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COMMITTEE PRINT

THIRD SEMIANNUAL REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

REPORT

SUBMITTED TO THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

U.S. SENATE,
Washington, D.C., December 5, 1977.

Hon. JOHN SPARKMAN,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The President has transmitted the third semiannual report to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, of which I am the Co-Chairman, on implementation of the Helsinki accords signed in August 1975. This report, which covers the period from June 1 to December 1, 1977, offers a detailed overview of the record of compliance and non-compliance by the signatory states since the second report of the President transmitted last June. The present report notes that the Helsinki accords have offered significant potential for improvement of relations between East and West, that up to now much of that potential remains to be realized, and that the review conference on CSCE now underway in Belgrade offers a unique opportunity to give new impetus to the long term process initiated at Helsinki a little over two years ago. These views are largely shared by the Commission.

I am sure that this detailed report will prove informative and useful to Members of the Committee on Foreign Relations and to other interested parties, and I am pleased to be able to transmit it herewith and request that it be printed as a Committee document.

With every good wish.

Ever sincerely,

CLAIBORNE PELL.

CONTENTS

Page

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL III

Third Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

CHAPTER ONE—INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER TWO—IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET ONE 5

A. Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States 5
(1) Implementation 5
(i) Human Rights 5
(ii) Nonintervention in Internal Affairs 7
(2) Developments Relating to the Declaration of Principles 7
B. Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament 7
(1) Prior Notification of Major Maneuvers 8
(i) NATO States 8
(ii) Warsaw Pact States 8
(iii) Neutral and Non-Aligned States 8
(2) Prior Notification of Smaller Maneuvers 8
(i) NATO States 8
(ii) Warsaw Pact States 9
(iii) Neutral and Non-Aligned States 9
(3) Exchange of Observers 9
(4) Prior Notification of Major Military Movements 10
(5) Exchange of Military Visits 10
(6) Questions Relating to Disarmament 10

CHAPTER THREE—IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET TWO 11

A. Introduction 11
B. Unilateral Implementation Activities 11
(1) Economic and Commercial Information 11
(2) Other Activities 13
C. Complaints About Implementation Failures 13
D. Bilateral Implementation 13
(1) Trade 13
(2) Science and Technology 14
(3) Tourism 15
(4) Other Activities 15
E. Multilateral Implementation Activities 16

CHAPTER FOUR—QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY AND CORPORATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 19

CHAPTER FIVE—IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET THREE 21

A. Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields 21
(1) Human Contacts 21
(i) Reunification and Family Visits 22
(ii) Binational Marriages 25
(iii) Travel for Personal or Professional Reasons 26

CHAPTER FIVE—IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET THREE—Continued
A. Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields—Continued
(1) Human Contacts—Continued Page
(iv) Religious Contacts and Information 26
(v) Tourism; Meetings among Young People; Sport 27
(vi) Expansion of Contacts 27
B. Information 28
(1) Dissemination of Information 28
(2) Cooperation in the Field of Information 29
(3) Working Conditions for Journalists 29
C. Cooperation and Exchanges in the Fields of Culture and Education 30
(1) General Considerations 30
(2) Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Culture 30
(i) Books and Publishing 30
(ii) Films and Broadcasting 31
(iii) Performing Arts 31
(iv) Exhibits 32
(v) Exchange Visits Among Specialists 32
(3) Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Education 33
(i) Exchanges, Educational Programs, and Visits 33
(ii) Science 33
(iii) Language 34

CHAPTER 1—INTRODUCTION

During this reporting period, the most significant development affecting implementation of commitments undertaken at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was the beginning on October 4 in Belgrade of the first CSCE follow-up meeting.

President Carter's appointment of the distinguished American jurist and diplomat, Arthur J. Goldberg, as Chairman of the U.S. delegation and Ambassador-at-large for CSCE demonstrates the importance which the President attaches to the CSCE process and to the Belgrade meeting in particular. This meeting provides the first opportunity to conduct a full review of the understandings contained in the CSCE Final Act, signed by 35 heads of state at Helsinki in August 1975. It also offers a forum to set forth clearly the President's personal commitment to a dialogue on humanitarian matters as one of the fundamental aspects of detente.

Ambassador Goldberg leads a delegation which includes all of the Congressionl members of the CSCE Commission as well as members of the Commission staff, a number of distinguished public members from business, academia, the labor movement and other walks of life, plus representatives of several government departments and agencies, including the Departments of State, Commerce and Defense. In preparing for the Belgrade conference, the United States delegation called upon the resources of other government departments and, with the assistance of the CSCE Commission, heard the views of numerous private organizations whose interests are affected by provisions of the Final Act.

As a result, Ambassador Goldberg entered the Belgrade meeting with the broad support of the American people for his important task. On instructions approved personally by the President, all delegation members are working to assure that the Belgrade discussions result in an honest and candid review of areas where progress has been made and of areas where greater efforts are needed, especially in the vital field of human rights.

The Administration shares the view expressed in the report issued by the CSCE Commission on the second anniversary of the Helsinki Summit that the Final Act offers significant potential for improvement of relations between East and West. We also agree that much of that potential is yet to be realized. The Belgrade meeting has offered a unique opportunity to give new impetus to the long-term process initiated with signature of the Final Act and to ensure that the great potential represented by this process is not left to dissipate.

The Belgrade meeting is a new venture in the history of East-West relations. It is not a negotiation as such, and it does not look toward a new agreement or to changes in the Helsinki Final Act. Its task is to conduct an exchange of views on experience gained during the past two years and to examine means of deepening cooperation in the fu-

ture. The experience gained in the course of this exchange will be one of the most important results of the meeting. Based on this experience, the participants should be better able to pursue implementation both in their own countries and in their mutual relations in years to come.

The Belgrade meeting is still in progress as of December 1 and will be discussed fully in the next semiannual report. However, during the first two months of discussions, Ambassador Goldberg and the United States delegation have established a position of leadership in promoting full and open discussion of the issues.

In his first address to the Belgrade meeting, Ambassador Goldberg emphasized the strong U.S. commitment to a thorough and detailed implementation review and stressed that improvement of political relations among CSCE participants could not be divorced from progress in humanitarian matters and human rights. While noting that all CSCE states should improve their implementation records, Ambassador Goldberg made clear that Eastern states have the farthest to go in fulfilling the commitments agreed upon at Helsinki. He stated that the U.S. delegation would focus its efforts in a constructive manner on advancing what should be the noblest common goal of the Belgrade meeting: to give the process of detente a human measure and a humanitarian face.

The United States, together with the Western Allies and many of the neutral/non-aligned states, has since continued to pursue the thorough and objective discussion mandated by the Final Act. We have used specific examples to illustrate areas where we believe improved implementation is needed, and we have rejected contentions that discussion of CSCE implementation can constitute interference in the internal affairs of other states. The issues raised thus far by the United States delegation span all three baskets of the Final Act and include, for example:

The repressive measures taken in some countries against human rights activists, and particularly against those individuals and groups whose activities relate solely to promoting the Final Act's goals and promises;

The persistence of divided family cases and obstacles to the freer movement of peoples between Eastern and Western countries;

The difficulties encountered in some Eastern countries by Western journalists and scholars seeking to engage in their professional activity;

The difficulties encountered by national minorities and ethnic groups in seeking the rights acknowledged in Principles Seven and Eight of the Final Act, as well as continued denial in some countries of the religious freedoms endorsed by the CSCE;

The slow progress of some countries in facilitating access to information necessary for expansion of East-West economic ties, and continued obstruction of informal contact and collaboration between Eastern and Western scientists;

The continued jamming by a few Eastern countries of international radio broadcasts, despite the provisions of the Final Act which call for the freer exchange of information of all kinds; and

The failure of some CSCE countries to abide by agreements in the delivery of ordinary and registered mail, despite Principle Ten of the

Final Act which calls for fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law.

While we believe that the Belgrade meeting must deal fully with all such problem issues, we realize as well that the process of implementation review is difficult and complex. The Helsinki Final Act sets forth broad commitments the fulfillment of which is primarily the responsibility of individual states, and it makes no provision for enforcement of the commitments or for agreement on how they should be construed. While all signatory states have formally accepted the commitments of the Final Act, there are real differences among them on how these commitments should be interpreted and put into practice. The United States recognizes that the CSCE is a long-term process and that the practices of many decades cannot all be changed in two years. We are therefore all the more determined to work patiently and steadfastly, for as long as may be required, to attain Helsinki's stated goals. As Secretary Vance stated in his testimony before the CSCE Commission on June 6, 1977:

> The CSCE Final Act was approved by 35 heads of state and government after three years of intense negotiations. Undertakings of such gravity cannot subsequently be relaxed or overlooked.

The implementation record currently being examined at Belgrade is mixed, with evidence for both optimism as well as concern. The broad principles of Basket One concerning relations among states continue to be better respected than those principles concerning relations between states and their peoples, though genuine security in Europe requires removal of the threat of arbitrary arrest or persecution no less than removal of the threat of war. The United States has always welcomed and will give serious consideration to all effective initiatives for control of the arms race, which is already the subject of a number of ongoing negotiations outside of the CSCE context. President Carter's call, made before the U.N. General Assembly in October, for a 50 percent reduction in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals demonstrates our deep commitment to pursue not only arms limitations, but actual reductions of military forces and armaments. While we share with our Allies the belief that the CSCE is not the proper forum to address specific arms control measures, we are also confident that our serious and constructive approach at Belgrade to security issues will strengthen the climate of confidence in Europe and thereby contribute to the foundation necessary for arms reductions to take place.

In addition, however, the United States will pursue with vigor those Basket One provisions which relate to the security of individuals. By including human rights in the Final Act's Declaration of Principles, all the signatory states confirmed that respect for human rights is a legitimate subject for discussion among them, as indeed it has been at least since the U.N. Charter was written. We have legal and moral obligations to work for full implementation of the human rights principle and to review its past implementation at Belgrade.

In the Basket Two area, we discern some progress in economic and scientific cooperation, which reflects a positive continuation of proceses begun before the Helsinki Summit. Certain problems persist, however, as for example the poor record of some countries in providing information vital to businessmen or the difficulty of private collabora-

tion between scientists from East and West. These, also, are issues which the Belgrade meeting is examining in the hope that improvements and greater cooperation may ensue.

The situation with respect to implementation of the humanitarian provisions of the Final Act is of particular concern to the many millions of people whose families and lives the East-West relationship affects. While some progress has been achieved since the Helsinki Summit, much more remains to be done. We will continue to discuss individual humanitarian cases with Eastern governments, both at Belgrade and elsewhere. Precisely because the Final Act is a balanced document that must be viewed as an integral whole, we must speak out when there are serious deficiencies in implementation of any section.

We continue to be prepared to discuss criticism of our own practices at Belgrade just as we have expected others to discuss in a constructive manner the views which we may voice about theirs. In the human rights area, we believe that the force of law and government policy in the United States is directed toward greater respect for the rights of the individual and toward the alleviation of abuses when such rights have not been fully observed. We are proud of our record, but we are also prepared to improve and do even more in all areas.

During the reporting period, for example, President Carter signed the U.N. covenants on human rights specifically endorsed in the Final Act's Declaration of Principles. We have also taken measures, discussed in the following report, to allow travel to the United States by certain categories of people sometimes excluded in the past for their political affiliation. Likewise, largely as a result of the CSCE and at the suggestion of the CSCE Commission, President Carter has agreed to appoint a panel to recommend ways of improving foreign area and language study in the United States.

The United States, with other nations, is also considering at Belgrade a number of new initiatives to enhance implementation of the Final Act by all participating states. While not in any way amending the Final Act, these undertakings should maintain momentum in the CSCE process and encourage the fulfillment of existing provisions. We are sponsoring or cosponsoring several proposals at Belgrade which appear best-suited to these aims.

The following chapters provide a review of CSCE implementation over the past six months. The record shows some areas of progress together with some areas of inertia or even deterioration. As Ambassador Goldberg told the opening session of the Belgrade meeting, however:

> In our work we will need patience, perseverance and perspective. This conference in Belgrade is one stage of a dynamic process and a continuing dialogue. . . . We are nearer the beginning rather than the end.

CHAPTER 2—IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET ONE

Questions Relating to Security in Europe

The first "Basket" of the Helsinki Final Act, titled "Questions Relating to Security in Europe," includes a "Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States," with a subsection on giving effect to certain of the principles, and a document on military confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security and disarmament.

A. Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating States

The ten CSCE principles articulate considerations which are generally accepted, at least as a matter of form, by almost all European countries and which have long been endorsed in the context of the United Nations. With the important exceptions noted below, most CSCE countries have generally respected the majority of these principles, both in the current reporting period and in the recent past. The key problem in monitoring implementation of the principles arises from the differing interpretations given them by various states, particularly differences in viewpoint between East and West.

(1) IMPLEMENTATION

During this reporting period, the approach and start of the Belgrade follow-up meeting raised the CSCE principles and differing Eastern and Western interpretation of them to particular prominence. In no area was the divergence of East-West viewpoints more apparent than on those principles relating to human rights (Principle Seven) and nonintervention in internal affairs (Principle Six). The following presents an illustrative review of the major interpretational differences as well as other developments pertaining to the CSCE principles which arose during the reporting period.

(*i*) *Human rights*

While most Western countries, including the United States, acknowledge that full implementation of Principle Seven is an imperfectly-reached objective toward which we are continually striving, the Warsaw Pact states have on a number of occasions claimed full compliance with Principle Seven tenets. Such a position is contradicted by the reality of Eastern societies and by specific incidents—such as the treatment of individuals seeking only to encourage their governments to implement the Final Act fully—which bring negative practices to the forefront of public attention. Only a representative sampling of such incidents, all occurring during the present reporting period, need be listed here:

Several prominent human rights activists mentioned in the previous semiannual report—including Aleksandr Ginzburg, Yuriy Orlov and Anatoliy Shcharanskiy—remained under arrest in the Soviet Union. There were indications that Shcharanskiy and the others will be put on trial, although the severity of the charges remained unknown. During the past six months, two Ukrainian members of the group established by Yuriy Orlov to monitor Soviet CSCE compliance—Mikola Rudenko and Aleksey Tikhiy—received seven and ten-year sentences in labor camps, and the Soviet security apparatus in general appears to have kept a very tight rein on all human rights activists.

Czechoslovak authorities persisted in similar efforts to silence supporters of the Charter '77 movement which seeks Czechoslovak compliance with international human rights documents as well as with the Final Act. In October, four individuals, including three original signers of Charter '77, were convicted after a closed trial on charges of subversion, though several defendants had sought only to send written material out of the country or to have materials published abroad. Two other individuals were convicted earlier on charges apparently related to their distribution of the Charter.

Religious harassment, including restrictions on services and discrimination against practicing believers, continued to be evident in most Warsaw Pact countries, although a few developments—such as a recent Polish decision to permit construction of new churches in the Warsaw area—were welcome steps in the direction of greater religious tolerance.

Reports of private organizations and groups, including an Amnesty International report estimating that there are several thousand East German citizens imprisoned for trying to leave the country without permission and the World Psychiatric Association's finding of evidence of the systematic abuse of psychiatry for political purposes in the USSR, served to question further the claims of these countries to full compliance with the Final Act's human rights provisions.

U.S. concern with these developments is not meant to shift attention from our own human rights performance, which is a matter of public record and which we are continually striving to improve. We believe our record speaks well of our performance, and we are willing to discuss it inside or outside the CSCE context.

Nor is a listing of these examples meant to obscure some positive efforts of Eastern governments in promoting human rights objectives in their countries. In July, for example, Poland announced a general amnesty of some 10,000 imprisoned individuals, including workers imprisoned following the June 1976 civil disturbances and a number of human rights advocates. On the other hand, the Soviet amnesty on the occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution gave no relief to prisoners associated with human rights activity.

The examples of negative developments cited in this section do serve, however, to illustrate that any review of CSCE implementation cannot avoid discussion of actions which appear contradictory to Final Act commitments on human rights and which—if left unquestioned—might threaten the credibility and integrity of the CSCE process itself.

(ii) Nonintervention in internal affairs

On numerous occasions during the reporting period, the Soviet Union and its allies continued to employ Principle Six of the Final Act to characterize U.S. and Western commentary on their implementation performance as "interference" in their internal affairs. The charge was most often directed against references to Eastern human rights developments, although other activities, such as the work of the CSCE Commission, were similarly described.

The United States believes that the Warsaw Pact interpretation of the nonintervention principle is inconsistent with established international legal principles and with the substance and negotiating history of the Final Act text. It is an interpretation which, if accepted, would render meaningless the review of implementation which the Final Act mandates.

(2) OTHER DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES

Other developments during the reporting period relating to the declaration have included the following:

U.N. Human Rights Convenants

Fulfilling a pledge made to the United Nations in March, President Carter in October signed the U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the U.N. Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The two covenants are cited specifically in the Final Act Principles Declaration.

Soviet Constitution

Article 29 of the new Soviet constitution, adopted by the Soviet Union in October, incorporates the ten CSCE principles (with slight alterations in the order and wording of certain of the principles) as the foundation of Soviet foreign relations. It should be noted, however, that Article 39 of the constitution qualifies all the rights proclaimed elsewhere in the document by the requirement that they may not be exercised against the interests of the state.

B. Document on Confidence-Building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament

Although the Final Act is not a legally binding document and the military confidence-building measures (CBMs) are explicitly "voluntary," there is a full political commitment by the signatory states to prior notification of exercises exceeding 25,000 troops. Because this CBM is clearly defined and requires agreed-upon action by signatory states, it lends itself to objective assessment. Notification of smaller maneuvers (25,000 troops or less) is also encouraged by the Final Act, as are invitations to observers to attend maneuvers.

Overall, the implementation record over the past two years remains moderately encouraging. It appears that no participating state has failed to provide notification of a major maneuver. While the Western and neutral/nonaligned states have chosen to notify a number of smaller exercises, the East has made no significant advance notification of such exercises. Both the West and the neutral/nonaligned states have sought to implement a forthcoming policy on observer invitations

and treatment. Until this reporting period, however, Eastern states had invited observers only from states adjacent to the immediate vicinity of the exercise. Although the East has now broadened the number of invitations to observers, the two non-European CSCE participants, the United States and Canada, have yet to be included. In addition, observers at Eastern exercises have been restricted in the opportunities afforded them to observe the activities.

(1) PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MANEUVERS

The Allies held two maneuvers involving more than 25,000 troops during this fall's exercise season, a decrease of one from the two preceding years. Within the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union reported one major maneuver during the reporting period, one less than in the comparable period for last year. No neutral or nonaligned state held a major exercise. The sole such maneuver to date since the signing of the Final Act has been a Swiss maneuver in October 1975. Notification has been given of the following major maneuvers during the reporting period:

(i) NATO States

August 23, 1977, by the United States and the FRG, of "Carbon Edge," a 59,000-troop maneuver held September 13–23 in Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg with the participation as well of Belgian, Canadian, Dutch and British forces.

August 22, 1977, by the Federal Republic of Germany, "Standhafte Chatten," a 38,000-troop maneuver held in Hesse September 12–17 in conjunction with the U.S.

(ii) Warsaw Pact States

June 20, 1977, by the U.S.S.R., of "Carpathia," a 25,000-troop maneuver held July 11–16 in the Carpathian Military District.

(iii) Neutral and nonaligned states

No neutral or nonaligned state held a major maneuver during the period.

(2) PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF SMALLER-SCALE MANEUVERS

In adhering to their policy of actively implementing CBMs, the Allies gave prior notification during the reporting period of four maneuvers involving less than 25,000 troops. This is the same number as in the like period of the preceding year. While the maneuvers of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states tend to be somewhat smaller in size than those of the West, no notifications of any smaller scale maneuver were rendered by an Eastern country. (Hungary in 1976 informed CSCE signatories of two lesser maneuvers, albeit without any significant prior notice.) Neutral and nonaligned states informed CSCE signatories of two exercises. During the reporting period, notification has been given of the following maneuvers in this category:

(i) NATO States

August 28, 1977, by Denmark, of "Arrow Express," an air/ground maneuver involving 16,000 troops, in conjunction with eight other Allies, which took place September 19–23 on Danish soil.

August 22, 1977, by Belgium, of "Blue Fox," a 24,000-troop maneuver which was held September 12–23 in Germany with the participation of the U.S. and F.R.G.

September 3, 1977, by the Netherlands, of "Interaction," a 12,000-troop manuever conducted from September 24 to October 1 in Germany.

September 13, 1977, by Turkey, of "Tayfun," a combined air, land and sea maneuver held on October 13 and 14 and involving 15,000 land troops.

(ii) Warsaw Pact States

No Eastern country gave notification of a smaller-scale maneuver during this period.

(iii) Neutral and nonaligned states

October 4, 1977, by Austria, of a 12,000-troop combat team maneuver held November 11–19.

(3) EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS

As the Final Act enters into its third year of implementation, it is apparent that within each of the three groupings of states—NATO, Warsaw Pact and neutral/nonaligned—greater attention is being given to implementation of the CSCE provisions on exchange of observers at military maneuvers. In this reporting period, Allied states extended invitations to observers at five of the six exercises of which notification was given. Figures for the same periods in the two preceding years are four out of eight (1976) and one out of six (1975).

Of these five just-completed exercises, invitations were extended either to all CSCE states or to a balanced, representative number from each grouping. As NATO states have gained experience in accommodating the needs of observers, the quality and frequency of the opportunities extended for observation during Western exercises have been markedly enhanced.

During the reporting period, the U.S.S.R. became the first Eastern state to invite observers from Western and nonaligned states not in the immediate vicinity of the exercise. Eastern invitations, however, continued to be extended primarily to fellow bloc members. Also, opportunities for observation remained quite constricted as compared to those afforded by NATO and neutral/nonaligned states. The proportion of Eastern exercises for which invitations were extended was three out of five in 1976 and one out of two to date in 1977. The U.S.S.R. accepted an invitation by the FRG to observe "Standhafte Chatten," marking the first time the Soviet Union sent an observer to a Western exercise.

The single neutral/nonaligned state to give notification of an exercise during this period did not invite observers. Of the seven maneuver notifications made to date by members of this grouping, observers have been invited to three. The quality of the observation opportunities afforded could be characterized as satisfactory and, in the most recent case, even forthcoming.

(4) PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS

To date, no signatory state has given notification of a military movement not associated with an exercise. The United States, however, does continue to refer to "Reforger" (return of forces to Germany) in the notifications given of its fall exercises in Europe. Also, the text of the notification given by the FRG of one of its maneuvers referred to the movement of troops out of barracks in preparation for the start of the exercise.

(5) EXCHANGE OF MILITARY VISITS

Under "other confidence-building measures," the Final Act encourages signatory states to exchange personnel and to arrange visits by military delegations. Several prominent visits took place during this period. For example, from June 14 to 20 General Mery, chief of the French defense staff, was a guest of the U.S.S.R. Also, the Turkish deputy chief of staff visited Romania for one week in June, and the commander-in-chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany made a two-day trip in July to the headquarters and a training area of the U.S. Army, Europe. A number of exchanges of personnel also took place below the highest military ranks. For example, the commandant of cadets at the U.S. Military Academy lectured at the Soviet Military Institute in Moscow, and a group of Soviet military historians visited the United States in return. Lastly, several visits of naval ships have been held or are planned. There are a number of such visiting programs which antedate the Helsinki Accords but which can nonetheless be considered activities implementing the CBM provisions of the Final Act.

(6) QUESTIONS RELATING TO DISARMAMENT

By citing on a number of occasions those sections of the Final Act which promote disarmament and describe the intertwined nature of the political and military aspects of security, the Soviets have sought to establish a direct relationship between implementation of the Final Act and movement in the arms control and disarmament field. In addition, the Warsaw Pact countries have sought unilateral advantages by advocating proposals for foreclosing any expansion of the membership of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and for the non-first-use of nuclear weapons. In the communique at the conclusion of the December 1976 NATO Ministerial meeting, the Allies noted that the right of states to belong or not to belong to treaties of alliance was confirmed by the Final Act and that countries of the Alliance, in the event of an attack on them, cannot renounce the use of any of the means available for defense. More recently, in an address on October 4, 1977 at the U.N. Assembly, the President stated that we will not initiate conflict but must retain the option of flexible response.

CHAPTER 3—IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET TWO

Cooperation in the Fields of Economics, of Science and Technology and of the Environment

A. INTRODUCTION

During this reporting period, activities on the multilateral front continued to provide the most evident implementation of Basket Two. Supported by the efforts of the United States and other Western countries, the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) maintained its role as the principal forum for multilateral Basket Two implementation and moved ahead on several specific CSCE projects. A special meeting of the ECE's Senior Advisers on Environmental Problems discussed potential topics for a possible high-level ECE meeting on the environment. In addition, representatives of the European Community and the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) held initial talks on a possible recognition agreement between the two bodies.

There were no significant developments in unilateral Basket Two implementation. The volume and quality of economic and commercial information provided by the Eastern countries did not increase and in some cases diminished. In the bilateral context, additional U.S. firms obtained representation in the East but overall U.S. trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe showed a significant decline over the preceding period. Scientific and technological activities under bilateral agreements were maintained at a high level, with discussion of new agreements and expansion of existing ones. The Soviet Union and Eastern European countries continued to direct trade complaints against the West and advocated acceptance of the Soviet Union's proposals for pan-European conferences on energy, transportation, and the environment.

Unilateral Implementation Activities

(1) ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL INFORMATION

The provision by Eastern countries of useful economic and commercial information needed to expand trade and commercial activity between East and West showed no overall improvement during the reporting period and even worsened in some cases. This situation varied somewhat country to country.

Soviet Union

The Soviet record of providing economic information continued its slow deterioration. The printing of the Statistical Annual for 1976, the main source for the West of statistical data on the Soviet economy, was for the second consecutive year limited to fewer copies than in 1973 and 1974. The Foreign Trade Statistical Yearbook appeared later

20-101—78——3

than it usually does, and there was no publication of a comprehensive decsription of the 1977 economic plan.

Bulgaria

There was no significant change in Bulgaria's inadequate provision of economic and commercial information.

Czechoslovakia

The relatively poor Czechoslovakian performance in providing economic and commercial information did not improve.

German Democratic Republic

The G.D.R. continued to provide inadequate economic and commercial information. The improvement in this situation expected from the formation of a privately sponsored U.S.-G.D.R. Trade and Economic Council has not yet materialized.

Hungary

Hungarian performance in providing economic and commerical information continues to be relatively good.

Poland

As noted in previous reports, Poland has generally done well in providing economic and commercial information. This year, for example, the Polish Chamber of Foreign Trade published a Directory to Polish Foreign Trade which not only lists the various organizations concerned with foreign trade, but also lists their departments, names of department directors and their direct telephone numbers. This is an improvement over previous editions which contained only the names, addresses, and central switchboard numbers of the organizations. Earlier this year, however, the Monthly Statistical Bulletin ceased including two valuable tables on foreign trade as well as data on average wage levels, savings and credits. In addition, the Bulletin appears at least one month later than in previous years, and the Foreign Trade Yearbook for 1976 appeared several months after its normal publication date.

Romania

During the reporting period, Romania provided information on the structure and operation of its foreign trade system and on the conditions under which foreign firms can do business ("A Businessman's Guide to Romania"). While this was an improvement, information on producer enterprises and end-users as well as on research and design institutes remained inadequate. Furthermore, Romanian statistical data continued to be poor. The "Statistical Annual" contains some foreign trade data, but the more comprehensive "Foreign Trade: Collection of Statistical Data" has not been published since 1974. In the area of agricultural exchanges, the Romanians have made some progress in fulfilling the information exchange provisions of the Protocol on the Development of Agricultural Trade, but performance still falls far short of what is called for in this document.

Western and nonaligned states

The United States and the Western European states generally continued to provide full economic and commercial information as en-

visaged in the Final Act. Several states renewed their efforts to improve deficiencies in statistical and information services. In addition, Finland, Switzerland and Yugoslavia participated in an ECE pilot study on development of a multilateral notification system for trade laws.

(2) OTHER ACTIVITIES

There was little change in unilateral implementation of other areas of Basket Two during this period. However, at least one step forward was noted. In September, Hungary announced that, as of January 1, 1978, Western tourists will not be required to change fixed amounts of foreign currency when visiting the country.

C. Complaints About Implementation Facilities

During this reporting period, there was no change in the chorus of complaints about Basket Two implementation. The areas of complaint cited by both East and West remained the same as in the past.

The most common grievance against the United States remained the absence of Most-Favored-Nation tariff status in trade relations between the U.S. and most Eastern countries. In addition, several Eastern countries continued to complain that U.S. antidumping regulations and proposed countervailing duty regulations discriminate against the non-market economies. The focus of Eastern complaints against the Western Europeans remained on alleged tariff and non-tariff barriers imposed by the European Community.

Similarly, Western complaints against the Eastern countries remained essentially as noted in previous reports. These included inadequate provision of economic information, lack of access by Western businessmen to end-users of their products, arbitrary quotas on trade with Western countries, and the Eastern countries' insistence on the primacy of intra-CEMA trade in their overall trade balance.

D. Bilateral Implementation

There was considerable activity connected with economic, commercial, scientific and technological agreements between the United States and Eastern countries. Although bilateral provision of economic and commercial information showed little progress, the United States obtained new assurances of improvement in this area. While trade between the United States and the Eastern countries registered a significant decline during this period, this took place primarily for economic reasons not directly related to CSCE. A number of bilateral meetings were held, including those of governmental economic commissions and non-governmental economic councils.

(1) TRADE

In the first ten months of 1977, total U.S. trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe registered a substantial decline when compared to the same period in 1976 (from $3.69 billion to $2.83 billion). The eight percent growth in U.S. imports from these countries was overwhelmed by the thirty-one percent drop in U.S. exports,

although the balance of trade continued to be in the U.S. favor. Only Hungary and Romania imported more from the U.S. during this period of 1977 than they did during the equivalent period of 1976, as shown in the following tables:

U.S. TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE DURING THE 1ST 10 MONTHS OF 1976 AND 1977

[In millions of U.S. dollars]

	1976	1977	% Change
Exports to—			
Bulgaria	39.7	18.8	−53
Czechoslovakia	108.5	58.8	−46
GDR	54.4	26.2	−52
Hungary	54.2	61.2	+13
Poland	541.2	351.2	−35
Romania	200.3	201.5	+.6
U.S.S.R	1,963.0	1,319.3	−33
Total exports	2,961.3	2,037.0	−31
Imports from—			
Bulgaria	26.3	17.6	−33
Czechoslovakia	30.4	31.6	+4
GDR	11.3	13.5	+19
Hungary	41.0	40.2	−2
Poland	263.8	280.4	+6
Romania	174.6	203.1	+16
U.S.S.R	183.6	203.1	+11
Total imports	731.0	789.5	+8
Total trade	3,692.3	2,826.5	−23

The decline in U.S. exports to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe can be attributed to two major reasons. The Eastern countries, plagued by hard currency trade deficits, made a concerted effort to reduce their imports. More importantly, the Soviet crop harvest reduced the requirements for grain imports by the Soviet Union and some Eastern European countries. For example, Soviet imports of agricultural products ($1.1 billion in the first seven months of 1976) dropped to $756 million in the same period of 1977.

Similarly, U.S. imports from the Eastern countries grew for reasons not directly related to the CSCE. The desire to reduce hard currency trade deficits led the Eastern countries to make greater efforts to sell in the U.S. At the same time, the U.S. economy's continued recovery from the 1975 recession opened additional markets for imports from the East.

(2) SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

During the reporting period, there were numerous scientific exchanges and extensive joint work under the auspices of the specialized bilateral agreements on scientific and technological cooperation with the Soviet Union. The transportation of a forty-ton U.S. "super magnet" to the U.S.S.R. in June for a joint experiment on more efficient ways to generate electrical energy was but one example of the extensive cooperation in progress. In July, the U.S.–U.S.S.R. Joint Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation met in Washington to review 47 projects currently being worked upon. A new agreement on cooperation in the fields of science and technology was signed during this meeting, thus extending the 1972 agreement for five more years. U.S.-

Soviet agreements for cooperation in medical science and public health as well as in artificial heart research and development were also signed and renewed during the reporting period.

Similar progress was also recorded under the science and technology exchange agreements in effect with Eastern European countries. The U.S.-Polish Joint Board on Scientific and Technological Cooperation met in June in Warsaw. Negotiations with Hungary continued on the scientific portion of the program documents which would implement the newly-signed cultural and scientific exchanges agreement. Such an agreement was also signed with Bulgaria, and discussions are still in progress with Czechoslovakia on the format of an umbrella exchanges agreement and on the content of the implementation documents. In addition, the G.D.R. Academy of Sciences has proposed an exchange agreement with the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, and the two bodies have exchanged the drafts of such an agreement.

Despite continuing progress in East-West scientific cooperation under governmental auspices, the difficulties of private collaboration between Eastern and Western scientists persisted. In November, for example, a senior Soviet nuclear physicist told Western reporters that his repeated requests for temporary exit permission in order to conduct scientific research in Switzerland had been stifled by Soviet authorities. Another Soviet scientist, previously denied permission to emigrate, was not allowed to attend an international conference held in his honor at Oxford University. Similarly, a prominent Czechoslovak chemist who has been offered a number of research opportunities in the West has not been allowed to depart Czechoslovakia or to engage in scientific work in his own country. Such obstruction of private scientific collaboration is inconsistent with the Helsinki Final Act which clearly endorses both private and official cooperation and seeks to facilitate its development on all levels.

(3) TOURISM

In July, the U.S. proposed the negotiation of a tourism agreement with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union rejected the proposal in November. The Visit U.S.A. Committee established at our Embassy in Moscow has continued its promotion of tourism by Soviet citizens to the United States. Cooperation from official Soviet organs, however, has been poor. In October, the U.S. proposed the negotiation of a tourism agreement with Poland, and the initial Polish reaction appeared positive.

(4) OTHER ACTIVITIES

Soviet Union

The Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Commercial Commission met in June and the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council in November. The Soviets accredited another U.S. firm during this period.

Czechoslovakia

The Second Plenum of the Czechoslovak-U.S. Economic Council was held in Washington on October 26–27.

GDR

In October, the U.S.-G.D.R. Trade and Economic Council held a joint meeting. The U.S. gave permission to the G.D.R.'s machine tool foreign trade enterprise (WMW) to open an office in New York City.

Hungary

Hungary opened a representation office of the Hungarian National Bank in New York in September. A series of Hungarian Economic-Technical Days, consisting of one-day seminars, was conducted in several U.S. cities in November. This will be followed by visits of Hungarian technical experts to scientific meetings and conventions throughout the U.S. next year. In other developments, the Hungarian-U.S. Economic Council held a meeting in September.

Poland

The Polish Minister of Foreign Trade and Maritime Economy visited the United States in October at the invitation of the Secretary of Commerce and discussed with Administration officials and Members of Congress a range of matters in U.S.-Polish trade. He also met with representatives of U.S. industry concerning specific projects under negotiation. In November, the Seventh Joint Session of the U.S.-Polish Trade Commission was held.

Romania

The Fourth Session of the Romanian-U.S. Economic Council was held in New York on July 11–12. The Joint (governmental) U.S.-Romanian Economic Commission held its fourth session on November 2–3 in Washington.

E. MULTILATERAL IMPLEMENTATION ACTIVITIES

Basket Two implementation activities were again most evident on the multilateral level. The Eastern countries continued their promotion of Soviet President Brezhnev's proposals for all-European conferences on energy, transportation, and the environment. Western efforts concentrated generally on maintaining the role of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe as the principal forum for multilateral Basket Two activities, particularly in pursuing specific, concrete projects within the ECE.

The most prominent multilateral activity in the Basket Two area was the September 19–21 meeting of the Senior Advisers to ECE Governments on Environmental Problems (SAEP). This special meeting was called to assist the ECE's Executive Secretary in fulfilling the task assigned to him by the ECE's 32nd Plenary Session, which requested a study of possible topics for consideration at a high-level meeting on the environment and a report on these topics to the 33rd Plenary in April 1978. A discussion of whether or not to hold such a meeting will be conducted at that time. The SAEP meeting considered various topics that had been proposed and provided clarification of interest in specific topics by member countries. The Executive Secretary will draw on these discussions in preparing his report to the 33rd Plenary.

Other ECE environmental activities focused on two specific Final Act recommendations: monitoring and evaluating the long-range transport of air pollutants and predicting environmental consequences of economic activities. The former was given priority attention in the ECE and a special group has been set up to consider specific project proposals. In August, a Steering Body met to plan for detailed implementation of a project concerning sulphur dioxide transport. With

regard to the environmental impact assessment recommendation, the ECE has embarked on several activities, including preparation of a seminar on the subject.

In other ECE activities, a working group of the Committee on Development of Trade met in September to discuss the development of a multilateral system for notification of trade laws, a task mandated to the ECE by the CSCE Final Act. Finland, Switzerland and Yugoslavia have participated in a pilot project to determine the feasibility and potential scope of such a system.

Another Committee project, based on a U.S. proposal, is an annual listing by member governments of the basic information they feel is needed to improve the development of trade in the region. Submissions have thus far been received from five countries: the U.S., Belgium (on behalf of the European Community), Norway, Spain and the German Democratic Republic.

The Committee on Development of Trade held its annual meeting at the end of November. It reviewed progress on projects deriving from its CSCE trade-related mandate and agreed on areas requiring further attention.

Finally, in October, ECE Executive Secretary Stanovnik reported to the Belgrade CSCE meeting on the ECE's activities in the Basket Two area. The central theme of his report was that the ECE has made progress in implementing Basket Two provisions and the CSCE has strengthened the ECE's role in European economic relations.

In other areas, there was further activity on the Eastern proposal for a recognition agreement between the European Community and the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA). In September, a CEMA delegation met with EC Commission officials in Brussels for initial discussions, and further talks are envisaged at a later date.

CHAPTER 4—QUESTIONS RELATING TO SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

The Mediterranean section of the Final Act affirms the importance of "good-neighborly relations" between the CSCE states and the non-participating Mediterranean states and emphasizes the importance of security and cooperation in the Mediterranean area. This section was not intended to shift the basic East-West focus of CSCE discussions, but rather to acknowledge in a positive manner the contributions made by representatives of the six non-participating Mediterranean littoral states [1] during the course of the CSCE.

During the reporting period, various activities could be related to the broad provisions of the Mediterranean section. For example, continuing U.S. efforts to encourage a peaceful solution in the Middle East as well as U.S. and other Western efforts to encourage the parties to the Cypriot dispute to negotiate, under U.N. auspices, a mutually acceptable solution could be seen as being in harmony with provisions of this section calling for an improvement in security and stability in the Mediterranean region.

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[1] Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia.

CHAPTER 5—IMPLEMENTATION OF BASKET THREE

A. Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields

Basket Three is the most innovative section of the Final Act, and the one which was most difficult to negotiate. While all Final Act provisions seek to benefit the peoples of the CSCE states, Basket Three relates directly to the concerns and aspirations of private individuals. Its provisions, while numerous and diverse, share the common objective of promoting the freer flow of people, ideas and information among the signatory states. They stem from the recognition of the CSCE that genuine security and cooperation in Europe cannot be achieved without lowering of the artificial barriers which—for example—prevent the reunification of divided families, hinder personal and professional travel, restrict the free interchange of cultural and informational materials, or serve generally to impede contact and communication between the peoples of East and West.

The United States has particular concern for Basket Three provisions. Our concern results not from a belief that other sections of the Final Act are less important, but rather from the fact that Basket Three stands especially in need of improved implementation. While the practices of most Western societies were already at the time of the Helsinki Summit in general conformity with Basket Three measures, the Soviet Union and its allies to varying degrees viewed the freer flow of people and ideas as threatening to the closed nature of their societies. They accepted Basket Three in principle, but sought to diminish its objectives in practice. Their implementation has since been correspondingly slow, uneven, and, at times, retrogressive.

Such a pattern persisted during this reporting period. With the approach of the Belgrade follow-up meeting, all of the Warsaw Pact countries took some steps to improve their implementation records. In some cases these efforts were genuine; in other instances they were largely cosmetic. While one may find examples of both positive and negative changes, the overall record of the Soviet Union and its allies has not improved substantially from the assessment of the previous semiannual report. The performances of individual countries varied considerably, but the general implementation of Basket Three provisions by the Warsaw Pact states remained well below the commitments agreed upon in the Final Act.

(1) HUMAN CONTACTS

The Basket Three document on human contacts covers a wide range of topics, including those relating to reunification of families, contacts and regular meetings on the basis of family ties, marriage between citizens of different states, travel for personal or professional reasons, improvement of conditions for tourism, religious contacts and information, and meetings among young people.

(i) Reunification and family visits

During the reporting period, the resolution of longstanding divided family cases continued to be a primary U.S. objective at Belgrade and in other CSCE discussions. While a number of Warsaw Pact states displayed encouraging cooperation in resolving some difficult cases, many old cases persisted and new applications met all too frequently with refusals. The following numbers of cases involving requests for permanent reunification through emigration had been refused one or more times and remained pending between the United States and Warsaw Pact countries as of November 1, 1977:

	Immediate families [1]		Nonimmediate families	
	Total cases	Individuals	Total cases	Individuals
Bulgaria	11	18	10	23
Czechoslovakia	29	51	14	28
GDR	4	6	20	43
Hungary	5	11	0	0
Poland	165	300	864	2,658
Romania	239	[2] 337	570	[2] 1,569
USSR	123	345	----	----

[1] An immediate family is comprised of spouses plus their minor children. A nonimmediate family includes brothers, sisters, adult children, parents of adult children, etc. It was not possible to make this distinction in the case of the Soviet Union, the figures for which include both immediate and nonimmediate families.
[2] Approximate.

The United States continued during the reporting period to make representations on cases of this nature and to monitor the efforts of individual countries in promoting family reunification.

U.S.S.R.

Despite the Universal Declaration on Human Rights which is specifically endorsed by the Final Act, Soviet authorities do not consider emigration a legal right and view family reunification as the sole legitimate reason for wishing to emigrate from the U.S.S.R. Permanent exit visas are thus technically granted only to those individuals who can show evidence of close relationships abroad. During the first ten months of 1977, our Embassy in Moscow processed 1718 individuals who had received such permission to emigrate to the United States. This figure was approximately 19 percent below 1976 levels and raised the possibility that the consistent annual increases of the previous five years might be halted in 1977:

1972	494	1975	1,162
1973	758	1976	2,574
1974	1,029	1977 (through October)	1,718

Given the exceptionally large increase in 1976, it is difficult to judge whether the current decline results from natural fluctuation or deliberate policy. At least part of the decrease may be a consequence of ethnic Armenians, who represented 69 percent of the 1976 figure, again choosing Lebanon rather than the U.S. as an immigration destination. We are watching statistics closely to determine the likelihood of such a trend.

While Soviet issuance of exit visas for the U.S. declined, issuance of exit visas for Israel continued to increase. As of the end of October 1977, totals were approximately 22 percent above 1976 levels. The

year 1977 will thus likely be the second in a row that Jewish emigration increases following the sharp declines of 1974–75, as shown in the following approximate figures on arrivals of Soviet Jewish emigrants in Vienna:

1972	31,500	1975	13,300
1973	33,500	1976	14,250
1974	20,700	1977 (through October)	13,250

Most of the increase in this emigration flow has come in the July-November period and seems connected in part with the Belgrade Meeting. As of the end of June 1977, Jewish emigration was virtually the same as the previous year. However, the next four months saw a 56 percent increase over the same period in 1976—6,251 this year as compared to 3,922 in 1976.

Ethnic German emigration from the Soviet Union to West Germany continued to fluctuate, with mid-1977 family reunification figures somewhat below the record 1976 rate, as shown in these rounded figures:

1972	3,400	1975	6,000
1973	4,500	1976	9,700
1974	6,500	1977 (through June)	3,500

Although the overall Soviet family reunification rates described above present a mixed picture with at least some positive elements, the Soviet pace of resolving difficult divided family cases which had incurred previous refusals remained exceptionally slow and frustrating. These cases, some of which have been pending for as long as two decades, impose extraordinary hardships on the families involved and fall clearly under the humanitarian concerns of the Final Act. We reiterated our strong interest in resolving these cases to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko during his autumn visit to the United States and pursued the issue as well at the CSCE meeting in Belgrade.

Bulgaria

Bulgarian efforts to resolve divided family cases improved somewhat during this reporting period, although the denial of several new applications left the total number of cases largely unchanged. In June, however, the Bulgarian Government resolved one particularly difficult case involving two children of parents who had immigrated to the United States, and several other cases appeared to be resolved with unusual expedition in subsequent months. As a result, we are hopeful that similar efforts will be made on behalf of families still awaiting reunification. In August, Bulgaria also allowed over 300 individuals to depart for Turkey under the terms of a Turkish-Bulgarian agreement to unite separated families.

Czechoslovakia

Following the Czechoslovak Government's grant earlier in the year of exit visas to a number of minor children whose parents were in the West, progress on resolution of difficult divided family cases slowed considerably. In early July, the Czechoslovak Government announced a program under which individuals who had left Czechoslovakia without permission of authorities could apply for family reunification through legalization of their status abroad. The terms of the program are complex, however, and certain provisions do not appear applicable

to U.S. citizens because of previous U.S.-Czechoslovak treaty agreements. One clause of the program states that family reunification would generally not be granted to individuals whose Czechoslovak citizenship is withdrawn because of activities "hostile" to Czechoslovakia, including statements to the foreign press or participation at meetings of unspecified organizations. Such a provision is not in harmony with the CSCE Final Act which recognizes family reunification as a humanitarian concern not subject to political conditions. We are nonetheless watching the new program closely with the hope that a reduction in divided family cases ensues.

GDR

Although most G.D.R. divided family cases involve reunification with relatives in West Germany, we continue to place high priority on resolution of the relatively small number of cases pending with the United States. Following assurances by the G.D.R. last spring that such resolutions would be forthcoming, we noted some increase in progress, though not all difficult cases have been resolved. In September, our Embassy in Berlin presented G.D.R. officials with updated lists of pending temporary and permanent reunification cases, and we emphasized that favorable action on these cases could contribute to the furthering of improved bilateral relations.

Hungary

U.S.-Hungarian divided family cases are fewer than those with any other Warsaw Pact country, and Hungarian emigration policy tends in practice to be relatively tolerant. Nonetheless, a small number of remaining cases has persisted through the reporting period. In June, we received indications that renewed efforts would be made to resolve all outstanding cases, and we continue to be hopeful of the results of such efforts.

Poland

Polish policy continued to be restrictive during the reporting period, both in resolution of the many pending divided family cases and in general tolerance of Polish emigration to the United States. Levels of such emigration in the year after signature of the Final Act were the lowest since 1957 and showed only marginal increase last year. Our numerous representations to the Polish Government on the large number of hardship reunification cases pending between the United States and Poland have met with little success so far. The greatest single problem continues to be the narrow Polish definition of family, which excludes adult siblings and married children of U.S. citizens or permanent residents. We do not accept the contention of the Polish Government that such individuals are not "family members" in the sense intended by the Final Act, and we believe that only the persons concerned can define the strength of their bonds of kinship. The Polish record to date on dealing with hardship cases of divided families is unsatisfactory and ranks among the worst in Eastern Europe. We will continue to make representations on this matter in the hope of promoting humanitarian resolution of the many pending cases.

Romania

Despite some improvement in Romanian performance on family reunification since the signing of the Final Act, the number of outstanding hardship cases remains relatively large. Although individual cases continue to be resolved, refusals of new applications maintain the total number of pending cases at a high level. There was no improvement in this situation during the reporting period, and we will persist in our efforts to encourage ameliorative action on the part of Romanian authorities.

Family visits

The Final Act encourages signatory states to facilitate both permanent family reunification in the form of emigration and temporary reunification through visits and regular meetings on the basis of family ties. Although most Warsaw Pact states tend to be more lenient in the latter category than in the former, family visits continue to be a problem, particularly in cases where relatives abroad are considered to have left Eastern countries "illegally." Many Warsaw Pact countries refuse entry visas to such former nationals and refuse their relatives permission to visit the West. The case of the ballet star Rudolf Nureyev, who has been trying unsuccessfully for fourteen years to get a temporary exit visa for his mother in the Soviet Union, typifies the difficulties which can be encountered.

During the reporting period, Hungary continued to have the most flexible policy in this area while Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union remained restrictive. The Soviet Union allowed 729 private Soviet citizens to visit relatives in the United States during the first six months of 1977, a figure which compares to 743 and 510 for the same periods in 1976 and 1975. As in the case of permanent reunification, we are monitoring officially stifled requests for family visits which the parties concerned bring to our attention and raising these in the CSCE context with Warsaw Pact countries. Following our intercession, some countries have on occasion reversed negative decisions on granting entry visas for family visits.

(ii) Binational marriages

Problem binational marriage cases arise when governments refuse a citizen permission to marry a foreign national or effectively preclude the possibility of marriage by denying necessary visas to prospective spouses. As of November 1, we were aware of the following numbers of such problem cases pending between American citizens and citizens of Warsaw Pact countries:

Bulgaria	0
Czechoslovakia	3
GDR	5
Hungary	1
Poland	0
Romania	54
USSR	6

During the reporting period, the situation regarding binational marriages improved somewhat. While some new cases developed, the number of outstanding cases with Czechoslovakia, the G.D.R., and particularly Romania, diminished, although Romanian policy on binational marriages continued to be restrictive. We hope that positive efforts will continue until all problem binational marriage cases are resolved.

(*iii*) *Travel for Personal or Professional Reasons*

During the reporting period, a significant step in the facilitation of personal and professional travel was taken by Hungary which announced in September that, as of January 1978, Western visitors would no longer be required to change fixed amounts of currency when visiting the country. Also, the governments of Austria and Hungary reached agreement to eliminate entry visa requirements for citizens of either country wishing to visit the other.

In other developments, the Bulgarian Government announced a number of revised visa-issuing procedures in September. Although entry and transit visas are no longer issued at Bulgarian border-crossing points, tourists traveling on pre-paid Balkantourist vouchers are not required to have visas for up to two-month stays in Bulgaria. We are watching implementation of the new regulations to determine whether they contribute to the CSCE objective of facilitating travel procedures.

The United States continued during the reporting period to seek bilateral agreements for facilitating travel in the CSCE context. In October, the United States and Romania agreed to facilitate the issuance of diplomatic, official, business and tourist visas on a reciprocal basis. In November, the United States and Bulgaria reached agreement to eliminate special travel restrictions which had been in effect on each other's accredited diplomats.

We are still awaiting responses from a number of Warsaw Pact countries to other U.S. proposals designed to simplify and reduce travel requirements.

(*iv*) *Religious contacts and information*

Under this provision of the Final Act, signatory states agreed to confirm that religious faiths, institutions and organizations can "have contacts and meetings among themselves and exchange information."

Although the attitudes of Warsaw Pact countries toward religious contacts between Eastern and Western groups continued to vary, Poland, Hungary and Romania generally showed the most tolerance in this area. Still, most Eastern governments often sought to discourage East-West religious contacts, particularly when these were conducted outside of the framework of approved ecclesiastic organizations or not authorized by the state.

During the reporting period, an example of improved implementation of this provision of the Final Act was the September visit to Hungary by the American evangelist Billy Graham. A representative of the Hungarian Council of Free Churches, which sponsored the visit, specifically characterized it as "a projection of the Helsinki spirit to the religious field." Cardinal Kroll and Archbishop Bernardin, of the United States, also visited Hungary in the fall. In other examples of

religious contacts, the Archbishop of Canterbury paid a two-week visit to the U.S.S.R. in October at the invitation of the Russian Orthodox and Armenian Churches, and a Soviet delegation attended the World Council of Churches Central Executive Committee meeting in Geneva in August.

(v) Tourism; meetings among young people; and sport

East-West contacts through tourist travel, youth meetings, and sports competitions continued during the reporting period with no major changes. A significant problem persisted, however, in the continued discouragement by most Warsaw Pact countries of tourism to the West.

Although Eastern countries cite impressive statistics on the extent to which their citizens engage in tourist travel, the overwhelming majority of such trips are to other Eastern countries. Tourism to the West remains a rare privilege to which numerous obstacles exist. These include the complex and expensive procedures required to obtain passports and exit visas, the generally inadequate allotment of Western currency, and the unspoken but almost automatic requirement that a close family member stay behind as assurance of the traveler's return. Of the Warsaw Pact countries, only Hungary has made significant efforts to facilitate tourism to the West.

According to Intourist, the official Soviet travel agency, in 1976 almost 100,000 U.S. citizens visited the Soviet Union. By contrast, in the same period only 577 Soviet tourists traveling in organized groups visited the United States. This figure reached 300 during the first six months of 1977, as compared to 263 and 326 for comparable periods in 1976 and 1975. In July, we proposed to the Soviet Union the negotiation of a tourism agreement which might have helped to increase these figures, but our proposal was rejected by the Soviet Government.

(vi) Expansion of contacts

This section of the Final Act calls for further development of contacts between governmental institutions and nongovernmental organizations of the signatory states. The provision has in the past been used by Warsaw Pact countries to criticize exclusion of Communist labor representatives from visits to the United States in their official capacities. Such exclusions were based upon a section of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 which prohibits visa issuance, except with provision of a waiver, to former and present members of Communist Parties. Although most waivers are routinely granted, we had in the past not recommended waivers for Communist labor representatives.

During this reporting period, an amendment sponsored by Senator McGovern to the State Department Appropriations Bill modified the waiver procedure for members of proscribed organizations. Under the provisions of this amendment, which was supported by the Administration, the Secretary of State should recommend a waiver of ineligibility to the Attorney General except when he determines that the applicant's presence in the United States would be contrary to our security interests. We expect that this amendment will increase the number of persons receiving such waivers, and a number of visas have in fact already been granted to labor representatives from Warsaw Pact states.

B. Information

During the reporting period, the Soviet Union and its allies continued to criticize Western implementation of CSCE provisions relating to the exchange and dissemination of information. Citing numerous statistics which claim that Eastern countries import quantitatively greater amounts of informational materials from the West than vice-versa, the Warsaw Pact states persisted in advancing an argument of statistical reciprocity which has little foundation in the Final Act.

No international agreement can provide a book or film with an assured readership or audience, but it can promote the removal of artificial obstacles to free choice. The objective of the Final Act is to widen the opportunities for individuals in both East and West to choose what they wish to read or see. The United States imposes no political censorship or restriction on the importation of informational materials and has an economic system which virtually guarantees the distribution of that material in which there is adequate interest. The Warsaw Pact countries, on the other hand, import and distribute only those materials to which government authorities tolerate public access. In this respect, dissemination of information continues to be the Basket Three area in which the Soviet Union and its allies have made the least implementation progress since the signing of the Final Act.

(1) Dissemination of Information

Examples of the political selectivity of some Eastern countries in the importation and dissemination of informational material continued to be apparent during the reporting period.

The First International Moscow Book Fair, for example, held in the Soviet Union in September, was portrayed by the Soviet press as evidence of further Soviet efforts to expand implementation of the CSCE Final Act. Although the event attracted a large public attendance and was generally judged a success by Eastern and Western participants, the refusal of Soviet authorities to allow display of a number of titles brought by American and other Western publishers was directly inconsistent with those Final Act provisions which the fair sought to advance.

Similar examples of political censorship in the exchange of information were evident in the area of broadcasting. In July, Soviet authorities asked U.S. Ambassador Malcolm Toon to delete references pertaining to the U.S. commitment to human rights from a televised Fourth of July message traditionally delivered to the Soviet people by American ambassadors. Ambassador Toon refused to make such changes, and his speech was not recorded or broadcast.

Several Warsaw Pact countries continued during the reporting period to jam the broadcasts of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe and to claim that these stations "interfere" in their internal affairs. A Soviet commentary in October, for example, described the stations as "a crying violation of the spirit of Helsinki." The German Democratic Republic also maintained its jamming of medium wave transmissions of RIAS (Radio in the American Sector) Berlin. We continued to point out that the Final act commits signatory states to

facilitating "the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds," and that jamming, rather than broadcasting, thus violates the letter and spirit of Helsinki.

Despite the announcements by several Warsaw Pact countries last spring that they would be importing and distributing greater numbers of Western newspapers and periodicals, we have not perceived any substantial improvement in implementation of this Final Act provision. The availability of Western newspapers in most Eastern countries remained confined to a very small number of issues generally sold in hotels and intended primarily for Western tourists. Although Eastern officials claimed that more copies were not offered for sale because of low public interest, the continued disappearance and confiscation of newspapers and periodicals from international mails suggested that political censorship considerations were also present.

Despite the lack of progress in implementation of this section of the Final Act, a few positive developments can be noted. In June, for example, the New York Times Corporation and the Soviet news agency TASS signed an agreement to promote and facilitate the exchange of news. Also in June, NBC television broadcast a live Soviet-American debate from Georgetown University on the subject of human rights. The exchanges, between three American and three Soviet participants, included the hope expressed by one American member that a similar debate might be held and televised in the Soviet Union in the future.

(2) COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF INFORMATION

This topic is discussed in section C of this chapter.

(3) WORKING CONDITIONS FOR JOURNALISTS

Although working conditions for journalists varied among the individual Warsaw Pact countries, the serious problems noted in a number of states in the last semiannual report continued to be evident.

The most serious incident during this reporting period occurred in June when Soviet authorities detained and interrogated Robert C. Toth, a U.S. correspondent for *The Los Angeles Times*. Subsequent Soviet press articles charged that he had sought the acquaintance of Soviet scientists in order to obtain sensitive information for "U.S. special agencies." Such allegations were denied by both the journalist and his newspaper, and President Carter stated publicly that a special inquiry had revealed no links between the correspondent and the Central Intelligence Agency. The United States protested the incident to the Soviet Government as inconsistent with commitments undertaken in the Helsinki Final Act.

The incident above continued the pattern of harassment of Western journalists already noted during the last reporting period. Through the summer and early fall, newspaper articles in the Soviet Union and several Eastern European states continued to attack Western journalists for activity allegedly inconsistent with legitimate journalism. The underlying objective of the media campaign appeared to be to discourage private citizens from speaking to foreign correspond-

ents, particularly on the subject of human rights activity. The concern of some Warsaw Pact countries on this matter was explicitly revealed last spring, for example, when Czechoslovakia made known that it would refuse visas to journalists who did not give assurances that they would avoid contact with human rights advocates.

Despite such discouraging developments, the United States continued to hope that all signatory states would in the future abide by Final Act commitments to improve and facilitate working conditions for journalists.

C. Cooperation and Exchanges in the Fields of Culture and Education

(1) General considerations

Although cooperation between East and West in the fields of culture and education predates the Final Act, the CSCE has provided new impetus to the process and stimulated more positive attitudes toward new activities. The Soviet Union and its allies recognize that cooperation and exchanges in these areas are mutually advantageous, and that they, as well as Western states, have much to gain from them. While the provisions relating to culture and education comprise the best-implemented sections of Basket Three, experience since the Helsinki Summit suggests that even greater progress should be sought, particularly on projects which involve direct interchange between organizations or unofficial groups working independently of government supervision.

In general, the performance of Eastern countries on this section of the Final Act has been characterized by a pragmatic and selective approach to implementation. The approach focuses more on quantitative increases in exchanges than on qualitative improvements in the scope and conditions of cooperation. The Warsaw Pact states—and the Soviet Union in particular—have placed great emphasis on concluding formal intergovernmental agreements and proceeding with activities encompassed by them. Although recently some Eastern states have begun to move away from an insistence that cooperation be funneled through central governmental offices, such activity remains limited and requires at least tacit government approval. There generally remains considerable reluctance on the part of Warsaw Pact states to engage in activities that involve less-structured contacts between individuals and groups or freer access to cultural works and scholarly material.

The remainder of this section provides examples of specific activities during the reporting period which relate to Final Act provisions on cooperation and exchanges in the fields of culture and education. The listing is by no means complete but rather a representative sampling of recent activity.

(2) Cooperation and exchange in the field of culture

(i) Books and publishing

There was a substantial amount of activity in the publishing area during this reporting period. In June, a U.S.-U.S.S.R. Writers' Conference was held in Moscow with prominent U.S. and Soviet writers

and critics attending. The meeting proved useful enough for there to be calls for a return conference next year in this country. A number of American authors accepted another June invitation and attended an International Writers' Conference in Sofia.

As mentioned previously, in September a number of American publishers participated at the First Moscow International Book Fair, which received considerable media and press attention in both East and West. Although the event was marred by Soviet censorship of several titles which Western participants hoped to display, the Soviet public showed great interest in the exhibits, and useful contacts with Soviet publishers and authors were established. Following this event, a small group of publishers representing American university presses visited Hungary, Poland and Romania to explore the possibilities of cooperation in publishing. The Tenth International Book Exhibition and Fair in Sofia was also held in September with a number of American publishers represented. In addition, a delegation of Soviet publishers participated in a seminar in New York City in November with the Association of American Publishers. This was in return for a similar seminar held last year in Moscow.

Other examples of related activity included a visit to the United States by the editor-in-chief of a Romanian publishing firm for consultations with American firms, as well as a U.S. visit by three Soviet writers. Bulgaria announced plans to publish novels by popular American authors Kurt Vonnegut and Joseph Heller, and Simon and Schuster secured exclusive rights to the official biography of Soviet President and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, which it will publish next spring.

(ii) Films and broadcasting

Cooperation in the field of broadcasting continued during the reporting period, with several examples of joint projects. A debate between U.S. and Soviet teams on human rights televised by NBC in June, has already been mentioned in the information section of this chapter. In other developments, former First Lady Betty Ford traveled to Moscow in September to act as hostess for a U.S.-Soviet television special presenting the Bolshoi Ballet's performance of "The Nutcracker Suite." The program is scheduled to be broadcast by NBC in the United States at Christmas time.

Cooperation in film exchanges continued as well, with the Soviet Union opening its film archives to a New York firm preparing a documentary on World War II. In the autumn, a number of Russian and Slavic film festivals were held in the United States and provided opportunity to view films not previously distributed by commercial theaters. The Carnegie Hall Cinema in New York, for example, in association with the American Film Institute, presented a retrospective of 24 Soviet films to mark the sixtieth anniversary of the Russian Revolution. The program, which included the works of silent-film directors as well as of recent Soviet filmmakers. was also scheduled for exhibit in Washington, Los Angeles, and Berkeley, California.

(iii) Performing arts

In developments in the general area of the performing arts, an eight-member delegation of U.S. regional theater directors traveled to the Soviet Union during the reporting period to gain knowledge of

Soviet theater. The trip resulted in agreement for two prominent Soviet directors to direct Soviet plays in Houston and San Francisco during the 1977–78 season. Also, the president of Actors Equity attended a meeting of the Executive Committee of the International Federation of Actors held in Moscow. In October, the singer Gisela May and the pianist Richard Krtschil of the G.D.R. performed at the University of California, Berkeley, and in November Kurt Sanderling of the G.D.R. was guest conductor of the Dallas Symphony Orchestra.

A group of Romanian folk singers performed in this country during the early summer, and in the fall Olympic medalist Nadia Comaneci and the Romanian women's gymnastic team toured five American cities. Also during the summer, Varna, Bulgaria was the site of a seminar on dance technique which attracted participants from numerous CSCE signatory states, including Robert Joffrey of the United States.

(iv) Exhibits

Exchange of exhibits between the United States and Warsaw Pact countries continued during the reporting period with an exhibit of Thracian art from Bulgaria on display at the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art. The exhibit, which was also shown at the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, represents a major art loan to the United States by the Bulgarian Government.

A USIA exhibit entitled "Reflections: Images of America," which has been shown in Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, went on display in Budapest during the reporting period. With the exception of a display of graphic arts from the New York Metropolitan Museum of Art in 1973, this is the first individual U.S. exhibit in Hungary outside the framework of the annual Budapest Trade Fair. A reciprocal Hungarian exhibit entitled "Hungarian Art Nouveau" is presently on tour in the United States.

During the summer, a USIA exhibit entitled "Photography USA" continued a six-city tour of the Soviet Union which began in 1976. Although Soviet authorities in a number of cities refused permission to display various books and photographs, the exhibit was enthusiastically received by well over one million Soviet visitors. A Soviet national exhibit, the first in the United States since 1959, was displayed in Los Angeles in November in reciprocity for a U.S. Bicentennial exhibit in the U.S.S.R. last year.

(v) Exchange visits among specialists

During the reporting period, the number of exchange visits among specialists continued to be high. One of the more publicized visits was that of Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren Burger who led a delegation of American jurists to the Soviet Union. In November, a delegation of Soviet officials came to the United States to repay an earlier visit to the U.S.S.R. by a group of American state governors.

In examples of other visits, members of the Future Farmers of America traveled to the Soviet Union under the terms of a recently-arranged exchange agreement. During the summer, 160 young Poles and 35 young Romanians toured the United States under sponsorship of the Friendship Ambassador program. Somewhat smaller groups of

Americans reciprocated the visits. The national 4–H Council arranged a twelve-week exchange of fourteen young American and Soviet agricultural specialists for study and practical work on farms. The Council also signed an exchange agreement with the Godollo Agricultural University in Hungary providing for the annual exchange of twenty-five agricultural trainees for one year periods. Also during the reporting period, three specialists on Africa from the Soviet Academy of Sciences visited the U.S. for three weeks under a Department of State invitation to meet with American Africanists. In addition, Nelya Ramazanova, editor of the English language edition of "Soviet Women," spent one month in the U.S. participating in a State Department multi-regional project on the status of women, and Vladimir Morozov of the Soviet Academy of Sciences spent one month in the U.S. participating in a State Department multi-regional project on food production.

(3) COOPERATION AND EXCHANGES IN THE FIELD OF EDUCATION

(i) Exchanges, educational programs, and visits

Contacts between professional organizations and visits by educational specialists and teachers continued to increase during the reporting period. The Midwest University Consortium for International Activities signed an agreement in the spring with Moscow State University for direct exchanges of senior research scholars. The University of Pittsburgh, the University of Kansas, and Kansas State University have proposed similar exchanges.

In September, the first group of young Soviet graduate students arrived at the State University of New York under the terms of a direct exchanges agreement signed with Moscow State University in October of 1976.

As the result of the new exchange agreement signed in June between the United States and Bulgaria, a Fulbright professor of American literature is lecturing at Veliko Turnovo University, and a Bulgarian scholar is lecturing at UCLA on Bulgarian language and literature. In June, the presidents of six U.S. universities attended a roundtable discussion on "Problems of Contemporary Higher Education" held in Zagreb, Yugoslavia. The conference was sponsored jointly by Johns Hopkins University and the University of Zagreb. Planning is already underway for a return conference to be held in Baltimore in 1978.

A four-member Soviet delegation came to the United States in September to study the training of school administrators. A delegation from the National Institute of Education participated with Soviet educators in a seminar on pedagogical research in Moscow and visited educational research institutes in Leningrad and Kiev. Four American vocational and technical educators were in the Soviet Union in October for discussions with their Soviet counterparts, and a return Soviet delegation is scheduled to visit the U.S. in December.

(ii) Science

As discussed in the Basket Two section of this report, official East-West scientific cooperation has continued to progress during the re-

porting period, although frequent obstacles to private collaboration between Eastern and Western scientists persist. In July, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to extend for another five years their agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology. The Joint Commission then met to review the forty-seven individual cooperative projects presently underway.

In other activity, an American cardiologist attended a symposium in Yalta, U.S.S.R., on sudden cardiac deaths. Also in the field of medicine, the Polish Minister of Health visited the U.S. in September on the occasion of the meeting of the joint U.S.-Polish Committee for Health Cooperation, and a joint U.S.-Polish seminar on medical education was held at Duke University. Other examples of scientific cooperation included a visit by the secretary of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences to Bulgaria to discuss U.S.-Bulgarian scientific exchanges, and American participation at the fifth Danubian Conference on Soil Mechanics held in September in Bratislava, Czechoslovakia. Specialists from the G.D.R. attended a number of scientific meetings and conferences in the U.S. during the reporting period, including the Second International Mycological Conference in Tampa, a Philadelphia symposium on drugs affecting lipid metabolism, and a symposium on bioelectro-chemistry held at Woods Hole, Massachusetts. Similarly, an American delegation attended a Dresden symposium on the prevention and treatment of alcoholism, and, in October, Dr. Joseph Quinn of the National Institute of Health conferred with the G.D.R. Ministry of Health. The G.D.R. Academy of Sciences has proposed an exchanges agreement with the U.S. National Academy of Sciences, and drafts of such an agreement have been exchanged between the two bodies.

(iii) Language

During the reporting period, the most significant development in the area of language and foreign area studies was President Carter's approval of a recommendation by the CSCE Commission that a special Commission on Foreign Language and Area Studies be appointed to make suggestions to the President and the Congress on how to strengthen and improve language and area studies in the United States. The findings of such a Commission, which was originally suggested by Congressman Paul Simon of the CSCE Commission, should serve to enhance our implementation of Final Act provisions which encourage foreign language and area studies as a means to strengthen international communication and cooperation. The six-month Commission will be coordinated through the office of the Commissioner of Education.

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