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THE INDOCHINESE REFUGEE SITUATION AUGUST 1979

REPORT OF A STUDY MISSION
OF THE

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

AUGUST 2-11, 1979

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FOREWORD

Following is the report of a study mission appointed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to investigate the Indochinese refugee situation. The report, which was printed under the auspices of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, does not necessarily reflect the views of the members of the committee or of the House of Representatives.

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

Hon. THOMAS P. (TIP) O'NEILL, Jr.,
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: Following is the report of the nine-member study mission which you appointed on July 30, 1979, to investigate the current Indochinese refugee situation.

Prior to the delegation's departure, extensive briefings and consultations were conducted with U.S. Government officials in Washington. In the field, the delegation visited four first-asylum countries (Hong Kong, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia), Vietnam, and the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC) in Honolulu.

During the visits in Southeast Asia, the delegation met with host country officials, representatives of international and voluntary organizations, and U.S. Embassy and other overseas personnel. The delegation also interviewed refugees in each of the nine camps visited.

The delegation was assisted by the following House staff and Departments of State and Defense representatives:

Committee on Foreign Affairs: Robert K. Boyer, senior staff consultant; F. Marian Chambers, staff consultant; and Shelly Livingston, staff assistant.

Office of Hon. John J. Rhodes, minority leader: John J. Williams, staff director.

Department of State: Robert Miller, Assistant Coordinator for Congressional and Public Liaison to Ambassador Dick Clark, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs; and Harold E. Meinheit, Thailand desk, Bureau of Asian and Pacific Affairs.

Department of Defense: Col. Clifford Harcourt Rees, U.S. Air Force, and Lt. Col. Ronald Sable, U.S. Air Force.

We wish to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to all of those, both here and abroad, who contributed to the study mission's endeavors.

Sincerely,

BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL,
Chairman.

JOHN PAUL HAMMERSCHMIDT,
Vice Chairman.

ROBERT F. DRINAN.

THOMAS J. DOWNEY.

GEORGE MILLER.

RICHARD NOLAN.

DANIEL K. AKAKA.

ANTONIO BORJA WON PAT.

LYLE WILLIAMS.

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INTRODUCTION

The Geneva Conference on July 21-22, 1979 on Indochinese refugees focused the world's attention on the plight of the boat refugees from Vietnam, some 250,000 of whom may have perished at sea according to U.S. Pacific Command estimates. Though the conference was generally considered a success, the U.S. congressional delegation to the conference returned home with many questions on the implementation of agreements made at Geneva. Numerous bills relating to Indochinese refugees are now pending in Congress and action on these legislative proposals may decide the fate of hundreds of thousands of refugees now seeking asylum or residing in refugee camps in Southeast Asia.

These circumstances prompted the Speaker of the House to appoint a nine-member congressional leadership delegation, headed by Representative Benjamin S. Rosenthal of New York, to conduct a factfinding mission on Indochinese refugees in Southeast Asia.¹ The purpose of the 10-day mission, which included visits to Hong Kong, Bangkok, Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Hanoi and to the U.S. Pacific Command Headquarters in Honolulu, was to visit and review conditions in refugee camps in four nations of first-asylum, discuss the refugee situation with officials in Vietnam, and report back to the House findings and recommendations on the refugee problem, and the need for legislative action.

Perhaps the single most important observation of the mission, after having visited 10 refugee camps housing one-half of Southeast Asia's refugee population, however, is that the refugee situation is enormously complex. The delegation discovered that, far from being a purely humanitarian problem, the Indochinese refugees raise political, economic and social questions in the countries of first-asylum and the United States and other resettlement countries as well. In many senses, the countries of first-asylum have been victims of circumstances, by mere geographic location. For them, and for the United States, the solutions to the problem will not come in simple black and white answers, but rather in varying shades of gray. Nonetheless, the United States faces a responsibility to motivate the international community with a call for a humanitarian solution to the plight of the beleaguered refugees. On this point, there can be no question.

¹ Delegation membership: Representatives: Benjamin S. Rosenthal, chairman; John Paul Hammerschmidt, vice chairman; Robert F. Drinan; Thomas J. Downey; George Miller; Richard Nolan; Daniel K. Akaka; Antonio Borja Won Pat; and Lyle Williams.

SUMMARY OF MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is clear that the absence of normal diplomatic relations between the United States and Vietnam is an obstacle to any long-term solution to the refugee problem in Southeast Asia, as well as to direct communications between the Governments of the two countries on other problems that may exist between them.

In order to explore practical avenues toward establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Vietnam, and in order to deal with any obstacles to establishing diplomatic relations, we recommend that the United States resume negotiations with Vietnam on this matter at the highest feasible level.

2. Preliminary to establishing full diplomatic relations with Vietnam, the United States and Vietnam should consider immediately opening liaison offices in Washington and Hanoi.

3. The refugee outflow from Vietnam is significantly influenced by economic hardships in that country. The President should give serious consideration to lifting the U.S. trade embargo against Vietnam, and providing aid to that nation either on a bilateral or multilateral basis, in order to alleviate economic conditions which contribute to the refugee outflow.

4. The United States should, during the course of future discussions with Peking, emphasize the impact of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict on the refugee situation. Consideration should be given to linking the granting of nondiscriminatory or "most-favored-nation" (MFN) trading status to China with a peaceful solution to the Sino-Vietnamese conflict.

5. Despite the anxieties expressed by our ASEAN allies (particularly Indonesia and Malaysia) with respect to the increased role of the 7th Fleet in refugee rescue operations, we believe that the humanitarian aspects of this operation outweigh any temporary political problems it may pose. Should, however, the moratorium on refugee departures announced by Hanoi in Geneva prove to be effective, thus dramatically reducing the refugee outflow, we recommend that, at the end of the 4-month period covered by the Presidential directive, the 7th Fleet return to its normal mission under international law regarding vessels and persons in distress.

6. The Indochinese refugee conference held in July focused on the plight of the "boat people." We recommend that a similar conference be convened to consider solutions for the refugees who fled to Thailand by land, and who constitute one-half of the total Indochinese refugee population.

7. Because of their unique relationship with the U.S. war effort in Laos, the Hmong, many of whom have been stranded in refu-

gee camps up to 4 years, should be considered for priority entry into the United States under a special one-time parole program.

8. The United States should seek creation of an internationally sponsored and monitored food relief effort in Cambodia in order to prevent a famine which could trigger a massive exodus of new refugees. Such a relief program should be made available to all needy Cambodians and not through the auspices of any political regime.

9. The United States should actively encourage those nations in the region with suitable land areas to provide additional Refugee Processing Centers (RPC's), and it should continue to encourage earmarked contributions to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to support the construction and maintenance of such centers. Specifically, we recommend that the Indonesian Government be urged to establish another RPC, which could accommodate 50,000 to 100,000 refugees, possibly in the West Irian area, with financial support from the international community.

10. Increased attention and consideration should be given to the special problems encountered by refugees resettled in the United States, preferably by providing more adequate language and skills training for the refugees while they are still residing in the first-asylum camps and RPC's awaiting resettlement.

11. The UNHCR staff responsible for refugees in Southeast Asian camps should be increased substantially in order to provide the level of services and monitoring necessary for the adequate care and maintenance of the refugee population.

In particular, we recommend that special attention be given to improving the coordination of the refugee effort among the UNHCR, other official international organizations, and the voluntary agencies.

12. The United States should strongly encourage host governments to permit World Health Organization (WHO) assistance in the refugee camps.

13. To date Hong Kong has accepted entry of all "boat people," unlike other first-asylum countries in the region. Because of Hong Kong's liberal refugee policy, boat refugees tend to choose Hong Kong as a first-asylum location. As a result, resettlement countries have been inclined to take refugees from countries such as Malaysia, where antirefugee pressures are greater, at a faster rate than from Hong Kong. Therefore, we recommend that the United States increase its rate of resettlement of refugees in Hong Kong camps in order to rectify this imbalance.

14. Currently pending in Congress are the Refugee Act of 1979 and the President's amended budget request for migration and refugee assistance. We strongly recommend that passage of this legislation be expedited. The legislation is urgently required if the United States is to meet its pledge to increase U.S. resettlement of Indochinese refugees from the current level of 7,000 per month to 14,000. Careful consideration should be given to the need for continued Federal assistance to those States which are heavily impacted by refugee resettlement.

COUNTRY REPORTS

Hong Kong

THE SITUATION

Hong Kong, with a land area of only 404 square miles, has a population of 5 million. In addition to the population increase by natural births (minus deaths), Hong Kong also absorbs large numbers of immigrants from the People's Republic of China who continue to enter the Crown Colony both legally and illegally. From 1978 to August 1979, Hong Kong has received about 203,000 immigrants from the People's Republic of China (114,000 legally and 90,000 illegally). This influx represents a 4 percent increase in Hong Kong's population in just 1½ years.

On top of this tremendous inflow, the first arrivals of Vietnamese refugees hit Hong Kong in May 1975, when some 3,700 arrived on board the S.S. *Clara Maersk*. It took almost 3 years to resettle these refugees in other countries. Subsequently, from 1976 through July 1979, 74,666 Vietnamese refugees arrived in boats in Hong Kong with the bulk of them (67,340) arriving between January 1 and August 1, 1979. Against this massive influx, only 8,408 have been resettled in third countries, with 5,450 going to the United States. Viewed in the context of the whole of the Vietnamese boat refugee problem in Southeast Asia, Hong Kong has taken, on a first-asylum basis, the largest number of boat refugees so far this year, but has the second lowest rate of resettlement elsewhere.

To date, Hong Kong has not refused entry to any "boat people," unlike other first-asylum countries where the record has been mixed; moreover, the Hong Kong Government has taken the primary responsibility for funding and administering the refugee camps and holding centers. Government expenditure per refugee is about \$2 per day, compared to 26 cents per day in Thailand. As a result of the liberal refugee policy of the Hong Kong Government, boat people are more inclined to choose Hong Kong as a first-asylum location, and the resettlement countries have been inclined to take boat refugees from Malaysia, for example, where antirefugee pressures are greater.

STUDY MISSION BRIEFINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

BRIEFING BY U.S. CONSUL GENERAL

The study mission was briefed by the U.S. Consul General, consulate staff, and representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM), and the Joint Voluntary Agency Representative (JVAR):

The major points made during the briefing by the Consul General and his staff were as follows:

- The bulk (84 percent) of the refugees now in Hong Kong are ethnic Chinese.
- Passage from Vietnam is often made on small unseaworthy boats with crowded shelving for the passengers, which observers compared to the slave ships pictured in "Roots."
- Upon arrival, the refugees, who have been at sea from 2 to 6 weeks, are exhausted and dehydrated, particularly the very young and very old.
- According to consulate officials and representatives of international and voluntary organizations who have interviewed Hong Kong arrivals, the refugees' decision to take the hazardous boat journey was influenced by Vietnamese Government confiscation of land and property, lack of food, the prospect of having to move to the so-called new economic zones (NEZ's), and, in the case of the ethnic Chinese, official harassment and persecution.
- Consular officials estimate that 40 to 50 percent may not survive the journey. The refugees themselves rate their own chances of survival at 50 percent.
- Refugees report having had to pay fees and bribes to middlemen and local officials of as much as 12 taels of gold (approximately \$3,600 at present rates).
- Reported payments and bribes in recent weeks have been lower (6 to 7 taels), and the educational level of the refugees is also noticeably lower, indicating that the more wealthy Vietnamese and ethnic Chinese have already fled, leaving the less-well-off elements of the potential refugee population to come in the next phase.
- Those interviewed are not clear on the extent to which government policy and connivance are behind the exit fees and bribes.

MEETING WITH HONG KONG GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Following the briefing by the U.S. Counsel General, the study team met with the Secretary for Security of the Hong Kong Government, who is responsible for refugee affairs.

The security officials stressed the adverse impact of the refugee influx in Hong Kong, which is one of the world's most densely populated countries with 144,000 people per square kilometer. Notwithstanding the added numbers, Hong Kong has shouldered the larger share of the burden of supporting the refugee camps, while the UNHCR has not been able to cope with more than one-fourth of the refugees in Hong Kong.¹ Financial costs to the Hong Kong Government to date for 1979 are \$11,775,000 compared to \$3,775,000 in UNHCR contributions for the same period. Further, the UNHCR has only 2 representatives in Hong Kong to oversee the 66,651 refugees.

The security officials emphasized that the government's liberal refugee policy is clearly unpopular with the people of Hong Kong who resent revenues being diverted for the refugees. The officials noted

¹ A few days before the delegation's arrival, UNHCR decided to accept responsibility for about one-half of the refugees (32,000).

that the resentment is aggravated by the fact that, while Hong Kong has received 35 percent of all boat cases, only 13 percent of those resettled have come from Hong Kong. Thus, it is important to increase the resettlement rate for Hong Kong, before its camps reach the saturation point (according to the Governor General, about 100,000).

HONG KONG REFUGEE CAMPS

There are 11 refugee camps in Hong Kong with an estimated total capacity of 93,500. As of the date of the study mission's visit, eight were administered by the Hong Kong Government, while three were run by the Hong Kong Christian Service, the International Rescue Committee, and the Red Cross. Seven of the camps are "open," meaning the inhabitants can go out to work, while four are "closed" pending completion of UNHCR identification cards.

The study mission visited the Kai Tak North camp located at one end of the international airport. The camp has a current refugee population of 14,402, 84 percent of whom are ethnic Chinese.

The housing barracks in the camp did not appear to vary markedly from surrounding buildings outside the camp. However, the three-tiered bunks which constitute the living and sleeping quarters for the refugees are extremely crowded. Despite these cramped conditions, the buildings are neat and free of refuse, sanitary facilities appeared to be adequate, and clean running water is available.

The camp contains a dispensary funded by the Hong Kong Government and staffed by three doctors. The facility treats 200 to 300 patients a day, many of whom are children with skin problems. Camp medical officials stated that there was no shortage of drugs, and relatively few serious medical cases which had to be taken to a hospital.

On August 1, responsibility for Kai Tak North was transferred from the Hong Kong Government to UNHCR, which will now provide funding for care and maintenance of the camp (though the Hong Kong Government will continue to pay for construction). Under UNHCR policy, refugees will be allowed to work outside the camp during the day. Although refugees who work have their rations discontinued, UNHCR officials stated that in "open" camps about 60 percent of the adults are employed.

While in the camp, the study mission had an opportunity to interview seven refugees who generally corroborated the reasons for leaving described by United States and Hong Kong Government officials. For the most part, the refugees interviewed were from the Saigon area and had been directly connected with the United States presence in Vietnam.

STUDY MISSION RECOMMENDATION

To date Hong Kong has accepted entry of all "boat people," unlike other first-asylum countries in the region. Because of Hong Kong's liberal refugee policy, boat refugees tend to choose Hong Kong as a first-asylum location. As a result, resettlement countries have been inclined to take refugees from countries such as Malaysia, where anti-refugee pressures are greater, at a faster rate than from Hong Kong. Therefore, we recommend that the United States increase its rate of resettlement of refugees in Hong Kong camps in order to rectify this imbalance.

Thailand

THE SITUATION

Of all the first-asylum countries, Thailand has probably borne the greatest burden in providing a haven for Indochinese refugees. In terms of numbers alone, Thailand has received by far the greatest influx of refugees. In addition, international concern for the plight of Indochinese refugees has been almost exclusively centered on the "boat people," whereas the refugees in Thai camps are largely land refugees who have fled from ongoing hostilities in Laos and Cambodia. In spite of these problems, Thailand has continued to accept both land and boat refugee arrivals.

This year, refugees have been crossing Thailand's land borders at an average monthly rate of 14,000 people (9,000 Cambodians and 5,000 Lao and Hmong), bringing the total camp population as of July 31, 1979, to some 175,000 people. Despite an average monthly reduction of 2,800 refugees who depart for settlement abroad, the refugee population in UNHCR camps has been growing at an average rate of 4,500 per month in 1979. Even with ongoing resettlement programs, for every three refugees who arrived in 1978, only one departed for resettlement abroad; in 1979, so far, the ratio of arrivals to departures is nearing 10 to 1.

STUDY MISSION BRIEFING BY AMBASSADOR MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ

The study mission met with U.S. Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz in Bangkok for a working dinner and briefing. During the discussion, the following points emerged:

- The 175,000 refugees in 17 camps in Thailand are populated by 3 major groups: Laotians, Cambodians, and Vietnamese.
- Laotians account for 150,000 (88 percent) of the total population, of whom 80,000 are lowland ethnic Laos and 70,000 are Hmong hill tribesmen. The outflow from Laos averages 5,000 to 6,000 per month, but due to refugee acceptance criteria only 10 percent of Lao refugee arrivals have departed for resettlement.
- The Cambodians, who comprise 11 percent of the camp refugees in Thailand, consist of those who have fled the Pol Pot regime, and ethnic Chinese who have escaped or been induced to flee after Vietnam took over the country. In addition, there are some 20,000 Cambodians under the control of the Pol Pot forces who have found refuge in Thailand along the Thai-Cambodian border, although they do not reside in U.N. camps and are not counted in official refugee camp estimates.
- About 9,000 Vietnamese boat people have arrived in Thailand, but pirates operating in the Gulf of Thailand have discouraged sig-

- nificant numbers of boat refugees from seeking haven in Thailand.
- UNHCR has five field representatives in Thailand, which is generally considered to be inadequate to monitor the camp programs.
- Although UNHCR funds the refugee camps, the camps are administered by the Thai Government, which provides the management and land.
- The United States acceptance rate from Thailand has just been increased to a minimum of 4,500 to 5,000 per month as a result of the President's decision to admit 14,000 Indochinese per month to the United States.
- Waiting time for a U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service interview for a land camp case is now a minimum of 1 year because of the backlog of qualified refugees.

STUDY MISSION VISITS TO THAI REFUGEE CAMPS, AUGUST 5, 1979

The study mission divided itself into three groups and visited a total of five refugee camps in Thailand, which comprise a total population of 123,087 refugees out of the total 175,227 refugees in Thai camps at the time of the delegation's visit.

GROUP A VISIT TO NONGKHAI AND LOEI CAMPS AND AREA DETENTION CENTER

Chairman Rosenthal and Congressmen Hammerschmidt, Drinan, and Downey visited the two largest camps in Thailand: Loei, with a population of 38,456 Hmong refugees; and Nongkhai, with a population of 36,690 refugees who are both Hmong and lowland Lao. They also viewed the detention center in Nongkhai, where new arrivals from Laos are processed before entering refugee camps.

Camp Loei

The visit of Chairman Rosenthal and Congressman Downey to Loei near Ban Vinai marked the first time that a congressional delegation has seen that camp.

Loei (Ban Vinai) Camp is situated in Loei Province which is 650 kilometers northeast of Bangkok. The camp is 12 kilometers from the Mekong River border. Established in 1976 to accommodate approximately 12,000 Hmong refugees from Laos, the 705 "rai" of land is divided into sections referred to as centers. The first four centers accommodate the original population; the fifth center is for the ethnic Lao; and center "six" is for arrivals since May 1979.

The camp population increases by an average of 1,000 each month despite third country departures, approximately 300 monthly. Presently, the camp population is 35,000 Hmong and about 3,000 Lao.

Facilities for physical-educational development include child and adult classes, vocational training, handicraft center, community development center, Catholic and Protestant churches, Hmong temple, a soccer field, and a makeshift hospital.

Voluntary agencies involved with development projects include: World Vision, contributing medical aid and community development organization; Christian Missionary Alliance (CMA), responsible for

agricultural development and handicrafts; and Food for the Hungry, milk distribution.

The members were told by UNHCR and voluntary agency representatives in the camp that many of the inhabitants have been there since 1975. In addition to new arrivals from Laos, the camp was also swollen by an additional 10,000 refugees who were moved a short while ago from Nongkhai. The official explanation for the move is that the Nongkhai camp had become overcrowded and that there was friction between the ethnic Laos and the Hmong inhabitants in Nongkhai. However, the Members were told by a voluntary agency representative intimate with the details of the situation that the move could very well portend an effort on the part of the Thai Government to begin repatriation of Hmong refugees. While the various voluntary agencies working in the Loei camp (World Mission, Christian Missionary Alliance, and the JVA) are carrying out very successful projects in the camps, conditions in general are, in our view, unacceptable. The study mission's most distressing single impression was that of the extremely poor physical condition of the new arrivals in the camp, caused by weeks or months on treacherous mountain escape trails from Laos into Thailand. The camp doctor estimated that there were some 1,200 malnourished children in the camp, many of whom will never fully recover. The sudden unannounced arrival of the 10,000 refugees transferred from Nongkhai aggravated the already wretchedly poor camp facilities and meager staff support.

Nongkhai Camp and detention center

Congressmen Hammerschmidt and Drinan visited the Nongkhai camp, whose inhabitants are now for the most part ethnic Lao, following the transfer of 10,000 Hmong to Loei. While in camp, the members conducted interviews with Lao refugees who gave insights into the situation in Laos and motivations for escapes. The members also noted the high percentage of refugees backlogged in camp, with stays of 3 years or more being commonplace. As in Loei, the poor physical condition of the inhabitants was obvious, as were woeeful inadequacies of space and facilities.

The visit to the detention center adjacent to the Nongkhai camp vividly illustrated the dangerously poor physical condition of the new refugee arrivals from Laos. Many of the children were obviously in an advanced state of malnutrition and exhibited various rashes and other skin afflictions. The center was extremely crowded and inadequately staffed. During the study mission's review of the center, an official from the American Embassy in Bangkok reported that he had just seen evidence of discriminatory rice distribution at the center. The UNHCR representative and Thai Ministry of Interior officials on the scene took issue with the charge and nothing was resolved at that point.

The episode does, however, exemplify the stresses and strains that the refugee situation brings to the host government and participating administrative bodies. Examples of possible corruption and discrimination are not unique to Nongkhai, as will be shown in the following camp descriptions.

At both Nongkhai and Loei, the members were given profiles of camp inhabitants who were intimately involved with the U.S. effort in Laos,

either as officers or soldiers in the CIA-financed and directed special guerrilla unit, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and other U.S.-sponsored agencies. The profiles are included in the appendix of this report.

UBON LAO CAMP

Congressmen Miller, Akaka, and Won Pat visited the Ubon camp for Lao refugees, located near the Thai-Lao border about 600 kilometers northeast of Bangkok. The delegation was impressed with the innovation the Lao refugees have shown in transforming a former U.S. ammunition supply depot of 300 acres into a livable village of some 38,000 people.

The camp living quarters consist of 20 long tin-roofed houses built by UNHCR, each housing about 250 refugees, and an extended large area of individual bamboo-thatched houses built by the refugees themselves at their own expense (from about \$75 to \$400 per house). While the longhouses are overcrowded, dark, and dank, the thatched houses are airy and occasionally even attractive. Water is supplied either from a limited number of taps drawing on a nearby city's water system (available 2 hours each day), or from wells dug at the refugees' expense (about \$50 per well, usually shared by 10 families). Availability of water is therefore limited, and because of drainage problems water quality is generally poor.

As the population of the camp has increased, support facilities have been seriously strained. Sewage disposal consists largely of open drainage ditches, and garbage removal is haphazard. Health problems have been greatly aggravated by the proximity of sewage and trash to living and cooking areas where children often play.

A small dispensary funded and partially staffed by Save the Children Federation, with the assistance of five volunteer Lao refugee doctors, treats 300 to 400 patients a day. Dysentery, malaria, hepatitis, and tuberculosis constitute the majority of the cases. Lao doctors also claimed that 8 percent of the camp's population suffered from malnutrition, though officials elsewhere questioned this figure. The facility is extremely limited in the assistance it can provide. Although the camp has avoided major health problems during the last year, this appears due more to chance than policy.

There were persistent complaints from refugees regarding the administration of the camp, especially the feeding program. A problem often mentioned was that several thousand refugees residing in the camp had not been given I.D. cards to obtain food rations. A camp interpreter stated that for the first few months he was in the camp he was refused an I.D. card and had to share the limited rations of his brother's family, who had arrived at the camp before him. Even more prevalent were complaints that refugees were not receiving their complete allocations of rations; one refugee explained that although his family of 7 was supposed to receive 23 kilos of rice every 10 days, in fact they receive only 15. It also appears that refugees are being charged substantially higher prices for construction materials for their homes than prevailing rates in the city nearby.

These administrative deficiencies have not thus far posed a life-threatening situation for the refugees. However, recent development

ments may aggravate the refugees' plight. First, a law recently enacted by the Thai Government subjects refugees to substantial taxes on the small shops run by them in camp. In Ubon, refugees claimed that they must either pay 200 baht (\$10) every 3 months for each employee in the shop or be shut down, a restriction which seems to have been placed exclusively on the Ubon camp. (This was later denied by Prime Minister Kriangsak during a meeting with the study mission.) Even more serious, perhaps, is a new policy forbidding refugees to work outside the camp. Apparently the refugees have been working for very low wages, undercutting the local Thai labor force. Without these supplemental incomes to purchase additional food, plight of the refugees may become much more severe.¹

Another area of concern is the security of the camp's inhabitants. There are about 20 to 25 village defense volunteers who serve as camp guards to protect the refugees. However, there have been several incidents in recent months where these guards have wounded or killed refugees under somewhat suspicious circumstances. In addition, the fence at the back of the camp is in a state of disrepair. As a result, many refugees have been raped and robbed by people entering the camp through the unsecured areas.

Both embassy officials and the refugees seemed convinced that unless refugees in the camp, a majority of whom have been living there for several years, are moved out more quickly in greater numbers, that the entire camp may be repatriated across the border into Laos—although the Thai officials denied this possibility. The delegation was concerned that the Thai Government, which has shown such compassion for the refugees, may feel compelled to take drastic action in order to dramatize its problems.

ARANYA CAMP

Congressmen Williams and Nolan visited the Aranya camp near Aranyaprathet, Thailand, located within 2 kilometers of the Cambodian border. The Cambodian camp at Aranyaprathet was first established in May 1975, about 1 kilometer south of the town. The area was very small and could not accommodate the continuing flow of Khmer refugees into Thailand. In September 1976, the refugees were moved to the present location 7 kilometers north of the town. The present official population is 6,029 refugees.

The camp has 20 barracks built by the UNHCR. Each barrack is divided into 30 rooms and was originally designed to house 300 people. Two other barracks were built by the refugees themselves. Over 500 thatched houses were built in the back of the camp for over 3,000 ethnic Khmer who had been living outside the camp until their arrest and confinement in July 1977.

The Aranya camp has absorbed the main influx of Cambodian refugees to Thailand during the past 2 years. In the period July-October 1978, over 1,000 refugees, including 99 single males, arrived in the camp.

¹ According to the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok, the law referred to by the refugees is the new "Working of Aliens Act." for which implementation regulations were promulgated May 11, 1979. The law restricts certain aliens (including the post-1975 refugees, who were previously not included) to certain occupations, and raises registration fees for refugee businesses from 100 to 800 baht. Implementation of the law, as well as policies regarding refugees working outside the camps, seems to vary according to local conditions.

A school in the camp, staffed by Thai teachers, provides education for a little more than 60 of the estimated 2,500 children in camp. The International Rescue Committee, a U.S. private voluntary agency, maintains a small hospital with one full-time nurse and doctor. In addition, a technical center organized by the refugees and assisted by Project Vietnam Orphans, offers training in weaving, batik, tool and die, oil painting, and hand crafting of musical instruments.

The delegation was told that people often come into the camp secretly from Cambodia, making it difficult to account for exact numbers present. There were reported to be a number of illegal refugees, and many who had faced considerable difficulty gaining admission.

Four principal reasons were given by refugees for fleeing Cambodia: (1) Those that fled the Pol Pot regime in fear of execution; (2) those who fled the current war; (3) those who were fleeing because of famine brought on by the current war; and (4) those who opposed communism.

The camp was not at its full capacity. The delegation remarked that there did not appear to be sufficient land for planting gardens, but the feeding program seemed adequate, and none of those interviewed by the delegation complained of a shortage of food. There were a few refugees who mentioned a shortage of clothing; however, it did not appear to be a serious shortage. The most glaring need noted was for medical and health supplies.

There were a number of refugees who had been approved for resettlement to the United States who had been waiting 3 to 6 months for sponsorship in the United States.

SURIN CAMP

Congressmen Nolan, Miller, Akaka, Williams, and Won Pat comprised the first congressional delegation to visit the camp. The Lumpek camp near Surin contains approximately 3,500 Khmer refugees, who fall into four categories: (1) Cambodians who have resided there since 1975; (2) illegal refugees; (3) new refugees who have been transferred to Lumpek from Aranyaprathet; and (4) Cambodians who have returned from the June repatriation. The last category consists of about 1,000 refugees whom the Thai Government agreed to allow into the camp on the condition that they would be resettled to the United States within 30 days.

Built in 1976, with a capacity for 6,000 to 8,000 people, the camp is one of the few where overcrowding is not a serious problem. Water is generally available and potable, and there is sufficient land for planting gardens. UNHCR has built a new hospital, though it has not yet opened due to a lack of money to provide water to the facility. The feeding program which supplies enough rations for about 2 meals per day is supplemented by a voluntary agency milk program for children under 12. The Thai Government funds and administers several schools where children are taught Thai and some Khmer.

Administrative problems seem to occur with some frequency, although not with the severity experienced in some other camps. A UNHCR official expressed regret that a recent camp commander, who had substantially reduced food program costs, was suddenly transferred to another province and replaced by the former camp commander who is now paid a high salary for administering the camp on a part-time basis. There seems to be some doubt as to whether the rice

purchased for the camp is of the same quality as that ordered. However, refugees interviewed did not generally complain of inadequate rations.

Because of the urgent need to resettle the Cambodian refugees in order to avoid forced repatriation, the number of camp refugees resettled has been relatively high—about 1,900 to the United States between February and August 2, 1979. However, if the current food shortage in Cambodia becomes more severe, a new wave of refugees may begin to appear in 2 or 3 months when the impact of the shortage is expected to hit the hardest.

MEETING WITH AIR MARSHAL SITTHI SAWETSILA

Air Marshal Sitthi Sawetsila, the Secretary General of the National Security Council, which is responsible for Thai refugee policy, hosted a working breakfast for the delegation to discuss refugee camp administration and policy.

Mr. Sitthi outlined the refugee situation from the Thai point of view, stressing domestic political pressures and the efforts of the Thai Government to pursue moderate policies without arousing the hostility of the Thai people. He reiterated his disappointment at the low priority which has been given to the land refugees, both at Geneva and by the media, considering that one-half of all Indochinese refugees are "land" refugees, and urged that attention and resettlement offers be more equitably distributed between the two groups.

MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER KRIANGSAK CHOMANAN

At the conclusion of the visit to Thailand, the delegation met with Prime Minister Kriangsak in order to discuss Thai refugee policies and conditions in the camps as well as to explore ways in which assistance could be provided to alleviate Thailand's burgeoning refugee problems.

The Prime Minister stressed that the delegation must understand the problems that the Thai people are facing internally in order to understand Thailand's refugee policy. Thailand has long borders which are difficult to defend, and the presence of 100,000 Vietnamese troops along the Thai-Cambodian border is obviously unsettling. The flood of refugees into Thailand shows no signs of abating, and the refugees are becoming increasingly unpopular with the Thai people.

The Prime Minister was particularly concerned that the Geneva Conference on Refugees focused only on the problem of the boat people, which ignores Thailand's problems. Third countries seem to think that the Thais can accept more refugees, whereas, in fact, the situation is very difficult already.

Mr. Kriangsak felt that the situation in Cambodia was very serious, with a strong probability of a famine in the near future and estimated that only 5 percent of the Khmer people are able to support themselves. If a famine occurs, a new wave of Khmer refugees will cross into Thailand. However, the Khmer are generally disliked by the Thai, and a large influx could create instability. Although the Thai Gov-

ernment repatriated some 40,000 Khmer in June, the Prime Minister stated that an improvement in the domestic political climate has made it possible for Thailand to provide temporary asylum for new Khmer refugees, at least for the present time. He felt, however, that there are many Khmer who want to return to Cambodia and will therefore be allowed to do so. In response to the delegation's question as to how a solution for Cambodia could be achieved, the Prime Minister stated that Vietnam must pull its troops out and let the Khmer people solve the situation themselves.

The study mission raised the question of a recent incident on an island in the Mekong river, where according to eyewitness accounts, a group of about 180 refugees fleeing Laos were prevented from entering Thailand and thus forced back into Laos, where many were shot or seriously injured. Although witnesses had claimed that many of the group were women and children, the official response was that the group consisted of armed insurgents fleeing Laotian forces.

The delegation also expressed its deep concern about Thai pirates who endanger the lives of refugees sailing through the Gulf of Thailand. The Prime Minister explained that his Government would like to control piracy in their waters, but that only four old patrol boats were available for this purpose, which makes adequate coverage of gulf waters impossible at this time. He suggested that boats provided through U.S. assistance would be helpful.

Mr. Kriangsak concluded by expressing his Government's concern for the refugees, but stated that Thailand was being flooded—in fact, “drowned”—by the influx and that the number of refugees in his country must be reduced.

STUDY MISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Indochinese refugee conference held in July 1979 focused on the plight of the “boat people.” We recommend that a similar conference be convened to consider solutions for the refugees who fled to Thailand by land, and who constitute one-half of the total Indochinese refugee population.

2. While 2 of every 5 refugees in Thailand are Hmong, only 1 in 12 of those refugees in Thailand resettled in third countries is Hmong. In view of their unique relationship with the U.S. war effort in Laos, the Hmong refugees, many of whom have been stranded in refugee camps up to 4 years, should be considered for priority entry into the United States under a special one-time parole program.

3. According to observers close to the scene, the Cambodian refugee population in Thailand, which now stands at 18,000, could increase by hundreds of thousands within the next few months as predicted famine conditions spread in Cambodia. We therefore recommend that the United States seek creation of an internationally sponsored and monitored food relief effort in Cambodia to prevent such a famine. Such a program should be made available to all needy Cambodians and not through the auspices of any political regime. In addition, we recommend that the United States establish a special bilateral aid fund to assist the Thai Government in caring for those Cambodian refugees

in the Thai-Cambodian border area who would like to return to Cambodia as soon as famine conditions and hostilities cease.

4. A major deficiency noted in each of the refugee camps visited was the lack of adequate medical services. In order to alleviate this problem, the United States should strongly urge all host governments, including Thailand, to permit World Health Organization (WHO) assistance in the camps. Such assistance could be made available both to camp inhabitants and to the local indigenous population in order to counter the host government's concern that the level of refugee care not rise above that provided to the local inhabitants.

Indonesia

THE SITUATION

Until this year, Indonesia's refugee population was fairly small, and although Indonesia is a poor country, it had welcomed refugees and provided for them relatively well.

Up to June 12, Indonesia's stated policy regarding Indochinese refugees was that no refugees would be allowed to resettle in the country, but that Indonesia would permit them temporary asylum while they sought a permanent place of settlement. Then announcements from Malaysia and Thailand rejecting any more first asylum refugees, as well as an unprecedented influx of refugees to Indonesia, raising the total from 4,000 in March to 30,000 in June, prompted a similar announcement from the Indonesian Government. Refugees have, however, continued to land and have been accepted for temporary asylum. As of the date of the study mission's visit, UNHCR registration figures showed about 46,000 refugees in Indonesia, most of whom have been pushed off from Malaysia and arrived in the Anambas Islands. Unofficial estimates place the total refugee population in Indonesia at 50,000 to 55,000.

STUDY MISSION BRIEFINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

BRIEFING BY AMBASSADOR EDWARD E. MASTERS

The delegation met with Ambassador Masters for a briefing on the current refugee problems in Indonesia. The Ambassador made the following points:

- Indonesia is unofficially continuing to grant first asylum to refugees arriving on their shores and no refugees have been sent back to sea.
- Indonesia was the first country to offer a Refugee Processing Center (RPC) for those who would be resettled elsewhere.
- No refugees have been accepted for permanent resettlement and it is unlikely that they will be, as Indonesia is a poor, overpopulated country, which has difficulty caring for its own people.
- Most incoming refugees are ethnic Chinese, whom the local population dislikes. There are fears that the ethnic Chinese refugees will stay and join the economically strong Chinese business minority, which contains only 2 percent of Indonesia's population but controls 80 percent of the economy.
- There is opposition to the refugees from the military, who view them as a potential security threat. Opposition also comes from some Muslims.
- The three UNHCR representatives in Indonesia are inadequate to cope with the number of refugees.

- Most of the refugees are living in the remote Anambas Islands, where a lack of potable water, arable land, and the coming monsoon season pose a life-threatening situation for at least some of the refugees if they are not moved.
- Two refugee camps are under construction on Galang Island: (1) a refugee processing center; and (2) a first-asylum camp, each of which will hold 10,000 refugees.

MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER MOCHTAR KUSUMAATMADJA

The delegation was received by Foreign Minister Mochtar at his residence. The Minister began the meeting by stating that he was a realist on the refugee situation and that for the time being, the commitments which were made at Geneva are sufficient though the processing of refugees must be accelerated. He also noted that the UNHCR office in Indonesia is understaffed.

Mr. Mochtar explained that Indonesia is taking steps on its own to deal with its refugee problem. First, his government planned to meet immediately with the Malaysians and state to them clearly that the Malaysians must not push their refugees out to sea since their subsequent arrival in Indonesia is causing grave problems. He noted that under international law, refugees from a first-asylum country who have moved elsewhere can be sent back to the country of first-asylum. However, he expressed hope that an agreement could be reached whereby Malaysia would stop expelling refugees.

Mr. Mochtar stated that his country will also send a delegation to Hanoi to discuss measures for an orderly departure of refugees from Vietnam, adding that he did not approve of the concept of RPC's within Vietnam itself. Rather, he felt that with an expanded UNHCR staff in Vietnam and simplified processing procedures, refugees could go from Vietnam immediately to their ultimate destination without being held in some type of "detention center."

The Foreign Minister expressed some discomfort at the concept of a refugee processing center, pointing out that he did not want to create a precedent which could encourage a government to expel elements of its population with the assurance that they will be accommodated in holding centers elsewhere. He reminded the delegation that Indonesia has agreed to and is in the process of establishing one refugee processing center, and rejected the idea of Indonesia providing a larger island for this purpose. His objection, he stated, was twofold: First, he wants to get resettlement countries "hustling," and the establishment of a larger refugee processing center would allow these countries to ignore Indonesia's problem. Second, he expressed concern that refugee processing centers would encourage an even greater outflow of refugees. He noted that while Indonesia has not considered resettling refugees in Indonesia permanently, he was unaware of any refugees who would want to settle in his country anyway.

Mr. Mochtar then outlined his suggestion for solving the refugee problem, which would consist of a family reunification program, and legal exits from Vietnam under broad general mandates. Any other refugees would be considered illegal, and, as illegal immigrants, be sent back to their country of origin.

The delegation expressed strong concern over the hazardous situation in the Anambas Islands, where some 40,000 refugees living in inhospitable areas will soon be hit with monsoons. In this regard the delegation asked how a potential tragedy could be averted, given the short time available to take action. Mr. Mochtar explained that steps were being taken to protect the refugees, and that some had already been moved to safer islands. The great need is for ships to transport these people. Several private agencies have offered ships, but many more are needed to successfully transport the people off the islands. He rejected the delegation's suggestion that ships from the 7th Fleet be used for this purpose. However, even when ships are obtained, he insisted that some other location must be found to settle the refugees as there are no camps with facilities and space to hold them unless others are resettled.

Mr. Mochtar assured the delegation that the problem in the Anambas Islands would be resolved. He also suggested that the world should not isolate Vietnam, but instead bring it back into the civilized world.

MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF THE INDONESIAN PARLIAMENT

The delegation paid a courtesy call on key members of the Indonesian Parliament including Deputy Speaker of the Parliament, Mr. Kartidjo; chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mr. Chalid Mawardi; chairman of the Interparliamentary Committee, Mr. Soekardi; and others.¹ During the exchange of views, the delegation again expressed its concern over the refugees in the Anambas chain, and received several conflicting opinions on the situation from the Indonesian members. Some felt the problem was not life threatening and others felt that much of the land was uninhabitable. All members agreed that the U.S. 7th Fleet would not be acceptable as a means of transporting the refugees to a new site, but that any other help the United States could provide Indonesia for coping with the refugee situation—medicine, food, transportation, and so forth—would be greatly appreciated. The Indonesian Parliament members also agreed that the best, and in fact, the only solution to Indonesia's refugee problem is to speed up the processing system of resettlement.

MEETING WITH VICE PRESIDENT ADAM MALIK

The delegation concluded its meetings in Jakarta with a call on Vice President Adam Malik at his residence, where he outlined his government's concerns about and policies on refugees. The Vice President stressed that the refugee migration is often cast as a humanitarian problem, and that government actions are judged in this light. In fact, however, this is only one aspect of the problem. Another aspect is that governments, by their policies, must not provide an incentive for more innocent people to leave their homes. In this regard, he felt, we must constantly be wary of setting an unwise precedent.

The most important aspect for Indonesia, in his view, is the impact of the refugees on the political, economic, and social conditions in the country, which affects national security. As of now, the Vice President

¹ See appendix for listing of other officials present.

stated, there are more than 40,000 refugees scattered through the Indonesian Islands. The Government wants to avoid potential conflicts between the permanent inhabitants and refugees. He noted that while the Government tries to take good care of its refugees, their own people are unemployed and hungry; therefore, the potential exists for social vengeance.

In response to the delegation's reiterated concern for the refugees in the Anambas, the Vice President pointed out that barracks are being constructed on Galang Island, both for a refugee processing center and a first-asylum camp. However, there are numerous problems in constructing facilities for 20,000 people in a very short period of time, and he questioned the advisability of moving people to this island when there are no facilities prepared to receive them. Nonetheless, he assured the study mission these refugees will definitely be moved to more hospitable locations.

VISIT TO TEREPA ISLAND REFUGEE CAMP, ANAMBAS ISLANDS

The visit of three members of the delegation, Congressmen Miller, Nolan, and Downey, to Terempa Island refugee camp marked not only the first congressional visit to the Anambas Islands, but also one of the few visits by any outsiders to the remote, almost inaccessible island group.

The delegation visited the largest refugee camp on Terempa, which was reached by locally hired nonmotorized sampans. The unavailability of other transport was indicative of the logistics problems which the area presents, even for the local population. Two partially sunken refugee boats which were passed on route to the camp also provided graphic evidence of the dangers on the high seas which the refugees face.

The precarious situation of the refugees at the camp was obvious. Flimsy pole and thatched shacks which the refugees had built for temporary shelter were constructed almost on top of one another on the hilly terrain, virtually assuring their destruction in the coming monsoons. A very small stream dripping from the hillside obviously did not provide sufficient fresh water for the 5,200 refugees. The camp doctor stated that malaria was a serious problem and that there was a general lack of medicines for the refugees, including insufficient vitamins to combat a growing problem of child anemia within the camp. Skin diseases and sores were common among the children, reflecting the effect of the extremely crowded conditions under which the refugees are living.

The delegation was particularly concerned that UNHCR did not seem to be insuring an adequate supply of basic medicines and other life support essentials to the camp. The members were also informed that many refugees had received checks from the United States and elsewhere, ranging in value from \$20 to \$300, which they were unable to cash. Local officials explained that refugee office policy is to limit the cashing of checks to those cases which are of an emergency nature and that the others should be turned over to the UNHCR for handling. The local subdistrict officer agreed that the uncashed checks would be turned over to the UNHCR.

Although conditions on Terempa Island are considered the worst for refugees in the Anambas Islands, the study mission also overflowed Letung and four refugee camps in the area. Thousands of refugees could be seen swarming out toward the beach on Kuku Island, indicating the mass of refugees who are willing to seek asylum even in such inhospitable areas.

In the view of the members, at least 9,000 to 12,000 refugees must be moved immediately if these refugees are not to perish in the coming monsoons. Indonesian military officers accompanying the study mission agreed with this assessment.

STUDY MISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

1. While the Indonesian Government should be applauded for its early efforts to establish an RPC on Galang Island, it is clear that the number of refugees—10,000—which can be accommodated by this center is inadequate to cope with the overall problem. Therefore, we recommend that the Indonesian Government be encouraged to establish an additional RPC, which could accommodate 50,000 to 100,000 refugees, possibly in the West Irian area, with financial support from the international community.

2. The United States, along with other nations capable of providing assistance, should make every possible effort to assist the Indonesian Government in its ongoing efforts in relocating those refugees now stranded in the Anambas Islands before the monsoon season hits the area.

Malaysia

THE SITUATION

Although Malaysia currently does not officially act as a first-asylum country for Indochinese refugees, Malaysia has given temporary asylum to the largest number of the boat refugees who have fled Vietnam since 1975. Malaysia's current policy of refusing temporary asylum to refugees landing on their shores stems from two factors: First, the tremendous influx of refugees in April and May of this year, which added to an already swollen in-country refugee population; and second, the Government's fear of upsetting Malaysia's delicate racial balance by substantially increasing the ethnic Chinese population. As a result of Malaysia's new policy and increased resettlement offers from third countries, a significant milestone was reached in July 1979, when, for the first time in the 2-year history of Indochinese refugees in Malaysia, there was a reduction in the total number of refugees on Malaysian soil.

STUDY MISSION BRIEFINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

BRIEFING BY AMBASSADOR ROBERT H. MILLER

At a working luncheon at his residence, Ambassador Miller made the following points:

- Until November 1978 the United States was taking 700 to 800 refugees per month from Malaysia, with other third countries taking an equal amount. Starting in July 1979, the United States has a target resettlement rate of 4,000 per month from Malaysia, which the United States hopes will encourage Malaysia to reinstitute its policy of granting refugees temporary asylum.
- The Malaysian population is composed of 47 percent Malays, who tend to dominate the Government structure; 36 percent Chinese, who are influential in the economy of the country; and about 10 percent Indians. The relations between these ethnic groups are complex and not always harmonious.
- In July 1979 some 6,000 refugees were intercepted prior to landing in Malaysia. Before being towed out, the boat refugees were given food, fuel, and water.
- UNHCR representatives are allowed into regular refugee camps, but not in the so-called limbo camps, where refugees are held on beaches and are subject to being towed out at any time, since the Malaysian Government does not recognize them as having refugee status.
- Despite Malaysia's reluctance to grant temporary asylum to Indochinese refugees, it is likely that refugees will continue to approach the Malaysian shores for purely physical reasons. Pri-

mary among the physical factors which draw refugees to the Malaysian shorelines are (1) the wind and current patterns; and (2) oil rigs seen from afar which act as landmarks.

MEETING WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMED

The Deputy Prime Minister began the meeting with the study mission by explaining his widely reported remark in June 1979, that Malaysia would shoot any refugees who attempted to land in the country. In fact, he said, his comment was misunderstood; what he really said was that "we will do everything short of shooting them, for which we would need the approval of Parliament * * *." In any case, the statement has served its purpose, in his view, by drawing the attention of the rest of the world to the severity of the refugee problem in Southeast Asia. He stated that while Malaysia had shot across some refugee boats in order to frighten them away, no refugees had been killed.

In response to the delegation's question as to whether Malaysia would resume its first-asylum policy now that substantial numbers of refugees are being resettled from the camps, Minister Mahathir replied that Malaysians were no less humanitarian than Americans and had in fact assisted many refugees. He specifically mentioned 140,000 Filipinos who had been given refuge in Malaysia's Sabah Province, explaining that they would be easily integrated into Malaysian society because they were Moslems. He stressed that after the Indo-chinese war, Malaysia had accepted numerous refugees for transit. However, he felt that the situation was much different when refugees were no longer fleeing from war, but merely from a form of government which they did not like. He asserted that these people will simply have to learn to live in their own country and accept their situation.

The Minister criticized the United States and other western countries for "stirring up" the refugees by pronouncements that they are not free, thereby encouraging them to leave. In his opinion, the increased operations of the U.S. 7th Fleet have aggravated the situation for the same reason. He stated that freedom is relative, and that since Malaysia had not given an incentive to the refugees by engaging in this kind of "freedom talk", Malaysia should not be saddled with the refugee problem. He also expressed sympathy for the economic and political problems faced by Vietnam which have led to its severe policies regarding refugees.

When the delegation pointed out that this kind of logic is not responsive to the reality of women and children being pushed into the sea and drowning, Mahathir stressed that a first asylum policy would force Malaysia to accept all incoming refugees immediately, with no questions asked. The United States, he pointed out, then has the luxury of spending several months asking the refugees if they have tuberculosis, if they speak English, and so on, before it decides whether to accept them or not. He stated that Malaysia would like to regard the refugees as a purely humanitarian problem, but that this was impossible. For example, he asserted, there was the danger that some of the refugees would leave the camps and join the Communist guerrillas in the jungles. (While the delegation was told by the UNHCR representa-

tive in Hanoi that there was evidence that some disillusioned members of the Vietcong movement were joining the refugee flow, Department of State experts discounted the likelihood of such activity.)

The Deputy Prime Minister emphasized that Malaysia was quite prepared to accept refugees on a temporary asylum basis, provided that assurances were given that "every single refugee would be resettled within a reasonable time". He concluded that Malaysia refused to be saddled with any unwanted refugees, a "residue" which would consist of prostitutes, criminals, and other social undesirables.

MEETING WITH HOME AFFAIRS MINISTER GHAZALI BEN SHAFIE

The delegation had a long and informative discussion with the Home Affairs Minister, Mr. Ghazali Shafie. Mr. Shafie opened the meeting by stating that there are three different kinds of refugees, who cannot be lumped together. The first are a permanent type, that is, those who have relatives in their selected host country and speak the host country's language. The second category are temporary refugees, who leave their country to escape war but who will want to return when hostilities end. The third kind are those who do not want to return to their country or to stay in the region, but want to get as far away as possible, such as the Vietnamese boat refugees. These three categories, he stressed, require different kinds of treatment. The third category are those who for a variety of reasons are "misfits" in their countries, and cannot adjust to the new system. Vietnam is "forced" to get rid of them to preserve its own stability, and therefore forces them into the sea while obtaining the extra advantages of extracting fees from them and creating instability among the non-Communist countries of the region.

Minister Shafie described the history of confusion surrounding the nationality of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam. Due to conflicting policy pronouncements from China and Vietnam regarding the citizenship of overseas Chinese, Vietnamese officials have questioned the loyalty of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam. However, even Chinese who are prepared to cooperate with Vietnam are suspect. The best solution to this problem, he felt would be to arrange for an orderly withdrawal of these people from Vietnam directly to the country of resettlement.

As for Malaysia resuming a temporary asylum policy, the Home Affairs Minister stated that Malaysia would be quite willing to assume a role as a first-asylum country, provided assurances of final asylum are guaranteed for every refugee in Malaysian camps. Until these assurances are given, however, Malaysian efforts for the refugees will not be commensurate with those during the period 1975-77.

Minister Shafie reminded the delegation of the riots involving Malays and Chinese in 1969, and stated that while 100,000 refugees could not destroy Malaysia, they could destroy democracy in Malaysia because the Government would not be able to retain the confidence of its people. This fragility of racial balance is partly psychological—but, in politics it is not facts that count, but what the people believe. In the minds of the Malaysian people, any change in the current racial balance is threatening.

The delegation was encouraged that, partly as a result of this discussion, Minister Shafie proposed to the Malaysian Cabinet the fol-

lowing day that the 4,000 refugees currently in "limbo camps" would be transferred to UNHCR camps, even though it would further swell the camps' population. The delegation has been informed that although no official decision has been announced on this proposal, 1,600 refugees from the "limbo camps" have been transferred to UNHCR camps, and that as many as 3,400 more would follow.

CHERAS TRANSIT CENTER

Congressman Drinan, Akaka, Williams, and Won Pat visited the Cheras Transit Center, located in Kuala Lumpur. Cheras is the point of departure for all Malaysian refugees leaving for the United States.

The camp, built in 1977, surrounds a Catholic church which has donated its land and outbuildings for the refugees. It is funded by private donations, the Malaysian Red Crescent Society, and UNHCR. Originally planned to hold 1,200 people, the camp's population is now 3,800 and recently was as high as 5,000. The increase in numbers has put an obvious strain on facilities and housing, which are extremely overcrowded. However, most refugees spend little time at the camp. Those with no medical problems usually depart within 3 days. Although there were 2,000 refugees with tuberculosis on medical "holds" at the time of the delegation's visit, this problem is usually solved by beginning treatment at the center, certifying that the disease is non-communicable and obtaining a waiver on those grounds, and informing public health officials in the United States of the need for continuing treatment.

While conditions at the camp are squalid, an atmosphere of hope and excitement prevails among these refugees, who are on the brink of departure for their new homes. Due to the dramatic reduction of new refugee arrivals in Malaysia and the rapid outflow of those presently in the camps, officials estimate that the remaining 64,000 refugees in Malaysia will be processed through the transit center by October of 1980.

PULAU BIDONG REFUGEE CAMP

The Pulau Bidong Island refugee camp, located off the eastern shore of the Malaysian mainland, is by far the largest camp in Malaysia. Some 34,000 people (about one-third Vietnamese and two-thirds ethnic Chinese) are huddled on 80 acres of land in what was once a tropical island paradise.

The delegation received a warm reception from the camp's refugees and the camp leader, who explained that the 34,000 refugees at Pulau Bidong were primarily those people who wanted to escape a Communist regime.

Pulau Bidong is one of the most well-organized refugee camps which the delegation visited. The refugee's administration of the camp consists of a 15-member advisory council elected by groups of families, and a camp leader and two deputy leaders appointed by the advisory council. The camp itself is divided into seven zones, each with its own committee.

A medical clinic built in July 1979 and funded by UNHCR treats 350 patients a day. Medical expertise is readily available, since there are over 300 professionally trained medical personnel among the

refugees themselves. While there is some shortage of drugs, the clinic does not appear to have any major problems.

Trash removal and sanitary facilities continue to pose a health hazard. Garbage is collected by the refugees and towed out to sea, but sometimes washes back up on shore. The absence of sanitary facilities means that the ocean where people swim, and children play, is also used for sewage purposes. There is no natural water supply on the island, except that which can be used for washing. Drinking water is brought in by barge and collected in containers by the refugees.

Most of the island's refugees were educated, professional people in Vietnam. A thriving black market, complete with expensive watches and radio sets, exists for those who have managed to escape with some money. The housing situation reflects both the wealth and time of arrival of the refugees, with the earliest or most wealthy arrivals living in better housing near the shore, and the latest and poorest refugees housed in crude shelters up the side of the high peaks on the interior side of the island. Construction materials are haphazard, consisting of plastic, tin, and wood which has been cut from the island's forests. Because the steep upper reaches where the poorest refugees live has been denuded by cutting down the trees, officials fear serious problems will come about when heavy rains come later this year with the possibility that some of these houses will be washed down the side of the mountains, or that mud slides will occur.

The current rate of departure for resettlement from Pulau Bidong is about 4,000 refugees per month. Since there have been few new arrivals due to Malaysia's current policies, this provides some hope that the strain on facilities and the island's resources from overcrowding may be alleviated in the future.

STUDY MISSION RECOMMENDATION

We commend current efforts on the part of the Malaysian Government to move the so-called "limbo people" stranded on the beaches to UNHCR camps and recommend that the Department of State continue to encourage the Malaysian Government to permit all such refugees to proceed for authorized camps.

Vietnam

Vietnam was the last of the delegation's stops in Southeast Asia. Hanoi's lack of development is in marked contrast to the other cities in the area. The effects of decades of war are vividly brought home during the hour-and-a-half drive from the airport to the Government guest house in downtown Hanoi.

The Vietnamese Government is under heavy criticism by the ASEAN states as a result of the refugee outflow, and Hanoi's presence in Laos and invasion of Cambodia have contributed to the refugee burden the Thai Government must bear and to heightened tensions in the region.

THE MEETINGS

The delegation's visit was hosted by Hoang Bich Son, Deputy Foreign Minister. After arrival at the Foreign Ministry's guest house, the delegation met with Mr. Son, who presented Vietnam's standard position on the refugee issue. The next day, the study mission discussed the refugee situation and other issues with Nguyen Co Thach, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the Prime Minister's office. (Thach's position in the Vietnamese Government is perhaps most similar to that of the President's National Security Adviser in the United States.)¹

During a 1½-hour meeting with Mr. Thach, the study mission covered a wide range of subjects relating to the refugee issue.

MORATORIUM ON ILLEGAL DEPARTURES

Secretary Thach asserted that the so-called "moratorium" on illegal departures announced by Vietnam in Geneva has been firmly enforced and that "very drastic measures" have been taken against those plying the refugee trade. He cited some 4,000 prosecutions brought to trial since January 1979 involving organizers of illegal departures and "some death sentences" for those guilty of capital crimes related to the refugee exodus. In response to the delegation's question as to the duration of the moratorium, he stated that it would last "forever" but that Vietnam would need the help of the international community with its orderly departure program. He added that it was possible to stop large vessels but impossible to prevent all departures by small boats. (Note: Secretary Thach's characterization of the moratorium was corroborated to a large degree by the UNHCR resident representative in Hanoi. The discussion with the UNHCR representative is summarized later in this report.)

ORDERLY DEPARTURE

In describing his government's commitment to establishing a procedure for orderly departure for those desiring to leave the country,

¹ The minutes of this meeting are included on p. 63 of the appendix.

Thach noted that four categories of people would not be eligible for emigration: (1) those who are serving or eligible for service in the military; (2) people involved in national security affairs; (3) persons working in vital sectors of the economy; and (4) people under prosecution by the law. He described two groups of people who want to leave Vietnam: (1) those from the Saigon area who cooperated with the U.S. Army and cannot accept a hard working life after becoming rich with U.S. aid; and (2) Vietnamese of Chinese origin. He asserted that only urbanites are leaving, not the peasants. When questioned on how many people these two groups represent, Thach replied that of those who had "cooperated with the U.S. Army," about 1 million remain in Vietnam, but not all of them want to leave.

On the proposal for three UNHCR officials to go to Saigon to expedite legal processing of refugees, Thach stated that as long as the officials were working for UNHCR, their nationality was immaterial. An American State Department official would be acceptable, he said, but only if the official were working for UNHCR—"he can't wear two hats." As to whether the number of officials which Vietnam would permit could be increased to six instead of three. Thach replied that "we hope to agree in advance". In response to the delegation's question on the possibility of direct flights to the United States from Vietnam for refugees who have been legally processed, Thach answered that "we can discuss this with you further. It is not a difficult question, but the United States must respect our law." He also noted that such flights were made to pick up prisoners of war. (Following its return to Washington, the delegation was informed that Hanoi had put forward a new proposal whereby one American voluntary agency official would be permitted in Ho Chi Minh city and U.S. consular officers would be permitted to come via charter flight to Ho Chi Minh City, interview the family reunification applicants, and accompany the approved applicants back to Bangkok the same day.)

FAMILY REUNIFICATION

The study mission noted that the United States has submitted a list of 5,000 names to the UNHCR who are eligible for emigration from Vietnam under the family reunification program, and asked why there had been such a delay in response from Vietnam. Secretary Thach replied that Vietnam must study the cases carefully, and added that of the 228 cases Vietnam had approved, the United States has accepted only 10. (Note: U.S. officials put the number at "less than 80.") He also remarked that "we have redtape here just like you do in the United States."

U.S. 7TH FLEET OPERATIONS

In a discussion on the expanded role of the U.S. 7th Fleet in rescuing refugees, Thach expressed opposition to this development, stating that the new policy only encourages the refugee exodus. Civilian ships, he felt, would be much better and were capable of handling the task "more quietly".

NORMALIZATION OF UNITED STATES-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS

Secretary Thach outlined the history of negotiations in 1978 on normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam. He vigorously objected to the three preconditions (that is, Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, solution to the refugee situation, and a reduction in the level of Soviet influence in Vietnam) the U.S. State Department had established for normalization, pointing out that raising the relationship between Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. as a factor affecting normalization was an unprecedented practice in international affairs. He noted that the United States established relations with China with no preconditions, and accused the United States of "playing the China card." However, he firmly stressed Hanoi's continuing desire to normalize relations, stating that Vietnam had provided photographs and blueprints of the former U.S. consulate in Hanoi, and had even repainted the building.

CAMBODIA

Secretary Thach explained that there are two characters to the war in Cambodia—it is both a war of liberation and a struggle against the war waged by China. He stated that Vietnam will withdraw its troops from Cambodia once the Chinese threat against Cambodia and Vietnam is removed.

BRIBES

In response to the delegation's inquiry about allegations that refugees had been forced to pay bribes in order to leave the country, Thach denied that it was government policy. He did admit that, while "some people had to pay" it is "not our policy." He reminded the delegation that the United States had "Watergate and Lockheed and that some Congressmen voted to impeach Nixon" which he thought was "good." He added that "we have cases which we must punish" but reasoned "if we are forcing them to leave, why would we force them to pay?" Further on the bribery issue, he reiterated that "it is not our policy to make them pay" and pointed to the 4,000 prosecutions and severe punishments, particularly for "making bribes and selling boats," some 5,000 of which he said were state-owned fishing boats. The fishing industry had been reduced by one-half as a result, he asserted.

NEW ECONOMIC ZONES (NEZ's)

Due to the continuing controversy on the nature of Vietnam's "New Economic Zones" (NEZ's) and allegations of refugees interviewed by the delegation on this subject, the study mission questioned Secretary Thach in detail on policy toward and conditions in the NEZ's. Mr. Thach stressed that the delegation should visit the NEZ's to "check up on this on the spot," but explained that NEZ's are a cornerstone of Vietnam's efforts to improve its agriculture. He stated that inhabitants of NEZ's are given land, houses, and food for 1 year, and are not forced to work if they don't want to. If there are no houses, the Army builds them. Food rations have been cut back, but not in the

NEZ's. Some inhabitants stay and some go, but they are not sent to the NEZ's as intentional punishment. Poor conditions in some of the NEZ's are a result of floods or other unfavorable circumstances, including administrative errors.

SINO-VIETNAMESE RELATIONS

According to Thach, the Sino-Vietnamese conflict is a major cause of Vietnam's current difficulties, including the refugee problem.

During the delegation's discussions with Thach, he contended that Chinese policy is to create "unstable conditions" in the Southeast Asian region. He added that the Peking Government uses the overseas Chinese population to "increase instability and put on pressure." In his view, the Chinese "want to isolate us politically and strangle us economically." Theirs, he said, "is a superpower policy to destroy Vietnam." Thach offered as evidence the recent Chinese invasion of Vietnam's northern border and Chinese support of the Pol Pot remnants in eastern Thailand and western Cambodia.

Thach saw the continuing Chinese military threat to Vietnam and Chinese activities in Cambodia as strongly influenced and even encouraged by the United States playing its "China card." He pointed out "at the same time the United States established relations with China with no preconditions, (former Treasury Secretary) Blumenthal visited China 1 day after China invaded Vietnam." "This," he said, "is a double standard. This is the 'China card.'"

In sum, Thach gave the strong impression that, were Peking encouraged to ease up its threat to Hanoi, Vietnam would be willing to withdraw its troops from Cambodia.

MEETING WITH UNHCR RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE

Two members of the study team and staff met with Mr. Anders Johnsson, UNHCR resident representative in Hanoi.

Mr. Johnsson stated that he had been assigned to Vietnam since September 1978 and has traveled freely throughout the country. As a result, he has been able to see the New Economic Zone firsthand, as well as speak with potential refugees around the country.

He described life in the NEZ's as very hard, where attempts to reclaim land with heavily alkaline soil were being made without sufficient machinery to drain the land and without fertilizer or insecticide. Villages must be built up on mud banks because of persistent flooding during the long monsoon season. He asserted that the poorly planned agricultural experiment is a result of a seriously thin pool of administrative and managerial talent. He observed that the lack of such personnel is due to:

- (1) The so-called "Phoenix" program of the United States during the war which effectively eliminated large numbers of Viet Cong cadre;

- (2) The exodus of the professional and managerial classes from the southern sector after the fall of the South Vietnamese Government; and

- (3) The outflow of ethnic Chinese from the North who were in key administrative positions.

In concluding this point, he noted that Hanoi now is confronted with administering 55 million people (minus the refugee population) as opposed to 20 million when the country was divided.

With regard to whether people are forced to go to NEZ's, he indicated that he had observed no evidence of direct force. Rather, the process was a more subtle form of giving them an offer they can't refuse. Taking the example of a Saigon inhabitant who is unemployed and hungry, he described the impact of Radio Hanoi broadcasts and newspapers advertising the opportunities available in the NEZ's and the promise of 1 year's ration of food. (For example, see article on p. 79.)

While he acknowledged that some of those fleeing the country do fear for their lives and well-being, he contended that the primary reason for leaving in recent months was economic. According to Johnsson, up to 50 percent of those who have left did so for economic reasons and an even larger percentage of those who may leave will do so for economic reasons. He cited the following factors:

- (1) Former merchants and other middle class inhabitants in the South can't cope with the harsh new economic regime;
- (2) The loss of \$1 billion in aid from the United States and China;
- (3) A serious food and medicine deficit; and
- (4) The U.S. trade embargo.

Unlike other Vietnam observers interviewed, Johnsson felt that a resumption of U.S. trade and aid to Vietnam would reduce the outflow of "economic" refugees.

On the subject of the government's moratorium on "illegal" refugee departures, he said that one "can be sure that (it) had taken effect." The government has begun to stop boats by all means, and to jail and even execute those who commit serious crimes in the attempt to get passage on boats.

Finally, on the orderly departure of family reunification cases, he revealed that UNHCR has made a proposal which has been accepted by the Vietnamese whereby UNHCR would open an office in Saigon to process departures. The office would consist of three professionals, including a regular UNHCR employee and one American and one Canadian, the latter two having expertise in "immigration matters." He said that Canada has nominated a candidate but that the United States had not responded. (Note: Subsequent Hanoi proposal to the UNHCR described on p. 28.)

STUDY MISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is clear that the absence of normal diplomatic relations between the United States and Vietnam is an obstacle to any long-term solution to the refugee problem in Southeast Asia, as well as to direct communications between the two countries on other problems that may exist between them.

In order to explore practical avenues toward establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Vietnam, and in order to deal with any obstacles to establishing diplomatic relations, we recommend that the United States begin negotiations with Vietnam on this matter at the highest feasible level.

2. Preliminary to establishing full diplomatic relations with Vietnam, the United States and Vietnam should consider immediately opening liaison offices in Washington and Hanoi.

3. The refugee outflow from Vietnam is significantly influenced by economic hardships in that country. The President should give serious consideration to lifting the U.S. trade embargo against Vietnam, and providing aid to that nation either on a bilateral or multilateral basis, in order to alleviate economic conditions which contribute to the refugee outflow.

4. The United States should, during the course of future discussions with Peking, emphasize the impact of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict on the refugee situation. Consideration should be given to linking the granting of nondiscriminatory or "most-favored-nation" (MFN) trading status to China with a peaceful solution to the Sino-Vietnamese conflict.

U.S. Navy 7th Fleet Refugee Rescue Operations

As a result of President Carter's directive of July 21, 1979, to the 7th Fleet regarding refugee rescue operations, and as a result of the negative response to the new policy expressed to the members in several countries of Southeast Asia, the delegation concluded its study mission at CINCPAC Headquarters in Hawaii.

CINCPAC officials began the briefing for the study mission by pointing out that there has been a traditional law of the sea governing rescue of those in distress since the earliest days of sailing vessels. These conventions were internationally codified in 1960 and are reflected in basic U.S. Navy regulations. (Article 0925, U.S. Navy Regulation 1973). The guidelines set forth pursuant to those regulations are:

- Proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in distress;
- Render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of being lost; and
- Afford all reasonable assistance to distressed ships and aircraft.

According to CINCPAC, the heavy flow of boat refugees prompted the 7th Fleet to amplify this basic guideline on June 24, 1978. Specifically, CINCPAC stated that U.S. Navy ships would assist any ship in distress with food, water, and medical supplies and render repair assistance if required. Refugees were to be embarked if undue hardship or death might ensue. Rescued refugees were to be disembarked at the next regular port of call or nearest feasible landing place as appropriate. In addition, U.S. aircraft were required to report distressed surface craft to the appropriate rescue coordination center.

Following the President's announcement of increased support for the boat people of Indochina on July 21, the 7th Fleet was given more specific guidance. While there was no basic change to guidance already promulgated, the major difference was that henceforth "aggressive" efforts would be made specifically to locate and assist refugees. Rescue opportunities were enhanced in a number of ways, including modifying ship schedules and port visits. In addition, this special effort included P-3 flights and a coordination center which is an addition to normal operations.

The guidelines adopted by the fleet pursuant to the President's instructions follow:

Within normal operation—

- Provide maximum opportunity to locate refugees and provide humanitarian assistance;
- Increase presence of ships and aircraft in rescue areas;

In addition to normal operations—

- Dedicate daily patrol flights to refugee search; and
- Establish a dedicated communications/control facility.

Since the implementation of the Presidential order, there have been 1,500 contacts and 11 actual sightings by both P-3 and ship-based aircraft and 8 rescues totaling 168 refugees.

The following chart compares 7th Fleet rescue figures for 1977, 1978, and January 1 to August 11, 1979:

Comparative rescue figures, 7th Fleet

<i>Inclusive time</i>	<i>Number rescued</i>
Jan. 1 to Dec. 31, 1977-----	540
Jan. 1 to Dec. 31, 1978-----	589
Jan. 1 to July 20, 1979-----	544
July 21 to Aug. 11, 1979-----	168

In addition to the 7th Fleet efforts and not included in these figures, a number of our allies, among them French, British, and Norwegian ships, have rescued refugees. Of particular note, a number of vessels have been dedicated to refugee rescue. Italy, for example, dedicated a 3-ship task force group that has embarked over 900 refugees for return to Italy, most of them boat cases towed to sea by Malaysia.

According to CINCPAC, the rescue operation raised the morale of the personnel; however, the operational commanders have encountered difficulties organizing and coordinating the various operations. The Department of Defense has requested to be reimbursed \$17 million by the Department of State for the rescue effort.

The delegation noted during the CINCPAC briefing that the rescue effort has been criticized by Malaysia, in particular, on the grounds that those rescued by U.S. vessels are automatically guaranteed resettlement in the United States while refugees already in first-asylum camps are subject to normal processing requirements, thus creating inequities.

STUDY MISSION RECOMMENDATION

Despite the anxieties expressed by our ASEAN allies (particularly Indonesia and Malaysia) with respect to the increased role of the 7th Fleet in refugee rescue operations, we believe that the humanitarian aspects of this operation outweigh any temporary political problems it may pose. Should, however, the moratorium on refugee departures announced by Hanoi in Geneva prove to be effective, thus dramatically reducing the refugee outflow, we recommend that, at the end of the 4-month period covered by the Presidential directive, the 7th Fleet return to its normal mission under international law regarding vessels and persons in distress.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF HON. LYLE WILLIAMS

I am in agreement with recommendations 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the report. However, I dissent from the majority opinion on recommendations 3, 7, and 14.

Recommendation No. 3.—The recommendation of the majority is that the President should give serious consideration to lifting the U.S. trade embargo against Vietnam.

I strongly oppose this recommendation of the majority and maintain that it is much too early to go beyond the preliminary stages of normalization of relations through the establishment of liaison offices in Washington and Hanoi. I believe time should be given to see if this trade-off of liaison offices should lead to further and closer relations that would be in our mutual self-interest.

Recommendation No. 7.—The majority recommends that the Hmong refugees from Laos be given priority entry into the United States under a special one-time parole program. I support this recommendation, so long as the number of refugees admitted under such a program does not increase the current level of 14,000 Indochinese refugees per month, which was the U.S. pledge at the Geneva Conference in July 1979.

Recommendation No. 14.—The majority has recommended that we support expeditious action on the President's amended budget request for migration and refugee assistance.

This and any further funding request should only be considered and approved so long as the United States is participating in international relief programs. In no way should the United States become involved in a bilateral effort and be forced to shoulder the burden alone.

APPENDIX

CODEL ROSENTHAL ITINERARY (2-11 AUG. 1979)

THURSDAY - 2 AUGUST 79

8:45 AM - Depart Andrews AFB
10:45 AM - Arrive Elmendorf AFB
12:15 PM - Depart Elmendorf AFB

FRIDAY - 3 AUGUST 79

1:30 PM - Arrive Yokota AB, Japan
3:00 PM - Depart Yokota AB, Japan
7:00 PM - Arrive Hong Kong

SATURDAY - 4 AUGUST 79

10:00 - 11:00 AM - Refugee Briefing/
Consulate
11:15 - 12:15 PM - Meeting with Government
Officials
12:30 PM - Working Lunch/Hong Kong
Governor Maclehorse
2:00 - 4:00 PM - Visit Refugee Camp
(Kai Tak North)
4:15 PM - Airport Press Conference
5:00 PM - Depart for Bangkok
6:50 PM - Arrive Bangkok
7:50 PM - Ambassador's Residence
Briefing Buffet

SUNDAY - 5 AUGUST 79

8:30 AM - Depart for Refugee Camps
Group A - Udorn/Nongkhai
Group B - Wattana Nakorn,
Aranyaprathet, Surin
Group C - Ubon, Surin
7:00 PM - Arrive Hotel

MONDAY - 6 AUGUST 79

10:15 AM - Arrive Government House/
Prime Minister Kriangsak
11:25 AM - Airport Press Conference
12:00 PM - Depart for Jakarta
3:15 PM - Arrive Jakarta
3:30 PM - Refugee Briefing/
Ambassador's Residence
4:30 PM - Briefing with Foreign
Minister Mochtar
6:00 PM - Meeting with Parliament/
Deputy Speaker Kartidjo
7:00 PM - Meeting with Vice-President
Malik
8:00 PM - Dinner/Ambassador's
Residence

TUESDAY - 7 AUGUST 79

6:00 AM - Group B leaves for Terempa
Refugee Camp, Anambas
Islands
8:00 AM - Press Conference/Hotel
9:30 AM - Depart for Kuala Lumpur
11:45 AM - Arrive Kuala Lumpur
12:15 PM - Meeting with Deputy
Prime Minister Mahathir
1:45 PM - Lunch-Ambassador's Residence
2:45 PM - Meeting/Home Affairs
Minister Shafie
4:00 PM - Briefing/Deputy Foreign
Minister Mokhtar
4:45 PM - Visit Cheras Transit Center

(Codel Rosenthal Itinerary -- Continued)WEDNESDAY - 8 AUGUST 79

7:00 - 12: AM - MAFC-130 to Kuala
Trengganu & helicopter to
Pulau Bidong

12:00 - 12:30 PM - Press Conference at
Airport

12:45 PM - Depart for Hanoi

4:00 PM - Arrive Hanoi

5: 30 PM - Meeting with Deputy Foreign
Minister Son

7:00 PM - Dinner

THURSDAY - 9 AUGUST 79

9:30 - 11:00 AM - Meeting with Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs Thach

11:00 - 11:30 AM - Meeting in Guest House

1:00 PM - Depart Hanoi

5:10 PM - Arrive Clark AB, PI
(Divert due to adverse weather in
Hong Kong)

6:10 PM - Depart Clark AB, PI

11:55 PM - Arrive Guam - Press/
Guam Governor

1:25 AM (10th) - Depart Guam

12:50 PM - Arrive Honolulu/Briefing
Pacific Command

FRIDAY - 10 AUGUST 79

12:00 PM - Luncheon/meeting with Hawaiian State Government
Officials

3:15 PM - Depart Hawaii

11:20 PM - Arrive Travis AFB

SATURDAY - 11 AUGUST 79

12:10 AM - Depart Travis AFB

8:00 AM - Arrive Andrews AFB

LIST OF OFFICIALS CONSULTED

HONG KONG

U.S. Government Officials:

Mr. Thomas P. Shoesmith, American Consul General

Mr. Edward Krueser, Chief, Consular Section, U.S. Consulate General

Anne W. Henshaw, Refugee Officer, U.S. Consulate General, Control Officer

Mr. Joseph Sureck, District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service

Captain Sheldon D. Kully, Defense Liaison Officer, U.S. Consulate General

Reverend Richard Shinn, Director, Joint Voluntary Agency Representative

Hong Kong Government Officials:

The Honorable Sir Crawford Murrery Maclehoze, Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Hong Kong

Mr. Ben Davies, Secretary for Security

Mr. Iain Orr, Deputy Political Adviser, Secretariat

Mr. Michael Cartland Deputy Secretary for Security

THAILAND

U.S. Government Officials:

The Honorable Morton I. Abramowitz, American Ambassador to Thailand

Mr. Mac Thompson, Refugee Officer

Mr. George Cosgrove, Refugee Officer

Ms. Bertha Romero, Refugee Officer

Mr. Herbert Mitchell, Control Officer

Thai Government Officials:

His Excellency Kriangsak Chomanan, Prime Minister, Thailand

Sitthi Sawetsila, Air Marshal, National Security Council

Mr. Pranai Suwannarat, Ministry of Interior

UNHCR Officials:

Mr. Pierre Jambor, Chief Representative

Mr. Martin Barber, Deputy Representative

Dr. Michael Gaubaudan, Regional Coordinator for Northern Thailand

Mr. Robert Saaf, Regional Coordinator for Eastern Thailand

Voluntary Agency Officials:

Ms. Charlene Day, Joint Voluntary Agency

Ms. Carol Leviton, Joint Voluntary Agency

Mr. Mike Carroll, Development Assistant, World Vision Foundation of Thailand

INDONESIAU.S. Government Officials:

The Honorable Edward E. Master, American Ambassador to Indonesia
 Mr. Paul F. Gardner, Deputy Chief of Mission
 Ms. Harriet W. Isom, Political Counsellor and Control Officer
 Mr. Eric Morris, Acting UNHCR Representative for Indonesia
 Mr. James A. Schill, Refugee Officer

Indonesian Government Officials:

His Excellency Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, Minister of Foreign Affairs
 His Excellency Adam Malik, Vice President
 Major General Raden Kartidjo, Deputy Speaker of Parliament
 Dr. Chalid Mawardi, Chairman, Committee for Foreign Affairs
 Mr. Mud'har Amin, Deputy Chairman, Committee for Foreign Affairs
 Mr. Kamil Kamka, Deputy Chairman, Committee for Foreign Affairs
 Mr. Ignatius Gde Djakse, Deputy Chairman, Committee for Foreign Affairs
 Mr. Soekardi, Chairman for the Committee for Inter-Parliamentary Cooperation (CIPC)
 Mr. Widya Pranata, Deputy Chairman, CIPC
 Mr. Ruslan Kasmiri, Deputy Chairman, CIPC
 Mr. Ricardo Siahaan, Deputy Chairman, CIPC

MALAYSIAU.S. Government Officials:

The Honorable Robert H. Miller, American Ambassador to Malaysia
 Mr. Bruce Hirshorn, Acting Deputy Chief of Mission
 Mr. Joe Gettier, Refugee Officer

Malaysian Government Officials:

His Excellency Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamed, Deputy Prime Minister
 The Honorable Ghazali bin Shafie, Minister for Home Affairs
 The Honorable Mokhtar Hashim, Deputy Foreign Minister

Pulau Bidong Refugee Camp

Father Nu Li Ngoc Trieu, Camp Leader

HANOISocialist Republic of Vietnam Officials:

Nguyen Co Thach, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Prime Minister's Office

Hoang Bich Son, Deputy Foreign Minister

Vu Hoang, Director, Consular Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Duong Minh, North American Affairs Desk, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

UNHCR Official:

Mr. Anders Johnsson, UNHCR Representative

CINCPAC OFFICIALS

Admiral Maurice F. Weisner, CINCPAC

Captain R.C. Elder (USN), J-2

Major General J.K. Davis (USMC), J-3

Colonel J.L. Wagner (USAF), J-4

Rear Admiral D.B. Shelton, J-5

Admiral D.C. Davis, Pacific Fleet Commander

Mr. Al Lynn, Special Assistant to CINCPAC for Public and Government Affairs

Brigadier General A.L. Codey, Executive Assistant to CINCPAC (Army)

Lt. General F.L. Poston, Chief of Staff, CINCPAC

STATISTICAL INFORMATION

POPULATION OF REFUGEE CAMPS VISITED¹

Camp Names and Countries	Ethnic Vietnamese	Ethnic Chinese	Lao	Hmong	Kmer	Total
<u>Hong Kong</u>						
1. Kai Tak North	2,304	12,098				14,402
<u>Thailand</u>						
2. Loei				38,456		38,456
3. Nongkhai ²			36,290	400		36,690
4. Ubon			38,231			38,231
5. Surin			"		3,845	3,845
6. Aranyaprathet					6,026	6,026
<u>Indonesia</u>						
7. Terempa, Anambas Islands	900	4,300				5,200
<u>Malaysia</u>						
8. Pulau Bidong	13,197	21,532				34,729
9. Cheras Transit	1,444	2,356				3,800
Grand Total:						181,379

¹ Represents about one-half of the refugee population in Southeast Asia. Statistics are based on host country, Embassy and UNHCR estimates. Camp population figures fluctuate widely due to arrivals and departures.

² The delegation also visited the Nongkhai Detention Center, which at the time of the visit held about 4,000 refugees.

INDOCHINESE REFUGEE ARRIVALS* JULY 1979

Country	July Arrivals	Departures for U.S.	Refugee Population as of July 31
Thailand			
Land	3,000	3,838	161,707
Boat	<u>600 (est.)</u>	<u>594</u>	<u>8,274</u>
Subtotal	3,600	4,432	169,981
Malaysia	1,559	5,590	61,559
Hong Kong/ Maccau	9,193	796	69,917
Indonesia	11,000 (est.)	401	55,000 (est.)
Philippines	599	97	5,794
Singapore	1,240	142	1,153
Japan	17	47	531
Others	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u>966</u>
Total	27,208	11,505	364,901

*Does not include refugees in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand who have not been registered in UN-sponsored camps.

(Source: U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs)

REGIONAL BOAT ARRIVALS—DECEMBER 1978—JULY 1979

COUNTRY	DEC 78	JAN 79	FEB 79	MAR 79	APR 79	MAY 79	JUNE 79	JULY 79
1. Hong Kong/Macau	427	3,455 1/	2,871 1/	507	1,952	33,732	20,011	9,193
2. Indonesia	501	809	960	3,101	4,606	19,188	9,932	11,000 (est.)
3. Japan	29	20 2/	-0-	45	21	49	133	17
4. Korea	26 2/	15 2/	-0-	NR	NR	NR	-0-	-0-
5. Malaysia	10,721	4,185	3,800	6,288	14,094	18,518	7,667	1,559
6. Philippines	2,380 1/	199 2/	715	20	208	790	1,131	599
7. Singapore	255	-0-	-0-	-0-	266	317	11	1,240
8. Thailand *	994	462	994	620	1,471	4,180	1,044	600 (est.)
TOTALS	15,333	9,145	9,340	10,581	22,618	76,774	39,929	27,208

* Land arrivals for Thailand from 1 January - 31 July 1979 totalled 130,000 (40,000 from Laos; 90,000 from Cambodia, of whom almost half have been forcibly repatriated).

1/ Primarily "large" ship arrivals

2/ UNHCR sources

(Source: U.S. Embassy, Bangkok, Thailand)

REFUGEE POPULATION ANALYSIS, 5/31/78 vs. 5/31/79

	Refugee Population 5/31/78	Refugee Population 5/31/79	Population Increase	Percentage Increase
Thailand				
Land	102,000	154,000	52,000	50.9%
Boat	1,700	7,200	5,500	324
Subtotal	103,700	161,200	57,500	55.4%
Malaysia	6,800	75,100	68,300	1004%
Hong Kong	600	43,400	42,800	7133%
Indonesia	300	30,100	29,800	9933%
Philippines	600	4,100	3,500	583%
Other	700	2,000	1,300	186%
TOTAL	112,700	315,900	203,200	180.3%

(Source: U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs)

RESETTLEMENT OF INDOCHINESE REFUGEES

Country	Resettlements April 1975- June 30, 1979	Resettlements July 1, 1979- June 30, 1980	Total Resettlements April 1975- December 31, 1980
Argentina	-	4,500	4,500
Australia	22,759	14,000	36,759
Austria	346	580	926
Belgium	1,336	2,062	3,398
Brazil	37	63	100
Cameroon	3	-	3
Canada	15,076	36,000	51,076
Denmark	570	800	1,370
Finland	-	100	100
France	50,637	22,600	73,237
Federal Republic of Germany	3,735	12,000	15,735
Gabon	4	-	4
Greece	-	200	200
Hong Kong	252	-	252
Iceland	-	30	30
Iran	47	-	47
Ireland	-	200	200
Israel	168	200	368
Italy	256	1,000	1,256
Japan	51	500	551
Liechtenstein	-	20	20
Luxembourg	47	100	147
Malaysia	2,137	600	2,737
Monaco	-	25	25
Netherlands	469	1,360	1,829
New Caledonia	38	-	38
New Zealand	948	1,200	2,148
Norway	870	2,400	3,270
Paraguay	31	-	31
Philippines	127	-	127
People's Republic of China	230,000	10,000	240,000
Spain	1	1,000	1,001
Suriname	-	750	750
Sweden	263	2,000	2,263
Switzerland	1,677	1,000	2,677
United Kingdom	2,841	10,000	12,841
United States	210,000	168,000	378,000
Taiwan	-	1,000	1,000
TOTALS	544,726	294,290	839,016

(Source: U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs)

U.S. RESETTLEMENT OF INDOCHINESE REFUGEES FROM SOUTHEAST ASIA AS OF
15 JULY 1979

	<u>Vietnam</u>	<u>Cambodia</u>	<u>Laos</u>	<u>Total</u>
Direct Resettlement from country of origin	130,000	4,000	-	134,000
1. Hong Kong	4,866	-	-	4,866
2. Indonesia	1,672	-	-	1,672
3. Japan	1,002	-	-	1,002
4. Korea	147	-	-	147
5. Macau	320	-	-	320
6. Malaysia	26,778	-	-	26,778
7. Philippines	1,905	-	-	1,905
8. Singapore	1,156	-	-	1,156
9. Thailand	12,354	9,407	27,147	48,908
Totals	180,200	13,407	27,147	220,754

(Source: U.S. Embassy, Bangkok, Thailand)

MEMORANDUM FROM THE JOINT VOLUNTARY AGENCY OFFICE, JUNE 12, 1979

MEMORANDUM

To : Eva Kelley, ACVA

From : Bill Sage, JVR-Thailand

Subject: Destination Summary June 3, 1979

<u>STATE DESTINATION</u>	<u>HMONG AND OTHER LAO MINORITIES</u>	<u>KHMER</u>	<u>LAO</u>	<u>THAI-DAM</u>	<u>VIETNAMESE</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWN</u>
ALASKA	13	0	7	0	8	28	.12%
ALBAMA	87	37	120	0	40	284	1.25%
ARKANSAS	55	11	75	0	35	176	.78%
ARIZONA	4	6	67	2	41	120	.53%
CALIFORNIA	1696	619	1403	7	1647	5372	23.71%
COLORADO	488	89	71	0	83	731	3.23%
CONNECTICUT	111	44	121	0	95	371	1.64%
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA	18	19	48	0	122	207	.91%
DELAWARE	2	0	14	0	3	19	.08%
FLORIDA	39	62	138	7	105	351	1.55%
GEORGIA	41	25	92	0	56	214	.94%
HAWAII	178	11	262	4	74	529	2.34%
IOWA	242	39	169	79	128	657	2.90%
IDAHO	9	3	89	0	6	107	.47%
ILLINOIS	567	104	455	0	173	1299	5.73%

International Rescue Committee

HEADQUARTERS : 386 Park Avenue South, New York, N.Y. 10016

Bangkok Buenos Aires Brussels Geneva Hong Kong Kinshasa Madrid Mexico City Montreal Munich Nuremberg Paris Rome Trieste Vienna

STATE DESTINATION	HMONG AND OTHER LAO MINORITIES	KHMER	LAO	THAI-DAM	VIETNAMESE	TOTAL	PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWN
INDIANA	69	25	45	0	74	213	.94%
KANSAS	61	57	86	0	106	310	1.37%
KENTUCKY	40	10	99	0	7	156	.69%
LOUISIANA	11	10	69	0	269	359	1.58%
MASSACHUSETTS	63	5	27	6	30	131	.58%
MARYLAND	7	12	43	0	38	100	.44%
MICHIGAN	162	55	83	0	72	372	1.64%
MINNESOTA	477	100	202	0	66	845	3.73%
MISSOURI	38	12	48	0	81	179	.79%
MISSISSIPPI	0	10	7	0	37	54	.24%
MONTANA	121	13	4	0	3	141	.62%
NORTH CAROLINA	65	3	56	0	3	127	.56%
NORTH DAKOTA	0	20	9	0	7	36	.16%
NEBRASKA	159	9	32	0	34	234	1.03%
NEW HAMSHIRE	0	0	7	0	0	7	.03%
NEW JERSEY	8	1	10	0	33	52	.23%
NEW MEXICO	25	5	80	0	31	141	.62%
NEVADA	53	2	23	0	15	93	.41%
NEW YORK	97	32	377	6	217	729	3.22%
OHIO	145	13	114	0	66	338	1.49%
OKLAHOMA	135	6	84	0	53	278	1.23%
OREGON	414	163	183	0	68	828	3.65%
PENNSYLVANIA	486	72	141	0	337	1036	4.57%

- 3 -

STATE DESTINATION	HMONG AND OTHER LAO MINORITIES	KHMER	LAO	THAI-DAM	VIETNAMESE	TOTAL	PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWN
PUERTO RICO	0	0	0	0	1	1	.01%
RHODE ISLAND	341	121	14	0	9	485	2.14%
SOUTH CAROLINA	30	0	43	0	9	82	.36%
SOUTH DAKOTA	39	9	9	0	28	85	.38%
TENNESSEE	203	12	280	0	52	547	2.41%
TEXAS	436	230	958	0	378	2002	8.84%
UTAH	105	56	138	0	83	382	1.69%
VIRGINIA	54	49	160	0	144	407	1.80%
VERMONT	0	5	0	0	0	5	.02%
WASHINGTON	293	228	193	0	126	840	3.71%
WISCONSIN	356	36	106	0	83	581	2.56%
WEST VIRGINIA	0	4	7	0	5	16	.07%
WYOMING	0	0	0	0	1	1	.01%
TOTAL	8043	2454	6868	111	5182	22658	100
PERCENTAGE TOTALS	35.50%	10.83%	30.31%	0.49%	22.87%	100%	

SELECTED PROFILES OF HMONG REFUGEES AT LOEI AND NONGKHAI CAMPS IN THAILAND

LOEI CAMP

IPP-APPROVED

Vang Yee (M)
 Family of Seven
 Entered Thailand: 14 May 1975
 Entered Camp: June 1975
 Building: 4-1-26/9

Cat I/III
 Spouse's parents in California
 Date of birth: 8 November 1947
 Place of birth: Xieng Khouang, Laos
 Ethnic: Hmong

Profile Data: Loei Camp Commander

1963 - 1969

Obtained teacher training in Laos; completed B.A. in teaching, Rennes, France.

1961 - 1975

Chief of Radio Operations, Village Defense Forces for three years; six months parachute and radio training under U.S. auspices in Thailand.

Upon return from France, enlisted with SGU as translator to U.S. advisors paid directly by Americans. Other responsibilities over five years period before escape include: Radio Communications, Chief of Personnel and Brigade Commander; four months officer training under U.S. auspices in Thailand; one year officer training by Lao government in Laos. Received performance/bravery medals and promotion to Lieutenant Colonel by King of Laos.

1977 to present

As the Hmong representative for the area, he is actively involved with third country resettlement prospects. In coordination with Thai Government and Food for Hungry, Vang Yee visited Bolivia in 1978.

Profile Date: December 8, 1978

LOEI CAMP

POST LRP CANDIDATES

Lee Lao Xia Pao
Family of 8
Entered Thailand: 13 May 1975
Entered Camp: Evacuated from Laos to Camp
Bldg 3-2-25/1

CAT III, 27 points
Sister in Texas
Date of Birth: Nov 14, 1941
Place of Birth: Sam Neua, Laos
Ethnic: Hmong

Profile Data: Military and Civil Leader

1961 - 1970

Village Defense Unit, Company
Commander for Zone 15A, Rank: Major.
Chief of Staff Training in Long
Tieng 6 months, 1968.

1970 - 1973

Special Guerilla Unit, Advisor for
two Battalions and Recruiter. Group
Mobile Commander over 1,200 soldiers,
two years had extensive combat
experience and received wound. Final
Rank: Colonel

1973 - 1975

Royal Lao Army, Battalion Commander
until evacuated to Nam Phong, Thailand

NOTE: PA declined INS interview until "next program" due to concern for
relatives and constituents remaining in Laos. Ethnic Affairs Officer
comments he was former leader of all Hmong from Sam Neua province, Laos
(15,000 to 20,000 pop) and close associate of U.S. Gov't. He speaks
a little English.

LOEI CAMPPOST LRP CONSIDERATION

Vang Ying (M)
 Family of four
 Entered Thailand: 15 May 1975
 Entered Camp: Evacuated from Laos
 Building: 4-1-10/3

Cat II
 Brothers in Illinois
 Date of Birth: 1 August 1946
 Place of Birth: Xieng Khouang, Laos
 Ethnic: Hmong

Profile Data: Air Traffic Controller

1966 - 1967	Special Guerilla Unit (SGU), Paymaster for Battalion 204 distributed salaries to front-line soldiers. Received six months U.S. sponsored combat training in Laos.
1968 - 1973	Air Traffic Controller, Long Tieng Air Operations, supervised by six Americans. Average daily rate for departures and arrivals-40 to 50 planes.
1973 - 1974	Chief Air Traffic Control, Long Tieng, supervised twenty-four men.
1974 - 1975	Chief of logistics support, Military Region Two (MR-II) responsible for supplies from Bangkok, Udorn and Vientiane and distribution to Group Mobiles. Close association with U.S. Air Operations personnel. Final Rank: Major.
1977 - 1978	Community Development Coordinator for Loei Camp sponsored by World Vision organizes and supervises building construction, fisheries project.

Profile Date: 5 January 1979

NEW ARRIVAL

Yang Pao
Entered Thailand: 31 October 1978
Entered Camp: 10 November 1978
Building: 3-2-21/9
Education: Completed 3 years
High School in
Vientiane 1968

Cat II
No rel in U.S.
Date of birth: 6 June 1948
Place of birth: Long Chieng, Laos
Ethnic: Hmong

Profile Data:

1968 - 1972

T-28 Pilot, logged 1,500 hours flying time and completed 600 missions; received 2½ years training under U.S. auspices in Thailand including Piper Cub, Cessna 180 and T-28. Final rank: Second Lieutenant.

June 1972 - May 78

Captured after anti-aircraft caused plane crash; confined to prison camps 3 years and labor camps 3 years.

May 1978 - Oct 78

Escaped from captivity; defended Hmong enclave in North Central Laos from "enemy" attacks; witnessed two "gas" bombings.

Oct 78 - present

Yang Pao led 51 people from defeated enclave to Mekong River; walked 15 days over distance of 230 kilometers. All arrived Thailand using bamboo poles except two boys who drowned. Reunited with mother in Loai after 10 days in Thai Detention Centers.

Complete interview conducted in English.

Profile Date: 22 December 1978

LOEI CAMPNEW ARRIVAL

Yang Chong	Cat II
Arrived Thailand: 30 October 1978	Date of Birth: 2 August 1953
Arrived Camp: 3 November 1978	Place of Birth: Xieng Khouang, Laos
Building: 3-2-31/1	Ethnic: Hmong
Education: 1972 finished 4 years	Sister in Ohio: Bee Yang
H.S. received diploma	1372 Brownstone St.
from Lycee de Vientiane	Akron, Ohio 44310

Profile Data:

1972 - 1974

Employed by USAID Refugee Survey under Mr. Robert Walf, Mr. Keep (American). Travelled around Northern, Central and Southern Laos to take refugee census through villagers and village chiefs using questionnaires. Traveled by plane, car and bus. Hired for 1 year, 6 months at 128 kip/hour, hourly hire, plus 6 months contract at 200 kip/hour - received per diem depending on location. Contacted Lao, Hmong, Lao-Theung refugees.

November 1974

Resigned from USAID for continued education.

1975 - 1978

Enrolled in Teachers College in Luang Prabang for 6 months. Evacuated to Phou Bia, lived on western side - had farm grew rice, corn, etc., with parents, wife, 2 children, brother and sister. However, separated Oct 78 when Phoua Bia was lost to P.L., family including wife and kids gave themselves up to P.L. for survival. Yang Chong was part of resistance with Xay Choua Yang, leader of resistance in Phou Bia. He had planned to escape, two attempts thwarted.

Yang Chong

Cat II

Profile Data:Escape:

On Oct 1978 he joined group of 51 people led by Yang Pao, T-28 pilot, carrying M-16. Arrived Mekong River after 15 days walking covering 230 kilometers. At 4:30 a.m., floated across by bamboo sticks. Arrived Bouang Gan for 3 days at Police Station. Then arrived Nongkhai camp. Transferred to Loai 12 November 1978.

Complete interview conducted in English, speaks French, Lao, Hmong.

LOEI CAMP

LEE MOUA

Family of seven

Entered Thailand: 22 February 1979

Entered Camp: 2 March 1979

Center 2 2 8/7

CAT II

Cousin in Tennessee

Date of Birth: 5 June 1951

Place of Birth: Xieng Khouang, Lao

Ethnic: Hmong

Profile Data; SKY Interpreter and Radio Operator, Forward Air Guide

1968-1969

Military officer for Payroll Section on Special Guerilla Unit (SGU) at Long Tieng Headquarters. Received intelligence-leadership training in Thailand for six months and English training eight months.

1970-1973

Interpreter for Air Operations and Forward Air Guide; survived multiple incoming attacks. Certified F-111 Coordinator.

1973-1975

After ceasefire, returned as military officer for Payroll Section at Long Tieng Headquarters.

1975-1979

Remained at the Hmong enclave Phou Bia, Laos, until defeat by Pathet Lao. Joined 458 people on five-month walk to Thailand.

Pr : Date: February 14, 1979

NONGKHAI HMONG CAMPRecent Arrival

Nhia Lao Vue (M)
 Family of 12
 Entered Thailand: 2 October 1978
 Entered Camp: 6 October 1978
 Building 22, Room 2

Cat III, 16 points
 No relatives in U.S.
 Date of Birth: 2 October 1938
 Place of Birth: Moung Nga, Xieng Khouang
 Laos

Profile Data:

1962-1964	ADC (Village Defense) Assistant Company Commander (104 persons). Recieved four weeks of Combat Tactics and Leadership training at U.S. supported Base, Hua Hin, Thailand. Exposed to extensive combat in Laos.
1965-1975	- Special Guerilla Unit (SGU) U.S. supported irregulars, Highest Rank Captain. Duties range from beginning Squad Leader to Executive Officer of Battalion in Long Tieng Military Region-II. In 1968 and again in 1971, received total 16 weeks of U.S. sponsored Combat and Leadership Training in Thailand and Laos. Experienced extensive combat, suffering wounds on more than one occasion by enemy mortar fire and small arms. Speaks Hmong and Lao.
1975-1978	Lived in Phou Ma Thao area as a farmer, where Hmong have an enclave of resistance.

RESISTANCE LEADER IN LAOS - WA KHAYVUE'S TWIN BROTHER

Profile (: February 17, 1979

NONGKHAI/HMONG CAMPRECENT ARRIVAL

Neng Xao Xiong (14)
 Family of Seven
 Entered Thailand: 7 Feb 1979
 Entered Camp: 9 Feb 1979
 Building 13/Hut

Cat III
 No relative in U.S.
 Date of Birth: 10 Dec 1943
 Place of Birth: Xieng Khouang
 Ethnic: Hmong

Profile Data:

1963 - 1968	Village Defense in Zone 10 at Sab Sob Village. Staff aid to Zone Commander.
1968 - 1975	Special Guerilla Unit (SGU), final rank: Major. Neng held positions a Company Commander, Assistant Battalion and Battalion Commander. Experienced extensive front line combat. Final position was Commander of Command Company which patrolled the front line after the 1973 Cease Fire. Neng was trained by Americans and under U.S. auspices twice in Thailand and once in Laos for a total of 18 months. He also received shrapnel wounds while in combat.
1975 - 1975	Neng was one of leaders of Hmong enclave at Phou Bia. Neng was involved in many defensive firefights with P.L/SRV forces. His village was bombed with a yellowish gas that made nauseous and dizzy for about 24 hours. His group of 26 persons took one month and four days to walk to Thailand.

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING REACHED BETWEEN UNHCR AND SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM, REGARDING UNHCR-VIETNAMESE SEVEN-POINT AGREEMENT ON REFUGEES

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Poul Hartling, today released the text of a Memorandum of Understanding between his office and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam concerning the orderly departure of persons who wish to leave Viet Nam for countries of new residence.

The Memorandum of Understanding was agreed on following discussion held in Hanoi from 25 May to 30 May 1979, between representatives of the Vietnamese Government and a UNHCR delegation led by Dale de Haan, the Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees. -


Memorandum of understanding between the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) concerning the departure of persons from the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam:

Following discussion held in Hanoi between representatives of the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam and a delegation of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) from 26 February to 5 March and from 25 May to 30 May 1979, it is agreed that UNHCR will facilitate the implementation of the 12 January announcement by the Vietnamese Government to permit the orderly departure of persons who wish to leave Viet Nam for countries of new residence. Regarding the programme to implement such orderly departure, it is understood that:

1. Authorized exit of those people who wish to leave Viet Nam and settle in foreign countries -- family reunion and other humanitarian cases -- will be carried out as soon as possible and to the maximum extent. The number of such people will depend both on the volume of applications for exit from Viet Nam and on receiving countries' ability to issue entry visas.
2. The selection of those people authorized to go abroad under this programme will, whenever possible, be made on the basis of the lists prepared by the Vietnamese Government and the lists prepared by the receiving countries. Those persons whose names appear on both lists will qualify for exit. As for those persons whose names appear on only one list, their cases will be subject to discussions between UNHCR and the Vietnamese Government or the Governments of the receiving countries, as appropriate.
3. UNHCR will make every effort to enlist support for this programme amongst potential receiving countries.
4. The Vietnamese Government and UNHCR will each appoint personnel who will closely co-operate in the implementation of this programme.
5. This personnel will be authorized to operate in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City and, as necessary, to go to other places to promote exit operations.
6. Exit operations will be effected at regular intervals by appropriate means of transport.
7. The Vietnamese Government will, subject to relevant Vietnamese laws, provide UNHCR and the receiving countries with every facility to implement this programme.

* * * * *

SELECTION PROCESS FOR INLAND CAMP REFUGEES



LIST OF INDOCHINESE REFUGEE CATEGORIES OF ELIGIBILITY FOR PAROLE TO THE UNITED STATES

CRITERIA FOR ADMISSION TO U.S. LONG RANGE PROGRAM (LRP) FOR INDOCHINESE REFUGEES

Category Ia

Close relatives of persons who entered the United States before June 14, 1978. Close relatives are defined as spouse, parent, son, daughter, grandparent, unmarried sibling, and unmarried grandchild. If a person entered the United States after June 14, 1978, only that person's spouse and unmarried children under 21 years of age are considered eligible as category I relatives.

Category Ib

Unaccompanied children and young adults, 17 years of age and under, whose parents or guardians are deceased or were otherwise unable to leave their country of nationality or most recent residence to accompany the minor: provided that no offer of resettlement is made to the minor by another country.

Category IIa

Former U.S. Government employees who held supervisory or otherwise meaningful positions for at least 1 year subsequent to January 1, 1962, or workers such as janitors, drivers, gardeners, and guards if they were so employed for at least 5 years subsequent to January 1, 1962.

Category IIb

Persons who were not officially U.S. employees but who were so integrated into the immediate structure of an official U.S. Government office as to appear to be such employees. An example of such a relationship would be a military interpreter assigned to assist and serve as part of the staff of a U.S. Government office. Numbers will be small in this category which will not include units or groups of persons. The time periods for eligibility are the same as those for category IIa.

Category III

Refugees who because of a previous close association with the United States were persecuted by or were in fear of being persecuted by the Communist regime. Time formerly spent in prison for political reasons or in reeducation camps in Communist countries of Indochina should be considered in determining eligibility under this category. If another country offers to resettle refugees in this category, however, they cannot be accepted under long range program, unless the refugee is 20 years of age or under, has a blood relative in the United States, and has no such relative elsewhere outside of the countries of Indochina. Moreover, before they can be considered for inclusion in long range program, refugees, other than those included in this exception, must be willing to accept an offer of resettlement from another country if it makes such an offer. Following are examples of refugees who can be included in category III:

Category IIIa

Former employees of U.S. foundations, voluntary agencies, or business firms who held supervisory or otherwise meaningful positions for at least 1 year subsequent to January 1, 1962, or other workers employed by such U.S. organizations for at least 5 years subsequent to January 1, 1962.

Category IIIb

Persons who because of their status in the civil service or Armed Forces of the former governments of the Indochinese countries were closely associated with U.S. Government policies or U.S. Government-supported programs.

Category IIIc

Persons educated or trained in the United States or abroad under U.S. auspices.

Category IIId

Persons who received individual U.S. military combat awards or decorations.

Category IIIe

Spouses and unmarried children of persons who would have qualified under one of the above categories, but who are dead or were unable to escape.

Category IIIf

Vietnamese refugees escaping by land from Laos and now in camps in Thailand. Such refugees shall be given priority under category III but not to exceed 125 per month beginning October 1, 1978. It is anticipated that this will permit the Royal Thai Government to close the Vietnamese camp at Sikhiu, Thailand, as soon as those refugees now in the camp are resettled abroad.

NOTE: These are examples only and do not include all refugees in category III. Nor should every refugee who fits in one of these examples automatically be included in long range program. Each post should exercise judgment and narrowly define category III to include only refugees who in fact were closely associated with the United States and fled from persecution or fear of persecution because of that association.

Category IV

Other refugees who because of obviously compelling reasons should be granted parole on humanitarian grounds. Like refugees in category III, those in category IV cannot be accepted under long range program if they are accepted by another country unless the refugee is 20 years of age or under, has a blood relative in the United States, and has no such relative elsewhere outside of the countries of Indochina.

Priority in the allocation of numbers under category IV will be as follows;

Category IVa

Married siblings of persons who entered the United States prior to June 14, 1978.

Category IVb

Close relatives, defined in category I, or persons who have entered the United States since June 14, 1978, except that spouses and unmarried children under 21 of persons who entered the United States after June 14, 1978, are eligible under category Ia.

Category IVc

Persons 20 years of age or under who have a blood relative in the United States and who have no such relative elsewhere outside of Laos, Cambodia, or Vietnam.

Category IVd

Refugees who have education or work experience which would assist in their resettlement; or have shown personal initiatives while in camp such as enrolling in language courses; or have undergone particularly difficult experience in their home country or during their escape; or for whom other special humanitarian circumstances exist.

Category IVe

Remaining refugees by date of registration with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

Category V

Cambodian Refugees: A separate quota is established for Cambodian refugees to be implemented at the rate of 625 refugees per month beginning on October 1, 1978, or at an annual rate of 7,500. Cambodians who departed for the United States after October 1, 1978 are to be counted with this quota. Priority of eligibility as among Cambodian refugees will be based on the factors in categories I-IV above taken in that order.

No matter what category the refugee head of family (principal applicant) falls under, his or her accompanying close relatives fall in the same category as he or she does. For this purpose, accompanying close relatives are defined as spouse, parent, grandparent, and unmarried son, daughter, sibling, or grandchild. Other more distant accompanying relatives may also be included in the same category as the principal applicant if they are judged by the post to be dependent on him or her. If refugees eligible for an immigrant visa have accompanying dependent relatives not eligible for such visas, such dependent relatives should be judged for eligibility for parole as if the principal applicant were entering under refugee parole.

The judgment of the Consular and Immigration and Naturalization Service officers will be the determining factor for acceptance of refugees in all of the above categories. The final decision rests with Immigration and Naturalization Service.

MINUTES OF DISCUSSION WITH NGUYEN CO THACH, SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE PREMIER, AND MEM-
BERS OF CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION, HANOI, AUGUST 9, 1979

Foreign Ministry Guest House

Thach*

I welcome you to Hanoi. We now are not at war with each other. That was under Nixon. The American people and Vietnamese are friends. I am sorry the Prime Minister was unable to meet with you since he is out of Hanoi. He hopes to meet you at another time.

Benjamin Rosenthal (D-New York)

We are grateful to meet with you and regret that our trip is much too short.

Thach

Yes, too short. Please speak slowly. My English...

Rosenthal

That's my New York speed.

We are honored that you can see us. We are here to pursue that goal. We agree that there should be a deep, abiding, and good working relationship between Vietnam and the United States. We want to understand the differences

*Thach spoke in English during the discussion. An interpreter occasionally clarified questions for him in Vietnamese. This record is not a verbatim transcript but was compiled from the notes of participants.

on outstanding issues between our people and yours.

The Speaker of the House appointed us to look into the refugee situation. The purpose of our mission was to visit and review conditions in order to learn things we might do to improve conditions of refugees and improve conditions that force people to become refugees. We want to know the procedures here regarding the expulsion problems or other problems you have here. We are interested in how people become refugees, economic availability to the people here, and bilateral relations between our two peoples. Our principal assignment was to provide useful information to Congress. We hope to improve relations between our countries as well.

George Miller (D-California)

We want to know your opinion or what impact the trade embargo or international aid is having on the refugee problem. Can Vietnam handle the problem without any aid?

Thach

Since 30 years ago a lot of people have left. 1954 was the first time; 1975 was the second -- the threat of Kissinger that there would be a blood bath caused some 100,000 people to leave; the last time of exodus was before and after the invasion by China since the middle of 1978. The Chinese have been warning people of war in Vietnam -- that's why

there is an exodus now. The economic situation is obviously bad as a result of the war.

Rosenthal

Is the exodus caused by the Chinese invasion -- who fled? Did it apply to the North or South or both?

Thach

There are two kinds of people: (1) those from Saigon who cooperated with the U.S. Army -- those that could not accept life now, as they became very rich during the war because of the U.S.; and (2) Vietnamese of Chinese origin. These two kinds are related. Peasants don't leave -- only urbanites. People leave for two reasons: (1) they have a guilty conscience -- had an easy life, and exploited the war; (2) they can't accept a hard working life after becoming rich with U.S. aid. In 1975 aid stopped.

Rosenthal

Is there another million people in the second group? How many people have left and want to leave?

Thach

Some hundreds of thousands. Most were cooperating with the U.S. Army. One million of these are left in Vietnam but all don't want to leave. Some people want to leave and some want to come back.

Rosenthal

What policy changes are you making since the Geneva Conference?

Thach

We have taken very drastic measures to stop this. People who are organizing are arrested and tried. We have started the prosecution and trials against the people.

Miller

How many people have come to trial?

Thach

4,000 cases under trial since beginning of the year.

Miller

What is their punishment?

Thach

Those that have killed people and sunk boats have greater sentences but others are light. There have been some death sentences.

Rosenthal

Will there be no more exodus by boat?

Thach

Now we have stopped them. The big boats we stop -- small ones are harder to stop. The 7th Fleet encourages the exodus.

John Paul Hammerschmidt (R-Arkansas)

There will be no more big illegal outflow. Would you be willing to accept UN help to process the legal outflow of refugees?

Thach

Yes. We have a declaration about those who go and who don't go. Those that can't go are (1) those with a military obligation; (2) those who keep the security of nation (secrets); (3) those connected directly to vital sectors of the economy; and (4) those under the prosecution of the law.

Robert Drinan (D-Mass.)

Is it possible for flights from the U.S. to take legal refugees directly from Vietnam to the U.S.?

Thach

We have accepted aircraft in the past to pick up POWs. We can discuss this with you further. It is not a difficult question, but the U.S. must respect our law.

Drinan

Many refugees said the war in Cambodia was the reason they left.

Thach

Under the Pol Pot regime, many refugees fled into Vietnam, some 50,000. The Chinese would like to bind the refugee question to Kampuchea. It should not be. Some 1,000 Chinese refugees have also come to Vietnam from Kampuchea. We have asked China to take them back. They would not.

Drinan

The U.S. has submitted to you a list of 5,000 names who are eligible for emigration. Why the delay?

Thach

We must examine the cases. Out of the 5,000 names we have given you 228 cases. The U.S. has only accepted 10.

Tony Won Pat (D-Guam)

We were here last September on the question of MIAs. We understood you wanted to normalize relations. There are still MIAs unaccounted for. How long can we wait for the rest?

Thach

We had made progress but since the U.S. suspended the process of normalization, we have no contact or dialogue. But we have continued to let the Commission work to find the remains of the MIAs. We are still working to find them.

There is no normalization. We understand that they have some things but there is now no contact.

Thomas Downey (D-New York)

How long will the moratorium on the refugee flow continue?

Thach

We will keep it forever, but we must have the help of the international community if it is to be in a legal way.

Downey

What will be the future of Vietnamese-Chinese relations? Will there be peace between China and Vietnam?

Thach

Peace only comes with two nations working together. The Chinese have refused our approaches. They provoke war at the border.

Downey

Why have so many people been put out to sea? We have great difficulty in our country understanding this.

Thach

Chinese policy is to create unstable conditions in this area. They want to use overseas Chinese to increase instability and put on pressure. They want to isolate us

politically and strangle us economically. This is a super-power policy to destroy Vietnam.

I have been in the U.S. and learned that after Pearl Harbor all Japanese were concentrated. Here the Chinese have not been concentrated. There are areas here that look like Chinatown in New York and they still have their freedom.

If the Chinese are neutral they are doubted by both sides. We have nationalized Chinese business so they do not have a favorable view of our side.

These Chinese, they are very clever. They take out their resources and set up firms as soon as they are resettled. If they went legally they could not do this.

Lyle Williams (R-Ohio)

What do you want us to tell the people back home regarding the possibility of our helping your nation?

Thach

Any help you can provide will be welcome, but with no conditions or political strings attached. Don't play cards like you did with China. Since September we have done everything to normalize relations. We provided photos and blueprints of the former U.S. consulate in Hanoi. We had confidence that you would come.

In December the State Department told us there were three preconditions: (1) the Cambodian question; (2) refugees; and (3) relations with the U.S.S.R. At the same time, the U.S. established relations with China with no preconditions. Blumenthal visited China one day after China invaded Vietnam. This is a double standard. This is the China card.

Rosenthal

These three things should not be qualifications for normalization -- is that right?

Thach

All over the world, no country has used relations with a third country as a condition for normalization. We could say the U.S. must withdraw its bases from the Philippines or stop playing the China card or give up Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. But we have not.

Richard Nolan (D-Minnesota)

We come here as friends and many want to see normalization of relations and reconstruction aid. My questions, therefore, are friendly. We have been told that conditions are harsh. How harsh are conditions in the New Economic Zones (NEZ)? Do people die of hunger and harsh elements? How many persons have gone? How many Vietnamese? Chinese? How many have left? We understand that after 30 years of war, conditions are harsh all over Vietnam.

Thach

In our country we cannot place development of industry first. Agriculture must come first. It would be good for you to see these NEZs on the spot. We have much uncultivated land. Saigon city is overpopulated. During the war, it had over 3 million people. We want to have less people in Saigon. We have given them land and houses and food for one year. They are not forced to work if they don't want to. They had a better life in the city. Maybe they stay or maybe they go. You should not believe people who run away. It is like a story you have heard about people who are afraid of ghosts or darkness, so they tell terrible stories about this fear when they run away. You should check up on this on the spot.

Miller

We have been told that when you first started the NEZs, the administration was poor -- no tools in the South and people died of floods.

Thach

Yes -- we have had floods. People in the U.S. die in floods.

Miller

Is sending people to NEZs intentional punishment?

Thach

No. Everyone knows that difficulties arise from war, particularly after 30 years of war. We have the support of the people. Pol Pot collapsed overnight, as well as Somoza, without the support of the people. We had the support of the people during the invasion from China or we could not have survived.

Williams

Does the one-year supply of food still hold, or has it been cut back?

Thach

We have cut back food rationing but not in NEZs. They are working people. Food has been reduced for civil servants after bad crops in 1978. My ration was cut from seventeen kilos to thirteen kilos.

Daniel Akaka (D-Hawaii)

We want to express our gratitude for receiving us. We have talked with many refugees. What kind of people leave, the rich, Chinese origin people, the undesirable?

Thach

As I said before, they are those of Chinese origin and those that have cooperated with the U.S. Army. If they pay, how can it be said they were forced to leave.

Some people had to pay but it is not our policy. In your country, there was Watergate and Lockheed. Some Congressmen voted to impeach Nixon. That was good. We have cases which we must punish. If we are forcing them to leave, why would we force them to pay?

Miller

You couldn't let people leave with Vietnamese money. You must keep money in the country for the people and so you closed your eyes to the money.

Thach

They pay gold, not currency. To ask people to pay money is very bad. It is not a wise course. It is not our policy to make them pay. 4,000 cases have been prosecuted and some are punished severely, particularly for making bribes and selling boats -- either private boats or some 5,000 of those that belong to the State which were stolen by the people. The fishing industry has been reduced by one-half. We must stop the exodus. It is in our interest, but we can't stop it at once. Small boats can go without detection, but bigger ones cannot.

Akaka

What are the obstacles preventing normalization?

Thach

The ball is in the State Department's court. We are not asking for reparations.

Miller

There is some confusion about the procedures you have for the legal processing of the refugees. We were told that your government has agreed to have three people in Saigon -- one American, one Canadian, and one UNHCR representative -- all working for the UNHCR. Is it the U.S. representative that is holding you up?

Thach

We accept only UNHCR. They can be American or even Chinese -- we don't care. We will accept State Department official, but he can't wear two hats.

Miller

Can there be six instead of three?

Thach

We have to agree in advance.

Downey

You now do not allow illegal departures. Why haven't you always had this policy?

Thach

In 1975 we were criticized by the U.S. and others for prohibiting people from leaving. In 1977 and 1978 we let them go free. Beginning this year, we were criticized. So we stipulated how they are to go in a legal way, but they prefer to go illegally.

Drinan

We wonder about Soviet influence and military presence in Vietnam as a cause for destabilization.

Thach

In April 1978, China cut off aid to Vietnam and caused tremendous difficulties. We had no other choice. Before we had three sources of aid: U.S. in the South; U.S.S.R. in the North; and Chinese in the North. So we need COMECON aid. The Chinese built up Pol Pot. In November we had to sign an agreement with the U.S.S.R.

Rosenthal

Can we ask about Garwood's family ties?

Thach

We will check.

Nolan

Is the Cambodian war considered a war of liberation?
Will Vietnam withdraw its forces after conditions stabilize?

Thach

There are two characters to the war, a war of liberation and a struggle against the war waged by China. It's not the first time that Vietnam is in Cambodia -- it is the third. The first time was the French war; the second time was the Johnson-Nixon war; the third time was the Chinese invasion. Vietnam will withdraw once the Chinese threat against Cambodia and Vietnam stops.

Williams

Are there no strings on aid from the U.S.S.R.?

Thach

We have had 30 years of war to maintain our independence. We have no foreign bases in our country. It is not true that the U.S.S.R. has a base at Cam Ranh. But we want to maintain our sovereignty and will use our territory in such a way as to defend our country's sovereignty.

Miller

You have only provided 228 names from our list of 5,000. How much longer do we wait?

Thach

We have red tape here just like you do in the United States.

Downey

What did you mean when you said you will use your territory to defend your sovereignty?

Thach

We will defend up to the end our independence and sovereignty by any means.

Miller

The threat of invasion by the Chinese causes alarm to the people. What should the U.S. role be regarding the constant talk about war? What can the United States do to reduce the pressure?

Thach

We are not in a position to advise you what to do. The problem is the State Department. There is a double standard. Don't play the China card.

Downey

I feel partly responsible for the 7th Fleet in the South China Sea. What about the 7th Fleet? Should the U.S. withdraw this Fleet? Would this be a sign of goodwill?

Thach

The 7th Fleet makes such noise that the people know that they can be rescued. Civilian ships would be much better. You would still be able to do the job.

Rosenthal

This was a very important meeting and we hope the plight of the refugees will be improved.

Thach

I think your visit will bring an understanding between our two countries. We are very patient people, but we hope to have normalization because it is in the best interests of both countries and in the interest of the peace and stability with Southeast Asia.

ARTICLE REGARDING POLICY FOR RESETTLERS IN NEW ECONOMIC ZONES MADE PUBLIC IN HANOI

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 18 Jan 79 p 3

[Unattributed article: "What Are the Rights of People in Hanoi Who Leave to Build the New Economic Zones?"]

[Text] What is the policy for people who leave to build the new economic zones?

1. Before leaving for the new economic zones:

--Each primary worker is given by the state an one-time allowance of 50 dong to buy items essential to his daily life.

--Each person is entitled to a subsistence allowance of 1 dong and a medicine allowance of .20 dong a day while en route from his locality to the new economic zone; and public health cadres will go along to provide medical care.

--Families which encounter difficulties concerning life upon leaving for the new economic zone may be considered for receiving an additional allowance of no more than 150 dong to buy production tools and items essential to their daily life.

--Expenses for moving people and property of families to the new economic zones will be paid by the municipality. Each household is allowed to bring along no more than 500 Kg of household effects, grain and food.

2. Liquidation of property:

--The liquidation of property belonging to families leaving to build the new economic zones must be properly resolved in the spirit of unity and mutual assistance among the people, with those staying behind making a share to help those who leave to make a new start in their new homeland.

In case the liquidation of property cannot be resolved by the people, the cooperative is responsible for settling the matter. If the cooperative

cannot reach a settlement after doing its best with the use of its own funds, the necessary money may be borrowed from the bank.

--Concerning the 5-percent land of families of agricultural cooperative members going to the new economic zones, the cooperative will not pay any compensation upon taking it back; nor will it allocate this land to other families.

--Concerning residential land and the land planted to crops of many years, compensation will be made as in the case of land appropriated for capital construction.

--Concerning houses, if no buyer can be found, the cooperative will pay for them based on their actual use value as determined by a price administration committee with the agreement of the families concerned.

--Upon liquidating property, it is necessary to organize a price administration committee comprised of representatives of the village people's committee, the cooperative, the bank, the financial service and the family concerned in order to avoid the fixing of too high or too low prices.

3. In the new economic zone:

Upon arriving in the new economic zone, each family will be given, depending on its size, a house measuring on the average no more than 5.2 square meters per family member.

Each family will be allocated by the state from 700 to 1,000 square meters of land for building houses, setting up orchards and building shelters for livestock in order to develop its secondary source of income (this land is for use only and it cannot be sold or transferred).

Upon arriving at their new place of residence, the resettlers have the same political and economic rights and public welfare benefits (in the public health, education and cultural fields) as well as the same obligations as the local people. During the first 3 years they are given medicines for the purpose of disease prevention, are not required to pay for medical expenses (in case of hospitalization) and are exempt from corvee labor obligation at their place of residence. They are also given a temporary deferment of military obligation (except in an emergency when a mobilization order is issued).

Grain distribution policy:

Memorandum No 806-TC dated 27 September 1977 of the Hanoi Grain Service stipulates as follows:

a) For the agricultural production sector:

--Resettlers from area planted exclusively to vegetables and food crops (area 1) who have been entitled to receive grain supply from the state

will get a grain allowance for a set period of time upon the issuance of the decision to send them to the new economic zone and the attached list.

--Resettlers from industrial crop area (area 2), after using up the grain supplied by the cooperative in a few months, will be provided by the state with grain for building the new economic zone just like those from the area planted exclusively to vegetables and food crops (area 1). If in the month of departure, they still draw a grain ration from the cooperative, the regulations for the rice area (area 3) will apply.

--Peasants from rice area (area 3) generally will have to bring along 15 days of grain for consumption while en route to the new economic zone and during the first days after their arrival. At cooperative, where the monthly subsistence allowance is too small (under 13 Kg of grain in paddy equivalent) and where the families going to the new economic zone get no assistance or only partial assistance from the cooperatives, a list of the resettlers will be prepared for consideration for full or partial grain allowance in accordance with set criteria.

b) For the non-agricultural sector:

--If departure is made at the beginning of the month, the resettlers will be allowed to buy grain for the whole month, including the 15-day supply of grain for consumption along the route and upon arrival at the new place.

--If departure is made toward the end of the month, the resettlers will have to present copies of the decision to send them to the new economic zone and the list attached, the grain allowance transfer order for the whole month and a request for grain distribution to receive a supply of grain for 15 days for the next month in accordance with the set criteria.

--Families which have not yet registered their residence in Hanoi and which have not yet drawn grain allowance, will, upon selected for departure to the new economic zone, also be allowed to receive a grain supply in accordance with the set criteria.

c) Criteria:

--Resettlers from the above sectors who are bound for the new economic zone of Lam Dong will all receive a 15-day supply of grain effective from the date of departure for consumption along the route and during the first days after their arrival in accordance with the following criteria:

--Each worker will receive .5 Kg a day.

--The grain allowance of children varies in accordance with their age.

--Each elderly person or housewife will receive 10 Kg a month.



