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FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION ON THE EFFECT OF PUBLIC LAW 93-107, THE SPORTS ANTIBLACKOUT LAW, ON THE BROADCASTING OF SOLD-OUT HOME GAMES OF PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL, BASEBALL, BASKETBALL, AND HOCKEY

SUBMITTED TO

HON. WARREN G. MAGNUSON, *Chairman*

FOR THE USE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION

JULY 1977

Printed for the use of the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,
United States Senate

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., June 16, 1977.

Hon. WARREN G. MAGNUSON,
Chairman, Committee on Commerce,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am pleased to transmit herewith the Fourth Annual Report of the Federal Communications Commission on the Effect of Public Law 93–107, the sports antiblackout law, on professional football, baseball, basketball, and hockey.

I trust this report will be useful to your committee.

Sincerely,

RICHARD E. WILEY, *Chairman.*

Enclosure.

The Effect of the

Sports Anti-Blackout Law

Federal Communications Commission

FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT



June 1977

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CONTENTS

	Page
Executive Summary and Conclusions	IX
Introduction	1
The Effects of Locally Televised Home Games on Professional Football Franchises	3
Introduction	3
The Effect of Public Law 93–107 on Professional Football: An Overview of NFL Locally Televised Home Games, Ticket Sales, "No Shows," and Audience Ratings	9
An Overview of Sold-out and Locally Televised Games: 1970–76	9
Ticket Sales: An Overview, 1972–76	13
"No Shows": An Overview, 1972–76	15
Television Audience Ratings: An Overview, 1972–76	17
The Effect of Public Law 93–107 on Member Clubs of the National Football League	29
Introduction	29
American Football Conference	30
Baltimore Colts	30
Buffalo Bills	32
Cincinnati Bengals	35
Cleveland Browns	37
Denver Broncos	39
Houston Oilers	41
Kansas City Chiefs	44
Miami Dolphins	46
New England Patriots	49
New York Jets	51
Oakland Raiders	54
Pittsburgh Steelers	56
San Diego Chargers	59
Tampa Bay Buccaneers	60
National Football Conference	60
Atlanta Falcons	60
Chicago Bears	63
Dallas Cowboys	65
Detroit Lions	67
Green Bay Packers	70
Los Angeles Rams	72
Minnesota Vikings	74
New Orleans Saints	76
New York Giants	78
Philadelphia Eagles	81
St. Louis Cardinals	83
San Francisco Forty Niners	85
Seattle Seahawks	87
Washington Redskins	88
The Effect of Public Law 93–107 on NFL Playoff Games: 1973–76	90
Complaints and Inquiries	92
The Effect of Public Law 93–107 on Professional Baseball	93
The Effect of Public Law 93–107 on Professional Basketball	95
Introduction	95
The Effect of Public Law 93–107 on Professional Hockey	97

Appendexes

	Page
A: Statistical Analysis of "No Shows" for Individual NFL Clubs	99
B: Statistical Analysis of NFL Season Ticket Sales 1970–76	129
C: A Summary of NFL Pro Forma Income Statements, 1969, 1972, 1975	135
D: A Week-by-Week Summary of NFL Televised Games, 1973–76	137
E: NFL Data on Ticket Sales and "No Shows" for the 1976 Regular Season	141
F: Television Stations Subject to the NFL's Home Territory Blackout Policy	147
G: Summary of NFL Clubs Which Share Revenues Earned From the Sale of Concessions and Parking	149
H: Correspondence From and To the FCC Regarding Public Law 93–107	151

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

In September 1973, Congress enacted Public Law 93–107 which generally provided that professional football, baseball, basketball, and hockey games, televised pursuant to a league contract and sold out 72 hours in advance, would be locally televised in a team's home territory. Public Law 93–107 further mandated the Federal Communications Commission to provide an annual report on the effects of locally televised games on various professional sports franchises. The latter provision was largely in response to the National Football League's contention that the sports antiblackout law would prove harmful to NFL teams. Additionally, Public Law 93–107 was designed to expire after a 3-year period terminating December 31, 1975.

Although new legislation has been introduced since the expiration of the law, no action has been taken. Nevertheless, congressional interest in this issue persists. On October 5, 1976, the Commission received a letter from Senator Warren G. Magnuson and Senator John O. Pastore, requesting a fourth annual report on the effects of the sports antiblackout law. Fortunately, the Commission is able to comply with this request, as a result of the National Football League's decision to abide voluntarily by the intent of Public Law 93–107 through the 1977 playing season. Although the other sports leagues did not make similar commitments, their failure to do so was of little consequence since very few baseball, basketball, or hockey games are broadcast on network television. As a consequence, the effect of Public Law 93–107 on professional sports has been limited to the NFL and its member clubs.

Since 1973, the legislation and the league policy—during the 1976 season—required NFL clubs to lift the local television blackout on approximately one-half of all regular season games. Only two clubs, the New Orleans Saints and the Tampa Bay Buccaneers, which joined the league in 1976, have failed to locally televise at least one home game. Additionally, 24 of 28 NFL postseason games played between 1973 and 1976 have been locally televised.

The legislation apparently has impacted on some teams more than others. For example, four clubs—Denver, Green Bay, Philadelphia, and Washington—enjoy very strong demand for their tickets and have subsequently sold out and locally televised all home games since 1973. Conversely, five other teams—Baltimore, Houston, Los Angeles, New Orleans, and San Diego—have locally televised fewer than 20 percent of their home games over the same 4-year period.

The NFL maintains that Public Law 93–107 has adversely influenced season ticket sales. There is some indication that this may be true (see pp. 11–15). Between 1970 and 1972, for example, approximately 60 percent of all regular season home games were sold out; an equivalent percentage were sold out and locally televised during 1973, the

first season affected by the sports antiblackout law. However, between 1974 and 1976, season ticket sales declined by 12 percent, while the average seating capacity of NFL stadiums increased by roughly 10 percent.[1] As a consequence, only 42 percent of all regular season home games were sold out during the latter 3-year period.

Moreover, recent trends in ticket sales tend to corroborate the league's assertion. Since the antiblackout law was not enacted until September 1973, the impact of local telecasts on season tickets was not felt until the 1974 season. Given that season ticket sales increased by 21 percent between 1970 and 1973, before declining by 12 percent since 1974, it appears that Public Law 93–107 has adversely affected NFL gate receipts.

Statistical analysis of the demand for season tickets (see pp. 13–14 and appendix B) lends credence to the league's assertion. Specifically, the results of that analysis indicate that local telecasts of home games compound the influence of a team's playing performance on its season ticket sales; that is, when a team does not play well, local telecasts of home games appear to exacerbate the adverse impact of the club's performance on its season ticket sales for the subsequent year. Conversely, when a club is winning, local telecasts may well heighten interest in the home team thereby enhancing demand for season tickets. On balance, however, Public Law 93–107 does not appear to have posed a serious threat to NFL gate receipts. Based on available information, it is estimated that season ticket sales since 1974 have remained approximately 10 percent below those levels which probably would have been realized had no home games been locally televised. Assuming this estimate is correct, Public Law 93–107, since 1974, appears to have cost the NFL approximately $1 million a year in terms of lower gate receipts, or less than 1 percent of the league's total revenues.

It should also be understood that the sports antiblackout law may have had a differential impact on season tickets sold by individual NFL teams. Gate receipts of eight teams—Buffalo, Cincinnati, Miami, New England, Atlanta, Dallas, Detroit, and St. Louis—seem to be especially sensitive to locally televised games. All other clubs were either minimally or not affected by the legislation.

Unfortunately, it is impossible to assess the magnitude of the financial burden which Public Law 93–107 has imposed on these clubs, since income statements for individual NFL teams are not available to the public. Financial information provided by the league for the 1975 season, however, indicates that all 26 NFL teams then in operation, earned combined revenues of $192.4 million. Accordingly, as indicated above, annual losses in gate receipts, which are apparently attributable to Public Law 93–107, represent less than 1 percent of the league's total revenues.

Local telecasts also have adversely impacted on live gate attendance at NFL games (see pp. 15–17). Indeed, "no shows"—that is, ticketholders who fail to attend games—at home games of only 10 clubs have remained unaffected by the legislation; the reason being that nearly all of these teams have locally televised a small percentage of all home games since 1973. Attendance at games of all other clubs has declined as a consequence of local telecasts (see section C of chapter II).

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[1] Not all teams increased stadium capacity between 1974 and 1976. A list of those clubs which did can be found in appendix B.

Public Law 93–107, however, does not appear to pose a serious threat to live gate attendance except in the case of Atlanta and Miami. Fans in those cities were especially prone to stay at home when games were locally televised. The same was true of ticketholders in Los Angeles. The Rams, however, very seldom sell all 91,000 seats in the LA Coliseum; accordingly, Public Law 93–107 has not seriously affected live gate attendance at Los Angeles.

It also should be noted that teams which sell out and broadcast a large number of home games have experienced relatively fewer "no shows" than teams which have lifted the blackout on a smaller number of home games. For example, in 1976, approximately 7 percent of all tickets sold to locally televised home games went unused. Conversely, 10 percent of all ticketholders failed to attend games which were blacked out locally. This is not particularly surprising; NFL clubs which sell out most or all home games generally play better football and their fans are more inclined to attend games.

Nevertheless, Public Law 93–107 has resulted in lower revenues earned from the sale of concessions and "Pro" magazine. Average annual "no shows" for the League as a whole have risen by approximately 55 percent since 1973. Given that this increase has largely resulted from local telecasts of home games, it can be estimated that concessionaires as well as municipal governments and those NFL teams which share these receipts have experienced a combined loss of roughly $700,000 during each of the previous 4 years.

Here again, the direct cost to the League does not pose a significant threat to the financial vitality of professional football franchises. Indeed, losses in concession receipts and "Pro" magazine sales which have resulted from Public Law 93–107 appear to represent less than one-half of 1 percent of total annual revenues which accrue to NFL teams.

The NFL has alleged, however, that "no shows" also impose certain intangible costs on professional football teams. When large numbers of seats at locally televised games go unused, it is argued that excitement surrounding these contests is lessened. Although it is impossible to assess the true costs of Public Law 93–107 in this regard, team owners have expressed concern over the impact of locally televised games on the psychological vitality of professional football.

All of the above indicates that Public Law 93–107 has not been free of costs. Although costs incurred by the League are not serious, they are in fact quite real. Additionally, since the NFL is not being compensated for these losses, it is clear that Congress, in requiring NFL teams to locally televise games, has imposed a financial burden on selected franchises.

The Congress, however, was not without a rationale in taking this action. Public Law 93–107 was viewed by many as a quid pro quo for an earlier antitrust exemption which permitted the league to pool and package their television rights to the networks (see pp. 3–9). In the absence of the exemption granted by Congress in 1961, the sale of league contracts to the networks would have been prohibited under the provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act. It is readily apparent that the NFL has substantially benefited from the antitrust exemption just as the viewing public has received additional television coverage of home games as a result of Public Law 93–107.

Indeed, locally televised home games are one of the most popular types of regularly scheduled television programs shown in most markets which support NFL franchises (see pp. 17–28).

Approximately 60 percent of all television households in this country are located within the home team territories of NFL clubs. Estimates of NFL audience ratings in these areas indicate that, on the average, locally televised home games are viewed by approximately one-third of the total audience residing in individual markets which support franchises. A comparable percentage watch locally televised away games, all of which are broadcast in home team territories.

Both percentages are considerably above average local audience ratings of those NFL telecasts which involve other clubs. NFL telecasts which did not compete with the home team's locally televised game received an average audience rating of 18.7 between 1973 and 1976. Conversely, other games which did conflict with the home team's televised contests were viewed by an average of only 6.6 percent of the total audiences over the same 4-year period.[2]

Viewer preferences, therefore, are clearly discernible. Generally speaking, locally televised home games command audiences which are roughly twice as large as audiences attracted to other noncompeting NFL telecasts. Moreover, when fans are forced to choose between locally televised home games and telecasts of other clubs, viewers—by a margin of 5 to 1—prefer to watch the home team. All of this indicates that most NFL fans residing in home team territories have strong preferences for local telecasts of home games.

It must be concluded, therefore, that Public Law 93–107, in lifting the local blackout on almost half of all regular season games played since 1973, has provided professional football fans throughout the country opportunities to watch televised home games which would, otherwise, have been unavailable.

Increases in television audiences resulting from local telecasts have also been financially beneficial to the networks, their local affiliated stations, and commercial sponsors who purchase advertising time during NFL telecasts (see pp. 19–22). It is estimated that the combined annual benefits from locally televised home games is on the order of $1.4 million a year. It further appears that most of these benefits have accrued to advertisers as opposed to the networks or their affiliated stations. It is doubtful, therefore, that Public Law 93–107 has appreciably influenced the value of NFL television rights. Indeed, incremental increases in revenues experienced by the network as a result of the legislation are less than 1 percent of total broadcast revenues which the networks annually earn from televising all NFL regular and postseason games.

In conclusion, it is apparent that locally televised home games are enormously popular with football fans throughout the country. However, local telecasts appear to be responsible for losses in NFL season ticket sales and live gate attendance at locally televised home

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[2] Audience ratings listed above are leaguewide averages. Accordingly, ratings experienced by individual teams may differ from the norm. This is particularly true of teams which play in large markets such as New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Audience ratings in these areas tend to be lower since television viewers have a larger number of programs to choose from. The total audience, therefore, is spread over a larger number of stations and audience ratings are accordingly lower in these markets than in others which support fewer stations.

games. Although these costs do not presently represent a serious problem, they should be appropriately weighted against the benefits which have accrued to the public through the enactment of Public Law 93–107. The Commission also recommends that Congress continue to monitor the effects of locally televised home games on NFL ticket sales and attendance, if sports antiblackout legislation is renewed.

INTRODUCTION

In a letter dated October 22, 1976, the Honorable Warren G. Magnuson, chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce and John O. Pastore, former chairman of the Senate Communications Subcommittee, requested that the Federal Communications Commission provide a fourth annual report on the effects of Public Law 93–107, the sports antiblackout law, on professional sports franchises.* Although Public Law 93–107 expired on December 31, 1975, the various sports leagues have continued to comply with the intent of the legislation pending resolution of this matter by the Congress. Accordingly, the Commission was able to obtain information necessary to update previous studies of the effects of locally televised home games on professional football, baseball, basketball, and hockey teams. The results of this analysis are summarized below. The reader will note that nearly all of the discussion pertains to professional football. This is due simply to the fact that the applicability of Public Law 93–107 to professional sports has been almost exclusively limited to football. Additionally, the National Football League has fully cooperated with the Commission in providing extensive information on the number of games locally televised, ticket sales, and live gate attendance, which is fundamental to a thorough assessment of the effects of the sports antiblackout law. A lesser amount of data was made available by the other sports interests. Consequently, the analysis on each is far less extensive.

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*Letter from Senator Warren G. Magnuson and Senator John G. Pastore to Richard E. Wiley, Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, Oct. 5, 1976.

THE EFFECTS OF LOCALLY TELEVISED HOME GAMES ON PROFESSIONAL FOOTBALL FRANCHISES

Introduction

In recent years professional football has become an increasingly popular source of television entertainment. On an average Sunday during the National Football League's (NFL) regular season, 25 to 30 percent of all households in this country watch one or more televised games.[1] Postseason contests are even more popular. Last season's Super Bowl, for example, attracted nearly 45 percent of all television households, a record number for a televised sporting event and the seventh most widely viewed program in the history of the medium.[2]

Revenues from television rights have also become an important source of income for professional football teams. Twenty-five years ago, combined revenues earned from the sale of broadcast rights by individual NFL teams amounted to only $840,000; on the average each of the 12 teams then in operation realized about $70,000 from radio and television broadcasts, which was equivalent to less than 10 percent of a team's total revenues.[3] In 1975, combined NFL broadcast rights were sold for approximately $63 million; about 95 percent of this amount came from the three commercial television networks which broadcast all NFL regular and postseason games. NFL teams earned an average of $2,442,000 each from the sale of broadcast rights which accounted for 33 percent of average total revenues.[4] This suggests, of course, that the financial health of the NFL has become increasingly dependent on the value of the league's broadcast rights.

Given the popularity of the game, it is reasonable to assume that professional football represents an increasingly prestigious, if not profitable, source of network television programing. Otherwise, it is doubtful that a network would devote relatively large amounts of time and money to NFL games. Taken together, weekly NFL telecasts may require as much as 15 hours of network time, equivalent to about 5 percent of all regularly scheduled network programing shown during an average week.[5] Additionally, the networks spend considerable sums of money to produce and distribute regular and postseason NFL games.[6] Given the popularity of NFL telecasts, local network

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[1] A review of NFL national television audiences can be found on pp. 59-61.
[2] See *Broadcasting*, vol. 92 No. 6 at 52-56 (Feb. 7, 1977).
[3] See hearings on "Organized Professional Team Sports," at 2562-2565, Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, 85th Cong., 1st. sess., pt. 3.
[4] See appendix C for summary of NFL combined pro forma income for 1969, 1972, and 1975.
[5] See Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. petition for inquiry, rulemaking and immediate temporary relief in the matter of television network practices and their effect on the ability of station licensees to operate in the public interest, FCC rulemaking No. 2749, attachment A, chart No. 6.
[6] Although this information was requested from each of the networks, it was not provided (see appendix H).

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affiliated television stations have also benefited financially from professional football.[7]

Accordingly, football fans, the NFL, the television networks, and their local affiliated stations have substantial, and sometimes conflicting interests in those practices influencing the availability of televised professional football games. Fans are primarily concerned with the opportunity to watch as many games as possible, especially those involving teams of local interest.

The NFL, on the other hand has two major objectives: (1) televising those games which promise to attract the largest possible audiences, and (2) maximizing subsequent revenues earned from the sale of television rights. The NFL has insisted, however, that television schedules be designed to encourage live gate attendance, the single most important source of revenue to its member clubs. The television networks and their local affiliated stations regard NFL telecasts as a source of prestige and profit. The networks are also desirous of acquiring NFL television rights at the lowest possible cost to insure that broadcast revenues and net income earned from NFL telecasts are maximized. Televised professional football games also enhance the image of the networks as the sole providers of consistently high quality programing. This is important in that it further enhances their competitive position vis-à-vis independent television stations and pay television systems.

The sports antiblackout law: Legislative background

It was within this context that Congress enacted Public Law 93–107 in 1973. Although the legislation applied to all four professional sports, it was essentially designed to amend NFL television policies which had precluded local telecasts of home games. Unlike other professional sporting events, virtually all NFL regular and postseason games are televised by the three major commercial networks; ABC, CBS, and NBC. Additionally, many of these games are sold out well in advance. In 1972, for example, 12 of the 26 NFL clubs sold all available seats to their home games as season tickets.[8]

Since 1973 approximately one-half of all NFL regular season games have been sold out at least 72 hours in advance.[9]

Congress concluded that the league's policy prohibiting local telecasts of sold-out home games was inappropriate in that it unnecessarily deprived fans of opportunities to watch their favorite teams play. The professional sports leagues did not agree. The leagues have consistently maintained that they must retain discretion over all decisions regarding local telecasts of home games to protect the financial and psychological vitality of their respective products.

The NFL has been particularly adamant in its opposition to the sports antiblackout law. Local telecasts have traditionally been viewed as a serious threat to live gate attendance. Specifically, the league is fearful that NFL ticket holders, if given the opportunity, will become increasingly inclined to stay home and watch games on television. "No shows" are problematic to the NFL for two reasons: (1) lower live gate attendance takes an edge off the psychological

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[7] See pt. 4 of sec. B below.

[8] "Evaluation of the Necessity for Television Blackouts of Professional Sporting Events," staff report of Special Subcommittee on Investigations, House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. at 13 (1973).

[9] See part 1 of section B below.

excitement surrounding particular games, and (2) "no shows" do not buy concessions. Eleven of the twenty-eight NFL teams currently share revenues earned from parking and concession sales.[10] Consequently, these teams experience revenue loss when live gate attendance decreases. Concession revenues are also used to help finance and maintain most municipally owned stadiums. Reductions in concession sales, therefore, must be offset by increasing rental charges to the teams or by diverting additional tax dollars to finance the costs of building and maintaining municipal stadiums.

The NFL further contends that locally televised games have adversely affected season ticket sales. The league argues that fans become less inclined to purchase season tickets when some or all home games are locally televised. It has been suggested that losses in season ticket sales have not been offset by single game ticket sales. Accordingly, the league believes that Public Law 93–107 has resulted in fewer sold-out games and subsequent losses in gate receipts.

Owners of professional football teams also maintain that the sports antiblackout law has reduced the value of their exclusive radio rights to NFL home games. The value of radio or television rights is largely a function of the total number of persons attracted to NFL broadcasts. Since television coverage of a football game is far more eventful and comprehensive than a radio broadcast, locally televised games tend to seriously erode local NFL radio audiences. Accordingly, radio stations are inclined to pay less for the rights to broadcast those games.

The league points out that these losses have not been offset by increases in television revenues. NFL television rights are currently pooled, packaged, and sold by the league. Contracts extend over a 4-year period. (The current agreements run through the 1977 season.) All three NFL contracts with the television networks specify a fixed amount of money, paid annually to the league which then equally divides that sum among its member clubs. Television revenues accruing to the NFL, therefore, do not vary with the size of the national or local audience. It should also be pointed out that the league negotiated its last contracts with the networks in June 1973, 3 months prior to the passage of Public Law 93–107.

Increases in television revenues which resulted from locally televised games were not reflected in annual payments to the league. All financial benefits from those games accrued to the networks, their local affiliated stations, or advertisers which purchase commercial time during NFL telecasts.

Finally, the NFL is fearful that locally televised home games will result in overexposure of professional football and an eventual waning of interest in the sport. The league's concern is not without precedent. Ubiquitous television coverage of professional boxing, and to some extent professional baseball during the 1950's, has led some sportsmen to believe that the medium was at least partially responsible for a declining interest in those sports.[11]

Given this situation, the league's opposition to the sports antiblackout law is understandable. The legislation does raise some dif-

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[10] See appendix G for a list of all NFL teams which currently share revenues earned from parking or concession sales.

[11] See James A. Michener, "Sports in America" (New York: Random House, 1976), pp. 333–335.

ficult economic issues regarding the reasonableness of congressional involvement in NFL broadcast practices. Television rights to professional football games are clearly the property of the teams. By requiring NFL clubs to broadcast locally their sold-out home games on commercial television stations, which may prove financially detrimental to some clubs, Congress is effectively appropriating a privately owned, valuable asset.

In that sense the passage of Public Law 93–107 was unusual. Congress has traditionally refrained from imposing restrictions on the marketing practices of private businesses unless those practices pose a significant threat to the welfare of the American public. Clearly this was not the case with the sports antiblackout law. The action, however, was not without a rationale.

Public Law 93–107 simply was viewed by some as a quid pro quo for Public Law 87–331, an antitrust exemption which Congress granted the four professional sports leagues in 1961.[12] The exemption permitted individual teams to collectively pool their television rights for sale to the commercial television networks. Just prior to the adoption of Public Law 87–331, Judge Alan K. Grim nullified a contract between the NFL and CBS which gave the network exclusive rights to all NFL games as well as virtually unlimited authority to determine which contests would be televised in different parts of the country.[13] The contract effectively "cartelized" the market for televised professional football games. Judge Grim held that the practice of pooling NFL television rights was collusive, unreasonable, and a violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act.

The league immediately petitioned Congress for statutory relief. Congress responded, by enabling the Commissioner of Football to collectively negotiate the sale of television rights to all NFL games.[14] Public Law 87–331 also codified those provisions of the NFL bylaws which permitted individual clubs to locally blackout all televised NFL games when a team was playing at home. Both provisions of the antitrust exemption were deemed necessary to insure the financial viability of the NFL and its member clubs.

At that time the NFL was plagued by financial disparities. Six of the twelve clubs had been losing money for some time and most of these teams were located in smaller markets.[15] Restrictions on other NFL broadcasts in competition with home games were particularly beneficial to weaker teams. Financially successful teams located in larger markets were, for the most part, in a better position to acquire premier talent and, therefore, field stronger teams. Consequently, in the absence of some type of protection, many fans could have preferred to watch these teams play on television rather than purchase tickets to games involving inferior clubs. Had this occurred, television could well have exacerbated financial disparities between teams, relegated some clubs to minor league status, and reduced the attractiveness of the sport.

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[12] See report of the Senate Committee on Commerce on S. 2554, "Professional Sports Anti-Blackout Law Extension," pp. 1–2, report No. 94–510, 94th Congress, 1st Sess., p. 6; U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, report to accompany H.R. 11070, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., report No. 94–722, p. 3 and 7; and P. Hochberg, "Congress Tackles Sports and Broadcasting," *3 West. St. L. Rev.* 223 (1976).

[13] *United States* v. *National Football League*, 196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961).

[14] 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–95.

[15] Hearings on "Telecasting of Professional Sports Contests," before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).

Public Law 87–331 went a long way in preventing such developments. Home games were not only protected from competing telecasts but the league's ability to collectively negotiate the sale of NFL television rights increased revenues earned from television and reduced financial disparities since all revenues earned from network contracts were equally divided among the teams.

The league as a whole clearly benefited from the antitrust exemption. As was pointed out in a report on the necessity of television blackouts prepared by the House Special Subcommittee on Investigations in 1973:

> In the ensuing 12 years since the antitrust exemptions were granted, professional football has gained unprecedented popularity. This popularity accounts for four additional club franchises being granted, the American Football League becoming viable, the American Football League and the National Football League merging, additional games being played by each team, most clubs obtaining new and/or enlarging stadiums, and for attendance more than doubling. Moreover, in recent years this increased attendance has resulted in most games being sold out. Many clubs perennially sell out all games several months before the beginning of the season to the same ticket patrons. As a result of the blackouts permitted by the antitrust exemption, many fans—in addition to being unable to purchase a ticket to any home game—are precluded from viewing those games on television. About 35 percent of the Nation's population resides in blacked-out areas. Thus, the impact of television blackouts is considerably greater today than in 1961.
>
> A large degree of the present popularity of professional football is attributed to television exposure. As a consequence of this popularity, the clubs have grown financially sound. This financial well-being has also been enhanced to a large degree by the antitrust exemption permitting the league to bargain for a television "package." [16]

Accordingly, Congress felt justified in establishing restrictions on NFL television blackout policies. In their view, local telecasts of sold-out home games were a small price to pay for financial benefits accruing from the antitrust exemption.

The three major television networks also lent their full support to the legislation but for seemingly different reasons. The networks viewed Public Law 93–107 as an effective means of precluding the NFL from selling its television rights to pay television systems.[17] In 1972 the Federal Communications Commission adopted rules which prohibited pay cable systems and subscription television stations from carrying sports programing which had been shown on "free" television some time during the preceding 2 years.[18]

In 1975 the period was extended to 5 years.[19] The Commission's antisiphoning rules coupled with Public Law 93–107 effectively restrained the NFL from selling its television rights to subscription operators as opposed to conventional broadcasters.[20]

Although the NFL and the other professional sports leagues were unable to forestall the passage of Public Law 93–107, their arguments raised a number of questions regarding the advisability of enacting permanent legislation. Consequently, the Congress adopted a temporary law which expired on December 31, 1975, after a 3-year trial period. Public Law 93–107 further required the FCC to submit an annual report to Congress on the effects of locally televised games on

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[16] "Evaluation of the Necessity for Television Blackouts," supra, note 8, at 2.
[17] Hearings on H.R. 9536 et al., before the Communications and Power Subcommittee of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, 78–100, 106–118 (1973).
[18] 36 FCC 2d 143 (1972).
[19] 52 FCC 2d 1 (1975).
[20] See discussion of *Home Box Office* v. *FCC*, *infra*, at p. 53.

professional sports teams. This particular provision of the legislation was largely due to those reservations expressed by the National Football League.

All three FCC reports concluded that Public Law 93–107 did not materially affect the financial performance of the NFL. The third annual report did indicate, however, that 12 of the 26 NFL teams experienced increases in "no shows" at locally televised home games. In two instances—Miami and Atlanta—the impact of local television coverage on live gate attendance was especially noticeable and, at least, arguably, posed a significant threat to the financial vitality of these teams.[21]

On the other hand, the Commission's analysis of NFL audience ratings in those television markets which support pro football franchises, demonstrated strong preferences for locally televised home games as opposed to contests involving other teams.[22] Clearly, Congress is faced with a dilemma. As the NFL persistently argued, Public Law 93–107 was not free of costs. Fans, however, expressed strong approval of the legislation as reflected by their viewing preference for games involving their home teams.

As of this writing, Congress has not enacted new legislation. Interest in the issue, nevertheless, persists. On October 5, 1976, Senator Warren G. Magnuson, chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, and Senator John O. Pastore, former chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Communications, requested the FCC to submit a fourth report to Congress on the effects on locally televised games on professional sports teams. This was made possible by the NFL's decision to voluntarily comply with the intent of Public Law 93–107 through the 1977 season or until Congress enacts new legislation, whichever occurs first.

The purpose of the subsequent section is to determine the impact of locally televised games on professional football teams. Specifically, the analysis is designed to assess the validity of various arguments raised by the NFL in opposition to a permanent sports antiblackout law, and, in so doing, evaluate the benefits and costs associated with Public Law 93–107. The discussion begins with a review of the number of NFL games locally televised since 1973. Sold-out games played between 1970 and 1972 are also identified in order to compare the frequency of sell-outs before and after the enactment of sports antiblackout legislation.

NFL ticket sales and live gate attendance figures are then evaluated so as to determine whether Public Law 93–107 has adversely affected gate receipts and attendance for the league as a whole. Again, if the NFL's opposition to sports blackout legislation is valid, increased television coverage of home games since 1973 should coincide with reductions in ticket sales and increases in "no shows," that is, ticket holders who chose not to attend games.

Conversely, proponents of the legislation regard locally televised games to be of considerable value to those fans residing in NFL home team territories who for one reason or another do not have the opportunity to watch their club play in person. Attention is, therefore, given to local as well as national audience ratings for NFL telecasts during the previous five playing seasons. This is done to compare and contrast the popularity of locally televised home games with other NFL

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[21] Third Annual Report of the Federal Communications Commission on the Effect of Public Law 93-107, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, at 4–13 (1976).
[22] Id. at 38–41.

telecasts and to determine whether increased television exposure has resulted in oversaturation and a lessening of viewer interest in the home team or football in general. An effort is also made to estimate the value of larger television audiences to the networks, their local affiliated stations and broadcast advertisers which have resulted from locally televised games.

Having reviewed leaguewide trends in local telecasts of home games, ticket sales, live gate attendance, and audience ratings, an assessment of the impact of Public Law 93–107 on individual NFL franchises is then provided. The team-by-team approach is advantageous in that it affords a more definitive understanding of the merits and problems associated with sports antiblackout legislation. As noted previously, the Commission's Third Annual Report on Public Law 93–107 clearly indicated that NFL fans around the country react differently to local telecasts of home games. In some instances, ticket holders appear to be far less inclined to attend games when they are locally televised; while in other markets television does not appreciably impact on live gate attendance. Similarly, locally televised home games are far more popular in some NFL markets than in others.

All of this suggests that a fair and thorough evaluation of the sports antiblackout law necessitates that attention be paid to the effects of local telecasts on individual NFL franchises. While permanent legislation may not impose undue financial hardships on the league as a whole, selected teams may be affected more seriously. Congress would have to weigh these costs against the benefits accruing to television audiences around the country. Hopefully, this analysis will prove helpful in making that judgment.

The Effect of Public Law 93–107 on Professional Football: An Overview of NFL Locally Televised Home Games, Ticket Sales, "No Shows," and Audience Ratings

An overview of sold-out and locally televised games: 1970–76

NFL television policies

The National Football League has long been concerned over the appropriate level of television coverage devoted to its games. The league, as noted above, has consistently maintained that locally televised home games pose a serious threat to live gate attendance. Moreover, the NFL is fearful that local coverage of home games could result in overexposure and an eventual waning of interest in particular teams or the sport in general.

Consequently, NFL television policy prohibited local telecasts of home games prior to the enactment of Public Law 93–107 in September 1973. Moreover, the NFL, until 1966, did not broadcast any of its games in the home territory of a franchise when that team was playing at home. This particular restriction was voluntarily dropped only after the rival American Football League began televising its games in the home territories of NFL clubs. By all indications, that change in policy did not adversely impact on live gate attendance.

Indeed, a report prepared by the House Special Subcommittee on Investigations in 1973 concluded that additional broadcast coverage of NFL contests after 1965 enhanced local interest in home teams and brought about subsequent increases in ticket sales. The report further

held that alterations of the league's television policies in 1966 resulted in a $6 million increase in revenues earned from the television networks. The House report, therefore, concluded:

> The fact that the change in television policy in 1966 did not generate the predicted adverse effects on attendance strongly suggests that further modification of the television policy (that is, local telecasts of sold-out home games) would also not result in reduced attendance. Since a change in television policy was successful when attendance was moderate (86 percent of capacity), it would appear that a further change in television policy could also be expected to be successful when attendance is approaching the maximum (95 percent of capacity).[23]

On the basis of this and related evidence, Congress acted favorably on sports antiblackout legislation, requiring NFL teams to locally televise home games sold out 72 hours in advance and broadcast pursuant to a league contract with a television network.

The latter provision was irrelevant from the NFL's standpoint since virtually all of its regular and postseason games are televised by the three commercial networks, as are a number of preseason contests. Games involving American Football Conference (AFC) teams are currently broadcast by the NBC television network, while National Football Conference (NFC) games are carried by CBS. Interconference games are televised by the network of the visiting team. Monday Night Football games are broadcast by ABC. Finally, under current contractual agreements, television rights to the Super Bowl alternate between CBS and NBC, CBS and NBC also televise seven or eight "doubleheaders" during the regular season. Carriage of doubleheaders is usually alternated between the two networks; CBS will televise a doubleheader one week while NBC will broadcast two games the next.

The second half of an NFL doubleheader usually involves a nationally televised game whereas the networks' first games are comprised of a number of regional telecasts. That is, both CBS and NBC will simultaneously produce five or six different games on a given Sunday afternoon. Each game is then televised into different regions of the country. Regional networks are structured in such a way so as to maximize the total viewing audience. If a particular television market has strong preferences for a team located in general proximity, then those games are broadcast into that market. For example, the New England Patriots' games are televised throughout the Northeast, since fans in this part of the country presumably prefer to watch the Patriots as opposed to other NFL clubs. Additionally, if New England is playing at home, the game would also be broadcast in the visiting team's home territory. Fans residing in NFL cities, therefore, have an opportunity to see all seven away games in addition to those home games which are sold out and locally televised.

League contracts with the CBS and NBC further stipulate that only two games televised by the networks are to be shown in the home city of an NFL franchise when that team is playing at home, regardless of whether or not the home game is locally televised. On the other hand, when a team is away all three contests are televised. To illustrate, assume the Washington Redskins are playing a 1 p.m. home game. Further assume the game is sold out and locally televised on the CBS Washington affiliated station. If NBC were televising a doubleheader, the network's local affiliated station would likely carry the second game so as not to compete with the Redskins game broadcast on CBS. If,

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[23] "Evaluation of the Necessity for Television Blackouts," op. cit., at 16.

on the other hand, CBS were televising a doubleheader the local CBS affiliate would not carry the second game assuming of course the NBC affiliate televised the single game carried by its network. If the Redskins were playing away, that game as well as two others would be televised in the Washington market. Here again, restricted local television coverage of NFL games when a team is playing at home is thought necessary to protect live gate attendance and prevent oversaturation.

Locally televised home games

Approximately half of all regular season NFL games have been sold out and locally televised since the enactment of Public Law 93–107 in 1973. While the NFL does not dispute the popularity of these telecasts, the league maintains that locally televised home games have adversely affected gate receipts, particularly season ticket sales, and have resulted in fewer sold-out games.

Available statistics on sold-out games lend credence to the league's position. Table 1 below lists the number of games sold out and locally televised by individual NFL teams since 1973. Table 2 lists the number of sold-out games played during the 1970, 1971, and 1972 regular seasons. The tables clearly illustrate a marked decrease in sold-out games following the 1973 season, when 60 percent of all regular season games were sold out 72 hours in advance and subsequently televised.

Between 1974 and 1976, on the other hand, an average of only 44 percent of all home games were locally televised. The latter percentage is also considerably below the proportion of games sold out during the 3 years prior to the enactment of Public Law 93–107. Indeed, figures reported in table 2 indicate that approximately 61 percent of all regular season games played between 1970 and 1972 were sold out.[24]

Tables 1 and 2 further indicate that the diminution in sold-out games has not been limited to a few teams, but rather reflects a leaguewide trend. Sixteen clubs, for example, sold out a higher percentage of their home games played during the 3-year period prior to 1973, whereas only six teams experienced increases in the number of sold-out games following the enactment of Public Law 93–107. The frequency of sellouts for the remaining five teams remained unchanged over the two periods under consideration. Additionally, one-half of all NFL clubs annually sold out at least five home games between 1970 and 1972 while half of the clubs have sold out an annual average of three games or less since 1973.

It is also interesting to note that the frequency of sellouts did not decline significantly until 1974. This is precisely what one would expect, however, if the NFL is correct in suggesting that locally televised games have adversely affected season ticket sales. Nearly all season tickets for 1973 were sold out well in advance of the passage of Public Law 93–107 in September 1973. Accordingly, the impact of the legislation on gate receipts should not have been felt until the following year. That substantially fewer games were sold out in 1974 and sub-

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[24] It should be understood, however, that figures reported in table 2 were compiled by the NFL prior to the enactment of Public Law 93–107. They do not necessarily reflect the number of games sold out at least 72 hours in advance. Some of these games, for example, could have been sold out on the day of the game in which case they would not have been locally televised had the sports antiblackout law been adopted 3 years earlier. Unfortunately, it is impossible to determine how many sold-out games listed in table 2 fall into that category. Moreover, according to the House subcommittee report from which these figures were taken, the NFL did not employ a uniform method of determining whether particular games were sold out. Consequently, figures in tables 1 and 2 may not be entirely comparable. Nevertheless, they do provide a clear indication that the enactment of Public Law 93–197 coincides with a decrease in the number of sold-out games.

sequent years certainly suggests the presence of a causal relationship between locally televised home games and season ticket sales.[24a]

TABLE 1.—SUMMARY OF THE NUMBER OF HOME GAMES LOCALLY TELEVISED BY INDIVIDUAL NFL TEAMS BETWEEN 1973 AND 1976

Team	1973	1974	1975	1976	Percent televised 1973–76
Atlanta	7	7	0	0	50
Baltimore	0	0	1	2	11
Buffalo	3	4	2	0	32
Chicago	7	6	2	5	71
Cincinnati	6	7	5	5	82
Cleveland	2	1	1	1	18
Dallas	3	0	1	5	32
Denver	7	7	7	7	100
Detroit	3	0	3	1	25
Green Bay	7	7	7	7	100
Houston	0	1	2	2	18
Kansas City	6	0	0	0	21
Los Angeles	0	0	1	1	7
Miami	7	3	0	0	36
Minnesota	7	5	7	7	93
New England	2	5	2	2	39
New Orleans	0	0	0	0	0
New York Giants	6	0	2	6	50
New York Jets	4	4	4	0	43
Oakland	5	4	5	7	75
Philadelphia	7	7	7	7	100
Pittsburgh	8	7	6	7	97
St. Louis	1	4	3	3	39
San Diego	0	0	0	1	4
San Francisco	4	0	0	1	18
Seattle	NA	NA	NA	2	29
Tampa Bay	NA	NA	NA	0	0
Washington	7	7	7	7	100
Total games televised	109	86	75	86	----------
Total games played	182	182	182	196	----------
Percent of games locally televised	60	47	41	44	----------

TABLE 2.—GAMES LISTED BY THE NFL AS SELLOUTS BETWEEN 1970 AND 1972

Team	1970	1971	1972	Percentage sold out 1970–72
Atlanta	4	7	7	86
Baltimore	7	3	2	57
Buffalo	2	2	3	33
Chicago	7	7	7	100
Cincinnati	6	7	5	86
Cleveland	5	3	0	38
Dallas	0	3	0	14
Denver	7	7	7	100
Detroit	7	7	7	100
Green Bay	7	7	4	86
Houston	1	1	0	10
Kansas City	7	7	0	66
Los Angeles	3	2	0	24
Miami	0	3	6	43
Minnesota	7	7	6	95
New England	0	4	7	52
New Orleans	0	3	0	14
New York Giants	7	7	6	95
New York Jets	7	7	4	86
Oakland	7	7	7	100
Philadelphia	0	7	5	57
Pittsburgh	3	2	5	48
St. Louis	2	4	0	29
San Diego	0	3	1	19
San Francisco	0	6	4	48
Washington	7	7	7	100
Total games sold out	103	130	100	----------
Percent of total	57	71	55	----------

[24a] See subsequent discussion on ticket sales.

TICKET SALES: AN OVERVIEW 1972–76

At first glance NFL ticket sales do not appear to have been seriously affected by Public Law 93–107. As the figures in table 3, below, indicate the total number of tickets sold to NFL regular season games has remained relatively constant since 1972. Indeed, total sales last year was only 1 percent below the level recorded in 1972. It may be asked, therefore, why the percentage of sold-out games fell from 55 percent of regular season games played in 1972 to 43 percent in 1976. One reason is immediately obvious; the average seating capacity of NFL stadiums increased from 58,355 to 64,217 or by 10 percent. Demand for tickets, particularly season tickets, has not kept pace with the increasing supply and, as a consequence, the number of sold-out games has declined.

As noted previously, the NFL has consistently maintained that Public Law 93–107 is responsible for this development. The league insists that locally televised home games have lessened demand for season tickets which in and of itself accounts for the decline in the number of sold-out games since 1974. The proposition is not unfounded.

Between 1974 and 1976 season ticket sales fell by nearly 12 percent. The loss in sales also marked a clear departure from previous trends. Between 1970 and 1973, for example, the total number of season tickets sold by NFL franchises increased by 21 percent. It is also interesting to note that season ticket sales, like the number of sold-out games, did not decline significantly until 1974.

Again, this is precisely what one would expect assuming the league's position is valid; since season tickets for the 1973 season were sold prior to the enactment of Public Law 93–107, the impact of locally televised home games on NFL gate receipts should not have been felt until 1974. Accordingly, figures in the summary table below lend further evidence to the proposition that locally televised home games have lessened demand for season tickets.

Fortunately, the issue lends itself to empirical investigation which is thoroughly discussed in appendix B of this report. Briefly, the results of that analysis indicate that season ticket sales of most NFL clubs are primarily determined by the team's performance during the previous season and the population of the metropolitan area in which the franchises are located. As expected, demand for season tickets increased following an improvement in the team's won-loss record. Additionally, NFL franchises located in large markets generally sell more tickets than do teams which play in smallcr metropolitan areas.

The results further indicate that demand for season tickets was not significantly influenced by changes in effective household buying income or, for that matter, ticket prices. In short, money was not a primary consideration in consumer decisions regarding the purchase of NFL season tickets.

The analysis also indicated that variations in the number of locally televised games did not significantly influence demand for season tickets in subsequent years. This, of course, suggests that increases in local telecasts per se were not responsible for declining sales in 1974, 1975, and 1976. If that were the case, one would expect season ticket sales to fall when a team sold out and locally televised additional home games during the previous season.

On the other hand, season ticket sales for 1974, 1975, and 1976 were found to be significantly below the level of sales recorded for 1971, 1972, and 1973 regular seasons, when all other factors which influence demand were taken into account. As noted previously, this particular finding substantiates the notion that local telecasts are at least partially responsible for recent reductions in demand for season tickets.

Admittedly these results are not entirely consistent. This is not to suggest, however, that neither is incorrect. Indeed, the analysis simply suggests that local telecasts of home games have heightened the influence of a team's won-loss record on its season ticket sales. Teams which sell out and locally televised additional games during a given year generally finish the season with an improved won-loss reccord. Acordingly, gate receipts for the subsequent season usually increase. In some instances television may actually heighten interest in a winning team which can easily translate into increased season ticket sales. In any event, it is not particularly surprising that demand for season ticket sales has remained unaffected by increases in local television coverage of home games which again generally results from improved performance on the playing field.

On the other hand, teams which play poorly but still manage to sell out and locally televise a number of home games can expect to encounter unusually large reductions in demand for season tickets. Television coverage of home games appears to exacerbate the adverse effect of a poor won-loss record on ticket sales for subsequent seasons. This is undoubtedly one major reason why season ticket sales for the league as a whole have declined since the enactment of Public Law 93–107.

In short, local telecasts of home games do not pose a serious threat to gate receipts when a team is winning. In the event that a club is not playing well, however, locally televised home games can have an adverse impact on demand for season tickets. None of this should be particularly surprising. Fortunately, problems created by the sports antiblackout law, in this regard, are not particularly serious in that most teams which are not winning generally do not sell out and locally televise many home games.

It also should be pointed out that nearly 90 percent of all season ticket holders have apparently remained unaffected by Public Law 93–107. Notice, for example, that season ticket sales last year fell by less than 1 percent even though more home games were locally televised in 1976 than in 1975 or 1974. Morevoer, the proportion of NFL games which are sold-out games has remained relatively constant since 1974. This would seem to indicate that demand for NFL tickets has stabilized. If so, an extension of the sports antiblackout law should not have an appreciably larger future impact on season ticket sales than has been felt by the league since 1974. Additionally, there is every reason to believe that future sales will increase along with the population of metropolitan areas which support NFL franchises. Nevertheless, assuming permanent legislation is enacted by Congress, season ticket sales will probably remain 10 to 12 perent below those levels which the league would experience in the absence of mandatory telecasts of sold-out home games (see appendix B).

TABLE 3.—SUMMARY OF TICKET SALES FOR NFL TEAMS 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Total tickets sold	10, 455, 827	10, 730, 933	10, 236, 322	10, 207, 041	10, 308, 734
Percent change from previous season		3	−4. 6	−0. 3	1
2. Average stadium capacity	58, 355	62, 135	62, 453	63, 249	64, 217
3. Average tickets sold per game:					
(a) All games	56, 964	58, 946	56, 255	56, 083	56, 641
(b) Locally televised games		59, 522	57, 023	57, 087	58, 161
(c) Nontelevised games	56, 964	58, 089	55, 567	55, 379	55, 338
4. Percentage of stadium capacity sold:					
(a) All games	97. 6	94. 9	90. 1	88. 7	89. 2
(b) Nontelevised games	97. 6	89. 9	83. 6	83. 0	81. 6
5. Total season tickets sold	1, 314, 485	1, 314, 389	1, 232, 459	1, 168, 710	1, 158, 363
Percent change from previous season		0	−6. 1	−5. 3	−0. 9
6. Average number of season tickets sold per team	50, 557	50, 553	47, 402	44, 950	44, 552
7. Number of locally televised home games	0	109	86	75	84

Note: 1972 figures—Exclude ticket sales of the Dallas Cowboys and New Orleans Saints. 1976 figures—Exclude ticket sales of Seattle Seahawks and Tampa Bay Buccaneers.

"NO SHOWS": AN OVERVIEW 1972–76

The National Football League has also consistently maintained that locally televised games adversely affect live gate attendance. The league believes that ticketholders are simply less inclined to attend games if those contests are broadcast on local television stations. This is thought to be particularly true in those cities where fans experience difficulties in getting to and from the stadium due to traffic congestion, parking problems or related obstacles. Additionally, the league maintains that local telecasts exacerbate the adverse impact of bad weather on attendance. The NFL reasons that fans become far less willing to sit in a cold or wet stadium when homes games are locally televised.

As noted previously, "no shows" are troublesome to the NFL for two reasons. First, empty seats are thought to detract from the excitement surrounding the game. Additionally, the average fan at NFL games spends about $1.50 on "Pro" magazine, an NFL publication, and concessions.[25] "No shows," therefore, translate into losses in revenue accruing to concessionaires, municipalities, and teams which share these receipts.

Table 4, below, affords some indication that locally televised games have, in fact, resulted in lower live gate attendance for the league as a whole. Total "no shows," for example, increased substantially in 1973 and have remained above recorded levels for the 1972 season during which no home games were locally televised. Indeed, approximately 6 percent of all tickets to regular season NFL games went unused in 1972 as compared with a seasonal average of nearly 10 percent since the enactment of Public Law 93–107. Additionally, "no shows" at locally televised games in 1973 and 1974 generally exceeded "no shows" at games which were blacked out. On the other hand, attendance at locally televised games in 1975 and 1976 exceeded attendance at nontelevised games. For example, 7 percent of all ticketholders failed to attend regular season games which were sold out and locally televised last year, while 10.1 percent chose not

[25] See third annual report of the Federal Communications Commission on the Effect of Public Law 93–107. op. cit., at appendix E.

to attend nontelevised games.[26] Similar percentages characterized attendance during the 1975 regular season.

The latter finding is of interest in that it suggests that teams which experience the greatest problems with "no shows" are not televising many home games. Statistical analyses of live gate attendance for individual teams tends to verify this proposition.[26a] A total of seven teams—Atlanta, Miami, Oakland, Dallas, Los Angeles, Minnesota, and Philadelphia—appeared to have been directly affected by Public Law 93–107. That is, "no shows" at locally televised games were significantly above "no shows" at nontelevised games, when all other factors which influence attendance were taken into account.

The impact of Public Law 93–107 on live gate attendance has not been particularly serious, however, except in the case of Atlanta and Miami. Both teams experienced dramatic increases in "no shows" when the local blackout was lifted. Atlanta, for example, locally televised all seven home games in 1974 and nearly 36 percent of all tickets sold went unused. Similarly the Dolphin's televised all home games in 1973 which coincided with a 473-percent increase in "no shows." This is not to suggest, however, that local telecasts were solely responsible for attendance problems in these two cities. "No shows" in Atlanta, for example, were also undoubtedly influenced by the team's consistently poor play following the 1972 season. As will be pointed out in a subsequent section, the Falcon's continued to experience major problems with live gate attendance in 1975 and 1976 despite the fact that all home games were blacked out.

Other NFL clubs directly affected by Public Law 93–107 did not encounter equally serious increases in "no shows." Indeed, "no shows" experienced by Oakland, Minnesota, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, and Dallas have remained below the league average since the enactment of Public Law 93–107. This, of course, indicates that while local telecasts have adversely affected the live gate attendance of these five clubs, the impact has not been serious. A more thorough explanation of attendance problems encountered by these teams can be found in section C of this chapter.

The analysis of NFL "no shows" also indicated that Public Law 93–107 has had an indirect appreciable impact on live gate attendance at Cincinnati, New England, New York (Jets), Pittsburgh, Chicago, Detroit, Green Bay, St. Louis, and Washington. In all nine instances, local telecasts appeared to exacerbate the adverse effect of bad weather on attendance. That is, "no shows" at games played in wet or cold weather appeared to be significantly higher when those games were locally televised than when they were not broadcast. But, here again, the problem did not appear to be particularly serious. Attendance experienced by nearly all of these teams has remained below the league average.

It is, therefore, apparent that "no shows" attributable to local telecasts have not posed a significant threat to the financial vitality of NFL franchises; particularly in light of the fact that losses in concession revenues amount to less than one-half of 1 percent of total average income which currently accrues to individual NFL clubs. Nevertheless, revenue losses associated with "no shows" represent a

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[26] These figures exclude games played at Seattle and Tampa Bay.

[26a] See part C of this section and appendix A for a statistical analysis of the effect of Public Law 93–107 on live gate attendance at NFL football games.

real cost for which individual teams, concessionaires, and municipal authorities are not being compensated. Accordingly, these costs should be properly weighed against the benefits of locally televised home games before further action on sports antiblackout legislation is taken.

TABLE 4.—SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR NFL TEAMS 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Total tickets sold	8,569,988 [1] 10,455,827	10,728,351 [1] 10,730,933	10,237,952 [1] 10,236,322	10,207,041 [1] 10,213,193	---------- [1] 10,308,734
Percent change from previous season		2.7	−4.6	−0.3	0.9
2. Total "no shows"	579,294	1,035,831	1,124,879	874,733	942,654
Percent change from previous season		78.8	8.6	−22.2	7.8
3. Average stadium capacity	58,355	62,135	62,453	63,249	64,217
4. Average tickets sold per game:					
(a) All games	56,964	58,946	56,255	56,083	56,641
(b) Locally televised games		59,522	57,023	57,087	58,161
(c) Nontelevised games	56,964	58,089	55,567	55,379	55,338
5. Average "no shows" per game:					
(a) All games	3,447	5,691	6,181	4,806	4,841
(b) Locally televised games		5,911	6,411	4,069	4,251
(c) Nontelevised games	3,447	5,363	5,974	5,323	5,346
6. Percentage of seats sold not showing:					
(a) All games	6.1	9.7	11	8.6	8.7
(b) Locally televised games		9.9	11.2	7.1	7.0
(c) Nontelevised games	6.1	9.2	10.8	9.6	10.1
7. Number of locally televised home games	0	109	86	75	84

[1] Indicates figure given in NFL annual reports.

Note: 1972 figures—Exclude the Dallas Cowboys and New Orleans Saints. 1976 figures—Exclude the Seattle Seahawks and Tampa Bay Buccaneers.

TELEVISION AUDIENCE RATINGS: AN OVERVIEW 1972–76

During legislative hearings on the extension of sports antiblackout legislation held in 1975, the Senate Committee on Commerce requested that the FCC study and report on the impact of Public Law 93–107 on local television audiences and the potential for greater NFL television revenues resulting from future contracts with the three commercial networks. While this section of the report is primarily concerned with the issue of audience ratings, attention is also given to the question of television revenues.

An audience rating simply refers to the percentage of all television households in a given location which view a particular program. Ratings differ depending on time of day, the day of the week, and the season during which a program is broadcast. Typically, the highest ratings occur in prime time (that is, 8–11 p.m.) during the weekdays. Network programs broadcast during this period generally acquire a rating of 20. Since people are less inclined to watch television on Sunday afternoon, most programs shown during this period usually attract far fewer viewers, that is, 5 to 6 percent of the total potential audience.[27] NFL football games, however, are an exception to the rule. This is particularly true of locally televised games involving home teams.

Between 1973 and 1976, locally televised NFL home games received an average audience rating of 33, indicating that on the average approximately one-third of all viewers residing in individual cities

[27] See Arbitron Television Market Summary, New York: American Research Bureau, Inc., February–March 1975.

with NFL franchises regularly watch home games when the blackout is lifted.[28] A comparable percentage watch the home team's locally televised away games. Moreover, a home team's locally televised games are substantially more popular than televised contests involving other NFL clubs. Other locally televised games, for example, which did not compete with the home team's televised contests received an average audience rating of 18.7 between 1973 and 1976. Conversely, other games which did compete with home team telecasts managed an average rating of only 6.6 during the same 4-year period.[29]

Viewer preferences are therefore clearly discernible. Locally televised games generally attract audiences which are nearly twice as large as other noncompeting NFL telecasts. Moreover, when forced to choose between telecasts involving the home team and other NFL clubs, local viewers—by a margin of 5 to 1—preferred to watch the home team.[30] The latter figure is indicative of strong viewer preferences toward locally televised home games.[31]

Additionally, there is no evidence to suggest that locally televised games have resulted in oversaturation. If this were so, audience ratings for all types of games broadcast in NFL markets should have decreased over the past 4 years. This has not been the case. Indeed, leaguewide audience ratings for home and away games have remained

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[28] Local audience ratings of NFL telecasts differ, of course, depending on the size of the market and the popularity of the teams involved. Specifically, audience ratings for all types of programs including NFL telecasts tend to be lower in very large markets such as New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago. Since viewers in these cities enjoy a larger number of television programs from which to choose, the total audience is spread over a larger number of stations and the average percentage of all households watching a given program is, therefore, lower. Audience ratings for locally televised home games also vary depending on the popularity of the home team.

To illustrate, consider differences in the popularity of locally televised games of the Dallas Cowboys and the New York Giants. Last year, the Cowboys' locally televised home games received an estimated average local audience rating of 47—the highest among NFL teams—while the New York Giants' locally televised home games managed an average rating of only 15. Moreover, the Giants' telecasts were not significantly more popular than most other NFL games broadcast in the New York area. The differences are partially due to the performance of each club. Dallas played well, finishing first in the NFC's central division while the Giants finished in last place with a 3 and 11 won-loss record. Additionally, nine commercial television stations are currently licensed to New York, whereas only five stations are licensed to Dallas-Ft. Worth; since New Yorkers can select programs from a wider array of stations, the percentage of the total audience watching a given station at a particular time is lower. Finally, New York also supports two NFL franchises. Accordingly, the total audience is usually divided between televised games of both home teams as well as other NFL telecasts. This, of course, further diminishes audience ratings experienced by both New York clubs.

[29] These percentages are based on local audience ratings for NFL games collected from the Arbitron Corp.'s 4-week fall audience sweeps of 1973, 1974, 1975, and 1976. Audience ratings for 25 NFL markets were analyzed. This number does not coincide with the number of teams because the New York Jets and Giants as well as the San Francisco Forty Niners and Oakland Raiders share markets, while the Green Bay Packers play home games in Green Bay and Milwaukee both of which represent separate television markets. The figures presented in the subsequent tables represent average audience ratings for home and away games played by the home team during each of the 4-week periods.

Specific dates for Arbitron's October–November audience sweeps are as follows:

Oct. 24–Nov. 20, 1973.
Oct. 24–Nov. 19, 1974.
Oct. 29–Nov. 25, 1975.
Nov. 7–Nov. 29, 1976.

Because ARB ratings are recorded in half-hour segments, it was necessary to compute an average game figure by summing these half-hour periods and dividing by six or seven (depending on perceived length of the game). It was assumed that most games would run 3 hours and any doubleheaders were split accordingly, after the first six ratings segments. All ratings were counted from an on-the-hour origin point with any pregame segment (for example, a 12:30 p.m. rating) excluded. Average figures were computed for each home and away game involving the local team. Next an average for all the home games and an average for all the away games of the team were calculated. It was further assumed that American Football Conference teams have their games carried on NBC while National Football Conference games are broadcast on CBS. In the case of an interconference game, the visiting team's network would broadcast the contest.

[30] This is reflected in the differences in audience ratings for the home team's games and those of competing games involving other NFL clubs. If another NFL game started at the same time as a home team telecast but was aired on a different station or had ratings for more than half of the segments during which the local team's telecast occurred, then those other games were defined as competing games. All other games not involving the local team were defined as noncompeting games. Again, this distinction was made in order to assess the magnitude of the local viewers' preferences for watching their home team play as opposed to other NFL clubs.

[31] Approximately 60 percent of all television households in this country are located within the boundaries of NFL home team territories. Television markets lying within NFL home team territories are listed in appendix E. Total TV households in each of these markets obtained from Arbitron Television ADI Market Ranking 1975–76.

consistently high and relatively constant since 1972; so have ratings for games involving other teams. Moreover, when the latter figures are compared with national network ratings for NFL games, one finds that professional football is substantially more popular among television viewers residing in markets which support NFL franchises, than in markets which do not have a team. This is indicated by the fact that the average audience rating for games involving the home team as well as noncompeting NFL telecasts generally exceeded national audience ratings for all types of NFL games.

For example, in 1976, NBC, which televises American Football Conference games, broadcast an early Sunday afternoon game during each week of the regular season. NBC also televised eight doubleheaders during the course of the season. The network's first game captured an average national rating of 11.5 while the second game of the doubleheader received an average rating of 16.9. Again, this simply indicates that an average of 11.5 percent of all television households in the country watched NBC's first game while 16.9 percent watched the second game.

NBC broadcasts of noncompeting games in markets which support AFC teams, on the other hand, captured an average rating of 18.7, while locally televised games involving the home team acquired an average rating of 34. This, of course, suggests that professional football is relatively more popular in those markets where the game is played.

Additionally, a review of local as well as national audience ratings for NFL games clearly indicates that viewer interest in the sport is not on the decline. National audience ratings for NFL telecasts, for example, reached their highest level last year. Additionally, local audience ratings of games involving NFL home teams were virtually the same in 1972 as in 1976. It is apparent, therefore, that Public Law 93–107 has not resulted in oversaturation of television coverage. NLF telecasts continue to be enormously popular with television viewers across the country. Moreover, there is no reason to believe circumstances will change in the near or more distant future. We must conclude, therefore, that NFL fans residing in most, if not all, home team territories would favor an extension of the sports antiblackout law.

It is further apparent that larger audiences attracted to locally televised home games are of value to the networks, their affiliated station, and advertisers who purchase commercial time during NFL telecasts. Revenues earned by the commercial broadcasting industry are obtained from sponsors who pay the networks or local stations for access to television viewers. Sponsors currently spend about $6 for every 1,000 viewers reached by a 60-second advertisement broadcast during an NFL game.[32]

Given the cost per 1,000 for NFL audiences, it is a relatively straightforward matter to estimate the financial value of locally televised games. This is done by estimating the net increase in NFL audiences which are attributable to local telecasts of home games and multiplying that figure by the amount of money advertisers are

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[32] Network cost per 1,000 estimates for NFL telecasts were obtained from the A.C. Neilson Co.'s annual publication "Let's Look at Sports" for the years 1973–76. Local cost-per-thousand estimates were derived from Media Market Guide published by Conceptual Dynamics Inc., New York, N.Y. Annual volumes of Media Market Guide for the fall of 1973, 1975, and 1976 were used for this purpose. The fall 1974 volume information was not available. Accordingly, cost per 1,000 information for 1974 was estimated using figures for 1973 and 1975.

willing to pay in order to reach the additional households with their commercial messages.

To illustrate, assume a team's home territory is comprised of 1 million households. Further assume the team locally televises all 7 home games which acquire an average audience rating of 30 as compared with average ratings of 17.5 and 5 for noncompeting and competing games respectively. In the event that a televised home game does not compete with another NFL telecast, the total audience for the network and its affiliated station in this market would increase by 125,000 households. If national and local advertisers are willing to pay $6 for every 1,000 households reached by their advertisements, then the additional 125,000 households attracted to the locally televised game would be worth an additional $750 for every minute of commercial time sold by the network or the local station during the game. As a rule of thumb, approximately 23 minutes of commercial time are available during an average NFL telecast.[33] Accordingly, the net value of this particular game would be on the order of $17,250.

Using this technique, estimated value of locally televised home games to the networks, affiliated stations, and their advertisers is as follows:

Estimated value of locally televised games to the television networks, their affiliated local stations, and commercial advertisers

Locally televised home games:	
1973	109
1974	86
1975	75
1976	84
Total	354
Estimated value of locally televised games:	*Thousands*
1973	$1,040
1974	1,430
1975	1,327
1976	1,894
Total	5,691

Admittedly, these figures are very rough estimates and subject to a number of qualifications. In the first place, the cost per 1,000 estimates used to compute the value of locally televised games are based on book advertising rates quoted by the networks and local stations. Oftentimes, commercial minutes are sold below the book rate if demand for time at the quoted price falls short of the available supply of commercial minutes. The figures above, therefore, are maximum estimates and may very well exceed actual value of locally televised games to broadcasters and their advertisers. Additionally, 15 percent of total advertising revenues are paid to advertising agencies who produce commercials and purchase time for their clients. Accordingly, the value of locally televised games should be adjusted downward to account for fees paid to advertising agencies.

It should also be understood that most of the financial benefits accruing from locally televised games are probably realized by advertisers as opposed to the networks and their affiliated stations. This is simply a consequence of the manner in which commercial advertising

[33] See correspondence from the television networks, appendix H.

time is sold. The networks and their affiliated stations establish rates or prices for commercial time aired during NFL telecasts well in advance of the season. Book rates generally reflect the expected size of the football audience, which is usually based on the number of households reached by NFL telecasts during the previous season, and the cost per 1,000 figure which broadcasters believe advertisers would be willing to pay for access to NFL viewers. Most of the commercial time available during NFL telecasts is sold at book rates. It is also purchased in advance of the playing season. By doing so, advertisers are guaranteed access to NFL audiences and their messages are also often placed in advantageous positions within the program, that is, during a timeout as opposed to the lengthy commercial break during halftime.

Accordingly, if the actual audience exceeds the estimated audience, the advertiser simply reaches more people than expected for the amount of money paid to the network or local station, and his cost per 1,000 viewers is, therefore, lower. In this situation, it is the advertiser, not the broadcaster, who experiences the immediate benefit from unusually popular NFL telecasts. This is particularly true of locally televised games since one cannot be sure of how many games will be locally televised until 72 hours before they are played. Given that virtually all commercials are sold before the 72-hour deadline, advertising rates charged by the networks and most of the affiliated stations do not immediately reflect substantial gains in audiences which result from local telecasts. Accordingly, most benefits associated with local telecasts accrue to the advertiser in the form of a lower cost per 1,000 viewers reached by the commercial messages.

This is not to suggest that broadcasters have been left empty-handed. Audience gains experienced by a station or a network during a given year result in advertising rate increases charges to sponsors in the subsequent season. Additionally, a few teams sell out all or nearly all home games. Stations in those markets can therefore command higher advertising rates for time sold during locally televised home games. The networks can also adjust their rates accordingly, before the season begins.

Unfortunately, it is impossible to precisely measure the extent to which the networks, local stations, or broadcast advertisers benefit from locally televised games. Suffice it to say that the total annual value of these telecasts is approximately $1.4 million a year, with the largest proportion of the total accruing to the advertisers. It is therefore evident that Public Law 93–107 has not had an appreciable impact on the value of NFL television rights. Indeed, even assuming that the network revenues have increased by $1 million a year as a result of locally televised games, the increase would still amount to no more than 1 percent of total revenues earned from NFL telecasts.

This is not to suggest, however, that the price of NFL television rights will remain at current levels. Indeed, the league's recent settlement with the NFL Players Association is expected to cost approximately $125 million over the next 5 years, increasing the average annual operating expenses of individual clubs by about 15 percent. NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle has given notice that he expects to offset a large part of these costs by increasing television revenues.[34]

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[34] New York Daily News, Mar. 29, 1977.

To this end the league has decided to expand its regular season schedule from 14 to 16 games in addition to adding another playoff game beginning with the 1978 season. Expansion of the regular season will be done by eliminating two of six preseason games which each team currently plays.

Undoubtedly, these changes in NFL schedules will enhance the value of the league's television rights. It remains to be seen, however, whether the networks will be willing to pay an additional $25 million a year which again is necessary to offset the full costs of the players association settlement. The cost of NFL television rights is presently equivalent to nearly 66 percent of total advertising revenues which the networks realize from NFL telecasts. This percentage is considerably above the ratio of network programing expenses to total advertising. Generally speaking, revenues earned by the networks exceed their programing expenditures by a margin of 3 to 1. It is evident, therefore, that the networks pay the NFL relatively larger sums of money for its television rights than is paid to the producers of other network programs. Accordingly, the networks may resist the league's efforts to negotiate substantial increases in the price of the league's television contract. Whether they are successful will largely depend on the bargaining skills of each party.

The situation is further complicated by the recent court of appeals decision to vacate the Federal Communications Commission's anti-siphoning rules.[35] In effect that decision enables the NFL to sell its television rights to pay-cable, subscription television, or closed circuit systems. Given the popularity of locally televised home games, the NFL may find it advantageous to experiment with pay television in the near future. Admittedly, if the sports antiblackout law were renewed, sold-out home games would be required to be shown on commercial network affiliated stations unless the league changes its current policy of broadcasting virtually all games on network television. The NFL, however, would still have the option of placing certain games which were not sold out on pay television. Since those games would not be locally televised otherwise, viewers would not be deprived of programs which they now receive free of charge.

It should be clearly understood, however, that the league has recently indicated that they have no immediate plans to market professional football on pay television. If operating expenses continue to increase, however, NFL franchises will eventually seek additional sources of revenue. Pay TV affords at least one possibility. Increased income from the television networks represents another, as do higher prices for NFL tickets.

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[35] *Home Box Office, Inc.* v. *FCC*, No. 75-1280 (D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, March 25, 1977).

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR NFL GAMES, OCT. 5–20, 1972

Home market	Home team		Other teams			
			Competing		Other times	
	Number	Away rating	Number	Rating	Number	Rating
AFC:						
Baltimore	2	37.4	2	5.6	7	14.2
Buffalo	2	32.0	2	5.6	6	23.1
Cincinnati	1	32.3	1	2.2	7	19.2
Cleveland	1	34.2			8	22.5
Denver	2	36.9	2	6.1	6	25.5
Houston	1	25.0	1	7.0	8	20.8
Kansas City	1	48.5	1	5.0	7	19.2
Miami	1	40.7	1	6.2	7	25.3
New England	1	12.3	1	14.0	8	14.8
New York Jets	1	23.8			8	17.4
Oakland	2	26.3			8	19.7
Pittsburgh	1	34.5	1	7.8	7	22.4
San Diego	1	31.3	1	4.7	6	17.2
Conference average		32.2		6.2		20.0
NFC:						
Atlanta	2	27.5	1	1.7	6	19.4
Chicago	1	25.8	1	2.3	7	19.8
Dallas	2	43.9	2	3.2	7	24.2
Detroit	1	33.2			8	16.9
Green Bay	3	50.6	3	3.3	5	26.0
Milwaukee	2	47.8	2	5.8	6	25.1
Los Angeles					7	17.8
Minnesota	1	39.2			8	17.3
New Orleans	3	38.4	3	7.4	5	27.4
New York Giants	2	16.9			7	17.6
Philadelphia	1	22.3	1	8.3	7	22.9
St. Louis	2	14.0	2	11.9	6	17.8
San Francisco	1	22.7	1	5.3	7	22.9
Washington	1	18.7	1	11.0	7	18.7
Conference average		33.1		6.0		20.7
League total	39	33.9	30	6.0	187	20.4

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR NFL GAMES, OCT. 24–NOV. 20, 1973

Home market	Home team				Other teams			
	Home		Away		Competing		Other times	
	Number	Rating	Number	Rating	Number	Rating	Number	Rating
AFC:								
Baltimore			2	23.1	2	4.2	10	16.8
Buffalo	2	45.5	1	30.7	2	10.1	8	22.4
Cincinnati	1	19.1	3	28.6	2	4.9	9	16.1
Cleveland			3	32.3	3	7.8	8	24.5
Denver	1	36.8	3	36.6	3	4.8	7	27.4
Houston			3	17.1	3	17.1	9	23.4
Kansas City	2	34.6	2	37.8	2	7.6	9	19.3
Miami	1	35.7	3	41.0	3	6.4	8	22.9
New England	2	21.0	2	20.3	3	5.6	7	16.9
New York Jets	3	11.6	1	17.9	2	15.9	6	16.8
Oakland	3	[1] 20.1	1	9.8	2	18.9	6	18.2
Pittsburgh	3	36.3	1	40.7	0	----------	10	18.6
San Diego			2	27.6	1	17.2	11	22.0
Conference average		29.0		28.0		10.0		20.4
NFC:								
Atianta	2	36.3	2	30.3	2	5.8	9	18.6
Chicago	2	19.2	2	27.0	2	6.4	8	15.2
Dallas			2	41.3	2	2.5	10	25.5
Detroit			2	27.5	1	4.0	11	17.6
Green Bay	2	41.2	2	45.4	3	4.4	7	22.7
Milwaukee	2	44.3	2	38.3	4	5.6	8	22.0
Los Angeles			2	31.4	2	6.3	10	20.1
Minnesota	3	37.4	1	45.8	0	----------	9	17.2
New Orleans			2	47.2	1	4.8	11	25.9
New York Giants	1	14.8	2	17.1	2	8.9	7	17.0
Philadelphia	3	28.6	1	35.7	1	6.7	8	24.4
St. Louis			2	20.4	2	6.5	10	16.7
San Francisco			3	[1] 22.7	2	13.9	7	21.4
Washington	2	34.1	3	44.0	1	4.3	9	22.8
Conference average		32.0		33.9		6.2		20.5
League total	35	30.5	55	30.9	53	8.1	232	20.5

[1] Includes 1 simulcast game carried on CBS Nov. 4, 1973, with Oakland and San Francisco sharing average rating.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR NFL GAMES, OCT. 24–NOV. 19, 1974

Home market	Home team				Other teams			
	Home		Away		Competing		Other times	
	Number	Rating	Number	Rating	Number	Rating	Number	Rating
AFC:								
Baltimore			2	25.7	2	6.6	10	14.0
Buffalo	1	41.3	2	48.4	2	1.3	9	20.1
Cincinnati	2	30.4	2	29.4	3	5.2	7	12.7
Cleveland	1	29.5	2	35.8	2	5.0	9	20.2
Denver	2	41.4	2	35.0	2	3.4	9	22.0
Houston			3	25.1	3	13.5	9	21.7
Kansas City			2	33.6	1	11.0	11	15.6
Miami	1	34.7	1	35.2	0		11	17.0
New England	3	38.4	1	32.8	1	2.2	8	12.0
New York Jets			1	11.7	1	10.7	11	14.6
Oakland			1	19.8	1	3.4	10	17.1
Pittsburgh	2	33.3	2	31.6	1	5.8	10	17.8
San Diego			2	23.7	2	6.5	10	20.3
Conference average		35.6		29.8		6.2		17.3
NFC:								
Atlanta	1	34.4	3	25.3	1	5.5	11	15.2
Chicago	2	24.3	2	23.9	3	6.1	7	15.2
Dallas			2	40.1	1	10.2	11	22.2
Detroit			1	25.2	1	5.8	11	15.9
Green Bay	2	48.3	2	46.0	3	6.7	8	22.2
Milwaukee	2	37.4	2	38.1	3	6.6	8	18.2
Los Angeles			3	25.6	2	5.1	10	16.6
Minnesota	2	32.8	2	38.6	3	8.3	7	16.6
New Orleans			1	39.8	1	2.5	11	22.3
New York Giants			2	18.5	0		11	13.3
Philadelphia	2	28.7	2	23.0	3	4.6	7	18.2
St Louis	2	32.2	2	34.0	2	3.9	9	16.0
San Francisco			2	19.6	1	10.0	9	16.2
Washington	1	45.3	3	38.3	3	3.8	7	19.6
Conference average		35.4		31.1		6.1		17.7
League total	26	35.5	52	30.5	48	6.2	251	17.5

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR NFL GAMES, OCT. 29–NOV. 25, 1975

Home market	Home team				Other teams			
	Home		Away		Competing		Other times	
	Number	Rating	Number	Rating	Number	Rating	Number	Rating
AFC:								
Baltimore			2	37.0	2	2.7	9	13.1
Buffalo			2	39.7	1	4.0	11	20.3
Cincinnati	2	34.2	2	34.8	1	.3	10	14.5
Cleveland			3	24.7	3	6.2	9	19.8
Denver	2	37.6	2	37.1	2	3.6	8	26.6
Houston	2	39.8	2	35.5	2	8.2	9	25.2
Kansas City			2	30.0	1	2.3	11	16.0
Miami			2	37.3	2	6.8	10	19.4
New England	1	18.1	3	20.0	2	7.7	9	11.9
New York Jets	1	18.1	1	17.8	0	----------	10	14.6
Oakland	1	23.1	2	24.8	1	2.8	10	19.0
Pittsburgh	2	32.7	2	39.0	1	5.5	9	20.3
San Diego			2	16.5	1	5.8	11	15.8
Conference average		29.1		30.3		4.7		18.2
NFC:								
Atlanta			2	21.9	2	8.2	10	17.6
Chicago	1	28.8	2	18.1	1	14.5	10	14.4
Dallas			2	50.5	2	3.3	10	26.3
Detroit			2	29.0	1	3.6	11	15.1
Green Bay	2	44.8	2	45.6	4	4.6	7	21.4
Milwaukee	2	41.7	2	38.7	3	4.2	8	19.7
Los Angeles			2	23.4	1	3.0	10	15.8
Minnesota	2	37.1	2	40.7	2	5.1	8	18.8
New Orleans			1	31.0	1	8.3	11	23.4
New York Giants	2	17.0	1	15.4	1	7.3	8	15.7
Philadelphia	2	26.3	2	21.9	2	6.8	9	17.6
St. Louis	1	29.1	2	25.0	2	3.8	9	18.4
San Francisco			2	15.9	1	8.3	11	20.5
Washington	2	44.4	2	38.6	0	----------	10	16.7
Conference average		33.7		29.7		6.2		18.7
League total	25	31.4	53	30.0	42	5.5	258	18.4

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR NFL GAMES, NOV. 7–29, 1976

Home market	Home team				Other teams			
	Home		Away		Competing		Other times	
	Number	Rating	Number	Rating	Number	Rating	Number	Rating
AFC:								
Baltimore	1	34.8	2	38.8	2	9.3	9	16.8
Buffalo			2	32.8	1	3.3	12	20.0
Cincinnati	3	30.9	1	36.7	1	5.8	9	13.9
Cleveland			2	33.8	2	6.1	10	21.3
Denver	2	34.7	2	38.9	1	5.8	9	21.2
Houston			2	27.5	1	26.8	11	23.8
Kansas City			2	30.0	1	5.7	11	16.1
Miami			3	32.5	2	4.5	10	20.0
New England	1	29.3	2	32.0	2	3.1	10	13.7
New York Jets			1	8.8	1	13.5	12	13.9
Oakland	2	20.7	1	22.7			7	22.3
Pittsburgh	2	41.7	2	41.7	1	10.2	9	22.3
San Diego			1	19.2	1	6.7	11	18.4
Tampa Bay			3	22.3	2	14.6	10	19.5
Conference average		39.9		30.9		8.5		18.7
NFC:								
Atlanta			2	19.9	1	10.0	11	18.5
Chicago	2	29.8	2	27.8	2	4.2	8	17.1
Dallas	3	47.0	1	50.1	1	3.0	11	25.7
Detroit	1	22.1	2	24.5	2	6.9	10	13.9
Green Bay	3	47.0	1	46.8	3	4.5	8	23.9
Milwaukee	3	37.3	1	38.8	3	4.8	7	16.7
Los Angeles	1	23.3	2	26.7			11	16.9
Minnesota	2	40.9	2	47.7	1	4.8	9	18.3
New Orleans			3	35.9	2	7.4	10	24.3
New York Giants	3	15.0	1	16.5			4	11.8
Philadelphia	1	26.2	3	24.8	2	5.4	8	20.8
St. Louis	2	31.3	1	37.2	2	3.1	10	3.1
San Francisco	1	26.2	1	20.7			9	22.0
Seattle			2	15.5	2	6.7	10	20.6
Washington	1	41.8	3	42.1	1	3.0	10	19.1
Conference average		34.0		31.2		5.3		18.4
League total	34	35.9	53	31.1	40	6.7	276	18.6

NATIONAL TELEVISION AUDIENCES FOR PRESEASON NFL GAMES: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
ABC:					
Rating	17.1	13.7	14.0	10.2	11.6
Total households (thousands)	10,620	8,880	8,977	6,955	8,070
Percent change		−16.4	1.1	−22.5	16.0
CBS:					
Rating	12.8	18.2	11.2	12.0	10.2
Total households (thousands)	8,053	12,020	7,410	8,287	7,123
Percent change		49.3	−38.4	11.8	−14.0
NBC:					
Rating	12.2	13.2	12.4	11.9	12.7
Total households (thousands)	7,600	8,555	7,893	8,223	8,877
Percent change		12.6	−7.7	4.2	8.0
All networks:					
Rating	13.2	15.3	12.5	11.5	11.5
Total households (thousands)	8,226	10,006	8,093	7,930	8,018
Percent change		21.6	−19.1	−2.0	1.1
American Football Conference—NBC:					
1st game:					
Rating	11.5	11.9	12.6	12.3	11.5
Total households (thousands)	7,456	7,901	8,646	8,620	8,191
Percent change		6.0	9.4	−.3	−5.0
2d game of doubleheader:					
Rating	17.3	15.3	16.4	17.1	16.9
Total households (thousands)	11,212	10,097	11,246	11,951	12,043
Percent change		−10.0	11.4	6.3	.8
National Football Conference—CBS:					
1st game:					
Rating	14.6	15.1	14.2	13.8	17.0
Total households (thousands)	9,480	10,014	9,746	8,916	12,171
Percent change		5.6	−2.7	−8.5	36.5
2d game of doubleheader:					
Rating	14.6	13.0	12.1	12.5	18.0
Total households (thousands)	9,410	8,590	8,256	8,698	12,879
Percent change		−8.7	−3.8	5.4	48.1
Monday night football—ABC:					
Rating	20.7	21.3	19.5	20.2	20.6
Total households (thousands)	13,423	14,015	13,320	14,080	14,668
Percent change		4.4	−5.0	5.7	4.2
AFC divisional playoffs:					
Rating	23.1	21.7	23.8	23.0	25.3
Total households (thousands)	14,935	14,365	16,300	15,970	17,980
Percent change		−3.8	13.5	−2.0	12.6
NFC divisional playoffs:					
Rating	22.5	22.7	22.7	23.1	25.8
Total households (thousands)	14,550	15,030	15,500	16,045	18,370
Percent change		3.3	3.1	3.5	14.5
AFC championship:					
Rating	27.1	30.1	28.4	30.6	29.6
Total households (thousands)	17,560	19,930	19,450	21,300	21,080
Percent change		13.5	−2.4	9.5	−1.0
NFC championship:					
Rating	31.0	29.7	31.0	33.3	31.0
Total households (thousands)	20,090	19,660	21,240	23,180	22,070
Percent change		−2.1	8.0	9.1	−4.8
Super Bowl:					
Rating	41.6	42.7	42.4	42.3	44.4
Total households (thousands)	27,540	27,670	29,040	29,040	31,610
Percent change		.5	5.0	1.4	7.4

The Effect of Public Law 93–107 on Member Clubs of the National Football League

INTRODUCTION

Past analyses of the sports antiblackout law have generally concluded that the legislation has not imposed substantial costs on the National Football League as a whole. The Federal Communications Commission's First Annual Report on Public Law 93–107 noted that locally televised games have had "a minimal economic impact on the 26 member teams of the National Football League in its first year of operation." [36] The Commission's Second Annual Report arrived at similar conclusions, noting that local telecasts did not appear to appreciably affect live gate attendance or concession sales. [37] Findings presented in both reports correspond with the results of a similar study on the sports antiblackout law done by professors C. Elton Hinshaw and John Siegfried of Vanderbilt University. This particular study concluded that locally televised home games did not result in significant increases in "no shows" during the 1973 and 1974 regular seasons. [38]

Unfortunately, each of these studies was done with a scarcity of data on individual NFL clubs. As a consequence, the analyses were constrained to assess the impact of Public Law 93–107 on the league as a whole. This is troublesome in that fans residing in NFL home team territories may react differently to local telecasts. If so, sports antiblackout legislation may impact on some teams while not on others. Congress, therefore, would have to weigh the benefits of sports antiblackout legislation which accrue to the viewing public against the demonstrable harm experienced by individual clubs.

This is precisely why the Commission's Third Annual Report on Public Law 93–107 contained a team-by-team assessment of the impact of the legislation. As noted previously, the results contained in the Third Annual Report conclusively indicated that locally televised home games have, in fact, differentially affected NFL clubs. "No shows" at locally televised games in Miami and Atlanta were found to be particularly serious and at least arguably posed consequential financial problems. Other teams were also affected by locally televised home games. In those instances, however, losses in attendance which could be attributable to television were not substantial. [39]

Nevertheless, the finding contained in the Third Annual Report indicated that Public Law 93–107 has not been free of costs to NFL clubs. Accordingly, it was deemed appropriate to update last year's report following the same general approach. The discussion which follows will assess, therefore, the impact of locally televised games on ticket sales, "no shows," and local television audiences for each of the 28 franchises which presently comprise the National Football League.

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[36] Report of the Federal Communications Commission: The Effect of Public Law 93–107, the Sports Anti-Blackout Law on the Broadcasting of Sold-out Home Games of Professional Football, Baseball, Basketball, and Hockey. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974) p. 35.

[37] Second Annual Report of the Federal Communications Commission on The Effect of Public Law 93–107, The Sports Anti-Blackout Law, on the Broadcasting of Sold-out Home Games of Professional Football, Baseball, Basketball, and Hockey. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974.)

[38] John J. Siegfried and C. Elton Hinshaw, "The Professional Sports Television Anti-Blackout Law." Published in Select Committee on Professional Sports Final Report, Inquiry into Professional Sports. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977) pp. 644–656.

[39] The Third Annual Report of the Federal Communications Commission on the Effect of Public Law 93–107, *op. cit.*, pp. 9–12.

Baltimore Colts

1. *Televised games and ticket sales*

Sports antiblackout legislation does not appear to have significantly affected the Baltimore Colts. Indeed, the Colts have locally televised only three home games since 1973; one in 1975 and two in 1976. Baltimore finished both seasons atop of AFC's Eastern Division. The rather dramatic improvement in the team's performance is further reflected in total ticket sales which increased by 21.5 percent in 1975 and 12.3 percent in 1976. The increase in 1975 is particularly interesting when recognizing that season ticket sales fell by 16 percent from the previous year. Undoubtedly, Baltimore fans did not expect the Colts to move from a fifth place divisional finish in 1974 to a first place finish in 1975. Expectations were, of course, higher as the team approached the 1976 season and season ticket sales increased by 30 percent. Fortunately, the team won all but 3 of its 14 regular season games before succumbing to the Pittsburgh Steelers in the AFC playoffs.

SUMMARY OF BALTIMORE COLTS' TICKET SALES: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Stadium capacity	60,000	60,000	60,000	60,000	60,020
2. Total seats sold	392,320	375,572	269,806	328,394	368,818
Percent change from previous season		−4.3	−28.2	21.5	12.3
3. Average seats sold per game	56,046	53,653	38,544	46,913	52,688
4. Season ticket sales	48,315	47,233	32,593	27,377	35,606
Percent change from previous season		−2	−31	−16	30
5. Percentage of games won	0.357	0.285	0.143	0.714	0.786
6. Divisional standing	3	4	5	1	1
7. Number of televised home games	0	0	0	1	2

Given the team's rather strong showing in 1975 and 1976, it is surprising that the Colts did not sell out more home games. Baltimore's Municipal Stadium is not large by NFL standards with a capacity of approximately 60,000 fans. Additionally, Baltimore ranks 13th in terms of population among those 27 metropolitan areas currently supporting NFL franchises. However, between 1973 and 1976, the Colts sold an average of only 80 percent of their available seats, compared with a league average of 91 percent over the same 4-year period. Although the Colts won their division in 1975 and 1976, the team's ratio of ticket sales to seating capacity did not exceed the league average.

While the franchise has encountered problems in attracting fans to the stadium, it is reasonable to assume that Colt ticket sales have not been appreciably affected by the sports antiblackout law. It must be remembered that Baltimore has televised only 3 of 28 regular season games played since 1973 with two of the games televised in 1976 when ticket sales were relatively high. The Colts were also able to sell out and locally televise last year's divisional playoff game with the Pittsburgh Steelers, providing another indication that Baltimore ticket sales have not been significantly affected by Public Law 93–107.

2. *"No shows"*

Although Baltimore ticket sales have not been particularly strong in recent years, improvement in the team's performance in 1975 and

1976 coincided with a rather dramatic reduction in "no shows." During 1973 and 1974 seasons, for example, the ratio of "no shows" to tickets sold averaged out to 15 and 13 percent respectively. Conversely, only 3 percent of the Baltimore ticket holders failed to attend home games in 1975 and 1976. The team's remarkable improvement in live gate attendance is further evidenced by the fact that nearly 10 percent of all NFL ticket holders failed to attend games during the 1975 and 1976 seasons.

All of this suggests that live gate attendance in Baltimore is particularly sensitive to the team's performance. As expected, the statistical analysis (see appendix A) indicated that "no shows" were inversely proportional to the Colts' won-loss record. The analysis also indicated that attendance declined as a consequence of bad weather. Finally, the results verified the supposition that locally televised games did not significantly influence live gate attendance at Baltimore.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR BALTIMORE COLTS: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Total "no shows"	37,062	56,977	36,018	9,623	12,216
Percent change from previous season		53.7	−36.8	−73.3	26.9
2. Average "no shows" per game	5,295	8,140	5,145	1,375	1,745
3. Average number of seats sold per game	56,046	53,653	38,544	46,913	52,688
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	9.5	15.2	13.3	2.9	3.4
5. Number of televised games	0	0	0	1	2
6. Average "no shows" per televised game				1,141	1,491
7. Average "no shows" per nontelevised game	5,295	8,140	5,145	1,415	1,847
8. Percentage of games won	0.357	0.286	0.143	0.714	0.786
9. Divisional standing	3	4	5	1	1

3. *Audience ratings*

Football fans in Baltimore, as is the case in nearly all markets which support NFL franchises, clearly prefer to watch the home team play as opposed to other clubs. The table below lists audience ratings for Colt games played during the previous five seasons. Although Public Law 93–107 was not enacted until 1973, figures for 1972 are provided for the sake of comparison. As noted previously, audience ratings reported in this study pertain only to games played during annual 4-week periods in October and November when television audiences were measured by the American Research Bureau. They should, however, reflect actual viewing levels over each of the seasons under consideration.

Not surprisingly, Baltimore viewers appear to be more inclined to watch the Colts' televised games when the team is playing well. Note, for example, that games televised in 1975 and 1976 attracted more than one-third of all viewers in the Baltimore television market. Morever, these figures are considerably above audience ratings for away games locally televised in 1973 and 1974. Again the disparities in audience ratings over the previous four seasons coincide with improvements in the team's performance.

Nevertheless, even when the team was playing poorly, viewers demonstrated a marked preference for locally televised games. In 1974 the Colts finished last in their division with a rather dismal 2 and 12 won-loss record. Locally televised away games still managed to capture nearly 26 percent of the total audience, as compared to ratings of 14 and 6.6 respectively for noncompeting and competing televised games

involving other NFL teams. As expected, differences in audience ratings between the home team and other NFL clubs became more pronounced as the Colts improved their position in the divisional standings.

It can be concluded, therefore, that Public Law 93–107 has proven beneficial to fans residing in the Baltimore metropolitan area. Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that locally televised home games have adversely affected ticket sales or live gate attendance.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR THE BALTIMORE COLTS: 1972–76

	Colts		Ratings for other teams	
	Home games	Away games	Competing	Noncompeting
1972	(1) (1)	(2) 37.4	(2) 5.6	(7) 14.2
1973	(0) ----	(2) 23.1	(2) 4.2	(10) 16.8
1974	(0) ----	(2) 25.7	(2) 6.6	(10) 14.0
1975	(0) ----	(2) 37.0	(2) 2.7	(9) 13.1
1976	(1) 34.8	(2) 38.8	(2) 9.3	(9) 16.8
Average ratings	(1) 34.8	(10) 32.4	(10) 5.7	(45) 15.0

[1] Not applicable.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of NFL locally televised games during the American Research Bureau's annual 4-week fall audience surveys.

Buffalo Bills

1. *Televised games and ticket sales*

The Buffalo Bills have locally televised only seven home games, or 15 percent of the total number, since the enactment of Public Law 93–107. Three home games were televised in 1973, four in 1974, and two in 1975. Buffalo did not sell out any of its home games during the 1976 regular season. Indeed, ticket sales fell off by nearly 25 percent last year. Demand for Bills' tickets appears to be quite sensitive to the quality of the team. In 1974, for example, the Bills finished second in their division with a respectable 9 and 5 won-loss record. Last year the team did not fare nearly as well finishing in last place while managing to win only two games.

Moreover, the Bills' season ticket sales also appear to be particularly sensitive to the fans expectations of how well the team will play in the subsequent season. For example, Buffalo's won-loss record and divisional standing deteriorated in 1975. Consequently, season ticket sales for the 1976 regular season fell off by nearly 23 percent, which accounts for a larger proportion of the decrease in total ticket sales experienced by the franchise last year. It can be argued that the fans expected the team's performance to continue to deteriorate and, as a consequence, were less willing to purchase tickets. As it turned out, their expectations were accurate.

The figures, however, also suggest that locally televised games may have adversely affected Buffalo's season ticket sales. Again the team had good seasons in both 1973 and 1974. Additionally, O. J. Simpson rushed in excess of 2,000 yards in 1974 breaking the league record by a considerable margin. Given this remarkable performance, coupled with the fact that Buffalo won a berth in the playoffs for the first time, it is surprising that season ticket sales declined by 20 percent in 1975. Perhaps Buffalo fans believed that all, or nearly all, of the Bills' home games would be televised in 1975 and were, accordingly, less

inclined to purchase season tickets. Similar attitudes may also have been partially responsible for losses in season ticket sales to 1976 home games.

SUMMARY OF BUFFALO BILLS' TICKET SALES: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Stadium capacity	45,748	[1] 80,000	80,020	80,193	80,020
2. Total seats sold	309,814	544,772	555,496	537,619	405,500
Percent change from previous season		75.8	2.0	−3.2	−24.6
3. Average seats sold per game	44,259	77,825	79,357	76,803	57,925
4. Season ticket sales	24,700	52,474	54,182	43,184	33,308
Percent change from previous season		112.5	3.3	−20.3	−22.9
5. Percentage of games won	0.286	0.643	0.643	0.571	0.143
6. Divisional standing	4	2	2	3	5
7. Number of televised home games	0	3	4	2	0

[1] Buffalo moved to a new larger stadium in 1973.

2. *"No shows"*

Buffalo has experienced rather substantial increases in "no shows" since the enactment of Public Law 93–107. However, most of this increase is directly attributable to the team's moving into the new Rich Stadium which expanded the team's seating capacity from 45,748 to 80,000.

It should be pointed out, however, that the percentage of ticketholders who chose not to attend games did not appreciably increase in 1973 and 1974. Indeed, in 1973, only 2 percent of all ticketholders failed to attend games while only 3 percent failed to attend in 1974. Both figures were substantially below the league average. Although Buffalo "no shows" did increase marginally in 1975 and 1976, the team's attendance record was still considerably better than most other clubs in the NFL. During last year's season, for example, only 5.9 percent of the Bills' ticketholders did not attend home games as compared with an average of 9.7 percent for the league as a whole. This was particularly encouraging given the team's rather dismal performance.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR BUFFALO BILLS: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Total "no shows"	8,310	17,964	12,047	27,137	24,307
Percent change from previous season		116	−32.9	125.3	−10.4
2. Average "no shows" per game	1,187	2,566	1,721	3,877	3,472
3. Average number of seats sold per game	44,259	77,825	79,357	76,803	57,925
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	2.7	3.3	2.2	5	5.9
5. Number of televised games	0	3	4	2	0
6. Average "no shows" per televised game		2,813	1,723	1,502	
7. Average "no shows" per nontelevised game	1,187	2,381	1,719	4,827	3,472
8. Percentage of games won	0.286	0.643	0.643	0.571	0.143
9. Divisional standing	4	2	2	3	5

The statistical analysis of Buffalo "no shows" indicates that live gate attendance during the previous four seasons has not been significantly affected by locally televised home games.* Temperature, however, did prove to be a significant determinant of attendance as did the team's won-lost percentage and its divisional standing. That is, fans were less inclined to attend games when the weather was cold but more inclined to go when the team was winning and in contention

*See appendix A.

for a divisional championship. Additionally, the analyses indicated that the ratio of "no shows" to tickets sold increased significantly after 1972. As noted, seasonal differences in "no shows" can probably be attributed to the acquisition of a new, larger stadium. The expanded seating capacity at Rich Stadium may have resulted in additional traffic congestion and parking problems. Additionally, many seats in the new stadium are undoubtedly farther away from the field than seats in Buffalo's old facility. Consequently, some ticketholders may not have been able to see as well as they could in the old facility. The combined effect of such factors may have discouraged some fans from attending games. Again, this is simply an hypothesized explanation. We have no factual evidence to support or refute its accuracy. We are reasonably certain, however, that Public Law 93–107 has not had a deleterious impact on Buffalo's live gate attendance.

3. *Audience rating*

The Bills' locally televised games are enormously popular with television viewers in the Buffalo area. Over the past four seasons, approximately 44 percent of all TV households in Buffalo and the surrounding area viewed the Bills' home games when the local blackout was lifted. An average of 39 percent have watched the team's locally televised away games since 1973. In order to appreciate the magnitude of these audience ratings, one should keep in mind that prime time network programs broadcast in the Buffalo television market generally acquire a rating of 20. Nonsports programs shown on Sunday afternoon are usually viewed by about 5 or 6 percent of the total audience.

A large proportion of Buffalo viewers also watch other NFL games. Between 1972 and 1973, NFL televised contests which did not conflict with the Bills' games were viewed by approximately 21 percent of the population. Competing NFL telecasts, as expected, did not do nearly as well, capturing an average rating of 5.2. Again, the latter figure is indicative of strong viewer preferences for games involving the home team.

Finally, the figures in the table below suggest that Buffalo audience ratings are relatively sensitive to the team's performance. That is, audience ratings were highest in 1974 and 1975 when the Bills were in contention for their divisional championship. When the team was not playing as well, audience ratings declined; although remaining well above average ratings for games involving other NFL clubs.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR THE BUFFALO BILLS: 1972–76

	Bills		Ratings for other teams	
	Home games	Away games	Competing	Noncompeting
1972	(1) (1)	(2) 32.0	(2) 5.6	(6) 23.1
1973	(2) 45.5	(1) 30.7	(2) 10.1	(8) 22.4
1974	(1) 41.3	(2) 48.7	(2) 1.3	(9) 20.1
1975	(0) ----	(2) 39.7	(1) 4.0	(11) 20.3
1976	(0) ----	(2) 32.8	(1) 3.3	(12) 20.0
Average ratings	(3) 44.1	(9) 37.4	(8) 5.2	(46) 20.9

[1] Not applicable.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of NFL locally televised games during the American Research Bureau's annual 4-week fall audience surveys.

In conclusion, the effect of Public Law 93–107 on the Buffalo Bills and the team's fans has been mixed. It appears that locally televised games may have adversely impacted on season ticket sales. However, ticketholders are as likely to attend locally televised games as blacked-out contests. Finally, home games which are broadcast locally usually generate very large audience ratings which reflects the team's popularity among Buffalo residents.

Cincinnati Bengals

1. *Televised games and ticket sales*

The Cincinnati franchise has experienced a relatively high degree of success in selling tickets to its home games since 1972. Between 1972 and 1976 the club sold an average of 57,569 tickets per game which is equivalent to 99 percent of the Riverfront Stadium's seating capacity. Strong demand for Bengal tickets is further reflected by the fact that 23 of its 28 home games played since 1973 have been sold out and locally televised.

Although local telecasts of home games may have affected season ticket sales, the problem is not a serious one. Season ticket sales did fall off in 1975 and 1976. The decline in 1975 may have been partially due to a worsening in the team's performance during the 1974 season when the team finished third in their division with a .500 won-loss record. Again, the propensity to purchase season tickets is at least partially determined by how well the team is expected to play in the coming season. Expectations, in turn, are probably shaped by the team's performance in the previous season. Consequently, if a club has a poor season, it is reasonable to expect a downturn in ticket sales, particularly if a number of home games have been locally televised.

SUMMARY OF CINCINNATI BENGALS' TICKET SALES: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Stadium capacity	56,000	59,754	59,754	59,754	56,200
2. Total seats sold	403,616	407,500	404,112	399,166	400,511
Percent change from previous season		1.0	−.8	−1.2	.3
3. Average seats sold per game	57,659	58,214	57,730	57,024	57,216
4. Season ticket sales	53,634	53,610	53,424	51,310	50,130
Percent change from previous season		0	0	−4.0	−2.3
5. Percentage of games won	0.571	0.714	0.500	0.786	0.714
6. Divisional standing	3	1	2	2	1
7. Number of televised home games	0	6	7	5	5

Nevertheless, the figures above clearly suggest that locally televised home games have not seriously affected Bengal gate receipts. If television has impacted on season ticket sales at all, the effect has not posed a serious financial threat to the franchise. Since 1973, the Bengals have still managed to sell nearly all available tickets despite the fact that 23 of 28 regular season home games were locally televised.

2. *"No shows"*

Although Cincinnati has experienced significant increases in "no shows" since 1973, it is unclear whether this problem is attributable to locally televised games. In 1972, for example, the Bengals averaged 3,113 "no shows" at each home game which was equivalent to 5.4 percent of the paid attendance. No home games, of course, were televised prior to 1973. By 1975, average "no shows" at each home game increased to 6,381 or 14.3 percent of the paid attendance. However, "no

shows" at locally televised games in 1975 were considerably below "no shows" at games which were blacked out. The same was true of televised and nontelevised games played during the 1976 season.

A statistical analysis of Cincinnati's live gate attendance further indicated that "no shows" were predominantly affected by climatic conditions.* That is, Cincinnati fans were far less willing to attend games when the weather was cold or wet. The results further indicated that "no shows" during the previous four seasons were significantly above those reported in 1972, all other things being equal. But again, locally televised games per se did not appear to have an appreciable, direct impact on live gate attendance. Locally televised games, however, may have heightened the fans' sensitivity to bad weather. Specifically, the results of the analysis suggest that Bengal ticketholders may be less inclined to attend games, if the weather is bad, and if the game is broadcast, than would be the case if the game were blacked out. In that sense, Public Law 93–107 may have marginally affected the Bengals' live gate attendance.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR CINCINNATI BENGALS: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Total "no shows"	21,789	26,059	41,084	44,669	43,067
Percent change from previous season		19.6	57.7	8.7	−3.6
2. Average "no shows" per game	3,113	3,723	5,869	6,381	6,152
3. Average number of seats sold per game	57,659	58,214	57,730	57,024	57,216
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	5.4	6.4	10.2	14.3	10.6
5. Number of televised games	0	6	7	5	5
6. Average "no shows" per televised game		3,829	5,869	5,691	6,913
7. Average "no shows" per nontelevised game	3,113	3,085		8,109	4,250
8. Percentage of games won	0.571	0.714	0.500	0.786	0.714
9. Divisional standing	3	1	2	2	1

3. *Audience ratings*

Bengal audience ratings, like ticket sales, have remained relatively high and constant over the previous five playing seasons. Approximately 30 percent of the residents in Cincinnati and the surrounding area watch the Bengals' home games when the blackout is lifted. The consistency reflected in the figures below also suggests that viewer interest in the home team is not waning even though 83 percent of its home games have been locally televised since 1973.

The figures further indicate a marked preference for games involving the Bengals as opposed to other NFL clubs. Audience ratings captured by the home team exceed ratings for other, noncompeting games by a margin of 2 to 1. When forced to choose between the Bengals and other teams, Cincinnati viewers preferenced the home team by a margin of 6 to 1.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR THE CINCINNATI BENGALS: 1972–76

	Bengals		Ratings for other teams	
	Home games	Away games	Competing	Noncompeting
1972	(1) [1]	(1) 32.3	(1) 2.2	(7) 19.2
1973	(1) 19.1	(3) 28.6	(2) 4.9	(9) 16.1
1974	(2) 30.4	(2) 29.4	(3) 5.2	(7) 12.7
1975	(2) 34.2	(2) 34.8	(1) .3	(10) 14.5
1976	(3) 30.9	(1) 36.7	(1) 5.8	(9) 13.9
Average ratings	(8) 30.1	(9) 31.5	(8) 4.2	(42) 15.2

[1] Not applicable.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of NFL locally televised games during the American Research Bureau's annual 4-week fall audience surveys.

*See appendix A.

It is evident, therefore, that Public Law 93–107 has bestowed substantial benefits on Cincinnati residents. The legislation has required the franchise to lift the blackout on 23 of its 28 regular season games played since 1973. On the average, these games have been viewed by 30 percent of TV households in Cincinnati which is equivalent to approximately 400,000 persons.

It is not entirely clear whether Public Law 93–107 affected season ticket sales and live gate attendance. Although both may have been influenced by locally televised games, the impact of the legislation has been minimal. The Bengals currently enjoy a very strong demand for tickets. As long as this situation persists, there is no reason to believe that local telecasts of home games pose a threat to the financial vitality of the franchise.

Cleveland Browns

1. *Televised games and ticket sales*

The Cleveland Browns have not been particularly successful in selling out home games since the enactment of Public Law 93–107. During the previous four seasons the franchise has sold out and locally televised only five games, two in 1973 and one each in 1974, 1975, and 1976. Undoubtedly, much of this can be attributed to the size of Cleveland Stadium which seats in excess of 80,000 fans. Moreover, the Browns have not played well since 1973. Cleveland's best finish was in 1976 when the team posted a 9 and 5 won-loss record, good enough for third place in the Central Division.

Like so many teams in the NFL, Cleveland ticket sales appear to be sensitive to the club's performance. The Browns had respectable seasons in 1972 and 1973 finishing in second and third place in the divisional standing with won-loss records of 10 and 4 in 1972 and 7 and 7 in 1973. Ticket sales in 1972 were equivalent to 91 percent of the available seats, while 94 percent of the seats were sold for games played in 1973.

Last place finishes in 1974 and 1975 resulted in substantial decreases in ticket sales. Indeed, total tickets sold in 1975 were equivalent to only 72 percent of the available seats. Season ticket sales in 1975 also deteriorated, falling 13 percent from the previous season. Again fans in Cleveland, as one might expect, are less inclined to purchase season tickets if the team is expected to play poorly. Consequently, season ticket sales in 1976 fell by an additional 10 percent even though the Browns fared much better last season than in previous years. The fans simply did not anticipate the significant improvement in the team's performance; rather their expectations were colored by last place finishes in 1974 and 1975.

SUMMARY OF CLEVELAND BROWNS' TICKET SALES: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Stadium capacity	79,282	79,282	79,282	80,165	80,165
2. Total seats sold	505,247	520,903	464,760	406,679	486,384
Percent change from previous season		3.1	−10.8	−12.5	19.6
3. Average seats sold per game	72,178	74,415	66,394	58,097	69,483
4. Season ticket sales	48,901	49,760	48,542	42,252	37,986
Percent change from previous season		1.6	−2.3	−13	−10.1
5. Percentage of games won	0.714	0.500	0.286	0.214	0.643
6. Divisional standing	2	3	4	4	3
7. Number of televised home games	0	2	1	1	1

Nevertheless, it is evident that Public Law 93–107 has not had a substantive impact on the Browns' ticket sales. The reason being that only 5 of 28 regular season home games have been sold out. Moreover, all five locally televised games have involved the Cincinnati Bengals and the Pittsburgh Steelers which are strong rivals of the Browns. Ticket sales to these games would have been high regardless of local television coverage.

2. *"No shows"*

The statistical analysis of Cleveland's live gate attendance* is unusual in that "no shows" at Browns' games did not appear to be particularly sensitive to weather, the quality of the team, local telecasts, or any other factors which normally influence attendance at NFL games. For example, "no shows" were higher in 1972 than in 1975 even though the Browns played much better in 1972. Undoubtedly, this was at least partially due to the fact that more tickets were sold in 1972 than in 1975. However, the percentage of ticketholders who failed to attend games in both years was approximately the same.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR CLEVELAND BROWNS: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Total "no shows"	30,094	38,787	52,266	28,177	21,130
Percent change from previous season		28.9	34.8	−46.1	−25
2. Average "no shows" per game	4,299	5,541	7,467	4,025	3,019
3. Average number of seats sold per game	72,178	74,415	66,394	58,097	69,483
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	6	7.4	11.2	6.9	4.2
5. Number of televised games	0	2	1	1	1
6. Average "no shows" per televised game		9,717	2,029	6,848	4,525
7. Average "no shows" per nontelevised game	4,299	3,871	8,373	3,555	2,769
8. Percentage of games won	0.714	0.500	0.286	0.214	0.643
9. Divisional standing	2	3	4	4	3

Additionally, while the average number of "no shows" at locally televised games exceeded "no shows" at nontelevised contests, the empirical analysis of Cleveland's live gate attendance indicated that these differences were not statistically significant. Consequently, it must be concluded that Public Law 93–107 has not adversely impacted on live gate attendance. The results further indicate that the fans' willingness to attend games is not affected by the weather or the team's performance as measured by the won-loss record, or the divisional standing. Finally, the analysis indicated no statistically significant differences between the ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold during each of the previous 5 years. It must be concluded, therefore, that factors which influence attendance in Cleveland are peculiar to that market and bear no relationship to locally televised games.

3. *Audience ratings*

Although the Browns have locally televised only five games since 1973, Cleveland residents take advantage of the opportunity to watch the club's televised contests. On the average, approximately 30 percent of all 1.3 million households in the Cleveland television market watch the Brown's games when they are locally broadcast. The intensity of demand for these contests is further evidenced by the fact that local viewers—by a margin of 5 to 1—prefer the Browns when forced to choose between televised games involving the home team as

*See appendix A.

opposed to other NFL clubs. Although noncompeting NFL telecasts (which also involved other teams) received an average rating of 21 between 1972 and 1976, the popularity of these telecasts were considerably below that of the home team, even though Cleveland did not play well in 1973, 1974, and 1975.

In conclusion, Public Law 93–107 has not affected ticket sales or live gate attendance at Cleveland home games, largely due to the fact that a small number of home games have been locally televised. Those that have been televised, however, have acquired substantial audience ratings, far in excess of ratings generated by other NFL telecasts. Sports antiblackout legislation, therefore, has proven beneficial to Cleveland residents and has not imposed financial burdens on the Browns' organization.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR THE CLEVELAND BROWNS: 1972–76

	Browns		Ratings for other teams	
	Home games	Away games	Competing	Noncompeting
1972	(1) (1)	(1) 34.2	(0) ---	(8) 22.5
1973	(0) ---	(3) 32.3	(2) 7.8	(8) 24.5
1974	(1) 29.5	(2) 35.8	(2) 5.0	(9) 20.2
1975	(0) ---	(3) 24.7	(3) 6.2	(9) 19.8
1976	(0) ---	(2) 33.8	(2) 6.1	(10) 21.3
Average ratings	(1) 29.5	(11) 31.3	(9) 6.3	(44) 21.6

[1] Not applicable.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of NFL locally televised games during the American Research Bureau's annual 4-week fall audience surveys.

Denver Broncos

1. *Televised games and ticket sales*

Professional football, by all indications, is enormously popular in Denver and the surrounding area. Indeed, the Broncos have sold out all home games since joining the NFL in 1970. Moreover, all home games have been locally televised since 1973. Given the franchise's remarkable success in selling tickets, it is readily apparent that Public Law 93–107 has not adversely affected gate receipts. Denver is simply able to sell all available seats with or without local telecasts of home games. Moreover, the figures in the table below indicate that virtually all seats in the Mile High Stadium are sold as season tickets. Additionally, every time the franchise has made additional season tickets available they have been sold immediately.

SUMMARY OF DENVER BRONCOS' TICKET SALES: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Stadium capacity	50,000	50,000	51,706	52,702	63,500
2. Total seats sold	355,693	356,364	356,494	363,525	438,704
Percent change from previous season		0.2	0	2	20.7
3. Average seats sold per game	50,813	50,909	50,928	51,932	62,672
4. Season ticket sales	48,000	48,000	49,000	49,000	61,287
Percent change from previous season		0	2.1	0	25.1
5. Percentage of games won	0.357	0.500	0.500	0.429	0.643
6. Divisional standing	3	2	2	2	2
7. Number of televised home games	0	7	7	7	7

In one sense, Denver's success is somewhat surprising. The Broncos have never earned a playoff berth, and, until 1976, did not have a winning season. Nevertheless, whether the team is winning or losing, the Broncos are obviously an enormously popular source of entertainment among residents in this part of the country.

2. *"No shows"*

Denver also has one of the best live gate attendance records in the NFL. Between 1972 and 1976, an average of only 3 percent of all ticketholders failed to attend home games, which compares quite favorably with the league average of 9 percent over the same 5-year period. Denver's live gate attendance is also surprising in that fans must often encouter inclement weather in getting to and from the stadium, particularly during the latter part of the season when snow is common.

Additionally, local telecasts did not appear to adversely influence attendance. "No shows," for example, have not increased substantially since 1973 despite extensive television coverage of Denver's home games. Indeed, average "no shows" at home games played in 1973 and 1976 were below the level of "no shows" recorded in 1972. The results of the statistical analysis * further indicate that Public Law 93–107 has not resulted in significant decreases in live gate attendance at the Broncos' home games.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR DENVER BRONCOS: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Total "no shows"	12,150	5,615	14,420	27,682	8,939
Percent change from previous season		−53.8	156.8	92.0	−67.7
2. Average "no shows" per game	1,736	802	2,060	3,955	1,277
3. Average number of seats sold per game	50,813	50,909	50,928	51,932	62,672
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	3.4	1.6	4	7.6	0.02
5. Number of televised games	0	7	7	7	7
6. Average "no shows" per televised game		802	2,060	3,955	1,277
7. Average "no shows" per nontelevised game	1,736				
8. Percentage of games won	0.357	0.500	0.500	0.429	0.643
9. Divisional standing	3	2	2	2	2

Although the statistical analysis did indicate that live gate attendance is significantly affected by temperature and the presence of some form of precipitation, the figures in the table above indicate that a relatively small percentage of fans are deterred from attending games due to bad weather. Between 1973 and 1976, for example, an average of only 3.3 percent of all ticket holders failed to attend locally televised home games, as compared with 3.4 percent in 1972 when all games were blacked out.

3. *Audience ratings*

The popularity of professional football in the Denver area is further reflected in the audience ratings accruing to the Broncos' televised games. On the average, home games locally televised between 1973 and 1976 were viewed in approximately 38 percent of the 598,000 households located in the Denver television market. The team's away games captured an averaged rating of 37 over the past 5 years. The consistently high ratings for locally televised games further suggest

*See appendix A.

that Public Law 93–107 has not resulted in oversaturation and a subsequent waning of viewer interest in the home team. If that were the case, audience ratings for all games, including the Broncos', would have declined. Clearly, this has not occurred.

Other noncompeting NFL telecasts garnered audience ratings which are considerably above the national average. Residents in the Denver area have also expressed a consistent preference for the Broncos' games. On the average, Denver's home and away games outdrew competing NFL telecasts by a margin of about 8 to 1.

Circumstances in Denver, therefore, represent a perfect example of what the legislation was intended to accomplish. Excess demand for Bronco tickets necessarily deprives some fans from attending the games. Consequently, television affords their only opportunity to watch home games. Fortunately, locally televised games have not significantly affected live gate attendance nor have local telecasts reduced demand for tickets. On the other hand, the Broncos' televised games are clearly the most popular type of programing shown on television in this area of the country. Moreover, there is no indication that circumstances will change in the near or more distant future.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR THE DENVER BRONCOS: 1972–76

	Broncos		Ratings for other teams	
	Home games	Away games	Competing	Noncompeting
1972	(1) (1)	(2) 36.9	(2) 6.1	(6) 25.5
1973	(1) 36.8	(3) 36.6	(3) 4.8	(7) 27.4
1974	(2) 41.4	(2) 35.0	(2) 3.4	(9) 22.0
1975	(2) 37.6	(2) 37.1	(2) 3.6	(8) 26.6
1976	(2) 34.7	(2) 38.9	(1) 5.8	(9) 21.2
Average ratings	(7) 37.7	(11) 36.9	(10) 4.6	(39) 24.3

[1] Not applicable.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of NFL locally televised games during the American Research Bureau's annual 4-week fall audience surveys.

Houston Oilers

1. *Televised games and ticket sales*

Although the seating capacity of Houston's Astrodome is relatively small by NFL standards, the Oilers have only televised five home games since 1973. One game was broadcast in 1974 while two were locally televised in both 1975 and 1976. Problems with ticket sales during the previous five seasons is partially attributable to the team's rather dismal performance in 1972 and 1973. The Oilers finished both of those seasons in last place, winning only one game each year. Although Houston's won-loss record improved in 1974 and 1975, the team has never finished better than third in the difficult AFC Central Division.

The Oilers have sold fewer season tickets over the last five seasons than any other team in the NFL. The fan's unwillingness to purchase season tickets also represents one reason why the club has not sold out a greater number of home games. In any event, the figures in the table below indicate that the Oilers' ticket sales have not been adversely affected by Public Law 93–107. Indeed, increases in the number of locally televised games coincided with increased ticket sales. In 1975, for example, the Oilers televised two of their seven home games. Season

ticket sales, nevertheless, increased in 1976 by nearly 23 percent. Had these sales been significantly influenced by locally televised games, the increase should not have occurred since many fans would have undoubtedly felt that some of the home games would be televised. Two games were sold out and subsequently broadcast even though the Oilers once again finished in last place with a 5 and 9 won-loss record.

SUMMARY OF HOUSTON OILERS' TICKET SALES: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Stadium capacity	50,000	50,000	50,000	55,254	50,000
2. Total seats sold	276,291	261,472	254,519	326,467	323,739
Percent change from previous season		–5.4	–2.7	28.3	–0.8
3. Average seats sold per game	39,470	37,353	36,360	46,638	46,248
4. Season ticket sales	27,460	30,325	24,435	26,179	32,135
Percent change from previous season		10.4	–19.4	7.1	22.8
5. Percentage of games won	0.071	0.071	0.500	0.714	0.357
6. Divisional standing	4	4	3	3	4
7. Number of televised home games	0	0	1	2	2

Fortunately, fans did not anticipate the team's misfortunes during last year's playing season; had they done so, total ticket sales would have undoubtedly fallen by a larger percentage and, in all probability, none of the team's home games would have been locally televised. Unless the team is able to perform better in the coming year, it is doubtful that the Oilers will experience a respite from their current problem of selling tickets.

2. *"No shows"*

The Oilers also have one of the worst records in the legaue regarding live gate attendance. Approximately 20 percent of all ticketholders failed to attend games during the 1973 season even though none of those contests were locally televised. While attendance has improved since then, "no shows" remain high—1975 was Houston's best year in this respect when only 6.3 percent of all seats sold went unused. Last year the percentage increased to 13 percent.

The results of the statistical analysis,* however, indicate that live gate attendance at the Oilers' games is not significantly influenced by local telecasts. Although total "no shows" increased by 113 percent between 1975 and 1976, average "no shows" at blacked-out home games were far in excess of the average number of "no shows" at locally televised games. Moreover, last year's "no shows" were still below those experienced in 1973 when no home games were broadcast.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR HOUSTON OILERS: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Total "no shows"	36,989	50,993	26,666	20,548	43,541
Percent from previous season		37.9	–47.7	–22.9	111.9
2. Average "no shows" per game	5,284	7,285	3,809	2,935	6,220
3. Average number of seats sold per game	39,470	37,353	36,360	46,638	46,248
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	13.4	19.5	10.5	6.3	13.1
5. Number of televised games	0	0	1	2	2
6. Average "no shows" per televised game			3,050	2,257	4,288
7. Average "no shows" per nontelevised game	5,284	7,284	3,936	3,207	6,993
8. Percentage of games won	0.071	0.071	0.500	0.714	0.357
9. Divisional standing	4	4	3	3	4

* See appendix A.

The analysis did indicate, however, that Houston's live gate attendance was significantly influenced by variations in the team's won-loss record. As expected, attendance improved when the team was playing well and declined when the club's fortunes took a turn for the worse. The results of that analysis further indicated that Houston fans are less inclined to attend games when the weather is cold. This is surprising since the team plays in a domed stadium where the temperature is kept at a constant 72°. Fans, however, must travel to and from the Astrodome which may account for the cold weather factor.

The final analyses indicated that "no shows" increased significantly in 1976, all other things being equal. Perhaps this was due to the fan's disenchantment with the team's performance following a season when the club had played quite well. Having finished with a 10 and 4 record in 1975, many fans, undoubtedly, expected the Oilers to do better in 1976 than, in fact, occurred. The team's inability to meet these expectations probably accounts for rather dramatic increase in "no shows" last year.

3. *Audience ratings*

A cursory review of the Oilers' audience rating indicates that the willingness of Houston residents to watch their home team depends on how well the club is playing. The two locally televised games in 1975 captured an average audience of nearly 40 percent of the 880,000 plus homes in the Houston television market. Furthermore, the club's locally televised away games were viewed by nearly 36 percent of this audience. These figures are considerably higher than in other years because the Oilers played quite well, remaining in contention for their divisional championship until the last few weeks of the season. It is also interesting to note that more people watched other, noncompeting NFL telecasts in 1975 than in any of the other 4 years. This suggests that heightened interest in the local team may spill over to other clubs, further enhancing the general interest in professional football.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR THE HOUSTON OILERS: 1972–76

	Oilers		Ratings for other teams	
	Home games	Away games	Competing	Noncompeting
1972	(1) [1]	(1) 25.0	(1) 7.0	(8) 20.8
1973	(0) ----	(3) 17.1	(3) 17.1	(9) 23.4
1974	(0) ----	(3) 25.1	(3) 13.5	(9) 21.7
1975	(2) 39.8	(2) 35.5	(2) 8.2	(9) 25.2
1976	(0) ----	(2) 27.5	(1) 16.8	(11) 23.8
Average ratings	(2) 39.8	(11) 25.2	(10) 13.2	(46) 23.1

[1] Not applicable.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of NFL locally televised games during the American Research Bureau's annual 4-week fall audience surveys.

In conclusion, Public Law 93–107 has not adversely affected the Houston franchise. Although the sports antiblackout law has not triggered a lifting of the blackout on a large number of home games, Houston residents have indicated a marked preference for the Oilers' broadcast, especially when the team is winning. There is no evidence

to suggest that locally televised games have influenced ticket sales or live gate attendance. While the Oilers have encountered difficulty in attracting fans to the stadium, television is not responsible. The franchise is simply in need of fielding a better, more competitive team.

Kansas City Chiefs

1. *Televised games and ticket sales*

Kansas City ticket sales have been erratic since the team joined the National Football League in 1970. The Chiefs virtually dominated the American Football League in the 1960's. Demand for tickets remained high following the merger between the NFL and AFL. According to the league, Kansas City sold out all home games in 1970 and 1971, but failed to sell out a single game in 1972.* This is surprising since the Chiefs finished in second place for the 1972 season in the AFC's Western Division with an 8 and 6 won-loss record. Moreover, ticket sales information supplied by the NFL indicated that the average number of tickets sold to the Chiefs' home games exceeded Arrowhead Stadium's seating capacity of 77,472. We can only conclude that the league information on the number of sold-out Kansas City games in 1972 may not be entirely accurate.

During 1973, the first season affected by the sports antiblackout law, the Chiefs sold out and locally televised six home games. Since then, Kansas City has not sold out or televised a single home game. Moreover, the franchise has experienced an annual decrease in total ticket sales since 1973.

This cannot be attributed, however, to Public Law 93–107. As noted, all locally televised home games were broadcast in 1973. Although the club received a great deal of television exposure during that year, season ticket sales for the 1974 season increased by 7 percent, despite expectations that many home games played during the course of the season would be locally televised. Conversely, season tickets sales declined in 1975 and 1976, even though all home games were blacked out during both seasons. The team, however, finished each of the past three seasons with a less than respectable 5 and 9 won-loss record, indicating that demand for tickets to the Chiefs' games is predominantly determined by the team's performance.

SUMMARY OF KANSAS CITY TICKET SALES: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Stadium capacity	77,472	77,472	78,000	78,099	78,000
2. Total seats sold	546,124	538,891	515,438	442,663	415,020
Percent change from previous season		−1.3	−4.4	−14.1	−6.2
3. Average seats sold per game	78,017	76,984	73,634	63,238	59,288
4. Season ticket sales	72,885	70,555	65,564	47,870	45,251
Percent change from previous season		−3.2	7.1	−27.0	−5.5
5. Percentage of games won	0.571	0.500	0.357	0.357	0.357
6. Divisional standing	2	2	3	3	4
7. Number of televised home games	0	6	0	0	0

Undoubtedly, Kansas City ticket sales will pick up as soon as the organization is able to field a stronger team. Until then, it is doubtful that many home games will be locally televised, considering the size of Arrowhead Stadium. In any event, it is apparent that Public Law 93–107 has not affected the Chiefs' ticket sales.

*See table 2, p. 12.

2. *"No shows"*

Kansas City "no shows" have fluctuated dramatically during the previous five seasons. Between 1972 and 1973, for example, the percentage of ticket holders who failed to attend the Chiefs' home games rose from 13 to 17 percent. The increase, however, did not appear to result from local telecasts of home games. More than 39,000 fans did not attend the Chiefs' last game of the season which was not broadcast on local television. Average "no shows" at the six locally televised games were actually below the average number of "no shows" at Kansas City during the 1972 and 1974 season when all home games were blacked out locally.

"No shows" declined significantly in 1975 when only 6.1 percent of the ticketholders chose not to attend. Last year live gate attendance worsened once again when the ratio of "no shows" to tickets sold rose to 10.8 percent. An explanation of the variation in live gate attendance is not immediately obvious particularly in light of the fact that the Chiefs finished each of the past three seasons with the same unenviable won-loss record and divisional standing.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR KANSAS CITY CHIEFS: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Total "no shows"	68,363	93,910	109,940	27,166	45,681
Percent change from previous season		37.4	17.1	−75.3	68.2
2. Average "no shows" per game	9,766	13,416	15,706	3,881	6,526
3. Average number of seats sold per game	78,017	76,984	73,634	63,238	59,288
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	13	17	21	6.1	10.8
5. Number of televised games	0	6	0	0	0
6. Average "no shows" per televised game		9,099			
7. Average "no shows" per nontelevised game	9,766	39,314	15,705	3,881	6,526
8. Percentage of games won	0.571	0.500	0.357	0.357	0.357
9. Divisional standing	2	2	3	3	4

The results of the statistical analysis* of Kansas City "no shows" indicated that attendance was significantly influenced by temperature. As expected, larger numbers of ticketholders chose not to attend games in cold weather. Moreover, the results further suggest that live gate attendance at the six locally televised games in 1973 was significantly higher than at games which were blacked out between 1972 and 1976. This does not necessarily mean the television per se had a positive effect on attendance. However, it does provide definitive evidence that Kansas City "no shows" in 1973 did not increase as a result of local telecasts.

3. *Audience ratings*

Although audience ratings have declined over the past four seasons, the Chiefs' locally televised home and away games remain quite popular with Kansas City residents. Between 1972 and 1976, the Chiefs' games were watched by an average of 35 percent of the nearly 450,000 households in the Kansas City television market. Noncompeting telecasts on the other hand acquired an average rating of 17 while competing NFL telecasts only managed an average rating of 6.5. Clearly then, local fans much prefer to watch their home team play when given the opportunity.

*See appendix A.

It is also interesting to note that audience ratings for noncompeting games involving other teams were generally higher when the Chiefs' televised games attracted particularly large audiences. Apparently interest in the Chiefs' televised game enhanced enthusiasm for football in general.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR THE KANSAS CITY CHIEFS: 1972–76

	Chiefs		Ratings for other teams	
	Home games	Away games	Competing	Noncompeting
1972	(1) (1)	(1) 48.5	(1) 5.0	(7) 19.2
1973	(2) 34.6	(2) 37.8	(2) 7.6	(9) 19.3
1974	(0) ----	(2) 33.6	(1) 11.0	(11) 15.6
1975	(0) ----	(2) 30.0	(1) 2.3	(11) 16.0
1976	(0) ----	(2) 30.0	(1) 5.7	(11) 16.1
Average ratings	(2) 34.6	(9) 34.6	(6) 6.5	(49) 17.0

[1] Not applicable.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of NFL locally televised games during the American Research Bureau's annual 4-week fall audience surveys.

The evidence presented above clearly indicates that locally televised games have not adversely affected Kansas City ticket sales or live gate attendance. Although relatively few home games have been broadcast in the Chiefs' home territory, viewers have clearly preferred to watch these games when they were made available.

Miami Dolphins

1. *Televised games and ticket sales*

Miami has sold out and locally televised 10 of its 28 regular season games since 1973. All seven home games were televised in 1973 while three were broadcast in 1974. The team's failure to sell out a larger number of games in both 1974 and 1975 is surprising.

Miami won back-to-back NFL championships in 1972 and 1973. Moreover, the Dolphins finished first in the AFC's Eastern Division in 1974 with an 11 and 3 won-loss record. Although the team finished second the following year, the Dolphins still managed to win 10 regular season games. All of which suggests that the franchise fielded one of the strongest, most exciting teams in the NFL during the period under consideration.

Nevertheless, season ticket sales fell by 10 percent in 1974 and again by 26 percent in 1975. Given the club's superior performance in the preceding seasons, it is entirely possible that local telecasts may have detracted interest in season tickets. Waning demand for season tickets may have also resulted from the loss of Larry Czonka, Paul Warfield, and Jim Kiick to the World Football League following the 1974 season. In all probability a combination of both factors prompted the decline in sales.

Miami fans were undoubtedly upset by the loss of three of their best players. Moreover, they probably expected all or most of the 1974 and 1975 regular season games to be locally televised. Many fans also may have chosen not to buy season tickets, particularly in light of the fact that traffic congestion and a scarcity of parking around the Orange Bowl is an inevitable occurrence on the day of a game.

SUMMARY OF MIAMI DOLPHINS' TICKET SALES: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Stadium capacity	75,385	80,050	80,050	80,050	80,045
2. Total seats sold	544,162	551,000	537,418	487,758	404,356
Percent change from previous season		1.3	−2.5	−9.2	−17.1
3. Average seats sold per game	77,737	78,714	76,774	69,680	57,765
4. Season ticket sales	69,303	74,961	67,322	50,000	44,494
Percent change from previous season		8.2	−10.2	−25.7	−11
5. Percentage of games won	1.000	0.857	0.786	0.714	0.429
6. Divisional standing	1	1	1	2	3
7. Number of televised home games	0	7	3	0	0

It is further surprising that season ticket sales fell by an additional 11 percent last year, even though the Dolphins finished the 1975 season with a very respectable 10 and 4 won-loss record. The team, however, did not win a berth in the playoffs which itself was unusual. Miami fans were undoubtedly accustomed to watching a club of championship caliber. When the Dolphins did not live up to expectations, fans simply chose to stay at home or partake in other recreational activities.

2. *"No shows"*

The sensitivity of Miami fans to local telecasts of home games is further reflected in the club's live gate attendance. Public Law 93–107 has definitely had an adverse impact on "no shows" at the Dolphins' home games. Between 1972 and 1973, total "no shows" in Miami increased from 20,567 to 117,611, or by an incredible 472 percent. An average of 2,938 ticket holders failed to attend home games in 1972 which of course were blacked out in the Miami area. Conversely, an average of 16,802 ticket holders stayed away from the seven locally televised home games in 1973. Moreover, an average 16,742 fans failed to attend the three locally televised games played during the 1974 season, while 9,476 chose not to attend the four blacked-out games. Average "no shows" declined to 5,916 in 1975 before increasing to 7,577 in 1976. All games played during both seasons were not broadcast on local television stations.

The statistical analysis of Miami "no shows" further demonstrated that live gate attendance fell significantly when home games were locally televised.* The analysis indicated that Miami attendance is influenced by the weather and the quality of the game. As expected, fewer fans attend in cold weather. Attendance also improves when the Dolphins, as well as the visiting team, are playing well.

The latter finding lends further evidence to the notion that many Miami ticketholders will simply not attend just any game. The team must be playing well and the weather must be comfortable, otherwise many fans refuse to deal with the traffic and other problems which are encountered in getting to and from the Orange Bowl.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR MIAMI DOLPHINS: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Total "no shows"	20,567	117,611	88,131	41,414	53,041
Percent change from previous season		471.8	−25.1	−53	28.1
2. Average "no shows" per game	2,938	16,802	12,590	5,916	7,577
3. Average number of seats sold per game	77,737	78,714	76,774	69,680	57,765
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	3.8	21.3	16.4	8.5	12.9
5. Number of televised games	0	7	3	0	0
6. Average "no shows" per televised game		16,802	16,742		
7. Average "no shows" per nontelevised game	2,938		9,476	5,916	7,577
8. Percentage of games won	1.000	0.857	0.786	0.714	0.429
9. Divisional standing	1	1	1	2	3

*See appendix A.

It would appear, therefore, that Public Law 93–107 has imposed real costs on the Miami franchise. Locally televised games seem to have adversely affected season ticket sales in 1974 and 1975. Moreover, local telecasts definitely resulted in lower live gate attendance during the 1973 and 1974 seasons. The Dolphins did not televise any of their home games in 1975 and 1976. Consequently, more recent problems with ticket sales and "no shows" cannot be attributed to Public Law 93–107. However, it is quite probable that local telecasts of future games will give rise to similar problems which the franchise experienced in 1973 and 1974. Whether these costs are affordable or for that matter whether they are exceeded by benefits to the public accruing from locally televised games is a debatable issue.

3. *Audience ratings*

Audience ratings indicate that the Dolphins' locally televised home and away games are enormously popular with Miami residents. There are approximately 550,000 households located in the Miami television markets. Between 1972 and 1976, an average of 37 percent of these households viewed the team's away games. Approximately 35 percent watched home games televised in 1973 and 1974.

The willingness of fans to watch games on television also appears to be influenced by how well the team is playing. The championship teams in 1972 and 1973 attracted an average audience rating of 40, while an average 32.5 percent of the total households watched the team's away games in 1976 when the Dolphins finished with a 6 and 8 won-loss record and a third place divisional standing.

Nevertheless, Miami's televised games are still considerably more popular than other NFL telecasts. Noncompeting games, for example, acquired an average audience rating of 21 between 1972 and 1976, while competing games managed an average rating of 6. When forced to choose between televised games of the home team and other NFL clubs, the Dolphins outdrew the competition by a margin of 6 to 1. Clearly then, Public Law 93–107 has proven beneficial to residents in Miami and the surrounding area.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR THE MIAMI DOLPHINS: 1972–76

	Dolphins		Ratings for other teams	
	Home games	Away games	Competing	Noncompeting
1972	(1) [1]	(1) 40.7	(1) 6.2	(7) 25.3
1973	(1) 35.7	(3) 41.0	(3) 6.4	(8) 22.9
1974	(1) 34.7	(1) 35.2	(0) ---	(11) 17.0
1975	(0) ---	(2) 37.3	(2) 6.8	(2) 19.4
1976	(0) ---	(3) 32.5	(2) 4.5	(10) 20.0
Average ratings	(2) 35.2	(10) 37.1	(8) 6.0	(38) 20.7

[1] Not applicable.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of NFL locally televised games during the American Research Bureau's annual 4-week fall audience surveys.

In conclusion, the Dolphins are illustrative of the problem surrounding sports antiblockout legislation. Public Law 93–107 has not been free of cost. On the other hand, locally televised home games are enormously popular with television audiences. Clearly then, decisions regarding an extention of the legislation will necessarily involve tradeoffs between viewer preferences and financial costs associated with lower attendance and possible losses in season ticket sales.

New England Patriots

1. *Televised games and ticket sales*

Patriots' ticket sales have been erratic, albeit relatively high, since the enactment of Public Law 93–107. Total tickets sold, for example, decreased by 4 percent in 1973, which was largely due to a 13-percent decline in season ticket sales. The latter phenomenon probably resulted from the Patriots last place finish in 1972. The decrease cannot be attributed to the sports antiblackout law since season tickets for 1973 were sold prior to the passage of legislation.

Total ticket sales increased in 1974 although season tickets declined by nearly 8 percent. The decrease in season ticket sales could possibly reflect the fans' disenchantment with the team's prior performance. The NFL would also likely argue that the decline in 1974 season ticket sales was due to the two home games locally televised in 1973. This may be true, at least to some extent. As noted previously, the adverse impact of a poor won-loss record on season ticket sales for subsequent years is often exacerbated by locally televised games. Conversely, if the team's performance improves, increases in local telecasts may actually heighten demand for season tickets. This is reflected by the fact that season ticket sales rose by 6 percent in 1975 despite the fact that the five of seven home games were televised in 1974. However, the Patriots finished the 1974 season with an improved won-loss record, which would seem to account for the subsequent increase in season ticket sales. This is further evidenced by the fact that last year's season ticket sales fell by 33 percent, following the team's last place divisional finish in 1975.

SUMMARY OF NEW ENGLAND PATRIOTS' TICKET SALES: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Stadium capacity	61,043	61,279	61,279	61,279	61,279
2. Total seats sold	421,243	403,922	415,157	404,847	364,027
Percent change from previous season		−4.1	2.8	−2.5	−10.1
3. Average seats sold per game	60,178	57,703	59,308	57,835	52,004
4. Season ticket sales	55,007	47,938	44,319	46,967	31,381
Percent change from previous season		−12.9	−7.6	6	−33.2
5. Percentage of games won	0.214	0.357	0.500	0.214	0.786
6. Divisional standing	5	3	3	5	1
7. Number of televised home games	0	2	5	2	2

It would appear that Patriot ticket sales, particularly season ticket sales, are, for the most part, determined by the performance of the teams. Since fans must purchase season tickets well in advance, decisions are often based on how well the team played in the previous season. This is precisely why season ticket sales have been directly related to the Patriots' won-loss records and divisional standings over the previous five seasons. While Public Law 93–107 may have been partially responsible for the 8-percent decrease in season ticket sales in 1974, the impact of locally televised games on gate receipts was marginal at best. Additionally, local television coverage of home games may have enhanced demand for season tickets in 1975. In any event, the sports antiblackout law has not seriously affected New England's gate receipts.

2. *"No shows"*

Live gate attendance at New England has been erratic since 1972. However, there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that Patriot "no shows" have increased significantly as a result of Public Law 93–107. During the first year affected by the sports antiblackout law, total "no shows" declined by 68 percent despite the fact that two games were locally televised. Although the average number of "no shows" at locally televised games in 1973 was considerably higher than average "no shows" at blacked-out games, attendance at both types of games was below the average number of "no shows" for the Patriots 1972 contests.

On the other hand, "no shows" rose in 1975 by 356 percent with the Patriots televising five home games. However, differences in the average number of "no shows" at locally televised and nontelevised games did not differ substantially. Moreover, "no shows" at the two locally televised games in 1975 were considerably below "no shows" at blacked-out games. Finally, "no shows" decreased precipitously last year when the Patriots won the AFC's Eastern Division with an 11 and 3 won-loss record. While total "no shows" amounted to only .004 percent of total tickets sold, fewer people failed to attend the two locally televised games than the five which were blacked out.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR NEW ENGLAND PATRIOTS: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Total "no shows"	19,358	6,232	28,396	13,892	1,605
Percent change from previous season		−67.8	355.7	−51.1	−88.1
2. Average "no shows" per game	2,765	890	4,057	1,985	228
3. Average number of seats sold per game	60,178	57,703	59,308	57,835	52,004
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	4.6	1.5	6.8	3.4	0.004
5. Number of televised games	0	2	5	2	2
6. Average "no shows" per televised game		2,183	4,243	526	167
7. Average "no shows" per nontelevised game	2,765	373	3,590	2,568	254
8. Percentage of games won	0.214	0.357	0.500	0.214	0.786
9. Divisional standing	5	3	3	5	1

The statistical analysis of New England's live gate attendance* further indicated that "no shows" at locally televised and nontelevised games were not significantly different, all other things being equal. The results did suggest, however, that weather significantly affected attendance. Specifically, more fans stayed at home when the weather was cold or wet. The figures in the table above, however, indicate that locally televised games may have influenced the fans' reactions to bad weather. That is, if a game was played on a cold or rainy day, it appears that more fans chose not to attend if the game was on television than if it was not broadcast. Public Law 93–107, therefore, may have had a marginal indirect impact on live gate attendance. Unfortunately, it is impossible to arrive at a definitive conclusion on this issue since the effects of bad weather and local telecasts on "no shows" cannot be separated.

Finally, the results of the analysis indicated that New England "no shows" in 1973 and 1975 were significantly below the 1972 level. Both results coincide with improvements in the team's performance which were especially noticeable in 1976. In summary, while Patriot

*See appendix A.

"no shows" may have been indirectly influenced by Public Law 93–107, the franchise has enjoyed a relatively high level of attendance. Indeed, the ratio of Patriot "no shows" to total tickets sold has been well below the league average during each of the previous five playing seasons.

3. *Audience ratings*

The New England Patriots are extremely popular with television audiences in Boston and the surrounding market, particularly when the team is winning. Boston currently represents the fifth largest television market in the country, encompassing approximately 1.1 million households. During 1976, when the Patriots were experiencing their best season to date, an average of approximately 30 percent of the total households watched the team's locally televised home games. Conversely, noncompeting NFL games were viewed in only 14 percent of all households while competing contests were only able to attract 3 percent of all local viewers. Preference for the Patriots' games by New Englanders is clearly evident.

It is also interesting to note that Boston audiences appear to be far more sensitive to the fortune of their home team than are viewers in other NFL markets. When the Patriots have not played well, audience ratings dropped substantially. Conversely, as shown in the figures for 1974 and 1976, locally televised home and away games attract far greater audiences when the team in winning.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR THE NEW ENGLAND PATRIOTS: 1972–76

	Patriots		Ratings for other teams	
	Home games	Away games	Competing	Noncompeting
1972	(1) (1)	(1) 12.3	(1) 14.0	(8) 14.8
1973	(2) 21.0	(2) 20.3	(3) 5.6	(7) 16.9
1974	(3) 38.4	(1) 32.8	(1) 2.2	(8) 12.0
1975	(1) 18.1	(3) 20.0	(2) 7.7	(9) 11.9
1976	(1) 29.3	(2) 32.0	(2) 3.1	(10) 13.7
Average ratings	(7) 29.2	(9) 23.3	(9) 6.1	(42) 13.7

[1] Not applicable.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of NFL locally televised games during the American Research Bureau's annual 4-week fall audience surveys.

In conclusion, Public Law 93–107 has clearly benefited Boston fans since the legislation has forced the Patriots to lift the blackout on 11 of 28 home games played since 1973. Local telecasts, however, may have influenced ticket sales, as well as live gate attendance. If so, it is highly doubtful that locally televised games pose a threat to the financial vitality of the franchise since New England's ticket sales and live gate have been consistently above league averages during the previous five seasons.

New York Jets

1. *Televised games and ticket sales*

Public Law 93–107 does not appear to have had a significant impact on the New York Jets' gate receipts. The Jets have been quite successful in selling available seats since the enactment of the sports antiblackout legislation in 1973. Between 1973 and 1976, an average

of 98 percent of all seats in Shea Stadium were sold, despite the Jets' rather lackluster performance over this period. This is not particularly surprising. Approximately 14 million people reside in the New York metropolitan area. Given the sheer size of the population, it would be unusual if either the Jets or the Giants were unable to sell nearly all available seats.

As noted in the table below, the Jets have locally televised four home games in 1973, 1974, and 1975. No home games were broadcast last year. The fans, it would appear, are becoming tired of watching the Jets finish in last place in the AFC's Eastern Division.

Public Law 93–107, however, does not appear to have reduced demand for season tickets. Although season ticket sales decreased during 3 of the previous 4 years, it appears that all reductions with the possible exception of 1976 sales, resulted from the franchise's decision to offer fewer season tickets. It is unclear why this was done. Demand for 1976 season tickets may have fallen short of supply as is reflected in the 1.3-percent decrease in sales. However, it is likely that the team's 3 and 11 won-loss record in 1975 was primarily responsible for marginally lower season ticket sales last year.

SUMMARY OF NEW YORK JETS' TICKET SALES: 1972–76

	1972	1973[1]	1974	1975	1976
1. Stadium capacity	60,000	60,000	60,000	60,416	60,000
2. Total seats sold	430,442	355,718	411,442	413,103	399,771
Percent change from previous season		−17.4	15.7	0.4	−3.2
3. Average seats sold per game	61,492	59,286	58,777	59,015	57,110
4. Season ticket sales	58,226	56,500	56,500	53,500	52,825
Percent change from previous season		−2.9	0	−5.3	−1.3
5. Percentage of games won	0.500	0.286	0.500	0.214	0.214
6. Divisional standing	2	4	4	4	4
7. Number of televised home games	0	4	4	4	0

[1] Six games.

In any event, it is highly doubtful that locally televised games would ever seriously threaten the Jets' gate receipts. There are simply too many people in New York who prefer to attend football games at Shea Stadium as opposed to watching the Jets play on television. Although television often affords a better vantage point, lively commentary, and comfortable surroundings, it is still not a perfect substitute for attending a game in person.

2. *"No shows"*

Live gate attendance has proven to be a problem to the Jets' organization in recent years. Since 1973, the percentage of ticketholders who failed to attend home games has averaged out to a very high 17 percent, well above the league average. The problem may be partially attributable to television. The evidence, however, is conflicting. "No shows" did increase dramatically in 1973, the first season affected by Public Law 93–107, when the Jets televised four of six home games. Average "no shows" for blacked-out games, however, exceeded "no shows" at locally televised games. In 1974, four home games were again televised and live gate attendance declined, although marginally. Attendance at the locally televised games was also considerably below attendance at contests which were not televised.

In 1975, on the other hand, "no shows" decreased by 16 percent even though the team's won-loss record worsened from the previous season. Moreover, a substantially larger percentage of the ticket-holders chose to attend the televised games than those which were not broadcast. Finally, while none of the Jets' home games were broadcast in 1976, "no shows" reached an all time high averaging out to 19 percent of total tickets sold.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR NEW YORK JETS: 1972–76

	1972	1973[1]	1974	1975	1976
1. Total "no shows"	32,597	56,836	71,865	60,225	78,469
Percent change from previous season		74.4	26.4	−16.2	30.3
2. Average "no shows" per game	4,657	9,473	10,266	8,382	11,209
3. Average number of seats sold per game	61,492	59,286	58,777	59,015	57,110
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	7.6	16	17.5	14.6	19.2
5. Number of televised games	0	4	4	4	0
6. Average "no shows" per televised game		8,568	12,056	6,382	
7. Average "no shows" per nontelevised game	4,657	11,283	7,880	11,566	11,209
8. Percentage of games won	0.500	0.286	0.500	0.214	0.214
9. Divisional standing	2	4	4	4	4

[1] Six games.

The results of the "no shows" analysis suggest that live gate attendance at the Jets' home games is primarily determined by the weather.* New Yorkers appear to be unwilling to brave cold or wet weather in order to see the game in person. This is not surprising given the team's less than admirable record over the previous four seasons.

Although the analysis indicates that local telecasts of home games has not had a direct, significant influence on "no shows," the figures for the 1974 season suggest that fans may have been particularly prone to stay at home in bad weather when home games were locally televised. It is doubtful, however, that television can be held accountable for a substantial share of the problems which the team has had with live gate attendance since 1973.

3. *Audience ratings*

The Jets' locally televised games, unlike those of other NFL clubs, have not captured a relatively large percentage of the television audience. In 1973, for example, locally televised home games were viewed by approximately 12 percent of the audience. Away games managed an average rating of 18. Neither type of game appeared to be significantly more popular than competing or noncompeting games involving other NFL clubs. Audience ratings in subsequent years reflect similar patterns.

It should be understood, however, that audience ratings in New York are generally lower than in other television markets. This is due to the fact that a relatively large number of stations are licensed to the market. Consequently, total viewership is spread over a wider array of outlets which in turn result in lower ratings. Additionally, other NFL games televised in New York sometimes involve the New York Giants which, of course, share the loyalty of New York fans.

*See appendix A.

Nevertheless, the figures below indicate that audience ratings accruing to the Jets' televised games are relatively lower than local audience ratings generated by other NFL clubs in their home territories. However, most of the Jets' games have captured larger audience ratings than games involving other NFL clubs, with the exception of the Giants. It also should be remembered that, while differences in audience ratings may not be particularly large, differences in terms of absolute numbers of viewers are considerable. A two-point difference in audience ratings in New York, for example, indicates that an additional 128,000 households are viewing the program with the higher rating. Consequently, Public Law 93–107 has proven beneficial to a substantial number of residents in the New York area. Furthermore, it does not appear that locally televised games have not affected the Jets' ticket sales or live gate attendance.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR THE NEW YORK JETS: 1972–76

	Jets		Ratings for other teams	
	Home games	Away games	Competing	Noncompeting
1972	(1) (1)	(1) 23.8	(0) ----	(8) 17.4
1973	(3) 11.6	(1) 17.9	(2) 15.9	(10) 16.8
1974	(0) ----	(1) 11.7	(1) 10.7	(11) 14.6
1975	(1) 18.1	(1) 17.8	(0) ----	(10) 14.6
1976	(0) ----	(1) 8.8	(1) 13.5	(12) 13.9
Average ratings	(4) 13.2	(5) 16.0	(4) 14.0	(51) 15.3

[1] Not applicable.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of NFL locally televised games during the American Research Bureau's annual 4-week fall audience surveys.

Oakland Raiders

1. *Televised games and ticket sales*

The Oakland Raiders have sold out and locally televised 21 of 28 regular season home games since 1973. The franchise's success in selling tickets coincides with their excellent performance on the field. The Raiders have finished first in the AFC's Western Division during each of the previous 5 years. Oakland is also the current defending NFL champion, having finished the 1976 season with a 13 and 1 won-loss record.

In that regard, it would have been surprising had the Raiders not sold out a large proportion of their home games. The Oakland Coliseum seats slightly more than 50,000 fans, well below the league average. Although the Raiders share the allegiance of San Francisco fans with the Forty Niners, the team has encountered few problems in selling available seats. Nearly all seats, as is reflected in the table below, are sold as season tickets.

SUMMARY OF OAKLAND RAIDERS' TICKET SALES: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Stadium capacity	53,800	54,041	54,041	54,037	54,037
2. Total seats sold	367,078	390,367	369,465	369,948	367,692
Percent change from previous season		6.3	−5.4	0.1	−0.6
3. Average seats sold per game	52,440	55,767	52,781	52,850	52,527
4. Season ticket sales	50,793	50,802	50,840	51,107	51,121
Percent change from previous season		0	0.1	0.5	0.03
5. Percentage of games won	0.714	0.643	0.857	0.786	0.929
6. Divisional standing	1	1	1	1	1
7. Number of televised home games	0	5	4	5	7

Although the Raiders have televised 75 percent of their home games, Public Law 93–107 has not adversely affected ticket sales. It appears that the Raiders sell all or nearly all season tickets. Had television been a factor in the purchasing decisions of Raider fans, season ticket sales should have declined. Clearly, this has not occurred. Indeed, it appears that demand for season tickets appears to have exceeded the available supply since 1974. This is evidenced by the fact that the number of season tickets sold has remained virtually constant since 1974, and has approached the seating capacity of the Oakland Coliseum. It can be concluded, therefore, that Public Law 93–107 has not adversely affected season ticket sales. Moreover, it is highly doubtful that future sales will be affected by local telecasts of home games as long as Oakland continues to dominate the AFC's Western Division.

2. *"No shows"*

The Raiders have not been as fortunate with regard to live gate attendance. It appears that Public Law 93–107 has resulted in increased "no shows" at the team's home games. Specifically, between 1973 and 1975 "no shows" at locally televised games exceeded "no shows" at games which were blacked out. Live gate attendance did improve significantly in 1976, however, even though all home games were broadcast in the home team's territory.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR OAKLAND RAIDERS: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Total "no shows"	21,507	31,796	27,112	31,598	17,417
Percent change from previous season		47.8	−14.7	16.6	−44.9
2. Average "no shows" per game	3,072	4,542	3,873	4,514	2,488
3. Average number of seats sold per game	52,440	55,767	52,781	52,850	52,527
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	5.9	8.1	7.3	8.5	4.7
5. Number of televised games	0	5	4	5	7
6. Average "no shows" per televised game		6,015	4,791	5,231	2,488
7. Average "no shows" per nontelevised game	3,072	860	2,650	2,720	
8. Percentage of games won	0.714	0.643	0.857	0.786	0.929
9. Divisional standing	1	1	1	1	1

The analysis of Raiders' "no shows" indicated that live gate attendance is influenced by the weather, the club's performance, and local telecasts.* As expected, "no shows" increased when it rained. Attendance also corresponded with the team's divisional standing. Additionally, "no shows" appeared to have increased significantly when home games were locally televised.

It should be pointed out, however, that the Raiders' live gate attendance has generally remained above that of other NFL clubs. Between 1973 and 1976, for example, an average of 7 percent of all tickets sold to Oakland's games were not used. During the same 4 years, the ratio of "no shows" to paid attendance at all NFL games averaged out to 10 percent.

3. *Audience ratings*

As noted above, there are two NFL franchises located in the San Francisco metropolitan areas. Consequently, the Raiders' telecasts often compete with the Forty Niners for local television audiences. This undoubtedly explains why the Oakland's television audience

*See appendix A.

ratings are not substantially above those of other NFL clubs, which, in this instance, commonly includes the Forty Niners televised games. Nevertheless, the figures in the table below clearly indicate that the Raiders are quite popular with the 1.7 million households situated in the San Francisco television market.

Since 1973, locally televised games have been viewed by approximately 21 percent of the total audience. Locally televised away games have acquired an average audience rating of 23 over the previous five seasons. Noncompeting games involving other NFL clubs, including the Forty Niners, captured a comparable rating of 19.1. Competing games were viewed by an average of 11 percent of the audience. However, one of the competing games in 1973 involved the Forty Niners. Competing games listed in 1974 and 1975, on the other hand, did not involve the Forty Niners. These data provide a much better indication of the preferences for locally televised games of the area's home teams.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR THE OAKLAND RAIDERS: 1972–76

	Raiders		Ratings for other teams	
	Home games	Away games	Competing	Noncompeting
1972	(1) (1)	(2) 26.3	(0) ----	(8) 19.7
1973	(3) [2]20.1	(1) 9.8	(2) 18.9	(6) 18.2
1974	(0) ----	(1) 19.8	(1) 3.4	(10) 17.1
1975	(1) 23.1	(2) 24.8	(1) 2.8	(10) 19.0
1976	(2) 20.7	(1) 22.7	(0) ----	(7) 22.3
Average ratings	(6) 20.8	(7) 22.1	(4) 11.0	(41) 19.1

[1] Not applicable.
[2] Includes 1 simulcast game carried on CBS on Nov. 4, 1973, with Oakland and San Francisco sharing average rating.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of NFL locally televised games during the American Research Bureau's annual 4-week fall audience surveys.

In conclusion, Public Law 93–107 has required the Raiders to locally televise 75 percent of their home games since 1973. Locally televised games appear to be more popular than other NFL telecasts and have had no discernible impact on ticket sales. Local telecasts, however, seem to have resulted in increased "no shows" at the Raiders' home games. Nevertheless, the franchise live gate attendance has remained consistently higher than attendance at most other NFL games, including those which were not locally televised.

Pittsburgh Steelers

1. *Televised games and ticket sales*

Pittsburgh has encountered very few problems in selling tickets to home games since 1973. The franchise has sold out and locally televised 28 of 29 games played in Pittsburgh since the enactment of Public Law 93–107.* It is, therefore, evident that the sports antiblackout law has not affected total ticket sales.

The same is true of season ticket sales. The figures in the table below indicate that the Steelers have sold all, or nearly all, season tickets made available to the public during the previous 4 years. This is not particularly surprising since Pittsburgh, like Oakland, has

*The Steelers played eight regular season games at home during 1973, all of which were locally televised. Conversely, the New York Jets played in six home games during the same year.

dominated its division in recent years. The team also won back-to-back Super Bowls in 1974 and 1975. Given the franchise's exceptional talent and enthusiam expressed by local fans, it is understandable why the club's gate receipts have not diminished as a consequence of local telecasts of home games.

SUMMARY OF PITTSBURGH STEELERS' TICKET SALES: 1972–76

	1972	1973[1]	1974	1975	1976
1. Stadium capacity	50,066	50,066	50,112	50,112	50,350
2. Total seats sold	335,335	397,299	347,228	348,227	347,819
Percent change from previous season		18.5	−12.6	0.3	−0.1
3. Average seats sold per game	47,905	49,662	49,604	49,747	49,688
4. Season ticket sales	28,159	44,844	44,531	44,902	45,540
Percent change fron previous seasom		59.3	−0.7	0.8	1.4
5. Percentage of games won	0.786	0.714	0.714	0.857	0.714
6. Divisional standing	1	1	1	1	1
7. Number of televised home games	0	8	7	6	7

[1] Eight games.

2. *"No shows"*

It is difficult to assess the impact of Public Law 93–107 on the Pittsburgh Steelers due to the fact that so few games have been blacked-out since 1973. Accordingly, differences in attendance at locally televised games as opposed to those not broadcast cannot be easily determined. No games were televised in 1972, however, which provides a basis for comparison.

The Steelers did experience an enormous increase in "no shows" during 1973; when all eight home games were locally televised. Live gate attendance remained relatively constant in 1974, before significantly increasing the following year. However, "no shows" at the single game, which was blacked out in 1975, were not substantially different from the average number of "no shows" at the six locally televised contests. The figures further indicate a substantial decrease in live gate attendance last year when the Steelers lost four of their first five regular season games. Nevertheless, the ratio of Pittsburgh "no shows" to total tickets sold has been below the league average during each of the previous five seasons.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR PITTSBURGH STEELERS: 1972–76

	1972	1973[1]	1974	1975	1976
1. Total "no shows"	5,011	25,591	26,541	11,627	22,183
Percent change from previous season		410.6	3.7	−56.2	90.8
2. Average "no shows" per game	716	3,199	3,792	1,661	3,169
3. Average number of seats sold per game	47,905	49,662	49,604	49,747	49,688
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	1.5	6.4	7.6	3.3	6.3
5. Number of televised games	0	8	7	6	7
6. Average "no shows" per televised game		3,199	3,792	1,740	3,169
7. Average "no shows" per nontelevised game	716			1,190	
8. Percentage of games won	0.786	0.714	0.714	0.857	0.714
9. Divisional standing	1	1	1	1	1

[1] Eight games.

The statistical analysis* of Pittsburgh's "no shows" indicates that Public Law 93–107 has not, in and of itself, adversely affected live

*See appendix A.

gate attendance. The results do suggest, however, that live gate attendance at the Steelers' home games is significantly influenced by the weather and the quality of home team's play as well as by the Steelers opponents. That is, fewer people attend the games in cold or wet weather. Additionally, attendance fell off when the Steelers were not winning, which probably accounts for increases in "no shows" last year. Finally, Pittsburgh fans are more likely to attend games at Three Rivers Stadium when the visiting team is also in contention for a berth in the playoffs. It would appear, therefore, that Pittsburgh ticketholders are increasingly discriminating in reaching decisions on whether or not to attend home games. They have become accustomed to professional football at its best. When fans do not believe their expectations will be realized, they are less inclined to attend games in person.

It should be pointed out that local telecasts may influence the sensitivity of ticketholders to bad weather and to the expected quality of the games. As is the case with many NFL clubs, the effect of certain factors (for example, rain) on attendance may be heightened by local telecasts of home games. In those instances, Public Law 93–107 may have indirectly affected live gate attendance. Unfortunately, it is not possible to come to any definitive conclusions regarding this point, since it is not possible to separate the impact of a factor such as the weather from the effects properly attributable to local telecasts.

3. *Audience ratings*

Given the quality of the team, it would have been surprising had the Steelers not acquired very large audience ratings. That they did, clearly demonstrates that Public Law 93–107 has benefited many of the 1.08 million households in the Pittsburgh metropolitan area. Indeed, during the previous four seasons, the Steelers' locally televised home games have been viewed by an average of 36 percent of the total audience. Locally televised away games have generated an average audience rating of 37.5. Both figures are considerably higher than audience ratings accruing to noncompeting as well as competing televised games involving other NFL clubs.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR THE PITTSBURGH STEELERS: 1972–76

	Steelers		Ratings for other teams	
	Home games	Away games	Competing	Noncompeting
1972	(1) [1]	(1) 34.5	(1) 7.8	(7) 22.4
1973	(3) 36.3	(1) 40.7	(0) ---	(10) 18.6
1974	(2) 33.3	(2) 31.6	(1) 5.8	(10) 17.8
1975	(2) 32.7	(2) 39.0	(1) 5.5	(9) 20.3
1976	(2) 41.7	(2) 41.7	(1) 10.2	(9) 22.3
Average ratings	(9) 36.0	(8) 37.5	(4) 7.3	(45) 20.1

[1] Not applicable.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of NFL locally televised games during the American Research Bureau's annual 4-week fall audience surveys.

It must be concluded, therefore, that Public Law 93–107 has been beneficial to Pittsburgh viewers, since the legislation has required the franchise to lift the blackout on 28 of its 29 regular season home games played since 1973. Not only do these games attract noticeably

larger audiences, but local telecasts do not appear to have adversely affected ticket sales. While Public Law 93–107 may have indirectly influenced "no shows," its impact in this regard has been marginal. Moreover, even though the Steelers have broadcast nearly all home games, the franchise continues to enjoy one of the better attendance records in the NFL. All of these points are largely attributable to the team's excellent performance in recent years.

San Diego Chargers

1. *Televised games and ticket sales*

Public Law 93–107 has not significantly affected ticket sales in San Diego since only one home game has been broadcast locally since 1973. Problems with ticket sales are undoubtedly due to the team's poor performance. The Chargers have not had a winning season, and until they do, relatively few games will be sold out.

Local preferences for a winner are reflected in increased ticket sales during 1976 when the team won six games, as compared with a 2 and 12 record for the 1975 season. Preferences are further reflected in the team's perennial loss of season ticket sales since 1973. Fans are less inclined to purchase season tickets if their team is consistently losing. Until the franchise is able to build a contending club, these circumstances will likely remain unchanged.

SUMMARY OF SAN DIEGO CHARGERS' TICKET SALES: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Stadium capacity	50,000	54,572	52,572	52,572	52,568
2. Total seats sold	347,349	330,722	264,269	228,124	260,220
Percent change from previous season		−4.8	−20.1	−13.7	14.1
3. Average seats sold per game	49,621	47,246	37,753	32,589	37,174
4. Season ticket sales	36,310	39,681	29,595	22,280	19,716
Percent change from previous season		9.3	−25.4	−24.7	−11.5
5. Percentage of games won	0.286	0.143	0.357	0.143	0.429
6. Divisional standing	4	4	3	4	3
7. Number of televised home games	0	0	0	0	1

2. *"No shows"*

It is, of course, further evident that Public Law 93–107 has not adversely affected live gate attendance at the Chargers' home game. Although total "no shows" at the single locally televised game in 1976 exceeded average "no shows" at the six blacked-out home games, both figures were below average "no shows" for all nontelevised home games played between 1973 and 1975. This suggests that if a relatively large number of San Diego's home games were to be televised in the future, "no shows" would probably not increase substantially.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR SAN DIEGO CHARGERS: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Total "no shows"	12,149	22,247	14,009	15,148	9,838
Percent change from previous season		83.1	−37.0	8.1	−35.1
2. Average "no shows" per game	1,736	3,178	2,001	2,164	1,405
3. Average number of seats sold per game	49,621	47,246	37,753	32,589	37,174
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	3.5	6.7	5.3	6.6	3.6
5. Number of televised games	0	0	0	0	1
6. Average "no shows" per televised game					2,023
7. Average "no shows" per nontelevised game	1,736	3,178	2,001	2,164	1,303
8. Percentage of games won	0.286	0.143	0.357	0.143	0.429
9. Divisional standing	4	4	3	4	3

3. *Audience ratings*

Viewer interest in the San Diego Chargers has declined in recent years, again reflecting the disposition of local fans for a winning team. There is simply no other feasible explanation as to why ratings for locally televised Chargers' games fell from 32.3 in 1972 to 19.2 last year. Nevertheless, when forced to choose between games involving the home team as opposed to other clubs, San Diego residents clearly preferred the Chargers by a margin of nearly 3 to 1. Consequently, if and when sold-out games trigger lifting of the blackout in San Diego, it will not go unnoticed by local television audiences.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR THE SAN DIEGO CHARGERS: 1972–76

	Chargers		Ratings for other teams	
	Home games	Away games	Competing	Noncompeting
1972	(1) [1]	(1) 32.3	(1) 4.7	(6) 17.2
1973	(0) ----	(2) 27.6	(1) 17.2	(11) 22.0
1974	(0) ----	(2) 23.7	(2) 6.5	(10) 20.3
1975	(0) ----	(2) 16.5	(1) 5.8	(11) 15.8
1976	(0) ----	(1) 19.2	(1) 6.7	(11) 18.4
Average ratings	(0) ----	(8) 23.3	(6) 7.9	(49) 18.9

[1] Not applicable.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of NFL locally televised games during the American Research Bureau's annual 4-week fall audience surveys.

Tampa Bay Buccaneers

Tampa Bay joined the NFL in 1976, as one of the league's two newest franchises. Unfortunately, the franchise was unable to sell out a single home game during its first year of play. Although the Buccaneers sold an average of 47,417 tickets to its seven home games, paid attendance fell well short of the 71,000 available seats in Tampa Stadium. Consequently, no games were locally televised.

The team also encountered problems with live gate attendance, as 11 percent of all tickets distributed went unused. Fans apparently expected to see a better performance than the new club's 0 and 7 won-loss record indicated. Undoubtedly, the Buccaneers have better years ahead. Hopefully, ticket sales and attendance will improve as the team develops.

THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL CONFERENCE

Atlanta Falcons

1. *Televised games and ticket sales*

Last year, the Commission's Third Annual Report on the Effects of Public Law 93–107 concluded that the legislation had seriously affected two teams—the Falcons and the Miami Dolphins. Local telecasts had a negative impact on the "no shows" of both teams. Evidence provided by the league this year further suggests that local telecasts may have adversely affected the Falcons' season ticket sales.

As noted in the table below, the Falcons televised all home games during 1973 and 1974, none were broadcast in 1975 or 1976. Season ticket sales remained stable in 1974 but declined by 28 percent in 1975. Undoubtedly, the reduction in 1975 was primarily due to the team's

last place finish in 1974. It is also possible that local telecasts may have had an exacerbating influence on sales. This is further suggested by the fact that while the team did not do much better in 1975, season ticket sales increased by 4 percent in 1976. Perhaps Atlanta fans expected that home games would be blacked out last year and as a consequence were more inclined to purchase tickets. On the other hand, the marginal improvements in the team's performance may have accounted for the slight increase in 1976 season ticket sales. However, if Atlanta fans were that sensitive to won-loss records, total ticket sales should not have declined in 1975 and 1976. It would appear, therefore, that seven locally televised home games in 1974 may have reduced demand for season tickets in 1975.

SUMMARY OF ATLANTA FALCONS' TICKET SALES: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Stadium capacity	58,850	58,850	58,850	58,850	60,489
2. Total seats sold	403,678	406,624	402,393	343,977	341,396
Percent change from previous season		0.7	−1.0	−14.5	−7.5
3. Average seats sold per game	57,668	58,089	57,485	49,140	48,770
4. Season ticket sales	49,872	53,037	53,278	38,426	40,110
Percent change from previous season		6.4	0.5	−27.9	4.4
5. Percentage of games won	0.500	0.643	0.214	0.286	0.286
6. Divisional standing	2	2	4	3	3
7. Number of televised home games	0	7	7	0	0

2. *"No shows"*

Atlanta has had a very serious problem with live gate attendance recently, and it is at least partially attributable to local telecasts. "No shows" increased by 59 percent in 1973, despite the fact that the team played better. However, all home games were locally televised in 1973, while none were broadcast during the previous season. Television, therefore, would appear to have been responsible for a major proportion of the increase in "no shows" in 1973. The same is true of live gate attendance during the Falcons' 1974 season when "no shows" increased to 143,488 or 36 percent of all tickets sold. Here again, Atlanta televised all seven home games. However, the franchise suffered serious setbacks on the playing field, finishing last with a 3 and 11 won-lost record. The team's performance, coupled with local telecasts of all sold-out home games, was, undoubtedly, responsible for the enormous increase in "no shows" in 1974.

Consistently poor play also explains why the live gate at Altanta's home games in 1975 and 1976 remained relatively low. Despite an absence of local telecasts during the previous 2 years, 19 percent of the tickets to the Falcons' home games went unused in 1975, while nearly 25 percent were not used in 1976.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR ATLANTA FALCONS: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Total "no shows"	40,506	64,631	143,488	65,244	85,590
Percent change from previous season		58.9	122	−54.5	31.2
2. Average "no shows" per game	5,787	9,194	20,498	9,321	12,227
3. Average number of seats sold per game	57,668	58,089	57,485	49,140	48,770
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	10	15.8	35.7	19.0	24.5
5. Number of televised games	0	7	7	0	0
6. Average "no shows" per televised game		9,194	20,498		
7. Average "no shows" per nontelevised game	5,787			9,321	12,227
8. Percentage of games won	0.500	0.643	0.214	0.286	0.286
9. Divisional standing	2	2	4	3	3

The statistical analysis of the Falcons' live gate attendance since 1972,* unequivocally demonstrates that local telecasts of home games in 1973 and 1974 were directly responsible for significant increases in "no shows." As suggested above, the results further indicate that attendance was sensitive to the team's performance. That is, "no shows" increased (decreased) as the percentage of games won by the team decreased (increased). Finally, live gate attendance in Atlanta was significantly influenced by temperature and precipitation. Specifically, "no shows" increased when the weather turned cold or wet.

As is the case with many NFL teams, television seems to magnify the effect of other factors, such as team performance and the weather, which in turn influence attendance. That is, when fans are able to watch the game on television in the comfort of their homes, they are much less inclined to go to the stadium, if the team is expected to play poorly or if the weather is bad. In any event, Public Law 93–107 has affected the Atlanta franchise in that it resulted in serious increases in "no shows" in 1974 and 1975, and may have had an adverse effect on season ticket sales in 1975. On the other hand, the franchise's serious problem with attendance in 1975 and 1976 can hardly be attributed to the legislation since no home games were locally televised.

3. *Audience ratings*

Television audiences, like ticketholders, appear to be more inclined to watch the Falcons' games when the club is playing well. For example, an average of 36 percent of the total audience in the Atlanta television market watched locally televised home games in 1973, when the Falcons managed a second place finish in the NFC's Western Division. Local audience ratings have since fallen, as has the team's won-loss record. Only 20 percent of the viewers watched the team's locally televised away games last year as compared with 19 percent who tuned into other NFL telecasts which did not compete with the Falcon's televised games.

Nevertheless, the Falcons continue to be more popular in Atlanta than other NFL clubs. When forced to choose between games, the local television audience preferred to watch the home team by a margin of 2 to 1 in 1976, and by an average margin of about 4 to 1 through the previous five playing seasons.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR THE ATLANTA FALCONS: 1972–76

	Falcons		Ratings for other teams	
	Home games	Away games	Competing	Noncompeting
1972	(1) (1)	(2) 27.5	(1) 1.7	(6) 19.4
1973	(2) 36.3	(2) 30.3	(2) 5.8	(9) 18.6
1974	(1) 34.4	(3) 25.3	(1) 5.5	(11) 15.2
1975	(0) ----	(2) 21.9	(2) 8.2	(10) 17.6
1976	(0) ----	(2) 19.9	(1) 10.0	(11) 18.5
Average ratings	(3) 35.7	(11) 25.0	(7) 6.5	(47) 17.7

[1] Not applicable.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of NFL locally televised games during the American Research Bureau's annual 4-week fall audience surveys.

*See appendix A.

Consequently, Public Law 93–107 has been of value to Atlanta residents even though the legislation may have adversely affected the Falcons' organization. It is not entirely clear why fans in this particular part of the country are so sensitive to local telecasts. Nonetheless, it does play an influential role in determining attendance, and possibly, season ticket sales.

Chicago Bears

1. *Televised games and ticket sales*

The Chicago Bears have sold out and locally televised 20 of 28 home games since the enactment of Public Law 93–107, despite the fact that the team has not had impressive won-loss records in recent years. Indeed, between 1972 and 1974 the Bears finished last in the NFC's Central Division. The club managed a third-place finish in 1975, but won only four games. Last year, Chicago's fortunes improved somewhat; finishing second in their division with a 7 and 7 won-loss record.

Chicago fans, nevertheless, have continued to buy tickets. Although season ticket sales fell slightly in 1973, the Bears still sold out and locally televised all seven home games. Moreover, season ticket sales increased by 5 percent in 1974, indicating that local telecasts of all home and away games during the previous season did not adversely affect demand for season tickets. Although sales fell by 9 percent in 1975, it is probable that this particular decrease reflected the fans' concerns over the team's three consecutive last place finishes. This is further evidenced by 1976 season ticket sales which did not increase significantly, despite the fact that only two of the Bears' home games were locally televised during the 1975 season.

SUMMARY OF CHICAGO BEARS' TICKET SALES: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Stadium capacity	52,500	52,500	52,701	57,455	57,359
2. Total seats sold	385,906	385,715	385,258	382,126	396,004
Percent change from previous season		0	0	−1	3.6
3. Average seats sold per game	55,129	55,102	55,122	54,589	56,572
4. Season ticket sales	49,124	48,996	51,525	47,070	47,116
Percent change from previous season		−0.3	5.2	−8.7	0.1
5. Percentage of games won	0.286	0.214	0.286	0.286	0.500
6. Divisional standing	4	4	4	3	2
7. Number of televised home games	0	7	6	2	5

Had local telecasts been a significant factor in determining the demand for season tickets, one would expect sales to decrease if a large percentage of home games were televised during the previous season. This should be particularly true when a club is not winning. Since the Bears' season and individual ticket sales did not decline substantially despite extensive television coverage, it must be concluded that Public Law 93–107 has not adversely affected Chicago gate receipts. None of this is surprising; nearly 6 million people live in the Chicago metropolitan area. Accordingly, potential demand for tickets to professional football games should be large enough to assure the sale of all or nearly all available tickets to home games.

2. *"No shows"*

Chicago's live gate attendance may have been indirectly influenced by local broadcasts of home games. "No shows" increased by 186 percent in 1973 when all seven home games were locally televised. Additionally, the average number of "no shows" at the six locally televised games played during the 1974 season exceeded "no shows" at the single nontelevised contests by a margin of nearly 2 to 1. On the other hand, attendance at locally televised games in 1975 and 1976 was actually above attendance at nontelevised games.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR CHICAGO BEARS: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Total "no shows"	24,828	71,102	100,056	63,020	49,311
Percent change from previous season		186.4	40.7	−37	21.8
2. Average "no shows" per game	3,547	10,157	14,294	9,003	7,044
3. Average number of seats sold per game	55,129	55,102	55,122	54,589	56,572
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	6.4	18.4	25.9	16.5	12.3
5. Number of televised games	0	7	6	2	5
6. Average "no shows" per televised game		10,157	15,498	7,245	6,027
7. Average "no shows" per nontelevised game	3,547		7,068	9,706	9,587
8. Percentage of games won	0.286	0.214	0.286	0.286	0.500
9. Divisional standing	4	4	4	3	2

Evidence regarding the relationship between local telecasts of home games and live gate attendance is, therefore, mixed. The results of the statistical analysis indicate that Public Law 93–107, in and of itself, did not significantly influence "no shows."* However, the analysis did suggest that Chicago fans are particularly sensitive to bad weather. That is, the Bears experienced substantially higher "no shows" when the weather was cold or wet. Moreover, "no shows" proved to be significantly higher in 1973, 1974, and 1975 than in 1972 when no home games were locally televised.

Unfortunately, it is impossible to arrive at a definitive explanation of why the Bears' "no shows" increased during the first three seasons affected by Public Law 93–107. Suffice to say, those variations in attendance may have been due to one or all of the aforementioned factors. It appears that Public Law 93–107 must shoulder some blame for poor attendance. During the previous four seasons, an average of 18 percent of all ticketholders have failed to attend the Bears' home games, which represents one of the worst attendance records in the league.

3. *Audience ratings*

The Chicago television market is the third largest in the country, encompassing nearly 2.8 million households, or about 6 million persons. On the average, approximately 25 percent of the total audience viewed the Bears' locally televised home games and 16 percent watch noncompeting telecasts involving other NFL teams. Additionally, when forced to choose between the Bears' televised games and other NFL telecasts, Chicago audiences preferred the home team by a margin of nearly 4 to 1. The figures, then, clearly suggest that Public Law 93–107 has had a favorable impact on Chicago's television audience, in that the legislation has made a number of home games

*See appendix A.

available to many local viewers who prefer to watch the Bears play as opposed to other NFL clubs.

The audience ratings listed below further indicate that the Bears attract larger audiences when the team is winning. The highest audience ratings captured by locally televised games occurred in 1976, which also represents the team's best season in recent years. Should the franchise put together a championship team in the near future, the club's local television audience would probably be enormous. Until then, it appears that a substantial proportion of the audience will continue to watch the team play when games are made available.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR THE CHICAGO BEARS: 1972–76

	Bears		Ratings for other teams	
	Home games	Away games	Competing	Noncompeting
1972	(1) [1]	(1) 25.8	(1) 2.3	(7) 19.8
1973	(2) 19.2	(2) 27.0	(2) 6.4	(8) 15.2
1974	(2) 24.3	(2) 23.9	(3) 6.1	(7) 15.2
1975	(1) 28.8	(2) 18.1	(1) 14.5	(10) 14.4
1976	(2) 29.8	(2) 27.8	(2) 4.2	(8) 17.1
Average ratings	(7) 25.1	(9) 24.4	(9) 6.5	(40) 16.2

[1] Not applicable.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of NFL locally televised games during the American Research Bureau's annual 4-week fall audience surveys.

To summarize, Public Law 93–107 has not adversely affected Chicago's gate receipts. The franchise has encountered few problems in selling nearly all available seats since 1973, even though the team has not played well in recent years. This is not surprising in that Chicago's Soldier Field, by NFL standards, is relatively small. Additionally, the population in and around Chicago is of sufficient magnitude to assure a high level of ticket sales regardless of whether or not home games are made available to local television audiences. Locally televised games, however, appear to have had an indirect, adverse effect on live gate attendance. "No shows" at the Bears' home games have heen well above the league average since 1973. Although costs associated with the legislation in this regard are quite real, they must be weighed against substantial benefits accruing to the Chicago television audience.

Dallas Cowboys

1. *Televised games and ticket sales*

The Cowboys have sold out and locally televised nine home games since the enactment of Public Law 93–107. Three games were broadcast in 1973, one in 1975, and five last year. Available evidence suggests that local telecasts may have adversely affected gate receipts. Season ticket sales in 1974, for example, decreased by 10 percent despite the fact that the Cowboys captured the NFC's Central Division championship in 1973 with a very respectable 10 and 4 won-loss record. However, three games were also locally televised in 1973, which may have led fans to believe that a number of home games would be televised in 1974. If so, Dallas residents may have become less inclined to purchase season tickets, particularly in light of the relatively high prices which the Cowboys charge for season tickets.*

*In addition to the normal price of a season ticket, Dallas requires that the purchaser buy a $300 bond which is used to finance the costs of maintaining Texas Stadium. Accordingly, the total price of season tickets is considerably above the league average.

SUMMARY OF DALLAS COWBOYS' TICKET SALES: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Stadium capacity	65,000	65,000	65,111	65,101	65,101
2. Total seats sold	NA	424,030	384,785	404,627	433,206
Percent change from previous season			−9.3	5.2	7.1
3. Average seats sold per game	NA	60,576	54,969	57,804	61,886
4. Season ticket sales	35,256	36,053	32,297	29,000	36,814
Percent change from previous season		2.3	−10.4	−10.2	26.9
5. Percentage of games won	0.714	0.714	0.571	0.714	0.786
6. Divisional standing	2	1	3	2	1
7. Number of televised home games	0	3	0	1	5

Note: NA—Information was not available.

On the other hand, season ticket sales in 1975 fell by 10 percent, even though all home games played in 1974 were blacked out. The Cowboys, however, did not play well finishing the 1974 season in third place with an uncharacteristic 8 and 6 won-loss record. In all probability, the team's relatively poor performance in 1974 lessened demand for season tickets in 1975. Apparently, the Cowboys' fans were fearful that the club would have another bad year. They were pleasantly surprised as Dallas won the NFL championship before succumbing to the Pittsburgh Steelers in the Super Bowl. As expected, season ticket sales to last year's home games increased by 27 percent, and the Cowboys locally televised five home games.

2. *"No shows"*

The figures below provide a strong indication that "no shows" were also influenced by local telecasts of home games.* For example, Dallas "no shows" reached their highest level last year, despite the team's first place finish and a very respectable 11 and 3 won-loss record. Moreover, average "no shows" at locally televised games played during the 1973, 1974, and 1976 seasons were well in excess of average "no shows" at nontelevised games.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR DALLAS COWBOYS: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Total "no shows"	NA	28,309	19,855	11,661	32,518
Percent change from previous season			−29.9	−41.3	178.9
2. Average "no shows" per game	NA	4,044	2,836	1,666	4,645
3. Average number of seats sold per game	NA	60,576	54,969	57,804	61,886
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	NA	6.7	5.2	2.9	7.3
5. Number of televised games	0	3	0	1	5
6. Average "no shows" per televised game		5,614		3,361	6,063
7. Average "no shows" per nontelevised game	NA	2,867	2,836	1,383	1,100
8. Percentage of games won	0.714	0.714	0.571	0.714	0.786
9. Divisional standing	2	1	3	2	1

Note: NA—Information was not available.

The statistical analysis supports this conclusion, and further indicates that attendance was also influenced by the weather as well as the expected quality of the game.**Specifically, Dallas "no shows" increased when the weather turned cold. Conversely, attendance improved when the Cowboys, as well as the visiting team, were playing well.

*Unfortunately, the Cowboys did not count "no shows" during the 1972 season. Consequently, data is only available since 1973.

**See appendix A.

Fortunately, live gate attendance has not been a terribly serious problem in Dallas. Although five home games were locally televised in 1976, the percentage of fans who failed to use their tickets to those games remained well below the league average. It is doubtful, therefore, that Public Law 93–107 has imposed a serious financial hardship on the Cowboys' organization.

3. *Audience ratings*

Dallas audience ratings clearly indicate that the Cowboys are one of the most popular home teams in the NFL. Locally televised home games in 1976 captured about 47 percent of the local audience which encompasses in excess of 1 million homes. Locally televised away games have averaged an equally remarkable audience rating of 46 over the previous 5 years. Moreover, there is no indication that the viewer interest in the Cowboys is waning.

The Cowboys' locally televised games are also substantially more popular than other NFL telecasts. Competing contests, for example, are generally viewed by only 4 percent of the audience, indicating that nearly 9 out of 10 football viewers prefer to watch the Cowboys play when forced to choose between the home team and other clubs. While noncompeting games are viewed by a larger percentage of the local audience, their popularity was substantially below that of the Cowboys' televised games.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR THE DALLAS COWBOYS: 1972–76

	Cowboys		Ratings for other teams	
	Home games	Away games	Competing	Noncompeting
1972	(1) (1)	(2) 43.9	(2) 3.2	(7) 24.2
1973	(0) ----	(2) 41.3	(2) 2.5	(10) 25.5
1974	(0) ----	(2) 40.1	(1) 10.2	(11) 22.2
1975	(0) ----	(2) 50.5	(2) 3.3	(10) 26.3
1976	(3) 47.0	(1) 50.1	(1) 3.0	(11) 25.7
Average ratings	(3) 47.0	(9) 44.6	(8) 3.9	(49) 24.8

[1] Not applicable.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of NFL locally televised games during the American Research Bureau's annual 4-week fall audience surveys.

In sum, the sports antiblackout legislation has resulted in nine locally televised home games since 1973; all of which were enormously popular with local television audiences. Local telecasts, however, appear to have adversely affected season ticket sales in 1974 and live gate attendance in 1973, 1975, and 1976.

Detroit Lions

1. *Televised games and ticket sales*

The Detroit Lions have locally televised seven home games, or 25 percent of the total, since 1973. Three were televised in both 1973 and 1975 with one being broadcast last year. Figures in the table below indicate that these telecasts may have adversely affected season ticket sales. For example, season ticket sales fell by 12 percent in 1974 following a season during which three home games were locally televised. However, the Lions also won fewer games in 1973 than in 1972 which could account for lower season ticket sales in 1974.

On the other hand, Detroit finished the 1974 and 1975 seasons with identical records. Season ticket sales increased by 25 percent in 1975 but declined by 9 percent in 1976. These seasonal changes also directly correspond with variations in the number of home games locally televised during the preceding season. The team's move into the new Pontiac Metropolitan Stadium, however, could have influenced season ticket sales. That is, many fans may have been more inclined to purchase seats in the new facility, which could partially explain the 25-percent increase in season ticket sales for 1975. The decline in sales in 1976 may simply reflect a lessening of the novelty associated with attending games in the new stadium. Fans could also have encountered added commuting and parking difficulties at the new Pontiac stadium, which seats nearly 30,000 more fans than the Lions' old facility. If so, they may have been less inclined to purchase season tickets last year.

SUMMARY OF DETROIT LIONS' TICKET SALES: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Stadium capacity	54,082	52,418	52,418	[1] 80,638	80,638
2. Total seats sold	374,053	372,675	344,977	536,662	500,674
Percent change from previous season		−0.4	−7.4	55.6	−6.7
3. Average seats sold per game	53,436	53,239	49,282	76,666	71,525
4. Season ticket sales	44,742	45,560	40,019	50,000	45,307
Percent change from previous season		1.8	−12.2	24.9	−9.4
5. Percentage of games won	0.571	0.429	0.500	0.500	0.429
6. Divisional standing	2	2	2	2	3
7. Number of televised home games	0	3	0	3	1

[1] The Lions moved into the new Pontiac Metropolitan Stadium in 1975.

Given all possible explanations for Detroit's season ticket sales, it is difficult to attribute seasonal changes to any one factor. Ticket sales were probably influenced to some extent by a combination of events, including the presence of locally televised home games.

2. *"No shows"*

Detroit "no shows" increased significantly during the first season following the enactment of Public Law 93–107, but have declined since then. However, the average number of "no shows" at the three locally televised home games in 1973 was actually less than the average number of ticket holders who failed to attend nontelevised games. The same was true in 1976. However, "no shows" at locally televised games in 1975 were substantially above "no shows" at nontelevised home games.

The figures in the table below further indicate that Detroit's live gate attendance improved following the team's move to Pontiac Metropolitan Stadium. Between 1972 and 1974, for example, 10 percent of all Detroit ticketholders failed to use their tickets. Following the move to Pontiac in 1975, the percentage declined to 6 percent even though the team did not play better during the latter 2-year period. This is not particularly surprising in that Pontiac Stadium is a domed facility. Consequently, adverse weather conditions have less impact on live gate attendance than was the case when the Lions played in their old stadium, prior to 1975.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR DETROIT LIONS: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Total "no shows"	21,895	50,102	32,289	34,776	29,901
Percent change from previous season		128.8	−35.6	7.7	−14
2. Average "no shows" per game	3,177	7,157	4,613	4,968	4,272
3. Average number of seats sold per game	53,436	53,239	49,282	76,666	71,525
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	5.9	13.4	9.3	6.5	5.9
5. Number of televised games	0	3	0	3	1
6. Average "no shows" per televised game		6,169		6,424	2,596
7. Average "no shows" per nontelevised game	3,177	7,899	4,613	3,876	4,984
8. Percentage of games won	0.571	0.429	0.500	0.500	0.429
9. Divisional standing	2	2	2	2	3

Not surprisingly, the results of the statistical analysis indicate that live gate attendance at Detroit's home games were significantly lower when it rained or snowed.* But, again, the effect of precipitation on the Lions' attendance was undoubtedly more pronounced prior to 1975, before the Lions moved into their domed stadium.

The analysis further indicated that local telecasts exacerbated adverse effects of weather on Detroit's live gate. That is, "no-shows" at televised games played in the rain or snow were higher than at nontelevised games played under similar conditions. Consequently, Public Law 93–107 appeared to affect indirectly attendance at Detroit's home games. However, since weather presently has a lessened influence on "no-shows," it is doubtful that locally televised games will give rise to serious attendance problems in the near or more distant future.

3. *Audience ratings*

Locally televised games are quite popular with football fans in the Detroit area. On the average, approximately 28 percent of the 1.6 million households in the Detroit television market tuned into the Lions' televised games during the previous five seasons. Clearly then, Detroit fans prefer to watch the Lions play when given the opportunity. Competing games, for example, managed an average audience rating of 5 while noncompeting telecasts acquired an average rating of 16. It is evidence, therefore, that Public Law 93–107 has been beneficial to Lions' fans in this part of the country.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR THE DETROIT LIONS: 1972–76

	Lions		Ratings for other teams	
	Home games	Away games	Competing	Noncompeting
1972	(1) [1]	(1) 33.2	(0) ---	(8) 16.9
1973	(0) ---	(2) 27.5	(1) 4.0	(11) 17.6
1974	(0) ---	(1) 25.2	(1) 5.8	(11) 15.9
1975	(0) ---	(2) 29.0	(1) 3.6	(11) 15.1
1976	(1) 22.1	(2) 24.5	(2) 6.9	(10) 13.9
Average ratings	(1) 22.1	(8) 27.6	(5) 5.4	(51) 15.9

[1] Not applicable.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of NFL locally televised games during the American Research Bureau's annual 4-week fall audience surveys.

*See appendix A.

Green Bay Packers

1. *Televised games and ticket sales*

The Packers, unlike other NFL clubs, currently play their home games in two separate locations. During each of the previous five seasons, the team has played four games in Green Bay and three in Milwaukee. This, undoubtedly, benefits ticket sales, since fans in each city have fewer opportunities to attend games. Moreover, season tickets are less expensive since they admit the purchaser to fewer games. Additionally, the Packers have a rich tradition in the NFL. Green Bay virtually dominated professional football in the late 1960's under head coach Vince Lombardi. Demand for Packers' tickets in recent years probably reflects deep fan loyalty. Accordingly, Green Bay has encountered no difficulties in selling tickets to its home games, despite the fact that the team has not played well and has locally televised all home games since 1973.

SUMMARY OF GREEN BAY PACKERS' TICKET SALES: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Stadium capacity	56,263	56,263	56,267	56,267	56,267
At Milwaukee[1]	47,826	47,826	47,826	52,607	55,896
2. Total seats sold	220,861	220,668	220,623	220,506	220,950
Percent change from previous season		0	0	0	0
At Milwaukee	140,441	140,658	139,389	153,904	164,089
Percent change		0	−1	10	0.1
3. Average seats sold per game	55,215	55,167	55,156	55,127	55,237
At Milwaukee	46,814	46,886	46,463	51,301	54,696
4. Season ticket sales	54,155	56,267	56,267	56,257	54,241
Percent change from previous season		3.9	0	0	−3.6
At Milwaukee	46,699	47,826	47,826	52,583	52,900
Percent change		6.9	0	10	0.6
5. Percentage of games won	0.714	0.286	0.429	0.286	0.286
6. Divisional standing	1	3	3	4	4
7. Number of televised home games	0	7	7	7	7

[1] Green Bay plays 3 regular season home games at Milwaukee.

Given the team's less than respectable performance, notorious weather conditions, and extensive television coverage, demand for Packers' tickets is unusual. It must be concluded, therefore, that most fans in Milwaukee and Green Bay simply regard television as a relatively poor substitute for a seat in the stadium.

2. *"No shows"*

Green Bay also enjoys one of the better live gate attendance records in the NFL. Although "no shows" have increased since the enactment of Public Law 93–107, attendance has remained high, particularly at home games played in Milwaukee. With the exception of four games played at Green Bay in 1975, the percentage of unused tickets to the Packers' home games have remained well below the league average. Additionally, only 3 percent of the tickets sold to the games played in Milwaukee have gone unused since 1973.

The figures presented in the table below indicate, however, that local telecasts may have had a marginal impact on attendance. The statistical analysis suggests that Green Bay fans have become increasingly sensitive to cold temperatures which may also explain differences in "no shows" between games played in Milwaukee and Green Bay.*

*See appendix A.

Green Bay is generally the colder of the two cities and as a consequence "no shows" were higher there than in Milwaukee. Knowing that home games will be locally televised, ticket holders appear to be less inclined to brave bitterly cold weather in order to watch the Packers play, especially when the club is consistently losing.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR GREEN BAY PACKERS: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Total "no shows"	6,103	9,375	12,190	27,633	3,481
Percent change from previous season		54	30	127	−87.4
At Milwaukee	2,074	3,239	4,369	4,328	6,755
Percent change		56	35	−1	56.1
2. Average "no shows" per game	1,526	2,344	3,048	6,908	870
At Milwaukee	691	1,080	1,456	1,443	2,252
3. Average number of seats sold per game	55,215	55,167	55,156	55,127	55,237
At Milwaukee	46,814	46,886	46,463	51,301	54,696
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	3	4	6	13	1.6
At Milwaukee	1	2	3	3	4
5. Number of televised games	0	7	7	7	7
6. Average "no shows" per televised game		2,344	3,048	6,908	870
At Milwaukee		1,080	1,456	1,443	2,252
7. Average "no shows" per nontelevised game	1,526				
At Milwaukee	691				
8. Percentage of games won	0.714	0.286	0.429	0.286	0.286
9. Divisional standing	1	3	3	4	4

Even if local telecasts have exacerbated the effect of cold weather on Green Bay's live gate attendance, the indirect influence has not been of great consequence. After all, the Packers in 1976, once again finished last in their division with a 4 and 8 won-loss record. Nevertheless, only 1.6 percent of all ticketholders failed to attend games in Green Bay and only 4 percent failed to attend at Milwaukee. Both percentages were well below the league average.

3. *Audience Ratings*

The Packers are enormously popular with television audiences in Green Bay and Milwaukee.* The Green Bay market contains approximately 302,000 households while the Milwaukee television market encompasses 640,000 homes. On the average, locally televised home games have been viewed by 46 percent of the Green Bay audience and 40 percent of the Milwaukee audience during the last four seasons. These figures compare quite favorably with average audience ratings for competing as well as noncompeting NFL telecasts in both cities. Green Bay fans, for example, chose to watch the Packers, as opposed to other NFL clubs, by an average margin of nearly 9 to 1. Milwaukee fans preferred the Packers over competing NFL telecasts by a margin of nearly 8 to 1. The Packers' locally televised games also outdrew audiences of noncompeting televised games by 2 to 1.

Clearly, the popularity of the Packers with Green Bay and Milwaukee television audiences is beyond question. There is also no indication that viewer interest in the home team is lessening despite the club's poor performance in recent years. Furthermore, the franchise unquestionably enjoys an excess demand for tickets. Hence, television affords the only opportunity for most local fans to see the Packers play at home. Fortunately, local telecasts have been made available without imposing a significant financial hardship on the franchise.

*Since both cities represent different television markets, audience ratings are reported for each.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR THE GREEN BAY PACKERS: 1972–76

	Packers		Ratings for other teams	
	Home games	Away games	Competing	Noncompeting
Green Bay:				
1972	(1) (1)	(3) 50.6	(3) 3.3	(5) 26.0
1973	(2) 41.2	(2) 45.4	(3) 4.4	(7) 22.7
1974	(2) 48.3	(2) 46.0	(3) 6.7	(8) 22.2
1975	(2) 44.8	(2) 45.6	(4) 4.6	(7) 21.4
1976	(3) 47.0	(1) 46.8	(3) 4.5	(8) 23.9
Average ratings	(9) 45.5	(10) 47.3	(16) 4.7	(35) 23.1
Milwaukee:				
1972	(1) (1)	(2) 47.8	(2) 5.8	(6) 25.1
1973	(2) 44.3	(2) 38.3	(4) 5.6	(8) 22.0
1974	(2) 37.4	(2) 38.1	(3) 6.6	(8) 18.2
1975	(2) 41.7	(2) 38.7	(3) 4.2	(8) 19.7
1976	(3) 37.3	(1) 38.8	(3) 4.8	(7) 16.7
Average ratings	(9) 39.9	(9) 40.5	(15) 5.4	(37) 20.2

[1] Not applicable.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of NFL locally televised games during the American Research Bureau's annual 4-week fall audience surveys.

Los Angeles Rams

1. *Televised games and ticket sales*

Los Angeles has locally televised only two home games since 1973, even though the team has won the NFC's Western Division 4 years running. Consequently, Public Law 93–107 has had virtually no impact on Rams' ticket sales. The absence of locally televised home games in the Los Angeles area is not unusual considering the size of the Los Angeles Coliseum. Any team in the NFL would encounter difficulties filling 91,000 seats regardless of how well they were playing. Additionally, a large number of seats in the Coliseum are a considerable distance from the playing field and do not afford a good vantage point from which to see the game.

The Rams' season ticket sales, as expected, did appear to be sensitive to the team's won-loss record. Season ticket sales, for example, declined in 1973 following a relatively poor showing during the previous year. Conversely, ticket sales improved in 1974 and 1976, following the club's 12 and 2 won-loss performance in both 1973 and 1975. It should also be noted that last year's season ticket sales increased despite the fact that one home game in 1975 was locally televised. Again this suggests that season ticket sales in Los Angeles have not been affected by the sports antiblackout law. Moreover, since sold-out games in the Coliseum are so unusual, it is highly doubtful that this situation will change unless the Rams choose to substantially reduce the number of tickets made available to home games.

SUMMARY OF LOS ANGELES RAMS' TICKET SALES: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Stadium capacity	76,000	79,281	92,000	91,038	91,038
2. Total seats sold	473,914	510,923	501,744	470,867	476,981
Percent change from previous season		7.2	−1.8	−6.2	1.3
3. Average seats sold per game	67,702	72,989	71,679	67,267	68,140
4. Season ticket sales	50,037	45,917	46,251	47,413	48,235
Percent change from previous season		−8.2	0.7	2.5	1.7
5. Percentage of games won	0.429	0.857	0.714	0.857	0.750
6. Divisional standing	3	1	1	1	1
7. Number of televised home games	0	0	0	1	1

2. *"No shows"*

Although Los Angeles has locally televised only two home games, both broadcasts resulted in substantial increases in "no shows" during the 1975 and 1976 seasons. For example, 21,649 ticket holders failed to attend the Rams' game with the Pittsburgh Steelers in 1975. This was surprising in that the game was billed as a preview of "Super Bowl X" where both teams were expected to vie for the NFL championship. Additionally, the game was the last of the season and was played under clear skies in 60-degree weather. Nevertheless, "no shows" were nearly four times higher than the average number at nontelevised contests. They were also equivalent to two-thirds of the total "no shows" at the Rams' six other home games.

A similar situation occurred in 1976 when Los Angeles locally televised its game with the St. Louis Cardinals on November 14. At that time, Los Angeles led the NFC's Western Division with a 6–2–1 record. St. Louis was in second place in the NFC's Central Division with a 7 and 2 record. A victory for the Cardinals would have substantially enhanced the club's chances of winning a berth in the playoffs, and would have thrown the Rams into a tie for the lead in their division. The game was sold out in advance and was played in warm (68 degrees) though wet weather. "No shows" numbered 26,340 as compared with an average of 6,546 "no shows" at six nontelevised home games.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR LOS ANGELES RAMS: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Total "no shows"	31,397	18,457	34,159	54,441	65,618
Percent change from previous season		−41.2	85.1	59.4	20.5
2. Average "no shows" per game	4,485	2,636	4,880	7,777	9,374
3 Average number of seats sold per game	67,702	72,989	71,679	67,267	68,140
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	6.6	3.6	6.8	11.6	12.9
5. Number of televised games	0	0	0	1	1
6. Average "no shows" per televised game				21,649	26,340
7. Average "no shows" per nontelevised game	4,485	2,656	4,880	5,465	6,546
8. Percentage of games won	0.429	0.857	0.714	0.857	0.750
9. Divisional standing	3	1	1	1	1

As expected, the statistical analysis of Los Angeles "no shows" indicates that local telecasts were almost entirely responsible for very substantial decreases in live gate attendance at the Steelers' game in 1975 and the Cardinals' game last year.* Only one other factor proved to have a significant influence on the Rams' attendance. When both teams were playing well and in contention for the playoffs, attendance generally increased.

Obviously, Public Law 93–107 would have been a far more serious problem to the Rams, had additional home games been sold out. But, as noted previously, this is unlikely to occur unless Los Angeles voluntarily reduces the number of tickets made available to their home games. Given the sensitivity of fans to local telecasts, it is doubtful that the team would take such action, unless the Rams believed that increased broadcast revenues accruing from locally televised games would exceed costs attributable to reductions in live gate attendance.

*See appendix A.

3. *Audience ratings*

Los Angeles is the second largest television market in the country, encompassing nearly 3.7 million households. On the average, approximately 27 percent of the viewing audience watched the team's locally televised away games between 1973 and 1976. The game with the Cardinals last year obtained an audience rating of 23. Both of these figures are considerably above average ratings for competing as well as noncompeting games. Indeed, the average rating for competing games indicate that the Rams outdrew other NFL clubs by a margin of nearly 5 to 1, when viewers were forced to choose between games broadcast at the same time but on different network affiliated stations. The difference is equivalent to approximately 766,000 households in Los Angeles and the surrounding area. Furthermore, approximately 320,000 additional households viewed the Rams' games as opposed to other NFL telecasts which were aired at different times. All of this suggests that Los Angeles fans clearly prefer to watch their home team and accordingly have benefited by Public Law 93–107.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR THE LOS ANGELES RAMS: 1972–76

	Rams		Ratings for other teams	
	Home games	Away games	Competing	Noncompeting
1972	(1) (1)	(0) ----	(0) ---	(7) 17.8
1973	(0) ----	(2) 31.4	(2) 6.3	(10) 20.1
1974	(0) ----	(3) 25.6	(2) 5.1	(10) 16.6
1975	(0) ----	(2) 23.4	(1) 3.0	(10) 15.8
1976	(1) 23.3	(2) 26.7	(0) ---	(11) 16.9
Average ratings	(1) 23.3	(9) 26.6	(5) 5.2	(48) 17.4

[1] Not applicable.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of NFL locally televised games during the American Research Bureau's annual 4-week fall audience surveys.

In conclusion, the sports antiblackout law has not affected Los Angeles ticket sales although two local telecases did result in substantial increases in "no shows." Moreover, the exceedingly large seating capacity of the Los Angeles Coliseum will probably preclude extensive television coverage of home games in future seasons. Nevertheless, it is clear that Los Angeles fans—by very large numbers—prefer to watch locally televised games when given the opportunity.

Minnesota Vikings

1. *Televised games and ticket sales*

Minnesota has sold out and locally televised all but two home games since the enactment of Public Law 93–107 in 1973. The team's success in this regard is largely attributable to its performance on the field. The Vikings finished first in the NFC's Central Division during each of the last four seasons, and won the NFC championship in 1973, 1974, and 1976. Additionally, Minnesota's Metropolitan Stadium is relatively small, and not particularly difficult to fill.

Accordingly, as long as the Vikings continue to win, extensive local television coverage should not adversely affect gate receipts. Minnesota sold all 41,500 available season tickets in 1973, 1974, and 1975. Season ticket sales fell by less than 2 percent last year, but this probably reflected the team's failure to win their conference championship as

they had done in both 1973 and 1974. The decrease in 1976 season ticket sales, however, was of no great consequence because the Vikings still managed to sell out all seven home games.

SUMMARY OF MINNESOTA VIKINGS' TICKET SALES: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Stadium capacity	47,693	47,693	48,503	48,446	48,446
2. Total seats sold	329,037	331,898	332,503	333,802	333,380
Percent change from previous season		0.9	0.2	0.4	−0.1
3. Average seats sold per game	47,005	47,414	47,500	47,686	47,626
4. Season ticket sales	41,984	41,500	41,500	41,500	40,831
Percent change from previous season		−1.2	0	0	−1.6
5. Percentage of games won	0.500	0.857	0.714	0.857	0.821
6. Divisional standing	3	1	1	1	1
7. Number of televised home games	0	7	5	7	7

2. *"No shows"*

Evidence regarding the effect of local telecasts on Minnesota "no shows" is mixed. The Vikings experienced an increase in live gate attendance during the 1973 season when all home games were locally televised. This, however, was undoubtedly attributable to a rather dramatic improvement in the team's performance. "No shows" continued to decline in 1974 despite five locally televised home games. Attendance, however, was higher at nontelevised games. In 1975, "no shows" increased substantially when all home games were again locally televised and the Vikings finished the season with a 12 and 2 won-loss record. Finally, "no shows" fell by 15 percent last year, although attendance remained below the team's live gate in 1972 when the team finished third in their division with a 7 and 7 won-loss record. Consequently, it would appear that Pubic Law 93–107 may have had a marginally adverse effect on Minnesota's live gate attendance since 1973.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR MINNESOTA VIKINGS: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Total "no shows"	10,393	8,293	7,949	15,786	13,377
Percent change from previous season		−20.2	−4.2	98.6	−15.3
2. Average "no shows" per game	1,485	1,185	1,136	2,255	1,911
3. Average number of seats sold per game	47,005	47,414	47,500	47,686	47,626
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	3.2	2.5	2.4	4.7	3.9
5. Number of televised games	0	7	5	7	7
6. Average "no shows" per televised game		1,185	1,218	2,255	1,911
7. Average "no shows" per nontelevised game	1,485		930		
8. Percentage of games won	0.500	0.857	0.714	0.857	0.821
9. Divisional standing	3	1	1	1	1

The results of the statistical analysis tend to confirm this finding.* "No shows" at locally televised games were significantly above "no shows" at blacked-out home games, all other things being equal. The analysis further indicates that Viking fans are quite sensitive to cold or wet weather. Here again, local telecasts may have exacerbated this particular relationship.

Even so, the Vikings enjoy one of the best attendance records in the NFL. On the average, only 3.4 percent of all Minnesota fans failed to use their tickets since 1973, which compares quite favorably

*See appendix A.

to the league average of 9.8 percent over the same period. While Public Law 93–107 may have had a negative impact on the Vikings' live gate, local telecasts certainly have not posed a serious threat to the financial or psychological vitality of the franchise.

3. *Audience ratings*

Not surprisingly, the Vikings also have a very large following among television audiences residing in the team's home territory. There are approximately 908,000 television households in Minneapolis-St. Paul area. On the average, locally televised games were viewed by approximately 37 percent of the total audience as compared with an average of 18 percent who watched noncompeting NFL telecasts. Local viewing preferences for the home team are further reflected by the fact that audiences, when forced to choose, opted for the Vikings' telecasts as opposed to other NFL clubs by a margin of nearly 8 to 1.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR THE MINNESOTA VIKINGS: 1972–76

	Vikings		Ratings for other teams	
	Home games	Away games	Competing	Noncompeting
1972	(1) (1)	(1) 39.2	(0) ---	(8) 17.3
1973	(3) 37.4	(1) 45.8	(0) ---	(9) 17.2
1974	(2) 32.8	(2) 38.6	(3) 8.3	(7) 16.6
1975	(2) 37.1	(2) 40.7	(2) 5.1	(8) 18.8
1976	(2) 40.9	(2) 47.7	(1) 4.8	(9) 18.3
Average ratings	(9) 37.1	(8) 42.4	(6) 6.7	(41) 17.7

[1] Not applicable.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of NFL locally televised games during the American Research Bureau's annual 4-week fall audience surveys.

It appears, therefore, that Public Law 93–107 has been of value to the residents of Minneapolis-St. Paul and the surrounding area. Moreover, there is no indication that the legislation has had a significant effect on gate receipts. Indeed, the franchise appears to currently enjoy an excess demand for available tickets. Finally, while television may have had a marginal effect on live gate attendance, the impact of Public Law 93–107 in this regard has not been of great consequence. In addition to an excess demand for tickets, the Vikings have one of the best live gate attendance records in the NFL. Accordingly, it would appear that benefits accruing from local telecasts exceed those costs which may be attributable to the legislation.

New Orleans Saints

1. *Televised games and ticket sales*

Unfortunately, New Orleans has yet to sell out and locally televise a single game. Public Law 93–107, therefore, has not affected the franchise. This is largely attributable to team performance. New Orleans has not had a winning season since 1972 and has finished no better than third in the divisional standing. Additionally, the team has played in very large stadiums. Prior to 1975, for example, the Saints occupied the Sugar Bowl with a seating capacity of 81,000. The team subsequently moved into the Superdome with 72,000 available seats. Both facilities, of course, would be difficult to sell out under any circumstances.

Moreover, the figures below indicate that fans are becoming increasingly less inclined to purchase season tickets. Sales have fallen during each of the previous four seasons. Here again, the Saints' playing performance is undoubtedly responsible for the waning of interest in season tickets. Hopefully, circumstances will improve as the franchise fields stronger teams. Until then, it is doubtful that any home games will be locally televised.

SUMMARY OF NEW ORLEANS SAINTS' TICKET SALES: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Stadium capacity	80,997	80,997	80,997	74,704	72,000
2. Total seats sold	NA	445,108	444,590	389,209	391,396
Percent change from previous season			−0.1	−12.5	5.6
3. Average seats sold per game	NA	63,587	63,513	55,601	55,914
4. Season ticket sales	53,319	50,005	49,252	46,000	40,093
Percent change from previous season		−6.2	−1.5	−6.6	−12.8
5. Percentage of games won	0.143	0.357	0.357	0.143	0.286
6. Divisional standing	4	3	3	4	3
7. Number of televised home games	0	0	0	0	0

Note: NA—Information was not available.

2. *"No shows"*

Although New Orleans has not locally televised any of its home games since 1973, the franchise has still experienced problems with live gate attendance. Between 1973 and 1976, approximately 14 percent of all tickets distributed by the Saints went unused. Few teams in the league have experienced "no shows" of this magnitude. Here again, the problem with live gate attendance appears to have resulted from the quality of the team's performance. Note, for example, that "no shows" reached their highest level in 1975 when the Saints won only 2 of 14 regular season games. Conversely, attendance picked up last year as the team captured third place in the divisional standing with an improved 3 and 11 won-loss record. Finally, the results of the statistical analysis also indicated that live gate attendance was quite sensitive to weather conditions.* As expected, "no shows" increased significantly when temperatures fell.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR NEW ORLEANS SAINTS: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Total "no shows"	NA	48,619	59,132	76,945	40,775
Percent change from previous season			21.6	30.1	47.0
2. Average "no shows" per game	NA	6,946	8,447	10,992	5,825
3. Average number of seats sold per game	NA	63,587	63,513	55,601	55,914
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing		10.9	13.3	19.8	10.2
5. Number of televised games	0	0	0	0	0
6. Average "no shows" per televised game					
7. Average "no shows" per nontelevised game	NA	6,946	8,447	10,992	5,825
8. Percentage of games won	0.143	0.357	0.357	0.143	0.286
9. Divisional standing	4	3	3	4	3

Note: NA—Information was not available.

3. *Audience ratings*

New Orleans locally televised away games have captured a consistently large share of the audience despite the team's performance.

*See appendix A.

Nearly 40 percent of the 492,000 households located in the New Orleans' television market watched the Saints' televised away games. Competing NFL telecasts, on the other hand, managed a rating of 7 while noncompeting games were viewed in approximately 24 percent of the total households. It is unfortunate, that some of the club's home games were not televised. They would have been appreciated by local viewers.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR THE NEW ORLEANS SAINTS: 1972–76

	Saints		Ratings for other teams	
	Home games	Away games	Competing	Noncompeting
1972	(1) (1)	(3) 38.4	(3) 7.4	(5) 27.4
1973	(0) ----	(2) 47.2	(1) 4.8	(11) 25.9
1974	(0) ----	(1) 39.8	(1) 2.5	(11) 22.8
1975	(0) ----	(1) 31.0	(1) 8.3	(11) 23.4
1976	(0) ----	(3) 35.9	(2) 7.4	(10) 24.3
Average ratings	(0) ----	(10) 38.8	(8) 6.6	(48) 24.4

[1] Not applicable.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of NFL locally televised games during the American Research Bureau's annual 4-week fall audience surveys.

New York Giants

1. *Televised games and ticket sales*

The impact of Public Law 93–107 on the Giants is difficult to assess. The club has locally televised 14 of 28 regular season home games since 1973. Total ticket sales have remained well above the league average, with the exception of the 1974 season when the Giants sold an average 53,278 seats to each of their home games. However, the club has used four different stadiums during the last five seasons. Prior to 1973, the Giants played their home games at Yankee Stadium before that facility underwent renovation. The Giants moved to the Yale Bowl in New Haven, Conn., after the first two regular season games in 1973, and remained there through the 1974 season. In 1975, the team played at Shea Stadium, and in 1976 moved into its permanent home in East Rutherford, N.J. Unfortunately, movement from one stadium to another obfuscates an assessment of the impact of Public Law 93–107. The reason being that one cannot be certain as to whether variations in ticket sales resulted from local telecasts, the location of a new stadium, or for that matter any other factors which might have affected gate receipts. For example, season ticket sales fell by 24 percent following the 1973 season during which the Giants locally televised six home games. However, the Giants played all home games in 1974 at the Yale Bowl. The team also finished the 1973 season in last place with a 2 and 12 won-loss record. One or all of these factors may have resulted in a loss of season ticket sales in 1974.

Fans may have simply been less inclined to travel to New Haven throughout the regular season particularly if they expected that all or nearly all home games would be locally televised.

Fortunately, season ticket sales increased in 1975 and again in 1976 following the move back to New York City. The latter increase was surprising in that the team finished the 1974 season in last place after winning only two games. However, no games were locally tele-

vised in 1974. Consequently, the increase in season ticket sales may have resulted from expectations that the games would be blacked out. Conversely, most fans may have had easier access to Shea Stadium which could have prompted increased demand for season tickets in 1974. The same may have been true of season ticket sales last year when the Giants moved into their new, permanent facility in East Rutherford, N.J., which is situated just outside the city. Additionally, since the Giants only televised two home games during the 1975 season, fans could well have expected most home games to be blacked out in the New York area during the 1976 season. If so, such expectations may have led to increased season ticket sales.

SUMMARY OF NEW YORK GIANTS' TICKET SALES: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Stadium capacity	63,350	[1] 64,892 [1] 70,200	70,874	60,416	76,891
2. Total seats sold	438,669	470,273	373,096	414,808	527,698
Percent change from previous season		7.2	−20.7	11.2	27.2
3. Average seats sold per game	62,667	67,182	53,298	59,258	75,385
4. Season ticket sales	57,214	52,686	40,007	54,294	73,511
Percent change from previous season		−7.9	−24.1	35.7	35.4
5. Percentage of games won	0.571	0.143	0.143	0.357	0.214
6. Divisional standing	3	5	5	4	5
7. Number of televised home games	0	6	0	2	6

[1] The Giants used 2 stadiums in the 1973 season: Yankee Stadium and the Yale Bowl in New Haven, Conn.

All of this suggests, but does not definitively demonstrate, that Public Law 93–107 may have impacted on the Giants' gate receipts. The same can be said of variations in the team's performance during the previous five seasons. Moreover, frequent changes in stadiums used by the Giants may have also influenced season ticket sales. In all probability variations in the Giants' gate receipts were influenced by a combination of these factors.

Whatever the reasons, they do not pose a threat to the financial vitality of the Giants' franchise. New York's season ticket sales in 1975 and 1976, for example, were in excess of 90 percent of all available seats. Again, the team's success in this regard is due to the extremely large population of the metropolitan area. Accordingly, locally televised games should not have a serious impact on gate receipts in future years.

2. *"No shows"*

The Giants have also experienced considerable problems with live gate attendance in recent years. Since 1973, "no shows" at home games have exceeded the league average by rather substantial margins. The differences, however, do not appear to be attributable to local telecasts. Indeed, with the exception of home games televised last year, attendance has been much higher at locally televised games than at games which were blacked out.

Undoubtedly, the team's move to New Haven, Conn., was at least partially responsible for the significant increase in "no shows" in 1973. The same was true of the relatively poor live gate attendance experienced by the club in 1974. Fans were probably less inclined to make the out-of-State trip especially when the team was losing so many games. On the other hand, "no shows" did not decline substantially in 1975, when the club moved into Shea Stadium and managed to win five regular season games.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR NEW YORK GIANTS: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Total "no shows"	26,881	59,991	59,759	62,836	55,071
Percent change from previous season		123.2	−0.4	5.2	−12.4
2. Average "no shows" per game	3,840	8,570	8,537	8,977	7,867
3. Average number of seats sold per game	62,667	67,182	53,298	59,258	75,385
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	6.1	12.8	16.0	15.1	10.3
5. Number of televised games	0	6	0	2	6
6. Average "no shows" per televised game		7,551		4,930	7,932
7. Average "no shows" per nontelevised game	3,840	14,688	8,537	10,595	7,481
8. Percentage of games won	0.571	0.143	0.143	0.357	0.214
9. Divisional standing	3	5	5	4	5

Rather peculiar variations in live gate attendance were also apparently due to the weather. The results of the statistical analysis indicate that attendance increased when games were played under warm, clear skies.* In sum, Public Law 93–107 does not appear to have significantly influenced the Giants' live gate attendance.

3. *Audience ratings*

At first glance, audience ratings for the Giants' locally televised games would appear to indicate that professional football is relatively less popular with New Yorkers than it is with viewers residing in other NFL home territories. Locally televised home games, for example, garnered an average audience rating of 16 while the club's away games were usually watched by about 17 percent of the local audience. Both figures are not substantially larger than equivalent ratings for noncompeting games.

It must be remembered, however, that many of the noncompeting telecasts involved the New York Jets. Moreover, audience ratings in New York City tend to be lower than ratings in other markets due to the fact that New York supports a relatively large number of television stations. Consequently, the viewing audience has more program options to select from and audience ratings accruing to any one station are generally lower.

Nevertheless, the Giants' televised games appear to be more popular than other NFL telecasts as is reflected in the audience ratings for competing games. When forced to choose, the New York viewers preferenced the Giants by a margin of nearly 2 to 1. It should also be kept in mind that the New York television market encompasses in excess of 6.4 million television households. Accordingly, the eight point difference in audience ratings for the Giants' televised games and competing contests means that approximately 513,000 households preferred to watch the Giants as opposed to other NFL clubs when televised games of each were broadcast at the same time but on different stations. It is evident, therefore, that Public Law 93–107 has been beneficial to many, but not all, NFL fans in the New York area.

*See appendix A.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR THE NEW YORK GIANTS: 1972–76

	Giants		Ratings for other teams	
	Home games	Away games	Competing	Noncompeting
1972	(1) (1)	(2) 16.9	(0) ---	(7) 17.6
1973	(1) 14.8	(2) 17.1	(2) 8.9	(7) 17.0
1974	(0) ----	(2) 18.5	(0) ---	(11) 13.3
1975	(2) 17.0	(1) 15.4	(1) 7.3	(8) 15.7
1976	(3) 15.0	(1) 16.5	(0) ---	(4) 11.8
Average ratings	(6) 15.6	(8) 17.1	(3) 8.4	(37) 15.2

[1] Not applicable.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of NFL locally televised games during the American Research Bureau's annual 4-week fall audience surveys.

Philadelphia Eagles

1. *Televised games and ticket sales*

By all indications, professional football is an extremely popular source of entertainment in Philadelphia. The franchise has sold out and locally televised all 28 regular season home games since 1973. Demand for tickets appers to be well in excess of the 66,052 seats currently available in Philadelphia's Veteran Stadium. Indeed, at least 95 percent of all seats have been sold as season tickets during each of the last 5 years. This phenomenon is unusual considering the fact that the team has not experienced a winning season and has finished no better than third in the NFC's Eastern Division since 1972. One must conclude that Philadelphia fans simply enjoy the game regardless of the home team's fortunes on the playing field.

Furthermore, there is no indication that Public Law 93–107 has adversely affected gate receipts. Again, the Eagles have been able to sell all available seats each year despite the fact that all regular season home games have been locally televised since 1973. Although season ticket sales declined marginally last year, it is doubtful that local telecasts were responsible. The Eagles finished the 1975 season in last place with a 4 and 10 won-loss record. Undoubtedly, the club's performance left something to be desired; so much so that it is surprising that the Eagles were able to sell nearly all available seats as season tickets.

SUMMARY OF PHILADELPHIA EAGLES' TICKET SALES: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Stadium capacity	65,000	65,000	65,954	66,095	66,052
2. Total seats sold	455,013	453,082	456,502	455,555	451,924
Percent change from previous season		−0.4	0.8	−0.2	0.8
3. Average seats sold per game	65,002	64,726	65,215	65,079	64,525
4. Season ticket sales	64,106	64,001	64,361	64,300	62,605
Percent change from previous season		−0.2	0.6	−0.1	−2.6
5. Percentage of games won	0.143	0.357	0.500	0.286	0.286
6. Divisional standing	5	3	4	5	4
7. Number of televised home games	0	7	7	7	7

2. *"No shows"*

Unfortunately, live gate attendance in Philadelphia has not been as strong as ticket sales. Moreover, Public Law 93–107 has resulted in a significant increase in "no shows" at the Eagles' home games. Total "no shows," for example, increased by 43 percent during 1973, the first season affected by the sports antiblackout law. Additionally, average attendance during subsequent seasons has been considerably below the level of attendance recorded in 1972. This was especially evident last year when nearly 15 percent of all tickets distributed went unused, as compared with 7 percent in 1972.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR PHILADELPHIA EAGLES: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Total "no shows"	31,000	44,417	42,032	33,075	65,754
Percent change from previous season		43.3	−5.4	−21.3	98.8
2. Average "no shows" per game	4,429	6,345	6,005	4,725	9,393
3. Average number of seats sold per game	65,002	64,726	65,215	65,079	64,560
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	6.8	9.8	9.2	7.3	14.3
5. Number of televised games	0	7	7	7	7
6. Average "no shows" per televised game		6,345	6,005	4,725	9,393
7. Average "no shows" per nontelevised game	4,429				
8. Percentage of games won	0.143	0.357	0.500	0.286	0.286
9. Divisional standing	5	3	4	5	4

The results of the statistical analysis of Philadelphia's live gate attendance support the proposition that "no shows" have increased significantly as a direct consequence of local telecasts.* Weather also influenced attendance. As expected, fewer fans chose to attend games when the weather turned cold or wet. It is also probable that local telecasts of home games heighten the sensitivity of Philadelphia fans to adverse climatic condition. Finally, attendance in Philadelphia increased significantly when the Eagles played strong opponents. This is an indication that local fans are as interested in seeing quality football as they are in watching their home team win.

3. *Audience ratings*

Locally televised home games are also quite popular with the Philadelphia television audience. Philadelphia is the fourth largest television market in the country, comprising nearly 2.3 million households. Since 1973, an average of 28 percent of the total audience have watched the Eagles play at home while 25 percent have watched the team's locally televised away games. Both figures are considerably above average audience ratings garnered by other NFL telecasts.

This is particularly true of competing telecasts. When viewers were forced to choose, the Eagles outdrew the competition by a margin of about 3 to 1. Noncompeting telecasts, on the other hand, acquired a respectable average audience rating of 21 which again reflects the general popularity of NFL football in this part of the country. Nevertheless, the figures below clearly indicate that Philadelphia audiences prefer to watch the Eagles' telecasts.

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* See appendix A.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR THE PHILADELPHIA EAGLES: 1972–76

	Eagles		Ratings for other teams	
	Home games	Away games	Competing	Noncompeting
1972	(1) (1)	(1) 22.3	(1) 8.3	(7) 22.9
1973	(3) 28.6	(1) 35.7	(1) 6.7	(8) 24.4
1974	(2) 29.7	(2) 23.0	(3) 4.6	(7) 18.2
1975	(2) 26.3	(2) 21.9	(2) 6.8	(9) 17.6
1976	(1) 26.2	(3) 24.8	(2) 5.4	(8) 20.8
Average ratings	(8) 28.0	(9) 24.6	(9) 5.9	(39) 20.7

[1] Not applicable.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of NFL locally televised games during the American Research Bureau's annual 4-week fall audience surveys.

St. Louis Cardinals

1. *Televised games and ticket sales*

St. Louis has sold out and locally televised 11 of 28 regular season home games since 1973. One game was televised in 1973, four in 1974, and three in both 1975 and 1976. The frequency of sellouts, however, did not correspond with variations in gate receipts. For example, although more games were televised in 1974 and 1975 than in 1973, total ticket sales were higher in 1973 than in the 2 subsequent years. This is particularly surprising given the rather dramatic improvement in the team's performance between the 1973 and 1974 seasons.

Understandably, season ticket sales fell by 4 percent in 1974 following the team's fourth place finish in the previous season. However, sales fell by an additional 4 percent in 1975 despite the Cardinals 10 and 4 won-loss record in 1974. Fortunately, the team continued to play well in 1975 and season ticket sales for the 1976 season increased by 3 percent.

SUMMARY OF ST. LOUIS CARDINALS' TICKET SALES: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Stadium capacity	49,818	49,818	51,186	51,342	51,392
2. Total seats sold	337,545	342,685	338,459	333,521	347,383
Percent change from previous season		1.5	−1.2	−1.5	4.2
3. Average seats sold per game	48,221	48,955	48,351	47,646	49,626
4. Season ticket sales	41,332	40,674	39,006	37,516	38,768
Percent change from previous season		−1.6	−4.1	−3.8	3.3
5. Percentage of games won	0.286	0.286	0.714	0.786	0.714
6. Division standing	4	4	1	1	2
7. Number of televised home games	0	1	4	3	3

It should also be pointed out that season tickets did not constitute a particularly high percentage of total tickets sold. This is to be expected when a team is not playing particularly well. However, when the fortunes of a club improve, demand for season tickets should become correspondingly stronger. This has not been the case in St. Louis. One could conclude, therefore, that local telecasts of home games may have adversely influenced the team's gate receipts. This would account for the decrease in season ticket sales in 1975. Four home games were locally televised in 1974 which may have given rise to expectations of extensive television coverage during

92-015—77——7

subsequent seasons. Accordingly, fans were probably less inclined to purchase tickets. As it turned out only three games were sold out in 1975 despite the fact that the Cardinals won all but three regular season games; season ticket sales subsequently increased by 3 percent last year, which again suggests that Public Law 93–107 may have affected gate receipts.

2. *"No shows"*

At first glance, live gate attendance at St. Louis does not appear to have been appreciably affected by Public Law 93–107. Indeed, "no shows" since 1973 have been considerably below levels recorded in 1972 when nearly 12 percent of all tickets distributed went unused. Additionally, average "no shows" at nontelevised games in 1973 exceeded "no shows" at the single televised contest. However, average attendance at nontelevised games played during the course of the 1974, 1975, and 1976 seasons exceeded attendance at locally televised home games. The verdict on the effect of Public Law 93–107 on St. Louis "no shows" is accordingly mixed.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR ST. LOUIS CARDINALS: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Total "no shows"	38,808	20,091	20,088	17,314	10,265
Percent change from previous season		−48.2	0	−13.8	−40.7
2. Average "no shows" per game	5,544	2,870	2,830	2,473	1,466
3. Average number of seats sold per game	48,221	48,955	48,351	47,646	49,626
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	11.5	5.9	5.9	5.2	2.9
5. Number of televised games	0	1	4	3	3
6. Average "no shows" per televised game		2,228	3,507	4,125	1,865
7. Average "no shows" per nontelevised game	5,544	2,977	2,020	1,235	1,168
8. Percentage of games won	0.286	0.286	0.714	0.786	0.714
9. Divisional standing	4	4	1	1	2

While the statistical analysis indicated that local telecasts did not directly affect attendance, the results did indicate substantial increases in "no shows" when the weather turned cold.* There is also some indication that the effect of cold weather on the Cardinals' live gate was particularly accute when the games were locally televised. Accordingly, Public Law 93–107 may have adversely impacted on attendance in St. Louis. Nevertheless, the ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold has remained well below the league averge since 1973. If local telecasts indirectly influenced attendance, the impact of Public Law 93–107 has not been a great consequence.

3. *Audience ratings*

On the average, approximately 31 percent of the 929,000 households located in the St. Louis television market watched the Cardinals' home games when they were made available. Away games garnered an average audience rating of 28. Both figures compare quite favorably to audience ratings of other NFL telecasts. Locally televised home games outdrew competing telecasts by a margin of nearly 5 to 1. Additionally, twice as many viewers watched the Cardinals play as opposed to other NFL contests which did not conflict with the home team's telecasts. It is apparent, therefore, that Public Law 93–107 has been of value to many NFL fans living in and around the St. Louis metropolitan area.

*See appendix A.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR THE ST. LOUIS CARDINALS: 1972–76

	Cardinals		Ratings for other teams	
	Home games	Away games	Competing	Noncompeting
1972	(1) (1)	(2) 14.0	(2) 11.9	(6) 17.8
1973	(0) ----	(2) 20.4	(2) 6.5	(10) 16.7
1974	(2) 32.2	(2) 34.0	(2) 3.9	(9) 16.0
1975	(1) 29.1	(2) 25.0	(2) 3.8	(9) 18.4
1976	(2) 31.3	(1) 37.2	(2) 3.1	(10) 3.1
Average ratings	(5) 31.2	(9) 24.9	(10) 5.8	(44) 14.0

[1] Not applicable.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of NFL locally televised games during the American Research Bureau's annual 4-week fall audience surveys.

As is the case with other NFL clubs, it is difficult to compare benefits to the television audience with costs which the franchise may have incurred as a consequence of locally televised games. Undoubtedly, the value of local telecasts is considerable. On the other hand, it remains to be seen whether NFL teams should be required to televise sold-out home games, if by doing so ticket sales and gate receipts are adversely affected.

San Francisco Forty Niners

1. *Televised games and ticket sales*

San Francisco has sold out and locally televised only five home games since the enactment of Public Law 93–107. Four games were broadcast in 1973 while one was televised last year. Not surprisingly the Forty Niners' ticket sales appear to be influenced by the team's performance. San Francisco must compete with the Oakland Raiders for the allegiance of local fans. When one local team is winning, as Oakland has done in recent years, gate receipts of the less successful team can be expected to suffer. This is particularly true in the Bay area which is not an exceedingly large market by NFL standards.

Nevertheless, local telecasts did not appear to have an appreciable effect on San Francisco's season ticket sales. Admittedly, four local telecasts in 1973 were followed by a 14-percent decline in season ticket sales. However, the decrease also coincided with a relatively poor fourth place finish in 1973. Given that the Forty Niners won the NFC's Western Division in 1972 with an 8 and 6 won-loss record, San Francisco fans were undoubtedly disappointed that the club was unable to equal this mark in 1973. Accordingly, they were probably less inclined to purchase season tickets in 1974. The sensitivity of demand for tickets to the quality of play is further reflected in season ticket sales in both 1975 and 1976. Although no games were broadcast during the preceding seasons, sales continued to fall off, as the Forty Niners lost more games than they won. Their crosstown rival, on the other hand, dominated play in the American Football Conference. Many San Francisco fans may have shifted their allegiance to Oakland which, of course, could at least partially account for the annual losses in Forty Niners season ticket sales since 1973.

SUMMARY OF SAN FRANCISCO FORTY NINERS' TICKET SALES: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Stadium capacity	60,000	60,000	61,249	61,252	61,000
2. Total seats sold	410,811	414,517	372,432	330,430	360,473
Percent change from previous season		0.9	−10.2	−11.3	9.1
3. Average seats sold per game	58,687	59,217	53,205	47,204	51,496
4. Season ticket sales	53,876	55,506	47,649	41,409	38,090
Percent change from previous season		3	−14.2	−13.1	−8.0
5. Percentage of games won	0.571	0.357	0.429	0.357	0.571
6. Divisional standing	1	4	2	2	2
7. Number of televised home games	0	4	0	0	1

Admittedly, this is speculation. Nevertheless, the figures above indicate that local telecasts did not substantially affect the Forty Niners gate receipts. Had television been a primary factor in determining demand, season ticket sales should not have decreased as much as they did in 1975 and 1976. Since problems with sales persisted through last year, we can only conclude that demand is primarily a function of the club's won-loss record. Local telecasts in 1974, however, may have exacerbated the impact of the team's won-loss record on subsequent season ticket sales.

2. *"No shows"*

San Francisco's live gate attendance also appears to be highly sensitive to the expected quality of the game. Note, for example, that poor play in 1973, 1974, and 1975 resulted in substantial increases in "no shows." Moreover, local telecasts did not appear to influence attendance. Average "no shows" at televised and nontelevised games in 1973 and 1976 were not significantly different.

Admittedly, the ratio of "no shows" to tickets sold rose from 4 percent in 1972 to 12 percent in 1973 when four of seven home games were locally televised. However, 12 percent of the tickets sold in 1975 also went unused despite the fact that no home games were televised. Additionally, the Forty Niners finished the 1973 and 1975 season with identical 5 and 9 won-loss records.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR SAN FRANCISCO FORTY NINERS: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Total "no shows"	16,464	49,963	37,685	40,269	20,166
Percent change from previous season		203.5	−24.6	6.9	−49.9
2. Average "no shows" per game	2,352	7,138	5,385	5,753	2,881
3. Average number of seats sold per game	58,687	59,217	53,205	47,204	51,496
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	4	12.1	10.1	12.2	5.4
5. Number of televised games	0	4	0	0	1
6. Average "no shows" per televised game		7,190			2,614
7. Average "no shows" per nontelevised game	2,352	7,068	5,384	5,753	2,925
8. Percentage of games won	0.571	0.357	0.429	0.357	0.571
9. Divisional standing	1	4	2	2	2

Analysis of the Forty Niners live gate substantiates the proposition that Public Law 93–107 has not appreciably influenced "no shows." * Attendance, however, did prove to be quite sensitive to the won-loss records of both teams. That is, when San Francisco and visiting teams were playing well, attendance improved markedly. Additionally,

* See appendix A.

"no shows," as one would expect, increased significantly if games were played in the rain.

3. *Audience ratings*

The Forty Niners audience ratings, like those of the Oakland Raiders, are not as large as most other teams in the NFL. The reason being that both teams compete for the attention of the same viewers. San Francisco is presently the fifth largest television market encompassing nearly 1.7 million households. Since 1972, the club's locally televised away games have captured an average audience rating of 21. Last year, San Francisco's single locally televised home game was viewed in 26 percent of all households in the Bay area.

Other NFL telecasts which did not conflict with San Francisco's games also managed an average audience rating of 21. However, many of these games as well as some of the competing telecasts involved the Oakland Raiders who also attract relatively large local audiences. Nevertheless, the figures below clearly indicate the San Francisco residents have strong preferences toward games involving either the Forty Niners or the Oakland Raiders. Consequently, most viewers would undoubtedly favor a continuation of current policies requiring local telecasts of sold-out home games. As far as San Francisco is concerned, the wishes of the fans can be accommodated without imposing a significant financial hardship on the Forty Niners' organization.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR THE SAN FRANCISCO FORTY NINERS: 1972–76

	Forty Niners				Ratings for other teams			
	Home games		Away games		Competing		Non-competing	
1972	(1)	[1]	(1)	22.7	(1)	5.3	(7)	22.9
1973	(0)	----	(3)	[2] 22.7	(2)	13.9	(7)	21.4
1974	(0)	----	(2)	19.6	(1)	10.0	(9)	16.2
1975	(0)	----	(2)	15.9	(1)	8.3	(11)	20.5
1976	(1)	26.2	(1)	20.7	(0)	----	(9)	22.0
Average ratings	(1)	26.2	(9)	20.3	(5)	10.3	(43)	20.5

[1] Not applicable.
[2] Includes 1 simulcast game carried on CBS Nov. 4, 1973, with Oakland and San Francisco sharing the average rating.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of NFL locally televised games during the American Research Bureaus's annual 4-week fall audience surveys.

Seattle Seahawks

Seattle joined the NFL last year as one of the league's two newest expansion franchises. Although the team was not expected to play particularly well, the Seahawks still managed to sell 55,623 season tickets. Moreover, paid attendance at each home game averaged out to 62,870 or 97 percent of the 65,000 avilable seats in Seattle's Kingdome. The Seahawks also sold out and locally televised two home games during the course of the season.

All of the above indicates that professional football is extremely popular among residents in and around the Seattle-Tacoma metropolitan area. It is further evident that fans enjoy watching games in person. During the course of the season only 5 percent of all tickets distributed went unused, despite the fact that Seattle won only two

games. Additionally, "no shows" at five nontelevised home games averaged out to 3,333 while an average 3,456 ticketholders failed to attend the two locally televised games. The difference did not appear to be significant. Consequently, one can reasonably assume that local telecasts did not adversely affect live gate attendance.

Additionally, an estimated 16 percent of the 768,000 households in the Seattle-Tacoma television market tuned into the Seahawks' locally televised games. Admittedly, the team's average audience rating was actually below the average rating of 21 which accrued to other, noncompeting NFL telecasts. When forced to choose, however, Seattle fans clearly preferenced the home team; competing games involving other NFL teams, for example, were only viewed by 6.7 percent of the audience which is less than half of the number captured by Seattle's locally televised games. It is evident, therefore, that Public Law 93–107 has benefited fans in this part of the country. Additionally, as the franchise develops stronger teams, it is probable that the club will become increasingly popular with local television audiences.

Washington Redskins

1. *Televised games and ticket sales*

Washington is one of four teams in the NFL which has sold out and locally televised all 28 regular season home games since 1973. The franchise's success in this regard is indicative of an excess demand for Redskins' tickets. Washington's Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Stadium currently seats approximately 55,000 fans. Nearly all available seats are sold as season tickets. Undoubtedly, the club could have sold additional tickets had seating capacity permitted. In 1972, for example, the Redskins reportedly turned down approximately 20,000 requests for season tickets due to a lack of available tickets.* There is also no indication that interest in the team has lessened since then. Even though Washington failed to make the playoffs in 1975, following a third place finish in the NFC's Eastern Division, the club experienced no problems in selling all available seats last year. Most fans who acquire season tickets do not give them up as a consequence of a relatively poor performance during any given year.

SUMMARY OF WASHINGTON REDSKINS' TICKET SALES: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Stadium capacity	50,000	50,000	54,380	55,004	55,004
2. Total seats sold	365,346	374,993	375,003	380,527	380,603
Percent change from previous season		2.6	0	1.5	0.02
3. Average seats sold per game	52,192	53,570	53,571	54,361	54,372
4. Season ticket sales	51,076	51,969	52,049	52,400	52,529
Percent change from previous season		1.8	0.2	0.7	0.3
5. Percentage of games won	0.786	0.714	0.714	0.571	0.714
6. Divisional standing	1	1	2	3	2
7. Number of televised home games	0	7	7	7	7

The Redskins won playoff berths in 1972, 1973, 1974, and 1976. Washington also won the NFC championship in 1972 before losing to Miami in Super Bowl VII. It is not surprising, therefore, that the franchise has experienced no problems in selling tickets. It is equally

*See appendix B.

evident that Public Law 93–107 has not adversely affected gate receipts even though all regular season home games have been locally televised since 1973.

2. *"No shows"*

Although "no shows" have risen since the enactment of the sports antiblackout law, Washington enjoys one of the best attendance records in the NFL. Between 1973 and 1976, an average of only 2.7 percent of all Redskin's tickets went unused during the regular season. Admittedly, the figure is above the 0.8-percent mark recorded by the team in 1972, but is also considerably below the league average. Additionally, there is little indication that local telecasts have appreciably influenced attendance. In 1974, for example, less than 1 percent of all tickets distributed were not used despite the fact that all home games were televised. Moreover, "no shows" in 1974 were roughly equivalent to the number of "no shows" at home games played in 1972 which, of course, were not televised. On the other hand, "no shows" increased substantially in both 1975 and 1976, which may indicate that Washington fans are becoming increasingly sensitive to local telecasts in reaching decisions of whether or not to attend games.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" FOR WASHINGTON REDSKINS: 1972–76

	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
1. Total "no shows"	3,000	8,906	3,333	8,499	21,020
Percent change from previous season		196.8	−62.6	155	147.3
2. Average "no shows" per game	429	1,272	476	1,214	3,003
3. Average number of seats sold per game	52,192	53,570	53,571	54,361	54,372
4. Percentage of seats sold not showing	0.8	2.4	0.9	2.2	5.4
5. Number of televised games	0	7	7	7	7
6. Average "no shows" per televised game		1,272	476	1,214	3,003
7. Average "no shows" per nontelevised game	429				
8. Percentage of games won	0.786	0.714	0.714	0.571	0.714
9. Divisional standing	1	1	2	3	2

Statistical analysis of the Redskins' live gate attendance indicates that local telecasts in and of themselves did significantly affect "no shows."* Subsequent tests, however, did suggest that ticketholders have become increasingly inclined to stay at home when a game is played in the rain or in cold weather. Consequently, Public Law 93–107 appears to have had an indirect effect on attendance, although the magnitude of the impact has not been acute, nor does it pose a threat to the financial vitality of the franchise.

Washington's live gate attendance was also significantly higher last year than in 1972, when all other factors which influence "no shows" are taken into account. Unfortunately, we have no explanation as to why attendance fell significantly in 1976. Again, this may have resulted from the fans' increased sensitivity to locally televised games. On the other hand, it may have resulted from other factors which are completely unrelated to Public Law 93–107. Perhaps the fans regarded the team as being less exciting than in years past. If so, they may have simply been less inclined to attend the Redskins' home games. Whatever the reason, the increase in "no shows" in 1976 did not consitutute a serious problem. Only 5 percent of all tickets

* See appendix A.

distributed went unused which compares quite favorably with the league average of 10 percent.

3. Audience ratings

Washington currently ranks as the eighth largest television market in the country, comprising about 1.3 million households. Audience ratings provide an additional indication of the enormous popularity of the Redskins among Washington residents. On the average, approximately 41 percent of all 1.3 million households in the market have watched the Redskins' locally televised games since 1973. Noncompeting games, on the other hand, managed an average audience rating of 19, while competing NFL telecasts were viewed in only 4 of every 100 households in the Washington area.

The latter figures are especially indicative of the exceedingly strong preferences for locally televised games. When forced to choose between the Redskins' games and other NFL telecasts shown at the same time, local audiences preferred to watch the home team by a margin of 10 to 1.

AUDIENCE RATINGS FOR THE WASHINGTON REDSKINS: 1972–76

	Redskins		Ratings for other teams	
	Home games	Away games	Competing	Noncompeting
1972	(1) (1)	(1) 18.7	(1) 11.0	(7) 18.7
1973	(2) 34.1	(3) 44.0	(1) 4.3	(9) 22.8
1974	(1) 45.3	(3) 38.3	(3) 3.8	(7) 19.6
1975	(2) 44.4	(2) 38.6	(0) ---	(10) 16.7
1976	(1) 41.8	(3) 42.1	(1) 3.0	(10) 19.1
Average ratings	(6) 40.7	(12) 39.1	(6) 5.0	(43) 19.3

[1] Not applicable.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate the number of NFL locally televised games during the American Research Bureau's annual 4-week fall audience surveys.

In conclusion, conditions in Washington provide an ideal illustration of circumstances which the sports antiblackout law was intended to amend. The Redskins are extremely popular in the Washington area. So much so, that the demand for tickets far exceeds the available supply. Accordingly, most fans will necessarily be deprived of seeing the team play at home unless those games are televised. Fortunately, they have been broadcast to the benefit of approximately 40 percent of the local television audience.

The Effect of Public Law 93–107 on NFL Playoff Games: 1973–76

All but four NFL playoff games have been locally televised since the enactment of Public Law 93–107 in 1973. The four games which were not broadcast include Cincinnati at Miami and Los Angeles at Dallas in 1973, Washington at Los Angeles in 1974, and St. Louis at Los Angeles in 1975. All other playoff games were televised pursuant to the sports antiblackout law with the exception of the Super Bowl played at Miami in 1973. Although that game was not sold out, the local blackout was voluntarily lifted.

Fortunately, Public Law 93-107 has not adversely affected attendance. "No shows" at locally televised playoff games have averaged out to less than 4 percent of total tickets sold since 1973. Additionally, "no shows" at last year's playoff games, all of which were locally televised, averaged out to 1.6 percent of the paid attendance. Both figures compare quite favorably with attendance at the four playoff games which have not been locally televised since 1973. In those instances, 3.2 percent of all ticketholders failed to attend the games.

It is further apparent that Public Law 93–107 has not adversely affected gate receipts at playoff games. Had the legislation impacted on ticket sales, it is doubtful that 86 percent of those contests would not have been sold out well in advance. Conversely, the sports anti-blackout law has been beneficial to those fans who for one reason or another cannot acquire tickets to playoff games. Unfortunately, local audience ratings for these telecasts are not available. However, given the size of local audience during the regular season, it is probably safe to assume that locally televised playoff games are very widely viewed.

Indeed, NFL playoff games last year were viewed by 25 to 30 percent of the national audience. Given that local audience ratings for locally televised regular season home games generally exceeds national ratings for NFL telecasts by a factor of 2, it is not unreasonable to suggest that anywhere from 50 to 60 percent of all residents in the teams' home territories watch locally televised playoff games. The value of the legislation in this regard is, therefore, apparent.

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" AT NFL PLAYOFF GAMES: 1973–76

Conference teams	Locally televised	Seating capacity	Seats sold	"No shows"
1973 PLAYOFFS				
AFC:				
Pittsburgh at Oakland	Yes	54,071	52,646	2,552
Cincinnati at Miami	No	80,050	78,928	4,277
Oakland at Miami	Yes	80,050	79,326	4,941
NFC:				
Washington at Minnesota	Yes	47,693	48,040	1,975
Los Angeles at Dallas	No	65,000	63,272	1,191
Minnesota at Dallas	Yes	65,000	64,422	4,734
Super Bowl: Minnesota vs. Miami (at Miami)	Yes	80,050	71,882	3,740
Total		471,891	458,515	23,410
Average:				
All games		67,412	65,502	3,344
Locally televised games		65,368	63,263	3,588
Blacked-out games		72,525	71,103	2,735
1974 PLAYOFFS				
AFC:				
Buffalo at Pittsburgh	Yes	50,112	49,841	1,911
Miami at Oakland	Yes	54,020	53,023	1,203
Pittsburgh at Oakland	Yes	54,004	53,800	489
NFC:				
Washington at Los Angeles	No	92,572	77,925	2,996
St. Louis at Minnesota	Yes	48,503	48,150	3,796
Los Angeles at Minnesota	Yes	48,503	48,444	1,040
Super Bowl: Pittsburgh vs. Minnesota (at New Orleans)	Yes	80,997	80,997	1,932
Total		428,711	412,180	13,367
Average:				
All games		61,244	58,883	1,910
Locally televised games		56,023	55,709	1,729
Blacked-out games		92,572	77,925	2,996

SUMMARY OF "NO SHOWS" AT NFL PLAYOFF GAMES: 1973–76—Continued

Conference teams	Locally televised	Seating capacity	Seats sold	"No shows"
1975 PLAYOFFS				
AFC:				
Baltimore at Pittsburgh	Yes	50, 112	49, 557	937
Cincinnati at Oakland	Yes	54, 037	53, 034	955
Oakland at Pittsburgh	Yes	50, 112	50, 609	1, 506
NFC:				
Dallas at Minnesota	Yes	48, 390	48, 050	1, 916
St. Louis at Los Angeles	No	92, 570	73, 459	1, 506
Dallas at Los Angeles	Yes	91, 038	88, 919	6, 555
Super Bowl: Pittsburgh vs. Dallas (at Miami)	Yes	80, 045	80, 197	3, 305
Total		466, 305	443, 825	16, 680
Average:				
All games		66, 615	63, 404	2, 383
Locally televised games		62, 300	61, 727	2, 529
Blacked-out games		92, 570	73, 459	1, 506
1976 PLAYOFF				
AFC:				
New England at Oakland	Yes	54, 037	54, 037	992
Pittsburgh at Baltimore	Yes	60, 020	59, 296	0
Pittsburgh at Oakland	Yes	54, 037	53, 821	82
NFC:				
Washington at Minnesota	Yes	47, 957	47, 466	736
Los Angeles at Dallas	Yes	64, 919	63, 283	2, 483
Los Angeles at Minnesota	Yes	48, 379	48, 379	1, 188
Super Bowl: Minesota vs. Oakland (at Pasadena)	Yes	(1)	(1)	(1)
Total		329, 349	326, 282	5, 481
Average:				
All games		47, 050	46, 612	783
Locally televised games		47, 050	46, 612	783
Blacked-out games				

[1] Not available.

Complaints and Inquiries

Written complaints received by the Commission concerning the blackout of professional sports events numbered four in the period from June 11, 1976, to April 15, 1977. All complaints referred to professional football. These complaints can be summarized as follows. Two of the complaints objected to the blackout of Miami Dolphin games in Tampa when the Dolphins were not sold out when playing at home. One complaint objected to the NFL's policy that permits the broadcast of only two games in a team's home town when the team is playing at home. Finally, one letter complained about a game that was blacked out in Boston. It appears, however, that tickets to the game were not sold out 72 hours before the beginning of the game. During the 1975–76 sports season, in contrast, there were 14 complaints, of which 11 concerned professional football, one to hockey, and two to baseball.

A telephone complaint was received concerning the blackout of the Colts-Cowboys football game in Dallas on September 26, 1976. The complainant asserted that announcements were made that the game would be telecast in Dallas, but that it was not. The person who called stated that he would provide additional information. Follow-up telephone calls and a letter did not result in the submission of any information from this source. However, all accounts of the events involved indicate that notice was mistakenly released by the network concerning the game's local telecast. The game was not sold out 72 hours before kickoff time and was not telecast in Dallas.

EFFECT OF PUBLIC LAW 93–107 ON PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL

As was the case throughout the life of Public Law 93–107, the 1976 major league baseball season (regular) generated no forced local telecasts. There were a total of 1,939 games played during the regular season, only 41 (2.1 percent) of which were televised pursuant to a league contract. Of those games, none were sold out,[1] and none were required to be telecast locally.[2] Importantly, all of baseball's major events—world series, league championship, and all-star games—are telecast locally as a matter of league policy, regardless of whether sold out. Consequently, it must be concluded that Public Law 93–107 has never adversely affected professional baseball.[3]

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[1] Sellouts of baseball games, not to speak of those occurring 72 hours prior to game time, are extremely infrequent. Traditionally, many fans purchase their tickets at the gate just prior to game time. Additionally, by comparison to other sports, there are relatively few season tickets sold by baseball clubs. Letter from James J. Fitzpatrick to Richard E. Wiley, p. 2 (Feb. 28, 1977).

[2] The league does not clarify whether any regular season network televised games were broadcast locally. See appendix H.

[3] No complaints regarding local blackouts of major league baseball have been received.

EFFECT OF PUBLIC LAW 93–107 ON PROFESSIONAL BASKETBALL

INTRODUCTION

After four seasons, there does not appear to be any clear evidence that Public Law 93–107 has adversely affected the National Basketball Association.[1] Throughout that term, the league has pooled its game telecast rights for less than 6 percent of all games played. Furthermore, based on leaguewide figures, no more than 2 percent of all games have ever been telecast in the locality of the home team. These figures, coupled with the sellout trigger to the law, lead us to the conclusion that the league suffered no adverse impact. There simply have not been enough games telecast locally.

Focusing on the 1976–77 season, and thereby updating last year's report, 902 games were played during the regular season, and only 88 percent of those games were televised locally pursuant to Public Law 93–107. Based on this infinitesimal figure, it is clear that gate receipts have not been affected.

Regarding live gate attendance, the league apparently did not retain "no show" figures for its 902 regular season games. Consequently, any determination of the impact of Public Law 93–107 would be little more than a poor guess. With that caveat, the league has compiled "no show" figures for the 28 games that were the subjects of network telecasts from November 25, 1976, through February 27, 1977. Of the 8 games televised locally, there were an average of 265 "no shows" whereas of the 20 games blacked out locally, there were an average of 374 "no shows" per game. If this sampling were representative, then one could conclude that Public Law 93–107 has had no adverse impact on basketball's live attendance.[2]

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[1] See third annual report of the Federal Communications Commission on the effect of Public Law 93–107, 275–85 (1976).

[2] On June 18, 1976, it was announced that the NBA had absorbed the American Basketball Association. From that time, the ABA ceased to exist.

NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION GAMES TELEVISED PURSUANT TO LEAGUE CONTRACT

Games	Date	Locally televised	Sold out
Washington at Phoenix	Nov. 25, 1976		
Chicago at Kansas City	Dec. 25, 1976		
Philadelphia at New York (Nets)	Jan. 2, 1977	X	
Los Angeles at Detroit	Jan. 9, 1977		
Indiana at San Antonio	Jan. 16, 1977		
New Orleans at Philadelphia	do		
Denver at Seattle	do	X	X
New York (Knicks) at Golden State	do		
Philadelphia at Boston	Jan. 23, 1977	X	
New York (Knicks) at New Orleans	do		
Portland at San Antonio	do		
Seattle at Phoenix	do		
Philadelphia at Denver	Jan. 30, 1977	X	X
San Antonio at Seattle	do	X	X
Kanasa City at Detroit	Feb. 6, 1977		
Los Angeles at Philadelphia	do	X	
New York (Knicks) at San Antonio	do		
Chicago at Indiana	do		
Houston at New Orleans	do		
Denver at Phoenix	do		
All Star Game	Feb. 13, 1977	X	
Cleveland at Philadelphia	Feb. 20, 1977		
New Orleans at San Antonio	do		
Phoenix at Detroit	do		
Los Angeles at Washington	do		
Boston at Golden State	do	X	
Buffalo at Washington	Feb. 27, 1977		
San Antonio at New Orleans	do		
Philadelphia at Seattle	do	X	X
Denver at Boston	Mar. 6, 1977		
New York at Philadelphia	do	X	X
Phoenix at Washington	do		
Chicago at Golden State	do		
Philadelphia at Boston	Mar. 13, 1977		
Cleveland at Atlanta	do		
Chicago at Philadelphia	do		
Detroit at San Antonio	do		
Washington at Golden State	do		
Detroit at Denver	Mar. 20, 1977	X	X
Portland at Phoenix	do		
Seattle at Milwaukee	do		
Philadelphia at New York (Nets)	do	X	
Portland at Philadelphia	Mar. 27, 1977		
Kansas City at San Antonio	do		
New York (Knicks) at Washington	do		
Golden State at Denver	do		
Philadelphia at Boston	Apr. 3, 1977	X	
Chicago at New Orleans	do		
Portland at Seattle	do	X	X
Cleveland at Boston	Apr. 10, 1977		
Philadelphia at Washington	do	X	
Los Angeles at Seattle	do	X	X
Chicago at Buffalo	do		
Total: (53)		16	8

Note: Total games played during regular season, 902; percent televised, 5.8; percent televised locally as required by Public Law 93–107, 0.88.

EFFECT OF PUBLIC LAW 93–107 ON PROFESSIONAL HOCKEY

Public Law 93–107 does not appear to have adversely affected the National Hockey League. Six hundred games were played in the United States during the regular season. Of those games, 25 were televised pursuant to a league contract (4.2 percent), and only 9 were televised locally (1.5 percent). Furthermore, the league has not argued that the antiblackout law has significantly damaged its members. Consequently, with less than 1 percent of all games being telecast locally, it must be concluded that there was no impact on NHL gate receipts.

Again, the league failed to record the "no show" figures for the season. Consequently, Public Law 93–107 seems also to be of no influence on live gate attendance. Finally, since the last report, we are in receipt of no relevant complaints regarding league television policies.

Appendix A.—Statistical Analysis of "No Shows" for Individual NFL Clubs

1. Introduction.—The purpose of the subsequent discussion is to explain the statistical techniques used to analyze "no shows" experienced by individual NFL teams from 1972 through 1976 and to list the results of those analyses which can be found in the Tables below. The reader is advised to refer to Section C of Chapter II for an explanation of the findings.

The objective of the analyses was to ascertain whether and to what extent various factors such as local telecasts of home games, weather, and team's performance influence the proclivity of NFL ticket holders to attend games. A specific explanation of the econometric model employed for this purpose follows.

2. Methodology.—The Model Used to Assess the Impact of Public Law 93–107 on the Number of "No Shows" Experienced by Individual NFL Teams between 1972 and 1976.

THE VARIABLES

While there may be a number of factors which influence a ticket holder's decision on whether or not to attend an NFL game, it is likely that most decisions will be influenced by a relatively small number of factors. Specifically, it can be assumed that the number of "no shows" will be sensitive to the following considerations:

(*a*) Televised games: According to the NFL, mandatory local telecasts of home games increase the number of "no shows". A variable indicating whether or not a game was televised was incorporated into the model to test the validity of this argument.

(*b*) Temperature: Ticket holders are assumed to be less inclined to attend games on a cold day than they would be if the weather was mild. The variable employed in the analysis reflects the temperature during the game.

(*c*) Precipitation: Ticket holders are also assumed to be less inclined to attend a game where it is raining, sleeting or snowing. The variable utilized in the analysis indicates the presence or absence of some form of precipitation during the game.

(*d*) Attractiveness of the home game: Whether or not ticket holders attend NFL games is expected to depend on the perceived attractiveness or "importance" of the game. For example, fans are expected to be more inclined to attend games if the home team is having a winning season or is in contention for the divisional championship. The same could be true if the visiting team is having a "good" year. The attractiveness of the game is measured by both the won-loss records and the divisional standings of the contestants.[1]

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[1] Consequently, three separate analyses were done on the "no shows" of each of the 26 NFL teams. The first analysis utilizes the "won-loss" percentage of the home and visiting team as a measure of the attractiveness of the game. "No shows" are expected to decrease as the percentage "won-loss" record of the home team and/or the visiting teams increases.

The attractiveness of individual NFL games could also be reflected in the divisional standing of the home and/or the visiting team. If one team, particularly the home team, is in contention for the divisional championship, then "no shows" would be expected to be lower than if one or both teams had no chance of getting into the playoffs. The second analysis of "no shows" utilizes the divisional standings of both teams as a surrogate for the attractiveness of the game.

A third measure of the attractiveness of particular games was also defined. This was done by simply multiplying the "won-loss" percentages of both home and visiting teams and incorporating that variable into the model. This particular measure yields an overall indication of the quality of the game by reflecting the combined success of both teams. This measure of the quality of the game was used in the third analysis of the number of "no shows" experienced by each NFL team.

It was thought necessary to do the three separate analyses since attendance fluctuations may be more sensitive to divisional standings than to "won-loss" records. This is particularly true if a team in one division ranks higher in the divisional standings but has a poorer "won-loss" record than a team in another division. Additionally, fans in other markets may be more sensitive to the measure of overall attractiveness of the game than they are to the home team's or the visiting team's prior victories. If so, this "quality of the game" variable (i.e., the product of the "won-loss" percentages of both teams) should prove to be the more relevant determinant of "no shows".

The "won-loss" percentages and divisional standings for games played during the first three weeks of the season used in the analysis are the final "won-loss" percentages and divisional standings from the previous season. The rationale for those measures is based on the assumption that the fans' perceptions of expected team success are determined to a large extent by the teams previous season record, at least for the first three weeks. It was assumed further that after that time, fans would have a good idea of actual or potential team performance for the current season and would, accordingly, make their game attendance decisions.

92-015 O - 77 - 8

(*e*) Season effects: Keeping in mind that subsequent analyses performed on individual NFL teams are based on home games played during 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975 and 1976 seasons, it is important to account for variations in "no shows" which can be attributed to individual seasons. As a result, each analysis incorporates variables designating whether or not a game was played in 1973, 1974, 1975 or 1976. Inclusion of these variables allows one to test whether or not "no shows" were significantly greater, all other things being equal, during any of the past three seasons than they were in 1972, the year prior to the implementation of the Sports Anti-Blackout Law.

Finally, "no shows" were computed as the ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold. This measure was used instead of the absolute number of "no shows", since it accounts for relative ticket sales differences and, as a result, better reflects the relative importance of "no shows" to individual teams. To illustrate, suppose one team sells 70,000 tickets to a game while another only sells 35,000. If 5,000 of those ticket holders fail to attend both games, the number of "no shows" will be of greater consequence to the team selling 35,000 seats than to the team selling 70,000. By defining "no shows" as a percentage of tickets sold, we are able to measure the relative importance of the impact of Public Law 93–107 on teams which have different seating capacities and which subsequently sell different numbers of tickets to their home games.

It should be understood that "no shows" will also likely be influenced by factors other than those defined in the model. For example, if a team has been eliminated from the playoffs during the latter part of the season, "no shows" could increase. Attendance may also depend on the month, day and/or time of the game. Fans may be more inclined to attend games during the early part of the season. They may also be more willing to attend games which are played in the early afternoon (i.e., 1:00 p.m.) instead of later in the day (i.e., 4:00 p.m.). "No shows" could also depend on whether the game is played on a Monday night.

Strong rivalries or the appearance of superstars such as O. J. Simpson could also affect attendance. Similarly, "no shows" may depend on how well the team has done in the past. The NFL, for example, believes that attendance is subject to a certain degree of fan loyalty which generally results from outstanding performances by the team and/or selected players in past years.

The situation in Green Bay is illustrative. The Packers under Coach Vince Lombardi built a virtual dynasty in the NFL during the mid-to late 1960's. While the team's performance has deteriorated since that time, ticket sales and attendance remain high which in all probability reflects a certain degree of loyalty.

Finally, "no shows" could depend on the availability of other types of entertainment, including other professional sports. Professional baseball, basketball and hockey seasons overlap with the professional football season. Consequently, attendance at football games may be affected by attendance at other sporting events. Similarly, fans residing in certain cities may have more recreational opportunities and, as a consequence, could be less inclined to attend NFL games.

Unfortunately, most of these factors are highly qualitative in nature. As a result, they could not be quantitatively measured and were therefore not incorporated into the model. Even so, the methodology employed in the "no shows" analysis should provide an accurate assessment of the impact of Public Law 93–107 on live gate attendance at NFL games.

THE DATA

Data on the number of "no shows", tickets sold, and whether or not the game was televised were obtained from the National Football League. Data on temperature and precipitation were also obtained from the NFL. When weather conditions were not reported by teams, this information was obtained from the National Weather Service. Data on divisional standings and "won-loss" percentages were obtained from The Sporting News, The New York Times, and The Washington Post. Finally, "no shows" at Seattle and Tampa Bay were not statistically analyzed due to insufficient data.

THE STATISTICAL TECHNIQUE

Multivariate regression analysis was employed to measure the extent to which each of these factors influence the percentages of ticket holders who do not attend games. Briefly, this particular statistical technique permits one to ascertain whether and to what extent a change in one variable—"no shows" in this instance—is influenced by changes in any or all of the other variables (i.e., temperature, precipitation, "won-loss" records, etc.) which are included in the model.

The analyses empirically assess the impact the Sports Anti-Blackout Law has had on the number of "no shows" experienced by each of the 26 NFL clubs over the four-year period effected by Public Law 93–107.

Finally, the reader should note that "F values" listed on the Tables below simply indicate whether particular variables, or groups of variables significantly influence "no shows." If the F value is followed by an asterisk, then it can be assumed that the variable or variables had an impact on attendance. The term "R^2" listed for each equation refers to the proportion of variation in the ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold which is "explained" or accounted for by the independent variables defined in the equation. For example, if $R^2=.80$, then one can assume that 80 percent of the variation in "no shows" were explained by the independent variables, i.e., local telecasts of home games, weather, team performance, etc.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
ATLANTA "NO SHOWS": 1972-1976

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .82988
F(5, 29) = 22.76483*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.19843	22.068*
Temperature	-.01101	69.031*
Precipitation	.10213	4.867*
Home Team's Win-loss %	-.28721	7.624*
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.06711	1.120
1973	-.10093	3.775
1974[a]	---	---
1975[a]	---	---
1976	.04265	.901
Constant	.91501	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .80088
F(5, 29) = 13.07200*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.23847	15.526*
Temperature	-.01117	47.633*
Precipitation	.09167	2.978
Home Team's Div. Standing	.02509	.662
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.01145	.613
1973	-.13999	5.223*
1974a	---	---
1975	.06749	1.333
1976	.09805	2.264
Constant	.65035	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales
R^2 = .82061
F(4, 30) = 17.64423*

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.23496	20.842*
Temperature	-.01111	62.801*
Precipitation	.11015	5.073*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.26414	4.798*
1973	-.12228	5.214*
1974[a]	---	---
1975	.04629	.775
1976	.09383	3.130
Constant	.79492	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

[a] The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
BALTIMORE "NO SHOWS": 1972-1976

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .77754
F(8, 26) = 11.35957*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.00750	.070
Temperature	-.00140	6.831*
Precipitation	.09075	14.304*
Home Team's Win-loss %	-.08044	2.957
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.02704	.948
1973	.00792	.173
1974[a]	---	---
1975	-.07171	12.590*
1976	-.06484	4.973*
Constant	.23565	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .77752
F(9, 25) = 9.70789*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.01188	.157
Temperature	-.00114	4.035
Precipitation	.09814	16.343*
Home Team's Div. Standing	.00945	.935
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.01009	2.296
1973	.01436	.365
1974	.00600	.054
1975	-.07321	10.665*
1976	-.07222	5.048*
Constant	.11102	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .76882
F(8, 26) = 10.80837*

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.00965	.097
Temperature	-.00138	6.314*
Precipitation	.08988	13.571*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.07388	1.377
1973	.01563	.477
1974	.01136	.259
1975	-.07388	11.132*
1976	-.08119	11.009*
Constant	.20066	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

[a] The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
BUFFALO "NO SHOWS": 1972-1976

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .59119
F(9, 25) = 4.01701*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	-.02255	1.422
Temperature	-.00150	5.580*
Precipitation	.02345	1.882
Home Team's Win-loss %	-.09382	4.293*
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.00360	.015
1973	.03461	1.370
1974	.04530	1.731
1975	.07490	5.501*
1976	.05115	5.580*
Constant	.12473	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .67106
F(9, 25) = 5.66684*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	-.02362	2.153
Temperature	-.00143	9.625*
Precipitation	.02760	2.991
Home Team's Div. Standing	.02803	11.579*
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	-.00073	.023
1973	.05618	4.420*
1974	.06539	4.997*
1975	.09510	11.496*
1976	.05597	8.553*
Constant	-.02164	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .53628
F(7, 27) = 4.46061*

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	-.01110	.392
Temperature	-.00154	8.911*
Precipitation	.02651	2.259
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.04542	1.074
1973[a]	---	---
1974	.00271	.019
1975	.03722	3.417
1976	.03989	4.939*
Constant	.10846	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

a The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
CHICAGO "NO SHOWS": 1972-1976

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .53074
F(9, 25) = 3.14171*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	-.05702	.694
Temperature	-.00369	5.228*
Precipitation	.10299	4.674*
Home Team's Win-loss %	.10369	.127
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.05240	.328
1973	.20152	3.639
1974	.23733	6.499*
1975	.21138	5.466*
1976	.13172	3.121
Constant	.18791	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .58488
F(9, 27) = 3.91375*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	-.14533	3.556
Temperature	-.00480	8.943*
Precipitation	.08976	4.108
Home Team's Div. Standing	-.10086	3.485
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.02771	1.998
1973	.31357	8.784*
1974	.28516	11.493*
1975	.20742	10.756*
1976	.08034	1.131
Constant	.55382	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .52431
F(8, 26) = 3.58214*

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	-.05598	.670
Temperature	-.00379	5.592*
Precipitation	.09908	4.596*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.00618	.001
1973	.19273	3.920
1974	.23515	6.763*
1975	.19061	7.024*
1976	.12932	3.108
Constant	.20915	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
CINCINNATI "NO SHOWS": 1972-1976

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .70608
F(9, 25) = 6.67286*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	-.02160	.847
Temperature	-.00126	6.265*
Precipitation	.08828	28.249*
Home Team's Win-loss %	-.04694	.462
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.04706	2.651
1973	.06114	4.303*
1974	.08358	6.591*
1975	.08990	7.017*
1976	.07130	5.267*
Constant	.14195	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .72578
F(9, 25) = 7.35185*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	-.02362	1.176
Temperature	-.00129	7.048*
Precipitation	.08760	24.571*
Home Team's Div. Standing	.01274	1.178
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.01408	4.800*
1973	.05929	4.039
1974	.08853	8.667*
1975	.08436	10.014*
1976	.08029	8.829*
Constant	.02603	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .71301
F(8, 26) = 8.07449*

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	-.01491	.410
Temperature	-.00125	6.640*
Precipitation	.08929	31.330*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.07637	4.189
1973	.05511	3.696
1974	.07575	6.112*
1975	.08340	10.763*
1976	.06422	6.252*
Constant	.11293	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
CLEVELAND "NO SHOWS": 1972-1976

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .33051
F(9, 25) = 1.7130

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.02016	.208
Temperature	-.00139	1.205
Precipitation	.06163	2.673
Home Team's Win-loss %	-.01319	.016
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.09503	2.182
1973	.03338	1.469
1974	.07997	1.737
1975	.03418	.271
1976	-.02127	.182
Constant	.15817	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .35915
F(8, 26) = 1.82136

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.03925	.873
Temperature	-.00123	1.046
Precipitation	.06846	3.510
Home Team's Div. Standing	.02176	1.842
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.02432	3.365
1973	.01152	.086
1974	.04363	1.030
1975[a]	---	---
1976	-.05008	1.651
Constant	-.00414	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .29818
F(7, 27) = 1.63874

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.02723	.409
Temperature	-.00127	1.059
Precipitation	.06627	2.986
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.12523	1.304
1973	.02918	.434
1974	.05405	1.951
1975[a]	---	---
1976	-.03117	.633
Constant	.13860	

[a] The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value.

Note -- None of the equations or independent variables are significant at the .05 level of confidence.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
DALLAS "NO SHOWS": 1972-1976

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .51501
F(4, 23) = .6110595

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.06540	12.991*
Temperature	-.00101	3.933
Precipitation[a]	---	---
Home Team's Win-loss %	-.16417	7.930*
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.07425	5.741*
Constant	.24725	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .39363
F(5, 22) = 2.85625*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.04857	5.580*
Temperature	-.00104	3.205
Precipitation	-.00397	.025
Home Team's Div. Standing	.01174	1.378
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.00722	1.472
Constant	.65300	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales
R^2 = .42393
F(3, 24) = 5.65027*

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.04762	7.434*
Temperature	-.00097	3.213
Precipitation[a]	---	---
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.07925	3.169
Constant	.12919	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

a The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
DENVER "NO SHOWS": 1972-1976

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .70753
F(8, 26) = 7.86227

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.02457	.658
Temperature	-.00219	31.275*
Precipitation	.05165	4.511*
Home Team's Win-loss %	-.12293	1.627
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.01478	.281
1973	-.02254	1.046
1974[a]	---	---
1975	.02405	1.201
1976	-.00557	.060
Constant	.19721	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .76772
F(8, 26) = 10.74186*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games[a]	---	---
Temperature	-.00239	44.704*
Precipitation	-.05046	5.633*
Home Team's Div. Standing	.02812	4.244*
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.00882	4.324*
1973	.01449	.297
1974	.04771	2.339
1975	.07456	6.142*
1976	.03188	1.082
Constant	.03246	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .69124
F(7, 27) = 8.63542*

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.00341	.021
Temperature	-.00218	30.473*
Precipitation	.05585	5.338*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.04962	1.149
1973	-.01755	.657
1974[a]	---	---
1975	.02620	1.415
1976	-.00916	.166
Constant	.15997	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

[a] The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
DETROIT "NO SHOWS": 1972-1976

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .50098
F(9, 25) = 2.78865*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	-.00917	.148
Temperature	-.00058	1.270
Precipitation	.04886	7.051*
Home Team's Win-loss %	-.04267	.527
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.01786	.279
1973	.06563	5.653*
1974	.00425	.024
1975	.00882	.120
1976	-.00784	.093
Constant	.11802	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .50355
F(9, 25) = 2.81753*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	-.00884	.154
Temperature	-.00060	1.314
Precipitation	.05140	7.423*
Home Team's Div. Standing	-.00327	.043
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.00528	.670
1973	.07550	6.646*
1974	.01775	.247
1975	.01017	.159
1976	.00405	.024
Constant	.07544	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .49428
F(8, 26) = 3.17643*

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	-.00837	.129
Temperature	-.00057	1.284
Precipitation	.04907	7.297*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.03862	.435
1973	.06944	6.893*
1974	.00863	.114
1975	.00686	.074
1976	-.00465	.037
Constant	.09538	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
GREEN BAY "NO SHOWS": 1972-1976

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .46971
F(7, 27) = 3.41649*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	-.00760	.082
Temperature	-.00152	9.742*
Precipitation	.01163	.239
Home Team's Win-loss %[a]	---	---
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.06131	2.549
1973	.01846	.478
1974	.03278	1.272
1975	.06267	5.378*
1976[a]	---	---
Constant	.12695	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .44293
F(7, 27) = 3.06679*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.01633	.411
Temperature	-.00158	10.063*
Precipitation	.02239	.891
Home Team's Div. Standing	-.00874	.921
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.00345	.231
1973[a]	---	---
1974	.01230	.253
1975	.05130	4.835*
1976[a]	---	---
Constant	.10377	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .42506
F(7, 27) = 2.85168*

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	-.00364	.015
Temperature	-.00166	11.138*
Precipitation	.01724	.490
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.03480	.255
1973	.01240	.189
1974	.02458	.618
1975	.05104	3.581
1976[a]	---	---
Constant	.11061	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

a The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
HOUSTON "NO SHOWS": 1972-1976

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .68292
F(9, 25) = 5.98260*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.01465	.120
Temperature	-.00314	16.021*
Precipitation	-.04548	1.432
Home Team's Win-loss %	-.37196	14.761*
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.02997	.404
1973	.04995	1.950
1974	.03720	1.129
1975	.10870	3.986
1976	.16075	9.183*
Constant	.43016	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .54569
F(8, 26) = 3.90372*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	-.05995	2.100
Temperature	-.00241	6.343*
Precipitation	.01172	.076
Home Team's Div. Standing	.02658	2.059
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.00928	.605
1973	.08908	6.467*
1974[a]	---	---
1975	-.02208	.303
1976	.04840	1.282
Constant	.17088	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .53493
F(8, 26) = 3.73820*

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	-.01991	.137
Temperature	-.00308	10.953*
Precipitation	-.01432	.108
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.17322	2.271
1973	.07793	3.718
1974	.00890	.048
1975	-.00858	.029
1976	.04475	.870
Constant	.35607	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

a The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
KANSAS CITY "NO SHOWS": 1972-1976

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .68772
F(9, 25) = 6.11725*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	-.24510	5.781*
Temperature	-.00374	15.540*
Precipitation	.04278	.772
Home Team's Win-loss %	-.27621	2.612
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	.04959	.620
1973	.29999	9.027*
1974	.04446	.754
1975	-.07819	1.402
1976	-.05301	.582
Constant	.44102	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .67730
F(9, 25) = 5.83019*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	-.25634	5.833*
Temperature	-.00398	14.585*
Precipitation	.08527	3.171
Home Team's Div. Standing	.01596	.167
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	-.02231	3.208
1973	.31890	8.576*
1974	.05560	.803
1975	-.02603	.119
1976	-.00406	.002
Constant	.33012	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .63357
F(7, 27) = 6.66912*

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	-.24571	5.365*
Temperature	-.00393	17.882*
Precipitation	.06229	1.745
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	.03144	.075
1973	.30935	9.411*
1974	.07297	2.566
1975[a]	---	---
1976	.03029	.461
Constant	.29396	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

[a] The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
LOS ANGELES "NO SHOWS": 1972-1976

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .78969
F(8, 26) = 12.20314*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.21300	53.319*
Temperature	-.00042	.398
Precipitation[a]	---	---
Home Team's Win-loss %	-.07587	1.841
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.06862	5.269*
1973	-.01388	.436
1974	.00915	.241
1975	.01709	.591
1976	.03653	3.311
Constant	.17879	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .76354
F(8, 26) = 10.4944*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.19567	46.430*
Temperature	-.00051	.509
Precipitation[a]	---	---
Home Team's Div. Standing	.01714	2.467
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.00896	2.585
1973	-.02467	1.633
1974	.01764	.776
1975	.02042	.954
1976	.03375	2.998
Constant	.05228	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .78973
F(7, 27) = 14.4865

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.21782	58.975*
Temperature	-.00041	.390
Precipitation[a]	---	---
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.09877	8.385*
1973	-.01814	1.083
1974	.00674	.157
1975	.01105	.39 !
1976	.03230	3.521
Constant	.12688	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

[a] The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
MIAMI "NO SHOWS": 1972-1976

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .79489
F(9, 25) = 10.76499*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.10677	9.525*
Temperature	-.00330	10.598*
Precipitation	.01197	.230
Home Team's Win-loss %	-.12139	1.533
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.12131	11.057*
1973	.07481	2.865
1974	.04355	1.158
1975	.03125	.924
1976	.05601	1.243
Constant	.45930	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .72367
F(9, 25) = 7.27468*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.08787	4.265*
Temperature	-.00344	8.609*
Precipitation	.02005	.567
Home Team's Div. Standing	.00593	.164
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.01395	4.165
1973	.09929	3.689
1974	.07001	3.161
1975	.04292	2.400
1976	.09083	7.003
Constant	.25532	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .77962
F(8, 26) = 11.49758*

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.10456	8.916*
Temperature	-.00314	9.690*
Precipitation	.01865	.694
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.16493	13.088*
1973	.08283	3.807
1974	.06050	4.325*
1975	.04323	3.240
1976	.07455	9.017*
Constant	.34455	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
MINNESOTA "NO SHOWS": 1972-1976

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .64205
F(5, 29) = 10.40345*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.01804	3.732
Temperature	-.00110	36.126*
Precipitation	.03719	6.476*
Home Team's Win-loss %	-.00567	.072
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.01598	1.379
Constant	.07986	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .63412
F(4, 30) = 12.99836*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.01659	4.241*
Temperature	-.00113	39.863*
Precipitation	.04065	7.691*
Home Team's Div. Standing[a]	---	---
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.00271	.879
Constant	.06326	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales
R^2 = .64561
F(4, 30) = 13.66318*

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.01860	5.562*
Temperature	-.00109	36.524*
Precipitation	.03679	6.611*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.02013	1.880
Constant	.07453	

---

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

[a] The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
NEW ENGLAND "NO SHOWS": 1972-1976

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .65926
F(8, 26) = 6.28820*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games[a]	---	---
Temperature	-.00069	4.719*
Precipitation	.06340	12.268*
Home Team's Win-loss %	-.04286	3.298
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.01053	.447
1973	-.03515	7.502*
1974	.03150	4.651*
1975	-.02179	2.916
1976	-.03161	5.655*
Constant	.10442	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .65244
F(9, 25) = 5.21439*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	-.00464	.155
Temperature	-.00077	5.166*
Precipitation	.05706	9.308*
Home Team's Div. Standing	.00426	.809
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	-.00291	.618
1973	-.03250	4.732*
1974	.02572	2.793
1975	-.01932	1.750
1976	-.03714	7.703*
Constant	.08340	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .63467
F(7, 27) = 6.70080*

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games[a]	---	---
Temperature	-.00065	4.298*
Precipitation	.06233	11.422*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.03264	1.490
1973	-.03142	6.078*
1974	.02227	2.794
1975	-.02935	2.262
1976	-.03680	8.069*
Constant	.08716	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

[a] The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
NEW ORLEANS "NO SHOWS": 1972-1976

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .41902
F(7, 20) = 2.06065

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games[a]	---	---
Temperature	-.00334	5.853*
Precipitation	-.02356	.062
Home Team's Win-loss %	-.25560	2.049
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.01039	.019
1973	-.02827	.348
1974	-.00810	.026
1975[a]	---	---
1976	-.05619	1.351
Constant	.47316	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .38442
F(7, 20) = 1.7842

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games[a]	---	---
Temperature	-.00329	5.171*
Precipitation	-.02294	.055
Home Team's Div. Standing	-.02121	.721
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.01788	1.081
1973[a]	---	---
1974	-.02074	.136
1975	.04526	.912
1976	-.03168	.416
Constant	.41254	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .39377
F(6, 21) = 2.27343

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games[a]	---	---
Temperature	-.00305	5.125*
Precipitation	-.01985	.045
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.24622	1.820
1973	-.01647	.138
1974[a]	---	---
1975	.02146	.197
1976	-.04401	.886
Constant	.40644	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

[a] The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
NEW YORK GIANTS "NO SHOWS": 1972-1976

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .53303
F(9, 25) = 3.17070*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.04104	.526
Temperature	-.00343	8.739*
Precipitation	.13545	9.404*
Home Team's Win-loss %	-.09009	.335
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.07717	2.297
1973	.00314	.002
1974	.09181	1.857
1975	.06230	1.175
1976	-.10744	.998
Constant	.32693	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .52254
F(9, 25) = 3.04009*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.02467	.205
Temperature	-.00336	8.293*
Precipitation	.12721	8.366*
Home Team's Div. Standing	.00837	.084
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.01539	1.792
1973	.02292	.100
1974	.10515	2.057
1975	.07357	1.726
1976	-.07100	.634
Constant	.17152	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .54300
F(8, 26) = 3.86156*

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.03748	.497
Temperature	-.00344	11.327*
Precipitation	.14844	11.254*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.22830	3.131
1973	-.00799	.013
1974	.08287	2.611
1975	.05756	1.330
1976	-.12289	2.191
Constant	.30249	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
NEW YORK JETS "NO SHOWS": 1972-1976

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .56532
F(8, 25) = 4.06425*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.04022	.730
Temperature	-.00616	15.338*
Precipitation	.09039	4.480*
Home Team's Win-loss %	.01412	.005
Visiting Team's Win-loss %[a]	---	---
1973	.00126	.000
1974	.04610	.207
1975	.04331	.259
1976	.09329	.927
Constant	.37697	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .58080
F(9, 24) = 3.69462*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.03323	.525
Temperature	-.00608	14.817*
Precipitation	.08536	4.201
Home Team's Div. Standing	-.02656	.670
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	-.00703	.348
1973	.04604	.306
1974	.09623	1.214
1975	.09587	1.175
1976	.14601	2.741
Constant	.45506	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .56524
F(8, 25) = 4.06286*

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.04166	.791
Temperature	-.00616	15.263*
Precipitation	.09133	4.812*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.00216	.000
1973	-.00528	.006
1974	.03943	.372
1975	.03813	.423
1976	.08678	2.461
Constant	.38650	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

[a] The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
OAKLAND "NO SHOWS": 1972-1976

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .57657
F(5, 29) = 7.89777*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.03957	8.294*
Temperature	-.00113	.886
Precipitation	.06701	16.508*
Home Team's Win-loss %	-.11214	2.872
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.06305	5.147*
Constant	.21372	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .59271
F(5, 29) = 8.44038*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.03218	6.027*
Temperature	-.00131	1.276
Precipitation	.04697	6.466*
Home Team's Div. Standing	.03988	5.044*
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.01053	3.133
Constant	.04364	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales
R^2 = .53963
F(4, 30) = 8.79126

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.03638	7.165*
Temperature	-.00156	1.689
Precipitation	.07040	17.868*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.08321	5.098*
Constant	.15517	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
PHILADELPHIA "NO SHOWS": 1972-1976

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .38515
F(5, 29) = 8.78020*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.06585	2.958
Temperature	-.00527	19.923*
Precipitation	.12471	12.340*
Home Team's Win-loss %	-.14942	1.863
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.15016	6.384*
Constant	.43624	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .55403
F(5, 29) = 7.20543*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.04804	1.559
Temperature	-.00562	19.414*
Precipitation	.11927	10.031*
Home Team's Div. Standing	.01626	.602
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.02418	4.874*
Constant	.20968	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total ticket sales
R^2 = .55756
F(4, 30) = 9.45159*

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.06950	3.290
Temperature	-.00533	19.441*
Precipitation	.12805	12.713*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.36024	5.364*
Constant	.36786	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
PITTSBURGH "NO SHOWS": 1972-1976

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .61793
F(9, 26) = 4,67223*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.01446	.119
Temperature	-.00136	9.544*
Precipitation	.05372	9.608*
Home Team's Win-loss %	-.12194	4.834*
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.07656	6.365*
1973	.03943	.738
1974	.02912	.402
1975	.03276	.650
1976	-.02502	.256
Constant	.20515	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .53117
F(7, 28) = 4.53194*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games[a]	---	---
Temperature	-.00140	9.172*
Precipitation	.04407	6.265*
Home Team's Div. Standing	.00559	.401
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.01312	4.735*
1973	.03319	2.699
1974	.03635	3.629
1975	.01491	.603
1976[a]	---	---
Constant	.05170	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .57546
F(8, 27) = 4.57476*

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.00516	.015
Temperature	-.00122	7.470*
Precipitation	.04814	7.582*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.11142	7.196*
1973	.03758	.627
1974	.03291	.483
1975	.02840	.458
1976	-.00656	.018
Constant	.11846	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

[a] The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
ST. LOUIS "NO SHOWS": 1972-1976

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .67624
F(9, 25) = 5.80200*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.02686	.988
Temperature	-.00212	20.198*
Precipitation	.07892	2.664
Home Team's Win-loss %	-.06469	1.207
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.06937	3.612
1973	-.02470	1.040
1974	-.03249	1.173
1975	-.02837	1.120
1976	-.03052	.972
Constant	.25743	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .66422
F(9, 25) = 5.49475*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.01363	.361
Temperature	-.00208	20.059*
Precipitation	.09602	3.936
Home Team's Div. Standing	.00817	.756
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.00995	2.671
1973	-.02503	1.029
1974	-.03991	1.766
1975	-.03203	1.316
1976	-.04324	2.228
Constant	.14385	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .66889
F(8, 26) = 6.56555

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.02532	1.058
Temperature	-.00216	22.289*
Precipitation	.07465	2.365
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.10356	3.295
1973	-.02489	1.086
1974	-.03585	1.774
1975	-.03162	1.603
1976	-.03370	1.547
Constant	.22071	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
SAN DIEGO "NO SHOWS": 1972-1976

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .83250
F(9, 25) = 13.80553*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.01574	.470
Temperature	.00052	.437
Precipitation	.17910	67.420*
Home Team's Win-loss %	-.04188	3.697
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.07841	19.668*
1973	-.00254	.046
1974	.01017	.780
1975	.01616	2.027
1976	.01024	.812
Constant	.05915	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .78641
F(9, 25) = 10.22755*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.02695	1.001
Temperature	.00029	.105
Precipitation	.17707	51.234*
Home Team's Div. Standing	.01092	2.641
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.01190	11.688*
1973	-.00592	.154
1974	.00503	.124
1975	.02000	2.514
1976	.00741	.335
Constant	-.04302	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .75716
F(8, 26) = 10.13320

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.03360	1.472
Temperature	.00023	.064
Precipitation	.17673	47.129*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.12422	8.537*
1973	-.00160	.013
1974	.00839	.390
1975	.01938	2.180
1976	.01026	.583
Constant	.04494	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
SAN FRANCISCO "NO SHOWS": 1972-1976

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .63814
F(9, 25) = 4.89852*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.01635	.368
Temperature	-.00052	.427
Precipitation	.07854	7.949*
Home Team's Win-loss %	-.06226	.828
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.09303	7.351*
1973	.10716	13.363*
1974	.10433	12.857*
1975	.09589	11.866*
1976	.05144	3.814
Constant	.11497	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .66577
F(9, 25) = 5.53323*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.02725	1.060
Temperature	-.00111	2.132
Precipitation	.06024	4.750*
Home Team's Div. Standing	.01135	1.664
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.02396	12.007*
1973	.09340	9.850*
1974	.11092	18.125*
1975	.11111	20.664
1976	.04630	3.632
Constant	-.01189	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .58952
F(8, 26) = 4.66760*

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.01236	.198
Temperature	-.00043	.269
Precipitation	.07764	7.138*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.14088	6.634*
1973	.10329	11.921*
1974	.09608	13.498*
1975	.09348	13.263*
1976	.04725	3.231
Constant	.07181	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSES OF
WASHINGTON "NO SHOWS": 1972-1976

Equation 1

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .86318
F(7, 27) = 24.33399*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.00450	.240
Temperature	-.00054	5.618*
Precipitation	.09333	79.321*
Home Team's Win-loss %	.01719	.176
Visiting Team's Win-loss %	-.01531	2.179
1973[a]	---	---
1974[a]	---	---
1975	.00259	.109
1976	.02164	6.816*
Constant	.03086	

Equation 2

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .85632
F(8, 26) = 19.36951*

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games	.00336	.122
Temperature	-.00054	5.321*
Precipitation	.09350	66.134*
Home Team's Div. Standing	-.00382	.297
Visiting Team's Div. Standing	.00138	.430
1973[a]	---	---
1974	.00279	.060
1975	.00597	.217
1976	.02771	4.777*
Constant	.03843	

Equation 3

Dependent Variable: The ratio of "no shows" to total tickets sold
R^2 = .86333
F(6, 28) = 29.47802*

Independent Variable	Regression Coefficients	F Values
Televised Games[a]	---	---
Temperature	-.00056	6.618*
Precipitation	.09222	81.080*
Home W-L% x Visitor's W-L%	-.02248	2.504
1973	.00134	.031
1974[a]	---	---
1975	.00278	.130
1976	.02190	6.633*
Constant	.04770	

* Indicates the equation or independent variable is significant at the .05 level of confidence.

[a] The independent variable was not forced into the equation due to an exceedingly low F value.

Appendix B.—Statistical Analysis of NFL Season Ticket Sales 1970–76

The purpose of the subsequent discussion is to assess the impact of Public Law 93–107 games on NFL season ticket sales. The League has consistently maintained that locally televised home games adversely influence demand for season tickets in that fans simply become less inclined to purchase tickets and attend games when the contests are televised locally. Fortunately the NFL's assertion lends itself to empirical evaluation.

THE MODEL

Admittedly demand for season tickets may be subject to a number of considerations, many of which cannot be quantified. However, other factors which may influence season ticket sales (i.e., the teams performance or local telecasts) can be empirically examined. For the purposes of this analysis, season ticket sales are assumed to be influenced by the following factors:

(1) Locally Televised Games: This particular variable is expressed in terms of the number of home games which a team locally televised during the previous season. If the NFL's assertion that Public Law 93–107 has adversely influenced gate receipts, season ticket sales should be inversely related to the number of games locally televised during the previous season. That is, if more games are sold out and locally televised then season ticket sales should decline, all other things being equal.

(2) Team Performance: It is also safe to assume that demand for season tickets will be sensitive to the expected quality of a team's performance. If fans believe their club will have a good year, season tickets sales should increase. Conversely if the team has a poor season one would expect season ticket sales to decline. For the purpose of this analysis team performance is measured by the club's won-loss record for the previous season.

(3) Ticket Prices and Effective Household Buying Income: Demand for an NFL season ticket, like most other commodities, may differ depending on its price and the ability of the consumer to purchase the item. Accordingly, average ticket prices and median effective household buying income were incorporated into the analysis in order to estimate the effect of changes in price or household income on demand for tickets. Both variables were adjusted by the Consumer Price Index and are accordingly expressed in real terms. If expectations hold demand for tickets should be inversely related to their price, but directly related to changes in household income. That is, if prices increase fewer people should be willing to purchase tickets. Conversely if household income increases then larger numbers of fans should be able to afford tickets and demand should increase.

(4) Population of the Home Team Territory: It also stands to reason that demand for NFL season tickets should be stronger in very large cities than in smaller markets. The reason being that there are simply more potential purchasers for every available seat in larger markets. Population is expressed as the ratio of total persons in the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area in which a team plays to the number of available seats in the stadium.

(5) Seasonal Variations: Seasonal variations in NFL season ticket sales were accounted for by incorporating variables which reflect the season or year in which tickets were sold. Specification of seasonal variables is advantageous in that it permits the research to estimate trends in sales, when all other factors incorporated in the model are taken into account. In this instance the seasonal variables allow an assessment of trends in season ticket sales before and after the enactment of Public Law 93–107 and in that regard are highly beneficial in assessing the impact of the local telecasts on the demand for season tickets.

(6) Market Variations: A series of variables were also specified to account for variations in ticket sales which are peculiar to individual NFL markets and independent of other factors incorporated in the model. This is advantageous in that it reduces the probability of obtaining biased or incorrect estimates of the effects of other variables on season ticket sales.

Again, the variables specified in the model are by no means indicative of all factors which influence demand for NFL season tickets. It is likely, however that, factors under consideration are responsible for a large proportion of the variation in season ticket sales experienced by NFL teams between 1970 and 1976.

It should also be noted that demand for NFL season tickets was expressed as a ratio of total season tickets sold by individual teams to the stadium capacity. This was done to derive an appropriate measure of demand relative to the number of available seats. Additionally for the purpose of the analysis, cross sectional data on ticket sales by individual teams was pooled over a seven-year period. The results, therefore, primarily reflect general trends in ticket sales experience by the league as a whole and may not reflect variations in ticket sales for individual teams. They should afford, however, an accurate representation of those factors which have generally influenced season ticket sales of most NFL clubs.

Finally, eight teams (Denver, Green Bay, Minnesota, New York Giants,* Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Oakland and Washington) were excluded from the analysis. These teams generally sell all or nearly all available tickets and accordingly have not been adversely affected by Public Law 93–107. By eliminating the eight clubs, attention can therefore be focused on those teams whose gate receipts may have been influenced by Public Law 93–107. Results obtained from the statistical analysis therefore should be more accurate.

THE STATISTICAL TECHNIQUE

Multivariant regression analysis was also employed to measure the extent to which each of these factors influenced the season ticket sales. Again, the technique permits one to ascertain whether and to what extent variations in ticket sales are influenced by any or all of variables listed above. The results of this analysis are reported below. The numerical findings can be found in Attachment 4.

THE RESULTS

The findings reported in the Tables below indicate that demand for season tickets is primarily determined by the team's performance as reflected by its won-loss record for the previous season. As expected, season ticket sales increased following an improvement in the team's performance. Conversely sales fell off when teams did not play well. None of this is particularly surprising. A team's won-loss record at seasons' end shapes fan expectation of how well the club will play in the subsequent season. Given that season tickets are sold well in advance of the season, it is understandable that fans would weigh the expected performance of a club before purchasing a ticket.

The results further indicate that teams located in larger markets generally sold more season tickets than teams situated in small markets. Again, this is to be expected since there are simply more potential fans in highly populated metropolitan areas. Consequently the teams experience fewer problems in selling tickets.

On the other hand, the analysis indicated that demand for NFL season tickets is not significantly influenced by changes in ticket prices or household buying income. This simply suggests that money is not a primary consideration when fans reach decisions regarding ticket purchases. The findings further indicate that attendance at NFL games should not deteriorate significantly when clubs increase prices of season tickets as a means of offsetting part of the $125 million cost of League's recent five-year settlement with the NFL Players Association which commences with the 1978 season.

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*The Giants' were excluded on the basis of season tickets sold when the team was playing in New York as opposed to New Haven, Conn. (see section C of chapter 2).

Local telecasts of home games also did not appear to adversely impact on season ticket sales. That is variations in demand for season tickets did not correspond with variations in the number of locally televised games. This of course suggests that season ticket sales have not been appreciably influenced by local telecasts.

On the other hand, the results indicate that season ticket sales fell significantly following the 1973 season. This is precisely what one would expect assuming the NFL is correct in asserting that locally televised games have diminished demand for season tickets. Additionally since the sports anti-blackout law was encated in September 1973, its impact on ticket sales should not have been felt until 1974. Given that season tickets sales declined significantly in 1974 and 1975, it would appear that the legislation is at least partially responsible for recent reductions in sales. This is further evidenced by the fact that season ticket sales between 1970 and 1973 increased by 21 percent before declining by 12 percent since 1974. Local telecasts would seem to afford the only feasible explanation of why sales have fallen off during the past three seasons.

Admittedly the results reported above are not entirely consistent. However this does not mean that neither is incorrect. Indeed, the findings simply suggest that local telecasts of home games have exaggerated the impact of a team's won-loss record on its season ticket sales. Specifically, if a team does not play well but continues to locally televise home games, subsequent season ticket sales will be lower than would be the case if all home games were blacked out locally. Conversely, if a team is winning and locally televising its home games, the telecasts do not appear to adversely affect sales. Indeed in some instances, additional television coverage of a winning club may enhance interest in the team resulting in subsequent increases in season ticket sales.

The net effect of Public Law 93–107 on season ticket sales, however, appears to have adversely impacted on season ticket sales. Specifically it is estimated that current sales are approximately 10 percent below those levels which the League would have experienced in the absence of sports anti-blackout legislation.

ATTACHMENT 1

SEASON TICKET SALES

Team	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Atlanta	41,110	43,771	49,872	53,037	53,278	38,426	40,110
Baltimore	35,606	49,367	48,315	47,233	32,593	27,377	35,606
Buffalo	33,308	21,671	24,700	52,474	54,182	43,184	33,308
Chicago	47,116	48,883	49,124	48,996	51,525	47,070	47,116
Cincinnati	50,130	54,000	53,634	53,610	53,424	51,310	50,130
Cleveland	37,986	48,450	48,901	49,670	48,542	42,252	37,986
Dallas	36,814	31,000	35,256	36,053	32,297	29,000	36,814
Denver	61,287	47,813	48,000	48,000	49,000	49,000	61,287
Detroit	45,307	42,565	44,742	45,560	40,019	50,000	45,307
Green Bay	54,196	54,260	54,155	56,267	56,267	56,267	56,823
Milwaukee	41,303	46,320	46,699	47,826	47,826	52,583	52,900
Houston	27,934	27,214	27,460	30,325	24,435	26,179	32,135
Kansas City	42,031	41,986	72,885	70,555	65,564	47,870	45,251
Los Angeles	45,000	45,246	50,037	45,917	46,251	47,413	48,235
Miami	28,235	44,834	69,303	74,961	67,322	50,000	44,494
Minnesota	38,919	41,578	41,984	41,500	41,500	41,500	40,831
New England	21,572	40,493	55,007	47,938	44,319	46,967	31,381
New Orleans	52,050	51,751	53,319	50,005	49,252	46,000	40,093
New York Giants	57,930	58,502	57,214	55,682 49,690	40,007	54,294	73,511
New York Jets	58,133	58,137	58,226	56,500	56,500	53,500	52,828
Oakland	50,584	50,614	50,793	50,802	50,840	51,107	51,121
Philadelphia	49,457	56,593	64,106	64,001	64,361	64,300	62,605
Pittsburgh	22,812	25,076	28,159	44,844	44,531	44,902	45,540
St. Louis	73,712	40,379	41,332	40,672	39,006	37,516	38,768
San Diego	27,940	30,045	36,310	39,681	29,595	22,280	19,716
San Francisco	19,442	41,230	53,876	55,506	47,649	41,409	38,090
Washington	49,530	52,008	51,076	51,969	52,049	52,400	52,529

ATTACHMENT 2

STADIUM CAPACITY[1]

Team	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Atlanta	58,850	58,850	58,850	58,850	58,850	58,850	60,489
Baltimore	60,020	60,240	60,020	60,020	60,020	60,020	60,020
Buffalo	46,206	46,206	46,231	80,020	80,020	80,020	80,020
Chicago	52,500	52,500	55,701	55,701	55,701	55,701	55,753
Cincinnati	56,200	56,200	59,509	59,754	59,754	59,754	56,200
Cleveland	79,282	79,282	79,282	79,282	79,282	80,165	80,165
Dallas	72,500	65,000	65,111	65,111	65,101	65,101	65,101
Denver	50,500	50,500	51,656	51,706	51,706	52,217	63,500
Detroit	54,082	54,082	54,118	54,118	54,118	80,343	80,638
Green Bay	56,263	56,263	56,317	56,267	56,267	56,823	56,823
Milwaukee	57,823	57,823	47,826	47,826	47,826	52,583	55,963
Houston	50,000	50,000	50,254	47,754	47,754	47,754	50,000
Kansas City	49,002	49,002	79,033	78,097	78,097	78,099	78,000
Los Angeles	76,000	76,000	80,089	79,281	91,040	91,038	91,038
Miami	75,385	75,385	78,952	79,968	79,968	80,045	80,045
Minnesota	47,900	47,900	48,503	48,503	48,503	48,446	48,446
New England	42,500	62,000	61,114	61,279	61,279	61,279	61,279
New Orleans	80,997	80,997	89,023	80,958	80,958	74,203	72,000
New York Giants	62,892	62,892	63,350	70,874 63,350	70,874	60,416	76,050
New York Jets	60,000	60,000	60,405	60,418	60,416	60,415	60,000
Oakland	53,825	53,825	54,041	54,037	54,037	54,037	54,037
Philadelphia	65,000	65,000	66,011	65,954	66,052	66,026	66,052
Pittsburgh	50,000	50,000	54,041	50,112	50,112	50,112	50,350
St. Louis	50,492	50,492	50,696	51,456	51,392	51,392	51,392
San Diego	52,000	52,000	53,222	49,422	49,462	49,462	52,568
San Francisco	45,000	45,000	61,245	61,247	61,252	61,252	61,000
Washington	50,366	50,366	53,041	54,381	54,395	54,754	54,398

[1] These figures for stadium capacity were taken from ticket sales information provided by the NFL. Variations between these figures and the individual team tables occur due to different sources used for team tables (i.e., "Second Annual FCC Report," NFL weekly reporting forms).

ATTACHMENT 3

RATIO OF SEASON TICKET SALES TO STADIUM CAPACITY

Team	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
Atlanta	0.744	0.744	0.847	0.901	0.905	0.653	0.663
Baltimore	.831	.820	.805	.787	.543	.456	.593
Buffalo	.488	.469	.534	.656	.677	.540	.416
Chicago	.692	.931	.882	.880	.925	.845	.845
Cincinnati	.869	.961	.901	.897	.894	.859	.892
Cleveland	.631	.611	.617	.626	.612	.527	.474
Dallas	.428	.477	.542	.554	.496	.446	.565
Denver	.863	.947	.929	.928	.948	.938	.965
Detroit	.718	.787	.827	.837	.735	.622	.562
Green Bay	.963	.964	.962	1.0	1.0	.990	.995
Milwaukee	.743	.801	.977	1.0	1.0	1.0	.945
Houston	.559	.544	.546	.635	.512	.548	.643
Kansas City	.858	.857	.922	.903	.840	.613	.580
Los Angeles	.592	.595	.625	.579	.508	.521	.530
Miami	.375	.595	.878	.937	.841	.625	.556
Minnesota	.823	.868	.866	.855	.855	.857	.843
New England	.508	.653	.900	.782	.723	.766	.512
New Orleans	.643	.639	.658	.617	.608	.616	.557
New York Giants	.921	.930	.903	.785	.564	.899	.967
New York Jets	.969	.969	.964	.935	.935	.886	.881
Oakland	.940	.940	.940	.940	.940	.946	.946
Philadelphia	.761	.871	.971	.970	.974	.896	.948
Pittsburgh	.456	.502	.521	.894	.889	.974	.905
St. Louis	.747	.800	.815	.789	.758	.730	.754
San Diego	.537	.578	.682	.802	.598	.450	.375
San Francisco	.432	.916	.880	.906	.778	.676	.624
Washington	.983	1.0	.963	.956	.957	.957	.966

ATTACHMENT 4

RESULTS OF SEASON TICKET SALES ANALYSIS

Functional form	Multiple linear regression			
	Equation 1: Without natural log on selected independent variables; R^2=0.80788, F(27, 106)=16.50885		Equation 2: With natural log on selected independent variables; R^2=0.80830, F(26, 107)=17.35293	
	Regression coefficients	F value	Regression coefficients	F value
Population to stadium capacity	0.001	[1] 10.43	[2]	[2]
In (population to stadium capacity)	[2]	[2]	0.059	[1] 10.20
Real effective household buying income	.00003	1.43	[2]	[2]
In (real effective household buying income)	[2]	[2]	.377	2.73
Real weighted average ticket prices	.003	.02	[2]	[2]
In (real weighted average ticket prices)	[2]	[2]	[3]	[3]
Won-loss percent in previous season	.261	[1] 37.62	.266	[1] 40.40
Number of TV home games in previous season	.006	1.47	.006	1.28
1971	.057	[1] 5.19	.055	[1] 4.83
1972	.115	[1] 22.20	.111	[1] 21.44
1973	.115	[1] 19.02	.109	[1] 18.32
1974	.047	3.00	.043	2.61
1975	[3]	[3]	[3]	[3]
1976	−.028	1.29	−.033	1.88
Atlanta	.062	1.54	.026	.36
Baltimore	−.037	.73	−.074	3.77
Buffalo	−.146	[1] 10.84	−.166	16.91
Chicago	.021	.12	−.007	.02
Cincinnati	.158	[1] 10.87	.132	[1] 9.85
Cleveland	−.160	[1] 8.06	−.200	[1] 16.62
Dallas	−.297	[1] 35.50	−.338	[1] 60.56
Detroit	−.108	3.33	−.159	[1] 9.32
Houston	−.132	[1] 9.66	−.176	[1] 21.74
Kansas City	.052	1.02	.030	.41
Los Angeles	−.275	[1] 40.87	−.319	[1] 60.06
Miami	−.067	2.13	−.078	3.15
New England	−.037	.59	−.082	4.06
New York Jets	.067	2.06	.080	3.68
St. Louis	.025	.32	−.019	.24
San Diego	−.091	[1] 4.67	−.120	[1] 10.35
San Francisco	−.035	.46	−.085	3.60
Constant	.214		−2.675	

[1] Indicates the regression coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level of confidence.
[2] Not applicable to equation.
[3] Do not enter due to exceedingly low F value.

ATTACHMENT 5

DATA SOURCES FOR FOOTBALL SEASON TICKET SALES ANALYSIS

Variable	Description	Source
Stadium capacity	Number of seats available	NFL.
Average ticket price	Average of all ticket prices weighed by number of tickets available at each price.	Calculated from data provided by NFL.
Won-loss percent	Won-Loss percentage of home team at end of previous season.	Washington Post, New York Times, and Sporting News.
Number of televised home games	Number of home games televised locally in the previous season.	NFL.
Play-off dummy	Value of 1 if team made playoffs, zero otherwise.	Washington Post, New York Times, and Sporting News.
Metropolitan area population	Estimated population for relevant SMSA	Survey of buying power and Sales Management, Inc.
Household income	Average effective household buying income. Personal income less taxes.	
Consumer price index	Average annual CPI for relevant SMSA	Statistical Abstract of the United States.
Real average ticket price	Average ticket price divided by relevant CPI.	
Real per capita income	Per capita income divided by relevant CPI.	
Population to capacity	Population of metropolitan area divided by relevant stadium capacity.	
Year dummy i	Value of 1 if relevant year (is 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, or 1976), zero otherwise.	
Team dummy i	Value of 1 if team i, zero otherwise.	

Appendix C.—A Summary of Pro Forma Income Statements

NFL PRO FORMA COMBINED STATEMENT OF INCOME FOR THE 1969, 1972, AND 1975 PLAYING SEASON

[Dollar amounts in thousand]

	1969			1972			1975		
	Total	Average	Percent	Total	Average	Percent	Total	Average	Percent
Income:									
Ticket sales—Preseason and regular season	$63,035	$2,424	61.5	$92,420	$3,555	61.6	$109,253	$4,202	56.8
Television and radio	29,817	1,147	29.1	42,374	1,630	28.2	63,487	2,442	33.0
Participating teams' shares of postseason games				5,988	230	3.9	6,351	244	3.3
Distributions from postseason games				5,117	197	3.4	7,190	276	3.7
Programs, concessions, films and royalties	9,610	370	9.4	2,834	109	1.9	3,558	137	1.9
Miscellaneous				1,360	52	1.0	2,538	98	1.3
Total, income	102,463	3,941	100.0	150,093	5,773	100.0	192,377	7,399	100.0
Operating expenses:									
Player costs:									
Preseason	(1)	(1)	(1)	3,253	125	2.2	6,450	248	3.5
Salaries, bonuses and deferred compensation	(1)	(1)	(1)	45,205	1,734	30.1	65,078	2,503	33.8
Postseason	(1)	(1)	(1)	3,455	133	2.3	3,523	136	1.8
Player insurance trust	(1)	(1)	(1)	4,964	191	3.3	1,710	66	.9
Medical expenses, workmen's compensation, and payroll taxes	(1)	(1)	(1)	3,129	120	2.0	4,790	184	2.5
Total, player costs	61,875	2,380	60.4	60,006	2,308	39.9	81,551	3,137	42.4
Team expenses, including coaching, scouting, travel, training camp, uniforms and equipment				25,081	965	16.7	33,542	1,290	17.4
Stadium costs	9,457	364	9.2	9,065	349	6.1	12,359	475	6.4
Box office and other services				6,841	263	4.6	8,468	326	4.4
League and council assessments, including officiating, security, publicity, legal and professional fees	19,372	745	18.9	26,963	1,037	18.0	6,373	245	3.3
General and administrative, including front office salaries, rent, utilities, insurance, charitable contributions, nonplaying employees' pension plans, professional fees, publicity and promotion	19,372	745	18.9	26,963	1,037	18.0	27,817	1,070	14.5
Total, operating expenses	90,705	3,489	88.5	127,956	4,922	85.3	170,110	6,543	88.4
Operating profit	11,758	452	11.5	22,137	851	14.7	22,267	856	11.6
Other income (expense):									
Interest income (expense), net	(120)	(5)	(.1)	(870)	(33)	(.6)	(2,281)	(88)	(1.2)
Other				446	17	.3	6		
Income before income taxes and extraordinary items	6,604	254	6.4	21,713	835	14.4	19,980	768	10.4
Provision for income taxes	3,302	127	.1	10,856	417	7.2	9,990	384	5.2
Net income	3,301	127	.1	10,857	418	7.2	9,990	344	5.2

[1] Not applicable.

Appendix D.—A Week-by-Week Summary of Televised Games 1973–76

A SUMMARY OF NFL GAMES TELEVISED

[TV, local blackout lifted; X, blackout imposed]

Team	Week 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	Season total of games televised
1973 SEASON															
Atlanta			TV	TV			TV		TV		TV	TV	TV		7
Baltimore	X	X				X	X			X		X	X		0
Buffalo		TV	X	X		X			TV	TV		X			3
Chicago	TV	TV			TV	TV			TV		TV		TV		7
Cincinnati		TV		TV	X[1]				TV	TV	TV	TV			6
Cleveland	X		X	X	TV	X	X			TV					2
Dallas		X	X		TV		X		X	TV		TV			3
Denver	TV	TV	TV		TV			TV		TV	TV				7
Detroit		TV	TV		X	X	X			TV		X			3
Green Bay	TV	TV		TV			TV	TV	TV		TV	TV			7
Houston		X	X	X				X		X	X				0
Kansas City	TV		TV	TV				TV	TV		TV		X		6
Los Angeles	X			X	X			X	X			X	X		0
Miami	TV		TV	TV	TV			TV			TV		TV		7
Minnesota	TV		TV		TV	TV	TV	TV		TV					7
New England	X	X		X	X	TV			TV		X				2
New Orleans	X			X	X	X	X			X		X			0
New York Giants	TV	TV		TV	TV			TV	X				TV		6
New York Jets						TV	TV	TV		TV	X		X		4
Oakland		X					TV	TV	TV	TV		X	TV		5
Philadelphia	TV		TV			TV	TV	TV		TV		TV			7
Pittsburgh	TV	TV		TV	TV	TV	TV		TV				TV		8
St. Louis		X		TV	X	X	X				X			X	1
San Diego		X	X		X	X		X		X			X		0
San Francisco			TV		TV	X	X			TV	X			TV	4
Washington	TV			TV		TV			TV	TV		TV		TV	7
Weekly totals of televised games	10	6	8	8	6	7	6	7	11	9	10	8	6	7	109

A SUMMARY OF NFL GAMES TELEVISED—Continued

[TV, local blackout lifted; X, blackout imposed]—Continued

Team	Week 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	Season total of games televised
1974 SEASON															
Atlanta	TV	TV		TV	TV				TV		TV		TV		7
Baltimore		X		X			X	X		X		X	X		0
Buffalo	X	TV	TV		TV	TV		X			X				4
Chicago	X	TV		TV		TV		TV		TV		TV			6
Cincinnati	TV	TV		TV			TV		TV		TV		TV		7
Cleveland		X		X	X		X			TV	X	X			1
Dallas			X	X		X		X	X			X			0
Denver	TV	TV			TV	TV		TV		TV			TV		7
Detroit		X		X		X	X		X		X				0
Green Bay	TV		TV	TV	TV			TV	TV		TV				7
Houston	X		X	X		X				X	TV			X	1
Kansas City	X			X	X			X	X				X	X	0
Los Angeles		X		X		X		X			X		X	X	0
Miami			TV		X		X			TV		X		TV	3
Minnesota			TV		X	TV	TV			TV		TV	X		5
New England	X		TV	X				TV	TV	TV			TV		5
New Orleans	X		X				X		X		X		X		0
New York Giants	X	X		X			X		X		X		X		0
New York Jets					TV	X	X	X			TV	TV	TV		4
Oakland		TV				X			X	X	TV	TV		TV	4
Philadelphia		TV	TV		TV				TV	TV		TV		TV	7
Pittsburgh	TV		TV			TV	TV	TV				TV		TV	7
St. Louis	X		X		TV		TV		TV			TV		X	4
San Diego			X	X			X	X					X	X	0
San Francisco			X	X	X		X	X			X		X	X	0
Washington		TV	TV		TV	TV				TV	TV			TV	7
Weekly totals of televised games	5	8	7	4	7	7	5	5	5	9	6	8	4	6	86
1975 SEASON															
Atlanta		X	X			X			X	X		X	X		0
Baltimore		X		X			X		X		X		TV	X	1
Buffalo	TV		X		X	TV		X		X				X	2
Chicago	X	X				TV	X	TV				X	X		2
Chicinnati	TV			X[1]	TV		TV		TV		TV			X	5
Cleveland		X	TV	X		X				X	X		X		1
Dallas	X	X			X			X		X	X		TV		1
Denver	TV	TV			TV		TV	TV			TV		TV		7
Detroit			TV	X				X	X		TV		TV	X	3
Green Bay	TV		TV			TV	TV			TV	TV			TV	7
Houston		X	X		X	X			TV	TV				X	2
Kansas City		X	X	X		X	X			X		X			0

Los Angeles			X		X	X		X		X			X	TV	1
Miami	X			X				X		X		X		X	0
Minnesota	TV		TV	TV		TV			TV		TV		TV		7
New England	X	TV			X	X				TV			X	X	2
New Orleans		X		X			X		X		X		X		0
New York Giants				X		X	X	TV	TV				X		2
New York Jets			TV		TV	X	TV			X	TV			X	4
Oakland						TV		X	TV		X	TV	TV	TV	5
Philadelphia	TV		TV			TV	TV	TV			TV	TV			7
Pittsburgh		TV		X	TV			TV	TV			TV	TV		6
St. Louis	X		X		X		X		TV		TV	TV			3
San Diego	X		X	X	X			X	X				X		0
San Francisco		X		X	X		X		X			X		X	0
Washington	TV	TV		TV			TV			TV	TV			TV	7
Weekly totals of televised games	7	4	6	2	5	5	6	6	7	4	8	5	6	4	75

1976 SEASON

Atlanta	X			X		X		X		X	X			X	2
Baltimore		X		X	TV			X		TV		X		X	0
Buffalo	X	X		X		X	X	X			X				0
Chicago	X		X	TV				TV	TV	TV				TV	5
Cincinnati	X		TV		X			TV	TV	TV		TV			5
Cleveland				X	TV		X			X		X	X		1
Dallas	X		X				TV		TV	TV		TV		TV	5
Denver		TV	TV	TV		TV			TV		TV		TV		7
Detroit		X	X		X			X			TV	X		X	1
Green Bay	TV			TV	TV	TV			TV		TV	TV			7
Houston	X		TV		X		TV		X			X		X	2
Kansas City	X	X	X				X		X		X			X	0
Los Angeles			X		X	X		X		TV		X	X		1
Miami			X	X		X		X			X		X	X	0
Minnesota		TV		TV	TV	TV			TV	TV			TV		7
New England	X	X		TV		X			TV			X	X		2
New Orleans	X	X		X	X		X			X				X	0
New York Giants					TV		TV	X		TV		TV	TV	TV	6
New York Jets	X				X		X		X	X	X		X	X	0
Oakland	TV						TV	TV		TV		TV	TV	TV	7
Philadelphia		TV	TV				TV		TV		TV		TV	TV	7
Pittsburgh		TV	TV			TV		TV		TV	TV		TV		7
St. Louis		X		X	X	TV		X			TV		TV		3
San Diego			X		TV	X			X	X		X	X		1
San Francisco		X		X		X	X		X		TV	X			1
Seattle	X		X	TV			X		X		X		TV		2
Tampa Bay		X	X			X	X	X			X			X	0
Washington	TV	TV			TV	TV	TV	TV				TV			7
Weekly totals of televised games	3	5	5	6	7	6	6	5	8	9	7	6	8	9	86

[1] Games conflicted with world series in which the Cincinnati baseball team was involved.

Appendix E.—NFL Data on Ticket Sales and "No Shows" for the 1976 Regular Season (Data for Other Years is Available in Previous FCC Reports)

NFL ATTENDANCE—WEEKLY SUMMARY

1ST WEEK (AVERAGE IN-HOUSE FOR 14 GAMES: 55,116)

Game	Blackout lifted	Paid attendance	Tickets distribution	No shows	In-house attendance	Percent of no shows	Weather
Baltimore at New England	No	38,773	39,637	125	39,512	0.003	Sunny, 73.
Denver at Cincinnati	No	55,084	55,831	2,367	53,464	4.2	Sunny, 80.
Detroit at Chicago	No	56,591	57,359	3,234	54,125	5.6	Sunny, 76.
Los Angeles at Atlanta	No	55,475	56,403	2,796	53,607	5.0	Clear, 73.
Minnesota at New Orleans	No	60,370	61,406	3,250	58,156	5.3	Domed, sunny, 75.
N.Y. Giants at Washington	Yes	54,412	55,004	759	54,245	1.4	Sunny, 83.
N.Y. Jets at Cleveland	No	69,024	69,923	2,427	67,496	3.5	Sunny, 75.
Philadelphia at Dallas	No	53,906	55,018	1,478	53,540	2.7	Sunny, 78.
Pittsburgh at Oakland	Yes	51,735	52,718	1,347	51,371	2.6	Sunny, 65.
St. Louis at Seattle	No	60,511	61,142	2,701	58,441	4.4	Domed, sunny, 72.
San Diego at Kansas City	No	54,368	55,600	2,467	53,133	4.4	Sunny, 85.
S.F. 49ers at Green Bay	Yes	55,231	55,984	1,356	54,628	2.4	Sunny, 83.
Tampa Bay at Houston	No	42,811	43,915	1,687	42,228	3.8	Domed.
Miami at Buffalo	No	77,800	78,321	638	77,683	.8	Clear, 73.
Totals:							
Weeks (1)		786,091	798,261	26,632	771,629	3.3	
TV games (3)		161,378	163,706	3,463	160,244	2.1	
Non-TV games (11).		624,713	634,555	23,170	611,385	3.6	

2D WEEK (AVERAGE IN-HOUSE FOR 28 GAMES: 53,643)

Atlanta at Detroit	No	53,945	54,981	4,886	50,115	8.9	Domed, sunny, 80.
Chicago at San Francisco	No	44,924	46,699	2,541	44,158	5.4	Clear, 62.
Cincinnati at Baltimore	No	50,457	51,119	498	50,621	.01	Sunny, 74.
Cleveland at Pittsburgh	Yes	49,704	50,400	1,231	49,169	2.4	Sunny, 74.
Dallas at New Orleans	No	64,364	65,405	3,992	61,413	6.1	Domed, sunny, 72.
Green Bay at St Louis	No	49,361	49,884	1,042	48,842	2.1	Sunny, 85.
Houston at Buffalo	No	63,183	63,677	2,313	61,364	3.6	Sunny, 70.
Los Angeles at Minnesota	Yes	47,626	48,446	1,136	47,310	2.8	Cloudy, 73.
Miami at New England	No	41,184	42,053	174	41,879	.004	Sunny, 77.
N.Y. Giants at Philadelphia	Yes	63,459	64,401	3,758	60,643	5.8	Clear, 75.
N.Y. Jets at Denver	Yes	62,738	63,382	863	62,519	1.3	Cloudy, 57.
San Diego at Tampa Bay	No	40,035	41,093	2,817	38,276	6.8	Cloudy, 90.
Seattle at Washington	Yes	54,406	55,004	1,830	53,174	3.3	Sunny, 80.
Oakland at Kansas City	No	61,942	63,225	2,341	60,884	3.7	Clear, 64.
Total		747,328	759,769	29,402	730,367	3.8	
Totals:							
Weeks (2)		1,533,419	1,558,030	56,034	1,501,996	3.6	
TV games (5)		277,933	281,633	8,818	272,815	3.3	
Non-TV games (9)		469,395	478,136	20,584	457,552	4.3	
Season totals:							
TV games (8)		439,311	445,339	12,280	433,059	2.8	
Non-TV games (20).		1,094,108	1,112,691	43,754	1,068,937	3.4	

NFL ATTENDANCE—WEEKLY SUMMARY—Continued

3D WEEK (AVERAGE IN-HOUSE FOR 42 GAMES: 53,490)

Game	Blackout lifted	Paid attend-ance	Tickets distribu-tion	No shows	In-house attend-ance	Percent of no shows	Weather
Atlanta at Chicago	No	56,116	56,969	15,940	41,029	28.0	Rain, 58.
Baltimore at Dallas	No	63,318	64,447	722	63,725	1.1	Second half rain, 91.
Buffalo at Tampa Bay	No	46,207	47,327	4,522	42,805	9.5	Cloudy, 90.
Cleveland at Denver	Yes	62,669	63,315	557	62,758	.01	Cloudy, 58.
Green Bay at Cincinnati	Yes	55,116	55,867	11,764	44,103	21.1	Rain, 65.
Minnesota at Detroit	No	79,196	80,260	3,346	76,914	4.2	Domed, rain, 57.
New England at Pittsburgh	Yes	49,507	50,204	2,825	47,379	5.6	Rain, 60.
New Orleans at Kansas City	No	57,365	58,596	4,678	53,918	8.0	Cloudy, 60.
N.Y. Giants at Los Angeles	No	63,100	64,475	3,777	60,698	5.9	Cloudy, 70.
N.Y. Jets at Miami	No	53,600	54,563	4,809	49,754	8.8	Sunny, 93.
Oakland at Houston	Yes	44,330	45,445	3,107	42,338	6.8	Rain, 78.
St. Louis at San Diego	No	39,591	40,572	661	39,911	1.6	Overcast, 72.
S.F. 49ers at Seattle	No	61,592	62,224	3,116	59,108	5.0	Sunny, 75.
Washington at Philadelphia	Yes	64,580	65,536	5,405	60,131	8.2	Rain.
Total		796,287	809,800	65,229	744,571	8.1	
Totals:							
Weeks (3)		2,329,706	2,367,830	121,263	2,246,567	5.1	
TV games (5)		276,202	280,367	23,658	256,709	8.4	
Non-TV games (9)		520,085	529,433	41,571	487,862	7.9	
Season totals:							
TV games (13)		715,513	725,706	35,938	689,768	5.0	
Non-TV games (29).		1,614,193	1,642,124	85,325	1,556,799	5.2	

4TH WEEK (AVERAGE IN-HOUSE FOR 56 GAMES: 53,640)

Cincinnati at Cleveland	No	76,330	77,276	1,459	75,817	1.9	Hazy, 65.
Dallas at Seattle	Yes	64,086	64,716	2,689	62,027	4.2	Domed, cloudy, 59.
Detroit at Green Bay	Yes	55,221	55,984	1,226	54,758	2.2	Clear, 72.
Houston at New Orleans	No	55,563	56,639	4,666	51,973	8.2	Domed.
Kansas City at Buffalo	No	52,462	52,960	1,051	51,909	2.0	Sunny, 72.
Los Angeles at Miami	No	65,314	66,262	5,509	60,753	8.3	Clear, 83.
N.Y. Giants at St. Louis	No	48,530	49,012	973	48,039	2.0	Sunny, 80.
N.Y. Jets at S.F. 49ers	No	44,702	46,430	3,469	42,961	7.5	Sunny, 72.
Oakland at New England	Yes	60,330	61,279	211	61,068	.003	Clear, 65.
Philadelphia at Atlanta	No	48,704	49,701	4,166	45,535	8.4	Sunny, 72.
San Diego at Denver	Yes	62,649	63,332	846	62,486	1.3	Clear, 72.
Tampa Bay at Baltimore	No	41,999	42,662	2,609	40,053	6.1	Rain, 64.
Washington at Chicago	Yes	56,648	57,359	5,254	52,105	9.2	Sunny, 66.
Pittsburgh at Minnesota	Yes	47,508	48,446	637	47,809	1.3	Partly cloudy, 55.
Total		780,046	792,058	34,765	757,293	4.4	
Totals:							
Weeks (4)		3,109,752	3,159,888	156,028	3,003,860	4.9	
TV games (6)		433,604	440,942	23,902	417,040	5.4	
Non-TV games (8)		346,442	351,116	10,863	340,253	3.1	
Season totals:							
TV games (19)		1,149,117	1,166,648	59,840	1,106,808	5.1	
Non-TV games (37).		1,960,635	1,993,240	96,188	1,897,052	4.8	

5TH WEEK (AVERAGE IN-HOUSE FOR 70 GAMES: 54,393)

Atlanta at New Orleans	No	55,662	56,694	5,173	51,521	9.1	Domed, sunny.
Buffalo at N.Y. Jets	No	58,054	59,122	6,706	52,416	11.3	Sunny, 53.
Chicago at Minnesota	Yes	47,688	48,446	498	47,948	1.03	Sunny, 59.
Dallas at N.Y. Giants	Yes	75,209	76,186	144	76,042	.19	Sunny, 50.
Denver at Houston	No	49,850	51,041	3,113	47,928	6.1	Domed, sunny, 68.
Kansas City at Washington	Yes	54,322	55,004	1,944	53,060	3.5	Sunny, 60.
Miami at Baltimore	Yes	59,348	60,020	1,188	58,832	2.1	Sunny, 64.
New England at Detroit	No	62,202	63,267	3,537	59,730	5.6	Cloudy, 56.
Oakland at San Diego	Yes	51,295	52,246	2,023	50,223	3.9	Sunny, 85.
Pittsburgh at Cleveland	Yes	79,359	80,294	4,525	75,769	5.6	Cloudy, 54.
Philadelphia at St. Louis	No	46,068	46,612	1,679	44,933	3.6	Sunny, 63.
Seattle at Green Bay	Yes	54,809	55,948	965	54,983	1.72	Hazy, 55.
Tampa Bay at Cincinnati [1]	No	55,068	55,833	6,133	49,700	11.0	Cloudy, 55.
S.F. 49ers at Los Angeles	No	82,790	84,483	3,951	80,532	4.7	Clear, 72.
Total		831,724	845,196	41,579	803,617	4.9	
Totals:							
Weeks (5)		3,941,476	4,005,084	197,607	3,807,477	4.9	
TV games (7)		422,030	428,144	11,287	416,857	2.6	
Non-TV games (7)		409,694	417,052	30,292	386,760	7.3	
Season totals:							
TV games (26)		1,571,147	1,594,792	71,127	1,523,655	4.5	
Non-TV games (44)		2,370,329	2,410,292	126,480	2,283,812	5.2	

[1] Sold out but not televised because of baseball playoffs.

NFL ATTENDANCE—WEEKLY SUMMARY—Continued

6TH WEEK (AVERAGE IN-HOUSE FOR 84 GAMES: 53,614)

Game	Blackout lifted	Paid attend-ance	Tickets distribu-tion	No shows	In-house attend-ance	Percent of no shows	Weather
Baltimore at Buffalo	No	73,242	73,837	2,828	71,009	3.8	Rain to snow, 43.
Chicago at Los Angeles	No	73,088	76,655	4,904	71,751	6.4	Clear, 72.
Cincinnati at Pittsburgh	Yes	49,720	50,482	2,171	48,311	4.3	Cloudy, 40.
Cleveland at Altanta	No	45,210	46,824	13,987	32,837	29.8	Rain in a.m., overcast, 52.
Dallas at St. Louis	Yes	50,835	51,342	1,025	50,317	2.0	Sunny, 47.
Detroit at Washington	Yes	54,403	55,004	9,096	45,908	16.5	Rain, 47.
Houston at San Diego	No	32,121	33,077	1,127	31,950	3.4	Sunny, 75.
Kansas City at Miami	No	54,718	55,661	12,336	43,325	22.2	Rain, 80.
New Orleans at San Francisco	No	44,299	46,027	2,867	43,160	6.2	Clear, 78.
N.Y. Giants at Minnesota	Yes	47,690	48,446	1,290	47,156	2.7	Cloudy, 42.
Oakland at Denver	Yes	62,615	63,342	101	63,241	.2	Sunny, 62.
Philadelphia at Green Bay	Yes	55,234	55,984	869	55,115	1.6	Sunny, 42.
Seattle at Tampa Bay	No	45,887	47,034	5,922	41,112	12.5	Cloudy, 82.
N.Y. Jets at New England	No	50,282	51,236	353	50,883	.7	Clear, 43.
Total		739,344	754,951	53,876	696,075	7.8	
Totals:							
Weeks (6)		4,680,820	4,760,035	256,483	4,503,552	5.4	
TV games (6)		320,497	324,600	14,552	310,048	4.5	
Non-TV games (8)		418,847	430,351	44,324	386,027	10.3	
Season totals:							
TV games (32)		1,891,644	1,919,392	85,679	1,833,713	4.4	
Non-TV games (52)		2,789,176	2,840,643	170,804	2,669,839	6.0	

7TH WEEK (AVERAGE IN-HOUSE FOR 98 GAMES: 53,795)

Atlanta at San Francisco	No	51,541	52,939	2,699	50,240	5.1	Clear, 45.
Baltimore at N.Y. Jets	No	58,437	59,616	9,848	49,768	16.5	Rain, 50.
Chicago at Dallas	Yes	63,098	64,346	3,556	60,790	5.5	Cloudy, 70.
Cincinnati at Houston	Yes	49,843	50,968	5,469	45,499	10.7	Domed, rain, 68.
Denver at Kansas City	No	62,329	63,584	5,623	57,961	8.8	Cloudy, 40.
Detroit at Seattle	No	63,700	64,428	3,148	61,280	4.9	Domed.
Green Bay at Oakland	Yes	52,861	53,751	1,519	52,232	2.8	Cloudy, 62.
Los Angeles at New Orleans	No	56,644	57,724	5,740	51,984	8.9	Domed.
Miami at Tampa Bay	No	63,016	64,276	5,121	59,153	8.0	Cloudy, 82.
Minnesota at Philadelphia	Yes	65,001	65,924	9,691	56,233	14.7	Rain, 50.
New England at Buffalo	No	49,777	50,383	5,239	45,144	10.4	Rain, 44.
Pittsburgh at N.Y. Giants	Yes	75,505	76,440	6,657	69,783	8.7	Rain, 53.
San Diego at Cleveland	No	61,981	62,969	2,951	60,018	4.7	Rain, 49.
St. Louis at Washington	Yes	54,388	55,004	6,679	48,325	4.6	Rain, 59.
Total		828,121	842,352	73,940	768,412	8.7	
Totals:							
Weeks (7)		5,508,941	5,602,387	330,420	5,271,924	5.9	
TV games (6)		360,696	366,433	33,571	332,862	9.2	
Non-TV games (8)		467,425	475,919	40,369	435,550	8.5	
Season totals:							
TV games (38)		2,252,340	2,285,825	119,250	2,166,575	5.2	
Non-TV games (60)		3,256,601	3,316,562	211,173	3,105,389	6.4	

8TH WEEK (AVERAGE IN-HOUSE FOR 112 GAMES: 53,628)

Cleveland at Cincinnati	Yes	58,843	59,608	4,832	54,776	8.1	Cloudy, 40.
Dallas at Washington	Yes	54,319	55,004	0	55,004	0	Cloudy, 59.
Denver at Oakland	Yes	52,814	53,807	1,638	52,169	3.4	Sunny, 62.
Green Bay at Detroit	No	77,181	78,404	3,822	74,582	4.9	Domed, cloudy, 45.
Kansas City at Tampa Bay	No	43,609	44,910	4,831	40,079	10.7	Rain in a.m., cloudy 70.
Minnesota at Chicago	Yes	56,611	57,359	3,757	53,602	6.5	Partly cloudy, 46.
New England at Miami	No	57,984	58,948	6,085	52,863	10.3	Sunny, 81.
New Orleans at Atlanta	No	45,285	46,387	12,685	33,702	27.3	Cloudy, 48.
N.Y. Jets at Buffalo	No	47,839	48,361	7,076	41,285	14.6	Rain, 41.
Philadelphia at N.Y. Giants	No	75,138	76,171	7,481	68,690	9.8	Rain, 57.
San Diego at Pittsburgh	Yes	49,729	50,418	4,934	45,484	9.8	Rain, 45.
S.F. 49ers at St. Louis	No	50,881	51,342	977	50,365	.02	Cloudy, 51.
Seattle at Los Angeles	No	55,614	59,929	7,894	52,035	13.1	Sunny, 80.
Houston at Baltimore	No	59,057	59,732	0	59,732	0	Clear, 48.
Total		784,904	800,380	66,012	734,368	8.2	
Totals:							
Weeks (8)		6,293,845	6,402,767	396,432	6,006,332	6.2	
TV games (5)		272,316	276,196	15,161	261,035	5.5	
Non-TV games (9)		512,588	524,184	50,851	473,333	9.7	
Season totals:							
TV games (43)		2,524,656	2,562,021	134,411	2,427,610	5.3	
Non-TV games (69)		3,769,189	3,840,746	262,024	3,578,722	6.8	

NFL ATTENDANCE—WEEKLY SUMMARY—Continued

9TH WEEK (AVERAGE IN-HOUSE FOR 126 GAMES: 53,781)

Game	Blackout lifted	Paid attendance	Tickets distribution	No shows	In-house attendance	Percent of no shows	Weather
Atlanta at Seattle	No	62,130	62,830	4,845	57,985	7.7	Cloudy, 59.
Baltimore at San Diego	No	42,667	43,618	791	42,827	1.8	Sunny, 84.
Buffalo at New England	Yes	60,292	61,279	122	61,157	1.9	Cloudy, 50.
Cleveland at Houston	No	45,914	47,070	7,242	39,828	15.3	Sunny, 72.
Detroit at Minnesota	Yes	47,595	48,446	1,711	46,735	3.5	Sunny, 32.
Miami at N.Y. Jets	No	58,882	60,045	6,701	53,344	11.1	Clear, 53.
New Orleans at Green Bay (Milwaukee)	Yes	54,610	55,832	2,896	52,936	5.1	Clear, 31.
N.Y. Giants at Dallas	Yes	62,869	64,223	5,993	58,230	9.3	Clear, 60.
Oakland at Chicago	Yes	56,703	57,359	3,774	53,585	6.5	Clear, 36.
St. Louis at Philadelphia	Yes	64,529	65,565	4,805	60,760	7.3	Clear.
Pittsburgh at Kansas City	No	75,283	76,505	4,989	71,516	6.5	Sunny, 47.
Tampa Bay at Denver	Yes	62,655	63,332	829	62,503	1.3	Clear, 60.
Washington at S.F. 49ers	No	56,161	57,937	1,803	56,134	3.1	Sunny, 72.
Los Angeles at Cincinnati	Yes	58,802	59,578	7,098	52,480	11.9	Very windy, clear, 27.
Total		809,092	823,619	53,599	770,020	6.5	
Totals:							
Weeks (9)		7,102,937	7,226,386	450,034	6,776,352	6.2	
TV games (8)		468,055	475,614	27,228	448,386	5.7	
Non-TV games (6)		341,037	348,005	26,371	321,634	7.6	
Season totals:							
TV games		2,992,711	3,037,635	161,639	2,875,996	5.3	
Non-TV games		4,110,226	4,188,751	288,395	3,900,356	6.9	

10TH WEEK (AVERAGE IN-HOUSE FOR 140 GAMES: 53,396)

Denver at San Diego	No	32,571	33,531	1,514	32,017	4.5	Cloudy, 69.
Detroit at New Orleans	No	49,563	50,777	8,729	42,048	17.1	Domed, rain.
Green Bay at Chicago	Yes	56,662	57,359	4,452	52,907	7.7	Sunny, 34.
Houston at Cincinnati	Yes	58,719	59,574	6,331	53,243	11.1	Sunny, 34.
Kansas City at Oakland	Yes	52,819	53,795	4,936	48,859	9.1	Rain, 62.
Miami at Pittsburgh	Yes	49,813	50,511	1,566	48,945	3.1	Clear, 30.
New England at Baltimore	Yes	59,340	60,020	1,794	58,226	2.9	Sunny, 44.
Philadelphia at Cleveland	No	63,941	64,842	2,722	62,120	4.2	Sunny, 40.
St. Louis at Los Angeles	Yes	83,189	91,038	26,340	64,698	28.9	Rain, 68.
S.F. 49ers at Atlanta	No	43,105	44,068	24,335	19,733	55.2	Rain, 36.
Seattle at Minnesota	Yes	47,651	48,446	3,359	45,087	6.9	Sunny, 38.
Tampa Bay at N.Y. Jets	No	55,401	56,545	10,118	46,427	17.8	Clear, 49.
Washington at N.Y. Giants	Yes	75,692	76,609	3,634	72,975	4.7	Sunny, 48.
Buffalo at Dallas	Yes	63,561	65,015	13,236	51,779	20.4	Clear, 37.
Total		792,027	812,130	113,066	699,064	14.0	
Totals:							
Weeks (10)		7,894,964	8,038,516	563,100	7,475,416	7.0	
TV games (9)		547,446	562,367	65,648	496,719	11.7	
Non-TV games (5)		244,581	249,763	47,418	202,345	19.0	
Season totals:							
TV games (60)		3,540,157	3,600,002	227,287	3,372,715	6.3	
Non-TV games (80)		4,354,807	4,438,514	335,813	4,102,701	7.6	

11TH WEEK (AVERAGE IN-HOUSE FOR 154 GAMES: 53,470)

Chicago at Detroit	Yes	78,975	80,327	2,596	77,731	3.2	Cloudy, 32.
Cincinnati at Kansas City	No	54,783	56,015	9,756	46,259	17.4	Cloudy, 40.
Cleveland at Tampa Bay	No	42,816	44,218	9,270	34,948	20.9	Cloudy, 70.
Dallas at Atlanta	No	59,511	60,489	5,497	54,992	9.0	Sunny, 55.
Houston at Pittsburgh	Yes	49,770	50,456	2,509	47,947	4.9	Snow, 35.
Los Angeles at S.F. 49ers	Yes	59,352	61,187	2,614	58,573	4.2	Sunny, 65.
Minnesota at Green Bay (Milwaukee).	Yes	54,670	55,998	2,894	54,104	5.1	Cloudy, 33.
New England at N.Y. Jets	No	57,335	58,507	8,524	49,983	14.5	Sunny, 45.
New Orleans at Seattle	No	64,022	64,720	2,855	61,865	4.4	Domed.
N.Y. Giants at Denver	Yes	62,681	63,342	381	62,961	.01	Clear, 52.
Oakland at Philadelphia	Yes	65,317	66,273	4,140	62,133	6.2	Clear, 40.
San Diego at Buffalo	No	41,197	41,701	5,162	36,539	12.3	Cloudy, 29.
Washington at St. Louis	Yes	50,818	51,342	1,509	49,833	2.9	Cloudy, 40.
Baltimore at Miami	No	68,372	69,303	7,199	62,104	10.3	Clear, 64.
Total		809,619	823,878	64,906	758,972	7.8	
Totals:							
Weeks (11)		8,704,583	8,862,394	628,006	8,234,388	7.1	
TV games (7)		421,583	428,925	16,643	412,282	3.9	
Non-TV games (7)		388,036	394,953	48,263	346,690	2.2	
Season totals:							
TV games (67)		3,961,740	4,028,927	243,930	3,784,997	6.1	
Non-TV games (87).		4,742,843	4,833,467	384,076	4,449,391	7.9	

NFL ATTENDANCE—WEEKLY SUMMARY—Continued

12TH WEEK (AVERAGE IN-HOUSE FOR 168 GAMES: 53,516)

Game	Blackout lifted	Paid attend-ance	Tickets distribu-tion	No shows	In-house attend-ance	Percent of no shows	Weather
Buffalo at Detroit	No	71,297	72,442	5,853	66,569	8.0	Domed.
St. Louis at Dallas	Yes	63,056	64,920	2,422	62,498	3.7	Rain, 35.
Atlanta at Houston	No	39,935	41,072	15,234	25,838	37.0	Snow, 31.
Chicago at Green Bay	Yes	55,264	56,297	30	56,276	.001	Clear , 6.
Denver at New England	No	60,216	61,279	151	61,128	.001	Cloudy, 55.
Kansas City at San Diego	No	27,967	31,539	2,267	29,272	7.1	Clear, 64.
Miami at Cleveland	No	76,562	77,526	2,811	74,715	3.6	Snow, 29.
New Orleans at Los Angeles	No	58,376	64,477	9,571	54,906	14.8	Sunny, 68.
N.Y. Jets at Baltimore	No	45,934	46,670	2,847	43,823	6.1	Sunny, 46.
Philadelphia at Washington	Yes	54,353	55,004	712	54,292	.01	Cloudy, 58.
Pittsburgh at Cincinnati	Yes	58,879	59,684	4,542	55,142	7.6	Snow, 28.
Seattle at N.Y. Giants	Yes	75,477	76,386	11,275	65,111	14.7	Cloudy, 50.
Tampa Bay at Oakland	Yes	51,745	52,804	2,814	49,990	5.3	Sunny, 60.
Minnesota at S.F. 49ers	No	59,494	60,948	4,173	56,775	6.8	Clear, 55.
Total		798,555	821,028	64,702	756,326	7.8	
Totals:							
Weeks (12)		9,473,138	9,683,422	692,708	8,990,714	7.1	
TV games (6)		295,718	300,175	19,373	280,802	6.4	
Non-TV games (8)		502,837	520,853	45,329	475,524	8.7	
Season totals:							
TV games (73)		4,227,458	4,332,033	263,303	4,065,799	6.1	
Non-TV games (95)		5,245,680	5,354,320	429,405	4,924,915	8.0	

13TH WEEK (AVERAGE IN-HOUSE FOR 182 GAMES: 53,345)

Atlanta at Los Angeles	No	60,824	66,547	9,181	57,366	13.8	Sunny, 68.
Baltimore at St. Louis	Yes	50,890	51,342	3,060	48,282	5.9	Sunny, 34.
Buffalo at Miami	No	51,423	52,532	9,057	43,475	17.2	Sunny, 80.
Chicago at Seattle	Yes	64,055	64,733	4,223	60,510	6.5	Cloudy, 46.
Dallas at Philadelphia	Yes	65,231	66,196	11,124	55,072	16.8	Sunny, 35.
Detroit at N.Y. Giants	Yes	75,056	75,963	9,894	66,069	13.0	Sunny, 34.
Green Bay at Minnesota	Yes	47,622	48,446	4,746	43,700	9.8	Cloudy, 20.
Houston at Cleveland	No	59,187	60,266	4,241	56,025	7.0	Cloudy, 25.
Kansas City at Denver	Yes	62,697	63,357	5,362	57,995	8.4	Cloudy, 34.
New Orleans at New England	No	52,950	54,057	465	53,592	.009	Sunny, 36.
S.F. 49ers at San Diego	No	34,008	34,994	1,445	33,539	4.2	Sunny, 66.
Tampa Bay at Pittsburgh	Yes	49,576	50,332	6,947	43,385	13.8	Sunny, 35.
Washington at N.Y. Jets	No	58,020	59,199	12,561	46,638	21.2	Clear, 38.
Cincinnati at Oakland	Yes	53,042	54,037	1,607	52,430	2.9	Clear, 56
Total		784,581	802,001	83,923	718,078	10.5	
Totals:							
Weeks (13)		10,257,719	10,485,423	776,631	9,708,792	7.4	
TV games (8)		468,169	474,406	46,963	427,443	9.9	
Non-TV games (6)		316,412	327,595	36,960	290,635	11.3	
Season totals:							
TV games (81)		4,632,946	4,740,166	309,885	4,430,281	6.5	
Non-TV games (101)		5,624,773	5,745,257	466,746	5,278,511	8.2	

14TH WEEK (AVERAGE IN-HOUSE FOR 196 GAMES: 52,789)

Los Angeles at Detroit	No	77,878	79,036	5,881	73,155	7.4	Domed, clear, 20.
Minnesota at Miami	No	52,945	53,899	8,046	45,853	14.9	Rain, 70.
Pittsburgh at Houston	No	51,066	52,432	7,689	44,743	14.6	Rain, 45.
Buffalo at Baltimore	No	52,683	53,731	3,280	50,451	61.1	Clear.
Cincinnati at N.Y. Jets	No	53,642	55,078	24,011	31,067	43.6	Cloudy, 43.
Cleveland at Kansas City	No	48,950	50,167	15,827	34,340	31.5	Sunny, 46.
Denver at Chicago	Yes	56,673	57,359	12,900	44,459	22.4	Sunny, 30.
Green Bay at Atlanta	No	44,016	45,240	22,124	2,116	48.9	Rain, 55.
New England at Tampa Bay	No	43,714	45,162	5,556	39,606	12.3	Sunny, 82.
St. Louis at N.Y. Giants	Yes	75,621	76,539	15,986	60,553	20.9	Rain, 41.
San Diego at Oakland	Yes	52,676	53,658	3,556	50,102	6.6	Cloudy, 55.
S.F. 49ers at New Orleans	No	49,230	51,761	9,225	42,536	17.8	Domed, cloudy.
Seatle at Philadelphia	Yes	63,807	64,780	26,831	37,949	41.4	Cloudy, 35.
Washington at Dallas	Yes	63,398	65,027	5,111	59,916	7.9	Cloudy, 48.
Total		786,299	803,869	166,023	637,846	20.6	
Totals:							
Weeks (14)		11,044,018	11,289,292	942,654	10,346,638	8.3	
TV games (5)		312,175	317,363	64,384	252,979	20.3	
Non-TV games (9)		474,124	486,506	101,639	384,867	20.9	
Season totals:							
TV games (86)		4,951,389	5,120,871	374,650	4,746,221	7.3	
Non-TV games (110)		6,036,216	6,168,421	568,004	5,600,417	9.2	

Appendix F.—Television Stations Subject to the NFL's Home Territory Blackout Policy

TV STATIONS SUBJECT TO LEAGUE HOME TERRITORY BLACKOUT POLICY

Home city	In city stations	Others
1. Atlanta	ABC—WOXI, NBC—WSB, CBS—WAGA.	None.
2. Baltimore	ABC—WJZ, NBC—WBAL, CBS—WMAR.	NBC—Washington, D.C., WRC. CBS—Washington, D.C., WTOP. ABC—Washington, D.C., WMAL. NBC—Hagerstown, WHAG. NBC—Harrisburg, WGAL. CBS—Harrisburg, WHP. CBS—York, WSBA. ABC—York, WTPA. CBS—Lancaster, WLYH.
3. Buffalo	ABC—WKBW, NBC—WGR, CBS—WBEN.	ABC—Rochester, WOKR. NBC—Rochester, WROC. CBS—Rochester, WHEC. ABC—Erie, WJET. NBC—Erie, WICU. CBS—Erie, WSEE. CBC—Toronto, Canada, CFTC. CBC—Toronto, Canada, CBLT. CTV—Hamilton, Canada, CHC.
4. Chicago	ABC—WLS, NBC—WMAQ	South Bend-Rockford Proviso, "Bears shall retain right to reexamine the South Bend-Rockford situation in the event that Bears attendance should show a significant drop below capacity."
5. Cincinnati	ABC—WKRC, NBC—WLW, CBS—WCPO.	ABC—Dayton, WKEF. NBC—Dayton, WLWD. CBS—Dayton, WHIO. ABC—Lexington, WBLG. NBC—Lexington, WLEX. CBS—Lexington, WKYT. IND—Springfield.
6. Cleveland	ABC—WEWS, NBC—WKYC, CBS—WJW.	ABC—Youngstown, WYTV. NBC—Youngstown, WFMJ. CBS—Youngstown, WKBN. ABC—Akron/Canton, WAKR.
7. Denver	ABC—KBTV, NBC—KOA, CBS—KMGH.	ABC—Pueblo, KRDO. NBC—Pueblo, KOAA. CBS—Pueblo, KKTV.
8. Dallas	ABC—WFAA, NBC—WBAP, CBS—KDFW.	ABC/CBS—Waco, KWTS. ABC/NBC—Tyler, KLTV. ABC/NBC/CBS—Sherman, KXII. CBS—Wichita Falls, KAUZ. NBC—Wichita Falls, KFDZ.
9. Detroit	ABC—WXYZ, NBC—WWJ, CBS—WJBK.	NBC—Lansing, WILX. CBS—Lansing, WJIM. ABC—Toledo, WDHO. NBC—Toledo, WSPD. CBS—Toledo, WTOL. ABC—Flint, WJRT. CBS—Saginaw, WEYI. NBC—Bay City, WNEH. CBC—Windsor, Ontario.
10. Green Bay	ABC—WLUK,[1] NBC—WFRV,[1] CBS—WBAY.[1]	ABC—Wausau, WAOW.[1] CBS—Wausau WSAU.[1] ABC—Milwaukee, WIUI.[2] NBC—Milwaukee, WTHJ.[2] CBS—Milwaukee, WI N.[2]
11. Houston	ABC—KTRK, NBC—KPRC, CBS—KHOU.	ABC/NBC—Lufkin, KTRE. ABC/CBS—Bryan, KBTX. ABC—Beaumont, KBMT. NBC—Beaumont, KJAC. CBS—Beaumont, KFDI.
12. Kansas City	ABC—KMBC, NBC—WDAF, CBS—KCMO.	NBC—Topeka, KTSB. CBS—Topeka, WIBW. ABC—St. Joseph, KQTV. NBC—Pittsburgh, KOAM.
13. Los Angeles	ABC—KABC, NBC—KNBC, CBS—KNXT.	ABC—San Diego, KCST. NBC—San Diego, KOGO. CBS—San Diego, KFMB.
14. Miami	ABC—WPLG, NBC—WCKT, CBS—WTVJ.	ABC—West Palm Beach, WEAT. NBC—West Palm Beach, WPTV. NBC—Fort Myers, WBBH. CBS—Fort Myers, WINK. ABC—Naples, WEVA channel 6.
15. Minneapolis/St. Paul	ABC—KMSP, NBC—KSTP, CBS—WCCO.	CBS—Mankato, KEYC. CBS—Mason City, KGLO. NBC—Alexandria, KCMT. NBC—Rochester, KROC. ABC—Austin, KAUS.
16. New England	CBS—WNAC, NBC—WBZ, ABC—WCVB.	ABC—Providence, WEV. NBC—Providence, WCAR. CBS—Providence, WPRI. ABC—Manchester, N.H., WMUR.
17. New Orleans	ABC—WVUE, NBC—WDSU, CBS—WWL.	ABC/CBS—Baton Rouge, WAFB. NBC—Baton Rouge, WBRZ. IND—Baton Rouge, WRDT.
18. New York	ABC—WABC, NBC—WNBC, CBS—WCBS.	None.

See footnotes at end of table.

TV STATIONS SUBJECT TO LEAGUE HOME TERRITORY BLACKOUT POLICY—Continued

Home city	In city stations	Others
19. Oakland	ABC—KGO, NBC—KRON, CBS—KPIX.	ABC—Sacramento, KOVR. NBC—Sacramento, KCRA. CBS—Sacramento, KXTV. NBC/CBS—Sacramento, KTXL. NBC—Salinas/Monterey, KSBW. CBS—Salinas/Monterey, KMST. ABC—San Jose, KNTV.
20. Philadelphia	ABC—WPVI, NBC—KYW, CBS—WCAU.	Harrisburg/Lancaster/Lebanon: ABC—WTPA, NBC—WGAL, CBS—WLYH. Scranton-Wilkes Barre: ABC—WNEP, NBC—WBRE, CBS—WDAU.
21. Pittsburgh	ABC—WTAE, NBC—WIIC, CBS—KDKA.	NBC—Altoona, WJAC. CBS—Altoona, WFBG. CBS—Johnstown, WARD. ABC/CBS—Wheeling, WSTV. NBC—Steubenville, WTRF. Youngstown: ABC—WYTV, NBC—WFMJ. CBS—WKBN. Clarksburg/Weston: NBC—WBOY CBS—WDTV.
22. San Francisco	Same as Oakland	
23. St. Louis	ABC—KTVI, NBC—KSD, CBS—KMOX.	None.
24. San Diego	ABC—KCST, NBC—KOGO, CBS—KFMB.	ABC—Los Angeles, KABC. NBC—Los Angeles, KNBC. CBS—Los Angeles, KNXT.
25. Washington	ABC—WMAL, NBC—WRC, CBS—WTOP.	ABC—Baltimore, WJZ. NBC—Baltimore, WBAL. CBS—Baltimore, WMAR.

[1] Not blacked out when Green Bay plays in Milwaukee.
[2] Not blacked out when Green Bay plays at home.

Appendix G.—Summary of NFL Clubs Which Share Revenues Earned From the Sale of Concessions and Parking

CLUB REVENUE SHARING FROM CONCESSIONS [1]

Club	None	Yes		
		Food	Beverage	Parking
NFC:				
Atlanta Falcons	X			
Chicago Bears	X			
Dallas Cowboys		16⅔ pct	16⅔ pct	No.
Detroit Lions	X			
Green Bay Packers	X			
Los Angeles Rams		16⅔ pct	16⅔ pct	16⅔ pct.
Minnesota Vikings	X			
New Orleans Saints	X			
New York Giants [2]	X			
Philadelphia Eagles		15 pct	15 pct	No.
St. Louis Cardinals	X			
San Francisco 49ers	X			
Washington Redskins	X			
AFC:				
Baltimore Colts		20 pct	20 pct [3]	
Buffalo Bills		13½ pct	13½ pct	
Cincinnati Bengals			([4])	No.
Cleveland Browns		Approximately 20 pct	Approximately 20 pct [5]	No.
Denver Broncos	X			
Houston Oilers	X			
Kansas City Chiefs		42 pct	42 pct	100 pct.
Miami Dolphins			([6])	No.
New England Patriots		12½ pct	12½ pct	No.
New York Jets	X			
Oakland Raiders	X			
Pittsburgh Steelers	X			
San Diego Chargers		10 pct	10 pct	10 pct.

[1] All figures are taken from the Commission's Third Annual Report on the Effects of Public Law 93–107. According to the NFL, concession revenue sharing arrangements did not change last year.

[2] The Giants currently retain ½ of all concession receipts.

[3] May be 30 pct if lease negotiation makes this retroactive to 1975.

[4] 33.2 pct of gross receipts on sale of food and beverages; 33.6 pct of gross receipts on sale of alcoholic beverages; 13.2 pct of gross receipts on tobacco sales and vending machine sales; 32.2 pct of gross receipts on sales or rental of all other products; less 10 pct this total amount retained by city of Cincinnati.

[5] Cleveland Browns, Inc., does not have any ownership interest in the concession operation. Concessions, however, are, operated by Cleveland Stadium Corp., which is owned and controlled by Arthur B. Modell who also owns Cleveland Browns Inc.

[6] City of Miami receives 30.5 pct of the gross revenues from concessions. The concessionaire, Restaurant Associates participates in 50 pct of the profit after payment to the city of Miami and amortization of equipment. The Dolphins keep the remainder.

Appendix H.—Correspondence from and to the FCC Regarding Public Law 93–107

U.S. Senate,
Committee on Commerce,
Washington, D.C. October 5, 1976.

Hon. Richard E. Wiley,
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D.C.

Dear Chairman Wiley: As you are aware, the professional sports anti-blackout law (P.L. 93–107) expired on December 31, 1975, and the 94th Congress adjourned before renewing legislation was finally acted upon. It appears certain, however, that the Committee will again consider such legislation in the next Congress.

It is therefore requested that the Commission continue its monitoring and study of the television blackout policies and practices of professional football, baseball, basketball, and hockey so that the information and data necessary for appropriate legislative action will be available. In this regard, it is further requested that the Commission transmit a report on such monitoring and study by April 15, 1977. Should the Commission encounter any difficulties in complying with this request, the Committee should be so advised.

The Commission's assistance in this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Warren G. Magnuson,
Chairman.
John O. Pastore,
Chairman,
Communications Subcommittee.

Federal Communications Commission,
Washington, D.C., March 10, 1977.

Hon. Warren G. Magnuson,
Chairman, Committee on Commerce,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator Magnuson: This letter is in regard to the Commission's Fourth Annual Report on the Effects of the Sports Anti-blackout Legislation. As you will recall, this year's study is being done at your request since the enabling legislation, Public Law 93–107, expired on December 31, 1975. While the Commission is pleased to provide assistance in this matter, we believe it would be advantageous to defer delivery of the Report until June 15, 1977.

Unfortunately, data needed to analyze the effects of locally televised games on NFL season ticket sales will not be available until the latter part of April. Consequently, if the Report is to be delivered on April 15, 1977, as you initially requested, it will not address this particular issue. Additionally, the current professional basketball and hockey seasons run through the end of May. A thorough review of current television blackout policies regarding regular and post-season basketball and hockey games will necessitate a June 15 submission date. If this does not meet with your satisfaction, the Commission will deliver the Report on April 15, 1977.

Time permitting, this year's study will provide a complete update of the third annual report. Specifically, we intend to analyze the impact of local televised games on NFL "no shows," season ticket sales, and local television audience ratings. We further hope to provide Congress with an assessment of the effect of Public Law 93–107 on (1) the financial value of NFL television rights and (2) the distribution of revenues accruing from NFL telecasts between the League, the television networks, and their local affiliated stations.

We believe all this information to be pertinent to the sports anti-blackout issue and to those legislative proposals Congress may wish to consider. If there are any other issues or questions you believe should be addressed in the Report, please feel free to raise them. We will do our best to provide a thorough response.

Since the April 15 deadline is now a month away, it would be helpful to have your decision regarding the extension of time as soon as possible. Best regards.

Sincerely,

Richard E. Wiley, *Chairman.*

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., March 15, 1977.

Hon. LIONEL VAN DEERLIN,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Communications,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CHAIRMAN VAN DEERLIN: This letter is to inform you that the Commission is currently preparing a fourth annual report on the effects of the sports anti-blackout legislation. This year's study is being done at the request of Senator Magnuson since the enabling legislation, Public Law 93–107, expired on December 31, 1975.

Senator Magnuson originally requested that the report be submitted to Congress on or before April 15, 1977. We have asked that the submission date be extended to June 15, 1977.

The additional time is necessary to provide a thorough review of current television blackout policies regarding regular and post-season basketball and hockey games. The extension will also permit the staff to analyze relationships between locally televised games and NFL season ticket sales. Unfortunately, some of the information needed to complete the latter aspect of the report will not be available until May 1, 1977.

Time permitting, this year's study will provide a complete update of the third annual report. Specifically, we intend to analyze the impact of locally televised games on NFL "no shows" season ticket sales, and local television audience ratings. We further hope to provide Congress with an assessment of the effect of Public Law 93–107 on (1) the financial value of NFL telecasts and (2) the distribution of revenues accruing from NFL telecasts between the League, the television networks, and their local affiliated stations.

We believe all of this information is pertinent to the sports anti-blackout issue and to those legislative proposals Congress may wish to consider. If there are any other issues or questions you or your colleagues believe should be addressed in the report, please feel free to raise them. We will do our best to provide a thorough response.

Best personal regards,
Sincerely yours,

RICHARD E. WILEY, *Chairman.*

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION,
Washington, D.C., April 25, 1977.

Hon. RICHARD E. WILEY,
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CHAIRMAN WILEY: Thank you for your recent letter in regard to the Commission's Fourth Annual Report on the Effects of the Sports Anti-blackout Legislation.

Given the importance of the season ticket data yet to be obtained, I agree that an extension is called for. I have discussed this matter with the Communications Subcommittee, Senator Hollings, and he concurs in the extension of time to June 15.

With kindest regards,
Sincerely,

WARREN G. MAGNUSON, *Chairman.*

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., January 24, 1977.

THOMAS C. WILLIAMS, Esq.,
Connole and O'Connell,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. WILLIAMS: Thank you for your letter expressing your desire to fully cooperate with the Commission in its preparation of the fourth annual report on the effects of television blackout policies and practices on professional football, baseball, basketball, and hockey teams. As you know the Commission presently has no statutory authority to obtain information pertaining to this matter. However, Senators Magnuson and Pastore have requested that the Commission sub-

mit a fourth annual report on or before April 15, 1977. We shall comply with their wishes assuming that the professional sports leagues voluntarily submit the necessary information.

Mr. Blau, of our Office of Plans and Policy, has informed me that you have graciously provided most of the information needed to complete this year's study. For that we are appreciative. However additional material will have to be obtained if the fourth report is to be as complete and definitive as last year's version. Accordingly I am hopeful that you will assist us in acquiring the following data:

(1) The number and dollar value of season tickets offered for sale by each member club and the number of season tickets sold during the 1976 football season.

(2) Concession revenues earned by individual NFL teams during 1976 regular season games. Please list revenues earned from the sale of "Pro" magazine separately. Also designate any changes in the percentage of concession sales which accrued to individual teams during the 1976 season as opposed to the 1975 season.

(3) Parking revenues earned by individual NFL teams during the 1976 season. Also list the percentage of total parking revenues which accrued to each team during the 1976 season;

(4) Revenues earned by individual clubs from the sale of television exhibition rights to pre-, regular-, and post-season games during the 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, and 1976 seasons.

(5) Revenues earned by individual clubs from the sale of radio rights to pre-, regular-, and post-season games during the 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, and 1976 seasons. Also include any rebates paid to stations during those years.

(6) Pro forma combined income statements for NFL teams for 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, and 1972.

This information, coupled with that which you have already made available, will permit the Commission to thoroughly and accurately assess the impact of anti-blackout policies on live gate attendance at NFL games. The report will also contain an analysis of the relationship between locally televised games and season ticket sales, as well as a description of television audience ratings for locally televised NFL games over the past five years. I am hopeful that the Commission's efforts will assist Congress in resolving the sports anti-blackout issue in a manner which is fair to the NFL and its fans.

We recognize, of course, that the provision of this information may be burdensome. However, it is necessary if we are to meet our responsibility in providing Congress with a thorough and accurate report. Since this year's study must be transmitted on or before April 15, 1977, we hope that the requested data can be submitted as soon as conveniently possible or by February 24, 1977 at the latest, to ensure time for analysis and inclusion in the report.

As in the past, you are welcome to forward any other information which the NFL may consider relevant to the Commission's study regarding the effect of locally televised games on professional football.

Again thank you for your continuing assistance to the Commission on behalf of the NFL.

Sincerely yours,

RICHARD E. WILEY, *Chairman.*

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., January 24, 1977.

Commissioner PETE ROZELLE,
National Football League, New York, N.Y.

DEAR MR. ROZELLE: Enclosed is a copy of my January 24, 1977 letter to Thomas C. Williams, Esq., NFL Washington counsel requesting additional information relevant to the Commission's fourth annual study of the effect of locally televised games on the member clubs of the National Football League. As you know, the Commission's statutory authority to request this information expired on December 31, 1975. However Senators Magnuson and Pastore have asked the Commission to submit a fourth study to Congress on or before April 15, 1977. We shall comply with their request on the condition that the necessary data is voluntarily made available.

As always, both Mr. Williams' assistance and your office's cooperation is greatly appreciated.

Best personal regards.

Sincerely yours,

RICHARD E. WILEY, *Chairman.*

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., April 15, 1977.

Mr. BARRY FRANK,
Vice President, Sports, CBS Television Network,
New York, N.Y.

DEAR MR. FRANK: This letter is a request for financial information needed by the Commission to complete its fourth annual report to Congress on the effects of the sports anti-blackout law on professional football, basketball, baseball, and hockey teams. The request is limited to information pertaining to regular and post-season National Football League games produced by CBS during each of the previous five seasons. The Commission is specifically interested in obtaining the following data:

Annual cost of acquiring NFL television exhibition rights during each of the previous five (5) seasons.

Total annual production cost of regular and post-season NFL games during each of the previous five (5) seasons. Please provide separate costs for regular and post-season games, excluding costs associated with the pre- or post-game programs produced by CBS.

Average number of commercial minutes sold during regular and post-season NFL contests during each of the previous five (5) seasons. Please report regular and post-season figures separately and designate that portion of available commercial time sold by the local stations.

The average cost per rating point for network advertisements aired during regular and post-season NFL telecasts during each of the previous five (5) seasons. Please report regular and post-season figures separately.

This year's report on the effects of the sports anti-blackout legislation is being done at the request of Senator Warren G. Magnuson, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce. The requested information will be used to estimate the impact of locally televised NFL games on the value of television rights to professional football games. Since the report will be transmitted to Congress on June 15, 1977, the Commission requests that this material be submitted on or before May 15, 1977.

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Robert Blau of the Commission's Office of Plans and Policy, (202) 632-6312. Your cooperation is highly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

RICHARD E. WILEY, *Chairman.*

COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM,
Washington, D.C., May 17, 1977.

Mr. ROBERT T. BLAU,
Office of Plans and Policy,
Federal Communications Commission,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. BLAU: This will confirm our recent conversation in which I expressed CBS's concern with the data request set forth in the Chairman's letter of April 15, 1977 to Barry Frank, Vice President, Sports, CBS Television Network.

As I advised you, CBS is concerned with the confidentiality of the data sought with respect to the cost to CBS of NFL exhibition rights, production costs of NFL games and average cost of per rating point of network advertising. We think that this is information that would cause competitive and business harm to CBS and its affiliates vis-a-vis the NFL, the other networks and advertisers. Accordingly, as I explained, we are limiting our response to data concerning the average number of commercial minutes sold by the CBS Television Network, and available to affiliates for local sale for the first five seasons.

Yours truly,

JOSEPH DEFRANCO.

NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, 1972–73 TO 1976–77

	1972–73	1973–74	1974–75	1975–76	1976–77
Average number network minutes sold per game (includes pre and post game):					
Regular season [1]	23.0	25.5	23.5	23.5	24.0
Post-season	28.5	29.0	28.0	31.0	30.0
Average number minutes available for local sale per game (includes pre and post game): [2]					
Regular season	4 minutes and 30 seconds				
Post-season	5 minutes and 10 seconds				

[1] Includes preseason games.
[2] Including 1 min adjacency both prior to pregame and at close of NFC coverage.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., April 15, 1977.

Mr. ROONE ARLEDGE,
President, ABC Sports, Inc., New York, N.Y.

DEAR MR. ARLEDGE: This letter is a request for financial information needed by the Commission to complete its fourth annual report to Congress on the effects of the sports anti-blackout law on professional football, basketball, baseball, and hockey teams. The request is limited to information pertaining to regular season National Football League games produced by ABC during each of the previous five seasons. The Commission is specifically interested in obtaining the following data:

Annual cost of acquiring NFL television exhibition rights during each of the previous five (5) seasons.

Total annual production cost of regular season NFL games during each of the previous five (5) seasons.

Average number of commercial minutes sold during regular season NFL Monday Night Telecasts during each of the previous five (5) seasons. Please designate that portion of available commercial time which is sold by local stations.

The average cost per rating point for network advertisements aired during regular season NFL telecasts during each of the previous five (5) seasons.

This year's report on the effects of the sports anti-blackout legislation is being done at the request of Senator Warren G. Magnuson, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce. The requested information will be used to estimate the impact of locally televised NFL games on the value of television rights to professional football games. Since the report will be transmitted to Congress on June 15, 1977, the Commission requests that this material be submitted on or before May 15, 1977.

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Robert Blau of the Commission's Office of Plans and Policy, (202) 632–6312. Your cooperation is highly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

RICHARD E. WILEY, *Chairman.*

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., April 15, 1977.

Mr. CHESTER R. SIMMONS,
Vice President, Sports, NBC Television Network,
New York, N.Y.

DEAR MR. SIMMONS: This letter is a request for financial information needed by the Commission to complete its fourth annual report to Congress on the effects of the sports anti-blackout law on professional football, basketball, baseball, and hockey teams. The request is limited to information pertaining to regular and post-season National Football League games produced by NBC during each of the previous five seasons. The Commission is specifically interested in obtaining the following data:

Annual cost of acquiring NFL television exhibition rights during each of the previous five (5) seasons.

Total annual production cost of regular and post-season NFL games during each of the previous five (5) seasons. Please provide separate costs for regular and post-season games, excluding costs associated with pre- or post-game programs produced by NBC.

Average number of commercial minutes sold during regular and post-season NFL contests during each of the previous five (5) seasons. Please report regular and post-season figures separately and designate that portion of available commercial time sold by local stations.

The average cost per rating point for network advertisements aired during regular and post-season NFL telecasts during each of the previous five (5) seasons. Please report regular and post-season figures separately.

This year's report on the effects of the sports anti-blackout legislation is being done at the request of Senator Warren G. Magnuson, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce. The requested information will be used to estimate the impact of locally televised NFL games on the value of television rights to professional football games. Since the report will be transmitted to Congress on June 15, 1977, the Commission requests that this material be submitted on or before May 15, 1977.

Should you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Robert Blau of the Commission's Office of Plans and Policy, (202) 632–6312. Your cooperation is highly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

RICHARD E. WILEY, *Chairman.*

NBC TELEVISION NETWORK DIVISION NATIONAL
BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC.,
New York, N.Y., May 13, 1977.

Hon. RICHARD E. WILEY,
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CHAIRMAN WILEY: This is in response to your letter of April 15, 1977, requesting financial information concerning NFL football games produced by NBC.

With one exception referred to below, the information requested is sensitive and competitive financial information we do not make available even if we had compiled it in the manner you requested.

Furthermore, much of the information you request is not presently available in the form you desire. Assembling this information as requested would be a substantial burden.

It is significant that in assembling previous reports to Congress on the sports anti-blackout law, the Commission has never believed that this information was necessary. Obviously the Commission has never before considered the information requested to be relevant to the purposes served by the report. No explanation is given as to why the requested information is necessary for this particular report.

Regarding the number of commercial minutes sold during NBC broadcasts of NFL games, NBC normally has an average of 20 commercial minutes per game during both regular season NFL games and playoff games. These figures have not varied substantially over the past five seasons. In addition, local stations have two 60-second commercial positions for sale.

As the Commission is aware, NBC wishes to be as cooperative as possible with the Commission in all of its regulatory endeavors. However, for the reasons stated above, we must decline to divulge the requested financial information. If you feel further discussion would be desirable, our Washington office (Howard Monderer or John Sturm) is available to talk with you or your representative.

Respectfully yours,

CHESTER R. SIMMONS.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., January 24, 1977.

Mr. BOWIE KUHN,
Commissioner of Baseball,
New York, N.Y.

DEAR MR. KUHN: Enclosed is a copy of my January 24, 1977 letter to James F. Fitzpatrick, Esq., Washington counsel for Major League Baseball, requesting information relevant to the Commission's fourth annual study of the effect of locally televised games on professional baseball. As you know, the Commission's statutory authority to request this information expired on December 31, 1975. However Senators Magnuson and Pastore have asked the Commission to submit a fourth study to Congress on or before April 15, 1977. We shall comply with their request on the condition that the necessary data is made available.

As always both Mr. Fitzpatrick's assistance and your office's cooperation is greatly appreciated.

Best personal regards.

Sincerely yours,

RICHARD E. WILEY, *Chairman.*

Enclosure.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., January 24, 1977.

JAMES F. FITZPATRICK, ESQ.
Arnold and Porter, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. FITZPATRICK: The Commission is currently preparing its fourth annual report to Congress on the effects of locally televised games on professional baseball, basketball, football, and hockey teams. As you know, our statutory reporting requirements pursuant to Public Law 93–107 expired December 31, 1975. However, Senators Magnuson and Pastore have asked the Commission to submit a fourth study to Congress on or before April 15, 1977.* We shall comply with this request on the condition that the various professional sports leagues submit the necessary information. Consequently the Commission must again request your assistance as counsel for Major League Baseball in providing the following data for the 1976 baseball season:

(1) The total number of games played during the 1976 season (breakdown by pre-, regular, post-season, all star, etc.);

(2) The number of games in the 1976 season which were scheduled for telecast pursuant to a league television contract and the number of games which were in fact so telecast (breakdown by pre-, regular, post-season, all star, etc.); also please indicate the home and visiting team and date for each game, and the name of party with which Major League Baseball contracted for telecast. If any games scheduled for telecast pursuant to league contract were not in fact televised, please indicate the reasons therefore;

(3) Of the games specified in (2) above, please indicate the games for which a local blackout was lifted. Also indicate the number of locally televised games which were sold out 72 hours in advance of game time.

(4) For each Major League Baseball team, please indicate the seating capacity figure for its home stadium. If the stadium capacity figure differs from the base number of tickets of admission employed in determining seating ticket availabilities 120 hours pre-game time, please also provide the latter figure. If any of the games specified in (2) above were played in other than a Major League Baseball team's home stadium, please provide similar information for that stadium;

(5) Please indicate the means used by the respective teams to inform the public of the number of tickets available during the 120 to 72 hour pre-game period;

(6) Indicate the number of "no shows" at those regular and post-season games which were locally televised and those which were blacked out in the home team's territory;

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*See letter of Oct. 5, 1976, to Chairman Richard E. Wiley from Senator Warren G. Magnuson and Senator John O. Pastore.

(7) Club revenues from television for game rights (pre-, regular, and post-season);

(8) Club revenues from radio for game rights (pre-, regular, and post-season) including any rebates paid for 1976 season;

Since the Commission's report must be transmitted to the Congress by April 1, 1977, it is hoped that the requested information can be provided as soon as conveniently possible, or by March 1, 1977 at the latest, to insure time for analysis and inclusion in the report. You are, of course, welcome to provide any other information which Major League Baseball may consider relevant to the Commission's study of the effect of locally televised games on professional baseball.

Should you have any questions concerning this request, please contact Mr. Robert T. Blau of the Commission's staff, (202) 632–6312. Your cooperation and assistance on behalf of Major League Baseball will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

RICHARD E. WILEY, *Chairman.*

ARNOLD & PORTER,
Washington, D.C., February 28, 1977.

Hon. RICHARD E. WILEY,
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CHAIRMAN WILEY: This is in response to your letter of January 24, 1977, in which you request Baseball's cooperation in providing information in conjunction with the now-expired Public Law 93–107, the Professional Sports Anti-Blackout Law.

The Office of the Commissioner of Baseball has informed us that none of the 41 1976 regular season network baseball telecasts—the Saturday Games of the Week and the Monday Night Games—were sellouts. Furthermore, there is a long-standing policy of permitting Baseball's showcase events—which in 1976 consisted of 4 World Series games, 8 League Championship Series games and the All-Star games—to be televised in the home team's territory whether or not they are sold out far enough in advance to trigger the Anti-Blackout Law. These were the only Baseball network telecasts in 1976.

Sellouts of Baseball games, not to speak of those occurring 72 hours prior to game time, are extremely infrequent. Traditionally, many fans purchase their tickets at the gate just prior to game time. Additionally, by comparison to other sports, there are relatively few season tickets sold by baseball clubs. Consequently, the Commissioner's Office maintains no records regarding advance sales, no-shows, or related information.

Therefore, in view of the general inapplicability of the Anti-Blackout Law to Baseball's particular situation, and in keeping with past practice, the response to your letter has been treated accordingly.

We plan continued cooperation with you and your office in providing data. Please do not hesitate to contact us if you require any further assistance.

Sincerely yours,

JAMES J. FITZPATRICK.

COMMISSIONER OF BASEBALL,
OFFICE OF PLANS AND POLICY,
January 27, 1977.

Mr. RICHARD E. WILEY,
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR DICK: This will acknowledge your letter of January 24th requesting information on the effect of televised games. You will, of course, have our complete cooperation as in the past. I will ask Jim Fitzpatrick to see to it that you are furnished the information you need.

With kind regards.

Sincerely yours,

BOWIE K. KUHN, *Commissioner.*

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., January 24, 1977.

ROBERT H. KAUFMAN, Esq.,
Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn,
New York, N.Y.

DEAR MR. KAUFMAN: The Commission is currently preparing its fourth annual report to Congress on the effect of locally televised games on professional baseball, basketball, football, and hockey teams. As you know, our statutory reporting requirements pursuant to Public Law 93–107 expired on December 31, 1975. However, Senator Warren G. Magnuson and Senator John O. Pastore have asked the Commission to submit a fourth study to Congress on or before April 15, 1977.[1] We shall comply with this request on the condition that the various professional sports leagues supply the necessary information. Consequently we must again request your assistance in obtaining the following data for the National Basketball Association's 1976–77 season:

(1) The total number of games played during the 1976–77 season (breakdown by regular season, play-off, and all star);

(2) The number of games in the 1976–77 season which were scheduled for telecast pursuant to a league television contract and the number of games which in fact were so telecast (breakdown by regular season, play-off and all star; also please indicate the home and visiting team and date for each game, and the name of party with which the league contracted for telecast). If any games scheduled for telecast pursuant to league contract were not in fact televised, please indicate the reasons therefore;

(3) Of the games specified in (2) above, please indicate those which were locally televised and those which were blacked out in the home team's territory. With regard to games where the blackout was not lifted, please indicate whether any of these games were sold out 72 hours in advance;

(4) For each league team, please indicate the seating capacity figure for its home arena. If the arena capacity figure differs from the base number of tickets of admission employed in determining seating ticket availabilities 120 hours prior to game time, please also provide the latter figure. Additionally, if any of the games specified in (2) above were played at other than a league team's home arena, please provide similar information for that arena;

(5) For each NBA team, please indicate the total number of "no shows" at pre- and regular season games. If possible, also designate the average number of "no shows" at locally televised and blackout home games;

(6) Please indicate the means used by the respective teams to inform the public of the number of tickets available during the 120 to 72 hour pre-game period;

(7) Club revenues earned from the sale of television rights to pre-, regular, and post-season NBA games;

(8) Club revenues earned from the sale of radio rights to pre-, regular, and post-season NBA games;

Please feel free to provide any other information that you believe to be relevant regarding the effect of locally televised games on member clubs of the NBA.

Since the Commission's report is due on April 15, 1977, we would appreciate receiving this information from you by March 11, 1977. We realize that the National Basketball Association's full season of play may not be completed by this time, but hope that you will forward as much of the necessary available data as possible to the Commission in time for analysis and inclusion in this report.

Should you have any questions concerning this request, please contact Mr. Robert T. Blau of the Commission's Office of Plans and Policy (202) 632–6312. Your continued cooperation and assistance on behalf of the National Basketball Association will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

RICHARD E. WILEY, *Chairman.*

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[1] See letter of Oct. 5, 1976 to Chairman Richard E. Wiley from Senator Warren G. Magnuson and Senator John O. Pastore.

NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION,
New York, N.Y., April 29, 1977.

Hon. RICHARD E. WILEY,
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CHAIRMAN WILEY: On April 21, 1977, you wrote to our attorney, Robert H. Kaufman, of Proskauer, Rose, Goetz & Mendelsohn stating that you had not received a response to your request for cooperation in preparing the FCC's report to Congress on the effect of locally televised sports events.

The requested information was sent to you on March 9, 1977, directly by George Faust, Director of Broadcasting for the National Basketball Association. However, in the event this material was not received by your office, I am enclosing herewith two additional copies of Mr. Faust's compilation.

In addition, as requested, the NBA will forward to you an updated report, including data from our playoff games, as soon as possible. However, this will not be possible by May 15, since our championship round will not end before the first week in June.

If the NBA can provide you with any further information or assistance, please contact me directly at the NBA League Office.

Sincerely,

RUSSELL T. GRANIK, *Counsel.*

NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION,
New York, N.Y., March 9, 1977.

Mr. RICHARD E. WILEY,
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. WILEY: The attached report is provided in accordance with a request contained in your letter of January 24, 1977, to Mr. Robert H. Kaufman of Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn, attorneys for the National Basketball Association.

We are herewith attempting to supply you with the requested information insofar as it can be provided for the 1976–77 season, as of this writing, which is through the broadcast date of February 27. References are made to your numbered subparagraphs with explanations and comments appropriate thereto:

1. The total number of games played during the 1976–77 season by all 22 member clubs of the association will be as follows:

	Maximum	Minimum
Regular season	902	902
Playoffs	61	36
All-Star Game	1	1
Total	964	939

2. The number of games in the 1976–77 season scheduled for telecast pursuant to a league contract are a total of 39. This figure is made up of the following components:

Regular season (includes All-Star Game)	17
Playoffs	22
Total	39

There is a provision in our agreement with the CBS Television Network for some variation on these components and current projections indicate 20 regular season games and 21 playoff games. The attached log sheet indicates the other factors, such as home and visiting team, dates, etc. All games pursuant to a league contract are provided for in an exclusive agreement with the CBS Television Network.

3. The attached log indicates all factors requested in this paragraph.

4. The attached log indicates all factors requested in this paragraph. All games indicated were played in the regular home arenas of those teams so designated.

5. The information requested under this number is also contained in the attached log. Please note that this information is for only regular season games to be televised over the facilities of the CBS Television Network pursuant to the league agreement with them.

6. The attached log indicates all factors requested in this paragraph.

7. Club revenues earned from the sale of television rights cannot be determined until the season is completed.

8. Club revenues earned from the sale of radio rights cannot be determined until the season is completed.

It should be noted that all of the information contained herein and the attached log applies only to those games of the National Basketball Association televised through February 27, 1977, pursuant to our agreement with the CBS Television Network for the 1976–77 season. Similar data for television and radio broadcast agreements between member clubs and local radio and television stations is not in possession of the league office.

We will supplement this report at the close of the season for the remaining regular season and playoff game telecasts if you so desire. Please advise on this point.

We trust that you will find this information self explanatory and helpful, but should you have any questions, please contact the undersigned.

Sincerely,

GEORGE W. FAUST,
Director of Broadcasting.

Attachment.

NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION, NETWORK TELEVISED GAME REPORT

Regular season games	Locally televised	Blacked out	Arena seating capacity	Comps. issued	Tickets on sale 120 h before game time	Means used to advertise available tickets between 120 and 72 h pregame period	Tickets sold 72 h before game time	Unsold tickets 72 h before game time	Total tickets sold	Total paid attendance	No-shows
November 25: Washington at Phoenix		X	13,274	2,300	10,974	Radio, newspaper	4,956	6,018	6,774	6,255	519
December 25: Chicago at Kansas City		X [1]	16,590	4,611	11,979	Print ad, radio, TV	3,696	8,283	4,965	4,965	
January 2: Philadelphia at New York Nets	X		15,621	1,216	14,405	Radio, newspaper	7,012	7,393	8,663	8,615	48
January 9: Los Angeles at Detroit		X	11,147	314	10,833	Radio, TV	4,000	6,833	6,943	6,661	282
January 16:											
Regional:											
Indiana at San Antonio		X	10,446	881	9,565	Radio, TV, newspaper	5,411	4,154	6,533	6,119	414
New Orleans at Philadelphia		X	18,176	489	17,687	Media, In-house advertisement.	10,849	6,838	13,371	12,208	1,163
Denver at Seattle	X		14,098	923	13,175	N/A	13,175		13,175	13,175	
National: New York Knicks at Golden State.		X	13,155	827	12,328	Radio, TV, newspapers	11,478	850	12,322	12,316	6
January 23: Regional:											
Philadelphia at Boston	X		15,040	430	14,610	Press	14,332	278	[2] 14,332	14,332	Unknown
New York Knicks at New Orleans		X	23,000	950	[4] 17,500	Radio, TV, publicity	7,000	10,500	13,079	13,079	
Portland at San Antonio		X	10,446	2,671	7,775	Radio, TV, newspapers	6,361	1,414	7,364	7,005	359
Seattle at Phoenix		X	13,274	3,396	9,878	Radio, newspaper	8,593	1,285	9,878	9,878	
January 30: Regional:											
Philadelphia at Denver	X		17,297	1,232	16,065	Radio, TV, print, PA at game.	16,065		16,065	[3] 16,065	1,310
San Antonio at Seattle	X		14,098	1,818	12,280	Radio, newspaper	12,280		12,280	12,280	

February 6:										
Regional:										
Kansas City at Detroit	X		11,147	458	10,689	Radio, TV	3,500	7,189	6,222	5,666	556
Los Angeles at Philadelphia	X		18,176	550	17,626	News media, in-house advertising.	13,042	4,584	17,060	16,292	768
New York Knicks at San Antonio	X		10,446	1,004	9,442	Radio, TV, newspaper	8,653	789	9,064	8,804	260
Chicago at Indiana	X		16,924	1,053	15,871	TV, radio, newspaper	9,683	6,188	12,652	12,652	
Houston at New Orleans	X		23,000	668	[4] 18,000	Radio, TV, publicity	3,500	14,500	8,872	8,872	
National: at Denver at Phoenix	X		13,274	778	12,496	Radio, newspapers	8,973	3,523	11,123	10,866	257
February 13: All-Star Game	X		10,938	652	10,286	N/A	10,152	134	10,152	10,152	N/A
February 20:											
Regional:											
Cleveland at Philadelphia	X		18,176	544	17,632	News media, in-house advertising.	13,637	3,995	15,205	14,461	744
New Orleans at San Antonio	X		10,446	1,363	9,083	Radio, TV, newspaper	5,491	3,592	6,269	5,831	438
Phoenix at Detroit	X		11,147	286	10,861	Radio, TV, newspaper	4,000	6,861	7,463	7,233	2 0
Los Angeles at Washington	X		17,973	1,393	16,580	Radio, newspaper	11,652	4,928	14,775	13,784	991
National: Boston at Golden State	X		13,155	788	12,367	Radio, newspapers	12,135	232	12,285	12,285	
February 27:											
Regional:											
Buffalo at Washington	X		17,973	1,532	16,441	Radio, newspapers	8,632	7,809	9,928	8,669	1,259
San Antonio at New Orleans	X		23,000	712	[4] 19,000	Radio, TV, publicity	2,500	16,500	6,748	6,748	
Philadelphia at Seattle	X		14,098	877	13,221	Sold out 3 weeks in advance.	13,221		13,221	13,221	

[1] CBS outlet within 75 mi of Kansas City (WIBW–TV, Topeka) carried this game due to an error in instructions to the station from the network.
[2] Includes 192 roof box seats not shown on box office report and not controlled by club. The difference represents late returns that did not sell when game was announced for local TV.
[3] Attendance based on number of tickets sold plus comps. In this case, 17,766 (includes 17,297 seats plus 469 obstructed view seats—in effect, standing room tickets.)
[4] New Orleans Jazz tickets available for sale 120 h before game time do not include tickets sold to season ticketholders.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., April 21, 1977.

ROBERT H. KAUFMAN, Esq.,
Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn,
New York, N.Y.

DEAR MR. KAUFMAN: As you may recall, on January 24, 1977, I sought your cooperation in preparing the Commission's fourth annual report to Congress on the effect of locally televised games on your teams. (see enclosure) Since I have not yet received your response, I hasten to ask that you extend the information from March 1, 1977 through the end of your championship games, and forward it to me by May 15, 1977. I urge you to comply by then, for without your cooperation, insufficiencies will arise that we may be asked to explain. Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely yours,

RICHARD E. WILEY, *Chairman.*

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., January 24, 1977.

Mr. WILLIAM H. MACFARLAND,
President, World Hockey Association,
Toronto, Ontario

DEAR MR. MACFARLAND: The Commission is currently preparing its fourth annual report on the effects of locally televised games on professional baseball, basketball, football, and hockey teams. As you may know, our statutory reporting requirements pursuant to Public Law 93–107 expired on December 31, 1975. However, Senators Warren G. Magnuson and John O. Pastore have asked the Commission to submit a fourth study to Congress on or before April 15, 1977. We shall comply with their request on the condition that the various professional sports leagues supply the necessary information. Consequently, we must again request your office's assistance in obtaining the following data for the World Hockey Association's 1976–77 season:

(1) The total number of games to be played during the 1976–77 season (breakdown by pre-, regular, post-season, all star, etc.);

(2) The number of games in the 1976–77 season which are scheduled for telecast pursuant to league television contract and the number of games which are in fact so telecast (breakdown by pre-, regular, post-season, all star, etc.); also please indicate the home and visiting teams and date for each game, and the name of party with which WHA contracted for telecast. If any games scheduled for telecast pursuant to a league contract are not in fact televised, please indicate the reasons therefore;

(3) Of the games specified in (2) above, please indicate those for which a local blackout was lifted and explain why these games were televised locally;

(4) For each WHA team, please indicate the seating capacity for its home arena. If the arena capacity figure differs from the base number of tickets of admission employed in determining seating ticket availabilities 120 hours pre-game time, please also provide the latter figure. If any of the games specified in (2) above are played at other than a WHA team's arena, please provide similar information for that arena;

(5) Please indicate the means used by the respective teams to inform the public of the number of tickets available during the 120 to 72 hour pre-game period;

(6) Please indicate the number of season tickets sold by each WHA team and the average attendance at each team's games during the past three seasons;

(7) Indicate the total number of "no shows" experienced by individual WHA teams. Also designate the average number of "no shows" for those games which were and were not televised in the home team's territory;

(8) The extent to which the WHA plans to comply with the intent of Public Law 93–107 through the remainder of the 1976–77 season;

(9) Gross concession and parking revenues earned by individual WHA teams through March 1, 1977; and

(10) Annual gross receipts earned from the sale of radio and television rights to WHA games between 1972 and 1977.

Please feel free to provide any other information that you believe to be relevant regarding the effect of locally televised games on the member clubs of the WHA.

Since the Commission's report to Congress is due on April 15, 1977, we would appreciate receiving this information from you by March 11, 1977. We realize that the World Hockey Association's full season of play will not be completed

by this time, but we hope that you will supply as much of the necessary available data as possible to the Commission in time for analysis and inclusion in this year's report.

Should you have any questions concerning this request, please contact Mr. Robert T. Blau of the Commission's Office of Plans and Policy (202) 632–6312. Your continued cooperation and assistance on behalf of the World Hockey Association will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

RICHARD E. WILEY, *Chairman.*

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., April 21, 1977.

MR. WILLIAM H. MACFARLAND,
President, World Hockey Association,
Toronto, Ontario.

DEAR MR. MACFARLAND: As you may recall, on January 24, 1977, I sought your cooperation in preparing the Commission's fourth annual report to Congress on the effect of locally televised games on your teams. (see enclosure) Since I have not yet received your response, I hasten to ask that you extend the information from March 1, 1977 through the end of your championship games, and forward it to me by May 15, 1977. I urge you to comply by then, for without your cooperation, insufficiencies will arise that we may be asked to explain. Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely yours,

RICHARD E. WILEY, *Chairman.*

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., January 24, 1977.

PHILIP R. HOCHBERG, Esq.,
O'Connor and Hannan,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. HOCHBERG: The Commission is currently preparing its fourth annual report to Congress on the effects of locally televised games on professional football, baseball, basketabll, and hockey franchises. As you know, our statutory reporting requirements pursuant to Public Law 93–107 expired on December 31, 1975. However, Senators Magnuson and Pastore have requested that the Commission submit a fourth report to Congress on or before April 15, 1977.* We intend to comply with their request, on the condition that the various professional sports leagues make the necessary information available in a timely manner.

Consequently, we must again request your assistance as counsel for the National Hockey League, in providing information relevant to this year's study. Specifically, we are hopeful that the following data will be provided for the National Hockey League's 1976–77 season:

(1) The total number of games to be played during the 1976–77 season with breakdowns in regular season, play-off and all star categories;

(2) The schedule of the 1976–77 National Hockey League games to be telecast pursuant to a league contract;

(3) A list of National Hockey League games televised pursuant to a league contract as of March 1, 1977. Please designate which of these games were sold out 72 hours in advance and specify those which were and were not locally televised;

(4) The extent to which the NHL plans to comply with the intent of Public Law 93–107 through the remainder of the 1976–77 season;

(5) The seating capacities for all NHL arenas;

(6) The extent that the seating capacity figures, sought in subparagraph 5 above, exceed the number of tickets available 120 hours before game time;

(7) The means by which the respective teams inform the public of the number of tickets available during the 120 to 72 hour pre-game period;

(8) For each NHL team, please indicate the total number of "no shows" at regular season games. Also indicate the average number of "no shows" at games which were and were not locally televised;

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*See letter of Senator Magnuson and Senator Pastore to Richard E. Wiley, Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, Oct. 5, 1976.

(9) Gross concession and parking revenues earned by individual NHL teams through March 1, 1977;

(10) Annual gross receipts earned from the sale of radio and television rights to NHL games between 1972 and 1977;

(11) Please indicate the number of season tickets sold by each NHL team and the average attendance at each team's games during the past three seasons.

Please feel free to provide any other information that you believe to be relevant regarding the effect of locally televised games on member clubs of the National Hockey League.

Since the Commission's report to Congress is due on April 15, 1977, we would appreciate receiving this information by March 11, 1977. We realize that the National Hockey League's full season of play will not be completed by this time. However, we hope that you will provide as much of the necessary available data as possible and that it will be transmitted to the Commission in time for analysis and inclusion in this year's report.

Should you have any questions concerning this request, please contact Mr. Robert T. Blau of the Commission's Office of Plans and Policy (202) 632–6312. Your continued cooperation and assistance on behalf of the National Hockey League will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

RICHARD E. WILEY, *Chairman.*

Attachment.

O'CONNOR & HANNAN, ATTORNEYS AT LAW,
Washington, D.C., March 11, 1977.

Hon. RICHARD E. WILEY,
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter of January 24, 1977. The National Hockey League desires to cooperate with the Commission in the Commission's fulfillment of its Congressional obligation.

Initially, however, please note that the NHL did not have a contract with a national network this season. Instead, selected games again have been televised on an *ad hoc* network basis, packaged by the League itself. This will be true the upcoming Stanley Cup Playoffs.

Answers to Specific Inquiries:

(1) During the 1976–77 season, each member team of the National Hockey League is scheduled to play 80 games, a total of 1440 regular season games; the 1440 games will obviously be 720 separate contests (since each game requires two teams). Of these 720 regular season contests, 600 were scheduled to be played in the United States.

At this time, it is impossible to determine the number of games or their sites for post-season playoffs.

The annual All-Star Game of the National Hockey League was played this season in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada on January 25, 1977.

(2) The following is a schedule of the 1976–77 National Hockey League games to be televised on the National Hockey League network:

January 3, 1977—Philadelphia at Montreal.
January 10, 1977—Philadelphia at New York Islanders.
January 17, 1977—Montreal at Boston.
January 25, 1977—All-Star Game.
January 31, 1977—Toronto at Atlanta.
February 7, 1977—Atlanta at Philadelphia.
February 14, 1977—St. Louis at Philadelphia.
February 21, 1977—Atlanta at Montreal.
February 28, 1977—Cleveland at St. Louis.
March 7, 1977—Toronto at Philadelphia.
March 14, 1977—Los Angeles at Montreal.
March 21, 1977—Montreal at Boston.

(There has been no decision on the teams competing in the final regular season telecast of March 28, 1977. In addition, Playoff Game Telecasts are scheduled tentatively for April 9, 17, and 24 and May 1, 7, 10, 12, 14, 17, 19, 22, 24, and 26, 1977. Obviously, the participating teams are not yet known.)

(3) The following is a list of the National Hockey League Games played in the United States and televised pursuant to its league contract as of March 1, 1977. (Games played in Canadian cities were not subject to the provisions of now-expired Public Law 93–107 and no information is provided herein for them.)

Date	Game	Soldout 72 h advance	Televised locally
Jan. 10, 1977	Philadelphia at New York Islanders	Yes	Yes.
Jan. 17, 1977	Montreal at Boston	No	Yes.
Jan. 31, 1977	Toronto at Atlanta	No	No.
Feb. 7, 1977	Atlanta at Philadelphia	Yes	Yes.
Feb. 14, 1977	St. Louis at Philadelphia	Yes	Yes.
Feb. 28, 1977	Cleveland at St. Louis	No	No.

(4) The National Hockey League has not adopted any change in its blackout policy. As has been stated in the past, in recent seasons the National Hockey League has lifted the home market blackout in the majority of its network telecasts. In this regard, see testimony of Don V. Ruck, Vice President, National Hockey League, on July 31, 1973, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Communications and Power of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, United States House of Representatives, 93d Cong., 1st. Sess., Ser. No. 93–40 (1973) and my letter to you of December 11, 1974.

(5) The following are the seating capacities for National Hockey League teams in the United States:

Atlanta Flames	15, 043
Boston Bruins	15, 003
Buffalo Sabres	15, 858
Chicago Black Hawks	18, 000
Cleveland Barons	18, 544
Colorado Rockies	16, 401
Detroit Red Wings	16, 200
Los Angeles Kings	16, 005
Minnesota North Stars	15, 184
New York Islanders	14, 865
New York Rangers	17, 500
Philadelphia Flyers	17, 077
Pittsburgh Penguins	13, 402
St. Louis Blues	18, 008
Washington Capitals	18, 130

(6) The above seating capacity figures do not exceed the number of tickets available 120 hours before game time.

(7) The National Hockey League and the member clubs use the normal communications media to inform the public of all ticket sales.

(8) No record has been kept of the number of "no-shows" at NHL regular season games.

(9) (10) and (11) In these three items, the Commission has sought revenue figures for gross concessions revenues and other gross receipts. The Commission is also seeking individual club season ticket and attendance information covering the past three years. The National Hockey League again finds that it cannot provide this information. The reasons continue to be those indicated in my letter in my letter to you of April 1, 1975.

The National Hockey League continually has attempted to be cooperative on this issue. I trust you will find the foregoing to be satisfactory explanation of our position in this matter.

With kindest personal regards, I am,

Sincerely,

PHILIP R. HOCHBERG.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., April 21, 1977.

PHILIP R. HOCHBERG, Esq.,
O'Connor and Hannan, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. HOCHBERG: Thank you for your letter of March 11, 1977, wherein you responded to my eleven point inquiry of January 24, 1977. Your cooperation, as usual, is much appreciated. As you may know, however, we have recently received a short stay in completing the report. Since the information you supplied can now be supplemented, please bring it up-to-date through the Stanley Cup Playoffs. We will need this added information by May 15, 1977 in order to forward a complete report to the Congress. Thank you very much for your assistance.

Sincerely yours,

RICHARD E. WILEY, *Chairman.*

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
Washington, D.C., January 31, 1977.

Mr. DONALD V. RUCK,
Vice President, National Hockey League, New York, N.Y.

DEAR MR. RUCK: Enclosed is a copy of my January 24, 1977 letter to Philip Hochberg, Esq., NHL Washington counsel requesting additional information relevant to the Commission's fourth annual study of the effect of locally televised games on the member clubs of the National Hockey League. As you know, the Commission's statutory authority to request this information expired on December 31, 1975. Howevei Senators Magnuson and Pastore have asked the Commission to submit a fourth study to Congress on or before April 15, 1977. We shall comply with their request on the condition that the necessary data is voluntarily made available.

As always, both Mr. Hochberg's assistance and your office's cooperation is greatly appreciated.

Best personal regards.

Sincerely yours,

RICHARD E. WILEY, *Chairman.*

O'CONNOR & HANNAN, ATTORNEYS AT LAW,
Washington, D.C., June 6, 1977.

Hon. RICHARD E. WILEY,
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Thank you for your letter of April 27, 1977. (The information in the instant letter supersedes my letters to you of May 27, 1977 and June 3, 1977).

In updating our March 11, 1977 letter, there are only two responses for which any information must be changed. Paragraph (2) and (3) should now be read to contain the following information:

The following is a list of the National Hockey League Games played in the United States and televised pursuant to its league contract as of March 1, 1977. (Games played in Canadian cities were not subject to the provisions of now-expired Public Law 93–107 and no information is provided herein for them.)

		Soldout 72 h	Television
Jan. 3, 1977	Philadelphia at Montreal	N.A	N.A.
Jan. 10, 1977	Philadelphia at New York Islanders	Yes	Yes.
Jan. 17, 1977	Montreal at Boston	No	Yes.
Jan. 25, 1977	All-Star Game at Vancouver	N.A	N.A.
Jan. 31, 1977	Toronto at Atlanta	No	No.
Feb. 7, 1977	Atlanta at Philadelphia	Yes.	Yes.
Feb. 14, 1977	St. Louis at Philadelphia	Yes	Yes.
Feb. 28, 1977	Cleveland at St. Louis	No	No.
Mar. 7, 1977	Toronto at Philadelphia	Yes	Yes.
Mar. 14, 1977	Los Angeles at Montreal	N.A	N.A.
Mar. 21, 1977	Montreal at Boston	No	No.
Mar. 28, 1977	St. Louis at Minnesota	No	No.
Apr. 9, 1977	Toronto at Pittsburgh	No	No.
Apr. 17, 1977	New York Islanders at Buffalo	No	No.
Apr. 21, 1977	Philadelphia at Toronto	N.A	N.A.
Apr. 24, 1977	Boston at Philadelphia	Yes	No.
Apr. 28, 1977	Philadelphia at Boston	No	Yes.
Apr. 30, 1977	Montreal at New York Islanders	Yes	No.
May 1, 1977	Philadelphia at Boston	No	Yes.
May 3, 1977	New York Islanders at Montreal	N.A	N.A.
May 5, 1977	Montreal at New York Islanders	Yes	No.
May 7, 1977	Boston at Montreal	N.A	N.A.
May 10, 1977	Boston at Montreal	N.A	N.A.
May 12, 1977	Montreal at Boston	No	Yes.
May 14, 1977	Montreal at Boston	No	Yes.

The National Hockey League continually has attempted to be cooperative on this issue. I trust you will find the foregoing to be satisfactory explanation of our position in this matter.

With kindest personal regards, I am,

Sincerely,

PHILIP R. HOCHBERG.

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