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1st Session

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GOVERNMENT

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THE SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY IN ASIA:
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REPORT

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STUDY MISSION TO HONG KONG, THAILAND,
VIETNAM, SRI LANKA, PAKISTAN, AND
THE SOVIET UNION, AUGUST 6-24, 1979

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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FOREWORD

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C.

The following report has been submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives by a delegation of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs which visited Asia and the Soviet Union from August 4 to 24, 1979. The report is being printed for use by the Congress in its deliberations on matters affecting U.S. relations with the nations of Asia and the Soviet Union.

The views and findings in the report are those of the congressional delegation, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,
Chairman.

(III)

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Attached is a report with recommendations by a delegation of the Congress to Asia led by the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, which I have the honor to chair. Our group of 12 Members included: Representatives Clarence Long, chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations; Guyer and Ireland of the Foreign Affairs Committee; Bowen of Foreign Affairs, also chairman of the Agriculture Subcommittee on Cotton; Gilman of Foreign Affairs, and the Select Committee on Narcotics; Lagomarsino of Foreign Affairs, and chairman of the Republican Foreign Policy Taskforce; Scheuer of the Narcotics Committee and chairman of the Consumer Protection and Finance Subcommittee; Moorhead of Judiciary; Stark of the Narcotics Committee and Ways and Means; Dornan of the Narcotics Committee; and Evans, chairman of the Special Task Force on the DEA of the Narcotics Committee.

I list the committee affiliations and chairmanships of the Members because they illustrate the degree of expertise, and diversity, with which our delegation approached the mission. The effectiveness of the various task forces we established to explore U.S. aid projects, for example, and the narcotics question, was greatly enhanced by the energies and expertise of Members who have specialized in such matters in their normal activities in Washington. I wish to thank all of them for their dedication and generosity in giving so much to the mission, and in helping to make it the successful mission that it was.

Between August 6 and 24, 1979, our delegation visited Hong Kong, Thailand, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union. In the Southeast Asian portion of the mission, we focused on issues including Vietnam's followup on the Geneva Conference on refugees, Vietnam's relations with Russia and China and the United States, the situation in the ASEAN nations in the face of the tensions between Vietnam and China, and the threat of renewed war over the fate of Kampuchea.

We also emphasized our continuing determination to secure as final as possible an accounting for our men still listed as missing in action in Southeast Asia. Representatives Guyer, Dornan, and Gilman deserve special commendation for their work on the MIA task force. Special thanks should also be given to Capt. Ray Vohden, U.S. Navy, who accompanied our delegation to Hanoi, and to Lt. Col. Paul Mather, USA, who came from Bangkok to assist us in the sensitive, in-depth discussions we had on MIA/POW issues in Hanoi.

In Sri Lanka and Pakistan, the delegation examined U.S. aid projects and the issues of Indian Ocean talks and the role of the

nonaligned movement. In Pakistan, the thorny issue of allegations that Pakistan is pursuing a course of nuclear development which will give her a weapons option was fully and frankly discussed.

Soviet policy in Asia, as well as the Pakistan-Afghan-Soviet issue and the effects of the Sino-Soviet rivalry in Asia, have long been a concern of the subcommittee. Consequently, this mission spent several days in the U.S.S.R., meeting with members of the Supreme Soviet, including top Communist Party, Foreign Office, and academic specialists on Asia, as well as other officials and individuals interested in the broad range of bilateral United States-Soviet concerns.

At each of our stops in the U.S.S.R.—in Tashkent, Moscow, and Leningrad—we discussed with our hosts, the Supreme Soviet, and with local party leaders, the human rights concerns of the American people, as well as the strategic concerns of SALT, and the foreign policy issues of the Sino-Soviet and triangular United States-China-Soviet relationship.

These issues and others will be fully discussed, with recommendations, where appropriate, in the following report.

In transmitting this report, the delegation would like to commend Lt. Col. Michael Eiland, U.S. Army, a political and military affairs adviser to Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, for his efforts in preparing for the mission, and in adding immeasurably to its success as our State Department escort officer. Lt. Col. James Kanouse, U.S. Army, served as our military escort officer in an outstanding manner. We would also like to thank staff members Chris Nelson and Jon Holstine of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Dr. Laura Sherman of the Select Committee on Narcotics, and Don Richbourg of the Appropriations Subcommittee staff for their contributions during the mission, and for their assistance in preparing this report.

In conclusion, we must thank our Soviet expert, Marshall Shulman, special adviser to the Secretary of State, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia, Robert Oakley; and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, Jane Coon for their participation in briefing the delegation prior to the mission, and in helping us to assess the results of the mission on our return.

Sincerely,

LESTER L. WOLFF,

Chairman, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.

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INTRODUCTION

Asia today is becoming locked in an evertightening circle of fear formed by the Sino-Soviet rivalry, but with links in the chain forged by traditional animosities which are frequently independent of the global struggle. These links include: the renewed threat of war between Vietnam and China, the related, ongoing tragedy in Cambodia, and the flight of refugees from Indochina. They also include the danger of nuclear proliferation in the subcontinent, which stems from the traditional India-Pakistan rivalry, but which is also fueled by the civil war in Afghanistan.

If regional stability is to be secured, and if the goal of world peace and economic progress is to have any long-term chance of success, then ways must be found to break the chain of fear and tension which, unresolved, will produce more war and the threat of global hostilities.

During its recent mission to Asia and the Soviet Union, a delegation from Congress led by the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Foreign Affairs Committee explored possible keys to opening the locks on the China-Vietnam-Cambodia crisis, the situation in Pakistan, the role of the nonaligned states, and the overall triangular relationship between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the People's Republic of China.

The mission was planned as part of a continuing process whereby the Congress exercises oversight, and can assess the progress and efficiency of U.S. economic and military assistance programs in Asia, as well as the regional political, military, and economic developments which impact on U.S. interests and policies. The mission was also designed to serve as a counterpoint to the China visit of July 1978, where many of the issues pursued this summer, particularly with Vietnam and the Soviet Union, were first raised within the context of the Sino-Soviet rivalry, and the triangular relationship among the U.S.-U.S.S.R.-PRC.¹

In addition to specific bilateral concerns in each nation the delegation visited, the report will examine in depth issues including:

SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY AND THE TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIP

Throughout the mission, as in the work of the subcommittee for the past several years, the delegation examined the role of the Sino-Soviet rivalry in Southeast Asia, as well as its impact on East-West relations, and the triangular relationship between Washington, Moscow, and Peking. As the delegation stated in Moscow, the United States is not attempting to play a "China card" against the Soviet Union. Rather, the United States seeks an orderly, balanced relationship with each nation, one with appropriate social and economic cooperation. The delegation stressed that the United States does not seek a military or strategic alliance with either Peking or Moscow against the other,

¹ A New Realism: Factfinding Mission to the People's Republic of China, July 3-13, 1978; report of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, December 1978.

does not plan military sales to either, and is fully aware of the implications of sophisticated technological transfers with military applications.

CAMBODIA AND VIETNAM

A principal finding of this delegation was that the issue of the future of Kampuchea (Cambodia) is a key to preserving peace and stability in Southeast Asia. The delegation discussed the question of normalization between Washington and Hanoi. Our judgment is that unless the Kampuchean question is resolved, the danger of renewed hostilities between Vietnam and China, and the threat to Thailand's borders will not be significantly affected by any improvement in Washington-Hanoi relations, no matter how desirable that might be in and of itself.

REFUGEES

In both Indochina and the subcontinent, the humanitarian plight of hundreds of thousands of refugees continues despite the progress made at the Geneva Conference in July. Following up on the subcommittee's previous mission in January, the delegation inspected refugee camps in Hong Kong and Thailand, then conducted indepth discussions with Vietnamese officials on the issues of safe emigration policies, and fair treatment of those who wish to leave the country. In Pakistan, the delegation explored new ground, visiting a camp of Afghan refugees—one of several containing some 200,000 refugees, at last estimate. Unlike the Indochinese refugees, the Afghans had not received any attention, or compassion, from the world community. Following the delegation's visit, the UNHCR announced it would incorporate the Afghan camps into its system, a move the delegation welcomes.

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

The delegation visited Pakistan at a time of greatly heightened tensions stemming from months of reports that Pakistan is engaged in a program to produce enriched uranium, hence implying the option of producing nuclear weapons. Tensions were exacerbated, just prior to the delegation's arrival, when there were press reports to the effect that the United States was considering possibly convert military action against Pakistan's nuclear program.

In January 1978, the subcommittee visited India, and held extensive discussion with then Prime Minister Desai on the nuclear issue. At that time, the delegation was assured that India under no circumstances would pursue a nuclear weapons option, but that India would not sign any treaties to that effect until the United States, the U.S.S.R., and China reached a comprehensive disarmament agreement.

While the present delegation was in Pakistan, the new Indian Government announced that if Pakistan were to produce a nuclear weapon, India would have to reassess its position on the production of the bomb. The Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, as well as other committees of the Congress, has held many hearings and briefings on this vital issue, and will continue to monitor the situation in the future. Later sections of this report, and the delegation's recommendations, deal specifically with this question.

THE ROLE OF THE NONALINED NATIONS

The delegation visited Sri Lanka on the eve of that nation's handing over the chairmanship of the nonalined movement to Cuba, with the expiration of Sri Lanka's 3-year term. In Sri Lanka, and again in the Soviet Union, the delegation raised in the strongest terms its concern that the nonalined movement remain independent of alliances, particularly military alliances, with any other nation, much less with one of the superpowers, if it is to remain a credible power on the world scene. Since the delegation's visit, the events at the Havana Summit only serve to underscore the concerns articulated in Colombo and Moscow.

HUMAN RIGHTS

As in previous subcommittee missions to the Philippines, South Korea, and throughout Southeast Asia, the delegation stressed the conviction of the Congress and the American people that human rights be not only a catch-word. On the present mission, the human right issue was particularly emphasized in Hanoi, and throughout the Soviet Union, where the issues of emigration for refuseniks, and fair play for dissidents, form a principal backdrop to United States-Soviet bilateral relations, including the vital issues of SALT, and increased economic and social cooperation. The delegation's presentation to the Supreme Soviet, and other conversations, such as a transcript of a meeting between the delegation and representatives of the dissident and refusenik community in Moscow will be presented in the appropriate section of this report.

In Sri Lanka, the delegation met with members of the Tamil minority, and held indepth discussions with Government officials on their programs to safeguard the legal, economic, and social rights of the Tamil minority.

MIA's/POW's

Vietnamese authorities indicated that because of humanitarian concerns, they have continued the search for information on our men still listed as missing in action, even though normalization talks broke off a year ago. While taking note of the question implied by this statement, the delegation welcomes these expressions of good will, and urges that promised steps, particularly the admission of U.S. personnel to Vietnam to work with their Vietnamese counterparts, be regularized. Specifically, we have requested the Government of Vietnam to approve the regular liaison mission of Lieutenant Colonel Mather, U.S. Army, or his designates, to work with Ambassador Vu Hoang and his office on the 100 files turned over to the Ambassador by the delegation, and on other matters which may arise.

U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Always a topic of interest on subcommittee missions, the effectiveness of U.S. programs in Thailand, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan were the subject of special focus by the task force led by Representative Clarence Long, Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations. Chairman Long's findings appear as a part of this overall report.

NARCOTICS

A task force of the delegation drawn from the members of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control conducted in-depth briefings by U.S. enforcement personnel in each nation, where appropriate, and met with drug officials of the host government in every nation, including the Soviet Union. Some new ground was broken in the Soviet Union, particularly in terms of stressing the need for increased Soviet participation in the world antinarcotics fight, prompted by the potential trafficking threat represented by the increase in tourism anticipated for next year's Olympic games. A detailed report on the narcotics portion of the mission will be published separately by the select committee.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. SINO-SOVIET RIVALRY AND THE TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIP

Recommendation A.—That the United States must not be perceived as playing nor should it play the so-called “China card” against the Soviet Union. Therefore, if “linkage” is to be applied on the extension of MFN and other agreements with U.S.S.R. because of Soviet military or political actions, likewise such linkage must be applied to the People’s Republic of China if it continues to pursue a military solution to problems in Southeast Asia.

Recommendation B.—The United States must pursue Salt II, and move beyond Salt II to the area of mutual conventional arms reduction.

Recommendation C.—The United States should encourage any steps, including the border talks between China and the U.S.S.R., which could lead to a reduction of tensions along the Sino-Soviet border. This would be a key move toward reducing the threat of conflict in Asia, and thus promoting stability in the region.

DISCUSSION

Increasingly, U.S. actions have called into question the assertion that we are not playing the “China card” against the U.S.S.R. While the Chinese invasion of Vietnam was condemned, no concrete U.S. action followed, as has been the case of the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, where strong U.S. sanctions against Vietnam are still in effect.

That United States-China relations should be appropriately pursued and enhanced is not challenged. Indeed, the Soviets also agree to this. However, the facts of the United States-Soviet relationship, including SALT, and questions of MFN, trade and scientific exchange of vital interest to the entire Western world, would seem to call for greater U.S. concern about the effects of moves made toward China without full consideration of the need for balance. This would be the case even without the added fact of the key Soviet role in Southeast Asia through Moscow’s relations with Hanoi, and its underwriting of the occupation of Kampuchea.

Thus, while the United States-China relationship seems bent on making up in 1 year for the neglect of 30, the Soviets are increasingly contrasting the handling of MFN, and issues such as high technology transfers between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. The congressional delegation (the Codel) therefore has recommended that if linkage is to be applied to United States-Soviet trade, scientific and social relations on the basis of Soviet strategic and military activities—not to mention human rights concerns—then, likewise, equal standards must be applied to the People’s Republic of China for its activities. In a subsequent section, the delegation will discuss the relevance of “linkage” to United States-Vietnamese bilateral relations.

The charge is made that the Soviets are actively engaged in a program of military expansionism and destabilization throughout Asia, if not the world. Certainly the Delegation recognizes the unfortunate Soviet policies regarding the occupied islands off Japan, and that a border dispute between the People's Republic of China and the U.S.S.R. dates back to czarist times. The delegation also recognizes the extension of the traditionally close Soviet ties to the Afghan Government to levels which emphasize military support, and which, thus, may not serve the interests of stability on the subcontinent.

Finally, the delegation shares with the ASEAN nations, Japan and others in the region concern lest increased Soviet naval and air activities be formalized into new basing facilities which might alter the present strategic situation. To date, however, Vietnam has resisted Soviet attempts to establish permanent bases, and the ASEAN nations have denied Soviet requests to make any port call at all, much less on a regular basis.

Misperceived motives and goals have been a characteristic of much American policy in Asia over the years. The delegation does not wish to minimize concerns over the potentials inherent in any Soviet activity in Asia, quite the contrary. But the delegation is concerned that opportunities to break the chains of tension may well be missed because each side misunderstands the nature of the other's activities.

The delegation believes that for the present, at least, the Soviets are reacting on the basis of two misperceptions of U.S. policy in Asia. As was made clear by the delegation in its discussions with representatives of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, the Soviet Union presently holds two incorrect assessments of U.S. Asia policy.

The first, that the United States is playing the "China card," the second, that the United States is "withdrawing" from Asia and adopting a so-called "island strategy."

Far from withdrawing from Asia, the United States, as a Pacific nation, remains committed to maintaining the territorial integrity of all nations, as well as a stable, peaceful equilibrium in Asia. The adjustments in American posture that followed the end of the Vietnam war are complete. The U.S. Pacific Fleet and its support forces remain strong. U.S. alliances with our traditional friends and allies in the region are likewise enduring. The delegation specifically called the attention of its Soviet hosts to President Carter's reaffirmation of the Manila Pact in the wake of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea and the threat to Thailand. The delegation noted that the planned U.S. redeployment from South Korea, while still a long-range policy goal, has been halted because it would lead to instability in the face of North Korea's continual force buildup.

Regarding the "China card" issue, the delegation made clear to its Soviet hosts the points inherent in its recommendations, specifically, that the United States does not intend to play such a "card," that the United States does not intend a military relationship with the People's Republic, and that the United States will closely monitor high technology transfers.

On the other hand, the delegation made it clear to the Supreme Soviet representatives that the United States considers normalization between Washington and Peking to be in the best interests of peace and stability in the region, and the world. This normalization is not

directed against the Soviet Union, or any third country, and the delegation noted that the Soviets had long supported normalization between Washington and Peking. Indeed, the delegation felt constrained to point out that Moscow recognized Peking 30 years ago, and had already poured billions in military and high technology assistance into the People's Republic of China.

Specifically regarding the Sino-Soviet split, the delegation emphasized that the United States would welcome a reduction of tensions along the Sino-Soviet border as a step toward reducing world tensions.

For the People's Republic of China, it should be noted that during the subcommittee's July 1978 mission to Peking Chinese officials including Deng Xiaoping frankly stated that their Vietnam policy was directed at the Soviet Union, which they described as seeking to encircle China, and to secure regional domination of Southeast Asia through the "Asian Cuba," Vietnam.

The present delegation's conversations in Moscow were hardly more reassuring, and at one point, a top Soviet foreign policy official was told his remarks echoed 1950's Cold War rhetoric at its worst. As examination of the delegation's talks in Moscow will show, aspects of the conversations were also disturbingly racist, including remnants of the old "Yellow Peril" argument.

It is within such a context that the U.S. opposition to the Chinese attack on Vietnam must be viewed. Citing the importance of a settlement of the issue of Kampuchea, the United States continues to maintain its opposition to any resumption of hostilities along the Sino-Vietnamese border, or through Laos. The delegation's recommendations put it clearly on record as to possible sanctions which should be considered if China again resorts to war. However, the delegation also clearly recognizes the task and the responsibility of the international community, as well as the United States, in helping to relieve the tensions created by the situation in Kampuchea. This is a common responsibility shared by the Soviet Union as well, and this point was made clear by the delegation during its mission.

The necessity of a solution to the future of Kampuchea, being directly linked to future Chinese action as well as possible Soviet, Southeast Asian, and Western reactions, will be discussed in the recommendations following this section.

In conclusion, the delegation notes that the Sino-Soviet rivalry manifests itself in competition, however limited, to give various levels of support to guerrilla activities in Southeast Asia. Long a bone of contention between China and the ASEAN nations, particularly Thailand and Malaysia, and in Burma, the People's Republic of China is now reportedly scaling down support for these movements. At present, each of these insurgencies has been well within the capacity of the individual nations to handle. However, recently, particularly in Thailand, traditionally pro-People's Republic of China guerrillas have been seeking support from Hanoi, and hence from the Soviet Union. The Vietnamese have not responded. However, should these insurrections grow in intensity, the cause of peace and stability

in the region would be seriously threatened regardless of any solution to the problems of Kampuchea, and along the Chinese-Vietnamese border.

2. VIETNAM-CAMBODIA

Recommendation A.—The delegation feels that a key to preserving peace in Southeast Asia lies in international cooperation in resolving the question of freedom and neutrality for the people of Kampuchea. Unless or until the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea is ended, the threat of a revival of the Pol Pot regime removed, and the opportunity of free expression of political will for the people of Kampuchea provided, the essential preconditions for peace in the region will not exist.

Recommendation B.—That regardless of the political and strategic situation in Kampuchea, all of the parties involved, including the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the authorities in Phnom Penh, the forces of Pol Pot, and the Khmer Serai, must cooperate with the United Nations/International Red Cross emergency food and medical relief efforts. This cooperation must include provisions for end-use monitoring of supplies to insure that the people of Kampuchea are receiving what they need to survive.¹

Recommendation C.—The delegation agrees with the stated U.S. Government position that there are no preconditions to normalization of relations between the United States and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. However, objective analysis of obstacles introduced since the talks began by Vietnam, the situation in Kampuchea, the continuing uncertainty on the security of Thailand and the ASEAN nations, and the need for actual performance on Hanoi's pledges on refugees and orderly emigration indicates that the time for normalization has not arrived.

Recommendation D.—The delegation urges recognition of the need for reciprocity between Vietnam and the United States so that an end to the trade embargo, and an end to U.S. opposition to multilateral assistance, can naturally flow from the course of events. Issues of concern include:

(1) Treatment of would-be emigrants, and performance of the pledges made at the Geneva Conference on Refugees, including family reunification, and orderly emigration through safe methods;

(2) Cooperation in an international settlement on Kampuchea; and

(3) Continued progress in providing a final accounting on MIA's and POW's [discussed in a subsequent section].

DISCUSSION

The future of Kampuchea is a key to preserving peace and stability in the region. The occupation of Kampuchea continues to provide the

¹ On Sept. 27, the House unanimously approved H. Res. 431, introduced by Hon. Lester L. Wolff, calling for an international relief program for Cambodia. On Oct. 17, 1979, the subcommittee recommended approval of H.R. 5519, authorizing \$35 million for Cambodian disaster relief. On Oct. 24, President Carter announced a \$69 million U.S. contribution to a UN/ICRC Cambodian relief program which incorporated \$30 million approved by the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the full House.

People's Republic of China with what that nation considers to be an intolerable situation, given its view that Vietnam is acting as a client of the Soviet Union. Thus, regardless of other interpretations of the historical causes of the present situation in Southeast Asia, failure to secure an internationally acceptable settlement to the problem of Kampuchea leaves open the potential for renewed hostilities between Peking and Hanoi. Such a war could have devastating spillovers into Laos, Thailand, and, ultimately, all of Southeast Asia. For reasons somewhat the opposite of their cold war origins, therefore, the "Domino Theory" may yet achieve ironic fulfillment.

Further, failure to find a solution to the Kampuchea dilemma increases the risk of the larger issue, direct Sino-Soviet confrontation. Although Moscow and Peking have agreed to renew their border talks, and observers have noted some tacit understandings on omitting past preconditions on territorial withdrawal along the Sino-Soviet border, the overall atmosphere of the Sino-Soviet struggle as observed by the subcommittee in July 1978, and the delegation this August, continues to give cause for concern.

Finally, the continued threat of hostilities in Southeast Asia, coupled with the continued economic and social loss to the populations involved, makes a humane solution to the refugee problem even more remote, as a subsequent section will detail.

The Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs is already on record as supporting an emergency airlift of food and medical supplies to the people of Kampuchea, regardless of which military faction controls their territory. Following that recommendation, made in a letter to President Carter on June 29, 1979, land convoy relief efforts were undertaken with the cooperation of Thai authorities. These efforts have continued, now to be joined by direct international assistance through Phnom Penh. As noted, however, success must be measured in terms of free access for relief to all the people of Kampuchea.

For the broad problem of mass starvation for the people of Kampuchea, however, it is clear that only a full-scale, internationally based relief effort will suffice. As this report was in final preparation, the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs approved a \$35 million U.S. contribution to the UNICEF/ICRC relief effort.

While another reason for mounting a massive relief program is hardly needed, the spectre of even more refugee pressure on Thailand, should the situation in Kampuchea continue to deteriorate, is obvious.

Regarding an eventual political settlement of the Kampuchean question, the delegation feels that a humanitarian relief effort—given the agreements implied by such an effort—is an essential first step.

It is the delegation's opinion that within the context of facilitating an international settlement of the future of Kampuchea, the question of an end to the present American trade embargo against Vietnam, and similar bans on multilateral assistance, can be properly discussed. The delegation recognizes the difficulties which the Pol Pot regime, supported by China, represented not only for Vietnam, but the other nations of Southeast Asia, as well as for the United States. The delegation has made clear its support of the U.S. condemnation of Vietnam's

occupation of Kampuchea on grounds of principle. Equally, however, the delegation recognizes the contribution to stability which progress toward a Vietnamese withdrawal would represent.

The delegation recognizes that many Members of Congress believe that the United States should reopen normalization discussions with Vietnam, and that some good faith gestures should be made, such as lifting the trade embargo, and ending U.S. opposition to international and multilateral assistance to Hanoi. The delegation's recommendations should make it clear that it does not oppose the eventual inclusion of Vietnam in international development assistance programs, nor do we oppose the eventual normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam.

For the same reasons the United States normalized with the People's Republic of China, normalization with Vietnam should be undertaken in hopes of promoting peace and stability in the region.

However, for the same reasons cited regarding linkage on strategic issues and such economic matters as MFN for the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, the delegation questions whether the United States can, with constancy to our stated policies, undertake normalization with Vietnam so long as the obstacles already discussed remain.

The delegation fully accepts the U.S. position that it is committed to no preconditions in effecting normalization with Vietnam. Consequently, the delegation returns to the central necessity of solving the Kampuchean tragedy as a key to breaking the chain presently binding Southeast Asia today. From a solution acceptable to all in Kampuchea, solutions to other issues, including United States-Vietnamese bilateral concerns, can naturally flow.

3. REFUGEES

Recommendation A.—As long as the refugee outflow continues, the rescue operations by the 7th Fleet should continue on a humanitarian basis, but on the understanding that the territorial waters of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, as well as all others, will be respected.

Recommendation B.—The international community, as with the Italian Navy, should be encouraged to assist in the sea rescue of refugees, on the same basis as 7th Fleet operations.

Recommendation C.—That the goals of the Geneva Conference be pursued vigorously, including the resettlement of land refugees as well as boat people, in all of the nations of the world on an equitable basis.

Recommendation D.—That the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees be adequately funded so that field staff is enlarged and are assigned in sufficient numbers to cope with the camp populations in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and, when the resettlement center comes on lines, the Philippines.

Recommendation E.—That the situation of some 200,000 Afghan refugees now in Pakistan receives the international attention and assistance it merits, particularly that the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees be supported in incorporating the camps now in Pakistan into the UNHCR system.

Recommendation F.—That the State Department study the use of excess U.S. currencies in Pakistan as a possible source of assistance to Afghan refugees.

DISCUSSION

A. Southeast Asia

As already discussed, the delegation recognizes that long-range solutions to the refugee crisis lie in ending Vietnam's forced emigration policies, as well as solving the Kampuchean tragedy. This entails removal of the military threat to Vietnam, so that nation can pursue its stated goals of economic and social reconstruction with access to the material and financial resources of the world community.

In the short run, however, the lives of many hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children depend on the ability of Vietnam to live up to the commitments made at the Geneva Conference regarding a regularized, safe flow of legal emigrants.

The delegation emphasizes that nothing which took place at Geneva, or which has been urged subsequently, should be construed by Vietnam to mean the United States desires an end to regularized emigration from that nation. The coercion that this would imply is absolutely unacceptable. The other side of this coin is that Vietnam must face up to its responsibility and stop deliberately generating refugees through its domestic policies.

In this regard, the delegation was not heartened by the attitudes expressed in Hanoi, or, for that matter, in Moscow. In each capital, it was apparent that there is a major gap between the Vietnamese position and that of the United States and the rest of the world. Both the Vietnamese and the Soviets argued that the refugee problem is not the fault or even the responsibility of Vietnam, but is, they say, a product of the deliberate policies of the People's Republic of China, which has encouraged ethnic Chinese in Vietnam to betray their host country in war, and to leave it in large numbers. Both Hanoi and Moscow also blame the United States for having waged war in Vietnam and thereby creating social and economic hardships which the United States now refuses to meet either bilaterally or through multilateral institutions.

Hanoi also accuses the United States of encouraging the refugee exodus by the original evacuation of 1975, and such "enticements" as VOA broadcasts noting present rescue efforts, particularly those by the 7th Fleet.

Finally, both Hanoi and Moscow accuse the United States of joining forces with China, playing the "China card," in not restraining China in its military activities against Vietnam.

As the delegation has repeatedly stated, it accepts the dangers of U.S. policy being perceived as playing a "China card," and urges against such a policy.

Specifically for Vietnam, however, the delegation is strongly of the opinion that Hanoi, and Moscow, must recognize the domestic origins of the pressures which now prompt the refugee flight. The war has been over for 5 years. The Vietnamese must accept responsibility for the results of their own policy decisions which involve forcible deportation of ethnic Chinese from their traditional areas, the conditions existing in new economic zones, and the corruption acknowledged to

exist in the form of the sale of exist permits, boats, and other apparent inducements to would be refugees by Vietnam.

All of these situations are in the control of the Vietnamese Government, and the recent lower numbers of refugees—both legal and illegal—cannot solely be attributed to the monsoon season. Hence, by making progress toward living up to its pledges at Geneva, however halting, the Vietnamese Government is tacitly accepting its responsibility to stem the refugee flow.

In its discussions in Hanoi regarding the Geneva Conference, the delegation was assured that Vietnam would facilitate family reunion programs, and that United Nations personnel would be allowed to work in Ho Chi Minh City for this purpose. Further, the Vietnamese pledged not to harass those of their citizens who elected to emigrate under this program. The delegation was able to help clarify a misunderstanding which had stalled the reunification program, particularly the fate of some 228 persons on a list submitted to the Vietnamese over which some confusion had developed. The delegation suggests that with good will on both sides, progress of this nature can be expected for the future, and can only help to improve relations between Vietnam, the United States, and the world community.

In sum, then, in addition to relieving human suffering, Vietnamese adherence to their pledges on a humanitarian basis will remove a key obstacle to restoring Vietnam as a member in full standing of the community of nations.

With regard to the responsibilities of the international community for those refugees already in temporary asylum, and those who can reasonably be expected to arrive in the future, the delegation stands by the recommendations of the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee in its January report.² The spread of the refugee plight to Indonesia, Japan's willingness to make a greater financial contribution, and the emergence of certain states such as Switzerland as donors of money or services mark the principal differences in the post-Geneva situation as compared with January. In short, the same nations which were shouldering the bulk of the burden then are doing so now, while the international community moves slowly, despite the pledges made at Geneva. As a consequence, the delegation once again calls attention to the January recommendations of the subcommittee, which were as follows:

(1) Until and unless the United Nations, the voluntary organizations, and the individual members of the international community embark on a concerted effort to resettle the Indochina refugees, the temporary host nations will be able to provide only the bare necessities of life for those refugees who live to reach their shores.

(2) Once a long-range program is underway to assure resettlement for the great majority (if not all) of the refugees, the particular problems presently existing in the camps will be much easier for the host nations and the volunteer organizations, working together, to resolve. In this regard, a proper balance should be struck between resettling land refugees and boat people, since land refugees constitute by far the majority.

(3) The United States, France, Australia, and Canada have almost entirely served as havens for resettlement, as have Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines almost entirely bore the burden of initial refuge. The subcommittee suggests that there is no moral excuse for this situation. The United Nations, and particularly those nations which were so vocal in condemning the Vietnam war, have shirked their responsibilities now that the war is over.

² Security and Stability in Asia: January 1979, report by the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.

(4) The subcommittee would stress that a key to stimulating the resettlement of Indochinese refugees is to stop thinking of these people as burdens for the potential host nations. Indochinese refugees are a good investment in the future. They are hardworking, have high skill levels, and are obviously motivated to participate in a free enterprise system.

(5) The subcommittee recognizes the great initial cost of accepting large numbers of refugees and that it will take time for the refugees to become economically self-sustaining. The subcommittee is also cognizant of the political and economic risk of straining local conditions by introducing refugees. With these problems in mind, the subcommittee suggests that the Asian Development Bank favorably review applications from host nations for joint development projects which would allow communities and regions with refugee populations to be economically self-sustaining, rather than a burden on the host countries or on the world.

(6) The subcommittee welcomes the endorsement by the ASEAN nations, under Malaysia's leadership, of the offer by Indonesia and the Philippines to make island's available for temporary resettlement of refugees. These islands, to be supported by international funding, would serve as a safe and humane haven for refugees fleeing Indochina, relieve the temporary host nations of the present refugee populations, and remove the fear that many host nations will be permanently saddled with a "residue" of refugees. The subcommittee notes, however, that it understands that the island refuge is intended as a temporary haven, and not a permanent "dumping ground" for the unfortunate human beings who have been forced to flee their homelands.

(7) The subcommittee notes that even under the present conditions which limit the ability of the temporary host nations to meet the needs of refugees, more can be done to ease the plight of the residents of the camps. While sensitivity to local political and social factors must be borne in mind, the fact is that the food, water, and sewage situation in most camps is still inadequate. Camp conditions can be improved, in some cases dramatically, to relieve the human suffering. Key to this process is a more sustained effort by United Nations officials to back up the work of United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees field representatives and members of the voluntary service organizations who actually work in the camps.

B. Afghanistan

As noted in the introduction, the delegation also visited a refugee camp in northwest Pakistan, one of a series of camps or base facilities presently helping to sustain an estimated 200,000 refugees from Afghanistan. Interviews at the Chitral camp indicated that the great majority of the refugees desired to return to Afghanistan, but that the civil war there, and the lack of personal and religious freedom imposed by the Soviet-backed Kabul regime prevented them from doing so.

Since the tragic murder of the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, the Honorable Adolph Dubs, the United States has had tenuous relations with the Kabul regime, and even less influence there. In any event, that regime is presently engaged in a fight for survival, a struggle increasingly involving the armed intervention of the Soviet Union. The delegation would note that while it views with concern the growing Soviet role in Afghanistan, it also recognizes that since czarist times, Russian governments have had very close relations with all Afghan governments.

In addition to general humanitarian and human rights matters, the delegation therefore considers the prime concern on Afghanistan to be closely monitoring the potential for a spillover of the unrest there into the neighboring nations of Iran and Pakistan. Particularly critical would be any attempt at pantribal agitation among social groups which traditionally migrate across modern borders which do not reflect ancient patterns.

The delegation also notes, parenthetically, that its advice in Moscow to heed some of the lessons of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam was received without comment by its hosts.

In conclusion, the delegation, through its visit to the Chitral camp, became dramatically aware of the dimensions of a human problem which had received scant attention in the press, and almost no concern from the world community. Upon its return to Washington, the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees was contacted concerning the Afghan camps in Pakistan. The delegation welcomed the decision by the UNHCR to send an immediate emergency fund of \$200,000 to cover the camps through November 1, and the eventual inclusion of the Afghan refugees into the regular UNHCR system, thus helping Pakistan in its present 40 cents per refugee per day burden, compared with U.N. expenses in Southeast Asia of 20 cents.

In addition, the delegation urges the Department of State to study the use of excess U.S. currency in Pakistan as a possible source of assistance to Afghan refugees.

The delegation emphasizes that the Afghan refugees represent a genuine humanitarian concern, a legitimate humanitarian concern, and that attempts by the authorities in Kabul to block assistance to the refugees will only exacerbate the situation, and further isolate the Kabul regime from the world community.

While at the Chitral camp, the delegation was presented with the following letter from a spokesman for the several thousand refugees who had braved high mountain passes and bullets from the hostile armies from Kabul:

LETTER GIVEN TO REPRESENTATIVE LESTER L. WOLFF DURING VISIT TO AFGHAN
REFUGEE CAMP AT CHITRAL, PAKISTAN

AUGUST 16, 1979.

In April 1978, Noor M. Taraki established a communist regime backed by Russia.

Life did not like the changes that followed. The new government is un-islamic; there are too many Russian advisers and soldiers.

We decided to fight Taraki and his communist regime. So in October 1978 we started to push the government soldiers out of Kamdesh Nooristan (N.E. Afghanistan).

They bombed our villages killing many people and leaving many without. So in the cold winter many people came to Pakistan for refuge.

We had to cross the high mountain pass in deep snow on our way. But we continued to fight for our independence.

The people sold their cows, sheeps, carpets to buy ammunition or bullets. And we captured many guns from the government, all Russian made.

We have not received any help or arms from America, China, Pakistan or Iran. This is only Taraki propaganda.

There is fighting in most areas of Afghanistan—many large areas of Afghans of the country are closed because they are controlled by Mujahidin (Muslims).

The refugees in Chitral number (5500-6000).

Since they left their belongings in Afghanistan they came with nothing.

The Pakistan Government gives 20 kilos of wheat and one (1) kilo sugar to adults, half to children but this is not enough.

Our housing situation is very bad. We have (20-30) people living in one room. We don't have medicine for the sick and education for our children.

We appeal to the people of the world, the United Nations, all Islamic countries and the Red Cross, to help the Afghan people who have been forced to take refuge in Pakistan.

And we would ask the United Nations to tell the Taraki regime to stop killing and putting our people in prison for their beliefs.

SHAH WALI,
Representative of Refugees in Chitral.

4. NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

Recommendation A.—That India and Pakistan be encouraged to initiate a process which would culminate in a formal agreement to neither produce nor test nuclear weapons, and which would be enforced by international inspection of the nuclear facilities of each nation.

Recommendation B.—That the United States and Soviet Union resume talks on the Indian Ocean as an integral part of attempting to secure agreement on arms control.

Recommendation C.—That the People's Republic of China be encouraged to reconsider its policy of not signing the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in view of the key role such a step would play in reducing regional tensions and working toward world peace.

Recommendation D.—The United States must clarify its policies on helping nations with which it has cooperated in peaceful nuclear development so that there are no further misunderstandings which themselves add to the dangers of nuclear proliferation.

Recommendation E.—The United States must continue to help nations develop peaceful energy resources, including alternative energy sources. However, the United States must also continue to employ economic and other appropriate, peaceful sanctions, as legislated by Congress, to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

DISCUSSION

The issue of nuclear proliferation is one of the key links in what the Delegation is characterizing as a chain of fear binding ever tighter in Asia. Its application to the region comes particularly through the traditional Pakistan-India rivalry. However, it is also directly related to the Sino-Soviet struggle, as well as to the inability of the super-powers to achieve nuclear disarmament.

Because of fears that China harbored territorial ambitions against India, and fueled by the border war of 1962, India began a massive arms buildup over the next decade, largely under the sponsorship of the U.S.S.R. In 1964, India exploded a nuclear device, although India has to date chosen not to produce or deploy nuclear weapons.

In 1965 and again in 1971, India and Pakistan met on the battlefield. The United States remained neutral in these struggles, although it was the principal supplier of arms to Pakistan, and Pakistan has made it clear it considered more support to have been warranted in view of the 1959 bilateral friendship agreement between Washington and Islamabad.

With the fall of the Desai government in India, the instability in Afghanistan and Iran, and the increasing Soviet role in Afghanistan, Pakistan now perceives itself to be under mounting pressure to provide for its self-defense independent of outside assistance.

As noted, in January, 1978, then-Prime Minister Morarji Desai told the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs the Indian Government

would never develop nuclear weapons. However, Desai added, India would not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty on the principle that nonnuclear nations should not be asked to forswear that which the superpowers themselves could not agree to renounce.³

Now, the new Indian Government has announced that if Pakistan fulfills its military nuclear potential, India will have to reconsider its policy of not developing nuclear weapons. Thus, should Pakistan do what it has consistently pledged not to do—pursue a nuclear weapons capacity—the countermove by India would automatically produce nuclear confrontation, and a new level of fear and tension in the world. For the first time, two contending nuclear states would be bound by no understandings or agreements—no matter how tenuous—on the balance of power and how it was to be maintained in the face of a greatly escalated arms race potential.

Such a tragic development could only be viewed with the greatest gravity by the United States, the Soviet Union and the world community at large.

The delegation recognizes that Pakistan (as with India, and other Asian nations which have historically depended on Western technology and assistance) has a need for energy which cannot be assured by conventional resources or technology. The delegation recognizes that Pakistan and India have a legitimate claim on the West for assistance in the peaceful development of nuclear energy, as well as alternative, safe forms of energy production.

However, the United States is presently constrained not only by law, but also by its own genuine sense of uncertainty as to the best course to follow, particularly on peaceful nuclear energy. Consequently, an unhappy coincidence now makes coherent U.S. policy on nuclear energy development difficult; at the same time as many nations are achieving the sophistication necessary to consider a weapons option, and hence require the closest possible monitoring, the United States and other Western nations, because of the requirements of the law, are cutting off cooperation.

Regardless of what decision is finally reached on peaceful nuclear development, it is clear that nothing could be more inimical to U.S. interests—or to the interests of Asia or the world—than for nuclear weapons to appear on the subcontinent.

Therefore, while the delegation shares with the administration a flat rejection of military intervention to prevent nuclear proliferation in the subcontinent, the fact remains that the United States must exercise all appropriate bilateral and multilateral options, including cutoffs of economic assistance or conventional defense equipment, which might succeed in forestalling a nuclear arms race on the subcontinent.

The delegation accepts the point that India and Pakistan are being asked, in effect, to take steps which the superpowers so far have not. But as noted, through the SALT process, the test ban treaty, and through the crucible of the threat of nuclear war over such confrontations as Berlin and Cuba, the superpowers have reached some formal and informal methods of crisis resolution.

³ Prospects For Regional Stability: Asia and the Pacific. Report on a study mission to Asia and the Pacific by the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978.

The delegation suggests that however imperfect, such a *modus vivendi* has not been achieved on the subcontinent. As a step toward achieving this, the delegation notes that President Zia of Pakistan and then-Prime Minister Desai once exchanged letters on the issue of each other's nuclear potential. Such a renewed exchange, particularly if it presaged steps toward a more comprehensive understanding, would greatly reduce the present uncertainty.

Ideally, the nations of the subcontinent should agree to negotiate a nuclear free zone for the region, with international inspection of the nuclear facilities of each nation.

In this regard, the delegation accepts the necessity of the United States and the Soviet Union resuming talks on the Indian Ocean. While in Moscow, the delegation told the Supreme Soviet it hoped the Soviet Union would join in a scheduled Chiefs of Mission conference in the fall, and added that the delegation intended to endorse resumption of Indian Ocean talks when it returned to Washington.

By linking actions of India and Pakistan with the Soviet Union and the United States, the delegation hopes to underscore its understanding of the organic process inherent in arms control, and the hope of world nuclear disarmament. For this reason, the delegation also cites the importance of China agreeing to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as an integral step toward reduction of tensions on the subcontinent, and throughout Asia and the world.

5. NONALINED NATIONS

Recommendation A.—That the United States and the industrialized nations cooperate with the nonalined movement to more adequately address the social and economic concerns of the Third World inherent in the "North-South" debate (exemplified by the Colombo Declarations of 1976), rather than continually focusing on the largely political "East-West" struggle which so dominated the recent Havana Summit of the nonalined movement.

Recommendation B.—That the members of the nonalined movement be encouraged to develop a code of conduct which clarifies the nature of relationships or activities, particularly those involving a superpower, or any of a military or strategic nature, which members can appropriately enter into with other nations.

Recommendation C.—That Sri Lanka, India and other democracies which are members of the nonalined movement be encouraged to continue and strengthen their role as moderating forces within the movement.

DISCUSSION

During the course of its mission in Sri Lanka, and again in the Soviet Union, the delegation engaged in frank discussions on the nature and leadership of the nonalined movement. The impetus to this debate was the then imminent ascension of Cuba to a 3-year term as chairman of the movement, succeeding Sri Lanka, and the potentially catastrophic chairmanship scheduled 3 years hence for Lybia.

The delegation's key concern was and remains that Cuba, or any nation with a clear military and strategic alliance with one of the

superpowers, is, by definition, "alined" in ways which must cast serious doubt on the ability of the movement to serve its professed goals. The fact that Lybia is scheduled to succeed Cuba in 3 years intensifies the delegation's concern that, in the meantime, some of the contradictions apparent in Cuba's role be clarified.

As the delegation said in Moscow, it does not challenge Cuba's right to pursue the military or diplomatic policies Cuba sees fit. And while the U.S. reserves the right to oppose some of these policies, it certainly does not likewise dispute the Soviet Union's prerogatives in these areas. The point is that by pursuit of its relationship with the U.S.S.R., and particularly by its active military involvement in various areas of the world, Cuba has become as tied to Russia and its policies as closely as the United States is tied to its NATO allies.

Public and private reactions from various members of the nonalined movement since Havana clearly shows they share the concern that Cuba's conduct poses a direct challenge to the future unity and effectiveness of the movement.

The delegation is aware that the nonalined movement received a major thrust to its development from the legitimate desires of much of the non-European world to throw off the bonds of colonialism, and economic exploitation. That the desire to steer a path between the cold war, East-West rivalry was also a prime concern, the delegation would respectfully emphasize as well. Recognition of this latter factor was involved in the delegation's recommendation that the United States and the Soviet Union take steps to resume talks on the Indian Ocean.

For the future, the delegation would suggest that the consequences of the increasing severity of the world economic situation, as exemplified by the oil-energy crisis, are common threats to the survival of nonalined and developed nations alike.

The delegation recognizes that the key point separating the nonalined from the former colonial powers, and the rest of the developed world, is that only the industrialized nations have the capacity to absorb the hammer blows of repeated oil price increases with any degree of success. And it is recognition of this symptom of the overall economic struggle which prompts the delegation's recommendation on the necessity of greater U.S. attention to the North-South dialog.

From its travels through Asia, the delegation is perhaps more aware than most of the degree of mutual interdependence of the nations of the world, a degree greater than at any time in history. The need to reach agreement on commodities pricing policy, as with the need to assist developing nations to meet the burden imposed by ever-increasing oil prices, and the threat of obstructive trade policies stemming from protectionist fears are but three of the many vital issues which the world community—including the members of the nonalined movement—must work together to address.

It is the delegation's contention that for the nonalined movement to constructively address such matters of self-interest, the criteria for membership, particularly a code of conduct for its members, has become essential. The delegation was encouraged, during its discussion in Sri Lanka, by that Government's agreement on this vital point.

Obviously, all nations are "alined" in some way, and the "non-alined" are alined with each other, if with none others. The point is

that to be clearly a part of one competing power bloc in the East-West rivalry helps cement the very divisions which the nonaligned movement, and the North-South debate, hopes to solve.

For these reasons, the delegation cites the leadership of Sri Lanka, India, and other democratic members of the nonaligned movement which strive to place a focus on the nature of the economic struggle which now poses a threat to the survival of so many developing nations. In the appendix of this report, the address of the External Affairs Minister of India, S. N. Mishra, at Havana, is presented as a useful compendium of the concerns of the nonaligned movement. As Minister Mishra points out, the Economic Declaration of Colombo (the 1976 summit preceding Havana) recognizes that the nonaligned movement must grow if it is to help solve the pressing needs of its members, much less the lofty ideals of its founders.

Three years later, the danger of transmuting the needs of the nonaligned into a foreign policy arm of one branch of the East-West struggle is great, and should be resisted by all concerned.

6. HUMAN RIGHTS

Introduction.—Throughout its report, the delegation has sought to emphasize its conviction that the need for balance in U.S. bilateral relations with the nations of Asia, and the world, be of uppermost concern to policymakers.

Thus, the delegation has recommended that the policies affected by the term "linkage," so frequently criticized for their contradictory or uneven application, are justifiable only if they are fairly invoked with a full understanding of their consequences.

Human rights concerns are a key part of U.S. foreign policy. But, equally clearly, human rights concerns cannot be viewed as the sole aim of that policy. The delegation is conscious of the instances during the mission when it was confronted by the difficulty of transposing concern for human rights into concrete actions which further the foreign policy interests of the people of the United States.

The following recommendations and discussion of human rights in the nations we visited must be read with the above cautionary thoughts in mind.

VIETNAM

Recommendation A.—The policies of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam must be recognized as the principal cause of the refugee outflow. Only when the Socialist Republic of Vietnam ceases trying to shift the burden to other factors, and nations, will the present situation, so disastrous for the Vietnamese people and their neighbors, and so unacceptable to the world community, begin to rectify itself.

Recommendation B.—The Socialist Republic of Vietnam must encourage its client administration in Phnom Penh to accept fully its responsibilities for the people of Kampuchea in terms of facilitating international humanitarian relief efforts to head off the famine and acute medical situation now threatening the bulk of the population.

Recommendation C.—The delegation's recommendations on refugees, already presented, and on Americans still listed as missing in action or as prisoners of war (which follow the human rights section

of this report), must be considered as integral parts of the human rights concerns of the delegation, and of the American people.

Discussion

The delegation has previously stated its recommendations on refugees, and the need to resolve the present tragedy in Kampuchea. However, there is need to reemphasize each of these matters in their human rights context, as the delegation feels it is clear from its conversations in Hanoi that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam neither recognizes this as a tragedy, nor accepts its human rights responsibilities as a member of the world community. Rather, Hanoi approaches this purely from a political perspective.

First, on refugees, as noted, the delegation was disturbed to hear in Hanoi, and again in Moscow, the claim that the refugee outflow stems entirely from outside pressures such as the threat now posed to Vietnam by China, and actions by the United States during a war which ended more than 5 years ago.

The delegation wishes to reemphasize the fact that it is the domestic policies of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, particularly those which have placed the military occupation of Laos and Kampuchea ahead of economic and social reconstruction at home, which must be considered a prime cause of whatever role economic dislocations may play in promoting the continued refugee outflow.

Second, the delegation notes that it was told in both Hanoi and Moscow that refugee outflow is inevitable during any period of "social reconstruction," because of persons who cannot or will not cooperate with the new order. With this claim in mind, the delegation finds it utterly illogical for the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to deny that its policies of giving certain ethnic groups within its population, and citizens at large, the "option" of purchasing an exit visa or permanent banishment from their homes and occupations to a so-called "new economic zone," are not designed to produce refugees.

Further in this regard, the humanitarian responsibility of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to provide minimally safe passage for citizens who have purchased exit permits has seemingly been ignored.

On Kampuchea, the situation has become even more critical since the delegation's mission to Hanoi, but some concessions have been wrung from the authorities in Phnom Penh, and their Vietnamese sponsors, regarding international humanitarian assistance. While the delegation finds this an encouraging sign, the fact remains that for months, the Kampuchean people were clearly being subjected to a policy of starvation for political purposes.

As of this writing, it is still not clear whether Vietnam—if not its client in Phnom Penh—understands the full dimension of the tragedy still unfolding in Kampuchea. Further, it is unclear that either are prepared to respond fully to the prospect that the estimated 3 million Kampucheans who somehow survived the genocidal policies of Pol Pot could now die due to the deliberate policies of their new rulers.

That is why the delegation strongly endorses the need for monitoring on a regular basis the international assistance which reaches Kampuchea to assess whether the food and medicine is reaching the people who so desperately require sustenance.

Finally as noted, the section following this will detail the delegation's conversations in Hanoi concerning increased cooperation in the

humanitarian concern of providing a final accounting of those Americans still listed as missing in action or as prisoners of war.

SRI LANKA

Recommendation A.—That insofar as possible, the Government of Sri Lanka be encouraged to meet what internal security problems are posed by the present minority situation through legal means which do not lend themselves to the arbitrary use of power, and hence to the denial of rights for any of its citizens.

Recommendation B.—That the Government of Sri Lanka be encouraged by the United States and the international community to continue to enlarge its present program designed to meet the legitimate needs and aspirations of the minority Tamil people.

Discussion

The delegation is very conscious of the inherent danger of distortion in discussing Sri Lanka in the same context as the situation in Vietnam, or those presently existing in Pakistan, and the U.S.S.R.

The delegation was made aware of the concerns of the Tamil minority before its visit to Sri Lanka, and the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs had been following the situation appropriately for the past 2 years. Thus, the delegation endeavored to examine the Tamil question as part of its overall mission in Sri Lanka.

The delegation met with the Minister of Justice, and with members of the Tamil people in and out of Government to specifically discuss the humanitarian issues involved. Further, the delegation held frank discussions of its concerns with many members of the Government of Sri Lanka, including President Jaywardene.

In general, the delegation was favorably impressed by the sincerity of President Jaywardene and his Government, and their desire to meet the legitimate concerns of all of the people of Sri Lanka, including the Tamil minority.

The most sensitive area discussed covered the need for emergency measures to meet the security threat posed by factions presently resorting to violence. While stating its desire not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Sri Lankan people, the delegation cited the basically successful experiences of the American people in meeting the challenges of the civil rights struggle within a framework which preserved the full legal rights of all citizens.

PAKISTAN

Recommendation A.—That the Government of Pakistan be encouraged to fulfill its pledge to conduct nationwide elections which are free, and open to all political parties and all members of those parties. The freeing of the increasing number of political prisoners is an integral part of this process.

Recommendation B.—That the Government of Pakistan be supported in its humanitarian efforts on behalf of the refugees from Afghanistan, including the full support of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, as already discussed in this report.

Discussion

The delegation has already expressed its appreciation to the Government of Pakistan for its firm commitment to the principles of hu-

man rights as exemplified by its succor to the refugees from Afghanistan.

However, the delegation was fully cognizant of the troubled social and political situation which had obtained in Pakistan since the events leading to the overthrow, and later the execution of former Prime Minister Bhutto. The Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs had written President Zia prior to Mr. Bhutto's death urging clemency, thus joining President Carter, Pope John Paul, the Saudi Government and other world leaders in expressions of humanitarian concern.

The subcommittee was further motivated by the fact that while it did not wish to pass judgment on the merits of the case, it felt compelled to urge clemency on the additional grounds that the future peace and stability of Pakistan and the region would be threatened by continued unrest in Pakistan.

Since the unhappy events of the spring, and through the difficult period when the nuclear controversy was exposed, the subcommittee had followed with hope the pledges of General Zia that full and free elections would be held in the fall, and that civilian government would be restored to the people of Pakistan.

During its mission, the delegation was repeatedly told by its hosts that the elections would take place as scheduled, and that they would be open to all.

As this report was being prepared for press, however, came a series of events culminating in the cancellation of the elections, and finally the arrest of political leaders and party members from all walks of Pakistani life. We have since been given to understand that the period of detention will be of short duration, and that elections have only been delayed until they are practical to conduct.

Implicit in its first recommendation is the delegation's firm conviction that all of the men and women jailed as a result of the actions just described be immediately freed. Obviously, the delegation cannot anticipate what the situation will be when its report is made public. But it is clear that the continued denial of the right of free elections, and the denial of basic human rights to so many of Pakistan's citizens, will continue to severely circumscribe United States-Pakistani relations, particularly those involving economic assistance and military sales.

THE SOVIET UNION

Recommendation A.—That the United States and all signators to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights take every opportunity to demonstrate to the Soviet Union that the concern for human rights is universal and deeply felt. Far from being a propaganda ploy, or an internal affair of one nation, human rights are an integral factor in the social and economic development of modern nations; thus, denial of human rights in one nation becomes an international concern, one which extends beyond the border of individual nation states.

Recommendation B.—That the United States, particularly regarding the treatment of "refuseniks" and "dissidents," constantly seek to encourage the Soviet Union to carry out the letter and spirit of the Helsinki accords, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; further, the linking of such questions as MFN and other economic factors are a legitimate and necessary method to pursue the goal of guaranteeing human rights for all people.

Recommendation C.—Because religious freedom in the Soviet Union is guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution, but not in actual legal practice, the delegation urges the U.S.S.R. to grant the Jews of the Soviet Union the legal rights and privileges due them as a religion under the constitution, and to end their false characterization as members of a national group.

Recommendation D.—Specifically, the delegation urges that discrimination against Soviet Jews such as barring the teaching of Hebrew, printing books in Hebrew, prohibiting the training of religious leaders of the congregation's choice, and related support activities, be immediately removed.

Recommendation E.—In a like manner, all such restrictions on Pentacostals, Catholics, Baptists, and all other religious groups presently banned from full and free pursuit of their rights as Soviet citizens under the constitution must be condemned.

Recommendation F.—That the issue of emigration for "refuseniks" be met by bringing Soviet law into line with the Helsinki accords, specifically by ending the present system of open-ended, indefinite waiting periods for exit visas. A 5-year maximum would serve all possible security concerns, given the pace of today's technological and scientific developments. The number of visas should not be fixed, but open ended to meet demand.

Recommendation G.—That as stated in Recommendation B, the treatment of "dissidents", as with all Soviet citizens, be brought into full compliance with the letter and spirit of the Helsinki accords, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and the Soviet Constitution. Specifically, the delegation urges that Anatoly Shcharansky be immediately provided with the medical attention he is reported to require, and that any evidence pertaining to his present circumstances be presented for the world to see. If no such evidence is provided, Shcharansky should be returned to the care of his family. In any event, he should be accorded the rights due any Soviet citizen, including the right to counsel.

Discussion

It is in Russia that the strength and weaknesses of the international campaign to promote human rights achieves its highest visibility, some of its greatest successes, and some of its most disheartening failures.

If the delegation sought to impress two key points on our Soviet hosts, they were, first, that human rights concerns are intimately connected to American bilateral relations with all nations; and second, that while the United States does not wish to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations, human rights by definition are a universal concern, and hence a legitimate matter for nations to discuss, criticize, and to take action when deemed necessary.

That the Soviets recognize these points is demonstrated by their statements on the U.S. civil rights situation, and certain aspects of the conduct of the war in Vietnam. For its part, the delegation sought to impress on our hosts that whether they liked it or not, whether it seemed fair or not, it was also a political fact of life that in addition to being codified in U.S. law, human rights have become part of the process of gaining public support for MFN, technology transfer, increased trade, and other bilateral issues.

The role of public opinion independent of government action, or law, can be most clearly seen in the international response of the scientific community to the continued dilemma of dissident and refusenik scientists within the U.S.S.R. Even though all scientists agree that free exchange between nations is in the best interests of the world, the overriding interest in human rights has already curtailed scientific exchange between Russia and the West. As the delegation stated to the Supreme Soviet members, continued concern for the fate of Orlov and Shcharansky, for example, will only exacerbate this development.

The simple fact of Soviet agreement to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Helsinki agreement, should attest to Moscow's appreciation of these political facts of life; what remains to be shown is Moscow's application of the principles, and requirements, of these agreements.

At the conclusion of the delegation's meetings in Moscow, all 12 members cosigned a letter to Communist Party Central Committee General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev outlining our human rights concerns. The letter made a number of specific requests, which have been incorporated into the general recommendations presented above. The letter to Secretary Brezhnev follows:

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., August 21, 1979.

His Excellency LEONID I. BREZHNEV,
*General Secretary, Central Committee of the Communist Party, Moscow, RSFSR,
U.S.S.R.*

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: We, the undersigned members of Congress, express our deep concern both for the individuals who have sought to emigrate from the Soviet Union, and for those individuals of all faiths who have suffered because they have spoken out on behalf of their liberties and their religion.

The right of an individual to emigrate is a fundamental human right. This right has been denied to a number of religious groups, including Protestants, Pentecostals, Catholics and Jews. A number of Jewish men and women have been sentenced to prison for three to fifteen years after expressing their desire to leave the USSR for Israel. Jews have been accused of parasitism after losing their jobs following an application to emigrate; of hooliganism, for such trivial acts as bumping into a passerby causing a cake to drop on the sidewalk; and of owning anti-Soviet materials, for possessing Hebrew primers and prayer books.

We are further told that prisoners' rights guaranteed by Soviet penal codes are often denied Jewish prisoners, persecuted by both inmates and prison administrators. Anti-Jewish incidents are provoked. They are compelled to perform hard labor on low-calorie diets, they must live in unsanitary surroundings and they receive inadequate medical care.

Anti-Semitism apparently has not disappeared in the Soviet Union—restrictions against Jews attending higher institutions are tightening. Jewish religious and cultural life is restricted. Impediments to teaching Hebrew remain in effect.

We are concerned not only with the violations of human rights of Protestants, Pentecostals, Catholics and Jews, but over the damage this repression has had on the progress of detente.

When in Tashkent, the delegation was gratified to learn from the Grand Mufti that Muslim people are granted, in practice as well as in law, full freedom to observe their religion, to print religious documents, to distribute the Koran, to teach their children in religious schools, and to train religious leaders. We ask that you allow the same opportunities for other religious minorities, including the ones we have mentioned above.

In consonance with the Declaration of Human Rights to which the Soviet Union is a signator, we respectfully call upon the Soviet Union to:

(1) Recognize, in practice as well as in law, the rights of persons belonging to religious and other minorities and interpret their rights equally before the law;

(2) Act to prevent all harassment, intimidation and punitive action against persons wishing to emigrate;

(3) Release all Jews as well as prisoners of other religions who decide to emigrate for reasons of conscience;

(4) Increase the number of visas to make them equal to the number of applications or requests for applications;

(5) Issue visas on a first-come, first-served basis, without discrimination because of profession or place of residence;

(6) Remove, from the paths of those wishing to emigrate, impediments—such as preventing applicants from obtaining official forms, and intercepting letters from abroad containing required documents, and eliminate all undue delays in processing and approving applications.

Mr. Secretary, your efforts on behalf of detente between our two nations are well known and deeply appreciated. It is unfortunate that our relations are constantly set back by the policies discussed in this letter, policies which gain your country nothing and which damage it in world opinion.

For all these reasons, we urge you to demonstrate your support for the spirit and substance of the Helsinki Agreement by acting promptly on these serious matters. Above all, we ask you to be generous and understanding in those cases the merits of which you may question. Such affirmative action would remove a major roadblock in the way of detente.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence D. Long, Robert J. Lagomarsino, Carlos J. Moorhead, Fortney H. Stark, Robert K. Dornan, Billy Lee Evans, Lester L. Wolff, Tennyson Guyer, Andy Ireland, David R. Bowen, Benjamin A. Gilman, James H. Scheuer.

It was the delegation's concern to discuss specifically with our Soviet hosts including First Deputy Chairman Vasiliy Kuznetsov, Chief Justice Lev Smirnov, Vitaliy Ruben, Chairman of the Council of Nationalities, and Victor Paputin, First Deputy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, how and why we felt that the internal matter of Soviet law and social practice had become a legitimate international human rights concern.

On the issue of religious freedom, already discussed in the letter to General Secretary Brezhnev, no explanation of the delegation's experience could be more eloquent than the words of a group of dissidents and refuseniks who met with us in our Moscow hotel on the night of August 21, 1979. Because of its importance to the development of the delegation's recommendations, the transcript of our conversation is presented in its entirety in appendix 4.

In conclusion, certainly, in the years since "détente," the human rights situation in Russia has in many respects improved, particularly, in the last year, for those persons wishing to emigrate. However, the continuing plight of the refuseniks, many of whom have been refused exit visas for up to a decade, continues to overshadow the genuine accomplishments in this area. As our hosts pointed out, Jewish emigration has vastly increased, although the restriction of this privilege to Jews and certain dissidents has kept emigration a privilege, and not a right as required by Helsinki. Overall, the Soviets now approve some 98 percent of all applicants, some 200,000 since 1959, a period of 20 years.

However, as the delegation stated during its discussion with members of the Supreme Soviet, the issue of emigration continues to serve as an irritant, and as a major obstacle to East-West relations.

The apparently arbitrary denial of visas, the splitting of families, the open-ended waiting period, the demands to produce documents from overseas—compounded by problems of delivery of mail, particu-

larly overseas mail—are but some of the many points which we pressed upon our hosts.

There are now more than 150,000 Soviet citizens who have received invitations from Israel alone, invitations which comply with Soviet legal requirements which must be met before a visa can be issued. This great number should be availed the opportunity to emigrate, in the delegation's view, given the statements made to it by Soviet officials.

The transcript of our conversation with dissidents and refuseniks shows that these people do not challenge the legitimacy of the Soviet state, nor do they seek to undermine the U.S.S.R. They simply want to exercise their internationally recognized right to emigrate, a right agreed to by the Soviet Union at Helsinki.

As the summarized discussions in the U.S.S.R. section later in this report will show, our hosts resisted the legitimacy of U.S. laws which tie MFN and related issues to the international human rights concerns of emigration, religious freedom, and the right of dissent. That such resistance is predictable, and leads to many obvious difficulties in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy, cannot be allowed to weaken the determination of the United States to continue to pursue all possible avenues to meet the human rights concerns embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Helsinki agreement.

But if there was any final point, regardless of the law, which we wished to leave in the Soviet Union it was that, like it or not, human rights are inextricably involved in world public perceptions and world support for nations and programs which, purely in terms of short-term or bilateral concerns, might be good, but which cannot be approved on the basis of the larger issue—human rights.

7. MIA's/POW's ⁴

Recommendation A.—The State Department should press the Vietnamese on their informal agreement with the delegation to work out specific arrangements to begin the visits by Lt. Col. Paul Mather, U.S. Army, to Hanoi to work on POW and missing case files.

Recommendation B.—The United States should undertake to broaden contacts with the Government of Laos, not merely to pursue the POW/MIA issue, but to improve communication and understanding so that further efforts by the Laotians to be forthcoming in either furnishing remains or information might be as productive as possible.

Recommendation C.—The United States through the State Department should seek to have Lieutenant Colonel Mather visit Vientiane, Laos, as regularly as possible for the purpose of providing expert assistance to the Laotian Government in recovering and providing remains or related MIA/POW information.

Recommendation D.—Laotian officials should be invited to the casualty identification laboratory in Honolulu to gain a better understanding of the way in which the laboratory arrives at a determination of identity.

Recommendation E.—The process whereby refugees are screened for admission to the United States should include inquiries to determine whether individuals have any useful information about Americans alive or dead in Indochina. Such screening might be especially useful

⁴ This section was prepared by Jon Holstine, minority staff consultant, Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.

in cases where the refugees have already been approved for admission to the United States, but should not be limited to those cases.

Recommendation F.—House Concurrent Resolution 10 calling for United Nations assistance in the MIA/POW accounting search should be pursued with the Secretary General of the United Nations, so that the greatest possible attention can be focused on this humanitarian issue. The President should provide all possible assistance on this issue.

BACKGROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS ON POW/MIA'S BY DELEGATION

Negotiations with the Vietnamese Government for the return of American prisoners, or the remains of Americans who died either in combat or in enemy custody in Indochina, have been carried on in a series of meetings for several years.⁵ Even before the hostilities in Indochina ceased for Americans, officials of the U.S. Government sought to obtain the return of Americans who had fallen into Vietnamese hands.

Congressional participation in this effort began with the Select Committee on the Missing in Action, under the chairmanship of the Honorable G. V. "Sonny" Montgomery, during the 94th Congress. Since members of that select committee first met with the Vietnamese Government delegation in Paris 1975, there have been 4 special delegations including Congressmen, prior to the visits of the delegation headed by Representative Lester L. Wolff.

In addition to these congressional contacts, during the years since the fall of Saigon there have been periodic talks between Vietnamese and U.S. officials on the subject of American prisoners and missing in Southeast Asia. Despite these contacts, in only 80 cases had the Vietnamese provided either American remains or information as to the fate of the individuals involved.

By August 1979 when the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs under Mr. Wolff's chairmanship, and its adjunct, the Foreign Affairs Task Force on American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia, visited Hanoi, there were still 2,400 cases remaining for which there has not been accounting. While 2,400 may seem a tiny fraction of the total casualties of approximately 57,000 which the United States suffered in Indochina, it should be recalled that of the casualties which have been accounted for, the vast preponderance were in South Vietnam. Almost 90 percent of the flyers downed in North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are unaccounted for. And half the 2,400 cases which remain unexplained are cases where the Vietnamese or Laos were either known (165 cases) or reasonably believed (almost 1,100) to have knowledge if not custody, of the Americans in question.

VISIT TO HANOI

Against this background of intermittent negotiations punctuated by occasional Vietnamese dispensing of remains, the delegation visited Hanoi in hopes of moving forward some solution to the impasse which had developed between the Vietnamese and the United States on this subject.

The question of POW/MIA's was therefore extremely important to the delegation as it began its talks with the Vietnamese. This con-

⁵ See appendix 3 for chronology, 1972-79.

cern had been transmitted to the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam even before the mission left the United States. In addition, the delegation had resolved that it would not accept, as a "token," remains of Americans if they were offered, but would insist that the remains be returned through a formal channel already established by the U.S. Government in earlier conversations with the Vietnamese.

In addition to the question of American missing, the delegation also was prepared to talk at length about the plight of Vietnamese boat people and the circumstances in Cambodia, where 200,000 Vietnamese troops had imposed an uneasy peace marked by starvation and protracted conflict with the forces of the deposed Pol Pot regime.

While in Hanoi, the delegation met with, among others, four high ranking Vietnamese officials, including Hoang Bich Son and Nguyen Co Thach of the Foreign Ministry, Vu Hoang of the Ministry of the Interior (which had responsibility for both the POW/MIA issue and the refugee question), Xuan Thuy, a Politburo member and the second-ranking member of the ruling Communist Party in Vietnam.

In each instance the delegation pointed out that as a means of both eliminating a problem in Congress toward normalized relations with Vietnam, and establishing a cooperative relationship between our two countries, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam could act to resolve the POW/MIA issue. It was the delegation's contention that the problem could be solved relatively easily if the Vietnamese Government chose to exercise its authority in this direction. The delegation was pleased when Deputy Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach indicated his view that it was time that the issue was resolved.

Accordingly, it was with some hope that the meeting with Vu Hoang began. As chairman of the Task Force on Prisoners and Missing, Congressman Guyer led the American side accompanied by Chairman Wolff, and Representatives Benjamin Gilman, Robert Lagomarsino, Robert K. Dornan, and James Scheuer. Also present were Captain Ray Vohden, U.S.N., who represented the Office of MIA Affairs in the Department of Defense (and a former prisoner in Hanoi himself), and Lt. Col. Paul Mather, U.S. Army who is the liaison officer in Bangkok for the Joint Casualty Resolution Center. Accompanying the delegation for these conversations were Lt. Col. Michael Eiland, the State Department escort officer and Vietnamese linguist, Christopher Nelson, and Jon Holstine of the subcommittee staff.

There were several points which emerged which offer both grounds for hope and reasons for caution.

The delegation stressed to the Vietnamese the political sensitivity and importance of this issue to the American Congress and the American public. The Vietnamese sought to indicate their feeling that the State Department had not emphasized the continued importance of this subject to the Congress and the families of the missing. Consequently, the delegation sought to impress upon the Vietnamese that this was still an area of great importance not only to the several hundred families of missing Americans, but also to the Congress and thereby to the Vietnamese.

The delegation pointed out that hundreds of cases were still unresolved, and that for too long there had been no new information, let alone remains. The members also pressed the Vietnamese with the question of why there had been no information on the 1,200 cases in

categories of accountability I and II. There was no direct response to this question, despite repeated efforts to focus on this issue.

The Vietnamese spoke, however, in general terms of the difficulties they had incurred because of the Indochina war and then the more recent hostilities with Cambodia and the People's Republic of China. Vu Hoang said that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam had had an office specially tasked with seeking information on American missing. The office still functioned, and there was a communications network which, according to the Vietnamese, was still in place even to the village level. The office was carrying on "normal" activity, but no explanation was offered as to what that involved.

In addition, Vu Hoang explained that the topography had changed to the extent that areas which were then brown have now become green again. There were also problems caused by the movement of peoples away from the Cambodian frontier and similar results from the Chinese invasion which caused reassignment of officials—presumably Interior Ministry personnel—away from the POW/MIA search. This requirement had strained budget and facilities. There were still 60 people, the Vietnamese said, in this office, and "thousands" who were on the look for remains, grave locales, crash sites, etc.

The Vietnamese noted that they did have three or four new sites under investigation, but did not elaborate. They said they would report on these investigations at a later date.

The delegation raised the general question of Americans who might still be alive in Vietnam. The Congressmen pointed out to the Vietnamese that the return of Marine Pfc. Robert Garwood after 14 years in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam legitimately raised the question of possible live American prisoners. Despite several carefully worded inquiries, Vu Hoang told the group that there were no Americans alive in Vietnam. He said that after Garwood's case he "could affirm" to the delegation that there were "no other Americans."

Rather than debate the general question of whether Americans were still being held prisoner by the Vietnamese, or were in the SRV in some precise status which was not easily definable, the delegation moved to the presentation of a group of case files. Almost all of these were in category I or II, and thus represented the precise sort of cases implied in a discussion of whether live Americans were to be found in Vietnam. Approximately 40 in number, the case files represented over 100 missing Americans. Some of these case files had been presented before.

A typical folder included the name of the missing American, an account of the date and place of the crash or capture, along with a map of the site. Any other information, such as photographs published by or captured from the Vietnamese showing the prisoner in custody or perhaps even his grave, was also included. All of this material was translated into Vietnamese. For instance, Navy Capt. Ron Dodge's case was a heavily documented example of a category I MIA—he had been photographed in custody shortly after his plane went down, and later was included in a Vietnamese propaganda film "Pilots in Pajamas." Yet Dodge was not repatriated nor were his remains ever accounted for.

To press the resolution of these cases, the delegation suggested to Vu Hoang that Lieutenant Colonel Mather be sent back to Hanoi in the near future, and as often as possible, to be of whatever assistance he

could in relating the material in the files to information in Vietnamese possession.

The delegation considered it a positive, significant step that the Vietnamese agreed, in principle, to this procedure. This would fulfill the promise of earlier agreements to cooperate and which had so far proved disappointing.

In another positive step, the task force proposed a somewhat modified procedure to help in obtaining an accounting. Vu Hoang repeated what earlier delegations had also heard, that the villagers in many instances resented being asked for assistance in recovering remains after the pilots had done so much damage and there had been no compensation from the United States.

Therefore the task force suggested that it would be desirable if the Vietnamese were to undertake to provide information even where remains might not be subject to recovery. If an investigation had, in a specific instance, revealed an unsurmountable obstacle to recovery of remains, then we would accept a report of the details of such an investigation. In some instances personal effects—pocket diaries, identification cards, letters, and so forth—would be of assistance.

The delegation also turned over to the Vietnamese several reports of crash or grave sights as revealed to us by refugees who had fled the country. In sum, the information turned over was not in the delegations view, the sort of data which could be easily dismissed, if carefully investigated.

One other effort was a request to Ambassador Hoang to guide us or assist us in approaching the Government of Laos concerning any information which might be obtained on the more than 500 cases missing in that country. He agreed to see if he could be of assistance to us in that regard.

The subcommittee thus was able to establish communication with the Vietnamese on this very important subject. The delegation impressed as much and as often as it could the significance of this issue to prospects for better relations between Vietnam and the United States. It requested and obtained approval in principle of regular visits by an American official to Hanoi for the purpose of working to resolve on a case by case basis the question of the fate of Americans who disappeared in Vietnam. It encouraged the Vietnamese not to wait until they could give us remains, identified or otherwise, but to provide personal effects or even information as to the fate of the missing. It also sought the good offices, to the extent possible, of the Vietnamese in dealing with the Government of Laos.

In the delegation's view, none of these points was rejected outright by the Vietnamese. Therefore the delegation was optimistic. At the same time there was little by way of concrete evidence that any of these proposals would be carried out. For that reason the delegation saw grounds for caution.

In sum, the delegation established communication with the Vietnamese which did not exist before—between the most actively interested Congressmen in this issue and the country which still holds the answer to this question. Vigorously pursued, that communication could provide a way to the full accounting which is the task and the target of the task force on prisoners and missing of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.

U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN ASIA AND COMMENTS ON THE SOVIET UNION ¹

THAILAND

U.S. interests in Thailand are to support the growth of a free, stable, and economically progressive nation and to strengthen mutually-beneficial trade and investment opportunities. Thailand is a moderating influence in Third World councils and is assuming a role in Asian regional affairs.

Thailand is predominantly an agrarian nation characterized by severe regional and rural-urban income disparities. While the proportion of Thailand's population living in absolute poverty—incomes less than \$90 per person per annum in urban areas—has declined from 50 percent in the early 1960's to 25 percent in recent years, there are still more than 11 million Thais who remain impoverished.

Adequate health care is accessible to only 25 percent of the population and in rural areas there is only 1 doctor for every 31,000 people. Literacy is reported to be 82 percent, but less than half of the eligible students go beyond the fourth year.

Thailand's population is 44.8 million as of mid-1978. Present development assistance levels are as follows:

[Dollar amounts in millions; fiscal years]

	1977	1978	1979
Agency for International Development.....	\$12.8	\$7.5	\$16
World Bank (IBRD).....	158.0	198.4	(1)
International Development Association.....		33.1	(1)
Asian Development Bank.....	47.0	157.1	(1)

¹ Not available.

BANGKOK METROPOLITAN AREA

Thailand's urban sector is characterized by a relatively low level of urbanization, rapid growth and the predominance of Bangkok. With a 1977 population of 4.8 million and a growth rate of 5 percent per annum, Bangkok accounts for almost half of the total urban population. Bangkok is 40 times larger than the next largest city in Thailand. It is the main port and transportation hub, industrial, commercial, and financial center, and regional headquarters for a number of international agencies and multinational businesses. Although Bangkok accounts for only 10 percent of the total population, in 1976 it contributed 27 percent of the gross domestic product. The city provides other important attractions as well: secondary and higher educational facili-

¹ This section was prepared by Donald Richbourg, House Appropriations Committee staff, under the supervision of Hon. Clarence B. Long, chairman, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations.

ties are heavily concentrated there, with about 60 percent of the nation's upper secondary and 85 percent of higher education institutions. The physician to population ratio in Bangkok is approximately 20 times higher than in the rest of Thailand. It is also the cultural center and location of the main royal residence.

WORLD BANK-BANGKOK SITES AND SERVICES AND SLUM IMPROVEMENT PROJECT

The amount of the total World Bank loan for the project is \$8.6 million made to the Government of Thailand for 20 years, including a 5-year grace period with interest of 7.5 percent per annum. The Government of Thailand in turn lends \$6.6 million of the loan to the National Housing Authority (NHA) on the same terms and interest rate with the balance of \$2 million being made available as a grant. The total cost of the project is about \$15 million with the balance of the funds being provided by NHA.

The project is designed to improve the living conditions of approximately 35,000 of Bangkok's low-income residents, by providing new housing for about 3,000 families; by improving the sanitation, health conditions, and access to public services for about 3,500 families in existing slums; and by increasing employment opportunities in the project areas. The project includes: (a) housing sites and services at Tung Song Hong for about 3,000 housing units, including land and infrastructure, core houses with sanitary facilities, materials loans for house completion through self help, community facilities, commercial and small-scale industrial areas and loans to small-scale businesses; (b) slum improvement at five slums affecting nearly 2,300 dwelling units, including land acquisition, infrastructure improvements, community facilities, loans to small-scale businesses and social support programs; and (c) technical assistance to NHA, including 66 man-months of consultancy and advisory services, training/fellowships and project monitoring and evaluation. The project inherently entails some risk, being the first of its kind to be undertaken by NHA. The demand for site and services units and the willingness of slum residents to pay for improvements have yet to be proven in Thailand, but the risks are considered reasonable in view of the pilot nature of the project in dealing with shelter problems of the poor.

With this background, on August 9, 1979, Representative Clarence D. Long toured the King Petch slum area which is one segment of the Bangkok sites and services and slum improvement project. Representative Long was accompanied by Mr. Donald Cohen, Mission Director for the Agency for International Development, Mr. Donald Richbourg, House Appropriations Committee staff, Mr. Jasdip Singh, Acting Chief of the World Bank Mission, and Mr. Khun Sidhijai Tanphiphat, Project Manager, National Housing Authority.

King Petch is an inner city community of 1,468 families with 61 percent of the families with below minimum incomes. It is also the first such upgrading project which departs from the conventional solution of clearance and resettlement in high-rise housing. It is a \$1.35 million component of the first World Bank urban project in Thailand.

The NHA has programed to upgrade slums containing 26,000 families over the next 3 years in accordance with its policy to rehabilitate economically and socially useful housing stock thereby reaching a large group of beneficiaries with relatively modest investment. The land is 67 percent government owned.

Upgrading consists of 3 main parts:

(a) Physical improvement of walkways, drainage, canal flow, water supply, solid waste disposal, fire protection facilities, and street lighting.

(b) Social and economic improvement programs including small scale business loans (administered by Krung Thai Bank), skill training, daycare facilities, health clinic facilities, family planning, and drug prevention.

(c) Land tenure improvement through giving long-term leases to all existing inhabitants eliminate sub-leases—in order to provide security of tenure and incentives for the tenants to improve their shelters.

Some investment costs, mainly for infrastructure, will be recovered directly from the beneficiaries through land rent increases.

The NHA is executing all civil works but takes a coordinating role for the implementation of social and economic programs responsible by other agencies such as Krung Thai Bank, Skill Training Institute of the Labour Department, Industrial Promotions Department, etc.

As of May 10, 1979, approximately 50 percent of civil works have been completed and skill training program initiated. Other social and economic programs will be started as soon as community buildings—included in civil works—are completed.

Initial response by the inhabitants seem to be extremely favorable, since very little resettlement is required. The direct cost recovery through improvement fees recovered over 10 years at 12 percent interest are well within affordability ranges of the inhabitants. These fees would be added to land rents. NHA is also working on indirect—through local government, property taxation—recovery strategies for future projects.

During our walking tour we were able to see the improved walkways, drainage facilities, and improved street lighting.

OBSERVATIONS

This project certainly was aimed at directly helping the poor while at the same time trying to recover some of the costs through improvement fees and property taxes. Other projects need to place more emphasis on the self-sustaining, self-liquidating aspects of project financing. Capital is in short supply worldwide and all possible cost recovery schemes need to be explored in order to be able to spread the benefits of development to as many people as possible.

While this type of project is certainly needed in Bangkok, it appears the problem is much larger than slum improvement. One need only walk the streets of Bangkok to witness the mass of humanity crowded into this small space. The traffic is never ending and the canals running through the city appear as black as ink serving as open sewers for the population of the city.

Thought needs to be given to relocating some of the industry, commerce, etc. to other cities in Thailand in order to stop the influx of people in to Bangkok. The city appears to be growing at a faster pace than the abilities to cope with such growth can develop. Waste disposal appears to be a major area creating a pollution problem in all the canals. Population control is another area that should be pursued more vigorously.

While this specific project was certainly beneficial to the people, the problems of Bangkok are much greater and need to be addressed in a much more comprehensive and coordinated plan.

SRI LANKA

Sri Lanka is a democracy with a strong record of free elections, individual rights, and social equity. The Government of Sri Lanka's priority is development—growth and equity. U.S. interests are served by Sri Lanka's attaining its goal while maintaining its democratic traditions.

Sri Lanka is a poor country whose development policies until recently have emphasized investments in health, education, and social programs instead of programs to improve economic productivity. These policies combined with droughts, low export prices and high imported food and fuel prices contributed in the 1970's to a low GNP growth of 2.8 percent and an even lower growth in agricultural production of 1.2 percent. The most serious consequences of these low growth rates and related policies have been widespread unemployment ranging between 15 and 20 percent, and a chronic and massive food deficit, roughly 50 percent of basic foods are imported.

Over the past year, long overdue and politically difficult measures have been implemented by Sri Lanka to improve the economy, including stimulation of domestic savings, investment and production, and restricting welfare expenditures to poorer families.

Sri Lanka's longstanding commitment to its people's basic needs for food, education, and health is reflected in impressive performance. In the last 25 years, Sri Lankans have:

- increased their food consumption by about 15 percent to 2,200 calories per capita;
- increased their life expectancy to 68 years;
- decreased their infant mortality to 45 per 1,000;
- decreased their population growth rate to 1.5 percent;
- achieved an adult literacy rate of 78 percent; and
- achieved a modest redistribution of income to benefit the lowest 40 percent of their population.

Recently the Government has adopted policies and programs to increase rice production. They include improved marketing and price incentives, increased fertilizer availability and acceleration of irrigation schemes. These measures, combined with good weather, have contributed to dramatic increases during 1977 and 1978 in rice production and in small farmers' real incomes.

Sri Lanka's population is 14.6 million as of mid-1978 and in 1977, per capita income stood at \$160. Present assistance levels are as follows:

[Dollar amounts in millions; fiscal years]

	1977	1978	197 ¹
Agency for International Development.....	\$20.9	\$23.0	\$29 ¹
International Development Association.....	41.2	33.5	(¹)
Asian Development Bank.....	41.5	33.9	(¹)

¹ Not available.

On August 13, 1979, a portion of the congressional delegation received a detailed briefing at the Ambassador's residence relating to development assistance. Present at this briefing were Representatives Clarence D. Long, James H. Scheuer, and Andy Ireland; U.S. Ambassador W. Howard Wriggins; Mission Director for the Agency for International Development (AID) Sarah J. Littlefield; and Donald Richbourg, House Appropriations Committee staff.

The general discussion indicated that the Government of Sri Lanka was dedicated to helping its poor and was making every effort to do so. The status of women is very good in Sri Lanka with abundant job opportunities and the literacy rate for women in 1971 was running around 70 percent. A good deal of discussion centered around the Mahaweli Ganga development project which is Sri Lanka's priority development program and will be discussed in greater detail later in the report. The Sri Lanka Government has been resettling people into the more productive areas of the country for the last 40 years and it seems to be accepted readily by the people involved. They are now resettling some of the old hydrological areas that were agriculturally productive in the twelfth century.

Representative Long inquired about progress made in providing safe drinking water in Sri Lanka. It was stated this was a highly technical area and qualified people are not available in the field of clean water development. In the health field, Sri Lanka has placed more emphasis on the curative side of health systems rather than on the preventative side which has slowed the progress in developing a clean water system. Forty percent of the people hospitalized in Sri Lanka suffer from water borne diseases.

Representative Long stated that development projects must be designed to be self-liquidating and self-sustaining so that they can exist on their own. The beneficiaries must be required to pay directly for the benefits received so the scarce development assistance funds can be spread over a larger area and benefit a greater number of poor people. The AID mission director stated that they require that the agricultural credits be repaid and the Government of Sri Lanka requires that each farmer pay a fee on each acre of irrigated land.

Representative Scheuer indicated that some officials of Sri Lanka were advocating the need for large capital transfers whereas the efforts of the Government should focus on land reform and the collection of income and property taxes to pay for the development effort. The U.S. Ambassador stated that the Government of Sri Lanka has confiscated property and no more than 50 acres may be owned by one individual. The Government also taxes incomes up to 70 percent.

MAHAWELI GANGA DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

The area involved is an area in the North Central Dry Zone of Sri Lanka, about 50 miles north of Kandy, near the ancient city of Anuradhapura. A diversion tunnel and canal recently began bringing irrigation water from the Mahaweli River—at a point near Kandy—to this area. A group of donors, led by the International Development Association—IDA and including Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States are providing about \$42 million in concessional loan and grant assistance to enable irrigated agricultural production by small farmers newly settled in this area and by farmers already working on unirrigated land. The IDA loan is for \$19 million and the U.S. Agency for International Development—AID—loan is for \$5.2 million plus \$800,000 for grant. The 5-year project, initiated in August 1977 with a total cost of \$70 million—including a Government of Sri Lanka contribution of \$28 million—provides for land preparation, canal construction, provision of agricultural research, extension and inputs, and health and education services for small farmers and their families. About 35,000 farm families—175,000 people—are being benefited, including 15,000 new families being resettled on new 2½ acre irrigated plots. The estimated increase in rice production—about 10 percent of the annual deficit—will generate additional income and employment in the local nonfarm sectors such as marketing, transport, and processing. Based on past experience this could result in 9,000 additional jobs. Thus, over the 5-year life of project, it will cost about \$60 per capita. The system H project is the pilot for a series of accelerated Mahaweli development projects intended to tap the waters of the Mahaweli Ganga, Sri Lanka's largest river, for irrigating 340,000 acres of new land and to provide 2½ acre irrigated farms in North-Central and Eastern Sri Lanka. Many of these farms will be provided to the currently unemployed. The Government is pinning many of its hopes for increasing employment and food production on this program.

The various foreign donors involved in the system H project are financing the foreign exchange costs of the project and a portion of the local costs. The U.S. AID loan provides for the water delivery systems to the farmer. The implementing agency is the Mahaweli Development Board of the Government of Sri Lanka. This project in system H is providing valuable experience for the Mahaweli systems to be developed in Eastern Sri Lanka over the next 5–6 years for some 140,000 families, or 700,000 people.

The farmers chosen for resettlement to this project generally must meet the following criteria; they must be 25 to 30 years old, married with one or two children, currently unemployed and landless. The Government of Sri Lanka provides the farmer material to build his own house, provides food until the first crops are produced and provides agricultural loans to buy seed, implements, et cetera.

With this background, on August 14, 1979, Representative Clarence D. Long toured section H of the Mahaweli Ganga development project. Representative Long was accompanied by Mr. E. L. B. Hurulle, Minister of Cultural Affairs, Government of Sri Lanka, Dr. Walter Abeygunewardene, General Manager, Mahaweli Development Board, Gov-

ernment of Sri Lanka, Miss Sarah Jane Littlefield, U.S. Agency for International Development Mission Director, and Donald Richbourg, House Appropriations Committee staff.

Representative Long talked to several farmers and workers in the project at random. Each individual interviewed seemed to be very grateful for the project and was saving money each month from his earnings. They earned about 7 percent on their savings if it was placed in the people's bank operated by the Government. Most of the farmers and workers earned between \$25 and \$50 per month. The main crop planted by the farmers is rice but they also grow some coconut and cassava. Most of their crops were sold to the cooperative of which the Government sets a fixed price for rice. Some of the crops were also sold on the open market. All of the farmers indicated their crop yields were increased on the irrigated land and they could now harvest two crops per year.

We toured a village market center where off-farm employment was provided for various types of shopkeepers and private entrepreneurs.

We visited a community center where they were training farm leaders on water management, canal maintenance, et cetera. They bring their farm leaders in for training for 6 days each month and they return to their hamlet and train the farmers there in the proper techniques of water management, agricultural techniques, et cetera. There were about 25 farmers present in the training group and everyone indicated he was satisfied with the project. They did indicate the need for additional industry in the area to provide off season employment and employment for their children. Most of the farmers wanted their children to have a good education and obtain good jobs because good land is in short supply.

Many of the farmers or their wives serve as voluntary health workers for their community. One such volunteer worker we interviewed, dispensed malaria pills to the community and provided information on what should be done if malaria is contracted. This particular volunteer served about 250 people in her community. She indicated that she used to provide pills to about 60 individuals per month but now she provides pills to only 5 individuals per month. This certainly indicates that the malaria control effort of the Government and the U.S. AID malaria program have been effective in reducing the incidence of malaria cases.

The group also visited a U.S. AID-assisted "on-farm water management" project, a subactivity of Mahaweli Ganga irrigation project. This project is located on an experimental farm within Mahaweli system H and is developing improved water delivery and management procedures suitable for small farmers and intended to increase production per unit of water. An American on-farm irrigation adviser has been onsite for a year, and has developed improved land leveling techniques, including the design and local manufacturing of simple but effective bullock and tractor drawn implements, as well as improved plot and field channel layouts which reduce the cost of bringing irrigation water to small farmers. Research on optimal amounts and timing of water delivery for various crops is also being carried out. The Government's Irrigation Department is the imple-

menting agency on behalf of the Mahaweli Development Board—MDB. The MDB is looking to this project for applications throughout the entire Mahaweli program. The total cost of the 5-year project is about \$1.1 million and the AID contribution is in the form of a \$0.8 million grant mentioned earlier.

We were met by Mr. George Knierim, AID contractor for land preparation. He demonstrated several land leveling techniques and showed us other examples of simple earth moving equipment. One of the pieces of land leveling equipment demonstrated was tractor drawn and another one was drawn by bullocks. Mr. Knierim felt the bullock drawn implement was adequate for the type of land leveling required in this area and that the tractor drawn implement was too costly and not needed to accomplish the same results. He felt the Government officials of Sri Lanka in charge of the project were disposed to use the more sophisticated tractor drawn land leveling implement and wanted to downplay the simple method of leveling.

The overall plan calls for certain cost recovery methods such as land sales and land betterment charges but these charges would only recover about 33 percent of the total costs.

OBSERVATIONS

It was generally felt that the Government of Sri Lanka is definitely dedicated to helping its poor people. This conclusion was drawn from meetings with top officials in the Government as well as onsite inspections of specific projects. It is felt that in order to successfully carry out development programs, an important requirement is that the Government be committed to helping its own poor people. Otherwise, how can foreign technicians be free to offer their services and train the people in more efficient techniques? If this dedication to helping the poor is not present in the host country, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to expect to develop a workable development assistance program.

In our discussions, it was obvious that an increased effort needs to be made in the development of clean water systems in Sri Lanka. It was stated that 40 percent of the people hospitalized suffer from waterborne diseases. This effort needs to focus on the development of trained personnel in this field, provide health education on the need for clean water, and place more emphasis on preventive health methods rather than on curative methods. These, of course, are only a few areas to be considered but their importance should not be minimized.

Concerning specifically the Mahaweli project, the following observations are provided. At the outset, it must be stated that this project appeared to be a very good project and aimed at directly helping the poor people in Sri Lanka. The delegation was highly impressed with the favorable reactions of the beneficiaries to the project and the actual on-site observations of the facilities, the opportunities for the earning of additional income being provided and the land being reclaimed for increased agricultural production. However, several constructive comments are in order. It was felt that the project was proceeding in too many directions at one time. New canals were being dug while at the same time previous sections that have had the canals

completed were not in full operation because of various delays. It would appear that it would be more beneficial to complete one section completely before moving on to another section. In this way, if certain arrangements or methods don't work out, they can be adjusted before starting another section. Conversely, if improved techniques are discovered, these improvements can be employed in the new section being developed.

The donors to the project should insist that capital saving technologies and methods are employed wherever and whenever possible. The immediate example that comes to mind is the land leveling equipment that was pulled by bullocks as opposed to the equipment pulled by tractors. The AID contractor felt the bullock drawn equipment was more than adequate to level the land in the project area but the officials of Sri Lanka wanted to use the more sophisticated equipment. In order to reach all the poor in the world, capital must be conserved and capital saving techniques must be employed whenever possible.

It would seem that a higher cost recovery from the beneficiaries could be achieved rather than only the 33 percent presently being estimated for the project. All development projects should try to avoid a subsidy element and be designed to be self-liquidating and self-sustaining in order to spread the scarce development assistance funds to as many needy people as possible. In some circumstances, it is not possible to recover 100 percent of the cost but a maximum cost recovery effort must be built in to all development projects in order to obtain the maximum leverage from the development funds provided.

PAKISTAN

A principal U.S. interest in South Asia is to maintain regional stability. A secure, independent Pakistan with a developing economy is important in accomplishing this objective.

With 77 million inhabitants and a per capita income of about \$170, Pakistan is among the world's poorer large countries. The social indicators associated with this level of poverty are somber: the illiteracy rate is about 75 percent; infant mortality is 124 per thousand; and the population growth rate is about 3 percent per year. Three-fourths of the inhabitants live in villages, most of which are isolated and inaccessible, without potable water or electricity, and with minimal health care and primary school facilities.

Agriculture contributes over one-third of the gross domestic product and employs over one-half the Pakistani labor force, which produces far below its potential. While the Government of Pakistan now recognizes the growing needs for fertilizer, seed, and water to increase agricultural production, insufficient attention and resources have been applied in the past.

Overall development efforts have been hampered by shortages of trained personnel, inadequate data for decisionmaking, an ineffective administrative structure, cultural restraints on participation by women and poor people in the development process, weak to nonexistent local government organizations, and periodic political instability which interrupts the pace of development.

The United States has provided concessional economic assistance to Pakistan since 1952. During this 27-year period our economic assist-

ance has totaled over \$5 billion, with about \$2 billion of this being in Public Law 480 commodities. During the 1950's we were the major donor with assistance levels reaching \$500 million in early 1965. In recent years our assistance has declined substantially to \$43 million in the current year, \$40 million of which is Public Law 480 commodities. Over the years the U.S. Government has made significant contributions to most of the existing development institutions and programs to Pakistan which range from the Tarbela Dam to universities, to village development schemes, with over 3,000 Pakistanis trained abroad under U.S. sponsorship.

Currently, due to the nuclear dispute, we have terminated all new obligations, and we are drawing down the pipeline on 11 development projects, primarily in the fields of agriculture and health, with the expectation that U.S. development activities and almost all U.S. staff will depart by October of 1980.

Present development assistance levels are as follows:

[Dollar amounts in millions; fiscal years]

	1977	1978	1979
Agency for International Development.....	\$52.7	\$0.7	¹ \$3
World Bank (IBRD).....	45.0	-----	(2)
International Development Association.....	80.0	122.2	(2)
Asian Development Bank.....	139.0	143.6	(2)

¹ Estimate.

² Not available.

ON-FARM WATER MANAGEMENT PROJECT

Pakistan has one of the most sophisticated and complex irrigation systems in the world. Despite this elaborate irrigation network, Pakistan crop yields are among the lowest in the world. Research conducted by the Colorado State University (CSU) under an Agency for International Development (AID) contract has demonstrated that over half of the available irrigation water is lost in delivery by small watercourses to the farmers' fields. Research by CSU has also shown that excessive irrigation water losses occur in the application and management of the remaining water.

The AID-assisted project was designed to reduce water losses and improve agricultural production of the small- to medium-size farmer with holdings of approximately 25 acres or less. The project consists of (1) provision of construction materials and technical guidance from trained Pakistan field technicians for low cost watercourse improvements; (2) financial and technical assistance for farmer land leveling; and (3) training to farmers in crop and water management practices. The project is also assisting Pakistan in developing a model for organization of water user associations to provide timely repair and maintenance of improved watercourses.

This pilot project is providing approximately \$0.9 million (grant) and \$7.5 million (loan) to assist the Government of Pakistan in financing project activities through December 31, 1980. The project focuses on the development of field teams who will collaborate with small farmers in carrying out the work, and provide technical assistance and on the job training for these teams. Approximately 350

watercourses are being improved and 75,000 acres of land are being leveled under this pilot effort.

At the termination of this project, a cadre of technically qualified, fully equipped field technicians, experienced in watercourse improvements, land leveling, and land and water management activities will exist. In addition, the Federal Level Water Management Cell and the Provincial Offices of On-Farm Water Management, Department of Agriculture, will be institutionally capable of implementing this project.

Upon completion of this pilot effort, the project is to be replicated on a wider scale throughout the irrigated areas of Pakistan.

With this background, on August 16, 1979, Representative Clarence D. Long toured the Faisalabad District of the On-Farm Water Management Project. Representative Long was accompanied by Mr. Michael Adler, Mission Director of the Agency for International Development (AID), Mr. Sid Bowers, AID project manager, Mr. M. S. Cheema, Director of the On-Farm Water Management Project, Government of Pakistan, and Mr. Donald Richbourg, House Appropriations Committee staff.

This segment of the overall project covered 350 acres of land, involved 3,182 meters of waterway, and 61 shareholders were located in the area; 58 of the shareholders owned less than 12.5 acres. The farmers are provided the materials to improve the waterways and level the land and they provide all the labor. Ten years ago most of the land in the area was productive, but because of poor water management, the land became waterlogged with a high degree of salt content. The group stopped at an unimproved waterway which consisted of a ditch dug in the earth. Approximately 50 percent of the water was lost before it reached the land needed to be irrigated.

The project will pay the farmer to improve the irrigation facilities for only five acres and the remainder has to be financed on his own. In addition, the farmer pays all the initial costs and then is reimbursed. The farmers are required to form a water association and they must recruit 75 percent of the farmers in the area to join before they can qualify for the construction of a waterway.

The group visited an improved area where a series of waterways had been constructed. We toured the actual waterway and talked to several farmers served by the new waterway. All the farmers seemed very pleased with the project and indicated they had improved their crop yields substantially.

The cost of the waterways is about 10 cents per linear foot in the normal areas but in the high traffic areas where soil is not firm and the waterway must be lined, it costs about \$3 per linear foot. The construction of the waterway was very simple but adequate for the area.

Representative Long, Mr. Adler, and Mr. Richbourg returned to Islamabad and toured the International Rice Research Institute—IRRI—Pakistan Agricultural Machinery program. Mr. Amir Kahn, director of the program, served as our host and guide during the tour.

This workshop designs and builds small machinery and equipment for use by the smaller farmers. They test the equipment and if it appears it will be functional in the area at a reasonable cost, the Institute turns it over to local small-scale manufacturers for production. In designing the equipment, the institute tries to utilize local available ma-

terial so it can be produced in the area and maintenance can be provided locally.

The group witnessed a demonstration of two small motorized threshers, a small riding tractor made out of old jeep parts, a walking tractor costing about \$700, which was cheaper than a pair of bullocks, several types of hand seeders, and a foot-operated water pump.

The institute carries out equipment demonstrations and attends local machinery fairs in order to educate the local people on the availability of the machinery and to encourage its local manufacture. The director of the institute said that he received very little encouragement from a World Bank representative in pursuing the development of small machinery. In fact, the World Bank representative felt they should concentrate on larger scale equipment.

OBSERVATIONS

From comments of the farmers benefiting from the on-farm water management project and from personal observation, it appeared that some effort should be made to provide the local people with off-farm employment. Many of the farmers indicated that they had opportunities to perform other work when not planting or harvesting their crops and that it would allow their children other opportunities so they would stay in the area. Because of the land shortage in the area and the fact that land is usually passed down from father to eldest son, many of their children must leave the area to find new land or other job opportunities.

The development and local production of small farm equipment should be encouraged so that economical equipment is available to the small farmer. The IRRI machinery development program visited in Islamabad seems to be just the type of operation that can be duplicated at other locations within Pakistan or for that matter in other countries. The exchange of information between such programs could serve to provide similar equipment in areas with similar agricultural conditions with the advantage of adapting such equipment to local surroundings. This type of program is not only beneficial to small farmers but provides employment for the local people who manufacture the equipment.

RUSSIA

TASHKENT

On August 18, 1979, Congressman Clarence D. Long, Congressman Billy Lee Evans, Congressman David R. Bowen, Congressman Fortney H. Stark, Congressman and Mrs. James H. Scheuer, Catherine M. Hunter, Select Committee on Narcotics staff, and Donald Richbourg, House Appropriations Committee staff, toured the Lenin Cooperative Farm. The group was accompanied by Mr. Dzalilov, First Deputy Minister of Agriculture U.S.S.R., and Mr. Abazob, chairman of the Lenin Cooperative Farm, U.S.S.R.

This particular cooperative farm was founded in 1930 and covered an area of approximately 6,670 acres. They stressed three areas of specialization at this farm; poultry production, cattle breeding, and agricultural production; 3,460 acres of the land was devoted to cotton production but they also grew rice, vegetables, and corn. 1,700 people

worked on the farm, of which 1,000 were involved in cotton production and they had 300 pieces of equipment. The workers receive a regular salary but at the end of the year they also receive a share of the profits depending on their performance record. This profitsharing technique can increase the annual wage by as much as 50 percent but usually runs about 30 percent. The wage levels are set by the cooperative members and are separated into six skill levels.

The cooperative sells the cotton to the state and the Government sets the price. All supplies are purchased from the state. This cooperative usually makes a handsome profit each year but in the poor production periods they would receive a subsidy from the state. The profits are reinvested in the cooperative to build roads, houses, et cetera, and do not revert to the state.

The chairman of the cooperative is elected at a general meeting of the members and any member may be nominated to seek the office. However, they usually choose the most qualified and experienced individual to hold this position. The present chairman was elected in 1961 and lived all his life in this area.

Upon reaching the age of 60 for the men and 55 for the women, they become eligible for retirement. They draw a pension from the cooperative and from the state and are allowed to retain their current housing. If they are physically able, they can continue to work past the retirement age in which case they would receive their pension plus a salary.

We then toured the administrative offices and the meeting hall and a war memorial.

At lunch, it was stated that the usual workday starts at 7 a.m. with a midafternoon break. They work 8 hours a day, 40 hours a week except at harvest time when they work from dawn to dusk. Sixty percent of the cotton in the U.S.S.R. is picked by machine and they hope to increase this to 70 or 75 percent in the next couple of years. They weed the cotton both by hand and machine. In the summer, they receive very little rain and they are required to irrigate the fields. They irrigate the field four or five times a year and most of the water comes from the rivers with about 1 or 2 percent coming from wells.

After lunch, we inspected a cotton field and visited a home of one of the cooperative farmers.

OBSERVATIONS

The cooperative leader seemed to be very proud of the fact that they had a great deal of mechanization for cotton production. However, Representative Bowen stated that a great deal of the machinery was primitive and some of the machinery looked as though it had been poorly maintained.

The cooperative leader allowed the congressional delegation to visit a home of one of its more affluent members. This was apparent by noting the size of the house and grounds and by the fact that his son was now a professor at one of the agricultural schools in the area. The delegation was not allowed to pick a typical house at random to visit but was directed to this particular house. We met the occupants which seemed to be extremely happy to have us and to show us their house.

On the way to the cooperative, we were shown a lot of apartments that had been built to provide housing for the local population. We

were told that many of the farmers still preferred to live in the adobe type houses we saw along the road rather than the more modern apartments being built.

LENINGRAD

On August 24, 1979, Representative Clarence D. Long and Donald Richbourg, House Appropriations Committee staff, visited the Lensovetsky State Farm. Mr. V. J. Nikulenkov of the Ministry of Agriculture, U.S.S.R. and Mr. G. A. Zagorny, the Director of the State Farm served as our host during the visit.

The Lensovetsky State Farm in the Tosno district of the Leningrad was organized in 1929.

Today Lensovetsky is an agricultural enterprise specializing in vegetables, dairy farming, and pig breeding.

The enterprise has at its disposal 8,250 acres of land; 5,446 acres are plowland, of which 1,630 acres are under vegetables and 3,816 acres under forage crops.

Thus, the growing of vegetables in covered grounds—gross output over 20,000 tons a year—is done by two specialized subdivisions on 30 acres of breeding grounds and plastic hothouses and 1,630 acres of open ground. The enterprise has 3,200 head of cattle and 14,000 pigs which are concentrated in three special stock farms.

All the agricultural machines are concentrated in the administrative center area where there is a machine park, a garage, and a repair shop.

The sale of produce to the state for the past year was as follows: milk 6,430 tons, meat 2,700 tons, vegetables 21,600 tons.

Three years ago a new milk-production complex for 1,200 cows came onstream.

The entire herd here is housed in a single building, a block which has a specially outfitted section for milk cows and a maternity block with a prophylactorium for calves under 10 days old.

The cows are kept indoors in boxes the year round, untethered, on slotted floors, with 64 cows to each section. Feeding is stationary, by band conveyer, the cows are milked by milking machines, manure removal is by gravity flow followed by the evacuation of the pulp into a manure dump by pumping.

The enterprise's entire herd of cattle and pigs is serviced by five veterinary surgeons and seven medical attendants. The veterinary division of Lensovetsky is headed by the chief veterinary surgeon. These specialists work in two shifts. They all live in the administrative center of the enterprise.

The veterinary workers of Lensovetsky devote most of their time preventing the incidence of infectious diseases among the animals, raising the milk yield and improving the reproduction rate of the herd.

Lensovetsky has a work force of 1,200 including 160 in animal husbandry. Various production subdivisions are headed by 72 specialists with a higher or secondary school education.

The families of Lensovetsky workers and specialists all live in five-story apartment houses in the township of Moskovskaya Slavianka, a community which has a personal service center, several stores, and a first-aid station. For clinical treatment the sick are transported

to the hospitals of Leningrad and Pushkin. The children study at an 8-year school designed for 380 pupils.

OBSERVATIONS

Before entering the cattle milking and feeding facility, we were required to put on rubber slippers over our shoes, and put on a white linen robe and a hat presumably to comply with sanitation standards for the dairy operation. Upon entering the facility, it was obvious that these precautions to preserve sanitary conditions were wasted. The stables were filthy and the stench was overwhelming.

There were no production workers present in the facility and we were told that they are there only at milking time—once in the morning and once in the afternoon. It appeared that the workers could be provided plenty to do in cleaning up the facility between milking schedules. We noted that many of the workers were just standing around carrying on informal conversations, instead of being properly utilized. It appeared needed work could have been done by these workers utilizing their idle labor time.

While in Leningrad, it was quite impressive to see the beautiful buildings and museums. The maintenance and upkeep on many of these historical buildings was most impressive and presented a sharp contrast to the conditions of most of the local stores and shops where the windows were unkempt and dirty and most of the merchandise was highly overpriced. It was quite a shock to observe some of the prices attached to the goods which were being purchased by the local population.

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ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO

While I generally support the conclusions and recommendations of the study mission, I would like to take this opportunity to emphasize my concerns regarding U.S. relations with Vietnam and the Soviet Union.

The study mission was an extremely valuable opportunity to exchange views directly with Government officials on the serious problems we face in Asia, such as Americans missing in action, the Vietnamese refugees and the Soviet arms buildup.

One point I believe we made very clear to Vietnamese officials was that before any progress could be made in improving relations with Vietnam, the S.R.V. would have to be more forthcoming on the unresolved cases of Americans who are missing in action. Our study mission made this clear to the Vietnamese, and I must confess, I was greatly disturbed by their response. The Vietnamese appeared surprised at our expressed interest in the MIA issue and implied that the State Department had led them to believe that the United States has very little interest remaining in this subject. I and the other members of our delegation quickly refuted that impression.

We turned over to the Vietnamese officials the case files of some 100 individual missing Americans and asked for an accounting of the disposition of those cases.

On the issue of Vietnamese refugees, the Government of Vietnam promised to institute a "more orderly" emigration policy, but they continued to make it clear that they intended to eventually rid their country of all ethnic Chinese.

Our study mission emphasized not only to the Vietnamese but also to the Soviet officials our belief that Vietnam must take greater responsibility for the refugee problem in Southeast Asia and for the continuing agony in Cambodia.

Unfortunately, the Vietnamese officials made it rather plain that they have no intention of departing from Cambodia in the near future. Both Vietnamese and Soviet officials state they felt U.S.-Carter administration policy toward the People's Republic of China was responsible for China's invasion of Vietnam earlier this year, following the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.

In the Soviet Union, I was particularly concerned about making clear to the Soviets that the American people themselves have grave reservations about the wisdom of the SALT II treaty. I brought to the attention of the members of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow the results of the survey conducted with my constituents on the subject of SALT II. I informed them that 35 percent of those responding were in favor of the treaty and 44 percent were opposed, with the rest undecided.

I thus tried to make it clear to the Soviets that the treaty negotiated by the administration did not mean an automatic acceptance by the

American people, and that the Soviets should not be surprised if clarifications or reservations to the agreement are made by the Senate.

During the second meeting our delegation had with members of the Supreme Soviet, I made a statement covering the basic issues that concern me in our relations with the Soviet Union. The text of those comments follows:

COMMENTS BY HON. ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, SECOND MEETING WITH SUPREME SOVIET, MOSCOW, THE KREMLIN, AUGUST 21, 1979

Good morning. I most appreciate the opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to add my views to those already expressed. The exchanges of opinion here yesterday, and those which we enjoyed later at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Institute for United States and Canadian affairs, were most stimulating and I think healthy. Because where we know we disagree, we can proceed with caution. It is necessary, because to think erroneously that we agree on something is to invite serious problems.

This is my first visit to Moscow, and like most Americans I am not quite sure what I expected of the other great world capital, besides Washington, D.C., but somehow not what I've found. Bus rides, walking about Moscow by night, meeting Soviet citizens on the subway, all give us a little better "feel" for your country. I have been impressed with what I have seen.

The United States is a Pacific nation—like the Soviet Union we have a long Pacific coast line. As a matter of fact, my home State, California, looks west across the Pacific almost more than it does to the East, in terms of trade. And this is significant. If California were a separate country (and some people in other States may have suggested this sometimes) we would be the fifth largest country, in terms of trade, in the world. Thus we consider the Pacific, and Asia, a vital part of America's national interests.

Among the views we exchanged yesterday some of us were quick to admit American faults—I would also like to put in another kind of word—that the United States has been less guilty of imposing its will on other peoples than most nations of anything like our size. Mr. Arbatov spoke of "manifest destiny" yesterday, as an example of the "American approach," if you will, to foreign affairs. One of the things that fascinated Americans with Russia in the 19th century was our awareness that the Russian Far East was similar to our western frontier—that we had something in common as we developed the territory of our two countries.

And when we governed territories outside the continental United States, we planned from the beginning to leave them to independence and national self-determination. The few points we still govern are with us either because they could never be viable States on their own—like American Samoa—or because they have freely elected to remain with us, like Puerto Rico. We promised independence to the Philippines, and we gave it.

And when your country, war torn and ravaged by war at the end of the Hitler conflict, was preparing to rebuild, we did not take advantage of your circumstances or the weakness of war-torn Europe, but left. We reduced our standing army and our expenditures and devoted attention to the rebuilding of Europe, and not conquering it.

However, more importantly, I would like to observe that there is one mistake we fall into almost unconsciously from time to time—that of mistaking a willingness to have friendly and cooperative relations with the Soviet Union for an endorsement of its system. Frankly, given the philosophical origins—the American view of the United States' purpose and reason for being based on historical Western ideas of democracy and freedom and the Soviet's core belief in communism as the reason for the State—there is no way we can do more than agree to disagree.

In that connection you are most concerned to obtain ratification of the SALT II agreements. I can understand your purposes. But just remember that the same President who concluded SALT II is the same one who normalized relations with the People's Republic of China. And just as we were quite upset at the lack of congressional consultation regarding his China policy, so many of us do not feel that Congress was appropriately consulted with regard to SALT II.

I should share with you the results of a questionnaire I conducted with my constituents in southern California—on the specific issue of whether we should approve SALT II. The question read :

“The new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) will impose constraints on future U.S. and Soviet weapons systems. Proponents argue that it will save money and enhance U.S. security through the principle of ‘mutual assured deterrence.’ Opponents argue that its high ceilings, exemptions, and lack of verification procedures will allow the Soviet Union to assume a dominant strategic position in the 1980’s. Do you favor this kind of a treaty or think it is too risky?”

The results were 35 percent in favor, 44 percent opposed, and the rest undecided. Thus the American people have some problems too with SALT II. And supporting it will require a thorough examination of its potentials before the voters will consider us responsible.

And, despite cancellation of our planned B-1 bomber, downgrading our new carrier to conventional power, and abandonment of the neutron bomb, we hear about a new Soviet submarine and two new aircraft. The American public feel uncertain. We also remember a quotation attributed to a Soviet general in response to a question by Lieutenant General Rowny, former SALT adviser, who asked how the Soviets would react to the U.S. cancelling the B-1 bomber. The Soviet general reportedly replied, “We are neither pacifists nor philanthropists.” Neither, I submit, should you expect us to be so disposed.

In concluding, and I appreciate your patience, I would like to suggest one area where you could help build bridges—and that is with the Vietnamese Government. In one specific area, a humanitarian concern which should be met as soon as possible, is the resolution of the fate of those Americans who are still missing in action in Indochina. Your assistance would move the United States closer to both the Soviet Union and the Vietnamese in a real humanitarian area.

I am glad to have had the opportunity to share these thoughts with you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

COUNTRY REPORTS

The following sections contain summaries of key meetings and conversations, and transcripts of press conferences, in all the nations visited by the Codel between August 6 and August 24, 1979.

1. HONG KONG

The delegation's visit to Hong Kong August 7 to 9 focused principally upon the refugee problem, and exchange of views on narcotics matters with Hong Kong officials.

In meeting with the U.S. Consulate General and representatives of voluntary agencies, the Codel had an opportunity to discuss with United Nations High Commission for Refugees Representative Rashayagam UNHCR's crash program to complete registration of all refugees presently in Hong Kong, and gradually to take over responsibility for refugee camps now being administered by Hong Kong Government.

Rashaygam noted expansion of the professional and interviewing staff, and expressed the hope that with pledges of increased funds made at Geneva, the UNHCR could substantially relieve the financial burden which, thus far, has been borne by the Hong Kong Government. Chairman Wolff expressed the concern that the UNHCR reduce UNHCR headquarters administrative costs in order to strengthen field operations.

In the meeting with Hong Kong Government officials which followed, Secretary for Security Davies provided a briefing on the evolution of refugee problems in Hong Kong and government's efforts to cope with it.

At the Hong Kong Government briefing, the Codel listened to Secretary for Security Davies, who pointed out the strains the refugee influx had brought to Hong Kong—in terms of costs not reimbursed by UNHCR, or overburdened social services, and unhappiness among some of the poorer Hong Kong citizens who felt the refugees were getting preferential treatment.

Secretary Davies said the Hong Kong Government was still committed to not turning any refugees away, but reiterated that it was unfair that Hong Kong this year received a large percentage of boat refugees in Southeast Asia when only 13 percent of the refugees here had been resettled in third countries. In the exchange which followed, almost every member of the Codel individually expressed their appreciation of Hong Kong's policy.

Codel members queried Davies on the possibility that ethnic Chinese from Vietnam who had entered China by land may be making their way to Hong Kong as "Legal" entrants. Davies stated that border checks precluded this possibility, but added that a comparatively small number may have made their way to Hong Kong by boat. The Codel questioned the advisability of the United Kingdom concentrating its

Indochinese refugee resettlement program exclusively in Hong Kong, noting that other countries in the area may consider that Britain should also participate in other resettlement programs.

Acting Political Adviser Orr noted that Australia was concentrating its refugee resettlement program in Malaysia, and that Canada was taking refugees not only from Hong Kong but other countries in Southeast Asia as well. Asked how many refugees Hong Kong might be willing to accept for permanent resettlement, Davies replied, "None." Davies noted that since 1975, approximately 13,000 persons had come from North Vietnam either legally or illegally, and have been resettled here, a number in relation to Hong Kong's total population which has been equaled by only a very few European countries.

The Codel commended Hong Kong's firm adherence to the policy of first asylum and the contribution it has made to the care and maintenance of such a large number of refugees. The suggestion was offered that other countries should assist Hong Kong in bearing the financial costs of its refugee program.

Following a working luncheon hosted by Governor Maclehole, which provided an opportunity for members of the Codel to discuss refugee and other matters with members of the Hong Kong Government who were present, the Codel visited an initial receiving center for refugees and two camps operated by voluntary agencies under UNHCR auspices.

TRANSCRIPT OF WOLFF PRESS CONFERENCE AT HONG KONG HILTON HOTEL,
AUGUST 8, 1979

Mr. Wolff: I'd like you to meet the other members of our delegation who are travelling with us. This is Chairman Clarence Long. Chairman Long is the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee for Foreign Assistance. Seated next to him is Congressman James Scheuer of New York. Chairman of the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance. We have no prepared notes. This is a very informal conference here today. And seated next to him is Congressman Bob Lagomarsino of California, one of the ranking members of the Foreign Affairs Committee, next to him is Congressman Carlos Moorhead of California, and next to him is Congressman Robert Dornan, also of California. Seated over on my right is Congressman Benjamin Gilman of New York, a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee and Congressman Andy Ireland, also a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, from Florida.

This is both a bi-partisan delegation as well as a delegation of a number of the ranking members of the Congress of the United States. These members are here for a specific purpose. Our purpose goes beyond just the question that has been highlighted recently in the press—that of the refugee situation. We are here in Hong Kong to look at the refugee problem and how it relates to the over-all international problem of refugees. I've just recently returned from the Geneva Conference as one of the United States' representatives at the Geneva Conference. Our objective in this entire trip will be to look at how the Geneva Conference is being implemented.

We have a variety of missions, however. We're only going to be in Hong Kong for one day. We would like to partake of the hospitality of Hong Kong for longer, but our journey is a long one and is going to be a difficult one, indeed. It includes a trip to Hanoi as well as to the Soviet Union. The mission includes, in addition to the question of refugees, the question of narcotics.

Many of you are familiar with the fact that I'm chairman of the select committee on narcotics, and several of the members who are here today are also members of the narcotics committee.

In addition to that, our mission to Hanoi will include discussions on the possible normalization with the Vietnamese at some time in the future. In addition to all of that, in Hanoi we will look into the continuing problem that we have of a solution to the question of our men who are still missing in action in Vietnam. However, the major objective of our journey to this part of the world is as part of the Asian Pacific Affairs Committee, and the political

ramifications of relationships in this part of the world. Now we will visit, among other nations here, Thailand. We will visit Pakistan and Sri Lanka. These countries have been chosen because of their particular political significance in the over-all scheme of things in Southeast Asia and the Pacific area generally as well as the Indian Ocean.

We today spent the better part of the day at a luncheon with the Governor General and we discussed the refugee problem with him. In addition to that, we visited several of the refugee facilities that exist here in Hong Kong.

Part of our mission met with the narcotics officers here in Hong Kong. I might just comment on that for a moment in saying we are very pleased with the success of the Hong Kong authorities. I remember one time when I was here I was quite critical of the effort that was being made by Hong Kong in stemming the flow of traffic from Hong Kong into Europe and the United States. We have seen marked improvement in that connection and as a result of which are benefiting from that in the United States.

We are also very appreciative of the work that the Hong Kong authorities are doing with regard to the refugee problem. Hong Kong has done more than its share in handling this tragic problem that the world is faced with. It is an international problem. Many people have indicated that the United States was the inspiration for much of the problem. The war has been over now for some period of time. Those refugees who are coming out today are not coming out as a result of the war, but are coming out as a result of present circumstances and conditions that have caused their departure from Vietnam.

We are not going to make any specific pronouncements as to the policies of Vietnam or the like until we have had an opportunity of talking to the Vietnamese authorities. I spoke to foreign minister Phan Hien in Geneva at the refugee conference, and we set up a fairly good agenda for our further discussions. We anticipate that this problem is not going to be solved by name-calling or by pointing a finger at one another, but by negotiation. And this is the basic reason why this mission, which is an official mission of the Congress, will attempt to inject itself into the refugee problem among others.

Upon our return to Washington, we will report directly to Secretary Vance and to the President of the United States. If there are any questions that you have, we'll be delighted to try to answer them. We don't claim to be universal experts, nor do we claim to have all of the answers. We have many questions. We are seeking the answers.

Two other members of our mission have joined us—Tennyson Guyer of Ohio. Mr. Guyer is the ranking member of the committee on Asian Pacific Affairs, and Mr. Billy Lee Evans of Georgia (from the President's home state) who is a member of the narcotics committee. Now, we'd like to try to take your questions.

Question. What will you be saying specifically to the Vietnamese about normalization of relations with the United States?

Mr. WOLFF. Well, normalization with the United States is dependent upon improving specific conditions that will make it possible for us to engage in a normal relationship. Namely, we are interested in talking to the Vietnamese about the problems of Cambodia and we're interested in talking to them about the question of the refugees, of the flow of refugees from Vietnam. The reasons for that—seeking ways and means of attempting to provide for an orderly flow of people from that country. And we're also going to talk to them about obtaining whatever information, on a compassionate basis, they can give us regarding our missing-in-action.

Question. How many men are missing?

Mr. WOLFF. Well, we have two men here—Mr. Gilman and Mr. Guyer are members of what was known as the missing-in-action task force. That work has now been taken over by the Asian Pacific Affairs Committee and both of these gentlemen are members of that committee. Mr. Guyer is the chairman of the task force that I appointed for the missing-in-action.

Mr. GUYER. I think our most recent figure is 2300 unrecovered and not returned. As you may know, the families have been going through a process of what we call status review, where the nearest of kin have the right to declare their missing loved one as apparently killed in action—presumptively. And I understand that that number that are still carried on the file as either POW/MIA—prisoners or missing-in-action is now down to about 85 or 90, so, we're talking about 2300 people that we do not know their fate, but presumed dead, and the 80 or 90 that have never been accounted for one way or another, and even possibly there might be one or two or four or five alive that we do not know about.

Mr. GILMAN. We'll be taking files in with us of some of the more specific cases who are known as the hard-core cases that where crash sites have been pinpointed, where there had been some prior publicity. These cases have now been translated into the Vietnamese language, are accompanied by maps, and we hope that we can obtain some information with regard to these case files.

Mr. DORNAN. We also have had about 235 or 240 reports by refugees of having had sites or having had visitations at locations that have been very helpful to us and we're going to resume hearings when we get back in September.

Mr. WOLFF. If I can introduce chairman Long for a short statement.

Mr. LONG. I'm very much interested in the refugee situation, partly because I'm chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee. We've just reported out a bill which raises the total amount for next year for refugee assistance to 500 million, that's half a billion U.S. dollars. We're going to the House floor with that bill immediately after Congress convenes in September. We're going to have some real difficulties at that time. There are going to be moves by certain members to cut off any aid to any multilateral development banks that are giving aid financed partly by U.S. dollars to Vietnam, because dumping large numbers of refugees onto the high seas has aroused great outcries in the United States.

I asked the Secretary of State to give me a letter which I could read on the House floor, which would state what the State Department was going to do about this. It was a letter which consisted mostly of generalities, but did not deal with the particular problem which I asked him to comment on—what was the United States doing through diplomatic measures and others to get the Vietnamese to stop dumping these large numbers of pitiful people onto the door steps of Hong Kong and other countries? And I'm not satisfied that the United States is doing what it can through diplomatic measures. Now diplomacy is not just merely a matter of being nice. It's a matter of using your bargaining power. We do have considerable bargaining power, and I don't think we got that kind of assurance.

We're going to have some real problems when my bill comes to the floor in September fighting off amendments which could cripple the multi-lateral banks because the banks claim they cannot take money with any strings tied to it. Yet I don't see how you can pass a bill through Congress which gives money directly or indirectly to Vietnam. Now those are some of the things that I want to tell the people in Vietnam when we meet with them.

Mr. WOLFF. And it is not with any sense of malice that we're doing this but purely to acquaint the Vietnamese with the problems that we will have in trying to adjust to the situation as it exists.

Question. This is not meant in any way (to be) criticism of your specific mission, but referring to a more general problem. It's widely believed in Hong Kong and in Peking that the large number of Congressional Delegations and other visitors is rather seriously cutting into the capacity of the foreign service to report on developments in China, both internal and foreign policy. And, what I'm wondering is whether there would be support from people here for measures such as increased appropriations for the State Department to hire local personnel to handle the hosting operations which are draining the energy of the foreign service officers, or perhaps even to appropriate more money for Congressional staff to do the advance planning, the helping with shopping, with guiding, all this kind of thing that is apparently producing some rather important problems in the ability of the United States to understand what is happening in an important part of the world.

Mr. WOLFF. We have now something called the Asian Round Table which is going in Washington. It's the first time all the Asian Ambassadors have had the opportunity to get together in an informal setting on a once a month basis. In fact, we had the Governor General at a recent meeting. I think we should move on from that.

Question. Congressman Wolff, you said that you were going to discuss Cambodia with the Vietnamese. Are you planning to make any kind of specific proposal in terms of the new government for Cambodia?

Mr. WOLFF. No, we are not going to tell the Vietnamese that they should have a new government in Cambodia. We are going to discuss the problems that are faced by the move that Vietnam made into Cambodia and try to find some resolution to the problem. I've indicated before that our objective is not to tell people how to do things, but our objective is to try to find some area of agreement that would provide us the opportunity of going forward with normalization.

Question. What is your assessment of Congressional sentiment regarding the problem of normalization and the trade embargo with Vietnam? And what sort of recommendations do you think Congress would go for concerning the three problems—and I add to the Cambodia and refugee problem—I add the problem of Soviet influence in Vietnam?

Mr. WOLFF. Well, we have been studying this problem. Our committee has been studying the over-all problem of what we've called the tri-partite relationship between the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union and the United States now for about 2½ years. We've issued a number of reports on that. The Soviet influence in this part of the world is something that is certainly being questioned.

We are going to the Soviet Union, as I indicated to you before, as for the sentiment in Congress, I think that what we've got to do is to go back to the Congress and report the circumstances as they exist.

With all due regard to the newspaper reports that have been circulated, we think that reporting back with the wide variety of people that we have in this delegation and from all parts of the United States and from all of the political specter that exists, that we will be able to better educate them to the situation that does exist here. I could not say off-hand.

I might say that the United States Government was very close to normalization with Vietnam. And certain events which have taken place have intervened and therefore have set the normalization process back which we hope can be moved forward, if we can resolve some of these problems that still exist.

Question. But what formula would Congress go for?

Mr. WOLFF. I don't think we have a specific formula. I mean there's really no formula that exists here. It's a question of negotiations, like anything else. Now we are not going to negotiate anything, but I think that we represent a system that is not very well understood by many nations in the socialist world whereby Congress, many things sometimes that are negotiated by the President, he finds very difficult to get through the Congress. Therefore, it is important, coming back to the other point, that Congress be well-informed as to the situations that exist. And the other members are dependent upon those of us who have responsibility for the particular areas of interest that we have for informed judgment.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, if I might just add to that. While there isn't any set formulas, as the chairman has indicated, there certainly are some obstacles to be overcome. And one very important obstacle is to have the cooperation of Vietnam with obtaining a full accounting of our missing-in-action as well as to observe some of the humanitarian concerns we all have for the refugees.

Question. How do you think the Geneva conference is being implemented in Hong Kong?

Mr. WOLFF. Well, as for its implementation in Hong Kong, I think the fact that the U.K. has decided to take 10,000 refugees from here is a step forward. I think importance of the Japanese move in supplying funding has been an outstanding move forward. I think that the Philippine effort of providing a transient area is important. I think one aspect, however, that is of concern to us is the fact that the United States has offered to supply consular officials under the aegis of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and this has not as yet been accepted by Vietnam. We're going to try to find out why and what steps we can take to implement that, to help with the transition of these people who have been approved for transfer to other countries.

Question. In the light of Hong Kong's policy of taking refugees on a humanitarian basis, how many refugees do you think the States should take from Hong Kong?

Mr. WOLFF. The United States should take from Hong Kong? I think that as an over-all picture, I don't think that it should be specifically allocated to one particular area or another. It depends upon the pressures that exist, as I indicated to you at the outset. I feel that, and I think that I share the conviction of most of my colleagues, that Hong Kong has done an outstanding job in accepting as many refugees as they have. It shows the real compassionate side of the colony.

I think as well, when you come down to numbers, I think that what we've got to do is have an orderly plan, an international plan. That's why I personally and the committee is very appreciative of Mrs. Thatcher's move toward attempting to set up this international conference. The House of Representatives under this committee's aegis put forth a resolution that provided for the international conference. I'm hopeful as well that the United Nations will proceed further. Secre-

tary Walheim is supposed to report to the General Assembly. In speaking to the Asian nations, I'm hopeful that the Asian nations, as well as others, will bring this matter before the Security Council so that there can be not just a moratorium on the process, but a final solution reached as to the setting up of an orderly process.

Question. Congressman Wolff, do you think Vietnam is currently trying to reduce the outflow of refugees?

Mr. WOLFF. I can't say. I haven't been there. That's one of the reasons we're going there. What we have seen is that the number of boat people have been reduced. Now we don't know whether it is the storm of protests or the storm of the seas that has accomplished this. But we do know that there has been a reduction in the number of people, and you can see here in the colony. You can see it as well in other places where they have temporary refuge. One thing that we were told by Phan Hien is the fact that there would be a reduction in the illicit, illegal traffic in refugees. In other words the illegal emigration of Vietnamese. There was nothing mentioned about the legal flow, however, and that is part of the discussions we would like to have with the Vietnamese to determine whether or not this reduction is because of a policy that has been established by the Vietnamese, or whether it's just a normal high and low of refugee transit.

Perhaps some of my other colleagues here would like to make some remarks.

Mr. LONG. Let me say this, that by the end of this year, we will have taken a quarter of a million refugees into the United States, vastly more than other countries have taken from Vietnam. In my bill we've just reported out to Congress a half billion dollars. Now this is large money, even for the United States, and I don't expect that we're going to be able to expand that very much in the years to come. I think the solution to this is cutting down the outflow from Vietnam. I think that's the message we've got to take to Vietnam.

I want to commend Hong Kong. Coming here is an education not to be gotten in any other way. I was here 12 years ago, and the transformation in Hong Kong is something that it is almost impossible to get anybody to believe. How you could have taken the number of people you have taken and grown and prospered the way you have done: I don't believe any other economy could have done it and I just don't know quite how it was done. I don't think very many countries are going to be able to do, or are going to be willing to do, politically, what Hong Kong has done.

Mr. WOLFF. I should just like to introduce Congressman Stark of California who has joined us here.

Mr. STARK. Can I say a word, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. WOLFF. Please.

Mr. STARK. On the refugees. Not only have we taken about 200,000 or 250,000 by the end of this year it will be a quarter of a million. But we've had several years of experience with refugees from Vietnam. And they have produced a very remarkable record of hard work, of upward mobility, of integration in American life, of achieving independence very, very quickly. And they have proven to be a great asset to our country. They have been made excellent citizens. The kids have learned to read, write, count and perform very well in school in an amazingly short period of time.

When they first came into this country, to our country, as you would expect, about 85 percent of them were on welfare, were being supported by our Government. You'd expect that. Now, of the ones who have been here for about 2 years in our country, somewhere between 10 and 15 percent, only 10 or 15 percent are still on welfare. They have proven to have a determination to be independent, to make it on their own, to achieve success on their own. Their kids, as I've said, have been real fine achievers in school. And I think that any country in the world that accepts these refugees will find that they have an outstanding group of new citizens on their hands who will make fine contributors to their society.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I wanted to reinforce Mr. Gilman's answer to this lady. You added a third priority to the normalization question. The Soviet influence is not one of three problems because, if anything, that would be more reason for us to proceed toward normalization so that we would have part of the picture here with Vietnam.

I just want to reinforce what Mr. Gilman said. The missing-in-action problem in the United States is almost co-equal with the refugee problem. Cambodia's situation has slipped really from the consciousness of the Congress, given the months that have passed. It just will not come up in debate on the floor of the House of Representatives. The two primary issues of those three—Cambodia being the third—are the refugee problem and the American missing-in-action left over from the Vietnam war.

There are four of us here from California. As our most populous State, we have more missing-in-action people than any other State. As a matter of fact, if you take California, New York and Ohio, you have the largest share of those missing-in-action people. And these family members—mothers, fathers, wives and children who came to all of our offices before we left and who have never stopped appealing to their Congressmen and their Senators for some mercy and justice on this problem. They wrote to all of us. They came and paid visits to us. They had what they called the League of Family meetings in Washington, D.C. just last month in July.

This is a far more significant problem than some of the international tensions. Of course, this typhoon probably swallowed up in the seas more human beings than all of the Americans put together in 10 years that were lost in Vietnam. And Americans are humane people and that is why the refugee problem is co-equal or maybe even more important with some. But the missing-in-action problem must not be left out of your assessment of what is a major block to normalization with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

Mr. GUYER. I'd just like to mention on that score. There have been or there has been an exploitation of the missing-in-action. Politically, in a variety of ways, this is not to infer that our mission of attempting to gain further information about the missing-in-action is an exploitation of armament of the Vietnam war. It is being done on a compassionate basis for the families of those who still have no word on their next-of-kin. And I think that it is important to understand, and we too who do understand something of the mores of Asia do realize that the Asian people revere their dead. So do our people. It is not in any measure of trying to raise this as somewhat of an objection to the normalization process, but it is of a sincere concern to give some peace of mind to the families who have really had no peace of mind since the end of the war. And it is done purely on a compassionate basis and I hope that you will understand this. There have been people who have exploited this. We don't want you to in any way get the idea, the Vietnamese to get the idea, for the American people to get the idea that this is an exploitation of these people. Unfortunately, too many people have exploited it on both sides. We want to see an end to that. Is there anything that you'd like to say about this? (Directed to the press)

Question. In your discussions with the Governor today, did he put forth in suggestions for the solution of the refugee problem in Hong Kong?

Mr. GUYER. Yes, he said that he hoped that we would be amenable to finding additional places for refugees from Vietnam from Hong Kong.

Mr. LONG. Just for the record, there have only been five countries, other than Hong Kong, that have taken any sizeable number of refugees permanently and given them homes. And only five countries out here who, because of geography, have had the influx of people on a temporary basis.

I'd like to appeal to the richer developed countries. If they can't take refugees, to make a monetary offering to countries like Hong Kong and help repay them for this tremendous cost of temporary asylum. Of the 168 or so countries in the world, if they can't do one thing they can do the other. That's one of the real thrusts of the Geneva convention that Secretary Waldheim had is to appeal to these countries who have taken none. If they can't put up some money, maybe provide a home. That would be a great contribution.

Mr. WOLFF. One other point, I think that, and I personally can't speak for my delegation, but I personally feel very strongly about. I don't think the European community has done its job in this question of refugees. The European Community, more than anyone else, has been faced with refugee problems, and yet they have failed in their responsibility, I feel very strongly that they have failed. The U.K. has taken its share. France has taken its share. France certainly has stepped forward and met their responsibility, but I feel other nations have not.

Mr. LONG. One area that could take a much larger number is Latin America.

Latin America is, I think, when you talk to most of the heads of state down there, is a continent which has tremendous room for people. They feel no real population pressure there. They have no problem about controlling population. They could take large numbers and I might suggest to them, for countries that are trying to develop, you couldn't find finer people than the people who are coming out of Vietnam. They're hard-working. They could really help the development program in Latin America, which has been one of the great difficulties there for quite a long time.

Mr. WOLFF. Just take into consideration that I believe the latest figure is that the west Germans import about almost a million people a year for labor from Turkey primarily. Now, if they are importing labor, that means that there is a shortage of labor. If there's a shortage of labor, why not provide some opportunity for these people to perform in a labor force within their country? I'm afraid that our time is just about up, if there's one more question. Yes.

Question. Congressman Wolff, getting back to normalization, if the Vietnamese are forthcoming on one or more of the apparent conditions that the U.S. is, such as MIA's, refugees, and Cambodia * * *

Mr. WOLFF. Please, we are not setting, I want to put that in quotes, we are not setting conditions. What we're doing is indicating that there are certain problems that are to be resolved. We are not setting conditions for normalization.

Question. Well, what could the Vietnamese do while you are there? For example, to convince you that we should normalize?

Mr. WOLFF. Work together with us in attempting to resolve these outstanding problems between our two countries.

Question. Do you think the White House has set conditions? Or the State Department?

Mr. WOLFF. No, no, in fact, to the contrary. There have been talks, that have been going on for sometime that would lead toward normalization. As I indicated to you, we never have favored the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia. Yet we strongly adhere to the principle of territorial integrity of individual countries and until the territorial integrity, no matter who is the government involved, is in some fashion resolved, it makes it more difficult for us to establish relationships that according to the principles of the United Nations guaranteeing the territorial integrity of each individual nation makes it more difficult for us to go ahead with a normalization procedure.

But I want to say very clearly that there are no pre-conditions. The pre-conditions, if they were to exist, are to establish a rapport, to establish an understanding, and to make a determination that we can live together in peace. It must be remembered the two of our most formidable enemies and adversaries are two of our of America's greatest allies today, namely Japan and Germany.

We have not only lived in peace with these countries after a very desperate war, but have worked toward the reestablishment of these countries to today where their economy in some ways is a little better off than our own. And we helped to establish that. These were enemies that we lost great number of lives in conflict with them and yet today we have them as our closest friends and allies. It is hoped that in the future, the policies that are established by the government in Vietnam will be such that we can count them in the same fashion. I thank you very much.

2. THAILAND

The Codel's conversations in Thailand, principally with Prime Minister Kriangsak Chomanand, were confidential, and covered in depth the topics discussed at the press conference in Bangkok, following the delegation's return from Hanoi.

The delegation was warmly received in Bangkok, and held a 3-hour meeting August 9 with Prime Minister Kriangsak, Foreign Minister Uppadit, Minister of Interior Lek Haeomali, National Security Council Secretary-General Air Marshal Sitthi Sawetsila, and Gen. Phao Sarasin, Secretary-General of Narcotics Control Board.

A reception by U.S. Ambassador Abramowitz was well attended by top Thai officials. Congressmen Wolff, Long, Gilman, and Ireland met again for 1 hour with the Prime Minister after their return from

Hanoi to give him their impressions from their trip. Talks focused on Kampuchea, refugees, piracy, narcotics, and economic issues.

During initial meeting August 9, Prime Minister Kriangsak asked that the Codel convey to Vietnamese leaders Thailand's desire to remain outside the conflict in Kampuchea, and Thai hopes that friendly relations with Vietnam could ensue.

The Prime Minister asked, however, that the Codel inform the Vietnamese that Thailand would not flinch from any attack and was prepared for any contingency. He also stressed that Thailand wanted a peaceful settlement of the Kampuchean problem with the withdrawal of foreign troops.

As during previous missions, Representative Wolff responded by reiterating U.S. support for Thailand, including the maintenance of the Manila Pact.

Discussions focused at some length on refugee issues. Prime Minister Kriangsak stressed to the delegation the burden Thailand was bearing and inclination of international community to focus on "boat people," not land refugees.

The Codel raised the subject of pirate attacks on boat refugees. The Prime Minister outlined difficulties Thailand has in controlling the long coast, and of identifying pirates among the large number of Thai fishing boats in the area, and requested fast patrol boats to help.

Delegation expressed concern about possible conditions in Kampuchea and the necessity for international assistance regardless of who was in power in Kampuchea. They noted with satisfaction that UNICEF and ICRC may be making some progress in Phnom Penh on aid question.

Narcotics was discussed briefly. Representative Wolff expressed his appreciation for cooperation in this area. The Prime Minister asked for additional helicopters and spare parts.

Ambassador Abramowitz pointed out that better maintenance would obviate the need for increase in the helicopter fleet and noted that the United States had recently brought maintenance experts to Thailand to assist with this problem.

Following return from Hanoi on Sunday, Representatives Wolff, Long, Gilman, and Ireland, accompanied by Ambassador Abramowitz, called on the Prime Minister at his home. Air Marshal Sitthi also attended.

Representative Wolff informed the Prime Minister that in the Codel's meeting with Vice Foreign Minister Hoang Bich Son, Minister of State Nguyen Co Thach, and Politburo member Xuan Thuy, the delegation had stressed three themes: Refugees, the Kampuchean issue, and MIA's.

The Codel said they also emphasized the United States strong support for Thailand and their opposition to any threat to Thailand. The Codel also stressed that Vietnam should not attempt to split ASEAN by dealing with the individual countries on matters of general interest.

OPENING STATEMENT MADE BY HON. LESTER L. WOLFF AT THE BANGKOK NEWS
CONFERENCE, SUNDAY, AUGUST 12, 1979

Our delegation has just returned from a series of very frank meetings with the leaders of Vietnam. I feel that our talks have broken some significant new ground in some areas, and helped clarify many issues which have to date blocked normalization between the United States and Vietnam.

We met with Nguyen Co Thach, the newly named Minister of State Vice Foreign Minister Hoang Bich Son, Ambassador Vu Hoang, and today, this morning, had an important exchange with Xuan Thuy, a ranking official of the Vietnamese Government, whom I had previously met in Paris during the peace negotiations.

In our meetings, we stressed three major themes:

(1) The problems created by the continued Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia;

(2) The continuing human tragedy of the refugees, and the uncertainty of the situation in the post-Geneva period;

(3) The continuing need for full Vietnamese cooperation in securing a final accounting of our men listed as missing in action, or who died in captivity without official notification of next of kin.

It is in this latter area—MIA's and POW's—that the delegation achieved what I feel is its most single success, and made genuine progress in both defining new ground through increased understanding as well as laying the groundwork for practical results.

Following the frank and often forceful presentations of the delegation, including turning over specific case histories of some of our missing men, the Vietnamese authorities have agreed to a new method of pursuing the accounting for our MIA's on a case by case basis. The Vietnamese authorities also promised to help us obtain cooperation from the Government of Laos.

As you know, we have never received any POW or MIA cooperation from the Laotian authorities, even though we maintain diplomatic relations with Vientiane. Our Vietnamese hosts said they would intercede in this regard, and the delegation is hopeful that in the present atmosphere of increased understanding and good will, something positive may result.

This positive achievement has a negative side, I am sorry to add; it became obvious during our talks that previous missions had failed to adequately convey to the Vietnamese the position of the MIA families—that is, that information itself is a positive goal, that the very attempt to locate remains or wreckage will be proof of good faith, that we recognize that mistakes in identification of remains can be honestly made but rectified by our own procedures and technical capacities.

Secondly, on the question of Cambodia, the Vietnamese made it clear that so long as they perceive a threat from China, they will remain. A positive development, however, it seems to me, is that each Vietnamese official we met repeatedly stated the intention of Vietnam to ultimately withdraw from Kampuchea, and repeatedly denied any long-term goal of an Indochinese federation dominated by Hanoi.

It is clear, however, that the question of Cambodia is not one which will be easily solved.

On the all-important issue of refugees, our delegation was firm in our declaration that the United States will remain committed to humanitarian principles, committed to free immigration, and committed to family re-unification. The Vietnamese objected to our use of the 7th Fleet for rescue purposes, saying we should substitute civilian vessels for such work, and we were equally firm in stating that the President was responding to the humanitarian concerns of the American people, and the entire world in the face of human beings drowning at sea and had not used this rescue effort for any other than humanitarian reasons.

As an example of positive results stemming from the frank and forceful presentations of the delegation, when pressed by us, the Vietnamese agreed to allow an American aircraft into Ho Chi Minh City to carry out the more than 250 family reunification cases they have already approved.

Frankly, much remains to be settled on the refugee question, including the issue of the fate of those who wish to legally emigrate, but who must wait their turn. Also, we hope that the U.S. consular officials will be allowed to travel to Ho Chi Minh City under their own auspices, although we welcome the sponsorship of the UNHCR.

At the time we were told that the Vietnamese would permit the U.S. or any nationality group to come in to Vietnam under the auspices of the UNHCR, but they had to give up their official position with the Government that they represented.

In summary, it was within the context of the three major topics discussed above—refugees, MIA's and Cambodia—that we explored the normalization is-

sue. Both of our nations clearly desire normalizations as in the best interests of the region, and the world. We hope that our mission has helped clear up important areas of concern, and will help open doors for future progress in the remaining areas of disagreement.

This is not to say that normalization is imminent. It is to say, however, that we hope there will be continued talks between our two nations to resolve the differences that exist between us.

We hope that evidence of this new atmosphere will be swiftly forthcoming in the form of further progress along the lines of the MIA agreement we achieved. Our delegation requested the Vietnamese to join in bilateral talks with the United States on each of the three major issues we have outlined, these are not preconditions to normalization. These are obstacles that we feel remain to be settled between our two countries. I am happy to report that Minister Xuan has promised to discuss our suggestion with his government.

In closing let me say that all of us here hope that Vietnam and the United States will be able to put the past behind us, and begin working together on the many issues and concerns we share for world peace and the future well-being of our people. We hope that peace will be maintained in this area of the world and that no nation will use force to accomplish its diplomatic aims.

Mr. WOLFF. I should like to ask the co-chairman of this mission, who is the ranking member of the Asian and Pacific Affairs Committee, Mr. Guyer, and who I appointed as the chairman of the Task Force on the MIA's, to make a short statement.

Mr. GUYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just say that as a member of the original Missing Persons Committee along with Mr. Gilman of New York, we were very visibly disappointed that after 18 months of laborious work and travels and visitations and inner dialogues, that we were never fully satisfied with the outcome and due to the fact that Chairman Wolff saw that this was a great wound and scar in the American heart. He alone is the one who kept this alive by virtue of the task force. I don't want to be repetitive but our task force was probably the first of its kind invited to come into the country and I am sorry to say that the other delegations that have been there have never made this a point. They've concentrated on the refugees, Cambodia, and so forth, but they had not made this a point of discussion.

So let me just say this: that we did meet for the better part of two days and had a substantive session with the ranking Vietnamese officials on this subject including Ambassador Vu Hoang who is the Minister of Foreign Affairs and head of their MIA Commission. The session was attended by myself, Mr. Wolff of New York, Mr. Gilman of New York, Bob Lagomarsino of California, Bob Dornan of California and Jim Scheuer of New York. We also had with us a former prisoner of war, Navy Captain Ray Vohden who is Chief of MIA Affairs—

Mr. WOLFF. I would like to have Capt. Vohden step forward if he could—Capt. Vohden is the first prisoner of war to go back to Vietnam and he came back with our delegation. He was a prisoner of war for 8 years in Vietnam.

Mr. GUYER. He is now working with us in the Department of Defense and I think we ought to give him a little applause here.

We have also Lt. Col. Paul Mather who is our liaison officer with the joint commission resolutions center (sic) in Bangkok and who has been interviewing literally thousands of refugees, and—he's going to be increasingly important. All of us, and I'm speaking for our commission now, we feel that the meeting was significantly important. We made several points to the Vietnamese, as a result of which I think we've made real progress in a very sensitive area. This has already been referred to by the chairman but let me summarize: we stressed to the Vietnamese very frankly the political sensitivity and the importance of this issue to the American Congress and the American public, and I can say this, and Chairman Long I think has said this before me. There is no chance of any substantive assistance unless some of these issues are settled. Am I correct in that, Mr. Chairman? I'm speaking in behalf of 21 million veterans along with what I believe to be a great majority of the Congress in saying this issue should have been high in the agenda whereas it was put on the back burner.

Apparently the Vietnamese have never realized the enormity of what this meant to us and I might say this and I'm going to say it very very frankly. Our own State Department did not put forward this issue as one of the talking points of the dialogue and that was an unfortunate thing because we had to bring it to their attention. Mr. Dornan is here, he can come forward. We stressed that there are hundreds of cases still unresolved on which we have little or no information,

let alone return of remains. Actually about 600 POW-MIA's did return. We've had about 75 remains returned sporadically over a period of many years. Now the Vietnamese did say they had some new information on some new sites and new cases which they are now investigating and they promised to give us a report at a very early date.

I think this is highly important. Then, we turned over to them, and this is a very important point, more than 100 cases of files of those who were known to have been seen or known to be alive at a certain time whose final whereabouts were never determined. Included in those files we've given names, dates of crash or capture, an account of the crash or capture including photographs, personal profiles, and maps showing the location of sites of interest. I hope that you'll bear with me because this is important.

To help with the pursuit of these files we suggested to Vu Hoang that Lt. Col. Mather be sent to Hanoi very soon as a shuttle person who has been invited now to come to their country. They've agreed to this, and he will assist them with his expertise, help them analyze any of their information, and then report to us in that capacity. I think this is a great breakthrough, in a very sensitive area. We also requested that Ambassador Hoang assist us in approaching the Government of Laos, to which we've had no access, no information, and we have more than 500 cases of men missing in that country. He agreed to see if he could be of assistance, and incidentally, we've only had four remains returned from Laos of which only one was identified as an American. Out of 500 missing people.

And one more significant accomplishment was to communicate to the Vietnamese the importance of this information—in the cases of many Americans. They did not quite understand that just having remains was not enough. Now they understand that further information might be even more important to a widow or mother or wife or a family, just to know what the final outcome was. And so we've made known to them that such objects as I.D. cards, photographs, letters, pieces of uniforms, any personal effects or wreckage of their particular vehicle, might be the answer to tell us who they were and answer that problem conclusively.

In summation we consider this to be a very significant, serious, and productive session. I say that very optimistically. I along with Mr. Gilman was in Paris in 1975 the first time we talked to the Prime Minister. This is the first time a group such as this has been invited into the country and we go home with two pieces of good news that I just recounted. And I see coming out of this not only better cooperation and understanding but the building of a bridge that could lead to what both countries in their hearts really desire—the cessation of total war and the beginning of a fruitful understanding between the two countries.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you Mr. Guyer. I see that our ambassador is standing in the rear and didn't even know he had entered the room. Now I know that there's a separation of powers between the State Department and the Congress but we'd be happy to have you join us up here Mr. Ambassador if you would please. We want you to know that we are very pleased with the work of our Ambassador here, Mr. Mort Abramowitz, who has done an outstanding job and who has facilitated not only this visit but other visits by this committee. Chairman Long—

Mr. LONG. Thank you Mr. Wolff. Let me say that I was very much encouraged by the results of our visit. One of the things that I, as chairman of the committee that appropriates all foreign aid worldwide, economic and military, wanted to make clear, because there have been so many suggestions or intimations that if the Vietnamese would mean that there would be foreign aid, some have mentioned even massive reconstruction aid, I wanted to make clear that in no way could aid be tied to anything they did.

I think I made that clear to everyone we talked to and I was very interested with the response they gave. They understood that these things that they were asked to do would not be a condition for the resumption of foreign aid, and that to me was one of the most encouraging things of all.

But of course I did point out that if the various things were not done this would interfere with any normalization. Normalization does not include a resumption of foreign aid. I don't believe the American people would go for it and I couldn't go for it myself.

I think the most important result of all of this was not so much anything we brought back in the way of tangible promises but it was the ambience of the meeting. We were treated with great courtesy. It was obvious that the Vietnamese wanted a normalization of relations with the United States, they wanted a relaxation of tension, they wanted goodwill. And they treated us with great consideration and to me that was the most heartening aspect of this meeting.

Mr. WOLFF. I understand that each one of our members would like to talk but I know that you have questions as well, so what I'm going to do is ask—

Mr. SCHEUER. I have a statement that I'd like to make that I think is going to be a little different from that of anybody else. May I do that?

Mr. WOLFF. Please.

Mr. SCHEUER. I wanted to congratulate Chairman Wolff and all of the members of this delegation for a very brilliantly organized and thoughtfully carried out mission to Vietnam. There wasn't a single member of this group that didn't handle himself with distinction. I agree wholeheartedly with everything that's been said this evening. We did make progress. We did receive assurances on the refugees, on Cambodia, on the MIA's. In fact we had such assurances and we believed those assurances to the extent that I think we ought to act on them.

Now, how should we act on them? At the height of our involvement in the Vietnam War, a war that I think most Americans now feel was not the right war for us, Sen. George Aiken of Vermont stated that we ought to announce that we have won the war and then get out. Now I believe that we ought to announce that we received sufficient assurances of good faith from the Vietnamese on the subject of Cambodia, on the subject of the refugees, and the boat people, on the subject of the MIA's, that it would justify us in extending diplomatic recognition to Vietnam now, tonight, tomorrow morning.

Now, why do I say that?

First, because diplomatic recognition has never historically meant that you approve of a nation's policies or that you love them or that you like them. It simply means that you are setting up formal communications in order to achieve your national policies. We had a period of almost 20 years when we ignored the fact that Russia existed. No diplomatic relations. It didn't prove to be a useful experiment. We had another period of almost 30 years when we had no relationships with the mainland Chinese. That was not a useful exercise.

We now have no diplomatic relations with Cuba. Many members of Congress feel that that is silly. We ought to have diplomatic relations with Cuba in order to negotiate with them the subjects about which we are concerned. I believe that we ought to recognize Vietnam now, and that there are many clear advantages that would accrue to our nation for doing that.

It's perfectly clear to us, I think all of us felt that the Vietnamese want to establish relations with us, do not want to continue a dependency on the Soviet Union. They have fought fiercely for their independence for the last 1,000 years against the Chinese, for 30 or 40 years against the French and for a decade against the United States. They do not want to become a vassal of the Soviet Union. They want to have another option. And I believe we ought to give them that option. If they want to begin to move away from the Soviets I think we ought to give it to them. Now, if we had diplomatic relations with Vietnam that would produce several very interesting and useful results from the point of view of self-interested American foreign policy.

It would cut down Russian influence in the Indochinese Peninsula and reduce their capacity for mischief making. Number two, if the United States had relations both with the mainland Chinese and with Vietnam I suspect that the Vietnamese would feel that we would exercise a moderating influence on the mainland Chinese and reduce their capacity for further punishing attacks on Vietnam and if that happened and if the Vietnamese felt somewhat calmed by the fact that we now had a leg in both camps and we wanted to keep the peace they might be a little bit less neurotic, a little bit less sensitive about the possibilities of threats to their security from their own ethnic Chinese.

If they felt that there was less of a chance for them to have military hostilities with mainland China they would feel a little bit less sensitive about the plight of their own ethnic Chinese and somewhat less eager I am sure to continue the oppression that they have imposed upon their ethnic Chinese.

Second, mainland China would feel that now that Vietnam was not so much a Soviet vassal and was not under the control of the Soviets and was not about to become a Soviet launching pad they would be less inclined to engage in adventures with Cambodia. They would feel that now they had a neighbor that was a responsible neighbor, a neighbor with whom they could live in peace. Finally, the beginning of diplomatic relations would give us what we need to make these assurances we have received on the MIA's, on Cambodia, on the boat people, to make those commitments real.

What we need is not occasional visits from Congressmen, not occasional visits from Bangkok of our military experts. We need embassy and consular people on the ground in Ho Chi Minh City and in Hanoi. That's what we need. People who can work day to day, encouraging the Vietnamese to live up to their assurances and insisting that the Vietnamese live up to their assurances. That's what we need to put meat on the skeleton of the assurances that have been made to us and I believe that everybody's national interest would be served by the beginning of diplomatic relations between the United States and Vietnam. (Sic) After that we could discuss the cessation of the embargo on trade, we could discuss some kind of aid, we could help them develop their enormous oil resources.

In conclusion, I want to make it very clear that I speak for myself. I do not speak for any other member of this delegation or any other member of Congress and I thank the Chairman for his kindness. Thank you.

Mr. WOLFF. May I just indicate that these are the separate views of Mr. Scheuer. I do not think that any one of us speaks for the entire delegation. However, let me just say that as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs there will be no normalization based upon promises but upon actions and deeds in the future, and this will not be able to go through all our subcommittee until such actions have been fully demonstrated, and I don't know whether or not the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee would join me in that—

Mr. LONG. I certainly do. I have subscribed to your views completely.

Mr. WOLFF. Because I know that this has involved now very different views of our committee. We are 435 members of the Congress. Each one has his own views I am sure. However, I do believe that if we can, in the time period that we do have, I should like to take some questions from the people here if you would like to question us—we've got to leave on our airplane very shortly but we'd be delighted to take some questions.

Question. Shibata, Mainichi and Shimbun: In your talks with the Vietnamese Government did you sound out the attitude or policy of the Vietnam Government toward the so-called Neutralization of Kampuchea—the establishment of a Neutral Government in Kampuchea and the political solution of the Kampuchean problem?

Mr. WOLFF. The response was that Sihanouk was not acceptable to the Vietnamese Government nor was any un-introduced neutral government.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, if I might add to that, we asked the Vietnamese Government when they intended to pull out of Cambodia and the response was we have been in Cambodia on three occasions and on two prior occasions we have left, we will leave again, and when we tried to press further for a timetable on leaving, the response was we will leave as soon as possible.

Question. Battye, Reuters: From your statement sir it would seem that you and maybe the United States Government considers that all the obstacles for normalization of relations between your countries are on the Vietnamese side. Did they in your talks have any conditions that they wanted to place on future talks on normalization?

Mr. WOLFF. They did not place any conditions whatsoever nor did we. We do feel that there are certain situations that are international situations. The refugee situation is not just a situation between the United States and Vietnam. This is an international problem that must be resolved. We do think that there is progress that is being made on this question. We are hopeful that the future will prove that this question can be resolved. And I do see progress and I think that I voice the sentiments of my colleagues in this connection.

Mr. LONG. We were all cautiously optimistic about movement in all these areas. But I think if we were to do what Mr. Scheuer has indicated he would have us do, I think that not only would the whole world think we are pretty silly but so would the Vietnamese after we have told them that we expect progress in all these areas.

For us to just suddenly give up for nothing especially when we have just indicated to them and they have just realized perhaps for the first time how interested we are in the MIA question. They all said, all of the officials said, "we didn't know you cared."

Question. Battye: But Mr. Wolff said you did not pose conditions or the Americans are not placing conditions on normalization, yet you've at great length picked out three areas in which you say there are problems and there are obstacles. Does not that in effect become a condition of normalization that these obstacles be removed?

Mr. WOLFF. No. These are not conditions because we had made progress toward normalization and were very close to it until such time as there was the violation of the territory of another country. This is not a condition. We don't set a condition on that basis but that was a situation that developed on the way to the forum, that we had no control over and we did not set a condition that they had to go in or out of another country. However, according to the principles of the United Nations the territorial integrity of each nation shall be sacred and we did not support the Pol Pot Regime, we do not support the policies of Pol Pot. We deplore the policies of Pol Pot, but by the same token we support the territorial integrity of one nation against another.

I might say while here in Thailand that we did bring up the question of Thailand and were reassured by the Vietnamese officials that they would not violate the territory of Thailand, nor would they in any way venture beyond their borders. They offered, in fact, a peace and friendship treaty with the government of Thailand as evidence of their good faith.

Question. In the opinion of the delegation, how long will it take for relations between your two countries to be normalized?

Mr. WOLFF. That does not depend upon a clock. It depends upon a resolution of the problems. I don't know how long it will take to solve the problems of the refugees. The problems of the refugees are ones of international humanitarian concern. The Geneva convention guarantees human rights and that one basic right is the right to live and not the right to die.

Question. Mr. Chairman is there still a chance of normalization while Vietnam is in Cambodia?

Mr. WOLFF. The Vietnamese told us that they were there at the invitation of the government of Cambodia. If the people feel that way so be it. We do not know whether or not the government of Heng Samrin represents the people however. We do not feel that the people should be subjugated by military means to a decision as to who their leaders should be.

Question. How do you assess Vietnam's attitude toward Thailand now, and this morning or this afternoon what did you say to the Thai prime minister?

Mr. WOLFF. We talked to the prime minister about the meetings that we had and we told him exactly what I had indicated here, that the Vietnamese officials had no animosity toward Thailand and had offered a peace and friendship treaty with the government here.

Question. Starner, Asia Week: In regard to locating the MIA's in Cambodia (sic) was any question raised about the U.S. locating and detonating the unexploded ordnance there which makes it very difficult to locate planes that went down and pilots that are missing?

Mr. WOLFF. That problem was not even brought up by our North Vietnamese hosts and therefore I would have to assume that they don't consider it a significant problem. It isn't a problem.

Mr. DORNAN. If I might add, on a prior occasion in 1975 when we went in with the Montgomery Commission we had offered and the Vietnamese rejected our help. Again on this mission we've offered to provide any technological assistance or military assistance that they might need to help with the MIA resolution and they've indicated at this point that they did not need any assistance but would welcome Colonel Mather to come back in to go over the files with them.

Question. This applies also to Laos? Have you had conversations with Laos?

Mr. WOLFF. Not on this issue.

I'm sorry because of the pressures of time, I would just like to close here by saying that we do believe that there is progress that has been made. There is much more progress that has to be made. They say that a long journey begins with a single step. I think we have taken a single step.

I think the fact that this delegation was invited in by the Vietnamese is a very significant factor and is the first delegation that was invited in. We did not

have any problems with the landing of our aircraft or anything else like that. We were accepted very graciously by our Vietnamese hosts.

Mr. GUYER. Could we also say that we're closer to solving the refugee problem than we've been at any time in the last several months?

Mr. WOLFF. That is correct. One last question, yes.

Question. I want a clarification on the Sihanouk answer. Did the Vietnamese say that Sihanouk was not acceptable at any cost or did they hint——

Mr. WOLFF. The Vietnamese said that Sihanouk was not acceptable. That, according to them, he was not acceptable, this is not passing judgment now——

Question. Sure but they didn't set any conditions for——

Mr. WOLFF. None whatsoever. They said that the Cambodian people had to make the decision on their own but Sihanouk was unacceptable.

3. VIETNAM

The substance of meetings and conversations with Vietnamese officials has already been discussed in the preceding section, at the Bangkok press conference. The following represents a summary of key conversations with Vietnamese officials.

Four formal meetings with Vietnamese Government officials on August 10-12. Although little new information came from the Vietnamese side, there was a lively and useful exchange of views. First meeting was with Vice Foreign Minister Hoang Bich Son immediately after arrival. The following day, the Codel had an extended meeting with Minister Nguyen Co Thach, followed by another lengthy meeting of the Codel MIA task force with an official of the Foreign Ministry, Vu Hoang, and staff. Representative Wolff also had a private meeting with Thach. On the last day the Codel met with a leading Communist Party official Xuan Thuy.

Meetings were frank as the longest and most comprehensive meeting was with Thach. The following paragraphs will concentrate on summarizing the major points covered there.

NORMALIZATION

There was limited discussion of normalization in the plenary session. In the private session Representative Wolff questioned Thach on his statement to the press that the United States and Vietnam had been conducting talks on normalization since June. Thach said that he was a victim of inaccurate reporting. Thach said, he had told the press only that there had been talks, but that he could not tell them the contents. The press then reported that as meaning that the talks were secret.

Thach said that he had told the press that he could not tell them about future talks. Those that had occurred were preliminary and further meetings "depend on both sides."

KAMPUCHEA

The Vietnamese repeated their oft-stated position: The problem of Kampuchea is one for Kampucheans only. There is no place for international settlement or supervision there—and there is no place for Prince Sihanouk. The new situation in Kampuchea is irrevocable, a closed book, but that can be put aside as an impediment to United States-Socialist Republic of Vietnam relations.

This is the third time that Vietnamese troops have been in Kampuchea. The first time was during the anti-French War, the second

during the Johnson-Nixon war, and this time in connection with the People's Republic of China aggression in Kampuchea. The Vietnamese withdrew after each of the first two times once the need for their presence was gone, and will do so this time once the People's Republic of China threat to Kampuchea and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is gone.

The Vietnamese officials gave repeated assurances that Thailand was in no danger from Vietnamese forces in Kampuchea. Even though Thai troops had twice fought on Vietnamese soil the Vietnamese would not intrude 1 inch into Thai territory.

REFUGEES AND IMMIGRANTS

Two points were stressed:

First, the presence of the 7th Fleet in a refugee rescue role was made a major topic by the Vietnamese hosts. Thach was conciliatory, saying that he understood the reason for the U.S. Fleet undertaking these operations, but that there had been "too much noise" about it. Others said that the rescue operation should not be carried out by navy ships, but by civilian ships. Xuan Thuy was very forceful in asserting that the presence of the 7th Fleet was inciting Vietnamese to flee.

Second, there was some question concerning the presence of U.S. consular officials in the Ho Chi Minh City. Thach, for example, said that while Vietnam does not discriminate against UNHCR employees because of their nationality, they could not concurrently hold a position with another government. This, he said, was a U.N. regulation. Both Thach and Vu Hoang said that the need for U.S. consular personnel in Ho Chi Minh City was unclear to them since the United States only took 10 immigrants from a recent offering of 228.

The Codel's explanation of the provisions of U.S. immigration law and procedure was dismissed by both as inconsistent with U.S. pressure for orderly departure.

Thach said that to close the illegal departure door effectively the legal departure door must be opened immediately. Thach said that if the legal outflow could be set at 10,000 per month the problem could be taken care of in 1 or 2 years—it would take that long to clear out the ethnic Chinese and U.S. "collaborators" in this connection Thach made aside to Representative Wolff about the "brain drain" that Vietnam is suffering; he also said that the output of the Vietnamese fishing industry had been cut in half because refugees had stolen thousands of boats.

Thach also compared the current situation in Vietnam where the ethnic Chinese are free to leave or stay and work, with the U.S. internment of ethnic Japanese during World War II.

MIA'S

The afternoon of August 10 was spent in meeting with Deputy Foreign Minister Hoang Bich Son. After a discussion of many topics in general, Representative Dornan focused on the MIA issue by making a forceful presentation on how resolution of this problem could be the beginning of construction of a "bridge of friendship" between the two nations.

Throughout the remainder of the afternoon's discussions, this theme was constantly reinforced by comments from Representatives Guyer, Gilman, Lagomarsino, and Wolff. Son replied by discussing the Vietnamese past humanitarian response to the violation of Vietnamese territory by the American ships *Sea Tiger*, *Brillig*, and *Algernon*.

In a morning meeting on August 11 with Minister of Foreign Affairs Nguyen Co Thach, the topic of POW's and MIA's was again brought up in a forceful manner by the Codel. Thach responded by stating that it was "crazy" that this issue had been allowed to remain for so long as an impediment to United States-Socialist Republic of Vietnam relations. He then said that work in this area had been going on constantly, though other priorities had somewhat diminished the effort at times. He went on to state that they were working on several cases.

Making reference to their past error in identification, Thach stated that they had to be more careful in their work, and that they would "know more later" about cases on which they were working.

Representative Wolff immediately pointed out that expertise was available to assist the Vietnamese in the work in resolving the POW-MIA problem. Thach responded by stating, and then repeating, "We will do it ourselves."

Lt. Col. Paul Mather was then publicly introduced to Thach, with Representative Wolff pointing out that Mather was available in Bangkok to provide any necessary assistance or to come to Hanoi on short notice. Thach's final comment on the POW/MIA issue was as follows: "I assure you, this issue has nothing to do with normalization. We can proceed even without normalization."

A specialized POW/MIA meeting was agreed to on the afternoon of August 11 between a Vietnamese group headed by Mr. Vu Hoang, chief of consular affairs in the Foreign Ministry; and an American group headed by Representative Guyer, chairman of the POW/MIA task force of the Asian Affairs Subcommittee.

Following an opening statement by Representative Guyer, Representative Gilman reviewed the DOD-DIA categories of degrees of Vietnamese knowledgeability of individual cases, suggesting that the United States hoped that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam already had, or could obtain, much additional information.

Vu Hoang opened by stating that the work of his committee was continuing, and he summarized their past cooperation (return of 75 remains during 7 occasions, the delegation to Honolulu, et cetera).

Making reference to a past identification mistake, Vu Hoang said they were now being more careful. He also stressed the increasing difficulty because of lapse of time, vegetation, weather, mines, and bombs, et cetera. He cited problems in mobilizing the manpower to carry out the task, mentioning the problems of the war with China and Cambodia, and the refugee issue. Originally his office had about 60 people involved in the task, with "perhaps thousands" of others in the field helping out—but the aforementioned problems had caused a reduction in manpower, funds, and materiel devoted to this task.

Representative Dornan then turned to the topic of possible live Americans still in Vietnam, citing the case of Marine Pfc. Robert Garwood and reports of refugees. The Congressman pointed out that these reports had prompted extreme interest by families in America. The

Congressman asked the Vietnamese to respond to such reports. Vu Hoang replied by stating that there were no live Americans known by the Vietnamese to be in their country.

Representative Guyer then introduced the topic of case files, and folders covering over 100 individuals were passed to the Vietnamese representatives.

Vu Hoang responded by pointing out the psychological problems of eliciting information from the local populace regarding the fate of those who had just bombed their homes. He expressed appreciation for the information in the case files turned over.

Vu Hoang next discussed their present activity. Since October 1978, they have received reports from four places and are in the process of checking out these reports. Acknowledging the presence of Lieutenant Colonel Mather, he stated that if they have any information, if they meet any difficulty, or if they have any requirements, they would immediately contact him through the Vietnamese Embassy in Bangkok.

Representative Dornan then brought up the topic of supplemental evidence and the role of information alone in resolving cases. Acknowledging that it was impossible to recover remains in many cases, the need for cooperative effort and records comparison was stressed.

Representative Wolff pointed out that, based on Vietnam's detailed recordkeeping on the released POW's, it would be difficult to understand any lack of records in the other areas. He then offered for Lieutenant Colonel Mather to return to Hanoi on a periodic basis to assist in the review of the cases earlier presented in the folders and to jointly continue the pursuit of resolution of other cases.

Vu Hoang expressed his agreement to this proposal.

Finally, the topic of casualty resolution in Laos was brought up. Explaining that Lao response on this issue has been very disappointing, Representative Dornan solicited Vietnam's advice and assistance on how to approach the Lao government.

Vu Hoang responded that he would report this to Minister Thach and see if there is any possibility of arranging talks with the Lao government on this topic.

4. SRI LANKA

This summarizes the official talks and trips that the delegation undertook in Sri Lanka August 12-15. In a call on the Foreign Minister, the Codel had a lively exchange of views on the nature and direction of nonalignment, the Government of Sri Lanka's support for nonaligned movement's positions on Puerto Rico and the Middle East and the philosophy of economic assistance.

At President Javewardene's luncheon, the Codel discussed some of the same issues with the President and had opportunity for informational exchanges with four senior ministers.

On the mornings of August 13 and 14, the Codel task forces called on a number of Ministers, opposition leaders and narcotics officials. Field trips were oriented toward Sri Lanka's economic development projects and commercial life.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

During an August 13 call by the entire Codel, Foreign Minister Hameed provided a history of Sri Lanka's domestic policies, with em-

phasis upon longstanding "basic needs" programs for improving the lives of Sri Lanka's people. He also referred to the communal situation and stated his view that most of the Tamil people do not want separation. Hameed described Sri Lanka's nonalinement and his view that all third world countries would soon belong, "including Pakistan and the Philippines."

There followed a vigorous exchange of views on Sri Lanka's support in the United Nations for demands for independence for Puerto Rico and Guam, and Sri Lanka's having joined in the non-aligned movement's condemnation of the Camp David accords.

Representative Wolff, with strong support from other members, noted that the majority of U.N. resolutions on Puerto Rico condemn the U.S. He then asked rhetorically whether it would not be considered provocative if the United States support Tamil separatism.

Representative Wolff said that in fact, the United States would consider it presumptuous to express support for any group in Sri Lanka.

Other members of the Codel then explained the Puerto Rican situation and its perception that demands for independence were the work of a small group, and of the Cubans. The Codel expressed view that Cuba was not a true nonaligned country because of its ties to the Soviet Union and warned of Cuban efforts to subvert the movement.

On the nonaligned movement's condemnation of the United States and the Camp David accords, Mr. Wolff cited sections of the Colombo nonaligned movement's meeting's communique, and said it was difficult to understand Sri Lanka's joining in that condemnation when United States is trying to bring peace with honor to Middle East.

In response, Mr. Hameed said that the Government of Sri Lanka does not believe in condemning any country by name and does not do so; he mentioned that Sri Lanka had taken a reservation on the Puerto Rican section of the communique produced at the 1978 nonaligned movement's meeting in Havana. As for Colombo communique, Hameed said again that Sri Lanka does not believe in condemning countries by name but that as the host and chairman of the Colombo meeting, it was not proper for Sri Lanka to take reservations on the final document. Further discussion of the nature of nonalinement ensued.

Mr. Hameed did not characterize the status of Cuba, but as for direction of the movement, said that he encouraged the idea of a code of conduct for members, which the nonaligned movement had not yet adopted.

Representative Clarence Long provided the Foreign Minister with his view that AID foreign assistance in general over the years had been largely wasted, and that emphasis on heavy industry and capital-intensive projects had increased poverty and unemployment. A new orientation was needed toward AID that is self-regulating, self-sustaining and self-financing, and helps the small producer. AID will be coming to an end, and a change in development strategy is necessary.

Mr. Hameed responded that Sri Lanka understood and that its own development program was moving along those lines.

The Codel spoke about Sri Lanka's leadership role in the non-aligned and the group of '77, and the moderating influence it can have on the direction of these groups. At the conclusion of the meeting the Codel invited Mr. Hameed to meet informally with the

Committee on Foreign Affairs when he next visited the United States so that they could continue the dialog.

AT THE PRESIDENT'S LUNCHEON

The Codel had the opportunity for informal exchanges with President Jayewardene and four of his senior Cabinet members: Finance Minister Ronnie De Mel, Mahaweli Minister Gamini Dissanayake, Justice Minister Devanayagam, and Rural Industrial Development Minister Thondaman. The Codel spoke to the President about the nature of the nonalignment, development strategies, the free trade zone, and the possibility of increased trade, and Sri Lanka's democratic traditions.

TASK FORCE CALLS

On August 13, one group discussed human rights, terrorism, and narcotics control with Justice Minister K. W. Devanayagam. In answer to Codel questions, the Minister explained the new Constitution and the provision for an ombudsman to protect fundamental rights; the reasons for and the limited nature of the emergency declared in the northern Province; GSL's suspicions of outside support, including that of the PLO, for the Tamil "Tiger" terrorists; and the narcotics situation in Sri Lanka.

Codel members expressed their interest in human rights for minorities and their desire not to interfere in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka. Justice Minister responded favorably to the request that the GSL share in international efforts to eliminate terrorism.

Another group discussed Sri Lanka's trade with Minister Lalith Athulathmudali. The Minister expressed an interest in receiving a U.S. investment mission, and reviewed for the group United States-Sri Lankan trade.

Asked about increasing U.S. cotton exports to Sri Lanka, the Minister said he was concerned about the danger of a U.S. quota on Sri Lankan garment exports. He asked about the possibilities of obtaining differential treatment because U.S.-made fabrics are used in Sri Lanka's manufactures.

Third group met with panel of three top GSL narcotics enforcement program officials and Pio Abarro, adviser on drugs to Colombo plan nations, and thoroughly reviewed situation.

While above groups made their GSL calls, Congressmen Long, Scheuer, and Ireland spent balance of morning at residence to hear development assistance presentation by AID mission director.

On August 14 a task force conferred with A. Amirthal Ingam and S. Sivasathamparam, leaders of the Tamil United Liberation Front, and later toured the parliamentary chambers. The Tulf leaders reviewed history of the Tamils from their perspective and their current grievances about education, employment, and land settlement.

They also referred to the reported six killings in Jaffna, said that there had been no similar incidents in the last month, and indicated that the atmosphere had improved in the past 2 weeks. The Tulf leaders indicated that they will participate in the select parliamentary committee investigating the killings and that their representative is sitting on the presidential commission to study decentralization of

authority. They expressed hope that the commission would have some results.

This group also called on Maithripala Senanayake, the deputy leader of the Sri Lankan Freedom Party, who expressed the view that there was not much terrorism in Sri Lanka and that the solution to the communal problem was basically economic. His party had declined to serve on the presidential commission, he said, because its terms of reference made no mention of solving the communal problem.

Senanayake noted that the SLFP had always been a principal supporter of nonalignment and thus did not have any quarrel with the broad outlines of the UNP government's foreign policy. The SLFP differed with the GSL on such domestic issues as the Presidential Commission on Decentralizing Authority, the terms on which foreign banks are established here, and on the free trade zone, because the SLFP sees no need for foreign collaborators in its industrial development.

Second task force which called on Rural Industrial Development Minister Thondaman learned about the Ministry's efforts to develop small industries in rural areas, and to promote large-scale poultry and commercial feed production. The Minister expressed his view that Government management of the tea estates had not been working effectively.

On the differences between Ceylon and Sri Lankan Tamils, Thondaman said the former were of the managerial class while the latter were workers. The Ceylon Tamils had liked to "boss" the Indian Tamils around, but in recent years had tried to close ranks in order to gain political support. Only a minority of Ceylon Tamils wanted a separate state; the Indian Tamils were against such a concept.

FIELD TRIPS

Representative Clarence Long, accompanied by E. L. B. Hurulle, local MP and Minister of Cultural Affairs; the general manager of the Mahaweli Board; and the AID Director, flew by helicopter over the Polgalla Dam to Galnewa, the new town which serves the surrounding settlements of block H in the Mahaweli scheme.

Mr. Long had extensive discussions with farmers and their wives, workers, and small businessmen. He visited several farms and training center for farm leaders in water management, agricultural extension, and community development. He also visited an AID-supported land-preparation technique demonstration area and viewed AID-financed small farm implements designs. Mr. Long viewed canal construction and land clearing activities which employ a mix of capital and labor-intensive methods.

CODEL PRESS CONFERENCE HELD IN COLOMBO, AUGUST 14, 1979

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you very much. Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. First let me thank you for coming here this evening. Our visit has been a short one but I feel a very satisfactory visit. This mission has been here to learn more about Sri Lanka. We are interested in examining the relationships that have existed in the past and the relationships for the future between our country, the United States, and Sri Lanka, the importance of Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean, and Sri Lanka's relations with other nations as well.

We have talked with a number of authorities here. We have broken up into various task forces in order to actually magnify the effort of the group that is

here and to make the most of the time that we have been able to spend here. As you may or may not know, we have just returned from Hanoi and Bangkok, and from here we will go on to Pakistan. I should like now to introduce Mr. Clarence Long who will speak to the situation of the United States' relationship with regard to our aid program and our mutual assistance. Mr. Long.

Mr. LONG. Thank you, Mr. Wolff. I have been on the Foreign Aid Appropriations Subcommittee now for fifteen years, and I have been one of the severest critics of foreign aid.

I have felt for many years that American foreign aid has been largely wasted, that it has gone for programs that would help mostly the rich, and has done very little to help the poor. In many cases it has brought in big machinery and caused unemployment and thrown a lot of poor people onto the streets in the big city.

I was therefore very curious to see whether the situation in Sri Lanka would be different from what I've seen elsewhere over the fifteen years that I have been in Congress and trying to improve the program. I have therefore traveled up today to the Mahaveli dam project, where as you know, there is a program to provide two-and-a-half acre farms, irrigated as result of building a damax for initially about 15,000 families, and then seeing how well this works to go on to another program to deal with 700,000 people in a much larger program later on.

First, there is the program in the "H" area, called the dry area above Kandy. I went through it today. I flew over a good part of the area. I drove from one project to another. I talked to many, many farmers as well as workers who are working on contract. I talked with some of the people who run little stores. I talked with the American advisor up there and I want to report to you that in all of my visits to 56 countries in my 15 years in Congress, I have seen which pleased me more than the program that you have here in Sri Lanka.

You have tremendous assets here, you have an educated population, you have a beautiful country, you have a lot of water, not always where you want it. You have great quantities of land which has to be developed and this project, let me say, is, I think the right kind of project to do it. It does not waste money so far as I can see, although I would like to make one caveat to that, but for the most part, this is probably the most prudently, carefully managed project that I have seen.

The reason I am so insistent on that is not that I want to be stingy about money, but simply because there are a billion people living in developing countries who have to be taken care of and with very limited foreign aid that is available. The United States is voting \$8 billion this next year. It has voted \$5 billion supplemental this year. So that means \$13 billion in one year and that is as much as the American people are going to go for.

Even that would be a trifle compared with what is needed to deal with all these billion people in the world and therefore I feel we must stretch our capital and I have been appealing for our aid people, the multilateral banks, and so on, to go in for capital-saving technology. The American advisor up there, who has also been trying to do this over many years, calls it simple technology. Whatever you call it, the purpose of it is to be inexpensive so that you can get the job done and help the maximum number of people.

I think you are doing that and I think you are doing it very, very well here and let me tell you I have been very hard to please over the years.

I was encouraged about another aspect of this. I talked to the farmers: They are saving money and that's a good test of whether they are getting along. Sometimes more than I've been able to do is to save money and many people here will say the same thing. They're saving money. They're putting it in the bank and this is going to help in the future to provide the funds to carry on this program.

I've been arguing that we make these AID programs self-sustaining and self-liquidating so that they pay for themselves and you can do that if the people make money and they are making money: They are all happy and satisfied with this. I talked with them individually with an interpreter, each one on his own. I talked with their wives and you know that wives are some times harder to please than anybody. They were happy about the program.

I also asked them about the number of children, whether they engaged in family planning. Practically all of them said they were involved in family planning in limiting their families. I asked each one how many children they had and that is the big problem in the developing world. Unless we limit popu-

lation we are not even going to be able to catch up with the poverty problem, let alone solve it. We would be bailing out the ocean with a teacup. This is what we have been trying to do in the past. Well, I want to congratulate you here in Sri Lanka on what I think is the best development program I've seen in my fifteen years in Congress. Thank you.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you very much, Mr. Long. Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First I would like to extend my thanks to the governmental leaders who so graciously hosted our task forces as we swooped in upon them and took up much of their valuable time.

We found that our exchange was mutually beneficial and I just wish that we could have spent more time with all of the ministers and department heads we had an opportunity to speak to, I wish we had more time to spend on this lovely island, but unfortunately we have to leave very hurriedly tomorrow.

We had two task forces that I was involved with. We spoke first with the narcotics unit. We met with Mr. Sunderlingam, the head of the narcotics unit in the police force. We met with his deputies. Part of our responsibility in this mission is to look at the narcotics problems in the Pacific area and in the Southeast Asia area. We have a select committee on narcotics and Congressman Wolff serves not only as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee but also is chairman of the Select Committee on Narcotics. And many of this delegation also serve in that capacity and as a result are spending a great deal of time and attention directing our work toward the narcotics effort in each of the countries we are visiting.

We were very pleased with the reports we received in Sri Lanka with regard to the narcotics effort. We find that your authorities are very alert to the dangers of Sri Lanka becoming a transit shipment area. It is situated in close proximity to opium producing regions of the world, the heaviest opium producing areas of Burma, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Indian routes, we are very much concerned that this beautiful country might be utilized by traffickers in the future.

We are all very much concerned about the ganja that is growing and it is estimated as some two thousand acres on the island. We explored the possibility of some substitution crops being developed to take the place of the ganja. Ganja is apparently financing some of the exchange for opium paste and we would hope that could be eliminated in the future.

We found some areas where our nation may be of help to the local authorities and we certainly hope to further explore those possibilities.

We had a second task force on human rights that met today with your parliamentary leaders and opposition. We went to the Parliament and met with Amirthalingam, the Tulf Secretary-General and leader of the opposition. We also met with Sivasithamparam, the President of Tulf and with Senanayake. He is, as you know, the deputy leader of the SLFP, and we came to have a better understanding of some of the opposition problems, some of the problems with regard to the Tamils which we explored in depth. I was very pleased to hear the secretary-general leader of the opposition—express cautious optimism with regard to the improved climate and improved atmosphere here in Sri Lanka regarding the Tamil problem, we hope that it certainly will continue to improve and that there will be a better atmosphere in the days to come. Again, I want to thank the government of Sri Lanka for extending an open door to us and for the frank discussions that we had as part of our task force work.

Thank you very much, Mr. Gilman.

Mr. Lagomarsino.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to say that I have been very impressed not only on this visit but from previous contacts with Sri Lankan Government officials. I have been very impressed with them individually and personally and also with their very innovative politics and although this new government has only been in office for a little over two years now. I think that there has been a remarkable progress and I hope it will continue.

I think that one thing that many of us can do is to publicize what is happening here in Sri Lanka: the atmosphere for private investment, the business confidence that is building up. I think there are a lot of American businessmen who would be pleased to engage in trade with this country if they only knew about it and I'm going to do what I can to see that they learn about Sri Lanka and all the advantages that can be had here.

Along the lines of Congressman Long, I am also a strong critic of foreign aid. I think we waste a lot of it, too. I was very pleased today to talk to some Sri

Lanka people up in the Kandy area. We asked them very frankly what they thought about American aid and they all said, all we talked to, that they thought we were doing a good job here, it was very helpful that the people who were engaged in it were very outstanding people and this is my opinion as well.

Of course, that is what it really comes down to is the caliber of people who are assisting in those programs. So I want to thank through the press here the Sri Lankan people and government for its hospitality and for, I think, doing a fine job with a lot of difficulties. It looks like things are certainly improving and getting a lot better.

Mr. SCHEUER. Thank you, sir.

I am very happy to be here and I am coming back here in two weeks for the conference on population of which I am a vice chairman of the steering committee. I have been working in the field of population and development very intensively. I have served for the last year and a half as chairman of a parliamentary committee on population, the only one of its kind in the world and as such I have developed two basic criticisms of developing world country policies in population and development. First, there has been a tremendous predilection in the third world, the developing world, for high technology, capital intensive technology, as against labor intensive technology.

It is a kind of pattern of development that profits the elite ruling groups. They produce a product for sale in international markets and they bank the profits in a numbered account in Switzerland and it profits the poor people in rural areas very little. Second, in the developing world there has been very, very little concern in advancing the status of women, for increasing the age of marriage, for giving women access to jobs and education. All of which have tremendous impact on fertility goals, on family size goals, without reduction in fertility all other development programs are doomed.

And the third thing you have criticized the developing countries for is not having redistributing mechanics. To get money out into the rural areas, services of all kinds, and health services, education services, housing, and above all job production. Now, on all of these three counts, Sri Lanka is doing an outstanding job on any kind of relative measure.

Before I came to Sri Lanka in the development writings of experts like Jim Grant who is now the head of UNICEF, and George Ziedenstein, all of them point to Sri Lanka as a model, as a country that has made great advances in the status of women, here I find that approximately half, or a little more than half, of the people in universities are women.

This country has made great advances with outstanding examples in family planning, we had the pleasure of visiting a rural family planning clinic way out in the country outside of Kandy this morning. And above all, this country has not committed this warping of development patterns in favor of high technology. It has been a classic example of a country that has followed rational population policies, rational investment policies and an outstanding pattern of redistributive services which results in a sense of perceived fairness here, a sense of perceived wellbeing, a sense of sharing.

I don't claim to be an expert on Sri Lanka after 48 hours in this country, but I can only tell you that my experience here, as short as it is, has only reconfirmed everything that I have heard and everything I have read about your beautiful and great country. I only hope that other developing countries that send representatives to the SID conference now, and two weeks from now to the population conference will have the chance to see some of the great things you are doing and will look upon your country and will perceive it as a model for all the other developing countries.

I just want to express my great joy and my great sense of satisfaction in seeing the wonderful work you are doing confirming everything I have read and everything I have heard. It's been a great privilege to be here.

Mr. WOLFF. I should like to turn to the question of United States foreign policy with relationship to aid which Chairman Long has mentioned.

Our desire is not to buy the friendship of the world. Our desire is to work in close cooperation and in partnership with the entire world. We are not in an adversary position with the world, although some people have taken an adversary position to our country. We have tried to maintain peace throughout the world. We did get into some unfortunate situations which were aberrations of American foreign policy. The American government has never waged an aggressive war in its history. There has been a situation in recent years where we have been criticized for our overseas activity Vietnam.

But we as a delegation have gone to Vietnam to close the book on a very bad period in both Nations' histories. We want to find some way and means of trying to reestablish a good relationship with all Nations throughout the world, and that gets us to the point of the Indian Ocean where your Nation sits in a very strategic position.

It is not the United States desire to exploit your country for its strategic position within this body of water. The United States has always lived by the principle of freedom of the seas. No nation should make the Indian Ocean into its own sea. The United States is interested in seeing to it that there is freedom of the seas and that no nation either to the north, the south, the east or the west takes it upon themselves to control that ocean, and in some way affect the destiny of your country.

I should also like to introduce one element that was introduced by one of my colleagues here before and that is the question of Sri Lanka's position in the Third World and the Group of 77. Non-alignment is a great policy, if there is non-alignment.

Unfortunately, it seems that some nations, and this is not directed at Sri Lanka, who are supposedly non-aligned but who are in fact, very much aligned. And it is destroying the very basic premise upon which non-alignment was based. And it is destroying the very basic element that can make non-alignment successful. And I caution your people and have tried to caution your government as well to avoid and avert those who would attempt to pervert non-alignment for their own particular purposes.

I have come to a final point, that is, the question of terrorism. I think the entire world must look at terrorism as an element that is totally destructive of society and totally destructive of orderly government, totally destructive of all the freedoms of the people. There cannot be, to my mind, acts of terror committed upon innocent people in the name of any type of freedom wherever it may exist, our intent is not to intrude upon the local political affairs of your country.

However, I should like to venture that I think it would be well for Sri Lanka, which has suffered from some degree of terrorism in the recent past, to join with the Nations of the world, in the highest councils of the world, in the United Nations, in a condemnation of terrorism. Diplomacy does not begin at the end of a barrel of a gun. If there is to be a free world, it should not be a world whose freedom is made through the barrel of a gun. I have said much in this connection.

I hope that you will take this in the sense that I have said it because I have a great admiration for the Sri Lankan people, and I feel that for too long the people of the United States have not been aware of the Sri Lankan people and the great importance that you have as a nation in the world community. I thank you very much and we should be glad to answer any questions.

I am De Silva from Agence France Press.

Mr. Wolff, your remarks about non-alignment. You said some of the countries are very much aligned. I wonder whether you would care to name some of the countries you had in mind.

Mr. WOLFF. Cuba.

DE SILVA. I see, of course, Cuba is going to be the chairman of the non-aligned movement for the next. * * *

Mr. WOLFF. That's very unfortunate.

DE SILVA. You say it's very unfortunate?

Mr. WOLFF. I say it's unfortunate because if the non-aligned movement is to succeed, the non-aligned movement should not be led by an organization that is very closely aligned with one of the major powers of the world.

A.B.C. DE SILVA (deputy editor, "Dinakara"). Do you mean the Soviet Union?

Mr. WOLFF. Yes. When you said non-aligned, you mean non-aligned with any of the great powers. Non-aligned with the Soviet Union. I think Sri Lanka is non-aligned. I don't think Cuba is.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. The Soviet union furnishes Cuba 9 million dollars a day, U.S., to say nothing of the military equipment.

DE SILVA. Have you conveyed this opinion to Sri Lankan leaders that you met during your visit here?

Mr. WOLFF. Yes, sir.

NEVILLE DE SILVA (World Times, London). You just said that Cuba, which is going to take over the chairmanship of the non-aligned movement, is aligned or close to the Soviet Union. Supposing there was a country which has claimed, like

Singapore, to be anticommunist and pro-western, was to take over the chairmanship of the non-aligned community, what would be your position then?

Mr. WOLFF. Non-aligned does not mean that you do not have friendships. But close to the Soviet Union. Supposing there was a country which has claimed, like non-aligned means that you do not have ties that preclude your impartiality.

Mr. THIRUCHELVAM ("Lankapuwath"). You have conveyed the message of America or your opinion to the leaders of this country. What is the response?

Mr. WOLFF. The response is that the non-aligned movement has not yet been able to set up any criteria for non-alignment. And that too is unfortunate.

Mr. THIRUCHELVAM. The opinion of the Sri Lankan leaders?

Mr. WOLFF. I do believe that the Sinhalese leaders—and I should like my colleagues to comment on this—I do believe that there is a very definite position of impartiality in this country. And we had some very animated discussions on this whole question of non-alignment. You know now people talk about the fourth world. I think about the only non-aligned people that are living in the whole world are those people that the astronauts went to visit, but couldn't find. I am being facetious on that and I should not be. The fact is that non-alignment for many of the nations who are part of the 77 is a misnomer today.

NEVILLE DE SILVA. Chairman, if I may follow up on the question I asked earlier: surely, when you try to define the principles of non-alignment A F the conditions of non-alignment, surely it's a matter for the members of the non-aligned community to decide who should be members and who should not.

Mr. WOLFF. Good question, but all I am doing is making a comment on the nomenclature that is used. Third world is one thing, non-aligned is something else.

NEVILLE DE SILVA. Mr. Chairman, if you are taking of the nomenclature, you use the word free world. Are you suggesting that your nomenclature is correct in most senses when you use the term free world?

Mr. WOLFF. Yes, I am. I am talking about nations that observe the principles of freedom and do not oppress their people.

MANIK DE SILVA (AP). You would be aware that there has been a lot of publicity in this country about the legislature about the condition of the Sri Lankan Tamils. Would you care to tell us a little bit about what you have observed in this country during your visit here on this particular issue?

Mr. WOLFF. As I indicated and I am going to have one of the other members comment on this. However, as I indicated to you before we are not going to interfere in the internal relations of your country, that's number one.

Number two, we support the idea of human rights, we support the idea of freedom from discrimination of all peoples. However, the Massachusetts assembly has as much effect upon * * * their resolution and its effect upon foreign policy, as they would have on levying a duty on Sri Lankan merchandise coming into the United States.

It is not the province of a State to determine foreign policy. It is the province of the Federal Government of the United States to determine foreign policy. Their resolution indicates a concern but it has no effect whatsoever on the foreign policy of the United States.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to add to that and before I do the only reason I was * * * at the beginning was because I was anxious to hear some of your questions. I want to join eagerly with the explosion of admiration and respect that you see this congressional delegation give to your beautiful island and your wonderful country.

I can tell you quite honestly I had never heard of the Massachusetts resolution till after I'd been in your country one day, when I pride myself on staying up with the news on the United States!

In 1972, 49 of our States voted for one man for President, and one State, Massachusetts, went its own way. We thought we had a separatist movement in 1972 in the emerging new State of Massachusetts!

I would not let this worry you at all. Most Americans are not even aware of it, and when this delegation goes back and talks about meeting five cabinet ministers of this excellent President that you've put into office, who are of the minority that Massachusetts in its legislature refers to, I tell you the Congress is not going to pay any heed to a State that has exactly the number of Congressmen that we have in this delegation right here.

And I would further like to close on the thought that friendship is a two-way street. Cuba has troops in about 22 African nations. Young Cuban boys killing young African boys in those nations is a disgrace. The wounded black lads are

taken to East Germany to be put in their hospitals where it would be a scandal to bring them back to the small island of Cuba.

We are not asking your nation to go up front and be the first nation of the non-aligned nations to take hold of this tiger by the tail, but we would ask you at this conference to realize that there has to be common sense in foreign policy, and to please look for other nations of truth and justice and decency, who understand what common sense is, to maybe join together in a statement at the end of the conference and point out that a nation that is sending its mercenaries, like the British nation sent Gurkha warriors around the world, sending its mercenaries all over one continent and now into Syria to fly its jets . . . this is a national disgrace for Cuba to allow its young men to be killed as puppets for another nation. Join with some other nations at this conference—you are not the host country this time where diplomacy restrains you—and try to bring a little reality back to the world scene.

I think your non-aligned status is magnificent and it brings a moral force far beyond your population and the size of your nation to the world scene. But that moral force is diminished when you are part of an organization where no one has the courage to point out that Cuba should be moved out of this brotherhood of nations that prides itself on not being aligned with the super powers.

A. B. C. DE SILVA. If Sri Lanka accepts Cuba's leadership as Chairman of the Non-Aligned movement at the next conference, what is your plight?

Mr. WOLFF. We are not going to think for Sri Lanka. We have made our opinion known as to the question of non-alignment. I do think that it is important for us to realize that the non-aligned movement is perhaps one of the most significant advances that has been made in the political world in a very, very long time. It is unfortunate that it is being in some fashion, perverted by some nations who seek to use the non-aligned movement as opportunity for exploitation.

Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Chairman, if I might just add to the prior question that the gentleman raised with regard to the Massachusetts resolution: while it is not the province of this committee to take any action with regard to the Massachusetts resolution, I might add that we have, as a result of our visit, become much more familiar with the problem and have become well-versed with the problem of the minority situation in Sri Lanka and the problem involving the tamils and will certainly make use of this information in trying to better inform our colleagues in the Congress with regard to that situation.

Thank you very much.

5. PAKISTAN

In Pakistan, the delegation met privately with President Zia Al Haq, and participated in a frank exchange during a briefing by three top Pakistani Government officials, Mr. Agha Shahi, foreign affairs adviser to the President; Lieutenant General Akhtar, chief of intelligence for the general staff; and the Hon. Gulam Ishaq Kahn, minister of finance.

The following summarizes the briefings, and the exchanges between the Codel and the Pakistani officials, on August 16, 1979, in Islamabad:

INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

Lieutenant General Akhtar covered the potential threats to Pakistan's security from its two immediate neighbors, Afghanistan and India, as well as more general concerns about the Soviet hold in Afghanistan.

He noted that the April 1978 revolution in Kabul had brought the Soviet Union from the Oxus to the Khyber in one step. He recounted developments in Afghanistan since then, described status of the rebellion now underway in 24 of 28 provinces, and detailed arms provided by Moscow.

General Akhtar spoke of India as the "Paramount" regional power, related the Indo-Soviet relationship to the Sino-Soviet conflict, and emphasized India's military and technological superiority over its neighbors.

SHAHI BRIEFING

Foreign Adviser Agha Shahi's presentation was effort aimed at demonstrating United States-Pakistan relations have had many points of friction over the years, expressing hope for future relations, and denying that Pakistan plans to develop a nuclear weapons capability.

In brief historical résumé, Mr. Shahi discussed (a) U.S. military aid to India in 1962;

(b) U.S. reaction to the warming Pakistan-Chinese relationship in 1968;

(c) U.S. actions during 1965 war between India and Pakistan including arms embargo;

(d) Pakistani disappointment over the years with Cento and with America's latter-day economic and military aid performance (in contrast with obligations of the 1954 and 1959 agreements);

(e) the A-7 turndown;

(f) the controversy over the French nuclear reprocessing plant contract in which the U.S. decision to terminate Pakistan while continuing to supply India was noted;

(g) the present application of the Symington Amendment over the nuclear enrichment issue, (noting this is double standard in comparison with continued U.S. sales of enriched fuel to India, which has exploded a nuclear device.

In this context, Mr. Shahi explicitly acknowledged Pakistan's "newly acquired capability to enrich uranium." In response to a question from Chairman Wolff on why such capability is necessary, in view of absence of Pakistan's peaceful requirement for enriched uranium, Mr. Shahi emphasized Pakistan's determination to acquire full the fuel cycle so as to be immune from foreign pressures. He also stated flatly that Pakistan "has no intention to make a bomb."

Mr. Shahi recounted Pakistani willingness to put its French plant under safeguards and plutonium therefrom under international control. He also recapped Pakistan's efforts to achieve some sort of nuclear-free zone on a regional basis, including its offer to India of mutual inspections.

Pakistan is alone in the region with India, an "old threat," and Afghanistan, a "new threat," and with both "superpowers against us." But Pakistan is "proud," he said, and the "campaign of scorn in the U.S. media will win no friends here." Shahi discussed the motion of possible Pakistani accommodation with the U.S.S.R., which he said many intellectuals favor.

ON ISLAMIC BOMB ALLEGATIONS

Mr. Shahi said: "We have not the technology to build a bomb. We have not solicited nor have we received aid in our nuclear program from any Muslim country. What we achieve in our (peaceful) program will be an achievement for Pakistan and will put Pakistan in the supplier market. We have no intention to develop weapons."

He characterized the notion that Libya would want "a crude Pakistan bomb for Jihad against Jews and Christians;" as "pure fantasy."

Representative Wolff, characterizing recent press articles speculating on possible U.S. paramilitary action against Pakistan's nuclear facility as "infamous." The chairman described his own Codel as "commandos of peace," interested in long-term ties with Pakistan, not a relationship based only on common foes. He described his basic concern as "stability in the region," which he said was in Pakistan's and America's interest.

Representative Wolff said the nuclear question threatens to open a Pandora's box in the region. He spoke of congressional attitudes on nonproliferation, as expressed by the Symington amendment, and discussed U.S. use of different approaches in different countries, depending on their nuclear stage.

Representative Wolff emphasized the need for trust in the United States-Pakistan relationship. I pointed out the continuing existence of the 1954 and 1959 agreements.

Representative Wolff spoke of the need to ignore unfortunate articles aimed at selling papers, assured Shahi that the United States has no intention to interfere in Pakistan's internal affairs, and offered that the United States would like to help Pakistan in whatever ways it can. Representative Wolff pointed to the constraints of U.S. law—and policy—however, and expressed his own strong commitment to the need to control nuclear proliferation.

Other members of the Codel, supported the chairman's position, Representatives Bowen and Lagomarsino urging Pakistan to assist the United States in putting this situation behind us, Guyer emphasizing the need to get the economy going again, and both Stark and Dornan urging Pakistan to reconsider plans to develop weapons capability.

In partial response to Representative Wolff, Minister Ghulam Ishaq indicated Pakistan is "attempting to master the entire nuclear fuel cycle," to meet its future energy need; this will take 5 to 10 years, he said. The next plants Pakistan will build will be breeder reactors, which will require enriched fuel. He added: "We are poor, and we are small. But we are not irresponsible. Pakistan would vanish in a nuclear holocaust."

Finance Minister Ghulam Ishaq Khan repeated the Pakistani position on the economic situation. He started by saying that present Government had inherited a "shambles" of an economy and in the 2 years has done a lot to salvage it.

This is evidenced by 2 strong years of productive economic growth concentrated in productive sectors, which contrasts with 7 previous years of stagnation in all but service sectors. The Government has also dealt firmly with the budget problem, as evidenced the much criticized effort to raise taxes substantially.

The balance of payments situation will take longer to turn around. To buy time, the Government of Pakistan has requested debt rescheduling at the last two aid to Pakistan consortium meetings. He promoted the target of 0.75 percent of gross national product by DCS for foreign assistance into a "commitment," and said the United States was demanding scarcely 0.20 percent of gross national product to foreign assistance.

Minister Ishaq suggested that the requests had been blocked by the United States both times. He went on to say that if Pakistan did not

receive additional aid or debt rescheduling, its development would come to a halt and the misery of the population would be increased.

CODEL VISIT TO AFGHAN REFUGEE CAMP

On August 16, the Codel traveled to Chitral in the northwest frontier province to see firsthand the condition of the Afghan refugees who have flooded into the area since the April 1978 revolution in Kabul.

The group was briefed at length by Province Chief Secretary U. A. G. Isani, who told the visitors of the age-old porosity of the frontier between the two countries and of the sociological and familial affinities between the tribesmen on either side of the frontier.

Isani said there are now over 120,000 Afghan refugees in his province alone—most having taken up residence in the Parachinar area southwest of Peshawar. In Chitral, Isani said, there are some 5,000 refugees being supported by the province government in a camp, and thousands of others camped with their kinsmen throughout the rugged area.

Following the briefing, the Codel was taken by jeep to the camp which is located in an unfinished hospital complex near the small town of Chitral. The complex appears to contain about a dozen buildings in various states of construction—many of which are being used as living facilities for the refugees. As many as 38 people a spokesman said, are housed in a single room and each receives the equivalent of U.S. 40 cents per day in food assistance and cash support.

On arrival at the camp the authorities assembled a few hundred of the refugees in an open area where they could be addressed by the Codel. Chairman Wolff delivered through interpreters a brief speech in which he made the following points:

The Codel is pleased to see the Afghans in person and to observe how they are being cared for by the Government of Pakistan.

We know you seek religious and political freedoms and hope sincerely that you will gain your national independence.

We have come to gain information on the plight of refugees. We have seen the refugees in Southeast Asia—some 400,000 souls—many more have died at sea. The Communists have pushed those poor people into leaky boats and the world must be informed of their abuse.

Likewise, we want the American people to be aware of the plight of the Afghans who have fled another oppressive regime.

The members of this delegation represent many religions. I am Jewish—others are Christian—we all support your efforts to gain freedom of religion.

Representative Wolff's words were responded to by one of the refugees, Shah Wali, who said he was a religious teacher before fleeing his home. Shah Wali made the following points:

We are from Nuristan and had to flee our motherland in December 1978, due to the situation in which, with Soviet backing, the Taraki regime has tortured and killed us. We Afghans are fighting "Jihad" against Taraki and his people.

The Taraki Government has stopped our 1,400-year-old cultural traditions and replaced them with Russian philosophies. We do not want to change our religion from Muslim to Communist: we do not

want the "Imperialist" Russians in Afghanistan where they number in the thousands and are running everything.

We are thankful to the Government of Pakistan which is doing what it can to help us. Their means are limited, however, and there are 117 "families" (5,500-6,000 people) crowded into this camp, packed 20-30 in a single room. We would appreciate additional assistance.

We want you to tell our story to the world, especially to the people of the United States who favor human rights.

We want the U.N. Secretary General and others to tell Taraki to stop bombing and burning villages.

In conclusion, Wolff asked the refugees whether they wanted to return to their homeland. The response was loudly positive that they do—once Taraki is gone. A member of the delegation asked Shah Wali what the refugees think of the former Daoud regime now. The response was, "He was not good but much better than Taraki."

Following the exchange of remarks, the Codel walked through the camp, talking with individual refugees and observing the living conditions.

TRANSCRIPT OF CODEL PRESS CONFERENCE AT HOLIDAY INN, ISLAMABAD,
AUGUST 16, 1979

Mr. WOLFF. First of all let me thank all of you for coming here this evening. We don't have any prepared statement. We just want to indicate to you that we have spent two very full days here in Pakistan. The days were well spent. They were very fruitful. The discussions we held were on a variety of issues and we found much common ground.

We found that we had some differences, differences, however, that I am sure can be resolved in the future. We see a strengthening of relations between our two countries and have great hopes for the future relations between our two nations.

Clarence Long has spent two days in the countryside. He has been looking at the various projects that exist here. I am sure that he will be very happy to discuss these with you.

We had a meeting this morning, or I shouldn't say a meeting, a trip this morning. We have recently come from Vietnam and we also visited a number of refugee camps in various parts of Asia. This morning we visited another refugee camp. It is, indeed, unfortunate at this day and age where we have a society that is supposed to be humane yet the society has to have people who flee their country. We talked to the refugees at Chitral. We are extremely pleased with the method with which the Pakistani Government is treating these refugees.

But, like anything else when refugees come from one country to another, it becomes an international responsibility, not the responsibility of one nation and, therefore, I as chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian Affairs will recommend to the UNHCR—the United Nations High Commission for refugees—that they take a role in attempting to care for these refugees. I should like to call upon Congressman Long for comments.

Mr. LONG. Thank you very much, Mr. Wolff. I've been one of the severest critics of foreign aid, been on the committee for 15 years and I've been appalled at the hideous waste of money all over the world that made a lot of millionaires—done very little for poor people. And I've been trying for a great many years to change this and since I've gotten to be chairman, I've been able to push some projects that I thought would help in that direction.

I was very heartened today to see that some of the things that I have been advocating are being carried out here in Pakistan. I visited your program for cleaning up irrigation ditches so that water flows more freely and doesn't get wasted. That's an excellent program, one of the best I've seen, costs very little and it greatly increases the productivity.

I talked to some of the farmers who are very happy with the program. It increased their means of earning money and, unfortunately, it's just getting started although it's been going for quite a while. It covers about 5,000 families and there are 4,000,000 families that have to be served yet. It's going to make a big difference, I think, to agricultural productivity in Pakistan when it's completed, and I would hope very much that this will be carried on in the same way.

Another program I visited was the appropriate technology capital saving technology—what I call capital saving technology. There's a great capital shortage in the world today. The United States is beginning to feel it.

Many people think of us as a rich nation. The truth is that we have tremendous capital shortages in the United States. We can't even come close to dealing with many problems and that's one of the reasons why we haven't been able to solve the energy problem. We got lots of energy but we don't have the capital to harness it and put it to work. It's awfully important to make sure our foreign aid is handled in the most efficient and cheapest way possible.

I've been pushing for some time to get cheap implements for farmers instead of these very expensive tractors and prestige items. What I say is if you pile your fertilizer too high in one corner of the field, most of the field isn't going to get fertilized. When you spend too much money on some implements to serve a few people, most of the people aren't going to get help. We have a billion people in the developing world whom we have to help and only a small portion have been helped because we've been spending too much money on a few people.

Therefore, I was very glad when I went to your international rice research institute Pakistan program today and saw a great many capital saving implements there: cultivators, thrashers, seeders and fertilizer spreaders, a water pump that people can stand on and pump water. They developed the designs and then they patented them and then turned the designs over to a manufacturing firm who can then go ahead—they don't charge anything to the firm—and market and distribute this. They're just getting started in Pakistan and have done some distributing here. In the Philippines, this has reached 150,000 families have gotten this type of implements. It's big business by now, in cheap instruments. This is the real way in which you help farmers and I'm glad to see that you're really making progress here.

I've been concerned—I've visited all over the world now and I've only seen a couple of places in which I could really honestly say that capital saving implement program has really gotten underway and reached any considerable number of people. One of them was Sri Lanka, which I just left, which has an excellent program and the other here in Pakistan and I want to congratulate you for encouraging this project and I'm going to do everything I can to make sure that that is the way foreign aid moves in the years to come. Thank you very much.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you very much Mr. Long. Any other of the members like to make a comment at this point?

Mr. GILMAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLFF. Yes, Mr. Gilman of New York, Mr. Gilman is one of the ranking members of the Select Committee on Narcotics as well as one of the ranking minority members of the Committee on International Foreign Relations.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I'd like to just touch briefly on two humanitarian concerns that our delegation had. First of all, we were very appreciative of the hospitality and courtesies extended by the Government of Pakistan in inviting us to the northwest territory this morning to be able to go into the refugee camps, to talk to the refugees and to see first hand the problems being encountered by the Government of Pakistan with regard to the refugee problem.

We've just come from an area where a government didn't have that kind of concern for refugees from Vietnam and the comparison is striking to see how your country has opened up its arms to these people needing help and I hope we can take back a message of what you're doing and seeking help from our own country and other countries to provide the kind of assistance that's needed

to take care of the refugees from Afghanistan. I want to commend the Government of Pakistan for their efforts.

The other issue of humanitarian concern that I expressed to the leaders of your government had to do with a concern that we have as members of our Select Committee on Narcotics in the House of Representatives.

We're here in the heartland of the biggest production of opium in the entire world in the Golden Triangle and the edges of the Golden Triangle and Pakistan is steadily moving toward becoming the number one producer of opium. We are all concerned about opium production. Your government is—our Government is—everyone throughout the world have to be concerned because it eats away at the very roots of our society, our young people and it corrupts our society.

I'm hoping that we can work closer together in the days to come to try to eliminate the production of opium, to try to reduce the production of opium, to try to interdict the illicit opium trafficking which has reached an extensive proportion here in your own country. It exceeds 400 tons, it may be as much as 800 tons annually. Your own government estimates the addicts here exceed 100,000.

In our own country, it's closer to 500,000. And we find that this is not unique. It's worldwide. This is the heartland from which opium is produced and I'm hoping we can find ways to provide a substitute crop to eliminate the production and to interdict the trafficking in a much more effective manner. I think today's conferences will help to open the door a little more in that direction. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you.

Mr. SCHEUER. I would like to say a word about the population situation here in Pakistan. I am by no means an expert on Pakistan, but I have served for the past year as chairman of the only parliamentary committee in the world devoted to population matters, and I've been an organizer of an international conference on population that will take place in about ten days in Sri Lanka. So I come with some background in the field of population.

It seems to me that the population situation in Pakistan should be of great concern to the leaders of this country. You have an approximate 3 percent population growth, which gives you a doubling rate of approximately 20 years. That means that by the year 2000, or within a very few years thereafter, the present population of 80,000,000 or so will hit 200,000,000. Certainly by 2010. And this has enormous implications for your education systems, your health systems, your housing systems and above all your employment programs.

At the present time as I understand it, less than 10 percent of the women in this country are literate. We have found in the developing world that the one, that a major key in providing rational population programs is first the provision of family planning services within a maternal and child health matrix. That is, a solid maternal and child health programs throughout the country. With a family planning component, number one.

Number two, education of women and access of women to employment possibilities. It seems to be that both of those programs, the widespread availability of maternal and child health services with a strong family planning component and widespread education of young people, especially women, and access of women to the job market are programs to which your government ought to give very serious consideration.

Our government has tried to assist in stimulating family planning programs here and it's my understanding that approximately 5 million dollars worth of contraceptives have been shipped here by our country and are in storage. There seems to be some difficulty or problem in getting them moved out of the storage to the people where they could really have a marvelous affect in improving the quality of life and helping the young couples in achieving their family size goals.

I hope that consistent with the principle that Congressman Long laid out, attention to human services rather than a preoccupation with high technology and that Pakistan does seem to be going this route and is to be commended that they are going the appropriate technology route.

I would be rash enough to express the hope that more resources would be put into human services, particularly a comprehensive maternal and child health program mostly carried out and delivered by para professionals, by village midwives and access by all young people to education and particularly the women to the job market also.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you very much. We will entertain your questions. We don't claim to be universal experts on Pakistan in two days.

Question. Mr. Chairman, your delegation had discussions with the government of Pakistan in depth, now are you convinced that Pakistan is not making the atom bomb, they are only making peaceful use of the (nuclear) technology?

Mr. WOLFF. Our Government has made a statement today through Ambassador Hummel who has issued a report. I should like to read parts of it to you for a moment. It was in response to some sensationalist reporting that appeared in our press and has been carried elsewhere throughout the world as to the response that the United States has had to nuclear program of Pakistan. And I read from that and I think that this is important for you to know.

Mr. Hummel reminded the Government of Pakistan of American concerns that have been previously expressed about the thrust of Pakistan's nuclear program, and suggested that reports of continuing discussions on this subject within the United States should therefore come as no surprise to the government of Pakistan.

Mr. Hummel assured the government of Pakistan that all such discussions within the United States and the discussions we held here today are aimed at finding a way to resolve our current differences in a manner which is both mutually acceptable and consistent with Pakistan's old expressed peaceful purposes and on-proliferation concerns.

Question. What has come to surprise to the people of Pakistan and our Government of Pakistan is the report published by one of the most prestigious, influential and well-known newspapers that you are planning to indulge in sabotage and para-military attack on nuclear facilities, number one.

Number two, excellency, your ambassador, has said that Pakistan press has entered in sensationalism. Pakistani press has not published it, it is the New York Times which published it, which Pakistani press has lifted it. Because the New York Times taken as all over the world as a very reliable paper. What are your comments on this?

Mr. WOLFF. Let me illustrate, I'm a former newsman, I came out of the public press, I was a newspaper reporter and later a journalist on television and I would do everything possible to protect by sources and I would do everything possible to protect your sources of information. I think this is most important. We engage in a free press so the information we publish is information we achieve on our own.

As for revealing the nature of the press reports, it is difficult for us to question: We as legislators or we as news people to question the source of those reports. The point that has been made here about the sensationalism is the fact that a story quoted an unknown source as a result of this particular statement being made. It's just as if I made a statement today in one of the meetings and it was taken to represent the policy of the United States. I must tell you this, so far as sabotage, so far as commando raids or anything like that, Mr. Burt should have been writing for a science fiction magazine rather than the New York Times.

I should also like to state the official position of the United States Government. Our ambassador, Mr. Hummel, visited with senior officials of the government and expressed the concern of the United States and the point of sensationalism was criticism of the story and not the Pakistan press.

And untrue stories in both American and Pakistan press which are causing damage to Pakistan-American relations. Mr. Hummel conveyed to the government of Pakistan categorical assurance that the United States has no intentions to use force or any other extra legal means in Pakistan, nor does the United States Government have any intention to encourage anyone else to do so.

And let me just add to that that there exists within the United States a war powers resolution that was passed by the Congress of the United States. Our Constitution specifically delegates to the Congress of the United States the responsibility for any war-making act. And this would constitute a war-making act and the United States Government is not and in no way would we as a Congress or we as a Government sanction such activity.

Where the story came from I do not know. I can assure you that the statement that was made today is a categorical statement that in no way has this alternative ever been considered by our Government.

Mr. LONG. Mr. Wolff, as you know, is the chairman of the subcommittee on Asian Affairs and it would be inconceivable to me that such a plan would be made without him being informed, and I know that he has not been.

Question. Please tell us a little about the differences that existed between the two countries which you have referred to in your opening remarks, and also to what extent is the difference on this nuclear question?

Mr. WOLFF. Those differences we spoke of relate to the thrust of the nuclear program here in Pakistan. I do not think that we as a committee here should exacerbate any differences that exist by attempting to thrash these difficulties out here at this point. I don't see any purpose being served.

The United States is in a position that it and other nations of the world do not want to see nuclear proliferation. In our own country right at the moment, there is a great question as to whether even the peaceful uses of nuclear power will be continued. We had a very serious accident that took place at a place called 3-Mile Island, that was not far from Washington and this was a nuclear power plant.

Now, there are members of my delegation who I am sure will differ with me on the whole idea of nuclear power. I do not believe the nuclear power is the ultimate answer to our energy problems. We have people here who will disagree with that. However, that's a serious difference that we have between us and that may be a serious difference we have between the Government of Pakistan and the United States.

However, I think that what we should do is attempt to solve those differences, to work toward those points which are common to our countries and that is to find a new means of providing energy that is needed throughout the world. We cannot permit our nation or any nation of the world to become captive to any group of nations who control the resources that is needed by the world and that's a basic energy resource.

Therefore, our objective is to attempt to find alternate sources of energy so that your country is not dependent upon outside sources of energy. We are exploring right now, we are exploring the possibilities of solar energy, of thermal energy, of a wide variety of peaceful uses of a variety of energy renewable sources of energy (word indistinct) for example, can be a renewable source of energy.

At the present time our committee is engaged in a program to bring the nations of Asia together. We are a Pacific nation. Most people think of us as oriented toward Europe. We are a Pacific nation. Our west coast fronts the Pacific. We have one of our large States in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. The fact is that the United States is very much interested in participating with other Pacific nations. The idea of providing for self-sufficiency to fulfill the energy requirements of this area of the world. When we talk about differences, we are talking about the idea of ways and means of trying to provide for this need. To provide for the needs of this nation as well as the other nations of the area.

Let me add to that I think one of the main reasons why nuclear energy is not the way to get energy in the future is because it costs too much. Whenever you count all the costs of energy, all the subsidies that go into it, the ways of disposing of the wastes and the fact that the plants have to be torn down after 30 years because they become saturated with radio activity. The disposal of all these wastes, the research that goes into it, you find that nuclear energy is too expensive to even a rich country like the United States.

For poor countries, it is the last way you should go about getting energy. It is a waste of your money. It is a waste of your resources.

Question. Who decides whether it is a waste or not?

Mr. WOLFF. You do. And you should decide it is a waste but we also have to decide because we have put billions of dollars of foreign aid in various countries, including Pakistan, and we have to decide whether we want to put foreign aid into countries that want to waste their money on nuclear energy when we are not willing to do it ourselves.

Mr. STARK. If you don't mind, I just want you to know that I respectfully disagree with my chairman in the spirit of good fellowship. I totally and thoroughly disagree, Mr. Chairman.

Question. You have just mentioned that the United States has a right to ask whether you should put in the aid or not into (words indistinct) if it is having the energy program of nuclear capability.

Mr. STARK. That's one man's opinion.

Question. That is one man's opinion but it is a public opinion.

Mr. WOLFF. No, no, we have 435 members of the House of Representatives.

Question. What I would like to know is why we should evaluate the experience of Pakistan—the impact has been negative on the productive side of Pakistan because most of the money has been going out in shape of experts and all. It is not going to the productive side. It is just going waste. Who is going to explain that aspect of economy in Pakistan?

Mr. WOLFF. Well, that's a decision actually that we have to make in concert with Pakistan officials. I do not think that we can make that decision. You have to make that decision, the recipient as well as the donor nation has to make that decision.

It's just unfortunate that when we have, as Chairman Long has stated, I think this is most important. We have poor people in the world, we have people who are hungry in the world. These people must be fed if we are going to attempt to provide assistance and not in the nature of providing it as "big brother" but in the nature of providing it as a partner, in trying to solve the problems of humanity. Then I think we must do it in the most efficient manner as possible.

That's why we talked about having differences. There are also differences as has been explained before. There are serious questions as to the ultimate use of this nuclear situation and the nuclear program. But that is a situation that has to be discussed by both of our countries.

Question. But what baffles Pakistani mind as regards nuclear program is concerned is the intensity of American reaction to the nuclear program Pakistan has as compared to the program India, South Africa and Israel (have). We have more specific objectives and one of whom (them) has already exploded a bomb.

Mr. WOLFF. Let me just say this, that first of all when you consider the situation of India and Pakistan, we are not going to get involved between India and Pakistan. That has been going on for too long and we are not part of this problem.

I must say this, however, that we have laws within our country. Because laws are made by people such as we who have responsibility to our constituents and when the majority of the people of the country, when the majority of the members of the Congress vote for a particular law, that becomes the law of the land just as you have laws within your country.

Now, the other factor that is involved here is that we have a law on our books, the Symington Amendment to our foreign aid program, which restricts the funds going to any country which has a program that could lead to nuclear proliferation in the form of nuclear weapons. And that is where we are today. Therefore, we are precluded by law until such time as there is a resolution of this problem between our two nations, we are precluded by the law—not singling out Pakistan—not singling out anyone else.

The law that was created was created after India exploded its bomb and it is not retroactive. There is no way of making a law retroactive. And, therefore, they do not come under that particular section of the law. However, the reprocessing has already been provided to India for one year. The reprocessing material, and that comes for further discussion within our next appropriation and our next authorization.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I would like to make one thing clear that causes a little bit of confusion here. Some members of the delegation, Congressman Long for example, are apparently totally opposed to the nuclear power. That certainly is his right to have that opinion. That is not what we are talking about here. As far as I understand the situation, the United States Government is not opposed to Pakistan having nuclear power. What we are concerned about and why the Symington Amendment is being brought into play is because Pakistan is engaged in the process of enriching uranium for which apparently at the present time there is no purpose. So that's what the argument is about and my understanding is that the United States Government is not opposed to Pakistan having nuclear energy, if you understand the difference between the two things. Another thing I would like to point out is that several members who are here voted against the last sale of uranium to India—I was one of them—because we felt that they had taken action that was not conducive to peace and stability in this area and as I understand the law, come next spring, I believe March, we will cut off further sales to India unless they agree to inspections and all other safeguards.

Question. Would you be also considering cutting off economic aid to India as you have done in the case of Pakistan?

Mr. WOLFF. Yes. If the use of the material is not for peaceful purposes.

Question. The problem that seems fabulous is that you have passed the judgment against us and this is precisely the problem. You have not taken the government of Pakistan and its entire leadership, including the opposition, on its word. And you have gone with certain measures which really means strangulating Pakistan economically. And, similarly, our application for rescheduling debts is being dropped by the United States Government. (Congressmen) that is not their fault. *Question continued.* Maybe, that is what I say is our interpretation and certainly we would like to be corrected.

Mr. WOLFF. You are the only nation developing the kind of nuclear material which could be made into a weapon. We will take sanctions against India, those of us who would oppose it. There is no other nation. I assure you we would take the same action toward any other nation.

Question. There is another problem which has been in the mind of developing countries, that is Brzezinski's theory of regional influentials. That you wanted to have one regional power in India and one in Iran, etc. After the experience of Iran, what happened to American interests there? Don't you think it is better to have bi-lateral relations than to have hegemony of one over the other?

Mr. WOLFF. Yes, no question of that.

QUESTIONER. This is one of the approaches which has affected us because you wanted to say that we are all equal but you are second to this one.

Mr. WOLFF. No, no, I don't think that is the case at all.

Question. After your talks today * * * the talks that you've already had in this country and after the talks that you are going to have, you think you are a little wiser about Pakistan's position now?

Mr. WOLFF. I think we all are [laughter] * * * it was helpful for us.

NEWSMAN. Or more confused? [Laughter.]

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you gentlemen, thank you all.

6. THE SOVIET UNION

The delegation was invited to the Soviet Union by the Supreme Soviet; thus, while it held many interesting and informative meetings with its local hosts in Tashkent and Leningrad, the following summaries will cover only the meetings in Moscow, and the press conference.

The Moscow meetings included sessions with Vasiliy Kusnetsov, First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and a Candidate Member of the Politburo; a delegation from the Supreme Soviet led by V. P. Ruben, Chairman of the Council of Nationalities; and working sessions with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the United States-Canada Institute, among the other foreign policy-academic groups.

FIRST PLENARY SESSION, AUGUST 20, 1979

Summary

The remarks of Chairman Wolff and other members of the U.S. delegation stressed interest of the U.S. Congress in continuing a positive dialog with Supreme Soviet, with the aim of promoting mutual understanding and seeking joint solutions to common problems; the continued importance U.S. attaches to Pacific and Asian questions, particularly the problem of Vietnamese refugees; lack of U.S. intent to develop relations with PRC at the expense of the U.S.S.R.; and human rights issues, particularly emigration and religion.

The Soviets stressed, the importance of the Vienna Summit in creating a climate for improved United States-Soviet relations; the necessity for the SALT II treaty to be ratified; unease over increased U.S. military expenditure as a price for SALT ratification; concern about the intent behind improved U.S. relations with China; and

full support for Vietnamese position on the refugee and Cambodian issues.

Head of the Soviet delegation, V. P. Ruben, Chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet, opened the first plenary session in the Kremlin on the morning of August 20 by welcoming the Codel to Moscow and stressing Soviet satisfaction that after the Vienna Summit, United States-Soviet relations are developing in a positive direction.

Chairman Ruben noted that the summit should aid the solution of other important bilateral and multilateral questions, especially the MBFR talks in Vienna. Chairman Ruben also noted that, in the Soviet view, are certain negative trends, especially the increase in U.S. and NATO military expenditures, which he said was both counterproductive and contrary to the spirit of the Vienna Summit.

Chairman Ruben stated that the U.S.S.R. as a European, Asian, and Pacific power has a great interest in equal and mutually beneficial cooperation between all the countries of the Asian and Pacific region. Chairman Ruben called attention to dangerous trends in Asia, especially along the Chinese-Vietnamese border. The U.S.S.R. favors more rapid normalization of SRV-PRC ties, on the basis of full respect for the national sovereignty of the SRV.

The Soviets also favor the development of normal, constructive relations with China, and do not oppose U.S. efforts to develop such relations with China as well. However, the Soviets oppose efforts to develop United States-Chinese relations which are aimed against the security interests of the U.S.S.R. But the Soviet Union is not indifferent to China's policy of inducing tension in Asia.

Chairman Ruben concluded by stating that the U.S.S.R. is not seeking a position of strategic advantage in Asia and expects other countries to refrain from seeking to gain such a position.

Representative Wolff thanked the Soviet hosts for their hospitality and noted that United States-Soviet relations are presently at a critical juncture. The two nations are making efforts in a variety of fields to find areas of agreement to end the problems which have divided them in the past.

Representative Wolff emphasized U.S. desire for peace and an end to the arms race, which would help both countries solve outstanding social and economic problems. Representative Wolff invited the Soviet Embassy in Washington to participate in his subcommittee's informal monthly luncheon with Ambassadors of Asian countries.

Representative Wolff pointed out two areas in which the U.S.S.R. has a mistaken conception of U.S. policy in Asia: (1) That the United States is trying to play the "China card" against the U.S.S.R.; (2) the United States is withdrawing from Asia and adopting an island strategy. Wolff stressed the U.S. desire for a stable, peaceful equilibrium in Asia. U.S. post-Vietnam adjustments have been completed. U.S. Pacific forces are strong and our alliances are enduring. Representative Wolff noted that we have been forced to halt our plans to withdraw U.S. ground forces from Korea because of the North Korean military buildup. U.S. withdrawal now would only create instability.

Noting U.S. understanding for Soviet concern over China, Representative Wolff stressed that the U.S. decision to normalize relations

with the PRC was based on the best interests of both countries and of world peace. United States-Chinese relations are not directed against the U.S.S.R. or any other country. The United States would welcome decreased tension on the Sino-Soviet border.

In the past the U.S.S.R. had provided weapons to China, but Chairman Wolff noted that the United States had no plans to do so. The United States had opposed the Chinese attack on Vietnam, just as we opposed the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea.

Reporting on the findings of the Codel in its travels before arrival in the U.S.S.R., Chairman Wolff stressed that in all countries visited (except Sri Lanka) the refugee problem was at top of the agenda. Wolff expressed the belief that during its visit to Hanoi the Codel had made progress on the refugee and MIA issues.

Unfortunately, little progress, had been made on Kampuchea. Wolff stated that the United States cannot recognize the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea, although we have no desire to see a return of the discredited Pol Pot regime.

[The complete text of Chairman Wolff's opening remarks to the delegation from the Supreme Soviet appears in appendix 1 beginning with on page 117.]

Representative Long noted that the reported treatment of minorities in the U.S.S.R. troubled many Americans. He stated that the United States felt entitled to criticize Soviet minority problems of concern to us because the U.S.S.R. criticized the United States for its racial problems. Representative Long expressed the hope that the Soviets would improve their treatment of religious minorities, especially Baptists, Pentecostals, and Jews.

Welcoming the increased emigration of Soviet Jews, Representative Long expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would create internal conditions which would induce Soviet Jews to remain in the U.S.S.R. He criticized the concept that the U.S.S.R. did not allow its citizens to emigrate because of the amount invested in their education. He said he had a list of Soviet Jews and others who are seeking to emigrate from the U.S.S.R. and expressed the hope that they would be allowed to leave.

Noting his position as chairman of the Subcommittee on Foreign Aid, Representative Long called attention to shortcomings and successes in the U.S. foreign aid program and stated that both countries could do more to insure that foreign aid really benefited the most needy in the underdeveloped countries.

V. V. Zagladin, First Deputy Chief of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee foreign affairs department, called attention to the importance of meetings between the parliamentarians of both countries for increasing mutual understanding. The example of the SALT I and II Treaties showed that the United States and the U.S.S.R. can agree on important matters in spite of their different economic and social systems.

Mr. Zagladin noted that the U.S.S.R. had closely followed the U.S. Salt ratification debate. He denied that the U.S.S.R. needs SALT II more than the United States does. Stating that he receives many letters from his constituents expressing concern that the treaty will damage Soviet security, Mr. Zagladin nevertheless noted that SALT represents a balance of interests.

Mr. Zagladin criticized the calls for increased military expenditures to compensate for "so-called loss of security" caused by SALT II, noting that the United States was mistaken if it thought it could increase its security through increased military expenditure. He suggested instead the acceleration of other joint steps to increase security.

Finally, Mr. Zagladin criticized the Camp David accords, noting that in solving a small portion of the problems affecting the Middle East, the accords had created even larger problems in other areas which had made final peace more difficult to obtain.

Representative Guyer noted the importance of increased trade and contacts between peoples to promote mutual understanding and added that Ohio farmers and specialists would be happy to arrange programs for the exchange of agricultural expertise with Soviet counterparts.

L. M. Tolkunov, chairman of the Novosti Press Agency, in replying to the remarks of Chairman Wolff, stated that "facts" gave the U.S.S.R. reason to doubt that the United States has a disinterested policy in Asia and the Pacific. For example, it was hardly accidental that the United States had only improved its relations with China after Sino-Soviet relations had worsened.

Mr. Tolkunov found Chinese policy in this regard especially negative because in the past, he claimed, it was only a warning from the U.S.S.R. which had prevented the United States from attacking China.

According to Mr. Tolkunov, China is the only government in the world which wants to change the map of the world and which does all it can to block improvement in international relations.

U.S. allies provide military assistance to China with U.S. acquiescence, he said. The United States also plays a certain role in increasing the armament of China through the increased travel of Chinese-American nuclear scientists to China. The United States should be aware that China will not always remain an "ally" of the United States. When China has increased its military might, it will turn against the United States too.

Mr. Tolkunov continued that in the Soviet view, the United States pursues a hostile policy toward Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, while at the same time it ignores the provisions of the Vietnam Peace Treaty which call for U.S. economic assistance to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The largest refugee problem in Asia is that of Chinese fleeing the People's Republic of China, and there are other refugee problems which the United States ignores, such as Palestinian and African refugees.

Although Chairman Wolff had stated that the United States had warned the Chinese prior to its attack on Vietnam, such a powerful state as the United States could have done more to prevent the attack. The U.S.S.R. in its place, would have done more.

At the Geneva conference the Socialist Republic of Vietnam had made a constructive offer to regulate the refugee problem. China was attempting to undermine this by instigating Chinese to leave Vietnam. Furthermore, the Soviets consider that the U.S. use of aircraft carriers supposedly to rescue refugees is a form of military pressure on the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which goes in concert with Chinese

military pressure on the northern borders of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

Responding to Mr. Tolkunov, Representative Wolff noted that the People's Republic of China is not a U.S. ally. The Vietnamese had breached the Paris accords through their invasion of the south in 1975 and therefore article 20 is null and void.

Representative Wolff emphasized that the mission of the U.S. Navy off Vietnam is solely to rescue refugees. It had not violated Vietnamese territorial waters. Its presence was necessary because the Vietnamese had allowed 500,000 persons to die at sea.

The United States has accepted more refugees than any other country in the world and has earmarked \$500 million this year for relief of Vietnamese refugees. Chairman Wolff noted that the United States would like Soviet help in influencing Vietnam to regulate the outflow of Vietnamese refugees.

Finally, Representative Wolff noted that U.S. caution over future Chinese policy had been shown by the congressional resolution that we would defend Taiwan against attack by the People's Republic of China.

Georgiy Arbatov, director of the USA Institute, stated that he had listen with pleasure to the words of Representative Wolff about U.S. policy toward China.

However, the Soviets are also forced to listen to other voices which talk about a coincidence of United States and Chinese strategic interests and which want to use China against the U.S.S.R. In addition, would U.S. allies provide weapons to China if Sino-Soviet relations were good? We do not misunderstand U.S. policy but we see its contradiction and confusions.

There is no analogy between Chinese aggression toward Vietnam and the Vietnamese support to patriots in Kampuchea, Dr. Arbatov said, would the United States wish the Soviets restore the regime of Pol Pot, which had killed 3 million Cambodians, in order to give him a chance to finish off the rest? The United States did not speak out against the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda to depose Idi Amin. Finally, Dr. Arbatov regretted that the United States had halted talks on the Indian ocean.

Representative Gilman stressed the humanitarian concern of the United States as a country of many religious faiths, that all people be free to practice their religion. Expressing concern about Soviet restrictions on travel, emigration, and communication abroad, he called on the Soviets to allow religious freedom for Jews, Pentecostals, Baptists, Protestants, and Catholics, in accordance with the many international agreements on human rights to which the U.S.S.R. is a party.

Representative Bowen noted that Dr. Arbatov had been an effective spokesman for Soviet interests on U.S. national television and expressed the hope that U.S. spokesmen could be allowed similar opportunities to explain their views on Soviet television.

Representative Bowen said no one wants Pol Pot to return to power in Cambodia. We hope that the U.S.S.R. would work with us to insure that Cambodia could be free from Chinese and Vietnamese control. The Vietnamese presence in Cambodia is an important barrier to normalization of United States-Vietnamese relations.

Noting with pleasure his visit to a Moscow Baptist church and reported importation of 25,000 Russian-language bibles for Soviet Baptist community, Representative Bowen expressed the hope that the U.S.S.R. would continue to expand freedom of religion and communication.

Mentioning progress in the United States in improving the position of blacks, Representative Bowen noted that the Soviet Union would set a good example by granting greater religious freedom and tolerance for dissent.

Representative Dornan expressed pleasure at the opportunity to exchange views with Soviet counterparts. He noted that no nation appreciates criticism from another; however, such criticism can increase mutual understanding. He called on the Soviet Union to allow Anatoliy Shcharansky, the seven Pentecostalists currently seeking asylum in embassy Moscow, and Lithuanian dissident Voyalis to leave the Soviet Union.

The first session adjourned until August 21.

SECOND PLENARY SESSION, AUGUST 21, 1979

Summary

The second plenary session between members of the Codel and Soviet parliamentarians, held at the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on August 21, focused primarily on human rights and emigration.

The Soviet side responded to questions raised by the Congressmen the previous day on the Shcharansky case, religious freedom in the U.S.S.R., emigration restricting, the Lerner's exit refusal, alleged misinformation in the United States on the Soviet human rights situation, and the Pentecostalists in the U.S. Embassy. (In the latter case, the Soviets suggested that the failure by the Pentecostalists to file a formal application was a major problem.)

Congressmen discussed the need for cooperation to aid Vietnamese refugees, the U.S. public's concern over Soviet military spending, and the spread of Soviet influence in Africa and other developing countries.

The Soviet side brought up concern over possible Western military sales to China and the Indian Ocean talks.

At the conclusion of the session, Representative Gilman handed Chairman Ruben a representation list of those refused exit permission and prisoners of conscience.

Chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet Vitaly Ruben chaired the August 21, session, which lasted almost 2½ hours. After welcoming the Congressmen, Chairman Ruben turned the floor over to the Soviet speakers, who he said, wished to respond to the U.S. presentations and questions of the previous day. Taking part in the discussion on the Soviet side were: Lev N. Smirnov, Chief Justice of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court; Georgiy Ahbatov, Director of the Institute for the United States and Canada; Viktor S. Paputin, First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs (MVD); Army General Sergey Akhomeyev, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff; Boris I. Stukhalin, Chairman of the State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants and the Book Trade; Vadim V. Zagladin, First Deputy Chief of the Central Committee International Department; Georgiy (Yuriy) Zhukov, Pravda political commentator.

Chief Justice Smirnov led off the discussion, indicating that he would provide some facts about Shcharansky which the delegation had requested the previous day.

Smirnov stated that while the RSFSR Supreme Court has the main responsibility for the case, his own involvement was due to the fact that he had received a large number of appeals on Shcharansky's behalf. He pointed out that the appeals were all similar and seemed to have come from the same typewriter, suggesting this was a concerted campaign.

He next brought out the "white book" (published by the juridical press 1979) which, he said, contained a good summary of the case.

After reading the data on Shcharansky's background he summarized the accusations against him as they were presented before the RSFSR Supreme Court. Shcharansky was charged with (1) providing information damaging to the Soviet state and society and (2) treason.

Judge Smirnov listed as the evidence against Shcharansky some of the documents which he had disseminated and which were used for hostile propaganda purposes abroad:

Reports on former political prisoners in the U.S.S.R. The U.S.S.R. has no political prisoners—or only a very tiny number, something which the KGB told Shcharansky.

Appeals to the Jews in America concerning alleged antisemitism in the U.S.S.R. and restrictions on emigration.

In 1976 he sent an appeal to the Supreme Soviet and U.S. Congress alleging dissidents were being confined to psychiatric hospitals.

These and many other documents were used in an attempt to discredit the U.S.S.R. abroad and damage its authority. For example, Shcharansky helped Peter Osnos (of the Washington Post) produce a distorted article on the Soviet court which purportedly showed dissidents awaiting trial when in fact these were people to be treated for alcoholism.

Addressing the treason charge, Judge Smirnov alleged Shcharansky collected information about people working at secret research institutes and gave it to a foreign correspondent, Robert Toth of the L.A. Times, who was working for Western intelligence services. In the article he wrote. Toth admitted that Shcharansky had helped him to get the data. Judge Smirnov pointed out that Soviet law provides a minimum penalty of 10 years' deprivation of freedom for treason, and Shcharansky was given 13 years.

Judge Smirnov then went on to cite other instances in which he said the West had sought to glamorize persons accused of crime. If one were interested in real human rights, Smirnov said, one should recall the previous regime in Kampuchea. He spoke of the horrors he had seen, the results of the Pol Pot regime, the refugees and the destruction of millions of people.

Turning next to religion, Judge Smirnov pointed out that the constitution of the U.S.S.R. guarantees freedom of religion as long as it does not violate the law. Persons who for religious reasons keep their children at home or refuse military service may be brought to trial. In conclusion, Judge Smirnov offered to provide the U.S. delegation with the facts in any case of interest to them.

Deputy minister of internal affairs Paputin next stated that he would address some of the questions raised by the delegation in the August 20 plenary session, since the delegation was not correctly informed of the facts in many of the cases they had raised.

A. Shcharansky's health: Shcharansky was examined on August 13 by a medical commission who found nothing wrong with him.

B. Exit visa for Lerner: Mr. Paputin said Lerner had previously worked in an institute of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences and had had access to state secrets. His latest application is now being reviewed and, if the competent agencies feel there are no more technical reasons for applying the secrecy restriction, Lerner's application will be approved as was the application of his daughter, Sonya, who has already left the Soviet Union. Lerner, his wife and son would in such case be allowed to emigrate.

C. Pentecostals in the U.S. Embassy: The Ministry of the Interior has not yet received an application for an exit visa from the Vashchenko and Chmykhlov families either from the U.S. Embassy through the MFA or from the individuals themselves. Once an application is received, their cases will be considered in accordance with Soviet law.

In conclusion, Mr. Paputin said the Soviet record on human rights was very good and better than that of most countries. He listed specific examples of Soviet compliance with the provisions of the Helsinki agreement, including decreasing the cost of exit passports, decreasing the period of review of emigration applications, and increasing the number of exchanges in scientific, technical, cultural and tourist areas.

He cited particularly the exchanges and travel of religious delegations in which over 300 delegations of 2,100 people had traveled to and from the U.S.S.R. He also defended the Soviet record on reunification of families, noting that Germans, Greeks, Spanish, Jews, and others were allowed to emigrate. More than 200,000 people have received exit permission since 1959. More than 98 percent of those who apply receive permission and only 2 percent have received temporary refusals. Soviet emigration policy is in accordance with the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act, both of which state that the state has the right to decide who can leave.

There are only two reasons, Mr. Paputin said, for which exit visas are refused: One is for reasons of national security, when a person has had access to secrets, and the second is when emigration would actually divide families rather than reunite them.

Parenthetically, he stated the view that although many Jews do not really want to leave the U.S.S.R., many have been incited to do so by what he termed Zionist propaganda. When they actually arrive abroad they find nothing but unhappiness and poor living conditions.

The discussion then moved to arms control and Asian issues.

In his statement, General Akhromeyev touched on SALT II, MBFR, U.S. arms sales, and China. He said SALT II was useful because it reduced the danger of nuclear confrontation between the United States and U.S.S.R. On the other hand, referring to the Senate debate on ratification, deplored the negative elements in the debate and the U.S. attempts to bolster its forces in central Europe, particularly possible deployment of the Pershing II. Such steps may block progress in MBFR.

General Akhromeyev then turned to China and expressed Soviet concern over potential arms sales by the West. He discussed Chinese territorial claims against not only the U.S.S.R. but Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, India, Mongolia, and Japan, and noted that China has a history of aggression. This explains why the "China card" is a very sensitive question for the U.S.S.R., he noted.

General Akhromeyev responded to Representative Long's expression of concern over Soviet arms sales by arguing that the greatest danger in that area comes from the United States. Arms sales should be regulated, he acknowledged, but he observed that we may find it difficult to agree on how to accomplish this task.

Representative Wolff then took the opportunity to respond to some of the Soviet statements on Shcharansky. He noted that while this was a relatively small issue in our overall relations, it should be removed on humanitarian grounds, if not because it has become a continual irritant.

If Shcharansky's sentence was partly based on the information he furnished on psychiatric treatment in the U.S.S.R., Wolff asked, was this before or after the meeting of World Psychiatric Association which had condemned Soviet psychiatric practice? Wolff said the psychiatric association had even established a working group to investigate abuse of psychiatry for political purposes in the U.S.S.R.

Judge Smirnov answered that Shcharansky was not condemned just for providing information on psychiatry. This was only one of the documents which was used to damage Soviet interests abroad. The most important charges were based on Shcharansky's betrayal of military secrets.

Representative Wolff went on to state that in general, Soviet policy on emigration has improved, but was still based on nationality. Speaking personally, he said, he did not think that Jews should be called a nationality. He himself was Jewish by religion and considered himself an American.

One problem for U.S. Congressmen, Representative Wolff said, was that letters sent to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington and to Soviet officials on emigration cases were never answered. As a courtesy, the Soviet Government should send some acknowledgment of the receipt of such letters.

In an effort to move forward in our relations, he asked to whom Congressmen should turn for information on an unofficial level in order to answer their constituents' queries.

Representative Wolff then asked whether Shcharansky had exhausted the legal remedies available in the U.S.S.R. or whether he could still appeal his case. Judge Smirnov said no further appeal to the RSFSR Supreme Court was available but Shcharansky could petition the U.S.S.R. Supreme Court for review of his case.

Representative Wolff also asked for the facts on Prof. Irvin Cutler, the Canadian lawyer for Shcharansky who, he understood, has been expelled from the U.S.S.R.

Representative Wolff also explained that his delegation was in no way trying to hold secret meetings with anyone and had quite openly arranged to meet with Professor Lerner and other refuseniks at the Codel's hotel. He added that Representatives Scheuer and Gilman, as

friends of the Lerner saw them on the evening of their arrival but that was a private visit.

Boris Ivanovich Stukhalin next took the floor and returned to the question of human rights and religious freedoms. He expressed Soviet frustration that each time there was a visit by U.S. Congressmen they went over the same ground on human rights. Clearly, when the Soviet side provided the facts, these were not passed on.

He said that many Congressmen still seem to have not only unreliable facts which the media propagates in the United States, but also officially propagated misinformation. This was evident in the Congressmen's questions and statements that there were religious restrictions in the U.S.S.R. He cited the large number of Bibles and Korans published in the U.S.S.R. each year and the availability of religious books.

But, he said, the Soviet Union draws the line when people violate the law, such as refusing military service or keeping their children from school.

Mr. Stukhalin charged that what he termed Western propaganda mongers pick up any criminal who calls himself a defender of human rights and make a hero of him. If the Soviet Union were to release Shcharansky today, Western propaganda organizers would find someone to take his place so the pressure on human rights would never let up.

Chairman Ruben interjected to emphasize strongly that the U.S.S.R. has its own laws and would not retreat from them. Attempts to put pressure on the U.S.S.R. to change its system were futile.

Representative Wolff said he understood this but wished to point out that the United States had its laws which, for example, prohibit according MFN treatment to any country which does not permit free emigration. The United States wished to move forward in this area and was therefore seeking some satisfactory solution.

Chairman Ruben answered that Soviet law was only directed internally while the United States directed its law externally as well.

Representative Lagomarsino prefaced his remarks on SALT and U.S. perception of Soviet moves in Africa and other Third World areas with the proposition that the delegation's report of its visit to the U.S.S.R. would receive wide dissemination in the United States so that future Codel's would not have to repeat the same questions.

He then pointed out that, in his home State of California, some of his constituents have doubts about the SALT II treaty. SALT is supported by 35 percent of his constituents, 44 percent are opposed, and the rest are undecided. Many Americans are hesitant to support SALT because they feel that such U.S. moves to reduce arms as cancellation of the B-1 and deferral of production of the neutron warhead were not matched by similar restraints on the Soviet side.

Representative Lagomarsino concluded with an expression of U.S. interest in continuing cooperation with the U.S.S.R. as long as each side understands the differences which separate them.

Pravda commentator Yuriy Zhukov introduced the subject of the Indian Ocean, pointing out the importance of the region and stressing the importance of keeping this area peaceful. He reviewed the history of attempts to demilitarize the area, noting that despite the resolutions of the Lusaka Conference and various U.N. declarations, the military

threat in the area has increased. He mentioned the U.S. "withdrawal" from the Indian Ocean talks and the fact that although several months have passed since it was agreed in Vienna to resume the talks, nothing has happened.

Furthermore, Mr. Zhukov continued, there is an Associated Press report from Peking that Congressmen Staggers and Pepper met with senior Chinese officials and suggested that China should include its naval forces with those of the West to meet the Soviet threat in the Indian Ocean area. In the Soviet view, the discussion of such a serious matter by two responsible U.S. officials with PRC officials goes well beyond playing the China card.

Representative Wolff responded to Mr. Zhukov by pointing out that the Indian Ocean talks were adjourned after the fourth round in the winter of 1978-79 because of a sharp increase in Soviet naval forces in the area in connection with the introduction of Cuban forces into the Horn of Africa. However, military forces in the area have since been reduced, and the Congressman said he would recommend resumption of the talks when he returns to the United States.

Representative Evans turned the discussion to the problem of Southeast Asian refugees, urging that the Soviet Union and the United States work together to relieve the suffering of millions of people.

He said he had visited Southeast Asia and could understand both U.S.S.R. concerns about Chinese expansionist intentions in Southeast Asia and the concerns of the Thais and other Asian nations that the Vietnamese have the same objectives. However, these questions should not be an obstacle to solving the refugee problem, and he urged continued dialog to find a solution.

Mr. Zagladin then summarized the results of the session. He noted that as far as the world situation was concerned, different approaches were possible but should not prevent both sides from coming to understandings; for example, on the refugee question, on the problem of disarmament, and so forth. Given good will on both sides, we can find answers to these problems without changing our convictions.

On other issues, such as human rights, each side has different laws covering its internal affairs to which it is committed. This is understandable since laws reflect social relationships and our systems are different. The U.S.S.R. has freedom of religion and emigration, but places certain limits on these freedoms, as does the United States. Limits on emigration apply to those who have access to state secrets, or who are under criminal investigation, or have not fulfilled their military obligations. Freedom of religion is guaranteed but those who violate the laws are subject to sanctions.

In response to Representative Wolff's request for a mechanism for receiving accurate information on the situation in the U.S.S.R. Zagladin urged continuation of these interparliamentary meetings and exchange of ideas. Zagladin also noted that the Soviet Embassy in Washington would be instructed to acknowledge inquiries from Congressmen in the future.

Representative Scheuer reiterated that the United States was not asking the Soviet Union to change its laws or system, but was sending a signal to the Soviets that we want to get on with trade, with SALT, and other outstanding questions. In order to do this, the climate of

our relations must improve; if positive steps are taken by the Soviet side, the climate will be improved.

Representative Moorhead thanked the Soviet side for its hospitality and discussed the effect Soviet actions in supporting national liberation movements has on United States-Soviet relations.

As long as the Soviet Union continues to support, either directly or through surrogates like Cuba, wars of national liberation, which many in the United States see as extensions of Soviet revolution in Africa, Central and South America, then many Americans will remain suspicious about Soviet intentions in general.

Although Americans do not like to spend money on military hardware, they feel such spending is required to meet the expansion of Soviet influence in other areas of the world. Mr. Moorhead urged more open discussion of these subjects including Soviet military spending.

Representative Gilman returned to the *Shcharansky* case, thanking Smirnov and Paputin for the information they had provided. He hoped the U.S.S.R. would not consider that the U.S. interest in human rights was merely a propaganda campaign but would realize that it reflected the genuine interest of the U.S. people as expressed by their representatives.

Representative Gilman discussed some of the legal issues in the *Shcharansky* case and asked that the Soviet Union facilitate Shcharansky family efforts to appeal the case. He noted the improvement in the emigration picture and expressed the hope that this improvement would continue, and that some refuseniks and prisoners of conscience would be allowed to leave the country.

At the conclusion of his remarks, Representative Gilman handed Chairman Ruben a list of longstanding refusenik cases and prisoners of conscience on which he hoped to see some progress.

Chairman Ruben closed the meeting by stressing the importance and usefulness of continued contacts between parliamentarians of both countries, despite differences of view. He expressed the hope that the discussions had cleared up misunderstandings on both sides.

MEETING WITH VASILIIY KUSNETSOV, FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE U.S.S.R., MOSCOW, THE KREMLIN, AUGUST 21, 1979

Deputy Chairman Kusnetsov opened the meeting with general greeting, referred to reports to him on the progress of the plenary sessions by Chairman Ruben, and noted that United States/Soviet relations are characterized by "complexities," and "in recent years, periods of ups and downs."

Relations are, for the present, potentially on the upswing, reference the SALT agreement and the Vienna Summit between Brezhnev and Carter. Reflecting the importance the Soviet officials placed on SALT throughout the mission, Deputy Chairman Kusnetsov called the SALT II agreement "the biggest step of all the steps ever taken in limiting the arms race." SALT's achievement shows the "fact" that neither the United States nor the U.S.S.R. is striving for arms superiority.

For the future, Kusnetsov said a gradual decrease in military competition must be the goal of continued arms talks. Citing his "25 years

personal experience in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he said that when both sides want an agreement, one is secured.

However, Kusnetsov went on, while there are positive signs, there are also negative signs. Scientific, trade, and economic relations are not prospering because of "obstacles to progress" such as "deployment in Western Europe of new U.S. missiles, extension of the U.S. Navy in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf."

Turning to what he termed "specific" interests of the Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, the Deputy Chairman said the Soviet Union maintains good relations with nearly all Asian nations except China. "Our policy vis-a-vis China is not a secret. We would like to maintain normal relations." However, Kusnetsov said, Russia is not responsible for the present (bad) relations.

Despite problems, however, the Soviet Union will keep a positive line at scheduled resumption of talks "and if the Chinese side takes this line, then the talks will be useful."

Kusnetsov then turned to the triangular relationship and cited the importance of China to United States-Soviet relations. He said the Soviet Union does not oppose normalization of relations between Washington and Peking, because that is "only natural." But citing Chairman Brezhnev's interview with *Time* magazine, Kusnetsov noted that the Soviets see as the views of some in the United States a pro-China policy line. These "love so much" the policy line of the present Chinese leadership that they are "seduced," and are thinking of using China as a "weapon" against Russia.

"Such a policy is very dangerous to the maintenance of world peace," Kusnetsov warned. He said the Chinese leadership still plans "to bring about a collision between the Soviet Union and the United States," following Mao's old dictum of watching the "two tigers" fight it out.

The Deputy Chairman said that despite U.S. denials of playing the China card, "I cannot but be put on guard by the fact that the United States in practice connives on (military) sales to China by NATO allies."

Kusnetsov cited as another "connected point" to the China issue, "the campaign in the West on refugees in Southeast Asia." Kusnetsov said the purpose of the campaign was to blame Vietnam and to distort the actual reasons for the refugee flow.

Noting the Codel's recent mission to Hanoi, Kusnetsov said he hoped its findings would be "objective." Russia's position, he said, is represented by the assistance it has given and will continue to give the people of Vietnam, and by the work of the U.S.S.R. at the Geneva Conference on refugees.

That position is that politics should not overwhelm humanitarian concerns. "We need to put an end to any kind of threats to Vietnam, and end interference in Vietnam's affairs."

On Kampuchea, Kusnetsov noted that a "hue and cry" on humanitarian relief also serves political concerns, in this case, interfering with the new Kampuchean Government's attempts to bring the domestic situation back to normal.

In conclusion, the Deputy Chairman said: "The Soviet Union ascribes great significance to cooperating with the United States in world

affairs." Since hundreds of millions around the world depend on United States-Soviet relations, "we need reciprocity."

Conceding "each country has its own social systems and its own peculiarities," the facts of the nuclear age compel United States-Soviet understanding, Kusnetsov concluded.

Representative Wolff, thanking Mr. Kusnetsov for his hospitality and the "frank and useful" talks arranged for the Codel, agreed with the Deputy Chairman that SALT's importance "cannot be overestimated" as a "step toward mutual trust, which is the ultimate in disarmament."

Countering Kusnetsov's remarks about the "obstacles" represented by the U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, and weapons deployment in Western Europe, Representative Wolff noted that the United States had announced it would not produce the following weapons systems—the B-1 bomber, the neutron bomb, and another nuclear aircraft carrier.

On the China card, especially NATO sales to China, Representative Wolff pointed out that France withdrew from NATO several years ago, and is thus subject to no constraints in that regard.

On refugees, Representative Wolff agreed that humanitarian concerns are paramount, noted that refugees stem from many sources, both past and present, and that the issue must not be exploited.

Representative Wolff said that both the United States and the Soviet Union "worked well" at Geneva, which was designed to help regulate an orderly flow of refugees.

On China's invasion of Vietnam, Representative Wolff said the United States opposed the first invasion, but that, unfortunately, the Chinese disregarded the U.S. objections. For the future, a renewed invasion "would be a threat to peace," and must therefore be discouraged.

Noting Kusnetsov's statement of Vietnam's concerns, Representative Wolff said that the United States is concerned for Thailand and its fears of invasion by Vietnam; therefore, the United States and the Soviets can help promote stability in the region.

Representative Wolff then discussed the U.S. role in Vietnam from the late 1950's through the war as stemming from a perhaps mistaken interpretation of events, but as representing a desire to keep China out of Vietnam. Now, perhaps, the situation is different, and it is the Soviet Union which wants to keep China out of Vietnam.

However, Representative Wolff went on to draw a parallel between Soviet concerns for Vietnam, and the U.S. position opposing the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.

Turning to bilateral United States-Soviet matters, Representative Wolff said he hoped that the Codel's concerns on human rights were not misinterpreted by the Soviets. The United States is motivated by, among other factors, the need to comply with laws such as the Jackson-Vanik provisions regarding MFN.

The fact that the United States would benefit, economically, from MFN with Russia should show that genuine principle is involved, Wolff said.

Also, discussions by the Codel reflect individual Members' attempts to represent the concerns of their constituents.

In conclusion, Representative Wolff said the goal of the Codel is to identify "areas of agreement" to "remove obstacles between us."

Representative Long made a plea for "generosity" by the Soviet Union toward refuseniks and dissidents.

On religious minorities, the continued problems represent an obstacle to improved United States-Soviet relations on economic and scientific levels because of the requirements of U.S. law, Long said.

The political problems caused by this also carry over to getting SALT approved, he warned. Therefore, since the Soviet Union is a powerful nation, it is in Russia's interest to be generous in issuing exit visas to those who meet the qualifications.

Representative Long noted his appreciation of Soviet progress in issuing increasing numbers of exit visas in recent years, saying such moves would be greatly appreciated in the United States.

Deputy Chairman Kusnetsov, in response, thanked the Codel for its remarks about hospitality and useful meetings. He said he felt the meetings had been "constructive" in tone, and therefore useful.

On some of the specific points raised by Representatives Wolff and Long, Kusnetsov noted:

(1) "Satisfaction" at statements that the United States had no plans to sell arms to China. But Kusnetsov questioned whether the United States was signing off on indirect sales, and said he felt the United States could take stronger action.

(2) On Kampuchea, the people there have chosen a definite path and a definite system for themselves, and should be free from outside interference.

(3) On human rights, Kusnetsov said that Chairman Ruben had indicated this area to be the principal interest of the Codel. Kusnetsov said he didn't want to repeat the arguments already raised, but noted that the Soviet Union "is strictly scrupulous" in carrying out the Helsinki accords, and the principles of the Council of Europe, which were included in the new Soviet Constitution in 1977.

(4) Minorities: all of the more than 100 minorities in the U.S.S.R. have equal rights, and the Codel should tell its constituents that reports which say persons are prevented from practicing their religion are in error.

MEETINGS WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS, AUGUST 20, 1979

Summary

The Far East Task Force of the Codel met with Asian specialists at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the afternoon of August 20. Major topics of discussion included Indochina refugees, the alleged threat of a second Chinese invasion of Vietnam, Soviet relations with ASEAN, and Kampuchea.

I. A. Rogachev, chief of the Ministry's Southeast Asia Department, presided over the meeting and did all of the talking for the Soviet side. Other Soviet officials in attendance were: F. I. Potapenko, Deputy Chief, First Far East Department; R. L. Khamidulin, Deputy Chief, Southeast Asia Department; O. M. Sokolov, Acting Chief, U.S.A. Department; and (FNU) Meketnit, Vietnam Section Chief.

Representative Wolff opened the meeting by stating that the United States and U.S.S.R. have common aims in Asia in that both are interested in (1) stability and (2) prevention of hostilities.

Since the United States and U.S.S.R. both have allies in the region, any conflict would involve us both. Our objective, therefore, is to relieve tensions there.

One of our major objectives concerns Vietnamese refugees. We have different views on the cause of the problem. Since the Soviet Union has influence on Vietnam, it can help solve this problem.

Mr. Rogachev agreed that there is a commonality of interests. Unfortunately the situation in Asia constantly causes concerns, including the refugee problem. One cause of this problem is massive Chinese emigration from Indochina. Another is foreign intervention in Indochina and the destruction it caused.

At present it is advisable to let passions settle and to give the countries concerned a chance to implement promises made at Geneva. The use of navies in no way contributes to a solution.

Mr. Rogachev then commented that the U.S. decision to double the monthly intake of Indochina refugees, while purely an internal U.S. matter, is risky since it would increase the size of the Chinese community in the U.S. Vietnam is the first country to suffer from having a large Chinese community. Vietnamese resistance to Chinese expansionism protects other southeast Asian countries from the threat from the north.

Mr. Rogachev continued that the current situation resembles that of last December and January, before the "first" Chinese invasion of Vietnam: increased number of incidents, growing concentration of Chinese troops on the border, and threatening statements by Chinese leaders.

The Soviet Union is concerned that in Japan, the United States and the West in general the possibility of another invasion is not taken seriously. The Chinese used Deng's visit to the United States and Japan to give the appearance that the invasion was approved in Washington and Tokyo; now Vice President Mondale is making an official visit to the People's Republic of China in late August. If China attacks Vietnam again, the attack would probably begin with the start of the dry season, sometime in October.

Turning to Soviet relations with ASEAN, Mr. Rogachev espoused the belief that forces in and outside the organization are trying to lead it toward military cooperation. The Soviet Union will resist this trend by every means, and wants economic cooperation between ASEAN and the Indochina countries. Soviet relations with the individual ASEAN countries are developing satisfactorily as a whole.

Chairman Wolff responded to Mr. Rogachev as follows:

- Soviet talk about China is reminiscent of talk in the United States about the "yellow peril" in the past.
- About 50 percent of the Indochina refugees are ethnic Vietnamese, including some former Vietcong.
- Should the U.S. Navy refuse to pick up people drowning at sea?
- Does the Soviet Union also oppose the Indochina bloc, the forced federation of Vietnam, Laos, and Kampuchea?
- It is hard to say whether Chinese charges of Soviet encirclement are valid or not.

Mr. Rogachev replied that the Indochina countries need economic assistance to help problems caused by war. Instead, a new military

situation is imposed on them from the north. Vietnam has explained that it no longer has any interest in forming an Indochina federation.

As for Chinese claims of Soviet encirclement, the Soviet Union has called for ensuring the security of all countries in Asia, a long-term goal in which the PRC is invited to participate. Soviet encirclement of China is thus a myth, Mr. Rogachev concluded.

Representative Dornan said that some Codel members sympathize with the Soviet position vis-a-vis China. Representative Moorhead said the United States has a historical tradition of accepting the homeless from the whole world, but the United States is not encouraging people to leave Vietnam.

Representative Lagomarsino said many Congressmen were opposed to the way in which the United States recognized the PRC—that is, without any conditions concerning nuclear proliferation or an invasion of Vietnam or Taiwan.

Regarding Mr. Arbatov's analogy, expressed at an earlier Codel discussion, between Kampuchea and Uganda, several Codel members noted that there are at least two differences: (1) Tanzania is going to withdraw from Uganda soon, and (2) Tanzania is not a U.S. ally, whereas the Soviet Union has great influence on Vietnam and could encourage Vietnam to withdraw from Kampuchea at an early date.

Representative Lagomarsino then asked if the Soviet Pacific Fleet had picked up refugees during its stay in Cam Ranh Bay.

Rogachev replied that civilian Soviet vessels have picked up refugees, and it would be better if the United States used nonmilitary vessels for this purpose.

Representative Lagomarsino answered that the refugees are happy to be picked up by anybody.

Representative Lagomarsino then said he could not understand Soviet concern about a possible ASEAN military alliance in view of the Chinese military threat to Southeast Asia. Mr. Rogachev reiterated that the Soviet Union opposes all blocs, and does not understand the Wolff subcommittee's idea of a new regional organization with a closed membership which would oppose the Indochinese countries.

Chairman Wolff said the idea of a "Pacific community" of nations is not a military bloc, but, rather, a loosely organized economic group of nations supported by Japan, Australia, and the ASEAN countries.

Representative Scheuer said he advocated the immediate establishment of diplomatic relations with Vietnam, so that a U.S. Embassy in Hanoi could negotiate with Vietnam on refugees and other problems. There is no apparent alternative at present to Vietnamese hegemony in Kampuchea, since Pol Pot slaughtered 3 million people and there aren't enough educated people left to run the Government.

Mr. Rogachev said that logically, therefore, the United States should then also recognize Kampuchea.

Representative Scheuer said the United States and U.S.S.R. should cooperate to help the poor countries of the Southern Hemisphere solve their population and food problems, since neither is willing to absorb the increasing population of these southern countries.

Mr. Rogachev thanked Mr. Scheuer for his "interesting views," and the meeting concluded.

Summary

Representatives Wolff, Long, Scheuer, Bowen, Dornan, Gilman, Moorhead, and Lagomarsino together with members of the Codel staff, met with their Soviet hosts in a meeting at the Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada on August 21.

The talks, which lasted approximately 1½ hours, focused primarily on the need for United States-Soviet understanding, on human rights, Soviet involvement in the Third World, and China.

The talks at the Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada were chaired by Georgiy Arbatov, the Institute's Director. Other Soviet participants included: Vitaliy Zhurkin, Deputy Director, USA Institute; Radomir Bogdanov, Deputy Director, USA Institute; and Genadiy Skorov, Deputy Director, USA Institute.

Representative Long began the session by stressing the need for mutual understanding. The Soviet Union often acts as if it fears the United States. As a result, many of our actions—such as, sending the 7th Fleet to rescue Vietnamese refugees—are often misunderstood. But as Dr. Arbatov knows, the American people do not want war. Our problem, Representative Long noted, is to overcome such fears.

Representative Long concluded his remarks by asking Dr. Arbatov to accept a list of 15 individuals who have been refused permission to emigrate from the U.S.S.R.

Dr. Arbatov accepted the list, noting that he would pass it along to the appropriate officials.

Dr. Arbatov responded to Representative Long's presentation by pointing out that the Soviet Union has had good reasons to be suspicious of American intentions toward the U.S.S.R. After all, he noted, the United States was not exactly one of the new Soviet state's best friends after the October revolution. Furthermore, every July, Congress passes a captive nations resolution which is not a friendly act. Finally, there is the question of U.S. military expenditures.

Representative Moorhead responded to Dr. Arbatov's mention of the captive nations resolution by observing that Americans feel they have a right to make their feeling known on such questions. The resolution, he noted, reflects a perception by many Americans, who have a strong attachment to the areas in question, that these regions remain in bondage.

Turning to China, Dr. Zhurkin argued that Soviet suspicions vis-à-vis U.S.-PRC relations are well founded. The PRC, he argued:

- Is the only great power with territorial demands on other countries;
- Committed aggression against Vietnam, fully aware that such an action risked a military confrontation with the U.S.S.R.; and
- Believes that war is inevitable.

The United States, he continued, improved relations with the PRC only after Soviet-Chinese relations deteriorated. Furthermore, the Chinese attack in Vietnam took place after Deng Xiaoping's visit to the United States.

The Soviets, Dr. Zhurkin stated, do not believe that China's actions in Vietnam are part of a U.S.-PRC "plot." Nevertheless, Moscow can-

not overlook the fact that there are some in the United States who want to use China against the U.S.S.R.

Dr. Bogdanov returned to the question of the captive nations resolution by arguing that the average Soviet citizen finds such statements by the U.S. Congress upsetting. Furthermore, he added, the U.S.S.R. has its own public opinion which, while it works differently than in the United States, is an important factor in Soviet political life. Congressional statements such as the captive nations resolution only make it more difficult to gain public support in the U.S.S.R. for improved U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations, he concluded.

Noting that he understood the Soviet point on the captive nations resolution, Representative Wolff responded to Bogdanov by pointing out that congressional resolutions do not reflect official U.S. Government policy. The United States is different in this regard, he added. For example, Radio Moscow is run by the Soviet Government and presumably reflects official Soviet Government policy. This is not true in the United States.

In response, Dr. Arbatov stated that while it was correct to say that Radio Moscow is owned by the Soviet Government, it does not necessarily follow that it always reflects the official Soviet Government position on all issues. Dr. Arbatov did not answer Representative Scheuer's question of whether or not it is permissible to publicly criticize the Soviet Government on Radio Moscow, but went on to argue that there is a variety of views on different topics within the U.S.S.R., "as American specialists on the U.S.S.R. know."

In an effort to explain American concern with Soviet foreign policy intentions, Representative Bowen noted that the real worry on the part of the U.S. public is that Moscow is attempting to foment revolutions abroad, most recently through the use of Cuban forces.

Dr. Arbatov responded by claiming that Soviet philosophy on world revolution has generally been "misinterpreted" in the West. The decision was taken in 1920, Dr. Arbatov noted, to forsake world revolution in favor of "socialism in one country." We believe, he continued, that in time all countries will become socialist, but a "revolution is not something which can be exported."

In response to Representative Bowen's question concerning the Soviet role in instigating the Afghan revolution, Dr. Arbatov answered that the U.S.S.R. has learned about the revolution on the radio.

Insofar as the Cuban factor is concerned, Dr. Bogdanov argued that the Soviets have far less control over them than the Americans tend to think. One can neither "send" Cubans nor "forbid" them to go, he added.

Following Representative Dornan's plea for more intensive contact between American and Soviet parliamentarians, Representative Long stated that in his opinion, the major factor which led to the downturn in U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations in the post-World War II period was Soviet actions in Eastern Europe.

Directing himself to the question of human rights, Representative Gilman noted that this is not an issue that will go away and suggested that the Soviets should permit the "800 refuseniks" and "12 prisoners of conscience" to leave the U.S.S.R.

Dr. Arbatov answered Gilman by arguing that because of the selectivity with which it is applied, American human rights policy does

not look very sincere to the U.S.S.R. The U.S.S.R. tries to be forthcoming, Dr. Arbatov continued, and in fact it even permits some individuals who have committed crimes to leave, but outside pressure only makes the situation more difficult. It puts the Soviet Government under duress and encourages Soviet dissidents to violate Soviet laws. The Soviet Union permits emigration, Dr. Arbatov concluded, but as the Helsinki Final Act states, "only in accordance with existing laws."

Citing the example of an unnamed physicist, who applied to leave the U.S.S.R. 9 years ago, and still has no visa while being forced to live from odd jobs, Representative Gilman suggested that access to classified material often serves only as a pretext for refusing permission to emigrate.

Dr. Arbatov responded by citing the following figures on emigration from the U.S.S.R.:

98.6 percent of those who apply are permitted to leave;

The cases of the other 1.4 percent are eligible for review;

Last year, 1,000 individuals who were previously refused permission to emigrate were allowed to leave.

In some cases, Dr. Arbatov continued, Soviet authorities may have made mistakes, but little will be accomplished if the West continues to attempt to apply pressure on the U.S.S.R.

Turning to the question of religious freedom, Representative Wolff asked why Soviet Muslims must not have their religion entered on their internal passports, as is the case with Soviet Jews.

This is a result of historical factors, Dr. Arbatov responded. For centuries Jews were treated as an ethnic group in Russia, and while the Soviet Government has made great efforts to overcome antisemitism, it would be difficult to know what else to enter in a travel document. After all, it is against the law to enter a person's religion on any document, so what should be substituted for the term "Jew?"

The meeting then adjourned.

OTHER MEETINGS

The delegation also held interesting and informative working sessions in Moscow with academic experts from the Institute for Far Eastern Affairs, led by its director, Dr. Sladkovskiiy, and the Institute of Oriental Studies, which was chaired by Deputy Director G. F. Kim.

At these private sessions, the details of Soviet policies in Asia, with emphasis on Soviet-China relations, were discussed along the lines already covered in the meetings reported with the Supreme Soviet, and the Rogachev, and Arbatov sessions.

At the Institute for Far Eastern Affairs, Professor Sladkovskiiy added the following enlargement on the Soviet view of internal Chinese policies:

The PRC's anti-Vietnam campaign of the last 2 years includes the theme of the "Eternal Unity of the Chinese People," which stems from the theory that China is the trunk of a tree of which Vietnam, Mongolia, et cetera are branches.

Regarding the internal situation in the PRC and the future of Sino-Soviet relations, Sladkovskiiy said that contradictions within the entire PRC leadership (not just between Deng and Hua Guo-

feng) make the internal situation in the PRC unstable. While the PRC leadership has had to drop some of the postulates of Maoism because of economic difficulties, its political course, especially foreign policy, will continue to adhere to Maoist principles.

The Chinese leadership is violently repressing minorities, for example in Tibet and Mongolia. There is a conscious policy of diffusing minority members throughout the country. This has led to the presence in the Soviet Union of "many" refugees, especially Mongolians and Uighers, but including Chinese intellectuals, from the PRC.

Anti-Soviet trends prevail in China, and the example of Sino-Vietnamese negotiations combines to form a difficult prospect for impending Sino-Soviet negotiations. However, the Soviets have economic leverage that not even Japan can match, that is, 70 percent of the industrial and transportation equipment in China is either of Soviet origin or Soviet design licensed for production in the PRC. The Soviets are also in a good position to offer barter trade which the Chinese want.

Another positive factor is that the Chinese leadership can be influenced by the Chinese public, which is basically friendly to the Soviet Union (it is "historically inevitable"), especially former high-ranking cadre which are now being released after 15 years imprisonment.

Prof. G. F. Kim, Deputy Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, stressed the "double nature" of the refugee problem: First, it has historic roots including the recent Chinese aggression. In its most recent form it began when relationship between Asean and the SRV began to improve, and difficulties were provoked by people who were against improved relations.

Second, it is the natural outcome of major social revolution, such as those of France, America, and the PRC. Social revolution settles class struggles, and in the unique case of Indochina class and ethnic problems coincide.

CODEL PRESS CONFERENCE IN MOSCOW AUGUST 22, 1979

Mr. WOLFF. Our delegation has completed three days of frank and fruitful talks here in Moscow as well as two days in Tashkent with our Soviet counterparts which we feel enhanced the working relationship between the parliamentary bodies of each nation, and thus contributed our small part toward mutual understanding and world peace.

Among the key issues we discussed by both sides and on which we feel general agreement has been reached were:

(1) That the agreement signed in Vienna between President Carter and General Secretary Brezhnev, SALT 2, is a historic step in what must be an action that will further the on-going process of negotiations and substantive steps toward world-wide reduction in armaments and nuclear nonproliferation.

(2) That the triangular relationship between the United States, the People's Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is an interconnected relationship which must be characterized by balance on all sides. Our Government, the United States Government, has no intention of playing a China card.

In fact in these critical days at any time, no nation can afford to gamble with world peace. Further, we agreed that the interconnections inherent in economic and security issues and reiterated the need for balanced policies which are not contradictory, and hence, self-defeating.

(3) That talks on arms limitation in the Indian Ocean should be resumed as soon as possible.

(4) That improved relations and scientific and technological exchange are of great mutual interest and should provide on-going activity that will bring our nations closer together.

(5) That the situation of the refugees in Indochina is above all one of humanitarian concern, and in that aspect must be addressed on the basis of the Geneva Conference principles agreed to by the United States, the Soviet Union and the other participating nations.

(6) And we did add that the long and heated discussions that we had on the question of human rights, including religious freedom and the right of free emigration according to the principles laid down by the United Nations, the Helsinki Agreement, and other international agreements and understandings, that are fundamental to the international and domestic policies of each nation.

(7) We concurred that the current tensions in Southeast Asia resulting from the historic rivalry between China and Vietnam could have potentially dangerous consequences to the balance in Asia between the Soviet Union, United States, and Peoples Republic of China. The ultimate goal of stability in the region can only be achieved if the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all of the states of South East Asia are respected by all parties concerned.

(8) We did conclude, I think, that the problem of drug abuse is not just a problem which exists in the United States or in the West but is a global problem, one which originates in Asia in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Golden Triangle Nations of Burma, Laos and Thailand whose illicit opium poppy cultivation represents an ultimate threat to every region of the world.

As a consequence, cooperation on stemming the flow of narcotics is in the interest of all nations. And although the Soviet Union has no real problem with hard narcotics, today with the influx of tourists and the growing problems of drug abuse in Europe the U.S.S.R. can become a potential target area for traffickers.

(9) That the need for continued and enhanced parliamentary exchanges be recognized and pursued on the principle that frank discussions and the agreement to disagree, if necessary, are far better than the perpetuation of misunderstandings and acrimony.

Areas which were discussed during our meetings; but on which agreement to disagree was reached, or on which the positions of each were acknowledged, included:

(1) The relationship of domestic political or legal conditions to international concerns; specifically, the U.S. side expressed its view that continued progress in the area of human rights, including religious freedom and the right to emigrate, is an essential part of the political process of negotiating the bi-lateral and strategic concerns of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and economic measures such as most favored nations which is an internal problem as well.

The Soviet side pointed to its progress in human rights, particularly free emigration, and expressed the view that misrepresentations have distorted the facts on human rights, particularly religious freedoms, within the U.S.S.R. The Soviet side further expressed the view that domestic political concerns in the U.S. should not take precedence over the bilateral and international concerns of the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

(2) That the sources of tensions between the nations of Southeast Asia, particularly the root causes, the refugee problem, and the solution to the problem of independence for Kampuchea, are subject to differing interpretations.

(3) That the causes of tensions in South Asia, including those producing refugees from Afghanistan, of which here are now 160,000, are subject to differing interpretations.

(4) That the purpose and function of the nonaligned movement should be to pursue the well being of the peoples of the member states independent of any alliances with other peoples.

To these points there are substantial areas of disagreement. But we feel that it is in the best interest of both nations there will be mutual cooperation to resolve these differences.

Now I'd like to call upon Chairman Long to make a statement at this point.

Mr. LONG. One of the things that I think we were successful in doing here was to convey to the officials in the Soviet Union and in Moscow the enormous importance that we attach to the Human Rights problem, particularly to the freedom of the various religious groups, Protestants, Pentecostals, Catholics and Jews to practice their religion and particularly to emigrate if they chose.

We at every meeting brought this question up and I think that we were able to get over to them that this was a major impediment in the path of a real détente between our countries. We drafted a letter; I don't think that any of us were entirely satisfied with the responses that we got from the various officials we talked to. I think we were given a fairly standard answer.

But I think there were hints here and there that some cases would be reconsidered but no promises were made.

I think that we were certainly told by the Soviet officials they had made great progress. And they have made some progress, there's no question about it. They have released around 200,000 so far and they feel that this should be the thing to look at. We pointed out, however, that there were considerable numbers of people who would like to go including around, I believe, 800 refuseniks. We've heard from other sources that there may be as many as 2,000 refuseniks.

I pointed out to Mr. Kuznetsov yesterday, the Deputy President, that this was the fly in the bowl of soup, no matter how good the soup is, the fly is going to get very large attention. And we felt that this was the major problem that they were going to have to deal with, these refuseniks.

I asked furthermore, I put to them the fact that the Soviet Union is a very strong nation, next to the United States the strongest in the world, it is a larger nation geographically, it has a larger population than we do. Many think it has a stronger military. Therefore, it would seem to me the Soviet Union could afford to be generous. And I pleaded for generosity. In those cases the merits of which they may disagree, I pleaded that they deal with those cases generously and I hope that they would do.

We drafted a letter, however, which goes beyond this. I drafted it but every member of the delegation made a significant contribution to it. It was signed by every member of the delegation and will be delivered through the Chargé D'Affaires to Mr. Brezhnev, in which we point out the problem of the human rights problems in the Soviet Union. Members of various religions who we feel have not been given, or who we have been told have not been given adequate freedom to practice their religion, to publish their stuff and so on. We pointed out that these were problems that they would have to deal with, we hope they'd deal with. Otherwise we felt that this would continue to be a block to détente. I ended up again with a plea for generosity. That will be distributed, given to Secretary Brezhnev.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you, Mr. Long. I'd like to turn to Tennyson Guyer of Ohio, a ranking member of the Committee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Mr. GUYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You might say that several of us serve in more than one capacity. Chairman Wolff did appoint me to head the task force on missing persons in Southeast Asia. Mr. Gilman and I both served on the original committee and we're also on the Committee on Narcotics. I understand there have been four congressional trips here this year. The thing that has impressed me about our trip is that this might be the first time we've had the kind of candor, the kind of dialogue without all the diplomatic falderal. For example, in Hanoi, we sat down and discussed very openly and genuinely the problem of our missing persons and we handed over 120 hard cases of men of whom the fate is unknown but who were known one time or another to have been alive in captivity. And they agreed to look into these.

They also agreed that they have four new pieces of information that they would pass along to us. They did not describe what it was but we're looking forward to that. They also agreed to have an on-going commission with us and will allow our Lt. Col. Mather to make visits there back and forth, share expertise there along that line. So that to me was a revelation.

Following the refugee situation which has been mentioned here so well, it was strange to me as a Member of Congress that only five countries have received permanently any great numbers of refugees. We have taken over 245,000 permanently in America. And with the exception of Australia and Great Britain, Canada, France, Hong Kong, of course, has about 67,000, and then the other countries there are temporary asylums but not permanent residency as we are.

And we were very very much pleased with both the candor of these discussions and their final resolution which of course was preluded by the meeting in Geneva when some 60 or 61 countries attended and also pledged two things. If they couldn't take people, they'd put up money.

I'm pleased with the recent activity here in the Soviet Union. I thought it was going to be surrounded with a lot of mysticism and secrecy and I was just very much impressed with the openness with which we were allowed to talk and with which they responded. I thank you Mr. Chairman for the time to comment.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you, Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Part of our work in the Soviet Union, as our chairman pointed out, was to try to establish better cooperation in the

field of narcotics. And it is true as the chairman has stated that the Soviet Union has a minimal problem, at least as far as we can find out, with regard to narcotics trafficking and abuse, although for the first time they did admit that there is a substantial cannabis problem and that they do have some 2,000 to 3,000 addicts that they are treating for various narcotic addiction.

We did stress the need for cooperation by the Soviet Union since they border on one of the largest opium-producing regions in the entire world in the Golden Triangle area of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Laotian area. We find that there are several hundred tons of opium coming out of Afghanistan into Pakistan which incidentally has now become the number one producer of opium in the world. And since the Soviet Union does have an influence on the Afghanistan Government today, we've appealed to the Soviet Union to control the flow and production of opium out of Afghanistan into other regions.

The Soviet Union is concerned too, about the flow of narcotics from that region into their own area. In Tashkent we heard some concern about the possibility of opium flowing into that region. We also urged a greater involvement in the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse and Control. The Soviet Union is a member of that organization but has not been a contributing member. The United States has been paying about half of the total fund and we're urging the Soviet Union to take a more active participating role in that important endeavor so that we can have a better worldwide effort.

We also sought assistance in another area. I'm a member of the Post Office Committee. It's another of my responsibilities in the House. I've been conducting hearings with regard to the interruption of mail into the Soviet Union. This has been going on for several years now. We've stressed the fact that we've compiled statistics showing more than 2,000 registered letters per year are not being delivered, some of which being returned to addresses unknown.

A great deal of the mail has been addressed to refusniks and to dissidents and to prisoners. We had an opportunity to meet with some recently repatriated people from exile. People who I have written to and who I was amazed to find had not received any of our mail in the past few years.

We met with Mr. Paputin, the head of their international section and again appealed to Mr. Paputin to be more cooperative with our nation so that there would not be this lack of communication, not only for ethnic groups, but in the scientific community and with regard to our media, who on occasion find difficulty in getting the mail through properly. I'm hoping that we can improve this sort of problem that is arisen between nations.

With regard to civil rights, we had a good opportunity with face-to-face confrontations with and discussions with people such as Judge Smirnoff, the chief justice. I was very much impressed with some of the remarks made by Judge Smirnoff with regard to attempting to seek better solutions, but I'm also very much distressed by the fact the chief justice became the editor of a book known as the "White Book" which castigates the whole human rights issue in the western world as a propaganda issue.

I would hope that there is a better understanding here in the Soviet Union that human rights is not a propaganda issue but is a people issue. And when that is properly understood and addressed that we'll do a great deal more for improving the climate between our two nations. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you, Mr. Gilman. Mr. Bowen.

Mr. BOWEN. In our conversations, our Soviet hosts pointed out to us that they felt that the point of view that we expressed to them regarding religious freedom and freedom to emigrate was, from their point of view, an internal matter which we should not be concerned with.

I think that we tried to convey to them that whether or not in isolation we might agree with the principle that matters such as that are internal as a principle. Nonetheless, in a country such as ours where important political decisions nationally revolve about what public opinion thinks where matters such as SALT II and other important decisions would be reflections of the public opinion of the country. And where public opinion is greatly moved and shaped by matters such as how the Soviet Union handles issues of religious freedom and the right to emigrate, we would not ignore these issues.

I pointed out, as did my colleagues, the Soviet Union might well have a substantially smaller problem dealing with the requests for emigration, if they allowed a degree of internal freedom, particularly freedom of religion.

I was pleased to find upon attending a Baptist church service here in Moscow that the Soviet Union has recently authorized shipment of 25,000 bibles printed

in Russian in Belgium. I think that's a welcome step and I would like to see, I think as all of us would, progress along these lines.

I happen to believe, and I'm sure that colleagues concur that the Soviet Union would have much smaller problem in terms of dealing with emigration if greater freedom were allowed to Baptists, Pentecostals, Catholics, Russian Orthodox and all other religious organizations within the Soviet Union.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you. We'll take questions now.

Question. Would you tell us, sir, you mentioned 2,000 to 3,000 addicts which they confessed to being treated, but what specifically did they tell you?

Mr. GILMAN. They mentioned that some of it was morphine, some of it codeine and some of its miscellaneous narcotics. They did not indicate that there was any heroin problem at the present time.

Of course, being so close to the border area of Afghanistan and an area which is such a high producer of opium, I would caution the Soviet Union that it is bound to happen in the near future and we would hope that they would give it a great deal of attention.

Moscow, too, is becoming a transit area, and we've urged better cooperation in criminal intelligence. They have been cooperative and we hope that they'll cooperate to an even greater extent with the police authorities in our nation and in other nations so that we can intercept any narcotics traveling from East to West.

Mr. GUYER. If the gentlemen will yield, we were also asked about any new techniques in treatment and we were told that they have some addicts under treatment from three to five years and with major successes and that this was a no-cost, no-charge to the person involved. We didn't get into any specifics, but we find that they do not use methadone and other things which could become addictive in themselves. That was not one of their techniques.

Question. Mr. Wolff, could you comment on your meeting with refuseniks and other dissidents, both Jewish and protestant, you met during your stay here? What was the substance of your exchanges?

Mr. WOLFF. I can tell you that we met openly with some dissidents, refuseniks and many individuals. We were very much up-front in this situation, no clandestine meetings were held, we asked the Soviet authorities for permission to meet with various people who had a story that they wanted to communicate to us. This permission was granted.

We met with a number of people who are classified as refuseniks and dissidents. The meetings were held here, in the hotel. I must say that one other aspect of this mission on the question of religion and religious freedom, that each one of us regardless of our faith visited the church or synagogue of his choosing and attended services here. And this is a very significant point. We were in no way impeded in our efforts to communicate with anyone while we were here.

Mr. LONG. I might add to the matter of the synagogue. We visited a synagogue in which there were very few people and the average age had to be 75. No one was younger than quite that age. And I am told that this is the only synagogue really open in the entire city.

Mr. WOLFF. May I comment on that? Congressman Gilman went to services in two synagogues.

Mr. LONG. Very good. Anyway, there are supposed to be a large number of synagogues which are very poorly attended and I want to know the reason for that. One of the reasons that we found in our discussions was that although they allow the printing of Hebrew and when a person goes to a synagogue all of the prayer books and everything is in Hebrew, the teaching of Hebrew is not allowed. So that the great majority of Jews who would want to go to a synagogue would not understand anything that was written in the religious literature there so this was felt to be, among some people I talked to, to be the major reason why synagogue attendance was so poor.

Question. Mr. Gilman, I'd like to come back to the drug discussions. Were there any discussions about any Americans being held here on charges of smuggling, possession or otherwise?

Mr. WOLFF. We are aware of two Americans who have been held here on drug charges and our government has spoken to them and to the Soviet Government about this.

Mr. GILMAN. This is based on our meeting with Dr. Babayan, the chief of the health ministry.

Mr. WOLFF. It is important to note that there will be, I believe in October, a world health organization meeting here in Moscow on narcotics. I think this

was a significant move as well. Members of our committee were invited to attend under the auspices of the world health organization.

One aspect of all this it must be remembered that the United States really didn't have a drug problem until the sixties. We had a small drug problem. In the sixties that problem grew as a result of the frustrations of our young people and various other factors that were involved. And it blossomed very substantially in that period.

It must also be remembered that Europe was not a part of the drug scene until very recently. We recently visited London and they asked us to in some fashion cooperate with them to help them in solving a problem that has grown out of hand in England. Everyone used to point to us and say you have the drug problem and what you ought to do is adopt the English system. The situation now is such that it has grown far in excess in Europe of anything that was anticipated. And I venture to say that in all of Europe that there are many more hard drug addicts today than there are in the United States.

So therefore, with that situation and background, it seems fair to assume that with the olympics coming up, with great traffic in this area, with communication lines being extended that this could become an area that is potentially dangerous for the Soviet Union.

We are very happy to extend whatever cooperation that we can to the Soviet Union in helping to solve a potentially dangerous problem for them and we would hope that they will give us the same cooperation as was mentioned by Mr. Gilbert in exchange of information primarily.

Question. I have two questions. The first refers to the status of talks on the Indian Ocean and the second on your statement on the Non-Aligned movement.

Mr. WOLFF. Let me take the second question first. What we are referring to is the result of the visit that we had to Sri Lanka. At which time we were commiserating with the Sri Lankans that it is unfortunate that they, who have been truly a Non-Aligned State, having no ties to any country, were relinquishing the chairmanship of the Non-Aligned movement to Cuba, which is certainly not Non-Aligned.

I think the Non-Aligned movement, the integrity of the Non-Aligned movement is dependent upon the Non-Aligned being non-aligned. Not that they should not have relations with any other countries. First of all, the Non-Aligned aren't non-aligned. They're aligned with each other. A completely non-aligned country is a fiction.

The other point is that certainly I do not expect Cuba to give up its alliance and close association with the Soviet Union. But by that same token that dispels the idea of non-alignment.

Question. Does this work against the movement as such?

Mr. WOLFF. I would hope that it does not, but it represented a potential difficulty. That does not prevent the freedom of movement within the Non-Aligned that really should represent the character of the Non-Aligned movement.

On the question of the Indian Ocean, we are going back and recommending that discussions be renewed in this area, leading to negotiations. There have been intrusions into the Indian Ocean of recent date but they have been reduced, and for this reason, we find that the time is ripe for new discussions to take place to provide a zone of peace, so there are no incursions by other nations, no hegemony, if that is the word; established over the Indian Ocean by any people who are part of the area or any outside forces coming in to control it.

Question. You said earlier that you had some heated discussions and I notice that some of you are wearing bracelets with Shcharansky's name on them.

Mr. WOLFF. That was part of the heated discussions.

Question. Can you tell us something about them?

Mr. WOLFF. I think that the situation with Shcharansky was discussed. There is a very strong point that was made to us that Shcharansky was involved in some degree of espionage with the United States. I have checked this, I have asked that evidence be produced to give credence to this fact. Hard evidence not heresay. We all have been very concerned about Shcharansky among others. I don't want to single this out. We are wearing bracelets, all of us, to indicate our concern that the Shcharansky case not be forgotten.

We did meet with Mr. Shcharansky's mother and she indicated that she felt that he was not in good health while we were assured by the Soviet authorities that he had had a medical examination and he's not in bad health. I asked his mother about his weight and I was told that he has lost some 28 kilos of weight

since Christmas. She characterized his condition as being poor and I think that this should be a subject of concern to the Soviet Government as well as us.

Question. Is there any indication that they may be forthcoming with some evidence?

Mr. WOLFF. I specifically said that if there is any evidence that this should be made known to the entire world. We have had some egregious acts committed by various agencies of various governments of the world. We are taking more steps than are necessary to prevent any recurrence. Therefore, if there is any hard evidence against Mr. Shcharansky this is the responsibility of the Soviet Union to release that evidence. We will see to it that it is brought to the attention of not only the other people of the world but the Congress of the United States to remedy any future activities if there be any past activities.

And I think that that is the important element that is involved here. We are not challenging the Soviet Union; we are not claiming injustice; we are asking for the facts. And I think that we are all entitled to those facts and that has been the general tenure of the discussions that we held in this direction.

Question. Have there been any hints that the Soviets would release Mr. Shcharansky?

Mr. WOLFF. I hesitate to venture an opinion on that. I don't think we can. I would say that Shcharansky's situation is cause celebre and as such I think that we would all be better off if the problem were solved.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, if I may comment on that. We did raise some of the legal procedural errors that the legal committee in the States had filed with the Soviet Union, particularly with Judge Smirnoff.

We also noted that it was unfortunate that at the very time we are here in Moscow urging a review of the legal aspects of the Shcharansky case that a Professor from Toronto came over to assist in the endeavor and was ushered out of the Soviet Union because he had attempted to travel to discuss the case.

We had urged that the legal aspects be attended to and that the procedural issues that had been raised by these briefs that had been filed. And so far the general response is that they will give attention to these matters and respond to our request.

Question. Can you enlarge on your interpretation of the situation in Afghanistan?

Mr. WOLFF. We went to the Afghan refugee camp in Pakistan to investigate the plight of these people and to see to it that they had the opportunity of practicing their religion in their country. They had told us that they wanted to go back to their country. But they could not practice their religion and as a result of that they had fled their country.

We talked to any number of their people at that time and were told that the conditions in Afghanistan are such that they cannot live there and live their life as they would like to.

The divergence of opinion on this is the fact that this has been inspired via Pakistan, and Pakistan has encouraged these people to come. To the contrary, I might say it is costing Pakistan some 40 cents a day per refugee, which is more than the United Nations is putting into the hands of the refugees in Vietnam or in Southeast Asia. They get 25 cents a day. Forty cents is a great drain upon the Pakistan Government and they have appealed for assistance in taking care of the refugees. The camps are not as poor as the conditions we viewed in other areas of the world where the Vietnamese refugees are but the people are in a very serious plight.

Mr. STARK. Mr. Chairman, it's been suggested that the Pakistani were training these Afghanian refugees as troops and certainly if they were, they are the most rag-tag bunch of troops you ever saw. The only weapons that were in evidence among the Afghanians were Russian automatic weapons and certainly not anything they would have gotten from Pakistan. As far as we were able to see, we certainly didn't get far out into the hills, there was no evidence of anybody being trained or armed other than the rifle or whatever the hill people normally carry up there.

Question. You also, I understand it, have taken up the case of the Pentecostals. Would you give us any indications, are there any signs of progress at all?

Mr. WOLFF. I should like to pass this to Dave Bowen who had contact with a number of the Pentecostals.

Mr. BOWEN. I have talked to some of them. I understand that there are about half a million pentecostals in the Soviet Union. Also I mentioned earlier visits

with the Baptist community here and there are about a million Baptists in the Soviet Union.

The difference between the two is that the Baptists are registered with the State and officially recognized and allowed to have a church, a single church, a very crowded church which of course is not adequate to accommodate those who want to attend.

The Pentecostals, on the other hand, are not recognized and are under substantially more pressure, I believe. They have recently been attempting to establish a nation-wide organization. There are about 5,000 applications, I have been told, of Pentecostals intending to leave the country. Many of these have received guarantees from the United States or other countries but cannot obtain exit visas from the Soviet Union.

I think almost all of those that I talked with said that they would certainly prefer to stay in the Soviet Union. They would like to stay in their homeland if they could be allowed to practice their religious faith. I certainly hope that we might see some improvement in their condition.

Question. What about the ones in the Embassy?

Mr. BOWEN. I think that all of you know that they are there because they have not been given exit visas. A few have left. There were more earlier. Some have left because special arrangements have been worked out. I hope that the Soviet Union would see fit to allow those to emigrate at some point. They have not made that determination.

Mr. WOLFF. Our hosts said, by the way, that applications had not been made. We then confirmed with the Embassy that applications had been filed but the Deputy Minister of the Interior did not indicate that they had received these applications. But they are on file with the Ministry of the Interior.

Question. The question was on recent emigration?

Mr. WOLFF. Yes, the question they posed to us was that there were no applications on file and we did indicate that there were and asked them, the Soviet authorities, to look into this.

I must say, although we are critical of the various policies that we have been told that are exhibited within the Soviet Union, I must say that the cooperation that this mission has gotten from the Soviet Union has been excellent. We have not been inhibited in any way and our requests have been met on all sides. I think that this is an indication of a spirit that I hope that will be followed in a variety of ways to be able to resolve some of the basic problems that are between us.

We do not see, for example, the situation of human rights as an internal circumstance alone. The question of human rights is part of the universal declaration of human rights which is an international problem and justified as an internal one within one particular nation or the other.

We are not pleading the cause of a particular individual or religion. These are universal principles that are involved and we are pleading adherence to the Helsinki Agreement, which is an international agreement.

We are also saying that we have laws on our books. The laws on Jackson-Vanik are laws that preclude most favored nation status to any nation, it doesn't single out the Soviet Union as such, to any nation which interferes with the emigration policies of its citizens. Now this is an internal matter within our park. And the reason we went so heavily into the question of human rights is because we are trying to find ways and means establishing a vehicle for normalizing the trade relationships between the Soviet Union and the United States. If there are no further questions.

Question. I asked you the other night, did you have the feeling while you were here whether the Soviet side has some particular message they were trying to convey to you?

Mr. WOLFF. That SALT needs seasoning.

Mr. GUYER. SALT is important to them.

Mr. WOLFF. SALT is important to us too. SALT is important to them and its important to us. I think that what concerns many of the people that are involved with this is the acclamation, other than the piece of paper, that SALT was written upon and we are concerned that both sides follow the statements that are made in writing with actions that will really mean disarmament and will have real meaning toward reducing the arms race.

Mr. GUYER. If I could just say a word on that. I think that we know its importance. Also hoping that, by way of good faith, we would make a recommendation

for a favorable vote, since it will be a well discussed debate and could be a very close vote. Their help in this exchange could contribute toward it.

Mr. LONG. It is clear, it seems to me, that one thing was clear from this that they want good relations with the United States, and while we couldn't get very much in the way of specifics from them, we feel that many of the things that we told them will be taken back and they will be working it over.

That is the best hope, I think, to get resolved many of the points that you brought up on the matter of refugees, on the matter of human rights, treatment of the Jews and other religious minorities.

Mr. WOLFF. Thank you.

APPENDIX 1

REMARKS BY HON. LESTER L. WOLFF, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, BEFORE THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, AUGUST 20, 1979

To our distinguished hosts and colleagues of the Supreme Soviet, and on behalf of our entire delegation, I wish to begin today by expressing our heartfelt thanks to you for your hospitality, and your invitation to visit the Soviet Union at this critical juncture in our relations.

I say "critical", because never before, in my opinion, have our two nations been more deeply involved and mutually concerned over such a variety of national and strategic interests.

We have come here not only because of your invitation, but also because we, as representatives of the American people, seek to find areas of agreement, and seek to find an end to the problems that divide us, so that we can join in efforts to better the lot of the people of the world.

Our mutual desires are peace, to end the arms race which is causing both our nations to divert so many resources to fear, instead of to the future.

We both have people who are ill fed, who suffer a lack of education, regardless of our accomplishments in these fields. We both seek an answer to the serious problem of an energy shortage which threatens the economic viability of our nations.

We seek to find peaceful solutions other than from the barrel of a gun, as the late Chairman Mao used to extol.

For all these reasons, therefore, let me state at the outset that I personally, and I know our delegation collectively endorses in every respect the words of Premier Kosygin last April to our colleague, Mr. Brademas, and his delegation, and I quote:

"We want improvement. We are confident that will happen only when there is reciprocity * * * We share too great a responsibility to have relations that are not normal * * * in our century, when there are such great stockpiles of weapons, we must be very cautious, very careful * * * our relations should be businesslike.

I must comment that as good capitalists, we of course endorse your Premier's call to be businesslike. With that, then, let us begin.

Many of our distinguished Soviet hosts are familiar with the work of the Congress, and particularly, the work of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, which I have the honor to chair. This is because our liaison work with your Embassy in Washington is thorough, and, I feel, profitable for both our countries. Representatives of your Embassy have attended virtually all of the dozens of hearings and meetings we have held in the past several years on such topics as U.S. relations with China and the Tri-Partate U.S.-U.S.S.R.-P.R.C. relationship, our Vietnam policy, the International Narcotics situation, and Human Rights in Foreign Policy. To name but a few examples.

I hope that our meetings and discussions today and over the next few days will broaden and deepen a process of understanding and frankness, which I feel is well begun. Let me at this time issue a formal invitation to the Soviet Union to join in our informal work as well. Each month when the Congress is in session, my colleagues and I host an informal, off-the record luncheon at which the Ambassadors of the Nations of Asia and the Pacific gather to discuss in a friendly atmosphere the many common interests and concerns we all share not only as members of the world community, but, most importantly, as members of the Asian and Pacific Community.

So with this formal invitation to our informal gatherings, I hope that we can begin today to do our part to broaden our mutual understanding and enhance our cooperation.

I have made this point about the membership of the United States in the community of Asian and Pacific nations at the outset because it is one of the major

items I think we should discuss today, and because it flows naturally from the work of the delegation during our present mission.

As you know, we have spent the past two weeks visiting Vietnam, Hong Kong, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Pakistan before arriving in your country last Thursday.

I will state frankly that I feel that the Soviet Union at the moment misunderstands the policies and motivations of the United States in Asia and the Pacific. This misunderstanding is, I feel, founded on two propositions: First, the mistaken idea that the United States is playing the so-called "China card in World Affairs, particularly against the USSR;

Second, the mistaken idea that the United States is presently "withdrawing" from Asia and adopting a so-called "island strategy" of military interests and involvements.

Each of these propositions, which I have frequently seen advanced by Soviet Foreign policy thinkers, is, I respectfully submit, in error. To deal with the second one first, let me state flatly that the United States is neither withdrawing nor moving into Asia—we are already a Pacific Nation, have been all along, and will be in the future. This is both natural, and fitting and proper. We are a Pacific Nation as well as a European Nation. Hawaii, one of our leading states, is a Pacific Island, and our Pacific Coast is represented here today by four members of our Delegation. We now carry on more trade with Asia than we do with the Nations of Europe. Far from withdrawing, we seek the maintenance of territorial integrity, a stable peaceful equilibrium in Asia, with each nation master of its own destiny. The adjustments in our posture that followed the end of the Vietnam war have been completed. Our Pacific forces remain strong. Our alliances with our friends in the area are likewise enduring. For example, President Carter, in the wake of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, publicly reaffirmed the validity of the Manila Pact—a pledge which was particularly welcomed by Thailand. On our January mission to Southeast Asia, the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs underlined this point with Thailand, as we did in our meetings with the leaders of the other ASEAN Nations.

We have brought with us a number of copies of our hearings and reports dealing with the Economic and Security Assistance Programs which we oversee in Asia, all of which have been given to your Embassy in Washington. I hope these will enable you and your staff to study in depth the points I will make briefly this morning.

Further to this point, but as an aside, I would comment that it is true that we plan to withdraw our ground forces from South Korea, and will as soon as it is possible. However, we have been forced to delay this plan because of the military buildup by North Korea to join in the talks recommended by President Carter. Hence, a precipitous withdrawal at this time, far from serving the interests of stability, would, as in past history, only further instability.

This leads me to the point about the "China Card." Let me say that I am sure we all fully understand the concerns of the Soviet Union regarding the attitude of China toward the USSR. The People's Republic is not sparing in its criticism of the Soviet Union, nor of your friend and ally, the Vietnamese.

It is with this awareness of the equilibrium between the relationships of China, the Soviet Union and the United States—a relationship we have called the "triangular relationship" to indicate its interconnected nature—that I wish to briefly discuss our China policy before moving on to the many issues my colleagues and I wish to cover with you.

The United States normalized relations with the People's Republic of China because we felt it was in the best interests of both nations and of the world. To not recognize the PRC, would only institutionalize a policy that had failed. In this course, your government concurred. Indeed, I think we are all agreed that if relations between the United States and China had been on a normal plane from the beginning, many of the tragedies which subsequently unfolded in Asia such as the Korean and Vietnamese Wars, and which are still occurring in Southeast Asia, might have been avoided.

Regarding our China relations, then, and to assure you that we are not playing "China Card," Let me make five points:

(1) Normal relations between Washington and Peking are in the best interests of peace and stability. This normalization is not directed against the Soviet Union or any third country. You had diplomatic relations long before we did.

(2) The United States would welcome a reduction of tensions along the Sino-Soviet Border. Peace throughout the world is the foundation of U.S. foreign policy.

(3) While we anticipated a substantial growth in commercial and scientific and technical exchanges with China, we intend to conduct our relations with your country, irrespective of and independent of China.

(4) Specifically, The United States has no plans to sell weapons to China as you did for years before your relations with the PRC deteriorated. While what other countries do on this issue is up to them to decide, I can assure you that we will not approve sales of third country equipment containing significant American licensed technology.

(5) Our people, as your people, desire peace in Asia. We opposed the Chinese attack on Vietnam. I can personally assure you that the Chinese were informed in the strongest terms, prior to their attack, of our strong feelings in this matter. I was present during the discussions with Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping in Washington last January.

That the Chinese chose to ignore our pleas for peace is unfortunate. They ignore your entreaties as well. I raise this point because I think you will agree that by working together, the United States and the Soviet Union can increase understanding of the needs of the people of Southeast Asia, and help avert the continuing tragedies which unfold there.

So to dispose of this question of the "China Card" once and for all, I would note finally that the Administration has not yet sent the proposed China Trade Agreement to the Congress for ratification, and, speaking personally, I would hope that it's time all of us stopped "playing cards," gambling with the destiny of the world.

I think it might now be useful for our discussions today if I briefly outlined some of the delegation's thoughts and findings during our present mission. By using specific examples as they arise, I think we will be able to illustrate many of the larger concerns between us, such as the "China Card" I have just mentioned.

Our mission has had two principal "themes" which we have pursued really for the past two years: First, the terrible humanitarian plight of the refugees from Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, and second, the progress of the many American Economic Assistance Programs throughout Asia and the Pacific. I am sure that my Co-Chairman, Dr. Long, will be delighted to discuss this latter aspect with you.

In addition, we have met with officials in each nation concerned with the traffic in narcotics. As you may know, I am also Chairman of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control. While I realize that the Soviet Union does not at present have a serious problem of narcotics abuse, I am hopeful that the meetings you have so graciously arranged with our counterparts will help lay the groundwork for a new era of cooperation between our countries in the international struggle against narcotics trafficking and abuse. Let me assure you that narcotics is not just a problem of the capitalist nations. It is a poison which spreads.

There was another important area of increased understanding and a promise of enhanced future cooperation between Vietnam and the United States, and that is on the issue of the American military personnel for whom no final accounting has been received from Hanoi. I know I speak for my entire delegation, and for the American people, when I tell you that the need for a final accounting of our men is of major importance in United States-Vietnamese relations. Any assistance or moral support you could give us on this issue and on the refugee issue would not only be significant humanitarian gestures, but would be a genuine and substantive move toward the peaceful and stable future the United States and the Soviet Union wish for the people of Asia.

There was one issue on which the delegation did not emerge from Hanoi with any but the most long-term hopes, and that is the situation in Kampuchea. As I stated earlier, the people of the United States do not support the attack by China on Vietnam, nor does our government. Similarly, we cannot endorse the occupation of Kampuchea by the forces of Vietnam, even though we strongly opposed the Pol Pot Regime, and all that it stood for. On this issue, I can only state that here, too, is an area where constructive cooperation between our nations can only be for the best.

There are many other matters regarding Vietnam which I might discuss, but in the interests of time, I think it best that we save them for the question and answer portions of our meetings today and tomorrow.

Among the points I hope we will discuss will be the effects of the refugee crisis and the continuing China-Vietnamese tensions on the nations of Southeast Asia,

particularly Thailand, and the policy of the Soviet Union toward the ASEAN Nations.

From Hanoi, Bangkok and Hong Kong, our delegation went to Sri Lanka, presently Chairman of the non-aligned movement, and a nation with which the United States has long been involved in Economic Assistance Programs.

In order to help stimulate our later discussions, I would like to make two points regarding our mission to Sri Lanka. First, I think the people of Sri Lanka and her Government share with the United States the desire that the Indian Ocean remain a Zone of Peace and that no power, be it a "superpower" or a regional power, seek to establish hegemony in the region. Accordingly, we urge that your government agree to join in a Heads of Delegation Meeting this fall to consider resuming our talks on the Indian Ocean.

Second, during our stay in Sri Lanka, the delegation had occasion to discuss the future of the non-aligned movement, particularly with the anticipated ascendancy of Cuba to the movement's leadership. As I said in Sri Lanka, I say to you today, that with all respect I consider it absurd to represent Cuba as a "non-aligned" nation. Cuba is as closely tied to your government and its foreign policy aims, particularly in Africa, as the United States is to any of our allies in Europe. I am not suggesting that Cuba does not have the right to pursue the foreign policy it sees fit, not that the Soviet Union and Cuba cannot cooperate in foreign policy. Obviously, I disagree, and so, I am sure, does my delegation, with what we see as some of the thrust and some of the results of the Soviet-Cuba alliance. My point is that if the developing nations of the Third and Fourth Worlds are to be truly served by the non-aligned movement, then such nations as Sri Lanka, which have never cooperated with any super power in any military endeavor, and which is open to the navies of both the United States and the Soviet Union, as just a small example, surely such nations as Sri Lanka are better fitted to lead than a nation with clear commitments in the world arena.

I make this point at some length because I note a recent Tass item severely criticising me by name for, as Tass put it, "deliberately interfering" in the affairs of the non-aligned movement. Our delegation was officially invited to Sri Lanka to discuss the many issues of interest and concern between us, just as we have been invited to the Soviet Union. Thus I think it is most unfair to see such conversations characterized as they have been, and frankly, I must say that if we cannot here today freely discuss our views without fear of being criticized for doing so, then perhaps we should not talk about anything at all.

I know you do not feel this way, and so in the spirit of furthering our mutual understanding I will simply say that I hope we can discuss such issues as the non-alignment movement frankly so, that if we do have disagreements, they will not be compounded by misunderstandings as to our positions.

Of course, it is always possible that Tass, being a journalistic organization, was incorrect in its interpretation of my remarks, and that you do not endorse them. Certainly we in the Congress are no strangers to finding our views or the policies of our government somehow misrepresented in the news media, but then again newspapers in the Soviet Union, I am told, reflect Soviet policy.

I raise this point because our final stop before arriving in the Soviet Union was Pakistan, and there we arrived in the wake of a New York Times story alleging that our government was considering some sort of an attack on Pakistan's nuclear program. As you are, of course, aware, the United States has reluctantly questioned the ultimate goals of Pakistan's nuclear program, because we feel it may be dangerously channeled toward production of a nuclear weapon.

I need not spend any of our time today discussing how gravely the United States views this situation, for it is a situation on which both you and we see eye to eye. I will take this occasion to make two comments: First, I can assure you that we deplore what we fear are the plans of the Pakistani Government. However, my government has absolutely no plans to carry out in Pakistan any of the activities so irresponsibly speculated upon in the press. This has been officially conveyed to the Government of Pakistan, and our delegation had frank discussions with the Pakistani Government on this entire situation.

The second point I wish to make is that we are aware of and we appreciate the consistent policy of the Soviet Union regarding nuclear non-proliferation. I will say frankly that you have been much more conservative in your sponsorship of nuclear power abroad than we have. As you are probably aware, the United States is presently undergoing a somewhat agonized reappraisal of the entire nuclear power program, as dramatized by the near disaster at Three Mile Island.

In any event, the idea of alternative energy from the sun and the wind and water are areas of mutual interest and common concern to both of our peoples. For even though our sources of oil are not the same, we each face a limited future and cannot permit ourselves to be exploited by a small group of nations who seek to use this critical resource as economic leverage against us.

But to conclude with the work of our delegation in Pakistan, there is a serious matter of mutual concern with which we had a first-hand experience, and that is, that more than 150,000 refugees who have had fled Afghanistan and are now living across the border in Pakistan. Our delegation flew up to the Chitral Refugee Camp along the Afghanistan border, and talked with many of the refugees. To give you a sense of the scale of their numbers, I will only note that there are now as many refugees from Afghanistan in Pakistan as there are Indochinese refugees in Thailand.

I will not now comment on the specific internal situation in Afghanistan but will suggest that perhaps our experience in Vietnam can serve as a cautionary tale. I will instead note that in our conversations with Afghan refugees a consistent theme emerged which also constitutes one of the major topics we wish to discuss with you, that is, the matter of religious freedom. For almost without exception, the Afghan refugees cited the crackdown by the present regime on religious practices as one of their prime reasons for fleeing.

Represented in our delegation are members of virtually every religious faith in the United States. But regardless of our specific denominations, we are united in the belief that every human being in every nation has the universal right, which transcends national borders, to practice his or her religion, free of harassment by others or restrictions by their government. I make these remarks in full awareness of their sensitivity in relations between our nations. But as we have said this morning, if our talks are to be truly useful, then they should be equally honest. For if we as legislators cannot speak frankly with one another without being disagreeable, even if it means agreeing to disagree, then we will find ourselves confronted by roadblocks which will make it impossible for us to heed the advice of Premier Kosygin to seek reciprocity and businesslike relations in our mutual quest for peace.

On the basic issue of Human Rights our delegation seeks to enlist your understanding and support for our concerns. These are: The ability of people to freely practice their religion—all religions. We recently met with the Grand Mufti in Tashkent. He explained that Muslims are allowed to have their own schools, to train their own Mullahs, and to publish their writing in their own language, to build new mosques.

In short, the Muslims in your country are apparently free to practice their religion. Our question is, why not grant these same freedoms for other religions in the Soviet Union? We understand that for Jews and others the full exercise of religion is not permitted.

Unlike the Muslims of the Uzbek Region, Jews are not permitted to publish religious books, nor to train their people in a theological seminary as do the Muslims—we ask you frankly today, why there is this disparity? We are talking about a universal right, and not about the internal right of a state to govern itself. There should be no conflict here.

And the issue of religious freedom is not a question simply of freedom for the Jews. There are Pentecostals and Baptists and Catholics and many others on whose behalf we so speak, and I hope that we can frankly and freely discuss this issue in a constructive fashion during our meetings today and tomorrow.

The matter of religious freedom, as important as it is, none-the-less represents but a part of the overall issue of Human Rights, and that is another major area which our delegation wishes to discuss. We would like you to understand, however, that we do not intend to use the human rights issue as a lever. We recognize that the human rights issue is a multi-faceted one, one on which honest men and women can hold honest degrees of difference on specific policies and specific cultural practices and expectations.

But we respectfully note that the Soviet Union, like the United States, is a signator to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and that we have signed the Helsinki Accords. From these facts arises the situation which, we feel, makes it mandatory that we have frank and detailed discussions today and tomorrow on the "Refuseniks" who wish to emigrate and the "Dissidents" whose plight has done so much to exacerbate Russian-American relations, and to engage the concern of the world, and particularly the scientific community.

I tell you frankly that scientific exchange between our two nations will become increasingly difficult unless the concerns of the thousands of scientists who have signed petitions on behalf of Orlof and Shcharansky, for example, are addressed. Today, we learned that the attorney for Shcharansky's mother has been expelled.

In looking back over my remarks, I see that I have outlined an ambitious schedule of often very difficult topics for us to discuss. I hope that we will make the attempt, at least, and I hope that you will understand that we raise these points in the hopes of reaching some genuine understandings, if not any final accommodations. This is in our tradition, a tradition which reaches back to the beginnings of our history as a nation.

We, like your nation, were founded on the battlefield in the struggle against those who would deny the principles of human liberty and human dignity, and freedom from material want. As our system has developed in our 200-plus years of independence, so too has our history of open and honest debate.

Sometimes we have been false to our institutions, as during our Civil War of 1861-65, when millions of men fought, and hundreds of thousands died. At the end of that war, slavery was officially ended, but the struggle for equal rights for Black Americans was just beginning, and it continues today.

In recent years, the harrowing experiences of the Civil Rights movement, the Vietnam War, and Watergate have tested our institutions to the limit, but, we are proud to say, not past the breaking point. Integral to that elasticity is the open debate I have repeatedly mentioned; also key is the institutionalized separation of powers which so characterizes our government, but which so frequently confuses the foreign observer.

As a final topic for my formal remarks this morning, I would like to enlarge on this point: The nature of the U.S. Governmental system and how it works, for I think that will be essential for you to understand how the issues of SALT, and trade policies, including MFN, are to be implemented in the future.

I have deliberately not discussed SALT, MBER, or MFN until this point because these topics were not integral to our delegation's mission to the nations we visited prior to the U.S.S.R. I felt that the method of raising issues as they occurred on our journey was perhaps the best way of showing you how our concerns fit the context of our travels and our relations with the nations on our itinerary.

And I do not at this point propose to get into details of the SALT, MBFR or MFN issues, but prefer to leave them to our later discussions by our delegation members. I will, however, make the general comment that the many issues I have discussed this morning, ranging from specific bilateral concerns between our two governments, to the more general regional or strategic concerns, are all related to the political process in the United States which will determine the fate of the SALT agreement, and the future of trade between our two nations.

I understand that many of you will find this process difficult to understand, and that many of you will feel that since President Carter has officially signed the SALT Accords, for example, there should be no further debate.

I can only say to you that in all honesty, our system is not designed to function in that way, that when it does attempt to do so, as during the Vietnam war, we betray our own institutions, and that our history is a testament to the fact that we do best when, through open and full public debate, we achieve a consensus on the best policy to follow.

As your news media has noted, Andrew Young has submitted his resignation as our Ambassador to the United Nations. However, it has been claimed that Mr. Young was somehow the victim of a pro-Israel lobby. I ask you today: what your government would recommend for an Ambassador who disobeyed the clear policies and instructions of his superiors? To lay Mr. Young's departure at the feet of anyone but Mr. Young himself is therefore very harmful to our mutual desire of fostering good relations.

Mr. Young left because he violated consensus, the development of which the President sometimes leads, sometimes follows. The Congress sometimes proposes, sometimes approves. Our courts sometimes support, and sometimes reject. In the end, our people always have the final word when they vote to re-elect—or to defeat—the President and the Members of Congress, and, hence, to ratify or reject the policies of their government.

I know you all understand the general outline of what I have just said, but I repeat again that the diversity—and, sometimes, the apparent inefficiency—of the American system is by design. The President cannot require the Congress to

take certain actions, and the Congress must work with the President, particularly on the vital foreign policy matters we have been discussing.

As a consequence of this, the hard work of your government in negotiating the SALT Agreement with Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter represents only part of the task before it. Because of the nature of the American political system, the role of public opinion in the formulation of policy—including the approval of foreign policy initiatives by the President—must be addressed.

I know you are aware of and appreciate the role of American public opinion and the role of the Congress in finally bringing to a halt the Vietnam War. Let me stress to you that likewise, the public's acceptance of the SALT accords will be equally vital to the approval of the Congress.

And it is here that the issues of Human Rights, religious freedom, the right to emigrate, the role of Soviet power in Asia and the Indian Ocean, the progress of peace in South Africa—all these issues and more are related in the public mind, and all are open to influence for better or for worse by the actions of your government.

I hope that by our frank and, yes, comradely discussions here today we can help this process along, so that the common goal we all share of world peace and prosperity and happiness for our people will not dissolve in nuclear war.

With that, I will conclude with once again the heartfelt thanks of our delegation for your hospitality and your generous invitation to meet this week so that we may do our small part in the common tasks before us.

APPENDIX 2

REMARKS OF S. N. MISHRA, MINISTER FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, INDIA, SEPTEMBER 7, 1979

In his address to the Non-aligned Summit Conference at Havana, on September 7, India's Minister for External Affairs, Mr. S. N. Mishra, called for concrete action to mitigate the acute hardships of developing countries resulting from the oil price hike.

Following is the text of Mr. Mishra's speech :

"Mr. President, on behalf of my delegation and on behalf of the people of India, I would like to felicitate you not just as the Chairman of our conference but as the person whom Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru in his first meeting in 1961 greeted simply as "a brave man". You led a peoples' revolution against an oppressive tyranny. You faced intervention and defeated it. You, now, preside over the well-established Socialist Republic of Cuba. Your chairmanship of our enlarged community is a tribute to your leadership and the importance which Cuba commands in international affairs. We salute you and Cuba for the manifold achievements of your people and express gratitude for the generous hospitality of your country.

"May I also offer grateful thanks to President Jayewardene for the exemplary manner in which he guided the movement as its Chairman.

"In 1961, Cuba alone from this continent, joined the movement as a member and since then and notably at this meeting, Latin American participation has grown steadily. This summit in Latin America is symbolic of the revolutionary appeal of the movement.

"May I warmly welcome once again the four new members to our fraternity from Latin America: Surinam, Granada, Bolivia and Nicaragua. May I also welcome as a full member the brave Zimbabwe Patriotic Front. I would particularly like to felicitate Pakistan and Iran who join us after a long association with blocks which have now happily been dissolved. The entire Indian sub-continent will now belong to our movement. This augurs well for reinforcing the outgoing search for good neighborly cooperation and trust and in turn should, no doubt, contribute to stability in the region.

"Owing to his preoccupation in India, our Prime Minister could not come and I was asked to lead our delegation. I bring his message that his absence would not mean less interest in the movement, and India would continue to march with you all, with unfaltering steps and unflinching faith in our ideals.

"Within our constitutional system, the people of India are shortly going to elect openly and democratically, representatives to our Parliament and to give themselves the government reflecting the will of the people. But let there be no mistake, just as our nation is committed to democracy, the entire spectrum of Indian political opinion is unreservedly committed to the letter and spirit of the philosophy of non-alignment. The government and leaderships have changed in India and, no doubt, will continue to change. What will not change, however, is our faith in the right of independent national judgment and our determined opposition to alliance systems based on multilateral militarism. Nor will India ever relent in its determined opposition to all forms of domination and every manifestation of racism, colonialism and imperialism.

PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

"Since Independence, India made non-alignment the bedrock of its foreign policy. We always saw in non-alignment, the fulfillment of Gandhiji's hopes that our freedom must be part of the struggle for emancipation for all peoples. In the spirit of the philosophy of Gandhi and Nehru, non-alignment signified respect for the individuality and personality of other nations. It recognized their right, like ours, to choose their own social and economic systems and, in this

spirit, permitted dignified and beneficial cooperation between nations. The five principles of peaceful co-existence and the ten principles evolved in Bandung which we proclaimed as the guide in our relations with nations, reinforced the spontaneous spirit of Non-alignment. Non-alignment was never a policy of equidistance or of neutrality for us. It was something inestimably more positive, vital, and vibrant. It enabled us to support decolonisation and liberation movements and take a principled stand on issues which confronted the world.

"Since the small but historic gathering in Belgrade in 1961, the vision of Non-alignment of our founding fathers, and here I would like to pay a special tribute to their sole survivor present here amongst us, the ageless President Tito, has established and vindicated itself. We recall with pride, that along with President Tito and President Nasser, Prime Minister Nehru, the architect of our foreign policy, worked to formulate the principles and criteria which gave us strength and direction. As President Jayewardene reminded us, it was Nehru who first used the word "Non-alignment". Today, we have become a large family of nearly one hundred nations encompassing the four continents, symbolising both unity and diversity.

"The process of growth has its own problems and challenges, its own trials and tribulations. Our response to these challenges must be true to the ethos of our movement. It must be according to the law of our origin and to the values and ideals we are pledged to uphold. We cannot have one foot in Non-alignment and another in alignment. Tragedy occurs in life when there is a hiatus between the law of one's being on the one hand and one's actions and behavior on the other.

"As our family has grown, it is not unnatural that differences and difficulties should occur. But it is disturbing that disputes between us should have erupted into armed conflicts. We have to remember that if we let such divisions erupt or fester, we are prone to intervention from outside powers. We must now allow ourselves even unwittingly to subserve their ulterior ends and act in a manner inconsistent with the fundamental principles of our movement.

PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES

"Precisely at this moment, when our movement is at its zenith, the need for introspection is the greatest. It is, I believe, timely to remind ourselves of old principles and new priorities which flow from them. Let me endeavor to define them briefly and pertinently: (1) The Non-aligned Movement independently and through support to the United Nations seeks to safeguard international peace and promote universal relaxation of tensions. It aims at the continuous reduction of cold war suspicions, the dissolution of great power military alliances and foreign military bases and the creation of an environment to facilitate conventional and nuclear disarmament in the world. (2) Non-alignment remains steadfastly opposed to imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, and every manifestation of racism, domination, hegemony and exploitation. It supports national liberation movements and must seek to preserve and promote, human rights and fundamental freedoms everywhere. (3) Non-alignment calls for respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security for all nations and their right to exercise independence of judgment and action. Given this respect and adherence to the principles of peaceful co-existence between different socio-economic systems, the movement can remain an effective non-bloc factor in world affairs. (4) Non-alignment endeavors to find the balance between the efflorescence of national personality based on the genius and cultural heritage of each nation and the inexorable logic of international interdependence and cooperation amongst nations. It recognizes the responsibility of national exertions in the resolution of national problems of growth, development and security. At the same time, it seeks to create an international climate where such national fulfillment can be obtained along with rectification of international imbalances. These principles and objectives led the Non-aligned movement to a firm commitment for the establishment of the New International Economic Order, which must narrow the widening gap between the developed and developing countries and thus obtain the eradication of poverty, sickness, hunger and illiteracy. The movement, through a program of mutual cooperation, must forge the sinews of complementarities among the developing world in general and non-aligned nations in particular and thus promote both national and collective self-reliance which in turn would contribute to the resolution of world economic and trade problems.

"These goals and objectives emerge from the declarations of the successive summit conferences at Belgrade, Cairo, Lusaka, Algiers and Colombo and have become the touchstone which can provide the beacon light for our deliberations at Havana.

"There is reason for continued and added confidence in our faith if only we recall our achievements. We anticipated détente and the logic of co-existence. We foresaw that in modern technology interdependence cannot be confined to one or another social system. We recognize that international commerce must grow and this would further bind the nations together in peace and cooperation. We cautioned from the very beginning against the spectre of human and material national resources being diverted to nuclear and conventional armaments and means of destruction. These achievements and our current goals reinforce the logic of unity in our diversity.

"The question, however, is as our membership grows, does it give strength or does it dilute our principles and cohesion? We chose non-alignment in defiance; the situation and the circumstances may have changed and yet can we, when non-alignment is not at bay, preserve it for continued positive purpose? Are we to lose our solidarity merely because some of our adversaries have been overwhelmed or because the countervailing pressures from the philosophy of alliances has eased?

"If we recognize the imperative of our solidarity, we must with consistency subordinate to it everything which undermines our capacity to work and cooperate together.

"There should be no complacency that this great movement has reached its plateau, even if some of the initial objectives have been achieved nor should there be any apprehension that the movement is on a declining curve. Much still abides for our united efforts.

COLOMBO DECLARATION

"The Colombo Conference in 1976 clearly pointed to the new terrain on which the Non-aligned Movement has now to function. It envisioned a new horizon opening up before it a horizon no less stimulating than the previous ones and in keeping with the basic urges and ethos of our movement.

"It would be apt to recall the Colombo political declaration. I quote from it: "As a result of recent developments, the importance of ensuring the genuine and complete independence of States as distinct from merely formal sovereignty had been enhanced. The problem of unequal relations between States often amounting to domination continues to be a disturbing phenomenon even negating the hard-won freedom of some states. Today, one of the principal tasks of the non-aligned nations remains the combating of unequal relations and domination arising from neo-colonialism and similar forms of domination."

"The Economic Declaration of Colombo made it clear that the developing countries would not be able to solve their urgent economic problems and pursue their plans of development without the establishment of the New International Economic Order. The Economic Declaration further warned that the New International Economic Order which we seek to establish must recognize the inter-connections between the present political and economic forces.

"The Colombo declarations, political and economic, called for the opening of the economic dimension of the movement in its full vigor and amplitude, if the process of unfoldment of the movement's personality was to continue unabated. But to the Colombo conference, even this stress on economic aspect, crucially important as it was, was not enough. It recognized, for example, the right to untainted knowledge and information which, if thwarted, could negate much of our efforts in the political and economic fields. So, the political declaration, inter-alia, affirmed that a new international order in the fields of information and mass communications was as vital as a New International Economic Order.

"Thus we can readily see that we do not find ourselves on a declining but on an ascending curve. The movement would suffer not only arrest and retardation of its personality, but inevitably face serious distortions and contradiction, if it does not accept the challenges of its further growth and efflorescence.

"The historic role of the Havana Summit lies in concretising the tasks on the new terrain and operationalising our ideas for their accomplishment.

"It appears that there is a certain correlation between the relationships among the great powers and the situation that exists in the Non-aligned Movement so that the unity and character of the latter get affected by the situation in respect

of the former. If we are reduced to a registering machine for the rise and fall or even stagnation in the great power relationships and do not seek to act as a correcting mechanism of any distortions that might occur in these relationships, it would lead to the downfall of a great movement. It would be the very negation of the objectives and principles for which we stand and we would become a new arena for cold war more dangerous because of its deceptive facade. Against such threats, we must exercise more alertness and vigilance.

"The play of these forces is evident in many troubled regions of the world. The situation in West Asia continues to cause grave anxiety. India has a deep and historical relationship with the Arab world. We are, therefore, seriously concerned about the recent developments which have further increased tensions in the region. The Egypt-Israeli treaties have caused fears and misgivings which have led to the exacerbation of the situation, particularly, by dividing the Arab world. It is for Egypt to take steps to remove these misgivings. One thing is clear—Israeli intransigence has hardened and the prospects of a just and durable settlement have receded. Any solution, which ignores the fact that Palestine is at the core of the issue, stands no chance of success. Peace, if it is to be lasting, must be based on the principles of inadmissibility of conquest by force. Israel must, therefore, vacate all Arab territories occupied since the 1967 war. The inalienable rights of the Palestinian people, whose sole representative is the PLO, including the rights to their own state is central to a satisfactory settlement. We must continue to exert unrelenting pressure on Israel to move it from its present obstinate persistence in occupying, illegally, Arab lands. We are quite clear, that any arrangement that bypasses these basic facts or serves to weaken Arab unity can only prove to be self-defeating.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

"In Southern Africa, the danger is still from entrenched racism standing in the way of majority rule and equals rights for all the peoples. The monstrous systems of apartheid continues in South Africa. We welcomed the Lusaka Agreement on Zimbabwe, hammered out by the Commonwealth Heads of Government, but made bold to caution that it must be pressed with time-bound urgency. It must not prove another fraud on the people of Zimbabwe, involving the acceptance of weighted advantage to the white minority. The Patriotic Front, now a member of our movement, must be allowed to have full part in formulating a new constitution.

"In the neighboring Namibia, the outlook remains gloomy. All the efforts of the western five seem to be floundering or stagnating. The people of Namibia cannot be blamed if, in their frustration, they turn under the undisputed leadership of SWAPO to other possible means to liberate their homeland. We for our part, must morally, materially, individually and collectively assist the SWAPO.

"South East Asia is once more troubled and threatened by foreign involvement. The people of Indo-China have suffered enough in the struggle for freedom because of intervention and destruction. The complexity and gravity of the situation in Kampuchea and the sharp divisions which it has created was reflected during our discussions last week. The seminal fact that stands out is that the region calls for a return to the search for stability through mutual confidence and regional cooperation. Such stability will never come unless there is respect for the personality and independence of every state and willing cooperation amongst them.

"Cyprus, a member of our movement, continues in the unhappy situation of its territory still remaining occupied. A settlement of the Cyprus problem, based on the dialogue between the two Cypriot communities, free from any outside interference must be encouraged within the framework of the resolution of the United Nations and the decision of the Non-aligned Movement.

INDIAN OCEAN

"Mr. Chairman, it is also a matter of deep regret that the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, adopted by the United Nations in 1971, have remained unfulfilled. On the other hand, despite the reiterated wishes of the littoral and hinterland states, great power military presence in the Indian Ocean, instead of decreasing, has actually been on the increase. In particular, the strengthening of the existing military bases such as Diego Garcia cannot but cause concern over further intensification of the arms race and a set-

back in the relaxation of international tension in the area. We were disappointed that the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union relating to the Indian Ocean were interrupted. We would strongly urge that the dialogue between the two sides be soon resumed. We would further urge all great powers to cooperate effectively with the ad-hoc committee in the United Nations in pursuance of the call reiterated by the recently concluded meeting of the littoral and hinterland states.

"Let us frankly acknowledge that the dangers to our movement flow, not only from external factors, but often from bilateral disputes within our fraternity. India has always carefully sought to avoid burdening the movement with any bilateral problems of its own. Fortunately, we have come a long way in resolving problems with our neighbors and can take pride that the climate of confidence in South Asia has improved significantly. We are convinced that if we continue this process we can release our energies for developments and beneficial cooperation on a bilateral and regional basis.

"Political problems catch our attention by dramatic headlines. But equally insidious and pervading problems come from the economic issues facing the world. The global economic situation is today characterized by insufficient growth and growing disparities amongst different groups of countries. Our meeting takes place on the eve of the special session of the United Nations in 1980, which is to be devoted to economic issues. A development strategy for the 1980s is to be discussed, and hopefully adopted, at that time. We do not, however, approach this session with much expectations not because we have no demands nor because nothing more needs to be done but because of our dismal experience in the first development decades.

"One can list many examples of the malaise that afflict the global economic scene. We recognize that the developed countries are also facing their own problems today. But it is regrettable that they fail to perceive that a lasting solution to their problems lies in ensuring the economic development of the developing world and in pursuing a path of growth which involves the harnessing of the potential effective demand and the productive capacities of the developing countries. Wider acceptance of this interrelationship between the growth of economies of the developed countries and prosperity of the developing countries can impart a new momentum to the international negotiating process. If, therefore, a beginning has to be made toward solving the problems of the world economy on the basis of genuine interdependence, it is vital that the developing countries should fully and effectively participate in the decision-making process related to the international economy.

SELF-RELIANCE

"The recent breakdown of the negotiations on the safeguards code at Geneva, is a further evidence of the lack of political will on the part of the developed countries to move toward a restructuring of the world trading system. It is more distressing that in spite of the antiprotectionist sentiments expressed by every nation and duly reflected in many international declarations, agreements on the "safeguards" should have been frustrated on account of the intransigence of a handful of developed countries. What we seek, Mr. Chairman, is not charity but an opportunity to earn our way in the world. If, therefore, our staple exports are subject to wide price fluctuations and our newer products are abruptly and unilaterally prevented entry in developed country markets, it makes a mockery of developing countries' professed, faith in free trade.

"A connected issue is the participation of the developing countries in tendering for award of contracts for executing projects in other developing countries. Further, some of the current institutional arrangements between a group of developed countries and that of developing countries, for example under the Rome convention, restrict access in this regard to firms of member states. Such restrictive provisions need to be reviewed in the context of the accepted need for untying aid and promoting economic cooperation among developing countries.

"Mr. Chairman, all this underscores the need for fully realizing the potential of collective self-reliance among the non-aligned and other developing countries by imparting vigor and dynamism to the program for mutual economic cooperation and collective self-reliance which is neither a political slogan nor an attempt to substitute North-South cooperation. It has a rationale of its own based on the ties. The surplus resources and skills in the developing countries that remain to be harnessed are frequently wasted or misdirected. At the same time, collec-

tive self-reliance is an essential element in the structural re-adjustments necessary in the international economy.

"The full potential of collective self-reliance can be realized only if it is pursued in an enlightened manner, and is based on a radical departure from the basic motivations and features characterizing North-South relations. Collective self-reliance should also be seen as a dynamic process, which not only involves the fullest utilization of the existing capacities, but also creates new complementarities and capacities, forges new links, and finds new ways of solving the common problems of the developing countries.

"National development plans provide the most useful if not indispensable basis for identifying complementarities among the non-aligned and developing countries. Therefore, the strengthening of the planning process and machinery in our countries can make a significant contribution to the promotion of economic and technical cooperation amongst us.

"The Colombo action program for economic cooperation added a new dimension to the Non-aligned Movement and opened a new chapter in its history. During the Colombo Summit, and soon thereafter, a number of new initiatives were taken and new ideas were advanced. These included the Non-aligned Solidarity Fund, the Council of Producers Association, the Non-aligned Information and Research System, the Project Development Fund, etc. Unfortunately, in spite of the laudable effort of the coordinators, most of these and other schemes and proposals included in the action program are languishing for lack of political will on the part of the member countries. By far, the greatest contribution that this Summit can make to the strength and viability of the movements, is to revise its action program for economic cooperation. It is time for us to demonstrate that collective self-reliance is not just a cliché to be used from time to time, but that it can be translated into a concrete time-bound dynamic program of mutual economic cooperation to the implementation of which we are all committed.

ECONOMIC PROGRAM

"India has come to this Summit prepared for taking any initiative that may be needed for revitalizing the action program. India, has already called upon the UNCTAD for the launching of a new round of tariff negotiations among the developing countries and indicated its willingness to participate on the basis of up to 50 percent tariff concession in such negotiations. Recently, we held a highly successful meeting in Delhi of experts from consultancy organizations of the Non-aligned and other developing countries which has made concrete recommendations for setting up a project developing facility. I hope that it would be possible for the Summit to take a positive decision for the establishment of this facility which is urgently needed for taking full advantage of the existing complementarities among the Non-aligned countries.

"We have also submitted for consideration by the Summit Conference, a study prepared by a leading consultancy organization of India on the fullest use of complementarities among Non-aligned and other developing countries. The scope and extent of possible cooperation that is revealed in this study, should be an encouragement and a challenge to all of us.

"Mr. Chairman, we have felt for sometime that the hiatus that has prevailed between the program for economic and technical cooperation among the developing countries and the actual performance has in large part been due to inadequate or ineffective instrument of enforcement. We, therefore, think it is important to consider the establishment of a small ad-hoc committee at a high political level which can monitor the implementation of such programs.

ENERGY ISSUE

"Mr. Chairman, I now turn to another issue, namely energy, which is of vital concern to most non-aligned and developing countries and the solution of which is of critical importance to us all. The worst sufferers from the current energy situation have been the oil importing developing countries. In the case of India, half of our total imports were accounted for by oil. The increase in oil prices effected this year imposed an additional burden of about \$1.4 billion. What is more, the Non-aligned and developing countries are also facing the problem of securing the bare minimum levels of supply of oil from the world market in which they have to compete with the developed countries. The present situation has seriously undermined our development efforts and made the prospects for the future even more uncertain.

"We do not question the right of our friends, members of the OPEC to take steps to obtain just and remunerative prices for their raw materials and dispose of their national wealth in a manner they deem fit. But one thing which must be clear to them is that while the developed countries have their methods and means of making up for what they have to pay, the developing countries have to face a critical situation which may bring to a complete standstill their development plans. We hope that there is no lack of desire on the part of the members of the OPEC to take such steps as may enable us to overcome what have become a major impediment to development. We are encouraged by the announcement of the President of Iraq to provide us interest-free long-term loans. We are also encouraged by the recent initiative of the Non-aligned countries in this field culminating in the unanimous report submitted by the consultative group which was convened by the Government of Guyana prior to this Summit Conference. It should be possible for the conference to take the necessary action toward implementing the major recommendations of the group. Nothing will contribute more to the strength of the movement and to the collective self-reliance of the members, than concrete actions for mitigating the acute sufferings of many of its members.

NEW WORLD ORDER

"To conclude, we have grounds for confidence and no cause for despair about our unity and utility. Our strength, in the ultimate analysis, depends on our political and economic self-reliance and adherence to our principles and goals. The odds are heavy and the pressures against our movement continue. But if we can, with maturity and wisdom, act together as we did in dethroning colonialism, we can make Non-aligned the motor for establishing a new world order.

"Mr. Chairman to be Non-aligned is to be aligned with truth and as our national motto confidently proclaims "Satyameva Jayate—truth alone triumphs".

1871

1. The first of the year was a very dry one, and the crops were much injured by the drought. The wheat was particularly affected, and the yield was very small. The corn was also much injured, and the yield was very small. The other crops were also much injured, and the yield was very small.

2. The second of the year was a very wet one, and the crops were much injured by the rain. The wheat was particularly affected, and the yield was very small. The corn was also much injured, and the yield was very small. The other crops were also much injured, and the yield was very small.

3. The third of the year was a very dry one, and the crops were much injured by the drought. The wheat was particularly affected, and the yield was very small. The corn was also much injured, and the yield was very small. The other crops were also much injured, and the yield was very small.

4. The fourth of the year was a very wet one, and the crops were much injured by the rain. The wheat was particularly affected, and the yield was very small. The corn was also much injured, and the yield was very small. The other crops were also much injured, and the yield was very small.

5. The fifth of the year was a very dry one, and the crops were much injured by the drought. The wheat was particularly affected, and the yield was very small. The corn was also much injured, and the yield was very small. The other crops were also much injured, and the yield was very small.

6. The sixth of the year was a very wet one, and the crops were much injured by the rain. The wheat was particularly affected, and the yield was very small. The corn was also much injured, and the yield was very small. The other crops were also much injured, and the yield was very small.

7. The seventh of the year was a very dry one, and the crops were much injured by the drought. The wheat was particularly affected, and the yield was very small. The corn was also much injured, and the yield was very small. The other crops were also much injured, and the yield was very small.

8. The eighth of the year was a very wet one, and the crops were much injured by the rain. The wheat was particularly affected, and the yield was very small. The corn was also much injured, and the yield was very small. The other crops were also much injured, and the yield was very small.

9. The ninth of the year was a very dry one, and the crops were much injured by the drought. The wheat was particularly affected, and the yield was very small. The corn was also much injured, and the yield was very small. The other crops were also much injured, and the yield was very small.

10. The tenth of the year was a very wet one, and the crops were much injured by the rain. The wheat was particularly affected, and the yield was very small. The corn was also much injured, and the yield was very small. The other crops were also much injured, and the yield was very small.

APPENDIX 3

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT POW/MIA NEGOTIATION ACTIONS, 1972-79

- January 20, 1972.—Heyward Isham, acting head of the U.S. delegation, at the 141st plenary session of the meetings on Vietnam in Paris, provided a document to the DRV with 14 case summaries on U.S. MIA personnel.
- April 1972.—Ambassador William Porter presented to the DRV representatives in Paris a printed folder containing the case histories of 14 U.S. personnel who were, at one time, identified by the North Vietnamese as having been captured. These individuals were not included on the so-called "complete list" provided by the DRV on December 22, 1970.
- January 27, 1973.—The DRV and the PRG identified 23 and 40 U.S. individuals respectively who reportedly died in captivity. The PRG list contained the names of three individuals who have been otherwise accounted for.
- February 1973.—Secretary Kissinger visited Hanoi and may have left approximately 20 case summaries with the DRV. Individual names are not known at this time.
- April 7, 1973.—In private, the USDEL asked the PRGDEL to provide all available information on the status of LCDR J. G. Graf, USN. A formal request on Graf was made to the PRGDEL on April 9, 1973.
- April 9, 1973.—USDEL provided list of DICs asking expeditious return of remains.
- April 13, 1973.—USDEL provided complete lists of MIA to DRV/PRG "followed up by detailed folders on MIAs about which the U.S. believed the DRV/PRG have information."
- April 17, 1973.—USDEL presented DRVDEL with a list of 104 U.S. and other foreign persons who are missing in action (list No. 1). Lists available in OASD/ISA and DIA.
- May 5, 1973.—The PRGDEL, in private, told the USDEL that he was unable to obtain any information pertaining to LCDR J. G. Graf, USN (see April 7, 1973).
- May 8, 1973.—USDEL provided other delegations with a list of 1,444 MIAs (list No. 2). List available in OASD/ISA and DIA.
- May 14, 1973.—USDEL provided other delegations with a list of 1,114 names of U.S. and foreign persons believed dead whose bodies have not been recovered (list No. 3). List available in OASD/ISA and DIA.
- May 15, 1973.—USDEL (in private) asked DRVDEL to provide copies of MIA and BNR lists to LPF.
- May 16, 1973.—By memo, USDEL requested information on the status of 14 Korean military and civilian persons MIA in South Vietnam.
- May 30, 1973.—USDEL memo requested information about Australian MIA and DIC personnel.
- July 3, 1973.—Laos MIA/BNR lists presented to Phagna Phound Voungvichit, Special Plenipotentiary Representative of the Patriotic Forces (Pathet Lao).
- August 6, 1973.—USDEL provided the DRVDEL with folders pertaining to five U.S. MIA.
- August 8, 1973.—USDEL sent memo to PRGDEL with folders about five U.S. MIA.
- August 20, 1973.—USDEL delivered one folder to the DRVDEL. On August 27, 1973, the folder was returned by the DRV with the comment that it was not responsible to account for persons other than those lost in the DRV.
- August 20, 1973.—USDEL provided the DRVDEL with folders pertaining to two U.S. MIA.
- August 22, 1973.—USDEL sent memo to PRGDEL with folders concerning three U.S. MIA.
- August 29, 1973.—USDEL sent memo to DRVDEL with folders concerning 12 U.S. MIA.

- August 29, 1973—USDEL sent memo to PRGDEL with folders concerning five U.S. MIA.
- September 19, 1973—USDEL sent memo to DRVDEL with folders concerning three U.S. MIA.
- September 19, 1973—USDEL sent memo to PRGDEL with folders concerning three U.S. MIA.
- October 5, 1973—USDEL sent memo to PRG requesting assistance in obtaining information and beginning repatriation of Republic of Philippines MIA and DIC personnel.
- October 9, 1973—In private, the USDEL asked the PRGDEL's assistance in obtaining the release of Mr. Homer L. Elm. Elm was captured on October 6, 1973.
- October 27, 1973—USDEL delivered memo to PRGDEL requesting information about eight Japanese civilians MIA.
- November 7, 1973—USDEL sent a memo to the DRVDEL with folders concerning eight U.S. MIA personnel.
- November 7, 1973—USDEL sent memo to PRGDEL with folders concerning 12 U.S. MIA personnel.
- December 9, 1973—Homer L. Elm was released by the PRG.
- December 12, 1973—USDEL sent memo to DRVDEL with folders concerning eight U.S. MIA personnel.
- December 12, 1973—USDEL sent memo to PRGDEL with folders concerning data about two U.S. MIA.
- December 20, 1973—Laos MIA/BNR lists passed to Mr. Soukan of the Royal Lao Government (RLG).
- March 4, 1974—Computer listings of MIA/BNRs passed to Mr. Soukan Vilaysarn, Chairman RLG, Delegation to the Joint Central Committee.
- March 6, 1974—After prolonged negotiations, the DRV returned the remains of 12 of the 23 U.S. personnel who had reportedly died in captivity.
- March 13, 1974—The DRV returned the remains of 11 U.S. personnel who had reportedly died in captivity. This completed the return of the 23 bodies listed on the DRV died in captivity list of January 27, 1973.
- April 8, 1974—USDEL provided folders to the DRVDEL concerning seven U.S. MIA.
- June 1974—Computer listings of MIA/BNRs sent to JCCIA Area Coordinators, International Red Cross UNHCR (Mr. Zenger), Canadian I.C.C. Delegate (Lt. Col. Newell), Indian I.C.C. Delegate (Brigadier Michigan) and Polish I.C.C. Delegate.
- June 7, 1974—USDEL provided folders to the DRVDEL pertaining to seven U.S. MIA.
- June 7, 1974—USDEL provides folders to the PRGDEL pertaining to two U.S. MIA.
- June 13, 1974—USDEL delivered an updated complete list of all MIAs (list No. 4) and a complete updated list of all BNRs (list No. 5). Lists available in OASD/ISA and DIA.
- September 17, 1974—Ambassador Whitehouse mentioned to Tianethone Chantharasy, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, RLG, that an American and an Australian were in the hands of the Pathet Lao near Thakhek and it should be brought to the attention of the JCCIA. This is one of many official/semi-official acts (not included here) taken to gain an accounting of Dean and Sharman.
- September 30, 1974—JCRC provided Mr. Zenger, International Red Cross Commission, a list of Americans missing in Laos.
- October 1974—Laos MIA/BNR lists were provided to Mr. Zenger, International Red Cross Commission, for submission to the JCCIA and to the JCCIA Area Coordinators.
- November 1974—Laos MIA/BNR lists were given to: The POW-MIA Committees of the Provisional Government of the National Union and the Lao Patriotic Front, International Red Cross, Indian Delegate to the ICC, Polish Delegate to the ICC, Australian Attache, British Attache, French Attache, Chief of the Vientiane Military Police.
- December 20, 1974—According to a local press release (January 9, 1975) XAT LAO reported that the Vientiane side presented the list of missing in action to the PL on November 14, 1974 and December 20, 1974 but received no responses. The list of missing included 4,895 Laotians, 567 Americans, and 643 Thais.

- February 26, 1975—USDEL delivered to the Communist Delegations 13 new folders on 20 U.S. individuals (DRV, 17 individuals; PRG, 3 individuals).
- April 1, 1975—USDEL delivered to the other delegations updated lists of all U.S. military and civilians and third country nationals missing in action (list No. 6) and those presumed dead (BNR) (list No. 7). Lists available in OASD/ISA and DIA.
- April 15, 1975—The DRV informed Senator Edward Kennedy, in response to his request for information regarding unaccounted-for U.S. personnel, of three U.S. personnel who had died. Their bodies were tentatively scheduled to be returned in late August 1975 after the families requested their return.
- August 13, 1975—Immediately following the U.S. veto of the admission of both Vietnams to the U.N., the DRV announced that they would not return the remains of three KIA U.S. personnel (see April 15, 1975).
- October 30, 1975—The DRV released nine Americans (and five foreign nationals) who had been taken prisoner during the 1975 communist offensive in South Vietnam.
- December 4, 1975—The People's Republic of China (URC) acknowledged the shootdown of four aircraft but did not know the fate of eight of the aircrew members. The ashes of aircrew members who were recovered will be returned.
- December 6, 1975—Eight members of the House Select Committee for Missing Persons in Southeast Asia (HSCOM) met with members of the PRG/DRV delegations in Paris. The HSCOM asked for: (1) permission for U.S., third country or International teams to search for U.S. remains; (2) the return of the remains of two Marines killed in the evacuation of Saigon, and (3) emigration of U.S. personnel and other foreign nationals from Saigon. The DRV/PRG agreed to: (1) return the remains of the three previously identified for return and (2) continue their research on missing Americans, including the two Marines. The DRV Ambassador said the Americans stranded in Saigon would be permitted to leave and stated that no live Americans were held by North or South Vietnam.
- December 16, 1975—The PRC returned the ashes of two aircrew members shot down in the PRC airspace.
- December 21, 1975—Four members of HSCOM visited Hanoi to receive the remains of the three U.S. personnel and to meet the Premier and Deputy Foreign Minister. They discussed: (1) live Americans, (2) the need for searching grave and crash sites—including the two Marines and (3) the establishment of a U.S. or third country mission in Hanoi to assist the DRV MIA agency. Several representative files (case summaries) were turned over to the DRV officials (December 22). (DIA had provided twenty-eight File Record Summaries pertaining to 40 Americans listed as missing in Vietnam to HSCOM plus five Americans lost in Laos to be provided to the Chiefs of the Delegations.)
- December 23, 1975—HSCOM met with the Chief of Cabinet of the Foreign Ministry (Mr. Soubanh Srithirath), Vientiane, Laos. They presented five cases (including that of "Spectre 17") of U.S. personnel known to have been alive, requesting an accounting of these and others. They were told that all live Americans were returned and that Laos had initiated search for own MIAs and would include U.S. unaccounted-for.
- January 15, 1976—DIA provided 40 case summaries (PRG DIC list) to OASD/ISA for the HSCOM. These summaries were forwarded to Senator E. Kennedy (D-Mass.). Unknown disposition.
- February 22, 1976—The PRG returned the remains of the two U.S. Marines killed during the evacuation of Saigon on April 29, 1975.
- April 14, 1976—DIA provided twelve folders concerning 38 U.S. personnel unaccounted-for in Laos to the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia.
- August 27, 1976—DIA provided ten negotiation folders on 20 individuals to the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia for possible delivery to Lao official in New York.
- September 6, 1976—The DRV provided the names of 12 U.S. personnel who were hitherto unaccounted-for in Southeast Asia, reporting only that they had died.
- September 21, 1976—Mr. Arlo N. Gay, U.S. civilian captured on April 30, 1975, was released by the PRG.
- October 13, 1976—Twenty-eight folders pertaining to 39 unaccounted-for U.S. personnel were provided by DIA to Mr. Frank Sieverts, Department of State for delivery to Under Secretary of State Philip C. Habib.

- March 16, 1977—The Presidential Commission on Missing and Unaccounted-for U.S. Personnel in Southeast Asia visited Hanoi to discuss the POW/MIA problem and future U.S./SRV relations. The Commission carried 36 negotiation folders (53 U.S. and six third country nationals). Only one folder, that pertaining to C. A. Paul and W. R. Spencer (USAF) was presented to the SRV.
- March 18, 1977—The SRV returned the remains of the 12 U.S. personnel previously reported (on September 6, 1976) as "having died," to the Presidential Commission. Upon examination, the CIL determined that C. A. Eaton's remains were actually those of a Vietnamese individual and L. G. Goldberg's remains were those of his crewmember, P. E. Wynne.
- March 18, 1977—The SRV informed the Presidential Commission that Tucker P. E. Gougelmann, who remained in South Vietnam after its fall in April 1975, had died and that his remains would be returned at a later date.
- March 19, 1977—The Presidential Commission arrived in Vientiane to discuss the POW/MIA problem with representatives of the Lao People's Democratic Republic. Nothing of casualty resolution value resulted from the talks.
- March 23, 1977—Members of the Commission discussed the results of their mission with President Carter.
- April 12, 1977—The Department of State forwarded seven negotiation folders pertaining to nine unaccounted-for U.S. personnel to the U.S. representatives in Paris. The folders were presented to the SRV Delegation on April 13, along with identification records pertaining to the remains received by the Presidential Commission on March 18, 1977.
- April 12, 1977—State Department forwarded negotiation folders pertaining to E. H. DeBruin, D. L. Hrdlicka, and S. E. Shelton to U.S. representatives in Vientiane for presentation to Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) officials.
- April 19, 1977—In a letter from Vu Hoang to Mr. Sieverts, the SRV identified Ben L. Fryer, USAF, as having died on December 26, 1972, when his B-52 was shot down.
- April 21, 1977—Twelve negotiation folder narratives and maps describing the loss of 17 U.S. personnel were forwarded to the Department of State for Paris presentation to the SRV representatives.
- April 22, 1977—Folders on C. A. Eaton and L. H. Golberg, USAF, along with remains identification data were forwarded to the Department of State for delivery to the SRV in Paris.
- May 3, 1977—The U.S. representatives in Paris presented 12 negotiation narratives (17 unaccounted-for personnel) to SRV representatives there. (See April 21, 1977, entry.) The SRV representatives also received the Eaton and Golberg folders and identification data on this date (see April 22, 1977, entry).
- May 9, 1977—The American Embassy passed three negotiation folders pertaining to three unaccounted-for U.S. personnel; DeBruin, Hrdlicka, and Shelton (see April 12, 1977, entry).
- May 16, 1977—Twelve negotiation folders pertaining to 17 unaccounted-for U.S. personnel were provided to the Department of State for presentation to the SRV delegation in Paris.
- June 2, 1977—The SRV Delegation in Paris stated that they would be prepared to return the remains of 20 unaccounted-for personnel in August or September 1977. They identified 15 of the 20 by name; the remaining five by a central location and time frame. The SVR insisted that they had returned the remains of Golberg not Wynne. They also offered to return the remains of T. Gougelmann and Ben Fryar. The U.S. representatives asked that those remains be returned with the 20 in August/September 1977.
- June 2, 1977—U.S. representatives in Paris provided negotiation folders on 17 unaccounted-for U.S. personnel to the SRP delegation. (See May 16, 1977, entry).
- June 10, 1977—DIA/DB-4H forwarded 12 negotiation folders on 13 unaccounted-for U.S. personnel to the Department of State. The folders will be passed to the SRV in Paris.
- June 22, 1977—The American Embassy passed three negotiation folders pertaining to three unaccounted-for U.S. personnel to the LPDR.
- June 22, 1977—DIA/DB-4H forwarded four negotiation narratives and maps pertaining to nine unaccounted-for U.S. personnel to the Department of State for the Lao People's Democratic Republic.

- June 27, 1977—DIA/DB-4H forwarded six negotiation narratives and maps pertaining to 11 unaccounted-for U.S. personnel to the Department of State to be passed to the SRV. Seven negotiation narratives and maps pertaining to nine unaccounted-for U.S. personnel were forwarded to State on the same date intended for delivery to the LPDR in Vientiane. Because incidents occurred close to the Laos/Vietnam border, folders pertaining to B. C. Fryar, N. G. Brooks, and R. L. Standerwick (two folders) were included in both groups.
- July 8, 1977—Six folders pertaining to 11 unaccounted-for personnel were passed to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam representatives in Paris.
- July 28, 1977—Eleven folders pertaining to 18 unaccounted-for U.S. personnel were presented to the Lao People's Democratic Republic representatives in Vientiane.
- August 3, 1977—Forwarded five negotiation folders pertaining to 26 unaccounted-for U.S. personnel to the Department of State for presentation to the Lao People's Democratic Republic. Twenty folders pertaining to 30 unaccounted-for U.S. personnel were also forwarded for presentation to the SRV Delegation in Paris. This group included one folder which would be forwarded to the LPDR (W. A. Ott and D. E. Shay).
- August 8, 1977—One negotiation folder pertaining to the 13 persons involved in the Spectre 17 loss was forwarded to the Department of State for the LPDR.
- September 3, 1977—Department of State announced that State and Defense representatives would travel to Hanoi on September 30, 1977, to accept the remains of 22 U.S. personnel (see June 2, 1977, entry).
- September 30, 1977—The SVR returned the remains of 22 unaccounted-for U.S. personnel to a State/Defense Team in Hanoi. The remains were, in one case, not those identified in the list provided by the SRV (15 names and five unidentified) in June (see June 2, 1977, entry). The remains of T. Gougelman and B. Fryar were included in this action. The Team gave SRV officials 12 negotiation folders pertaining to 30 unaccounted-for personnel on the visit (see August 3, 1977, entry).
- October 26, 1977—Forwarded 20 negotiation folders pertaining to 24 unaccounted-for personnel to the Department of State for eventual presentation to the SRV in Paris. The folders in this group pertained to individuals on aircraft with one or more crew members that had been captured and released in 1973.
- December 27, 1977—Forwarded a negotiation folder to the Department of State for eventual presentation to the SRV.
- April 12, 1978—Forwarded 21 negotiation folders pertaining to 32 unaccounted-for U.S. personnel to the Department of State for eventual presentation to the SRV.
- July 12, 1978—A Vietnamese delegation visited the U.S. Army's Central Identification Laboratory (CIL) in Hawaii. The CIL's mission is identification of remains of deceased U.S. personnel. During the visit the delegation was given 21 negotiation folders pertaining to 32 unaccounted for personnel (see April 12, 1978, entry).
- August 8, 1978—Forwarded 20 negotiation folders pertaining to 37 unaccounted-for personnel to the Department of State for presentation to the SRV. Ten folders pertaining to 25 unaccounted-for personnel were also forwarded for presentation to the Lao Peoples' Democratic Republic. This group included two folders which were to be forwarded to the SRV.
- August 23, 1978—The SRV returned the remains of 11 unaccounted-for personnel to a U.S. delegation headed by Representative G. V. Montgomery.
- August 24, 1978—The LPDR returned the remains of four unaccounted-for personnel to a U.S. delegation headed by Representative G. V. Montgomery.
- October 12, 1978—Forwarded a negotiation folder to Congressman Moore for eventual presentation to the LPDR.
- December 29, 1978—A scheduled trip to Hanoi by members of the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs was cancelled due to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.
- August 10, 1978—Visit to Hanoi by members of House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, during which folders including over 100 cases in Category I were delivered to the Vietnamese, along with refugee sightings of grave/crash sites. Proposed that American JCRC liason officer be permitted to return to Hanoi to discuss material presented to the Vietnamese. Vietnamese agreed in principle.

APPENDIX 4

DELEGATION MEETING WITH REFUSENIKS AT HOTEL SOVIETSKYIA, MOSCOW, AUGUST 21, 1979

Mr. SCHEUER. All right, Alexander, why don't you introduce your friends and colleagues?

Mr. LERNER. First of all, I would like to express our deep feelings for the concern and help we get from American people and American Congress. We are sure that this concern and this activity which we respect very high will not stop and will be promoted, we do believe that in the end it will give all of us the possibility to reach, to join our people and our relatives in our Holy Land.

Mr. SCHEUER. Now, I don't want to interrupt you because I want to have the introductions and then I want you to have some informal conversation, though this is our distinguished leader of our mission, Congressman Lester Wolff of New York. We are taping this with their permission and consent and all of us will get a transcript. Here is Congressman Dave Bowen of the State of Mississippi, one of our very brilliant young Members of Congress.

Mr. GILMAN. We have just gathered and are in the introduction stage.

Mr. SCHEUER. Before we go any further, following your remarks, the fear has sometimes been expressed to us that by getting in touch with you, by visiting you in your homes, by telephoning you, by writing you letters, we may be placing you in jeopardy. We may be endangering you. We are very sensitive about that because we know when we come to Russia as Congressmen we are safe. And we don't want to feel that by some kind of irresponsible adventurism, by getting in touch with you or by contacting you or visiting you, we are placing you in danger when we have no danger. So give us your views on that.

Mr. GILMAN. Ladies and gentlemen, if I might just introduce another Member, Congressman Stark.

Mr. SCHEUER. First introduce your friends and then perhaps you would address my question.

Mr. LERNER. Mr. Ilya Essas, "refusenik" for about 7 years. Mr. Mark Nashpitz, "refusenik" for about 9 years now—he spent in exile 5 years, only 4 weeks ago he came to Moscow.

Mr. GILMAN. Mark was just released from Siberia 4 weeks ago.

Mr. LERNER. Mr. Boris Tsitverblit, a "refusenik" of 7 years from Kiev. Mr. Arkady Mai, a "refusenik" of about 5 years from Moscow. Dr. Victor Brailovsky, a "refusenik" of 7½ years from Moscow. Mr. Eytan Finkelstein, doctor of technical sciences. Unfortunately they (Goldsteins) could not come, they are in Vilitsa now.

Mr. Lev Ovsishcher, retired colonel, hero of World War II, and air ace, a "refusenik" of about 8 years from Minsk. Mr. Abe Stolar, a citizen of the United States of America, "refusenik"—

Mr. STOLAR. Not a "refusenik," a captive, I say—

Mr. LERNER. A captive for more than 4 years.

Mr. GILMAN. A citizen of the United States?

Mr. STOLAR. Yes, with a passport.

Mr. LERNER. Mrs. Ida Milgrom, mother of Shcharansky. Mrs. Maria Slepak, wife of Vladimir Slepak who is now in exile in Siberia. Myself is Professor Alexander Lerner. Now I will answer your questions.

Now to answer your question. You see, to answer on this question I would like, first of all, to make quite clear that all of us are constantly in a very dangerous situation. We don't think that any visit can increase this danger. We can be taken in custody, arrested without trial and sent to long-term exile or imprisonment even without your "help," without any contacts with foreign statesmen. We think that your visits and contacts with us, of course, are in our defense, they defend us a little bit, especially if these contacts are not stopped after your departure. If you write letters to our home, and to the authorities about our fates, and try to be active, it is excellent, it will give us good support and decrease the danger of how our lives here in such a terrible situation as "refusenik" endure.

Mr. WOLFF. I take it that you are aware that we have made known to the Soviet authorities that we are having this meeting.

Mr. LERNER. Of course.

Mr. WOLFF. And even if we don't, I'm sure that they are recording the same way as we are recording.

Mr. LERNER. No doubt. [Laughter.] And we regard our meeting as quite legal. No conspiracy, we are intended to meet with our friends and colleagues and defenders which come to help us by using extremely and absolutely legal ways.

Mr. WOLFF. Just to set the stage and I think it is important, we requested that permission to meet with this group, the Soviet authorities gave us permission and herefore any attempt to censure you for this meeting will be extralegal because they have permitted the meeting to occur. I think that should be very much on the record.

Mr. LERNER. We also understand that it is quite legal and we know that all of our previous meetings with Congressmen and Senators were quite legal, they also were made by agreement with Soviet authorities, but, nevertheless in the accusations against Anatoly Shcharansky, his meeting with Senators was one of the main accusations.

Mr. LONG. Even though that was a legal meeting.

Mr. LERNER. Yes.

Mr. SCHEUER. Alexander why don't you tell us now how you appraise the current situation of the "refuseniks" and the current situation of Russian Jewry.

Mr. LERNER. Dr. Victor Brailovsky has referred to make a review about it.

Mr. SCHEUER. Excellent.

Mr. BRAILOVSKY. I can give very short review. To begin with I want to tell that we know that the general figure of emigration is increasing now.

Mr. GILMAN. Would you speak just a little louder please.

Mr. BRAILOVSKY. Yes; we know that the general figure of emigration is increasing now and that the average quantity of Jews who leave Russia every month now more than 4,000 persons per month. But if we compare this figure with another figure, with the figure of people who would like to emigrate, who express their wish to emigrate. I must tell you there is a great gap between these two figures. To prove this I want to refer to the number of invitations from Israel now. I think this number is more than 200,000. The second figure, in many towns of U.S.S.R.—

Mr. MOORHEAD. You mean 200,000 want to go to Israel that are on the list?

Mr. BRAILOVSKY. 200,000 have official document. Official invitation from Israel, they are ready to apply.

Mr. LONG. These are the ones that have not yet gone, that are still here.

Mr. BRAILOVSKY. That is it exactly. But, I can give you another proof. Another proof is that in many towns of U.S.S.R., in Minsk, in Odessa, in Leningrad to apply for exit visa you must wait about half of year or year, in some cases even more than a year. To get answer after you apply for exit visa you also must wait for year and even more.

Mr. SCHEUER. Isn't there also trouble in getting the actual application forms?

Mr. BRAILOVSKY. Yes; exactly. To get this application form you must wait in very very long line for about a year. There great troubles, to apply for an exit visa, a lot of formalities. The procedure is very difficult. With this difficulty the authorities are trying to decrease the quantity of people who apply for visa. That is the first point and we think that to estimate what the figure of emigration is we must take into account this comparison. The real figure of people who leave the country with the figure of persons who wish to emigrate, who try to apply for exit visa, who are ready to apply for exit visa.

Mr. MOORHEAD. Of those of you that are on this waiting list for many years, do you see any progress of those people being allowed to emigrate, are they reviewing the applications from time to time, so that they will take a few of you or maybe one or two of you a year?

Mr. BRAILOVSKY. I will tell you a little later about this program, but I must tell that all this waiting to apply for exit visa and waiting the answer is not the problem of "refusenik." It is problem of ordinary Soviet people who want to apply. But problem of "refusenik" is problem of absolutely another kind. If the answer after these years is refusal the person became "refusenik" and that's another problem. Another part of the problem of emigration, that is the situation with "refusenik."

Mr. LONG. How long have you waited?

Mr. BRAILOVSKY. I am more than 7 years. I am not the longest "refusenik." I must tell that now these situation with "refusenik" is absolutely frozen. During this year only a number, a very small part of "refuseniks" have the possibility

to leave the country. The situation is even worse, as you saw here, people with the term of refusal. Eytan with 8 years, Slepak 10 years after being refused.

Mr. LONG. And her husband——

Mr. SCHEUER. I met with them in 1972——

Mr. LONG. What is this lady's name?

Mr. SCHEUER. Maria Slepak—her husband, Vladimir, is in exile beyond the Urals. The son is Alexander. Vladimir is in exile because they hung a banner out on their balcony saying, "let us join our son in Israel."

Mr. GILMAN. How many "refuseniks" are there do you estimate?

Mr. BRAILOVSKY. It is very difficult to estimate, because there are very many people who think that it would be better for them not to be known as a "refusenik" and the whole propaganda and the whole effort of Soviet authority leads to this direction.

Mr. GILMAN. Do you have any estimate to the number?

Mr. BRAILOVSKY. We know about 2,000 of "refuseniks," but I suspect that maybe there are two or three times more unknown "refuseniks."

Mr. SCHEUER. In other words 4,000 to 6,000.

Mr. BRAILOVSKY. That's our estimation, but you see—we have no reliable figure.

Mr. SCHEUER. How many people now do you think would like to go to Israel, or would like to leave the country, would like to get the applications or who have already filed applications.

Mr. BRAILOVSKY. That's more of a reliable figure—we know that more than 200,000 persons have official documents, invitation from Israel——

Mr. WOLFF. Are they based upon communication with Israel—they are based upon a request to Israel and Israel sent back an approval?

Mr. BRAILOVSKY. Yes.

Mr. LONG. A letter from an Israeli family or from the Israeli Government?

Mr. BRAILOVSKY. A letter from the Government of Israel—but the form is that it is an invitation from private person from Israel, relatives.

Mr. LERNER. It is an invitation from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel.

Mr. WOLFF. May I ask, there is a point that was raised with us today, that Israel and the American Jews are encouraging the emigration of people from here in the Soviet Union. Is this what is causing the people to want to emigrate?

Mr. BRAILOVSKY. Absolutely not. I think that the second speech of Essas will make clear why Jews emigrate and what is their reason and what is the causes. I must tell that I am absolutely sure that no propaganda can encourage, only the real situation, the effects of situation here may move people from this country——

Mr. LERNER. It is a responsible decision to leave the country, and it is not so easy to make that decision.

Mr. WOLFF. The point is made that we in the United States and Israel are encouraging the people to leave.

Mr. LERNER. Absolutely not.

Mr. WOLFF. I just wanted your reaction.

Mr. GILMAN. Of the 200,000 invitations, how many people have started processing those documents? Of the 200,000 invitations, how many have decided that they wanted to process?

Mr. BRAILOVSKY. We have no figure.

Mr. LONG. How does this gentleman know that there are 200,000?

Mr. BRAILOVSKY. From old friends from Israel.

Mr. WOLFF. Why don't we let this gentleman finish his——

Mr. LERNER. Maybe this point will be discussed better after Mr. Essas comments. He will especially give us the picture of why people decided to leave this country. Now there are a number of families with the term of waiting for exit visa more than 5, more than 7 years and so on. We have no such a situation in 1974. In 1974, I must tell, we were more optimistic. In 1974 the term of refusal 3 years was considered rather big. Now the situation as "refusenik" became worse. After the gesture concerning the prisoner of Zion which was given in May of this year, when some group of prisoners was released. There were no change in the situation with prisoners. No new success was reached in this field. I must tell that such situation could not be considered such a satisfactory situation with emigration. From time to time Soviet authorities make some oral statement about possible change of situation. About positive solution. As far as I know last such statement was given to Bob Hawk. In this statement they promised to solve problem of prisoner of Zion——

They promised to solve problem of prisoner—to release them. To solve problem of all "refuseniks"——

Mr. GILMAN. May I interrupt for a moment, we have another Member that has joined us, Congressman Bob Dornan from California, a wonderful fighter for the cause of Soviet Jewry. Bob, you know, was here before in Moscow.

Mr. DORNAN. May I interrupt for just one second, Ben. I have a promise to keep that I promised last year. 10,000 Shcharansky bracelets. Will you give this to Leonid? Explain that 10,000 are being worn all over the United States. We had some made up for Ginsberg and some of the others and did not even get to wear them. That's the way we like to have it. At the Presidium the other day, I took mine off and I showed it to Smirnov. I hope we don't have to wear this very long.

Mr. BRAILOVSKY. From time to time Soviet authorities make some promises about positive solution to the emigration problem. Last such promises was given to Hawk, and they spoke about positive solution of prisoner problem, about releasing of prisoner. About releasing of long-term refuseniks and about establishing maximum term for refusal—5 years. Of course it is not the perfect terms but we consider them as a rather big liberalization, a substantial liberalization of policies. But unfortunately up till now there is no indication that such liberalization is working.

Mr. WOLFF. Let me just interrupt for a moment. In speaking today, we spoke about the various things that were happening and we were criticized for a meeting that was held, a very much in the open meeting, because I saw you at the circus and if I saw you at the circus I'm sure everyone else saw you. I think that it is important that it is on the record that anything that occurs subsequent to this meeting that this was on the record today.

Mr. LONG. This gentleman has made one statement that puzzles me. He says that things are getting tighter not more liberal and yet we know that they have allowed vast numbers of Jews to leave the Soviet Union in the last year or so. Is that—We know those figures—there has been an increase—200,000. How does he reconcile the fact that they are letting a lot more go with his feeling that things are getting tighter?

Mr. BRAILOVSKY. Ah, the problem of emigration is divided among different aspects. As to about general figure I told that of course there is increasing of general figure of people who can leave the country, but there is great increase in the people who apply for exist visa. Much greater increase and if we compare these two figures we see that there is a great gap between them.

Mr. LONG. I see. I understand.

Mr. BRAILOVSKY. As for situation with refuseniks, situation with refuseniks became even worse because during this year only very a number, a number of refuseniks family small number of refuseniks family were able to leave the country and now there are rather many families of refusenik this very long term of refusal. That's the situation and at this point it's absolutely sure that the situation became worse.

Mr. LERNER. Maybe we will consider this problem after comments of Mr. Essas because he's prepared to give you some picture about what is the situation with the Jewish life here and why people decided to leave.

Mr. WOLFF. May I just interject one very important point which I think is important to the entire picture. If you leave the Soviet Union will you cause problems for the Soviet Union after you leave? Is your desire to leave or to propagandize against the Soviet Union after you leave?

Mr. LERNER. May I, may I—

Mr. WOLFF. Please, please—

Mr. LERNER. First of all I would like to emphasize that all of us are absolutely not anti-Soviet Union.

Mr. WOLFF. Uh-huh. I think that's very important.

Mr. LERNER. We—our goal is not to change the system or to make a new revolution here or to offend it by going abroad. What we do want really is to leave this country the greater part of people who are present here want to join their families and their people in Israel. Some others are interested in living in the United States or other countries it is their choice but nobody intended to give any harm to Soviet Union. If anybody do it, it seems to me that it's not quite honest to live all life in a country and then try to make problems for it.

Mr. WOLFF. Now we understand this. We'll hear from Mr. Essas.

Mr. ESSAS. Because in every meeting with Senators and Congressmen in which I was in the last four years the problem with Jewish emigration is always discussed. So it's very natural to understand what is the distinction of the situation of Jews from other ethnic minorities in this country and the distinction is very

clear. Let us take for an example the normal Jew in this country. He knows from his childhood that there are restrictions to enter the universities and higher institutions. Every Jew knows it. He knows from his childhood that there are restrictions to enter more qualitative jobs, not menial jobs. Every Jew knows it. Then he knows from his childhood that in the newspaper, in the news media, on the TV, on the radios, every year, every day, and every week there are many articles and reports that describe Jews, or in Israel, or all over the world as conspirators against all the world—so called Jewish conspiracy. As very brutal Jewish soldiers that kill innocent children in the Middle East, that there are very brutal Jews who cannot be treated well in other countries because they are always against the country in which they live and so on and so on. This is every day. Sometimes the authorities use the word Zionist not to mention Jews but you must understand that in many articles the word Jews and Zionist are intermingled and very frequent so that in the first sentence there are Jews are bad and then Zionist are bad or Jewish Zionist and so on.

Mr. DORNAN. Excuse me, when they are reporting Syria and Israeli struggle do they use the word Jewish instead of Israeli?

Mr. ESSAS. They use such words—Jewish State, Soviets of Jewish State, Zionist Soldiers, Zionist State and these words are intermingled. So if in one article there are two times Jewish and five times Zionist and about the same country everybody knows—

Mr. DORNAN. Did they ever use the word Israeli?

Mr. ESSAS. Yes, surely. Intermixed with everybody else, so its very clear to everybody—Russian, to a Jew, that Jews are meant and not some special sort of human beings as Israeli's and so everybody knows this, all Russians, all Jews. This complaint increased in the last years in numbers that means it is very frequent in local and central press and in quality if I can use such word. The peak was reached last year or in the beginning of this year when a very famous white paper, white book was published.

Mr. GILMAN. We were given that book today by the judge.

Mr. ESSAS. Yes. It was published by the Smirnoff, Chief Justice of the highest court—he is the editor of this book. It is very strange that he is not ashamed to give you his book because maybe he understands that most of you don't know Russian and you will not read it. Please read this.

Mr. WOLFF. We will not only read, we will have it translated by the Library of Congress.

Mr. ESSAS. I can recommend on behalf of Mr. Smirnoff to read this book. It is a very good book, a very white book. You understand.

Mr. WOLFF. I think that we should know about it, so we should have it translated.

Mr. ESSAS. So these are the negative sides of the life here but maybe you can ask what are the positive, maybe Jews can counteract this campaign by something positive in their hearts, in their lives. The Jewish minority has a very distinct situation even from the point of view of ethnic culture, of ethnic education. Only Jewish language, I mean the Hebrew language, the language of the Bible is the only language which is prohibited to teach. It is a strange thing—I Jew, I am a Jew, I can teach freely without any restrictions Arabic language, Chinese language, languages of not so friendly people. I'm only prohibited to teach to others Hebrew.

Mr. WOLFF. What about Yiddish?

Mr. ESSAS. Yiddish is not discussed at all by the authorities because practically speaking people don't know Yiddish and young people for many reasons are not interested in this language. Personally for instance, I know Yiddish.

Mr. WOLFF. But we are told that in the book stores we can get Hebrew language books.

Mr. ESSAS. You mean Jewish, not Hebrew, Jewish.

Mr. WOLFF. That's why I asked about Yiddish.

Mr. ESSAS. You can find books on (of) assorted authors written because of many reasons, because of their content, because of their authors and practically all the generation under 40 or 50 years so practically nobody can use it. But we as Jews here and all people know the Bible which is the basis of all European civilization is written in the Hebrew language. It is our basis, it is basis of every human being of Judea-Christian civilization. This language is forbidden to teach and so you therefore, there is no practical ways to know it.

Mr. WOLFF. May I ask you again to clarify this because I think this is important. You are not permitted to teach Hebrew, are you permitted to publish books in Hebrew?

Mr. ESSAS. Maybe you are not aware that in any language you have no right to publish any book.

Mr. WOLFF. Can you get a license to publish a book in Hebrew?

Mr. ESSAS. No, no, the only publishing houses are the government houses and they don't publish books in Hebrew.

Mr. WOLFF. Alright, now what about prayer books in Hebrew?

Mr. ESSAS. Prayer books were published in the Soviet Union two times in the last years, several hundred copies but because you don't know Hebrew this is of no use. It is the same as to publish Jewish prayer books in Chinese language.

Mr. WOLFF. How is the language of Hebrew prohibited? What are the penalties and how is it prohibited?

Mr. ESSAS. Yes, uh, the Hebrew language is not taught in the official government institutions with the exception of some closed institutions like KGB, Soviet Army and Foreign Languages Institution.

Mr. WOLFF. Are you permitted to have private schools to teach Hebrew?

Mr. ESSAS. No, you came just to the point because, you can privately teach any language in the world with one exception the Hebrew language. When you come to the Soviet authorities to have a license the only restriction is—"is it a Hebrew language?". If it is Hebrew, you are not authorized to teach. That means you cannot have pupils, you cannot pay taxes for having money for teaching, and practically pupils are under very restrictive measures.

Mr. WOLFF. I should like to pursue this a little further because I think this is basic to a conversation that we had and a very big discussion that I had with Chairman Ruben. I should like to know how you consider the Jews here in this country—you all have identity cards I take it?

Mr. ESSAS. Yes.

Mr. WOLFF. On that identity card what does it say?

Mr. ESSAS. A Jew.

Mr. WOLFF. Now what is the language of the Jew?

Mr. LERNER. We are sure that our major language is Hebrew.

Mr. WOLFF. Now what I'm asking is when you, as I understand it the Tartar's have a language of their own, the Georgians have a language of their own, what is the language that they say is the nationality of the Jew?

Mr. LERNER. They argue that Yiddish is the Jewish language. We cannot teach and study because there is no textbook.

Mr. WOLFF. Now I come to one other point I had a very big discussion today and I think this is all pertinent to what we are discussing now. I was told that the reason you have on your identity card the word Jew is because Jew is a nationality within the Soviet Union. I would like you to explain this to us because I think this is very important to us. I said to Ruben and I said today in the meeting. I am an American and I am a Jew and I resent the fact that you say that Jew is a nationality—I consider Jew as a religion. I am Jewish but I am an American and I said that I take great offense to their calling Jew a nationality that goes into the passport because it is like the armband that the Jews had to wear in Nazi Germany.

Mr. LERNER. Yes, but you see here the word Jew is not a nationality, it's not a religion, it's purely a racist word that your blood is crimes for Jewish blood. We can not get rid of it even if we convert to Orthodox or to Catholic Church—it doesn't matter.

Mr. LONG. He said today that you were allowed to decide whether you were a Jew or not and if you wanted to say that you were something else then they would not put Jew down.

Mr. LERNER. Absolutely wrong.

I want to explain—Marx doesn't recognize Jews as nationality. You can read it in Marxist works and Lenin. They don't recognize Jews as a nationality so it is contradiction between ideology and administrative practice. You can take nationality in Soviet Union only if one of your parents—if they are different. If both parents are Jewish you can't change. Second or third, not all Jews have Yiddish as their native language in the 19th century—we have large groups of Jews who never spoke Yiddish in Middle Asia. Yiddish cannot be the language for all Jews in the Soviet Union at all. I think that I answered the question. It is a contradiction in administrative practice and in ideology of Soviet Union, as concerns the rights of nationality but they are recognized ideologically also the right of national culture. For us it is written nationality but it is not recognized—our rights and our language and our special culture.

Mr. STARK. I have a question and it's my paranoia. Let's suppose for a moment that Russia suddenly made a great policy change. the worst thing I could conceive of is, what's happening in Vietnam; and suddenly Russia said not only will we let all Jews emigrate but we're going to chase you out of the country and you might not all have a place to go, might not be able to get visas to the

United States or to Israel. Is that a concern that they might get so fed up that suddenly they would turn against 2 million Jews in Russia and say "out with you". And the second part of the question is, if in fact emigration were free and open and quick how many people do you estimate of the 2 million Jews would want to leave—say in a year's time?

Mr. LERNER. 1 million I would say.

Mr. STARK. And do you think the Russians are afraid of that?

Mr. LERNER. Yes, my estimation is that 1½ million will leave.

Mr. SCHEUER. If they did not feel harassment and intimidation?

Mr. LERNER. Yes.

Mr. STARK. And Russia fears this?

Mr. LERNER. I don't know what Russia feels about it.

Mr. WOLFF. Colonel, what does your identity card say?

Mr. MAI. Jewish.

Mr. WOLFF. When you fought in the Russian army, were you considered a Jew or a Russian?

Mr. MAI. In my military block was written Jew.

Mr. STOLAR. It is not only the identity card, but all official documents which list nationality.

Mr. BOWEN. Let me ask you a question—I spoke to a Soviet official yesterday who said you do not have to be listed as a Jew if you don't want to. That you could be listed as an Eskimo or anything that you want to, any other nationality.

Mr. LERNER. That's not true.

Mr. WOLFF. Have you tried to have your passport or your identity card changed in any way?

Mr. MAI. I have such a refusenik who tried once, he was double family, he changed first to Russian and then wanted to change to Jew. He was prohibited to change, also every decision after you take your nationality at 16 it is prohibited to change.

Mr. LONG. So after you're 16 years old you can not change your nationality.

Mr. MAI. Yes. And also if you have two parents of different nationalities.

Mr. LONG. If your mother and father are both Jewish could you put down Ukrainian?

ALL. No * * * No you can't.

Mr. DORNAN. It follows your grandparents nationality. They ask the grandparents now to try and nail down one reference to Jewish.

Mr. STOLAR. No, that's when you go to college or university.

Mr. LERNER. It's more sophisticated. You have to write down their names, of parents, grandparents. If you have a questionnaire or you have to write your biography, you must mention the names and second names of your grandparents and great-grand parents. And from names they can recognize who you are.

Mr. STOLAR. Names are "conservative" in this country. You can practically always tell from a person's name what his nationality is.

Mr. DORNAN. I was told that a choice is to be made in the next decade—either all Jews leave or there is total assimilation as the Armenians have been forced to do in Turkey. You lose your Jewishness, you try and change your name, you forget you are a Jew. That's one choice. Or you leave. Because once a million goes, the pressure mounts on the other million. Then when it gets to a million and half, the remaining 500,000 are faced with total isolation, pressure building up till finally it's the whole 2 million. Is there anybody who disagrees with that statement?

Mr. WOLFF. I think we are getting to a point now where we are putting words in their mouths. We're here to listen. The important element that is involved here is that these people are refuseniks and I think the statement made by Mr. Lerner is a very important one. The objective is for those individuals, who want to leave, to leave. Period. They want to leave for a particular purpose. They want to join their families someplace else. I think for us to try to project how many people want to leave, what will happen to the people who are left, is conjecture. We have here right at the moment, specific facts, specific people who would like to leave and they are not permitted to leave. I think this is the important element we have to discuss. I think we should limit our conversation to that type of thing.

Mr. LONG. Can you tell us about the synagogues? Are there more than one?

Mr. ESSAS. The last point that I made mention is the Hebrew language. In the synagogue all the prayers, all the ritual is in Hebrew. The generation under 40 years, under 50 years, does not know Hebrew. So when you come to the synagogue, you don't understand any word. You have no channel, no way for the teachers to use their knowledge because it is forbidden. The old people are

afraid to teach the young people; the young people cannot teach because they have no knowledge. It is not a joke, but a tragedy that for a Jew it is easier to be a Buddhist or a Christian, than to be a practicing Jew. He has no key to Judaism.

Mr. GILMAN. One of the officials today said that they were sending some people here to America so they could learn to be teachers of Hebrew. Is there any basis for that?

Mr. ESSAS. It's a little misinformation from them. They are sending two or three people to New York to study at the Union Theological Seminary to study Judaism. These people already study 6 years in the synagogue. We believe they are specially sent by the authorities to study for many reasons, to manipulate the religion. In the last 6 years they didn't know anything. So maybe now is the time for them to go to America to learn something and then to return and talk to American tourists. To show how excellent and so on and so on. That's the only comment we can give.

Mr. WOLFF. Can I ask Mrs. Milgrom a question? I got into a very big discussion with Mr. Ruben regarding your son. It has been charged that he was in the employ of the CIA. That he spied for the CIA. Can you tell us anything you know about this because I said to Mr. Ruben in front of a number of people, if you have any information on this, it is your duty to make it public to the entire world so that they will know. If he has any information, I will read it in the Congress. I ask you, can you tell us anything your son had in connection with an American?

Mrs. MILGROM. President Carter stated that my son never engaged in any espionage. He was a Jewish activist who wanted to go to Israel to his wife who is there to unite with her and live in a country of his own. From the time he applied to the visa office to go and after he was refused his visa, he began his activities, wanting only to get his rights to emigrate. Meanwhile helping other Jews. They began to victimize him.

There was no activity of any kind that he engaged in other than that. I know that yesterday or today you were informed by Chairman Ruben that my son is well. It's the same kind of misinformation like that my son worked for the CIA. I didn't see my son for a year. Fifteen days ago I had a meeting with him; I was allowed to see him. I met an altogether alien person. Only on the television screens when they showed the prisoners of Auschwitz did I see such emaciated faces. He's seriously ill. He can't do any kind of work, he can't read, he can't write. For several months he's been sick, nobody knows what's wrong with him. The information I get in response to my letters are absolutely untrue. I saw that when I saw my son for 1 hour. He's suffering some horrible disease.

Mr. GILMAN. We raised his health issue yesterday with Paputin. Paputin told us yesterday that if he needed health care he would get it in the prison.

Mr. LONG. They gave him a physical exam.

Mr. GILMAN. Today, Paputin reported to us that he had gotten a report back that a physical exam had been given to your son on August 13 and that everything was all right.

Mrs. MILGROM. That's just the latest lie. Before going to see him, I received a letter from the Chief of the Ministry of Interior's medical service. He wrote to me that my son through all of June and July was examined by five specialists, their names were listed. He was given all kinds of examinations—X-rays, cardiograph, absolutely everything possible.

When I saw him and saw how horrible he was, when I heard his complaints, he confirmed that on July 26 he was examined by a medical commission in jail. It was a routine commission examining all people there. In that commission, two of the doctors saw him. A surgeon checked his blood pressure; a neurologist hit him on the knee with a little hammer. That served as the grounds to announce here that 2 months ago he was examined by a medical commission. After that I was told that he did not need any hospitalization. He gets outpatient treatment whenever he needs it. I can say now that for many months he has been complaining about terrible tremors. They treat him only with aspirin which has brought him to complete exhaustion.

Mr. WOLFF. How much did he weigh before he went to prison?

Mrs. MILGROM. He was 62 to 64 kilograms [130 to 140 pounds]. Now he refuses to tell me. He now weighs 40 kilograms [88 pounds] at the maximum. He is 5 feet 6 inches.

Mr. STARK. Can I ask a question? It has been suggested by Mr. Lerner that we keep in touch by writing and other things. I think that as soon as you 12 leave, there will be 12 more to take your place I would like to know what kinds of things that we as individual Members of Congress, or collectively, can do over

the time ahead that will help all of you. Besides keeping in touch and writing letters, what else can we do to help?

Mr. LERNER. May I answer this question? It seems to me that the significant improvement in emigration policy that is acceptable to us is to fulfill the points which were mentioned in the promise Hawk's received. (1) Release the prisoners of conscience. Now we have 10 of them. (2) Give visas for exit to all Jews, refuseniks who are waiting 5 years or more. (3) Establish 5 years as the maximum period for waiting for an exit visa. If the activity of the American Congress will be concentrated on these three points, it will be the best help to all Jews who want to emigrate. We are not politicians. We don't know what levers you can use, what will be used as a pressure, but we do hope that such a country as the United States has enough force and power and prestige to reach such a modest improvement in this very sensitive field.

Mr. WOLFF. You said at the outset that you were an American citizen. It is our duty as American Congressmen to protect American citizens. Why have you been forbidden to leave?

Mr. STOLAR. My family had visas—there's my wife and son who was 15 at the time. At the place when we were boarding—

Mr. WOLFF. I want to know why you are in Russia and why you are a refusenik.

Mr. STOLAR. I was born in a Communist family. My father was a blind idealist and we were brought up in the same spirit. He was born in Russia and he wanted to come back very much to help build socialism, and the whole family came back with him. That was in 1931. I was 19 at the time. In 1975, 4 years ago, my family got visas—well, the rest of the family is all gone now.

Mr. WOLFF. Did you renounce your American citizenship?

Mr. STOLAR. No, my American citizenship was taken away. Without my consent or knowledge in the first week when I came.

Mr. WOLFF. How?

Mr. STOLAR. Well, you have to register your passports in this country. So as soon as we got a place to live here—it was given to us—the house committee or the police, I don't remember who or what it was as I didn't know the language, took our passports to be registered. And instead of registering our passports they gave us back Soviet documents, internal documents. Ever since then I was a Soviet citizen.

Mr. WOLFF. Did you ever take an oath to bear arms for the Soviet Government?

Mr. STOLAR. No, but I did serve in the army. There was no oath of any kind. That was at the beginning of the war.

Mr. SCHEUER. Have you been in touch with our Embassy here?

Mr. STOLAR. Yes, I go there rather regularly, about once a month.

Mr. SCHEUER. What is their position on your case?

Mr. STOLAR. Their position is that they want proof that I'm not a Soviet citizen. There's plenty of proof but it's all in the hands of the Soviet authorities. I have nothing that can prove anything at all. I only have indirect proof.

Ms. SHERMAN. You have no birth certificate?

Mr. STOLAR. My birth certificate is in the Embassy. They have it and that's no problem.

Mr. WOLFF. Can you tell us where you were born? What day? So we can check with American authorities.

Mr. STOLAR. You don't have to check, that is not in dispute. I have plenty of proof that I am an American citizen, but no proof that I am not a Soviet citizen. I'm not a Soviet citizen, but I have no proof. From the Soviet standpoint, I am a Soviet. They claim I'm Soviet. The American Embassy and the State Department cannot do anything to refute that because I have no papers to show that I am not a citizen.

Mr. WOLFF. You have papers to show that you're not Soviet, if you have a birth certificate proving you were born in the United States.

Mr. LERNER. It's quite difficult. It's a typical example of violation of elementary rule of law.

Mr. STOLAR. Arbitrary rule and lawlessness.

Mr. LERNER. It's true that people can be kept here for 4 years, even when they are foreign citizens.

Mr. STOLAR. Keeping us is just in the small change department.

Mr. WOLFF. I don't know what your exact circumstances are. I can't do anything with the people who are here, who are Russian citizens and who are refuseniks or anything else like that. We give you whatever help that we can in the way of assistance to plead your case and your cause.

Mrs. SLEPAK. I will try and do this briefly. We've been trying to get out for 10 years. In these 10 years my mother, sister, two sons and grandson are all in Israel. After 10 years as refuseniks, we decided to take drastic measures in protest that they wouldn't let us out. My husband and I went out on the balcony of our house holding in our hands a banner saying "let us go to our son in Israel." For that we were arrested. My husband was sentenced to 5 years in exile in Siberia and I was sentenced to 3 years in a general prison camp, but the sentence was suspended.

Mr. LONG. Her husband got 5 years in exile for putting a banner out?

Mr. STOLAR. Yes.

Mr. SCHEUER. I mentioned this to Georgiy Arbatov yesterday as a case that was deserving of some compassionate treatment. He answered right off the bat, he had all the information in his mind, that your husband was a criminal because when the police officer came and knocked on the door to ask him to pull up the banner, he beat up the police officer.

Mr. LERNER. The same thing as Shcharansky is a spy. Perfectly the same "truth."

Mr. GILMAN. Did he beat up a police officer?

Mr. LERNER. He's not crazy, he's a sane person.

Mr. BRAILOVSKY. It was not possible. There were many police officers, not just one.

Mrs. SLEPAK. If he had beaten up a policeman he would have gotten 5 years in a prison camp. This way he is at large, but he cannot leave the place where he is.

Mr. LONG. So it was a total fabrication?

Mrs. SLEPAK. Absolutely.

Mr. LONG. So it was a total fabrication and not just an exaggeration.

Mrs. SLEPAK. They didn't even accuse him of that at his trial.

Mr. SCHEUER. All right Alexander. Do you want to tell us anything else about the general conditions of the Jewish community here? Is there any kind of help that you need? Is there enough money? Clothes? Or anything we can send from the States? What kind of assistance do you need?

Mr. LERNER. I'm sure that the main assistance we need is assistance to get to Israel. All other is not significant.

Mr. LONG. How do they live? I'm interested in that.

Mr. LERNER. I will explain that. It's quite different. For instance, for me there is no financial problem at all. I was paid very high before I applied. I had savings, a country house, two cars; so I am quite well. I'm quite comfortable. I don't need any support. But that is not the case for many other refuseniks. Many of them were dismissed from their jobs. They were deprived of their pensions. Lev Ovsischer, who got his pension for losing blood during the war, was deprived of it.

Mr. LONG. How does Mr. Stolar live?

Mr. STOLAR. I get a pension. I earned it before retirement, before we decided to go. I had to fight a year and a half to get it. For a year and a half we didn't get anything.

Mr. SCHEUER. How does the colonel get along?

Mr. LERNER. He is supported by some foreign friends. They send him parcels and he tries to live in a very difficult financial situation. But he survives because he has no other way out. He cannot get a job or a pension. So he gets some things and tries to use them for living expenses. That's his life.

Mr. GILMAN. Why can't he get a pension?

Mr. LERNER. He had a pension, but he was deprived of it for being a refusenik and a Jewish activist. He's officially deprived of his pension.

Mr. STOLAR. He earned a pension but doesn't get it. It's a military pension which is higher than the average.

Mr. WOLFF. He survives with living expenses that are sent to him by friends. Colonel, what type of military activity did you engage in in the service?

Mr. OVSISCHER. I was in the army 20 years. Any talk about my knowing secrets is absurd. As you well know, I was an economist, and I have not served in the army in 19 years.

Mr. WOLFF. What did you do after you left the army?

Mr. OVSISCHER. I worked in the economic ministry.

Mr. WOLFF. On the question of the refuseniks generally, the statements that have been made to us are that because of the possession of certain information by the people who have applied for visas are refused based upon the loss of information to the Soviet Union. They create a security risk.

Mr. OVSISCHER. I was told by the Minister of Defense that they had no complaints about any security hazard.

Mr. WOLFF. What is the reason then that they gave for refusing him?

Mr. LERNER. It's a pretext. They have no reason at all. They only use his military service as a pretext for refusal. The real reason is to frighten others away from applying. That's the only real reason. I can show you another example. My son never had access to any classified work. But he is a refusenik for 8 years, without even a pretext. When he demanded they tell him what is the reason for his refusal, they told him there was no reason at all.

Mr. OVSISCHER. When they took my pension away, they told me that they were taking everything away from me and were never going to let me out. It's just to intimidate the others.

Mr. WOLFF. I do believe that we have certainly profited from the information you have given to us. Our basic point in meeting with you is to obtain from you personally information on your individual situation. The idea of trying to think for other people, for the other Jews in this country, is very difficult. But you can state from personal experience your own experiences. We ask for nothing more from you because if we are to try to think for all Jewry in the Soviet Union we are not going to be able to achieve the desired results in your individual cases.

Now, it must also be understood, I personally, I can't speak for the delegation, feel that individual cases are one part of the problem. The overall problem is something else. The overall problem is a question of relations between our country and the Soviet Union based upon Helsinki, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, discrimination that occurs and our own laws. In individual cases I do believe that we are not going to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. We can't. This is their doing.

However, what we can do is to allow the world and the people at large to know your individual situations. That is the basic reason why we have come here to speak with you. I think it also is important for us to make clear that our objectives are not to make difficulties for the Soviet Union but to redress the grievances that you have. That is most important.

Mr. SCHEUER. Alexander, do you have anything you would like to tell us? That we can discuss with our colleagues in Washington?

Mr. LERNER. I would like to add only that we are very grateful to the American people and to the American Congress that you are so much concerned about our problems and we are sure that your intentions and your activities will bring us what we need badly—exit visas and nothing else. I want to emphasize a second time that we don't want to do any harm to this country. We want only to get out of it.

Mr. SCHEUER. I take it you don't want to change the system?

Mr. LERNER. We don't want that, especially because we want to leave. It is not our business. We have no moral rights to try to change something in the country we want to leave. Thank you very much.

I think it is very important now to mention that the key problem now is the release of one of our best friends who suffered most, Anatoly Shcharansky. His fate is not only the fate of a person, it's the fate of a symbol. He symbolizes the honesty, the nobility of Jewish people and his fate is very much bound up with that of Jewish activists who do their best to contribute to their people and to their country and to human rights all over the world. So the problem of releasing Anatoly Shcharansky is now the most important problem for all of us. Not only for us, but for all people who understand what human rights really means.

Mr. SCHEUER. One last additional word, Dr. Lerner.

Mr. LERNER. My best greetings to my good friends, especially to Irene Manakovsky, to Judy Patkin, to Regina Bublaik, to Jack Minkow, Dr. Wisner and many others—good friends in the United States who are so much concerned about my fate, who do a lot.

I have no doubt that their efforts will bring us what we need badly—exit visas. I'm sure that you understand quite well that the MFN status should not be given to the Soviet Union. We appreciate very much the improvement in Soviet-American trade. But we are sure that according to your law, according to Jackson-Vanik amendment, you will not give it until the Soviet emigration policy will be improved. I mean as a minimum the fulfillment of the promises given to Bob Hawk. It means releasing the prisoners, exit visas to 5-year refuseniks, and limit of 5 years for waiting for an exit visa. Shalom and all the bests to all our American friends.

Mr. SCHEUER. Next year in Jerusalem.

Mr. LERNER. Next year in Jerusalem.

1. The first part of the paper discusses the importance of the study of the history of the United States. It is argued that a knowledge of the past is essential for a full understanding of the present and for the development of a sound policy for the future. The author points out that the United States has a long and rich history, and that it is one of the most powerful and influential nations in the world. It is therefore essential that we should have a clear understanding of our own history, and of the history of the world, in order to be able to make the best use of our resources and to maintain our position of leadership in the world.

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