning points of the border patrol units may be established on the coast of this Zone.

(4) There will be in Zone B field fortifications and military installations for the four border battalions.

c. Zone C

(1) Zone C is bounded by line B (green line) on the west and the International Boundary and the Gulf of Aqaba on the east, as shown on Map I.

(2) Only United Nations forces and Egyptian civil police will be stationed in Zone C.

(3) The Egyptian civil police armed with light weapons will perform normal police functions within this Zone.

(4) The United Nations Force will be deployed within Zone C and perform its functions as defined in Article VI of this Annex.

(5) The United Nations Force will be stationed mainly in camps located within the following stationing areas shown on Map I, and will establish its precise locations after consultations with Egypt:

(a) In that part of the area in the Sinai lying within about 20 Km. of the Mediterranean Sea and adjacent to the International Boundary.

(b) In the Sharm el Sheikh area.

d. Zone D

(1) Zone D is bounded by line D (blue line) on the east and the international boundary on the west, as shown on Map I.

(2) In this Zone there will be an Israeli limited force of four infantry battalions, their military installations, and field fortifications, and United Nations observers.

(3) The Israeli forces in Zone D will not include tanks, artillery and anti-aircraft missiles except individual surface-to-air missiles.

(4) The main elements of the four Israeli infantry battalions will consist of up to 180 armored personnel vehicles of all types and up to a total of four thousand personnel.

2. Access across the international boundary shall only be permitted through entry check points designated by each Party and under its control. Such access shall be in accordance with laws and regulations of each country.

3. Only those field fortifications, military instal-

lations, forces, and weapons specifically permitted by this Annex shall be in the Zones.

Article III Aerial Military Regime

1. Flights of combat aircraft and reconnaissance flights of Egypt and Israel shall take place only over Zones A and D, respectively.

2. Only unarmed, non-combat aircraft of Egypt and Israel will be stationed in Zones A and D, respectively.

3. Only Egyptian unarmed transport aircraft will take off and land in Zone B and up to eight such aircraft may be maintained in Zone B. The Egyptian border units may be equipped with unarmed helicopters to perform their functions in Zone B.

4. The Egyptian civil police may be equipped with unarmed police helicopters to perform normal police functions in Zone C.

5. Only civilian airfields may be built in the Zones.

6. Without prejudice to the provisions of this Treaty, only those military aerial activities specifically permitted by this Annex shall be allowed in the Zones and the airspace above their territorial waters.

Article IV Naval Regime

1. Egypt and Israel may base and operate naval vessels along the coasts of Zones A and D, respectively.

2. Egyptian coast guard boats, lightly armed, may be stationed and operate in the territorial waters of Zone B to assist the border units in performing their functions in this Zone.

3. Egyptian civil police equipped with light boats, lightly armed, shall perform normal police functions within the territorial waters of Zone C.

4. Nothing in this Annex shall be considered as derogating from the right of innocent passage of the naval vessels of either party.

5. Only civilian maritime ports and installations may be built in the Zones.

6. Without prejudice to the provisions of this Treaty, only those naval activities specifically permitted by this Annex shall be allowed in the Zones and in their territorial waters.

Article V Early Warning Systems

Egypt and Israel may establish and operate early warning systems only in Zones A and D respectively.

Article VI United Nations Operations

1. The Parties will request the United Nations to provide forces and observers to supervise the implementation of this Annex and employ their best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms.

2. With respect to these United Nations forces and observers, as appropriate, the Parties agree to request the following arrangements:

- a. Operation of check points, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts along the international boundary and line B, and within Zone C.
- b. Periodic verification of the implementation of the provisions of this Annex will be carried out not less than twice a month unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.
- c. Additional verifications within 48 hours after the receipt of a request from either Party.
- d. Ensuring the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran in accordance with Article V of the Treaty of Peace.

3. The arrangements described in this article for each zone will be implemented in Zones A, B, and C by the United Nations Force and in Zone D by the United Nations Observers.

4. United Nations verification teams shall be accompanied by liaison officers of the respective Party.

Article VIII Respect for War Memorials

Each Party undertakes to preserve in good condition the War Memorials erected in the memory of soldiers of the other Party, namely those erected by Israel in the Sinai and those to be erected by Egypt in Israel, and shall permit access to such monuments.

5. The United Nations Force and observers will report their findings to both Parties.

6. The United Nations Force and Observers operating in the Zones will enjoy freedom of movement and other facilities necessary for the performance of their tasks.

7. The United Nations Force and Observers are not empowered to authorize the crossing of the international boundary.

8. The Parties shall agree on the nations from which the United Nations Force and Observers will be drawn. They will be drawn from nations other than those which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council.

9. The Parties agree that the United Nations should make those command arrangements that will best assure the effective implementation of its responsibilities.

Article VII Liaison System

1. Upon dissolution of the Joint Commission, a liaison system between the Parties will be established. This liaison system is intended to provide an effective method to assess progress in the implementation of obligations under the present Annex and to resolve any problem that may arise in the course of implementation, and refer other unresolved matters to the higher military authorities of the two countries respectively for consideration. It is also intended to prevent situations resulting from errors or misinterpretation on the part of either Party.

2. An Egyptian liaison office will be established in the city of El-Arish and an Israeli liaison office will be established in the city of Beer-Sheba. Each office will be headed by an officer of the respective country, and assisted by a number of officers.

3. A direct telephone link between the two offices will be set up and also direct telephone lines with the United Nations command will be maintained by both offices.

Article IX Interim Arrangements

The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces and civilians behind the interim withdrawal line, and the conduct of the forces of the Parties and the United Nations prior to the final withdrawal, will be governed by the attached Appendix and Maps 2 and 3.

C. Appendix to Annex I—Organization of Movements in the Sinai

Article I Principles of Withdrawal

1. The withdrawal of Israeli armed forces and civilians from the Sinai will be accomplished in two phases as described in Article I of Annex I. The description and timing of the withdrawal are included in this Appendix. The Joint Commission will develop and present to the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations forces in the Middle East the details of these phases not later than one month before the initiation of each phase of withdrawal.

2. Both Parties agree on the following principles for the sequence of military movements.

a. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article IX, paragraph 2, of this Treaty, until Israeli armed forces complete withdrawal from the current J and M Lines established by the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of September 1975, hereinafter referred to as the 1975 Agreement, up to the interim withdrawal line, all military arrangements existing under that Agreement will remain in effect, except those military arrangements otherwise provided for in this Appendix.

b. As Israeli armed forces withdraw, United Nations forces will immediately enter the evacuated areas to establish interim and temporary buffer zones as shown on Maps 2 and 3, respectively, for the purpose of maintaining a separation of forces. United Nations forces' deployment will precede the movement of any other personnel into these areas.

c. Within a period of seven days after Israeli armed forces have evacuated any area located in Zone A, units of Egyptian armed forces shall deploy in accordance with the provisions of Article II of this Appendix.

d. Within a period of seven days after Israeli armed forces have evacuated any area located in Zones A or B, Egyptian border units shall deploy in accordance with the provisions of Article II of this Appendix, and will function in accordance with the provisions of Article II of Annex I.

e. Egyptian civil police will enter evacuated areas immediately after the United Nations forces to perform normal police functions.

f. Egyptian naval units shall deploy in the Gulf of Suez in accordance with the provisions of Article II of this Appendix.

g. Except those movements mentioned above, deployments of Egyptian armed forces and the activities covered in Annex I will be effected in the evacuated areas when Israeli armed forces have completed their withdrawal behind the interim withdrawal line.

Article II Subphases of the Withdrawal to the Interim Withdrawal Line

1. The withdrawal to the interim withdrawal line will be accomplished in subphases as described in this Article and as shown on Map 3. Each subphase will be completed within the indicated number of months from the date of the ex-

change of instruments of ratification of this Treaty.

- a. First subphase: within two months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the area of El Arish, including the town of El Arish and its airfield, shown as Area I on Map 3.
- b. Second subphase: within three months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the area between line M of the 1975 Agreement and line A, shown as Area II on Map 3.
- c. Third subphase: within five months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the areas east and south of Area II, shown as Area III on Map 3.
- d. Fourth subphase: within seven months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the area of El Tor-Ras El Kenisa, shown as Area IV on Map 3.
- e. Fifth subphase: Within nine months, Israeli armed forces will withdraw from the remaining areas west of the interim withdrawal line, including the areas of Santa Katrina and the areas east of the Giddi and Mitla passes, shown as Area V on Map 3, thereby completing Israeli withdrawal behind the interim withdrawal line.

2. Egyptian forces will deploy in the areas evacuated by Israeli armed forces as follows:

- a. Up to one-third of the Egyptian armed forces in the Sinai in accordance with the 1975 Agreement will deploy in the portions of Zone A lying within Area I, until the completion of interim withdrawal. Thereafter, Egyptian armed forces as described in Article II of Annex I will be deployed in Zone A up to the limits of the interim buffer zone.
- b. The Egyptian naval activity in accordance with Article IV of Annex I will commence along the coasts of Areas II, III, and IV, upon completion of the second, third, and fourth subphases, respectively.
- c. Of the Egyptian border units described in Article II of Annex I, upon completion of the first subphase one battalion will be deployed in Area I. A second battalion will be deployed in Area II upon completion of the second subphase. A third battalion will be deployed in Area III upon completion of the third subphase. The second and third

battalions mentioned above may also be deployed in any of the subsequently evacuated areas of the southern Sinai.

3. United Nations forces in Buffer Zone I of the 1975 Agreement will redeploy to enable the deployment of Egyptian forces described above upon the completion of the first subphase, but will otherwise continue to function in accordance with the provisions of that Agreement in the remainder of that zone until the completion of interim withdrawal, as indicated in Article I of this Appendix.

4. Israeli convoys may use the roads south and east of the main road junction east of El Arish to evacuate Israeli forces and equipment up to the completion of interim withdrawal. These convoys will proceed in daylight upon four hours notice to the Egyptian liaison group and United Nations forces, will be escorted by United Nations forces, and will be in accordance with schedules coordinated by the Joint Commission. An Egyptian liaison officer will accompany convoys to assure uninterrupted movement. The Joint Commission may approve other arrangements for convoys.

Article III United Nations Forces

1. The Parties shall request that United Nations forces be deployed as necessary to perform the functions described in this Appendix up to the time of completion of final Israeli withdrawal. For that purpose, the Parties agree to the redeployment of the United Nations Emergency Force.

2. United Nations forces will supervise the implementation of this Appendix and will employ their best efforts to prevent any violation of its terms.

3. When United Nations forces deploy in accordance with the provisions of Articles I and II of this Appendix, they will perform the functions of verification in limited force zones in accordance with Article VI of Annex I, and will establish check points, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts in the temporary buffer zones described in Article II above. Other functions of the United Nations forces which concern the interim buffer zone are described in Article V of this Appendix.

Article IV Joint Commission and Liaison

1. The Joint Commission referred to in Article IV of this Treaty will function from the date of exchange of instruments of ratification of this Treaty up to the date of completion of final Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.

2. The Joint Commission will be composed of representatives of each Party headed by senior officers. This Commission shall invite a representative of the United Nations when discussing subjects concerning the United Nations, or when either Party requests United Nations presence. Decisions of the Joint Commission will be reached by agreement of Egypt and Israel.

3. The Joint Commission will supervise the implementation of the arrangements described in Annex I and this Appendix. To this end, and by agreement of both Parties, it will:

- a. coordinate military movements described in this Appendix and supervise their implementation;
- b. address and seek to resolve any problem arising out of the implementation of Annex I and this Appendix, and discuss any violations reported by the United Nations Force and Observers and refer to the Governments of Egypt and Israel any unresolved problems;
- c. assist the United Nations Force and Observers in the execution of their mandates, and deal with the timetables of the periodic verifications when referred to it by the Parties as provided for in Annex I and in this Appendix;
- d. organize the demarcation of the international boundary and all lines and zones described in Annex I and this Appendix;
- e. supervise the handing over of the main installations in the Sinai from Israel to Egypt;
- f. agree on necessary arrangements for finding and returning missing bodies of Egyptian and Israeli soldiers;
- g. organize the setting up and operation of entry check points along the El Arish-Ras Muhammed line in accordance with the provisions of Article 4 of Annex III;
- h. conduct its operations through the use of

joint liaison teams consisting of one Israeli representative and one Egyptian representative, provided from a standing Liaison Group, which will conduct activities as directed by the Joint Commission;

i. provide liaison and coordination to the United Nations command implementing provisions of the Treaty, and, through the joint liaison teams, maintain local coordination and cooperation with the United Nations Force stationed in specific areas or United Nations Observers monitoring specific areas for any assistance as needed;

j. discuss any other matters which the Parties by agreement may place before it.

4. Meetings of the Joint Commission shall be held at least once a month. In the event that either Party or the Command of the United Nations Force requests a special meeting, it will be convened within 24 hours.

5. The Joint Commission will meet in the buffer zone until the completion of the interim withdrawal and in El Arish and Beer-Sheba alternately afterwards. The first meeting will be held not later than two weeks after the entry into force of this Treaty.

Article V Definition of the Interim Buffer Zone and Its Activities

1. An interim buffer zone, by which the United Nations Force will effect a separation of Egyptian and Israeli elements, will be established west of and adjacent to the interim withdrawal line as shown on Map 2 after implementation of Israeli withdrawal and deployment behind the interim withdrawal line. Egyptian civil police equipped with light weapons will perform normal police functions within this zone.

2. The United Nations Force will operate check points, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts within the interim buffer zone in order to ensure compliance with the terms of this Article.

3. In accordance with arrangements agreed upon by both Parties and to be coordinated by the Joint Commission, Israeli personnel will operate

military technical installations at four specific locations shown on Map 2 and designated as T1 (map central coordinate 57163940), T2 (map central coordinate 59351541), T3 (map central coordinate 59331527), and T4 (map central coordinate 61130979) under the following principles:

a. The technical installations shall be manned by technical and administrative personnel equipped with small arms required for their protection (revolvers, rifles, sub-machine guns, light machine guns, hand grenades, and ammunition), as follows:

T1-up to 150 personnel

T2 and T3-up to 350 personnel

T4-up to 200 personnel.

b. Israeli personnel will not carry weapons outside the sites, except officers who may carry personal weapons.

c. Only a third party agreed to by Egypt and Israel will enter and conduct inspections within the perimeters of technical installations in the buffer zone. The third party will conduct inspections in a random manner at least once a month. The inspections will verify the nature of the operation of the installations and the weapons and personnel therein. The third party will immediately report to the Parties any divergence from an installation's visual and electronic surveillance or communications role.

d. Supply of the installations, visits for technical and administrative purposes, and replacement of personnel and equipment situated in the sites, may occur uninterruptedly from the United Nations check points to the perimeter of the technical installations, after checking and being escorted by only the United Nations forces.

e. Israel will be permitted to introduce into its technical installations items required for the proper functioning of the installations and personnel.

f. As determined by the Joint Commission, Israel will be permitted to:

(1) Maintain in its installations fire-fighting and general maintenance equipment as well as wheeled administrative vehicles and mobile engineering equipment necessary for the maintenance

of the sites. All vehicles shall be unarmed.

(2) Within the sites and in the buffer zone, maintain roads, water lines, and communications cables which serve the sites. At each of the three installation locations (T1, T2 and T3, and T4), this maintenance may be performed with up to two unarmed wheeled vehicles and by up to twelve unarmed personnel with only necessary equipment, including heavy engineering equipment if needed. This maintenance may be performed three times a week, except for special problems, and only after giving the United Nations four hours notice. The teams will be escorted by the United Nations.

g. Movement to and from the technical installations will take place only during daylight hours. Access to, and exit from, the technical installations shall be as follows:

(1) T1: through a United Nations check point, and via the road between Abu Aweigila and the intersection of the Abu Aweigila road and the Gebel Libni road (at Km. 161), as shown on Map 2.

(2) T2 and T3: through a United Nations checkpoint and via the road constructed across the buffer zone to Gebel Katrina, as shown on Map 2.

(3) T2, T3, and T4: via helicopters flying within a corridor at the times, and according to a flight profile, agreed to by the Joint Commission. The helicopters will be checked by the United Nations Force at landing sites outside the perimeter of the installations.

h. Israel will inform the United Nations Force at least one hour in advance of each intended movement to and from the installations.

i. Israel shall be entitled to evacuate sick and wounded and summon medical experts and medical teams at any time after giving immediate notice to the United Nations Force.

4. The details of the above principles and all other matters in this Article requiring coordination by the Parties will be handled by the Joint Commission.

5. These technical installations will be withdrawn when Israeli forces withdraw from the interim withdrawal line, or at a time agreed by the Parties.

Article VI

Disposition of Installations and Military Barriers

Disposition of installations and military barriers will be determined by the Parties in accordance with the following guidelines:

1. Up to three weeks before Israeli withdrawal from any area, the Joint Commission will arrange for Israeli and Egyptian liaison and technical teams to conduct a joint inspection of all appropriate installations to agree upon condition of structures and articles which will be transferred to Egyptian control and to arrange for such transfer. Israel will declare, at that time, its plans for disposition of installations and articles within the installations.

2. Israel undertakes to transfer to Egypt all agreed infrastructure, utilities, and installations intact, inter alia, airfields, roads, pumping stations, and ports. Israel will present to Egypt the information necessary for the maintenance and operation of these facilities. Egyptian technical teams will be permitted to observe and familiarize themselves with the operation of these facilities for a period of up to two weeks prior to transfer.

3. When Israel relinquishes Israeli military water points near El Arish and El Tor, Egyptian technical teams will assume control of those installations and ancillary equipment in accordance with an orderly transfer process arranged beforehand by the Joint Commission. Egypt undertakes to continue to make available at all water supply points the normal quantity of currently available water up to the time Israel withdraws behind the international boundary, unless otherwise agreed in the Joint Commission.

4. Israel will make its best effort to remove or destroy all military barriers, including obstacles and minefields, in the areas and adjacent waters from which it withdraws, according to the following concept:

a. Military barriers will be cleared first from areas near populations, roads, and major installations and utilities.

b. For those obstacles and minefields which cannot be removed or destroyed prior to Israeli withdrawal, Israel will provide detailed maps to Egypt and the United Nations through the Joint Commission not later than 15 days before entry of United Nations forces into the affected areas.

c. Egyptian military engineers will enter those areas after United Nations forces enter to conduct barrier clearance operations in accordance with Egyptian plans to be submitted prior to implementation.

Article VII

Surveillance Activities

1. Aerial surveillance activities during the withdrawal will be carried out as follows:

a. Both Parties request the United States to continue airborne surveillance flights in accordance with previous agreements until the completion of final Israeli withdrawal.

b. Flight profiles will cover the Limited Forces Zones to monitor the limitations on forces and armaments, and to determine that Israeli armed forces have withdrawn from the areas described in Article II of Annex I, Article II of this Appendix, and Maps 2 and 3, and that these forces thereafter remain behind their lines. Special inspection flights may be flown at the request of either Party or of the United Nations.

c. Only the main elements in the military organizations of each Party, as described in Annex I and in this Appendix, will be reported.


2. Both Parties request the United States operated Sinai Field Mission to continue its operations in accordance with previous agreements until completion of the Israeli withdrawal from the area east of the Giddi and Mitla Passes. Thereafter, the Mission will be terminated.

Article VIII

Exercise of Egyptian Sovereignty


Egypt will resume the exercise of its full sovereignty over evacuated parts of the Sinai upon Israeli withdrawal as provided for in Article I of this Treaty.

D. Annex II—Maps



Sinai Peninsula


MAP 2




Representation of original map included in treaty.

Sinai Peninsula

MAP 3



Sinai Peninsula

Representation of original map included in treaty.

E. Annex III—Protocol Concerning Relations of the Parties

Article 1 Diplomatic and Consular Relations

The Parties agree to establish diplomatic and consular relations and to exchange ambassadors upon completion of the interim withdrawal.

Article 2 Economic and Trade Relations

1. The Parties agree to remove all discriminatory barriers to normal economic relations and to terminate economic boycotts of each other upon completion of the interim withdrawal.

2. As soon as possible, and not later than six months after the completion of the interim withdrawal, the Parties will enter negotiations with a view to concluding an agreement on trade and commerce for the purpose of promoting beneficial economic relations.

Article 3 Cultural Relations

1. The Parties agree to establish normal cultural relations following completion of the interim withdrawal.

2. They agree on the desirability of cultural exchanges in all fields, and shall, as soon as possible and not later than six months after completion of the interim withdrawal, enter into negotiations with a view to concluding a cultural agreement for this purpose.

Article 4 Freedom of Movement

1. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal, each Party will permit the free movement of the nationals and vehicles of the other into and within its territory according to the general rules applicable to nationals and vehicles of other states. Neither Party will impose discriminatory restrictions on the

free movement of persons and vehicles from its territory to the territory of the other.

2. Mutual unimpeded access to places of religious and historical significance will be provided on a nondiscriminatory basis.

Article 5 Cooperation for Development and Good Neighborly Relations

1. The Parties recognize a mutuality of interest in good neighborly relations and agree to consider means to promote such relations.

2. The Parties will cooperate in promoting peace, stability and development in their region. Each agrees to consider proposals the other may wish to make to this end.

3. The Parties shall seek to foster mutual understanding and tolerance and will, accordingly, abstain from hostile propaganda against each other.

Article 6 Transportation and Telecommunications

1. The Parties recognize as applicable to each other the rights, privileges and obligations provided for by the aviation agreements to which they are both party, particularly by the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 1944 ("The Chicago Convention") and the International Air Services Transit Agreement, 1944.

2. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal any declaration of national emergency by a party under Article 89 of the Chicago Convention will not be applied to the other party on a discriminatory basis.

3. Egypt agrees that the use of airfields left by Israel near El Arish, Rafah, Ras El Nagb and Sharm El Sheikh shall be for civilian purposes only, including possible commercial use by all nations.

4. As soon as possible and not later than six months after the completion of the interim withdrawal, the Parties shall enter into negotiations for the purpose of concluding a civil aviation agreement.

5. The Parties will reopen and maintain roads and railways between their countries and will consider further road and rail links. The Parties further agree that a highway will be constructed and maintained between Egypt, Israel and Jordan near Eilat with guaranteed free and peaceful passage of persons, vehicles and goods between Egypt and Jordan, without prejudice to their sovereignty over that part of the highway which falls within their respective territory.

6. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal, normal postal, telephone, telex, data facsimile, wireless and cable communications and television relay services by cable, radio and satellite shall be established between the two Parties in accordance with all relevant international conventions and regulations.

7. Upon completion of the interim withdrawal, each Party shall grant normal access to its ports for vessels and cargoes of the other, as well as vessels and cargoes destined for or coming from the other.

Such access shall be granted on the same conditions generally applicable to vessels and cargoes of other nations. Article 5 of the Treaty of Peace will be implemented upon the exchange of instruments of ratification of the aforementioned Treaty.

Article 7 **Enjoyment of Human Rights**

The Parties affirm their commitment to respect and observe human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and they will promote these rights and freedoms in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

Article 8 **Territorial Seas**

Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 5 of the Treaty of Peace each Party recognizes the right of the vessels of the other Party to innocent passage through its territorial sea in accordance with the rules of international law.

F. Agreed Minutes

ARTICLE I

Egypt's resumption of the exercise of full sovereignty over the Sinai provided for in paragraph 2 of Article I shall occur with regard to each area upon Israel's withdrawal from that area.

ARTICLE IV

It is agreed between the parties that the review provided for in Article IV(4) will be undertaken when requested by either party, commencing within three months of such a request, but that any amendment can be made only with the mutual agreement of both parties.

ARTICLE V

The second sentence of paragraph 2 of Article V shall not be construed as limiting the first sentence of that paragraph. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the second sentence of paragraph 2 of Article V, which reads as follows:

"The parties will respect each other's right to navigation and overflight for access to either country through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba."

ARTICLE VI(2)

The provisions of Article VI shall not be construed in contradiction to the provisions of the framework for peace in the Middle East agreed at Camp David. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the provisions of Article VI(2) of the Treaty, which reads as follows:

"The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty."

ARTICLE VI(5)

It is agreed by the Parties that there is no assertion that this Treaty prevails over other Treaties or agreements or that other Treaties or agreements prevail over this Treaty. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the provisions of Article VI(5) of the Treaty, which reads as follows:

"Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented."

ANNEX I

Article VI, Paragraph 8, of Annex I provides as follows:

"The Parties shall agree on the nations from which the United Nations force and observers will be drawn. They will be drawn from nations other than those which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council."

The Parties have agreed as follows:

"With respect to the provisions of paragraph 8, Article VI, of Annex I, if no agreement is reached between the Parties, they will accept or support a U.S. proposal concerning the composition of the United Nations force and observers."

ANNEX III

The Treaty of Peace and Annex III thereto provide for establishing normal economic relations between the Parties. In accordance therewith, it is agreed that such relations will include normal commercial sales of oil by Egypt to Israel, and that Israel shall be fully entitled to make bids for

Egyptian-origin oil not needed for Egyptian domestic oil consumption, and Egypt and its oil concessionaires will entertain bids made by Israel, on the same basis and terms as apply to other bidders for such oil.

For the Government
of Israel:
M. BEGIN

For the Government of the
Arab Republic of Egypt:
A. SADAT

G. Letter on West Bank/Gaza Negotiations

JOINT LETTER TO PRESIDENT CARTER FROM PRESIDENT SADAT AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN

March 26, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

This letter confirms that Egypt and Israel have agreed as follows:

The Governments of Egypt and Israel recall that they concluded at Camp David and signed at the White House on September 17, 1978, the annexed documents entitled "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David" and "Framework for the conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel."

For the purpose of achieving a comprehensive peace settlement in accordance with the above-mentioned Frameworks, Egypt and Israel will proceed with the implementation of those provisions relating to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. They have agreed to start negotiations within a month after the exchange of the instruments of ratification of the Peace Treaty. In accordance with the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East," the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is invited to join the negotiations. The Delegations of Egypt and Jordan may include Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The purpose of the negotiation shall be to agree, prior to the elections, on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority (administrative council), define its powers and responsibilities, and agree upon other related issues. In the event Jordan decides not to take part in the negotiations, the negotiations will be held by Egypt and Israel.

The two Governments agree to negotiate continuously and in good faith to conclude these

negotiations at the earliest possible date. They also agree that the objective of the negotiations is the establishment of the self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza in order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants.

Egypt and Israel set for themselves the goal of completing the negotiations within one year so that elections will be held as expeditiously as possible after agreement has been reached between the parties. The self-governing authority referred to in the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" will be established and inaugurated within one month after it has been elected, at which time the transitional period of five years will begin. The Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn, to be replaced by the self-governing authority, as specified in the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East." A withdrawal of Israeli armed forces will then take place and there will be a redeployment of the remaining Israeli forces into specified security locations.

This letter also confirms our understanding that the United States Government will participate fully in all stages of negotiations.

Sincerely yours,

For the Government
of Israel:

M. BEGIN

Menachem Begin

For the Government of the
Arab Republic of Egypt:

A. SADAT

Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat

The President,
The White House

Explanatory Note

President Carter, upon receipt of the Joint Letter to him from President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, has added to the American and Israeli copies the notation: "I have been informed that the expression 'West Bank' is understood by the Government of Israel to mean 'Judea and Samaria'." This notation is in accordance with similar procedures established at Camp David.

H. Letters Regarding Exchange of Ambassadors

March 26, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

In response to your request, I can confirm that, within one month after the completion of Israel's withdrawal to the interim line as provided for in the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, Egypt will send a resident ambassador to Israel and will receive a resident Israeli ambassador in Egypt.

Sincerely,

A. SADAT

Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat

The President,
The White House

March 26, 1979

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have received a letter from President Sadat that, within one month after Israel completes its withdrawal to the interim line in Sinai, as provided for in the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, Egypt will send a resident ambassador to Israel and will receive in Egypt a resident Israeli ambassador.

I would be grateful if you will confirm that this procedure will be agreeable to the Government of Israel.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

Jimmy Carter

His Excellency
Menachem Begin,
*Prime Minister of the
State of Israel*

March 26, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

I am pleased to be able to confirm that the Government of Israel is agreeable to the procedure set out in your letter of March 26, 1979 in which you state:

"I have received a letter from President Sadat that, within one month after Israel completes its withdrawal to the interim line in Sinai, as provided for in the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, Egypt will send a resident ambassador to Israel and will receive in Egypt a resident Israeli ambassador."

Sincerely,

M. BEGIN

Manachem Begin

The President,
The White House

I. Letters Concerning Treaty Violations**LETTERS FROM PRESIDENT CARTER TO PRESIDENT
SADAT AND PRIME MINISTER BEGIN**

March 26, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

I wish to confirm to you that subject to United States Constitutional processes:

In the event of an actual or threatened violation of the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel, the United States will, on request of one or both of the Parties, consult with the Parties with respect thereto and will take such other action as it may deem appropriate and helpful to achieve compliance with the Treaty.

The United States will conduct aerial monitoring as requested by the Parties pursuant to Annex I of the Treaty.

The United States believes the Treaty provision for permanent stationing of United Nations personnel in the designated limited force zone can and should be implemented by the United Nations Security Council. The United States will exert its utmost efforts to obtain the requisite action by the Security Council. If the Security Council fails to establish and maintain the arrangements called for in the Treaty, the President will be prepared to take those steps necessary to ensure the establishment and maintenance of an acceptable alternative multinational force.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER
Jimmy Carter

His Excellency

Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat,
*President of the Arab
Republic of Egypt*

March 26, 1979

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I wish to confirm to you that subject to United States Constitutional processes:

In the event of an actual or threatened violation of the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt, the United States will, on request of one or both of the Parties, consult with the Parties with respect thereto and will take such other action as it may deem appropriate and helpful to achieve compliance with the Treaty.

The United States will conduct aerial monitoring as requested by the Parties pursuant to Annex I of the Treaty.

The United States believes the Treaty provision for permanent stationing of United Nations personnel in the designated limited force zone can and should be implemented by the United Nations Security Council. The United States will exert its utmost efforts to obtain the requisite action by the Security Council. If the Security Council fails to establish and maintain the arrangements called for in the Treaty, the President will be prepared to take those steps necessary to ensure the establishment and maintenance of an acceptable alternative multinational force.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER
Jimmy Carter

His Excellency

Menachem Begin,
*Prime Minister of the
State of Israel*

J. Letter on Agreed Minutes

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

His Excellency
Mustafa Khalil,
Prime Minister of the
Arab Republic of Egypt.

Dear Mustafa:

I am writing this to follow up our discussions on March 13 at the Cairo airport concerning the Agreed Minutes to Articles VI(2) and VI(5) of the Treaty of Peace. Those Agreed Minutes are as follows:

ARTICLE VI(2)

The provisions of Article VI shall not be construed in contradiction to the provisions of the Framework for Peace in the Middle East Agreed at Camp David. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the provisions of Article VI(2) of the Treaty, which reads as follows:

The Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty.

ARTICLE VI(5)

It is agreed by the Parties that there is no assertion that this Treaty prevails over other treaties or agreements or that other treaties or agreements prevail over this Treaty. The foregoing is not to be construed as contravening the provisions of Article VI(5) of the Treaty, which reads as follows:

Subject to Article 103 of the United Nations Charter, in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Parties under the present Treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this Treaty will be binding and implemented.

This will confirm that in my opinion these Agreed Minutes to Articles VI(2) and VI(5) are interpretations of those Articles.

Sincerely yours,

K. Letter on Legal Status of Defense Pacts

THE LEGAL ADVISER

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON


March 26, 1979

Dear Meir:

You asked about the status of the draft legal opinion from me to the Secretary of State concerning interpretation of Article VI of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty, and the draft letter from the U.S. to Israel, both of which had been given consideration in connection with discussions of the relation of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty to existing defense pacts.

Neither of those drafts was ever made final. Both have now been abandoned. Accordingly, neither has any standing or significance whatever.

Sincerely,



Herbert J. Hansell

The Honorable
Meir Rosenne,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

L. Letter on War Memorials



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D C. 20520

March 26, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

FROM: Jock Covey

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'JC' or 'Jock Covey'.

It is my understanding that it has been agreed between General Tamir and Ambassador Magdoub that the details of Article VIII of Annex I, including the exchange of lists of war memorials erected in the Sinai by Israel, or to be erected in Israel by Egypt, will be dealt with in the Joint Commission.

cc: Ambassador Taha Magdoub
General Avraham Tamir

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'A. Tamir'.

M. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Governments of the United States
of America and the State of Israel

Recognizing the significance of the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt and considering the importance of full implementation of the Treaty of Peace to Israel's security interests and the contribution of the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace to the security and development of Israel as well as its significance to peace and stability in the region and to the maintenance of international peace and security; and

Recognizing that the withdrawal from Sinai imposes additional heavy security, military and economic burdens on Israel;

The Governments of the United States of America and of the State of Israel, subject to their constitutional processes and applicable law, confirm as follows:

1. In the light of the role of the United States in achieving the Treaty of Peace and the parties' desire that the United States continue its supportive efforts, the United States will take appropriate measures to promote full observance of the Treaty of Peace.

2. Should it be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the United States that there has been a violation or threat of violation of the Treaty of Peace, the United States will consult with the parties with regard to measures to halt or prevent the violation, ensure observance of the Treaty of Peace, enhance friendly and peaceful relations between the parties and promote peace in the region, and will take such remedial measures as it deems appropriate, which may include diplomatic, economic and military measures as described below.

3. The United States will provide support it deems appropriate for proper actions taken by Israel in response to such demonstrated violations of the Treaty of Peace. In particular, if a violation of the Treaty of Peace is deemed to threaten the security of Israel, including, inter alia, a blockade of Israel's use of international waterways, a violation of the provisions of the Treaty of Peace concerning limitation of forces or an armed attack against Israel, the United States will be prepared to consider, on an urgent basis, such measures as the strengthening of the United States presence in the area, the providing of emergency supplies to Israel, and the exercise of maritime rights in order to put an end to the violation.

4. The United States will support the parties' rights to navigation and overflight for access to either country through and over the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba pursuant to the Treaty of Peace.


5. The United States will oppose and, if necessary, vote against any action or resolution in the United Nations which in its judgment adversely affects the Treaty of Peace.


6. Subject to Congressional authorization and appropriation, the United States will endeavor to take into account and will endeavor to be responsive to military and economic assistance requirements of Israel.

7. The United States will continue to impose restrictions on weapons supplied by it to any country which prohibit their unauthorized transfer to any third party. The United States will not supply or authorize transfer of such weapons for use in an armed attack against Israel, and will take steps to prevent such unauthorized transfer.

8. Existing agreements and assurances between the United States and Israel are not terminated or altered by the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, except for those contained in Articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, and 16 of the Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of Israel (United States-Israeli Assurances) of September 1, 1975.

9. This Memorandum of Agreement sets forth the full understandings of the United States and Israel with regard to the subject matters covered between them hereby, and shall be carried out in accordance with its terms.


FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:


FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF
ISRAEL:

March 26, 1979.

N. Letter on Superseded Articles of September 1, 1975

THE LEGAL ADVISER

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

March 30, 1979

Mr. William B. Bader
Staff Director
Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations
Washington, D. C. 20510


Dear Bill:

When Roy Atherton and I discussed with you the other day the Memorandum of Agreement recently signed between the U.S. and Israel, you asked for some additional explanation of the references in paragraph 8 to various provisions of the September 1, 1975, Memorandum of Agreement.

I am enclosing another copy of the recent MOA, and also copies of the September 1, 1975, MOA and of the Peace Treaty. You will see that the various paragraphs of the 1975 MOA that are referred to in the new MOA all make reference to the 1975 disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel. Under Article IX(2) of the Peace Treaty, the Treaty supersedes the September 1975 disengagement agreement, and consequently, the provisions of the 1975 MOA that relate to the disengagement agreement are effectively terminated by the Peace Treaty. Hence, it was thought desirable that those terminated provisions should be specifically identified as such in paragraph 8 of the new MOA.

If you would like any further information on the subject, please don't hesitate to let me know.

Sincerely,



Herbert J. Hansell

O. Letter on United States Defense Assistance to Egypt

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

March 23, 1979

His Excellency
General Kamal Hassan Ali
Minister of Defense and War Production
General Commander of the Armed Forces
Arab Republic of Egypt

Dear Mr. Minister:

In the context of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the United States is prepared to enter into an expanded security relationship with Egypt with regard to the sales of military equipment and services and the financing of, at least a portion of those sales, subject to such Congressional review and approvals as may be required.

With respect to financing, the President is prepared to recommend to Congress that the United States provide military equipment and services during the next three years of a value of \$1.5 billion, with up to \$500 million annually in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits. The credits will be made available on the following terms: current interest rates, a ten-year deferment of payments on principal, and twenty years to repay the loan thereafter.

The United States is prepared in general to supply the items of equipment we discussed and which are listed in a classified attachment to this letter. In this connection, the United States agrees to dispatch teams to Egypt in the very near future to survey and discuss Egyptian needs for naval forces, air defenses, and ground force armored and other vehicles. The United States is also pleased to receive an Egyptian team in Washington in the near future to discuss the needs of the Egyptian Air Force.

Sincerely,

Harold Brown

P. Letter to Defense Minister Weizman on United States Defense Assistance to Israel

Dear Mr. Minister:

In the context of the Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel, the United States is prepared to provide extraordinary assistance in order to help Israel in relocation of Sinai military facilities to the Negev and in additional military equipment purchases, subject to such Congressional review and approvals as may be required.

With respect to financing, the President is prepared to recommend to Congress that the United States provide up to \$3 billion over a three year period for construction of two air bases in the Negev and to assist in meeting other relocation costs or equipment purchases as Israel and the United States may agree. In accordance with our agreement, \$800 million of this total of \$3 billion assistance will be in the form of grants and the remainder will be in the form of loans. This extraordinary assistance is intended to be in addition to annual FMS credits and security supporting assistance provided to Israel.

The United States is prepared to supply substantial quantities of additional military equipment to Israel for the modernization of Israeli defense forces. The agreed items are shown in a classified attachment. In addition, the United States is prepared to accelerate the delivery of F-16 aircraft to Israel so that first deliveries begin in January, 1980 rather than October 1981 as originally agreed.

To aid in the relocation of Israel's air bases from the Sinai, the United States is prepared to provide managerial, technical and financial assistance to construct two air bases in the Negev for a total of four squadrons. The United States is planning shortly to dispatch a team to Israel to negotiate a government-to-government agreement which would establish the necessary framework to manage this construction. The United States is also prepared to assist in meeting Israel's early warning requirements in connection with the Sinai withdrawal and is prepared to receive an Israeli team in Washington for discussions on this subject. Also I am prepared to send a survey team to Israel, similar to that sent earlier to assess the airfield costs, to make estimates with respect to other relocation costs to compare with your detailed cost estimates.

Further, I am prepared to enter into a memorandum of agreement with you for cooperative research and development and military procurement. The United States recognizes the high degree of proficiency in the Israeli research, development and military production communities and is prepared to enter into this agreement with Israel providing for increased R & D exchange between the two countries and for removal of barriers to competitive bidding by Israeli industry in the United States defense market.

Sincerely,

Harold Brown
Secretary of Defense

Q. Agreement Between the Government of the United States and the Government of Israel Concerning Funding of Airbase Construction

1. The Government of the United States, subject to the authorization and appropriation of funds, will provide as a grant to the Government of Israel defense articles and defense services in a total amount of \$800,000,000 to construct in Israel two airbase facilities, as provided in the agreement signed on 6 April 1979, (hereinafter: "The Airbase Agreement").
2. The Government of Israel shall fund all costs of completing the construction of the agreed airbase facilities beyond the grant of defense articles and services made available by the Government of the United States. The Government of Israel may provide the funds for which it is responsible (hereinafter: Government of Israel funds) from any source available to it, including direct credits and the proceeds of guaranteed loans available pursuant to the United States Arms Export Control Act.
3. Such Government of Israel funds will be made available in such amounts and at such times as may be required by the Government of the United States, normally quarterly in advance of the

quarter in which payments for United States obligations for the airbase construction are due. Such Government of Israel funds may be consolidated with, or credited to, the United States funds available for the defense articles and services referred to in paragraph 1 and may be administered by the Government of the United States in the same manner as it administers such United States funds.

4. In the expenditure of funds for construction of the two airbases the Government of the United States normally will first use funds available for the grant of defense articles and services in the total amount of \$800,000,000, then Government of Israel funds. In accordance with this principle the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers may execute purchase agreements with the Government of Israel to provide reimbursement when the Government of Israel contracts for articles and services for the airbase construction.

5. The Government of the United States will refund to the Government of Israel any payments made by the Government of Israel pursuant to paragraph 3 that are in excess of the final total costs incurred in the construction of the airbase facilities beyond the Government of the United States grant of defense articles and services in the amount of \$800,000,000.

6. This agreement shall come into force simultaneously with the Airbase Agreement.

Abraham S. Duffett

Date June 6, 1972

S. W. Harrison

Date April 6, 1972

R. Agreement Between the Government of Israel and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Construction of Airbase Facilities

ARTICLE 1

PURPOSE OF AGREEMENT

The purpose of this agreement is to provide for the construction of two airbases in the vicinity of Ovda and Matred as agreed to by the Government of the United States and the Government of Israel (hereinafter: "The Parties").

ARTICLE 2

FUNDING

Arrangements for funding this agreement are specified in a separate agreement between the parties, to which this agreement is subject.

ARTICLE 3

DESIGNATED AGENCIES AND PROGRAM MANAGER

3.1 For the purpose of implementing this agreement, the United States Department of Defense (hereinafter: "DOD") is the designated agency of the Government of the United States and the Ministry of Defense of Israel (hereinafter: "MOD") is the designated agency of the Government of Israel.

3.2 Each designated agency will identify a responsible official within the designated agency, who will have the authority and responsibility necessary for the purpose of facilitating cooperation between the parties in carrying out this agreement, providing necessary liaison, and promoting the swift resolution of any differences which may arise.

3.3 The responsible DOD official shall be identified as the Program Manager and shall carry out his responsibilities hereunder under the general policy direction of the Chief of the United States Diplomatic Mission to Israel.

ARTICLE 4

PLAN OF WORK

4.1 The designated agencies will agree on a plan (hereinafter: "The Plan") specifying:

- A. Scope of construction of the two airbases (hereinafter: "The Work")
- B. Criteria and design
- C. Time sequence schedules

- D. Cost estimates
- E. Work breakdown structure for management and budget and quality control
- F. Procedures for cooperation between the designated agencies in the execution of the work.

4.2 The designated agencies will exert their best efforts to reach agreement on the plan within forty-five (45) days following signature of this agreement.

4.3 The work shall be divided into two categories:

- A. That part of the work required for initial operational capability (hereinafter: "IOC"), which for the purpose of this agreement shall be generally defined as the capability to operate two fighter aircraft squadrons from each base under combat conditions in accordance with Israeli Air Force (hereinafter: "IAF") doctrine and procedures; and
- B. That part of the work necessary for normal airbase operations and activities, including but not limited to recreation and community support.

The plan will include a list of facilities in order of priority of completion of construction required to meet the IOC. If the parties agree to the location of an additional squadron at either Ovda or Matred, the construction will be governed by this agreement.

4.4 Criteria and designs used by the MOD at Eitam and Etzion Airbases, adapted to conditions at Ovda and Matred, normally will be used, or other criteria and designs as mutually agreed. Any deviations from the Eitam and Etzion criteria and designs must not delay the accomplishment of IOC. For any facilities which the IAF does not require to be completed for accomplishment of IOC, including any facilities which may be removed from the original list of IOC facilities, the DOD will give primary consideration to the operational requirements of the IAF. Consistent with the requirements of the time sequence schedules, each designated agency will be afforded the opportunity to review, comment upon, and approve designs not originated by it prior to release for construction. After commencement of construction, changes

to criteria or the scope of the work adopted in the plan shall be made only in accordance with paragraph 5.8.

4.5 The time sequence schedules shall provide for completion of that part of the work required for IOC prior to the date agreed for final relocation of Israeli Forces in the Negev. Provision will be made for advance beneficial occupancy of facilities to allow the orderly relocation and operational readiness of the Israeli Forces by such date.

4.6 The cost estimate shall be prepared initially based upon the best available data and shall be updated as better data become available through the completion of designs and construction increments. The cost estimate shall be used as the budget for the project and the basis for the commitment in advance of funds to be provided by the Government of Israel.

ARTICLE 5

EXECUTION OF THE WORK

5.1 The DOD will carry out and manage the work

in accordance with the plan. Any part of the work to be performed by the MOD shall be detailed in the plan and may be performed simultaneously with the work of the DOD, subject to appropriate coordination.

5.2 The DOD is authorized to perform in Israel all acts necessary to carry out and manage the work, including funds management and administration, engineering, construction, and program management. The DOD may establish, in coordination with the MOD, such offices in Israel as it considers necessary for the purpose of performing its functions under this agreement.

5.3 The parties agree to share responsibility to assure the completion of all IOC construction prior to the date agreed for final relocation of Israeli Forces in the Negev and to update the plan in accordance with paragraph 5.8 as necessary for this purpose.

5.4 The parties agree to exert their best efforts to assure the completion of all other work per paragraph 4.3 B above within one year of the date of achieving the IOC.

5.5 The designated agencies shall provide all

items, including services, specified in this agreement in accordance with the time sequence schedules in the plan.

5.6 The DOD shall have authority to make decisions regarding the quality of construction and compliance with established criteria for the work.

The DOD will give careful consideration to all comments and recommendations of the MOD regarding quality and compliance with criteria and designs. Upon completion of a construction unit, inspection will be made by the designated agencies and the responsible contractor. Prior to certification the MOD shall be afforded the opportunity to invoke the provisions of Article 7 should it so wish. Upon certification by the DOD that a particular construction unit has been completed in accordance with the terms of the contract, responsibility for such unit shall be transferred to the MOD.

5.7 The DOD will provide the MOD, at regular intervals as agreed, reports on the status of accomplishment of the plan, including physical progress and accumulated costs by work breakdown structure.

The designated agencies shall conduct at the same interval a joint review of progress in executing the plan. The DOD will give careful consideration to all comments and recommendations of the MOD and will endeavor to implement them, consistent with the plan.

5.8 If the status of plan accomplishment or the operational requirements of the Israeli Air Force indicate the necessity or desirability of changing the plan, the DOD Program Manager and the MOD responsible official will meet for the purpose of considering possible courses of action which would not delay the accomplishment of IOC beyond the date agreed for final relocation of Israeli Forces in the Negev. Such possible courses of action will include the provision of temporary facilities pending completion of the permanent facilities and the determination by the MOD that the IAF does not require certain facilities for accomplishment of IOC. Any agreed changes will be implemented as soon as practicable, and the plan shall be modified accordingly.

ARTICLE 6

USE OF CONTRACTORS

6.1 The DOD may accomplish the work through contractors of its selection who are nationals of countries having diplomatic relations with

Israel and shall perform the work in accordance with pertinent United States laws and regulations, including DOD contracting and fiscal procedures. Should DOD perform any part of the work through Israeli contractors, it will, when feasible and when permissible under United States laws and regulations, utilize provisions of MOD procurement regulations applicable to pricing, control of costs, and other financial aspects.

6.2 Having due regard for the scarcity of resources within Israel and time limitations, DOD and its contractors will meet their personnel and materiel requirements from non-Israeli sources except as provided in this paragraph. At the request of either designated agency, in particular cases to be agreed upon between the agencies, DOD and its contractors will utilize Israeli sources. Guidelines for utilization of Israeli sources shall be agreed upon by DOD and MOD. These guidelines will be based on the criteria of availability, suitability, quality, cost, and timeliness.

ARTICLE 7

RESOLUTION OF DIFFERENCES

If any action taken by either designated agency is not satisfactory to the other, the DOD Program Manager and the MOD responsible official will consult for the purpose of resolving the problem. If the dispute cannot be resolved between the two, it may be referred for resolution by designated senior DOD and MOD officials, with the right by either party to appeal to the Secretary of Defense of the United States and the Minister of Defense of Israel. These consultation procedures shall not be permitted to delay any action required for the accomplishment of IOC prior to the date agreed for final relocation of Israeli Forces in the Negev.

ARTICLE 8OBLIGATIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

8.1 The Government of Israel will exert its best efforts to assist the Government of the United States in the fulfillment of its responsibilities under this agreement, in order to facilitate and assure the efficient, economical, and timely

implementation of this agreement.

8.2 The Government of Israel shall acquire and furnish, without cost to the Government of the United States or its contractors, and in accordance with the time sequence schedules for construction, all land, rights of way, and easements necessary for the construction of the required facilities, including land for on-site housing and other support facilities for DOD and contractor personnel and their dependents. The Government of Israel will maintain and improve, as determined to be necessary by DOD and MOD, all existing roads to and from the construction sites and support facilities, it being understood that this obligation does not include access roads which will be constructed as part of the work.

8.3 The Government of Israel shall assure the availability of adequate port and freight handling facilities for the processing, forwarding and storage of materials, equipment and supplies for the work. The Government of Israel shall ensure that such materials, equipment and supplies receive

priority and expeditious treatment. Both governments shall exert their best efforts to prevent interruption in such treatment by strikes, labor unrest, or other causes.

8.4 The Government of Israel shall establish a central authority to assist the DOD, its contractors, DOD and contractor personnel and their dependents with customs clearances, exit and entry procedures, and all other matters related to activities covered by this agreement. The Government of Israel shall honor vehicle operating licenses issued by appropriate authorities of the Government of the United States or any subdivision thereof, including the DOD, and shall waive work permit requirements for all DOD and contractor personnel.

8.5 The Government of Israel will provide to the construction sites and support facilities, without charge to the Government of the United States, in a timely fashion and in sufficient quantities, all utilities, including water, sanitation facilities, electricity, telephone and communication services.

If the Government of Israel is unable to provide sufficient water, the work will be enlarged and DOD will make necessary connections to available sources or drill for, store, and operate its own water supply. Similarly, if adequate sanitation facilities are not available, such facilities will be included in the work and DOD will arrange for and operate a liquid and solid sanitary and general waste disposal system. Electricity will also be provided by DOD if not otherwise available. MOD will advise DOD of any of these requirements in sufficient time to allow inclusion in appropriate contracts and importation of needed equipment and materials.

8.6 The Government of Israel shall exert its best efforts to ensure that materials, equipment, supplies and services, including transportation and use of port unloading facilities, purchased by the DOD or its contractors in Israel to carry out their functions under this agreement, are furnished on a priority basis and at the lowest possible price.

ARTICLE 9

SECURITY

9.1 The protection of the construction sites and the support facilities from external threats will be the responsibility of the MOD. The responsibilities for internal physical security of the construction sites and support facilities will be agreed between the DOD and the MOD. Upon any part of an airbase becoming operational, the MOD may impose additional security measures with respect to such part of the base.

9.2 In the event of hostilities, civil disturbance, or natural disaster, the Government of Israel shall use all reasonable means, including evacuation, if necessary, to assure the safety of DOD and contractor personnel and their dependents, together with the safety of their personal property.

9.3 DOD personnel will have United States security clearances equivalent to those required by the Government of Israel for MOD personnel in similar positions.

9.4 Each party will respect the other party's security regulations and will accord to the other party's classified information protection under

its own security regulations equivalent to that required by the originating party's security regulations. Distribution of classified information among persons with appropriate security clearances will be under the principle of "need to know".

9.5 DOD shall assure that contractors and their personnel are advised of all security measures applicable to them. DOD shall report to MOD any security violations which involve Israeli classified information.

ARTICLE 10

DOD ACTIVITIES

10.1 Except as provided in this agreement, the DOD shall exercise full administrative and operational control over activities at construction sites and support facilities.

10.2 For purposes of this agreement, the DOD and its contractors may operate within Israel communications systems, including radio, for communication within and without Israel. The Government of Israel shall allocate necessary frequencies.

10.3 The DOD and its contractors may operate ships and aircraft into, within, and out of Israel in connection with the implementation of this agreement. Such operations will be conducted in accordance with maritime and air traffic regulations of Israel generally applicable. The use of ports and airports by such ships and aircraft shall be free of all taxes, tolls, landing fees and other charges, except charges for actual services requested and received. In the event that the Government of Israel is unable to provide an exemption from a particular tax, fee, or similar charge, the MOD shall bear the cost involved.

10.4 The DOD and its contractors may bring into Israel nationals of the United States and third countries having diplomatic relations with Israel for employment in carrying out the work, without utilizing Israeli hiring hall procedures. The Government of Israel reserves the right, on the grounds of security and public order, to limit access to designated security areas and to refuse entry into and to require departure from Israel of specified individuals, in accordance with

Israeli law and practice. DOD and MOD shall agree on the nature of information to be provided the Government of Israel concerning the backgrounds of third country national employees in order to determine their eligibility for admission into Israel.

10.5 The Government of the United States may establish for the exclusive use of DOD and contractor personnel and their dependents those on-site support facilities which may be required for housing, health and welfare, including military postal and American or Israeli banking facilities. The MOD shall assist DOD in obtaining the approval of the Bank of Israel for the establishment of any banking facilities. The activities of such facilities shall be regulated exclusively by the DOD, which shall assure their proper use.

10.6 All salaries of DOD and contractor personnel in Israel may be paid in U.S. dollars, and DOD, its contractors and their personnel shall be exempt from restrictions on movement of currency into or out of Israel.

10.7 DOD and contractor personnel shall be exempt from the laws and regulations of the Government of Israel with respect to terms and conditions of employment, including restrictions on hours per day, hours per week, or days of the week that personnel may perform work.

ARTICLE 11

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

11.1 Within the meaning of this agreement, "DOD Personnel" means military members of the United States Armed Forces and civilian employees of the United States Department of Defense. "Dependents" of DOD personnel means members of the families of DOD personnel forming part of their households.

11.2 DOD personnel and their dependents shall be accorded privileges and immunities no less than those accorded to members of the administrative and technical staff of the United States Diplomatic Mission in Israel.

11.3 All property of the DOD and its personnel shall be immune from attachment and seizure.

The Government of Israel shall exert its best efforts to prevent attachment or seizure of any property of DOD contractors whenever such attachment or seizure is likely to impede or delay completion of the work.

11.4 A All property and services imported into or procured in Israel by the DOD or its contractors for the implementation of this agreement, including property and services imported or purchased in Israel by DOD or its contractors for the support of DOD and contractor personnel and their dependents, shall be exempt from all duties, taxes, fees, bonds, deposits, other charges, or license or registration requirements. If necessary, rebate or reimbursement may be used to give effect to these exemptions.

11.4 B Without prejudice to para 11.2 above, household goods and personal effects imported for their personal use by DOD or contractor personnel and their dependents within six months of their first arrival in Israel for permanent duty shall be entitled to the same exemptions provided in subparagraph 11.4 A above.

11.4 C Exemptions from import duties, however, shall be available only for directly imported items and shall not extend to imported items purchased from Israeli sources.

11.5 Non-military vehicles for use off the project sites or on public thoroughfares will be licensed, but without charge; military vehicles need not be licensed, but shall have appropriate identification markings. Key personnel of DOD contractors from the United States who have duties requiring the use of a motor vehicle in Israel off the project sites shall be issued the same fuel tax exemption coupons, through the United States Embassy, as are issued to Embassy personnel. Tax-free fuel for vehicles used only on the sites will be available only at the sites. Notwithstanding the foregoing, tax refunds for diesel fuel will be available regardless of where the fuel is obtained.

11.6 All personal or moveable property of DOD, its contractors, the personnel of both, and their dependents may at any time be removed from or disposed of in Israel free of any restrictions or charges, provided that the duty thereon shall be paid in the event of their sale or disposal in Israel to a person not enjoying duty-free import privileges.

11.7 The activities, income and transactions of the DOD and its contractors in Israel in connection with this agreement, including those of the service facilities established under paragraph 10.5 above, shall be exempt from all Israeli duties, taxes, fees, bonds, deposits, other charges or license or registration requirements. Notwithstanding the foregoing, corporations from third countries which are selected as DOD contractors shall be subject to Israeli corporate income taxes on their profits arising from activities in Israel under the DOD contract at a rate not to exceed 25% of such profits. If the corporate income tax rate in the home country of such a corporation is less than 25%, then the lesser rate

shall apply. If any part of Israeli income taxes on such profit is not given full tax credit in the home country of the corporation, then such part of Israeli income taxes shall be exempted or refunded by the Government of Israel. If, notwithstanding the foregoing, Israeli income taxes are found to have been included in the contract price to DOD, the MOD shall either pay such taxes directly or reimburse the DOD or the contractor, as the case may be.

11.8 The income of DOD and contractor personnel shall be exempt from all Israeli taxes, fees or other charges.

11.9 The privileges granted by this article are not available to persons normally resident within Israel or to third country corporations controlled by Israeli residents, or with respect to income derived from sources in Israel not associated with the performance of this agreement.

11.10 Administrative arrangements will be agreed between the parties establishing procedures for facilitating the obtaining of exemptions from taxes, duties, charges, and other requirements provided in this article, while preventing abuses of these privileges. The arrangements will also include reasonable limitations on the number of items imported duty free by individuals to assure that such items are imported only for their personal use.

ARTICLE 12

CLAIMS

12.1 Each party waives all claims against the other party and its personnel for damage or loss of any kind to any property owned by it and arising in connection with activities covered by this agreement. Unless covered by the compulsory liability insurance referred to in paragraph 12.4 below, the waiver of such claims by the Government of Israel also extends to DOD contractors and their personnel.

12.2 Unless otherwise provided by this agreement or covered by insurance of the MOD, claims arising out of acts or omissions of DOD personnel done in

the performance of this agreement and causing damage to third parties in Israel or territories administered by Israel shall be settled by the appropriate authorities of Israel in accordance with the laws and regulations of Israel applicable to claims arising from activities of members of the Armed Forces of Israel. Any amount paid in settlement of claims under this paragraph shall be shared equally by the two governments.

12.3 Unless otherwise provided by this agreement, claims not covered by liability insurance which arise out of acts or omissions of DOD personnel not done in the performance of this agreement, for damage to third parties in Israel or territories administered by Israel, may be submitted to the DOD for consideration under United States foreign claims settlement procedures.

12.4 The privately owned motor vehicles of DOD and contractor personnel and their dependents shall be subject to the compulsory liability insurance law of Israel. The MOD shall pay directly or reimburse the premium or other charge for such insurance for vehicles owned by the DOD or its contractors.

ARTICLE 13ENTRY INTO FORCE

13.1 This agreement shall enter into force upon signature by the parties.

13.2 This agreement shall remain in force until four years from the date of entry into force of the treaty of peace between Israel and Egypt, except that it shall continue in force beyond that time if necessary for the purpose of completing activities under it, for closing out contracts awarded pursuant to it or claims which might arise in connection with it, or for such additional periods mutually agreed by the parties.

ARTICLE 14AMENDMENT

This agreement may be amended at any time by agreement of the parties.

Ussama S. Ruff
Date April 6, 1979

S. W. [Signature]
Date 6 April 1979

S. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Government of the United States
and Israel

March 26, 1979


The oil supply arrangement of September 1, 1975, between the Governments of the United States and Israel, annexed hereto, remains in effect. A memorandum of agreement shall be agreed upon and concluded to provide an oil supply arrangement for a total of 15 years, including the 5 years provided in the September 1, 1975 arrangement.


The memorandum of agreement, including the commencement of this arrangement and pricing provisions, will be mutually agreed upon by the parties within sixty days following the entry into force of the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel.

It is the intention of the parties that prices paid by Israel for oil provided by the United States hereunder shall be comparable to world market prices current at the time of transfer, and that in any event the United States will be reimbursed by Israel for the costs incurred by the United States in providing oil to Israel hereunder.

Experts provided for in the September 1, 1975, arrangement will meet on request to discuss matters arising under this relationship.

The United States administration undertakes to seek promptly additional statutory authorization that may be necessary for full implementation of this arrangement.


For the Government of
Israel


For the Government of the
United States

ANNEX

Israel will make its own independent arrangements for oil supply to meet its requirements through normal procedures. In the event Israel is unable to secure its needs in this way, the United States Government, upon notification of this fact by the Government of Israel, will act as follows for five years, at the end of which period either side can terminate this arrangement on one-year's notice.

(a) If the oil Israel needs to meet all its normal requirements for domestic consumption is unavailable for purchase in circumstances where no quantitative restrictions exist on the ability of the United States to procure oil to meet its normal requirements, the United States Government will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel to meet all of the aforementioned normal requirements of Israel. If Israel is unable to secure the necessary means to transport such oil to Israel, the United States Government will make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport.

(b) If the oil Israel needs to meet all of its normal requirements for domestic consumption is unavailable for purchase in circumstances where quantitative restrictions through embargo or otherwise also

prevent the United States from procuring oil to meet its normal requirements, the United States Government will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel in accordance with the International Energy Agency conservation and allocation formula, as applied by the United States Government, in order to meet Israel's essential requirements. If Israel is unable to secure the necessary means to transport such oil to Israel, the United States Government will make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport.

Israeli and United States experts will meet annually or more frequently at the request of either party, to review Israel's continuing oil requirement.

T. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Governments of Israel and the United States

June 22, 1979

Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement between the Governments of the United States and Israel signed March 26, 1979, Israel and the United States have entered into the Oil Supply Arrangement set forth herein as follows:

1. Israel will make its own independent arrangements for oil supply to meet its requirements through normal procedures. In the event Israel is unable to secure its needs in this way, the United States Government, upon notification of this fact by the Government of Israel will act as follows:

- (a) If the oil Israel needs to meet all its normal domestic requirements is unavailable for purchase in circumstances where no quantitative restrictions exist on the ability of the United States to procure oil to meet its normal requirements, the United States Government will promptly make oil available for purchase

by Israel to meet the shortfall in the aforementioned normal requirements of Israel. Oil will be made available to Israel as soon as practicable after notification; the United States will make every effort to ensure this period is less than 60 days.

(b) If the oil Israel needs to meet all of its normal requirements for domestic consumption is unavailable for purchase in circumstances where quantitative restrictions through embargo or otherwise also prevent the United States from procuring oil to meet its normal requirements, the United States Government will promptly make oil available for purchase by Israel in accordance with the International Energy Agency conservation and allocation formula as applied by the United States Government, in order to meet the shortfall in Israel's essential requirements. Oil will be made available to Israel as soon as practicable after notification; the United States will make every effort to ensure this period is less than 60 days.


(c) If Israel is unable to secure the necessary means to transport to Israel oil made available pursuant to this Agreement, the United States Government will make every effort to help Israel secure the necessary means of transport.


2. Prices paid by Israel for oil provided by the United States hereunder shall be comparable to world market prices current at the time of transfer. Israel will, in any event, reimburse the United States for the costs incurred by the United States in providing oil to Israel hereunder.

3. Israeli and United States experts will meet annually or more frequently at the request of either party, to review Israel's continuing oil requirement and to develop and review any necessary contingency implementing arrangements.

4. This Memorandum of Agreement is subject to applicable United States law. The United States administration may seek additional statutory authorization that may be necessary for full implementation of this Memorandum of Agreement.

5. This Memorandum of Agreement shall enter into force on November 25, 1979 and shall terminate on November 25, 1994. The oil supply arrangement of September 1, 1975 between the Governments of Israel and the United States shall be in force during the period from the date of this Memorandum of Agreement to November 25, 1994 and shall be performed and implemented in accordance with the provisions of this Memorandum of Agreement.


For the Government of
the United States


For the Government of
Israel

June 22, 1979

In connection with the Memorandum of Agreement being entered into on this date between the Government of Israel and the Government of the United States, Israel and the United States understand that:

Because of the unique security situation of Israel its oil reserves are and should be at the level equal to six months of Israel's oil consumption; and in this connection U.S. oil supplies should be at such levels that U.S. ability to meet its oil requirements will not be adversely affected.

For the Government of
the United States

Herbert J. Hansell

For the Government of
Israel

Melchior / 2/7/79

U. United States Sinai Support Mission

Executive Order 12150. July 23, 1979

By the authority vested in me as President of the United States of America, including Chapter 6 of Part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2348, 2348a.-2348c.), Section 1(b) of Executive Order No. 11896 of January 13, 1976, is hereby amended to read:

“(b) The Mission shall, in accordance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, including Part II, Chapter 6 thereof, the Joint Resolution of October 13, 1975 (Public Law 94-110, 89 Stat. 572, 22 U.S.C. 2441 note), and the provisions of this Order, carry out the duties and responsibilities of the United States Government to implement the “United States Proposal for the Early Warning System in Sinai” in connection with the Basic Agreement between Egypt and Israel, signed on September 4, 1975, and the Annex to the Basic Agreement, as superseded by the Treaty of Peace between the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel, signed on March 26, 1979, and Article VII of the Appendix to Annex I of the Treaty of Peace, subject to broad policy guidance received through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the continuous supervision and general direction of the Secretary of State pursuant to Section 622(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2382(c)).”.

JIMMY CARTER

UNITED NATIONS

6. General Assembly Resolution 2253 on Jerusalem, July 4, 1967

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned at the situation prevailing in Jerusalem as a result of the measures taken by Israel to change the status of the City,

- 1. Considers that these measures are invalid;*
- 2. Calls upon Israel to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem;*
- 3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly and the Security Council on the situation and on the implementation of the present resolution not later than one week from its adoption.*

*1548th plenary meeting,
4 July 1967.*

7. General Assembly Resolution 2254 on Jerusalem, July 14, 1967

*The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolution 2253 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967,
Having received the report submitted by the Secretary-General,⁸*

Taking note with the deepest regret and concern of the non-compliance by Israel with resolution 2253 (ES-V),

1. Deplores the failure of Israel to implement General Assembly resolution 2253 (ES-V);

2. Reiterates its call to Israel in that resolution to rescind all measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council and the General Assembly on the situation and on the implementation of the present resolution.

*1554th plenary meeting,
14 July 1967.*

⁸ A/6753. For the printed text of this document, see *Official Records of the Security Council, Twenty-second Year, Supplement for July, August and September 1967*, document S/8052.

8. Security Council Resolution 242 for a Just and Lasting Peace,
November 22, 1967

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. *Affirms* that the fulfilment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

- (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
- (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. *Affirms further* the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area,

through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting.

9. General Assembly Resolution 2443 To Establish a Committee To Investigate Israeli Practices, December 19, 1968

The General Assembly,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Bearing in mind the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949,³⁰

Mindful of the principle embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights regarding the right of everyone to return to his own country, and recalling Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, General Assembly resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967 and 2341 B (XXII) of 19 December 1967, Commission on Human Rights resolution 6 (XXIV) of 27 February 1968³¹ and Economic and Social Council resolution 1336 (XLIV) of 31 May 1968, in which those United Nations organs called upon the Government of Israel, *inter alia*, to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the area of military operations since the outbreak of hostilities,

Recalling the telegram dispatched by the Commission on Human Rights on 8 March 1968, calling upon the Government of Israel to desist forthwith from acts of destroying homes of the Arab civilian population in areas occupied by Israel,³²

Recalling also Security Council resolution 259 (1968) of 27 September 1968, in which the Council expressed its concern for the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the Arab territories under military occupation by Israel, and deplored the delay in the implementation of Council resolution 237 (1967),

Noting resolution I on respect for and implementation of human rights in occupied territories, adopted by the International Conference on Human Rights on 7 May 1968,³³ in which the Conference, *inter alia*:

(a) Expressed its grave concern at the violation of human rights in Arab territories occupied by Israel,

(b) Drew the attention of the Government of Israel to the grave consequences resulting from the disregard of fundamental freedoms and human rights in occupied territories,

³⁰ United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 75 (1950), No. 973.

³¹ See *Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Forty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 4 (E/4475)*, chapter XVIII.

³² *Ibid.*, para. 400.

³³ See *Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.68.XIV.2), p. 5.

Palestine Refugees in the Near East to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and in serious need of immediate assistance as a result of the recent hostilities;

3. *Appeals* to all Governments and to organizations and individuals to make special contributions for the above purposes to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and to the other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations concerned.

1640th plenary meeting,
19 December 1967.

(c) Called upon the Government of Israel to desist forthwith from acts of destroying homes of the Arab civilian population inhabiting areas occupied by Israel and to respect and implement the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949³⁴ in occupied territories,

(d) Affirmed the inalienable rights of all inhabitants who have left their homes as a result of the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East to return home, resume their normal life, recover their property and homes, and rejoin their families according to the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

1. *Decides to establish a Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories*, composed of three Member States;

2. *Requests* the President of the General Assembly to appoint the members of the Special Committee;

3. *Requests* the Government of Israel to receive the Special Committee, co-operate with it and facilitate its work;

4. *Requests* the Special Committee to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arises thereafter;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Special Committee with all the necessary facilities for the performance of its task.

1748th plenary meeting,
19 December 1968.

10. General Assembly Resolution 2628, Reaffirming the Jarring Mission, November 4, 1970

The General Assembly,

Seriously concerned that the continuation of the present grave and deteriorating situation in the Middle East constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security,

Reaffirming that no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized,

Deploing the continued occupation of the Arab territories since 5 June 1967,

Seriously concerned that Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967, which was unanimously adopted and which provides for a peaceful settlement of the situation in the Middle East, has not yet been implemented,

Having considered the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East",

1. *Reaffirms* that the acquisition of territories by force is inadmissible and that, consequently, territories thus occupied must be restored;

2. *Reaffirms* that the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East should include the application of both the following principles:

(a) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(b) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and its right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

3. *Recognizes* that respect for the rights of the Palestinians is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

4. *Urges* the speedy implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which provides for the peaceful settlement of the situation in the Middle East, in all its parts;

5. *Calls upon* the parties directly concerned to instruct their representatives to resume contact with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East in order to enable him to carry out, at the earliest possible date, his mandate for the implementation of the Security Council resolution in all its parts;

6. *Recommends* to the parties that they extend the cease-fire for a period of three months in order that they may enter into talks under the auspices of the Special Representative with a view to giving effect to Security Council resolution 242 (1967);

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within a period of two months, and to the General Assembly as appropriate, on the efforts of the Special Representative and on the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967);

8. *Requests* the Security Council to consider, if necessary, making arrangements, under the relevant Articles of the Charter of the United Nations, to ensure the implementation of its resolution.

1896th plenary meeting,
4 November 1970.

11. Security Council Resolution 298 on Jerusalem, September 25, 1971

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 252(1968) of 21 May 1968 and 267(1969) of 3 July 1969 and the earlier General Assembly resolutions 2253(ES-V) and 2254(ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967 concerning measures and actions by Israel designed to change the status of the Israeli-occupied section of Jerusalem,

Having considered the letter of the Permanent Representative of Jordan on the situation in Jerusalem and the reports of the Secretary-General, and having heard the statements of the parties concerned on the question,

Reaffirming the principle that acquisition of territory by military conquest is inadmissible,

Noting with concern the non-compliance by Israel with the above-mentioned resolutions,

Noting with concern also that since the adoption of the above-mentioned resolutions Israel has taken further measures designed to change the status and character of the occupied section of Jerusalem,

- 1. Reaffirms its resolutions 252(1968) and 267(1969);*
- 2. Deplores the failure of Israel to respect the previous resolutions adopted by the United Nations concerning measures and actions by Israel purporting to affect the status of the City of Jerusalem;*
- 3. Confirms in the clearest possible terms that all legislative and administrative actions taken by Israel to change the status of the City of Jerusalem, including expropriation of land and properties, transfer of populations and legislation aimed at the incorporation of the occupied section, are totally invalid and cannot change that status;*
- 4. Urgently calls upon Israel to rescind all previous measures and actions and to take no further steps in the occupied section of Jerusalem which may purport to change the status of the City or which would prejudice the rights of the inhabitants and the interests of the international community, or a just and lasting peace;*
- 5. Requests the Secretary-General, in consultation with the President of the Security Council and using such instrumentalities as he may choose, including a representative or a mission, to report to the Council as appropriate and in any event within sixty days on the implementation of the present resolution.*

12. Security Council Resolutions 338 and 339 on Cease-Fire,
October 22-23, 1973

The Security Council

1. *Calls upon* all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

2. *Calls upon* the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

3. *Decides* that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations shall start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.

Adopted at the 1747th meeting by 14 votes to none²⁷

The Security Council,

Referring to its resolution 338 (1973) of 22 October 1973,

1. *Confirms* its decision on an immediate cessation of all kinds of firing and of all military action, and urges that the forces of the two sides be returned to the positions they occupied at the moment the cease-fire became effective;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take measures for immediate dispatch of United Nations observers to supervise the observance of the cease-fire between the forces of Israel and the Arab Republic of Egypt, using for this purpose the personnel of the United Nations now in the Middle East and first of all the personnel now in Cairo.

Adopted at the 1748th meeting by 14 votes to none²⁸

13. Security Council Resolution 340, Establishing United Nations
Emergency Force, October 25, 1973

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 338 (1973) of 22 October
and 339 (1973) of 23 October 1973.

Noting with regret the reported repeated violations
of the cease-fire in non-compliance with resolutions
338 (1973) and 339 (1973),

Noting with concern from the Secretary-General's
report²⁹ that the United Nations military observers
have not yet been enabled to place themselves on both
sides of the cease-fire line,

1. *Demands* that immediate and complete cease-
fire be observed and that the parties return to the posi-
tions occupied by them at 1650 hours GMT on 22
October 1973;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, as an imme-
diate step, to increase the number of United Nations
military observers on both sides;

3. *Decides* to set up immediately, under its author-
ity, a United Nations Emergency Force to be composed
of personnel drawn from States Members of the United
Nations except the permanent members of the Secu-
rity Council, and requests the Secretary-General to
report within 24 hours on the steps taken to this effect;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the
Council on an urgent and continuing basis on the state
of implementation of the present resolution, as well as
resolutions 338 (1973) and 339 (1973);

5. *Requests* all Member States to extend their full
co-operation to the United Nations in the implemen-
tation of the present resolution, as well as resolutions
338 (1973) and 339 (1973).

*Adopted at the 1750th meet-
ing by 14 votes to none³⁰*

14. Security Council Resolution 350, Establishing United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, May 31, 1974

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General contained in documents S/11302 and Add.1, and having heard his statement made at the 1773rd meeting of the Security Council,

1. *Welcomes the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces, negotiated in implementation of Security Council resolution 338(1973) of 22 October 1973;*

2. *Takes note of the Secretary-General's report and the annexes thereto and his statement;*

3. *Decides to set up immediately under its authority a United Nations Disengagement Observer Force, and requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to this effect in accordance with his above-mentioned report and the annexes thereto; the Force shall be established for an initial period of six months, subject to renewal by further resolution of the Security Council;*

4. *Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council fully informed of further developments.*

(99)

15. General Assembly Resolution 3210, Inviting Palestine Liberation Organization to Participate in Palestine Debate, October 14, 1974

The General Assembly,

Considering that the Palestinian people is the principal party to the question of Palestine,

Invites the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine in plenary meetings.

*2268th plenary meeting
14 October 1974*

16. General Assembly Resolution 3236 on Palestinian Rights,
November 22, 1974

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of Palestine,

Having heard the statement of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,¹⁴

Having also heard other statements made during the debate,

Deeply concerned that no just solution to the problem of Palestine has yet been achieved and recognizing that the problem of Palestine continues to endanger international peace and security,

Recognizing that the Palestinian people is entitled to self-determination in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

Expressing its grave concern that the Palestinian people has been prevented from enjoying its inalienable rights, in particular its right to self-determination,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter,

Recalling its relevant resolutions which affirm the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination,

1. *Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including:*

(a) *The right to self-determination without external interference;*

(b) *The right to national independence and sovereignty;*

2. *Reaffirms also the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return;*

3. *Emphasizes that full respect for and the realization of these inalienable rights of the Palestinian people are indispensable for the solution of the question of Palestine;*

4. *Recognizes that the Palestinian people is a principal party in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;*

5. *Further recognizes the right of the Palestinian people to regain its rights by all means in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;*

6. *Appeals to all States and international organizations to extend their support to the Palestinian people in its struggle to restore its rights, in accordance with the Charter;*

7. *Requests the Secretary-General to establish contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization on all matters concerning the question of Palestine;*

8. *Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session on the implementation of the present resolution;*

9. *Decides to include the item entitled "Question of Palestine" in the provisional agenda of its thirtieth session.*

*2296th plenary meeting
22 November 1974*

17. General Assembly Resolution 3237, Granting Observer Status to Palestine Liberation Organization, November 22, 1974

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of Palestine,

Taking into consideration the universality of the United Nations prescribed in the Charter,

Recalling its resolution 3102 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973,

Taking into account Economic and Social Council resolutions 1835 (LVI) of 14 May 1974 and 1840 (LVI) of 15 May 1974,

Noting that the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, the World Population Conference and the World Food Conference have in effect invited the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in their respective deliberations,

Noting also that the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea has invited the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in its deliberations as an observer,

1. *Invites the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer;*

2. *Invites the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the sessions and the work of all international conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer;*

3. *Considers that the Palestine Liberation Organization is entitled to participate as an observer in the sessions and the work of all international conferences convened under the auspices of other organs of the United Nations;*

4. *Requests the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps for the implementation of the present resolution.*

*2296th plenary meeting
22 November 1974*

18. General Assembly Resolution 3379, Calling Zionism a Form of Racism, November 10, 1975

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 1904(XVIII) of 20 November 1963, proclaiming the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and in particular its affirmation that "any doctrine of racial differentiation or superiority is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous" and its expression of alarm at "the manifestations of racial discrimination still in evidence in some areas in the world, some of which are imposed by certain Governments by means of legislative, administrative or other measures,"

Recalling also that, in its resolution 3151 G (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973, the General Assembly condemned, *inter alia*, the unholy alliance between South African racism and zionism,

Taking note of the Declaration of Mexico on the Equality of Women and their Contribution to Development and Peace, 1975, proclaimed by the World Conference of the International Women's Year, held at Mexico City from 19 June to 2 July 1975, which promulgated the principle that "international co-operation and peace require the achievement of national liberation and independence, the elimination of colonialism and neo-colonialism, foreign occupation, zionism, *apartheid* and racial discrimination in all its forms, as well as the recognition of the dignity of peoples and their right to self-determination,"

Taking note also of resolution 77(XII) adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity at its twelfth ordinary ses-

sion, held at Kampala from 28 July to 1 August 1975, which considered "that the racist régime in occupied Palestine and the racist régimes in Zimbabwe and South Africa have a common imperialist origin, forming a whole and having the same racist structure and being organically linked in their policy aimed at repression of the dignity and integrity of the human being,"

Taking note also of the Political Declaration and Strategy to Strengthen International Peace and Security and to Intensify Solidarity and Mutual Assistance among Non-Aligned Countries, adopted at the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, which most severely condemned zionism as a threat to world peace and security and called upon all countries to oppose this racist and imperialist ideology,

Determines that zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.

19. General Assembly Resolution 32/20, Calling for Reconvening Geneva Conference, November 25, 1977

The General Assembly,

Having discussed the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East",

Recalling its previous resolutions on the subject, in particular resolutions 3414 (XXX) of 5 December 1975 and 31/61 of 9 December 1976,

Taking into account the decisions of the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo from 16 to 19 August 1976, concerning the situation in the Middle East and the question of Palestine,

Deeply concerned that the Arab territories occupied since 1967 have continued, for more than ten years, to be under illegal Israeli occupation and that the Palestinian people, after three decades, are still deprived of the exercise of their inalienable national rights,

Reaffirming that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible and that all territories thus occupied must be returned,

Reaffirming also the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region, based on full respect for the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as for its resolutions concerning the problem of the Middle East including the question of Palestine,

Taking note with satisfaction of the joint statement on the Middle East issued on 1 October 1977 by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Secretary of State of the United States of America, in their capacities as Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East,

Reaffirming that peace is indivisible and that a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East problem must be based on a comprehensive solution, under the auspices of the United Nations, which takes into account all aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict, in particular the attainment by the Palestinian people of all their inalienable national rights and the Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Arab territories,

Convinced that the early convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East with the participation of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, in accordance with relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, is essential for the realization of a just and lasting settlement in the region,

1. Condemns Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law and repeated resolutions of the United Nations;
2. Reaffirms that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, in which all countries and peoples in the region can live in peace and security within recognized and secure boundaries, cannot be achieved without Israel's withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied since 5 June 1967 and the attainment by the Palestinian people of their inalienable national rights;
3. Calls anew for the early convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, under the auspices of the United Nations and the co-chairmanship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, with the participation on an equal footing of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization;
4. Urges the parties to the conflict and all other interested parties to work towards the achievement of a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the problems and worked out with the participation of all parties concerned within the framework of the United Nations,
5. Requests the Security Council, in the exercise of its responsibilities under the Charter, to take all necessary measures in order to ensure the implementation of relevant resolutions of the United Nations and to facilitate the achievement of such a comprehensive settlement aiming at the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region;
6. Requests the Secretary-General to follow up the implementation of the present resolution and to inform all concerned, including the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East;
7. Also requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council periodically on the development of the situation and to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-third session a comprehensive report covering, in all their aspects, the developments in the Middle East.

20. General Assembly Resolution 32/40, Excerpts, Creating Special Unit on Palestinian Rights, December 2, 1977

1. Requests the Secretary-General to establish within the Secretariat of the United Nations a Special Unit on Palestinian Rights which would:

(a) Prepare, under the guidance of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, studies and publications relating to:

- (i) The inalienable rights of the Palestinian people;
- (ii) Relevant resolutions of the General Assembly and other organs of the United Nations;
- (iii) The activities of the Committee and other United Nations organs, in order to promote the attainment of those rights

(b) Promote maximum publicity for such studies and publications through all appropriate means;

(c) Organize, in consultation with the Committee, commencing in 1978, annual observance of 29 November as the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People;

2. Further requests the Secretary-General to ensure the full co-operation of the Office of Public Information and other units of the Secretariat in enabling the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights to perform its tasks;

3. Invites all Governments and organizations to lend their co-operation to the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights in the implementation of the present resolution.

21. General Assembly Resolution 33/28 on Question of Palestine, December 7, 1978

A

The General Assembly,

Recalling and reaffirming its resolutions 3236 (XXIX) of 22 November 1974, 3375 (XXX) and 3376 (XXX) of 10 November 1975, 31/20 of 24 November 1976 and 32/40 A and B of 2 December 1977,

Having considered the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,

Having heard the statement of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,

1. Expresses its grave concern that no just solution to the problem of Palestine has been achieved and that this problem therefore continues to aggravate the Middle East conflict, of which it is the core, and to endanger international peace and security;

2. Reaffirms that a just and lasting peace in the Middle East cannot be established without the achievement, inter alia, of a just solution of the problem of Palestine on the basis of the attainment of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;

3. Calls once more for the invitation of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate, on the basis of General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX), in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East which are held under the auspices of the United Nations, on an equal footing with other parties;

4. Declares that the validity of agreements purporting to solve the problem of Palestine requires that they be within the framework of the United Nations and its Charter and its resolutions on the basis of the full attainment and exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, and with the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization;
5. Endorses the recommendations of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People as contained in paragraphs 55 to 58 of its report;
6. Expresses its regret and concern that the recommendations of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolutions 31/20 and 32/40 A have not been implemented;
7. Notes with regret that the Security Council has not taken the action it was urged to take by the General Assembly in paragraph 4 of its resolution 32/40 A;
8. Once again urges the Security Council to consider and take as soon as possible a decision on the recommendations endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolutions 31/20 and 32/40 A and in the present resolution;
9. Authorizes and requests the Committee on the Exercise and the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, in the event that the Security Council fails to consider or to take a decision on those recommendations by 1 June 1979, to consider that situation and to make the suggestions it deems appropriate;
10. Decides to include the item entitled "Question of Palestine" in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session.

B

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3376 (XXX) of 10 November 1975, 31/20 of 24 November 1976 and 32/40 A and B of 2 December 1977,

Having considered the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,

1. Expresses its appreciation to the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People for its efforts in performing the tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly;
2. Requests the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to keep the situation relating to the question of Palestine under review and to report and make suggestions to the General Assembly or to the Security Council, as may be appropriate;
3. Authorizes the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to continue to exert all efforts to promote the implementation of its recommendations, to send delegations or representatives to international conferences where such representation would be considered by it to be appropriate, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session and thereafter;
4. Requests the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, established under General Assembly resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948, to co-operate fully with the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and to make available to the Committee, at its request, the relevant information and documentation which the Commission has at its disposal;

5. Decides to circulate the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People to all the competent bodies of the United Nations and urges them to take necessary action, as appropriate, in accordance with the Committee's programme of implementation;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to provide the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People with all the necessary facilities for the performance of its tasks, including summary records of its meetings.

C

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 32/40 B of 2 December 1977,

Having considered the report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,

Noting, in particular, the information contained in paragraphs 47 to 54 of that report,

1. Takes note of the establishment, within the Secretariat of the United Nations, of a Special Unit on Palestinian Rights in accordance with paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 32/40 B;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights continues to discharge the tasks assigned to it in paragraph 1 of resolution 32/40 B in consultation with the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and under its guidance;

3. Further requests the Secretary-General to consider, in consultation with the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, the strengthening and the possible reorganization and renaming of the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights;

4. Also requests the Secretary-General to ensure the full co-operation of the Office of Public Information and other units of the Secretariat in enabling the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights to perform its tasks;

5. Invites all Governments and organizations to lend their co-operation to the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and the Special Unit on Palestinian Rights in the performance of their tasks.

22. General Assembly Resolution 33/29 on the Situation in the Middle East, December 7, 1978

The General Assembly,

Having discussed the item entitled "The situation in the Middle East",

Recalling its previous resolutions on the subject, in particular resolutions 3414 (XXX) of 5 December 1975, 31/61 of 9 December 1976, 32/20 of 25 November 1977 and 33/28 of 7 December 1978,

Taking into account the decisions of the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade from 25 to 30 July 1978, concerning the situation in the Middle East and the question of Palestine,

Deeply concerned that the Arab territories occupied since 1967 have continued, for more than eleven years, to be under illegal Israeli occupation and that the Palestinian people, after three decades, is still deprived of the exercise of its inalienable national rights,

Reaffirming that the acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible and that all territories thus occupied must be returned,

Reaffirming also the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region, based on full respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as for its resolutions concerning the problem of the Middle East including the question of Palestine,

Convinced that the early convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East with the participation of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, in accordance with relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, is essential for the realization of a just and lasting settlement in the region,

1. Condemns Israel's continued occupation of Palestinian and other Arab territories, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the principles of international law and repeated resolutions of the United Nations;
2. Declares that peace is indivisible and that a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East problem must be based on a comprehensive solution, under the auspices of the United Nations, which takes into account all aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict, in particular the attainment by the Palestinian people of all its inalienable national rights and the Israeli withdrawal from all the occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories;
3. Reaffirms that until Israel withdraws from all occupied Palestinian and other Arab territories, and until the Palestinian people attains and exercises its inalienable national rights, a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, in which all countries and peoples in the region live in peace and security within recognized and secure boundaries, will not be achieved;
4. Calls anew for the early convening of the Peace Conference on the Middle East, under the auspices of the United Nations and the co-chairmanship of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, with the participation on an equal footing of all parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3375 (XXX) of 10 November 1975;
5. Urges the parties to the conflict and all other interested parties to work towards the achievement of a comprehensive settlement covering all aspects of the problems and worked out with the participation of all parties concerned within the framework of the United Nations;
6. Requests the Security Council, in the exercise of its responsibilities under the Charter, to take all necessary measures in order to ensure the implementation of relevant resolutions of the United Nations, including General Assembly resolution 33/28 and the present resolution, and to facilitate the achievement of such a comprehensive settlement aiming at the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the region;
7. Requests the Secretary-General to follow up the implementation of the present resolution and to inform all concerned, including the Co-Chairmen of the Peace Conference on the Middle East;
8. Also requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council periodically on the development of the situation and to submit to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session a comprehensive report covering, in all their aspects, the developments in the Middle East.

23. General Assembly Resolution 33/71, Section A Excerpt, Banning Military Cooperation With Israel, December 14, 1978

Military and nuclear collaboration with Israel

The General Assembly,

Gravely concerned over the continued and rapid Israeli military build-up,

Alarmed by the increasing evidence regarding Israeli attempts to acquire nuclear weapons,

Expressing its alarm over the use by Israel of cluster bombs against refugee camps and civilian targets in southern Lebanon,

Recalling its resolutions 3263 (XXIX) of 9 December 1974, 3474 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, 31/71 of 10 December 1976 and 32/82 of 12 December 1977 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,

Recognizing that the continued escalation of Israeli armament constitutes a threat to international peace and security and underlies Israel's persistent defiance of General Assembly resolutions and its policy of expansion, occupation and denial of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people,

Further recalling its repeated condemnations of the intensification of military collaboration between Israel and South Africa and its resolution 32/105 F of 14 December 1977, entitled "Military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa",

1. Calls upon all States to co-operate fully in effective international action, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to avert this grave menace to international peace and security;
2. Requests the Security Council, in particular, to call upon all States, ~~under~~ Chapter VII of the Charter and irrespective of any existing contracts:
 - (a) To refrain from any supply of arms, ammunition, military equipment or vehicles, or spare parts therefor, to Israel, without any exception;
 - (b) To ensure that such supplies do not reach Israel through other parties;
 - (c) To end all transfer of nuclear equipment or fissionable material or technology to Israel;
3. Further requests the Security Council to establish machinery for supervising the implementation of the measures referred to in paragraph 2 above;
4. Invites all Governments and organizations to take all appropriate ~~actions~~ to promote the purposes of the present resolution.

24. General Assembly Resolution 33/112 on United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Middle East, December 18, 1978

Assistance to Palestine refugees

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 32/90 A of 13 December 1977 and all previous resolutions referred to therein, including resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948,

Taking note of the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1977 to 30 June 1978,

1. Notes with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) has not been effected, that no substantial progress has been made in the programme endorsed by the Assembly in paragraph 2 of resolution 513 (VI) of 26 January 1952 for the reintegration of refugees either by repatriation or resettlement and that, therefore, the situation of the refugees continues to be a matter of serious concern;

2. Expresses its thanks to the Commissioner-General and to all the staff of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, recognizing that the Agency is doing all it can within the limits of available resources, and also expresses its thanks to the specialized agencies and private organizations for their valuable work in assisting the refugees;

3. Notes with regret that part of the headquarters of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East has been relocated outside of the area of its activity and requests that the headquarters be reconsolidated within the area of its operations as soon as practicable;

4. Notes with regret that the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine has been unable to find a means of achieving progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 194 (III) and requests the Commission to exert continued efforts towards the implementation of the paragraph and to report as appropriate, but no later than 1 October 1979;

5. Directs attention to the continuing seriousness of the financial position of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, as outlined in the report of the Commissioner-General;

6. Notes with profound concern that, despite the commendable and successful efforts of the Commissioner-General to collect additional contributions, this increased level of income to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East is still insufficient to cover essential budget requirements in the present year, and that, at presently foreseen levels of giving, deficits will recur each year;

7. Calls upon all Governments as a matter of urgency to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, particularly in the light of the budgetary deficit projected in the report of the Commissioner-General, and therefore urges non-contributing Governments to contribute regularly and contributing Governments to consider increasing their regular contributions.

B

Assistance to persons displaced as a result of the
June 1967 hostilities

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 32/90 B of 13 December 1977 and all previous resolutions referred to therein,

Taking note of the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1977 to 30 June 1978,

Concerned about the continued human suffering resulting from the June 1967 hostilities in the Middle East,

1. Reaffirms its resolution 32/90 B and all previous resolutions referred to therein;

2. Endorses, bearing in mind the objectives of those resolutions, the efforts of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to continue to provide humanitarian assistance, as far as practicable, on an emergency basis and as a temporary measure, to other persons in the area who are at present displaced and in serious need of continued assistance as a result of the June 1967 hostilities;

3. Strongly appeals to all Governments and to organizations and individuals to contribute generously for the above purposes to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and to the other intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations concerned.

C

Offers by Member States of grants and scholarships for
higher education, including vocational training, for
the Palestine refugees

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 212 (III) of 19 November 1948 on assistance to Palestine refugees,

Recalling also its resolution 32/90 F of 13 December 1977,

Cognizant of the fact that the Palestine refugees have, for the last three decades, lost their lands and means of livelihood,

Having examined with appreciation the report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East covering the period from 1 July 1977 to 30 June 1978,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 32/90 F,

Noting that less than one per thousand of the Palestinian refugee students has the chance to continue higher education, including vocational training,

Noting also that over the past five years the number of scholarships offered by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East has dwindled to half of what it was because of the Agency's regular budgetary difficulties,

1. Expresses its regret that the response to the appeal contained in resolution 32/90 F, as reported by the Secretary-General, has not been commensurate with the needs of the Palestine refugees for higher education and vocational training.

2. Appeals to all States to make special allocations, scholarships and grants to Palestinian refugees, in addition to their contributions to the regular budget of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;

3. Invites relevant United Nations agencies, including the United Nations University, to consider the inclusion, within their respective spheres of competence, of assistance for higher education for the Palestinian refugee students;

4. Appeals to all States, specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations to contribute generously to Palestinian universities in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, as well as to offer scholarships to Palestinian refugee students in those universities;

5. Requests the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East to act as recipient and trustee for such special allocations and scholarships and to award them to qualified Palestinian refugee candidates;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session on the implementation of the present resolution.

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2656 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, 2728 (XXV) of 15 December 1970, 2791 (XXVI) of 6 December 1971, 2964 (XXVII) of 13 December 1972, 3090 (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973, 3330 (XXIX) of 17 December 1974, 3419 D (XXX) of 8 December 1975, 31/15 C of 23 November 1976 and 32/90 D of 13 December 1977,

Having considered the report of the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,

Taking into account the annual report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1977 to 30 June 1978,

Gravely concerned at the critical financial situation of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, which has already reduced the essential minimum services being provided to the Palestine refugees and which threatens even greater reductions in the future,

Emphasizing the urgent need for extraordinary efforts in order to maintain, at least at their present minimum level, the activities of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East,

1. Commends the Working Group on the Financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for its efforts to assist in ensuring the Agency's financial security;
2. Notes with approval the report of the Working Group;
3. Requests the Working Group to continue its efforts, in co-operation with the Secretary-General and the Commissioner-General, for the financing of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East for a further period of one year;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary services and assistance to the Working Group for the conduct of its work.

E

Palestine refugees in the Gaza Strip

The General Assembly,

Recalling Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967,

Recalling also its resolutions 2792 C (XXVI) of 6 December 1971, 2963 C (XXVII) of 13 December 1972, 3089 C (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973, 3331 D (XXIX) of 17 December 1974, 3419 C (XXX) of 8 December 1975, 31/15 E of 23 November 1976 and 32/90 C of 13 December 1977,

Having considered the report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1977 to 30 June 1978, and the report of the Secretary-General of 11 October 1978,

1. Calls once more upon Israel:

(a) To take effective steps immediately for the return of the refugees concerned to the camps from which they were removed in the Gaza Strip and to provide adequate shelters for their accommodation;

(b) To desist from further removal of refugees and destruction of their shelters;

2. Requests the Secretary-General, after consulting with the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to report to the General Assembly by the opening of its thirty-fourth session on Israel's compliance with paragraph 1 above.

F

Population and refugees displaced since 1967

The General Assembly,

Recalling Security Council resolution 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967,

Recalling also its resolutions 2252 (ES-V) of 4 July 1967, 2452 A (XXIII) of 15 December 1968, 2535 B (XXIV) of 10 December 1969, 2672 D (XXV) of 8 December 1970, 2792 E (XXVI) of 5 December 1971, 2963 C and D (XXVII) of 13 December 1972, 3039 C (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973, 3331 D (XXIX) of 17 December 1974, 3419 C (XXX) of 3 December 1975, 31/15 D of 23 November 1976 and 32/90 E of 13 December 1977,

Having considered the report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, covering the period from 1 July 1977 to 30 June 1978, and the report of the Secretary-General of 12 October 1978,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of all the displaced inhabitants to return to their homes or former places of residence in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, and declares that any attempt to restrict, or to attach conditions to, the free exercise of the right of return by any displaced person is inconsistent with that inalienable right and inadmissible,

2. Deplores the continued refusal of the Israeli authorities to take steps for the return of the displaced inhabitants;

3. Calls once more upon Israel:

(a) To take immediate steps for the return of all the displaced inhabitants;

(b) To desist from all measures that obstruct the return of the displaced inhabitants, including measures affecting the physical and demographic structure of the occupied territories;

4. Requests the Secretary-General, after consulting with the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, to report to the General Assembly by the opening of the thirty-fourth session on Israel's compliance with paragraph 3 above.

25. General Assembly Resolution 33/113 on Report of Special Committee on Palestine, December 18, 1978

A

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 3092 A (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973, 3240 B (XXIX) of 29 November 1974, 3525 B (XXX) of 15 December 1975, 31/106 B of 16 December 1976 and 32/91 A of 13 December 1977,

Considering that the promotion of respect for the obligations arising from the Charter of the United Nations and other instruments and rules of international law is among the basic purposes and principles of the United Nations,

Bearing in mind the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949,

Noting that Israel and those Arab States whose territories have been occupied by Israel since June 1967 are parties to that Convention,

Taking into account that States parties to that Convention undertake, in accordance with article 1 thereof, not only to respect but also to ensure respect for the Convention in all circumstances,

1. Reaffirms that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;
2. Strongly deplores the failure of Israel to acknowledge the applicability of that Convention to the territories it has occupied since 1967;
3. Calls again upon Israel to acknowledge and to comply with the provisions of that Convention in all the Arab territories it has occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;
4. Urges once more all States parties to that Convention to exert all efforts in order to ensure respect for and compliance with the provisions thereof in all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem.

B

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 32/5 of 28 October 1977,

Expressing grave anxiety and concern over the present serious situation in the occupied Arab territories as a result of the continued Israeli occupation and the measures and actions taken by the Government of Israel, as the occupying Power, and designed to change the legal status, geographical nature and demographic composition of those territories,

Considering that the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, 17/is applicable to all the Arab territories occupied since 5 June 1967,

1. Determines that all such measures and actions taken by Israel in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967 have no legal validity and constitute a serious obstruction of efforts aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;
2. Strongly deplores the persistence of Israel in carrying out such measures, in particular the establishment of settlements in the Palestinian and other occupied Arab territories;
3. Calls upon Israel to comply strictly with its international obligations in accordance with the principles of international law and the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949;
4. Calls once more upon the Government of Israel, as the occupying Power, to desist forthwith from taking any action which would result in changing the legal status, geographical nature or demographic composition of the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;
5. Urges all States parties to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War to respect and to exert all efforts in order to ensure respect for and compliance with its provisions in all the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem.

C

The General Assembly,

Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the principles and provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

Bearing in mind the provisions of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, of 12 August 1949, as well as of other relevant conventions and regulations,

Recalling all its resolutions on the subject, in particular resolutions 32/91 B and C of 13 December 1977, as well as those adopted by the Security Council, the Commission on Human Rights and other United Nations organs concerned and by the specialized agencies,

Having considered the report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories, 18/which contains, inter alia, public statements made by leaders of the Government of Israel,

1. Commends the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories for its efforts in performing the tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly and for its thoroughness and impartiality;
2. Deplores the continued refusal by Israel to allow the Special Committee access to the occupied territories;
3. Calls again upon Israel to allow the Special Committee access to the occupied territories;

4. Deplores the continued and persistent violation by Israel of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilians in Time of War and other applicable international instruments, and condemns in particular those violations which that Convention designates as "grave breaches" thereof;
5. Condemns the following Israeli policies and practices:
 - (a) Annexation of parts of the occupied territories;
 - (b) Establishment of new Israeli settlements and expansion of the existing settlements on private and public Arab lands and transfer of an alien population thereto;
 - (c) Evacuation, deportation, expulsion, displacement and transfer of Arab inhabitants of the occupied territories, and denial of their right to return;
 - (d) Confiscation and expropriation of private and public Arab property in the occupied territories and all other transactions for the acquisition of land involving the Israeli authorities, institutions or nationals on the one hand, and the inhabitants or institutions of the occupied territories on the other;
 - (e) Destruction and demolition of Arab houses;
 - (f) Mass arrests, administrative detention and ill-treatment of the Arab population;
 - (g) Ill-treatment and torture of persons under detention;
 - (h) Pillaging of archaeological and cultural property;
 - (i) Interference with religious freedoms and practices as well as family rights and customs;
 - (j) Illegal exploitation of the natural wealth, resources and population of the occupied territories;
6. Reaffirms that all measures taken by Israel to change the physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure or status of the occupied territories, or any part thereof, including Jerusalem, are null and void, and that Israel's policy of settling parts of its population and new immigrants in the occupied territories constitutes a flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and of the relevant United Nations resolutions;
7. Demands that Israel desist forthwith from the policies and practices referred to in paragraphs 5 and 6 above;
8. Reiterates its call upon all States, in particular those States parties to the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, in accordance with article 1 of that Convention, and upon international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize any changes carried out by Israel in the occupied territories and to avoid actions, including those in the field of aid, which might be used by Israel in its pursuit of the policies of annexation and colonization or any of the other policies and practices referred to in the present resolution;
9. Requests the Special Committee, pending the early termination of the Israeli occupation, to continue to investigate Israeli policies and practices in the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, to consult, as appropriate, with the International Committee of the Red Cross in order to ensure the safeguarding of the welfare and human rights of the population of the occupied territories and to report to the Secretary-General as soon as possible and whenever the need arises thereafter;
10. Requests the Special Committee to continue to investigate the treatment of civilians in detention in the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967;

11. Requests the Secretary-General:

- (a) To render all necessary facilities to the Special Committee, including those required for its visits to the occupied territories, with a view to investigating Israeli policies and practices referred to in the present resolution;
- (b) To continue to make available additional staff as may be necessary to assist the Special Committee in the performance of its tasks;
- (c) To ensure the widest circulation of the reports of the Special Committee, and of information regarding its activities and findings, by all means available through the Office of Public Information of the Secretariat and, where necessary, to reprint those reports of the Special Committee which are no longer available;
- (d) To report to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session on the tasks entrusted to him in the present paragraph;

12. Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-fourth session the item entitled "Report of the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories".

26. Security Council Resolution 446 on Settlements, March 22, 1979

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

Having heard the statement of the Permanent Representative of Jordan and other statements made before the Council,

Stressing the urgent need to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East,

Affirming once more that the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 is applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem,

1. *Determines* that the policy and practices of Israel in establishing settlements in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied since 1967 have no legal validity and constitute a serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

2. *Strongly deplores* the failure of Israel to abide by Security Council resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 and 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971 and the consensus statement by the President of the Security Council on 11 November 1976 and General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967, 32/5 of 28 October 1977 and 33/113 of 18 December 1978;

3. *Calls once more upon* Israel, as the occupying Power, to abide scrupulously by the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention, to rescind its previous measures and to desist from taking any action which would result in changing the legal status and geographical nature and materially affecting the demographic composition of the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, and, in particular, not to transfer parts of its own civilian population into the occupied Arab territories;

4. *Establishes* a Commission consisting of three members of the Security Council, to be appointed by the President of the Council after consultation with the members of the Council, to examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;

5. *Requests* the Commission to submit its report to the Security Council by 1 July 1979;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Commission with the necessary facilities to enable it to carry out its mission;

7. *Decides* to keep the situation in the occupied territories under constant and close scrutiny and to reconvene in July 1979 to review the situation in the light of the findings of the Commission.

27. Security Council Resolution 452 on Settlements, July 20, 1979

The Security Council,

Taking note of the report and recommendations of the Security Council Commission established under resolution 446 (1979) to examine the situation relating to settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem, contained in document S/13450,

Strongly deploring the lack of co-operation of Israel with the Commission,

Considering that the policy of Israel in establishing settlements in the occupied Arab territories has no legal validity and constitutes a violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949,

Deeply concerned by the practices of the Israeli authorities in implementing that settlements policy in the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and its consequences for the local Arab and Palestinian population,

Emphasizing the need for confronting the issue of the existing settlements and the need to consider measures to safeguard the impartial protection of property seized,

Bearing in mind the specific status of Jerusalem, and reconfirming pertinent Security Council resolutions concerning Jerusalem and in particular the need to protect and preserve the unique spiritual and religious dimension of the Holy Places in that city,

Drawing attention to the grave consequences which the settlements policy is bound to have on any attempt to reach a peaceful solution in the Middle East,

1. Commends the work done by the Commission in preparing the report on the establishment of Israeli settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;

2. Accepts the recommendations contained in the above-mentioned report of the Commission;

3. Calls upon the Government and people of Israel to cease, on an urgent basis, the establishment, construction and planning of settlements in the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;

4. Requests the Commission, in view of the magnitude of the problem of settlements, to keep under close survey the implementation of the present resolution and to report back to the Security Council before 1 November 1979.

28. Draft Resolution Before Security Council, August 23, 1979

"The Security Council,

"Having considered the report of the Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People,

"Having heard the representatives of the parties concerned, including the Palestine Liberation Organization,

"Convinced that the question of Palestine is the core of the problem in the Middle East,

"Reaffirming the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just and lasting peace through a comprehensive settlement based on full respect for the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations as well as for its resolutions concerning the problem of the Middle East and the question of Palestine,

"Expressing its concern over the continuing deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, and deeply deploring Israel's persistence in its occupation of the Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and its refusal to implement the United Nations resolutions,

"Reaffirming the principle of inadmissibility of acquisition of territories by the threat or use of force,

"Reaffirming also its resolutions on the Middle East and the question of Palestine, particularly 237, 242, 252 and other relevant resolutions,

"1- Affirms:

"A- That the Palestinian people should be enabled to exercise its inalienable rights of self-determination, national independence and sovereignty in Palestine in accordance with the United Nations Charter and relevant resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly;

"B- The right of the Palestinian refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors to do so and the right of those choosing not to return to receive compensation for their property in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and United Nations resolutions particularly General Assembly Resolution 194 of 11 December, 1948;

"2- Decides that the provisions contained in Paragraph 1 should be taken fully into account in all international efforts and conferences organized within the framework of the United Nations for the accomplishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East."

MULTILATERAL PEACE EFFORTS—1967-73

The following two sections contain statements and proposals by major countries and institutions. While an effort was made to include all major powers and significant initiatives, this compilation does not pretend to be all inclusive.

29. U.N. Special Representative Jarring, Letter to Egypt, Jordan, and Israel, March 1968

(Note: Generally, Israel interpreted Resolution 242 as a means for arranging direct negotiations from which a peace would emerge, while the Arabs interpreted 242 as a framework for a peace to be arranged by the U.N. Special Representative through indirect negotiations. To clarify the discrepancies, Ambassador Jarring presented the following draft letter to Jordan, Israel, and Egypt for their acceptance. The Arab acceptance was conditioned on an Israeli agreement to implement 242 as a framework for peace. The Israeli acceptance was conditioned on an Arab agreement to direct negotiations proceeding from 242.)

"The Governments of Israel and the United Arab Republic [Jordan] have both indicated to me that they accept Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 for achieving a peaceful and accepted settlement of the Middle East question and intend to devise arrangements, under my auspices, for the implementation of the provisions of the resolution.

"The two Governments have expressed their willingness to co-operate with me in my capacity as Special Representative of the Secretary-General in the discharge of my tasks of promoting agreement and achieving such a settlement.

"In view of the urgency of the situation and with a view to expediting efforts to reach settlement, I have invited the two Governments to meet with me, for conferences within the framework of the Security Council resolution, in Nicosia. I have pleasure in informing you that the two Governments have responded favourably to this invitation."

30. Jarring Questionnaire to Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon, With Replies, March 1969

Note: Ambassador Jarring submitted his questions to the States concerned in the form of separate lists specifically addressed to each Government. Those lists were, however, prepared from a general list applicable to all the parties and that list is, to save repetition, reproduced here. As some questions related to provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) which applied to only one or some of the parties, the numbers of questions in the specific lists were not always the same as those in the general list. Where the number of the answer differs from that of the question in the general list, the latter number is added in square brackets.

Specific lists of questions based on the following general list were submitted by Ambassador Jarring to the Governments of the United Arab Republic on 5 March, of Jordan on 8 March, of Israel on 9 March and of Lebanon on 14 March 1969.

A. QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

Security Council resolution 242 (1967) sets out provisions and principles in accordance with which a peaceful and accepted settlement of the Middle East Question should be achieved. Some of these provisions would impose obligations on both sides, some on one side, and some on the other. It has generally been accepted that they should be regarded as a whole. The following questions designed to elicit the attitude of the parties towards the provisions of the Security Council resolution are based on this assumption and are to be understood in the context that each provision is regarded as part of a "package deal".

1. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) accept Security Council resolution 242 (1967) for implementation for achieving a peaceful and accepted settlement of the Middle East Question in accordance with the provisions and principles contained in the resolution?
2. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) agree to pledge termination of all claims or states of belligerency with Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic (Israel)?

3. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) agree to pledge respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic (Israel)?
4. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) accept the right of Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Republic (Israel) to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force?
5. If so, what is the conception of secure and recognized boundaries held by Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic)?
6. Does Israel agree to withdraw its armed forces from territories occupied by it in the recent conflict?
7. Does the United Arab Republic agree to guarantee freedom of navigation for Israel through international waterways in the area, in particular:
 - (a) through the Straits of Tiran, and
 - (b) through the Suez Canal?
8. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) agree that, if a plan for the just settlement of the refugee problem is worked out and presented to the parties for their consideration, the acceptance in principle of such a plan by the parties and the declaration of their intention to implement it in good faith constitute sufficient implementation of this provision of the Security Council resolution to justify the implementation of the other provisions?
9. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) agree that the territorial inviolability and political independence of the States in the area should be guaranteed:
 - (a) by the establishment of demilitarized zones;
 - (b) through additional measures?
10. Does Israel agree that such demilitarized zones should include areas on its side of its boundaries?
11. Does Jordan agree that a demilitarized zone should be established in Jordanian territory from which Israel armed forces have been withdrawn?
12. Does the United Arab Republic agree that a demilitarized zone should be established:
 - (a) at Sharm-el-Sheikh;
 - (b) in other parts of the Sinai peninsula?
13. Does Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) agree that demilitarization of such zones should be supervised and maintained by the United Nations?
14. Would Israel (Jordan, Lebanon, United Arab Republic) accept as a final act of agreement on all provisions a mutually signed multilateral document which would incorporate the agreed conditions for a just and lasting peace?

B. REPLY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

(Handed to Ambassador Jarring in Jerusalem by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on 2 April 1969)

Jerusalem, 2 April 1969

Dear Ambassador Jarring,

Israel's position on all the subjects raised in your eleven questions has been stated in detail in my address to the General Assembly of 8 October 1968, and in the memoranda presented to you on 15 October 1968 and 4 November 1968.

I now enclose specific replies in an affirmative spirit to the questions as formulated. It is my understanding that on the basis of the answers received from the three governments you propose to pursue further mutual clarifications in an effort to promote agreement on all the matters at issue in accordance with your mandate. We are ready to join in this process at any appropriate place.

Israel's statements of attitude, including her replies to these questions, has taken into account recent developments in Arab policy including the speeches recently delivered by President Nasser and other Arab leaders. We have noted the specific and emphatic reiteration of their refusal to make peace with Israel, to recognize Israel, to negotiate with Israel, to cease terrorist attacks on Israel or to admit the possibility of sovereign co-existence in any field. It would appear at this time that the effective negation by the UAR of the principles of the Charter and of the Security Council's Resolution is obvious and vehement. We hope that this policy, to which effect is given every day, will change; but these authoritative statements have caused deep concern and have intensified the tension which we would have wished to see relieved.

It is also our view that highly publicized encounters by four member States have weakened the attention which should have been concentrated on the efforts of the parties themselves to move towards agreement. They are causing a duplication and dispersal of effort. They have also encouraged a wrong impression in some quarters that a solution can be sought outside the region and without its governments. Israel recognizes your mission as the authoritative international framework within which peace between the States in the Middle East should be promoted.

I recall the idea which we discussed some weeks ago that the Foreign Ministers of the three governments should meet with you soon at a suitable place to pursue the promotion of agreement. As you will remember, I reacted positively to this idea. I wish to reaffirm that Israel will continue to co-operate with you in the fulfilment of your mission.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Abba EBAN

Answer to Question One:

Israel accepts the Security Council resolution (242) for the promotion of agreement on the establishment of a just and lasting peace, to be reached by negotiation and agreements between the governments concerned. Implementation of agreements should begin when agreement has been concluded on all their provisions.

Answer to Question Two:

It is the Arab States, not Israel which claimed and originated states of belligerency. They declared themselves for two decades to be in a state of unilateral war with Israel. It is therefore primarily incumbent upon them to terminate the state of war with Israel.

On the establishment of peace with her Arab neighbours, Israel agrees to the termination, on a reciprocal basis, of all claims or states of belligerency with each State with which peace is established. A declaration specifying each State by name would be made by Israel in each case.

The corresponding statement by any Arab State must specifically renounce belligerency "with Israel" and not "with any state in the area". Legal obligations must be specific in regard to those by whom they are bound.

Renunciation of belligerency includes the cessation of all maritime interference, the cessation of boycott measures involving third parties; the annulment of reservations made by Arab States on the applicability to Israel of their obligations under international conventions to which they have adhered; non-adherence to political and military alliances and pacts directed against

Israel or including States unwilling to renounce claims or states of belligerency with Israel and maintain peaceful relations with it; the non-stationing of armed forces of such other States on the territory of the contracting States and the prohibition and prevention in the territory of Arab States of all preparations actions or expeditions by irregular or para-military groups or by individuals directed against the lives, security or property of Israel in any part of the world.

The last stipulation is without prejudice to the fact that the responsibility of Arab governments for preventing such activities is legally binding under the cease-fire established by the parties in June 1967.

Answer to Question Three:

Israel agrees to respect and acknowledge the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of neighbouring Arab States; this principle would be embodied in peace treaties establishing agreed boundaries.

Answer to Question Four:

Israel accepts the right of Jordan, Lebanon, the United Arab Republic and other neighbouring States to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries, free from threats or acts of force. Explicit and unequivocal reciprocity is Israel's only conditions for this acceptance. "Acts of force" include all preparations, actions or expeditions by irregular or para-military groups or by individuals directed against the life, security or property of Israel in any part of the world.

Answer to Question Five:

Secure and recognized boundaries have never yet existed between Israel and the Arab States; accordingly, they should now be established as part of the peace-making process. The cease-fire should be replaced by peace treaties establishing permanent, secure and recognized boundaries as agreed upon through negotiation between the governments concerned.

Answer to Question Six:

When permanent, secure and recognized boundaries are agreed upon and established between Israel and each of the neighbouring Arab States, the disposition of forces will be carried out in full accordance with the boundaries determined in the peace treaties.

Answer to Question Seven: /general question 8/

The refugee problem was caused by the wars launched against Israel by Arab States, and has been perpetuated through the refusal of Arab States to establish peaceful relations with Israel. In view of the human problems involved in this issue Israel has expressed its willingness to give priority to the attainment of an agreement for the solution of this problem through regional and international co-operation. We believe that agreement could be sought even in advance of peace negotiations. We suggest that a conference of Middle Eastern States should be convened, together with the Governments contribution to refugee relief and the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, in order to chart a five-year plan for the solution of the refugee problem in the framework of a lasting peace and the integration of refugees into productive life. This conference can be called in advance of peace negotiations.

Joint refugee integration and rehabilitation commissions should be established by the governments concerned in order to work out agreed projects for refugee integration on a regional basis with international assistance.

In view of the special humanitarian nature of this issue we do not make agreement on plans for a solution of the refugee problem contingent on agreement on any other aspect of the Middle Eastern problem. For the same reason it should not be invoked by Arab States to obstruct agreement on other problems.

Answer to Question Eight: /general question 9/

The effective guarantee for the territorial inviolability and political independence of States lies in the strict observance by the governments of their treaty obligations. In the context of peace providing for full respect for the sovereignty of States and the establishment of agreed boundaries, other security measures may be discussed by the contracting governments.

Answer to Questions Nine and Ten: /General questions 10 and 13/

Without prejudice to what is stated in answer to Question Eight, it is pointed out that experience has shown that the measures mentioned in Questions Nine and Ten have not prevented the preparation and carrying out of aggression against Israel.

Answer to Question Eleven: /General question 14/

Peace must be juridically expressed, contractually defined and reciprocally binding in accordance with established norms of international law and practice. Accordingly, Israel's position is that the peace should be embodied in bilateral peace treaties between Israel and each Arab State incorporating all the agreed conditions for a just and lasting peace. The treaties, once signed and ratified, should be registered with the Secretariat of the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter.

2 April 1969

C. REPLY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN

(Received by Ambassador Jarring in Nicosia on 24 March 1969)

23 March 1969

Your Excellency,

Following are the answers of my Government to the questions which you presented to us in Amman, on Saturday, 8 March 1969. The answers as numbered, hereunder, correspond to your questions.

These answers explain my Government's position, which position has repeatedly been stated to Your Excellency throughout our past meetings.

May I take this opportunity to express to you my continued sincere wishes for your success in the important mission with which you are entrusted.

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) Abdul Monem RIFA'I
Minister of Foreign Affairs

His Excellency,
Ambassador Gunnar Jarring
Special Representative to
The Secretary-General of
The United Nations.

Answer (1)

Jordan, as it has declared before, accepts the Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and is ready to implement it in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles contained in the resolution.

Answer (2)

Jordan agrees to pledge termination of all claims or states of belligerency. Such a pledge becomes effective upon withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories which Israel occupied as a result of its aggression of 5 June 1967.

A pledge by Israel to terminate the state of belligerency would be meaningful only when Israel withdraws its forces from all Arab territories it occupied since 5 June 1967.

Answer (3)

On 5 June 1967 Israel launched its aggression against three Arab States, violating their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Agreement to pledge respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area requires the termination by Israel of its occupation and the withdrawal of its forces from all the Arab territories it occupied as a result of its aggression of 5 June.

Answer (4)

Jordan accepts the right of every State in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force, provided that Israel withdraws its forces from all Arab territories it occupied since 5 June 1967, and implements the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967.

Answer (5)

When the question of Palestine was brought before the United Nations in 1947, the General Assembly adopted its resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 for the partition of Palestine and defined Israel's boundaries.

Answer (6) [general question 8]

It has always been our position that the just settlement of the refugee problem is embodied in paragraph 11 of the General Assembly resolution 194 of December 1948 which has been repeatedly reaffirmed by each and every General Assembly session ever since its adoption.

If a plan on the basis of that paragraph is presented for consideration to the parties concerned, its acceptance by the parties and the declaration of their intention to implement it in good faith, with adequate guarantees for its full implementation, would justify the implementation of the other provisions of the resolution.

Answer (7) (8) [general questions 9 and 11]

We do not believe that the establishment of demilitarized zones is a necessity. However, Jordan shall not oppose the establishment of such zones if they are astride the boundaries.

Answer (9) [general question 13]

In case demilitarized zones are established Jordan accepts that such zones be supervised and maintained by the United Nations.

Answer (10) [general question 14]

In view of our past experience with Israel and her denunciation of four agreements signed by her with Arab States we consider that the instrument to be signed by Jordan engaging her to carry out her obligations, would be addressed to the Security Council. Israel would likewise sign and address to the Security Council an instrument engaging her to carry out her obligations emanating from the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967. The endorsement by the Security Council of these documents would constitute the final multilateral act of agreement.

D. REPLY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON

(Received by Ambassador Jarring in Moscow on 21 April 1969)

[Translated from French]

...

In reply to the questionnaire which Your Excellency addressed to me on 14 March 1969, I have the honour, on behalf of the Lebanese Government, to inform you of the following:

Lebanon is essentially involved in the general context of the Israeli-Arab conflict - and, therefore, in the consequences of the war launched by Israel on 5 June 1967 - because of its brotherly solidarity with the Arab States and of the threats which are constantly directed at it by Israel.

Lebanon is justified in considering, however, that the armistice agreement which it concluded with Israel on 23 March 1949 remains valid, as indicated in its message of 10 June 1967 to the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission and as confirmed by U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his report to the General Assembly of 19 September 1967. In that report, Mr. Thant, referring to the actual text of the agreement, said that it could be revised or suspended only by mutual consent. In view of Lebanon's circumstances, now and in the past, the armistice lines have, of course, never been changed. These lines, it should be noted, correspond to the frontiers of Lebanon which have always been internationally recognized in bilateral and multilateral diplomatic instruments as well as by the League of Nations and the United Nations. Lebanon participated actively in the drafting of the United Nations Charter and was admitted in its present form and structure to membership in the Organization. Its frontiers have not undergone any de facto or de jure alteration as a result of the cease-fire decisions taken by the Security Council after 5 June 1967.

It may be appropriate to state the above-mentioned facts, more particularly with a view to explaining the nature and character of the only reply which we are in a position to give to the questionnaire sent to us by Your Excellency on 14 March 1969.

In this reply, which reflects the position taken by Lebanon at inter-Arab conferences, we proclaim Lebanon's support of the position of the Arab States whose territory has been occupied by Israel and which have accepted the Security Council's decision of 22 November 1967.

The present note is consistent with the spirit of the talks which you have already held with various Lebanese officials.

Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Youssef SALEM
Minister for Foreign Affairs

E. REPLY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

(Handed to Ambassador Jarring in Cairo by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Republic on 27 March 1969)

The memorandum handed to you on 5 March 1969 during your recent visit to Cairo clearly expresses the realities of the present situation. In its items 1 to 7, the memorandum gives a clear restatement of the position of the United Arab Republic which is based on the acceptance of the Security Council resolution 242 of 22 November 1967, and its readiness to carry out the obligations emanating therefrom.

The memorandum also clearly expounds Israel's persistence in rejecting the Security Council resolution and its refusal to carry out its obligations emanating from it as well as Israel's plans for annexation of Arab lands through war; a policy not only prohibited by the Charter of the United Nations but also violates the Security Council resolution which specifically emphasizes the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. It has become obvious that Israel, in its endeavour to realize its expansionist aims, is no longer satisfied with the actual rejection of the Security Council resolution but actively works against it.

The same memorandum also states Israel's expansion plan as revealed by the quoted statements of Israeli leaders. This plan aims at:

1. Annexation of Jerusalem;
2. Keeping the Syrian Heights under its occupation;
3. Occupation of the West Bank in Jordan and its complete domination, practically terminating Jordan's sovereignty in that part;
4. Economic and administrative integration of the Gaza strip into Israel and the systematic eviction of its inhabitants;
5. Occupation of Sharm El-Sheikh and the Gulf of Aqaba area as well as the continued military presence in eastern part of Sinai;
6. The establishment of Israeli settlements in occupied territories.

This Israeli position constitutes a flagrant violation and clear rejection of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967 and of the peaceful settlement for which it provides.

In the light of these undeniable facts, I find it incumbent upon me to state categorically, at the outset of the replies to the specific questions you addressed to the United Arab Republic on 5 March 1969, that all the answers of the United Arab Republic, which reaffirm its acceptance of the Security Council resolution and its readiness to carry out the obligations emanating from it require, likewise, that Israel accept the resolution and carry out all its obligations emanating from it and in particular withdrawal from all Arab territories it occupied as a result of its aggression of 5 June 1967.

Question (1)

The United Arab Republic, as it has declared before, accepts the Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and is ready to implement it in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles contained therein.

Question (2)

The United Arab Republic agrees to pledge termination of all claims or state of belligerency. Such a pledge becomes effective upon withdrawal of Israel's forces from all Arab territories occupied as a result of Israel's aggression of 5 June 1967.

A declaration by Israel terminating the state of belligerency would be meaningful only when Israel withdraws her forces from all Arab territories it occupied since 5 June 1967.

Question (3)

On 5 June 1967, Israel launched its aggression against three Arab States violating their sovereignty and territorial integrity. Acceptance by the United Arab Republic to pledge respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area requires the termination by Israel of its occupation and the withdrawal of its forces from all the Arab territories it occupied as a result of its aggression of 5 June, and the full implementation of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967.

Question (4)

The United Arab Republic accepts the right of every State in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force, provided that Israel withdraws its forces from all Arab territories occupied as a result of its aggression of 5 June 1967, and implements the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967.

Question (5)

When the question of Palestine was brought before the United Nations in 1947, the General Assembly adopted its resolution 181 of 29 November 1947, for the partition of Palestine and defined Israel's boundaries.

Question (6) [General question 7]

We have declared our readiness to implement all the provisions of the Security Council resolution covering, inter alia, the freedom of navigation in international waterways in the area; provided that Israel, likewise, implements all provisions of the Security Council resolution.

Question (7) [General question 8]

It has always been our position that the just settlement of the refugee problem is embodied in paragraph 11 of the General Assembly resolution 194 of December 1948, which has been unfailingly reaffirmed by each and every General Assembly session ever since its adoption.

If a plan on the basis of that paragraph is presented for consideration to the parties concerned, its acceptance by the parties and the declaration of their intention to implement it in good faith, with adequate guarantees for its full implementation would justify the implementation of the other provisions of the Security Council resolution.

Questions (8), (9) [General questions 9 and 12]

We do not believe that the establishment of demilitarized zones is a necessity. However, the United Arab Republic will not oppose the establishment of such zones if they are astride the boundaries.

Question (10) [General question 13]

In case demilitarized zones are established the United Arab Republic accepts that such zones be supervised and maintained by the United Nations.

Question (11) [General question 14]

In view of our past experience with Israel and her denunciation of four agreements signed by her with Arab States, we consider that the instrument to be signed by the United Arab Republic engaging her to carry out her obligations, should be addressed to the Security Council. Israel should, likewise, sign and address to the Security Council an instrument engaging her to carry out her obligations emanating from the Security Council Resolution of 22 November 1967. The endorsement by the Security Council of these documents would constitute the final multilateral document.

Cairo, 27 March 1969

31. Four Power Discussions, Joint Communiqué, April 3, 1969

Joint Communiqué

The Permanent Representatives to the United Nations of France, the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States met on April 3 at the residence of the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations to begin consideration of how they can contribute to a peaceful political settlement in the Middle East. They based the approach to this problem on Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) which they fully accept and support.² They reaffirmed their support for Ambassador Jarring's mission.

The Four Powers are agreed that the situation in the Middle East is serious and urgent and must not be permitted to jeopardize international peace and security. They have straight away entered into a discussion on matters of substance and have started defining areas of agreement. There is a common concern to make urgent progress. The Secretary General of the United Nations will be kept fully informed.

Active consultations will continue. These consultations will be private and confidential. All appropriate contacts with the parties primarily concerned will be maintained.

The next meeting will take place on April 8th.

32. U.S.S.R. Reply to United States, January 13, 1970¹

(Note: In October 1969, the United States circulated proposals for an Egyptian-Israeli and a Jordanian-Israeli settlement. The American plans were not made public. In mid-December 1969, the Soviet Union replied to the American proposals. The Soviet reply was made public in early January 1970.)

* * * * *

A careful study has been made in Moscow of the recent American proposal on Middle East settlement.

* * * * *

. . .our comments on the contents of the American plan of Oct. 28, both as a whole and on separate provisions, . . .are basically as follows:
We do not see sufficient grounds for a joint Soviet-American document . . .to be in an abridged form, to contain the so-called "neutral formulas" and in effect to shift the main emphasis, in working out an agreement on basic aspects of the settlement, over to contacts between the parties through Ambassador Jarring.

* * * * *

As we understand it, the objective of a joint Soviet-American document should be as far as possible a sufficiently detailed elaboration of the essence of the fundamental aspects of the Middle East settlement. Also, it would hardly make sense to negate the work already done, aimed at working out agreed positions of our countries, by following the United States proposal to limit ourselves to "neutral formulas" alone.

The new American draft, as before, does not mention anything concerning the essence of the key question of the settlement, namely, the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from the occupied Arab territories . . . It only mentions that the parties themselves shall determine a timetable and a sequence for the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces to boundaries to be agreed upon in advance.

* * * * *

We have already repeatedly pointed out that our proposal, a de facto cessation of the state of war simultaneously with the beginning of the

¹ Excerpts taken from the New York Times, January 13, 1970, p. 6.

withdrawal of armed forces and de jure cessation of the state of war after completion of the withdrawal, would correspond to the interests of both sides and would remove their mutual suspicions.

* * * * *

One might note certain progress on the formula for the boundaries between the U.A.R. and Israel. We understand the American formula, naturally, as meaning that sovereignty of the U.A.R. over Sharm al-Shaykh is not called into question and such a provision must be clearly recorded in the joint Soviet-American document.

As to the Gaza sector, which is Arab territory and must be restored within the borders existing before the 1967 conflict, a provision to that effect should also be included in the joint document. The participation of Israel in determining the future of this territory has no justification whatsoever.

In regard to demilitarized zones, . . . these zones should not give any advantage to any of the parties and their administration shall contain limitations only of a purely military nature. For practical purposes, this would mean recognition of the principle that such zones can possibly be established on both sides of the border.

In implementing a "package" settlement we proceed from provisions of the point in the Security Council resolution of Nov. 22, 1967, on the cessation of the state of war, respect and recognition of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of each state in the area in question.

* * * * *

. . . in working out formulas on the cessation of the state of war and on ensuing consequences, it is necessary to adhere strictly to the provisions of the November resolution of the Security Council and to avoid formulas which may be, even beforehand, unacceptable to one of the sides.

On the question of settlement of the refugee problem, . . . Israel must fulfill United Nations decisions on this question. Even if the Arabs agreed that the question of a just settlement of the problem of Palestine refugees would be worked out in detail at the time of a final accord between Jordan and Israel, even then it would be necessary to confirm in other final documents the necessity of

implementing the well-known General Assembly resolution on the Palestine refugees.

As before, we proceed from the necessity of recording the principle of freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal for the vessels of all countries in conformity with the Constantinople Convention of 1888 now in effect.

Questions of navigation through the Strait of Tiran and in the Gulf of Aqaba must be considered and solved in conformity with generally recognized principles of international law, which will guarantee to a sufficient degree free passage for the vessels of all countries through those waterways.

As for the procedure and form of the Arab-Israeli contacts through Dr. Jarring. . . . We are convinced that once an understanding is reached on the principle aspects of settlement, it should be possible to find a proper form--acceptable to the sides--of the intermediary role for Ambassador Jarring, provided he will discuss questions of settlement separately with each side, as well as the procedure for the signing of a final document or documents.

* * * * *

. . . we would like to emphasize once more that the Soviet side views settlement in conformity with the Security Council resolution as something complete, related to all its aspects and to the entire area of the Middle East, as a "package." In this connection a U.A.R.-Israeli settlement is considered by us, naturally, as part of the whole, inseparable from a settlement concerning other countries directly involved in the conflict.

33. Cease-Fire Along the Suez Canal, Secretary of State Rogers' Letter to Egypt, June 19, 1970

(Note: The Secretary of State sent the letter to the Governments of Egypt, Israel, and Jordan to propose a cease-fire along the Suez Canal and Jordan River frontiers. All three states accepted the proposal, Egypt on July 22, Jordan on July 26, and Israel on August 4. A cease-fire along the Suez Canal went into effect on August 8, 1970, was extended in November 1970, February 1971, and indefinitely extended in March 1971.)

JUNE 19, 1970

DEAR MR. FOREIGN MINISTER: I have read carefully President Nasser's statement of May 1 and your subsequent remarks to Mr. Bergus [Donald C. Bergus, Counselor of Embassy and Consul General, U.S. Special Interests Section, Spanish Embassy, Cairo]. Mr. Sisco [Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs] has also reported fully on his conversations with President Nasser and you, and we have been giving serious thought to what can be done about the situation in the Near East. I agree that the situation is at a critical point and I think it is in our joint interest that the United States retain and strengthen friendly ties with all the peoples and states of the area. We hope this will prove possible and are prepared to do our part. We look to others concerned, and in particular to your government, which has so important a role to play, to move with us to seize this opportunity. If it is lost, we shall all suffer the consequences and we would regret such an outcome very much indeed. In this spirit, I urge that your government give the most careful consideration to the thoughts which I set forth below.

We are strongly interested in a lasting peace, and we would like to help the parties achieve it. We have made serious and practical proposals to that end, and we have counseled all parties on

the need for compromise, and on the need to create an atmosphere in which peace is possible. By the latter we mean a reduction of tensions as well as clarifications of positions to give both Arabs and Israelis some confidence that the outcome will preserve their essential interests.

In our view, the most effective way to agree on a settlement would be for the parties to begin to work out under Ambassador Jarring's auspices the detailed steps necessary to carry out Security Council Resolution 242. Foreign Minister Eban of Israel has recently said that Israel would be prepared to make important concessions once talks got started. At the same time, Egyptian participation in such talks would go far towards overcoming Israeli doubts that your government does in fact seek to make peace with it. I understand the problems that direct negotiations pose for you, and we have made it clear from the beginning that we were not proposing such an arrangement be put into effect at the outset, although, depending on the progress of discussions, we believe the parties will find it necessary to meet together at some point if peace is to be established between them.

With the above thoughts in mind, the US puts forward the following proposal for consideration of the UAR.

(a) that both Israel and the UAR subscribe to a restoration of the ceasefire for at least a limited period;

(b) that Israel and the UAR (as well as Israel and Jordan) subscribe to the following statement which would be in the form of a report from Ambassador Jarring to the Secretary General U Thant:

The UAR (Jordan) and Israel advise me that they agree:

(a) that having accepted and indicated their willingness to carry out Resolution 242 in all its parts, they will designate representatives to discussions to be held under my auspices, according to such procedure and at such places and times as I may recommend, taking into account as appropriate each side's preference as to method of procedure and previous experience between the parties;

(b) that the purpose of the aforementioned discussions is to reach agreement on the establishment

of a just and lasting peace between them based on (1) mutual acknowledgment by the UAR (Jordan) and Israel of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence, and (2) Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict, both in accordance with Resolution 242;

(c) that, to facilitate my task of promoting agreement as set forth in Resolution 242, the parties will strictly observe, effective July 1 until at least October 1, the ceasefire resolutions of the Security Council.

We hope the UAR will find this proposal acceptable; we are also seeking Israeli acceptance. In the meantime, I am sure you will share my conviction that everything be done to hold these proposals in confidence so as not to prejudice the prospects for their acceptance.

I am sending a similar message to Foreign Minister Rifai [of Jordan].

I look forward to your early reply.

With all best wishes,

Sincerely,

WILLIAM P. ROGERS

34. Jarring Aide-Memoire to Egypt and Israel, With Replies, February 8, 1971

I have been following with a mixture of restrained optimism and growing concern the resumed discussions under my auspices for the purpose of arriving at a peaceful settlement of the Middle East question. My restrained optimism arises from the fact that in my view the parties are seriously defining their positions and wish to move forward to a permanent peace. My growing concern is that each side unyieldingly insists that the other make certain commitments before being ready to proceed to the stage of formulating the provisions to be included in a final peace agreement. There is, as I see it, a serious risk that we shall find ourselves in the same deadlock as existed during the first three years of my mission.

I therefore feel that I should at this stage make clear my views on what I believe to be the necessary steps to be taken in order to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles of Security Council resolution 242 (1967), which the parties have agreed to carry out in all its parts.

I have come to the conclusion that the only possibility to break the imminent deadlock arising from the differing views of Israel and the United Arab Republic as to the priority to be given to commitments and undertakings - which seems to me to be the real cause for the present immobility - is for me to seek from each side the parallel and simultaneous commitments which seem to be inevitable prerequisites of an eventual peace settlement between them. It should thereafter be possible to proceed at once to formulate the provisions and terms of a peace agreement not only for those topics covered by the commitments, but with equal priority for other topics, and in particular the refugee question.

Specifically, I wish to request the Governments of Israel and the United Arab Republic to make to me at this stage the following prior commitments simultaneously and on condition that the other party makes its commitment and

a/ In presenting the aide-mémoire, Ambassador Jarring added the following interpretation:

"I interpret practical security measures in the Sharm el Sheikh area for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran to mean arrangements for stationing a United Nations force in the area for this purpose."

subject to the eventual satisfactory determination of all other aspects of a peace settlement, including in particular a just settlement of the refugee problem:

Israel would give a commitment to withdraw its forces from occupied United Arab Republic territory to the former international boundary between Egypt and the British Mandate of Palestine on the understanding that satisfactory arrangements are made for:

- (a) Establishing demilitarized zones;
- (b) Practical security arrangements in the Sharm el Sheikh area for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran; and
- (c) Freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal.

The United Arab Republic would give a commitment to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and to make explicitly therein to Israel, on a reciprocal basis, undertakings and acknowledgments covering the following subjects:

- (a) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency;
- (b) Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;
- (c) Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
- (d) Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate from or are not committed from within their respective territories against the population, citizens or property of the other party; and
- (e) Non-interference in each other's domestic affairs.

In making the above-mentioned suggestion I am conscious that I am requesting both sides to make serious commitments but I am convinced that the present situation requires me to take this step.

AIDE-MEMOIRE PRESENTED TO AMBASSADOR JARRING BY THE
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC ON 15 FEBRUARY 1971

The United Arab Republic has informed Your Excellency, that it accepts to carry out - on a reciprocal basis - all its obligations as provided for in Security Council resolution 242 (1967) with a view to achieving a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. On the same basis, Israel should carry out all its obligations contained in this resolution.

Referring to your aide-memoire of 8 February 1971, the United Arab Republic would give a commitment covering the following:

1. Termination of all claims of states of belligerency;
2. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;
3. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
4. Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate from or are committed from within the respective territories against the population, citizens or property of the other party; and
5. Non-interference in each other's domestic affairs.

The United Arab Republic would also give a commitment that:

6. It ensures the freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal in accordance with the 1888 Constantinople Convention;
7. It ensures the freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran in accordance with the principles of international law;
8. It accepts the stationing of a United Nations Peace-keeping Force in the Sharm el Sheikh; and
9. To guarantee the peaceful settlement and the territorial inviolability of every State in the area, the United Arab Republic would accept:
 - (a) The establishment of demilitarized zones astride the borders in equal distances;
 - (b) The establishment of a United Nations Peace-keeping Force in which the four permanent members of the Security Council would participate.

Israel should, likewise, give a commitment to implement all the provisions of Security Council resolution 242 (1967). Hence, Israel should give a commitment covering the following:

1. Withdrawal of its armed forces from Sinai and the Gaza Strip;
2. Achievement of a just settlement for the refugee problem in accordance with United Nations resolutions;
3. Termination of all claims of states of belligerency;
4. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence;
5. Respect for and acknowledgement of each other's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
6. Responsibility to do all in their power to ensure that acts of belligerency or hostility do not originate from or are committed from within the respective territories against the population, citizens or property of the other party; and
7. Non-interference in each other's domestic affairs; and
8. To guarantee the peaceful settlement and the territorial inviolability of every State in the area, Israel would accept:
 - (a) The establishment of demilitarized zones astride the borders in equal distances;
 - (b) The establishment of a United Nations Peace-keeping Force in which the four permanent members of the Security Council would participate.

When Israel gives these commitments, the United Arab Republic will be ready to enter into a peace agreement with Israel containing all the afore-mentioned obligations as provided for in Security Council resolution 242 (1967).

The United Arab Republic considers that the just and lasting peace cannot be realized without the full and scrupulous implementation of Security Council resolution 242 (1967) and the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from all the territories occupied since 5 June 1967.

COMMUNICATION PRESENTED TO AMBASSADOR JARRING
BY ISRAEL ON 26 FEBRUARY 1971

Pursuant to our meetings on 8 February and 17 February, I am instructed to convey to you, and through you to the United Arab Republic, the following:

Israel views favourably the expression by the United Arab Republic of its readiness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel and reiterates that it is prepared for meaningful negotiations on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement between the two countries.

The Government of Israel wishes to state that the peace agreement to be concluded between Israel and the United Arab Republic should, inter alia, include the provisions set out below.

A. Israel would give undertakings covering the following:

1. Declared and explicit decision to regard the conflict between Israel and the United Arab Republic as finally ended, and termination of all claims and states of war and acts of hostility or belligerency between Israel and the United Arab Republic;
2. Respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the United Arab Republic;
3. Respect for and acknowledgement of the right of the United Arab Republic to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries;
4. Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from the Israel-United Arab Republic cease-fire line to the secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement. Israel will not withdraw to the pre-5 June 1967 lines;
5. In the matter of the refugees and the claims of both parties in this connexion, Israel is prepared to negotiate with the Governments directly involved on:
 - (a) The payment of compensation for abandoned lands and property;
 - (b) Participation in the planning of the rehabilitation of the refugees in the region. Once the obligation of the parties towards the settlement of the refugee issue have been agreed neither party shall be under claims from the other inconsistent with its sovereignty;
6. The responsibility for ensuring that no war-like act, or act of violence, by any organization, group or individual originates from or is committed in the territory of Israel against the population, armed forces or property of the United Arab Republic;

7. Non-interference in the domestic affairs of the United Arab Republic;
 8. Non-participation by Israel in hostile alliances against the United Arab Republic and the prohibition of stationing of troops of other parties which maintain a state of belligerency against the United Arab Republic.
- B. The United Arab Republic undertakings in the peace agreement with Israel would include:
1. Declared and explicit decision to regard the conflict between the United Arab Republic and Israel as finally ended and termination of all claims and states of war and acts of hostility or belligerency between the United Arab Republic and Israel;
 2. Respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Israel;
 3. Respect for and acknowledgement of the right of Israel to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries to be determined in the peace agreement;
 4. The responsibility for ensuring that no war-like act, or act of violence, by any organization, group or individual originates from or is committed in the territory of the United Arab Republic against the population, armed forces or property of Israel;
 5. Non-interference in the domestic affairs of Israel;
 6. An explicit undertaking to guarantee free passage for Israel ships and cargoes through the Suez Canal;
 7. Termination of economic warfare in all its manifestations, including boycott, and of interference in the normal international relations of Israel;
 8. Non-participation by the United Arab Republic in hostile alliances against Israel and the prohibition of stationing of troops of other parties which maintain a state of belligerency against Israel.

The United Arab Republic and Israel should enter into a peace agreement with each other to be expressed in a binding treaty in accordance with normal international law and precedent, and containing the above undertakings.

The Government of Israel believes that now that the United Arab Republic has through Ambassador Jarring expressed its willingness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and both parties have presented their basic positions, they should now pursue their negotiations in a detailed and concrete manner without prior conditions so as to cover all the points listed in their respective documents with a view to concluding a peace agreement.

35. Organization of African Unity, Peace Proposal, December¹ 1971

(Note.—The Organization of African Unity sent a four-man mission composed of Presidents Leopold Senghor of Senegal, Yakubu Gowon of Nigeria, Mobutu-Sese of Zaire, and Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon, to Israel and Egypt seeking positions on a series of proposals. The four-man mission reported their findings to OAU President Ould Daddah, who presented a final report to Secretary-General U Thant.)

(a) Agreement by the two parties "to resume indirect negotiations" through UN mediator Gunnar Jarring and in line with Security Council resolution 242 of November 22nd, 1967 (p. 917), so as to reach a peace agreement.

Israeli reply: "Israel agrees to the resumption of negotiations without prior conditions, under the auspices of Dr. Jarring, under the terms of resolution, 242, with a view to reaching a peace agreement. This was made known to Dr. Jarring in August, 1970".

Egyptian reply: "Agreement to indirect negotiations under Mr. Jarring with a view to applying the Security Council resolution in all its provisions, as well as to the initiative of Ambassador Jarring of February 8th to achieve a peace agreement".

(b) Agreement by the two parties to "conclusion of an interim agreement for opening of the Suez Canal and stationing on the eastern bank of the Canal of United Nations troops, between the Egyptian and Israeli lines".

Israeli reply: "Israel agrees to drafting of an agreement on the Suez Canal, the details of which will be negotiated and accepted in common agreement. Israel will be prepared, in the framework of negotiations for such an agreement, to discuss measures designed to ensure control and respect of the agreement on the Suez Canal."

Egyptian reply: "Egypt is willing to make the necessary arrangements for reopening of the Suez Canal in exchange for Israeli withdrawal as a first step, in line with the initiative made public by the President of the Republic in his speech of November 11th, 1971, and on the condition that Israel should respond favourably to the memorandum of Mr. Jarring of February 8th, 1971" (p. 2015).

(c) "Agreement by the two parties that secure and recognized borders should be defined in the peace agreement".

Israeli reply: "Israel agrees that 'secure and recognized borders should be determined by negotiations between the parties and incorporated in a peace agreement'".

Egyptian reply: "We agree that secure and recognized borders should be incorporated in a peace agreement on the basis of the resolution of the Organisation of African Unity which stipulates the necessity for withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories, and of the initiative of Mr. Jarring, which stipulates the necessity for Israeli withdrawal to the international borders of Egypt".

(d) Agreement by the two parties that solution of security problems should be sought "in guarantee by the United Nations, in creation of demilitarized zones and in the presence of international troops at certain strategic points".

Israeli reply: "Israel agrees that in addition to determination of secure and recognized borders established by common agreement, other arrangements designed to ensure security could be negotiated".

Egyptian reply: "Agreement to the following peace guarantees: United Nations guarantees, creation of demilitarized zones on both sides of borders, presence of international troops at certain strategic points".

(e) Agreement by the two parties "that details of evacuation of the occupied territories should be set down in a peace agreement".

Israeli reply: "Israel agrees that conditions of withdrawal to negotiated borders established by common agreement should be incorporated in the peace treaty".

No Egyptian reply was given.

(f) Agreement by the two parties, "so as to guarantee free passage to all ships in the Tiran Strait, to stationing of international troops at Sharm-el-Sheikh".

Israeli reply: "the question of Sharm-el-Sheikh will be included in the peace negotiations, as specified in the above paragraph (Israeli reply "E"). In conformity with Security Council resolution 242, freedom of navigation on all international waterways such as the Suez Canal and the Tiran Straits for all ships and all merchandise, including the ships and merchandise of Israel, will be provided for in the peace agreement".

Egyptian reply: "Egypt agrees to the presence of international troops at Sharm-el-Sheikh to guarantee freedom of navigation in the Tiran Straits".

¹ African Research Bulletin, vol. 8, No. 12, January 15, 1972, p. 2324. Reprinted by permission of Africa Research Ltd., One Parliament Street, Exeter, England.

36. "Proximity Talks," Secretary of State Rogers News Conference, December 23, 1971

Q. Mr. Secretary, talking about the Middle East, you said you will continue your efforts. We are also told that you phoned to Mr. Eban [Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban], and to Mr. Riad [Egyptian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad], in effect offering your services or to continue your efforts. Can you tell us something about your blueprint, how you want to proceed?

A. Well, I think Mr. McCloskey [Robert J. McCloskey, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Press Relations] did point out to you that I had had discussions, telephonic discussions, with Mr. Eban and Mr. Riad, and that was for the purpose of telling them that we were prepared as a nation to continue to play a role in the negotiating process, particularly in connection with an interim agreement on the Suez, if they were interested in that possibility.

We are willing to play that role, and we talk about it as a role which we say is close proximity. By that we mean that we think the parties should get together and actively exchange ideas, and there has to be someone who helps in that process. We are prepared to do that if the parties want us to. We are not sure yet how they will react. Israel has indicated a willingness to do that. We are not sure yet how Egypt feels about it. There have been some indications that they did not favor this approach. On the other hand, there have been some suggestions that they might be prepared to continue. We don't know yet. But we are going to try to do that if it is possible.

Secondly, of course, we encourage the parties to negotiate under Ambassador Jarring's [U.N. Special Representative Gunnar Jarring] auspices, because the two are different in scope. Whereas the interim agreement relates to only a portion of the dispute and by and large the Suez Canal itself, Ambassador Jarring's efforts are directed toward a total settlement under the principles announced and promulgated in Security Council Resolution 242.

37. Geneva Peace Conference, Opening Remarks of Secretary of State Kissinger, Excerpts, December 21, 1973

(Note.—Secretary Kissinger headed the U.S. delegation to the opening of the Middle East Peace Conference in Geneva December 21–22. Following are excerpts of his statement before the conference on December 21.)

First, this conference must speak with a clear and unequivocal voice: The cease-fire called for by the Security Council must be scrupulously adhered to by all concerned. Prior to last October, the United States did all it could to prevent a new outbreak of fighting. But we failed because frustration could no longer be contained.

After the fighting began, we, in concert with the Soviet Union, helped bring an end to the hostilities by sponsoring a number of resolutions in the Security Council. The six-point agreement of November 11 consolidated the cease-fire. It helped create the minimal conditions necessary for carrying forward our efforts here. All these resolutions and agreements must be strictly implemented.

But regardless of these steps, we recognize that the cease-fire remains fragile and tentative. The United States is concerned over the evidence of increased military preparedness in recent days. A renewal of hostilities would be both foolhardy and dangerous. We urge all concerned to refrain from the use of force and to give our efforts here the chance they deserve.

Second, we must understand what can realistically be accomplished at any given moment.

The separation of military forces is certainly the most immediate problem. Disengagement of military forces would help to reduce the danger of a new military outbreak; it would begin the process of building confidence between the two sides.

Based on intensive consultations with the leaders of the Middle East, including many in this room today, I believe that the first work of this conference should be to achieve early agreement on the separation of military forces and that such an agreement is possible.

Serious discussions have already taken place between the military representatives of Egypt and Israel at kilometer 101. It is important to build promptly on the progress achieved there. And on the Jordanian and Syrian fronts, a comparable base for the lessening of tensions and the negotiation of further steps toward peace must be found. Progress toward peace should include all the parties concerned.

Third, the disengagement of forces is an essential first step—a consolidation of the cease-fire and a bridge to the “peaceful and

accepted settlement” called for in Security Council Resolution 242. Our final objective is the implementation in all its parts of Resolution 242. This goal has the full support of the United States.

Peace must bring a new relationship among the nations of the Middle East—a relationship that will not only put an end to the state of war which has persisted for the last quarter of a century but will also permit the peoples of the Middle East to live together in harmony and safety. It must replace the reality of mistrust with a new reality of promise and hope. It must include concrete measures that make war less likely.

A peace agreement must include these elements, among others: withdrawals, recognized frontiers, security arrangements, guarantees, a settlement of the legitimate interests of the Palestinians, and a recognition that Jerusalem contains places considered holy by three great religions.

Peace will require that we relate the imperative of withdrawals to the necessities of security, the requirement of guarantees to the sovereignty of the parties, the hopes of the displaced to the realities now existing.

Fourth, we believe there must be realistic negotiations between the parties. Resolution 338 provides just such a process. It is on the parties that the primary responsibility rests. The United States intends to help facilitate these talks in every feasible way, to encourage moderation and the spirit of accommodation. We are prepared to make concrete suggestions to either side if this will help promote practical progress. But we must always remember that while a Middle East settlement is in the interest of us all, it is the people of the area that must live with the results. It must, in the final analysis, be acceptable to them.

Peace, in short, cannot last unless it rests on the consent of the parties concerned.

MULTILATERAL PEACE EFFORTS—1974-79

38. Brookings Institution, Toward Peace in the Middle East, Summary, December 1975

(Note.—The Brookings Report, endorsed by Presidential candidate Jimmy Carter among others, was drafted by a distinguished panel of diplomats and academicians, several of whom later became associated with the Carter administration.)

Summary

The study group reached five main conclusions.

1. *U.S. interests.* The United States has a strong moral, political, and economic interest in a stable peace in the Middle East. It is concerned for the security, independence, and well-being of Israel and the Arab states of the area and for the friendship of both. Renewed hostilities would have far-reaching and perilous consequences which would threaten those interests.

2. *Urgency.* Whatever the merits of the interim agreement on Sinai, it still leaves the basic elements of the Arab-Israeli dispute substantially untouched. Unless these elements are soon addressed, rising tensions in the area will generate increased risk of violence. We believe that the best way to address these issues is by the pursuit of a comprehensive settlement.

3. *Process.* We believe that the time has come to begin the process of negotiating such a settlement among the parties, either at a general conference or at more informal multilateral meetings. While no useful interim step toward settlement should be overlooked or ignored, none seems promising at the present time and most have inherent disadvantages.

4. *Settlement.* A fair and enduring settlement should contain at least these elements as an integrated package:

(a) *Security.* All parties to the settlement commit themselves to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the others and to refrain from the threat or use of force against them.

(b) *Stages.* Withdrawal to agreed boundaries and the establishment of peaceful relations carried out in stages over a period of

years, each stage being undertaken only when the agreed provisions of the previous stage have been faithfully implemented.

(c) *Peaceful relations.* The Arab parties undertake not only to end such hostile actions against Israel as armed incursions, blockades, boycotts, and propaganda attacks, but also to give evidence of progress toward the development of normal international and regional political and economic relations.

(d) *Boundaries.* Israel undertakes to withdraw by agreed stages to the June 5, 1967, lines with only such modifications as are mutually accepted. Boundaries will probably need to be safeguarded by demilitarized zones supervised by UN forces.

(e) *Palestine.* There should be provision for Palestinian self-determination, subject to Palestinian acceptance of the sovereignty and integrity of Israel within agreed boundaries. This might take the form either of an independent Palestine state accepting the obligations and commitments of the peace agreements or of a Palestine entity voluntarily federated with Jordan but exercising extensive political autonomy.

(f) *Jerusalem.* The report suggests no specific solution for the particularly difficult problem of Jerusalem but recommends that, whatever the solution may be, it meet as a minimum the following criteria:

- there should be unimpeded access to all of the holy places and each should be under the custodianship of its own faith;
- there should be no barriers dividing the city which would prevent free circulation throughout it; and
- each national group within the city should, if it so desires, have substantial political autonomy within the area where it predominates.

(g) *Guarantees.* It would be desirable that the UN Security Council endorse the peace agreements and take whatever other actions to support them the agreements provide. In addition, there may well be need for unilateral or multilateral guarantees to some or all of the parties, substantial economic aid, and military assistance pending the adoption of agreed arms control measures.

5. *U.S. role.* The governments directly concerned bear the responsibility of negotiation and agreement, but they are unlikely to be able to reach agreement alone. Initiative, impetus, and inducement may well have to come from outside. The United States, because it enjoys a measure of confidence of parties on both sides and has the means to assist them economically and militarily, remains the great power best fitted to work actively with them in bringing about a settlement. Over and above helping to provide a framework for negotiation and submitting concrete proposals from time to time, the United States must be prepared to take other constructive steps, such as offering aid and providing guarantees where desired and needed. In all of this, the United States should work with the USSR to the degree that Soviet willingness to play a constructive role will permit.

39. Reconvening the Geneva Peace Conference, Secretary of State Kissinger Speaking at the U.N. General Assembly, September 30, 1976

The role of the United Nations has been crucial. The Geneva Conference met in 1973 under its aegis, and the implementation of subsequent agreements has been negotiated in its working groups. Security Council resolutions form the only agreed framework for negotiations. The U.N. Emergency Force, Disengagement Observer Force, and Truce Supervision Organization are even now helping maintain peace on the truce lines. I want to compliment the Secretary General and his colleagues in New York, Geneva, and on the ground in the Middle East for their vigorous support of the peace process at critical moments.

The United States remains committed to help the parties reach a settlement. The step-by-step negotiations of the past three years have now brought us to a point where comprehensive solutions seem possible. The decision before us now is how the next phase of negotiations should be launched.

The United States is prepared to participate in an early resumption of the work of the Geneva Conference. We think a preparatory conference might be useful for a discussion of the structure of future negotiations, but we are open to other suggestions. Whatever steps are taken must be carefully prepared so that once the process begins the nations concerned will advance steadily toward agreement.

The groundwork that has been laid represents a historic opportunity. The United States will do all it can to assure that by the time this Assembly meets next year it will be possible to report significant further progress toward a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

40. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Communiqué, October 1, 1977

Having exchanged views regarding the unsafe situation which remains in the Middle East, U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and Member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. A.A. Gromyko have the following statement to make on behalf of their countries, which are cochairmen of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East:

1. Both governments are convinced that vital interests of the peoples of this area, as well as the interests of strengthening peace and international security in general, urgently dictate the necessity of achieving, as soon as possible, a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This settlement should be comprehensive, incorporating all parties concerned and all questions.

The United States and the Soviet Union believe that, within the framework of a comprehensive settlement of the Middle East problem, all specific questions of the settlement should be resolved, including such key issues as withdrawal of Israeli Armed Forces from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict; the resolution of the Palestinian question, including insuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; termination of the state of war and establishment of normal peaceful relations on the basis of mutual recognition of the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence.

The two governments believe that, in addition to such measures for insuring the security of the borders between Israel and the neighboring Arab states as the establishment of demilitarized zones and the agreed stationing in them of U.N. troops or observers, international guarantees of such borders as well as of the observance of the terms of the settlement, can also be estab-

lished should the contracting parties so desire. The United States and the Soviet Union are ready to participate in these guarantees, subject to their constitutional processes.

2. The United States and the Soviet Union believe that the only right and effective way for achieving a fundamental solution to all aspects of the Middle East problem in its entirety is negotiations within the framework of the Geneva peace conference, specially convened for these purposes, with participation in its work of the representatives of all the parties involved in the conflict including those of the Palestinian people, and legal and contractual formalization of the decisions reached at the conference.

In their capacity as cochairmen of the Geneva conference, the United States and the U.S.S.R. affirm their intention, through joint efforts and in their contacts with the parties concerned, to facilitate in every way the resumption of the work of the conference not later than December 1977. The cochairmen note that there still exist several questions of a procedural and organizational nature which remain to be agreed upon by the participants to the conference.

3. Guided by the goal of achieving a just political settlement in the Middle East and of eliminating the explosive situation in this area of the world, the United States and the U.S.S.R. appeal to all the parties in the conflict to understand the necessity for careful consideration of each other's legitimate rights and interests and to demonstrate mutual readiness to act accordingly.

41. Statements by Egyptian, Israeli, and American Foreign Ministers After the Meeting at Leeds Castle, Great Britain, July 20, 1978

EGYPT

(Radio reporter's interview with Egyptian Foreign Minister Muhammad Ibrahim Kamil in London on July 20—recorded.)

[Text] [Question] Your Excellency, what is your assessment of the London talks? Have these talks produced positive results or does the gap still exist between the two sides?

[Answer] The Leeds Castle meeting was in response to an invitation from U.S. President Carter.

The meeting was an opportunity for us to explain the Egyptian plan for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian people's rights. It is known very well that Egypt submitted this plan to Israel through the United States. The Americans believed that it would have been more appropriate if we explained our plan and its aim to the Israelis directly. I believe that this was a useful process because the Israeli side did not find any gaps in our plan. The Israelis tried to submit their old autonomy plan that was submitted to us at the Ismailia meeting in December and that was rejected then, because through this plan withdrawal and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people would not have been achieved.

Our plan, as is known--I am not going to explain it now--is based on a sound balance between Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza and achieving the Palestinian people's rights, on one hand, and agreeing on security measures that would insure security for the two sides, on the other.

[Question] Was it agreed that there should be another round of talks between the foreign ministers of Egypt and Israel and the U.S. secretary of state?

[Answer] There was no agreement on this. We have stated our stand and it is known. The instructions I received before going to the meeting were clear. The instructions I had were that if the Israeli side showed a positive readiness to raise the subject, I could commit myself to another meeting. However, what happened was that the Israeli side--although it did not reject our plan--Minister Dayan said that he was going to convey our ideas and clarifications of the Egyptian plan to the Israeli Government. Our attitude is that another meeting will depend on Israel's position in the future. There is no commitment, neither to the date nor to the venue of the next meeting.

[Question] Your Excellency, Mr Minister: How about the U.S. role? I mean what was the U.S. role at the talks?

[Answer] We consider the United States a full partner to these talks in view of its special relationship with Israel, in view of its good relations with us, and in view of the enormity of its influence on Israel or of the prospects of its influence on Israel. The United States had accepted playing the role of full partner. Consequently, arrangements were made for the London meeting. Their efforts are continuing in urging the Israeli side to adopt a positive stand which might possibly lead to peace in the area.

ISRAEL

(Interview of Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan by Mikha Limor at Leeds Castle—
July 19, videotaped.)

[Excerpt] [Question] Mr Foreign Minister, Mr Dayan, how do you sum up the 2-day conference here in Leeds Castle?

[Answer] The meetings with the Egyptians this time were the most basic clarification held with them concerning their position both with regard to their proposals, why, what they are proposing, what they see as the things which are so essential and so on, and also, with regard to our proposal, their interest in each and every clause and in the contents of the matters. It was, if I may put it like this, a seminar, to get down to the roots of matters, to understand the approach of the other side and the operative proposals, not a declaration of principles or general things, but getting down to individual details, how will peace or a settlement really appear or be made. More than any other time I regard this as a very positive result, as a preparation for the possibility of advancement from now on.

[Question] You say advancement from now on. Has there been any practical decision on the matter of advance? Any additional meeting?

[Answer] I do not know. The U.S. proposal is for an additional meeting in the near future. We responded to this positively. I do not know whether the Egyptians have announced a positive reply. I am not sure whether the Egyptian delegation was authorized, on the spot, to inform the secretary of state that they are indeed prepared for another meeting as he proposed.

UNITED STATES:

(Statement by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, July 20, 1978)

At President Carter's invitation and with the generous cooperation of the British authorities, the Foreign Ministers of Egypt and Israel and I have held talks since Monday evening at Leeds Castle. Our purpose was to discuss in detail the issues relating to the West Bank and Gaza and to lay a basis for the early continuation of negotiations looking toward peace in the Middle East.

During our 2 days at Leeds Castle, the three delegations met together in an informal setting. The two sides explored in depth the principal issues and clarified for each other their respective proposals concerning the West Bank and Gaza. These were the most candid and probing discussions I have heard between them. I also held

several bilateral meetings with each of the Foreign Ministers.

Major differences remain between the positions of the two sides. There is a lot of hard work ahead. Common elements in their approaches have been identified. I believe Egypt and Israel remain fully committed to establishing a genuine peace, and we will continue to help them in that effort. The parties will be reporting to their respective governments. The governments will be studying these reports. I anticipate there will be further meetings when I go to the Middle East in about 2 weeks [August 5-9]. In the meantime, I have asked Ambassador at Large [Alfred L.] Atherton to go to the area to maintain contact with the parties and to participate, as they might find useful, in preparations for further meetings.

The foreign ministers join me in expressing our thanks to the Government of the United Kingdom for the gracious hospitality extended to us and our delegations at Leeds Castle.

42. Egyptian, Israeli, and American Foreign Ministers at Camp David, February 1979

Delegations headed by Egyptian Prime Minister Mustafa Khalil, Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, and Secretary Vance met at Camp David February 21-25, 1979. Following is a statement President Carter made on February 25.¹

I have a statement to read, which has been drafted jointly by the Prime Minister of Egypt and the Foreign Minister of Israel, and it is expressed from my own point of view.

During the past week, I, as President, have kept in close touch with the negotiations at Camp David, and Secretary Vance, Prime Minister Khalil, and Foreign Minister Dayan have now given me a firsthand report on their talks.

In light of the developments in the talks at Camp David this past week, we are discussing with the two governments the possibility of moving these

negotiations to the head-of-government level later this week. Prime Minister Begin would then represent Israel, and Prime Minister Khalil, who has been authorized by President Sadat to conclude the negotiations on behalf of Egypt, would represent Egypt.

I would be going to Camp David with Prime Minister Begin and Prime Minister Khalil, accompanied by Secretary Vance. Prime Minister Khalil is leaving this afternoon for Cairo for consultations. Foreign Minister Dayan is returning to Israel this evening to report to the Prime Minister and to the Cabinet.

I am prepared to spare no effort in achieving the peace settlement foreseen in the Camp David accords reached last year. The other two partners in these negotiations share this determination. □

43. Statement by the Government of France, March 29, 1979

Following the signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the French government, which has taken note of the texts published and praised the efforts made by President Carter, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, deems it necessary to reiterate its position.

The just and lasting peace to which all the peoples of the Middle East aspire can only come about if all the parties concerned, including the representatives of the Palestinian people, are invited to take part in an overall settlement based on Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. France maintains that the following principles should guide this settlement and be recognized by the parties to the negotiations:

- Withdrawal of Israeli forces from the territories occupied in June 1967;
- Right of the Palestinian people to a homeland;
- Right of all the states in the region, including Israel, to live in peace within secure, recognized and guaranteed boundaries.

We are obliged to note that certain conditions we consider indispensable in matters of procedure as well as in those of principle are not fulfilled by the complex agreements recently concluded by the signatories of the peace treaty. The government cannot help but express its concern in this regard over certain positions recently taken.

France remains convinced that dialogue and negotiation on the basis of resolution 242 are the path to follow. It hopes that the necessary negotiations may demonstrate the will to arrive at a genuine overall settlement in which all the interested parties would participate and which would have the endorsement of the international community. France's most heartfelt wish is to pursue its efforts in such a way that the entire Middle East will see a definitive and overall settlement bring an end to the tribulations it has suffered for 30 years.

44. Statement by the Government of Great Britain, May 18, 1979

(Note.—Sir Ian Gilmore, Lord Privy Seal, outlines British policy in the Middle East in the House of Commons on behalf of the new government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.)

"The Government will give a high priority to the search for a Middle East settlement that will enable all the peoples of the area, including of course the

Israelis and the Palestinian people, to live in peace and security. Such a settlement must deal satisfactorily with all aspects of the dispute.

"President Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem and the successful conclusion of negotiations between Egypt and Israel have given a new impetus to efforts to achieve peace. The treaty between them has shown that patient negotiations can produce far-reaching results, even in the face of the hostility and mistrust of decades, and it reflects great credit on all those who worked so hard to bring it about.

"However, as President Carter himself has said, the treaty between Egypt and Israel is only a step towards full peace. It represents only a partial implementation of Security Council Resolution 242. Major issues have still to be tackled, most important of all the question of the Palestinians. A start will be made to solving this problem in the negotiations which will shortly begin on the future of the West Bank and Gaza. There is no doubt that they will be very difficult because the objectives of the two sides are very different. If the momentum established by the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel is to be maintained, it is vital that they result quickly in full and genuine autonomy for the areas concerned. Only if this can be achieved will the Palestinians have grounds for hope that their legitimate aspirations can eventually be achieved and Resolution 242 implemented in all its parts.

"The Government stand ready to help in this process in any way they can... The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has already had discussions with his colleagues in the Community on ways in which the Nine can contribute, and will shortly be discussing these problems with Secretary Vance.

"... I should also like to take this opportunity to put on record the Government's firm position to Israel's policy of settlement in the occupied territories. These settlements are not only contrary to the provisions of the Geneva Conventions; they are a truly major obstacle to the building of trust in the area, and, therefore, to peace.

"A decision by the Israeli Government to halt all settlement activity during the forthcoming negotiations would be a major contribution to creating a climate of confidence."

45. Non-Aligned Conference in Havana, Excerpts From Final Declaration, September 7, 1979

The situation in the Middle East

98. The Conference reaffirmed that the situation in the Middle East continues to pose a serious threat to world peace and security due to the increasing possibility of a new war as a result of Israel's determination to pursue its policy of aggression, expansionism and colonial settlement in the occupied territories with the support of the United States of America. This support encourages Israel in its refusal to recognize the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and to withdraw from all the occupied Arab territories, in violation of all the relevant resolutions adopted by the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement.

99. The Conference therefore considered it essential to reaffirm all the principles and resolutions already adopted by the Non-Aligned Movement on the Question of Palestine and the situation in the Middle East since its inception, and particularly since the Israeli aggression of 1967. It reaffirmed that no just solution to the problem could be found nor peace restored in the region until the following basic principles were simultaneously applied in their entirety:

(a) The Palestinian question is the crux of the problem of the Middle East, and the fundamental cause of the Arab-Israeli conflict;

(b) The Question of Palestine and the problem of the Middle East are an integral whole, neither can be settled in isolation from the other. In consequence there can be no partial solution or a settlement that involves only some of the parties to the conflict, just as there can be no separate peace. Peace must be all-embracing, include all the parties, eliminate all the causes of the conflict, and it must be just;

(c) No just peace can be established in the region unless it is based on total and unconditional withdrawal by Israel from all the occupied Palestinian and other Arab occupied territories, and the recovery by the Palestinian people of all its inalienable national rights, including its right to return to its homeland, to self-determination and to the establishment of an independent State in Palestine, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3236 (XXIX);

(d) The city of El Qods is an integral part of occupied Palestine. It must be evacuated in its entirety and restored unconditionally to Arab sovereignty;

(e) The Palestine Liberation Organization is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It alone possesses the right to represent the Palestinian people, and is entitled to exercise the full and sovereign right to participate on an equal footing in all international conferences, activities and fora dealing with the Palestinian problem and the Arab-Israeli conflict with a view to recovering the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and the settlement of the Middle East problem. No settlement to the problem can be comprehensive, just and acceptable without the Palestine Liberation Organization participating in it as a sovereign party and on an equal footing with the other parties concerned;

(f) All measures taken by Israel in the Palestinian and Arab territories since their occupation, including all arrangements, constructions, modifications and alterations designed to transform the political, cultural, religious, physical, geographic and demographic features are illegal and null and void;

(g) The establishment of colonies (settlements) in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel constitutes an illegal act which is null and void and is an obstacle to peace. For this reason such colonies must be dismantled immediately, and no new ones allowed to be established.

100. The Conference of Heads of State and/or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries noted that the United States policy in aligning itself with Israel and in supporting it in all areas, particularly in its continued occupation of the Arab territories, at the very time when the United States has opted against the Palestinian people and their inalienable rights, plays a major role in preventing the establishment of a just and comprehensive peace in the region. Far from working for peace, the United States is trying instead to obtain partial solutions that are favourable to Zionist aims and underwrite the gains of Israeli aggression at the expense of the Palestinian Arab people and the entire Arab nation. For this reason the Conference condemned American policies and manoeuvres in the region.

101. The Conference affirmed that any departure from the resolutions of the conferences of the Non-Aligned Countries on the Middle East problem and the question of Palestine undermines the struggle for the liberation of the occupied Arab territories and the realization of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people, and is prejudicial to the unity of the Non-Aligned Movement in its fight against colonialism, occupation, racism and zionism. Such departure also runs counter to the determination of the non-aligned countries to put an end to the occupation of the Palestinian and Arab territories and to assist the Palestinian people to achieve its inalienable national rights.

102. The Conference reaffirmed that the Non-Aligned Movement considers the cause of Palestine and of the Arab territories occupied since 1967 as the cause of all the non-aligned countries.

103. The Conference endorsed the right of the Palestine Liberation Organization and of the Arab States to reject and oppose any solution or settlement detrimental to the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people and the liberation of all the occupied Arab territories, and to foil them through all possible means, including the use of force.

104. The Conference vigorously denounced Israel's exploitation of the natural resources in Palestine and the occupied Arab territories, and its violation of the Hague and Geneva Conventions, and called upon all States to take the necessary measures to prevent any co-operation with Israel which might enable it to continue its illegal exploitation of these resources or obtain illicit profits from such exploitation.

105. The Conference condemned Israel's persistent violation of the fundamental rights and freedoms of the inhabitants of the occupied Palestinian and Arab territories. It likewise condemned Israel's persistent policy of colonization and expulsion of the indigenous Arab population, its alteration of the physical, cultural, religious, and demographic features of the occupied territories, the destruction of Arab homes and confiscation of Arab property in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention (1949). The Conference also condemned Israel's refusal to receive or co-operate with the Commission established by Security Council resolution 446 (1979) to investigate the situation relating to settlements in the occupied Arab territories, including Jerusalem; and its rejection of Security Council resolution 452 (1979).

106. The Conference recalled the resolutions adopted by United Nations and reaffirmed the resolutions of the non-aligned conferences which determined that zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination.

107. The Conference denounced the position adopted by certain States, notably the United States of America which continue to supply Israel with advanced weaponry and various forms of aid for the development of an arms industry in Israel. The Conference expressed its deep concern at the escalation of Israeli military strength in both conventional and nuclear weapons, with the aim of establishing Israel as a colonialist and racist base in the third world in general, and Asia and Africa in particular, thus posing a threat to world peace and security.

The Conference called for the implementation of resolution 33² adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its thirty-third session concerning military co-operation with Israel.

108. The Conference condemned the co-operation existing between Israel and the racist régime of South Africa for the development of Israel's arms industry so that it can supply advanced weapons to repressive and racist régimes, and to enable the United States of America to use Israel as an intermediary for that purpose.

109. For the sake of safeguarding international peace and security, and in particular to put an end to Israeli aggression against Lebanon, the Conference appealed to all member countries to call upon the United Nations Security Council to take the necessary enforcement measures against Israel, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, especially those set forth in Chapter VII.

110. The Conference affirmed its support for the unity of Lebanon, land and people, and its independence and sovereignty and strongly condemns Israeli raids and continued aggression in south Lebanon and its failure to withdraw from parts of Lebanese territory and its continued and repeated attacks against Lebanon, particularly against peaceful towns and villages in the south using the most advanced aircraft and weapons supplied by the United States of America; inflicting thousands of innocent casualties including women, children and elderly people, the destruction of towns and villages and the economic structure of the area as well as the exodus of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians from their homes in the area.

The Conference condemned the Israeli attempt to consolidate their occupation of parts of southern Lebanon through their agents disrupting the unity of Lebanon and its people as well as its sovereignty over all its territory.

The Conference further condemned all acts which constitute a violation of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the resolutions adopted by the Security Council.

The Conference called upon all States to support the people of Lebanon who are being subjected to savage Zionist attacks and appeals to them to exert efforts by all means to put an end to those attacks, and to ensure respect for the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial integrity of Lebanon.

The Conference called upon the Security Council to implement all resolutions relating to this question, particularly resolutions 425, 426 and 450 and to take measures prescribed in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter against Israel.

The Conference further called on all member States of the Non-Aligned Movement to support the Lebanese position in all international organizations particularly in the United Nations.

111. The Conference strongly condemned the action taken by the imperialist States, in particular the United States of America, to increase and consolidate their military presence in the region. It further condemned threats made by the United States of America to use force against the Arab countries, in particular the oil-producing countries.

The Conference also denounced threats and pressures against other countries which support the just Palestinian and Arab cause.

112. The Conference commends the active solidarity shown by States and by other peace-, freedom-, and justice-loving democratic progressive forces and organizations which support the struggle of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation. It invites those States, forces and organizations to intensify their political, diplomatic and material support for the Palestinian people and the Arab countries in their efforts to recover all their national rights and all the occupied Arab territories.

The Question of Palestine

113. The Conference reaffirmed that the Zionist occupation, the usurpation of Palestine and of the rights of its people, is the core of the Middle East conflict, which render any solution to that conflict impossible without the exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable national rights, including the right to return, to self-determination, and to the establishment of an independent Palestinian State in Palestine.

114. The Conference recalled that the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 33/28 had declared that the validity of agreements purporting to solve the problem of Palestine required that they be within the framework of the United Nations and its Charter and its resolutions on the basis of the full attainment and exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, including the right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine, and with the participation of the Palestine Liberation Organization; declared all agreements which did not meet the said requirements as null and void; invited all member States to continue to support the Palestinian people's right to pursue its struggle by all means, including armed struggle, against the Zionist occupation of Palestine, until the recovery by the Palestinian people of its inalienable national rights. Invited all members to intensify their efforts within the United Nations and its specialized agencies in compliance with General Assembly resolutions, in particular resolution 3236 (XXIX).

115. The Conference noted with deep concern that since the Camp David accords among Egypt, Israel and the United States, Israel has intensified the implementation of its policy by confiscating Palestinian lands in occupied territory, establishing Zionist settlements and installing new military posts, in addition to annexing Jerusalem and turning it into a Jewish city; condemned Israel and demanded the halting of that policy, the immediate dismantling of existing settlements and the restoration of the Arab character of Jerusalem, in compliance with Security Council resolution 452 (1979).

116. The Conference affirmed that the restoration of Jerusalem to Arab sovereignty is an indispensable condition for a durable peace. Israel should be compelled to adhere to the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council regarding Jerusalem and the Holy Places. The Conference appealed to members of the Non-Aligned Movement to take firm measures, including severance of diplomatic and economic relations, with countries which recognized, formally or by implication, the city of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

117. The Conference expressed its concern in the face of the escalation of barbaric attacks on southern Lebanon and the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, which have been increasing in scope since the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. This aggression, carried out by land, sea and air, was tantamount to genocide of the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples, with Israel using the most sophisticated weapons supplied by the United States of America, thereby sowing death and destruction, and causing the flight of hundreds of thousands of Lebanese and Palestinian civilians, including large numbers of women and children.

118. The Conference denounced the Zionist and racist policy pursued by Israel, which was stubbornly continuing to ignore the decisions of the international community and maintaining its military occupation, engaging in terror and brutal oppression against the Palestinian people, thereby demonstrating its racist, expansionist, aggressive and discriminatory nature. That policy was a challenge to world opinion and a flagrant violation of the principles of the United Nations and its resolutions and of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

119. The Conference stressed the need for concrete solidarity in every form - political, cultural and informational and in respect of programmes for military aid to the Palestinian people, led by the PLO - so as to develop the struggle for the liberation of its homeland; and also called for the adoption of all measures to ensure further international recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

120. The Conference invited the Security Council to meet its responsibilities by imposing on Israel the sanctions provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter. The Heads of State or Government participating in the Conference affirmed their commitment, in concert with all peace-loving States and forces, to the adoption of all steps, within the United Nations and in particular in the Security Council, to confront the continuing challenge by Israel. These measures should include the application of all necessary sanctions against Israel, as well as a mandatory and total embargo and its exclusion from the international community. It is essential, also, to study the political, diplomatic and economic measures to be taken against countries that support the Zionist racist régime.

121. The Conference expressed its appreciation for the work of the United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People and its positive contribution to the search for a just solution to the Palestinian problem. The Conference also reaffirmed its support for the decisions and proposals of the Committee and called upon that Committee to consider the situation as it developed and to make further appropriate recommendations.

122. The Conference expressed its regret that the Security Council had not yet taken any decision concerning the General Assembly recommendations providing for the free exercise by the Palestinian people of its inalienable rights. It reiterated its request to the Security Council to study the recommendations and adopt them.

123. The Conference condemned the threat by the United States to use the veto in the Security Council against any resolution concerning the implementation of the Palestinian people's inalienable national rights. In the face of that threat, which was calculated to obstruct Security Council action, the Conference decided that an emergency special session of the United Nations General Assembly should be convened should the Security Council fail to act because of lack of unanimity among the permanent members of the Council. It entrusted the Co-ordinating Bureau in New York, acting in co-ordination with the United Nations Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, to call for such an emergency special session at the appropriate time. With that in mind, the Conference again stressed the threat to world peace and security should the Security Council fail to meet its obligations under the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

46. Statement on the Problem in the Middle East, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at the U.N. General Assembly, September 25, 1979

The Middle East problem, if divested of the immaterial, boils down to the following-- either the consequences of the aggression against the Arab states and peoples are eliminated or the invaders get a reward by appropriating lands that belong to others.

A just settlement and the establishment of durable peace in the Middle East require that Israel should end its occupation of all the Arab lands it seized in 1967, that the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine including the right to create their own state be safeguarded and that the right of all states in the Middle East, including Israel, to independent existence under conditions of peace be effectively guaranteed.

The separate deal between Egypt and Israel resolves nothing. It is a means designed to lull the vigilance of peoples. It is a way of piling up on a still greater scale explosive material capable of producing a new conflagration in the Middle East. Moreover, added to the tense political atmosphere in this and the adjacent areas is the heavy smell of oil.

It is high time that all states represented in the United Nations realized how vast is the tragedy of the Arab people of Palestine. What is the worth of declarations in defence of humanism and human rights--whether for refugees or not--if before the eyes of the entire world the inalienable rights of an entire people driven from its land and deprived of a livelihood are grossly trampled upon?

The Soviet policy with respect to the Middle East problem is one of principle. We are in favour of a comprehensive and just settlement, of the establishment of durable peace in the Middle East, a region not far from our borders. The Soviet Union sides firmly with Arab peoples who resolutely reject deals at the expense of their legitimate interests.

47. Statement of European Community, Excerpts of Remarks by Irish Foreign Minister O'Kennedy Before the U.N. General Assembly, September 25, 1979

The Nine continue to hope that it will be possible to achieve in the Middle East the just, lasting and comprehensive settlement to which this Assembly is overwhelmingly committed. They believe that such a settlement must be based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, applied in all their parts and on all fronts. It must also be based on the principles set out by the Nine in their statement on 29 June 1977 and on several occasions subsequently.

26. These principles are as follows:--

- (i) the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force;
- (ii) the need for Israel to end the territorial occupation which it has maintained since the conflict of 1967;
- (iii) respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries;
- (iv) recognition that in the establishment of a just and lasting peace account must be taken of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

27. The Nine emphasise that it is essential that all parties to the negotiation of a settlement accept the right of all states in the area to live within secure and recognised boundaries with adequate guarantees. Equally, of course, it is essential that there be respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. These include the right to a homeland and the right, through its representatives, to play its full part in the negotiation of a comprehensive settlement.

28. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, together with the principles I have mentioned, taken as a whole, set the essential framework for a peace settlement. In the view of the Nine it is necessary that they be accepted by all those involved - including the Palestine Liberation Organization - as the basis for

negotiation of a comprehensive settlement in which all the parties will play their full part.

29. Such a settlement would win the endorsement and support of the international community; and it would meet the legitimate rights and interests of all parties. This includes Israel, which is entitled to exist at peace within secure boundaries, accepted and adequately guaranteed; and the Palestinian people, who are entitled, within the framework set by a peace settlement, to exercise their right to determine their own future as a people.

30. The Nine recognise of course that such a settlement is not easy to achieve. But they believe it must be the continuing aim of the international community to promote it. They are convinced that such a comprehensive settlement would bring peace at last to the region; and they recall that they have already expressed their readiness to consider participating in guarantees in the framework of the United Nations.

31. The past year has seen some major developments to which the Nine, in view of their close connections with the region, are particularly sensitive. One of these was the signature last March of agreements between Egypt and Israel. In their declaration of 26th March last, the Nine stated their position on these agreements.

32. Since the signature of these agreements, which the Nine see as a correct application of the principles of Resolution 242 as far as Egyptian-Israeli relations are concerned, there has

been progress towards improved relations between Egypt and Israel and there have been withdrawals of Israeli forces in Sinai. The Nine note these recent developments and recall that one of the basic requirements of a comprehensive settlement is an end to the territorial occupation which Israel has maintained since the conflict of 1967. The Nine will continue to follow the situation closely and will seek in every way they can to advance the aim of a comprehensive and lasting peace settlement involving all parties and meeting all of the fundamental issues I have mentioned.

33. It follows that the Nine must view with the greatest regret any action or statement which aggravates the present situation or places an obstacle in the way of a peace settlement. Accordingly, they strongly deplore continued acts of violence by any of those involved. The Nine are opposed to the Israeli Government's policy of establishing settlements in occupied territories in contravention of international law; and they cannot accept claims by Israel to sovereignty over occupied territories, since this would be incompatible with Resolution 242. The security of Israel, which the Nine consider essential, can be guaranteed, and the legitimate rights of the Palestinians given effect, within the framework of a comprehensive settlement.

34. The Nine are fully aware, too, of the importance of the question of Jerusalem to all parties. They know that an acceptable solution to this problem will be vital to an overall settlement on the basis I have indicated. They consider, in particular, that any agreement on the future status of Jerusalem should guarantee free access by all to the Holy Places; and they do not accept any unilateral moves which claim to change the status of the city.

48. Statement of People's Republic of China, Excerpts of Remarks by Vice Foreign Minister Han Nianlong Before the U.N. General Assembly, September 27, 1979

The people of the world are currently watching the situation in the Middle East with concern. Developments in the Middle East since the 33th session of the UN General Assembly have shown that the crux of the Middle East question still lies in the struggle between the superpowers for oil resources and strategic areas and the expansionist policy of Israel. One superpower sticks to its position of partiality to Israel. The other has used every opportunity to carry out infiltration and expansion, split Arab unity and undermine the stability and peace of the Middle East. The Israeli authorities remain adamant in obstructing and opposing an overall settlement of the Middle East question. They have continued to make armed attacks on southern Lebanon and subjected the Palestinian and other Arab peoples to new war threats and provocations. There is a long way to go toward an overall and just settlement of the Middle East question.

Of late, more and more countries and world opinion have come to agree that in order to have stability and peace in the Middle East it is essential to respect the Arab national interests and the Palestinian people's national rights. Such is the truth and the general trend. It must be pointed out that the just struggle carried out by the Arab and Palestinian people over a long period has promoted this general trend and that it will have to mainly rely on the staunch unity and persistent struggle of the Arab and Palestinian people to fulfill the wish and to achieve the goal of the Arab people. Nevertheless, the United Nations must play its positive and instrumental role in promoting efforts to solve the Middle East problem.

Here we reiterate the unswerving support of the Chinese Government and people for the people of the Arab countries and the Palestinian people in their just struggle.

We strongly condemn the expansionism and rivalry of the superpowers in the Middle East and firmly oppose the sinister superpower attempt to sow discord among the Arab countries and Israel's peremptory attitude of obstructing an overall settlement of the Middle East question. The occupied Arab land must be recovered and the Palestinian people must be given their national rights including the right to return to and build their own homes. It is our sincere hope that all parties in the Arab world will show mutual understanding, restore their unity and work together to speed up their victory.

49. Statement of Pope John Paul II, Excerpts of Remarks Before the U.N. General Assembly, October 2, 1979

It is my fervent hope that a solution also to the Middle East crises may draw nearer. While being prepared to recognize the value of any concrete step or attempt made to settle the conflict, I want to recall that it would have no value if it did not truly represent the "first stone" of a general over-all peace in the area, a peace that, being necessarily based on equitable recognition of the rights of all, cannot fail to include the consideration and just settlement of the Palestinian question. Connected with this question is that of the tranquillity, independence and territorial integrity of Lebanon within the formula that has made it an example of peaceful and mutually fruitful co-existence between distinct communities, a formula that I hope will, in the common interest, be maintained, with the adjustments required by the developments of the situation. I also hope for a special statute that, under international guarantees - as my predecessor Paul VI indicated - would respect the particular nature of Jerusalem, a heritage sacred to the veneration of millions of believers of the three great monotheistic religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

Statement of John F. Kennedy, Jr.

I, John F. Kennedy, Jr., do hereby certify that the following is a true and correct copy of the original document as it appears in the files of the Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts.

The original document is a letterhead memorandum dated May 1, 1961, and is addressed to the President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, Jr., from the Vice President, John F. Kennedy, Jr.

The subject of the memorandum is the proposed amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which would provide for the direct election of the President and Vice President of the United States.

The memorandum is signed by John F. Kennedy, Jr., Vice President of the United States.

ISRAEL

50. Israeli Laws on Jurisdiction Over Occupied Territories and Jerusalem, June 27, 1967

LAW AND ADMINISTRATION ORDINANCE (AMENDMENT No. 11) LAW, 5727-1967

1. In the Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948), the following section shall be inserted after section 11A:

"Application of law. 11B. The law, jurisdiction and administration of the State shall extend to any area of Eretz Israel designated by the Government by order."

2. This Law shall come into force on the date of its adoption by the Knesset.

MUNICIPALITIES ORDINANCE (AMENDMENT No. 6) LAW, 5727-1967

1. In the Municipalities Ordinance), the following section shall be inserted after section 8:

"Enlargement of area of jurisdiction in certain cases. 8A. (a) The Minister may, at his discretion and without an inquiry under section 8 being made, enlarge, by proclamation, the area of a particular municipality by the inclusion of an area designated by order under section 11B of the Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948).

51. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, Reply to Nasser, Interview in Newsweek, February 17, 1969

(Note.—In a conversation with Newsweek Senior Editor Arnaud de Borchgrave and Newsweek's Michael Elkins, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol of Israel explained his objections to Nasser's peace proposal and replied to some of the charges that the Egyptian leader had leveled against Israel. See also document No. 63.)

Q. *How do you justify Israel's continued occupation of Arab lands?*

A. We have fought three wars in our brief lifetime of twenty years. If the Arab governments had accepted, as the whole world did, the establishment of the State of Israel, this would not have happened. In fact, there would have been no need to change our borders one jot. But after the six-day war, it is a miracle that we are still here. So why should we now crawl on our hands and knees to the Arabs and say: Please, do us a favor and take it all back . . . If we had lost the last war, our lot would have been the same as the nine Iraqi Jews hanged in public last week. Our occupation of the territory is the outcome of war. In 1948, Jordan conquered the west bank contrary to the resolution of the United Nations. In 1967 we conquered the west bank. You seem to forget the Arabs were the first to attack.

Q. *Th Arabs attacked in 1967?*

A. They closed the Strait of Tiran, moved tanks and troops into Sinai, and were headed toward our borders. When they chased the U.N. troops out, we were faced with a blatant act of war; there was no way out for us. I tried to delay, hoping

something would happen, something would intervene. It didn't . . . guarantees proved worthless. Ten years ago, President Eisenhower pledged that the Suez Canal would be open to us and that if President Nasser tried to stop it, the international community would have to deal with the situation with a firm hand. You know what happened.

Q. President Nasser charges that your objective is a greater Israel, from the Nile to the Euphrates. What can you say that would convince him this is not so?

A. It is difficult to say anything that would convince him. During the last two decades we have repeatedly said we are ready to discuss our problems with Nasser. I am still ready to fly to Cairo tomorrow. I don't want to talk to him as a conqueror. I want to rid his mind of the ridiculous notion of a greater Israel. He cannot base his policy on a phrase that has been uttered by individuals who represent nothing but themselves. Even the Bible doesn't use that phrase. The "river of Egypt" referred to in the Old Testament is not the Nile but the El-Arish River—a muddy stream a few miles inside Sinai. I can pledge my word to Nasser that greater Israel never has been and never will be our policy. I am ready to meet him anywhere, anytime, and I won't quarrel about procedure, agenda, or the shape of the table.

Q. What about your plans for new Israeli settlements on the Golan Plateau in Syria, on the west bank of the Jordan River, and in Egyptian Sinai?

A. You know what happened on the Golan Heights before the war—the Syrians shelled our settlements from there. Never again. Besides, these are not ordinary settlements but military agricultural outposts.

Q. But why not an agreement to demilitarize Golan rather than settle Israelis in what is part of Syria?

A. What is demilitarization? Who watches over the border? No one knows what demilitarization means.

We had a war. We won it. And as long as Golan remains a dangerous spot, we have to defend it. Besides we have no one to talk to on the Syrian side. They are not even willing to talk with Dr. Gunnar Jarring.

Q. Are you prepared to give up these new settlements in occupied territories as part of a final peace settlement?

A. It is not proper to answer iffy questions today. We are flexible on everything, but I don't want to get into specifics before negotiations.

Q. Right after the six-day war, Israeli leaders said that they would make generous offers to settle the Palestinian refugee problem. What happened?

A. We were perhaps a little overoptimistic on the chances for lasting settlement. Clearly the refugee problem can only be settled in cooperation with our neighbors. We must have a dialogue. The refugees are an international problem. We need land and water for them. We are a small nation with only 7,720 square miles of land and an annual water flow of 1.5 billion cubic meters. Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and Iraq have between them 670,000 square miles of land and an annual water flow of more than 90 billion cubic meters.

Q. I'm afraid I don't see your point.

A. If these countries are interested in settling the refugee problem, there is

much territory and much wasted water. We will pay compensation to the refugees or buy land for them to resettle in neighboring countries.

Q. Arab leaders see no chance of peace because they are convinced you are determined to hold on to what you have conquered, come what may. Are they right?

A. I am sure that Nasser knows that the opposite is the case.

Q. How?

A. Through channels I cannot disclose, Arab rulers have heard interesting things from us. They know we want peace.

Q. But would you go back to your frontiers in return for peace?

A. Let me say, clearly and unequivocally, there will be no return to the situation preceding the June war. The present cease-fire lines will not be changed except for secure and agreed lines within the framework of a final and durable peace. We must discuss new borders, new arrangements. The armistice agreements are dead and buried. We don't want any part of the settled area of the west bank—Nablus, Jenin and so on. What we say is that the Jordan River must become a security border for Israel with all that that implies. Our army shall be stationed only on the strip along that border.

Q. You have repeatedly demanded direct negotiations with the Arab states, but if part of your country were occupied by Arab armies, could you afford to sit down with them face to face?

A. Surely. No doubt. No doubt whatsoever. God forbid, but if we had been the losers and—miraculously—were still alive and they were to say "We are ready for peace negotiations," I cannot imagine that we would refuse.

Q. You insist on a permanent peace with the Arab governments as the price of withdrawal. But do you think that is possible without a solution to the refugee problem?

A. For our neighbors, the refugees are a convenient political football, not a life-and-death issue. If they want to begin with the refugee problem, we are ready. We are completely flexible on the agenda. It's all a package deal so it doesn't matter where you start.

Q. The U.N. has said that the refugees should be given a choice between compensation and the right to their old homes. What is your stand on this?

A. I would like to remind our friend Nasser that there was a time when we agreed to the return of 100,000 refugees—though I was against it as I didn't believe it would work out, because Arab leaders needed them as pawns. Today the situation has changed. Any returning refugees would be a time bomb for Israel. We cannot take them back, but we have agreed over the years to return of 40,000 of the refugees on compassionate grounds. We are ready to pay compensation.

Q. Would you withdraw from the occupied territories if the great powers would guarantee a settlement that gave you freedom of navigation, an Arab declaration of nonbelligerence, Arab recognition of the territorial integrity of Israel, and a demilitarized zone along your frontiers policed by the U.N.?

A. No. We have learned a lesson. Remember the United Nations force in 1967? Nasser whistled and they packed their kit bags. And President Nasser speaks of freedom of navigation in "international waterways." What is "interna-

tional"? I am sure that he will say the Suez Canal is an Egyptian waterway. He has said it before.

Q. What concessions do you insist upon in return for withdrawal from the Arab lands? Do you insist upon demilitarization of the Sinai Peninsula and a permanent military presence at Sharm el Sheikh?

A. We don't insist on anything. Try us out and you'll be surprised on the degree of give and take we are prepared for. We have not made any demands for the demilitarization of Sinai. At Sharm el Sheikh, however, we must be in a position to protect the access to the Strait of Tiran—our backyard. We cannot rely on promises and outsiders to do it for us. We cannot live as a nation without a peace treaty. As for the Golan Heights, we will quite simply never give them up. The same goes for Jerusalem. Here there is no flexibility at all. I regret it. I would be very happy to say yes. But every time I look at the map I shake my head because there is no possible way to compromise on Jerusalem. It is the very heart of our state.

Q. Some Israeli leaders are now suggesting that Nasser and King Hussein are too weak domestically to risk a peace settlement, and that eventually you will have to settle with the Palestinians directly. What do you think?

A. If those two could work together—and if Nasser didn't stab the King in the back from time to time—I am quite sure they could sell a reasonable settlement to their peoples. I have met at least half a dozen times with Palestinian leaders on the west bank. They said they would go talk to Hussein and to Nasser. They did, but came back empty-handed.

Q. Do you see the Palestinian commandos—Al-Fatah and the fedayeen—as a potentially important political factor in the Middle East?

A. I don't want to brag, but the fedayeen have lost a lot of people. Many are leaving the movement dispirited. I do not believe the fedayeen will become as important as some people in Western countries seem to think. But if Al-Fatah wants to talk to us directly, we would not say no. If one day they overthrow established Arab governments, we would then have a new enemy and a new situation. But I don't believe this will happen because they feel better off as free lances, and are not at all anxious to take on the burdens of government.

Q. You call the fedayeen terrorists. But how do they differ from other resistance movements through history?

A. If people perpetrate terrorist acts they can, of course, call themselves a resistance movement. But what are they resisting? They cannot find shelter on the west bank; the Arabs there are not cooperating with the fedayeen. That hardly qualifies them as resistance fighters.

Q. But in Gaza the local population is resisting your occupation. Doesn't that constitute a resistance movement?

A. As a Jew, I will answer with another question. What difference does it make? Why should I glorify them with their own label? But, more seriously, I would point out that for twenty years Gaza was occupied by the Egyptians. The Egyptians' curfew there was much tougher than ours. The Palestinian refugees in Gaza resisted the Egyptians just as strongly as they resist us.

Q. *Do you think that Israelis and Palestinians might one day live together in a binational state, comparable to the Christian-Moslem arrangement in Lebanon?*

A. I would not like to be in the same position as Lebanon—that is, on a 50-50 basis. Lebanon could become 60-40 one day . . . and then what happens to the minority?

It's very important that you and your readers should understand that for 2,000 years we were persecuted minorities around the world. Never again. We must have our own place where we are a majority. Look at Cyprus. Twenty-three percent Turks, and look at what is going on. Is that what you want for us? Israel is and must remain a Jewish state.

Q. *In that case, how would you feel about a separate Palestinian Arab state?*

A. I am against it. Personally, I think Palestinian connections and ties should be with Jordan; they have the same customs, same religion, same language. But who knows? Jordan's behavior may force them to have a separate entity.

Q. *If the Jews are entitled to a homeland, aren't the Palestinians similarly entitled to their own country?*

A. What are Palestinians? When I came here there were 250,000 non-Jews—mainly Arabs and Bedouins. It was desert—more than underdeveloped. Nothing. It was only after we made the desert bloom and populated it that they became interested in taking it from us.

Q. *You expect Arab governments to disarm or control the fedayeen. But were Jewish leaders capable of controlling Jewish underground groups like the Stern gang at the time of your own struggle for independence?*

A. Yes, to a certain degree we were. But how can you compare? The Arabs have established governments with armies and police forces. We had nothing. We were just as illegal as the underground movements you just mentioned. And while trying to control them, we had at the same time to struggle against the British Army.

Q. *President Nasser told NEWSWEEK that Egyptian representatives are prepared to sit down with Israelis in joint committees with U.N. observers as they did under the 1949 armistice agreements. What are your objections to resuming such a dialogue—a dialogue, incidentally, which Nasser says your government ended?*

A. There was always a third party in these committees and this third party—the U.N.—was the decisive party. The U.N. observer nearly always said he never saw what happened. The arrangement had become a mockery, a travesty of justice. When Nasser launched the first fedayeen raids more than ten years ago, he acted as though he was free to do as he pleased while we were supposed to respect the armistice agreements. That's why the arrangement broke down. But if Nasser is ready to resume these joint committees and to sit with us there, why isn't he ready to sit with us under the U.N. Security Council resolution of Nov. 22, 1967?

Q. *Hasn't the time come for some new Israeli peace initiatives?*

A. We feel that every day is the time for this. The question is what and how. Let's sit down and discuss it. Let's reason together. We have said—and it certainly reached the ears of the Jordanian Government—that if Jordan needs a Mediterranean harbor we are prepared to give them free port facilities in Haifa or Ashdod. We can embark on all sorts of joint endeavors to develop their industry and export

business. Go talk to the Arab farmers on the west bank and they will tell you what we have done in a few months to increase their productivity—which had barely changed for centuries before. We dug wells for them where their own people had assured them there was no water. This is what we can offer. But there is a price. Either they maintain a state of war and nothing happens, or they want real peace and then the hopes for the future are unlimited.

Q. If you were President Nixon and trying to counteract Russian penetration of the Arab world, wouldn't you find it necessary to inch a bit closer to the Arab view?

A. It is always hard to put yourself in someone else's shoes, especially those of the President of the United States. But I am convinced that, although we fought alone, the six-day war enhanced the interests of the free world in the Middle East. There is much alarm about Soviet influence, but what do Egypt and Syria have to offer? And the states that do have a lot to offer—Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Turkey, etc.—in those states Soviet influence is minimal. The value of Israel to the West in this part of the world will, I predict, be out of all proportion to its size. We will be a real bridge between three continents and the free world will be very thankful not only if we survive, but if we continue to thrive in secure and guaranteed borders.

**52. Prime Minister Golda Meir, Statement to the Knesset,
Excerpts, March 17, 1969**

"....we want a simple and elementary thing for us and our neighbors
.... peace.... which is achieved through talking face to face. Only
in this way is it possible to achieve peace. We need friends but our
friends can and must understand that our fate cannot be determined
by others.....

The Government of Israel is firm in its conviction, affirmed by the
Knesset, that we want peace and we want a peace agreement that will
assure secure, safe and recognized borders.....we called for and
continue to call for a dialogue to negotiate and arrive at a general
agreement on all the issues....We are ready to negotiate with our
neighbors about peace at any time and on all the issues."

translation from Divrei Ha Knesset, the official record of Knesset
proceedings.

53. Foreign Minister Abba Eban, Statement Before the U.N.
General Assembly, Excerpts, September 30, 1971

"* * * if the Arab States * * * sincerely desire an honorable and lasting peace there are many roads leading to that goal.

The first road lies in a Suez Canal agreement. There are many reasons for giving priority to this attempt. A sudden transition from a conflict of more than two decades to a total settlement has proved difficult. It may be more rational to expect progress by stages. Each stage would bring about a solution of a specific problem while opening the way to further agreements and thus to final peace.

* * * Israel developed a proposal that an arrangement be agreed upon with a view to the opening of the Suez Canal to be cleared and operated by Egypt. Israel would make a withdrawal of its forces from the waterline to an agreed distance. The fighting would not be resumed. Egypt would clear and open the Canal. It would be agreed that there be free passage for all ships and cargoes, including those of Israel. Effective and agreed supervision procedures would be established. Means of deterrence against the danger of violation of the agreement would be assured. The agreement would stand on its own feet but it would not affect or annul the undertakings which the parties gave in August 1970 to hold discussions under Ambassador Jarring's auspices in conformity with his mandate under Security Council Resolution 242 (1967). The line to be held by Israeli forces in accordance with that Canal agreement would not be considered final. When agreement on a final boundary is reached in the framework of the peace settlement Israeli forces will withdraw to it.

* * * "A second road to peace lies through the resumption of negotiations under Ambassador Jarring's auspices. Israel agreed to resume these talks in January 1971 despite Egypt's refusal to rectify its violations of the missile-standstill agreement.

* * * "There are other roads to peace. * * * The problem of refugees requires a broad acceptance of regional and international responsibility. We have therefore proposed the convening of a conference of Middle Eastern States, together with Governments which have contributed to refugee relief and the specialized agencies of the United Nations, in order to chart a five-year plan for the solution of the refugee problem and the integration of refugees into productive life.

* * * "There is a fourth possibility. The problems of boundaries and security are usually considered to be the crux of the negotiation. But there are other unresolved matters in the memoranda presented by Egypt and Israel in February. At first sight there seems to be some proximity between the peace, non-aggression, recognition and navigation clauses suggested by the two Governments. On closer inspection the disparities are substantial, and could become crucial. We suggested in January and later in March that it might be profitable to draft some of the clauses of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty relating to the principles of peace. It is an accepted negotiating technique to begin with problems in which divergences are less broad and thus to create a favorable atmosphere in which to confront the more acute problems.

There is a fifth road toward negotiating procedure and activity; it concerns the negotiating procedure, but its weight is intensively substantive and not at all procedural. * * * Let us meet here this month under the auspices of the United States to discuss the details and principles of a Suez Canal settlement; or under the chairmanship of Ambassador Jarring to discuss the establishment of peace in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) on the basis of our respective memoranda of February 1971."

54. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Excerpts From Statement Before the U.S. Congress, January 28, 1976

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, from this rostrum I declare that, however difficult the road, however hard the challenge, and however complex the process, Israel will strive with all its being to contribute to the peace of the world by pressing ahead with its effort for peace with the Arab countries. This is the driving goal of all our policies.

We know of your concern and national interest in the stability of our area, and I wish to say to you that we seek to be sensitive to them. I believe that certain steps we have pursued have also contributed to that interest. We see the expression of that interest—through the advancement of the human and economic welfare of the peoples of our region—as a positive development and as a hope for progress toward peace itself.

We express our confidence that such developing ties need not be, and must not be, at the cost of Israel's vital interest of liberty and security. And if, in the pursuit of our shared goals, differences

do arise from time to time, then let us recall Jefferson's wisdom that "every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle."

The principle of which I speak is the resolution of a conflict that has lasted too long. Let me share with you my thinking on what has, thus far, stood in the way of a solution to it.

If I were to be asked to state in a word, what is the heart and the core of the Arab-Israeli conflict, I would say this: It is the refusal of the Arab countries to reconcile themselves to the right of existence of one, small, viable, sovereign Jewish State in the land of our people's birth; by Jewish State I mean an independent, democratic society, secular in the equality of all its citizens, Jew and non-Jew alike, before the law, and founded upon historic Jewish values.

By stating this, I am saying that the question of territory, the matter of boundaries, the issue of maps, were not, and are not, the true obstacles to peace.

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, until 1967, Israel did not hold an inch of the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip or the Golan Heights. Israel held not an acre of what is considered disputed territory. And yet we enjoyed no

peace. Year after year Israel called for—pleaded for—a negotiated peace with the Arab governments. Their answer was a blank refusal and more war.

The reason was not a conflict over territorial claims. The reason was, and remains, the fact that a free Jewish state sits on territory at all.

It is in this context that the Palestinian issue must be appraised. That issue is not the obstacle to peace as some would suggest. Certainly, it has to be solved in the context of the final peace.

Peace will come when the Arab leaders finally cross the rubicon from aggressive confrontation to harmonious reconciliation. Then, there is no problem between us that cannot be solved in negotiation. That includes, too, the Palestinian issue, within the geographic and political context of peace with Jordan. When I say Jordan, I do not discount Palestinian representation in the peace delegation of that country. And when I say geography, I do not discount a negotiation concerning the future final peace boundaries of the territories involved.

For the genuine peace we seek, Israel is ready to give up much and to compromise much on territory. In a negotiation whose sincere shared goal is final reconciliation, we shall go more than half way to assure its success.

Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker, a short time ago, from this very rostrum, President Sadat wisely declared; "there is no substitute for direct person-to-person contacts that go deep into the

heart of all the problems which invoke our common concern and capture our imagination." I wish that he would direct those words to me as well as to you, the Congress of the United States. I would then know that the work of true peacemaking has finally begun.

I today declare: I am ready to meet with any Arab head of government, at any time and at any place, for the purpose of peace talks.

I do not know when peace will finally come. But of this I am certain: It will be our future strength that will largely determine the resources of peace in our region. Weakness is no prescription for negotiation. If it be perceived that Israel is not weak, so shall our neighbors perceive the wisdom of mutual compromise, reconciliation, and peace.

What, therefore, does Israel propose as the next step in the effort for peace? Israel proposes the re-convening of the Geneva Peace Conference in accordance with the letter of invitation from the U.N. Secretary General to the parties to the conference.

The basis for the conference has to be founded on two fundamental principles—on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as they were accepted by Israel and by the other parties and powers concerned. The second principle is that the parties to the conflict must be the parties to the peacemaking process. The negotiations for peace must be conducted between ourselves—the Government of Israel and the neighboring Arab governments.

There are some who tell us that—here and there—a change toward realism is perhaps slowly evolving. I pray there is some truth to this.

Israel is determined to encourage whatever symptoms there may be to move that process along. This is why we entered into the interim agreement with Egypt. We did so to encourage the trend toward greater realism. Our aim in the agreement is to promote conditions of stability and trust which, we hope, will produce, in time, a climate for genuine peace negotiations.

In the light of what I said and under the given conditions of regional tension, the pursuit of this policy calls for taking risks. It has required our making tangible concessions for concessions far less tangible. We have done so because we believe it is necessary to take measured risks not only in case of war but also for the sake of peace.

Thus, in a very few weeks time, the defense forces of Israel will carry out a withdrawal in Sinai. We have already handed to Egypt proper the oilfields on the Gulf of Suez and the coastal link to them. With that, Israel has given up its single oil resource. We have agreed to these measures not in return for peace, not even in return for an end to the state of war. We did what we did in the hope that it will move us some steps closer to peace.

Congress, I know, is familiar with these measures. They are major elements of the recent Israel-Egypt agreement, negotiated through the good offices of the United States. May I say that the limited American civilian technical presence—

requested by both parties—and which Congress authorized in the context of this agreement, is a contribution toward the cause of peace. That presence has no function or responsibility in case of war. And I wish to add with emphasis that if a condition of hostilities does arise, I will be the first to call for its removal. This is a matter of fundamental doctrine for Israel. We alone are responsible for our own defense. This is how it has been; this is how it must be. I believe it to be the essence of our political relationship.

55. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Yigal Allon, Article in Foreign Affairs, Excerpts, October
1976


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..... [the geostrategic conditions that have existed in the Middle East over the past nine years permit a solution based upon a fair political compromise. This could provide Israel with the minimal defensible borders that are indispensable without impairing, to any meaningful extent, the basic interests of the other side, including those of the Palestinian community. As with every other compromise, so, too, is this one likely to be painful in the short term to both sides. But this compromise will, in the long run, grant advantages that both sides do not currently possess nor, without it, ever would in the future.

According to the compromise formula I personally advocate, Israel—within the context of a peace settlement—would give up the large majority of the areas which fell into its hands in the 1967 war. Israel would do so not because of any lack of historical affinity between the Jewish people and many of these areas. With regard to Judea and Samaria, for example, historical Jewish affinity is as great as that for the coastal plain or Galilee. Nonetheless, in order to attain a no less historically exalted goal, namely that of peace, such a deliberate territorial compromise can be made.

For its part, the Arab side would have to concede its claim to those strategic security zones which, together with a number of effective arrangements to be discussed below, will provide Israel with that vital element so lacking in the pre-1967 war lines: a defense posture which would enable the small standing army units of Israel's defense force to hold back the invading Arab armies until most of the country's reserve citizens army could be mobilized. These security zones would thus guarantee enough time to organize and launch the counteroffensive needed to defeat any such aggression.

As can be observed from the accompanying map, the armistice lines of 1949 ("the green line") extend along the foothills of the



Judean and Samarian mountains and along the Mediterranean coastal plain—that is, flat territory without any topographical barriers. This leaves central Israel with a narrow area that comprises the Achilles heel of the lines prior to June 4, 1967. It serves as a constant temptation to a hostile army in possession of hilly Judea and Samaria to attempt to inflict a fatal blow against Israel by severing it in two in one fell swoop. Moreover, this weakness would permit such an army not only to strike at Israel's densest population and industrial centers, but also in effect to paralyze almost all of Israel's airspace with surface-to-air missiles with which the Arab armies are so abundantly equipped.

According to the 1949 lines, Jerusalem was pierced through its heart—the university and the principal hospital on Mount Scopus were cut off, while access from the coastal plain to Jerusalem was restricted to a narrow corridor, threatened on both sides by a pincer attack.

In the northeastern sector, the 1949 line left Syria on the dominating Golan Heights, controlling the Huleh Valley and the Galilee Basin at their foothills, and including the sources of the Jordan River and the Sea of Galilee from which Israel draws a vital part of its water supply. Moreover, after 1949 Syria not only repeatedly shelled the Israeli villages located at the Golan foothills but also attempted to divert the sources of the Jordan and thereby deprive Israel of a vital source of water. Even more important, the Golan Heights served in past wars as the most convenient base for the Syrian army to make swift and major attacks upon Galilee, ultimately aimed at the conquest of the entire northern part of our country.

According to the 1949 armistice agreements, signed by Israel in the naïve belief that they would lead swiftly to peace, Egypt was given control of the Gaza Strip. This was a dangerous and needless anomaly. Bordering the unpopulated Sinai desert and without any affinity to Egypt proper, this zone came to serve as a base for large-scale terrorist raids launched at southern Israel. Should the strip be returned to Egyptian control it might easily resume its destructive function. Even worse, it might serve Egypt as a bridgehead for an offensive northward and eastward toward the very heart of Israel, following the historic invasion route from south to north. Another serious defect in the armistice agreements was that it left Israel's southern port entrance at Elath on a tiny strip of shoreline only six miles long from its border with Egypt to that of Jordan. Moreover, Israel's maritime route to the Red Sea and Indian Ocean passes through the Straits of Tiran at Sharm-el-Sheikh, and the Egyptian

blockade there against Israeli ships and cargoes constituted a *casus belli* in both 1956 and 1967.

A reasonable compromise solution can be found for all these weaknesses in the current geostrategic and demographic situation existing in the Middle East. Without going into details or drawing precise maps, an activity that must await direct negotiations between the parties themselves, in my opinion the solution in principle ought to be along the following general lines.

Both to preserve its Jewish character and to contribute toward a solution of the Palestinian issue, Israel should not annex an additional and significant Arab population. Therefore the strategic depth and topographical barriers in the central sector, so totally absent in the lines preceding the 1967 war, cannot be based on moving these lines eastward in a schematic manner, even though this would be logical from a purely strategic point of view. Rather, apart from some minor tactical border alterations along the western section of "the green line," this same goal can be achieved through absolute Israeli control over the strategic zone to the *east* of the dense Arab population, concentrated as it is on the crest of the hills and westward. I am referring to the arid zone that lies between the Jordan River to the east, and the eastern chain of the Samarian and Judean mountains to the west—from Mt. Gilboa in the north through the Judean desert, until it joins the Negev desert. The area of this desert zone is only about 700 square miles and it is almost devoid of population. Thus this type of solution would leave almost all of the Palestinian Arab population of the West Bank under Arab rule.

Cutting through this zone, which continues from north to south, it would be possible to delineate a corridor from west to east under Arab sovereignty. This would permit uninterrupted communication along the Jericho-Ramallah axis, between the Arab populated areas of the West and East banks of the river. In this manner the only realistic solution becomes possible—one that also helps resolve the problem of Palestinian identity that could then find its expression in a single Jordanian-Palestinian state. (After all, the population of both banks, East and West, are Palestinian Arabs. The fact is that the great majority of Palestinians carry Jordanian passports while almost all of Jordan's inhabitants are Palestinians.)

Jerusalem, Israel's capital, which was never the capital of any Arab or Muslim state, but was always the capital and center of the Jewish people, cannot return to the absurd situation of being partitioned. The Holy City and adjacent areas essential for its protection and communications must remain a single, undivided unit under

Israel's sovereignty. Because of its universal status, however, in that it is holy to three great religions, as well as the mixed nature of its inhabitants¹, a solution for the religious interests connected with it can be found, a *religious* and not a political solution. For example, special status could be granted to the representatives of the various faiths in the places holy to them, just as it might be possible to base the municipal structure of the city upon subdistricts that take ethnic and religious criteria into account.

While the strategic zone in the central sector is crucial to Israel's security, so, too, is a zone on the Golan Heights. As past experience has demonstrated, a border not encompassing the Golan Heights would again invite the easy shelling of the villages below in the Huleh Valley, the Galilee Basin and eastern Galilee. More important than the danger of renewed Syrian shelling and sniping at Israeli villagers and fishermen below, which is basically a *tactical* question, is that Israel needs an effective defense line on the Golan Heights for two cardinal *strategic* reasons: first, to preclude any new Syrian attempts to deny Israel its essential water resources and, second, to prevent a massive Syrian attack on the whole of Galilee, either independently or in coordination with other Arab armies on Israel's other frontiers.

In my view the city of Gaza and its environs, which is heavily populated by Palestinian Arabs, could comprise a part of the Jordanian-Palestinian unit which would arise to the east of Israel, and serve as that state's Mediterranean port. In this case, it would be necessary to place at the disposal of traffic between Gaza and the Jordanian-Palestinian state the use of a land route (as distinct from a land corridor) similar to that, for example, connecting the United States with Alaska. But Israel must continue to control fully the strategic desert zone from the southern part of the Gaza Strip to the dunes on the eastern approaches of the town of El Arish, which itself would be returned to Egypt. This strategic zone, almost empty of population, would block the historic invasion route along the sea coast which many conquerors have taken over the generations to invade the land of Israel, and further north.

A number of border adjustments will also be essential to ensure security along sensitive areas of the 1949 Armistice line between Israel and Egypt. These must be made in such a manner as to permit full Israeli control in a number of sectors of crucial importance to its defense and which lack any value for the security of Egypt. I am refer-

¹ From the middle of the nineteenth century Jerusalem has had a Jewish majority. Today, the population consists of 260,000 Jews, 84,000 Muslims and 12,000 Christians.

ring to such areas as those surrounding Abu Aweigila, Kusseima and Kuntilla, which comprise the principal strategic crossroads on the main routes from the desert to Beersheba, and to the Elath shore line which is the gateway to Israel's maritime routes to the Indian Ocean and the Far East.

An especially sensitive point is that of the area of Sharm-el-Sheikh at the southern tip of the Sinai Peninsula. Although, from this vantage point, there is no danger of a massive surprise attack on Israel proper, a very concrete threat to Israeli freedom of navigation does exist. It should be repeated that Egypt has twice imposed blockades against Israeli ships and cargoes seeking passage through the Straits of Tiran. And, in both instances, Israel was compelled to break this blockade mounted from Sharm-el-Sheikh by capturing the place. In one way or another, unquestionable Israeli control over this corner of the Sinai—and over a land route reaching it—is not only critical to Israeli defense, but also serves to neutralize a focal point that is liable to set the area on fire once again. Moreover, because of the threat of blockade to Israeli-bound traffic through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea with the Indian Ocean, full Israeli control over Sharm-el-Sheikh might serve as a countervailing deterrent against such blockade attempts.

To sum up, there were numerous bitterly deficient points in the pre-1967 lines, and these proposals encompass minimal corrections to them required for an overall peace settlement.

Is this not only desirable but also possible? My answer is yes, it is possible, maybe not today, or tomorrow, or at one time. Of course, if it were possible to achieve this in one fell swoop by an overall agreement that would solve the conflict, this would be splendid. And as

far as Israel is concerned, it desires and is ready for such a settlement as soon as possible. It may be very difficult to leap from the hostility and hatred which the Arab states bear toward Israel to an era of reconciliation and friendship. But this transition—a process if not a solitary act—is possible. It is a process that can lead from the cease-fire situation to an end of hostilities—from violence to nonviolence, from nonacceptance to acceptance, and from there to real peace. The three agreements signed since the 1973 war (two with Egypt and one with Syria) may mark the beginning of the beginning of this process.

All this of course is possible under the appropriate circumstances and requisite conditions. The central two are: first, that the realistic trend become dominant in the Arab camp, i.e., that the Arabs recognize that Israel is a reality which cannot be obliterated by further rounds of war, and that they reconcile themselves to Israel's existence by reaching a compromise agreement with it. To this end, Israel must have sufficient potential for self-defense to deter the Arab states from any additional military adventure; and should they nonetheless be so drawn to such an adventure, Israel's strength must be adequate to repel them with the minimum of damage to itself. Second, that the international community not foster the delusion among the Arab leaders that it is possible—whether by military means or political pressure—to force Israel to give up what is essential to its minimum security needs. Israel will never yield to such pressure nor will it accept any attempt to impose a solution. Its readiness to compromise is not a function of pressure or war but of its desire for peace and of Arab readiness to start moving toward that goal.

The various proposals or plans raised by third parties to the conflict only serve the opposite purpose, including that unfortunate American plan that entered history under the name of the "Rogers plan" of 1969, which erred on two main counts: first, by the very fact of its presentation to the parties instead of leaving it to them to negotiate their differences without prior conditions; second, by its total lack of any consideration for Israel's security needs. The presentation of this plan gave rise to expectation in the Arab States that Washington was about to impose on Israel a scheme favorable to the Arabs and thereby dealt a damaging blow to the hopes for evolution of realistic policies in the capitals of the Middle East. It is doubtful if any positive movement would have been achieved in the Middle East if this plan had not been shelved in 1970. French policy has played a conspicuously negative role since the Six-Day War of 1967 by its openly pro-Arab bias during the hostilities and by the unfounded interpretation given by France to Resolution 242 in flat contradiction to the

expressed intentions of its sponsors. There is no doubt that this French attitude has encouraged even the least extremist of the Arab States to adopt rigid and uncompromising positions. Outside powers and international organs should strictly refrain from making their own proposals for the solution of the conflict. And if one cannot hope for such "monasticism" in the coming period on the part of those powers hostile to Israel, such as the U.S.S.R.—which is interested in perpetuating the conflict in the region at the expense of the welfare of all the peoples living there—one would hope for such behavior on the part of such friendly powers as the United States, that insist upon the region's peace for the benefit of all. If we had not had to deal with such proposals in the past, we would now be nearer to a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The actual conditions and details of a peace settlement between Israel and the Arab states, and even the next stage toward it, should such a transitional stage prove necessary, must be left in the hands of the parties themselves. Should the Arab states sit at the negotiating table without any preconditions, with full acceptance of Israel's legitimate existence and readiness to make a balanced compromise peace with it, I believe it will be possible to solve all the basic points of conflict, including a constructive solution of the problem of Palestinian identity.

I have no doubt that Israel would be ready and willing, on the basis of such a realistic approach, to negotiate a peace settlement with each of its neighbors, at any time and at any place, within the framework of the Geneva Conference or outside it. If these conditions are achieved, peace in the Middle East becomes not only a desirable goal but a possible one. I will not prophesy when such a turning point will be reached. Very much depends on international circumstances, and on the way these are interpreted by the Arab states. However, it is my firm belief that this stage is bound to come because there is no realistic alternative for the peoples and countries of the region.

56. Likud Party Platform, Excerpts, March 1977

(Note.—Translated document provided by the U.S. Department of State.)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND SECURITY POLICY

THE JEWISH PEOPLE AND EREZ ISRAEL

The Likud government will faithfully and energetically work toward the realization of Zionism.

THE RIGHT OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE TO THE LAND OF ISRAEL (EREZ ISRAEL)

- a. The right of the Jewish people to the land of Israel is eternal and indisputable and is linked with the right to security and peace; therefore, Judaea and Samaria will not be handed to any foreign administration; between the sea and Jordan there will only be Israeli sovereignty.
- b. A plan which relinquishes parts of western Erez Israel, undermines our right to the country, unavoidably leads to the establishment of a "Palestinian State", jeopardizes the security of the Jewish population, endangers the existence of the State of Israel, and frustrates any prospect of peace.

GENUINE PEACE - OUR CENTRAL OBJECTIVE

- a. The Likud government will place its aspirations for peace at the top of its priorities and will spare no effort to promote peace. The Likud will act as a genuine partner at peace treaty negotiations with our neighbors, as is customary among the nations. The Likud government will attend the Geneva Conference.
- d. The Likud government's peace initiative will be positive. Directly or through a friendly state, Israel will invite her neighbors to hold direct negotiations, in order to sign peace agreements without pre-conditions on either side and without any solution formula invented by outsiders ("invented outside"). At the negotiations each party will be free to make any proposals it deems fit.

SETTLEMENT

Settlement, both urban and rural, in all parts of the Land of Israel is the focal point of the Zionist effort to redeem the country, to maintain vital security areas and serves as a reservoir of strength and inspiration for the renewal of the pioneering spirit. The Likud government will call the younger generation in Israel and the dispersions to settle and help every group and individual in the task of inhabiting and cultivating the wasteland, while taking care not to dispossess anyone.

ARAB TERROR ORGANIZATIONS

The PLO is no national liberation organization but an organization of assassins, which the Arab countries use as a political and military tool, while also serving the interests of Soviet imperialism, to stir up the area. Its aim is to liquidate the State of Israel, set up an Arab country instead and make the Land of Israel part of the Arab world. The Likud government will strive to eliminate these murderous organizations in order to prevent them from carrying out their bloody deeds.

**57. Abba Eban, "Arab Hopes and Israeli Fears," Excerpts From
New York Times, June 17, 1977**

The Labor movement's view is that since history has created a duality of national identities west of the Jordan River, a unitary framework, no matter in whose favor, can only be unstable. The million arabs in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip do not share a common national experience, a common vision or a common dream with Israelis in the area of our sovereign law. The West Bank and Gaza Strip are as saturated with intense Arabism as is Israel with the spirit and legacy of Hebraism and Zionism. Neither of these two worlds seeks harmony with the other through any compromise of its essential nature.

We should therefore seek solutions reconciling political separation with a high degree of social integration and human accessibility. Those of us who accept the possibility of territorial compromise in the West Bank also believe that Israel's vocation lies in its predominantly Jewish character. There is a geographical element in the security of states, and this cannot be ignored. But what makes for the ultimate security of a society is its human texture, the power of its solidarities, the intensity of the bonds that hold its citizens together in a mutual rhythm of experience.

The Labor movement in Israel has upheld the partition logic for four decades, not only because it gave reality and immediacy to the dream of Jewish statehood, but also because it responded to our vision of a Jewish and democratic society in Israel. But no vision of a secure Israeli society can be realized within the perilous straitjacket of the pre-1967 lines.

Demilitarization, security agreements, a balance of deterrent strength and international support can reduce the need for changes in the previous lines under a peace settlement, but cannot eliminate that need totally. If American policy espouses the June 4, 1967 lines, it loses contact with the most moderate possible consensus in the Israeli political system.

Something of this has already occurred with disquieting effects on Middle Eastern stability and on Israel's domestic alignment. Unless there is a more understanding American approach to the question of Israel's peace frontiers, 1977 may be the year of missed opportunities.

58. Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Excerpts From Statement in Washington, As Printed in the New York Times, July 20, 1977

On behalf of the Government of Israel I brought to the President a proposal about the framework for the peacemaking process. For nearly two weeks I had to reply to all the questions about the contents of that decision taken unanimously by the Cabinet in Israel: please, out of respect for the President, he should be the first man to hear from me.

Explanation of Proposals

The proposals themselves shouldn't be any secret to public opinion and I will now explain the contents of what we call framework for the peacemaking process.

The Government of Israel will be prepared, beginning Oct. 10, 1977, to participate in a new additional session of the Geneva peace conference. It should be reconvened by the two co-chairman on the basis of Paragraph 3 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 338, which stipulates—I quote—"The Security Council decides that immediately and concurrently with a cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed in the establishing of a just and durable peace in the Middle East."

The Government of Israel acknowledges that Resolution 338 includes and makes reference to Security Council Resolution 242 of Nov. 22, 1967, participation in the reconvened session of the Geneva peace conference, accredited delegations of sovereign states will participate in the reconvened session of the Geneva peace conference: namely, representatives of Israel, Egypt, Syria and Jordan.

May I add that if the suggestion is made that Lebanon participates, we will agree.

The participating states in the Geneva peace conference will present no

prior conditions for the taking part in the conference,

the Geneva conference should mean an open negotiation. Therefore, I state here that President Sadat or his emissary will be entitled to bring his proposal to the conference table at Geneva. However, should President Sadat say in advance, "You, the Israelis, have to accept my demands, so that I should come to the conference table; you, the Israelis should accept my proposal in advance of the Geneva conference," that is a precondition. And that will not be acceptable, that will not be accepted by Israel.

No preconditions by either side.

When we say a peace treaty, we mean mainly the termination of the state of war, the determination of permanent boundaries, diplomatic relations, the economic clauses, etc. And when the three or the four mixed commissions will work out the conditions and the details of those peace treaties, and they will conclude them, then another session of the Geneva peace conference will be reconvened and the peace treaties so concluded will be signed by the parties concerned.

We cannot accept participation of ~~that organization~~. They declared in their covenant or charter—in Article 19 of their charter—that the State of Israel is null and void fundamentally. They also declare that only those Jews who were born or lived in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion, as they put it—in other words until the proclamation of the Balfour Declaration will be regarded Palestinians. And all the others, as the assumption goes, will have to leave the country.

If, therefore, the Arab countries will make it impossible to reconvene a full-fledged additional new session of the Geneva conference through insisting on the participation of the organization called P.L.O., then we must look for alternatives.

And we suggest two alternative possibilities. One, that the good offices of the United States be used to bring about the establishment of the three or four mixed commissions through diplomatic contacts with the respective capitals. That's one possibility. And it is based on the method used in 1949 during the negotiations for the armistice in Rhodes Island. It is a well-tried method which brought about very good results. The armistice agreements, the three armistice agreements with Syria, with Jordan and with Egypt are documents of great national importance. In one of the articles it is stipulated there that those armistice agreements are an indispensable step towards establishment of full peace in Palestine. Twenty-nine years, twenty-eight years elapsed since then, so we are late. And in the intervening years there were four wars. It is very regrettable.

Yet, let us start now; at least now, with the delay of almost a generation. And let us carry out the mutual pledge given by the parties concerned that we shall establish real peace.

So we suggest, as one of the alterna-

tive possibilities, to have such mixed commissions established through diplomatic contacts in the respective capitals. And they may sit either in the respective capitals or on any neutral soil as the decision will be taken by the parties concerned.

The second alternative possibility is what is termed the proximity talks. In 1972, the United States Government suggested that proximity talks be held in New York. In other words, an Israeli delegation, an Arab delegation and the United States delegation giving their good offices to bring the parties together. We will be willing to adopt such a method as well.

59. Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Excerpts From Speech to the Knesset Outlining the "Autonomy Plan" for the Occupied Territories, December 28, 1977

(Note.—Following President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, in November 1977 and a meeting between Begin and Sadat at Ismailia, Egypt on December 25, 1977, Begin presented to the Knesset on December 28 this version of his "autonomy plan.")

TA280837Y Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 0810 GMT 28 Dec 77 TA

[Speech by Israeli Prime Minister Begin opening debate in the Knesset on 28 December--live]

~~[Text]~~ Mr Chairman, respected Knesset members: With the establishment of peace we shall propose the introduction of an administrative autonomy for the Arab residents of Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip on the basis of the following principles:

The administration of the military rule in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip will be abolished. In Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip an administrative autonomy of, by and for the Arab residents will be established. The residents of Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip will elect an administrative council which will be composed of 11 members. The administrative council will act according to the principles postulated in this document. Every resident 18 years old or older, regardless of his citizenship or the lack of it, will be entitled to vote for the administrative council. Every resident who is 25 years old or older the day the list of candidates for the administrative council is presented will be entitled to be elected to the administrative council. The administrative council will be elected in general, direct, personal, equal and secret elections.

The term of office of the administrative council will be 4 years from the day of its election. The council will have its seat in Bethlehem. All the administrative issues pertaining to the Arab residents of Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip will be under the jurisdiction of the administrative council.

The administrative council will establish the following departments: department of education; department of transportation; department of construction and housing; department of industry, commerce and tourism; department of agriculture; department of health; department of labor and social betterment; department for the rehabilitation of refugees; department of legal administration and supervision of the local police force. The administrative council will issue regulations pertaining to the activities of those departments.

Security and public order in the areas of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza will be entrusted to the Israeli authorities.

The administrative council will elect its own chairman. The first session of the administrative council will be held 30 days after the publication of the election results. Thus, Mr Chairman, the administrative expression of autonomy for the Arab residents of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza. And now, the parliamentary expression:

Residents of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza, regardless of their citizenship or lack of it, will have the free option to receive either Israeli or Jordanian citizenship. A resident in the areas of Judaea, Samaria or Gaza who requests Israeli citizenship will receive it in accordance with the state's citizenship law. Residents of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza who choose, in accordance with their free option, Israeli citizenship will be entitled to vote for the Knesset and to be elected to it in accordance with the election law. Residents of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza who are Jordanian citizens, or those who become Jordanian citizens, in accordance with their free option, will vote and will be entitled to be elected to the parliament of the Jordanian Hashemite Kingdom in accordance with the election law of that country. Questions deriving from the elections of the Judaea, Samaria and Gaza residents to the Jordanian parliament will be presented for negotiations between Israel and Jordan.

A committee of representatives of Israel, Jordan and the administrative council will be established to examine the existing law in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza district and to determine which laws will remain valid, which will be abolished and what the authority of the administrative council will be to issue regulations. The decisions of this committee will be adopted unanimously.

Israeli residents will be entitled to purchase land and settle in the areas of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza. Arab residents of Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza district who become, in accordance with the free option granted them, Israeli citizens will be entitled to purchase land and settle in Israel. A committee of representatives of Israel, Jordan and of the administrative council will be established to determine immigration rules for the areas of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza. The committee will postulate those rules which will permit Palestinian refugees outside Judaea, Samaria and Gaza immigration in a reasonable volume into these areas. The decision of the committee will be adopted unanimously.

Israeli residents and the residents of Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza district will be assured free movement and free economic activity in Israel, in Judaea, in Samaria and in the Gaza district.

The administrative council will name one of its members to represent it before the Government of Israel for the purpose of discussing common issues, and one of its members will represent it before the Government of Jordan for the discussion of common issues.

Israel insists on its right and demand for its sovereignty over Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. Knowing that other demands exist, it proposes, for the sake of the agreement and of peace, to leave the question of sovereignty in those areas open.

Regarding the administration of the places holy to the three religions in Jerusalem, a special proposal will be prepared and presented, insuring free admission for all believers to the places sacred to them.

These principles will lend themselves to reexamination after a period of 5 years.

Mr Chairman, I have to explain now the 11th clause of this plan, as well as the 24th clause.

Esteemed Knesset members, in the 11th clause of our plan we postulated: the security and the public order in the areas of Judaea, Samaria and Gaza will be entrusted to the hands of the Israeli authorities. Without this clause there is no meaning to the plan of administrative autonomy. I wish to announce from the Knesset rostrum that it is self-evident that this includes deployment of IDF forces in Judaea, Samaria and in the Gaza Strip.

We do not even dream of the possibility--if we are given the chance to withdraw our military forces from Judaea, Samaria and Gaza--of abandoning those areas to the control of the murderous organization that is called the PLO, or ASHAF in Hebrew, that is, translated into Hebrew. [meaning there is really no such word in Hebrew] This is history's meanest murder organization, except for the armed Nazi organizations. It also bragged 2 days ago about the murder of Hamdi al-Qadi, deputy director of the Education Bureau in Ramallah.

It is a frightening proposition that someone's solution to the problems in the Middle East might be a single bullet dispatched to the heart of Egyptian President as-Sadat, as the PLO's predecessors did at Al-Aqsa Mosque to King 'Abdallah. One single bullet. No wonder that the Egyptian Government has declared that should such a single shot be fired, Egypt would retaliate with a million shots. We wish to say that under no condition will that organization be allowed to take control over Judaea, Samaria and Gaza. If we withdrew our army, this is exactly what would happen. Hence, let it be known that whoever desires an agreement with us should please accept our announcement that the IDF will be deployed in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza. And there will also be other security arrangements, so that we can give to all the residents, Jews and Arabs alike, in Eretz Yisra'el a secure life--that is to say, security for all.

We postulated in the 24th clause: Israel insists on its right and demand for sovereignty over Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. Knowing that other demands exist, it proposes, for the sake of the agreement and peace, to leave the question of sovereignty in those areas open.

I said these words to U.S. President Carter and also to Egyptian President as-Sadat. We have a right and a demand for sovereignty over these areas of Eretz Yisra'el. This is our land and it belongs to the Jewish nation rightfully. We desire an agreement and peace. We know that there are at least two other demands for sovereignty over these areas. If there is a mutual desire to reach an agreement and to promote peace --what is the way?

Should these contradictory demands remain, and should there be no answer to the collision course between them, an agreement between the parties would be impossible. And for this reason, in order to facilitate an agreement and make peace, there is only one possible way. One way and no other: to agree to decide that the question of sovereignty remain open and to deal with people, with nations. That is to say, administrative autonomy for the Arabs of Eretz Yisra'el; and for the Jews of Eretz Yisra'el--genuine security. This is the fairness that is inherent in the content of the proposal. And in that spirit the proposal was also accepted abroad.

With this plan, as well as with general rules I am going to present now about the settlement of relations between Israel and Egypt, to be specified in a peace treaty between the two countries, I left for the United States to visit President Carter and present him with both parts of our peace plan.

The second part, namely, the rules for settling the relations between Egypt and Israel in the context of the peace treaty is:

Demilitarization: The Egyptian Army will not cross the Jiddi-Mitla line. Between the Suez Canal and that line the limitation of forces agreement will remain valid. The Israeli settlements will remain in place with their full complement. These settlements will be linked to Israeli administration and jurisdiction. They will be defended by an Israeli force. I repeat this sentence, for a reason well known to all members of the house: They will be defended by an Israeli force.

For an interim period of several years, IDF forces will be stationed along a defense line in the center of Sinai, and Israeli airfields and Israeli early warning stations will be maintained until our forces withdraw to the international border.

Free shipping in the Strait of Tiran, to be recognized by the two countries in a special declaration designating the strait an international seaway that must remain open to the free sailing of ships under any flag, will be guaranteed either by a UN force, whose withdrawal will be impossible except by consent of the two countries and by an unanimous decision of the Security Council or by joint Egyptian-Israeli military patrols.

While I was in the United States, I asked the secretary of state to contact President as-Sadat and inform him in my name of my desire to meet with him in Cairo, in a neutral place or, should he wish so, also in Ismailia. I mentioned Ismailia as the meeting place because that possibility was discussed with President as-Sadat during his visit in Jerusalem. The Egyptian president told me via the secretary of state that he chose Ismailia to be our meeting place. I agreed. Thus, a few days after the end of the mission in the United States and in Britain, the meeting took place in Ismailia.

Mr Chairman, this was a successful meeting. Its success came with its opening. We had a private talk--President as-Sadat and myself--and in the first 5 minutes of that talk the decisive matter was accomplished: the continuing of the negotiations between the two countries for the signing of a peace treaty, as was postulated in lieu of the term peace agreement, in the meeting of the two delegations in Ismailia.

The negotiations will be conducted at a high level. The committees will be a political one, which will be meeting in Jerusalem, and a military one, which will be sitting in Cairo. The committee chairmen will be the foreign ministers and the defense ministers of Egypt and of Israel. The chairmanship of the committees will be rotated. Our foreign minister will open the committee sessions in Jerusalem. The Egyptian defense minister will open the military committee session in Cairo. A week later the chairmen will change.

The political committee will deal with the civilian settlements in the Sinai Peninsula as well as with the issue--which can be called Jewish-Arab--of the Arabs of Eretz Yisra'el. The military committee will handle all the military issues linked to the peace treaty concerning the Sinai Peninsula.

It thus came to be, Mr Chairman, that for the first time in 30 years, soon, in about 2 weeks, direct face-to-face negotiations will be started between authorized representatives, ministers of Israel, and Egypt's representatives, its ministers of defense and of foreign affairs. No third person will chair these committees, as it was wont to be in all meetings between us and the Arab countries, but the ministers themselves will conduct the sessions, chairing them in rotation. These will be profound and military negotiations for the achievement of peace and for the signing of peace treaties. And since this is happening for the first time since the establishment of our state, for the first time after five wars, for the first time after the proclamations from various directions that the State of Israel should be annihilated, we have to welcome this turning point itself.

We should also wish and yearn that during the weeks or months in which the two committees are meeting they will reach an agreement, and if there is an agreement, it will serve as a basis for peace treaties which, in that case, will be signed by authorized representatives of Israel and of Egypt.

It may be said that at the Ismailia meeting the two parties agreed also on a joint statement. Its publication, however, was prevented because the two delegations did not arrive at a joint and agreed-upon formula regarding the issue which we call--and justly--the problem of Eretz Yisra'el's Arabs, while the Egyptians call it, in their language--and this is their right to use their language--the problem of the Palestinian people. We tried, we made an effort to arrive at a joint formula. It transpired, however, that we were unable to accept one or the other version. If it was proposed by the Egyptian delegation, it was unacceptable to us, and if it was proposed by the Israeli delegation, it was unacceptable to the Egyptians. Accordingly, sometime between 2200 and 2230 on Sunday night, we postponed the meeting until Monday morning, assuming that with a mutual endeavor we would find a way out. And indeed the way out has been found: a kind of an agreement about a joint formula, based on precedents in international conferences. We proposed--and our proposal was accepted--that each side present its position, using its own language. For this reason, the announcement about the problem of the Arabs of Eretz Yisra'el, as it was read by the Egyptian president at our joint press conference, consisted of two parts, namely: [begin quotes in English] The position of Egypt is that a Palestinian state should be established in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The position of Israel is that the Palestinian Arabs residing in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza district should enjoy self-rule. [end quotation]

Because of the difference on this subject, the publication of the statement--over the content of which there had been full agreement--was prevented. We did not deem it proper to press for the publication of a joint statement if the Egyptian side was saying that under such circumstances it was unable to sign it. I wish to go on record, however, that the content itself was agreed upon by both delegations jointly.

60. Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Excerpts From Interviews After Signing Camp David Agreements, September 18, 1978

[Question] According to the agreement signed today, a peace agreement with Egypt is to be signed in 3 months. Will the removal of the settlements in Sinai be a condition for a peace agreement with the Egyptians?

[Answer] First of all, we undertook to sign a peace agreement during the next 3 months--this does not necessarily mean at the end of 12 weeks. It is possible that we might do this earlier. It is true that President as-Sadat raises a condition and this is also what he wrote--in the signing of a peace treaty we should remove the settlements. We have not undertaken such a condition. However, we stated that we would submit this matter for a Knesset vote because the policy of removing the settlements goes against the government's decisions, which was approved by the Knesset. Therefore, the delegation--the foreign minister, the defense minister and myself and our aides--did not have the authority to change this policy.

Thus, our answer was that the matter would be submitted for a vote by the Knesset--and we will allow a free vote; there will be no party discipline on this vote, and since the coalition will allow a free vote I am sure that the opposition will do the same. Thus all Knesset members will vote according to their conscience. Each, personally, will decide--not according to the lineup of coalition and opposition--supporters of the government and its opponents--but according to his conscience. The decision will be made in the freest manner possible with the Knesset decision being binding on all.

[Question] Will we have maximum security with the return of Sinai and the airfields to Egypt?

[Answer] We will have security. We have insured this. Maj Gen Avraham Tamir stands with us on this. He is a great expert on Israel's security--knows every grain of sand in the Sinai and if he supported the agreement from a security point of view than you can sleep with ease.

[Question] As for the settlement in the West Bank, in your assessment, will Jordan take an active part?

[Answer] Yes, in accordance with our peace proposal Jordan has a function--even functions. However, it must be clear: Our army will be present in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza, and only our army. No other army will be in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza.

[Question] There was mention of a withdrawal of IDF forces from the West Bank. When, in your assessment, will the IDF begin the withdrawal from the West Bank?

[Answer] Any withdrawal will be implemented when the peace treaty is signed. However, I wish to refer you to the English version: a withdrawal, this is what we wrote, meaning in Hebrew a certain withdrawal [nesiga v'uyemet]. We have insured the IDF's remaining in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza in the following sentence: The remaining Israeli Defence Forces. This means the Israeli Army that will remain in Judaea and Samaria--there is a double meaning here--those that remain, out of those which withdraw. This means that there will be a certain withdrawal and the main force of the IDF will remain in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza in order to provide security for the people of Israel in Eretz Yisra'el.

[Question] Mr Prime Minister, will there be foreign rule in Judaea and Samaria?

[Answer] No, there will not.

[Question] When will the military government be dissolved?

[Answer] After peace is made.

[Question] What is the meaning of the clause about the exchange of letters on East Jerusalem?

[Answer] Today there is no exchange of letters, as there was to have been, but if we get a letter with a certain content which does not at all endanger Jerusalem on the part of the president, I will answer the president telling him that Jerusalem is one city which cannot be divided, ever, and it is the eternal capital of Israel. This is what I will answer him and I will explain to him that this is a decision of the Knesset of 11 years ago in accordance with a law passed on 28 June 1967 saying: The government may by order apply the state's law, jurisdiction and administration over all parts of Eretz Yisra'el as specified by the order. On the basis of this law the government then--that is in June 1967--applied the State of Israel's law, jurisdiction and administration over all of Jerusalem.

[Shilon] How will you face Gush Emunim, for example, which is bound to request more settlements, which you have promised? You said--the day you entered office, or the day you were elected--there would be many more Allon More's?

[Begin] I have said there would be, and there are, many Allon More's. What have we committed ourselves to? We have a period, I said--true--we will refrain from settling--by the way, not in all the places, but in certain places. As I told President Carter, we will also take into account the possibility of establishing Nahal footholds. There is nothing like what is called a total freezing of the settlements, and all of this is out in the open, this is what I told the U.S. President. However, basically, I am prepared to admit that during this period of the negotiations, I think it wise specifically during--how long is it--90 days not to establish settlements, it is possible to wait for 3 months. The Israeli nation has waited for peace for a much longer period. That, I think, was done wisely and I have no regrets about it and I will argue with each one of the lovers of Eretz Yisra'el, among which I am numbered.

What I want to say is that Gush Emunim, even if it demonstrates against me or against my way, and even if it uses vile words--I shall always love the Gush Emunim people. I love them, they are true pioneers, they are men of conviction and of understanding. They may curse me as they wish, and I will return love to them. For selfless love, as you know, Israel has been redeemed.

[Nissan] Mr Prime Minister, several minutes ago you mentioned something about erroneous interpretations of this agreement on television and in the press. In this context, could you clarify what is called the rights of....

[Begin] Oh, I shall give several examples, such as: it was said that we have agreed to have a joint Jordanian-Israeli rule over Judaea and Samaria: nothing of the sort. We have, however, agreed that there will be joint Israeli-Jordanian guards to watch over the border. This is a beautiful thing and will demand cooperation which is good. It will also bear fruit in the future, but we will not introduce any foreign army into Judaea and Samaria. The only army that will be stationed in Judaea and Samaria--and not only for 5 years, but beyond that--will be our army, and it will maintain our national security: only it, nothing else.

[Nissan] Allow me only to continue on this note. On this point, during the briefing to the correspondents here at the signing of the agreement, it was said that the agreement in fact answers the question of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. Can this definition, in your opinion, be accepted?

[Begin] Yes. We have accepted what is called in English legitimate rights, because everyone has his own interpretation. The word legitimate, which is linked to rights--as I tried to explain to my hosts at Camp David--has no meaning, really, because the English tongue is very rich. The two words are of Latin origin, so that one can also say: rightful rights. This would be a tautology, simply a repetition. So, when we saw that for our hosts and for the other party it is a matter of a feeling of dignity because they have already used that expression, and because it does not change reality, we accepted it, and everyone has his own interpretation of what the legitimate rights are. If it transpires that any demand is illegitimate, illegal, then we will not accept it.

[Shilon] As for the treaty with Egypt and the security assurances: Perhaps you could disclose to us what security assurances Israel will receive, if it receives them?

[Begin] We have no security assurances, we have never, and from no element, asked for security guarantees. I think that the arrangement we have accomplished, proposed and accepted in the Sinai is based on security for Israel. There will be totally demilitarized zones, where no soldier will be located; there will be thinned-out areas--we shall, of course, be on guard. We shall secure freedom of shipping not only in the Tiran Straits, but also in the Suez Canal; not only for goods, but also for ships flying the Israeli flag--this has been promised and concluded, and so it will be, and the arrangement with Egypt is based entirely on security for Israel.

[Shilon] Has the United States undertaken to establish an Israeli airbase in place of the bases which we will leave?

[Begin] Yes, the United States has promised to establish two alternative airfields. This is not for the United States, it is for us, so that strategically there will be no change; neither in the north nor in the south.

[Nissan] Are there additional bilateral agreements between Israel and the United States, or between Egypt and the United States?

[Begin] There are exchanges of letters on various issues. The letters, too, will be publicized. They are not confidential.

[Nissan] Do you mean only on security issues, or on other questions as well?

[Begin] On various problems. We have exchanged letters, and they will all be publicized, so that in 24 hours, every individual in the United States, in Israel, will know about them. Especially since I will present them to the Knesset. We have not drawn up any secret agreements.

[Nissan] Perhaps you could clarify one point which was raised yesterday: To what degree are the implementation--or the realization--of the two documents, the agreement concerning the relations with Egypt and the document discussing the framework for making peace, conditioned on each other?

[Begin] They are not conditioned upon each other, but there is an understanding that a comprehensive peace must be reached. This means, as I have already told you, the mere framework has already given us the basis, almost 98 percent, for signing the peace treaty. As for Judaea, Samaria and Gaza, the principles have already been stated: there will be an autonomy, not a Palestinian state, under no circumstances will there be a Palestinian state, no foreign army in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza, only our army will guard our security. However, all the practical steps must be taken, namely, to elect the administrative council, to abolish the military government, and first the administration of the military government, and allow them indeed to live in autonomy and live together with us in peace, equality and mutual honor--that is what we have always wanted. This is for a period of 5 years, a period of seriousness: we shall all observe and see what happens in reality. I can say that perhaps this period will be extended, and if it is extended, this will also be in accordance with the desire of our hosts--if it should be extended. Of course, everything depends on the agreements that will be reached, if they are reached--as I hope--in the next few years. However, for the time being, the difference, or the shift, is in that without giving up any principle--and I say this with respect to both parties--we reached a realistic agreement. In this way, it was possible--as I claimed a year ago--to reach an agreement, and reality has proved this.

[Shilon] Mr Prime Minister, do you have signs to indicate that King Husayn is going to join the negotiations?

[Begin] I have no signs as of yet, however, I hope he joins. In any case, in the document, we invited him to join.

61. Prime Minister Menachem Begin, Statement Following Peace Treaty Signing, March 26, 1979

Mr. President of the United States of America, Mr. President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Mr. Vice President, Mr. Speaker of the House of Representatives, Mr. Speaker of the Knesset, Members of the Cabinets of the United States, of Egypt and Israel; Members of the Congress and the Knesset; Your Excellencies; Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Jewish Agency; Chairman of the Executive of the Zionist Organization; Mrs. Gruber, the mother of the sons, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen: I have come from the land of Israel, the land of Zion and Jerusalem and here I am in humility and with pride as a son of the Jewish people, as one of the generation of the Holocaust and redemption.

The ancient Jewish people gave the world a vision of eternal peace, of universal disarmament, of abolishing the teaching and the learning of war.

Two prophets, Yishayahu Benamotz and Micah Hamorashti, having foreseen the spiritual unity of man under God, with these words coming forth from Jerusalem, gave the nations of the world the following vision—expressed in identical terms—“And they shall beat the swords into plowshares and their spears into pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more.”

Despite the tragedies and disappointments of the past, we must never forsake that vision, that human dream, that unshakable faith.

Peace is the beauty of life. It is sunshine. It is the smile of a child, the love of a mother, the joy of a father, the togetherness of a family. It is the advancement of man, the victory of a just cause, the triumph of truth.

Peace is all of these and more, and more.

These are words I uttered in Oslo on December

10th, 1978, while receiving the second half of the Nobel Peace Prize. The first half went, rightly so, to President Sadat. (Applause) And I took the liberty to repeat them here on this momentous, historic occasion.

It is a great day in the annals of two ancient nations, Egypt and Israel, whose sons met in battle five times in one generation, fighting and falling.

Let us turn our hearts to our heroes and pay tribute to their eternal memory. It is thanks to them, to our fallen heroes, that we could have reached this day.

However, let us not forget that in ancient times, our two nations met also in alliance. Now we make peace, the cornerstone of cooperation and friendship. (Applause) It is a great day in your life, Mr. President of the United States. You have worked so hard, so insistently, so consistently, to achieve this goal. And your labors and your devotion bore God-blessed fruit. (Applause)

Our friend, President Sadat, said that you are the unknown soldier of the peace-making effort. I agree, but as usual, with an amendment. (Laughter) A soldier in the service of peace, you are. You are, Mr. President even, *mirabile dictu*, an intransigent fighter for peace. (Applause)

But, Jimmy Carter, the President of the United States, is not completely unknown. (Laughter) And so it is his efforts which will be remembered and recorded by generations to come. (Applause)

It is, of course, a great day in your life, Mr. President of the Arab Republic of Egypt. In the face of adversity and hostility, you have demonstrated the human value that can change history—civil courage. (Applause)

A great field commander once said, “Civil courage is sometimes more difficult to show than military courage.” You showed both, Mr. President. (Applause) But now it is time for all of us to show civil courage in order to proclaim to our peoples and to others: no more war, no more bloodshed, no more bereavement; peace unto you. Shalom, Salaam forever. (Applause)

And it is, ladies and gentlemen, the third greatest day in my life. The first was May 14th, 1948, when our flag was hoisted. Our independence in our ancestors' land was proclaimed after 1,878 years of dispersion, persecution, humiliation and ultimately, physical destruction.

We fought for our liberation alone, and with God's help, we won the day. (Applause) That was spring. Such a spring we can never have again.

The second day was when Jerusalem became

one city and our brave, perhaps most hardened soldiers, the parachutists, embraced with tears and kissed the ancient stones of the remnants of the wall destined to protect the chosen place of God's glory. Our hearts wept with them in remembrance. (Prime Minister Begin spoke briefly in Hebrew.) (Applause)

This is the third day in my life. I have signed a treaty of peace with our great neighbor, with Egypt. The heart is full and overflowing. God gave me the strength to persevere, to survive the horrors of nazism, and of the Stalinite concentration camp, and some other dangers, to endure, not to waver in, nor flinch from my duty, to accept abuse from foreigners, and what is more painful, from my own people, and even from my close friends. This effort, too, bore some fruit.

Therefore, it is the proper place and the appropriate time to bring back to memory the song and prayer of thanksgiving I learned as a child in the

home of father and mother that doesn't exist anymore, because they were among the 6 million people, men, women and children, who sanctified the Lord's name with the sacred blood which reddened the rivers of Europe from the Rhine to the Danube, from the Bug to the Volga, because, only because they were born Jews, and because they didn't have a country of their own, and neither a valiant Jewish army to defend them; and because nobody, nobody came to their rescue, although they cried out, "Save us, save us"—*de profundis*, from the depths of the pits, and agony. That is the Song of Degrees, written 2 millenni and 500 years ago when our forefathers returned from their first exile to Jerusalem and Zion. (Prime Minister Begin spoke briefly in Hebrew.)

I will not translate. Every man, whether Jew or Christian or Moslem can read it in his own language in the Book of the Books. It is just Psalm 126. (Applause)

62. Statement by Former Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan After His Resignation From the Government, October 23, 1979

TA231123 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0930 GMT 23 Oct 79 TA

[News conference with former Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan in Bet Agron, Jerusalem--live]

First of all, I want to speak about the reasons for my leaving.

I have said this and explained that the issue is substantive in that I did not see myself as someone who is capable or able to give loyal expression to the conception concerning autonomy and the future of Judaea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip, because of most of the members of the Coalition, that is, of the Likud and the NRP parties.

Well, in my view, first of all we must, in the days ahead, we should be bound to the Camp David accords. There is no need to deviate from them. It may be that an agreement or understanding which will be achieved during the autonomy negotiations will be more detailed or different in various matters. Even now, I regard the Camp David accords as a framework that should not be breached. There is no objective need to deviate from them. It is sufficiently suitable... in my opinion, it is possible to reach an agreement with the Arabs of the territories as well and to guarantee our basic interests. They are the security interests, the settlement issue, a guarantee that we will not have the status of aliens--as though we were foreigners in the territories, in Judaea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip--and not touching upon the question of sovereignty at present but, in accordance with the Camp David agreement, to say: 5 years after the establishment of the autonomy there will be peace negotiations, and then borders will be discussed, and then sovereignty will be discussed, and this will be done with Jordan, not with a Palestinian state and not with the autonomy and not with any other body.

The United States and Egypt have signed this. Well, now comes the time when the first difficult question arises: the autonomy agreement must be fulfilled by the Arabs, the Palestinian Arabs, and the fact that the United States and Egypt and Israel have signed this does not yet bind the Palestinian Arabs and the difficulty exists. However, I do not advise any one of us to scorn these three signatures when they appear together. After all, when there is a signature by the president of Egypt in addition to a peace agreement with Egypt and a signature by the President of the United States and a signature by the Prime Minister of Israel, so from the aspect of the formal framework, Israel is committed to it. In my view, this is no less than, let us say, Security Council Resolution 242. Go and ask Eban how many resolutions the Security Council makes which are not fulfilled.

So there is Resolution 242, but its strength lies in the fact that the parties agree to it. So I very much admire the Camp David agreement, and I think we should not deviate from it. It gives us, in my opinion, the following things: an interim period--and we must now deal with an interim period--and the guaranteeing of our basic issues from the military aspect. From the security aspect, there is no restriction. On the contrary, it is stated that the IDF will be along the Jordan. The matter of settlement is not mentioned in it at all. What it does say is that the peace agreement will be made with Jordan, and we will hear about it from it. That is, there is no other state, Palestinian or other, which is a candidate for this.

I want to say, with regard to the settlements--this has also appeared in that letter I wrote on 2 October--I am in favor of our settling according to a plan, and we are entitled to settle in all the territories of Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. The claim by the Alignment concerning areas densely populated is, in my opinion, indirectly connected with this issue only via the Allon plan. That is, I see nothing wrong in establishing Jewish settlements in centers of dense Arab population. Nor did the Alignment see anything wrong in this. As an example, in the Gaza Strip, in the Qatif settlements, one cannot say that the Gaza Strip is not a dense Arab settlement. There can be no more dense than that. It is much more dense than the region of Elon More or something else. The logic in the Alignment position on this matter lies in the fact that if we build on a partition program--the Allon plan, any sort of partition plan--and say we do not want, neither we nor the Arabs, to add the parts densely populated by Arabs to Israeli sovereignty, and we do not want to establish settlements in places which will not remain in our possession. So we must establish settlements only in places which will afterward be a part of Eretz Yisra'el, and they do not include the densely populated places. But anyone who does not think that the solution to coexistence with the Arabs is partition--and I do not think so--does not see anything wrong in the establishment of Jewish settlements, even close to a dense Arab population.

What is the only reservation I have concerning the settlements? Not to take, not to seize private land, whether this private land is barren or not. So one Arab has a barren hill; that does not give the right, in my view, to us to say, since this land is barren, even if it is under private ownership, we can take it and give it to our settlements. This is the point that I voted against, because of it I voted against the establishment of Elon More. This is the only matter on this issue. The matter of private land. Maybe I should also say--and I am sure that there is nobody in the Cabinet who thinks differently from the way I do on this matter, but it is good to emphasize this--when I say that we should not take private land for the purpose of establishing our settlements--I have already said this in public and I want to say it again--there is a lot of land which belongs to the state and, in my view, there will be no quantitative limit, if they are not intransigent about specific places, on establishing settlements on state lands, from the aspect of the quantity of land belonging to the government which is at our disposal.

The second point I wanted to make is in regard to autonomy. I think that it is necessary to end the government, the military government, not what is called the source of authority. On the contrary, on the matter of the source of authority my position is perhaps one of the most extreme in the government: What is called the source of authority must remain in Israel's hands. I will explain in simple language what source of authority means. I am in favor--in accordance with the autonomy agreement, if the agreement materializes; and if it does not, we should do this unilaterally--of our removing to the extent possible the military, urban, Israeli command headquarters from the towns, from Gaza or Nabulus, of our being satisfied with military units which are in the field nearby, and of our maintaining routine contact with the municipalities or the inhabitants on various issues via the Israeli Government ministries. For example, on the agriculture issue, contact should be via the Israeli Ministry of Agriculture; on the health issue, via the Ministry of Health. We should do this because it is impossible to maintain this colony without a government. And I am speaking, for the moment, about a situation in which autonomy has not been established.

the prevailing view is that the Arabs of Judea, Samaria and Gaza cannot take part in the talks or accept such a program because the PLO does not agree, or without the PLO representing them and so on. Well, I do not know whether you all remember the period after the Six Day War when the PLO came out firmly against Arabs from the territories working in Israel. They simply sent terrorists to fire at the cars and trucks that brought the workers. But when the Arabs themselves wanted this...in the end they knew who was firing at them from the ditch at the side of the road. The reference here is not to the PLO in Lebanon. The reference here is to someone who waits between Nabulus or Gaza and Tel Aviv. So, when the Arabs of Gaza or the Arabs of Judea and Samaria wanted to work in Israel, then even when the PLO took an extreme opposite position on this matter to the point of using terror, with our aid they found a way to overcome this. In my opinion, the same thing applies to the autonomy program. The key is in the hands of the local Arabs. Whether or not the PLO gives them permission, we must first of all come to an understanding with them about what they want. If they do not want this, we will not be able to impose it on them. But, in my view, from Israel's viewpoint, if they do not want this, then the administrative autonomy will not be established. There will not be elections; there will not be any of these authorities given to a representative body. To the extent possible, this should not prevent us from following a policy which does not interfere with their affairs and which safeguards our security and settlement interests, but lets them run their lives as far as possible as they want to run them--and this includes the removal of the military government from within the towns.

EGYPT

63. President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Newsweek Interview, February 10, 1969

(See document No. 51 for Israeli response.)

Q. And if they pulled back now, how would Israel's security be enhanced? What quid pro quo would the Arab states offer for evacuation?

A. (1) A declaration of nonbelligerence; (2) the recognition of the right of each country to live in peace; (3) the territorial integrity of all countries in the Middle East, including Israel, in recognized and secure borders; (4) freedom of navigation in international waterways; (5) a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem.

Q. Do you insist on the choice of repatriation to what is now Israel or compensation for all refugees?

A. The United Nations has said over and over again "the right to return or compensation."

* * * * *

Q. Would you allow the Soviet Union, the United States, France and Britain to station troops in the Sinai as part of an agreement on Israeli withdrawal?

A. No. We will not agree to the stationing of any soldier from the four major powers in our country.

* * * * *

Q. Would you accept units from smaller countries under the U.N. flag?

A. We would have no objection.

Q. Would you agree to keep the Sinai demilitarized if Israel withdrew to its pre-June boundaries?

A. No. We could only agree to the demilitarization of areas that are astride the boundaries.

Q. If Israel were to pull back as the first phase of settlement, would Egypt be prepared to sit down with the Israelis to discuss other issues?

A. I could not give you an answer about that until they pull out. Obviously, you would not sit down with a foreign power occupying part of the U.S. until it withdrew. But I can tell you we sat down with the Israelis after the 1948 war under the armistice agreement until the 1956 war, and that we are prepared to do so again. We had joint committees with United Nations observers and it was Israel who refused to continue this procedure after 1956.

Q. You have said that you recognize realities and that Israel is one of them. How does this differ from de facto recognition of Israel's prewar frontiers?

A. This question has been complicated by the Israelis themselves. Under the 1949 armistice agreements, Arabs and Israelis were supposed to agree on the rehabilitation of Palestinian refugees. If this had been done, it would have been a mighty step toward lasting peace. But the Israelis refused to discuss rehabilitation. So the situation got progressively worse. Before, there were under 1 million refugees. Now, there are almost 1.5 million.

Q. Could you spell out how you see a lasting solution?

A. The only way is for Israel to become a country that is not based on religion, but on all religions--a nation of Jews, Moslems and Christians. They lived for centuries together with few problems, but as long as the Israelis insist on depriving the Palestinians of their rights, the crisis will be with us for 10, 20, 30 and 40 more years.

64. President Mohamed Anwar Al-Sadat, Interview, February 22, 1971

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Q. Does your proposal include free passage for Israeli ships?

A. Yes, we have agreed to this in our memorandum to Ambassador Jarring. Free passage is clearly spelled out. But first Israel must fulfill its obligations under the U.N. resolution.

* * * * *

Q. The Israelis say no withdrawal without peace and you say no peace without withdrawal. . . .couldn't you test Israel's real intentions by committing yourself to a peace treaty and then see if the Israelis commit themselves to withdrawal?

A. That is a very important question. If you read the U.N. resolution very carefully it is an embryonic peace treaty. That is a solemn commitment on our part. But we are still waiting for a solemn commitment on the other side. . . . A partial withdrawal will test Israel's alleged good intentions, open the canal for free navigation for the whole world, and after that Jarring can work out a timetable to solve the whole problem. Then I can prolong the cease-fire for another fixed date. And then we move toward final peace. The trouble with the Israelis is that they are still dreaming about their victory. If they want real peace, we are more than ready for one too.

Q. You ask for complete withdrawal to the 1967 borders. The Israelis reply they won't pull back all the way. Would the Arabs be prepared to negotiate minor border rectifications? For example, if the Israelis gave up all of Sinai in return for a strong U.N. presence at Sharm el Sheikh guaranteed by the Big Four and gave up the Golan Plain, including the Syrian city of El Kuneitra, would you have any objection to minor concessions in the Latrun Bulge, Kalkilya, Tulkarm and on the Golan Heights themselves?

A. It's for the countries concerned to decide. The problem now is the larger aspect of peace. In our view, the Israeli demand for secure and defensible borders is a pretext for expansion.

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. . . The party that needs secure borders is us, not Israel.

Q. Does partial withdrawal mean that Israel has to begin by abandoning the Bar-Lev line--or would a thinning out of defenses along this line be acceptable as a first step?

A. Partial withdrawal means to a line behind El Arish.

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Q. If they pulled back behind El Arish, what would you give them in return?

A. I would guarantee to reopen the canal in six months to international trade. I would prolong the cease-fire to a fixed date to give Jarring time to work out the details. I would guarantee free passage in the Strait of Tiran with an international force at Sharm el Sheikh. Its composition doesn't matter; the Big Four or other nations--it's immaterial to us. It would be guaranteed by the Security Council and could not be removed without all four agreeing. We would finally be grappling with fundamentals and a final settlement would at last be in sight. We are open-minded and open-hearted about the rest of the program. We will be flexible and willing to discuss anything that could lead to lasting peace in this part of the world. But mark this. It must be an over-all settlement for all territories occupied in 1967, not just Sinai.

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Q. I think it's important that you spell out as clearly as possible what you would be prepared to put in a peace treaty.

A. If Israel returns our land under the Security Council resolution, the inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, including Israel. We pledge our solemn word on this. We have no designs on Israel, it is Israel that has designs on us. The territorial integrity of Israel in secure and recognized borders will be guaranteed by the Big Four. Israel will enjoy freedom of navigation in the canal and the strait, again guaranteed. For all this to happen, however, there must be a just solution to the Palestinian problem.

Q. There is still much confusion about the Palestinian problem. What would be your objection to adequate financial compensation for Palestinian refugees coupled with a referendum in the west bank and Gaza to determine whether Palestinians want a separate state, either federated or confederated with Jordan, or remain an integral part of Jordan?

A. I'm not in a position to decide for the Palestinians but this sounds like a reasonable way to solve the problem--compensation and referendum. They must decide for themselves.

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Q. When I asked President Nasser two years ago whether he would agree to the stationing of units of the Big Four powers at Sharm el Sheikh as part of an agreement on Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, he said no very emphatically. Your position on this score has changed completely. Why?

A. My proposal is motivated solely by my desire to facilitate a durable settlement. My people won't like it. That's why Nasser was against it. But I will take that risk. And after that, if world opinion doesn't understand our attitude, we can then say we've done our level best. It won't be our responsibility if the Israelis refuse the guarantees that are being offered.

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65. President Al-Sadat, Statement Before the Egyptian People's Assembly, November 9, 1977

I frankly tell you, our people and the entire world: we are prepared to go to Geneva and sit there for the sake of peace, irrespective of all the procedural claims Israel is making in its desire to make us lose the opportunity or to make us nervous so that we may say, as we have said in the past: No, we do not want to go and we will not go and then Israel will appear to the world as the advocate of peace. Never. I agree to any procedural process. [applause] Why? Because when we eventually go to Geneva, Israel will not be able to prevent me from demanding the return of the Arab territory occupied in 1967. Neither Israel nor any power will be able to prevent from demanding the legitimate rights: the right to self-determination and the right of the Palestinians to establish their state. [applause] This is what Israel wants to avoid by trying to play with the procedural process by adding a word or omitting a word or by issuing a declaration after an Israeli cabinet meeting by which they try to excite the Arab nation as they used to do in the past in order that we may have a nervous breakdown, that some may suffer a fit and that we may come out and say: We do not want to go to Geneva. No, never. I declare before you and the Arab nation that I am not interested at all in procedural processes. Let there be procedures. Regardless of Israel's emotionalism and hysteria, I am going to Geneva. As I have said, neither Israel nor the powers of the world can dissuade me from what I want--the Arab territory occupied in 1967 and the rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to establish their state.

As long as this is my conviction, it is Israel which fears the Geneva conference. No Arab must ever fear the Geneva conference. Why? It is because we have exported to the Israeli society the division, fear, defeatism, doubt and suspicion and everything which we suffered from in the past.

Why should we return to this state? No, never. I am ready to go to Geneva. I will not hide it from you as representatives of the people and I say it for all our people here and our Arab nation to hear--and you have heard me say it--I am ready to go to the ends of the earth if this will prevent a soldier or an officer of my sons from being wounded--not being killed, but wounded. [applause]

I say now that I am ready to go to the ends of the earth. Israel will be astonished when it hears me saying now before you that I am ready to go to their house, to the Knesset itself and to talk to them. [applause]

66. President Al-Sadat, Statement Before the Israeli Knesset, November 20, 1977

In the name of God, Mr. Speaker of the Knesset, ladies and gentlemen, allow me first to thank deeply the Speaker of the Knesset for affording me this opportunity to address you.

As I begin my address I wish to say, peace and the mercy of God Almighty be upon you and may peace be with us all, God willing. Peace for us all, of the Arab lands and in Israel, as well as in every part of this big world, which is so beset by conflicts, perturbed by its deep contradictions, menaced now and then by destructive wars launched by man to annihilate his fellow men.

Finally, amidst the ruins of what man has built among the remains of the victims of mankind there emerges neither victor nor vanquished. The only vanquished remains always a man, God's most sublime creation. Man, whom God has created, as Gandhi, the apostle of peace puts it, to forge ahead, to mold the way of life and to worship God Almighty.

I come to you today on solid ground to shape a new life and to establish peace. We all love this land, the land of God, we all, Moslems, Christians and Jews, all worship God.

Under God, God's teachings and commandments are: love, sincerity, security and peace.

I do not blame all those who received my decision when I announced it to the entire world before the Egyptian People's Assembly. I do not blame all those who received my decision with surprise and even with amazement—some gripped even by violent surprise. Still others interpreted it as political, to camouflage my intentions of launching a new war.

I would go so far as to tell you that one of my aides at the presidential office contacted me at a late hour following my return home from the People's Assembly and sounded worried as he asked me: "Mr. President, what would be our reaction if Israel actually extended an invitation to you?"

I replied calmly: "I would accept it immediately. I have declared that I would go to the end of the earth. I would go to Israel, for I want to put before the people of Israel all the facts."

I can see the faces of all those who were astounded by my decision and had doubts as to the sincerity of the intentions behind the declaration of my decision. No one could have ever conceived that the president of the biggest Arab state, which bears the heaviest burden and the main responsibility pertaining to the cause of war and peace in the Middle East, should declare his readiness to go to the land of the adversary while we were still in a state of war.

We all still bear the consequences of four fierce wars waged within 30 years. All this at the time when the families of the 1973 October war are still mourning under the cruel pain of bereavement of father, son, husband and brother.

As I have already declared, I have not consulted as far as this decision is concerned with any of my colleagues or brothers, the Arab heads of state or the confrontation states.

Most of those who contacted me following the declaration of this decision expressed their objection because of the feeling of utter suspicion and absolute lack of confidence between the Arab states and the Palestine people on the one hand and Israel on the other that still surges in us all.

Many months in which peace could have been brought about have been wasted over differences and fruitless discussions on the procedure of convening the Geneva conference. All have shared suspicion and absolute lack of confidence.

But to be absolutely frank with you, I took this decision after long thought, knowing that it constitutes a great risk, for God Almighty has made it my fate to assume responsibility on behalf of the Egyptian people, to share in the responsibility of the Arab nation, the main duty of which, dictated by responsibility, is to exploit all and every means in a bid to save my Egyptian Arab people and the pan-Arab nation from the horrors of new suffering and destructive wars, the dimensions of which are foreseen only by God Himself.

After long thinking, I was convinced that the obligation of responsibility before God and before the people make it incumbent upon me that I should go to the far corners of the world—even to Jerusalem to address members of the Knesset and acquaint them with all the facts surging in me, then I would let you decide for yourselves.

Following this, may God Almighty determine our fate.

Ladies and gentlemen, there are moments in the lives of nations and peoples when it is incumbent upon those known for their wisdom and clarity of vision to survey the problem, with all its complexities and vain memories, in a bold drive towards new horizons.

Those who like us are shouldering the same responsibilities entrusted to us are the first who should have the courage to make determining decisions that are consonant with the magnitude of the circumstances. We must all rise above all forms of obsolete theories of superiority, and the most important thing is never to forget that infallibility is the prerogative of God alone.

If I said that I wanted to avert from all the Arab people the horrors of shocking and destructive wars I must sincerely declare before you that I have the same feelings and bear the same responsibility towards all and every man on earth, and certainly toward the Israeli people.

Any life that is lost in war is a human life, be it that of an Arab or an Israeli. A wife who becomes a widow is a human being entitled to a happy family life, whether she be an Arab or an Israeli.

Innocent children who are deprived of the care and compassion of their parents are ours. They are ours, be they living on Arab or Israeli land.

They command our full responsibility to afford them a comfortable life today and tomorrow.

For the sake of them all, for the sake of the lives of all our sons and brothers, for the sake of affording our communities the opportunity to work for the progress and happiness of man, feeling secure and with the right to a dignified life, for the generations to come, for a smile on the face of every child born in our land for all that I have taken my decision to come to you, despite all the hazards, to deliver my address.

Efforts to find peace

I have shouldered the prerequisites of the historic responsibility and therefore I declared on Feb. 4, 1971, that I was willing to sign a peace agreement with Is-

rael. This was the first declaration made by a responsible Arab official since the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Motivated by all these factors dictated by the responsibilities of leadership, on Oct. 16, 1973, before the Egyptian People's Assembly, I called for an international conference to establish permanent peace based on justice. I was not heard.

I was in the position of man pleading for peace or asking for a cease-fire, motivated by the duties of history and leadership, I signed the first disengagement agreement, followed by the second disengagement agreement in Sinai.

Then we proceeded, trying both open and closed doors in a bid to find a certain road leading to a durable and just peace.

We opened our heart to the peoples of the entire world to make them understand our motivations and objectives and actually to convince them of the fact that we are advocates of justice and peacemakers. Motivated by all these factors, I also decided to come to you with an open mind and an open heart and with a conscious determination so that we might establish permanent peace based on justice.

It is so fated that my trip to you, which is a journey of peace, coincided with the Islamic feast, the holy Feast of the Sacrifice when Abraham, peace be upon him, forefather of the Arabs and Jews, submitted to God. I say, when God Almighty ordered him, not out of weakness, but through a giant spiritual force and by free will to sacrifice his very own son, personified a firm and unshakeable belief in ideals that had for mankind a profound significance.

Ladies and gentlemen, let us be frank with each other. Using straightforward words and a clear conception with no ambiguity, let us be frank with each other today while the entire world, both East and West, follows these unparalleled moments, which could prove to be a radical turning point in the history of this part of the world if not in the history of the world as a whole.

'Let us be frank ...'

Let us be frank with each other, let us be frank with each other as we answer this important question:

How can we achieve permanent peace based on justice? Well, I have come to you carrying my clear and frank answer to this big question, so that the people in Israel as well as the entire world may hear it. All those devoted prayers ring in my ears, pleading to God

Almighty that this historic meeting may eventually lead to the result aspired to by millions.

Before I proclaim my answer, I wish to assure you that in my clear and frank answer I am availing myself of a number of facts that no one can deny.

The first fact is that no one can build this happiness at the expense of the misery of others.

The second fact: never have I spoken, nor will I ever speak, with two tongues; never have I adopted, nor will I ever adopt, two policies. I never deal with anyone except in one tongue, one policy and with one face.

The third fact: direct confrontation is the nearest and most successful method to reach a clear objective.

The fourth fact: the call for permanent and just peace based on respect for United Nations resolutions has now become the call of the entire world. It has become the expression of the will of the international community, whether in official capitals where policies are made and decisions taken, or at the level of the world public opinion, which influences policymaking and decision-taking.

The fifth fact, and this is probably the clearest and most prominent, is that the Arab nation, in its drive for permanent peace based on justice, does not proceed from a position of weakness. On the contrary, it has the power and stability for a sincere will for peace.

The Arab declared intention stems from an awareness prompted by a heritage of civilization, that to avoid an inevitable disaster that will befall us, you and the whole world, there is no alternative to the establishment of permanent peace based on justice, peace that is not swayed by suspicion or jeopardized by ill intentions.

In the light of these facts, which I meant to place before you the way I see them, I would also wish to warn you, in all sincerity I warn you, against some thoughts that could cross your minds.

Frankness makes it incumbent upon me to tell you the following:

No separate agreement

First, I have not come here for a separate agreement between Egypt and Israel. This is not part of the policy of Egypt. The problem is not that of Egypt and Israel.

An interim peace between Egypt and Israel, or between any Arab confrontation state and Israel, will not bring permanent peace based on justice in the entire region.

Rather, even if peace between all the confrontation states and Israel were achieved in the absence of a just solution of the Palestinian problem, never will there be that durable and just peace upon which the entire world insists.

Second, I have not come to you to seek a partial peace, namely to terminate the state of belligerency at this stage and put off the entire problem to a subsequent stage. This is not the radical solution that would steer us to permanent peace.

Equally, I have not come to you for a third disengagement agreement in Sinai or in Golan or the West Bank.

For this would mean that we are merely delaying the ignition of the fuse. I would also mean that we are lacking the courage to face peace, that we are too weak to shoulder the burdens and responsibilities of a durable peace based upon justice.

I have come to you so that together we should build a durable peace based on justice to avoid the shedding of one single drop of blood by both sides. It is for this reason that I have proclaimed my readiness to go to the farthest corner of the earth.

Here I would go back to the big question:

How can we achieve a durable peace based on justice? In my opinion, and I declare it to the whole world, from this forum, the answer is neither difficult nor is it impossible despite long years of feuds, blood, faction, strife, hatreds and deep-rooted animosity.

The answer is not difficult, nor is it impossible, if we sincerely and faithfully follow a straight line.

You want to live with us, in this part of the world.

In all sincerity I tell you we welcome you among us with full security and safety. This in itself is a tremendous turning point, one of the landmarks of a decisive historical change. We used to reject you. We had our reasons and our fears, yes.

We refused to meet with you, anywhere, yes.

We were together in international conferences and organizations and our representatives did not, and still do not, exchange greetings with you. Yes. This has happened and is still happening.

It is also true that we used to set as a precondition for any negotiations with you a mediator who would meet separately with each party.

Yes. Through this procedure, the talks of the first and second disengagement agreements took place.

Our delegates met in the first Geneva conference without exchanging a direct word, yes, this has happened.

Yet today I tell you, and I declare it to the whole world, that we accept to live with you in permanent peace based on justice. We do not want to encircle you

or be encircled ourselves by destructive missiles ready for launching, nor by the shells of grudges and hatreds.

I have announced on more than one occasion that Israel has become a fait accompli, recognized by the world, and that the two superpowers have undertaken the responsibility for its existence. As we really and truly seek peace we really and truly welcome you to live among us in peace and security.

There was a huge wall between us that you tried to build up over a quarter of a century but it was destroyed in 1973. It was the wall of an implacable and escalating psychological warfare.

It was a wall of the fear of the force that could sweep the entire Arab nation. It was a wall of propaganda that we were a nation reduced to immobility. Some of you have gone as far as to say that even for 50 years to come, the Arabs will not regain their strength. It was a wall that always threatened with a long arm that could reach and strike anywhere. It was a wall that warned us of extermination and annihilation if we tried to use our legitimate rights to liberate the occupied territories.

Together we have to admit that that wall fell and collapsed in 1973. Yet, there remains another wall. This wall constitutes a psychological barrier between us, a barrier of suspicion, a barrier of rejection; a barrier of fear, of deception, a barrier of hallucination without any action, deed or decision.

A barrier of distorted and eroded interpretation of every event and statement. It is this psychological barrier that I described in official statements as constituting 70 percent of the whole problem.

Today, through my visit to you, I ask why don't we stretch out our hands with faith and sincerity so that together we might destroy this barrier? Why shouldn't our and your will meet with faith and sincerity so that together we might remove all suspicion of fear, betrayal and bad intentions?

Why don't we stand together with the courage of men and the boldness of heroes who dedicate themselves to a sublime aim? Why don't we stand together with the same courage and daring to erect a huge edifice of peace?

An edifice that builds and does not destroy. An edifice that serves as a beacon for generations to come with the human message for construction, development and the dignity of man.

Why should we bequeath to the coming generations the plight of bloodshed, yes, orphans, widowhood, family disintegration and the wailing of victims?

Why don't we believe in the wisdom of God conveyed to us by the wisdom of the proverbs of Solomon. [Sadat went on to quote extensively from the proverbs.]

Peace must be based on justice

Ladies and gentlemen, to tell you the truth, peace cannot be worth its name unless it is based on justice and not on the occupation of the land of others. It would not be right for you to demand for yourselves what you deny to others. With all frankness and in the spirit that has prompted me to come to you today, I tell you you have to give up once and for all the dreams of conquest and give up the belief that force is the best method for dealing with the Arabs.

You should clearly understand the lesson of confrontation between you and us. Expansion does not pay. To speak frankly, our land does not yield itself to bargaining, it is not even open to argument. To us, the nation's soil is equal to the holy valley where God Almighty spoke to Moses. Peace be upon him.

We cannot accept any attempt to take away or accept to seek one inch of it nor can we accept the principle of debating or bargaining over it.

I sincerely tell you also that before us today lies the appropriate chance for peace. If we are really serious in our endeavor for peace, it is a chance that may never come again. It is a chance that if lost or wasted, the resulting slaughter would bear the curse of humanity and of history.

What is peace for Israel? It means that Israel lives in the region with her Arab neighbors in security and safety. Is that logical? I say yes. It means that Israel

lives within its borders, secure against any aggression. Is that logical? And I say yes. It means that Israel obtains all kinds of guarantees that will ensure these two factors. To this demand, I say yes.

Beyond that we declare that we accept all the international guarantees you envisage and accept. We declare that we accept all the guarantees you want from the two superpowers or from either of them or from the Big Five or from some of them. Once again, I declare clearly and unequivocally that we agree to any guarantees you accept, because in return we shall receive the same guarantees.

In short then, when we ask what is peace for Israel, the answer would be that Israel lives within her borders, among her Arab neighbors in safety and security, within the framework of all the guarantees she accepts and that are offered to her.

But, how can this be achieved? How can we reach this conclusion that would lead us to permanent peace based on justice? There are facts that should be faced with courage and clarity. There are Arab territories that Israel has occupied and still occupies by force. We insist on complete withdrawal from these territories, including Arab Jerusalem.

I have come to Jerusalem, the city of peace, which will always remain as a living embodiment of co-existence among believers of the three religions. It is inadmissible that anyone should conceive the special status of the city of Jerusalem within the framework of annexation or expansionism. It should be a free and open city for all believers.

Above all, this city should not be severed from those who have made it their abode for centuries. Instead of reviving the precedent of the Crusades, we should revive the spirit of Omar Emil Khtab and Saladin, namely the spirit of tolerance and respect for right.

The holy shrines of Islam and Christianity are not only places of worship but a living testimony of our interrupted presence here. Politically, spiritually and intellectually, here let us make no mistake about the importance and reverence we Christians and Moslems attach to Jerusalem.

Let me tell you without the slightest hesitation that I have not come to you under this roof to make a request that your troops evacuate the occupied territories. Complete withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied after 1967 is a logical and undisputed fact. Nobody should plead for that. Any talk about permanent peace based on justice and any move to ensure our coexistence in peace and security in this part of the world would become meaningless while you occupy Arab territories by force of arms.

For there is no peace that could be built on the occupation of the land of others, otherwise it would not be a serious peace. Yet this is a foregone conclusion that is not open to the passion of debate if intentions are sincere or if endeavors to establish a just and durable peace for our and for generations to come are genuine.

Palestine: the crux of the problem

As for the Palestine cause nobody could deny that it is the crux of the entire problem. Nobody in the world could accept today slogans propagated here in Israel, ignoring the existence of a Palestinian people and questioning even their whereabouts. Because the Palestine people and their legitimate rights are no longer denied today by anybody; that is nobody who has the ability of judgment can deny or ignore it.

It is an acknowledged fact, perceived by the world community, both in the East and in the West, with support and recognition in international documents and official statements. It is of no use to anybody to turn deaf ears to its resounding voice, which is being heard day and night, or to overlook its historical reality.

Even the United States of America, your first ally, which is absolutely committed to safeguard Israel's security and existence and which offered and still offers Israel every moral, material and military support—I say, even the United States has opted to face up to reality and admit that the Palestinian people are entitled to legitimate rights and that the Palestine problem is the cause and essence of the conflict and

that so long as it continues to be unresolved, the conflict will continue to aggravate, reaching new dimension.

In all sincerity I tell you that there can be no peace without the Palestinians. It is a grave error of unpredictable consequences to overlook or brush aside this cause.

I shall not indulge in past events such as the Balfour Declaration 60 years ago. You are well acquainted with the relevant text. If you have found the moral and legal justification to set up a national home on a land that did not all belong to you, it is incumbent upon you to show understanding of the insistence of the people of Palestine for establishment once again of a state on their land. When some extremists ask the Palestinians to give up this sublime objective, this in fact means asking them to renounce their identity and every hope for the future.

I hail the Israeli voices that called for the recognition of the Palestinian people's right to achieve and safeguard peace.

Here I tell you, ladies and gentlemen, that it is no use to refrain from recognizing the Palestinian people and their right to statehood as their right of return. We, the Arabs, have faced this experience before, with you. And with the reality of the Israeli existence, the struggle that took us from war to war, from victims to more victims, until you and we have today reached the edge of a horrible abyss and a terrifying disaster unless, together, we seize this opportunity today of a durable peace based on justice.

You have to face reality bravely, as I have done. There can never be any solution to a problem by evading it or turning a deaf ear to it. Peace cannot last if attempts are made to impose fantasy concepts on which the world has turned its back and announced its unanimous call for the respect of rights and facts.

There is no need to enter a vicious circle as to Palestinian rights. It is useless to create obstacles, otherwise the march of peace will be impeded or peace will be blown up. As I have told you, there is no happiness [based on] the detriment of others.

Direct confrontation and straightforwardness are the shortcuts and the most successful way to reach a clear objective. Direct confrontation concerning the Palestinian problem and tackling it in one single language with a view to achieving a durable and just peace lie in the establishment of that peace. With all the guarantees you demand, there should be no fear of a newly born state that needs the assistance of all countries of the world.

When the bells of peace ring there will be no hands to beat the drums of war. Even if they existed, they would be stilled.

Terms for peace

Conceive with me a peace agreement in Geneva that we would herald to a world thirsting for peace. A peace agreement based on the following points:

Ending the occupation of the Arab territories occupied in 1967.

Achievement of the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people and their right to self-determination, including their right to establish their own state.

The right of all states in the area to live in peace within their boundaries, their secure boundaries, which will be secured and guaranteed through procedures to be agreed upon, which will provide appropriate security to international boundaries in addition to appropriate international guarantees.

Commitment of all states in the region to administer the relations among them in accordance with the objectives and principles of the United Nations Charter. Particularly the principles concerning the nonuse of force and a solution of differences among them by peaceful means.

Ending the state of belligerence in the region.

Ladies and gentlemen, peace is not a mere endorsement of written lines. Rather it is a rewriting of history. Peace is not a game of calling for peace to defend certain whims or hide certain admissions. Peace in its essence is a dire struggle against all and every ambition and whim.

Perhaps the example taken and experienced, taken from ancient and modern history, teaches that missiles, warships and nuclear weapons cannot establish security. Instead they destroy what peace and security build.

For the sake of our peoples and for the sake of the civilization made by man, we have to defend man everywhere against rule by the force of arms so that we may endow the rule of humanity with all the power of the values and principles that further the sublime position of mankind.

Allow me to address my call from this rostrum to the people of Israel. I pledge myself with true and sincere words to every man, woman and child in Israel. I tell them, from the Egyptian people who bless this sacred mission of peace, I convey to you the message of peace of the Egyptian people, who do not harbor fanaticism and whose sons, Moslems, Christians and Jews, live together in a state of cordiality, love and tolerance.

Entrusted with a sacred message

This is Egypt, whose people have entrusted me with their sacred message. A message of security, safety and peace to every man, woman and child in Israel. I say, encourage your leadership to struggle for peace. Let all endeavors be channeled towards building a huge stronghold for peace instead of building destructive rockets.

Introduce to the entire world the image of the new man in this area so that he might set an example to the man of our age, the man of peace everywhere. Ring the bells for your sons. Tell them that those wars were the last of wars and the end of sorrows. Tell them that we are entering upon a new beginning, a new life, a life of love, prosperity, freedom and peace.

You, sorrowing mother, you, widowed wife, you, the son who lost a brother or a father, all the victims of wars, fill the air and space with recitals of peace, fill bosoms and hearts with the aspirations of peace. Make a reality that blossoms and lives. Make hope a code of conduct and endeavor.

The will of peoples is part of the will of God. Ladies and gentlemen, before I came to this place, with every beat of my heart and with every sentiment, I prayed to God Almighty. While performing the prayers at the Al Aksa mosque and while visiting the Holy Sepulcher I asked the Almighty to give me strength and to confirm my belief that this visit may achieve the objective I look forward to for a happy present and a happier future.

I have chosen to set aside all precedents and traditions known by warring countries. In spite of the fact that occupation of Arab territories is still there, the declaration of my readiness to proceed to Israel came as a great surprise that stirred many feelings and confounded many minds. Some of them even doubted its intent.

Despite all that, the decision was inspired by all the clarity and purity of belief and with all the true passions of my people's will and intentions and I have chosen this road, considered by many to be the most difficult road.

I have chosen to come to you with an open heart and an open mind. I have chosen to give this great impetus to all international efforts exerted for peace. I have chosen to present to you, in your own home, the realities, devoid of any scheme or whim. Not to maneuver, or win a round, but for us to win together, the most dangerous of rounds embattled in modern history, the battle of permanent peace based on justice.

It is not my battle alone. Nor is it the battle of the leadership in Israel alone. It is the battle of all and every citizen in all our territories, whose right it is to live in peace. It is the commitment of conscience and responsibility in the hearts of millions.

When I put forward this initiative, many asked what is it that I conceived as possible to achieve during this visit and what my expectations were. And as I answer the questions, I announce before you that I have not thought of carrying out this initiative from the precepts of what could be achieved during this visit. And I have come here to deliver a message. I have delivered the message and may God be my witness.

I repeat with Zachariah: Love, right and justice. From the holy Koran I quote the following verses: "We believe in God and in what has been revealed to us and what was revealed to Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob and the 13 Jewish tribes. And in the books given to Moses and Jesus and the prophets from their Lord, who made no distinction between them." So we agree Salam Aleikum - peace be upon you.

67. President Al-Sadat, Statement to the Organization of African Unity, July 19, 1978

Brothers and friends: The Egyptian people and the entire Arab nation are greatly indebted to all of you. You have been and still are our best companions along the path of the exhaustive struggle which entails enormous responsibilities and difficult challenges. You have been and still are the truthful and sincere supporters who do not hesitate in making precious sacrifices to support our struggle. You have thus given the most splendid examples of true fraternity, sincere faith in the unity of the struggle for the sake of the common aims and the unity of the actual solidarity among the peoples who agree in their views and who share interests and fate.

The first free voice was raised from this platform supporting the struggle of the Arab nation for its legitimate rights. Within this framework, the first nucleus of international support for the Arab cause was established here. Because of you the Arab cause has now become a tree with its roots deep in the earth and its branches in the sky.

It was from this good land that Egypt embarked on the peace initiative which has shaken the world and caused tremendous qualitative and quantitative changes in the international support for the Arab right. This is in addition to the change it caused in the nature of the conflict and the way of dealing with it. Egypt has proceeded along this path with firm steps, without stumbling or hesitating. It moved in the direction of peace with all confidence in itself, facing the foe in the fields of peace with the same solid will with which it faced him on the battlefield. It gives me pleasure to seize this opportunity to express to you our sincerest loyalty and gratitude. Your support for the Egyptian people in their struggle for peace is an extension of your great principled stand in the various stages of the struggle. Indeed, this stance of yours reflects a magnificent revolutionary consciousness because the real revolutionaries do not confine themselves to a certain way of conducting their struggle, but always remember the sublime aims which they seek to realize by all available means without falling victims to the complexes or prejudices of the past or giving in to despair.

Proceeding from belief in the oneness of the struggle and the cause, I want to explain to you in detail the developments in the efforts we are exerting to achieve a peaceful and just solution on the basis of law, justice and legitimacy. This will be done in such a way that every side will have its rights and secure its legitimate interests without trampling on the rights of others and without harming their interests, which are firmly acknowledged by the international community.

Dear brothers, we firmly believe that a just and lasting peace throughout the area is imperative, because the people cannot reject the option of peace if they are given a chance to express their will, if they are given a chance to uproot fear and rancor and if they can really participate in steering matters and pushing them forward on the road leading to the achievement of their real interests and to sparing them the dangers of war and destruction.

We believe there is no substitute for achieving a comprehensive settlement taking the core of the conflict into consideration and based on the essence of the issue--that is, the right of the struggling Palestinian people to liberate their land, to experience their distinct identity and their age-old entity, and to freely express their latent creative potentials. On this basis, we have called on Israel to commit itself to withdraw from the West Bank and Gaza as well as from the rest of the occupied Arab territories. Israel is indeed committed to implement the binding general provisions of international law and the letter and spirit of Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967.

Consequently, it is imperative for Israel to cease hindering the Palestinian people from exercising their natural rights to freedom and a dignified life in a manner far removed from the sins and tragedies of occupation. In return, we have categorically declared on all occasions our readiness to assume all the countercommitments which would safeguard security and peace for Israel and which would place the area, for the first time since the outbreak of the conflict, on the threshold of a new era in which peace would prevail, without rancor, grudge and hate.

It is regrettable that the Israeli Government is still clinging to past illusions and concepts. It is enough to state that up to this moment Israel has failed to absorb the new dimensions looming on the horizon.

Israel is still dreaming about territorial expansion and still gives priority to seizing the territory of others over the establishment of peace. However, we are determined to proceed on the road of peace as long as there is hope for the will of the peoples to triumph and the voice of reason and moderation to triumph over the voices of extremism, blind chauvinism and haughtiness. We will continue our endeavors until it is proved to us and to the whole world that the other side is totally incapable of facing up to its responsibility for erecting an edifice of just peace.

Brothers and friends, you are aware that a meeting is now being held in the United Kingdom. We consider it another opportunity for Israel to prove its ability to forget the myths of the past for the sake of the hope which the future holds for all the peoples of the area.

We believe--and you all support us in this--that peace cannot be achieved unless it is based on justice and legality and that it cannot be a stable peace unless it is based on respect for rights and on granting what is due to every side and asking what is due from every side. We will not accept any forfeiting of rights or violation of territory.

Egypt has submitted specific proposals calling for withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and agreement on arrangements that would guarantee security for and give reassurance to every side and preclude risks and dangers for every side.

Israel has an opportunity to prove its seriousness and readiness to respond to our desire to establish a just and lasting peace, and to prove that it is capable of shouldering its peace responsibilities. If it chooses the other path and if it persists in its intransigence, it will greatly harm its qualification to join us in establishing peace.

Mr Chairman, these days we are passing through a difficult phase that could affect our struggle and march and leave its marks on the fate of the future generations of our children and grandchildren. We must all rise to the level of the challenge and the responsibility. We must insist on a clarity of vision so as to be able to distinguish good from evil and right from wrong and so as not to lose track of our real interests and not to fight other people's battles in which there is no victor and no vanquished.

From our long history of struggle we must derive self-confidence, hope in the future, and determination to continue on the road of victory. God is great, glory for immortal Africa, and may peace and God's blessings be with you.

68. President Al-Sadat, Statement at the Signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, March 26, 1979

President Carter, dear friends:

This is certainly one of the happiest moments in my life. (Applause) It is a historic turning point of great significance for all peace-loving nations. Those among us who are endowed with vision cannot fail to comprehend the dimensions of our sacred mission. The Egyptian people, with their heritage and unique awareness of history, have realized from the very beginning the meaning and value of this endeavor.

In all the steps I took, I was not performing a personal mission. I was merely expressing the will of a nation. I am proud of my people and of belonging to them. (Applause)

Today, a new dawn is emerging out of the darkness of the past. A new chapter is being opened in the history of coexistence among nations, one that is worthy of our spiritual values and civilization. Never before had men encountered such a complex dispute, which is highly charged with emotions. Never before did men need that much courage and imagination to confront a single challenge. Never before had any cause generated that much interest in all four corners of the globe.

Men and women of good will have labored day and night to bring about this happy moment. Egyptians and Israelis alike pursued this sacred goal undeterred by difficulties and complications. Hundreds of dedicated individuals on both sides have given generously of their thought and effort to translate the cherished dream into a living reality.

But the man who performed the miracle was President Carter. (Applause) Without any exaggeration, what he did constitutes one of the greatest achievements of our time. He devoted his skill, hard work, and above all his firm belief in the ultimate triumph of good against evil to ensure the success of our mission. (Applause)

To me he has been the best companion and partner along the road to peace. With his deep sense of justice and genuine commitment to human rights, we were able to surmount the most difficult obstacles.

There came certain moments when hope was eroding and retreating in the face of crisis. However, President Carter remained unshaken in his confidence and determination. He is a man of faith and compassion. Before anything else, the signing of the peace treaty and the exchanged letter is a tribute to the spirit and ability of Jimmy Carter. (Applause)

Happily, he was armed with the blessing of God and the support of his people. For that we are grateful to each and every American who contributed in his own way to the success of our endeavor.

We are also heartened by the understanding of hundreds of thousands of Israelis who remained unwavering in their commitment to peace. The continuation of this spirit is vital to the coronation of our effort. We realize that difficult times lay ahead. The signing of these documents marks only the beginning of peace. But it is an indispensable start. Other steps remain to be taken without delay or procrastination. Much will depend on the success of these steps.

We are all committed to pursue our efforts until the fruits of the comprehensive settlement we agreed upon are shared by all parties to the conflict.

President Carter once said that the United States is committed without reservation to seeing the peace process through until all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict are at peace. We value such a pledge from a leader who raised the banner of morality and ethics as a substitute for power politics and opportunism. The steps we took in the recent past will serve Arab vital interests. The liberation of Arab land and the reinstitution of Arab authority in the West Bank and Gaza would certainly enhance our common strategic interests.

While we take the initiative to protect these interests, we remain faithful to our Arab commitment. To us, this is a matter of destiny. Pursuing peace is the only avenue which is compatible with our culture and creed.

Let there be no more wars or bloodshed between Arabs and Israelis. (Applause) Let there be no more wars or bloodshed between Arabs and the Israelis. Let there be no more suffering or denial of rights. Let there be no more despair or loss of faith. Let no mother lament the loss of her child. Let no young man waste his life on a conflict from which no one benefits. Let us work together until the day comes when they beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruninghooks. And God does call to the abode of peace, He does guide whom He pleases to His way. (President Sadat spoke briefly in Egyptian.) (Applause)

69. Former Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi, Interview in The Middle East, April 1979

Bruzonsky: When President Sadat first went to Israel, do you think he had in mind what most people consider to be a separate peace? Or did he realise later that this was the most he could get?

Fahmi: One of the main reasons why I refused to join President Sadat is that the only thing which could come from such a visit was a separate agreement.

☐ You had no hope in October 1977 that there could be a psychological breakthrough to a comprehensive settlement? You foresaw this separate agreement?

☐ Certainly, because there was nothing else. People try to justify major political steps on a psychological basis, but I don't believe that politicians become psychiatrists.

As a politician I deal with things on a pragmatic basis, especially when these things affect human lives, the future of a whole population, the national security of nations, justice, international law, or treaties. It was clear that the Israelis could not risk their national security and their philosophy just for a psychological effect or to break psychological barriers.

All this is an invention to justify certain actions. When I deal with things I deal with them as they are. I don't dream. This is a new thing as far as I am concerned and I'm not going to take part in it.

☐ You negotiated with the new Carter Administration for almost a year before you left the Egyptian Government. Why

do you think Carter agreed to a separate agreement after insisting so strongly that there should be a comprehensive settlement and a Palestinian homeland?

☐ Right up to President Sadat's visit to Israel President Carter, Cyrus Vance and their colleagues were working very hard to have the Geneva Conference convened. And they were going to succeed! There is no doubt about it!

First they were going to have all the parties go to Geneva and sit and negotiate sometime in the last week of December 1977. And the Russians were going to participate.

President Carter himself had prepared the whole thing – procedurally and substantively. Concurrently, President Carter and Cyrus Vance negotiated for a long time with the Russians about a framework for solving the Middle East crisis once and for all. Then the Joint Statement came on the first of October 1977. It was the real framework for a comprehensive settlement, with all parties concerned attending and the two superpowers as co-chairmen.

And this is why President Carter and his colleagues were reluctant at the beginning to support President Sadat's trip to Jerusalem. They waited a little to watch things, but when they examined the pros and cons they had no choice but to support it.

Here is the biggest Arab country in the area offering a separate peace with Israel, so why the hell shouldn't the Americans profit from this, bearing in mind their own internal problems with the Jewish community and the Jewish lobby?

☐ If Sadat knew that Geneva was to be convened in a few months and that the Americans and the Russians were serious about pushing for a comprehensive settlement, he must have in-

tentionally set out to abort that process.

○ No, I don't believe Sadat did this intentionally, because Egypt was co-operating with President Carter formally on the convening of Geneva. We were not against it. We even accepted the single Arab delegation and the whole Carter formula.

□ Is that how the PLO problem was going to be solved with PLO people coming as part of that one delegation?

○ Exactly. And before that you may remember again that President Carter in August 1977 took the unusual step of proposing a formula to the PLO leaders which would enable his Administration to sit with PLO people. This was to overcome the difficulty resulting from Kissinger's agreement with the Israelis in connection with the second disengagement of the Egyptian-Israeli front that the Americans would not sit with the PLO without previously consulting Israel.

This would have been the real breakthrough between the American Administration at the highest level and the PLO. As a superpower the US should sit with anybody, everybody, especially when the problems involve war and peace, human rights and justice.

I was the intermediary between the Americans and the PLO. The process was starting - the PLO proposed another formula. And the Americans proposed a second formula. So the process of negotiations started through me. This was a major step.

□ You really think that in view of US domestic politics Carter would have been able to succeed?

○ He took the initiative! I didn't ask him to do it. He knew exactly what he was doing. And he repeated it even two months ago.

□ But he went back on the US-USSR Joint Statement within two days by producing the US-Israel "Working Paper".

○ But this was a bilateral thing. The Joint US-Russian Statement was intact and was going to be respected by the Americans and the Russians.

□ Even after the American Jews and the Israelis protested so effectively?

○ I was sure of it because I saw President Carter myself after that. Up to this very minute I haven't heard any concrete statement to suggest that the Americans were going back on what they agreed with the Russians. Ultimately, if there is any comprehensive peace settlement, it will be in accordance with this statement.

□ You consider that Statement such a historic accomplishment?

○ Yes, I may disagree with some parts of it. But I am not a superpower. I am an interested party. We don't speak the same language. Our vision is completely different and our interests are different. Our commitments are different. Our dedication to

principles is different.

□ The treaty has a large military component and there has been some discussion that the Americans are planning to buttress their military potential in the Middle East in three ways: by strengthening Israel as a potential arm of Western military might; by strengthening Egypt as a potential gendarme in the Middle East and North Africa; by a 5th Fleet and the preparation of American contingency forces.

○ (long, unusual pause) So far as Israel is concerned, I believe the Americans paid a

very high price. And this will appear in the future, because it will backfire.

□ How? Why?

○ The only thing which really generates peace is to have a balance between the major countries of any region of the world. If one of the superpowers is very weak and the other much stronger, there would be an imbalance in everything. There would be a big temptation for the strongest to do whatever it wanted.

The same applies on the regional level. If Israel realises that Egypt alone, militarily speaking, is not that weak and that in any armed conflict between Israel and Egypt there would be a lot of damage, Israel will think a hundred times before launching any pre-emptive war or ever threatening to use force. Instead Israel would concentrate on peaceful methods.

On the other hand, if Egypt is weak militarily it will be in a very bad position to negotiate peace. The result of negotiations will reflect this weakness. Egypt would be negotiating under duress, and Israel would have the upper hand in negotiating about the Palestinians.

This means it will never be a permanent peace. Egypt, itself, when it gets stronger or when things change, will say "No, I was forced to accept this under duress, this must be changed", and the whole thing will start again. There will either be another armed conflict or some sort of massive pressure will be needed to convince Israel to agree to new Egyptian demands.

The military help which the Americans are giving to the Egyptians now is far inferior to what they are giving to the Israelis. Take, for instance, the deal of the F-5s. What the hell do I need with F-5s. They're obsolete. They are giving them to the Yemen or to Ethiopia or Sudan!

The Israelis had F-5s about 10 years ago. Now, they give Egypt, the biggest and strongest country in the Arab world, 50 F-5s. And they give the Israelis the most sophisticated planes in the American arsenal. This is a mockery!

☐ Do you see any likelihood of the autonomy negotiations leading to any solution of the Palestinian problem?

○ It depends on what you mean by a solution of the Palestinian problem.

☐ A solution which will be widely considered . . .

○ You are using very evasive words. Come to the point. Do you want to ask whether I believe autonomy will lead to a Palestinian state?

☐ If that's the only solution that you see.

○ Yes. I don't see any permanent peace to the Middle East crisis unless the Palestinian problem is solved on the basis of restoring the full rights of the Palestinian people in the form of a homeland with territorial boundaries.

Once this state of Palestine is established I am not at all against this new state having some relations with Israel. It's up to them – federation, confederation, even if they decide to unite in a secular state. If they choose to have a political link with Jordan, it's up to them.

But let us understand each other very clearly. There will be no peace unless the Palestine problem is solved on the basis of a Palestine state.

☐ But the Israelis are hinting at a somewhat different solution which many Egyptians I've spoken with don't seem to object to too strongly. If Jordan were controlled by the Palestinians politically, Israel could argue that the Palestinians had three-quarters of Palestine – the East Bank of the Jordan River – and the Jews, one-quarter – everything to the West of the River.

○ This means aggression against the Jordanian state. It means the Arabs and the Palestinians would relinquish their rights in Palestine. More importantly, the result of the Palestinisation of Jordan would be the Israelisation of the West Bank and Gaza. This is why the Israelis are promoting this idea, but this is not the solution. This is exactly what Begin and some American strategists are trying to do. But they are evading the main problem. This is impossible.

☐ Why?

○ Because it attempts to solve the problem of the rights of one people at the expense of another people.

☐ History's full of examples of such things. It might not be "just," but it might be a solution.

○ If this is a theoretical exercise I can extend it to many more things. Begin and his colleagues could go back again to Poland, Germany, France and the United Kingdom. Or, they could start shopping all over again for new ground and go to Madagascar or Libya or Uganda.

☐ Do you think the treaty has greatly strengthened the Likud-Begin political forces in Zionism?

○ I don't believe that there is any difference between all these people. They have their old testament. They are trying to implement it by stages, by force, or influence all over the world.

☐ But don't you see a difference between Labour, Mapam, Likud . . .

○ No difference. All this is semantics, believe me.

☐ Are you afraid that after the treaty the Israelis may seek excuses for further expansion?

○ You see, Israeli expansion can be in different forms – war and armed conflict is just one way. And history taught us that they can create the conditions in which they can justify through the media that what they took was in self-defence. They can

either use physical means or complete penetration through various slogans like "peace," "open frontiers," "joint projects". And all what you hear now is this new vocabulary.

☐ But it's not unwarranted penetration if Egypt welcomes these things. It's not Israeli expansion, it's something that the Egyptians – desire.

○ Yes, but I don't believe that the Egyptians do welcome this. I am sure that all the Egyptians, if they understood exactly what's going to happen, would never have accepted it. And the future will show you.

☐ What do you expect when the autonomy negotiations begin?

○ The whole process is a non-starter for the Palestinians. It is based on Begin's plan, which means, as you will see, that the Israelis will try to change the demographic composition of the West Bank and Gaza and they'll try to establish a massive number of new settlements. And this is why the framework agreed upon at Camp David is a non-starter, and is rejected by all the Arab countries without exception.

☐ What about Sudan, Oman . . . ?

○ No, no, no. No exception. Go to Sudan yourself. Walk in the street. Speak to the people of Sudan, the responsible people. They will tell you exactly this.

The Israelis and the Americans claim that

they are very just and fair, that they believe in international law and common sense. So I have only one very simple proposal. Let us agree to have the West Bank and Gaza under international trusteeship, under the United Nations trusteeship. I formally propose a UN trusteeship for Palestine, namely the West Bank and Gaza, for two years.

□ You don't seriously think the Israelis would be interested in such a proposal, do you?

○ I said before, if they are interested in peace, in human rights, in justice, in international law, what is wrong with the UN having a trusteeship on Palestine? After two years there will be elections under international supervision. We give to the Palestinians – like anybody else – the right to say yes or no to their statehood. And I may add, to assure the Israelis of their own security. In addition, I propose that the new Palestine state, once it is established, declares its complete neutrality – another Switzerland.

□ No army, at least not a large one?

○ A security force composed of, let us say, 50,000. A security force to control its own territory and frontiers and so on. I make this concrete proposal for, if the Israelis are really honest, why should they fear an international trusteeship.

The Americans, the Russians, the French could serve on the Board of Transition too – the five permanent members. Anybody the Israelis want!

□ Many of the leaders of the Arab states have declared that the leaders of Egypt who have entered this treaty with Israel are "traitors". Do you share that view?

○ *(long pause)* No. Every politician takes decisions for one reason or another and tries hard to justify his position. Statesmen rarely declare they are wrong. But calling people bad names is not my style. History will judge whether the Arabs are wrong and President Sadat is correct.

PALESTINIANS

Unless otherwise noted, the documents contained in this section are taken from the Journal of Palestine Studies.

70. Palestinian National Council of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Palestine National Covenant, Cairo, July 17, 1968 (Excerpts)

(Note: Since there is no central government or universally recognized spokesman for the Palestinian Arab people, a Palestinian peace plan comparable to an Israeli, Jordanian, or Egyptian peace plan does not exist. The views expressed in this document may or may not represent the Palestinians, but are at least representative of one body of Palestinian opinion. In the text, the Arabic words Qawmiyya and Wataniyya both mean "national" or "nation," but there is a subtle suggestion in their use. Qawmiyya is accepted as meaning nationalism in the whole of the Arab world, while Wataniyya is accepted as meaning patriotism in a state or region. A pan-Arabist might use Qawmiyya while an Egyptian nationalist might use Wataniyya.)

Article (1): Palestine is the Homeland of the Palestinian Arab people and an integral part of the Great Homeland, and the People of Palestine is a part of the Arab Nation.

Article (2): Palestine with its boundaries that existed at the time of the British Mandate is an integral regional unit.

Article (3): The Palestinian Arab people possesses the legal right to its homeland, and when the liberation of its homeland is completed it will exercise self-determination solely according to its own will and choice.

Article (4): The Palestinian personality is an innate, persistent characteristic that does not disappear, and it is transferred from fathers to sons. The Zionist occupation, and the dispersal of the Palestinian Arab people as result of the disasters which came over it, do not deprive it of its Palestinian personality and affiliation and do not nullify them.

Article (5): The Palestinians are the Arab citizens who were living permanently in Palestine until 1947, whether they were expelled from there or remained. Whoever is born to a Palestinian Arab father after this date, within Palestine or outside it, is a Palestinian.

Article (6): Jews who were living permanently in Palestine until the beginning of the Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians.

Article (7): The Palestinian affiliation and the material, spiritual and historical tie with Palestine are permanent realities. The upbringing of the Palestinian individual in an Arab and revolutionary fashion, the undertaking of all means of forging consciousness and training the Palestinian, in order to acquaint him profoundly with his

homeland, spiritually and materially, and preparing him for the conflict and the armed struggle, as well as for the sacrifice of his property and his life to restore his homeland, until the liberation—all this is a national duty.

Article (8): The phase in which the people of Palestine is living is that of the National (*Watani*) struggle for the liberation of Palestine. Therefore, the contradictions among the Palestine National Forces are of a secondary order which must be suspended in the interest of the fundamental contradiction between Zionism and Colonialism on the one side and the Palestinian Arab people on the other. On this basis, the Palestinian masses, whether in the homeland or in places of exile (*Mahajir*), organisations and individuals, comprise one national front which acts to restore Palestine and liberate it through armed struggle.

Article (9): Armed struggle is the only way to liberate Palestine and is therefore a strategy and not tactics. The Palestinian Arab people affirms its absolute resolution and abiding determination to pursue the armed struggle and to march forward towards the armed popular revolution, to liberate its homeland and return to it, (to maintain) its right to a natural life in it, and to exercise its right of self-determination in it and sovereignty over it.

Article (10): Fedayeen action forms the nucleus of the popular Palestinian war of liberation. This demands its promotion, extension and protection, and the mobilisation of all the mass and scientific capabilities of the Palestinians, their organisation and involvement in the armed Palestinian Revolution, and cohesion in that National (*Watani*) struggle among the various groups of the people of Palestine, and between them and the Arab masses, to guarantee the continuation of the revolution, its advancement and victory.

Article (11): The Palestinians will have three mottoes: National (*Wataniyya*) Unity, National (*Qawmiyya*) mobilisation and liberation.

Article (12): The Palestinian Arab people believes in Arab unity. In order to fulfill its role in realising this, it must preserve, in this phase of its national (*Watani*) struggle, its Palestinian personality and the constituents thereof, increase consciousness of its existence and resist any plan that tends to disintegrate or weaken it.

Article (13): Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are two complementary aims. Each one paves the way for realisation of the other. Arab unity leads to the liberation of Palestine, and the liberation of Palestine leads to Arab unity. Working for both goes hand in hand.

Article (14): The destiny of the Arab Nation, indeed the very Arab existence, depends upon the destiny of the Palestine issue. The endeavour and effort of the Arab nation to liberate Palestine follows from this connection. The people of Palestine assumes its vanguard role in realising this sacred national (*Qawmi*) aim.

Article (15): The liberation of Palestine from an Arab viewpoint is a national (*Qawmi*) duty to repulse the Zionist, imperialist invasion from the Great Arab Homeland and to purge the Zionist presence from Palestine. Its full responsibilities fall upon the Arab nation, peoples and governments, with the Palestine Arab people at their head.

For this purpose, the Arab nation must mobilise all its military, human, material and spiritual capacities to participate actively with the people of Palestine in the liberation of Palestine. They must, especially in the present stage of armed Palestinian revolution, grant and offer the people of Palestine all possible help and every material and human support, and afford it every sure means and opportunity enabling it to continue to assume its vanguard role in pursuing its armed revolution until the liberation of its homeland.

Article (16): The liberation of Palestine, from a spiritual viewpoint, will prepare an atmosphere of tranquillity and peace for the Holy Land, in the shade of which all the Holy Places will be safeguarded, and freedom of worship and visitation to all will be guaranteed, without distinction or discrimination of race, colour, language or religion. For this reason, the people of Palestine looks to the support of all the spiritual forces in the world.

Article (17): The liberation of Palestine, from a human viewpoint, will restore to the Palestinian man his dignity, glory and freedom. For this, the Palestinian Arab people looks to the support of those in the world who believe in the dignity and freedom of man.

Article (18): The liberation of Palestine, from an international viewpoint, is a defensive act necessitated by the requirements of self-defence. For this reason, the people of Palestine, desiring to befriend all peoples, looks to the support of the states which love freedom, justice and peace in restoring the legal situation to Palestine, establishing security and peace in its territory, and enabling its people to exercise national (*Wataniyya*) sovereignty and national (*Qawmiyya*) freedom.

Article (19): The partitioning of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of Israel is fundamentally null and void, whatever time has elapsed, because it was contrary to the wish of the people of Palestine and its natural right to its homeland, and contradicts the principles embodied in the charter of the United Nations, the first of which is the right of self-determination.

Article (20): The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate Document, and what has been based upon them are considered null and void. The claim of a historical or spiritual tie between Jews and Palestine does not tally with historical realities nor with the constituents of statehood in their true sense. Judaism, in its character as a religion of revelation, is not a nationality with an independent existence. Likewise, the Jews are not only people with an independent personality. They are rather citizens of the States to which they belong.

Article (21): The Palestinian Arab people, in expressing itself through the armed Palestinian revolution, rejects every solution that is a substitute for a complete liberation of Palestine, and rejects all plans that aim at the settlement of the Palestine issue or its internationalisation.

Article (22): Zionism is a political movement organically related to world imperialism and hostile to all movements of liberation and progress in the world. It is a racist and fanatical movement in its formation; aggressive, expansionist and colonialist in its aims; and Fascist and Nazi in its means. Israel is the tool of the Zionist movement and a human and geographical base for world imperialism. It is a concentration and jumping-off point for imperialism in the heart of the

Arab homeland, to strike at the hopes of the Arab nation for liberation, unity and progress.

Israel is a constant threat to peace in the Middle East and the entire world. Since the liberation of Palestine will liquidate the Zionist and imperialist presence and bring about the stabilisation of peace in the Middle East, the people of Palestine looks to the support of all liberal men of the world and all the forces of good, progress and peace; and implores all of them, regardless of their different learnings and orientations, to offer all help and support to the people of Palestine in its just and legal struggle to liberate its homeland.

Article (23): The demands of security and peace and the requirements of truth and justice oblige all states that preserve friendly relations among peoples and maintain the loyalty of citizens to their homelands to consider Zionism an illegitimate movement and to prohibit its existence and activity.

Article (24): The Palestinian Arab people believes in the principles of justice, freedom, sovereignty, self-determination, human dignity and the right of peoples to exercise them.

Article (25): To realize the aims of this consent and its principles the Palestine liberation organization will undertake its full role in liberating Palestine.

Article (26): The Palestine Liberation Organisation, which represents the forces of the Palestinian revolution, is responsible for the movement of the Palestinian Arab people in its struggle to restore its homeland, liberate it, return to it and exercise the right of self-determination in it. This responsibility extends to all military, political and financial matters, and all else that the Palestine issue requires in the Arab and international spheres.

Article (27): The Palestine Liberation Organisation will cooperate with all Arab states, each according to its capacities and will maintain neutrality in their mutual relations in the light of, and on the basis of, the requirements of the battle of liberation, and will not interfere in the internal affairs of any Arab state.

Article (28): The Palestinian Arab people insists upon the originality and independence of its national (*Wataniyya*) revolution and rejects every manner of interference, guardianship and subordination.

Article (29): The Palestinian Arab people possesses the prior and original right in liberating and restoring its homeland and will define its position with reference to all states and powers on the basis of their positions with reference to the issue (of Palestine) and the extent of their support for (The Palestinian Arab people) in its revolution to realise its aims.

Article (30): The fighters and bearers of arms in the battle of liberation are the nucleus of the popular army, which will be the protecting arm of the gains of the Palestinian Arab people.

Article (31): This organisation shall have a flag, oath and anthem, all of which will be determined in accordance with a special system.

Article (32): To this covenant is attached a law known as the fundamental law of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, in which is determined the manner of the organisation's formation, its committees, institutions, the special functions of every one of them and all the requisite duties associated with them in accordance with this covenant.

Article (33): This covenant cannot be amended except by a two-thirds majority of all the members of the National Council of the Palestine Liberation Organisation in a special session called for this purpose.

71. Kamal Nasser, PLO Executive Committee, Statement on Israeli-Sponsored Municipal Elections on the West Bank, February 1972

... [The elections are] part of a Zionist-colonialist plan whose aim, among other things, is to get the Palestinian people into a position where they participate in the liquidation of the Palestine problem and in prejudicing the security, future and destiny of the Arab nation. The Executive Committee ... warns all who support or participate in them that it will not stand idly by in the face of attempts to liquidate the Palestine problem by Zionists and colonialists and the traitors who co-operate with them for the achievement of their aims.

The Executive Committee affirms...

1. That in urging the Palestinian people to take part in the alleged municipal elections in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the aim of the Zionist occupation is to execute its plan to impose coexistence between the people and the occupation, to legitimize the occupation, and consequently to perpetuate the occupation of the part of Palestine occupied in 1967.

2. That only resistance is legitimate in a state of occupation.

3. That the immediate object of holding these alleged elections is to turn the conflict between the people and the occupation into a struggle between different groups of the people, with Palestinians fighting among themselves instead of fighting the enemy.

72. George Habash, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Statement on Palestinian State, August 4, 1973

A. In our estimate, in the light of the present situation, and of the present balance of power in the area, the question of the Palestinian state is part of the imperialist conspiracy to liquidate the Palestine problem. The object of submitting the idea of a Palestinian state is to lure the Palestinian resistance into a trap, in view of the fact that the resistance is still comparatively distinct [in its policy] from the traditional Arab liberation movement. We also believe that the real aim is not, and cannot be, actually to establish a Palestinian state. The aim behind the submission of this idea is to split the resistance movement in the light of the controversy that may arise, to deprive it of its political significance and subsequently to destroy it, should it join in the discussion of the subject.

There must be a clearly visible operation of mass mobilization to create a force that is really capable of frustrating this conspiracy. Of course the strategic slogan of the Palestinian revolution is a Palestinian democratic state in the territory of Palestine brought into existence by the struggle of the oppressed revolutionary and class forces, both Arab and Jewish. It is difficult to envisage this strategic goal being achieved at a single step. But there is a difference between the liberation of an area of occupied Palestine, in which the struggle continues to complete the liberation of the whole of Palestinian territory, and a Palestinian state in part of Palestinian territory, as proposed by imperialism, within the framework of projects for settlement and conspiracies to liquidate the Palestine cause and put an end to its armed revolution.

73. Nayif Hawatamah, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Interview Rejecting Negotiated Settlement, February 1974

We state unequivocally that all settlements [of the conflict] based on the [proposed] American-Zionist-Hashemite solution will lead to surrender and the liquidation of the Palestine problem. Our attitude to all other interested parties who do not precisely define their concept of Palestinian rights will be clearly determined by the support they provide for the principles implied by the concept of the national rights of the Palestinian people. These national rights are derived from all the contemporary and historical rights and achievements of the Palestinian people, and we shall oppose anything that leads to their infringement.... The clear implication of this, from our viewpoint as Palestinians, is that our struggle is towards the liquidation of the Zionist occupation and its dislodgement from the Arab and Palestinian territories occupied in 1967. This approach derives from the general strategy of total liberation of the soil of the homeland; this national achievement will be employed in the service of the general strategy, at the same time enabling our Palestinian people, in all the territories which have been liberated and from which the enemy has withdrawn, to decide their own destiny there and establish their own independent Palestinian jurisdiction. This requires the mobilization of the masses of our people, both internally and externally, for this clearly expressed purpose, because the struggle for this achievement serves the general strategy of pursuing total liberation of the soil of the homeland in subsequent stages.

We are immediately responsible for struggling against these solutions which lead eventually to a plan for the liquidation of the Palestine problem at this stage, for the obliteration of Palestinian national identity and personality, and the reannexation of these Palestinian territories, either within the framework of the process of Israeli expansion, or to the United Arab Kingdom [proposed by Jordan]. The adoption of such a solution would by necessity mean the creation in the area of a situation based on the concept of dual security maintained by Israel and the Arab states who would conclude the settlement. The Palestinian problem and all our national gains would thus be threatened with liquidation. Not only would the state of war with Israel be terminated and the confrontation frozen, but the whole Arab-Israeli conflict would be stabilized and the situation that existed from 1948 to 1967 would be restored.

74. Palestine National Council, PLO, Political Program, June 9, 1974

The Palestinian National Council:

On the basis of the Palestinian National Charter and the Political Programme drawn up at the Eleventh Session, held from January 6-12, 1973; and from its belief that it is impossible for a permanent and just peace to be established in the area unless our Palestinian people recover all their national rights and, first and foremost, their rights to return and to self-determination on the whole of the soil of their homeland; and in the light of a study of the new political circumstances that have come into existence in the period between the Council's last and present sessions, resolves the following:

1. To reaffirm the Palestine Liberation Organization's previous attitude to Resolution 242, which obliterates the national rights of our people and deals with the cause of our people as a problem of refugees. The Council therefore refuses to have anything to do with this resolution at any level, Arab or international, including the Geneva Conference.

2. The Liberation Organization will employ all means, and first and foremost armed struggle, to liberate Palestinian territory and to establish the independent combatant national authority for the people over every part of Palestinian territory that is liberated. This will require further changes being effected in the balance of power in favour of our people and their struggle.

3. The Liberation Organization will struggle against any proposal for a Palestinian entity the price of which is recognition, peace, secure frontiers, renunciation of national rights and the deprivation of our people of their right to return and their

right to self-determination on the soil of their homeland.

4. Any step taken towards liberation is a step towards the realization of the Liberation Organization's strategy of establishing the democratic Palestinian state specified in the resolutions of previous Palestinian National Councils.

5. Struggle along with the Jordanian national forces to establish a Jordanian-Palestinian national front whose aim will be to set up in Jordan a democratic national authority in close contact with the Palestinian entity that is established through the struggle.

6. The Liberation Organization will struggle to establish unity in struggle between the two peoples and between all the forces of the Arab liberation movement that are in agreement on this programme.

7. In the light of this programme, the Liberation Organization will struggle to strengthen national unity and to raise it to the level where it will be able to perform its national duties and tasks.

8. Once it is established, the Palestinian national authority will strive to achieve a union of the confrontation countries, with the aim of completing the liberation of all Palestinian territory, and as a step along the road to comprehensive Arab unity.

9. The Liberation Organization will strive to strengthen its solidarity with the socialist countries, and with forces of liberation and progress throughout the world, with the aim of frustrating all the schemes of Zionism, reaction and imperialism.

10. In the light of this programme the leadership of the revolution will determine the tactics which will serve and make possible the realization of these objectives.

The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization will make every effort to implement this programme, and should a situation arise affecting the destiny and the future of the Palestinian people, the National Assembly will be convened in extraordinary session.

75. General Union of Palestinian Women, Excerpts From Communique, August 10, 1974

The continuity of the revolution, until the destruction of the Zionist enemy and the liberation of all occupied Palestinian soil, requires the struggle for the establishment of a revolutionary base on all liberated land that will guarantee the continuity of the revolution and offer more conditions for its success.

The achievement of the revolutionary fighting power of the people over the land liberated by armed struggle cannot occur except by a change in the balance of power between the revolution and its enemies — which is something that cannot be achieved except by armed struggle.

The revolutionary power must in the first place guarantee the continuity of the revolution. Therefore we must refuse, as a price for its acceptance or continuity, negotiations with the enemy, recognition of the legitimacy of the Zionist occupation over any part of Palestine, acceptance of the authority of the Jordanian conspirators over any part of the nation, succumbing to the international and Arab official acceptance of the division of the Palestinian people, or silencing the revolutionary shotgun.

The dangerous situation which the Palestinian cause and Palestinian existence are facing, emerges from the fact that this imperialist reality has found its way to existence. The Alexandria Communique was not the result of a miscalculation and that is why we must face the real event and not its symptoms. This requires from us the following:

1. We must depend basically on our own potentials, for it is necessary to develop and solidify our national unity. The unity of the revolution is the practical answer to the efforts which take place, and will take place for the sake of liquidating the revolution, and destroying the gains of our Palestinian people, including the right of representation.

2. The unity of the revolution will strengthen the cohesion with the Arab masses, the international liberation movement and the socialist countries, namely the Soviet Union and China. Such forces are capable of destroying all Zionist and imperialist plans.

3. The formation of the national Jordanian-Palestinian front in Jordan, and the exercising of armed struggle against the institutions and symbols of the conspiratorial regime for the sake of overthrowing it and replacing it by the national democratic rule is the practical answer to its conspiracies, and is capable of changing Jordan into a secure base of the revolution and a starting point for liberation.

4. It is imperative to continue escalating the political, military and popular struggle in the occupied land.

5. We must intensify the work with the Arab liberation movement groups for the sake of strengthening the cohesion of the revolution, in order to defeat the conspiracy against the Arab liberation movement, namely the Palestinian revolution.

6. We must move widely on the international level, especially with the socialist countries, non-aligned countries, and liberation movements in order to gain support for the point of view of the revolution.

76. Yasir Arafat, PLO, Statement to the United Nations General Assembly, November 13, 1974

Mr. President, I thank you for having invited the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the plenary session of the United Nations General Assembly. I am grateful to all those representatives of United Nations member states who contributed to the decision to introduce the question of Palestine as a separate item on the Agenda of this Assembly. That decision made possible the Assembly's resolution inviting us to address it on the question of Palestine.

the highest tension exists in our part of the world. There the Zionist entity clings tenaciously to occupied Arab territory; the Zionist entity is holding on to the Arab territories it has occupied and persisting in its aggressions against us. New military preparations are feverishly being made. These anticipate another, fifth war of aggression to be launched against us. Such signs behoove the closest possible watching, since there is a grave likelihood that this war would forbode nuclear destruction and cataclysmic annihilation.

----- If we return now to the historical roots of our cause we do so because present at this very moment in our midst are those who, as they occupy our homes, as their cattle graze in our pastures, and as their hands pluck the fruit of our trees, claim at the same time that we are ghosts without an existence, without traditions or future. We speak of our roots also because until recently some people have regarded — and continue to regard — our problem as merely a problem of refugees. They have portrayed the Middle East question as little more than a border dispute between the Arab states and the Zionist entity. They have imagined that our people claim rights not rightfully their own and fight neither with logic nor legitimate motive, with a simple wish only to disturb the peace and to terrorize others. For there are amongst you — and here I refer to the United States of America and others like it — those who supply our enemy freely with planes and bombs and with

every variety of murderous weapon. They take hostile positions against us, deliberately distorting the true essence of the problem. All this is done not only at our expense, but at the expense of the American people and its well-being, and of the friendship we continue to hope can be cemented between us and this great people, whose history of struggle for the sake of freedom and the unity of its territories we honour and salute.

Zionist ideology was utilized against our Palestinian people: the purpose was not only the establishment of Western-style settler colonialism but also the severing of Jews from their various homelands and subsequently their estrangement from their nations. Zionism is an ideology that is imperialistic, colonialist, racist; it is profoundly reactionary and discriminatory; it is united with anti-Semitism in its tenets and is the other side of the same coin. For when what is proposed is that adherents of the Jewish faith, regardless of their national residence, should neither owe allegiance to their homeland nor live on equal footing with its other, non-Jewish citizens — when that is proposed we hear anti-Semitism being proposed. When it is proposed that the only solution for the Jewish problem is that Jews must alienate themselves from communities or nations of which they have been a historical part, when it is proposed that Jews solve the Jewish problem by immigrating to and settling the land of another people by terrorism and force, this is exactly the same attitude as that of the anti-Semites to the Jews.

The Jewish invasion of Palestine began in 1881. Before the first large wave of settlers started arriving, Palestine had a population of half a million, most of these Muslims or Christians, and about 10,000 Jews. Every sector of the population enjoyed the religious tolerance characteristic of our civilization.

Palestine was then a verdant land, inhabited by an Arab people in the course of building its life and enriching its indigenous culture.

Between 1882 and 1917 the Zionist movement settled approximately 50,000 European Jews in our homeland. To do that it resorted to trickery and deceit in order to plant them in our midst. Its success in getting Britain to issue the Balfour Declaration demonstrated the alliance between Zionism and colonialism. Furthermore, by promising to the Zionist movement what was not hers to give, Britain showed how oppressive the rule of colonialism was. As it was then constituted, the League of Nations abandoned our Arab people, and Wilson's pledges and promises came to nought. In the guise of a mandate, British colonialism was cruelly and directly imposed upon us. The mandate document issued by the League of Nations was to enable the Zionist invaders to consolidate their gains in our homeland.

In thirty years the Zionist movement succeeded, in collaboration with its colonialist ally, in settling more European Jews on the land, thus usurping the properties of Palestinian Arabs.

By 1947 the number of Jews had reached 600,000; they owned less than 6 per cent of Palestinian arable land. The figure should be compared with the [Arab] population of Palestine, which at that time was 1,250,000.

As a result of the collusion between the mandatory power and the Zionist movement and with the support of the United States, this General Assembly early in its history approved a recommendation to partition our Palestinian homeland. This took place on November 30, 1947, in an atmosphere of questionable actions and strong pressure. The General Assembly partitioned what it had no right to divide — an indivisible homeland. When we rejected that decision, our position corresponded to that of the real mother who refused to permit Solomon to cut her child in two when the other woman claimed the child as hers. Furthermore, even though the partition resolution granted the colonialist settlers 54 per cent of the land of Palestine, their dissatisfaction with the decision prompted them to wage a war of terror against the civilian Arab population. They occupied 81 per cent of the total area of Palestine, uprooting a million Arabs. Thus, they occupied 524 Arab towns and villages, of which they destroyed 385, completely obliterating them in the process. Having done so, they built their own settlements and colonies on the ruins of our farms and our groves. The roots of the Palestine question lie here. Its causes do not stem from any conflict between two religions or two nationalisms. Nor is it a border conflict between neighbouring states. It is the cause of people deprived of its homeland, dispersed and uprooted,

the majority of whom live in exile and in refugee camps.

With support from imperialist and colonialist powers, headed by the United States of America, this Zionist entity managed to get itself accepted as a United Nations member. It further succeeded in getting the Palestine question deleted from the Agenda of the United Nations and in deceiving world public opinion by presenting our cause as a problem of refugees in need either of charity from do-gooders, or settlement in a land not theirs.

As a result of Zionist aggression in June 1967, the enemy occupied Egyptian Sinai as far as the Suez Canal. The enemy occupied Syria's Golan Heights, in addition to all Palestinian land west of the Jordan. All these developments have led to the creation in our area of what has come to be known as the "Middle East Problem." The situation has been rendered more serious by the enemy's persistence in maintaining its unlawful occupation and in further consolidating it, thus establishing a beachhead for world imperialism's thrust against our Arab nation. All Security Council decisions and calls by world public opinion for withdrawal from the lands occupied in June 1967 have been ignored. Despite all the peaceful and diplomatic efforts on the international level, the enemy has not been deterred from his expansionist policy. The only alternative open to our Arab nations, chiefly Syria and Egypt, was to expend exhaustive efforts to prepare, firstly, to resist this barbarous armed invasion by force and, secondly, to liberate Arab lands and to restore the rights of the Palestinian people, after all other peaceful means had failed.

Under these circumstances, the fourth war broke out in October 1973, bringing home to the Zionist enemy the bankruptcy of its policy of occupation and expansion and its reliance on the concept of military might. Despite all this, the leaders of the Zionist entity are far from having learned any lesson from their experience. They are making preparations for the fifth war, resorting once more to the language of military superiority, aggression, terrorism, subjugation and, finally, always to war in their dealings with the Arabs.

It pains our people greatly to witness the propagation of the myth that its homeland was a desert until it was made to bloom by the toil of foreign settlers, that it was a land without a people, and that the settler entity caused no harm to any human being. No, such lies must be exposed from this rostrum, for the world must know that Palestine was the cradle of the most ancient cultures and civilizations. Its Arab people were engaged in farming and building, spreading culture throughout the land for thousands of years, setting an example in the practice of religious tolerance and freedom of worship, acting as faithful guardians of the holy places of all religions. As a son of Jerusalem, I treasure for myself and my people beautiful memories and vivid images of the religious brotherhood that was the hallmark of our Holy City before it succumbed to catastrophe. Our people continued to pursue this enlightened policy until the establishment of the state of Israel and their dispersion. This did not deter our people from pursuing their humanitarian role on Palestinian soil. Nor will they permit their land to become a launching pad for aggression or a racist camp for the destruction of civilization, culture, progress and peace. Our people cannot but maintain the heritage of their ancestors in resisting the invaders, in assuming the privileged task of defending their native land, their Arab nationhood, their culture and civilization, and in safeguarding the cradle of the monotheistic religions.

a) We distinguish between Judaism and Zionism. While we maintain our opposition to the colonialist Zionist movement, we respect the Jewish faith. Today, almost one century after the rise of the Zionist movement, we wish to warn of its increasing danger to the Jews of the world, to our Arab peoples and to world peace and security. For Zionism encourages the Jew to emigrate from his homeland and grants him an artificially-made nationality. The Zionists proceed with their destructive activities even though these have proved ineffective. The phenomenon of constant emigration from Israel, which is bound to grow as the bastions of colonialism and racism in the world fall, is an example of the inevitability of the failure of such activities.

b) We urge the people and governments of the world to stand firm against Zionist attempts at encouraging world Jewry to emigrate from their countries and to usurp our land. We urge them as well firmly to oppose any discrimination against any human being, as to religion, race, or colour.

c) Why should our people and our homeland be responsible for the problems of Jewish immigration, if such problems exist in the minds of some people? Why do the supporters of these problems not open their own countries, which are much bigger, to absorb and help these immigrants?

Those who call us terrorists wish to prevent world public opinion from discovering the truth about us and from seeing the justice on our faces. They seek to hide the terrorism and tyranny of their acts, and our own posture of self-defence.

The difference between the revolutionary and the terrorist lies in the reason for which each fights. For whoever stands by a just cause and fights for the freedom and liberation of his land from invaders, settlers and colonialists would have been incorrectly called terrorist; the American people in their struggle for liberation from the British colonialists would have been terrorists, the European resistance against the Nazis would be terrorism, the struggle of the Asian, African and Latin American peoples would also be terrorism. It is actually a just and proper struggle of the Asian, African, and Latin American peoples, consecrated by the United Nations Charter and by the Declaration of Human Rights. As to those who fight against just causes, those who wage war to occupy the homelands of others, and to plunder, exploit and colonize their peoples—those are the people whose actions should be condemned, who should be called war criminals: for the just cause determines the right to struggle.

Zionist terrorism which was waged against the Palestinian people to evict them from their country and usurp their land is on record in your documents. Thousands of our people have been assassinated in their villages and towns; tens of thousands of others have been forced by rifle and artillery fire to leave their homes and the crops they have sown in the lands of their fathers. Time and time again our children, women and aged have been evicted and have had to wander in the deserts and climb mountains without any food or water. No one who in 1948 witnessed the catastrophe that befell the inhabitants of hundreds of villages and towns — in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Lydda, Ramleh, and Galilee — no one who has been a witness to that catastrophe will ever forget the experience, even though the mass blackout has succeeded in hiding these horrors as it has hidden the traces of 385 Palestinian villages and towns destroyed at the time and erased from the map. The destruction of 19,000 houses during the past seven years, which is equivalent to the complete destruction of 200 more Palestinian villages, and the great number of maimed as a result of the treatment they were subjected to in Israeli prisons, cannot be hidden by any blackout.

we deplore all those crimes committed against the Jews; we also deplore all the open and veiled discrimination suffered by them because of their faith.

I need not dwell on the burning of the al-Aqsa Mosque, the theft of the treasures of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the disfiguring of so many aspects of its culture and civilization. Jerusalem, with its beauty, and atmosphere redolent of history, bears witness to successive generations of our people who have lived in it, leaving in every corner of it proof of our eternal presence, of our love for it, of our civilization, of our human values. It is therefore not surprising that under its skies the three religions were born and that under that sky these three religions have shone to enlighten mankind so that it might express the tribulations and hopes of humanity, and that it might mark out the road of the future with its hopes.

The small number of Palestinian Arabs whom the Zionists did not succeed in uprooting in 1948 are at present refugees in their own country. Israeli law treats them as second-class citizens — even as third-class citizens since Oriental Jews are second-class citizens — and they have been subject to all forms of racial discrimination and terror after the confiscation of their land and property. They have been victims of bloody massacres such as that of Kafr Qassim; they have been expelled from their villages and denied the right to return, as in the case of the inhabitants of Iqrit and Kafr Bir'im. For 26 years, our population has been living under martial law and has been denied freedom of movement without prior permission from the Israeli military governor — this at a time when an Israeli law was promulgated granting citizenship to any Jew anywhere who wanted to emigrate to our homeland.

I am a rebel and freedom is my cause. I know well that many of you present here today once stood in exactly the same position of resistance as I now occupy and from which I must fight. You once had to convert dreams into reality by your struggle. Therefore you must now share my dream. I think this is exactly why I can ask you now to help, as together we bring out our dream into a bright reality, our common dream for a peaceful future in Palestine's sacred land.

Let us remember that the Jews of Europe and here in the United States have been known to lead the struggles for secularism and the separation of church and state. They have also been known to fight against discrimination on religious grounds. How can they reject this humane and honourable programme for the Holy Land, the land of peace and equality? How can they continue to support the most fanatic, discriminatory and closed of nations in its policy?

In my capacity as Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization and commander of the Palestinian revolution I proclaim before you that when we speak of our common hopes for the Palestine

of tomorrow we include in our perspective all Jews now living in Palestine who choose to live with us there in peace and without discrimination.

In my capacity as commander of the forces of the Palestine Liberation Organization I call upon Jews to turn away one by one from the illusory promises made to them by Zionist ideology and Israeli leadership. They are offering Jews perpetual bloodshed, endless war and continuous thralldom.

We invite them to emerge into a more open realm of free choice, far from their present leadership's efforts to implant in them a Masada complex and make it their destiny.

We offer them the most generous solution — that we should live together in a framework of just peace in our democratic Palestine.

In my formal capacity as Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization I announce here that we do not wish one drop of either Jewish or Arab blood to be shed; neither do we delight in the continuation of killings for a single moment, once a just peace, based on our people's rights, hopes, and aspirations has been finally established.

In my capacity as Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization and commander of the Palestinian revolution I appeal to you to accompany our people in its struggle to attain its right to self-determination. This right is consecrated in the United Nations Charter and has been repeatedly confirmed in resolutions adopted by this august body since the drafting of the Charter. I appeal to you, further, to aid our people's return to its homeland from an involuntary exile imposed upon it by force of arms, by tyranny, by oppression, so that we may regain our property, our land, and thereafter live in our national homeland, free and sovereign, enjoying all the privileges of nationhood.

I appeal to you to enable our people to set up their national authority and establish their national entity in their own land.

Only then will our people be able to contribute all their energies and resources to the field of civilization and human creativity. Only then will they be able to protect their beloved Jerusalem and make it, as they have done for so many centuries, the shrine of all religions, free from all terrorism and coercion.

Today I have come bearing an olive branch and a freedom-fighter's gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.

War flares up in Palestine, and yet it is in Palestine that peace will be born.

77. Palestinian Six-Point Program, December 4, 1977

In the wake of Sadat's treasonous visit to the Zionist entity, all factions of the Palestinian Resistance Movement have decided to make a practical answer to this step. On this basis, they met and issued the following document:

We, all factions of the PLO, announce the following:

First: We call for the formation of a "Steadfastness and Confrontation Front" composed of Libya, Algeria, Iraq, Democratic Yemen, Syria and the PLO, to oppose all capitulationist solutions planned by imperialism, Zionism and their Arab tools.

Second: We fully condemn any Arab party in the Tripoli Summit which rejects the formation of this Front, and we announce this.

Third: We reaffirm our rejection of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338.

Fourth: We reaffirm our rejection of all

international conferences based on these two resolutions, including the Geneva Conference.

Fifth: To strive for the realization of the Palestinian people's rights to return and self-determination within the context of an independent Palestinian national state on any part of Palestinian land, without reconciliation, recognition or negotiations, as an interim aim of the Palestinian Revolution.

Sixth: To apply the measures related to the political boycott of the Sadat regime.

In the name of all the factions, we ratify this unificatory document:

- The Palestinian National Liberation Movement, Fateh: Abu Ayyad [Salah Khalaf]
- The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine: Dr. George Habbash
- The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine: Nayef Hawatmeh
- The P.F.L.P. — General Command: Ahmad Jabril
- Vanguard of the People's Liberation War, Saiqa: Zuhair Muhsin
- Arab Liberation Front: Abdul-Rahim Ahmad
- Palestinian Liberation Front: Talaat Ya'qoub
- P.L.O.: Hamed Abu-Sitta.

78. Walid Khalidi, "Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign Palestinian State," Excerpts From FOREIGN AFFAIRS, July 1978

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What solution of the Palestine Problem would constitute a viable component of such an honorable overall settlement? What follows is not a blueprint but rather an inventory, followed by some reflections. It represents the personal viewpoint of the writer.

The Juridical Status of the Palestine State

The cornerstone is the concept of Palestinian sovereignty. Not half-sovereignty, or quasi-sovereignty or ersatz sovereignty. But a sovereign, independent Palestinian state. Only such a state would win the endorsement of the PLO. Only such a state is likely to effect a psychological breakthrough with the Palestinians under occupation and in the Diaspora. It would lead them out of the political limbo in which they have lingered since 1948. It would end their anonymous ghost-like existence as a non-people. It would terminate their dependence on the mercy, charity or tolerance of other parties, whether Arab, Israeli, or international. It would be a point of reference, a national anchorage, a center of hope and achievement.

Of all peoples, the Jewish people are historically qualified to understand this. Only such a state, through PLO endorsement, would win the support of Arab opinion and the majority of Arab states. These results could not ensue from a Bantustan "federal" formula under a Hashemite dressing, or the perpetuation of Palestinian minority status under international guardianship. They are less likely to result from an Israeli mosaic of Indian reserves and hen-runs, crisscrossed by mechanized patrols and police dogs and under surveillance by searchlights, watchtowers and armed archaeologists. But there is no reason why the concept of Palestinian sovereignty should not accommodate provisions designed to allay legitimate fears of neighbors on a reasonable and preferably reciprocal basis.

The Frontiers of the Palestinian State

The frontiers of 1967 with minor and reciprocal adjustments are the most realistic under the circumstances. They would include East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Contact between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip could be maintained through guaranteed freedom of access along a specified route or routes. This need not necessarily entail the extraterritorial status of the routes.

Such a solution embodying Palestinian sovereignty is a reversion to the old concept of partition. The difference is that no former partition proposal (Peel in 1937, Woodhead in 1938, and the U.N. Special Commission and U.N. General Assembly in 1947) gave the Jewish state anywhere near as much territory as a settlement along the 1967 frontiers would. Given the historical context of the evolution of the Palestine Problem, a partition solution (particularly along the 1967 frontiers) does no violence to Zionism. Within the lifetime of most readers the following words were addressed by Lord Peel to the Palestine Arabs in 1937 in the recapitulation of his report recommending partition: "Considering what the possibility of finding a refuge in Palestine means to many thousands of suffering Jews, is the *loss* occasioned by partition, *great* as it would be, more than Arab *generosity* can bear?"² It should be borne in mind that on the eve of the U.N. General Assembly's partition resolution ten years later and six months before the declaration of the state of Israel, Jewish land ownership in Palestine did not exceed 6.5 percent of the total territory of the country.³

The fact that partition is an old formula is no argument against its validity today. After all, the idea of a Jewish return to Palestine is of considerable vintage. Nor is it a valid argument against partition that Palestinian and Arab leaders rejected it at the time. Given the context and circumstances, it was inevitable that they should do so. This was known beforehand to all proponents of partition including its chief beneficiary, the Zionists. A different generation of Palestinian and Arab leaders in different circumstances today are prepared to say that they accept it with all the implications of such acceptance for Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab reciprocal recognition and coexistence.

If it is wondered why it was that throughout the period 1948-67 no one talked of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the answer is simple: Palestinian and Arab opinion was not prepared for it. It aspired to the recovery of the whole of Palestine or the establishment of a democratic secular state in it. Acceptance of partition or a state on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip was treason. In some Palestinian and Arab quarters, it still is. Therefore, if partition is accepted today over a much smaller area of the

² *Palestine Royal Commission: Summary of Report*, Official Communiqué No. 9/37, June 1937, p. 31. The emphasis is the writer's.

³ At the time of the U.N. partition resolution in November 1947, Palestine was administratively divided into 16 districts. Distribution of population and land ownership in these districts between Arabs and Jews is shown in the maps accompanying U.N. Doc. A/AC 14/32, November 11, 1947. These maps indicate (a) that the Arabs were in the majority in 15 of the 16 districts and (b) owned the bulk of private land in all 16 districts. The U.N. partition resolution gave the Jews about 55 percent of Palestine.

country than under any previous partition formula, this is a measure of the evolution in the last decade or so of Palestinian and Arab pragmatism. It is the development that has long been awaited by outside observers and Israelis. It would be tragic if it were not recognized when it occurred. It would be more tragic if it were recognized and ignored.

The Foreign Relations of the Palestinian State

Given the security concerns of its neighbors and the balance of power between it and them, it would make sense for the Palestinian state to declare its nonaligned status vis-à-vis the superpowers and other powers particularly in the defense and military fields. Some variant of the Austrian model could be applicable in this connection. This could involve agreement between the superpowers, their allies and clients to recognize this nonaligned status. Those Arab states party to the settlement as well as other powers could subscribe to this agreement. The arrangement could be guaranteed by the U.N. Security Council and the Arab League.

This does not mean that the state need be demilitarized. Nor would it preclude its membership in the United Nations, the Arab League and other international organizations. Nor would it prevent it, again like Austria, from having a foreign policy.

The closest relations of the Palestinian state would naturally be with Arab League members. These relations could cover the political, economic, commercial, cultural and social fields. But its most intimate relations are likely to be with Jordan. Consanguinity, historical ties and common economic interests would all demand this. Jordan would be the nearest Arab neighbor, the gateway to the Arab world and the sea. Naturally, relations with Jordan would have to be on an inter-state basis of equality. But this does not preclude a consensual evolution of relations toward greater intimacy.

The Armed Forces of the State

A state bristling with the most sophisticated lethal weapons systems is unrealistic. A demilitarized state would be self-defeating. Without national armed forces the political leadership of the state would become the laughing stock of the Arab world. Their eunuch-like image would be enhanced by the formidable Israeli arsenal next door. So would their own sense of insecurity. This would increase their vulnerability to criticism by opponents of the settlement at home and abroad. For several years large segments

of the population would continue to live in "refugee" camps, posing security problems to the authorities. There would be a need to curb adventurism across the border into Israel. There would be a need to stand in the way of armed excursions by extremist Israeli groups of would-be settlers. The Palestinian state would be likely to become a great center of tourism and pilgrimage for Diaspora Palestinians, Arabs and Muslims, as well as for Jews and Christians. This could involve the influx of hundreds of thousands annually. Reliance for all this on borrowed security made available by U.N. forces would be impracticable. It would be unstable politically and psychologically. But this does not preclude the use of such forces in a supplementary role or for specific purposes. They could be stationed, for example, along the borders as well as at airports, harbors, and the points of exit from and entrance to the West Bank-Gaza Strip highway.

East Jerusalem

Without East Jerusalem there would be no West Bank. It is the navel, the pivotal link between Nablus to the north and Hebron to the south. Together with its Arab suburbs it is the largest Arab urban concentration on the West Bank. It is the former capital of the *sanjak* (district) of Jerusalem under the Ottomans, as well as of mandatory Palestine.⁵ The highest proportion of the Palestinian professional elite under occupation resides in it. It is the site of the holiest Muslim shrines on Palestinian soil. Muslims first turned to it in prayer before they turned to Mecca. Toward it the Prophet Muhammed journeyed on his mystical nocturnal flight and from it he ascended to within "two bow-lengths" of the Throne of God. It is the fountainhead and focus of Sufism—the deepest spiritual tradition of Islam. Within its precincts are buried countless generations of Muslim saints and scholars, warriors and leaders. It evokes the proudest Palestinian and Arab historical memories. It contains the oldest religious endowments of the Palestinians, their most prestigious secular institutions—the cumulative and priceless patrimony of a millennium and a quarter of residence. Architecturally it is distinctively Arab. In ownership and property, it is overwhelmingly so. It is the natural capital of Arab Palestine.

To make it so would involve the partition of the city along the 1967 lines. But not necessarily a return to the *status quo ante bellum* in all its details. The Israeli argument for a unified city must not obfuscate the military conquest of East Jerusalem. The argument contains two themes. The first is an implicit justification for Israeli

⁴ The additional systems both Israel and Jordan have are mortars, anti-tank guided weapons, missile guns, recoilless rifles, and Redeye surface-to-air missiles. Additional systems that Israel has are surface-to-surface missiles (Ze'ev/Wolf, Lance, Gabriel), rocket launchers, and Hawk surface-to-air missiles. Israeli defense expenditure for 1977-78 is \$4.27 billion; Jordanian expenditure for 1977 was \$200.6 million. *Military Balance, 1977-78*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1977, pp. 36-37.

⁵ The *sanjak* of Jerusalem covered some 60 percent of what later became mandatory Palestine. From a line drawn east-west from the sea to the Jordan River some ten miles north of Jerusalem, it extended down to the borders of Sinai and the Gulf of Aqaba. The *sanjak* was directly attached to Istanbul instead of to any provincial capital. Palestinian deputies for Jerusalem and other cities in the *sanjak* sat in the Ottoman Parliament of which a Jerusalemite became Deputy Speaker. (Other Palestinians from the *sanjak* became senior diplomats, army officers, provincial governors, and civil servants in the Ottoman Empire.)

annexation. The second endows this annexation with an ecumenical purpose. Neither is sacrosanct. Continued Israeli occupation precludes an overall settlement. This in itself frustrates any ecumenical purpose. Such a purpose is best served if a Jerusalem settlement symbolizes and consecrates the principles most worthy of association with the uniqueness of the Golden City. These are the principles of non-exclusivity, co-equality, non-dominance, co-sharing, non-coercion, palpable justice, the absence of a victor-vanquished equation, the non-dictation of spiritual hierarchies.

There is no monopoly in history or common sense for any one of the three great monotheistic faiths over the fate or future of Jerusalem. But if only because of the chronological sequence of its occurrence, it is Islam alone of the three faiths that encompasses in its reverent ken the other two. Abraham and Moses, David and Sarah, Jesus and Mary occupy the same pedestal alongside Muhammed in Muslim adoration. A partition solution does not mean the erection of a wall. The frontiers could remain open between the capital of Israel in West Jerusalem and the capital of Arab Palestine in East Jerusalem. Provisions could be agreed to at the interstate level for freedom of movement and residence between the two capitals. Regulation of entrance and exit between the capitals and the two states could also be included. A joint interstate great municipal council could operate and supervise certain essential common services, while residual services would fall under the separate municipalities of each sovereign state. Another grand interfaith council of senior representatives of Christianity, Judaism and Islam under U.N. or rotating chairmanship could oversee the special interests, holy places and institutions of each religion and act as an arbitration and conciliation body for disputes or claims arising with regard to them. An irreversible right of access to the Wailing Wall would be an integral part of the settlement, while a special regime for the Jewish-owned properties adjacent to the Wailing Wall could be created.⁶ These arrangements could be overseen by the grand interfaith council or by a special inter-state Israeli-Palestinian body, under the guarantees of the U.N. Security Council, the Arab League and the Islamic states. It would be supremely fitting if both capitals could be demilitarized in part or wholly except for essential internal security forces.

Only some such solution for Jerusalem is likely to capture the

⁶ Jewish property within the municipal boundaries of pre-1967 East Jerusalem did not exceed five percent of the area of the city. Most of the Jewish quarter inside the Old City was Arab-owned – the pre-1948 Jewish residents being largely tenants of Arab landlords. In Western Jerusalem whole quarters were Arab owned, e.g., Talbiyeh, Katamon, Musrara, Upper Baka, Lower Baka, El Turi, the "Greek" Colony, the "German" Colony.

imagination of the world and stamp out for all time the ugly embers of holy wars. Only by some such solution would Jews, Christians and Muslims translate their veneration of Jerusalem from rhetoric to the idiom of accommodation and love.

The Internal Politics of the Palestinian State

If the PLO is to endorse the settlement, it has to participate in the government of the Palestinian state. The likelihood is that the centrist Fatah, the backbone of the PLO, will be the backbone of any Palestinian government. Those Palestinian elements that do not subscribe to the settlement will of themselves decline to participate in such a government. A Palestinian government built around Fatah will almost certainly be a national coalition. And the Palestinians who have lived under occupation since 1967 will in the nature of things play a major role in any coalition. Given their experiences, they will strengthen the centrist tendencies in Fatah. So will the monumental task of state- and nation-building facing the new government. This will demand the extensive support of the entrepreneurial and professional Palestinian elite in the Diaspora. These centrist tendencies will be further strengthened by economic dependence on international and foreign sources as well as on oil-rich Arab countries. The need for close cooperation with Jordan will promote the same result. There is little reason to believe that Fatah and its coalition partners will want to squander overnight the fruits of decades of terrible struggle and sacrifice by the Palestinians. Considerations of pride will impel them to demonstrate how Palestinian genius can build, those of prudence to avoid playing into the hands of others, those of self-interest to survive and prosper.

One of the first tasks of the new Palestinian government will be to draw up the constitution of the new state, to replace the National Charter.

The Refugees

As many refugees as possible need to be settled in East Jerusalem, on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. Cooperation with Jordan is essential for the fullest exploitation of the Jordan Valley.

U.N. General Assembly Resolution 194 III of 1948, providing the refugees with the choice between compensation and return, will have to be implemented.⁷ It is impossible to know how many

⁷ The resolution has been repeatedly affirmed by the United Nations and supported by the United States. One of the last direct American references to it was made by Harold Saunders (then Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs) on November 12, 1975. *Department of State Bulletin*, November 1975, No. 8.

will choose to return to pre-1967 Israel. While Israel may not be expected to welcome inundation by all those who will want to return, its acceptance of a mere handful will offer no solution. Many Diaspora Palestinians in the Arab countries have become middle class. Most of those in the Gulf countries and the Peninsula have not been granted and are unlikely to be granted the nationalities of the host countries. Their acquisition of a Palestinian nationality, in addition to its psychological impact on them, will regulate their status in their countries of residence and make it easier for them to return or commute to the Palestinian state. The balance of the Diaspora refugees who cannot return to pre-1967 Israel (because of Israeli objections) or to the Palestinian state (because of lack of absorptive capacity) will still have the options of compensation and Palestinian citizenship.

The Israeli Settlements on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip

Given the need for every inch of territory in East Jerusalem, on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip to solve the Palestinian refugee problem, it would not make sense to maintain the Israeli settlements established in these territories after 1967.⁸ Their presence would become a ready target for criticism and agitation by refugees (and their supporters) who had been barred by Israel in the past from return under Resolution 194 III, or who were unable to settle in the Palestinian state because of lack of space. The protection of these settlements and their inhabitants en route to or from them would develop into a major security risk. The circumstances in which these settlements were established would be a constant reminder of the hated occupation. The rights and claims of villagers trespassed upon during their establishment would continue to plague the Palestinian authorities. Far from contributing to or symbolizing Israeli-Palestinian harmony or coexistence, the settlements are likely to exacerbate interracial relations. Palestinians would not stop wondering why, after having acquired 77 percent of Palestine, Israelis should want to settle in yet more Palestinian territory. The continued presence of the settlements would undermine the authority of the Palestinian government and the stability of the overall settlement. There would be challenge enough for Palestinians and Israelis to try out the experiment in "hostile symbiosis" in Jerusalem. It would be folly to overload the system.

⁸ See Ann Lesch, "Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories," *Journal for Palestine Studies*, Autumn 1977.

Theological arguments have been adduced against the establishment of a Palestinian sovereign state in East Jerusalem, on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. The serious arguments are three and will be addressed below:

1. *The Absorptive Capacity of the State*

The thrust of this argument is that a Palestinian state within virtually the 1967 frontiers (and *a fortiori* within smaller ones) would be too small and too poor in resources to absorb the bulk of the refugees. The refugee problem and therefore the Palestine Problem would persist even after the establishment of the Palestinian state. It follows that the establishment of such a state would not be a definitive solution of the Palestine Problem.

A few comments are in order.

It is true, of course, that a Palestinian state within (at best) the 1967 frontiers would not itself be able to absorb all the Palestinian refugees. That is why the closer the frontiers are to those of 1967, the greater will be the capacity of the Palestinian state to do so. Israel could also help by meeting its obligations under Resolution 194 III and by withdrawing its settlers from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

A Palestinian state along the lines described above is likely to win PLO endorsement. The responsibility for tackling the question of the balance of refugees after the absorption of others by Israel and the Palestinian state will fall upon the shoulders of the PLO and the Arab states party to the overall settlement.

The psychological effect on the refugees of the mere establishment of a Palestinian state should not be ignored. They have been alluded to earlier; no one can predict what advantage the refugees might take of the opportunity to choose compensation and citizenship in the event of the establishment of a Palestinian state. The miraculous impact of Israel on the Jews in the Diaspora may be relevant in this connection.

Without a state there is no hope of PLO endorsement of an overall settlement. Without such endorsement it is difficult to see who would have the will or the power to tackle the refugee problem.

Even if an overall settlement that does not involve a state were feasible (which it is not), it would have no obvious advantages over a state formula with regard to the refugees.

2. *The Economic Non-Viability of the State*

The short answer to this argument is that the Palestinian state would be joining a populous club whose membership list includes its neighbor to the West. But there could be worse prospects facing fledgling states. The Arab oil countries do not suffer from a dearth of capital. They would have a vested interest in the stability of the state. So presumably would some affluent industrial countries. The United Nations and other international organizations would be deeply involved in technical aid and assistance programs for the foreseeable future.

A *sine qua non* for economic progress would be some form of common market arrangement with Jordan. But the greatest asset of the state will be high-level Palestinian manpower. Relatively speaking this exceeds that of all Arab states (with the possible exception of Lebanon) and of most Third World countries.⁹ It will be attracted by the novel challenge of building a country for its own kith and kin. Specialized new light industries as well as off-season agriculture could depend on this human resource as well as on imported capital, including that of the Palestinian Diaspora.¹⁰ Palestinian entrepreneurs, sick of the humiliations of exile in Arab and other countries, are likely to transfer their main or regional offices to the state. A restored East Jerusalem could become a cultural and artistic showpiece of the Arab and Muslim worlds. Arab heads of state would vie with one another to endow and embellish its monuments and institutions as their ancestors had done in medieval times. Individual Palestinian cities could be "paired" with prosperous Arab municipalities. East Jerusalem could become the site of ecumenical, Third World and Islamic conferences. The pilgrimage industry would boom. Expenditure on the armed forces would be modest. The climate of the hills of Jerusalem and those of Nablus and Hebron is ideal for the development of a large-scale summer tourist industry for the Arab world. Jericho and the Dead Sea are equally ideal for a winter tourist industry. Remittances from the Palestinian Diaspora would be sent with greater incentive and confidence. The country could even become a retirement haven for Palestinians aspiring to die within earshot of the muezzins of the Aqsa Mosque or the bells of the Holy Sepulcher.

⁹ See Nabeel Shaath, "Palestinian High Level Manpower," *Journal for Palestine Studies*, Winter 1972.

¹⁰ A Palestinian refugee from Jaffa, Talal Abu Ghazaleh, who made good in the Diaspora, was recently reported to have donated \$10 million to his alma mater, the American University of Beirut, in Lebanon. *New York Times*, May 2, 1978.

3. *The Dangers of a Radical State, Militarily Threatening to Israel*

The thrust of this argument is that the government of the state would be taken over by radical groups. These would be bent upon the prosecution of revolutionary armed struggle, not only against Israel but also against Jordan. They would offer the Soviets or Soviet clients military bases that would put the slender urban waist of Israel under the constant threat of annihilation.

The likelihood that any radical group would seize, much less maintain, power is negligible for reasons already given. Moreover, any Palestinian regime would be subject to several constraints:

First, there would be *the global context of settlement*. An overall settlement to which the Soviet Union is not a party is a non-starter. A settlement involving the application of some variant of the Austrian model demands the specific agreement of the superpowers, their allies, and their clients to respect the nonaligned status of the Palestinian state. The Soviets might well welcome such an arrangement if acceptable to other parties, including the PLO. It would give them a responsible, integral role in the settlement. It would be welcomed by their Palestinian and Arab allies. It would save them from a potentially embarrassing military commitment in a highly vulnerable place (the West Bank) where the balance of local power is crushingly in favor of Israel. Within such a framework, under U.N. Security Council and Arab League guarantees, the possibility of entanglement by the Palestinian state in dangerous military alignments would be precluded.

Next, there would be *the regional context of the settlement*. An overall settlement would have to remove the causes of a specifically Egyptian and Syrian irredentism. It would have to involve full withdrawal to the 1967 frontiers on the Golan and in Sinai. This need not entail the stationing of Egyptian or Syrian troops on the frontiers. With pan-Arab irredentism defused by a PLO endorsement of the Palestinian state, and Egyptian and Syrian irredentism defused by return to the 1967 frontiers, the stage will have been set for the generation of an Arab consensus in favor of an overall settlement. Within such a framework, a collective Arab guarantee of the settlement could be made and the modalities elaborated for economic assistance to the Palestinian state. Given its nonaligned status, it is difficult to see what expectation would prompt a Palestinian regime to withdraw from such an arrangement.

Third, let us look again at *the military balance between Israel and a Palestinian state*. As we have already seen, even if for argument's sake a Palestinian state acquired armed forces one-half or one-third those of Jordan, the balance of power between it and Israel

would be crushingly in favor of the latter. The deterrence Israel would command would be eminently credible. It would be all the more enhanced by a sober assessment of the military implications of the new state's geography. Note specifically the following:

(a) *Discontinuity*. The Gaza Strip and the West Bank are separated from one another by Israeli territory from 20 to 35 miles wide. Even with East Jerusalem restored to the Palestinian state, West Jerusalem dominates the main road linking Nablus to the north and Hebron to the south.

(b) *Encirclement*. Both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are almost completely surrounded by Israel, the former on the north and east, the latter on the north, west, south and southeast.

(c) *Accessibility of Palestinian Territory*. If Tel Aviv is 15 miles from the West Bank, the West Bank is the same distance from Tel Aviv. Accessibility is not only a function of distance. It is a function of terrain, vegetation, communication routes and transport capacities, but above all it is a function of the balance of power. Visual accessibility with the naked eye is a bonus.

The Gaza Strip is five to ten miles wide, 30 miles long. Every square yard is penetrable from the Israeli side by foot within an hour, by vehicle within minutes. It has no warning time against aircraft. It is totally accessible to the naked eye from land and sea.

The West Bank is some 85 miles long. Its greatest width is under 40 miles, its narrowest at Jerusalem is under 20 miles. No point on the West Bank falls outside a 25-mile radius from the nearest point along the Israeli frontier, and most of it falls within a 20-mile radius of the frontier. No impenetrable vegetation or inaccessible terrain prevents arrival from the Israeli frontier anywhere on the West Bank, by foot within six hours, by vehicle within one. Warning time against aircraft is to all intents and purposes nil. No dense forests cover any part of it.

(d) *Links to the Outside World*. The Gaza Strip has no direct land link to the outside world. If the Israelis dismantled their settlements in the Arish area on the southern frontier of the Gaza Strip, they could be replaced by a U.N. buffer zone. The single airport in the Strip is a stone's throw from Israel. The only harbor is small and makeshift. The figures for the Palestinian forces that might be deployed in the Strip under the formulae discussed above and their relation to the Israeli forces speak for themselves. The Israeli Navy is also available to monitor the Gaza coastline.¹¹

The West Bank has no direct access to the sea. It has one airport

¹¹ This includes one submarine (two under construction), 18 naval vessels with surface-to-surface missiles, 40 patrol boats, and 12 landing craft. *Military Balance*, 1977-78, *op. cit.*

north of Jerusalem with limited capacity. It is within medium mortar range from the Israeli frontier. It is accessible to the naked eye to aircraft flying within Israeli airspace. The West Bank's land link to the Arab world is through Jordan. Vehicular travel to and from Jordan is along two main routes with two crossing points on the Jordan River. The routes leading to the crossing points from the Jordanian side pass through gorges and open country. As they come out of the open country on the Palestinian side, they start their climb up the mountains of Nablus and Jerusalem. Given Israeli air superiority, the terrain on both sides of the Jordan River is an ideal burial ground for armor.

As a party to the settlement, Jordan would be anxious to monitor the armed forces of the Palestinian state. Its position astride the land routes of access to the state as well as the state's only contact with the sea through Arab territory (Jordanian Aqaba) enables it to exercise effective control on vehicular traffic to the state. This could be reinforced by U.N. inspection and verification personnel at the two crossing points on the Jordan River, as indeed at the Jerusalem airport. The orifices of the state would thus be sealed.

The West Bank has the configuration of a bulge abutting on Israel, with its base on the Jordan River. The length of this base from north to south is 45 miles. A road runs along the base parallel to the river from the Israeli frontier near Lake Tiberias. An army crossing the Syrian desert in the direction of the Jordanian routes of access to the Palestinian state would have to cover hundreds of miles before reaching the eastern frontiers of Jordan, themselves hundreds of miles from the Jordan River. An armored Israeli column traveling southward from the direction of Lake Tiberias could in less than two hours sever all contact between the Palestinian state and the Arab hinterland. Israel could also draw on its five paratroop brigades and 186 helicopters (not to mention its 574 combat aircraft) to take possession in time of the two crossing points on the Jordan River.

In *conclusion*, therefore, any PLO leadership would take the helm in a Palestinian state with few illusions about the efficacy of revolutionary armed struggle in any direct confrontation with Israel. They would be acutely aware of its costs. They would have little incentive on national or corporate grounds to incur it.

To one observer, the real security question posed by the Palestinian state is: For how long would the Israeli brigadier generals be able to keep their hands off such a delectable sitting duck?

79. West Bank National Conference, October 1, 1978

(Note.—In October 1978, prominent Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip met and published the following statements—documents 79 and 80—rejecting the Camp David Accords. See document No. 4.)

On this day Sunday, October 1, 1978, in the professional unions' centre in Jerusalem, Muslim and Christian religious leaders, mayors and city council members, representatives of the unions, clubs and national institutions, and leading personalities in Jerusalem and the rest of the occupied territories held a national conference and studied the results of the Camp David conference, its agreements, explanations, letters and the declarations of those who signed it. All those present have unanimously decided the following:

1. To totally reject and oppose these agreements, and all the documents, explanations and annexes related to them.

2. The Camp David agreements are in contradiction to the all-Arab character of our battle, as they actually constitute a separate treaty between Egypt and Israel, which will take Egypt out of the Arab arena in order to strike at the Arab and African liberation movements.

3. The above-mentioned agreements are a clear deviation from the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences in general and the Algiers and Rabat summits in particular, which clearly opposed separate solutions and demanded that the confrontation forces work jointly in all fields.

4. The above-mentioned agreements contradict the UN General Assembly resolutions on the Palestinian issue and are an open defiance of the international will and an attack on the Palestinian people's natural rights.

5. The above-mentioned agreements have denied the rights of the Palestinian people and ignored their just cause, which is the crux of the conflict in the Middle East, and ignored their usurped rights and their right of self-determination on their land. The agreements have also ignored the PLO, which is the sole legitimate leadership of the Palestinian people, and attempt to create an alternative leadership to the PLO under the auspices of occupation by establishing self-rule which time after time all sectors of our people have absolutely rejected.

6. The struggle of the Palestinian people was and still is an integral part of the struggle of the Arab peoples for freedom, unity and progress, and is part of the world liberation movement. And the Palestinian people inside and outside the occupied territory are a unified, inseparable whole.

7. No peace is possible in the area without the complete and genuine withdrawal of Israeli forces from all the occupied territories, nor without securing for the Palestinian people the right of return, self-determination and the creation of their own independent state on their land, with Jerusalem as its capital.

8. We reject the self-government plan both in its form and content. It is a plan to consolidate the occupation, to continue the oppression of our people and the usurping of our legitimate rights. It is an open plot to bypass the ambitions of our people and our right to our own homeland and to self-determination.

9. From our beloved Jerusalem, the throbbing heart of Palestine, we appeal to our Arab people everywhere to retain their national unity, confirm their allegiance to their legitimate leadership, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and stand united in the face of all efforts to implement the proposed self-government plan and other capitulationist solutions.

On this occasion we salute our Palestinian people inside and outside [Palestine], the memory of our martyrs who sacrificed their lives for their country and the resisters in the Israeli prisons. We salute the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front and the resolutions of its summits in Tripoli and Damascus. These are an extension of the Arab militant stance established by the Arab people through their struggles. And we salute all friendly nations for their clear position in support of our national rights.

[96 signatories]

80. Gaza National Conference, October 18, 1978

On October 16 and 18, 1978, the municipalities, rural councils, benevolent societies, trade associations, chambers of commerce and industry and business establishments of the Gaza Strip met to discuss the contents of the Camp David agreements and the documents appended thereto.

In affirming the concern of the Palestinian Arab people of the Gaza Strip that a just peace should prevail in the Middle East, and in desiring that all causes and consequences of wars should disappear so that all peoples of the region can live in a permanent peace which will come about by fulfilling the national aspirations of the Palestinian Arab people, they set forth their views, in a positive, constructive and objective spirit:

1. The Camp David agreement ignores the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people, their right to freedom and self-determination and their right to create an independent national state in their homeland. The agreement also violates the UN Charter, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the provisions of international law.

2. The Camp David agreement violates the consensus of Arab states arrived at in the various Arab summit meetings, especially the resolutions of the Algiers and Rabat summits.

3. The Camp David agreement violates UN General Assembly resolutions, especially resolution 3236 of November 22, 1974 and resolution 3375 of November 10, 1975.

4. The agreement entrenches Israeli occupation for an unlimited period of time, endows it with legality, disrupts the unity of the Palestinian people at home and abroad, creates a new situation and new facts that essentially and basically conflict with the interests of the Palestinian Arab people and, in addition, does not specify the removal of the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

5. The agreement ignored the future of Arab Jerusalem. This deliberate oversight represents a grave danger to its Muslim and Christian shrines and to the rights of its Palestinian Arab population.

6. A just solution to the Palestinian question can only be achieved when the rights of the Palestinian Arab people to their soil and homeland and to the exercise of their natural right to freedom, justice and self-determination are respected and when the Israeli forces have completely and immediately withdrawn from all occupied Arab territories.

7. The participants affirm that the PLO is the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people and that its participation on an equal footing with all other sides is essential for the achievement of a just solution to the Palestinian question. The cause of peace in the Middle East is not served by deliberately ignoring the PLO.

8. Self-government according to the Camp David agreement is without content or meaning since it does not fulfil even the minimum demands and rights of the Palestinian Arab people, nor does it represent the correct manner in which that people can exercise their right to freedom and self-determination. This is because it is obscure, ambiguous and complex and lacks specific and genuine guarantees which ensure for that people their freedom, their return and self-determination on their soil and in their homeland.

9. Accordingly, the participants condemn the Camp David agreement and call upon all who love justice and peace in the world, upon the Arab and Islamic worlds, upon world public opinion and the United Nations to help the Palestinian Arab people obtain their just rights and put an end to their continuing tragedy. The participants affirm that they fully support a just peace. They assert that the Palestinian Arab people aspire to that just peace. Of all nations in the world, they need and desire this most in order to be rid of their sufferings and of the cruel fate imposed upon them against their will. They affirm that they have always been the victim of continuous wars and have been denied their natural right to freedom and a life of dignity on their own soil and in their homeland.

81. Yasir Arafat, PLO, Interview in the Washington Star,
August 12, 1979

Dialogue With U.S.

Q: *I'm asking you not for the words, but for the spirit. The problem here is not whether you want to sit down immediately and talk with Israel, but whether you want to enter a direct dialogue with the United States?*

A: There has been a lot of maneuvering, just to transform our push a resolution that has been taken by the General Assembly into the Security Council. We have been subjected to such a hectic kind of maneuvering, what do you expect me to do? What you Americans did when you approved the establishment of Israel, your approval, your consent, your establishment of Israel included the establishment of a Palestinian state, because the decision, the resolution has not one, but two paragraphs. It is a coin with two faces. Establish two states. Why do you confirm one and neglect the other one? I believe your commitment to this resolution that resulted in the establishment of Israel, and which included at the same time the establishment of a Palestinian state, is much more crucial, and important, and historical, than your peripheral commitment which (former Secretary of State Henry) Kissinger secretly committed your country to. When I remember such incidents, it is my right to insist on clear resolutions. I look at the picture from a short distance, and I look upon it from a strategic angle. The presence of constants, now, makes the picture look rather miserable. But when I can look at it with my strategic look, I can see much more clearly and optimistically.

Q: *What you expect in terms of achieving your purposes, toward the establishment of a Palestinian homeland?*

A: Any victory we can score — small as it could be, military, or political, or diplomatic — would be a push forward towards achievement of the goals I have mentioned. On the political level, and on the diplomatic level as well, to achieve some victories, including other blocs of countries — we are approaching a very important session of the summit conference of the non-aligned countries. Do not forget that we are an essential party in this group.

Q: *What does that mean? Does it*

mean that the oil is committed to the Palestinian cause?

A: Definitely. You have to remember (Sheik Ahmad Zaki) Yamani's statement, that the Americans have to remember the importance of this economic factor to the just rights of the Palestinian people. Just tonight, Saud Faisal, the minister of foreign affairs of Saudi Arabia, made the statement to NBC that the continuation of air raids in the south of Lebanon may explode and put the entire area in the danger of another war. Another statement. What I'm speaking about — when Yamani is saying these things from an oil point of view, Khomeini is saying the same. . . . They are linking. . . .

Q: *Oil and Palestinian rights?*

A: Definitely. And do not to forget also 1982, it is a very critical date. Because on that date, according to American information, socialist countries will be in the need of oil.

Existence of Israel

Q: *Are you willing to acknowledge the existence of Israel and its future right to exist?*

A: Why is this question always being addressed to the victim of aggression? Why not such questions addressed to the Israelis and not to the people who have been chased out of the country? Why are such questions not addressed to the Israelis who now claim that they have rights over the water supplies of the people on the West Bank and the Gaza strip? And the owner of the land do not have such rights over the water supplies. . . .

Q: *The question is asked because the world acknowledges the existence of Israel and has not yet come by any formal means to acknowledge the existence of a Palestinian state.*

A: I am not responsible for the moral deterioration of any official of this world who has not yet recognized the rights of the Palestinian people. The Palestinian people consist of 4 million people having the highest rate of educated people in the Middle East, and still as you say, not recognized by some of these officials. This is immoral, an international immoral crime. It is high time to have a kind of a conscience shock. What have we done? What are the crimes we have committed? Why did we have to survive for the past 30 years not to have a home, a passport, a nation, or anything, living as refugees, without any rights, even human rights. What have we done? And the Israelis, even Judaism itself is a religion, (it) would never agree to such values. Judaism as a religion has never manifested any kind of oppression against any people. These Zionists are even soiling their own religion.

Q: Do you think you can ever acknowledge the existence of Israel?

A: Don't ask me this question. I'm not going to put my cards on the table. I'm not going to uncover my cards.

Q: You recognize that it is a fundamental question?

A: I have a very few cards, but I have the strongest cards.

Relationship With U.S.

Q: How do you see the PLO's relationship with the United States? Do you want a relationship? Under what circumstances? Do you want a relationship now, or must it await further conflict, bloodshed or turmoil in this area?

A: Unfortunately, there are no relationships between the PLO and the United States — no official relationships. We have some relationships, with some American groups, public groups, and some persons, figures, congressmen. But no official relationships. We have tried so many times.

Q: Do you want a relationship with the United States?

A: Yes. Of course.

Q: What kind?

A: Like all other countries. The five big countries. Like I have with the Soviet Union. I have a very good relation, a strong relation with one of the superpowers. I want to have the same relation with the other superpower.

Q: You want the same relationship with the United States that you have with the Soviet Union?

A: Yes.

Q: Now? You want it now?

A: Yes, now. And I have the right. I want it now. As soon as possible.

Q: How do you hope to achieve it?

A: I'm doing my best, but they are still afraid and in connivance with the Israelis.

Q: What are you doing?

A: I called for a kind of relationship, we sent representatives to the American people. At the very first, I tried to respond to the goals of all people who come under protest, like congressmen and others. They all come and they start their discussions with a statement that I have learned by heart: "Please, Mr. Chairman, consider this meeting is not official and I have nothing to do with you as an official." And they have to mention this before and after meeting me to the press people. As if meeting me is a crime. I'm a human being. Every congressman has the same slogan. Before starting talks with me, he has this famous opening. And he has to tell the press before and after that he has met Arafat, not officially, but personally. I am the chairman of the PLO, who is a representative of the Palestinian people.

Q: What more do you think you can do to establish a relationship with the United States?

A: What do you suggest? I am ready to do anything. To send our minister of foreign affairs to the United States? I'm ready. He will go there in the next months. But he is prevented from going more than 20 kilometers from the United Nations. It is forbidden.

Q: Can you accept Resolution 242?

A: No. And I'll tell you why. And I have said this more than once. (Resolution) 242 was a resolution to end of the war that took place between the Arabs and the Israelis. It has nothing to do with the Palestinian people. The only mention is refugees. And not Palestinians. We have to remember the second working paper explained the word refugees as all refugees, Jews and Arabs, but not Palestinians. Why do I have to recognize it while it doesn't even mean Palestinian. According to the second Israeli-American working paper, the word refugee is interpreted as Jews and Arabs.

Resistance to Force

Q: *Are you saying a state of war exists between the Palestinian people and Israel, and, until that state of war ends by creation of a Palestinian state, there can be no cessation of the hostilities on either side?*

A: It is not a state of war. We have not declared war. It is a state of Israeli aggression. We are responding to this situation by our resistance force. It's clear.

Q: *So you say the acts against the aggression cannot cease until the aggression ceases?*

A: Acts of resistance, otherwise we will have accepted slavery which you have not accepted for yourselves, which the French have not accepted, which the Irish have not accepted for themselves, which the Latin Americans have not accepted.

Q: *Many American leaders believe that it is more than Israel that opposes the creation of a Palestinian state. Some say they can find few Arab leaders willing to say they really believe in the establishment of a new state in the Middle East occupied by Palestinians.*

A: This is one of the maneuvers in the area. We have clear resolutions approved by five (Arab) conferences. This approval has been the result of a conviction, a free conviction. It has not been only a lip service, because there have been resolutions in which the Palestine Liberation Organization has been offered aid, financial and otherwise, to implement its goal striving for the establishment of a Palestinian state. And it has been implemented at so many summit conferences. We are the only national liberation movement in the region, in the Arab countries, that has been accepted as a full member in the Arab league. . . . We are full members in the Islamic organization and the non-aligned countries.

Q: *You can never participate in the Camp David framework?*

A: I will not commit Sadat's crime by getting outside the Arab unanimity, which I have called for and which I have strived to get, because Arab unanimity is essential to our strike. Sadat will discover this sooner or later — that without Arab unanimity, nobody can impose any kind of solution in this area. Even the Israelis will discover this sooner or later. And the Americans will discover that too.

Q: *You say that peace is your purpose. Would you be willing to order an end to all bombings, hijackings, terror and other means of conflict in order to achieve peace?*

A: The Palestinians have nothing to do with hijackings. Hijacking is an international problem. If you want to make this an issue why don't you punish the Japanese government for the activities of the Red Army? Or the Italian government for the Red Brigades? Or the Americans who hijack planes sometimes.

Q: *I'm talking about acts of violence, generally.*

A: If there is a point of difference of definition, do you consider resisting occupation — an act of defense against occupation — as a terrorist act? Internationally, this is resistance. Otherwise, there wouldn't have been an independent United States, or an independent Europe. You can't address an occupied people to stop their activities defending their rights, their independence and their freedom before addressing the occupier to evacuate and to leave these people free. Let the occupier leave the country, before addressing the victims for resisting the occupying forces. You are representing a very wrong formula. How can you address people defending their own rights doing an act of violence or terrorism. The real terror is the occupation itself. I want peace, but I want a just one, in which my people will not be refugees; will not be oppressed; will not be under occupation. This is peace. Otherwise it is surrender.

Q: What do you think of President Carter?

A: When he first came into office, he mentioned something about (a) homeland for the Palestinian people. I evaluated this very highly in our national council, I repeated this position of mine on many international platforms. But after the Camp David agreement, I have been shocked, like all other Palestinians. We were shocked by that. In Camp David, we have been offered certain things — Ian Smith (of Rhodesia) offered the Africans more than what we have been offered by the Camp David accords and the Americans rejected that. It is a coincidence that these two things happened at the same time, but it showed that you have two balances by which you measure your moral values. I don't feel the freedom to express my feelings or beliefs about the amount of pressure under which the American president is suffering from the Israeli blackmail. We were surprised by his last statement — that the Palestinian people are similar to the civil rights movement. The Palestinian people want not only civil rights, but there have been complete political rights that have been acknowledged by the United Nations. You Americans are morally responsible for the implementation of our people's right. Politically, morally, spiritually — I am referring again to your commitment to the establishment of Israel, that resolution which declared the establishment to two states, the Palestinian state as well. All President Carter's talk about civil rights stops with the Palestinian people.

Advice on Interests

Q: What would you like to tell the president if you could meet with him?

A: First, I would say that the Palestinian people are entitled to their rights, like all other peoples the rights to live in this world, and the right for self-determination and the establishment of a state of their own. And I would advise him not to risk much American interests because of his present strategy toward Israel. Secondly, the future of the United States of America, the American interest in this part of the world, is with the Arab people — with the Arab people, not with Israel, and he should stop demanding that the American taxpayer to pay more taxes just to fulfill the aggressive strategy of Israel in this part of the world with American weapons.

Q: Would you ask for his help in establishing a Palestinian state?

A: I am not putting my head in the sand. I know what American means. I am pragmatic.

Q: What would you say exactly?

A: I would address him as one of the two superpowers who are committed to peace in the world, and second as a believer, as a man who has religious feeling and who secretly believes that the Palestinian people are entitled to just treatment like other nations. And as a believer, it is his responsibility to help restore peace.

82. Letter From PLO Executive Committee to Delegate Walter Fauntroy, October 5, 1979, as Printed in the *Congressional Record*, October 11, 1979

WASHINGTON, D.C.,
October 5, 1979.

WALTER FAUNTROY,
Chairman, SCLC,
Washington, D.C.

In response to Dr. Joseph Lowery and Congressman Walter Fauntroy and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference peace initiative as well as Reverend Jesse Jackson's People United to Save Humanity (PUSH) appeal, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat after meeting with members of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization issued the following 6 point program. (1) The PLO reaffirms its rejection of the Camp David process and the autonomy plan which only legitimizes the occupation and oppression of the Palestinian people. (2) The PLO reaffirms the resolution of the Palestine National Council including the Palestinian people's right of self determination, their right of return, and their right to an independent state. (3) The PLO commits itself to a cease fire in Lebanon in line with the safety and security of Lebanon, at a time when Israel continues its ceaseless attacks

by air, land and sea which have resulted in 600,000 refugees. (4) The PLO reaffirms its right to an independent state on any land Israel evacuates or is liberated. (5) The PLO reaffirms its respect for Judaism and the right of Jews to live in peace and its commitment to full equality of Jews, Moslems, and Christians and its opposition to all forms of racism. (6) The PLO appeals to all people to support the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

Chairman Arafat sends his best wishes to the SCLC delegation members and to the PUSH delegation.

OTHER ARABS

83. Arab Summit Conference Communique, Excerpts, Khartoum, Sudan, September 1, 1967

* * * * *

3—The Arab heads of state have agreed to unite their political efforts on the international and diplomatic level to eliminate the effects of the aggression and to ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the Arab lands which have been occupied since the 5 June aggression. This will be done within the framework of the main principles to which the Arab states adhere, namely: no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it, and adherence to the rights of the Palestinian people in their country.

* * * * *

84. King Faisal Ibn Abd Al-Aziz of Saudi Arabia, Appeal to the Islamic World, Excerpts, August 23, 1969

(Note.—The Al-Aqsa Mosque, Islam's third holiest shrine, was partially destroyed by a fire set by Dennis Michael Rohan, an Australian. Muslim mobs blamed Israel for the fire and attacked Israeli firefighters. King Faisal issued the following appeal for a "holy war" to save Jerusalem. Rohan was declared insane by an Israeli court on December 30, 1969.)

At this historic moment, when criminal Zionism has hit the sacred Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, I appeal to Moslem leaders and their people throughout the world to come forward armed with faith, which is stronger than any other arms, to liberate Islamic holy places in dear Jerusalem.

Wicked Zionism--which is persisting in its criminal aggression with complete disregard for spiritual and human values, for religious sanctities, and all the UN resolutions--understands only the logic of force, especially after the United Nations has failed to force Israel to implement any of its resolutions. All the proposed peaceful solutions are a mirage and simply give world Zionism a chance to implement its expansionist plans to dominate the world.

Brothers, at the last pilgrimage I appealed to you to come forward to liberate the holy places in dear Palestine. Today, I appeal to you to declare a holy war (Jihad), now that all peaceful methods have been exhausted.

85. King Hussein Ibn Talal of Jordan, Proposal for a United Arab Kingdom, Excerpts, March 15, 1972

We are happy to declare that the bases of the proposed formula for the new phase are as follows:

1. The Hashimite Kingdom of the Jordan shall become a United Arab Kingdom and shall bear this name.

2. The United Arab Kingdom shall consist of two regions:

a. The Palestine region which will consist of the West Bank and any other Palestinian territories which are liberated and whose inhabitants desire to join it.

b. The Jordan region which will consist of the East Bank.

3. Amman shall be the central capital of the kingdom as well as the capital of the Jordan region.

4. Jerusalem shall be the capital of the Palestine region.

5. The head of the state shall be the king, who will assume the central executive authority with the help of a central cabinet. The central legislative authority shall be vested in the king and an assembly to be known as the national assembly. Members of this assembly shall be elected by direct secret ballot. Both regions shall be equally represented in this assembly.

6. The central judicial authority shall be vested in a central supreme court.

7. The kingdom shall have unified armed forces whose supreme commander is the king.

8. The responsibilities of the central executive authority shall be confined to affairs connected with the kingdom as an international entity to guarantee the kingdom's safety, stability and prosperity.

9. The executive authority in each region shall be assumed by a governor general from among its sons and a regional cabinet from among its sons as well.

10. Legislative authority in each region shall be assumed by a council to be called the people's council. It shall be elected by direct secret voting. This council will elect the region's governor general.

11. The judicial authority in the region shall be in the hands of the region's courts, and no one will have power over them.

12. The executive authority in each region shall assume responsibility for all the affairs of the region except such affairs as the constitution defines as coming under the jurisdiction of the central executive authority.

Naturally the implementation of this formula and its bases should be according to the constitutional norms in force. It will be referred to the [Jordanian] National Assembly to adopt the necessary measures to prepare a new constitution for the country.

86. Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, Communique, Excerpts, October 17, 1973

The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) Ministerial Council ended its meetings at 2130 today after

holding a session at the Kuwait Sheraton Hotel under the chairmanship of Algerian Industry and Energy Minister Belaid Abdessalam. The Council meetings had begun this morning at the OAPEC premises in Kuwait in response to an invitation by the Kuwaiti Government to discuss oil matters under the present circumstances. The Ministerial Council has issued the following press statement on its meetings:

The Arab oil-exporting countries are contributing to the world's prosperity, welfare and economy by exporting quantities of this valuable natural wealth. Although the production of many of these states has exceeded the limits required by their local economies and the needs of their future generations for energy and sources of income, they have continued to increase their production, sacrificing their own interests for the sake of international cooperation and the interests of the consumers.

It is known that Israel occupied by force vast areas of three Arab states in the June 1967 war, and that it is continuing its occupation unmindful of the UN resolutions and the various appeals for peace from Arab and peace-loving states. Although the world community is committed to implement the UN resolutions and prevent the aggressor from reaping the fruits of his aggression and seizing the lands of others by force, most of the great industrial states that consume Arab oil have not adopted a measure or an action which indicates awareness of its general international commitment; some of them, rather, have acted in a manner which supports and strengthens aggression.

The United States became active before and during the current war, supplying Israel with all sources of strength which increase its arrogance and enable it to defy the legitimate rights and the principles of general international law which are not subject to argument.

Israel caused the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967, burdening the European economy with the consequences. In the war taking place now, it has hit the exporting ports in the eastern Mediterranean, burdening Europe with another cut in its supplies.

For the third time there is a war resulting from Israel's defiance of our legitimate rights with the backing and support of the United States. This prompts the Arabs to adopt a decision not to continue to make economic sacrifices by producing quantities of their valuable oil wealth in excess of what is justified by the economic factors in their states unless the world community arises to put matters in order, compel Israel to withdraw from our occupied lands and make the United States aware of the exorbitant price the great industrial states are paying as a result of its blind and unlimited support for Israel.

Therefore, the Arab oil ministers meeting on 17 October in the city of Kuwait have decided to begin immediately the reduction of production in every Arab oil-producing country by no less than 5 percent of the production for the month of September. The same procedure will be applied every month and production will be reduced by the same percentage of the previous month's production until the Israeli forces are completely evacuated from all the Arab territories occupied in the June 1967 war, and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people are restored.

The conferees are eager that this production should not affect any friendly state which has helped or will help the Arabs in a fruitful and **effective manner**. They will continue to be supplied with the same quantities of oil they used to obtain before the reduction.

The same special treatment will be given to every state which adopts an important measure against Israel to persuade it to end its occupation of the usurped Arab territories.

The Arab ministers appeal to all peoples of the world, most of all the American people, to support the Arab nation in its struggle against Israeli colonialism and occupation. They emphasize the sincere desire of the Arab nation to cooperate fully with the peoples of the world, and the Arab nation's readiness to supply the world with oil despite all sacrifices when the world shows sympathy toward us and condemns the aggression against us.

87. Arab League Summit Conference Communiqué, Rabat, Morocco, October 29, 1974

The Seventh Arab Summit Conference after exhaustive and detailed discussions conducted by their Majesties, Excellencies, and Highnesses, the Kings, Presidents and Amirs on the Arab situation in general and the Palestine problem in particular, within their national and international frameworks; and after hearing the statements submitted by His Majesty King Hussein, King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and His Excellency Brother Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and after the statements of their Majesties and Excellencies the Kings and Presidents, in an atmosphere of candour and sincerity and full responsibility; and in view of the Arab leaders' appreciation of the joint national responsibility required of them at present for confronting aggression and performing duties of liberation, enjoined by the unity of the Arab cause and the unity of its struggle; and in view of the fact that all are aware of Zionist schemes still being made to eliminate the Palestinian existence and to obliterate the Palestinian national entity; and in view of the Arab leaders' belief in the necessity

to frustrate these attempts and schemes and to counteract them by supporting and strengthening this Palestinian national entity, by providing all requirements to develop and increase its ability to ensure that the Palestinian people recover their rights in full; and by meeting responsibilities of close cooperation with its brothers within the framework of collective Arab commitment;

And in light of the victories achieved by Palestinian struggle in the confrontation with the Zionist enemy, at the Arab and international levels, at the United Nations, and of the obligation imposed thereby to continue joint Arab action to develop and increase the scope of these victories; and having received the views of all on all the above, and having succeeded in cooling the differences between brethren within the framework of consolidating Arab solidarity, the Seventh Arab Summit Conference resolves the following:

1. To affirm the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to return to their homeland;
2. To affirm the right of the Palestinian people to establish an independent national authority under the command of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in any Palestinian territory that is liberated. This authority, once it is established, shall enjoy the support of the Arab states in all fields and at all levels;
3. To support the Palestine Liberation Organization in the exercise of its responsibility at the national and international levels within the framework of Arab commitment;
4. To call on the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Palestine Liberation Organization to devise a formula for the regulation of relations between them in the light of these decisions so as to ensure their implementation;
5. That all the Arab states undertake to defend Palestinian national unity and not to interfere in the internal affairs of Palestinian action.

88. Arab League Summit Conference Declaration, Excerpts, Tripoli, Libya, December 5, 1977

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate: An Arab summit conference was held in Tripoli, the capital of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah, from 2 to 5 December 1977 at the invitation of Brother Col Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi. It was attended by the following:

1. President Houari Boumediene for the Algerian Democratic and Popular Republic;
2. President Hafiz al-Asad for the Syrian Arab Republic;
3. Col Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi, secretary general of the General People's Congress of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah;
4. Brother 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, secretary general of the Unified Political Organization-National Front, for the PDRY;
5. Brother Taha Yasin Ramadan, for the Iraqi Republic;
6. Brother Yasir 'Arafat, chairman of the PLO Executive Committee and commander of the Palestinian revolution forces.

With a sense of complete pan-Arab responsibility, the conference discussed the dimensions of the current phase through which the Arab cause in general and the Palestinian question in particular are passing and the American-Zionist plans aimed at imposing capitulatory settlements on the Arab nation, prejudicing the established national rights of the Palestinian people, liquidating the national Arab accomplishments and striking at the Arab liberation movement as a prelude to subduing the Arab area and controlling its destiny and tying it to the bandwagon of world imperialism.

The conference also discussed the visit made by President as-Sadat to the Zionist entity as being a link in the framework of the implementation of the hostile schemes. The conference reviewed the results of the visit, which constituted a flagrant violation of the principles and objectives of the pan-Arab struggle against the Zionist enemy, a squandering of the rights of the Palestinian Arab people, a departure from the unity of the Arab ranks, a grave violation of the Arab League Charter and the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences and the withdrawing of Arab Egypt from the front of conflict with the Zionist enemy--a matter which the conference considered a great service by President as-Sadat to Zionism and American imperialism and their designs and a consecration of the Zionist entity, which is their tool and base in the Arab area.

Those attending the conference studied the current situation with all of its dimensions and concluded that the objectives of the plot are as follows:

1. To undermine the possibility of the establishment of a just and honorable peace which would safeguard the national rights of the Arab nation and guarantee for it the liberation of its occupied territories, the foremost of which is Jerusalem, and for the Palestinian people their established national rights.
2. To isolate the Arab nation from its allies and friends on the African Continent who have adopted a historic stand in support of the Arab issue and exposed the organic link between the Zionist entity and the racist regime in South Africa.
3. To isolate the Arab nation from the group of nonaligned states and Islamic states which have supported the Arab issue in all of its stages and stood on the side of the just struggle of the Palestinian people.
4. To harm the relations of friendship and cooperation between the Arab states on the one hand and the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist camp, which have given support and backing to the Arab nation in its historic struggle against the imperialist-Zionist enemy.
5. To enable the forces hostile to the Arab nation, headed by the United States, to realize gains that will upset the international balance in favor of the Zionist-imperialist forces and Zionism and undermine the national independence of the Afro-Asian and Latin American countries.

6. To establish an alliance between the Zionist enemy and the current Egyptian regime aimed at liquidating the Arab issue and the issue of Palestine, split the Arab nation and forfeit its national interests.

Out of its belief in the nature of the Zionist and imperialist challenges aimed at weakening the Arab will for liberation and harming the firm national rights of the Palestinian people which have been confirmed by international legitimacy--the foremost of which is their right to return and decide their own destiny and build their independent state on the soil of their homeland under the leadership of the PLO, which is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people--and proceeding from the reality of pan-Arab and historic responsibility, the summit conference decided the following:

1. To condemn President as-Sadat's visit to the Zionist entity since it constitutes a great betrayal of the sacrifices and struggle of our Arab people in Egypt and their armed forces and of the struggle, sacrifices and principles of the Arab nation. While appreciating the role of the great Egyptian people in the national struggle of the Arab nation, the conference stresses that Egypt is not the beginning or the end and that if the Arab nation is great with Egypt, the latter's greatness is only possible within the Arab nation, without which it can only diminish in importance.
2. To work for the frustration of the results of President as-Sadat's visit to the Zionist entity and his talks with the leaders of the Zionist enemy and the subsequent measures including the proposed Cairo meeting. The conference warns that anyone who tries to pursue a similar line or to have any dealings with the said results shall be held responsible for his deed nationally and on the pan-Arab level.
3. To freeze [tajmid] political and diplomatic relations with the Egyptian Government, to suspend dealings with it on the Arab and international levels and to apply the regulations, provisions and decisions of the Arab Boycott against Egyptian individuals, companies and firms which deal with the Zionist enemy.
4. To decide not to take part in Arab League meetings which are held in Egypt and to undertake contacts with the Arab League member states to study the question of its headquarters and organs and the membership of the Egyptian regime.
5. The conference salutes the Palestinian Arab people, who are standing fast in the occupied homeland, including all of their national and other popular organizations which are struggling against the occupation and which reject the visit of As-Sadat to occupied Palestine. The conference also warns against any attempt to prejudice the legitimacy of the PLO representation of the Palestinian people.
6. The conference takes satisfaction in recording the preliminary positions taken by the Arab states which have denounced the visit and rejected its consequences. Out of its responsibility and in compliance with its commitment and collective resolutions, the conference calls on these states to adopt practical measures to face the serious character of this capitulatory policy, including the suspension of political and material support. The conference also condemns the disgraceful stands adopted by those who praise this visit or support it and warn them of the consequences of their despondent and defeatist policies.
7. The conference appeals to the Arab nation on the official and popular levels to provide economic, financial, political and military aid and support to the Syrian region, now that it has become the principal confrontation state and the base of steadfastness for dealing with the Zionist enemy and also to the Palestinian people represented by the PLO.

8. The conference greets our Arab people in sisterly Egypt and particularly their national and progressive forces, which have rejected the capitulatory policy being pursued by the Egyptian regime as being a betrayal of the sacrifices of the people and their martyrs and an insult to the dignity of their armed forces.

9. In asserting the importance of the relationship of struggle and nationalism between Syria and the Palestinians, the Syrian Arab Republic and the PLO announce the formation of a unified front to face the Zionist enemy and combat the imperialist plot with all its parties and to thwart all attempts at capitulation. The Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah and the PDRY have decided to join this front, making it the nucleus of a pan-Arab front for steadfastness and combat which will be open to other Arab countries to join.

10. Members of the pan-Arab front consider any aggression against any one member as an aggression against all members.

The conference pledges to the Arab nation that it will continue the march of struggle, steadfastness, combat and adherence to the objectives of the Arab struggle. The conference also expresses its deep faith and absolute confidence that the Arab nation, which has staged revolutions, overcome difficulties and defeated plots during its long history of struggle--a struggle which abounds with heroism--is today capable of replying with force to those who have harmed its dignity, squandered its rights, split its solidarity and departed from the principles of its struggle. It is confident of its own capabilities in liberation, progress and victory, thanks to God.

The conference records with satisfaction the national Palestinian unity within the framework of the PLO.

Done at Tripoli on 5 December, 1977.

89. Crown Prince Fahd Ibn Abd Al-Aziz of Saudi Arabia, Interview in Newsweek, Excerpts, March 26, 1979

DE BORCHGRAVE: *Although Arab reaction to the Egyptian-Israeli treaty has been negative, Saudi Arabia has not commented. Why not?*

FAHD: We see no useful purpose being served with rhetoric. We naturally deplore separate initiatives that endanger the stability of the region by making the people at the center of the whole problem more desperate than they already are. The Palestinians have been waiting 30 years for the restoration of their rights . . . A separate peace treaty between Egypt and Israel—if that's what it is—will, I fear, trigger convulsions in the region . . .

Q. *But doesn't phase two of the accords offer an opportunity for at least a beginning of a Palestinian solution?*

A. We would like to express our deep thanks and appreciation for the incessant and enormous efforts by President Carter to secure Israel's withdrawal from Egyptian territory. But even bigger efforts will now be required to secure Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories, including Arab Jerusalem. There seems to be a lack of awareness in America that Israel's policy ever since the 1967 war has been one of gradual annexation of the West Bank . . . The Israelis have taken over 27 per cent of West Bank Arab land, including the extension of Jerusalem. The Israeli population in these lands is now 13 per cent of the West Bank population. What can autonomy for the Palestinians mean under these circumstances? Only a new cover for continued Israeli occupation. So every effort must be made during this historic period to encourage President Carter's support for the Palestinians to establish their own homeland.

Q. *Either the Israelis are serious about a Palestinian solution or they are not. Shouldn't the Palestine Liberation Organization at least try to find out which is the case by getting involved in phase two?*

A. The PLO makes its own decisions, but it seems to us that there is still an opportunity to reinforce the link to a just solution for the Palestinian people.

Q. *But since Israel will not negotiate with the PLO, and the West Bank Arabs will not negotiate with Israel, how are we going to get out of the current impasse? I have heard that you believe that the Islamic world as a whole could*

play some role. Is that correct?

A. From Indonesia to Iran and from Saudi Arabia to Morocco, there are hundreds of millions of Muslims with a vital stake in the liberation of our holy city of Jerusalem. And since this can only be achieved by the fulfillment of Palestinian rights, Islam could indeed provide a bridge to a solution.

Q. *I have also heard in Riyadh that a committee of Islamic nations could become the interlocutor to test the seriousness or bottom line of Israel's intentions in regard to a Palestinian solution. Is this a possibility?*

A. Within the context of Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, the situation requires imaginative thinking and a fresh ap-

proach. The alternative is a separate treaty, continued Israeli annexation of Palestinian land, upheavals throughout the area and, down this road, the specter of another war. The Islamic world could provide important backing to President Carter's efforts.

Q. *Some news reports have indicated that Saudi Arabia will join an Arab boycott of Egypt, cutting economic and diplomatic support. Is this in the cards?*

A. No such statement has been made by this government.

Q. *But does your support for Egypt now depend on a treaty being firmly linked to a Palestinian solution and further Israeli withdrawal?*

A. The Saudi Government's relationship with Egypt does not hinge upon a single linkage . . . We have proven this in the past. We are

deeply concerned about the welfare of all Arab countries and this will continue to be the case in the future.

Q. *Am I correct in assuming that you oppose any direct U.S. military presence in the Middle East?*

A. Saudi Arabia is against any foreign military presence in our region.

Q. *Are you reassessing your relations with the U.S.?*

A. These are turbulent times, and Saudi Arabia, like the U.S., must respond to regional and global changes in terms of its own national interest. But this does not necessarily involve anything as strong as a "reassessment." A special relationship, which our two countries enjoy, is certain to involve "special differences."

Q. *Many Americans saw Saudi presence at the hard-lining Baghdad summit as a departure from moderation.*

A. Americans tend to see the actions of other nations in terms of U.S. policy. Thus, words like "moderate" and "rejectionist" usually refer more to a nation's attitude toward the U.S. than its moderate or radical stance toward developing situations. There is no need for the U.S. to respond so egocentrically to every movement. The Arab nations in the Middle East region have many common concerns and objectives and, at times, we must respond in unison.

90. Arab League Summit Communiqué, Baghdad, Iraq, March 31, 1979

[Text] As the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt has ignored the Arab summit conferences' resolutions, especially those of the sixth and seventh conferences held in Algiers and Rabat; as it has at the same time ignored the ninth Arab summit conference resolutions--especially the call made by the Arab kings, presidents and princes to avoid signing the peace treaty with the Zionist enemy--and signed the peace treaty on 26 March 1979;

It has thus deviated from the Arab ranks and has chosen, in collusion with the United States, to stand by the side of the Zionist enemy in one trench; has behaved unilaterally in the Arab-Zionist struggle affairs; has violated the Arab nation's rights; has exposed the nation's destiny, its struggle and aims to dangers and challenges; has relinquished its pan-Arab duty of liberating the occupied Arab territories, particularly Jerusalem, and of restoring the Palestinian Arab people's inalienable national rights, including their right to repatriation, self-determination and establishment of the independent Palestinian state on their national soil.

In order to safeguard Arab solidarity and the unity of ranks in defense of the Arabs' fateful issue; in appreciation of the Egyptian people's struggle and sacrifices for Arab issues and the Palestinian issue in particular; in implementation of the resolutions adopted by the ninth Arab summit conference that convened in Baghdad 2-5 November 1978, and at the invitation of the Government of the Republic of Iraq, the Arab League Council convened in Baghdad from 27 March 1979 to 31 March 1979 on the level of Arab foreign and economy ministers.

In light of the ninth Arab summit conference resolutions, the council studied the latest developments pertaining to the Arab-Zionist conflict, especially after the signing by the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt of the peace [as-sulh] agreement with the Zionist enemy on 26 March 1979.

The Arab League Council, on the level of Arab foreign ministers, has decided the following:

1. A. To withdraw the ambassadors of the Arab states from Egypt immediately.
B. To recommend the severance of political and diplomatic relations with the Egyptian Government. The Arab governments will adopt the necessary measures to apply this recommendation within a maximum period of 1 month from the date of issuance of this decision, in accordance with the constitutional measures in force in each country.

2. To consider the suspension of the Egyptian Governments' membership in the Arab League as operative from the date of the Egyptian Government's signing of the peace treaty with the Zionist enemy. This means depriving it of all rights resulting from this membership.

3. A. To make the city of Tunis, capital of the Tunisian Republic, the temporary headquarters of the Arab League, its General Secretariat, the competent ministerial councils and the permanent technical committees, as of the date of the signing of the treaty between the Egyptian Government and the Zionist enemy. This shall be communicated to all international and regional organizations and bodies. They will also be informed that dealings with the Arab League will be conducted with its secretariat in its new temporary headquarters.
- B. To appeal to the Tunisian Government to offer all possible aid in facilitating the settlement of the temporary Arab League headquarters and its officials.
- C. To form a committee comprising representatives of Iraq, Syria, Tunisia, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Algeria, in addition to a representative for the General Secretariat. The aim of this committee will be to implement this resolution's provisions and to seek the aid it requires from the member-states. The committee will have all the authorization and responsibilities from the Arab League Council necessary to implement this resolution, including the protection of the Arab League's properties, deposits, documents and records. It is also entitled to take necessary measures against any action that may be taken by the Egyptian Government to hinder the transfer of the Arab League headquarters or to harm the Arab League's rights and possessions.

The committee will have to accomplish its task of transfer to the temporary headquarters within 2 months from the date of this resolution. This period of time may be extended another month if the committee so decides. The committee shall submit a report on its accomplishments to the first forthcoming meeting of the Arab League Council.

- D. A sum of \$5 million shall be placed at the committee's disposal to cover the transfer expenses. This sum shall be drawn from the credit accounts of various funds. The committee has the right to spend more than that amount if required. Expenditures for this purpose shall come under the supervision of the committee or of those it authorizes. The expenses shall be paid by the member-states, each according to the percentage of its annual contribution to the Arab League budget.

- E. To transfer the Arab League General Secretariat officials who are employed at the time of the issuance of this resolution from the permanent headquarters to the temporary one during the period defined in paragraph 3C of this resolution. The committee referred to in the above-mentioned paragraph 3 will have the responsibility of paying them financial compensation compatible with the standard of living in the new headquarters and for settling their affairs until a permanent system is drafted for this purpose.

4. The competent and specialized Arab organizations, bodies, establishments and federations named in the attached list No 1 will take the necessary measures to suspend Egypt's membership. They will transfer their headquarters from Egypt to other Arab states on a temporary basis, similar to the action that shall be taken regarding the Council General Secretariat. The executive councils and boards of these bodies, organizations, establishments and federations shall meet immediately following the implementation of this decision within a period not to exceed the period specified in Paragraph 3C above.

5. To seek to suspend Egypt's membership in the nonaligned movement, the Islamic conference organization and the OAU for violating the resolutions of these organizations pertaining to the Arab-Zionist conflict.
6. To continue to cooperate with the fraternal Egyptian people and with Egyptian individuals, with the exception of those who cooperate with the Zionist enemy directly or indirectly.
7. The member-states shall inform all foreign countries of their stand on the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and will ask these countries not to support this treaty as it constitutes an aggression against the rights of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation as well as a threat to world peace and security.
8. To condemn the policy that the United States is practicing regarding its role in concluding the Camp David agreements and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty.
9. To consider the measures in this decision to be temporary and subject to cancellation by an Arab League Council decision as soon as the circumstances that justified their adoption are eliminated.
10. The Arab countries will pass legislation, decisions and measures necessary for the implementation of this resolution.

The Arab League Council, on the level of Arab foreign and economy ministers, has also decided the following:

1. To halt all bank loans, deposits, guarantees or facilities, as well as all financial or technical contributions and aid by Arab governments or their establishments to the Egyptian Government and its establishments as of the treaty signing date.
2. To ban the extension of economic aid by the Arab funds, banks and financial establishments within the framework of the Arab League and the joint Arab cooperation to the Egyptian Government and its establishments.
3. The Arab governments and institutions shall refrain from purchasing the bonds, shares, postal orders and public credit loans that are issued by the Egyptian Government and its financial foundations.
4. Following the suspension of the Egyptian Government's membership in the Arab League, its membership will also be suspended from the institutions, funds and organizations deriving from the Arab League. The Egyptian Government and its institutions will cease to benefit from these organizations. The headquarters of those Arab League departments residing in Egypt will be transferred to other Arab states temporarily. (Appendix No 2)
5. In view of the fact that the ill-omened Egyptian-Israeli treaty and its appendices have demonstrated Egypt's commitment to sell oil to Israel, the Arab states shall refrain from providing Egypt with oil and its derivatives.
6. Trade exchange with the Egyptian state and private establishments that deal with the Zionist enemy shall be prohibited.
7. The Economic Boycott

A. The Arab boycott laws, principles and provisions shall be applied to those companies, foundations and individuals of the Arab Republic of Egypt that deal directly or indirectly with the Zionist enemy. The boycott office shall be entrusted with following up the implementation of these tasks.

B. The provisions of paragraph A shall include the intellectual, cultural and artistic activities that involve dealing with the Zionist enemy or have connection with the enemy's institutions.

C. The Arab states stress the importance of continued dealings with those private national Egyptian institutions that are confirmed not to be dealing with the Zionist enemy. Such institutions will be encouraged to work and maintain activities in the Arab countries within the framework of their fields of competence.

D. The Arab countries stress the importance of caring for the feelings of the Egyptian people's sons who are working or living in the Arab countries as well as looking after their interests and consolidating their pan-Arab affiliation with Arabism.

E. To consolidate the role of the Arab boycott and to enhance its grip at this stage, in affirmation of Arab unanimity, the assistant secretary general for economic affairs will be temporarily entrusted with the task of directly supervising the major boycott office in Damascus. He will be granted the necessary powers to reorganize and back the said department and to submit proposals on developing the boycott in method, content and scope. He shall submit a report in this regard to the first meeting of the Arab League Council.

8. The United Nations will be asked to transfer its regional offices, which serve the Arab region, from the Arab Republic of Egypt to any other Arab capital. The Arab states will work collectively toward this end.

9. The Arab League General Secretariat will be assigned the task of studying the joint Arab projects so as to take the necessary measures for protecting the Arab nation's interests in accordance with the aims of these resolutions. The General Secretariat shall submit its proposals to the Arab League Council in its first forthcoming meeting.

10. The Zionist plot must be faced by drafting an Arab strategy for economic confrontation. This will lead to utilizing the Arabs' own strength and will emphasize the need for realizing Arab economic integration in all aspects.

The strategy will strengthen joint Arab development and regional development within the pan-Arab outlook and will expand the establishment of joint Arab projects--projects that serve the aims of emancipating, developing and integrating the Arab economy--and will promote the projects already in operation. The strategy will also develop the methods, systems and substance of the Arab boycott of Israel and will diversify and promote international relations with the developing countries. The Arab League General Secretariat shall rapidly submit studies relevant to the strategy of joint Arab economic action to the forthcoming session of the Arab Economic Council. This will be a prelude to the convention of a general Arab economic conference.

11. The above-mentioned committee shall be assigned the task of supervising the implementation of these decisions and of submitting a followup report to the Arab League Council in its first forthcoming meeting.

12. The Arab states will issue the decisions and legislations pertaining to these decisions and will take the necessary measures to implement them.

13. These measures taken by the Arab and economy ministers are considered a minimal requirements to face the threats of the treaty. Individual governments can take whatever measure they deem necessary in addition to these measures.

14. The Arab foreign and economy ministers call on the Arab nation in all Arab countries to support the economic measures taken against the Zionist enemy and the Egyptian regime.

The following is the text of the first and second appendices that are annexed to the text of the foreign and economy ministers' resolutions. The two appendices include the Arab institutions that will be transferred from Cairo.

91. King Hussein of Jordan and President Hafiz Al-Assad of Syria, Interview in Newsweek, April 2, 1979

DE BORCHGRAVE: *President Carter and Zbigniew Brzezinski, on their recent missions, made it very clear that the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty is intended to be the beginning, not the end, of a search for a comprehensive Mideast settlement. So what useful purpose is served in applying economic and political sanctions against Egypt?*

ASSAD: As a measure of self-defense, the Arabs obviously have to take certain precautionary steps against the Egyptian regime, which has now placed itself in the position of an enemy of the Arab nation, in the same trench with Israel . . . After all this, does anyone really expect us to extend a helpful hand to Sadat?

HUSSEIN: From long experience in dealing with this problem, I don't believe that President Carter's approach, regardless of goodwill, is likely to bring about an over-all settlement—the recovery of all the Israeli-occupied Arab territories, including Arab Jerusalem, and Palestinian self-determination. The problem of Arab sanctions against Egypt will be discussed in detail and steps taken to remove Arab League headquarters from Cairo and expel Egypt from the league.

Q. *If Jordan, Syria, the Palestine Liberation Organization and the West Bank Arabs all refuse to get involved with Carter's initiative, even if only to test the seriousness of U.S. and Israeli intentions on a Palestinian solution, won't the end result then be Israel's de facto annexation of the West Bank?*

ASSAD: What is now taking place is helping Israel consolidate its hold on the territories occupied in 1967 and obliterate the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and then give all this international, as well as Arab, legitimacy. This is what U.S. policy is all about . . . What does autonomy for the Palestinians really mean? Doesn't it mean Arab recognition that the West Bank and Gaza Strip are part of the State of Israel? Didn't Begin this very week reaffirm this when he said that autonomy only applied to the Palestinian inhabitants because they were an Arab population on Israeli land? And where are the rights of the displaced Palestinians in all of this? And the withdrawal from East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights? All of this has been wiped out, and yet the Carter Administration wants us to deliver our consent on a silver platter.

HUSSEIN: What we were offered, excuse my saying so, was a big fat zero. We have been testing [Israel's] good intentions since 1967—with no results. What the U.S. is talking about doesn't bear the remotest resemblance to United Nations resolutions 242 and 338. Israel's objective has always been to isolate Egypt and consolidate its hold on the West Bank, and the U.S. initiative has made a significant contribution to this objective. It will disrupt hitherto friendly relations and destabilize the entire area. What on earth for?

Q. *So what's the alternative?*

ASSAD: We will now seek new methods and means to help us restore our rights . . . And to be effective, pressure has to be painful.

HUSSEIN: We must make the U.S. see the error of its policy and get the whole problem back into the U.N. Security Council.

Q. *PLO leader Yasir Arafat has called for an oil embargo against Egypt and the U.S. Do you favor this, too?*

ASSAD: It is, of course, natural for the Arabs to use all their available weapons. First, we will deploy our efforts to ensure the implementation of the Baghdad Arab summit resolutions of last November. At each stage, we will do what we think is useful and effective.

HUSSEIN: The phase immediately ahead calls for joint decisions on what should be done to ensure the survival of the Arab nation to safeguard its very identity, which is now threatened. Jordan will, of course, abide by the joint decisions.

Q. *Some Arab leaders say the U.S. is pursuing a policy of "neocolonialism" and that they will stop at nothing to block the "U.S.-Zionist-Sadat plot." What do these radical slogans mean?*

ASSAD: The U.S. is trying to divide and rule by . . . transferring some of the Arabs to the Israeli side. There are also U.S. attempts to create an atmosphere of tension in the area—for instance, movements of the U.S. Navy in the Arabian Sea under the pretext of events between the two Yemens. [The purpose was to] intimidate some Arab countries and convince others that the U.S. will come to protect them. This gives us a pretty good picture of Washington's intention to let the region sink deeper into conflicts as a means for

U.S. policy to achieve its targets. And these objectives coincide, of course, with Zionist aims—things the American people are not aware of and would not agree to if they understood what is happening. Why, for example, didn't the U.S. Navy move in when Israel invaded Southern Lebanon last year? U.S. policy in the region is being put at the service of Israeli interests and is not serving the interests of the U.S. people.

HUSSEIN: I was very satisfied with my talks with Arafat. We had a very constructive review of the whole situation and we saw eye to eye on everything. But this is not to say that I am endorsing everything he and others say publicly. We agreed, however, that the Arabs will have to do everything they can to face the new challenge in the most effective way.

Q. Do you share the view of some Arab leaders that Carter was primarily inspired by U.S. political considerations?

ASSAD: Well, he was certainly not inspired by the interests of the American or Arab people. It is indeed regrettable that certain domestic considerations are playing a primary role in U.S. foreign policy. I mean, of course, the influence of Zionist Jews in the U.S. concerning forthcoming elections.

HUSSEIN: I was sadly disappointed in Carter's approach. He's on the wrong track and he will very soon find out how wrong. But I am still fully convinced about his good intentions. He is simply misguided.

Q. Saudi Arabian leader Prince Fahd believes that the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, however much one may deplore it, is a new fact in the Middle East area. He also believes that phase two should now be put to the test by the Islamic world as a

whole. Do you have any objections to that?

ASSAD: There is no doubt that the Egyptian regime, by siding with Israel, is a new fact, a new reality, but this doesn't mean that we should accept it. The Israeli occupation of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights is also a reality. Does this mean we have to submit? Of course not. The fundamental element in the whole situation is the total isolation of Sadat's regime, Arab cohesion and Arab determination to restore our rights. And it's only natural for us to expect the Islamic world to support us by adding its power to our liberation struggle. The stand of the new Iran, for example, is as bright and as promising as a new dawn.

HUSSEIN: Prince Fahd does echo my feelings when he says that hundreds of millions of

Muslims, not only Arabs, are affected by the occupation of East Jerusalem. The role they can now play is still to be defined.

Q. Prince Fahd also said he would not allow Egypt to suffer financially as a result of any Arab resolutions. While multilateral Arab payments to Egypt will be cut off, bilateral assistance from Saudi Arabia to Egypt will continue. So how can sanctions hurt Egypt?

ASSAD: Last November's Baghdad summit agreed on resolutions that stipulated a complete boycott of the Egyptian regime once a separate agreement is signed with Israel. And Saudi Arabia participated in the formulation and voting of these resolutions. Since then the Saudi leadership has reaffirmed many times—the last time only a few days ago—that it was still committed to the Baghdad resolutions, which include a commitment to cut all forms of economic and military

assistance, both multilateral and bilateral.

HUSSEIN: There are other sanctions besides cutting financial aid. I believe you will see that Saudi Arabia will end all military aid to Egypt, which may cause a backlash in Washington and complicate immeasurably your relations with your principal ally in the area.

Q. Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein has branded Sadat a traitor and as "mentally and psychologically unfit" to lead his country. Do you really believe Sadat is a traitor?

ASSAD: I have never had the habit of using such words. But if I am to call things by their real name, I have to say that Sadat is indeed a traitor to his own people and to the Arab nation. He has sold out the dignity, interests and principles of the Egyptian and Arab

people who will now call him to account for these dastardly deeds. It would be terribly wrong ... to think that what Sadat has done meets with [their] approval ... We can say without any hesitation, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that Sadat has signed his own demise.

HUSSEIN: Sadat has embarked on a course that is without precedent in terms of the damage it is causing to the very concept of the Arab nation ... Sadat has handed Israel a long-sought opportunity to divide and rule the Arabs.

Q. What sort of upheavals do you expect as a result of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty?

ASSAD: I expect upheavals in Egypt, and in the coming phase Sadat will depend for his protection on the security services of the United States and Israel—not protection against an external threat, but against his own people. And past experience has proved that such outside protection is useless, as we recently witnessed in Iran.

HUSSEIN: There is, of course, a possibility of our external relations being affected. Bilateral relations with the U.S., to be specific. This reassessment will, hopefully, bring greater cohesion in a manner never achieved before among Arab nations. But my hope is still that we can avoid upheavals.

Q. To be fair, Egypt is getting all of the Sinai back, including the oil and Israeli air bases, and it gets a foot in the door in the Gaza Strip. So why not take the process forward now, as Prince Fahd advocates?

ASSAD: Because what Sadat has done is, in effect, to put Egypt under Israeli trusteeship. The Sinai will be returned, but Egyptian sovereignty will be deficient and such restoration is not worth splitting Egypt away from the Arab nation.

HUSSEIN: We're not new at this game. We've been asking all the right questions since 1967, and the only answer we get is continued Israeli annexation of the West Bank. Before getting involved we want to know whether the end result will be Resolution 242, or not. But even the U.S. now says it cannot commit itself to any end result ... So what do you want Jordan to get involved in? Israel's annexation plans? We will never acquiesce in such a process.

Q. Saudi Arabia is convinced that Jimmy Carter is sincere and determined to move on a Palestinian solution. I take it you don't think he is.

ASSAD: I don't think Mr. Carter is determined to move toward the solution we all want for the Palestinian question.

HUSSEIN: I think he is indeed sincere about peace. But after a good beginning, his methods and approach are badly misguided and will soon be derailed. President Carter originally spoke of a comprehensive settlement. Now he has switched to a different course, the dangerous road to a partial settlement.

In the second part, the focus shifts to the analysis of the recorded data. It describes how trends can be identified and how they relate to the overall performance of the organization. The text provides examples of how certain patterns in the data might indicate areas for improvement or potential risks.

The third part of the document addresses the role of management in overseeing the financial process. It stresses the need for clear communication and collaboration between different departments to ensure that all financial activities are properly managed and reported. This section also discusses the importance of regular reviews and audits to maintain transparency and accountability.

Finally, the document concludes with a summary of the key points discussed. It reiterates the importance of accurate record-keeping, thorough analysis, and effective management in achieving the organization's financial goals. The text encourages a proactive approach to financial management, where potential issues are identified and addressed before they become major problems.

UNITED STATES

92. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Statement on U.S. Policy in the Middle East, Excerpts, May 23, 1967

—To the leaders of all the nations of the Near East, I wish to say what three American Presidents have said before me—that the United States is firmly committed to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of that area. The United States strongly opposes aggression by anyone in the area, in any form, overt or clandestine. This has been the policy of the United States led by four Presidents—President Truman, President Eisenhower, President John F. Kennedy, and myself—as well as the policy of both of our political parties. The record of the actions of the United States over the past 20 years, within and outside the United Nations, is abundantly clear on this point.

The United States has consistently sought to have good relations with all the states of the Near East. Regrettably, this has not always been possible, but we are convinced that our differences with individual states of the area and their differences with each other must be worked out peacefully and in accordance with accepted international practice.

We have always opposed—and we oppose in other parts of the world at this very moment—the efforts of other nations to resolve their problems with their neighbors by the aggression route. We shall continue to do so. And tonight we appeal to all other peace-loving nations to do likewise.

**93. President Johnson, Statement on Principles for Peace,
Excerpts, June 19, 1967**

Now, finally, let me turn to the Middle East—and to the tumultuous events of the past months.

Those events have proved the wisdom of five great principles of peace in the region.

The first and the greatest principle is that every nation in the area has a fundamental right to live, and to have this right respected by its neighbors.

For the people of the Middle East, the path to hope does not lie in threats to end the life of any nation. Such threats have become a burden to the peace, not only of that region but a burden to the peace of the entire world.

In the same way, no nation would be true to the United Nations Charter, or to its own true interests, if it should permit military success to blind it to the fact that its neighbors have rights and its neighbors have interests of their own. Each nation, therefore, must accept the right of others to live.

Second, this last month, I think, shows us another basic requirement for settlement. It is a human requirement: justice for the refugees.

A new conflict has brought new homelessness. The nations of the Middle East must at last address themselves to the plight of those who have been displaced by wars. In the past, both sides have resisted the best efforts of outside mediators to restore the victims of conflict to their homes, or to find them other proper places to live and work. There will

be no peace for any party in the Middle East unless this problem is attacked with new energy by all, and, certainly, primarily by those who are immediately concerned.

A third lesson from this last month is that maritime rights must be respected. Our Nation has long been committed to free maritime passage through international waterways, and we, along with other nations, were taking the necessary steps to implement this principle when hostilities exploded. If a single act of folly was more responsible for this explosion than any other, I think it was the arbitrary and dangerous announced decision that the Straits of Tiran would be closed. The right of innocent maritime passage must be preserved for all nations.

Fourth, this last conflict has demonstrated the danger of the Middle Eastern arms race of the last 12 years. Here the responsibility must rest not only on those in the area—but upon the larger states outside the area. We believe that scarce resources could be used much better for technical and economic development. We have always opposed this arms race, and our own military shipments to the area have consequently been severely limited.

Now the waste and futility of the arms race must be apparent to all the peoples of the world. And now there is another moment of choice. The United States of America, for its part, will use every resource of diplomacy, and every counsel of reason and prudence, to try to find a better course.

As a beginning, I should like to propose that the United Nations immediately call upon all of its members to report all shipments of all military arms into this area, and to keep those shipments on file for all the peoples of the world to observe.

Fifth, the crisis underlines the importance of respect for political independence and territorial integrity of all the states of the area. We reaffirmed that principle at the height of this crisis. We reaffirm it again today on behalf of all.

This principle can be effective in the Middle East only on the basis of peace between the parties. The nations of the region have had only fragile and violated truce lines for 20 years. What they now need are recognized boundaries and other arrangements that will give them security against terror, destruction, and war. Further, there just must be adequate recognition of the special interest of three great religions in the Holy Places of Jerusalem.

These five principles are not new, but we do think they are fundamental. Taken together, they point the way from uncertain armistice to durable peace. We believe there must be progress toward all of them if there is to be progress toward any.

There are some who have urged, as a single, simple solution, an immediate return to the situation as it was on June 4. As our distinguished and able Ambassador, Mr. Arthur Goldberg, has already said, this is not a prescription for peace, but for renewed hostilities.

Certainly troops must be withdrawn, but there must also be recognized rights of national life, progress in solving the refugee problem, freedom of innocent maritime passage, limitation of the arms race, and respect for political independence and territorial integrity.

But who will make this peace where all others have failed for 20 years or more?

Clearly the parties to the conflict must be the parties to the peace. Sooner or later it is they who must make a settlement in the area. It is hard to see how it is possible for nations to live together in peace if they cannot learn to reason together.

But we must still ask, who can help them? Some say it should be the United Nations; some call for the use of other parties. We have been first in our support of effective peacekeeping in the United Nations, and we also recognize the great values to come from mediation.

We are ready this morning to see any method tried, and we believe that none should be excluded altogether. Perhaps all of them will be useful and all will be needed.

• So, I issue an appeal to all to adopt no rigid view on these matters. I offer assurance to all that this Government of ours, the Government of the United States, will do its part for peace in every forum, at every level, at every hour.

Yet there is no escape from this fact: The main responsibility for the peace of the region depends upon its own peoples and its own leaders of that region. What will be truly decisive in the Middle East will be what is said and what is done by those who live in the Middle East.

They can seek another arms race, if they have not profited from the experience of this one, if they want to. But they will seek it at a terrible cost to their own people—and to their very long-neglected human needs. They can live on a diet of hate—though only at the cost of hatred in return. Or they can move toward peace with one another.

The world this morning is watching, watching for the peace of the world, because that is really what is at stake. It will look for patience and justice, it will look for humility and moral courage. It will look for signs of movement from prejudice and the emotional chaos of conflict to the gradual, slow shaping steps that lead to learning to live together and learning to help mold and shape peace in the area and in the world.

The Middle East is rich in history, rich in its people and its resources. It has no need to live in permanent civil war. It has the power to build its own life, as one of the prosperous regions of the world in which we live.

If the nations of the Middle East will turn toward the works of peace, they can count with confidence upon the friendship, and the help, of all the people of the United States of America.

In a climate of peace, we here will do our full share to help with a solution for the refugees. We here will do our full share in support of regional cooperation. We here will do our share, and do more, to see that the peaceful promise of nuclear energy is applied to the critical problem of desalting water and helping to make the deserts bloom.

Our country is committed—and we here reiterate that commitment today—to a peace that is based on five principles:

- first, the recognized right of national life;
- second, justice for the refugees;
- third, innocent maritime passage;
- fourth, limits on the wasteful and destructive arms race; and
- fifth, political independence and territorial integrity for all.

This is a time not for malice, but for magnanimity; not for propaganda, but for patience; not for vituperation, but for vision.

We are not here to judge whose fears are right or whose are wrong. Right or wrong, fear is the first obstacle to any peacemaking. Each side must do its share to overcome it. A major step in this direction would be for each party to issue promptly a clear, unqualified public assurance that it is now ready to commit itself to recognize the right of each of its neighbors to national life.

Second, the political independence and territorial integrity of all the states in the area must be assured.

We are not the ones to say where other nations should draw lines between them that will assure each the greatest security. It is clear, however, that a return to the situation of June 4, 1967, will not bring peace. There must be secure, and there must be recognized, borders.

Some such lines must be agreed to by the neighbors involved as part of the transition from armistice to peace.

At the same time, it should be equally clear that boundaries cannot and should not reflect the weight of conquest. Each change must have a reason which each side, in honest negotiation, can accept as a part of a just compromise.

Third, it is more certain than ever that Jerusalem is a critical issue of any peace settlement. No one wishes to see the Holy City again divided by barbed wire and by machineguns. I therefore tonight urge an appeal to the parties to stretch their imaginations so that their interests and all the world's interest in Jerusalem, can be taken fully into account in any final settlement.

Fourth, the number of refugees is still increasing. The June war added some 200,000 refugees to those already displaced by the 1948 war. They face a bleak prospect as the winter approaches. We share a very deep concern for these refugees. Their plight is a symbol in the minds of the Arab peoples. In their eyes, it is a symbol of a wrong that must be made right before 20 years of war can end. And that fact must be dealt with in reaching a condition of peace.

All nations who are able, including Israel and her Arab neighbors, should participate directly and wholeheartedly in a massive program to assure these people a better and a more stable future.

Fifth, maritime rights must be respected. Their violation led to war in 1967. Respect for those rights is not only a legal consequence of peace. It is a symbolic recognition that all nations in the Middle East enjoy equal treatment before the law.

And no enduring peace settlement is possible until the Suez Canal and the Straits of Tiran are open to the ships of all nations and their right of passage is effectively guaranteed.

Sixth, the arms race continues. We have exercised restraint while recognizing the legitimate needs of friendly governments. But we have no intention of allowing the balance of forces in the area to ever become an incentive for war.

We continue to hope that our restraint will be matched by the restraint of others, though I must observe that has been lacking since the end of the June war.

We have proposed, and I reiterate again tonight, the urgent need now for an international understanding on arms limitation for this region of the world.

94. Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, Statement Before the United Nations General Assembly, Excerpts, July 14, 1967

It is against the background of this overall policy that my Government has developed its attitudes toward the question of Jerusalem, and I wish to make that attitude very explicit. The

views of my Government on Jerusalem have been expressed by the President of the United States and other high-level officials.

On June 28, the White House released the following statement:

The President said on June 19 that in our view "there . . . must be adequate recognition of the special interest of three great religions in the holy places of Jerusalem." On this principle he assumes that before any unilateral action is taken on the status of Jerusalem there will be appropriate consultation with religious leaders and others who are deeply concerned. Jerusalem is holy to Christians, to Jews, and to Moslems. It is one of the great continuing tragedies of history that a city which is so much the center of man's highest values has also been, over and over, a center of conflict. Repeatedly the passionate beliefs of one element have led to exclusion or unfairness for others. It has been so, unfortunately, in the last 20 years. Men of all religions will agree that we must now do better. The world must find an answer that is fair and recognized to be fair. . . .

The second statement, released on the same day by the Department of State, read:

The hasty administrative action taken today¹ cannot be regarded as determining the future of the holy places or the status of Jerusalem in relation to them.

The United States has never recognized such unilateral actions by any of the states in the area as governing the international status of Jerusalem. . . .

During my own statement to the General Assembly on July 3, I said that the "safeguarding of the holy places, and freedom of access to them for all, should be internationally guaranteed; and the status of Jerusalem in relation to them should be decided not unilaterally but in consultation with all concerned." These statements represent the considered and continuing policy of the United States Government.

With regard to the specific measures taken by the Government of Israel on June 28, I wish to make it clear that the United States does not accept or recognize these measures as altering

the status of Jerusalem. My Government does not recognize that the administrative measures taken by the Government of Israel on June 28 can be regarded as the last word on the matter, and we regret that they were taken. We insist that the measures taken cannot be considered other than interim and provisional, and not prejudging the final and permanent status of Jerusalem. Unfortunately and regrettably, the statements of the Government of Israel on this matter have thus far, in our view, not adequately dealt with this situation.

Many delegations are aware that we were prepared to vote for a separate resolution on Jerusalem which would declare that the Assembly would not accept any unilateral action as determining the status of Jerusalem and calling on the Government of Israel to desist from any action purporting to define permanently the status of Jerusalem. However, the sponsors made clear then, as was their right, that they preferred to proceed with their own text in document A/2253, and now with their resolution in A/L. 528/Rev. 2.

The latter draft does include changes which we consider represent a marked improvement over the original version, particularly in that it no longer tends to prejudge action in the Security Council. Nevertheless, since the resolution just adopted expressly builds on Resolution 2253 on which we abstained for reasons which we stated publicly, consistent with that vote we also abstained today.

Even as revised, the resolution does not fully correspond to our views, particularly since it appears to accept by its call for rescission of measures that the administrative measures which were taken constitute annexation of Jerusalem by Israel, and because we do not believe the problem of Jerusalem can realistically be solved apart from the other related aspects of Jerusalem and of the Middle Eastern situation. Therefore, the United States abstained.

We have, of course, recently expressed ourselves in a more formal sense by voting for a resolution dealing with the question of Jerusalem. This was the Latin American resolution contained in document A/L. 523/Rev. 1, which dealt with Jerusalem as one of the elements involved in a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.

¹ On June 27, the Israeli Parliament approved three bills authorizing extension of Israel's laws, jurisdiction, and public administration over the Old City of Jerusalem and other territory of the former mandate of Palestine which has been under the control of Jordan since the General Armistice Agreement of 1949. On June 28, the Government of Israel took administrative action under the new legislation to extend its municipal services and controls over the entire city of Jerusalem. See document No. 50.

95. President Richard M. Nixon, News Conference, Excerpts,
February 6, 1969

Q. Mr. President, on the Middle East, now that you have completed your review with the NSC, you spoke of a need for new initiatives, can you tell us what your policy is going to be now and what initiatives you do expect to take?

THE PRESIDENT. Mr. Bailey, our initiatives in the Mideast, I think, can well be summarized by that very word that you have used. What we see now is a new policy on the part of the United States in assuming the initiative. We are not going to stand back and rather wait for something else to happen.

We are going to assume it on what I would suggest five fronts:

We are going to continue to give our all-out support to the Jarring Mission. We are going to have bilateral talks at the United Nations, preparatory to the talks between the four powers. We shall have four-power talks at the United Nations. We shall also have talks with the countries in the area, with the Israelis and their neighbors, and, in addition, we want to go forward on some of the long range plans, the Eisenhower-Strauss plan for relieving some of the very grave economic problems in that area.

We believe that the initiative here is one that cannot be simply unilateral. It must be multilateral. And it must not be in one direction. We are going to pursue every possible avenue to peace in the Mideast that we can.

It is in the treatment of one aspect of the problem of Jerusalem as an isolated issue, separate from the other elements of Jerusalem and of a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, that we were unable to support Resolution 2253. Certainly, Jerusalem, as has been pointed out universally, I think, by every speaker, is an important issue and, in our opinion, one which must necessarily be considered in the context of a settlement of all problems arising out of the recent conflict. In Jerusalem there are transcendent spiritual interests. But there are also other important issues. And we believe that the most fruitful approach to a discussion of the future of Jerusalem lies in dealing with the entire problem as one aspect of the broader arrangements that must be made to restore a just and durable peace in the area. And we believe, consistent with the resolution we were ready to sponsor, that this Assembly should have dealt with the problem by declaring itself against any unilateral change in the status of Jerusalem.

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96. Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Statement on Peace in the Middle East, Excerpts, December 9, 1969

The United States decided it had a responsibility to play a direct role in seeking a solution.

Thus, we accepted a suggestion put forward both by the French Government and the Secretary General of the United Nations. We agreed that the major powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France—should cooperate to assist the Secretary General's representative, Ambassador Jarring, in working out a settlement in accordance with the resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations of November 1967. We also decided to consult directly with the Soviet Union, hoping to achieve as wide an area of agreement as possible between us.

These decisions were made in full recognition of the following important factors:

First, we knew that nations not directly involved could not make a durable peace for the peoples and governments involved. Peace rests with the parties to the conflict. The efforts of major powers can help, they can provide a catalyst, they can stimulate the parties to talk, they can encourage, they can help define a realistic framework for agreement; but an agreement among other powers cannot be a substitute for agreement among the parties themselves.

Second, we knew that a durable peace must meet the legitimate concerns of both sides.

Third, we were clear that the only framework for a negotiated settlement was one in accordance with the entire text of the U.N. Security Council resolution. That resolution was

agreed upon after long and arduous negotiations; it is carefully balanced; it provides the basis for a just and lasting peace—a final settlement—not merely an interlude between wars.

Fourth, we believe that a protracted period of no war, no peace, recurrent violence, and spreading chaos would serve the interests of no nation, in or out of the Middle East.

U.S.-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS

For 8 months we have pursued these consultations in four-power talks at the United Nations and in bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union.

In our talks with the Soviets we have proceeded in the belief that the stakes are so high that we have a responsibility to determine whether we can achieve parallel views which would encourage the parties to work out a stable and equitable solution. We are under no illusions; we are fully conscious of past difficulties and present realities. Our talks with the Soviets have brought a measure of understanding, but very substantial differences remain. We regret that the Soviets have delayed in responding to new formulations submitted to them on October 28. However, we will continue to discuss these problems with the Soviet Union as long as there is any realistic hope that such discussions might further the cause of peace.

The substance of the talks that we have had with the Soviet Union has been conveyed to the interested parties through diplomatic channels. This process has served to highlight the main roadblocks to the initiation of useful negotiations among the parties.

On the one hand, the Arab leaders fear that Israel is not in fact prepared to withdraw from Arab territory occupied in the 1967 war.

On the other hand, Israeli leaders fear that the Arab states are not in fact prepared to live in peace with Israel.

Each side can cite from its viewpoint considerable evidence to support its fears. Each side has permitted its attention to be focused solidly and to some extent solely on these fears.

What can the United States do to help to overcome these roadblocks?

Our policy is and will continue to be a *balanced* one.

We have friendly ties with both Arabs and Israelis. To call for Israeli withdrawal as envisaged in the U.N. resolution without achieving agreement on peace would be partisan toward the Arabs. To call on the Arabs to accept peace without Israeli withdrawal would be partisan toward Israel. Therefore, our policy is to encourage the Arabs to accept a permanent peace based on a binding agreement and to urge the Israelis to withdraw from occupied territory when their territorial integrity is assured as envisaged by the Security Council resolution.

BASIC ELEMENTS OF U.N. RESOLUTION

In an effort to broaden the scope of discussion we have recently resumed four-power negotiations at the United Nations.

Let me outline our policy on various elements of the Security Council resolution. The basic and related issues might be described as peace, security, withdrawal, and territory.

Peace Between the Parties

The resolution of the Security Council makes clear that the goal is the establishment of a state of peace between the parties instead of the state of belligerency which has characterized relations for over 20 years. We believe the conditions and obligations of peace must be defined in specific terms. For

example, navigation rights in the Suez Canal and in the Strait of Tiran should be spelled out. Respect for sovereignty and obligations of the parties to each other must be made specific.

But peace, of course, involves much more than this. It is also a matter of the attitudes and intentions of the parties. Are they ready to coexist with one another? Can a live-and-let-live attitude replace suspicion, mistrust, and hate? A peace agreement between the parties must be based on clear and stated intentions and a willingness to bring about basic changes in the attitudes and conditions which are characteristic of the Middle East today.

Security

A lasting peace must be sustained by a sense of security on both sides. To this end, as envisaged in the Security Council resolution, there should be demilitarized zones and related security arrangements more reliable than those which existed in the area in the past. The parties themselves, with Ambassador Jarring's help, are in the best position to work out the nature and the details of such security arrangements. It is, after all, their interests which are at stake and their territory which is involved. They must live with the results.

Withdrawal and Territory

The Security Council resolution endorses the principle of the nonacquisition of territory by war and calls for withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the 1967 war. We support this part of the resolution, including withdrawal, just as we do its other elements.

The boundaries from which the 1967 war began were established in the 1949 armistice agreements and have defined the areas of national jurisdiction in the Middle East for 20

years. Those boundaries were armistice lines, not final political borders. The rights, claims, and positions of the parties in an ultimate peaceful settlement were reserved by the armistice agreements.

The Security Council resolution neither endorses nor precludes these armistice lines as the definitive political boundaries. However, it calls for withdrawal from occupied territories, the nonacquisition of territory by war, and the establishment of secure and recognized boundaries.

We believe that while recognized political boundaries must be established and agreed upon by the parties, any changes in the preexisting lines should not reflect the weight of conquest and should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for mutual security. We do not support expansionism. We believe troops must be withdrawn as the resolution provides. We support Israel's security and the security of the Arab states as well. We are for a lasting peace that requires security for both.

ISSUES OF REFUGEES AND JERUSALEM

By emphasizing the key issues of peace, security, withdrawal, and territory, I do not want to leave the impression that other issues are not equally important. Two in particular deserve special mention: the questions of refugees and of Jerusalem.

There can be no lasting peace without a just settlement of the problem of those Palestinians whom the wars of 1948 and 1967 have made homeless. This human dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict has been of special concern to the United States for over 20 years. During this period the United States has contributed about \$500 million for the support and education

of the Palestine refugees. We are prepared to contribute generously along with others to solve this problem. We believe its just settlement must take into account the desires and aspirations of the refugees and the legitimate concerns of the governments in the area.

The problem posed by the refugees will become increasingly serious if their future is not resolved. There is a new consciousness among the young Palestinians who have grown up since 1948 which needs to be channeled away from bitterness and frustration toward hope and justice.

The question of the future status of Jerusalem, because it touches deep emotional, historical, and religious wellsprings, is particularly complicated. We have made clear repeatedly in the past two and a half years that we cannot accept unilateral actions by any party to decide the final status of the city. We believe its status can be determined only through the agreement of the parties concerned, which in practical terms means primarily the Governments of Israel and Jordan, taking into account the interests of other countries in the area and the international community. We do, however, support certain principles which we believe would provide an equitable framework for a Jerusalem settlement.

Specifically, we believe Jerusalem should be a unified city within which there would no longer be restrictions on the movement of persons and goods. There should be open access to the unified city for persons of all faiths and nationalities. Arrangements for the administration of the unified city should take into account the interests of all its inhabitants and of the Jewish, Islamic, and Christian communities. And there should be roles for both Israel and Jordan in the civic, economic, and religious life of the city.

It is our hope that agreement on the key issues of peace, security, withdrawal, and territory will create a climate in which these questions of refugees and of Jerusalem, as well as other aspects of the conflict, can be resolved as part of the overall settlement.

FORMULAS FOR U.A.R.-ISRAEL ASPECT OF SETTLEMENT

During the first weeks of the current United Nations General Assembly the efforts to move matters toward a settlement entered a particularly intensive phase. Those efforts continue today.

I have already referred to our talks with the Soviet Union. In connection with those talks there have been allegations that we have been seeking to divide the Arab states by urging the U.A.R. to make a separate peace. These allegations are false. It is a fact that we and the Soviets have been concentrating on the questions of a settlement between Israel and the United Arab Republic. We have been doing this in the full understanding on both our parts that, before there can be a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, there must be agreement between the parties on other aspects of the settlement—not only those related to the United Arab Republic but also those related to Jordan and other states which accept the Security Council resolution of November 1967.

We started with the Israeli-United Arab Republic aspect because of its inherent importance for future stability in the area and because one must start somewhere.

We are also ready to pursue the Jordanian aspect of a settlement; in fact the four powers in New York have begun such discussions. Let me make it perfectly clear that the U.S. position is that implementation of the overall settlement would

begin only after complete agreement had been reached on related aspects of the problem.

In our recent meetings with the Soviets we have discussed some new formulas in an attempt to find common positions. They consist of three principal elements:

First, there should be a binding commitment by Israel and the United Arab Republic to peace with each other, with all the specific obligations of peace spelled out, including the obligation to prevent hostile acts originating from their respective territories.

Second, the detailed provisions of peace relating to security safeguards on the ground should be worked out between the parties, under Ambassador Jarring's auspices, utilizing the procedures followed in negotiating the armistice agreements under Ralph Bunche in 1949 at Rhodes. This formula has been previously used with success in negotiations between the parties on Middle Eastern problems. A principal objective of the four-power talks, we believe, should be to help Ambassador Jarring engage the parties in a negotiating process under the Rhodes formula.

So far as a settlement between Israel and the United Arab Republic goes, these safeguards relate primarily to the area of Sharm al-Shaykh controlling access to the Gulf of Aqaba, the need for demilitarized zones as foreseen in the Security Council resolution, and final arrangements in the Gaza Strip.

Third, in the context of peace and agreement on specific security safeguards, withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian territory would be required.

Such an approach directly addresses the principal national concerns of both Israel and the U.A.R. It would require the

U.A.R. to agree to a binding and specific commitment to peace. It would require withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from U.A.R. territory to the international border between Israel [or Mandated Palestine] and Egypt which has been in existence for over a half century. It would also require the parties themselves to negotiate the practical security arrangements to safeguard the peace.

We believe that this approach is *balanced* and fair.

U.S. INTERESTS IN THE AREA

We remain interested in good relations with all states in the area. Whenever and wherever Arab states which have broken off diplomatic relations with the United States are prepared to restore them, we shall respond in the same spirit.

Meanwhile, we will not be deterred from continuing to pursue the paths of patient diplomacy in our search for peace in the Middle East. We will not shrink from advocating necessary compromises, even though they may and probably will be unpalatable to both sides. We remain prepared to work with others—in the area and throughout the world—so long as they sincerely seek the end we seek: a just and lasting peace.

97. Secretary Rogers, Statement on Interim Peace, Before the United Nations General Assembly, Excerpts, October 4, 1971

The other place where progress is urgently required is in the Middle East. Over several years, the United Nations has made determined and persistent efforts to achieve a lasting peace in that critical area. Nonetheless, the opportunities for success and the risks of failure remain in precarious balance.

Security Council Resolution 242, establishing the principles for a durable peace, was the first major step toward reason after 18 years of

belligerency and a fragile, often violated armistice.

The cease-fire along the Suez Canal, now nearing its 15th month, was the second major step away from war.

It is time for a third major step toward peace.

For 4 years Ambassador Jarring [U.N. Special Representative Gunnar Jarring] has worked diligently to secure the agreement called for in Security Council Resolution 242. We support his efforts. We believe his mission remains the best path to an overall settlement and to lasting peace. Our views on such a final peace settlement remain those expressed in President Nixon's foreign policy report earlier this year and in my statement of December 9, 1969.

Both sides to the conflict are committed to the fundamental and reciprocal principles to which the Jarring Mission is dedicated: living in peace with each other and withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict as set forth in Security Council Resolution 242. Despite those commitments, a deep gulf of suspicion and distrust remains.

Each side is convinced of the justice of its cause. Each is concerned about its future security. A political settlement based on mutual accommodation could assure both. An attempt to achieve these ends by force will destroy all possibilities for either.

This is why we believe a third major step toward peace is essential:

- A step which can be taken now;
- A step that is practical;
- A step that could help create the confidence and trust which are now lacking;
- A step toward full and complete implementation of Resolution 242.

That step is an interim Suez Canal agreement. That is why the United States has welcomed the interest of both Egypt and Israel in such an agreement. That is why, at the request

of the parties, the United States has undertaken to play a constructive role in the process of arriving at an agreement.

In order to explore the positions of each side, we have discussed concrete and specific ideas designed to meet the legitimate needs and concerns of both sides. Those ideas, given willingness and good intentions on both sides, could become the basis for a breakthrough. They require further quiet discussions with the parties, an undertaking we now hope can be expedited along the following lines:

A first point is the relationship between an interim agreement and an overall settlement. A fair approach should be founded on two basic principles:

—That a Suez Canal agreement is merely a step toward complete and full implementation of Resolution 242 within a reasonable period of time and not an end in itself. That has to be clearly established in any agreement.

—That neither side can realistically expect to achieve, as part of an interim agreement, complete agreement on the terms and conditions of an overall settlement. If it could, there would be no necessity for an interim agreement. Those final terms and conditions will have to be worked out through negotiations under Ambassador Jarring's auspices. And we would hope that if an interim agreement is reached, active negotiations under Ambassador Jarring's auspices could be renewed.

A second point is the matter of the cease-fire. Its maintenance is in the interest of all of us, of everyone concerned, of everyone in this room—in fact, in the interest of the whole world. The ultimate objective, of course, is a permanent end to belligerency as part of a final binding peace agreement. But such a commitment is not realizable in the context of an interim agreement. Neither would a cease-fire of short duration be realistic. With good will on both sides, it should be possible to find common understanding between the parties on this issue.

Third is the issue of withdrawal. There are,

of course, very important strategic considerations involved in this key point. However, based on our discussions, we believe it should be possible to meet the principal concerns of both sides. Without going into the details, I would merely say that I believe that in the long run the most significant aspect of an interim agreement might prove to be that it established the principle of withdrawal looking to an overall settlement as a fact rather than as a theory.

Fourth is the nature of the supervisory arrangements. Both sides must have confidence that the agreement will not be violated and that adequate machinery will be provided for prompt detection of any infractions. We are confident that ways reassuring to both Israel and Egypt can be found for altering and strengthening the supervisory mechanisms that have existed in the area for the past two decades.

Fifth is the question of an Egyptian presence east of the Suez Canal. The reopening and operation of the Suez Canal would require Egyptian personnel east of the canal. It is understandable, too, that normal activities should be pursued in as much of the zone evacuated as possible. The question of an Egyptian military presence east of the canal is one on which the parties hold opposite views. But here, too, based on our discussion, we believe that there are possibilities for compromise on this issue.

Sixth is the use of the Suez Canal. The United States has long held that the canal should be open to passage for all nations without discrimination. This principle is clear in the Security Council resolution of November 1967. What is at present at issue in considering an interim agreement is principally the timing at which this right could be exercised. We believe an accommodation on this point is quite possible.

With those six points in mind let me say this: Because the parties have asked us, we intend to continue our determined effort to assist them in arriving at an interim agreement. This effort, we believe, is imperative because—and I think it is important to keep this in mind—

there is no more realistic and hopeful alternative to pursue.

There are risks to peace; but the greater risk is inaction, unwillingness to face up to the hard decisions.

A practical step now—an interim agreement—would make the next step toward peace less difficult for all the parties to take.

It would restore the use of the Suez Canal as a waterway for international shipping.

It would reestablish Egypt's authority over a major national asset.

It would separate the combatants.

It would produce the first Israeli withdrawal.

It would extend the cease-fire.

It would diminish the risk of major-power involvement.

It would be an important step toward the complete implementation of Security Council Resolution 242.

I submit that the logic for such an agreement is overwhelming. If the leaders of the area would grasp this opportunity, they would give new hope to their peoples for tranquillity, for progress, and for peace.

98. President Nixon, Statement on Commitment to Israel, Trip to the Soviet Union, Excerpts, June 1972

(Note.—While previous Presidential statements generally supported the national independence of all Middle Eastern nations, President Nixon was the first to specify Israel's survival as a singular objective of U.S. foreign policy.)

Another area where we had very full, frank, and extensive discussions was the Middle East. I reiterated the American people's commitment to the survival of the state of Israel and to a settlement just to all the countries in the area. Both sides stated in the communiqué their intention to support the Jarring peace mission and other appropriate efforts to achieve this objective.

99. Ambassador John Scali, Statement on Terrorism Before the United Nations Security Council, December 5 and 8, 1976

Once again we meet here to consider the massacre of innocent men, women, and chil-

dren. On April 11 three terrorists brutally killed 16 civilians in Qiryat Shemona. Alleging that the terrorists came from Lebanon, Israel launched a reprisal raid two days later against several villages in southern Lebanon, which reportedly resulted in civilian casualties as well.

We do not presume to make a judgment about the respective claims as to whether or not the terrorists came from Lebanon. The fact is, however, that innocent people were brutally murdered and spokesmen for the murderers held a press conference in Beirut to boast of their callous act. Once more we have been faced with mounting violence, ugly language, and harsh retribution.

This is a familiar tale but with a significant difference. This time the cancer of terrorism not only takes innocent lives; it threatens the new and more promising trends toward peace in the area. This, indeed, may have been the principal motive of the attackers.

Sadly, this objective is still repudiated by groups of terrorists uninhibited by law and unrestrained by common standards of human decency. The group which claims responsibility for the murders at Qiryat Shemona is categorically opposed to the process of negotiation through the peace conference at which the Soviet Union and the United States are cochairmen. Indeed, one spokesman who claims to speak for that group has reportedly claimed that Qiryat Shemona was just the beginning of revolutionary violence aimed at

preventing a permanent Arab-Israeli settlement.

It is of course natural and right that we voice here our condemnation of senseless acts of terror such as occurred at Qiryat Shemona, just as we condemn the violence undertaken in retaliation in southern Lebanon by Israeli forces.

We regret that our amendment to refer specifically to Qiryat Shemona did not receive the necessary support in this Council. We believe, however, that the resolution before us did condemn all violence, whatever its origin, including the tragedy at Qiryat Shemona.

But we must move forward from condemnations of violations to encouraging moves toward a just and durable peace. Above all, our efforts in this Council must contribute to the climate of peace and mutual good will which is indispensable if negotiations are to succeed.

100. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Harold H. Saunders, Statement on the Palestinians Before House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East, November 12, 1975

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HAROLD H. SAUNDERS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, a just and durable peace in the Middle East is a central objective of the United States. Both President Ford and Secretary Kissinger have stated firmly on numerous occasions that the United States is determined to make every feasible effort to maintain the momentum of practical progress toward a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

We have also repeatedly stated that the legitimate interests of the Palestinian Arabs must be taken into account in the negotiation of an Arab-Israeli peace. In many ways, the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the heart of that conflict. Final resolution of the problems arising from the partition of Palestine, the establishment of the State of Israel, and Arab opposition to those events will not be possible until agreement is reached defining a just and permanent status for the Arab peoples who consider themselves Palestinians.

The total number of Palestinian Arabs is estimated at a little more than three million. Of these, about 450,000 live in the area of Israel's pre-1967 borders; about one million are in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza; something less than a million, about 900,000, are in Jordan; half a million are in Syria and Lebanon; and somewhat more than 200,000 or so are elsewhere, primarily in the Gulf states. Those in Israel are Israeli nationals. The great majority of those in the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Jordan are Jordanian nationals. Palestinian refugees, who live outside of pre-1967 Israel and number 1.6 million, are eligible for food and/or services from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA); more than 650,000 of these live in camps.

The problem of the Palestinians was initially dealt with essentially as one involving displaced persons. The United States and other nations responded to the immediate humanitarian task of caring for a large number of refugees and trying to provide them with some hope in life. In later years there has been considerable attention given to the programs of UNRWA that help not only to sustain those people's lives but to lift the young people out of the refugee camps and to train them and give them an opportunity to lead productive lives. Many have taken advantage of this opportunity, and an unusually large number of them have completed secondary and university education. One finds Palestinians occupying leading positions throughout the Arab world as professionals and skilled workers in all fields. The U.S. has provided some \$620 million in assistance—about sixty-two percent of the total international support (\$1 billion) for the Palestinian refugees over the past quarter of a century.

Today, however, we recognize that, in addition to meeting the human needs and responding to legitimate personal claims of the refugees, there is another interest that must be taken into account. It is a fact that many of the three million or so people who call themselves Palestinians today increasingly regard themselves as having their own identity as a people and desire a voice in determining their political status. As with any people in this situation, there are differences among themselves, but the Palestinians collectively are a political factor which must be dealt with if there is to be a peace between Israel and its neighbors.

The statement is often made in the Arab world that there will not be peace until the "rights of the Palestinians" are fulfilled, but there is no agreed definition of what is meant and a variety of viewpoints have been expressed on what the legitimate objectives of the Palestinians are:

Some Palestinian elements hold to the objective of a binational secular state in the area of the former mandate of Palestine. Realization of this objective would mean the end of the present state of Israel, a member of the United Nations, and its submergence in some larger entity. Some would be willing to accept merely as a first step toward this goal the establishment of a Palestinian state comprising the West Bank of the Jordan River and Gaza.

Other elements of Palestinian opinion appear willing to accept an independent Palestinian state comprising the West Bank and Gaza, based on acceptance of Israel's right to exist as an independent state within roughly its pre-1967 borders.

Some Palestinians and other Arabs envisage as a possible solution a unification of the West Bank and Gaza with Jordan. A variation of this which has been suggested would be the reconstitution of the country as a federated state, with the West Bank becoming an autonomous Palestinian province.

Still others, including many Israelis, feel that with the West Bank returned to Jordan, and with the resulting existence of two communities—Palestinian and Jordanian—within Jordan, opportunities would be created thereby for the Palestinians to find self-expression.

In the case of a solution which would rejoin the West Bank to Jordan or a solution involving a West Bank/Gaza state, there would still arise the property claims of those Palestinians who before 1948 resided in areas that became the State of Israel. These claims have been acknowledged as a serious problem by the international community ever since the adoption by the United Nations of Resolution 194 on this subject in 1948, a resolution which the United Nations has repeatedly reaffirmed and which the United States has supported. A solution will be further complicated by the property claims against Arab states of the many Jews from those states who moved to Israel in its early years after achieving statehood.

In addition to property claims, some believe they should have the option of returning to their original homes under any settlement.

Other Arab leaders, while pressing the importance of Palestinian involvement in a settlement, have taken the position that the definition of Palestinian interests is something for the Palestinian people themselves to sort out, and the view has been expressed by responsible Arab leaders that realization of Palestinian rights need not be inconsistent with the existence of Israel.

No one, therefore, seems in a position today to say exactly what Palestinian objectives are. Even the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which is recognized by the Arab League and the United Nations General Assembly as the representative of the Palestinian people, has been ambivalent. Officially and publicly, its objective is described as a binational secular state, but there are some indications that coexistence between separate Palestinian and Israeli states might be considered.

When there is greater precision about those objectives, there can be clearer understanding about how to relate them to negotiations. There is the aspect of the future of the West Bank and Gaza—how those areas are to be defined and how they are to be governed. There is the aspect of the relationship between Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to those Palestinians who are not living in those areas, in the context of a settlement.

What is needed as a first step is a diplomatic process which will help bring forth a reasonable definition of Palestinian interests—a position from which negotiations on a solution of the Palestinian aspects of the problem might begin. The issue is not whether Palestinian interests should be expressed in a final settlement, but how. There will be no peace unless an answer is found.

Another requirement is the development of a framework for negotiations—a statement of the objectives and the terms of reference. The framework for the negotiations that have taken place thus far and the agreements they have produced involving Israel, Syria, and Egypt, has been provided by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. In accepting that framework, all of the parties to the negotiation have accepted that the objective of the negotiations is peace between them based on mutual recognition, territorial integrity, political independence, the right to live in peace within secure and recognized borders, and the resolution of the specific issues which comprise the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The major problem that must be resolved in establishing a framework for bringing issues of concern to the Palestinians into negotiation, therefore, is to find a common basis for the negotiation that Palestinians and Israelis can both accept. This could be achieved by common acceptance of the above-mentioned Security Council resolutions, although they do not deal with the political aspect of the Palestinian problem.

A particularly difficult aspect of the problem is the question of who negotiates for the Palestinians. It has been our belief that Jordan would be a logical negotiator for the Palestinian-related issues. The Rabat Summit, however, recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."

The PLO was formed in 1964, when 400 delegates from Palestinian communities throughout the Arab world met in Jerusalem to create an organization to represent and speak for the Palestinian people. Its leadership was originally middle class and relatively conservative, but by 1969 control had passed into the hands of the Palestinian fedayeen, or commando, movement, that had existed since the mid 1950's but had come into prominence only after the 1967 war. The organization became an umbrella organization for six separate fedayeen groups: Fatah; the Syrian-backed Saiqa; the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine; Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine; the General Command—a subgroup of the PFLP; and the Iraqi-backed Arab Liberation Front. Affiliated with the PLO are a number of "popular organizations"—labor and professional unions, student groups, women's groups and so on. Fatah, the largest fedayeen group, also has a welfare apparatus to care for widows and orphans of deceased Fatah members.

However, the PLO does not accept the United Nations Security Council resolutions, does not recognize the existence of Israel, and has not stated its readiness to negotiate peace with Israel; Israel does not recognize the PLO or the idea of a separate Palestinian entity. Thus we do not at this point have the framework for a negotiation involving the PLO. We cannot envision or urge a negotiation between two parties as long as one professes to hold the objective of eliminating the other—rather than the objective of negotiating peace with it.

There is one other aspect to this problem. Elements of the PLO have used terrorism to gain attention for their cause. Some Americans as well as many Israelis and others have been killed by Palestinian terrorists. The international community cannot condone such practices, and it seems to us that there must be some assurance if Palestinians are drawn into the negotiating process that these practices will be curbed.

This is the problem which we now face. If the progress toward peace which has now begun is to continue, a solution to this question must be found. We have not devised an American solution, nor would it be appropriate for us to do so. This is the responsibility of the parties and the purpose of the negotiating process. But we have not closed our minds to any reasonable solution which can contribute to progress toward our overriding objective in the Middle East—an Arab-Israeli peace. The step-by-step approach to negotiations which we have pursued has been based partly on the understanding that issues in the Arab-Israeli conflict take time to mature. It is obvious that thinking on the Palestinian aspects of the problem must evolve on all sides. As it does, what is not possible today may become possible.

Our consultations on how to move the peace negotiations forward will recognize the need to deal with this subject. As Secretary Kissinger has said, "We are prepared to work with all the parties toward a solution of all the issues yet remaining—including the issue of the future of the Palestinians." We will do so because the issues of concern to the Palestinians are important in themselves and because the Arab governments participating in the negotiations have made clear that progress in the overall negotiations will depend in part on progress on issues of concern to the Palestinians. We are prepared to consider any reasonable proposal from any quarter, and we will expect other parties to the negotiation to be equally openminded.

101. Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan Statements on Terrorism Before United Nations Security Council, Excerpts, December 5 and 8, 1976

My delegation considers that all loss of innocent human life is reprehensible, and we are prepared to deplore it in strong terms whether it occurs from the acts of organized groups or of governments.

We would remind the Council that organizations which carried out recent acts of violence against citizens of Israel have publicly acknowledged their responsibility for those acts, just as the Government of Israel has acknowledged its responsibility for the attacks which are now before us. I make these points not to condone or excuse Israel's recent massive air attacks, which by their nature could not avoid taking innocent victims. We neither condone nor excuse them. But we must deal with them in context and not in isolation.

So let me be quite clear, Mr. President: the United States deeply deplores these attacks, just as we have consistently deplored those despicable terrorist incidents which have caused the loss of life in Israel.

We are prepared to support an appropriate resolution which registers the strongest disapproval of this Council of all acts of violence in the Middle East, particularly those which result in the death of innocent civil-

ians, and which calls on all parties to refrain from any action that might endanger peace negotiations.

And so, Mr. President, the United States, the mediator country, would like to suggest two simple amendments to the resolution before us.

Mr. President, these are not unfamiliar amendments. To the contrary, the language will be familiar to you, sir, and to a number of the members of the Council, to most of the members of the Council, for the very simple reason that most members of this Council have already voted for these amendments. These amendments have won the approval of every permanent member of this Council which voted on them. They won the approval of all those members elected to the Council who were here last year, and they won the approval of all the other elected members who were there at the time, all of this with the exception of one permanent and one elected member who chose not to participate in the vote. But among the participating nations, the vote was unanimous.

Mr. President, the U.S. amendments would add to our present resolution, which has three operative paragraphs, a fourth and a fifth. The fourth paragraph reads as follows:

Condemns all acts of violence, especially those which result in the tragic loss of innocent civilian life, and urges all concerned to refrain from any further acts of violence;

Paragraph 5 reads:

Calls upon all parties to refrain from any action which might endanger negotiations aimed at achieving a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

I repeat, sir, these are operative paragraphs which the Security Council has already voted upon and did so in a similar situation—a not dissimilar situation—a year and a half ago. There is no one present at this table who opposed those paragraphs.

Mr. President, the United States strongly deplores the Israeli actions which were brought to our attention by the Governments of Lebanon and Egypt through the offices of their distinguished Ambassadors who are with us tonight. But we also believe that the problem of the loss of innocent life from incursions from Lebanon and other neighboring states of Israel should also be condemned. This is part of the cycle of violence with which we are dealing and which the United States, as a mediating power, hopes to bring to an end.

We worked strenuously for a balanced resolution, and we have reluctantly had to veto the resolution as it now stands, which as we have made clear from the beginning, we did not consider to be balanced.

102. Ambassador William W. Scranton, Statements on Occupied Territories, Before the United Nations Security Council, Excerpts, March 23, 1976

The occupation of territories in the 1967 war has always been seen by the world community to be an abnormal state of affairs that would be brought to an end as part of a peace settlement. Resolution 242, adopted by this Council shortly after the end of the 1967 war that led to the occupation, established the basic bargain that would constitute a settlement. This bargain was withdrawal of Israeli forces in return for termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area and their

right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.

My government has committed itself to do all it can to bring about this settlement and, in the words of Resolution 338, to implement Council Resolution 242 in all of its parts and to further negotiations between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East, which is what we are here for. We are engaged at this moment in an effort to regain momentum, as all of you know, in the negotiating process that has brought some unusual progress—and it must bring more.

The second focus of our consideration must be the conduct of the occupation itself. In asking for this meeting, the letter of complaint circulated by the Permanent Representatives of the Libyan Arab Republic and of Pakistan identifies three issues:

- The administration of the holy sites;
- The situation in Jerusalem; and
- Israeli actions in regard to the civilian population of the occupied territories and the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories.

The position of the United States on these issues is clear and of long standing. I propose to review the U.S. position today once more to point out that there are proper principles and there are procedures under international law and practice which, when applied and maintained, will contribute to civil order and will, over the longer run, facilitate a just and a lasting peace.

First, there is a matter of the holy sites and practice of religion in the occupied areas. The deep religious attachment of Moslems and Jews and Christians to the holy places of Jerusalem has added a uniquely volatile element to the tensions that inhere in an occupation situation. The area known to Moslems as the Haram as-Sharif and to Jews as the Temple Mount is of particular sensitivity. Israel's punctilious administration of the holy places in Jerusalem has, in our judgment, greatly minimized the tensions. To my government, the standard to be followed in

administering the holy sites is contained in article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. All parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict are signatories of the convention. Article 27 of the convention prescribes, *inter alia*, that:

Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs.

With regard to the immediate problem before us—a ruling by a lower Israeli court which would have the effect of altering the status of the Haram—it is our view that Israel's responsibilities under article 27 to preserve religious practices as they were at the time the occupation began cannot be changed by the ruling of an Israeli court. We are gratified, deeply gratified, that the Supreme Court of Israel has upheld the Israeli Government's position.

The status of the holy places is, of course, only one facet, however important, very important, of the problem of the status of Jerusalem itself. The U.S. position on the status of Jerusalem has been stated here on numerous occasions since the Arab portion of that city was occupied by Israel in 1967.

Ambassador Yost said in 1969:⁴

... the part of Jerusalem that came under the control of Israel in the June war, like other areas occupied by Israel, is occupied territory and hence subject to the provisions of international law governing the rights and obligations of an occupying power.

Ambassador Goldberg said in 1968, to this Council:⁵

The United States does not accept or recognize unilateral actions by any states in the area as altering the status of Jerusalem.

⁴ For a statement by U.S. Representative Charles W. Yost made in the Security Council on July 1, 1969, see BULLETIN of July 28, 1969, p. 76.

⁵ For a statement by U.S. Representative Arthur W. Goldberg made in the Security Council on May 9, 1968, see BULLETIN of June 3, 1968, p. 732.

I emphasize, as did Ambassador Goldberg, that as far as the United States is concerned such unilateral measures, including expropriation of land or other administrative action taken by the Government of Israel, cannot be considered other than interim and provisional and cannot affect the present international status nor prejudice the final and permanent status of Jerusalem. The U.S. position could not be clearer. Since 1967 we have restated here, in other fora, and to the Government of Israel that the future of Jerusalem will be determined only through the instruments and processes of negotiation, agreement, and accommodation. Unilateral attempts to predetermine that future have no standing.

Next I turn to the question of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. Again, my government believes that international law sets the appropriate standards. An occupier must maintain the occupied area as intact and unaltered as possible, without interfering with the customary life of the area, and any changes must be necessitated by the immediate needs of the occupation and be consistent with international law. The Fourth Geneva Convention speaks directly to the issue of population transfer in article 49:

The Occupying Power shall not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies.

Clearly, then, substantial resettlement of the Israeli civilian population in occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, is illegal under the convention and cannot be considered to have prejudged the outcome of future negotiations between the parties on the location of the borders of states of the Middle East. Indeed, the presence of these settlements is seen by my government as an obstacle to the success of the negotiations for a just and final peace between Israel and its neighbors.

103. President Jimmy Carter, Response to Question on Middle East Peace, Town Meeting, Clinton, Mass., March 16, 1977

Q. What do you personally feel must be done to establish a meaningful and a lasting peace in that area of the world? Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT. I think all of you know that there has been either war or potential war in the Middle East for the last 29 years, ever since Israel became a nation. I think one of the finest acts of the world nations that's ever occurred was to establish the State of Israel.

So, the first prerequisite of a lasting peace is the recognition of Israel by her neighbors, Israel's right to exist, Israel's right to exist permanently, Israel's right to exist in peace. That means that over a period of months or years that the borders between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, Israel and Jordan, Israel and Egypt must be opened up to travel, to tourism, to cultural exchange, to trade, so that no matter who the leaders might be in those countries, the people themselves will have formed a mutual understanding and comprehension and a sense of a common purpose to avoid the repetitious wars and death that have afflicted that region so long. That's the first prerequisite of peace.

The second one is very important and very, very difficult; and that is, the establishment of permanent borders for Israel. The Arab countries say that Israel must withdraw to the pre-1967 borderlines, Israel says that they must adjust those lines to some degree to insure their own security. That is a matter to be negotiated between the Arab countries on the one side and Israel on the other.

But borders are still a matter of great trouble and a matter of great difficulty, and there are strong differences of opinion now.

And the third ultimate requirement for peace is to deal with the Palestinian problem. The Palestinians claim up 'til this moment that Israel has no right to be there, that the land belongs to the Palestinians, and they've never yet given up their publicly professed commitment to destroy Israel. That has to be overcome.

There has to be a homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees who have suffered for many, many years. And the exact way to solve the Palestinian problem is one that first of all addresses itself right now to the Arab countries and then, secondly, to the Arab countries negotiating with Israel.

Those three major elements have got to be solved before a Middle Eastern solution can be prescribed.

I want to emphasize one more time, we offer our good offices. I think it's accurate to say that of all the nations in the world, we are the one that's most trusted, not completely, but most trusted by the Arab countries and also Israel. I guess both sides have some doubt about us. But

we'll have to act kind of as a catalyst to bring about their ability to negotiate successfully with one another.

We hope that later on this year, in the latter part of this year, that we might get all of these parties to agree to come together at Geneva, to start talking to one another. They haven't done that yet. And I believe if we can get them to sit down and start talking and negotiating that we have an excellent chance to achieve peace. I can't guarantee that. It's a hope.

I hope that we will all pray that that will come to pass, because what happens in the Middle East in the future might very well cause a major war there which would quickly spread to all the other nations of the world; very possibly it could do that.

Many countries depend completely on oil from the Middle East for their life. We don't. If all oil was cut off to us from the Middle East, we could survive; but Japan imports more than 98 percent of all its energy, and other countries, like in Europe—Germany, Italy, France—are also heavily dependent on oil from the Middle East.

So, this is such a crucial area of the world that I will be devoting a major part of my own time on foreign policy between now and next fall trying to provide for a forum within which they can discuss their problems and, hopefully, let them seek out among themselves some permanent solution.

104. Vice President Walter Mondale, Speech on Middle East, Excerpts, June 17, 1977

A genuine and lasting peace in the Middle East is of essential interest to all Americans. Conflict there carries the threat of a global confrontation and runs the risk of nuclear war. As we have seen, war in the Middle East has profound economic consequences. It can, and has, damaged the economies of the entire world. It has been a tragedy for the nations of the region. Even short of war, continued confrontation encourages radicalization and instability.

Genuine peace is needed by all parties to the conflict. The Arab nations need peace.

The Survival of Israel

Israel, above all, has a profound interest in peace; there is no question about that. For almost three decades, Israel has borne the burden of constant war. More than half its entire budget is dedicated to defense. Its citizens bear the highest average tax burden in the world—more than 60 percent of their income goes for taxes.

And yet, at the same time, this valiant nation has managed to create a miracle in the desert. With ingenuity, hard work, and skill, it has created a land that could be a model for economic development and for political liberty to be emulated throughout the Middle East. Democracy has thrived in Israel despite the kind of adversity that has crushed freedom in other lands.

And yet, what of the future? Is it a future in which Israel's three million people try, by force of arms alone, to hold out against the hostility and growing power of the Arab world? Or can a process of reconciliation be started—a process in which peace protects Israel's security, a peace in which the urge for revenge and recrimination is replaced by mutual recognition and respect?

America has a special responsibility and a special opportunity to help bring about this kind of peace. This comes about first of all because of our unique and profound relationship with the State of Israel since its creation more than a generation ago. Our sense of shared values and pur-

poses means that, for Americans, the question of Israel's survival is not a political question but rather stands as a moral imperative of our foreign policy.

And yet, our special relationship with Israel has not been directed against any other country. We have been able to enjoy the friendship of much of the Arab world where we and our close allies have important interests.

It is precisely because of our close ties with both Israel and her Arab neighbors that we are uniquely placed to promote the search for peace, to work for an improved understanding of each side's legitimate concerns, and to help them work out what we hope will be a basis for negotiation leading to a final peace in the Middle East.

When this Administration entered office on January 20, we found that the situation in the Middle East called for a new approach. The step-by-step diplomacy of our predecessors had defused the immediate tensions produced by the war in 1973. But it was also evident that it would be increasingly difficult to achieve small diplomatic concessions when the ultimate shape of a peace agreement remained obscure. At the same time, it was unlikely that an agreement on a lasting peace could be achieved at one stroke.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which is supported by all the parties, provides a basis for the negotiations which are required if there is to be a settlement. But Resolution 242 does not by itself provide all that is required. We, therefore, decided to work with the parties concerned to outline the overall framework for an enduring peace. Our concept was to use this framework as the basis for a phased negotiation and implementation of specific steps toward peace.

A major impediment to this approach lay in the fact that the positions of all sides were frozen. The words and phrases used by the parties had become encrusted with the fallout of countless diplomatic battles.

The Framework for an Agreement

We have tried to regain momentum in this process. We have encouraged Arabs and Israelis to begin thinking again seriously about the elements of peace, and not to remain committed to particular words and formulations.

To this end, the President has tried to de-

scribe our understanding of what the key elements of an overall framework for an agreement might be:

- A commitment to a genuine and lasting peace demonstrated by concrete acts to normalize relations among the countries of the area.
- The establishment of borders for Israel which are recognized by all and which can be kept secure.
- A fair solution to the problem of the Palestinians.

The President has set forth these elements not to dictate a peace or to impose our views but to stimulate fresh thought.

President Carter has gone further than any of his predecessors to stress with Arab leaders the essential point that peace must mean more than merely an end to hostilities, stating as he did in Clinton, Massachusetts last March:

... the first prerequisite of a lasting peace is the recognition of Israel by her neighbors, Israel's right to exist, Israel's right to exist permanently, Israel's right to exist in peace. That means that over a period of months or years that the borders between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, Israel and Jordan, Israel and Egypt, must be opened up to travel, to tourism, to cultural exchange, to trade, so that no matter who the leaders might be in those countries the people themselves will have formed a mutual understanding and comprehension and a sense of a common purpose to avoid the repetitious wars and deaths that have affected that region so long. That is the first prerequisite of peace.

We have found that the Arab leaders did not insist that this kind of peace is something that only future generations could consider. Some leaders, such as King Hussein, during his visit to Washington, have made clear their commitment to a just and lasting peace—one which would enable all the people in the Middle East to divert their energies and resources to build and attain a better future.

So we believe that we have made some progress in getting Arab leaders to recognize Israel's right to exist and to recognize—however reluctantly—that this commitment is essential to a genuine peace. That peace must be structured in such a way that it can survive even if some leaders were to nurture aims to destroy Israel. Still, we have a long way to go. The Arabs have been in-

sistent that Israel withdraw from the territories it occupied in the 1967 war. We have made clear our view that Israel should not be asked to withdraw unless it can secure in return real peace from its neighbors.

The question of withdrawal is, in essence, the question of borders. For peace to be enduring, borders must be inviolable. Nations must feel secure behind their borders. Borders must be recognized by all.

A crucial dilemma has been how to provide borders that are both secure and acceptable to all. It is understandable that Israel, having fought a war in every decade since its birth, wants borders that can be defended as easily as possible. But no borders will be secure if neighboring countries do not accept them.

The problem is that borders that might afford Israel the maximum security in military terms would not be accepted as legitimate by Israel's neighbors. Borders that Israel's neighbors would recognize, Israel has not been willing to accept as forming an adequate line of defense.

For this reason, the President has tried to separate the two issues. On the one hand, there must be recognized borders. But, in addition, there could be separate lines of defense or other measures that could enhance Israel's security. The arrangements in the Sinai and in the Golan Heights provide models of how Israel's security might be enhanced until confidence in a lasting peace can be fully developed.

We would urge all the parties to think realistically about security arrangements to reduce the fear of surprise attack, to make acts of aggression difficult if not impossible, and to limit the military forces that would confront one another in sensitive areas.

This approach recognizes the fact that there is a profound asymmetry in what the two sides in the Middle East are seeking. On the one hand, a principal Arab concern is to regain lost territory. On the other, Israel wishes peace, and recognition. Territory is tangible, and once ceded difficult to regain short of war. Peace, on the other hand, can be ephemeral. Peaceful intentions can change overnight, unless a solid foundation of cooperation and a firm pattern of reinforcing relationships can be established to insure that all have a stake in continuing tranquility.

We believe that separating the imperatives of security from the requirement of recognized borders is an important advance toward reconciling the differences between the two sides. It is in this way that Israel could return to approximately the borders that existed prior to the war of 1967, albeit with minor modifications as negotiated among the parties, and yet retain security lines or other arrangements that would insure Israel's safety as full confidence developed in a comprehensive peace. Thus, with borders explicitly recognized and buttressed by security measures, and with the process of peace unfolding, Israel's security would be greater than it is today.

The Future of the Palestinians

A further major issue is that of the future of the Palestinian people. It has been the source of continuing tragedy in the Middle East. There are two prerequisites for a lasting peace in this regard.

- First, there must be a demonstrated willingness on the part of the Palestinians to live in peace alongside Israel.
- Second, the Palestinians must be given a stake in peace so that they will turn away from the violence of the past, and toward a future in which they can express their legitimate political aspirations peacefully.

Thus, if the Palestinians are willing to exist in peace and are prepared to demonstrate that willingness, by recognizing Israel's right to exist in peace, the President has made clear that, in the context of a peace settlement, we believe the Palestinians should be given a chance to shed their status as homeless refugees and to partake fully of the benefits of peace in the Middle East, including the possibility of some arrangement for a Palestinian homeland or entity—preferably in association with Jordan.

How this would be accomplished and the exact character of such an entity is, of course, something that would have to be decided by the parties themselves in the course of negotiation. However, the President has suggested that the viability of this concept and the security of the region might be enhanced if this involved an association with Jordan. But I emphasize that the specifics are for the parties themselves to decide.

Direct Negotiations

This leads me to a further crucial aspect of our approach—the necessity of direct negotiations among the parties concerned. We cannot conceive of genuine peace existing between countries who will not talk to one another. If they are prepared for peace, the first proof is a willingness to negotiate their differences.

This is why we believe it is so important to proceed with the holding of a Geneva Conference this year. That conference provides the forum for these nations to begin the working out of these problems together directly face-to-face. We have a continuing objective to convene such a conference before the end of this year.

Underlying this entire effort to promote the process of negotiation is our determination to maintain the military security of Israel. There must be no question in anyone's mind that the United States will do what is necessary to insure the adequacy of Israel's military posture and its capacity for self-defense.

We recognize that America has a special responsibility in this regard. In fact, in promulgating our overall policy to curb the international traffic in arms, the President specifically directed the government that we will honor our historic responsibilities to assure the security of the State of Israel. Let there be no doubt about this commitment by this Administration.

We do not intend to use our military aid as pressure on Israel. If we have differences over military aid—and we may have some—it will be on military grounds or economic grounds, but not political grounds. If we have differences over diplomatic strategy—and that could happen—we will work this out on a political level. We will not alter our commitment to Israel's military security.

Let me conclude by saying that we hope the concepts I have been discussing here today—concepts which the President has advanced at talks with Israeli and Arab leaders—will stimulate them to develop ideas of their own. We realize that peace cannot be imposed from the outside and we do not intend to present the parties with a plan or a time-

table or a map. Peace can only come from a genuine recognition by all parties that their interests are served by reconciliation and not by war, by faith in the future rather than bitterness over the past.

America can try to help establish the basis of trust necessary for peace. We can try to improve the atmosphere for communication. We can offer ideas, but we cannot, in the end, determine whether peace or war is the fate of the Middle East. That can only be decided by Israel and her Arab neighbors.

We believe that both sides want peace. As the President has said, "this may be the most propitious time for a genuine settlement since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict almost 30 years ago. To let this opportunity pass could mean a disaster not only for the Middle East, but perhaps for the international political and economic order as well."

As we go forward in our mediating role, we will have to expect from time to time to have differences with both sides. But these will be differences as to tactics. Our overall objectives will be those that we believe are now shared by all sides: a permanent and enduring peace in the Middle East.

105. President Carter, Statement on Recognition of Palestinians, at Aswan, Egypt, January 4, 1978

It is an honor and a pleasure for us to be in this great country, led by such a strong and courageous man.

Mr. President, your bold initiative in seeking peace has aroused the admiration of the entire world. One of my most valued possessions is the warm, personal relationship which binds me and President Sadat together and which exemplifies the friendship and the common purpose of the people of Egypt and the people of the United States of America.

The Egyptian-Israeli peace initiative must succeed, while still guarding the sacred and historic principles held by the nations who have suffered so much in this region. There is no good reason why accommodation cannot be reached.

In my own private discussions with both Arab and Israeli leaders, I have been deeply impressed by the unanimous desire for peace. My presence here today is a direct result of the courageous initiative which President Sadat undertook in his recent trip to Jerusalem.

The negotiating process will continue in the near future. We fully support this effort, and we intend to play an active role in the work of the Political Committee of Cairo, which will soon reconvene in Jerusalem.

We believe that there are certain principles, fundamentally, which must be observed before a just and a comprehensive peace can be achieved.

- First, true peace must be based on normal relations among the parties to the peace. Peace means more than just an end to belligerency.

- Second, there must be withdrawal by Israel from territories occupied in 1967 and agreement on secure and recognized borders for all parties in the context of normal and peaceful relations in accordance with U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338.

- Third, there must be a resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The problem must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and enable the Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future.

Some flexibility is always needed to insure successful negotiations and the resolution of conflicting views. We know that the mark of greatness among leaders is to consider carefully the views of others and the greater benefits that can result among the people of all nations which can come from a successful search for peace.

Mr. President, our consultations this morning have reconfirmed our common commitment to the fundamentals which will, with God's help, make 1978 the year for permanent peace in the Middle East.

106. Ambassador Alfred L. Atherton, Speech on Middle East Peace Process, April 5, 1978

The 30-year search for peace between Arab and Jew in the Middle East has been called a history of lost opportunities. I leave it to others to argue the question of who was responsible for losing which opportunity in the past. Our concern as a nation, and as a friend of both sides to this tragic and intractable conflict, must be with the opportunity of the present and the promise of the future.

For a brief dramatic moment last November [19-21], the world saw a vision of what that future could be, when President Sadat of Egypt met with Prime Minister Begin of Israel in Jerusalem, and in December [24-26] when they met again in Ismailia. Today many ask—what has gone wrong? Why have the hopes of November turned to frustration and disappointment, to charge and countercharge?

I would suggest to you that nothing has gone irretrievably wrong. Indeed, some morning-after reaction to the heady experience of those first moments of genuine breakthrough was probably inevitable. What has happened, quite simply, is this: The effort to transform those moments of vision into a dynamic process of reconciliation through negotiations has come face-to-face with the reality that the underlying issues which have blocked progress for so long are still there—that hard decisions involving fundamental premises and policies are ultimately unavoidable. But the opportunity for progress is still there to be seized because of one overriding fact. The global and the regional context within which those issues are now being addressed is no longer what it was for much of the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. President Sadat's offer to visit Jerusalem, and Israel's spontaneous response to that initiative, have transformed the situation.

Whether this opportunity is lost or won depends in the first instance on the wisdom and courage of the leaders and peoples of the Middle East. It depends on the sense of responsibility of the international community. It depends on the willingness of the major powers, above all, not to seek unilateral advantage in a situation fraught

with danger for the entire world. And it depends upon the ability of this country to steer a steady and fair-minded course, true to our commitments to our friends in the area and to our shared vision of the future, even when friends on one side or the other of the conflict may differ with us. President Carter has charted such a course. To succeed, he needs the understanding and support of the American people and of their representatives in the Congress.

I cannot tell you today what will happen in the future or even precisely what the next steps in our diplomatic efforts will be. These will depend upon the results of consultations with the parties to the conflict which are still in progress. I can, however, use this occasion to examine with you the basic issues that the United States and the parties to the conflict are facing and to describe the active role the United States is playing.

U.S. Concerns

Let me first talk for a moment about why peace in the Middle East is important to the United States and to the world community—and about why our country is so deeply involved in the diplomatic effort to achieve the goal of peace.

For the United States, involvement in the search for peace in the Middle East is not a matter of preference but a necessity and a major responsibility. A responsible American policy for the Middle East must assure that we retain the capacity to influence the course of events there commensurate with our responsibilities as a major power. The United States, with the goodwill which it uniquely has among all the parties in the Middle East, is in a position to help shape events, to help prevent wars, and to help the parties find their way along the hard road to a negotiated peace. To continue to play this role, we must pursue policies which take into account the broad range of American concerns and interests in the Middle East.

It is therefore important, as a starting point, to identify what those concerns and interests are.

First, we have an interest, dictated by our global responsibilities in this

nuclear age, to prevent conflict in the Middle East from again becoming a flashpoint of superpower confrontation. More basically, we have an interest in conducting our relationships with other great powers so as to prevent a shift in the global balance of power which itself could invite confrontation.

Second is our strong commitment to the security and survival of Israel. It is a commitment rooted deeply in history and in our moral values as a nation. It has been reaffirmed by every Administration in this country since the modern State of Israel came into existence 30 years ago. It is our conviction that Israel's security over the long term can best be assured by peace treaties which resolve Israel's differences with its Arab neighbors and commit them to live at peace with Israel.

Third, a mutually beneficial relationship with the major nations of the Arab world is essential. They hold the key to their own defense against outside domination or domination by radical forces in the Middle East, and they look to us for help in maintaining their own security and independence. The oil which some of them produce is literally vital to our allies in Western Europe and Japan and increasingly important to us. Their financial power—through the level of oil prices and their large financial reserves—makes them important partners in the effort to maintain a worldwide economic order. In the course of our relationship, thousands of Arab students, professionals, and technical experts are trained every year in the United States, and jobs are created in this country by the growing volume of exports to, and investment in, Arab countries. Our relations with the Arab world, wisely nurtured, can enhance our ability to strengthen the forces of moderation in the Middle East and advance the cause of peace.

Fourth, in the deepest sense, our concern for human rights also dictates efforts to end a conflict which has taken countless thousands of innocent victims and has deflected the nations of the area from using their bountiful resources and talents for bettering the lives of their peoples.

Fundamental Issues

Next, what are the fundamental issues which must be dealt with if there is to be tangible progress toward peace? Briefly stated, the issues are these.

- Israel seeks from the Arabs recognition of its legitimacy and right to exist, with all this implies—an end to belligerency, an end to threats of force, and commitments to live together in peace and security.

- The Arab states seek the restoration of occupied territories and a just solution of the Palestinian problem.

An equitable and durable solution of these issues can only be hammered out through a process of negotiations between the parties. Prior to the 6-day war of 1967, no real basis for peace negotiations existed. The Arabs refused to accept the existence of Israel, much less contemplate making peace with it. Since no basis for negotiations existed, U.S. policy had to focus more on containing area tensions than on helping to resolve them.

The 1967 war began to change that. In 6 days Israel not only proved beyond all doubt that it was there to stay, but it also ended up occupying Arab territory stretching to the Golan Heights of Syria, the Jordan River, and the Suez Canal. Slowly, meticulously, painfully, the United States and other like-minded members of the international community working with the parties to the conflict in the months immediately following the war launched intensive diplomatic efforts to translate this new situation into the long-sought basis for genuine peace negotiations.

U.N. Resolution 242

The result was U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, adopted unanimously by the Council in November 1967. Here for the first time in 20 years was spelled out the framework for a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. That resolution was and remains the basis for all the peacemaking efforts over the past decade. At its heart is a very simple formula: In return for Israeli withdrawal from territories occupied in the 1967 conflict, the Arabs will recognize Israel within a framework of peace and security agreed by both. It calls for a just and lasting peace based upon the right of every state in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries and upon Israeli withdrawal from territories oc-

cupied in 1967. Resolution 242 is clearly a package. The parts are linked together to make a balanced whole, to be carried out together or not at all.

That having been said, let me note what Resolution 242 does not do. It does not define secure and recognized boundaries. It does not call for withdrawal from "all" occupied territories or "the" occupied territories. It does not require Israel to give up every inch of occupied territory. Neither, however, does it preclude Israeli withdrawal to the lines of 1967.

In the final analysis, this issue can only be resolved in agreements negotiated by the parties. The emphasis of Resolution 242 taken as a whole, however, is clear. The emphasis is on establishing conditions of peace and security based upon the concept of withdrawal-for-peace. It is also clear that all the principles of Resolution 242, including the principle of withdrawal, were intended by its authors, and understood at the time by all the governments con-

For the United States, involvement in the search for peace in the Middle East is not a matter of preference but a necessity and a major responsibility.

cerned, to apply wherever territory was occupied in 1967. In other words, the withdrawal-for-peace formula applies to all fronts of the conflict. I will revert to this point later to explain its relevance to the current negotiations.

That brings me to a second issue relating to Resolution 242. That resolution does not deal in a comprehensive way with a solution to the Palestinian problem. In the decade since the passage of the resolution it has become inescapably clear that a solution to the Palestinian problem is essential in reaching a lasting settlement of the Middle East conflict. No party to the conflict today disputes that the Palestinians have a sense of identity which must be taken into account. President Carter has recognized this by speaking of the need for a homeland for the Palestinians. In our own view, no settlement in the Middle East can endure, for Israel and Arab states alike, which does not include a just solution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects.

U.S. Role

Let me now turn to the role of the United States in the search for peace in the Middle East. Soon after President Carter took office he decided to seek a new approach. For the first time in 30 years all the major parties to the dispute were ready to negotiate a comprehensive settlement. One of his first foreign policy decisions was to send Secretary Vance to the area. The Secretary obtained agreement from the governments involved that the three issues I have outlined lie at the core of the dispute and have to be resolved in an overall settlement:

- The nature of peace;
- Withdrawal from occupied territories in conjunction with security arrangements that will make recognized boundaries also secure boundaries; and
- Resolution of the Palestinian problem.

Beginning in March 1977 in Clinton, Massachusetts, the President, and subsequently other Administration officials, have laid out our thinking on these issues.¹ We did this not to put forward an American blueprint or plan for a settlement but to help stimulate the thinking of the parties about new ways to overcome old obstacles to the peace process. Let me elaborate a bit on our thinking about each of these three issues.

First, the definition of true peace. Peace does not mean simply a cessation of hostility or belligerency. It means open borders, normal commerce and tourism, diplomatic relations and a range of official and unofficial contacts, free navigation through waterways, and an end to all boycotts.

The United States regards normal relations among the parties as an indispensable component of a lasting settlement. The keystone of this is the recognition of Israel's right to exist permanently and formal recognition of its nationhood.

Second is the dilemma of providing borders that are both secure and acceptable to all. This is the other half of the withdrawal-for-peace equation set up in Resolution 242. Israel, which has fought for its very existence for 30 years, must be able to feel secure within recognized borders. But borders that might give Israel the greatest sense of security in geographic and military terms are not those acceptable to Israel's neighbors. They could not, therefore, provide true security.

We understand the very real security concerns posed for Israel by withdrawal from occupied territory. But we also believe that without withdrawal, coupled with meaningful security arrangements, there can be no peace; and without peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors, Israel can have no true security. The goal has to be the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states in the area.

Third is the issue of the future of the Palestinian people. To achieve a durable peace, the Palestinians must demonstrate a willingness to live in peace with Israel. At the same time, a durable peace requires meeting the humanitarian needs of the Palestinian refugees, responding to the aspiration of Palestinian Arabs for an identity of their own, and agreement on the future status of the West Bank and Gaza where the largest single group of Palestinian Arabs live.

This is not a simple question. It involves vital security considerations for Israel which must be taken into account. At the same time, it also involves interests of other Arab states, in particular Jordan and Egypt. And it involves the interests of the Palestinian Arabs themselves, over one million of whom reside still in the West Bank and Gaza.

A way must be found for the Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future. Any solution, if it is to be viable and lasting, must be based ultimately on the consent of the governed.

Because this issue is so complex and no instant solution seems possible, we have suggested that there need to be interim arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza agreed between Israel and Jordan, Egypt, and Palestinian representatives. During this interim period an ultimate solution can be worked out combining security for Israel and its neighbors and a territorial solution which will not leave a residue of irredentism to ferment and threaten the peace in the future. Our own view is that an independent Palestinian state in this truncated territory would not be a realistic or durable solution and that its future should lie in a close link with Jordan.

The Approach Toward Peace

These, then, are the issues, and these are our general views about them. Let me now discuss briefly how this Administration has approached them with the parties in the peace process. For it is clearly a process. Nothing stands still in the Middle

East. Matters are always moving—toward peace, or toward war, so long as the basic conflict is unresolved. Despite the apparent deadlock, the deep differences, and the cycle of violence so tragically reflected in the terrorist attack recently in Israel and the subsequent Israeli move into southern Lebanon, we still believe the dynamics of the process are at work toward a negotiated peace.

What we are seeing today, for the first time in the history of the conflict, are genuine attempts by key parties involved to come to terms. Real negotiations have commenced. We are also seeing an unprecedented public debate over the core issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Given the depth of hostility and suspicion which underlie that conflict, and the painful decisions needed to make negotiations succeed, no one should expect results overnight.

Efforts to get the negotiations moving have gone through several phases over the past year. Initially, they focused on seeking to reconvene the Geneva Middle East Peace Confer-

...the key differences remaining to be bridged relate to the issue of withdrawal and an approach to the Palestinian problem, including the future of the West Bank and Gaza.

ence, which was established and met briefly after the 1973 Arab-Israeli war and which remains the ultimate framework for a comprehensive peace settlement.

Efforts to reconvene the Geneva conference last year, however, encountered sharp differences among the parties on a number of procedural issues, in particular the question of how the Palestinians should be represented. Israel took the position that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was not an acceptable negotiating partner. In this we supported Israel, in view of the PLO's nonacceptance of Resolution 242 as the basis for negotiations and its refusal to state publicly its willingness to recognize the right of all states in the area, which include Israel, to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

Then, suddenly, President Sadat transformed the situation with his historic trip to Jerusalem last November. His initiative did not resolve the basic

issues in dispute. But at one stroke he sought to break down the psychological barriers which had prevented serious negotiations.

For the first time, the leader of an Arab state demonstrated not by words alone but by a tangible act his country's acceptance of the peace-for-withdrawal formula of Resolution 242. He recognized in an unprecedented official and public act Israel's sovereign existence. He put Egypt in the forefront of the Arab world in accepting the concept of the nature of peace as President Carter has defined it, and as Israeli leaders themselves over the years have envisaged it as Israel's goal in negotiations. In doing so, President Sadat opened up possibilities that never before existed to break out of the 30-year cycle of war and truce in the Middle East.

President Sadat made clear, and Israel agreed, that what he had done was not done for Egypt alone, but to create a new psychological climate in which there can be progress toward peace between Israel and all its neighbors. Whether other Arab leaders will seize the opportunity thus created remains to be seen. Some have reacted with open hostility, some with suspicion, some want to wait and see—but some also have wished Egypt well and are giving its peace initiative their support.

What is important today is to insure that this moment not become another lost opportunity. The United States from the beginning has supported Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. Our efforts are directed toward assuring, first, that there is tangible and early progress in the negotiating process begun by Egypt and Israel in Jerusalem last November, and second, that out of this process there emerge a basis and an incentive for the negotiations to be broadened to include other Arab parties. Both Egypt and Israel have stated that this is also their objective.

Since November, the negotiating process has proceeded on two tracks. Following an initial preparatory conference in Cairo in December, attended by Egyptian and Israeli delegations and also by representatives of the United States and U.N. Secretary General Waldheim, Egypt and Israel agreed to establish two committees at ministerial level.² A Military Committee was convened in Cairo to negotiate essentially Egyptian-Israeli bilateral issues. A Political Committee was convened in Jerusalem to negotiate multilateral Arab-Israeli issues. The United States participated in the Political Committee and, when

President Sadat withdrew his delegation, has continued as a middleman with the support of both to seek to advance the work of the Political Committee through a process of indirect negotiations.

The immediate focus of the Political Committee is the negotiation of a declaration of principles for a comprehensive peace settlement, building on Security Council Resolution 242, which can serve as a framework for negotiations between Israel and any of its other neighbors which are prepared to move toward peace, as Egypt has demonstrated it is prepared to do.

With a large measure of agreement already achieved on those principles dealing with the nature of peace and recognition of Israel, the key differences remaining to be bridged relate to the issue of withdrawal and an approach to the Palestinian problem, including the future of the West Bank and Gaza.

The important talks which President Carter has had in recent months with President Sadat and with Prime Minister Begin have helped clarify the differences that have to be resolved. The issues to be decided are out on the table for all to see. We believe the point has come where painful compromises have to be made if the promise of peace is not to be lost.

It is no secret that we have differences with the Israeli Government about what is required to move forward on negotiations, just as we have had in the past—and expect to have in the future—with Arab governments on negotiating issues of critical importance to them. The fact that we can talk frankly and openly with Israel about these differences testifies to the closeness of our friendship.

To be concrete, we have a basic difference with the Israeli Government over the applicability of the withdrawal principle in Resolution 242 to all fronts of the conflict. I noted earlier that the authors of Resolution 242 and all the governments concerned, including the Government of Israel, understood at the time that the withdrawal-for-peace concept applied wherever territory was occupied in 1967.

The present position of the Israeli Government is that this concept does not apply to all fronts. Specifically, it has not so far agreed that, in the context of a final peace treaty embodying commitments to normal peaceful relations and agreed security arrangements which can include agreed border modifications, Israel will withdraw from any of the West Bank of the Jordan River and Gaza—the

parts of former Palestine lying outside Israel's 1967 boundaries.

This new Israeli interpretation of Resolution 242, together with the policy of establishing Israeli settlements in occupied territory, has complicated efforts to make progress in the negotiations between Egypt and Israel. It has also inhibited efforts to broaden those negotiations to include other Arab parties, in particular Jordan and Palestinian representatives who, together, have an interest in negotiations relating to the future of the West Bank and its Palestinian Arab inhabitants.

We realize that the withdrawal-for-peace formula as it applies to the West Bank and Gaza, and the Palestinian issue generally, are the most difficult issues for Israel. In all our deliberations, we constantly have before us the very real security questions posed for Israel. We cannot conceive of any formula the United States—or Israel—could accept which did not make fullest provision for these security concerns as part of a peace settlement.

To supplement the commitments and security arrangements the parties may agree to incorporate in peace treaties between themselves, and if we judge it essential to cement final agreement, we have said we are prepared to consider whatever bilateral U.S. security guarantees Israel may consider desirable as part of the peace settlement. This would, of course, be done in close consultation with the Congress in full consonance with its constitutional authority and responsibilities.

In closing, let me say a word about where the negotiating process now stands. During his recent talks in Washington with Prime Minister Begin, President Carter put forward some exploratory ideas on how to bridge the differences in the negotiations. In doing so, we took into account the proposals—in many respects far-reaching proposals—which Prime Minister Begin advanced in December for a Sinai agreement with Egypt and for a self-rule regime in the West Bank and Gaza. We said then, and say now, that in our judgment those proposals represent a good first step and a basis for negotiations.

We understand the need for time for our ideas and these issues to be discussed and debated within Israel's democratic political process. We know that our ideas—dealing as they do with the key issues for Israel of security, withdrawal, the Palestinian question, and the future of the West Bank and Gaza—require agonizingly

difficult choices to be made. We hope nevertheless that our ideas will commend themselves to Israel, because we believe they offer the possibility—perhaps the only possibility—for renewing the momentum of the Egyptian-Israeli and ultimately the overall Arab-Israeli negotiating process.

We are meanwhile gratified that direct Egyptian-Israeli talks were resumed through the visit last week [March 30–31, 1978] of Defense Minister [Ezer] Weizman to Cairo. We are also gratified that progress is being made, with the help of the courageous men of the U.N. Interim Force in Lebanon and the efforts of the Lebanese Government itself, toward calming the potentially dangerous situation in south Lebanon—a situation which can otherwise have serious adverse effects on the prospects for regional peace.

I return in the end to where I started. When an Egyptian President has visited Israel and an Israeli Prime Minister has visited Egypt, when the President of the United States has engaged the authority of his office and the weight of the United States in the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, can there be any doubt that an unprecedented opportunity exists to make progress toward that long elusive goal? At the same time there are strong forces—forces of historical distrust and suspicion, of bitterness and violence, of national ambition and ideological commitment, of perceived injustices on both sides—which are working against the success of all that we and our friends in the Middle East are seeking to achieve. And time is on their side, not ours. We must not, we do not intend, to let this moment in history become simply another lost opportunity. □

Address before the Atlanta Foreign Policy Conference on U.S. Interests in the Middle East on Apr. 5, 1978. Mr. Atherton was Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; on Apr. 6, the Senate confirmed the President's nomination of Mr. Atherton as Ambassador at Large with special responsibility for Middle East peace negotiations.

¹ For excerpts relating to foreign policy from President Carter's opening remarks and question-and-answer session at the Clinton, Massachusetts, Town Hall, see BULLETIN of Apr. 11, 1977, p. 334.

² For a chronology of Middle East events during November, December, and January, which includes participants in various meetings and committees, see BULLETINS of Dec. 19, 1977, p. 880; Jan. 1978, p. 401; and Feb. 1978, p. 37, respectively.

107. President Carter, Statement on Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty Signing, March 26, 1979

During the past 30 years, Israel and Egypt have waged war. But for the past 16 months, these same two great nations have waged peace. Today we celebrate a victory—not of a bloody military campaign, but of an inspiring peace campaign. Two leaders who will loom large in the history of nations—President Anwar Al-Sadat and Prime Minister Menachem Begin—have conducted this campaign with all the courage, tenacity, brilliance and inspiration of any generals who have ever led men and machines onto the field of battle.

At the end of this campaign the soil of the two lands is not drenched with young blood. (Applause) The countrysides of both lands are free from the litter and the carnage of a wasteful war. Mothers in Egypt and Israel are not weeping today for their children fallen in senseless battle. The dedication and determination of these two world statesmen have borne fruit. Peace has come to Israel and to Egypt. (Applause)

I honor these two leaders and their government officials who have hammered out this peace treaty which we have just signed. But most of all, I honor the people of these two lands whose yearning for peace kept alive the negotiations which today culminate in this glorious event.

We have won at last the first step of peace, a first step on a long and difficult road. We must not minimize the obstacles which still lie ahead. Differences still separate the signatories to this treaty from one another, and also from some of their neighbors who fear what they have just done. To overcome these differences, to dispel these fears, we must rededicate ourselves to the goal of a broader peace with justice for all who have lived in a state of conflict in the Middle East.

We have no illusions—we have hopes, dreams, prayers, yes—but no illusions.

There now remains the rest of the Arab world whose support and whose cooperation in the peace process is needed and honestly sought.

I am convinced that other Arab people need and want peace. But some of their leaders are not yet willing to honor these needs and desires for peace. We must now demonstrate the advantages of peace, and expand its benefits to encompass all those who have suffered so much in the Middle East.

Obviously, time and understanding will be necessary for people, hitherto enemies, to become neighbors in the best sense of the word.

Just because a paper is signed, all the problems will not automatically go away. Future days will require the best from us to give reality to these lofty aspirations.

Let those who would shatter peace—who would callously spill more blood—be aware that we three and all others who may join us will vigorously wage peace. (Applause)

So let history record that deep and ancient antagonism can be settled without bloodshed and without staggering waste of precious lives, without rapacious destruction of the land.

It has been said, and I quote, "Peace has one thing in common with its enemy, with the fiend it battles, with war; peace is active, not passive; peace is doing, not waiting; peace is aggressive—attacking; peace plans its strategy and encircles the enemy; peace marshals its forces and storms the gates; peace gathers its weapons and pierces the defense; peace, like war, is waged."

It is true that we cannot enforce trust and cooperation between nations, but we can use all our strength to see that nations do not again go to war. (Applause)

All our religious doctrines give us hope. In the Koran, we read: "But if the enemy incline towards peace, do thou also incline towards peace. and

trust in God: for He is the One that heareth and knoweth all things."

And the prophet Isaiah said: "Nations shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."

So let us now lay aside war. Let us now reward all the children of Abraham who hunger for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East. Let us now enjoy the adventure of becoming fully human, fully neighbors, even brothers and sisters. We pray God, we pray God together that these dreams will come true. I believe they will. Thank you very much. (Applause)

108. Ambassador Andrew Young, Statement Before United Nations Security Council, August 24, 1979

(Note.—U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, resigned on August 15, 1979, after admitting that he had concealed facts about a meeting with a PLO official in contradiction of U.S. policy. The following is Ambassador Young's last statement to the Security Council.)

"May I take the liberty to speak for a few moments not as the representative of my Government, but in my capacity as a friend and colleague of all of you who are present? I take this liberty because it was not my design that I should be leaving the council at a time when I was serving as its president. I hardly anticipated that this would occur, and yet I have no regrets about what has occurred

"I have no quarrel with the President or the White House. In spite of petty differences with the Department of State, and overwhelmingly, I would say that we basically share a sense of conviction and direction about the way things should move in today's world. I do not think that I was "set up" by my Arab or my Israeli friends. I think that whatever happened leading to my resignation was something that I entered into very much with my eyes open, and came not out of any quarrel with any person or any institution but rather out of a fundamental disagreement with a policy, one that I sought to run from for two and a half years, for I never agreed with it.

"And yet, when I found myself taking on the presidency of the Security Council and being faced with an issue which required a certain level of communication and understanding, I thought that there was no

particular risk involved in that communication beyond the risk of my job, and my job has never been particularly important to me... and so it was no great decision on my part to visit the home of my friend and to meet another friend, and I hope that in some small way it may have opened up a question to the American people that will call attention to some of the tragic history of our nation as a result of the refusal to communicate.

"It was a result of the refusal to communicate with the People's Republic of China and a denial of the existence of 800 million people for almost 20 years that led us into escalations and war in Korea. It led us to war with Vietnam. We could not end that war in Vietnam until we started talking and communicating with the People's Republic of China...

"The same might be said of the situation in the Middle East, and it was because I felt that no talking would contribute to violence and bloodshed that I believed that the risks of talking to the PLO were nothing compared to the risk of bloodshed, violence and the possible destruction and disruption of the relationships that we enjoy with many, many people in that region of the Middle East.

"I have said that it is a ridiculous policy not to talk to the PLO, and I believe that it is a ridiculous policy. But if it is ridiculous not to talk to the PLO on the part of the United States and the Nation of Israel, it is also ridiculous for many states represented here not to have good relations with the nation of Israel.

"For ultimately, if we are to have peace in that region, people have got to approach each other as friends and as brothers, and not as enemies, bloodthirsty for the destruction of each other. And so there has to be a renunciation of violence on all sides and a beginning of communication about the possibilities of peace in the region.

"One of our colleagues in the Secretariat who has been moving back and forth between Israel and the PLO in the situation in Lebanon made the matter-of-fact remark, "It's amazing how similar they are -- the people around Weizman and the people around Arafat. If they could ever get together they could be a powerful combination."

"And so I would say that in the experience of my nation, though many in my nation would not agree with me, that violence has almost always failed ... but I would say that is also true in the Middle East. I would say that the violence of the Arab world has failed to destroy Israel, and the attempt to destroy Israel has cost greatly the moral basis of the existence of the Palestinian people.


The strength of Israel in its early days was that it was, in a sense, on a moral foundation. And yet Israel now is rapidly spending its moral capital, wasting it in pursuit of violence and destruction

in Lebanon, and in the building of settlements where perhaps, while affirming Resolution 242 (1967) in the very fact Israel violates that resolution...

"I think violence has failed on both sides. Actually, it is counter productive. I think isolation of the PLO has certainly failed, and isolation of Israel has failed. Talking has not yet had a chance to succeed.

"And yet I think that in the kind of statesmanlike deliberations that have gone on in this Council on this question, on the question of Namibia and on the questions of our relationships in many parts of the world, we see a faint glimmer of hope that talking might succeed.

"And so for those long hours that we have gathered together, going over the course of the struggles in the world, I really do not give up, for I think there is an educational process, a process of calling to the attention of the court of the world opinion the reality of justice and injustice in the world in which we live."



LEBANON

109. U.N. Security Council Resolution 270, on Israeli Air Attack on Lebanon, August 26, 1969

The Security Council,

Having considered the agenda contained in document S/Agenda/1498/Rev.1,

Having noted the contents of the letter of the *Chargé d'affaires ad interim* of Lebanon (S/9383),

Having heard the statements of the representatives of Lebanon and Israel,

Grieved at the tragic loss of civilian life and property,

Gravely concerned about the deteriorating situation resulting from the violation of Security Council resolutions,

Recalling the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon of 23 March 1949, and the cease-fire established pursuant to resolutions 233(1967) and 234(1967) of 6 and 7 June 1967, respectively,

Recalling its resolution 262(1968) of 31 December 1968,

Mindful of its responsibility under the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Condemns* the premeditated air attack by Israel on villages in southern Lebanon in violation of its obligations under the Charter and Security Council resolutions;

2. *Deplores* all violent incidents in violation of the cease-fire;

3. *Deplores* the extension of the area of fighting;

4. *Declares* that such actions of military reprisal and other grave violations of the cease-fire cannot be tolerated and that the Security Council would have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against repetition of such acts.

110. Beirut Radio Announcement of Lebanon-Arab League Negotiated Cease-Fire, April 16, 1975

Prime Minister Rashid as-Sulh has stated the following: Following contacts and discussions that we carried out with all parties concerned, at the instructions of his excellency the president of the republic and in cooperation with His Excellency Arab League Secretary General Mahmud Riyad and the Arab ambassadors, it has been agreed to cease firing and to withdraw armed men from streets and public squares. Commanders of the internal security forces are charged with observing, implementing and enforcing this agreement. I appeal to everyone to stop bloodshed so as to preserve Lebanon and the Palestinian brothers. I call upon everyone to show patience and love during these critical conditions. The security forces are charged with pursuing those who sow sedition and spread false rumors, and to strike with an iron fist against anyone that tries to harm this agreement which is being sought by everybody.

111. Council of Arab Foreign Ministers, Communique on Joint Action To Support Lebanese Government, October 17, 1975

The Council of Arab Foreign Ministers examined the present situation in Lebanon with the greatest concern and observed the need for joint Arab action to help the sister country surmount the crisis and avert the dangers arising from it.

The Council heard the exposés of the Foreign Ministers and heads of delegations and studied Israeli statements threatening aggression against Lebanon.

While thanking the government of the State of Kuwait for calling this meeting, the Council expresses its profound distress at the succession of incidents in Lebanon. It reaffirms total Arab solidarity with her and calls on all parties in Lebanon to exercise wisdom and restraint and to place the spirit of patriotism and nationalism above all other considerations so that the normal state of affairs may be rapidly restored in Lebanon and that her spiritual and human values may once more exert their influence.

The Council affirms the concern of all the Arab countries for the sovereignty of Lebanon and the unity of her territory and people, expressing its appreciation of the efforts Lebanon has always made to support Arab causes and, first and foremost, the cause of Palestine.

The Council supports the measures that the Lebanese government has taken and is indefatigably following up in order to bring the parties together and reconcile viewpoints, with the aim of putting an end to the crisis and restoring permanent peace and stability to Lebanon. The Council also expresses appreciation of the efforts that have been made by the Arab countries to aid and support Lebanon. It calls on them to continue these constructive efforts, collectively and individually, and hopes that each of them will do all in its power to consolidate Lebanon's stability and national unity. The Council calls on the

member states to provide material aid to replace the losses sustained by Lebanon in the recent incidents.

It also affirms that all the Arab states are committed to resisting with all their resources any Israeli attempt to exploit the situation directly or indirectly. It regards any aggression against Lebanon as an aggression against all the Arab states, to be resisted jointly in accordance with the provisions of the Joint Arab Defence Treaty and the Charter of the League.

It was decided that the Council of Arab Foreign Ministers should follow up the development of events in Lebanon and that the Secretary-General should maintain close contact with the Lebanese government in order to keep the member states informed of new developments as they occur and call any Arab meeting at whatever level Lebanon may consider necessary or useful.

Published in al-Nahar, Beirut, October 17, 1975

112. Egyptian Six-Point Plan to Resolve the Lebanese Crisis, December 1, 1975

The problem in Lebanon has two aspects: the Lebanese internal situation and the Lebanese-Palestinian situation. There has also been outside interference, both Arab and foreign, for reasons that go beyond these two aspects and have other aims in view.

As regards the first aspect, it is clear to Egypt, just as it is clear to the whole Arab nation and to the outside world as well, that it was the Lebanese, Muslims and Christians, who devised the Lebanese formula on which Lebanon's independence was established and which has been the basis of Lebanon's existence as an independent sovereign Arab state....

In view of the above, the Lebanese should sit down to consider how much this formula needs amendment and how far this amendment should go, through dialogue, by its people and for its people, without outside interference, whether Arab or foreign, aimed at preserving Arab Lebanon.

As for the second aspect, the Lebanese-Palestinian situation Egypt, as is well known, prefers to be frank in its dealings and in facing facts. From the start, Egypt has believed that there is absolutely no reason for the destruction and bloodshed, and that if there is a reason it is unacceptable to Egypt, to the Arab nation and to all Lebanese....

Egypt is looking to the future from the point of departure that it is important to her at present — and it is certainly important to the Arab nation — to consider the future of Lebanon. Egypt believes that the solution lies in political factors and principles that could constitute the framework of any settlement leading to the preservation of national unity, the Lebanese entity and the role of Lebanon as an independent sovereign Arab people. Therefore:

1. Egypt calls for control on the carrying of arms in Lebanese towns;
2. Egypt insists on the use of dialogue rather than arms in Lebanon, the country which used to be an example to others by its way of settling its affairs through dialogue;
3. Egypt condemns the irresponsible actions of Phalangist elements;
4. Egypt condemns no less severely the Syrian organization "Saiqa" for what it has done and is still doing, overtly or covertly,

against Muslims and Christians alike;

5. Egypt is totally opposed to the partition of Lebanon and regards any demand for it as treason;

6. Egypt regards the attempt to internationalize the conflict in Lebanon as treason.

Parallel and linked to all this is the fact that the only solution lies first in an agreement among the Lebanese and then with the Palestinians. There is certainly a situation that incontestably raises difficulties for some people in Lebanon, but the problem must be solved between the Lebanese and Palestinian parties. There is the 1969 Cairo Agreement to regulate the situation. Under its auspices and if it is respected, things can return to normal.

113. Beirut Radio and Voice of Palestine Radio Report of Lebanese-Syrian-Palestinian Agreement, January 22, 1976

[Text] In the wake of the contacts conducted by the Syrian delegation and aimed at complete settlement of the crisis in Lebanon, an agreement has been reached among all the parties on the basis for a total political settlement of the crisis in all its aspects. Agreement has been reached on the following:

1. The formation of a Lebanese-Syrian-Palestinian higher military committee whose task is to work out arrangements for ending the fighting, to restore normal life and to supervise implementation [of these arrangements].
2. The formation of a number of supervisory subcommittees stemming from the higher committee to observe and follow up implementation in the various areas and positions.
3. The higher committee will fix a date for the cease fire and declare the arrangements for ending the fighting and the stages of its implementation.

[Text] A responsible Military source at the Palestinian revolution has stated the following: Representatives of the Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian sides met at the Lebanese National Defense Ministry this afternoon. It was agreed to form a higher committee to supervise the cease-fire over Lebanese territory.

The committee is made up on the Syrian side by Col 'Ali al-Madani, Col Muhammad al-Khuli; on the Lebanese side by Brig Gen Musa Kan'an, and Col Dib Kamal; and on the Palestinian side by Zuhayr Muhsin and Col Sa'd Sayil. This joint committee has given priority to the measures which must be taken to maintain the cease-fire. These measures are:

1. A cease-fire will take place in all Lebanese areas as of today, 22 January 1976.
2. Withdrawal of armed men from all the areas of the clashes and removal of armed manifestations from the streets and roads to make them safe and passable as of 1400 tomorrow, Friday 23 January 1976.
3. Evacuation of army barracks and security forces' posts occupied by armed men in all areas of Lebanon.
4. Return of evacuees to their places of residence and homes.
5. Return of abducted persons and delivery of dead bodies.
6. Return of military equipment and military personnel.

The Syrian-Lebanese-Palestinian higher supervisory committee will form regional and sub-committees in all areas in Lebanon: Beirut, Jabal Lubnan, the north, the south and Al-Biqat. The regional committees will consist of a Syrian, a Lebanese, and a Palestinian officer. The subcommittee will be formed on the same pattern.

114. Voice of Palestine Broadcast of 10-Day Cease-Fire Agreement, April 1, 1976

The Lebanese national and progressive parties and forces have decided to suspend fighting for 10 days on the condition that a new president of the republic be elected during this period, while these forces continue to cling to the program of reforms which, to them, constitutes the only way out of the Lebanese crisis.

The Lebanese national and progressive parties and forces had held a meeting at noon today during which they held consultations on the new developments and the appeal addressed by Lebanese Mufti Shaykh Hasan Khalid and Patriarch Khraysh of the Maronite community to all the belligerent parties to halt the fighting.

A meeting is now being held between PLO Executive Committee Chairman Abu 'Ammar and the Lebanese national and progressive forces, attended by Lebanese leader Kamal Junblatt for consultations on the developments taking place in the Lebanese arena.

115. President Ford Comment on Outside Intervention in Lebanon, April 2, 1976

Q. Mr. President, with Syria poised to invade Lebanon, there are some fears of a full-scale war erupting in the Mideast. How does the administration view the events?

THE PRESIDENT. The administration has taken a very firm position that no outside government should invade Syria (Lebanon). That means no government should move in and try to, with military force, take care of the situation in Syria (Lebanon). Furthermore, we have strongly urged a cease-fire. And 2 days ago, I sent a personal envoy, Mr. Dean Brown, to Lebanon. He has been in contact with the various parties there. I believe that his efforts were significant in getting the cease-fire which is now in place, and if we can keep that cease-fire, get a change in the Government, I think the danger of any invasion by any party will not materialize.

I repeat, we are against the invasion of Lebanon by any force. And we are seeking to get, and have helped to achieve, a cease-fire, which is the first constructive step to stabilize and to improve the situation.

116. Syrian-Palestinian Seven-Point Communique, April 16, 1976

President Hafez al-Assad received Messrs.: Yasser Arafat, head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Zuhair Muhsin, Farouq Qaddoumi, Naif Hawatmeh, Salah Khalaf and Abu Saleh. Also present were: 'Abdul-Halim Khaddam, General Naji Jamil and General Hikmat al-Shihabi. The situation in the area in general and in Lebanon in particular was passed in review, and all aspects of the crisis in Lebanon were analysed and the dangers of its continuing assessed, and there was agreement on all points. The two sides stressed their concern for the Lebanese people and for their security, the integrity of their territory and their stability, and agreement was reached on

the following points:

1. That the fighting should stop and that a unified attitude should be adopted against any quarter that resumes military operations.
2. That the tripartite Syrian-Palestinian-Lebanese Higher Military Committee should be reconstituted to establish, implement and supervise the cease-fire until the election of the new President, who will decide on such security measures as he deems appropriate in accordance with his constitutional powers.
3. To oppose all forms of partition and any action or measure liable to impair the unity of the people and the territory of Lebanon.
4. To reject the Arabization of the Lebanese crisis, especially should it lead to the introduction of Arab forces.
5. To reject American solutions and plans for Lebanon.
6. That the Syrian initiative should continue.
7. To reject internationalization or the introduction of international forces into Lebanon.

117. Arab League Resolution for an Arab Peace Force for Lebanon and President Franjeh's Response, June 10, 1976

The Council of the League. . .

1. Thanks the Secretary General of the League for having convened the extraordinary meeting.

2. Asks all parties to ceasefire immediately and asks for the stabilization of the ceasefire.

3. Decides to place symbolic Arab security forces under the supervision of the Secretariat of the League, in order to preserve security and stability in Lebanon. These forces will replace the Syrian forces. Their mission is subject to the demands of the President-elect before taking effect.

4. Decides upon the immediate sending of a committee, representing the Council of the League. The committee is to be comprised of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bahrain, the Secretary General of the League, and the chiefs of the delegations of Libya and Algeria. This committee must collaborate with all parties in Lebanon to observe the situation and assure the security and the stability in this country.

5. Invites all the parties in Lebanon to a national reconciliation under the aegis of the President-elect, in order to safeguard the unity of the Lebanese people and its territorial integrity.

6. Affirms the Arab pledge to consolidate the Palestinian revolution and to protect it against all dangers.

7. Considers itself in permanent assembly in order to follow the developments of the situation.

MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT FRANJIEH OF LEBANON TO SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE MAHMOUD RIAD REJECTING THE LEAGUE'S RECENT RESOLUTIONS. Kfour, June 10, 1976.

Since April 1975, a succession of murderous and bloody events have afflicted Lebanon, causing the collapse of the country and a world-wide uproar of indignation. Since that time, several years ago, when the first symptoms of these events began to appear, Lebanon repeatedly brought the problem to the attention, among others, of the Arab League. But the League as well as the individual Arab states remained unconcerned. The Arab League saw fit to take action only when the Syrian mediation, after several unsuccessful attempts at a peaceful solution, took the form of an armed inter-

vention. The Arab League initiative, however, was not in response to the persistent demands of the Lebanese, but rather in response to the demands of others. It was as if the League was responsive to the voice of those others, even when they were the aggressors, rather than to the voice of justice; it was as if the League had been created to serve some of its members and not others.

Lebanon had on every occasion been in favour of a League meeting, hoping to obtain from it the benefits which it had assumed would automatically accrue to it as a member of the League. But it is contrary to the League's Charter and to the very reasons which had prompted the creation of the League for an Arab League meeting to take place to discuss a Lebanese matter—tantamount to the very destiny of this country—and to attempt to make decisions binding on Lebanon without inviting Lebanon to attend or be represented at the meeting by a responsible person. The Lebanese Council of Ministers, which had the sole authority in those matters, had not charged anyone with representing Lebanon.

I have seen fit in a previous letter dated June 9 to caution you and the member states against violating the Charter and breaching the will, spirit, and principles which had been at the basis of its adoption. I reiterated Lebanon's determination not to abide by any resolution taken in its absence, drawing attention to Article VII of the Charter which affirms that a resolution must be accepted by the country concerned before it becomes binding on that country.

In view of all that, Lebanon declares:

First: The resolutions taken yesterday and today by the Arab League dated June 9 and 10, 1976, are null and void and unbinding and shall remain unenforced.

Second: Lebanon refuses in respect to any matter, and particularly in respect to matters pertaining to its destiny, to submit to the will of any but its own children. Consequently, Lebanon will not submit to a decision taken in its absence, particularly since it considers it an arbitrary verdict rather than a decision.

Third: Lebanon will not consent to any Arab country supervising its peace and

integrity if such a country is party to the war raging on its territories and contributes men and arms to the fighters, and especially if such a country contributes a division to the Palestine Liberation Army.

Fourth: Lebanon censures the attitude of discrimination which the Arab League has taken in that it rejects one demand for intervention but accepts another, depending on the identity of the initiator of the demand rather than on the validity of the justification.

Fifth: Lebanon will resist with all its means and resources any Arab force which enters its territories against its will and without its prior consent, drawing attention to the numerous serious consequences which will result on the international level from this intervention.

Sixth: Should Lebanon feel apprehensive about being forsaken by its brothers, then any messenger of justice in the world would be as a brother and a neighbour to it. Lebanon is determined without any hesitation not to allow its rights to be compromised and its existence to come to an end.

Please accept my best regards.

118. President Ford Statements on Evacuating Americans From Beirut, June 18 and 20, 1976

STATEMENT OF JUNE 18

White House press release dated June 18

Due to the continuing uncertainty of the situation in Beirut, I have directed the U.S. Embassy there to assist in the departure by overland convoy to Damascus of U.S. citizens who wish to depart Lebanon at this time.

The convoy is expected to leave Beirut Saturday, and American citizens are being alerted both by the Embassy and by broadcast on the Voice of America to be prepared for departure at that time, if they so wish.

The remains of Ambassador Francis Meloy and Mr. Robert Waring have been brought to Damascus overland. They will be picked up by a U.S. plane and returned to the United States, arriving on Saturday.

Only those Embassy officials not essential to our continuing operations will be leaving Lebanon. The American Embassy in Beirut is to remain open to continue our efforts to help bring an end to the strife which has brought this tragedy to Lebanon.

STATEMENT OF JUNE 20

White House press release dated June 20

The evacuation operation [by sea] in Beirut today was completed successfully without incident. The success of this operation was made possible through the combined efforts of our Armed Forces and State Department personnel both here and in the field.

I want to express my deep appreciation and pride in the outstanding performance of all the men and women who contributed to this effort. We are grateful, as well, for the assistance of other governments and individuals that facilitated the evacuation. The United States will continue to play a positive role in seeking to restore stability and bring peace to Lebanon.

I would like to express to all those who played a part in the success of this operation my heartfelt thanks.

**119. Public Law 94-329 for Lebanon Relief and Rehabilitation,
Section 495C of the Foreign Assistance Act, June 30, 1976**

Sec. 495C.³⁰³ Lebanon Relief and Rehabilitation.—(a) The Congress, recognizing that prompt United States assistance is necessary to alleviate the human suffering arising from the civil strife in Lebanon and to restore the confidence of the people of Lebanon, authorizes the President to furnish assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, for the relief and rehabilitation of refugees and other needy people in Lebanon.

(b) There is authorized to be appropriated to the President for the purposes of this section, in addition to amounts otherwise available for such purposes, \$20,000,000, which amount is authorized to remain available until expended.³⁰⁴

(c) Assistance under this section shall be provided in accordance with the policies and general authority contained in section 491.

(d) Obligations incurred prior to the date of enactment of this section against other appropriations or accounts for the purpose of providing relief and rehabilitation assistance to the people of Lebanon may be charged to the appropriations authorized under this section.

(e) Not later than sixty days after the date of enactment of appropriations to carry out this section, and on a quarterly basis thereafter, the President shall transmit reports to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Appropriations of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives regarding the programing and obligation of funds under this section.

³⁰³ 22 USC 2202i. Sec. 495C was added by Sec. 416 of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.

³⁰⁴ FA Appropriations Act, 1977: "For necessary expenses to carry out the provisions of section 495C, \$20,000,000."

120. Arab Conference at Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Resolution on Cease-Fire and Arab Peace Force, October 18, 1976

The limited Arab summit conference which met in Riyadh, October 16-18, 1976, at the initiative of His Majesty King Khalid ibn 'Abd al-Aziz al-Saud, King of Saudi Arabia, and H.E. Sheikh Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah, Ruler of the State of Kuwait, having reviewed the resolution of the Arab League Council during the extraordinary sessions it held between June 8-10, June 23, July 1, and September 4, 1976...the conference resolves the following:

1. A ceasefire and an end to all hostilities throughout Lebanese territory and by all parties in a final manner, as from 6:00 a.m. on October 21, 1976. All parties must abide by this in every respect.
2. To reinforce the present Arab peace forces so as to become a deterrent force acting inside Lebanon and under the personal command of the President of the Republic, provided their numbers are about 30,000 soldiers. Among the basic functions of this force will be the following:
 - a) To improve adherence to the ceasefire and the cessation of hostilities, to separate the combatants and deter all violators.
 - b) To implement the Cairo Agreement and its appendices.
 - c) To maintain internal security.
 - d) To supervise the withdrawal of armed elements to the places they occupied before April 13, 1975, and to remove all armed manifestations in accordance with the schedule set forth in the appendix.
 - e) To supervise the gathering of all heavy arms such as artillery, mortars, rocket launchers, armoured vehicles, etc., with the various parties being held responsible for this.
 - f) To assist the Lebanese authorities when necessary to take over public institutions and utilities prior to reactivating them, and to protect public institutions, both civil and military.
3. To restore normal life to Lebanon to where it was before the beginning of these events, that is before April 13, 1975, as a first step and in accordance with the time schedule set forth in the appendix.

4. To implement the Cairo Agreement and its appendices and adherence to their text, in both letter and spirit, with the participating Arab states acting as guarantors. A committee shall be formed of representatives of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Syrian Arab Republic and the State of Kuwait, which shall undertake to coordinate its work with the President of Lebanon in all that concerns the implementation of the Cairo Agreement and its appendices. It shall function for 90 days starting from the date of the announcement of the ceasefire.

5. The Palestine Liberation Organization affirms its respect for Lebanon's sovereignty and well-being and its non-interference in its domestic affairs, all of which is based upon its total adherence to the national objectives of the Palestinian question. Lebanon's legitimate authorities, in return, guarantee the security and activities of the PLO in Lebanon within the framework of the Cairo Agreement and its appendices.

6. The participant Arab states undertake to respect Lebanon's sovereignty, security and unity, both of its people and of its territory.

7. The participant Arab states affirm their adherence to the resolutions of the Arab summits in Algeria and Rabat and their support for Palestinian resistance represented by the PLO as well as their

respect for the right of the Palestinian people to struggle in all ways to recover its national rights.

8. Information media:

a) All media campaigns and negative psychological mobilization by all parties are to cease.

b) The media are to be directed towards the consolidation of the ceasefire, the establishment of peace and the propagation of a spirit of cooperation and fraternity among all parties.

c) The governmental media must be reunified.

9. The schedule attached which pertains to the implementation of these resolutions is to be considered an inseparable part of them.

(Following is the text of the attached schedule which pertains to the implementation of the resolutions of the six-state summit conference:)

1. A ceasefire and an end to hostilities is proclaimed throughout Lebanese territory by all parties and in a final manner as from October 21, 1976 at 6:00 a.m.

2. Observation posts will be established by the deterrent force after setting up disengagement zones in areas of tension in order to consolidate the ceasefire and end the fighting.

3. Armed men are to be withdrawn, heavy weapons collected and armed manifestations ended in accordance with the following time schedule:

a) Mount Lebanon: this is to be completed within five days.

b) The South: this is to be completed within five days.

c) Beirut and its environs: this is to be completed within seven days.

d) The North: this is to be completed within ten days.

4. Reopening of international highways:

a) The following highways are to be reopened within five days: Beirut-Masna, Beirut-Tripoli-the frontier, Beirut-Tyre, Beirut-Sidon, Marjayoun-Masna.

b) Observation posts and patrols from the deterrent force are to be established on unsafe roads, in agreement with the relevant parties and the commander of the said force.

5. The legal Lebanese authorities shall take over all public utilities, institutions and buildings, both military and civil:

a) They shall undertake to clear them of all armed men and non-employees and to entrust the Arab peace force with protecting them and facilitating their operation by their employees after these have taken them over. This is to take place within ten days.

b) These utilities shall be handed over to a central Lebanese governmental committee which in turn will form special subcommittees for each utility and institution, in order to make an inventory of contents and take over.

6. The forces required to reinforce the Arab peace force shall be formed with the agreement of the President of Lebanon, and these forces shall arrive within two weeks.

7. The Cairo Agreement and its appendices shall be implemented at a second stage, especially as regards the presence of arms and ammunition in the camps and the withdrawal of Palestinian armed forces that entered the country after the start of events, it being understood that this implementation shall be completed within 45 days starting from the date of the formation of the Arab deterrent force.

121. Arab Summit Conference at Cairo, Egypt, Resolution on Assistance for Lebanon, October 26, 1976

The Kings and presidents of member states of the Arab League at their meeting in Cairo at the headquarters of the League of Arab States on October 25 and 26, 1976, having reviewed the current situation in Lebanon, the results of the actions adopted at the six-state Arab summit conference held in Riyadh on October 18, 1976, as well as the importance of Arab solidarity, resolve the following:

1. The current situation in Lebanon:

a.) To affirm the communiqué, the resolutions and the appendices issued at the six-state Arab summit conference issued in

Riyadh on October 18, 1976 and attached herewith.

b.) The Arab states shall contribute according to their abilities to the reconstruction of Lebanon; shall offer material aid necessary to remove all traces of armed conflict and of the damage sustained by the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples; they shall extend rapid aid to the Lebanese government and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

2. Strengthening of Arab solidarity:

To reaffirm the commitment of Arab Kings and presidents to the resolutions of summit conferences and League council meetings in this regard, especially to the Charter of Arab solidarity promulgated at the Casablanca summit conference on September 15, 1965, and to undertake to implement all these resolutions completely and at once.

3. Financing the Arab peace force:

The Arab Summit conference, with the aim of furnishing the necessary financial resources for the expenses of the Arab peace forces in Lebanon stipulated in Resolution No. 2 of the Riyadh summit conference resolutions, and having taken note of the report of the military secretariat of the Arab League, resolves the following:

a) To establish a special fund to take care of the expenditure and needs of the Arab peace forces in Lebanon.

b) Each member state of the Arab League shall contribute to this fund a certain percentage to be determined by each state according to its ability.

c) The president of Lebanon shall supervise this fund and shall, in consultation with the General Secretariat of the Arab League and with states contributing at least 10 percent, establish general regulations for the fund outlining how the money is to be spent and the manner of its liquidation at the end of its term. The present system as regards the Arab peace forces shall remain in force until a new system is established.

d. The fund shall be established for a period of six months, renewable by resolution of the League Council which would meet at the request of the President of Lebanon.

122. Lebanon Prime Minister Salim Al-Huss, Statement on Israeli Invasion, March 15, 1978

On what grounds does Israel hold Lebanon responsible for what happened near Tel Aviv on Saturday? ¹ If Israel tries to make a weak country like Lebanon a scapegoat, the world will condemn her in the strongest terms.

This attack has come at a time when Lebanon has not recovered from the consequences of the bitterest ordeal in her history, an ordeal such as few countries in the world have suffered, and to the causes of which Israel made an essential contribution. As for the anomalous situation in South Lebanon, the area that is the object of the iniquitous Israeli attack, Israel bears more responsibility for it than any other party. For it is Israel that prevented the Arab Deterrent Forces from entering the area to establish security with a view to restoring legitimate authority.

We condemn this unjustifiable aggression, which enjoys the sanction of neither custom nor principle, and we call on the world to support us in condemning this aggression and to take action to put an end to it.

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123. Israeli Defense Minister Weizman, Excerpts From Press Conference on Israeli Actions in Southern Lebanon, March 15, 1978

Good morning. The Israel Defense Forces are in the process of clearing Fatah and the rest of the nasty ones in south Lebanon bordering on north Israel from the coast of the Mediterranean to north of Metulla, northeast of Metulla. The chief of staff will elaborate [words indistinct] the south Lebanon for the last few years has been an area of concentration of terrorists. These Fatah, or these other organizations and that for years we've had troubles from south Lebanon, some from Lebanon itself, which came to a peak in the terrible tragedy of last Saturday on the Haifa-Tel Aviv road. We therefore decided, not as a retaliation, but as a major operation of clearing this infected area once and for all from areas bordering with our north.

The operation started at night, including support weapons and air force which, as I said, the chief of staff will elaborate--the operation is in process now within south Lebanon.

Up to now we have inflicted casualties--it is too early to say how many--but appreciable and substantial casualties to the enemy. I hope that this operation will contribute to returning to their senses of the organizations themselves who operate from south Lebanon and to whatever countries and forces that have some influence over them.

We shall continue to clear the area, prevent the area from being attack positions against us, as long as we find it necessary or as long as nobody else puts his foot down. Therefore, we don't see it as one operation, but we see it as a continuous preventive action in our northern borders. I do hope--and we've been doing our best to strike at and eliminate fighting forces--we've done our best and we'll do our best to prevent any human losses to the civilian population. Up to now, the operation in that respect has been going according to plan. In all respects, it has been going according to plan.

I do hope that Syria will understand that this is a limited action in south Lebanon. I do hope that the Government of Lebanon understands that this is a preventive action for protecting the lives of Israelis and I do hope that the rest of the civilized world will understand that this is an action to prevent disasters like the one that happened on Saturday.

[Weizman--in Hebrew] To the Hebrew press: Since the late hours of last night, there has been an operation in southern Lebanon by all arms of the IDF, including the air force and the navy. There is no doubt that this operation is coming in the wake of what happened in the disaster on Saturday. It is, however, not a retaliatory operation in the customary sense. This is an operation attempting to--and I think it will succeed--destroy and liquidate as best as possible concentrations of terrorists in southern Lebanon, concentrations which, particularly in recent weeks and months, have been reinforced both on land and on the sea with arms and personnel, and for which southern Lebanon and the whole of Lebanon served as a launching base for operations against the State of Israel.

It is not the objective of the Government of Israel either to hold or to remain in southern Lebanon. Southern Lebanon is a part of sovereign Lebanon, provided the sovereign government of southern [as heard] Lebanon is capable of controlling the situation. The president of Lebanon, President Sarkis, or more precisely, President Sarkis asserted yesterday that his government had no control over southern Lebanon. I confirm this. Thus, since this lack of control contributed, among other things, to the fact that the territory south of the Litani River in particular, and also in other Lebanese areas, served as a launching base for terrorists, the government decided and ordered the IDF to enter certain areas in southern Lebanon to enforce order there, with the aim that eventually and hopefully, a lawful and sovereign government of Lebanon will be capable of maintaining the regular and tranquil life of the citizens of the south and of citizens in the north of Israel.

The operation is a relatively large-scale operation. So far we have followed the plan. We are now in the middle of the military movement, and I hope that in the course of today, tomorrow and during the night, the IDF spokesman will be able to give you more precise details.

Among other things, we deem it our task or aim not to involve or expand ourselves any farther than southern Lebanon. I hope the Government of Syria understands this, that the operation we have undertaken is meant to defend ourselves and that it has no other aim. I hope other governments the world over understand this too. Explicit instructions have been issued to the IDF to endeavor as much as this is possible--in war such a thing is not usually acceptable--that citizens and, especially women and children, are not hit. The IDF is making that endeavor.

I hope that we shall very quickly reach a situation where we shall have accomplished our task and we shall return the situation in southern Lebanon to what it had been in the past--one of the calmest areas in the Middle East.

124. U.N. Security Council Resolution 425, Calling for Israeli Withdrawal From Lebanon and the Creation of the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL), March 19, 1978

RESOLUTION 425 (1978)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 2074th meeting
on 19 March 1978

The Security Council,

Taking note of the letters of the Permanent Representative of Lebanon (S/12600 and S/12606) and the Permanent Representative of Israel (S/12607),

Having heard the statements of the Permanent Representatives of Lebanon and Israel,

Gravely concerned at the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, and its consequences to the maintenance of international peace.

Convinced that the present situation impedes the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East,

1. Calls for strict respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries;
2. Calls upon Israel immediately to cease its military action against Lebanese territorial integrity and withdraw forthwith its forces from all Lebanese territory;
3. Decides, in the light of the request of the Government of Lebanon, to establish immediately under its authority a United Nations interim force for southern Lebanon for the purpose of confirming the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restoring international peace and security and assisting the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area, the force to be composed of personnel drawn from States Members of the United Nations;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council within twenty-four hours on the implementation of this resolution.

125. French Prime Minister Raymond Barre, Statement Before the National Assembly on the Situation in Lebanon, October 18, 1978

Yesterday [Deputy] Pierre Messmer asked me a question about the distressing problem in Lebanon. I would like to reply to it now before your questions to the government in order to give the Assembly all the necessary information about developments in the situation in that country.

I understand the emotion generated by the events in Lebanon both in Parliament and the country as a whole. I share these feelings not only in my capacity as Prime Minister but, if you will allow me to introduce a personal note, as a university professor receiving sad news from his former Lebanese students about the tragedy in their country and the tragedy in their personal lives.

Several times, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and I have had occasion to say how much the government shares the anguish felt by every French person at the conflicts which have made a blood bath of Lebanon for more than three years. Added to this was horror at the suffering endured by a population of innocent civilians, particularly during the shelling of Beirut and the murderous fighting recently staged in that city.

The President and the government have stepped up their efforts so that France might help by all possible means to bring about a lasting solution to a crisis in a country bound to France by history. Our action has most often been pursued privately--we have been criticized for this--but despite the violent emotions in this conflict, results have been achieved. It is not by chance that the Security Council under the presidency of France called for an immediate cease-fire in Beirut on October 7. The decision was a unanimous one, which is remarkable. It was the result of intense diplomatic activity on the part of France.

The President of the Republic wrote to President Assad, President Carter and Mr. Brezhnev in order to back President Sarkis' efforts to bring the fighting to a halt. At the same time the Minister of Foreign Affairs was making numerous contacts in New York to the same end. Our ambassadors to Beirut and Damascus have constantly approached the authorities concerned in order to put a stop to the tragedy. France has therefore worked actively and effectively to bring about a cease-fire.

Since then, we have not relaxed our efforts because everything must be done to strengthen a truce that is still fragile. In Beirut, our ambassador is in continual communication with the Lebanese government, with the Christian leaders of the National Liberal party and the Phalangists, and also with the Moslem leaders. In the Arab countries that have contingents in the Arab Deterrent Force or are financing its operations, our representatives have been instructed to approach those governments so that when the force is renewed, which is to be done shortly, the responsibilities will be distributed in a more balanced manner.

Lastly, we have urged the Israeli authorities to refrain from intervening at all costs, to keep from aggravating the conflict still further. The French government, by all these initiatives, is seeking to assist President Sarkis in his difficult task.

We have also acted on the humanitarian level: a French surgical unit was set up yesterday afternoon in the Christian zone, on the premises of the school at Aayaltoun.

What has been done, what is being done and will continue to be done reflects the outpouring of sympathy that has made everyone in France feel for the Lebanese in their trouble, particularly for the fate of the Christian community that is so close to us in every respect and whose future is so threatened.

In the tragedy now unfolding in Lebanon, the important thing is not to pass judgments, still less to assign blame, even though it is at times necessary to recall that emotion or sympathy must not be allowed to generate bias. What is important, what is urgent, is to strengthen a fragile cease-fire by approaching all the responsible parties. This is what France is doing.

What is important, what is urgent, is to work for national reconciliation in Lebanon by endeavoring to get those on both sides who are not inclined to listen to reason to do so.

Accordingly, we are saying this to our Lebanese friends, without exception: Your place, like that of every leader of Lebanon's communities, is by President Sarkis' side; it is to restore peace, reestablish the state, give the legitimate authority of your country the means to maintain order and security, means that are Lebanese and Lebanese only. You must not rely on foreign support to settle your problems but on yourselves. Establish dialogue immediately between the Christian and Moslem communities, a dialogue that is capable of leading to national concord, which is the only guarantee for the survival of a united and peaceful Lebanon and the only valid and lasting guarantee for the Christian community. This is what France is doing.

What is important, what is urgent, is to help restore the cohesiveness, unity and integrity of Lebanon, which is an indispensable element for a firm and lasting settlement of the problem of the Middle East. This is what France is doing.

The government has had and will continue to have but one single concern: to do everything in its power so that Lebanon, a country dear to France, may find peace again; so that

the trials and suffering inflicted on innocent civilians may cease; so that Lebanon's communities, and in the very first place the Christian community, may be snatched from a suicidal chain of events caused by fratricidal dissension and confrontation.

I ask the entire Assembly to join with the government in expressing the profound attachment our country feels for Lebanon in its time of trial and to express the fervent wish that this country may soon, in unity, regain its independence and prosperity.

126. U.N. General Assembly Resolution 33/146, Concerning the Reconstruction of Lebanon, December 20, 1978

The General Assembly,

Deeply concerned about the tragic loss of life and the immense damage to the economic structure and to property and about the disruption of society in Lebanon resulting from the hostilities during the past four years,

Aware of the magnitude of the unmet needs for the relief of the Lebanese people and the reconstruction and development of Lebanon,

Bearing in mind the concern expressed by Member States about the grave situation in Lebanon and their interest in its return to normal conditions of life and its reconstruction and development,

Affirming the urgent need for an international action to assist the Government of Lebanon in its efforts for relief, reconstruction and development,

Noting the appeals of the Secretary-General for relief and other forms of assistance to Lebanon and the creation of a special fund for this purpose,

Noting also resolution 65 (V) of 6 October 1978 of the Economic Commission for Western Asia in which the Commission considered that the assistance for the reconstruction and development of Lebanon exceeded the capabilities and resources of the Government of Lebanon,

1. Endorses the appeal of the Secretary-General for international assistance to Lebanon;

2. Urges all Governments to contribute to the reconstruction of Lebanon, either through existing bilateral and multilateral channels, or, in addition, through a special fund to be established by the Secretary-General for this purpose;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to establish at Beirut a joint co-ordinating committee of the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system to co-ordinate their assistance and advice to the Government of Lebanon in all matters relating to reconstruction and development;

4. Decides that the Committee on Assistance for the Reconstruction and Development of Lebanon, headed by a co-ordinator appointed by the Secretary-General, shall also assist the Government of Lebanon in the assessment, formulation and phasing of aid and ensure its implementation within the framework of the needs of Lebanon;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all possible assistance to the Committee in discharging its duties and to establish, in the manner he deems appropriate, a mode of consultation with representatives of the countries providing assistance;

6. Further requests the Secretary-General to report to the Economic and Social Council at its first regular session of 1979 and to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session on the progress achieved in the implementation of the present resolution.

127. U.N. Security Council Resolution 450, Concerning Attacks Against Lebanon, June 14, 1979

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

Recalling its resolutions 425 (1978) and 426 (1978) of 19 March 1978, 427 (1978) of 3 May 1978, and 434 (1978) of 18 September 1978, and the statement of the President of the Security Council of 8 December 1978 (S/12958),

Recalling also, and particularly, resolution 444 (1979) of 19 January 1979, and the statements of the President of the Security Council of 26 April 1979 (S/13272) and of 15 May 1979 (S/PV.2144),

Having studied the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (S/13384),

Acting in response to the request of the Government of Lebanon and noting with concern the questions raised in its letters addressed to the Security Council on 7 May 1979 (S/13301), 30 May 1979 (S/13361) and 11 June 1979 (S/13387),

Reaffirming its call for the strict respect for the territorial integrity, unity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon within its internationally recognized boundaries,

Expressing its anxiety about the continued existence of obstacles against the full deployment of the Force and the

threats to its very security, its freedom of movement and the safety of its headquarters which prevented the completion of the phased programme of activities,

Convinced that the present situation has serious consequences for peace and security in the Middle East and impedes the achievement of a just, comprehensive and durable peace in the area,

1. *Strongly deplores* acts of violence against Lebanon that have led to the displacement of civilians, including Palestinians, and brought about destruction and loss of innocent lives;

2. *Calls upon* Israel to cease forthwith its acts against the territorial integrity, unity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon, in particular, its incursions into Lebanon and the assistance it continues to lend to irresponsible armed groups;

3. *Calls also upon* all parties concerned to refrain from activities inconsistent with the objectives of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and to co-operate for the fulfilment of these objectives;

4. *Reiterates* that the objectives of the Force as set out in resolutions 425 (1978), 426 (1978) and 444 (1979) must be obtained;

5. *Highly commends* the performance of the Force and reiterates its terms of reference as set out in the Secretary-General's report of 19 March 1978 (S/12611) and approved by resolution 426 (1978), in particular, that the Force must be enabled to function as an efficient military unit, that it must enjoy freedom of movement and communication and other facilities necessary for the performance of its tasks and that it must continue to be able to discharge its duties according to the above-mentioned terms of reference, including the right of self-defence;

6. *Reaffirms* the validity of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Lebanon in accordance with its relevant decisions and resolutions and calls upon the parties to take the necessary steps to reactivate the Mixed Armistice Commission and to ensure full respect for the safety and freedom of action of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization;

7. *Urges* all Member States which are in a position to do so to bring their influence to bear on those concerned, so that the Force can discharge its responsibilities fully and unhampered;

8. *Decides* to renew the mandate of the Force for six months, that is, until 19 December 1979;

9. *Reaffirms* its determination, in the event of continuing obstruction of the mandate of the Force, to examine practical ways and means in accordance with relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations to secure the full implementation of resolution 425 (1978);

10. *Decides* to remain seized of the question.

128. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Letter to Committee on Foreign Affairs Concerning the Use of United States Weapons in Attacks Against Lebanon, July 1979

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have received a letter dated July 23 from Congressman Findley concerning recent military actions by Israeli defense forces which involved the use of U.S.-supplied equipment, a copy of which is enclosed. There follows my response.

The United States has repeatedly and publicly condemned the deplorable acts of terrorism by Palestinians and the tragic cycle of violence that has followed, which have inflicted casualties and human suffering on innocent people in both Israel and Lebanon.

During this recent period of intensified conflict, Israel's military operations in Lebanon have involved the use of defense articles furnished to Israel by the United States under the Foreign Military Sales program. The purposes for which these articles may be used by Israel are set out in the bilateral Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of July 23, 1952, which fulfills the requirements of the Arms Export Control Act.


In the circumstances, I am reporting that a violation of the 1952 Agreement may have occurred by reason of such actions as Israel's July 22 airstrikes and the deployment in Southern Lebanon of U.S.-supplied artillery subject to U.S. law.

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The complex and dangerous situation in Lebanon has been the subject of frequent discussions with the Lebanese Government, the Israeli Government, the Syrian Government, the United Nations, and all governments and quarters with influence on events there. Our concern over the use of U.S. military equipment has been made clear, in discussions with senior officials of the Israeli Government. We are satisfied at this time that the Government of Israel is fully aware of the gravity with which we view the current trend to the conflict in Lebanon. We are continuing to watch this situation with seriousness and concern; further action on our part will depend upon the course of events and our assessment of them.

I am providing the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with copies of this statement of our views and Congressman Findley's letter. I will advise the Congress of any further developments in our efforts regarding this matter.

Sincerely,

James Vance

Enclosure

129. Irish Foreign Minister O'Kennedy Speaking for the European Community at the U.N. General Assembly on the Problem in Lebanon, September 25, 1979

35. The problem of the Lebanon is clearly related to the larger problem of the Middle East as a whole. The Nine have frequently reaffirmed their support for its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. They did so most recently in a statement issued by the Nine Foreign Ministers at their meeting in Dublin on 11 September. This statement also recognised the courageous efforts made by the Lebanese Government to promote the security of its people and the restoration of its authority over the whole of its territory.

36. Violence has nevertheless continued in several parts of Lebanon. The Nine recognise that there has been some improvement in the situation particularly in the south of the country since the recent meeting of the Security Council requested by the Government of the Lebanon. They are concerned however about the constant harassment of UNIFIL of which certain members of the Nine form part, and about the difficulties which have been placed in its way as it attempts to fulfill its mandate. They are particularly disturbed about the military and financial aid provided from outside Lebanon to those who have made it difficult for the United Nations force to carry out its mandate. They call on all parties to give full support to UNIFIL and to respect the decisions of the Security Council.

**130. Statement by Hodding Carter, U.S. Department of State on
the Trip of Ambassador Habib to Lebanon, October 22, 1979**

“At the request of Secretary Vance, Ambassador Phillip Habib leaves today on a fact-finding trip about the situation in Lebanon. Beginning October 23, he will visit Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Israel. He may also stop at the Vatican and Paris on his way home. At each stop he plans to solicit the views on the government and other leaders on ways to bring peace to Lebanon. Ambassador Habib plans to return to Washington about November 1 to report his findings.”

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130. Statement by Haddad (Latter) U.S. Department of State on
the Trial of Ambassador Haddad in Lebanon, October 28, 1982

On October 28, 1982, Ambassador Haddad was taken to the
Lebanese court and held in custody. The court is a
tribunal established by the Lebanese government in 1981
to try those responsible for the assassination of
President Ezer Weizman. The court is composed of
judges appointed by the Lebanese government. The
trial is expected to last several months.

(S)

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