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1st Session } COMMITTEE PRINT

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TOWARD IMPROVED UNITED STATES-CUBA RELATIONS

REPORT

OF A

SPECIAL STUDY MISSION TO CUBA

FEBRUARY 10–15, 1977

MAY 23, 1977

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
89-540 O WASHINGTON : 1977

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FOREWORD

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C., May 23, 1977.

This report was submitted to the Committee on International Relations by a special study mission which traveled to Cuba in February 1977. The observations and findings in the report are those of the mission and do not necessarily reflect the views of the membership of the committee.

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, *Chairman.*

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., May 23, 1977.

Hon. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN, transmitted herewith is a report of a special study mission to Cuba which I conducted between February 10 and 15, 1977.

The major purpose of the mission was to determine and assess the views of Cuban leaders regarding possible steps toward improvement and eventual normalization of relations with the United States; a subsidiary purpose was to observe firsthand some of the conditions of life in Cuba. This mission constituted a logical followup to the extensive hearings on Cuba and legislation (H.R. 6382) to lift the U.S. embargo held by the Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce and the Subcommittee on International Organizations in the spring and summer of 1975 ("U.S. Trade Embargo of Cuba", hearings on H.R. 6382, 94th Congress, May–September, 1975). It seemed particularly timely in view of expressions of interest by the new administration in improved United States-Cuban relations. While I discussed the mission with administration officials, I carried no official administration message and traveled strictly in my capacity as an individual member of the House International Relations Committee.

I trust this report will prove useful to the committee and the Congress in assessing administration policies and making congressional decisions with respect to relations with Cuba.

Sincerely,

JONATHAN B. BINGHAM,
Chairman, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade.

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Introduction

This report contains the findings and impressions of a congressional study mission to Cuba. The mission consisted of Representatives Jonathan B. Bingham of New York (Chairman, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade), accompanied by R. Roger Majak, staff director of the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, and George Ingram, staff consultant to the House International Relations Committee.

The mission was conducted from Thursday, February 10 to Tuesday, February 15, 1977. The Cuban Government made available a car, driver, escorts, and interpreter for the members of the study mission during their stay in Cuba. Accommodations and expenses of the mission during its stay in Cuba, however, were paid for from funds provided by the House of Representatives in accordance with relevant statutes and House rules. June R. Bingham, author and wife of Representative Bingham, accompanied the study mission at her own expense.

On January 31, 1977, in his first press conference after having been confirmed by the Senate as Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance said the United States wished to set no particular preconditions on moving toward normalization of United States-Cuban relations, and that he hoped the United States "could begin the process." This statement was the first official indication of the new administration's views on Cuba, as well as the first indication of willingness to improve United States-Cuban relations since Cuban troops began arriving in large numbers in Angola in mid-1975.

The chill in United States-Cuban relations triggered by the introduction of Cuban troops into Angola was intensified from the Cuban perspective when, on October 6, 1976, a Cubana airliner exploded and crashed into the sea off Barbados killing all 73 people aboard. Then Cuban Premier (now President) Fidel Castro, in an unusually brief but detailed speech before a mass gathering in Havana on October 15, 1976, charged the CIA with direct responsibility for the crash and said he was notifying the U.S. Government that Cuba was abrogating the United States-Cuban hijacking agreement of 1973.[1] In view of the provision of the agreement requiring 6 months prior notice of withdrawal by either party, the Cuban withdrawal was to take effect April 15, 1977.[2] No official expression of sympathy over the loss of Cuban lives in this major disaster was offered by the United States—only a terse denial of U.S. responsibility by then Secretary of State Kissinger.

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[1] The text of the Castro speech of October 15 appears in this report as appendix A, p. 23. The United States-Cuban hijacking accord appears in appendix B, p. 30.

[2] Pursuant to Castro's notice, the agreement did in fact terminate, on this date.

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It was in this setting—of both new possibilities for improved United States-Cuban relations and difficult political barriers to such improvement—that the study mission visited Cuba. Subcommittee Chairman Bingham was the first American legislator to visit Cuba under the new administration of President Jimmy Carter and the commencement of the 95th Congress.

The members of the study mission wish to thank the Cuban officials and representatives of other governments in Havana who assisted them in their work. In particular, the mission thanks Ms. Mary Gentile, Mr. Alberto Beterand, and Mr. Sergio Martinez who made arrangements for accommodations and visits with Cuban officials and locations of interest, and Ms. Juanita Vera who served as an expert interpreter throughout the mission's stay in Cuba. The mission also wishes to thank the Honorable Theodore Jackson, Ambassador to Cuba from the United Kingdom, the Honorable James Edward Hyndman, Ambassador to Cuba from Canada, as well as several resident media representatives who generously shared their time and perceptive views on Cuba with members of the study mission.

Discussions With Top Cuban Officials

In addition to meetings with numerous mid-level officials, the study mission benefited from extended discussions with four top Cuban leaders: President (of the Council of State and General Assembly) Fidel Castro Ruz, Vice President (of the Council of State) and Communist Party Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Carlos Raphael Rodriguez, Minister of Foreign Trade Marcelo Fernandez Font (accompanied by Vice Minister of Trade for Capitalist Countries, Ricardo Cabrisis), and Minister of Education, Jose Ramon Fernandez. Discussions with President Castro totaled 8½ hours in two meetings—approximately 7 hours on February 12, 1977, and an additional 1½ hours on February 14, 1977. The study mission spent 2 hours each with Carlos Raphael Rodriguez and Foreign Trade Minister Font, and about 5 hours with Education Minister Fernandez.

Conversations with these officials covered a wide range of topics. Throughout the talks, members of the study mission stressed that they spoke only for themselves, bore no message from President Carter or Secretary of State Vance, and did not represent official U.S. Government views. Directly or indirectly, much of the discussion dealt with the possibilities for and obstacles to official discussions in which both governments had expressed interest, the issues to be covered, and the possible progression of such official talks. Cuban officials carefully avoided the use of the term "negotiations" to describe possible official discussions since, in their view, "negotiations" connote both a commitment to solutions and mutual concessions which they are not, at this point, willing to make.

Conditional and Unconditional United States-Cuban Cooperation

Cuban officials divide issues and areas of cooperation between the United States and Cuba sharply into two categories—those which can be discussed or undertaken immediately, without preconditions, and

those that can only be discussed or undertaken after the United States has lifted at least the "essential elements" of its trade embargo (or "blockade," as Cubans refer to it) against Cuba.

Cuban leaders cited three matters which could be taken up immediately with the United States: discussion of a United States-Cuban fishing agreement covering the waters between the two countries and along the Atlantic coast of Florida, increased cultural and sports exchanges, and scientific cooperation in combatting sugar blight presently in Jamaica and threatening both Cuban and American sugar crops.[3]

Members of the study mission expressed concern and disappointment that the United States-Cuban hijacking agreement—and its possible continuation—was not among the issues that could be discussed without preconditions. Cuban officials made clear that the kind of terrorist action that resulted in the October 6 Cubana airline disaster was of deep and "basic" concern to them, and that they were prepared to let the hijacking agreement lapse on April 15, 1977, although they could continue substantially to abide by its terms. Terrorism, for which they hold the United States, and particularly the Central Intelligence Agency, responsible would, they said, be a high priority subject of discussion once the United States has at least partially lifted its economic embargo of Cuba. The embargo, they repeated, is a "knife at Cuba's throat." Under such a threat, they will not discuss such serious matters as terrorism and other issues "essential" to them or to the United States.

Issues of concern and interest to the United States which Cuban officials seem willing to discuss only after at least partial lifting of the U.S. embargo include: release of American prisoners and general observance by Cuba of human rights, compensation for U.S. claims, and Cuban foreign policy (including especially Cuban activities in Africa and the Caribbean).

Treatment and release of Cuban political prisoners, and Cuban relations with the Soviet Union, were issues raised by the study mission which Cuban officials indicated no willingness to discuss officially under any circumstances, although as described later in this report they provided rather detailed comments on these issues in informal talks with the study mission.

Cuban counterclaims against the United States, alleged violations of human rights by the United States, alleged U.S. suppression of Puerto Rican desires for independence, and the Guantanamo Naval Base were issues Cuban officials mentioned they would want to take up in any official talks following lifting of the embargo.

Cuban officials implied that this category of issues would have to be discussed as a total package. Members of the study mission expressed misgivings about such an approach—that it would make for a very long, complicated, and difficult set of negotiations, and that more progress might be made if some issues could be discussed separately. Some Cuban officials seemed flexible on this point.

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[3] Since the study mission's visit, an American basketball team has visited Cuba, and arrangements are being made for other possible sports and cultural exchanges. After several weeks of direct talks between Cuban and U.S. officials, maritime and fisheries agreements were signed by the two governments April 28, 1977.

Anti-Cuban Terrorism

Not only Cuban officials, but students and others with whom the study mission came in contact, while surprisingly friendly and unresentful toward the United States, seemed to resent rather deeply what they regard as U.S. responsibility for the bombing of the Cubana airline plane.

In a country of only about 10 million people, the violent deaths of 73 people, 57 of them Cubans, is a national disaster, and was so regarded by the Cuban people. Visiting Cuba 4 months after the tragic event, the study mission sensed continuing strong feelings of loss, sadness, and—perhaps most of all—puzzlement over how such a thing could happen with so little reaction from the rest of the world. When 11 athletes were killed by terrorists at the Olympic games in Munich, one Cuban told us, there was an outpouring of sympathy and outrage from the entire world. But when 57 innocent Cubans were killed by terrorists in Barbados, including Cuba's Olympic fencing team, there was little reaction in the press or from other governments.

Cuban leaders see the Cubana bombing as part of an ongoing pattern of terrorist activities against Cuba for which they hold the United States responsible. Numerous other, less publicized incidents have occurred, including attacks on Cuban diplomats and fishermen. Eight specific incidents between April 6, and October 6, 1976, are detailed in President Castro's October 15 speech (see app. A, p. 23).

Cuban officials attach considerable significance to what they claim to have been a cessation of such terrorist activities when, in 1975, as has recently been revealed in the press (see app. C, p. 32), then Secretary of State Kissinger was secretly talking to the Cubans about possible improvements in relations.

This alleged cessation of terrorist activties coinciding with secret talks, along with both "hard" and circumstantial evidence they claim to have of United States and CIA links to individuals known or believed to be involved in anti-Cuban terrorism, leads Cuban officials to hold the United States responsible for this terrorism.

The leader of the study mission, Congressman Bingham, expressed to Cuban officials and others his personal condolences over the tragic loss of life in the Cubana airline bombing. He assured officials that, to the best of his knowledge, the United States had no direct involvement in the bombing, nor does the United States any longer, as a matter of official policy, conduct or encourage any violent operations against Cuba.

At most, he noted, certain individuals with possible past associations with the CIA could be held responsible for some recent acts of terrorism. In the absence of a U.S. policy of harassment of Cuba, he said, the problem is one of unauthorized and illegal activity. One solution is more active and effective prosecution of such activity by U.S. officials, although such prosecution is hampered by the fact that much of the illegal activity is organized and/or occurs outside the borders and jurisdiction of the United States. He also noted that U.S. laws dealing with illegal activities against foreign nations, such as the Neutrality Act, are antiquated and difficult to enforce.

Cuban officials generally insisted that U.S. involvement in recent terrorism was, in their view, more direct than simply through CIA-

trained individuals with no current U.S. Government contacts, but that even if U.S. Government involvement were so limited they still hold the United States responsible.

It is anticipated that Cuba will place heavy emphasis on the need for U.S. action to crack down on terrorism in any wide-ranging official discussions that may take place, and that such action will be an important factor contributing to a revival of the hijacking agreement and perhaps other areas of United States-Cuban cooperation.

Education and Quality of Life

Cuba has evidently concentrated on education and rural development in a strategy to achieve both its political goals and a decent quality of life for the Cuban population. That stategy seems to have been reasonably successful. Cubans appear uniformly to enjoy a no-frills, but nevertheless adequate, basic standard of living.[4]

There is little sign of poverty. People are well-clothed, adequately housed, and healthy. Children particularly seem healthier and generally better provided for than in most developing countries.

The simplest luxuries, however, are scarce or unavailable, and even the basic necessities are far from plentiful. There are few automobiles. Food, clothing, even shoes (one pair a year) are tightly rationed, though fewer items are on the ration list now than in the past. Still, Cubans are allowed to purchase only an ounce of coffee, for example, a week. Meat is also rationed. Much of the clothing is made at home from rationed yard goods. A few staples, such as fish and eggs, are relatively plentiful and not subject to rations.

Because there are few things to buy, many Cubans seem to have plenty of cash. Since education, health care, vacations and other necessities are provided by the state, there is relatively little to save for. One of the few places this extra cash can be spent is in rather lavish restaurants, night clubs, and hotels catering mostly to foreigners. Especially on weekends and holidays, these places are filled with romancing young couples and Cuban families "splurging."

When the Castro regime took over in 1959, there were about 187,000 students in a population of about 6.5 million. Today, in a population of about 10 million, there are 3.5-million students. Literacy has risen from 25 percent to over 99 percent. Much of the educational effort, of course, has been focused on the very young. But adult education has also been stressed and is quite popular. The universities are so full that stricter requirements for admission are being considered to keep enrollments under control. The University of Havana campus teems with students day and night—many of them adults taking courses part time.

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[4] It is hard, of course, to measure standard of living. But the Overseas Development Council has recently worked out a new index, called the Physical Quality of Life Index, composed of three factors: life expectancy, infant mortality, and literacy. On this index, Cuba scores 86, which is high relative to its per capita GNP and compares favorably with Brazil (68), Chile (77), and Peru (58). It is about the same as some Caribbean countries—e.g., Jamaica (87), Trinidad and Tobago (88)—but substantially higher than others, such as the Dominican Republic (64). It is much higher than the score on this index of most African countries—that is, Nigeria (25), or Algeria (42). Since Cuban resources are no greater, and in some cases considerably less, than the countries to which it compares favorably, these figures suggest that Cuba is using those resources effectively and equitably with respect to the basic necessities of life. "The United States and World Development—Agenda 1977," John W. Sewell and the staff of the Overseas Development Council, Praeger, 1977.

A nationwide system of boarding schools—primary and secondary—is the heart of the Cuban educational system. The study mission visited the Lenin School near Havana, obviously a showcase. This coeducational secondary school is open only to the best students interested in "technical" careers. Like many of the Cuban schools, classroom study is combined with work in school workshops and in adjacent student factories and forums, for which students receive a small wage.

The Lenin school was well designed and equipped, mostly with Russian, Chinese, and East European equipment. The atmosphere was intense and formal. Competition is obviously keen to get in, and stay in, such a school. Though larger than most Cuban schools (about 4,000 pupils), the Lenin School seemed to offer highly personal instruction. In addition to their basic course of studies, students are offered art, music, an extensive sports program, and a choice of English or Russian as a foreign language (about equal numbers opting for each).

Many of the Cuban boarding schools are located in the countryside—away from major cities. Students are permitted to go home only on weekends. Separation of students from the pressures of family life and the cities, Cuban officials feel, provides a good atmosphere for learning. It also, however, fragments the family and would seem to run counter to Cuban Government policies encouraging close family life. The study mission was unable to determine how popular this system is with parents. Cuban officials, noted, however, that policies on the assignment of students to schools are flexible enough to accommodate special family circumstances that require students to be at or near home.

The development of new educational complexes in the countryside is also part of a broader Cuban policy and program of rural development. Even the brief visitor to Cuba is struck by the extent of new construction and facilities in the countryside. In the smallest farm villages, new apartment complexes (each apartment comes with a television set), schools, medical centers, sports facilities.

While this concentration on improving life in the rural countryside has not enabled Cuba to meet its agricultural production goals, it has been successful in another, perhaps more important respect. It has kept the population from flooding into the major cities and further overtaxing inadequate urban facilities. On the contrary, there has been some outmigration from the cities to rural areas.

As a result, Havana strikes the visitor as a rather quiet, uncrowded, provincial town—not the teeming metropolis it once was or the metropolitan area of over a million people that it still is.

The heavy investment in rural facilities seems to have been accompanied by minimal investment in urban improvements. The Havana mass transit (bus) system is greatly overcrowded and underequipped. Many hotels are in disrepair. The magnificant old stuccoed buildings of the city have not been painted seemingly in 20 years. Except for the few new hospitals and sports complexes in Havana, public facilities are generally rundown.

This is partly an effect, of course, of the embargo. But it is also a matter of choice and policy, since goods have long been available from Europe, Japan, and elsewhere had the Cuban Government chosen to put more of a priority upon urban improvement.

Cubans take pains in small ways to brighten up the rather drab atmosphere especially of the cities. Flowers are lovingly cared for in yards and flower boxes. Dyeing of women's hair and bright nail polish on fingers and sandal-bare toes are common. Miniskirts have never gone out of fashion.

To what extent the Cuban Government can now afford—both financially and politically—to permit expanded availability of consumer goods and improvements particularly in the urban environment is a matter of disagreement among Cuban leaders. Prospects of American tourism and possible lifting of the U.S. embargo have set off a lively, if private debate among Cuban leaders as to whether Cuba should become a more consuming and consumer-oriented society. All indications are that consumerism will continue to be tightly limited in Cuba both by economic necessity and Government policy.

This prospect has led, according to foreign observers in Cuba, to some disenchantment and discouragement in the Cuban population. "Is this the best we can hope for," increasing numbers of Cubans are quietly wondering, "and, if so, why."

It would be a considerable exaggeration, however, to suggest that the Cuban population is actively restive. On the contrary, all indications available to the study mission were that support is strong for the Government and cooperation with Government programs and officials is widespread.

While some coercion is undoubtedly used to assure compliance with Government policies and ideology, carefully organized social pressure is clearly the major means of influencing public opinion and behavior. Every neighborhood, community, and group is organized into grassroots "Committees for the Defense of the Revolution." Originally created essentially as civil defense units, these committees now function as pressure groups as well as town halls and local courts. By keeping tabs on the participation, achievements, and decorum of every individual in the community, and with the power to make recommendations or actually dispense a wide variety of favors, services, and penalties from housing allocations, to marriage licenses, to vacation schedules, these committees are able to bring great pressure to bear on virtually every individual to follow Government policies.

Despite the premium put on participation and compliance with Government programs, Cuban officials noted that the system makes allowance for individuals who do not wish to take part. These nonparticipators, we were informed, are not penalized so long as they do not violate the law or take any action against the regime. Non-Cubans report that many Cubans who are not integrated into the regime are vocal in their complaints, but that such grumblers can get into serious trouble.

Human Rights and Political Prisoners

A 5-day visit, even with the evidence compiled by the Subcommittees on International Trade and Commerce and on International Organizations in extensive hearings in 1975 on the embargo and on human rights in Cuba, is an insufficient basis for a detailed assessment of the complex question of the extent to which Cuba deprives its citizens of basic human rights. Cuban officials are extremely sensitive about the matter, and access by outsiders to situations in which denial of human

rights might occur is quite limited. Nevertheless, the study mission did gain certain insights into Cuban views and practices with respect to human rights.

In general, Cuban officials take the offensive when the subject of human rights comes up. Human rights, they assert, is an internal matter which "only the Cuban people have a right to judge." Furthermore, their definition of human rights includes freedom from hunger and misery, racial prejudice, unemployment, illiteracy; it also includes the right to free education and health care (rights which, it should be noted, are included in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). On all these points, they counter, the United States has a poor record and, therefore, no right to criticize the human rights record of other nations.

With respect to political prisoners, Cuban officials continue to deny that anyone is imprisoned in Cuba simply for expressing views—even views hostile to the Government. They admit, however, that a category of crime exists known as crimes against the security of the state. This appears to be roughly equivalent to what Americans would consider political crimes, but Cuban officials insist that persons convicted of such crimes have taken overt action against the state.

Amnesty International estimates that there are 4,000 to 5,000 political prisoners in Cuba. Cuban officials expressed general satisfaction that the 1976 Amnesty International annual report was fair and objective, and said they are considering entering into an unofficial dialog with Amnesty International.[5]

Cuban leaders were firm in saying that release of Cuban political prisoners is not negotiable with any foreign nation, but indicated that the release of some or all of the nine Americans still held in Cuban jails might be an appropriate subject for discussion after lifting of the U.S. embargo.

Many of those convicted of crimes against the security of the state were charged with counterrevolutionary activity. Cuban officials defend their treatment of counterrevolutionaries. Many, they claim, have been reeducated and released. Since 20 years was a common sentence for counterrevolutionary activity others still held are due to be released in the next few years. The study mission was unable to judge the accuracy of rumors that sentences are often extended simply by administrative decision.

The Cuban political prisoner best known outside Cuba, Huber Matos, will serve out the remaining 3 years of his 20-year term, a high-level official said with great emphasis.[6]

Despite their view that human rights and political prisoners are strictly internal matters, Cuban officials consented to a visit by the study mission both to a prison and a criminal trial. This, they noted was permissible since the study mission was not directed by the Congress to make such a visit.

The prison was a new one, not yet completed, near Havana, called East Combinado. It was a well-designed, modern complex with ex-

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[5] Cuban exile groups generally estimate the number of political prisoners in Cuba at 20,000 or more. Cuban officials insist that these figures are greatly exaggerated.

[6] Senora Matos and their son, both now in the United States, insist that Huber Matos, who had been a close associate of Castro in the early stages of the revolution, although disaffected, did not take action against the revolution. That, however, is the charge on which he was convicted and imprisoned.

tensive medical, sports, conjugal visit, day care, and work facilities. The cell blocks we saw, which were still under construction, were well ventilated and decorated with cheerful colors.

Prison officials informed the study mission that three Americans are held in this prison, but that they were not authorized to agree to our request to meet them. During the mission's tour, few prisoners were seen, except those working on the construction; presumably most of the prisoners were at work in the nearby factory, or on other projects. We did communicate briefly with one prisoner. He was Dr. Santiago Echemendia Orsini, a medical doctor now assigned to the prison hospital's emergency room. He has served 16 years of a 20-year sentence for a crime against the security of the state. Dr. Orsini seemed in good health, but his facial expression was a tragic one.

Prisoners convicted of crimes against the security of the state are kept separate from the other prisoners, the study mission was informed, but in similar facilities. They do not, however, enjoy the same recreational and family visitation privileges of other inmates unless and until reeducated.

East Combinado, we were told, will, when completed, house most of the male prisoners of Havana Province—between 700 and 800. It is part of a system of new prisons, all of which combine paid work with incarceration (thus the name "Combinado"), which eventually will enable Cuban authorities to close down virtually all of the country's old and now inadequate prisons, including the infamous La Cabana, which, they said, will be made into a museum.[7]

Accused offenders awaiting trial are housed in quarters separate from convicted inmates. Trial within 20 days is required by law. Both provincial and regional courts use a combination of professional and lay judges—all selected by people's assemblies. As in most countries of South America whose legal system is Spanish based, the legal process is rather loose and informal in comparison to British and American procedures. There are no juries. Defendants are not required to testify under oath. Hearsay evidence is permissible. Trial records are incomplete, and those that are kept are not available to the public.

Capital punishment had been abolished in Cuba, but was revived after the Castro revolution. It can now be used for serious crimes against the security of the state, violent rape, theft with homicide, and first degree murder. In recent years executions have averaged about 5 or 6 a year. In cases involving capital punishment and sentences of 30 years or more, appeal is automatic. Defendants may choose their own attorney in all cases, and attorneys are paid by the state.

For whatever reason—whether because of the severity of punishment, the activity of the local Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, or otherwise—the crime rate in Cuba appears to be low.

So far as religious freedom is concerned, the study mission found no evidence that religious worship is interfered with, although reports persist that certain religious sects that require rejection of the state, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, continue to be persecuted.

Members of the study mission visited with Mr. Isidoro Stettner and Mr. Luis Sklar at the United Jewish Temple in Havana. Mr. Stettner,

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[7] From sources outside Cuba, the study mission has been informed that Huber Matos is now held in the new prison under conditions as inhumane as those at La Cabana which are said to have seriously impaired his health.

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a remarkable and dedicated man, is a leader of the Cuban Jewish community. Mr. Sklar, his young assistant, is president of the B'nai B'rith chapter in Havana.

The Jewish community in Havana was established in 1886. It took in many refugees from Nazi persecution in the 1940's. During and after the Castro revolution of 1959, however, Jews left in large numbers. Today, the Jewish community consists of only about 1,400 families, many of them with relatives in the United States.

Mr. Stettner reported that Jews are able to worship freely in Cuba, and that the Cuban Government has even granted the community special exemptions from Cuban law to permit compliance with traditional Jewish burial and other customs. The community supports its needy members by the sale of kosher items which it imports each year with the cooperation of the government. Discrimination against Jews is not a problem, Mr. Stettner said, noting that a number of Jews serve in high government positions.

While religious freedom is thus observed in a technical sense, it appears that Cubans who are ambitious for advancement or who seek educational advantages for their children will not wish to be identified as active participants in a church or temple.[8]

There is no free press in Cuba. Cuban officials admit freely that they have a different conception of the press than that in the United States and most of the non-Communist world, and that in our terms they do not have a free press. The single Cuban Government newspaper *Granma* (named after the ship on which Castro returned to Cuba to complete his revolution), is a dreary publication containing very little news. Cubans, however, can get a considerable amount of news by listening to U.S. radio broadcasts with which the government makes no effort to interfere.

The Revolution of 1959 has radically changed the position of women, at least on paper. Between the sexes the word now is "equality, si; machismo, no."

The Family Code of 1975 insists on "absolute equality" between the sexes. In a Latin country this is truly revolutionary. In marriage, the Code says, "Both parties must care for the family they have created and . . . must participate . . . in the running of the home."

In practice, however, women appear still to do the lioness' share of the housework and child care. Examples:

Carmen, an educated Cuban woman, lives with her husband in the home of her parents. She helps with the cooking and ironing on Sundays, but her mother does all the shopping and cooking.

Carolita, a high level official, is divorced. She and her two school-age daughters live with her father. He will babysit if she has to work at night but will not cook. Meals for him and the girls are then usually provided by Carolita's ex-mother-in-law.

On the other hand, some men do help around the house. Camillo organizes his four young sons (he has no daughter) into a Saturday house-cleaning brigade. His wife does most of the cooking, but the oldest boy does some of the shopping.

All echelons of education in Cuba are open to women, including medical and law school. More and more girls are entering these professions.

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[8] Time limitations prevented the study mission from visiting with leaders of other religious denominations. The 1975 hearings on U.S. Trade Embargo in Cuba, however, contain detailed assessments of the status of Christian denominations in Cuba See particularly the testimony of Dr. Margaret Crahan and Sister Helen Volkomener, pp. 274 and 303.

The so-called oldest profession, prostitution, has been officially abolished. On the other hand, because of the shortages of food, clothing, and gadgets, there is a widespread black market. Payola reportedly often comes in the form of services. These have been known to include the favors of young women.

Several Cubans, including Fidel Castro, spoke with distress about the high divorce rate in Cuba. Contributing to it are several factors. One is lack of privacy because of the housing shortage. Another is lack of sufficient day-care centers so that young mothers can pursue their education and/or career. Still another is the long wait in line for almost everything (food, clothing, transportation) which means that a working wife gets home late and exhausted much of the time. In addition, for those people who are ambitious for themselves or for their children being admitted to the university, there is much so-called volunteer work that must be done in addition to their job and home tending. The volunteer work may be close to home in the form of the CDR's (Committees for the Defense of the Revolution), or far from home in the form of the "micro-brigades." The net result is little time or energy for intimacy building with one's spouse.

U.S. Claims and Cuban Counterclaims

During 1959 and 1960 the Cuban Government moved to expropriate almost all U.S. property in Cuba (except for the Guantanamo naval base). Subsequently, in 1964, the Congress authorized the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission to adjudicate the claims. The Commission received 8,816 claims totaling $3,346 million and awarded 5,911 claims totaling $1,799 million. These claims involve 898 claims by corporations, amounting to $1,578 million, and 5,013 by individuals, amounting to $221 million.

While the United States has successfully settled its claims against some Communist countries, the claims against Cuba total more than the value of the U.S. property expropriated by all other Communist governments combined (U.S.S.R., Poland, Romania, Czeckoslovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria). Although the United States has settled other claims at less than full value, even a settlement of 50 percent of the value would probably be more than the Cuban economy could bear unless it were stretched out over several decades.

A complicating factor in considering the U.S. claims against Cuba is that, when confronted with the issue, the Cubans reply that they have claims against the United States. Their claims, for unspecified losses to Cuba from the economic embargo and for hostile activities such as the Bay of Pigs operation, would more than offset U.S. claims against Cuba. While Cuban claims may, to some extent, be asserted for reasons of bargaining leverage, they also seem to reflect a deep sense of injury suffered by the Cuban nation at the hand of the United States and so are unlikely to be readily negotiated away.

It should be noted that in most cases where such claims against Communist governments have been successfully negotiated, the negotiation and agreement have followed the establishment of trade and diplomatic relations. Certainly, in no case has the United States

ever attempted to press for payment of such claims while maintaining a total trade embargo against the country in question.

In the case of Cuba, the claims problem is going to be an especially difficult one and is likely to take years to negotiate. It is possible that such a negotiation could be started before the restoration of full diplomatic relations, but in the judgment of this study mission there is no chance that the negotiations could be undertaken before the embargo is at least partially lifted or that a claims settlement could be obtained from the Cuban Government as the price for lifting the embargo.

Trade

In recent years, Cuba has engaged in several billion dollars a year in two-way trade with non-Communist countries. Cuban trade officials cited the following trade statistics for 1975:

	Million
Trade with socialist countries:	
Imports	$1,724
Exports	1,986
Total	3,710
Trade with capitalist countries:	
Imports	1,547
Exports	964
Total	2,500

Cuban officials indicated that as much as $1 billion a year of its trade with capitalist countries could be conducted with the United States. The United States, they noted, however, has lost the Cuban market through more than 16 years of embargo, and will have to work hard to regain it after the embargo is lifted.

Most Cuban trade with capitalist countries is with Japan, Spain, Canada, the United Kingdom, West Germany, Italy, and France. These nations never embargoed Cuba, and have developed and maintained business ties while the United States refused to do business with Cuba.

Even if the embargo were lifted tomorrow, the achievement of a billion dollars a year in United States-Cuban trade seems overly optimistic for many reasons. With sugar normally accounting for 80 percent of the value of Cuban exports, current depressed world sugar prices have hit the Cuban economy particularly hard. Hard currency is extremely scarce. Cuban production of sugar and other products that would be attractive to U.S. buyers is uncertain. Increased Canadian and American tourism [9] will raise some hard currency, but tourist facilities are quite limited and the gains from tourism are not likely to be sufficient to sustain a large volume of trade.

The study mission noted that the weak condition of the Cuban economy has forced some curtailment of Cuban trade with capitalist countries. Cuban officials confirmed, for example, that they have stopped delivery on many shipments of Japanese goods because of inability to pay for these goods at the present time. They are negotiating with the Japanese and others to postpone purchases and revise payment arrangements.

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[9] American tourism to Cuba was reestablished March 15, 1977, when restrictions on travel by Americans to Cuba were lifted by the State and Treasury Departments.

Among the products most prominently mentioned as major possible Cuban exports to the United States that would enable Cuba to raise sufficient foreign exchange to make significant purchases from the United States were, of course, sugar, but also nickel and fish.

Nickel would seem to be the most promising Cuban export. Cuba has one of the world's largest reserves of nickel, and plans to expand its production facilities substantially over the next several years. This would permit Cuba eventually to become a major supplier of nickel to the United States.

Cuban officials indicated that while some sugar production is committed to the Soviet Union and other customers into the future, and that Cuba has had some difficulties meeting production goals, it expects to have substantial amounts of uncommitted sugar that could be available for sale in the United States. The availability of this sugar, of course, could vary with world prices and production. Foreign observers in Havana estimated, however, that in the current year the Soviet Union, for example, has purchased more than a million tons of sugar beyond what it was committed to purchase from Cuba.

Cuban officials seem sensitive to the fact that some of Cuba's potential exports to the United States could threaten domestic U.S. producers. The study mission discussed this problem specifically with respect to possible Cuban citrus exports to the United States. Cuban trade officials indicated that they have a market in Eastern Europe for virtually all the citrus products they can produce. They said they would favorably consider limitations on any exports of citrus products to the United States in order not to disrupt U.S. citrus prices and production.

Food commodities were by far the most frequently mentioned product which the Cubans showed interest in purchasing from the United States. Cuban officials were frank to acknowledge that Cuba has not yet been able to achieve self-sufficiency in basic food commodities—both for animal and direct human consumption—and must import more than half of its food needs. It sees the United States as a possible source particularly of rice, beans, and wheat.

Given the current shortage of hard currency and the general fragility of the Cuban economy, the economic benefits of trade with the United States would seem to be minimal. It is a common contention among American opponents of improved United States-Cuban relations that trade between Cuba and the United States would "take the Soviet Union off the hook" with respect to the economic burden it bears for Cuba. United States-Cuban trade, however, would be on a strictly commercial basis, at prevailing world prices, and would not make any net improvement in the Cuban economy or significantly reduce Cuban economic dependence on the Soviets. As noted below, Cuban-Soviet trade constitutes indirect aid to Cuba, whereas United States-Cuban trade would involve no such subsidy. Cuba would presumably need to import more from the United States than she could export, as the figures above indicate is the case in Cuban trade with other capitalist countries.

The bulk of trade between Cuba and the U.S.S.R. is governed by a 5-year agreement, which covers the period 1976–80. It includes a list of products, of which sugar and oil are the most important. In general,

the Soviet Union is obligated to purchase approximately 2.5 million tons of Cuban sugar and to supply Cuba with 7 to 8 million tons of crude oil and petroleum products. This agreement amounts to a substantial Soviet subsidy of the Cuban economy, to the tune, given current world sugar and oil prices, of at least $1 billion a year. The U.S.S.R. pays three times the world price (currently about 10 cents a pound) for sugar and Cuba pays half the world price for petroleum. Each year the price Cuba pays for petroleum supplied by the Soviet Union is set by the average of the world price over the previous 5 years. So, the price Cuba pays will increase. However, the price the U.S.S.R. pays for Cuban sugar is "indexed" to the price Cuba pays for the oil, so the two prices will rise together giving Cuba a constant net advantage. Cuban trade officials expect that the current 5-year agreement will be extended in 1980 for another 5 years.

It is possible that the Cubans are thinking about buying U.S. grains, and perhaps other products on credit. But no Cuban officials suggested this as a possibility.

The lack of major economic benefits to Cuba of resumed United States-Cuban trade suggests that Cuban interest in achieving a partial lifting of the U.S. embargo is more psychological than economic.

Cuban Foreign Policy

The study mission devoted much of its discussion with Cuban officials, including President Castro himself, to foreign policy issues. President Castro and other officials spoke warmly of Cuba's highly favorable trade agreements with the Soviet Union. Estimates by foreign observers in Cuba of Soviet assistance to Cuba range from $2 million to as high as $3.5 million a day, mostly in the form of the sugar-oil arrangement. More direct technical and military assistance is also provided, though at least a portion of the Soviet military equipment received by Cuba is purchased.

The Soviet presence in Cuba is not conspicuous, but very real nonetheless. A large high-rise apartment building in the heart of Havana is devoted mostly to housing Russian advisers and their families. Soviet ships are much in evidence in Havana harbor. Pictures of Marx and Lenin are prominently displayed. However, we saw no Soviet military personnel.

At no time did Castro or any other Cuban official suggest that improved relations with the United States would lead to any major change in Cuba's relations with the Soviet Union. However, the mission, nevertheless, gained the impression that Castro would like to reduce Cuba's material dependence on the U.S.S.R.

President Castro vigorously denies that the Soviet Union dictates Cuban foreign policy, and that, for example, the Soviets pressed Cuba to send troops to Angola. On the contrary, the decision to send troops to Angola is explained by Cuban officials as a purely Cuban decision based mostly upon a request from the MPLA and the Cuban assessment that Angola was under real and direct threat from South Africa and that no country in Africa was in a position effectively to defend the Angolans from this threat. The only role played by the Soviet Union, Castro told the study mission, was the presence of some Soviet military equipment in Angola which the Angolans were unable to

operate and with which Cuban troops were quite familiar. The availability of this equipment reduced the potential cost and increased the potential effectiveness of sending Cuban troops to Angola, and contributed to the decision to do so.

The fact that many Cubans can trace their "roots" to areas of Africa was also mentioned as a reason for the Cuban response to the Angolan request for military help. This consideration is being particularly stressed to the Cuban public through the press and special documentary films on Cuba's African heritage.

President Castro refused to rule out entirely an expansion of the Cuban role in Africa should dire and unforeseen circumstances develop. He emphasized, however, that Cuba has no desire, intention, or capacity to extend its military presence beyond Angola. He noted, in fact, that he has received more requests for assistance than he has the capacity to provide, and has turned down such requests.

The peak Cuban troop presence in Angola, Castro told the study mission with noticeable amusement, was "larger than Secretary Kissinger estimated." This would suggest that it was more than 15,000—the figure generally cited by Kissinger.

There has been a net reduction of Cuban troops in Angola, Castro noted, of "more than half." Assuming the top figure was close to 20,000, this would mean a reduction to between 8,000 and 10,000 troops. There has also been rotation of units. Cuban troops will continue to be gradually removed over a projected time schedule that, according to one Cuban official, is "not as long as you might suppose." President Castro noted, however, that Cuban troops would not be withdrawn totally until Angola is capable of defending itself or the Cubans are informed by the Angolan Government that they are no longer needed.

In the meantime, Cuban civilian "technical advisers," from doctors to truck drivers, are being sent to Angola "by the thousands." The cost of these civilian advisers to Cuba in terms of its own development would appear to be considerably greater than the cost of the Cuban military presence in Angola. Troops contribute little to the Cuban economy and development, and are maintained in Angola at minimal cost. Civilian technicians, on the other hand, are in short supply in Cuba, and the diversion of thousands of such trained people to Angola has surely meant a substantial sacrifice.[10]

With respect to Cuban policy in the Caribbean, President Castro stressed that the United States should not view Cuban actions toward Caribbean nations and territories as designed to counter or conflict with U.S. policy. He noted, for example, that he had counseled Panamanian leaders to take a moderate position in negotiations with the United States over a new canal treaty.

Cuban policy, however, with respect to the future status of Puerto Rico clearly does conflict with U.S. policy. Castro told the study mission that his government has a "moral" commitment to support independence for Puerto Rico. The hero of Cuban independence, Jose Marti, he reminded us, also envisioned and fought for Puerto Rican independence. His support for Puerto Rican independence, Castro said, would be "moral and political," not military.

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[10] Long lines and overcrowded conditions which the study mission observed in the Havana mass transit system were said to be due in part to shortage of drivers and mechanics. Many Cuban drivers and mechanics have reportedly been sent to Angola.

Congressman Bingham reminded President Castro that the independence movement has never gained the support of as much as 5 percent of the Puerto Rican people in free elections there. Castro did not repeat the usual Cuban propaganda line on this subject, but stated very simply that "as long as there is a single *independista* in Puerto Rico, we will support him, but not with arms." He gave the impression that he thought the Puerto Ricans *ought* to want to be independent.

United States policy toward Puerto Rico will probably be a major item on the Cuban agenda for any official talks. It is the study mission's view, however, that this is an ideological and symbolic question which the Cubans will raise in talks largely for tactical purposes rather than with any expectation of gaining concessions or concrete action by the United States.

Finally, it should be noted that the notion of "morality" cropped up frequently in the study mission's discussions with President Castro. He spoke of "moral" commitments to Angola and Puerto Rico. He admired President Carter, he said, because he feels Carter is a man with a strong moral sense. Pressed for a definition of "morality," Castro responded that it is action based upon justice. But what constitutes justice, he admitted, could vary widely from nation to nation, thus providing no assurance that "moral" leaders and national foreign policies would necessarily be compatible.

Although anti-U.S. diatribes have substantially moderated in the last few years, pro-Communist propaganda, of course, continues full-blast. Following are two examples:

> On the bulletin board in the Criminal Courts building in Havana, a sign: "In capitalist countries nobody pays attention to the children. But in our country * * *" There followed four photos of happy Cuban children at work and play.
>
> From the official 1975 Report by the Cuban Women's Federation concerning the American way of life: "The bourgeoisie conceived women as an ornament put for sale and which through marriage might insure an increase of the family capital. They are women incapable of creating, inactive women, useless to the point of boredom or corruption."

Though Cuban and American foreign policies will undoubtedly continue to be divergent in many respects, an advantage of direct and continuing contact with Cuban leaders would be the opportunity to seek areas of agreement on international action and thereby possibly bring Cuban and American foreign policy into greater harmony.

Guantanamo Naval Base

Cuban officials reminded the study mission that Guantanamo is the only American base in the world which we continue to maintain over the opposition of the Government of the country on whose territory it is located. As the size of the base has declined, the number of Cuban workers employed there and the economic importance of the base has similarly declined. Guantanamo is unlikely, therefore, to constitute a major item on the Cuban agenda in future United States-Cuban dis-

cussions—an impression reinforced by the fact that it was only briefly mentioned in the study mission's extensive discussions.

Nuclear Development

Cuba has virtually no energy resources of its own (with the exception, of course, of the sun which neither it nor more advanced nations have learned to harness in large scale). It is totally dependent upon foreign sources of energy. At present, that source is the Soviet Union, which provides nearly all Cuba's energy needs by way of oil at about one-half the world price (for details, see "Trade," pp. 12–14).

In view of their vulnerable energy position, Cuban officials feel compelled to develop nuclear electric power. They confirmed press reports that they have signed an agreement with Comecon, the Communist Common Market, to build a nuclear power plant which, when completed in about 1980, will supply 1,700 megawatts of power (more than doubling Cuba's generating capacity).

Construction has not yet begun on this nuclear plant, and the study mission was unable to learn any details of its design.

The study mission found Cuban officials well aware of concern in the United States and elsewhere that appropriate safeguards be followed to prevent diversion of nuclear fuel to military purposes. The study mission repeated this concern. Cuban officials said that Cuba is entirely committed to the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and plans to sign an agreement with the IAEA to abide by them. However, whether the design of the proposed plant will provide maximum protection of both Cuban and American populations which could be affected by an accident at the planned Cuban plant is a matter which should continue to be pursued with Cuban officials.[11]

Governmental Structure

An interesting aspect of the Cuban scene is the recent creation of a new political structure.

The structure is composed of a council of Ministers (the executive), a National Assembly, a Council of State (the executive committee of the National Assembly), 14 provincial assemblies, and 169 municipal assemblies. The municipal assemblies are elected by electoral districts, which in Havana might comprise a city block or a large apartment building (about the same area as that covered by a local "Committee for the Defense of the Revolution"). The elections to the municipal assemblies, first held in the fall of 1976, apparently were relatively free and open. Both party and nonparty members were eligible to run. There was obviously some social pressure to elect party members, who, in general, have been the political leaders in the "Committees for the Defense of the Revolution," but 20 to 30 percent of the successful candidates in the elected districts were not party members.

The municipal assemblies serve both as the legislative bodies for the municipalities and to elect representatives to the provincial assemblies. Up to this level, there would seem to be an effort to institutionalize representative election and an orderly process of selecting govern-

[11] See appendix E, p. 73.

mental officials. It is of interest that Castro and most of the cabinet were candidates for election to these bodies.

However, from the provincial assemblies to the national assembly the representative idea broke down, as half the people chosen to sit in the national assembly had not been elected to the provincial assemblies. Furthermore, the Communist Party seems to play an increasingly important role on the higher rungs of the political ladder. The party sets the main tasks for the National Assembly, and the main role of the Council of Ministers and the National Assembly is to implement the policies set by the party. Castro is President of both the Council of State and of the Council of Ministers.

This elaborate system is considered to be a move to institutionalize the process of choosing the head of State and the Government (1976 is the "Year of Institutionalization"). In essence, Cuba has apparently developed a system that attempts to give at least the appearance of representative government without giving up ultimate control by the party. It will be interesting to see how this system evolves and what its significance becomes.

Several non-Cuban observers expressed the view that Castro was becoming increasingly hemmed in by a kind of politburo. He is clearly not an absolute dictator. To a suggestion by Congressman Bingham that the United States and Cuba might both promote the idea of a Helsinki agreement for the Americas, he responded: "That's an interesting idea, but I would not dare [sic] respond to it without consulting my colleagues."

Recommendations

(1) The United States should step up actions to deter terrorist activities against Cuba, including strong policy statements opposing such activities, review and strengthening of U.S. laws under which terrorists can be prosecuted, and vigorous prosecution of suspected terrorists to the fullest extent of the law.

Comment.—The responsibility for carrying out this recommendation falls largely on the Justice Department. The State Department should encourage the Justice Department to devote greater attention and effort to prosecution of anti-Cuban terrorists and to reform criminal statutes relating to terrorism—particularly the Neutrality Act.

(2) The United States should actively seek the cooperation of Central and South American countries in curbing terrorism against Cuba.

Comment.—Other governments, as well as terrorists and potential terrorists themselves, find encouragement to undertake or condone terrorism by the silence of U.S. officials regarding such activity and from occasional tough statements about Cuba. The United States should make perfectly clear, through periodic secret diplomatic as well as public statements, that the United States, despite whatever tough or even negative statements it may make about Cuba as part of a continuing diplomatic strategy, considers terrorist acts against Cuba to serve no useful or desirable purpose, that it opposes such actions, and that it seeks the cooperation of other governments in this regard.

(3) At the earliest opportunity, the U.S. Government should express deep sympathy at the loss of 57 Cuban lives in the October 1976, Air Cubana bombing and extend condolences to the people of Cuba, and especially to the families of the victims.

Comment.—Although very late, such a gesture would constitute recognition that such a statement should have been made last October. This would help to assuage the Cubans' continuing feelings of outrage.

(4) The Committee on Intelligence in the Senate, the Intelligence Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, and the Intelligence Oversight Board, should give consideration to the possible need for increased restrictions on direct and indirect contact by the CIA with any person known or believed to be engaged in unauthorized and illegal activities which are inconsistent with U.S. Government and CIA policies, and which could give the appearance of U.S. support and responsibility for such activities.

Comment.—As the study mission reminded Cuban officials, President Ford's Executive order of February 18, 1976, already places certain restrictions on CIA activities, including any involvement in assassination plots. The possibility that the CIA may still have contact,

however limited or indirect, with U.S. or foreign persons engaged in acts of terrorism against Cuba in violation of U.S. law and policy raises serious question as to whether the ends served by such contacts are worth the price paid in disruption of our foreign policy, particularly in a time of effort at improved relations such as we are hopefully now entering with Cuba.

(5) The United States should continue to speak out on alleged human rights violations by Cuba, as Cuba undoubtedly will do with respect to the United States, and should, at the appropriate time, seek to enter with Cuba (and other Latin American states) into an agreement similar to the Helsinki "final act." Within the framework of such an accord, a continuing dialog on national security, human rights, and other issues could be peacefully and constructively pursued.

Comment.—The "final act" of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, entered into in Helsinki, Finland, on August 1, 1975, by the United States and 34 countries of Western and Eastern Europe, defines certain agreed upon goals and areas of agreement on matters of boundaries and security, human rights and cultural contact, and trade. It also establishes a process for assessing progress in these areas by participating nations periodically. These are the same issues that pose problems between and among Cuba, the United States, and other Caribbean, Central and Latin American countries. Formulation of a broad agreement of this type for the Americas might provide a helpful basis for assuring that, as Cyrus Vance said prior to his confirmation as Secretary of State, Cuba will "live within the international system."

(6) The United States should lift the U.S. embargo against Cuba, at least with respect to food and medicines, thus opening the way for negotiations on difficult and important issues such as revival of the hijacking agreement, financial claims, the release of American prisoners, Cuba's role in Africa, and human rights generally.

Comment.—The embargo has long since outlived its usefulness as a weapon against the Cuban Government. It serve no U.S. purpose. The major effects of the embargo now are to impose some hardships upon the common people of Cuba against whom the American people harbor no ill will, to deny the United States even the slightest influence on Cuban policies and activities, and to block any payment of U.S. claims. While many of these claims are held by large corporations, many others are held by individual Americans who are growing older and who will not benefit from any settlement and repayment of claims unless it is achieved relatively soon.

While the potential economic benefits of trade both to Cuba and the United States can easily be exaggerated, there would undoubtedly be some boost to both economies from such trade. The major benefits, however, for Cuba would seem to be an end to the humiliation of being treated like a pariah, and for the United States increased opportunity to influence Cuban policies and actions on issues of concern to us.

Partial—or even total—lifting of the embargo should not be equated

with total "normalization" of United States-Cuban relations. It will not even lead to totally normal trade relations (as Cuba will not be eligible to receive MFN, GSP, or credit). The latter is probably not an attainable goal until many outstanding problems and difficulties between the two countries are resolved, and seems, therefore, to be quite a way down the road. Partial lifting of the embargo, however, is a separate matter which would permit discussion of these problems and open the way to ultimate normalization.

Since Cuba regards the embargo as a "criminal" act of warfare against it, the United States cannot reasonably expect to get much more than token reciprocation for a partial lifting of the embargo. The case seems compelling, however, for a partial lifting of the embargo in order to sustain and expand direct talks that may ultimately produce solutions of problems beneficial to both Cuba and the United States.[12]

(7) The United States should continue to encourage and expand sports and cultural exchanges with Cuba.

Comment.—The recent visit of a basketball team to Cuba is a step in the right direction. The Cuban invitation for a major league American baseball team to visit Cuba has now been revised from an invitation specifically for the New York Yankees, to an invitation for an "All-Star" team which Baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn seems to prefer. Acceptance of this invitation should be encouraged in the interest of U.S. foreign policy without interference from the baseball commissioner. The U.S. Government should invite and encourage private U.S. organizations to invite reciprocal visits by Cuban sports and cultural groups, and should take necessary steps to assure the safety of visiting Cubans.

(8) The United States should announce its readiness to have its scientists who are working on the sugarcane smut blight in Jamaica cooperate with Cuban technicians.

Comment.—While there is disagreement among experts over the seriousness of the smut disease which attacks sugarcane and has moved as far north as Jamaica, Cuban officials expressed the fear that it could threaten not only Jamaican, but also Cuban and American sugar production. The United States should accept in principle Cuban proposals to cooperate in stopping this blight and should be prepared to undertake efforts with the Cubans if detailed plans can be worked out with the Government of Jamaica.

(9) Cuban capacity to respond to U.S. initiatives and to make concessions of its own to achieve improved relations may decline over time, so the preceding recommendations should be implemented without delay.

Comment.—President Castro impressed the study mission as being more positive and realistic, and less doctrinaire, about improved relations with the United States than many of his followers, particularly among the younger generation. The establishment of a more complex and structured government system may tend to hem him in, and restrict

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[12] According to Theodore Jaquenay, writing in World View magazine, Cuba's political prisoners believe the United States will be able to help them obtain release or more humane treatment only if the embargo is lifted.

his latitude to take decisive action. In the opinion of some astute observers in Cuba, prompt action toward improved relations by the United States would take maximum advantage of President Castro's current disposition and capacity to restore relations with the United States and reduce somewhat Cuba's dependency on the Soviet Union.

APPENDIX A

Speech by Commander in Chief Fidel Castro Ruz, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba and Prime Minister of the Revolutionary Government, at the Memorial Meeting for the Victims of the Cuban Airlines Plane Destroyed in Flight on October 6, Given in Revolution Square, October 15, 1976, "Year of the 20th Anniversary of the Granma"

Relatives of the Cubans assassinated October 6:

Compatriots: In sorrow, mourning, indignation, we meet today in this historic square to bid farewell, however symbolically, to the remains of our comrades assassinated in the brutal act of terrorism perpetrated against a civilian plane in flight with 73 persons aboard, 57 of them Cubans. Most of the remains lie in the unfathomable ocean depths, without the tragedy having left the relatives even the consolation of their bodies. It has been possible to retrieve the physical remains of only eight Cubans. They thus become the symbol of all those who died, the sole material remains we will bury in our land of those 57 healthy, vigorous, enthusiastic, selfless, young compatriots. Their average age was barely 30, although their lives had nevertheless already been immensely rich in terms of their contribution to work, studies, sports, to their family and friends and to the Revolution.

When we read each one's biography, we see what a splendid page of service to the country their lives represented. The captain of the plane had been elected National Work Hero this very year. Many had earned the 20th Anniversary Medal. A number of crew members had provided various internationalist services and the athletes had just finished writing a brilliant and insuperable page in sports history by winning all the gold medals in the regional fencing competition that had just been held in Caracas. Many were members of the Communist Youth or the Party, all were outstanding in their activities, each one of them had been a lucid example of how devotion to study, achievement, work and the fulfillment of duty is the essential characteristic in our citizenry today.

They weren't millionaires on a pleasure trip, they weren't tourists with time and money to visit other countries; they were humble workers or students and athletes performing the tasks their country had given them, with modesty and devotion.

Among the passengers were 11 Guyanese youth, six of them selected to study medicine in Cuba—lives lost of men whose destiny was to save lives in their underdeveloped and poor country. Five dedicated citizens of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea also died, representatives of a people who had been victims of United States aggression for so long, who were visiting Latin-American countries on a friendship trip.

The plane was destroyed in flight by an explosion a few minutes after it had taken off from the Barbados airport. With indescribable heroism, the brave and expert pilots of the plane made a supreme effort to land, but the burning and almost destroyed craft could only remain aloft a few more minutes. They had enough time and fortitude, however, to explain that there had been an explosion aboard, that the plane was on fire and they were trying to make a landing. It is unimaginable what an impact the explosion and fire must have had on the passengers and crew enclosed in an airplane at an altitude of approximately 6000 meters.

Some imperialist news agency immediately mentioned a possible mechanical failure, but everything the pilot transmitted to the Barbados airport was taped. More evidence was immediately added. Two individuals with Venezuelan documents had boarded the plane in Trinidad and left it in Barbados before the accident; almost immediately after the plane blew up in the air, they boarded

a return flight to Trinidad, where they checked into the most luxurious hotel without any luggage at all. At the request of the Barbados authorities, whose suspicions had been aroused, they were arrested.

The investigations begun by the police of both countries immediately produced evidence strongly indicating that they were the physical perpetrators of the sabotage.

Because of the documents they used, the Venezuelan authorities also quickly became apprised of the events and involved in the investigation. On the following day, October 7, in a cable of condolence to Cuba, the President of Venezuela, Carlos Andrés Pérez, described the deed as an abominable crime. Later, the Prime Minister of Barbados used similar terms publicly when he spoke at United Nations headquarters. The fact that those governments—whose officials had access to the most immediate and important sources of information, the detainees themselves, the circumstances surrounding their behavior and their documents—labeled the act as one of terrorism, was already very significant in itself.

Although from the first information, the Government of Cuba had not the slightest doubt about what caused the tragedy, it refrained from making any statement, waiting to analyze carefully the news that was being received as well as the background and reports—some public and others confidential—that were in its hands.

At first, the real identity of the detainees was not precisely known. It was said that perhaps the documents were false. The names Freddy Lugo and José Velázquez were released and it was said that the latter also called himself José García, and that he held more than one passport. Later the press also reported that the Venezuelan consul had talked with the detainees for 5 hours and that the U.S. ambassador in Barbados had hurriedly left for Washington. Nevertheless, news surrounding the detainees and other details and circumstances of interest were fairly tightly guarded.

On October 9, the Government of Venezuela stated that Freddy Lugo was a Venezuelan citizen and that investigations were proceeding to identify José Velázquez or José García.

On October 10, several absolutely reliable sources in Venezuelan press circles, indignant at the monstrous crime, sent Cuba highly important reports. They revealed that a photographer from the newspaper El Mundo, named Hernán Ricardo, had been seen 2 weeks earlier with Félix Martínez Suárez, well-known enemy of the Cuban Revolution, and two other individuals. That this Hernán Ricardo was inseparable from Freddy Lugo. That 2 days after the explosion of a bomb in the Cuban Airlines office in Panama, Hernán Ricardo had arrived at Maiquetía airport on a flight from that country. That they had proof that said person held three passports, one of them in the name of José Velázquez. It was added that, in the very editorial offices of El Mundo newspaper, he had bragged that he knew a Cuban plane would be blown up in Barbados.

But the most essential and important point these well-informed Venezuelan sources communicated to us, is that it was widely known that Hernán Ricardo was a CIA agent, that he often handled reports from the agency and that, earning a relatively modest salary of 1600 bolívares, he had a car that cost 40,000 and an apartment that cost 100,000. Some people had also heard him talking with Freddy Lugo about explosives courses they were receiving. And because of all these antecedents, they suspected that the other person arrested, who claimed to be José Velázquez, was Hernán Ricardo.

Two days later, on October 12, the Government of Venezuela officially announced that the second detainee, José Velázquez, was really Hernán Ricardo.

This explains everything.

To the reports from Venezuela we must add that, according to data in our hands, Félix Martínez Suárez is a well-known CIA agent.

News reports from Venezuela speak about fabulous amounts of money given to the physical perpetrators of the deed.

Venezuelan territory was unquestionably used to work out the final phase of the sabotage and citizens of that country were undoubtedly the physical perpetrators of the horrible crime. But this in no way leads us to confuse the issue.

It is true that there is a group of well-known Cuban counter-revolutionaries in Venezuela who have a degree of access to specific political circles, who are implicated in imperialism's terrorist plans against our country and it is very likely that some of them had a hand in the events. But we don't harbor the slightest doubt that the Government of Venezuela has absolutely nothing to do with the U.S. aggressive plans against Cuba; that its attitude toward our

country has been honest; that just as President Carlos Andrés Pérez himself has promised, it will make an exhaustive investigation concerning the involvement of Venezuelan citizens or residents of the country in the repugnant events, and will demand that responsibility for the use of Venezuelan territory as a base for terrorist acts of aggression be placed where it belongs.

The recruitment of citizens and the use of the territory of other countries to carry out acts of that nature are methods typical of the CIA.

At the beginning we had doubts as to whether the CIA had directly organized the sabotage or had carefully elaborated it through its cover organizations made up of Cuban counter-revolutionaries; we are now decidedly inclined toward the first theory. The CIA participated directly in the destruction of the Cuban Airlines plane in Barbados.

The most repugnant aspect of this case is the use of mercenaries who, for money, are capable of cutting off in a few seconds the precious lives of 73 defenseless persons, people who had been their fellow passengers in the plane a few minutes earlier.

In recent months, the Government of the United States, resentful at Cuba's contribution to the defeat the imperialists and racists suffered in Africa, has unleashed a series of terrorist actions against Cuba, accompanied by brutal threats of aggression. That campaign has been intensified day by day and has been directed chiefly against our diplomatic headquarters and our airlines.

On July 9 of this year, in Kingston, Jamaica, only a few weeks before the plane sabotage in Barbados, a powerful bomb exploded in a cart carrying the luggage to the Cuban Airlines flight leaving for Cuba. The bomb did not explode while the plane was in flight because its arrival had been delayed.

On October 2 of this year, four days before the plane sabotage in Barbados, the counter-revolutionary journalist Llano Montes, who has reason to be well informed about those events, wrote in the Caracas *El Mundo* that a plastic dynamite bomb had been fastened under the wing of a Cuban Airlines plane in Barbados and had been loosened by a little stream of gasoline when the plane went down the runway to start its flight. He added that an airport security employee found the plastic dynamite on the ground, deactivated it and took it to the office where it disappeared without his superiors being informed of the fact.

Not only have all the Caribbean and Central-American states that maintain relations with our country been used in the terrorist acts perpetrated against Cuba—Mexico, Panama, Colombia, Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela—but also other neighboring states such as Santo Domingo and Costa Rica, where the terrorists live, move and organize, without of course excluding the United States, Puerto Rico, Nicaragua and Chile where they are based and act openly with official support. In expanding these activities, imperialism has shamelessly violated the sovereignty and the laws of many countries in the region.

The perpetrators of these crimes move everywhere with impunity; they have inexhaustible funds; they carry United States passports as naturalized citizens of that country, or real or false documents from other countries, and they use the most sophisticated methods of terror and crime.

Who, if not the CIA, with the sanctuary of established imperialist domination and impunity in this hemisphere, is capable of such deeds?

An important aspect is the Central Intelligence Agency's close association with the tyrannies of Nicaragua and Chile in order to carry out these plans.

While the territories of Nicaragua and Guatemala served as a base for armed aggressions against Cuba even at the time of the mercenary attack on Playa Girón, and later pirate attacks were made from bases in Miami, Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo and Costa Rica, today the same groups of counter-revolutionary types are being used by Somoza and Pinochet as well, according to the specific purposes of each, not only against Cuba but also against Panamá, Jamaica, Guyana, the Chilean popular movement and other Latin-American progressive movements.

It is a well-known fact that every time the CIA has concocted a plan of action against Cuba, at the time of Girón or later, to perpetrate the interminable chain of pirate attacks, subversive actions and arms deliveries it organized and directed, it has always, on every occasion, disguised its activities under the cloak of various Cuban counter-revolutionary organizations. It is impossible to recall the number of names and initials this shady Yankee institution has created.

Last June a group of terrorist counter-revolutionary organizations, all of them located inside the United States—the so called National Liberation Front of

Cuba, Cuban Action, Cuban Nationalist Movement, Brigade 2506 and F–14, chiefly composed of individuals who have worked for the CIA for a number of years and have received training from it—met in Costa Rica to create the so-called United Revoluntionary Organization's Command (CORU).

These groups not only act freely and with impunity from United States territory, but through CORU, their main heads are closely linked to CIA activities against Cuba.

The actions are not always carried out by members of these cover groups. Many times the CIA does the dirty work by other means, and the events are then attributed to the organizations that have been created.

In the United States these groups publicly proclaim their crimes and announce new acts of vandalism.

In the month of August, 1976, an alleged war communiqué was printed in a counter-revolutionary newspaper published in Miami, which, after describing how they blew up an automobile in front of the Cuban Embassy in Colombia and destroyed the Air Panama offices, states at the end: "Very soon we will attack airplanes in flight . . ." and it is signed by the five previously-mentioned terrorist organizations located in Miami.

In another Miami newspaper, on September 19 of this year, we read a detailed description by CORU of the attempt to kidnap the Cuban consul in Merida and the assassination of the fishing technician Artagnán Díaz Díaz together with the plan to dynamite the Cuban embassy in Mexico. Two of the assassins had flown from Miami to Mexico with United States passports to do the work, and were arrested in that country following the crime. A third returned to the United States to escape the action of Mexican justice.

In another of the malicious articles published in Miami, on September 9, 1976, there is a picture spread of a so-called congress of the terrorist organization Brigade 2506 held in that city. The same publication includes the photo of the tyrant Somoza making the closing speech and with him, a Yankee Congressman, Claude Pepper.

Another publication printed the photo of an assembly of those counter-revolutionary groups presided over, according to the picture caption, by Julio Durán, Chilean Ambassador to the United Nations; the Mayor of Miami, Maurice Ferrer; Colonel Eduardo Sepúlveda, Chilean consul general in Miami, and U.S. Congressman Tom Gallagher.

What is strange about the fact that now CORU claims responsibility, through the news agency AP, for the repugnant feat of having dynamited a passenger plane in flight with 73 people aboard?

Why should it be strange for these same groups to have assassinated the former Chilean minister Orlando Letelier, whose death infuriated Latin-American and world opinion?

Reviewing the terrorist acts perpetrated against Cuba since the United States Government launched its insolent threats against our country, we have the following:

April 6, 1976. Two fishing boats, "Ferro 119" and "Ferro 123" are attacked by pirate launches proceeding from Florida, causing the death of the fisherman Bienvenido Mauriz and serious damage to the boats.

April 22. A bomb is placed in the Cuban Embassy in Portugal causing the death of two comrades and seriously wounding several others, completely destroying the building.

July 5. The Cuban Mission to the United Nations is the object of an explosive attack, causing important material damage.

July 9. A bomb explodes in the cart carrying luggage to the Cuban Airlines flight, in the Jamaican airport, moments before boarding time.

July 10. A bomb explodes in the British West Indies Airways office in Barbados, which represents Cuban Airlines' interests in that country.

July 23. A technician from the National Fishing Institute, Artagnán Díaz Díaz, is assassinated in an attempt to kidnap the Cuban Consul in Mérida.

August 9. Two officials of the Cuban Embassy in Argentina are kidnapped, and have disappeared without a trace.

August 18. A bomb explodes in the Cuban Airlines office in Panama, causing considerable damage.

October 6. The Cuban Airlines plane is destroyed in flight with 73 persons aboard.

As is evident, in just two months, two extraordinarily serious sabotages were organized against Cuban planes on international flights, filled with passengers, one of which was fatal.

Behind these deeds stands the CIA. And almost without exception, on all occasions, the terrorist organizations located inside the United States and acting with impunity in the country's territory, essentially the five that form the so-called CORU, claimed responsibility for them.

I wish to recall that the CIA has been the instigator of criminal methods that have increasingly affected the international community in recent years. The CIA plotted and encouraged skyjacking in order to use it against Cuba during the early years of the Revolution; the CIA plotted pirate attacks from foreign bases in its aggressive policy against Cuba; the CIA plotted the destabilization of foreign governments; the CIA revived in modern times the deplorable policy of plotting and committing assassinations of leaders of other countries; the CIA has now plotted the ominous scheme to blow up civilian airplanes in flight. The world community must be aware of the gravity of these events.

Even after the United States Senate investigated and publicly acknowledged the countless CIA plots to assassinate leaders of the Cuban Revolution and its dedication to that end for a number of years, the United States Government has given the Cuban Government no explanation of those events nor has it in any way apologized.

We suspect that the United States Government has not given up such practices. On October 9, only three days after the criminal sabotage in Barbados, a message sent by the CIA to an agent in Havana was intercepted. That message, transmitted from the CIA's central headquarters in Langley, Virginia, says in part: "Please inform at earliest opportunity any date concerning Fidel's attendance at the ceremony for the first anniversary of Angola's independence, November 11. If he's going, try to get complete itinerary of Fidel's visit to other countries on the same trip".

Another order, dated earlier, says:

"What is the official and specific reaction concerning bomb attacks against Cuban offices abroad? What are they going to do to avoid them and prevent them? Whom do they suspect is responsible? Will there be reprisals?

We hope the United States Government does not dare deny the truth of these instructions from the CIA's main office, and many others sent to the same person, in flagrant acts of espionage. We have the code, the numbers and every proof of authenticity for these communiques. In this particular case, the presumed agent recruited by the CIA has kept the Cuban Government informed, from the very beginning and for ten years, of all details of every contact he had with it, the equipment and instructions he received. The CIA thought the agent had succeeded in placing a modern electronic microtransmitter given to him for that purpose in no less a place than the office of Comrade Osmany Cienfuegos, Secretary to the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers. Hence the CIA's certainty in assuming it would receive, in plenty of time, the pertinent information on any trip abroad made by the Cuban Prime Minister.

Those who believe the CIA has changed one iota because of the denunciations its hair-raising actions have caused within United States society itself are deeply mistaken. Its methods will simply become more subtle and more perfidious.

Why did the CIA want to know the exact itinerary of the Prime Minister's possible trip to Angola and other African countries in honor of November 11? Why did it want to know what measures would be taken to avoid and prevent terrorist acts?

Considering the importance of this fact and the enlightening value it has in terms of the CIA's conduct and activities, we have considered it appropriate to reveal it publicly, although this implies the sacrifice of a valuable source of information (applause).

Three years ago the Cuban Government signed an agreement with the United States Government on air and maritime piracy and other crimes. This was an important contribution on the part of our country to the solution of the serious world problem of skyjacking. The Cuban Government demanded no conditions whatsoever for signing that agreement, not even the end of the criminal economic blockade the United States Government has maintained against our country. Moreover, without any legal obligation whatsoever, Cuba returned to a United States enterprise the two million dollars some skyjackers had brought with them and which was confiscated by our authorities.

On one occasion, Cuban authorities at the Rancho Boyeros airport saved the lives of a number of United States citizens proceeding from Florida when the plane had to make an emergency landing after United States police had shot up the tires in a futile attempt to keep it on the ground. We would behave in precisely the same way under any similar circumstances, strictly for humanitarian reasons.

How different from the brutal conduct of those who armed the assassins and inspired the destruction of our plane in Barbados!

Cuba has never and will never propagandize in favor of skyjackers, and is prepared to collaborate realistically with any responsible government in the struggle against air piracy and terrorism.

But the United States Government has been incapable of fulfilling the spirit and letter of the agreement signed with Cuba in February, 1973.

After the unpunished assassination of a Cuban fisherman and the destruction of two boats by a pirate attack off the Florida coasts, we warned the United States Government that if events such as those were repeated and their perpetrators were not properly punished, the agreement would no longer be valid (applause). There was no reply. The crime was neither investigated nor punished.

The events that have occurred since then are much more serious, because the terrorist action unleashed by United States hostility and is policy toward Cuba has culminated in the incredible barbarity of destroying Cuban passenger planes in flight.

The agreement signed between the Governments of the United States and Cuba on February 15, 1973, cannot survive this brutal crime (applause and shouts of "Fidel, seguro, a Los Yanquis Dales Duro!" Fidel, you bet, will get the Yankees yet).

The Cuban Government finds it necessary to cancel it and will, therefore, so inform the United States Government this afternoon (applause). According to the textual terms of that agreement, at any time during the period of its validity and by written denunciation made six months beforehand, one of the parties can communicate to the other its decision to end the agreement. Strictly adhering to the agreement and proceeding to notification of its denunciation today, October 15, 1976, said agreement will have validity only up to April 15, 1977, and we will not again sign any such agreement with the United States (applause) until the terrorist campaign unleashed against Cuba is definitely terminated, effective guarantees against these actions are made to our people and there is a definitive end to United States acts of hostility and aggression against Cuba (applause). There can be no collaboration of any kind between an aggressor country and a country under attack.

If after April 15, 1977, when the validity of the agreement ends, any U.S. commercial plane should be detoured to Cuba, the plane as well as the crew and passengers will be given every facility to return immediately to their country (applause).

Cuba will never encourage skyjacking nor will it be tolerant with its perpetrators, but Cuba cannot maintain virtually unilateral commitments to return or punish such perpetrators with a government that bears the basic responsibility for this infamous terrorist offensive against our country.

The agreements of a similiar nature signed with Canada, Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela, will remain fully valid.

Cuba is also prepared to collaborate with Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, Colombia, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Barbados and other countries of the Caribbean and Central America capable of acting in good faith, in any joint measures considered appropriate in combating these crimes.

Cuba is even ready to discuss with the United States, whichever government is elected in November, a solution to these problems; but I repeat, on the basis of the definitive halting of all acts of hostility and aggression against our country (applause).

We might ask ourselves what is the purpose of these crimes? To destroy the Revolution? (exclamations of "no!"). That is impossible. The Revolution emerges more vigorous in the face of every blow and every aggression; it becomes more profound, more aware, stronger (applause). To intimidate the people? (exclamations of "no!"). That is impossible. Faced with the cowardice and monstrosity of such crimes, the people are inflamed, and every man and woman becomes a fervent and heroic soldier prepared to die (APPLAUSE).

The Revolution has taught us all the idea of human fraternity and solidarity. It has made us all the most profound brothers among whom the blood of one belongs to all and the blood of all belongs to each of the others (applause). So it is that the sorrow is everyone's, the mourning is everyone's, but the invincible strength of millions of people is our strength. And our strength is not only the strength of one people, it is the strength of all the peoples who have now freed themselves from slavery and of all those in the world who struggle to eliminate exploitation, injustice and crime from human society (applause).

In short, our strength is the strength of patriotism and the strength of internationalism. The ideas we fight for are the banner for the world's most honest and worthy men and women and the certain and victorious emblem of the world of tomorrow.

Imperialism, capitalism, fascism, neocolonialism, racism, man's brutal exploitation of man in all its forms and manifestations, is approaching its end in humanity's history, and their maddened lackeys know it; that is why their reactions are ever more desperate, more hysterical, more cynical, more impotent. Only that can explain such repugnant and absurd crimes as the one in Barbados.

For more than 100 years, the shooting of the medical students in 1871 has been recalled and condemned with inextinguishable indignation. For thousands of years our people will recall, will condemn and will abhor in their deepest souls this horrible assassination.

Our athletes sacrificed in the flower of their life and intelligence will be eternal champions in our hearts (applause); their gold medals will not lie on the ocean floor but will rise like unblemished suns and symbols in the Cuban firmament; they will not win the honor of the Olympics but they have ascended for all time to the beautiful Olympus of martyrs of the homeland!

Our crew members, our heroic aviation workers and all our selfless compatriots sacrificed under cowardly circumstances that day, will live eternally in the memory, the affection and the admiration of the people! (applause). A homeland ever more revolutionary, more worthy, more socialist and more internationalist (applause) will be the grandiose monument our people will erect to their memory and that of all those who have died or will die for the Revolution (applause).

To our Guyanese and Korean brothers immolated that day goes our most fervent recollection at this time also. They remind us that imperialism's crimes have no borders, that we all belong to the same human family and that our struggle is universal (applause).

We cannot say that the sorrow is shared. The sorrow is multiplied. Millions of Cubans shed their tears today together with the dead ones of the victims of the abominable crime. And when a strong and energetic people cry, injustice trembles!

Patria o Muerte!

Venceremos!

(OVATION)

APPENDIX B

Text of Note Signed by Secretary of State William P. Rogers Containing Agreement With Cuba on Hijacking, February 15, 1973

Hon. Jaroslav Zantovsky,
Charge d'Affaires ad interim, of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

Sir: I refer to the Memorandum of Understanding on the hijacking of aircraft and vessels and other offenses which has resulted from conversations which have taken place between the Embassy of Switzerland, representative of the interests of the United States of America in Cuba, and representatives of the Government of the Republic of Cuba, the text of which is as follows:

Memorandum of Understanding on Hijacking of Aircraft and Vessels and Other Offenses

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Cuba, on the bases of equality and strict reciprocity, agree:

FIRST: Any person who hereafter seizes, removes, appropriates or diverts from its normal route or activities an aircraft or vessel registered under the laws of one of the parties and brings it to the territory of the other party shall be considered to have committed an offense and therefore shall either be returned to the party of registry of the aircraft or vessel to be tried by the courts of that party in conformity with its laws or be brought before the courts of the party whose territory he reached for trial in conformity with its laws for the offense punishable by the most severe penalty according to the circumstances and the seriousness of the acts to which this Article refers. In addition, the party whose territory is reached by the aircraft or vessel shall take all necessary steps to facilitate without delay the continuation of the journey of the passengers and crew innocent of the hijacking of the aircraft or vessel in question, with their belongings, as well as the journey of the aircraft or vessel itself with all goods carried with it, including any funds obtained by extortion or other illegal means, or the return of the foregoing to the territory of the first party; likewise, it shall take all steps to protect the physical integrity of the aircraft or vessel and all goods, carried with it, including any funds obtained by extortion or other illegal means, and the physical integrity of the passengers and crew innocent of the hijacking, and their belongings, while they are in its territory as a consequence of or in connection with the acts to which this Article refers.

In the event that the offenses referred to above are not punishable under the laws existing in the country to which the persons commiting them arrived, the party in question shall be obligated, except in the case of minor offenses, to return the persons who have committed such acts, in accordance with the applicable legal procedures, to the territory of the other party to be tried by its courts in conformity with its laws.

SECOND: Each party shall try with a view to severe punishment in accordance with its laws any person who, within its territory, hereafter conspires to promote, or promotes, or prepares, or directs, or forms part of an expedition which from its territory or any other place carries out acts of violence or depredation against aircraft or vessels of any kind or registration coming from or going to the territory of the other party or who, within its territory, hereafter conspires to promote, or promotes, or prepares, or directs, or forms part of an expedition which from its territory or any other place carries out such acts or other similar unlawful acts in the territory of the other party.

THIRD: Each party shall apply strictly its own laws to any national of the other party who, coming from the territory of the other party, enters its territory, violating its laws as well as national and international requirements pertaining to immigration, health, customs and the like.

FOURTH: The party in whose territory the perpretrators of the acts described in Article FIRST arrive may take into consideration any extenuating or mitigating circumstances in those cases in which the persons responsible for the acts were being sought for strictly political reasons and were in real and imminent danger of death without a viable alternative for leaving the country, provided there was no financial extortion or physical injury to the members of the crew, passengers, or other persons in connection with the hijacking.

FINAL PROVISIONS

This Agreement may be amended or expanded by decision of the parties.

This Agreement shall be in force for five years and may be renewed for an equal term by express decision of the parties.

Either party may inform the other of its decision to terminate this Agreement at any time while it is in force by written denunciation submitted six months in advance.

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date agreed by the parties.

Done in English and Spanish texts which are equally authentic.

In compliance with the express instructions of my Government, I wish to convey its acceptance of the Memorandum of Understanding transcribed above, as well as its agreement that the simultaneous exchange of notes taking place in Washington between the Department of State and the Embassy of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, representative of the interests of the Republic of Cuba in the United States of America, and in Havana between the Embassy of Switzerland, representative of the interests of the United States of America in Cuba, and the Ministry of Foreign Relations, shall constitute the agreement on the hijacking of aircraft and vessels and other offenses between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Cuba, which shall take effect on the date of this note.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my high consideration.

APPENDIX C

[From the New York Times, Tuesday, March 29, 1977]

U.S. and Cubans Discussed Links in Talks in 1975 [1]

(By David Binder, Special to the New York Times)

Washington, March 28—The United States and Cuba conducted highlevel talks on establishing normal relations from late 1974 until late 1975, covering the entire range of issues between the two countries, Administration officials said today.

The talks were treated as confidential until now because United States officials feared that disclosure might harm chances to resume diplomatic dialogue with the Cuban Government, Administration officials said. "With the two Governments negotiating openly and directly now, it doesn't matter any more," one official said.

Direct talks were resumed last Thursday in New York by Terence A. Todman, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Relations, and Pelegrin Torras, Cuba's Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. So far their talks have been limited to discussion of an agreement regulating fishing in waters between the two countries.

The earlier series of secret talks was conducted at National Airport in Washington and at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York as well as at the Hotel Pierre in New York. The principals on the United States side were William D. Rogers, then the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and Lawrence S. Eagleburger, who was executive assistant to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.

Two Cuban envoys, one a longtime intimate of Fidel Castro, the Cuban leader, traveled to the United States by way of Jamaica to take part in the discussions. United States officials familiar with the exchanges declined to name them, explaining that it might harm their usefulness in future efforts at quiet diplomacy.

The aim of the talks, begun at the initiative of Mr. Kissinger, was to clarify and catalogue outstanding issues between Washington and Havana and to explore paths for resolving them. Administration officials said the discussions were the first direct official contact between the United States and Cuba since 1961, when Washington broke off relations.

RESTRICTIONS ON CUBANS EASED

The round of talks was begun with soundings in November 1974 by Mr. Eagleburger on the telephone to the Cuban Mission to the United Nations. He explained that the Ford Administration was interested in conducting quiet face-to-face meetings.

Shortly afterwards Mr. Eagleburger met the first Cuban envoy at the airport in New York to work out details of the talks. Mr. Rogers was brought into the discussions in February and participated in four formal meetings.

To facilitate the meetings, the Ford Administration eased travel restrictions on Cuban representatives at the United Nations, allowing them to travel up to 250 miles from New York instead of 25 miles. Cuban envoys were also allowed to enter the United States at ports other than New York.

The February meeting was "exploratory," Mr. Rogers said today, with both the United States and Cuba indicating the issues to be resolved. At the same time, both sides agreed to remove some "threshold issues" through a series of planned gestures.

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On March 1, 1975, for example, Mr. Kissinger declared in a speech in Houston that "we see no virtue in perpetual antagonism" with Cuba. A few weeks later, Mr. Castro described Mr. Kissinger's statement as "positive" and noted that "there has been a certain lessening of tension between the United States and Cuba."

$2 MILLION RANSOM RETURNED

These statements were followed by more substantive gestures. Cuba handed back the hijacker of an American plane and returned a $2 million ransom seized from the hijacker of a Southern Airways plane three years earlier.

On July 29, 1975, the United States voted with a majority in the Organization of American States to abolish the group's embargo on political and economic ties with Cuba. Three weeks later the United States ended its sanctions against trade with Cuba by American-owned subsidiaries in third countries.

Meanwhile, at a meeting in the Hotel Pierre in July, the discussions with the Cuban envoys reached what Mr. Rogers described as "a high pitch."

By this time the two sides had catalogued a large number of issues, including the United States trade embargo against Cuba, the question of compensation for $1.8 billion in expropriated American property, Cuba's $30 million in frozen assets in this country, the destiny of Cuba's political prisoners, the future of the United States Navy's base at Guantanamo and the possibility for the reunion of thousands of families divided by the break between the two Governments.

Mr. Rogers recalled, "We were looking at a wide variety of ways to move toward resolving the issues, for instance on compensation of property with a lump sum settlement before taking up diplomatic ties as opposed to the more traditional way of resuming ties and then discussing claims." However, the two sides did not reach "the point of trade-offs," he said.

That meeting prompted Mr. Rogers to declare on Sept. 23, 1975, that the United States was "prepared to improve our relations with Cuba" and "to enter into a dialogue with Cuba." Instead of more meetings, however, there was what Mr. Rogers called "a lull."

Mr. Castro had by then dispatched an initial 3,000 Cuban troops to support the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola in the Angolan civil war. In late November, at the height of the fighting in Angola, Mr. Rogers had a fourth and final meeting with one Havana envoy in the coffee shop of Washington's National Airport.

ONLY SILENCE FROM CUBA

In the course of their 90 minutes together, Mr. Rogers made clear that the United States firmly opposed the Cuban military involvement in Angola, but, he said, he "did not slam the door on further talks."

On the contrary, he broached the idea of taking steps immediately to enable Cuban exiles in the United States to visit spouses and children still in Cuba and to allow Cubans with immediate relatives in this country to visit here. The Cubans had hinted at the idea before the meeting.

The envoy noted the proposals and returned to Cuba by way of New York. "We listened very carefully but we never had a response after that," Mr. Rogers said.

The fighting in Angola wore on and the Cuban military presence there increased to the point when, on Dec. 21, President Ford declared that the Cuban venture "destroys any opportunity for improvement of relations with the United States."

In retrospect, however, some United States specialists on Cuban affairs have concluded that it was not the Angolan affair that stopped the rapprochement. Rather, these officials believe that Mr. Castro had decided he could not handle normalization of relations with the United States at that time.

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APPENDIX D

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS RELATING TO NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH CUBA [1]

05/12/77 -- The House approved (288-119) an amendment to the foreign aid bill (H.R. 6714) which barred aid or trade with Cuba and Vietnam. The provision countered the action taken May 10 in the Senate. The bill, however, contained a provision which allows food aid to countries which trade with Cuba and Vietnam.

05/11/77 -- The State Department confirmed that 27 U.S. citizens are being held in Cuban prisons. In a letter to Senator Jesse Helms, Assistant Secretary of State Douglas Bennett stated that eight are "political prisoners," serving 20-30 year sentences. The others are serving under criminal charges. Bennett estimated that there are between 10,000 and 15,000 political prisoners in Cuba.

05/10/77 -- The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted (10-6) to partially lift the embargo against Cuba permitting the export of food, agricultural supplies, and medicines. This amendment to the State Department Authorization bill (S. 1190) was a modification of an earlier amendment proposed by Senator McGovern which would have permitted two way trade between the United States and Cuba in food and medicines. Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Culver Gleysteen stated that the Department of State neither supported nor approved the original McGovern amendment. He made clear that State did not favor allowing Cuban sugar into the U.S. market without receiving equivalent concessions from the Cubans.

05/05/77 -- U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young said he informally met with the Cuban delegate to the meeting of the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America in Guatemala City and was extended an invitation to visit Cuba.

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[1] Prepared by Barry A. Sklar, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.

05/04/77 -- The Cuban news agency Prensa Latina reported that a Cuban basketball team will tour South Dakota later this year.

-- The House of Representatives voted down (47-103) an amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY 1978 (H.R. 6689) which would have prevented funds from being used for the negotiation of the resumption of diplomatic relations with Cuba.

05/02/77 -- Jack Anderson reported that President Carter secretly ordered an end to SR-71 reconnaissance flights over Cuba shortly after taking office.

04/29/77 -- State Department officials confirmed that two U.S. diplomats, part of the team in Havana which negotiated the fishing and maritime agreements, remained in Cuba to interview Americans being held in Cuban prisons. Twenty-four Americans, some of them holding dual citizenship are reported to be in jail.

04/28/77 -- On announcing the signing of the maritime and fishing agreements, Assistant Secretary of State Todman predicted "constant improvement" in future U.S.-Cuban relations. Todman disclosed in his news conference that in Havana he discussed a brcad range of issues with Cuban Foreign Minister Isidro Malmierca. Based on these discussions, Todman said that "the changes are good" for steady improvement of relations on a step-by-step basis. Cuba, Todman indicated, is likely to take some positive steps on its own to improve relations.

04/27/77 -- In Havana, the United States and Cuba signed agreements on fishing rights and maritime boundaries. The joint statement said, "A governing international fisheries agreement on Cuba's participation in fisheries within the 200-mile zcne of the United States and another agreement on a preliminary boundary between the 200-mile zones arising frcm the laws passed by both parties were concluded." Details of the agreements are to be published later.

04/25/77 -- High-ranking U.S. officials met with Cuban officials in Havana for the first time in 16 years in a step toward the normalization of relations. Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Terence Todman headed the seven-member delegation ostensibly to continue the fishing and maritime talks begun in New York in March. The State Department announcement of the meeting said, "The governments of the United States of America and Cuba initiated today in Havana the second round of negotiaticns on matters concerning fisheries and maritime boundaries which arise from the laws

passed by both ccuntries."

04/22/77 -- Cuban officals qranted permission for the resumption of cruise line service between a U.S. port and Havana since the break in relations. The action cleared the way for the liner Daphne of the Carras Shipping Company to leave New Orleans on May 15 and to drop anchor in Havana on May 17 with some of America's leading jazz musicians on board. The jazz musicians will give a performance at Havana's National Theater. Beginning January 1978, the Daphne will call regularly in Havana in a series of one-week cruises from New Orleans.

-- The Associated Press reported that the U.S.-Cuban maritime talks will be resumed shortly in Havana with Terence Todman, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, heading the delegation.

-- The Associated Press reported that the Carter Administration is considering the posting of U.S. diplomats in Cuba for the first time since the break in relations in 1961. The openinq of "interest secions" with U.S. diplomats in the Swiss Embassy in Havana and Cuban diplomats in the Czechoslovakian Embassy in Washington would siqnificantly move both nations toward normalization.

04/21/77 -- A Gallup Poll on relations with Cuba reveals that a majority of the U.S. public feels that diplomatic relations with Cuba should be reestablished. According to the latest poll, 53% feel that the U.S. should formally reestablish diplomatic relations with Cuba. About one third of the public is opposed to the move.

04/20/77 -- Fidel Castro told the 52 visiting Minnesota businessmen that the U.S. trade embargo was morally unjustified and a "measure of force" whose end would "make the solution of all other problems" easier. Castro said that Cuba wanted to buy food and industrial technology frcm the United States and sell sugar. He reacted positively to the recent U.S. actions on Cuba dealing with travel to Cuba by U.S. citizens. A Cuban official earlier told the businessmen that U.S. trade with Cuba could total $1.5 billion within one to two years after the embarqo is lifted. The group from Minnesota, representinq 48 companies, is the largest U.S. trade deleqation to visit Cuba since the imposition of the embarqo.

04/19/77 -- President Carter tcld Senators McGovern and Abourezk that he would not oppose efforts to partially lift the embargo on Cuba to allow the export of food and medicine. McGovern said that the President, "made clear to us that he would nct oppose any action" to lift the embargo as it applies tc fcod and medicine. The Senators met with the President after their recent trip to Cuba.

04/17/77 -- The semi-official Egyptian Middle East News Agency reported that 200 Cuban commandos have arrived in

Ethiopia to train the Ethiopian Army in guerrilla warfare. The Washington Post reported from Addis Ababa that the reports could not be confirmed.

04/15/77 -- President Carter tcld a group of visiting editors that he agreed with the statement of UN Ambassador Andrew Young that the Cubans stabilized the situation in Angola. On the question of Cuban withdrawal from Angola as a precondition for normalizing relations, the President said, "I would rather not say that before we ever had normal relations with Cuba they would have to withdraw every Cuban from other nations on earth. We don't do it.... But the withdrawal of Cuban troops is a dominant factor in Angola and other places around Africa.... I would rather not be pinned down so specifically on it. But the attitude of Cuba to withdraw its unwarranted intrusion into the affairs of Africa and other nations would be a prerequisite for normalization, yes."

04/14/77 -- In his address before the Organization of American States in which he outlined his administration's policy toward Latin America, President Carter spoke of Cuba as one of the "problems that plaque us from the past which we must work to resolve." The President said, "We believe the normal conduct of international affairs, and particularly the negoatiations of differences, require communication with all countries in the world. To these ends, we are seeking to determine whether relations with Cuba can be improved on a measured and reciprocal basis."

04/11/77 -- In his press conference after his return from Cuba, Senator McGovern said that during a 4-hour meeting, Fidel Castro indicated that "Cuba will not consider agreeing to an extension [of the anti-hijacking agreement] until the U.S. ends its economic embargo on Cuba." The Senator related that Castro "made clear that even if the agreement dces expire, Cuba will continue to cooperate with the U.S. on hijacking, just as it has been. McGovern felt that a partial lifting of the embargo might be interpreted by the Cubans as a concrete step and therefore announced he would introduce an amendment to the State Department authorization bill allowing for the two-way trade in food and medicine. McGovern revealed that Castrc had agreed to accept a team of U.S. all-stars after the current baseball season and agreed to send a Cuban basketball team to play in the United States next fall. McGovern said that Castro was favorable to his suggestion that a student exchange be affected between the U.S. and Cuba.

04/10/77 -- In a telephone interview from Havana, Rep. Les Aspin said that he came away from a meeting with Defense Minister Raul Castro with the impression that a partial lifting of the embargo "might be enough to get the general discussion going."

04/09/77 -- UPI reported that a senior State Department official

indicated that the Carter Administration wants to expand the fishing talks with Cuba to include discussions on political prisoners, the status of U.S. citizens in Cuba, and Cuban international policy. The official said that the U.S. "is prepared to continue the dialoque" with Cuba and will contact the Cubans to continue the talks. He said, however, that the United States is nct considering lifting the trade embarqo.

04/08/77 -- A communique issued after the departure of President Castro frcm Moscow said that the Cuban leader and Soviet party chief Leonid Brezhnev resolved to do everything they could for promotinq the interaction of the international Communist and national-liberation movements." The leaders promised support for the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America but they did not specify a course of action.

-- According to the Chicago Tribune, Raul Castro said there can be no normalization of relations between Cuba and the United States until the U.S. pulls its approximately 2,500 servicemen out of the naval base at Guantanamo Bay.

04/07/77 -- President Idi Amin said there were no Cuban military advisers in Uganda but he intends to bring some Cubans in shortly tc work in the sugar industry.

-- Senator McGovern said that during the meeting, Raul Castro complained about overflights by the SR-71 reconnaissance plane which the Cuban said began on Sept. 24, 1974 and continued on 16 other occasions until Jan. 11, 1977. Raul noted that no overflights had taken place since President Carter took office.

-- Raul Castro, Cuban Minister of Defense, saw the visit of the South Dakota basketball team as an important step toward normal relations with the United States and said, "The war has ended and now we are reconstructing the bridge brick by brick, 90 miles from Key West to Varadero. It takes a long time. At the end of the bridqe we can shake hands, without winners or losers." He made these remarks during a meeting with Senators McGovern and Abourezk and Rep. Les Aspin. Raul Castro also said that no Cuban troops are involved in the invasion of Zaire and that there were no Cuban troops in Uganda. He also said that an unspecified number of Cuban troops were being removed from Angola but that civilian assistance was being increased.

04/05/77 -- During a dinner in his honor in Moscow, Fidel Castro said "The leaders of imperialist countries are now talkinq with amazing hypocrisy about human rights. Clearly, they are first and foremost worried about the bourgeois right to exploit man, to preserve the class system and social inequalities."

-- Soviet Communist Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev said that the African nations were shown by the Castro

and Podgorny visits that the Soviet Union and Cuba are "friends who can be counted on."

04/04/77 -- Fidel Castro arrived in Moscow two hours after President Podgorny returned from his African trip. The visit was described as unofficial and reportedly hastily arranged.

-- Zaire broke diplomatic relations with Cuba charging "irrefutable evidence" of Cuba's involvement in the Katangan invasion of Shaba Province. A communique from Zaire's official news agency said a Cuban diplomat was caught with documents demonstrating Cuba's collusion in the invasion. (Relations between Cuba and Zaire had been strained for the past 18 months because of Cuba's support for the MPLA and Zaire's support for a pro-Western faction in Angola.)

04/01/77 -- The President of the Southwest African People's Organization, in an interview with South African reporters, said that President Castro promisted to assist the group in its attempt to seize power in Namibia. Sam Nujome, who met with Castro in Angola along with other nationalist leaders said that the Cuban president "promised to continue to support SWAPO in and out" of Namibia "with material assistance and he did the same for other liberation movements in southern Africa."

03/30/77 -- The State Department reported "substantial progress" toward an agreement with Cuba on fishing rights and maritime boundaries. The first round of negotiations was concluded on March 29 and the communique issued said the talks would be resumed "in the near future." The communique added, "The delegations of both governments hope, as a result of the progress of the negotiations, to reach a satisfactory resolution of these issues." Department spokesman Frederick Z. Brown said that the New York meeting was devoted entirely to the fishing issue, but he reiterated the Administration's desire for talks with Cuba on the anti-hijacking agreement.

03/29/77 -- The New York Times reported that the United States and Cuba conducted high level talks on the normalization of relations from late 1974 until late 1975, covering the entire range of issues between the two countries, according to Administration officials speaking publicly for the first time. These secret talks were conducted at Washington's National Airport, Kennedy airport in New York, and at the Hotel Pierre in New York. The U.S. officials involved were William D. Rogers, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and Laurence S. Eagleburger, executive assistant to Secretary of State Kissinger. The objective of the talks, begun at the initiation of Secretary Kissinger, was to clarify the issues and explore means for resolving them. The talks were

begun when Eagleburger called the Cuban Mission to the United Nations in November 1974 and then worked out the details at the airport in New York. Rogers was brought into the discussions in February 1975 and participated in four meetings. Rogers said (on Mar. 28, 1977) that both sides indicated the issues to be resolved and agreed to remove some of the "threshold issues" through a series of planned gestures. (See chronology below for the moves made by both sides in the new context.) Rogers final meeting with a Cuban representative was in the coffee shop at National Airport in late November, at the height of the fighting in Angola. Rogers said he made clear U.S. opposition to Cuban military involvement in Angola but did not close the option for further talks. He said that in addition he broadened the idea of visits between exiles and families in Cuba, an issue the Cubans hinted at before the meeting. Rogers said no response was ever made.

03/25/77 -- In a press conference, President Carter said, "We have no hard evidence, or any evidence...that the Cubans or Angolan troops have crossed the border into Zaire."

-- The U.S. Government lifted the ban on the spending of U.S. dollars in Cuba. Under the new Treasury Department regulation, Americans can bring $100 worth of Cuban goods for personal use into the United States once every six months. The trade embargo still prohibits U.S. firms from doing business in Cuba.

03/24/77 -- Representatives of the United States and Cuba held face-to-face talks on fishing rights and maritime boundaries in New York, in the first formal and publicly acknowledged meeting between the two nations since the severance of relations in January 1961. Terence Todman, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and Vice Foreign Minister Pelegrin Torres headed the delegations. The establishment of the 200 mile fishing zone by each country set the stage for the talks because of the overlap of 200,000 square miles of fishing territory at issue.

03/23/77 -- President Fidel Castro arrived in Angola to an emotional welcome news agencies reported. In Luanda he referred to the significant role of Cuban troops.

03/21/77 -- At a new conference upon leaving Tanzania for Mozambique, Fidel Castro said there was "not a single Cuban involved" in the arming or training of the invading force in Zaire. Castro also indicated that there were limits to Cuban involvement in the nationalist struggles in southern Africa. According to the government-owned newspaper Castro said, "It is not Cuba's intention to send soldiers to free any part of southern Africa. Independence is never delivered from abroad. The people concerned must fight for their

independence."

-- Castro left Tanzania for Mozambique before the arrival of Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny, beginning a two week visit to Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Somalia.

03/20/77 -- During his visit to Tanzania, President Castro told President Nyerere that although Cuba wanted to help, it would not be able to increase its assistance because Cuban resources were occupied in Angola.

03/19/77 -- A joint communique issued 3 days after Castro's vist to Ethiopia, called on "progressive forces" in the Red Sea region to coordinate their struggle. (Since early March, President Castro has visited Libya, South Yemen, Somalia, and Ethiopia. It has been speculated that Castro's shuttling between Ethiopia and Somalia, traditional enemies with Marxist regimes, is an attempt to promote a federation of Ethiopia, Somalia, South Yemen, and the French Territory of Afars and Issas, soon to become independent. Moderate Arab states have been conducting a campaign to draw Somalia and South Yemen from Soviet influence.)

-- During a tour of Shaba Province, Zaire President Mobutu dismissed denials by Fidel Castro that Cuban troops were involved in the invasion. Mobutu said the invaders "are in fact led by Cubans" and were using "the same sophisticated Soviet weapons" used by Cuban forces in Angola.

03/18/77 -- The United States dropped restrictions for Americans traveling to Cuba.

03/16/77 -- Secretary of State Vance told the House International Relations Committee that the United States and Cuba are now "in direct contact" on negotiations that could lead toward normal relations. Vance said direct talks are now possible on a fishing agreement, on renegotiation of the anti-hijacking treaty due to end April 15, and other issues.

-- Secretary Vance said that U.S. intelligence had "no hard information" to show that Cubans or other foreign elements are involved in the invasion from Angola of Zaire's mineral rich Shaba province. The Government of Zaire had charged that Cubans were leading the invading military force.

03/12/77 -- A Cuban sports official said that the invitation to the New York Yankees to play a series of games in Cuba this spring has been withdrawn. The official said that baseball commissioner Bowie Kuhn was responsible for the withdrawal because of Kuhn's insistence that a team of U.S. all-stars play in Cuba, rather than the Yankees.

-- The International Rescue Committee, in a statement, urged that efforts to normalize relations with Cuba, include a call for amnesty for political prisoners in Cuba. The group said that estimates of the number of political prisoners in Cuba ranged from 5,000, the figure according to the group, given by Fidel Castro, and 50,000. It said many have been held for more than 10 years and some for as long as 16. The statement cited examples of mistreatment of prisoners.

03/11/77 -- During a press conference in Plains, President Carter said that he would be willing to end U.S. animosity toward Cuba if the Government of Fidel Castro would ensure the human rights of its people. "The main thing that concerns me about Cuba is the human rights question -- political prisoners and so forth."

03/09/77 -- President Carter, in his press conference, announced that the restrictions on travel to Cuba, Vietnam, Cambodia, and North Korea are being lifted. The statement was made in the context of the President's commitment to freedom of movement for U.S. citizens which is related to his Administration's policy on human rights.

03/07/77 -- The Department of State, responding to a question by baseball Commissioner Bowie Kuhn, said that there would be no objection to a major league team playing an exhibition game in Cuba. The New York Yankees had expressed interest and Fidel Castro had earlier proposed the idea.

03/05/77 -- The Washington Post reported that the Department of State has given permission for a group of college basketball players from South Dakota to travel to Cuba. The waiver of the 16-year-old travel restriction was made at the request of Senator James Abourezk. In his press conference the day before, Secretary of State Vance said that the travel restrictions were being "restudied."

03/04/77 -- Secretary of State Vance, at a press conference, proposed that the United States and Cuba enter into discussions on the wide range of issues between the two countries without preconditions. He said that President Carter, in a statement last month, did not intend to imply there were conditions in order for U.S.-Cuba talks to begin. Vance also said that he thought exchanges of athletic teams would be "constructive." The Secretary said that the United States has sent word to Cuba that the United States would like to discuss the fishing issue "promptly." On Cuban military presence in Uganda, the Secretary said that the U.S. had "no hard evidence" of large numbers but said he could not rule out the presence of a "few."

02/27/77 -- Citing reports from Kenya, the Washington Post reported that a Cuban military delegation had arrived in Uganda to assess Uganda's military needs. In a Los Angeles Times report from Kenya on Mar. 3, it was reported that Cuban military advisers had been entering Uganda in the

past month to help train the Ugandan Army and prop up the economy. This activity follows an official visit made to Uganda in late January by a Cuban military delegation headed by Cuban Deputy Defense Minister General Francisco Cabrera to commemorate the sixth anniversary of Amin's government. Kampala radio said that during a courtesy call by Cabrera to bid farewell, Amin said that he would like to see Cuba helping Uganda in the military field. Amin also said that Uganda would soon open an embassy in Havana. Cabrera replied that Cuba intended to strengthen cooperation and collaboration with Uganda in cultural, technical, and other fields.

02/23/77 -- The Christian Science Monitor, citing "Western intelligence sources" reported that Cuba maintains 3,000 or more soldiers in at least six African nations in addition to Angola; Somalia -- 1,500 serving as military advisers in engineering, running military hospitals, and advising guerrillas. They are not engaged in combat; Mozambique -- 1,200 involved in training guerrillas for Rhodesian operations. No evidence of involvement in Rhodesia itself; Congo -- 1,000 are thought to be serving in this former staging area for the Angola operation. Some of the troops have served in Angola; Guinea -- estimates of 300 serving as palace guard for President Sekou Toure and as advisers to the Army; Guinea-Bissau -- estimates of 300 remaining in this former transshipment point for the Angola operation. The Cubans assist in the arrival of occasional Cuban transports and advise the local police; Equatorial Guinea -- estimates of 200 advisers remaining in a former staging area for the Angola operation.

02/16/77 -- Although expressing optimism regarding the prospects for a normalization of relations with Cuba, President Carter, in response to a question posed at the Department of Agriculture, indicated that he would not inaugurate talks with Cuba until certain conditions were met. He said, "I would very much like to see the Cubans remove their soldiers from Angola..." and added, "We've received information from indirect sources that Castro and Cuba have promised to remove those troops...and that would be a step toward full normalization of relationships with Angola. The same thing applies ultimately to the restoration of normal relationships with Cuba." The President continued, "If I can be convinced that Cuba wants to remove their aggravating influence from other countries in this hemisphere, will not participate in violence in nations across the oceans, will recommit the former relationship that existed in Cuba toward human rights -- then I would be willing to move toward normalizing relations with Cuba as well."

02/15/77 -- Upon returning from a 5-day visit to Cuba, during which he met with Fidel Castro, Rep. Jonathan Bingham said that "there is a good opportunity" now

for normalizing relations between the United States and Cuba. He cited areas of cooperation on which Castro told him the United States and Cuba could move ahead immediately: fisheries talks, sports and cultural exchanges, and joint efforts to curb the spread of sugar cane blight. Bingham felt that discussion could be held on these areas without any preconditions.

Bingham said that Cuban officials told him that the number of troops in Angola had been reduced by one half since last spring. (At the high point of involvement, the number of troops was estimated to be about 20,000.) The Cubans indicated to Bingham that the troops would remain in Angola for some time and would leave only when asked to do so by the Neto government. The Congressman also said that in order for full scale negotiations to begin with Cuba, the United States would have to lift the trade embargo. He saw the lifting on the ban on food and medicines as a possible start. He said also that Castro wants the United States to relax its curbs on Americans visiting Cuba. However, Bingham added that Castro and other Cuban officials indicated that the continuation of the 1973 anti-highjacking agreement was contingent upon U.S. crackdcwn on anti-Castro terrorism and can be discussed only after the trade embargo is lifted.

02/15/76 -- In response to a question after his address before the National Press Club, Mexican President Jose Lopez Portillo said that he was happy with the prospects of normalization of relations between the United States and Cuba. "There seems to be goodwill on the part of both nations to solve this situation." He offered the good offices of Mexico but said he thought it would not be necessary. White House press secretary Jody Powell said that Lopez and President Carter talked about the possibility of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba among other issues.

02/13/77 -- During a press conference in Plains, President Carter said the human rights issue was the key element in relations between the United States and Cuba. He expressed the hope that recent statements by Fidel Castro on relaticns with the United States "can be followed up by mutual efforts to alleviate tensions and reduce animositites."

02/13/77 -- The New York Times reported that during the spring and summer of 1975, the Castro government had begun secret-high level talks with the Ford Administration on U.S.-Cuban issues, with a view toward negotiating diplomatic relaticns. The article stated that Secretary Kissinger and senior aides held lengthy discussions with a special Cuban envoy in Washington on the various problem areas. The talks were broken off after it was reported that Cuban troops were in Angola, according to the article.

02/09/77 -- In an interview with news correspondent Bill Moyers, a portion of which was shown on CBS Evening News, Fidel Castro said he thought that is was possible to normalize relations between Cuba and the United States and that he would be glad to talk with Carter. He said he believed Carter was a man with a "sense of morals" who may bring an end to the years of hostility between the United States and Cuba. Castro also said that trade would be the best way to normalize relations.

02/07/77 -- In answer to a reporter's question, a State Department spokesman said that the provision banning travel to certain countries, including Cuba is "being reviewed" and that the issue could be resolved before March 15.

02/04/77 -- The Department of State announced that in a message conveyed through the Swiss Government two weeks before, Cuba had notified the United States that it wanted to discuss the new U.S. law which established the 200-mile fishing zone. The Fishery Conservation and Management Act will come into force on March 1. The U.S. already signed agreements under the law with Bulgaria, China, East Germany, South Korea, Poland, Rumania and the Soviet Union, which stipulate conditions under which these nations will be permitted to fish inside the limit.

02/03/77 -- The United States Government raised the possibility of direct talks with the Cuban Government over the anti-hijacking agreement and other issues. In a statement approved by Secretary of State Vance, Department spokesman Frederick Brown said that "there have been no new developments since the Cubans announced their intention to terminate the anti-hijacking agreement," but, he continued, "this is something we hope to be able to discuss with the Cubans. He later added, "There's a whole range of issues we would want to discuss." In a later interview with the Associated Press and United Press International, Vance said it would be "constructive" for the two Governments to discuss other major issues. He mentioned Cuba's "exporting" revolution and continued presence in Angola. Vance added that the Administration had not yet decided how to approach Cuba and that "no direct indication" that Castro was ready for talks had been received.

02/02/77 -- According to a press release of the Cuban Mission to the United Nations, Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez said in a BBC-TV interview that Cuba is willing to discuss all issues with the United States, from the problem of the Guantanamo Naval base to the cessation of aggression and sabotage. He cautioned that this did not imply that Cuba is renouncing its political and ideological positions. He also said that Cuban troops were sent to Angola at the request of a government and not a liberation movement. He

said that the Cuban Army will not become directly involved in wars of liberation. He also stated that there are no political prisoners in Cuba because people are detained for their actions and not for their ideas.

01/31/77 -- In answer to a question on relations with Cuba at his press conference, Secretary of State Vance expressed a hope that the United States "could begin the process of moving toward normalization" with Cuba. "I don't want to set any pre-conditions at this point..." He added, "the presence of any outside forces is not helpful to a peaceful solution," in Angola, but "I think that this is a matter that should be settled by the Africans themselves." Kissinger had stressed the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola as a condition for normalizing relations with the United States.

01/27/77 -- In a written response to questions posed by Senator Case at the January 11 confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Vance stated that, "...the release of Mr. Huber Matos would help the process of normalization of relations with Cuba. The Cuban Government holds a number of other political prisoners including some American citizens. The release of these political prisoners as a gesture of goodwill and as a humanitarian act would be one indication that Cuba is seriously interested in starting a dialogue with the United States."

01/25/77 -- In a TV interview with CBS newsman Dan Rather, U.N. Ambassador Andrew Young said that "...the Cubans bring a certain stability and order to Angola..." He also stated that he believed the United States could negotiate a withdrawal of Cuban troops from southern Africa. On February 2, a State Department spokesman said, "Neither Ambassador Young nor the Secretary of States condones the presence of Cuban troops in Angola."

01/24/77 -- In a letter to Fidel Castro, thirty members of the House of Representatives asked the Cuban President to give serious consideration to releasing Huber Matos, held prisoner since 1959. Matos, then military commander of Camaguey Province, was sentenced to prison for counter-revolutionary activities after he publicly denounced the leftist path of the Castro government. The congressional letter also expressed the hope that "international conditions will allow for a lessening of tensions between our two governments."

01/12/77 -- The Canadian Government expelled five Cubans, including three diplomats, after a Montreal newspaper reported that Cuba was recruiting undercover agents to go to southern Africa and was training them in Canada. The Cuban Foreign Ministry defended its actions claiming "the normal right to know by whom and how its nationals are being attacked."

-- The Hearst newspapers reported that President-elect Carter

is considering a relaxation of the trade embargo against Cuba. Citing "senior foreign policy advisers," the newspapers said Carter could act within 100 days after his inauguration and would consult with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee.

01/11/77 -- The New York Times reported that during his confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State designate Vance said that the trade embargo against Cuba had been ineffective. According to the published official hearing record, however, Vance is reported as saying, "I think the boycott has been obviously in effect." Vance also said, "I think if Cuba is willing to live within the international system, then we ought to seek ways to find whether we can eliminate the impediments which exist between us and try to move toward normalization."

01/09/77 -- Newsday reported that anti-Castro terrorists, with at least the tacit support of the CIA, introduced African swine flu fever virus into Cuba in the spring of 1971. The Cuban Government was forced to slaughter 500,000 pigs six weeks after the outbreak of the disease to prevent a nationwide epidemic. There were no human deaths involved in the outbreak. A U.S. intelligence source told Newsday that he was given the virus in a sealed container at Fort Gulick in the Canal Zone and turned it over to anti-Castro agents who transported it to Cuba by sea. In a speech, on July 26, 1971, Fidel Castro referred to the epidemic and speculated that it could have resulted from enemy activity.

01/08/77 -- Senator Richard Stone (D. Fla.) said he would ask for more Federal involvement in the investigation of the assassinations which have plauged the Miami exile community. Stone was reacting to the recent killing of the former president of the Bay of Pigs Veterans Association, friends of whom blamed the killing on followers of Fidel Castro.

01/01/77 -- A White House spokesman commenting on President Ford's recommendation of statehood for Puerto Rico said that the President's action "might be interpreted as an indication to Cuba's Fidel Castro that we value Puerto Rico and won't allow any tampering there." Radio Havana called Ford a "frantic annexationist."

12/21/76 -- Generally negative reaction in the Miami exile community to the Linowitz Commission's recommendations on Cuba was reported by the Miami Herald and the Miami News. Alfredo Duran, chairman of the Democratic Party in Florida and a Bay of Pigs veteran, stated that re-establishing relations with Cuba "would be a tremendous mistake at this point." Other political leaders such as Miami Mayor Maurice Ferre, a member of the Democratic National Hispanic Committee, indicated that the recommendations of the Linowitz Commission were those of an independent group, inferring that they are not represented as

Carter Administration policies.

12/20/76 -- The second report of the Commission on United States-Latin American Relations, headed by former OAS Ambassador Sol Linowitz, urged the Carter Administration to "actively explore opportunities early in its term..." to resolve the issue of relations with Cuba. The report recommended that the Administration "take the initiative in launching a sequence of reciprocal actions...." It recommended that the Administration give assurances that it would prevent terrorist actions against Cuba and speculated that this would prevent the abrogation of the anti-hijacking agreement. Furthermore, the Commission recommended that the embargo on food and medicines be lifted and that the United States enter into negotiations with Cuba on the other issues in dispute, as long as Cuba gives assurances that it would make an appropriate public response such as the release of U.S. prisoners, the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola, and respect for the principle of non-intervention and self-determination with respect to Puerto Rico.

12/04/76 -- Raul Castro, Minister of Armed Forces, said that Cuba will be watching the Carter Administration for signs that "hostility and aggression against our fatherland are terminated."

12/02/76 -- Representative Charles Diggs, completing a fact-finding tour of southern Africa said that he supported the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. Speaking in Lesotho Diggs said, "They are training the indigenous armed forces, working in hospitals and doing many other things."

11/22/76 -- The Washington Post reported that since last month, a Federal grand jury in Miami has been asking Miami exiles about their connection with international incidents such as the February shelling of a Soviet freighter near Cuba, the April attack on two fishing boats in the same area and the murder of a chauffeur in an attempted kidnapping of the Cuban consul in Merida, Mexico, in July.

-- The United States abstained in the Security Council vote and Angola's application to become the 146th member of the United Nations was approved. (In the vote in June, before the Republican convention, the U.S. vetoed Angola's application because of the presence of Cuban troops. On Nov. 16, Secretary Kissinger estimated that 12,000-13,000 Cuban troops were in Angola involved in mop-up operations against anti-government factions. In June, U.S. officials estimated that there were 15,000 Cuban troops in Angola.)

11/17/76 -- Nicaragua accused Cuba of training and infiltrating Nicaraguan leftists into the country to conduct a guerrilla war against the Somoza government. The Washington Star reported (Nov. 20) that the Nicaraguan government claimed that the National Guard had killed eight Cuban-backed terrorists in battles in the past two weeks.

(Recently, Castro charged that Nicaragua was a base for Cuban exile extremists involved in the sabotage of the Cubana airliner.)

11/15/76 -- The New York Times reported that a meeting took place in July in the Dominican Republic during which Cuban exile action groups, meeting with Orlando Bosch, declared a policy of attacking Cuban targets internationally as well as within Cuba, but took a stand against terrorism within the United States. (Earlier in Venezuela, six persons, including Cuban exiles Bosch, Hernan Ricardo, Freddy Lugo [the latter two alleged to have planted the bomb], and Luis Posada Carriles, a former high ranking official in the Venezuelan secret police, were indicted on charges of sabotage in connection with the crash of the Cubana plane.)

11/12/76 -- In the wake of the crash of the Cubana airliner, the Cuban government declined to send scholars to an upcoming conference on "Cuba in World Affairs," at the University of Pittsburgh. The State Department earlier had indicated that the Cubans would be permitted to attend. In Mar. 1975, the Department of State reversed an earlier decision to permit five Cuban scholars to attend the Latin American Studies Association meeting in Atlanta.

10/20/76 -- According to a New York Times News Service report, Venezuelan and U.S. authorities believe that a group of anti-Castro Cuban exiles have plotted a "vast" number of terrorist actions against Cuban diplomatic and commercial installations in seven countries in the Western Hemisphere. The article reported that Venezuelan and Cuban officials said that two of the Cuban exiles under arrest in connection with recent bombings had ties with the CIA. A Venezuelan official said that one of those arrested, a former chief of operations of the Venezuelan secret police, had been given "technical training by the CIA."

10/18/76 -- According to a report in the Christian Science Monitor, Cuba has been steadily withdrawing its troops from Angola in recent weeks. As many as 3,000 may have left since August 1. (There is no indication if this represents a reduction or rotation of troops.)

10/16/76 -- During a press conference in Kansas City, Democratic Presidential candidate Jimmy Carter said, "I don't see any immediate prospect for the normalization of relationships with Cuba. And I don't advocate that as a goal of our country in the foreseeable future.."

10/15/76 -- In a speech delivered before a massive gathering in Havana, Cuban Premier Fidel Castro charged the CIA with direct responsibility for the crash of a Cubana airliner on October 6, and said that he was notifying the U.S. Government that Cuba

was abrogating the U.S.-Cuban hijacking accord of 1973. All 73 passengers and crew, mostly Cuban, were killed after an explosion forced the plane down in the sea off Barbados. The plane was enroute to Kingston and Havana.

-- Castro related Cuban exile terrorist activity of the past several months to involvement with the CIA, citing Venezuelan sources as well as a Cuban who has acted as a double agent for the past 10 years. He spoke of the various exile organizations that comprise the United Revolutionary Organizations Command (CORU) and said "These groups not only act freely and with impunity from United States territory, but through CORU, their main heads are closely linked to CIA activities against Cuba." Castro ascribed the terrorist activity to U.S. resentment of Cuban policy in Africa.

-- With specific reference to the hijacking agreement, the Cuban Premier stated, "Strictly adhering to the agreement and preceeding to notifications of its denunciation today . . . , said agreement will have validity only up to April 15, 1977, and we will not again sign any such agreement with the United States until the terrorist campaign . . . is definitely terminated and there is a definitive end to United States acts of hostility and aggression against Cuba." However, toward the conclusion of his speech, Castro said, "Cuba is even ready to discuss with the United States, whichever government is elected in November, a solution to these problems."

-- At a Boston press conference, Secretary Kissinger said, "I can state categorically that no official of the U.S. government, no one paid by the American government, no one in contact with the American government has had anything to do" with the airplane sabotage. He earlier said, "We will hold the government of Cuba strictly accountable for any encouragement of hijacking and any encouragement of terrorism that may flow from its renunciation of the treaty."

-- The Venezuelan Government announced the arrests of Cuban exile leaders, including Orlando Bosch, head of CORU, who is wanted in the United States for parole violation stemming from terrorist activity in 1968, in connection with the airline crash. U.S. authorities have requested the extradition of Bosch in connection with the investigation of the assassination of former Chilean Ambassador to the U.S. Orlando Letelier.

-- On October 16, U.S. authorities said they had established a link between Cuban exiles suspected of having caused the explosion of the plane and an incident on July 9, in which a bomb exploded in a Cubana plane in Kingston.

09/30/76 -- In the section of his speech before the UN General Assembly devoted to U.S.-Soviet relations, Secretary Kissinger said, "We have been disturbed by the continuing accumulation of armaments and by recent instances of military intervention to tip the scales in local conflicts on distant continents . . . . These efforts only foster tensions; they cannot be reconciled with the policy of improving relations." With specific reference to Africa, the Secretary said, "The rivalry and interference of non-African powers would make a mockery of Africa's hard-won struggle for independence from foreign domination. It will inevitably be resisted."

09/07/76 -- The UN Special Committee on colonialism deferred action on a Cuban-sponsored resolution on the status of Puerto Rico until the meeting scheduled for next fall.

08/15/76 -- The Republican Party Platform adopted the following on Cuba: ". . . We condemn attempts by the Cuban dictatorship to intervene in the affairs of other nations;. . . We shall continue to share the aspirations of the Cuban people to regain their liberty. We insist that decent and humane conditions be maintained in the treatment of political prisoners in the Cuban jails, and we seek arrangements to allow international entities, such as the International Red Cross, to investigate. . . ."

08/08/76 -- Reuter reported that the opposition to the Manley government in Jamaica has charged that many Cubans in Jamaica under a technological exchange agreement between the two countries are Communist agents. Cuban engineers, teachers, doctors and farmers are working on various projects in Jamaica.

07/26/76 -- In his speech commemorating the 23rd anniversary of the Cuban Revolution, Premier Castro said that Cuban troops and arms will remain in Angola to protect that country from future invasions and to help it along the road to development. Visiting Angolan president Agostinho Neto also spoke. Castro and Neto concluded a series of economic and technical agreements, which call for Cuba to provide doctors, nurses, teachers, engineers, as well as experts in internal distribution, fishing, and information.

07/11/76 -- The Baltimore Sun reported that according to the BBC, between 20,000 and 25,000 Cuban troops are still in Angola.

07/03/76 -- The Associated Press reported that U.S. intelligence sources have received reports that several thousand Cuban troops may be transferred from Angola to the Congo Republic. It was speculated that Raul Castro's visit to Brazzaville last month was to discuss the redeployment. (The Congolese Foreign Ministry, on July 20, denied the reports.) The reports also indicated that Raul, in his visit to Luanda, discussed Fidel Castro's decision to reduce Cuban military presence in Angola.

07/01/76 -- The Washington Star reported that Spanish workers in

the port of Mariel, near Havana, said that up to 1,000 troops have returned from Angola. U.S. sources contend that Cuban troops coming from Angola are part of a rotation process rather than withdrawal.

06/26/76 -- On his arrival in San Juan for an economic summit meeting, President Ford said that those who might attempt to interfere in the United States' "freely determined relations should know such an act will be considered as intervention in the domestic affairs of Puerto Rico and the United States." Not mentioning Cuba by name, Ford said, "It will be an unfriendly act which will be resisted by appropriate means."

06/23/76 -- The United States vetoed Angola's application for U.N. membership because of the "continuing presence and apparent influence of Cuban troops" in that country.

-- In issuing the final findings of its investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence raised the possibility that the assassination might have been a retaliation by Fidel Castro. Mentioned were inferences by the Cuban premier that those in the United States who aid terrorist plans against Cuban leaders would not be safe.

06/18/76 -- The Democratic Party Platform Committee adopted the following on U.S. relations with Cuba: "Relations with Cuba can only be normalized if Cuba refrains from interference in the internal affairs of the United States, and releases all U.S. citizens currently detained in Cuban prisons and labor camps for political reasons. We can move towards such relations if Cuba abandons its provccative international actions and policies."

06/11/76 -- At a news conference in Mexico City, Secretary Kissinger said there is no "conclusive confirmation" that Cuba is withdrawing its troops from Angola. He added that the United States had been prepared to explore the normalization of relations with Cuba, . . . but the introduction of large military contingents in Angola has created a very serious situation in our relationship . . . . The pre-condition for any improvement in our relations with Cuba is the total withdrawal of all organized military units from Angola. Responding to a question on Cuba's activity in the Caribbean, Secretary Kissinger said, I'd like to make the distinction between diplomatic activity and military activity. We would oppose military infiltration and we have seen no evidence of Cuban military units in the Western Hemisphere.

06/03/76 -- At the U.N. Conference on Human Settlement in Vancouver, Cuban Construction Minister Levi Farah-Balmaseda announced that a nuclear reactor will be built near the city of Cienfuegos with Soviet assistance. It will be Cuba's first nuclear power plant.

05/24/76 -- Cuban troops are being withdrawn from Angola at a systematic weekly rate which will "drastically" reduce Cuban forces in the African nation by the end of the year, according to the contents of a letter from Cuban Premier Fidel Castro to Swedish Prime

Minister Olof Palme and passed on to visiting Secretary of State Kissinger. According to Swedish sources, the letter indicated that Cuba was withdrawing troops at the rate of 200 per week. In the letter, Castro wrote that he had no intention of sending troops elsewhere, either in Africa or Latin America. It had been rumored for weeks that the decision to remove Cuban troops was imminent. It was reported that Kissinger regarded the news as a positive development but said that "A partial withdrawal does not meet our requirements...." Earlier (May 12) the Washington Star reported that a high-ranking U.S. official at the U.N. told Angolan representatives that the United States would have to veto the application for U.N. membership unless there were signs that the Cuban troops would be withdrawn.

05/20/76 -- Cuban Deputy Premier Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, responding to questions at the Japan Press Club in Tokyo, said that Cuba had no intention of sending troops to assist black nationalist forces in Rhodesia, as it did in Angola. Rodriguez made the distinction between the two cases reiterating that Cuban troops were in Angola at the request of the legitimate government. Rodriguez said Cuban troops would be withdrawn when the Government requested it. Commenting on relations with the United States, Rodriguez said, "We may have thus to wait until the presidential election is over. But we can be patient."

05/19/76 -- In a speech before the National Press Club, Governor Rafael Hernandez-Colon of Puerto Rico charged that Cuba was training and aiding terrorists to overthrow the government of Puerto Rico. He said there was a clear tie between the Puerto Rican Socialist Party and Cuba. A high-ranking Ford Administration official, according to an article in the New York Times, said that Cuban support for the Puerto Rican Independence movement is "confined largely to rhetoric and providing free vacations for the leaders."

05/12/76 -- The New York Times reported that the Presidents of Venezuela and Colombia feel that Cuban action in Angola was deplorable but it had not altered their policy of seeking a normalization of relations between Cuba and the rest of the hemisphere. Venezuelan President Lopez Michelsen said he accepts in good faith the statement by Fidel Castro, published last week in Bohemia, a Caracas magazine, that speculation on Cuba's use of military force in the Hemisphere was "absurd".

04/22/76 -- On the eve of his departure for Africa, Secretary Kissinger told reporters, "There is no possibility of continuing any discussions with Cuba about normalizing of relations as long as Cuban military forces are stationed in Africa and as long as Cuba continues the attacks on America and American policy in Puerto Rico and elsewhere.

Unless there is a substantial change in Cuban attitudes, the process of improving relations can be considered suspended."

04/19/76 -- In a speech commemorating the 15th anniversary of the Cuban victory over U.S.-backed exile forces at the Bay of Pigs, Prime Minister Fidel Castro threatened to call off the anti-hijacking agreement with the United States if U.S.-based Cuban refugee groups continued attacks against Cuban fishing boats. Castro also called President Ford a "vulgar liar" for allegedly concealing from the American people that South African troops invaded Angola before Cuban troops were sent to help the MPLA. He also said that Ford was lying when he said that the Soviet Union was responsible for the Cuban presence. Castro said, "The Soviet Union never requested that a single Cuban soldier be sent to Angola."

04/10/76 -- In a letter of protest sent to the United States the Government of Cuba charged that an attack on two Cuban fishing boats, on April 8, in which one man was killed, was inspired by "threats against Cuba by the highest authorities in the United States government." Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the Cuban-exile Front for the National Liberation of Cuba and Brigade 2506. On April 20, White House and Department of State officials said that Cuba was informed on April 16 that the United States was was trying to learn the identity of raiders who attacked the Cuban fishing boats and was taking steps "to deter further such attacks."

04/08/76 -- The leader of Trinidad and Tobago's ruling People's National Movement has demanded an apology from the U.S. Ambassador to that country for his recent attacks on Cuba. Selwyn Richardson said that statements made by the Ambassador concerning possible actions against Cuba if it continued its assistance to African peoples is an insult to the sovereignty of Trinidad and Tobago.

04/06/76 -- The Journal of Commerce reported that the Multinational Caribbean Shipping Line - NAMUCAR is now in operation with Mexico, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Nicaragua, and Cuba as founding members and Honduras as a more recent member. NAMUCAR's objectives are to increase trade throughout the region and to reduce maritime shipping costs.

04/05/76 -- According to the New York Times News Service, "qualified" intelligence sources reported that Cuban military forces were joining Soviet military elements in the Red Sea-Persian Gulf area as part of a general buildup of strength. British sources reported that 650 Cubans have been flown into Somalia where there are believed to be already 2,500 Soviet military advisers and air and naval equipment. Also reported were

60 to 70 Cuban pilcts and missile technicians in the country. Cuban pilots and advisers are reported to be training pilots in Southern Yemen and guerrillas in Oman.

04/01/76 -- According to a Panamanian official, apprehensions about the renewed militancy of Cuba caused the cancellation of a ccnference of Latin American leaders scheduled for June in Panama. The chiefs of state of all Latin American countries had been expected to attend the 150th anniversary of the Amphictyonic Congress held in Panama in 1826. Both Castro of Cuba and Pinochet of Chile indicated they would attend. The communique which reported the cancellation said that a meeting was not propitious "due to the political conditions that currently exist."

03/25/76 -- A Pentaqon spokesman confirmed that a formal review is beinq made of possible military action that the United States miqht take aqainst Cuba. A DOD spokesman said "The Joint Chiefs of Staff are participating in a National Security Council review of possible action which might be taken with regard to Cuba." He declined to say what types of action were contemplated. The day before, in a meeting with some Members of Congress, President Ford repeated warnings to Cuba similar to those expressed by Administration officials recently.

03/25/76 -- Testifyinq before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Kissinqer said that U.S. contingency plans against Cuba are designed to warn the Soviet and Cuban Governments that further intervention in Africa could have "serious consequences." Kissinger related that a review of contingency plans with regard to Cuba does not indicate that we are in a crisis situation, but said "We do want Cuba and the Soviet Union to understand it's a matter of deep gravity."

03/23/76 -- At a news conference in Atlanta, Secretary Kissinger refused to rule out the possibility of U.S. military action against Cuba in the event that the warnings issued by the Ford Administration were disregarded. Pressed by reporters for specifics of U.S. action against Cuba, Kissinger said, "...it's impossible for any senior official to put out ahead of time all the things the United States will or won't do and all the circumstances that may arise. We have pointed out the dangers to Cuba. We are serious about what I have said." When asked specifically about an invasion of Cuba, Kissinqer said he did not want to discuss "any specific measures," adding, "You should not draw any conclusions for or against...."

03/22/76 -- In a major policy address in Dallas, Secretary Kissinger warned Cuba that the United States was capable of "forthright and decisive action" if Cuba intervenes further in Africa. He said, "The United States cannot acquiesce indefinitely in the presence of Cuban expeditionary forces in distant lands for the purpose

of pressure and to determine the political evolution by force of arms." The Washington Star (March 23) reported that it was told by an offical close to the administration decision making process that if the Cubans became involved in new actions in Africa, any U.S. response would be against Cuba itself, not in Africa. Some observers speculated that the most likely possibility would be a blockade similar to the action taken during the 1962 missile crisis.

03/17/76 -- The State Department refused to issue visas to a delegation of Cuban filmmakers who planned to attend the Los Angeles Film Exposition (Filmex) because "the time is not propitious" for their visit, according to a State Department official. In November, the State Department said that it would "recommend that our consul general in Mexico City issue the visas," according to a Filmex official. Indications are that the decision was made at the highest levels in the Department according to the report in the Los Angeles Times. At the end of the month, the Department of State refused to issue visas to a group of scholars scheduled to attend the national meeting of the Latin American Studies Association in Atlanta.

-- According to an article by James Reston in the New York Times, the Ford Administration sent a private communication to Fidel Castro last autumn offering to meet privately with high-level Cuban officials at the United Nations to discuss the possibility of normalization of relations. Reston noted that the communication was never answered. David Binder, in the New York Times, Apr. 25, 1976, reported that Kissinger and Castro exchanged private messages about beginning actual negotiations.

03/06/76 -- During a news conference in Atlanta, Secretary Kissinger In response to questions about the position of the United States regarding the possibility that Cuban forces might aid the black guerrilla forces opposing the Government of Rhodesia, Secretary Kissinger, in a press conference in Atlanta, said that the United States "will not accept any further Cuban military adventures" in other parts of the would. Earlier, it was reported that, according to intelligence sources, Cuban troops and Soviet T-34 tanks had landed at the Moazambique port of Beira. Rhodesian Defense Minister Pieter Van der Byl said Rhodesia had no evidence of any Cuban or Soviet "presence of any significance in Mozambique," the base of operations of guerrillas opposing the Smith government.

03/04/76 -- Secretary of State Kissinger, in testimony before the House International Relations Committee, cautioned Cuba about further moves in Africa and warned that U.S. actions cannot be deduced by the U.S. performance in Angola. He said, "...we cannot accept intervention by the Cubans in the Western Hemisphere or any other

state."

03/01/76 -- The U.N. High Commissioner for Namibia said that he does not think that the United Nations would interfere if Cuban or other foreign troops helped guerrillas in that territory to fight South African rule, which is in violation of U.N. principles.

02/28/76 -- President Ford, during a campaign trip for the Florida primary election, branded Fidel Castro "an international outlaw" who commited a "flagrant act of aggression" by sending troops to Angola. In his Miami speech before an audience largely composed of Cuban refugees, Ford said, "My administration will have nothing to do with the Cuba of Fidel Castro." He stated, "It is a regime of aggression, and I solemnly warn Fidel Castro against any temptation to armed intervention in the Western Hemisphere. Let his regime, or any like-minded government be assured that the United States would take appropriate action."

02/24/76 -- In statements made at a luncheon in San Jose, Costa Rica, on the last day of his tour through six Latin American countries, Secretary of State Kissinger sought to assure Central American governments that the United States would not permit Cuban military intervention in the Hemisphere. Referring to Cuban action in Angola, Kissinger said, "Expeditionary forces may still be sent across the oceans to intervene in, and impose their will upon, the domestic affairs of other countries. The United States will not tolerate a challenge to the solemn treaty principle of non-intervention in this hemisphere.

-- In a dispatch from Havana, the London Times reported that "officials in Havana" when asked if Cuban support for Namibia "meant engaging in a full-scale war with South Africa," replied that "Cuba would do whatever must be done to support the Namibians." The article quoted the officials as saying that Cuba has "no intention of invading African states for political reasons, but would continue to provide aid for its sister peoples on the continent of Africa in their armed struggle against colonialism and for national liberation."

02/23/76 -- Colombian President Alfonso Lopez Michelson, with Secretary of State Kissinger sitting at his side, declined to condemn Cuban military intervention in Angola and said that his government would soon reorganize the MPLA government. (Colombia would be joining Brazil and Peru in recognizing the Cuban-supported government in Angola.)

02/21/76 -- The Washington Post reported that more than a dozen U.S. organizations, most of them black, had been invited to Cuba for briefings on Cuban foreign policy and the civil war in Angola.

-- According to the Washington Post, MPLA leaders have been reported as saying that they would ask Cuban and Soviet troops to leave Angola once the civil war was over.

-- At a press conference in Brasilia, Secretary of State Kissinger sought to play down the importance Cuba has been given by some to his Latin American trip. Reiterating that his trip was not intended to line up support against Cuba, Kissinger said that he did not want to turn U.S. hemispheric policy into "an obsession with a small Caribbean country." He said, "If there is any specific concern with Cuba, and the United States feels that action is called for, we will undoubtedly discuss this matter with interested Latin states..."

02/18/76 -- The Associated Press reported that the MPLA has decided to withdraw Cuban troops from further combat in order to avert a clash with South African forced holding a defense line 21 miles inside Angola.

02/17/76 -- During his visit to Venezuela, Secretary Kissinger said that the United States will not accept a repetition of the Cuban intervention in Angola. He said the United States "cannot be indifferent" to what he later called "an unacceptable mode of behavior." Kissinger said, "I am convinced that once the American people understand that Cuba asserts the right to intervene militarily in other parts of the world, we will not stand idly by." The statements on Cuba were in response to questions; Kissinger emphasized that the United States is not asking any government to take specific action now. He said that Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez raised the Cuban issue and they saw the issue pretty much alike.

02/10/76 -- The Organization of African Unity (OAU) recognized the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola as the sole government of the former Portuguese colony. A correspondent for the London Times reported that with the rout of the pro-Western UNITA in southern Angola, a direct confrontation with the South African army seemed imminent.

-- At a White House breakfast meeting with reporters, President Ford, when asked what Cuba had to do to earn its way back into "our good graces," said "Right now there isn't a possibility--it's zero--of any improvement in relations with Cuba."

02/09/76 -- Huambo, the South central Angolan capital of the Western-backed forces, fell under assault by Popular Movement and Cuban troops. Military experts in Lusaka said Cuban soldiers had been used almost exclusively in the offensives on the Southern front.

02/05/76 -- According to the New York Times, knowledgeable sources say that Secretary of State Kissinger privately has concluded that Cuba is again in the business of "exporting revolution" on its own initiative, this time to Angola, to the Sahara, and perhaps elsewhere outside the hemisphere. The article stated that Kissinger said that he had rejected the theory held. until recently, by most of the Administration's specialists on Cuba that Fidel Castro has

been forced by Soviet pressure to send the troops.

-- United Press International reported that according to diplomatic sources in Havana, military intervention in Angola has caused more complaining against the Cuban Government than any issue in recent years. According to the article, complaints have been voiced at Communist Party meetings, and some militia reserves have balked at being recruited for service in Angola. A dilpomat is reported to have said that according to one rumor, a ship docked in Havana in December carrying 450 dead and wounded.

02/04/76 -- Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau told his Parliament that while in Cuba he advised Cuban Prime Minister Castro to pull Cuban troops out of Angola, calling Cuban involvement in the civil war there "A serious mistake."

02/02/76 -- Time magazine reported that Cuban-led MPLA forces delivered devastating blows in the past week to FNLA troops in the north and to UNITA forces in the south as they got closer to the UNITA capital of Huambo. The article reported that the troops of Roberto Holden's FNLA were virtually defeated.

01/29/76 -- Secretary Kissinger, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, said that the Soviet and Cuban effort in Angola "is a willful, direct assault upon the recent constructive trend in U.S.-Soviet relations and our efforts to improve relations with Cuba... . To those who have acted so recklessly must be made to see that their conduct is unacceptable." Kissinger said that the 11,000 Cuban combat troops in Angola are doing almost all the fighting.

01/28/76 -- According to an article in the Christian Science Monitor, Cuban intervention in Angola is causing concern in Venezuela and throughout the Caribbean. Top Venezuelan officials privately said that Cuban action "is a grave act" and that it threatens relations with Cuba. One Venezuelan official expressed the fear that if Cuba can take military action so far from home, it can do it anywhere in the Caribbean. The article asserted that similar concern was expressed by officials in Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, all of which have relations with Cuba.

01/27/76 -- In an appeal for House support of aid to pro-Western factions in Angola, President Ford, in a letter to Speaker Carl Albert, wrote, "The U.S. cannot accept as a principle of international conduct that Cuban troops and Soviet arms can be used for a blatant intervention in local conflicts, in areas thousands of miles from Cuba and the Soviet Union, and where neither can claim an historical national interest." He said "...it would make Cuba the mercenaries of upheaval everywhere." The President said that in addition to the 10,000 Cuban troops, from March to December 1975, the Soviet Union and Cuba provided almost $200 million in weapons and other military aid to the Communist faction.

01/22/76 -- According to the Washington Star, the Cuban military is involved in eight African countries: People's Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville), the major staging area for the Angola operation, 1,000; Tanzania, 500; Equatorial Guinea, 500; Republic of Guinea, 300 (60 of whom have been identified as military); Somalia, 50; Guinea-Bissau, 20-25; and Sierra Leone, 20-25. For the most part, they are involved in training.

01/21/76 -- U.S. officials said that Soviet aircraft have been flying Cuban troops into Angola at the rate of 200 per day for the past two weeks bringing the total Cuban contingent up to 10,500.

01/19/76 -- Newsweek magazine reported that the Russians are providing long-range Ilyushin-62 jets to fly Cuban troops to Angola. The magazine said 3,000 to 6,000 Cubans may be en route to join the estimated 9,000 there.

-- The Washington Post reported that the =Chicago Daily News= quoted sources in Cuba as saying that all Cuban soldiers in Angola are volunteers from a pool of crack troops selected for overseas duty. The paper quoted Minister of Defense Raul Castro as saying "...we have an obligation to join with all people of the world who are struggling against Yankee imperialism."

01/17/76 -- The Washington Post reported that U.S. officials estimate that Cuba has 9,500 troops in Angola with another 1,000 en route.

01/15/76 -- At his press conference, Castro said, "It is not that Cuba should reject the ideal of improving relations with the United States--we are in favor of peace, of the policy of detente, of coexistence between states with different social systens--what we do not accept are humiliating conditions--the absurd price which the United States apparently would have us pay for an improvement in relations."

-- Premier Castro, speaking to Cuban and foreign journalists at a press conference in the Havana airport after the departure of Panamanian leader Omar Torrijos, declared publicly for the first time that Cuban soldiers were fighting in Angola. He said that no Cuban fighting unit had gone to Angola prior to the South African intervention of Oct. 23, 1975. He declared that Cuban soldiers would continue to fight as long as their help was wanted by the MPLA. He said that Cuba had supported revolutionary movements in Africa for more than 10 years.

01/11/76 -- According to a New York Times report, Cuba's Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, had indicated in an informal talk with U.S. newsmen that South African intervention in Angola on October 23 was the reason for Cuban involvement.

01/09/76 -- Osmani Cienfuegos, member of the Cuban Communist Party

Central Committee, arrived in Addis Ababa as the chief of a six-man Cuban delegation. Cienfuego said they had come for talks with Ethiopian leaders.

01/08/76 -- A four-man Cuban delegation, headed by Cuba's permanent representative at the UN, Ricardo Alarcon, arrived in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The Cuban delegation's arrival coincided with the arrival of African leaders for a special Organizatien of African Unity meeting on Angola.

01/08/76 -- The Washington Post reported that Rep. Charles W. Whalen, Jr., a member of the House International Relations Committee, felt that Cuban Premier Fidel Castro had changed course. Whalen spoke with Castro in Havana in July and was told that Cuba wanted relatiens with the United States.

01/02/76 -- The United States Government has warned other countries that it objects to any nation's allowing Cuban planes to use their airfields or airspace in connection with Cuba's intervention in Angola. The Washington Post reported on January 4 that Guyana had banned Angola-bound Cuban troop planes following a U.S. request. Previously, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago ceased to permit refueling stops for Cuban planes bound for Angola.

01/01/76 -- The Washington Post reported that foreign intelligence sources in South Africa said that Cuban forces fighting alongside the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola have more than doubled in the past month and now number about 7,500.

12/23/75 -- In response to a question regarding Cuban involvement in Angola, Secretary Kissinger, at a news conference, said "We will not continue the process of normalization of relations until Cuban forces return to Cuba."

12/22/75 -- At the close of the First Party Congress, Premier Castro declared that Cuba would not renounce its policies in support of revolutionary movements in Angola and Puerto Rico for the sake of relations with the United States. He said "At that price, there shall never be any relations with the United States." Castro acknowledged that economic relations with the United States "would be useful for our country, but those relations shall never be established if it is on the basis of the renunciation of one atom of our principles."

-- Premier Fidel Castro, in an address before a million people expressing support for the decisions of the First Party Congress in the Plaza de la Revolution, demanded an apology from President Ford for the assassination attempts by the CIA. Castro made the statement in the context of his reaction to Ford's comment which related Cuba's Angolan involvement to a halt in efforts toward reconciliation with Cuba on the part of the United States. In his speech, Castro said, "We don't need them for anything." He stated, "What Ford has to do is ask pardon of the government of Cuba for the dozens of crimes against the directors of all revolutions that the CIA has committed over many years." Regarding

Angola, Castro said, "We have to establish our principles, and our ideology. With our own blood we defend--we will defend Angola and we will defend Africa."

12/21/75 -- A foreign policy document of the First Party Congress declared that Cuba "is willing to discuss the normalization of relations with the United States, something which will also contribute to a necessary international detente."

12/20/75 -- President Ford in a surprise press conference declared that Cuban involvement in Angola had seriously affected U.S. policy toward conciliation with the Castro government. The President stated, "I want it on the record, and as forceful as I can say, that the effort of the Cuban government to get Puerto Rico free and clear of the United States and to involve itself in Angola ends any efforts at all as far as I am concerned to have friendlier relations." Ford continued, "The action of the Cuban government in sending combat forces to Angola destroys any opportunity for improvement in relations with the United States. They have made a choice which in effect, and I mean it very literally, has precluded any improvement of relations with Cuba." The White House estimated that there are 4,000-6,000 troops fighting in Angola. The President made his statement a day after the Senate, by a 54 to 22 vote, blocked any further funds for CIA aid to U.S.-supported factions in Angola.

12/18/75 -- At the opening of the First Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, Fidel Castro declared that the Cuban army had "shed blood more than once in other countries threatened by imperialist aggression and had helped organize the armed forces and militia of other progressive countries." He also accused the CIA of organizing "dozens of attempts against the lives of the leaders of the Cuban revolution."

12/12/75 -- An article in the New York Times reported that a high-ranking official said there was evidence that Cuba now had "close to 5,000 men in Angola."

12/11/75 -- A dispatch in the Washington Post from Zaire reported that Western intelligence reports say that around 3000 Cubans and 400 Soviets are serving as advisers, tank and armored car crews, pilots, and occasionally as front line combatants with the Popular Movement.

12/08/75 -- According to an article in U.S. News and World Report, the Cuban military is active in eight African countries and two in the Middle East. The article reported that according to conservative estimates, there are 5,000 soldiers in the ten countries, with a combat role being assumed in Angola only. The magazine asserted that officials believe the Cuban troops are in the countries at the initiative of the Soviets.

11/27/75 -- Jack Anderson reported that an investigator, in testimony before a closed session of the Senate Internal Security Committee, charged that Cuban-trained revolutionaries are active in undermining Puerto Rico's relationship with the

United States.

11/26/75 -- In a press conference in Detroit, Secretary Kissinger said that a proposed trip to Cuba by major league baseball players had been "iminent at one point" but "is not imminent now." U.S. officials disclosed later that Cuba's involvement in Angola, its demands for Puerto Rican independence, and the Cuban vote in the United Nations equating Zionism with racism were factors in this decision, according to news reports.

11/24/75 -- An article in Sports Illustrated reported that an agreement to send a group of U.S. baseball players to Cuba in the Spring of 1976 was reached at an October meeting in Mexico City between two independent television producers, baseball commissioner Bowie Kuhn, and Cuban sports officials.

11/24/75 -- The Department of Commerce further eased trade restrictions on Cuba by issuing a new regulation which permits Western Hemisphere nations to sell goods to Cuba provided they contain less than 20 percent by value of U.S.-made parts or materials. The Commerce Department announced that the new terms comply with the July 29 OAS resolution on Cuba.

11/24/75 -- In a speech before the Economic Club of Detroit, Secretary of State Kissinger declared that Cuban involvement in Angola is damaging U.S. policy of conciliation toward the Castro Government. Mr. Kissinger said, "nor can we ignore the thousands of Cubans sent into an African conflict. In recent months the United States has demonstrated, by deed as well as word, its readiness to improve relations with Cuba. We have cooperated with steps to ease the Inter-American boycott against Cuba, and to restore a more normal relationship between the nations of the Americas and Cuba. But let there be no illusions: A policy of conciliation will not survive Cuban meddling in Puerto Rico or Cuban armed intervention in the affairs of other nations struggling to decide their own fate."

11/22/75 -- Representative Jonathan Bingham announced he has dropped "for the foreseeable future" efforts to lift the U.S. embargo against Cuba. Bingham cited a recent "pattern of disruptive and interventionist activities in various parts of the world," by the Cuban Government. He cited Cuba's "leading role in promoting" a UN resolution labeling Zionism a form of racism, its "direct military intervention" in Angola, and military training and support for Syria. In the past months, Bingham has held hearings on his bill to clear the way for renewal of trade relations with Cuba.

11/20/75 -- U.S. officials said that Cuba has sent 3,000 fighting men and advisers to Angola in support of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. The New York Times (11/24/75) reported that Soviet-supplied 122-mm ground to ground rockets, which have a range of 12 miles and have been the most important weapon keeping advancing armies of the National Front away from Luanda, are said to be fired by

Cubans.

11/20/75 -- Nearly one third of the report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence detailed eight separate plots against the life of Cuban Premier Fidel Castro conceived by CIA officials in the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. According to the report, there was no clear indication that the plots, which involved various U.S. underworld figures, Cuban exiles, and CIA agents, had been made known to U.S. Government officials outside the CIA.

11/13/75 -- In a clash in the UN's Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee, Cuban delegate Miguel Alfonso charged that the United States lacked the credibility to pass judgment on human rights situations in other countries. He was responding to an American move urging all governments to free political prisoners. U.S. delegate Clarence Mitchell charged that Castrc had conceded that Cuba had political prisoners and cited an Amnesty International report which cited Castro speaking in 1967 of 20,000 political prisoners.

11/12/75 -- United Press International, citing Popular Movement political sources, reported that about 1,200 Cuban troops had disembarked in Luanda's harbor to aid the Popular Movement. The sources said that the total number of Cubans aiding the Soviet-backed movement is now about 2,800.

11/11/75 -- In a press conference, Secretary Kissinger said that "in recent months Cuba has taken some actions...that have given us some pause." He cited Cuban support of Puerto Rican independence and activity in Angola. He added, "The United States is, in principle, prepared to improve relations on a basis of reciprocity."

11/06/75 -- The New York Times reported according to East European sources, that 200 Cuban soldiers arrived last month in Angola and are fighting alongside forces of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. (An editorial in The Nation said the Cubans first entered Angola in September. According to an article in the Times of London (Jan. 8, 1976) a captured Cuban soldier said he arrived with a group in August.)

11/05/75 -- Secretary of State Kissinger told the House International Relations Committee, for the first time, that Cuba as well as the Soviet Union was supplying aid to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

10/24/75 -- The Washington Star reported that the Ford Administration had decided to "freeze" normalization of relations with Cuba until after the 1976 elections to avoid criticism frcm conservatives and Cuban exiles.

10/19/75 -- The U.S. Department of Commerce released a study on commercial relations with Cuba which found that "the adverse effect of the [U.S.] embargo on Cuba has lessened" and the "unilateral continuation of the Cuban

embargo becomes a bit more costly to the U.S. though that economic cost is still relatively small."

09/29/75 -- Premier Castro declared that Cuba was prepared to remain "economically blockaded" by the United States indefinitely rather than give up her campaign for Puerto Rican independence. In his speech commemorating the 15th Anniversary of the establishment of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, Castro said "There can never be a betterment of relations with Cuba if it is based on the renunciation of our fundamental principles.

09/23/75 -- Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs William D. Rogers reaffirmed the United States' willingness "to improve our relations with Cuba," "to enter into a dialoque with Cuba." He stressed, however, that "the dialoque must be on a basis of reciprocity. The resolution of the problems between us will not be easy and will not be furthered by calculated offense to the other party." This last statement was interpreted as a reference to Cuba's support for Puerto Rican independence, a policy which Secretary of State Kissinger recently characterized as a a stumbling block tc normalization, as "an unfriendly act and an unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of the United States."

08/23/75 -- The Coast Guard announced that a Cuban fishing vessel seized 55 miles east of Cape Cod on August 17, for taking lobster illeqally cn the continental shelf, will be freed because the U.S. Government had decided not to press charges.

08/21/75 -- The United States relaxed the embargo on Cuba by lifting certain aspects of the ban. In a briefing to reporters, a State Department spokesman listed the specific policy changes. The U.S. Government will grant licenses for trade with Cuba to U.S. subsidiaries trading in foreign-made goods--U.S. regulations pertaining to exporting strategic goods, technology, and American-made components will still apply; no longer will the U.S. Government prohibit aid to nations permitting their ships or aircraft to carry goods to or from Cuba; the U.S. Government will take steps to modify regulations which deny docking and refueling privileges for ships engaged in trade with Cuba; Congress will be asked to change legislation which prohibits nations trading with Cuba from receiving food assistance under P.L. 480.

White House press Secretary Ron Nessen said that the action "doesn't really relate to bilateral relations with Cuba," explaining the action in terms of the decision taken by the OAS in Costa Rica last month. Nessen reiterated that the U.S. desired no "permanent antagonism" with Cuba and that "any change in our bilateral relations with Cuba will depend on Cuba's attitude."

In Havana, Premier Castro welcomed the U.S. decision to

lift certain trade restrictions as a "positive gesture" but still regarded the embargo on direct trade as "a dagger at our throat." In an apparent change of previous policy, Castro asserted that there can be "negotiation on how to negotiate." Previcusly he had held that the trade embargo would have to be ended before any negotiations could take place, although during the McGovern visit, the Cuban leader stated that he would consider negotiations if the ban were lifted on food and medicines. In response to Castro's suqqestion of possible negotiations, State Department spokesman Robert Funseth reiterated the U.S. position that "we're prepared to move on a reciprocal basis with Cuba. We have emphasized that the most useful way would be through private negotiaticns."

The parents of Boston Red Sox pitcher Luis Tiant arrived in Boston, after receiving permission from the Cuban Government to travel to the United States. Permission for exit from Cuba to see their son was requested by Senator McGovern on behalf of Senator Brooke, during McGovern's meeting with Premier Castro in May.

08/20/75 -- The United Nations Decolonization Committee decided not to act on a Cuban-sponsored resolution that would give strong support to the Puerto Rican independence movement.

08/11/75 -- President Ford applauded Cuba's decision to return the ransom money to Southern Airways but declined to say whether the action would affect U.S. policy.

08/09/75 -- The Cuban Government returned to the airline the nearly $2 million in ransom money taken from hijackers of a Southern Airways plane in 1972, after a series of exchanqes of communication between Premier Fidel Castro and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee John Sparkman. During a press conference (August 11), Senator Sparkman said the action was "very solid evidence that the Cuban Government is genuinely interested in pursuinq a policy of improved relations with the United States." Sparkman also asked the Ford Administration to respond in kind by immediately, liftinq all trade restrictions on Cuba covering food and medicine, and eventually other commodities. "It is our turn to act," Sparkman said. The return of the money was interpreted as another move by Castro to demonstrate his desire to improve relations with the United States.

07/30/75 -- A State Department spokesman declared that the United States is prepared to open "serious discussions" with Cuba on a normalization of relations. He added that the United States welccmed the OAS action which permits member States to establish trade and diplomatic relations with Cuba. The spckesman felt that it removed a "contentious issue" from Inter-American relations.

07/29/75 -- The United States, in contrast with its previous policy, voted alonq with 15 other OAS nations to end the 11-year-old

diplomatic and economic sanctions on Cuba. Voting in favor of the Mexican-proposed "freedom of action" resolution were: Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Peru, the Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Haiti, Bolivia, Guatemala, and the United States. Voting against were: Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Brazil and Nicaragua abstained. With the passage of the resolution each OAS nation is free to decide the type of relationship it desires to have with Cuba. It is expected that Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, and Honduras will resume diplomatic relations shortly. The key paragraph of the "freedom of Action" resolution says: "To leave the States parties to the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) free to normalize or conduct in accordance with the national policy and interests of each their relations with the Republic of Cuba at the level and in the form that each State deems advisable."

07/26/75 -- Following 11 days of negotiation, OAS foreign ministers, meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica, voted to amend the 1947 Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance including a provision which allows a simple majority rather than a 2/3 vote on major decisions taken under the Treaty. It is expected that this and other revisions of the Treaty will take a period of years before becoming effective because of the ratification process. Also the ministers, acting as the OAS governing Permanent Council, voted 21-3 to sit as an Organ of Consultation and deal with a resolution which would allow each nation to decide for itself whether to lift the diplomatic and economic sanctions imposed on Cuba in 1964. The 2/3 rule would apply to this vote. The United States indicated it would vote in favor of the "freedom of action" resolution.

07/11/75 -- Premier Fidel Castro asserted that he knew of plans for "maybe 40 to 60" attempts against his life by counter-revolutionary groups controlled by the Central Intelligence Agency.

07/03/75 -- Representative Charles W. Whalen Jr. who just returned from Cuba, said that he expects the United States to establish diplomatic relations with Cuba "reasonably soon." He proposed that the United States resume diplomatic relations "for our own self interests."

06/16/75 -- In response to a question, Secretary Kissinger said that Castro had recently moderated the tone of Cuban propaganda and even had taken some limited steps. He added, "...we are prepared to reciprocate Cuban moves, and we do not consider that an animosity toward Cuba is an essential aspect of our foreign policy."

06/06/75 -- Former CIA Director John A. McCone reported that both the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations sanctioned plots to kill Cuban Premier Castro. McCone, after giving secret testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, told reporters that the most serious murder plan was

stopped right after the Bay of Pigs invasion.

06/02/75 -- The U.S. Department of State reported that Cuba returned three accused hijackers to the United States by way of Barbados. The alleged hijackers were arrested at San Juan, P.R., International Airport. The U.S. Government was not informed of the Cuban decision to release the Americans.

05/31/75 -- An article in the Washington Post reported that at the end of a visit to London, Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriquez indicated that Cuba had stopped supporting querrilla movements in Latin America. He said, "the objective conditicns for armed struggle exist in many places in Latin America but the subjective conditions are not there yet."

05/30/75 -- Retired Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale declared that in late 1961 Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, acting on behalf of President Kennedy ordered him to prepare contingency plans to depose Premier Castro. The New York Times reported that Lansdale added that at no time did he receive orders from either Kennedy to plan an assassination of the Cuban leader.

05/21/75 -- Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence indicated that CIA Director William A. Colby was acknowledging CIA involvement in assissination plots against foreign leaders. Allegations of CIA involvement in assassination attempts under investigation are believed to center primarily on Castro and the late Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic.

05/13/75 -- Senator McGovern in a statement before the House Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce and the Subcommittee on International Organizations called on the Ford Administration to start at once sending medicine and food as a first unilateral step toward ending the trade embargo against Cuba. McGovern related that Castro claimed that this gesture could launch discussions toward settling some of the issues on U.S.-Cuba relations. McGovern affirmed that "The next move is clearly up to us and the ball is back in our court." McGovern noted that this was a significant change on the part of the Cuban Government because previously Castro had been insisting on the total lifting of the embargo imposed by the OAS in 1964. McGovern pointed out that there are no OAS restrictions on food and medicine to Cuba. The Senator said he would favor lifting the full embargo at once.

OAS foreign ministers agreed to call a special meeting of consultation in July in San Jose, Costa Rica, to consider lifting the embargo on Cuba.

05/10/75 -- Secretary of State Kissinger said that the United States and Latin America have reached "a general understanding" on how to end the diplomatic and economic isolation of Cuba.

05/09/75 -- Senator George McGovern, back from his visit to Cuba, said he would very strongly recommend that the United States lift its trade embargo against Cuba. Appearing on the "Today" show, he could see "no reason" why the United States would not sell wheat, rice, corn, and livestock to Cuba.

05/08/75 -- At the end of his four-day visit to Cuba, Senator McGovern revealed that he proposed to Premier Castro that exchanges of baseball and basketball teams be used to improve relations between the two countries in the same way that "Ping-Pong diplomacy" helped the United States relations with China. Senator McGovern also said he and Castro had seen eye-to-eye on giving priority to lifting the trade embargo so that other conflicts between the two countries could be solved. These include compensation for $1.8 billion in U.S. property expropriated after the 1959 Castro-led revolution and the release of nine Americans the United States regards as political prisoners in Cuba. Senator McGovern also declared that Premier Castro had promised to grant exit visas to the parents of Boston Red Sox pitcher Luis Tiant. In addition, McGovern reported that Castro said he would consider returning $2 million in ransom taken from the hijackers of a Southern Airways plane in 1972.

Castro made it clear however, that the lifting of the embargo was the essential first step to improved relations, according to McGovern.

White House Press Secretary Ron Nessen told reporters that the United States "sees no advantage in perpetual antagonism" with the Government of Cuba. Nessen added that the Cuban leader seemed to have accepted a "mutuality of obligation" in looking toward more normal relations with the United States. Mr. Nessen's statement was interpreted as an indication to Mr. Castro that the United States was monitoring his attitude toward the United States and welcomed positive steps. For the moment, however, the Ford Administration seemed determined not to take any major unilateral actions until the OAS acts.

The annual meeting of the OAS General Assembly opened in Washington without the Cuba issue on the agenda. Mexican Foreign Minister Emilio Rabasa said he would set in motion the revision of the Rio treaty under which the sanctions were invoked so that they could be lifted by a simple majority vote rather than by the present two thirds requirement. [At the November 1974 OAS meeting in Quito, the foreign ministers failed to give a two-thirds majority to a resolution which would have lifted OAS sanctions on Cuba.] Rabasa's proposal is that the foreign ministers meet in San Jose, Costa Rica in September as an organ of consultation to amend the Rio Treaty and consider the Cuba embargo. It was reported that there was widespread support for such a meeting.

05/07/75 -- Premier Castro told American newsmen covering the McGovern

trip that he was lccking for a small sign from the United States: "The United States has prohibited the export of even food and medicine to Cuba. The removal of the ban can be a small qesture...we would prefer the lifting of the entire embarqo, but we are talking about the need for a qesture." Castro said that the lifting of the restriction on medicine and food-stuffs would constitute evidence of U.S. willinqness tc neqotiate its longstanding differences with Cuba. He also said that he hoped for "friendship" with the United States. "One way or the other, we owe it to ourselves to live in peace."

05/05/75 -- Senator Georqe McGovern arrived in Havana on a four-day fact-finding visit.

05/01/75 -- Retired Air Force Cclonel L. Fletcher Prouty said that the CIA sent an assassination team to kill Castro in 1960, after he came to power.

05/00/75 -- Two hundred and thirty Cuban military advisers were sent to Anqola, where they set up four training centers for soldiers of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Anqola (MPLA). This information was disclosed January 11, 1976, in a Havana Press interview with Carlos Rafael Rodriquez, the Cuban Deputy Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs. Rodriquez said the Cuban advisers were sent at the request cf Popular Movement leader Neto when the shaky MPLA/FNLA/UNITA* coalition collapsed late last spring.

04/22/75 -- The Washinqton Post reported that last week Cuba released four U.S. prisoners beinq held in jail for smuggling marijuana. U.S. officials said it was the 3d-4th release of U.S. citizens this year.

04/21/75 -- A law professor frcm the University of Havana and three Cuban law students arrived in Washington to participate in the Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition. They were the first Cubans to visit the United States for a professional meeting in many years.

03/30/75 -- The New York Times reported that in conversations with a qroup of Canadian journalists, Castro said, "lately there has been a certain lessening of tension between the United States and Cuba. In practical terms, however, there still has not been much progress. But we consider Dr. Kissinger's recent statements on Cuba as positive. We are really not impatient about it."

03/10/75 -- Seymour Hersh, in an article in the Washington Star wrote that Adam Walensky and Peter B. Edelman, assistants to Robert F. Kennedy, told him that in 1967, CIA agents contracted with the Mafia in an aborted plot to assassinate Cuban premier Fidel Castro before the Bay of Piqs invasion in 1961. The aides said that Kennedy told them he played an active role in stopping the assassination attempt.

03/07/75 -- The OAS set May 8 for the openinq of the General Assembly

meeting to be held in Washington. The Foreign Ministers are expected to overturn the 2/3's procedural rule which prevented the lifting of sanctions on Cuba in Quito in November and thus pave the way for allowing the individual nations to decide their own policy toward Cuba.

03/06/75 -- The Governments of Colombia and Cuba announced the resumption of diplomatic relations.

03/04/75 -- The official Cuban news agency Prensa Latina indirectly acknowledged Secretary Kissinger's statement on Cuba by quoting Senator Kennedy's suggestion that the Kissinger speech was "recognition that the isolationist policy against Cuba did not prove beneficial to the interests of the United States."

03/02/75 -- In a major speech on U.S. relations with Latin America, in Houston, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said that if the OAS sanctions on Cuba were lifted "the United States will consider changes in its bilateral relations with Cuba. We see no virtue in perpetual antagonism between the United States and Cuba," Kissinger declared. He added, ". . . we are prepared to move in a new direction if Cuba will." This is the first time Kissinger or any other U.S. official has gone so far toward indicating that Washington is ready to go along with the majority of Latin American nations in ending the OAS sanctions on Cuba.

03/00/75 -- Various news sources reported revelations of alleged CIA-sponsored assassination plots against Cuban Premier Fidel Castro in the early 1960s.

02/26/75 -- In a press conference in Miami, President Ford declared "(U.S.) policy today is the same as it has been, which is that if Cuba will reevaluate and give us some indication of a change of its policy toward the United States, then we certainly would take another look, but thus far there is no sign of Mr. Castro's change of heart, and so we think it is in our best interests to continue the policies that are in effect at the present time."

02/17/75 -- The State Department confirmed that the U.S. Government had liberalized the travel restrictions placed on Cuban diplomats at the United Nations. The new rules allow the Cubans to travel 250 miles outside of New York City. The former restriction was a 25-mile radius. The relaxation of the travel restriction was one of the suggestions of Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff director Pat Holt and Senators Pell and Javits made after their respective trips to Cuba.

02/14/75 -- The U.S. Government granted a license to a Canadian subsidiary of Litton Industries for the sale of $500,000 worth of office equipment to Cuba, thus making an exception to the embargo. Earlier negative responses to the deal by the United States drew official protests from the Canadian Government.

01/30/75 -- The Latin American caucus at the United Nations encouraged and received participation from Cuba in a formal meeting of the group. This ended a decade of isolation of Cuba from the Latin American group at the U.N. Caucus chairman Jamaican Ambassador Donald Mills said there were no objections from the nations regarding Cuba's participation.

01/28/75 -- In a major foreign policy statement on the floor of the Senate, Foreign Relations Committee Chairman John Sparkman said, "Our policy of isolating Cuba has been a failure, and it is time to reexamine that policy with a view toward ending the futile economic boycott and restoring normal relations."

01/17/75 -- It was announced that West Germany and Cuba agreed to resume diplomatic relations broken in 1963. In Paris, France and Cuba signed a major pact on trade, economic, and technical cooperation.

01/13/75 -- The Washington Post reported that Senator Edward Kennedy is expected to visit Cuba for talks with Prime Minister Castro some time this year.
Two Kennedy aides were in Cuba from December 28 to January 3 and met with Castro and other Cuban officials.

01/09/75 -- During an impromptu press conference with a group of Mexican and other foreign reporters Premier Castro expressed interest in establishing contacts with the United States. He said, "We have always had some visitors from the United States, such as Congressmen, economists, workers, students, young Americans. But I can assure you that in different U.S. circles there is a growing interest in Cuba and we receive this with pleasure of course."

01/03/75 -- Prime Minister Fidel Castro said that Cuba will join the Latin American Economic System, which is expected to be formed in Caracas in the spring.

APPENDIX E

Press Release on Safeguards Against Cuban Nuclear Accident, March 19, 1977

Committee on International Relations,
Saturday, March 19, 1977.

CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY ON CUBA RELEASED/FASCELL CALLS FOR ADMINISTRATION ACTION TO INSURE SAFEGUARDS AGAINST CUBAN NUCLEAR ACCIDENT

The transcript of three days of hearings on Soviet and Cuban activities in the Western Hemisphere were released today by the Committee on International Relations.

The hearings were held in 1975-1976 by the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs chaired by Congressman Dante B. Fascell (D-Fla.) and include testimony on Cuba's new nuclear power program. Also included is testimony on:

Soviet naval activities and air reconaissance operations in the Hemisphere;
Cuban military and political activities in the Hemisphere and elsewhere;
Soviet economic and military aid to Cuba;
Cuba's role in Angola; and
Developments in various Hemisphere nations.

At the September 16, 1976 hearing, DIA analysts expressed their belief that the supply of a nuclear station to Cuba by the Soviet Union is not a prelude to a nuclear weapons program, but stated:

"An area of far greater concern is the lack of a containment building. The reactor could be modified so that higher safety standards are observed * * * modifications and refinements by Cuba would definitely increase the safety of its proposed reactor."

In response to a question by Congressman Fascell on possible radioactive contamination reaching south Florida as a result of an accident in Cuba a DIA analyst said "* * * It would depend on the extent of leakage or what the specifics of the accident were. Conceivably those areas would be subject to contamination".

In June 1976 Fascell first wrote the State Department and called attention to Cuba's nuclear program and the necessity for the U.S. to monitor Cuba's nuclear program.

Fascell has reiterated his concerns to the Carter Administration and called "for high priority attention by the Department of State to insuring that Cuba's nuclear power program meets maximum safety standards in order to protect both the people of the United States and Cuba against the danger of nuclear accidents".

The hearings released today contain testimony presented to the Subcommittee in classified briefings October 7, 1975 and September 16, 1976 and in an open hearing June 15, 1976.

Copies of the hearings entitled "Soviet Activities in Cuba—Parts VI and VII" are available from the Committee on International Relations, 2170 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20515.

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