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THE SOVIET UNION AND THE THIRD WORLD:
A WATERSHED IN GREAT POWER POLICY?

REPORT

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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WASHINGTON : 1977

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FOREWORD

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C., May 8, 1976.

This study was prepared by the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress at the request of the Committee on International Relations. The study was proposed by Hon. Larry Winn, Jr., a member of the committee.

Dr. Joseph Whelan, senior specialist in international affairs and Mr. William B. Inglee, research assistant in Soviet and East European affairs, in the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, prepared this study.

The material contained herein is the work of the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress and does not necessarily represent the views of the Committee on International Relations or its members.

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, *Chairman.*

(III)

MEMORANDUM

FOR THE RECORD

TO: THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

FROM: THE CHIEF OF STAFF

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
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Washington, D.C., May 8, 1977.

Hon. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,
*Chairman, Committee on International Relations,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.*

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: In response to your request, the Congressional Research Service has undertaken a study of the Soviet approach to the Third World. The study, entitled, "The Soviet Union and the Third World: A Watershed in Great Power Policy?", has been completed and is herewith submitted.

The purpose of the study was: To examine Soviet relations with the Third World since the Stalin era; explain the Soviet rationale for involvement; indicate the instrumentalities of Soviet policy; record current (1975-76) Soviet attitudes and activities; and finally to assess the meaning of the Soviet-Third World relationship and its possible implications for U.S. foreign policy.

Dr. Joseph G. Whelan, Senior Specialist in International Affairs, and Mr. William B. Inglee, Research Assistant in Soviet and East European Affairs, Congressional Research Service, prepared this study.

The maps, "Soviet Involvement in the Third World," and "Essential United States Foreign Trade Routes," were prepared under the direction of Mr. Robert L. Bostick, Graphic Information Specialist, Congressional Research Service. That part of the map on the Soviet presence in the Third World showing Soviet naval activity was based on unclassified information furnished by the Department of the Navy. The data on economic aid was based on unclassified information provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Sincerely,

GILBERT GUDE,
Director.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20540, 1977

Hon. Clement F. Frazier
Chairman, Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: In response to your request, the Congressional Information Service has prepared a copy of the report of the Joint Committee on International Relations, "The Soviet Union and the World: A Review of Soviet Policy," which has been completed and is being submitted to you. The purpose of the report is to provide a comprehensive review of the Soviet Union's foreign policy and its impact on the world. The report is divided into two main parts: the first part discusses the Soviet Union's foreign policy in general, and the second part discusses the Soviet Union's foreign policy in relation to the United States. The report is based on a review of the Soviet Union's foreign policy from 1945 to 1975. The report is a valuable contribution to the understanding of the Soviet Union's foreign policy and its impact on the world. It is hoped that the report will be of interest and value to you and your committee.

Very truly yours,
Clement F. Frazier

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ABSTRACT

Purpose of study:

- To examine Soviet relations with the Third World since the Stalin era;
- To explain the Soviet rationale for involvement;
- To indicate the instrumentalities of Soviet policy;
- To record current (1975-76) Soviet attitudes and activities; and
- To assess the meaning of the Soviet-Third World relationship and its possible implications for U.S. foreign policy.

Main points in study:

- Soviet interest in the Third World has its roots in the thought of Lenin who had perceived the connection between the West and its colonial empires as imperialism's "weakest link" and the source of socialism's final victory;
- Stalin failed to perceive and act upon the advantageous revolutionary implications of rising nationalism in the colonies and newly emerging states during the post-World War II period;
- Khrushchev changed this doctrinal stance and formulated new policies designed to unite the Communist world community with the emerging countries and the national liberation movements into a correlation of forces that the Soviets insisted tipped the balance of world power in their favor and against world capitalism;
- The Brezhnev successor regime built on Khrushchev's Third World policy, accepting his conceptual formulations of peaceful coexistence, but sought to avoid Khrushchev's excesses and errors by adopting a rationalistic, pragmatic, and cautious approach;
- Brezhnev had successes and failures, the most important success being that he built on Khrushchev's policy to affirm the reality of Soviet power and a Soviet global presence;
- The rationale for Soviet involvement in the Third World is based on the importance of the Third World as a major component in international politics, its possession of vital raw materials, the potential danger of great power confrontation arising from spreading regional disputes, the vital strategic sea communications along its littoral, and its role in the Soviet ideological design;
- The instrumentalities of Soviet policy are economic aid and trade, military assistance, the use of military power for political purposes, and support of Third World causes and interests;
- The Soviets have maintained their commitment in economic aid, increasing extensions sharply during the past 2 years, though signs were evident of a burden on the Soviet economy; their military assistance program is large and growing annually;

- Soviet actions during 1975-76 reveal a continued commitment to the Third World and an extension of its activities beyond the Eurasian continent and the traditional "national liberation zone" into Black Africa, suggesting the emergence of a new imperial phase in Russian history.

Meaning and implications for U.S. foreign policy:

- The Soviet Union has succeeded during the past two decades in establishing an impressive global presence encompassing much of the Third World;
- The Soviets have demonstrated a constancy of purpose in the pursuit of their Third World goals;
- Factors favoring the Soviets in the Third World are: the positive aspects of ideology, expansion of Soviet power, appeals of economic aid and military assistance, exploitable characteristics of the Third World, and the ambivalent nature of detente;
- Among the countervailing forces are: doubtful Soviet ideological assumptions; Soviet failures and limitations imposed on their activities; durable problems endemic to the Third World, and the negative aspects of "social imperialism";
- The Soviets have no assured destiny of success in the Third World, but the danger to the United States would seem to lie more in their perceptions, expectations, and a willingness to act upon them than in the realities as perceived by the outsider;
- International relations seem to be entering a new cycle of change termed "interdependence" in which the Third World is a key component, suggesting a possible watershed in great power policy toward the Third World;
- U.S. interests in the Third World derive from the necessity of preserving an acceptable international system, protecting its strategic interests (notably to maintain the principle of freedom of the seas and deny Soviet control), preventing Soviet political incrementalism in marginal areas, and maintaining a satisfactory economic relationship with the Third World upon which the United States and its allies depend for materials and resources;
- Given the realities of international life, particularly the continuing expansion of Soviet influence and power on a global scale and the Soviet approach to the Third World, a U.S. option of "selective involvement," based on criteria beyond strictly military considerations, might strike a reasonable point between the unacceptable extremes of isolationism and globalism;
- suggested criteria for U.S. policy fall into economic, military/strategic, and political/ideological categories, and that concerned with timing; namely, the extent to which the Third World country satisfies such economic needs as raw material resources, military/strategic needs as access to vital sea lanes, those political/ideological expectations relating generally to respect for democratic principles, and finally the matter of timing and setting priorities when the other criteria should be met;

- Significant assets and advantages of the United States over its Soviet competitor are the scale, diversity, and dynamics of the American economy that places it at the center of the international economic system, American leadership in science and technology, the “primacy of liberty”, and the “centrality of pluralism” which are proven forces of attraction to the Third World; and
- What the United States seems to need in its approach to the Third World is a vision of its proper role, a policy to give it structure, and a broad-based, democratic sanction of the Congress to give it strength, authority, and a consensus.

SUMMARY OF STUDY

PURPOSE AND DESIGN

This study attempts to examine the Soviet experience in the Third World since the Stalin era; explain the Soviet rationale for involvement; indicate the instrumentalities of policy; record the current (1975-76) Soviet attitude; and briefly analyze the meaning of this involvement and possible implications for U.S. foreign policy. The structure of the study is designed accordingly. Its limitations derive from the magnitude of the Third World, the diversity of Soviet policy, and the timespan of three decades. At best the study seeks only to suggest the main thrust and broad lines of Soviet policy and activity in the Third World, concentrating mainly on the "national liberation zone" of Asia and Africa.

THIRD WORLD IN SOVIET PERSPECTIVE

Soviet interest in the Third World has its roots in the thought of Lenin who long ago had perceived the connection between the West and its colonial empires as imperialism's "weakest link" and the source of socialism's final victory. But the fledgling Soviet state, beset by problems of building socialism within the Soviet Union and coping with the "capitalist encirclement", lacked the resources, the power, and the opportunity to exploit this weakness.

Stalin did not take a creative approach to the Third World. He distrusted any alliance with the national bourgeoisie; that is, the indigenous national leadership within the Third World. And in the post-World War II period he failed to perceive the revolutionary implications of the rising spirit of nationalism in the colonies and the newly independent nations emerging from the collapsing Western imperial systems. Seeing the alinement of world forces from only a manichean view sharply drawn along antagonistic Communist and capitalist lines, Stalin dogmatically ruled out any alliance with the liberation movements in the Third World. The result was cold war with the West, revolutionary radicalism on all fronts, and eventually a Soviet Union isolated from the main currents of international life.

Not until Khrushchev's rise to power was this doctrinal stance changed and a new formulation devised with policies adopted accordingly that would unite the Communist world community—or socialist community as the Soviets prefer—with the emerging LDC's and national liberation movements into a new and enduring correlation of forces that the Soviets insist has tipped the balance of world power against world capitalism and to the advantage of world socialism. Within this new ideological construct, peaceful coexistence was assured, and the way was cleared for a radical shift in Soviet policy. Khrushchev now openly courted the Third World; the national bourgeoisie was accepted as allies and their states as national demo-

cratic states; and Soviet policy moved from the stance of isolationist continentalism to interventionist globalism.

Khrushchev's approach to the Third World was characterized by political opportunism, adventurism, excessive propaganda, and exaggerated optimism. Soviet activity was concentrated in South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and to a lesser extent Africa. The main instrument of political action was economic and military assistance. The results were a mixture of successes and failures. The Soviet Union established a strong global presence, extending from Cuba to Indonesia. The connection with the Third World was firmly established. The Soviet image was changed in the Third World and its prestige enhanced globally. The Soviet Union was able to penetrate the LDC's with men, material, and ideas and accordingly impinged on what had once been a Western preserve. Soviet support for the nationalist movements in many LDC's had paid off, leading to a further weakening or elimination of Western economic and political influence in many areas.

But Khrushchev's failures appeared to cancel out, or at least balance off, some of his successes. His approach to the Third World was oversimplified, overoptimistic, and oversold. The primacy of politics and ideology over economics led to serious errors in judgment. The decline of Western influence was not always matched by the equivalent rise in that of the Soviet Union, for Third World nationalism was inner directed and only incidentally pro-Soviet. Only a minimal impact on indigenous Communist parties and of ideology was perceptible. Finally, many of the leftist regimes upon which Khrushchev depended lacked staying power. Brezhnev was to reap the whirlwind. In brief, Khrushchev had serious failures in the Third World, and these failures were partly responsible for his removal from power.

In contrast, the approach of the Brezhnev successor regime to the Third World was highly rationalistic, realistic, pragmatic, and cautious. Priorities were reversed: economics took precedence over politics; ideology took a back seat to economic rationalism. In ideology, Brezhnev did not abandon Khrushchev's conceptual formulations; he retained them as part of the ideological infrastructure of peaceful co-existence but changed their function to suit his pragmatic approach. Priorities and expectations were lowered and interest declined as the primary focus of Soviet concerns shifted increasingly to problems involving the West and China. Still, the essential commitment remained intact. Economic and military aid were concentrated in the "national liberation zone"; Africa became secondary in Soviet considerations.

Brezhnev's Third World policy yielded costs and benefits. He lost when a series of Soviet supported leaders in Africa and Asia were overthrown. Expulsion from Egypt in mid-1972 was a particularly serious blow to Soviet prestige and to its position in the Middle East. But Brezhnev accrued such benefits for the Soviet Union as affirming the Soviet presence in the Third World; introducing Soviet power in the Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, and Indian Ocean; successfully extending Soviet influence in the northern tier states of Iran and Turkey; and establishing a predominant Soviet influence in South Asia. Economic arrangements made with the Third World (e.g., joint projects) also reinforced the Soviet connection with the Third World and assured economic benefits for the Soviet Union.

A balance of costs and benefits during the decade-long Brezhnev regime (1964-74) may be difficult to strike, but one overarching generalization can be made; and it is that Brezhnev had built on Khrushchev's policy to affirm the reality of Soviet power and a global Soviet presence.

RATIONALE FOR SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD

While the rationale for Soviet involvement in the Third World has an ideological, political, economic and strategic dimension, the first consideration is the importance of the Third World as a component of international politics today. The size, population, land area give the Third World the physical dimensions of a new center of international power and influence. By possessing raw material resources vital to the progress of the industrialized nations and by having the will to organize and use economic leverage for political as well as economic purposes, the leaders of the Third World have drawn attention to the importance of their new power center in this era of interdependence. The instability of the Third World has drawn great powers into regional disputes, risking confrontations sometimes of grave magnitude. The existence of vital strategic sea communications along its littoral has generated great power involvement. And growing military capabilities of the Third World have limited great power freedom of action. Contemporary history has shown that developments in the Third World have contributed to the rise and fall in the prestige, power, and influence of great powers, invariably affecting their standing in world affairs. In brief, the Third World cannot be ignored; nor has it been ignored by the Soviet Union which has looked upon it as a vital component in the correlation of world forces and an integral part of the Soviet ideological design of the world as seen from Moscow.

The Soviet Union has reckoned with this new power reality for reasons that are rooted in its political, economic, ideological, and strategic interests. For the Soviets, the Third World is an integral part of their ideological design of the world as they now perceive it and as they theoretically expect it to be with the unfolding of history; it is a vital component in the correlation of world forces that in the Soviet view implies a shift in the balance of world power in their favor. The Third World presents them, moreover, with political opportunities to achieve the goals of this design and to fulfill their historical expectations; for it has become the instrumentality for expanding and globalizing Soviet influence and power, and for reducing or denying that of the United States, the West, and Communist China.

Economically, the Third World serves as a market for Soviet economic goods, military weapons, supplies and equipment; a source of raw materials; and an opportunity for economic integration to the Soviet advantage.

In the political and ideological realm the Soviet Union puts itself forward as an appealing model for development and progress toward modernity, and pursues a carefully designed political and propaganda campaign to win over the friendship and loyalty of the Third World.

The pursuit of a globalist policy imposes on the Soviets the imperative need to control strategic areas in the Third World. Accordingly, Soviet aid and political energies have been directed toward expanding

Soviet influence and power in the "national liberation zone" of Asia and Africa.

For many reasons, therefore, the Third World is important in Soviet foreign policy. Each element—political, economic, ideological, and strategic—relates to the other to form an integrated whole. The composite suggests one transcending idea; namely, a surge toward globalism.

INSTRUMENTALITIES OF SOVIET POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD

The Soviet Union has employed various instruments in pursuing its goals in the Third World: economic aid and trade; military assistance and the use of military power for political purposes; and policies and political actions designed to support Third World causes and interests while simultaneously serving those of the Soviet Union. The foremost instruments are economic aid, trade, and military assistance. They provide the initial point of penetration for the expanding arch of Soviet influence and power.

The Soviet economic aid program has distinctive features: it is generally given to strategically located border nations and those within the "national liberation zone"; it is generally in the form of highly visible industrial projects; it is almost always tied to the purchase of Soviet equipment; it is invariably allocated to the state sector; it is almost never dispensed through multilateral institutions; very little is given in the form of outright grants; and extensive credits are offered for financing economic aid. The Soviets also provide technical assistance in the form of technicians and training of Third World personnel in their own countries or the Soviet Union. This aspect of the program enables the Soviets to maintain a substantial presence in the Third World.

Soviet trade with the LDC's, though growing, is small by comparison with that carried on between the LDC's and the West. For the Soviets, trade is an important instrument of their Third World policy; it strengthens the Soviet-Third World connection, while reducing that of the West; and it is designed to serve Soviet economic needs as well as those of the Third World. Among the main features of Soviet-Third World trade are the following: it is carried on largely with nations in the "national liberation zone" of the Middle East and Southeast Asia; Soviet industrial and technological goods are exported in return for Third World resources and semifinished goods; a large portion of Soviet exports is in the form of military materials; trade arrangements are generally bilateral and long term; and trade and aid are closely related.

The Soviet Union's military aid program is large; it is growing yearly; and the Soviet commitment remains strong. Despite setbacks, it is viewed as one of the most successful and durable instruments in Soviet policy toward the Third World. There have been costs. Supposed Soviet gains have often proven ephemeral. And as the size of the Soviet military aid program has grown, so has the economic burden. Finally, the growing presence of both Soviet material and personnel in the Third World, often in highly volatile areas, has greatly increased the chances of Soviet entanglement in regional conflicts involving one or more of its recipient nations. Thus the Soviet

leadership has had to assess carefully its military aid program, taking into account its relations with the West, the Chinese factor, its larger global interests, and finally, balancing returns against costs. Apparently, the assessment has been favorable, for the Soviet military aid program remains an active and dynamic component of the Soviet Union's Third World policy.

In the political sphere the Soviet Union, through various devices, has been able to establish a mutually identifiable connection with the Third World, its causes and interests, and conversely has been able to turn this connection to advantage in its struggle against the West and the Chinese. Through the development of its navy, the Soviet Union has been able to use its sea power as an effective arm of diplomacy in attaining political goals. Finally, in cultural diplomacy the Soviets have found an important instrumentality for expanding the beachhead of their influence and power in the Third World.

In brief, the Soviet Union has utilized many instruments in pursuing its goals in the Third World, and it has done so with apparent vigor and constancy, determination and imagination.

BREZHNEV AND THE THIRD WORLD, 1975-76: A CURRENT ASSESSMENT

The real world of the mid-1970's, as generally perceived by the West, is one of diversity, complexity, uncertainty, insecurity, and interdependence. East-West issues are giving way to North-South issues, as limits on the exercise of power and the requirements of security in the nuclear age, and as international economic problems increasingly coming to the fore, impose on the superpowers and lesser powers an awareness of other problems in other places from which they cannot escape.

Through the distorted prism of Marxism-Leninism, the world, as the Soviets perceive it, is remarkably different from the Western view: it is more orderly, more purposeful, more directed. Symbiotically linked to the Third World and to the forces of national liberation, this socialist world follows an assured destiny prescribed by history leading to the triumph of socialism. In the present era of the "general crisis of capitalism," the balance of forces favors socialism. Realistically, this view, while recognizing that history is on its side, nonetheless, insists on action, "struggle", and the "conquest of power" in the pursuit of its goals. Accordingly, it utilizes the advantages of the scientific and technological revolution; values the preeminence of military power in achieving ultimate goals; and allows for intervention into the national liberation zone to insure socialism's success, as in the case of the Soviet Union's bold and aggressive behavior in Angola. Détente with the United States and the West is the centerpiece of this view, but construed in a way that does not impede the pursuit of revolutionary goals in the Third World.

The Soviet worldview in the mid-1970's is thus a mixture of unsubstantiated utopian expectations and a reality that contrasts sharply with that of the West. In this worldview the Third World is featured prominently. As Brezhnev's speech at the 25th Party Congress and recent Soviet activity indicates, the Third World remains a prime target of Soviet foreign policy for the 1970's. Consolidation of relations with India; penetration of the Philippines; expansion of

Soviet influence in southern Africa, notably by the use of military power; the pursuit of long established strategic designs as in the case of the Indian Ocean; the successful use of the navy as a means for establishing a global Soviet presence; the effective and extended use of aid and trade as instruments for expanding Soviet influence, particularly in the "national liberation zone" and other targets of opportunity as in Latin America; thwarting and contesting American and Chinese power wherever their presence is felt as in Angola and Mozambique, respectively—all are part of the continuing commitment to revolutionary activism, carefully orchestrated to suit the needs of time and place, but directed toward long-range ideological goals. The dispute with China may impede the advance, but presumably it is regarded only as a momentary aberration that does not impair the vision of fulfillment in the future.

Yet, there are flaws in this Soviet worldview and the most significant is the assumption that it is possible to pursue a policy of peaceful accommodation with the United States and the West, while simultaneously adhering to, advocating, and indeed carrying out a policy of revolution and intervention in the Third World. This is a contradiction in policy and the use of power that, however much may be glossed over with casuistic argument, objectively could invite risks of super-power confrontation and possibly even war. Such were the essential ingredients in the Angolan civil war late in 1975. The potentiality remains; for the contradiction is still unresolved.

Other flaws in the Soviet position have become more visible as international interest has shifted from East-West to North-South issues. The launching of the "new international economic order" by Third World countries, with emphasis on "equal responsibility" of all advanced industrial nations for its poverty and its recovery, provoked Soviet opposition and exposed another contradiction: the Soviets want the ideological and political connection with the Third World as an imperative of doctrine and world power, but not the responsibility for seeking equity and justice for the Third World's share in the benefits of the world economy.

Undeterred by such contradictions and other expressed displeasures by the Third World, the Soviets continue on their course of globalism, holding their sights firmly set on targets in the Third World and using multiple instrumentalities for achieving their goals with calculation, vigor, and notable effect. Soviet activity has now extended beyond the Eurasian continent and the traditional "national liberation zone" into Black Africa, suggesting the emergence of a new imperial phase in Russian history. Risks are apparent in the pursuit of an expansionary policy that seeks to reconcile the requirements of détente in the West with the ideological imperative of revolutionary action in the Third World. Within this persisting, unresolved contradiction lay the seeds of potential confrontation and conflict.

SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD: ITS MEANING AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

At the outset of this study a series of basic questions were asked pertaining to the Soviet experience in the Third World, the rationale for such involvement, the instrumentalities of Soviet policy, the current

attitude of the Brezhnev regime, and its meaning and implications for U.S. foreign policy. The responses to the first four of these questions, as this summary indicates, provided the structure and essence of the study along with the underpinnings for the initial judgment that the Soviet Union "maintains a firm and active commitment to the developing nations of the Third World, and that the Third World holds an important, perhaps even vital, place in the Soviet worldview of international relations today."

That the Soviet Union has succeeded during the past two decades in establishing an impressive global presence embracing much of the Third World is perhaps the most significant generalization that emerges from this study. The constancy of the Soviet commitment to the Third World is another significant point the study suggests.

Certain factors seem to favor the Soviets in pursuit of their Third World goals. Briefly, they relate to positive aspects of ideology, expansion of Soviet power, appeals of economic aid and military assistance, exploitable characteristics of the Third World, and the ambivalent nature of detente.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that countervailing forces are not working against Soviet purposes in the Third World. There are; and they arise from such matters as: doubtful Soviet ideological assumptions; Soviet failures and limitations imposed on their activities; durable problems endemic to the Third World; and the negative aspects of "Social imperialism"—a pejorative term Peking uses to describe the expansionist Soviet policy in the Third World.

The Soviet Union has no assured destiny of success in its approach to the Third World. Still, the Soviet Union has its own perception of reality; its own design of national and international life; its own principles and beliefs for organizing society to achieve its purposes. It is perhaps more in these perceptions and expectations than in the realities as perceived by the outsider wherein lies the danger in the future for the United States. For the expanding global presence of Soviet power and the undiminished fervor of its commitment to establish a new international system constitute a challenge of the first order to U.S. national interests and to the democratic principles, values, and beliefs that are rooted in its own national history.

The Soviet approach to the Third World has fundamental implications for U.S. foreign policy: it compels Americans to define anew their role in the world; to reassess the value of the Third World in U.S. national interest; and to formulate a national policy toward the Third World to achieve those interests, a policy directed at the Third World as a whole rather than just the Soviet component.

The United States faces a politically multipolar and economically interdependent world which, except for southern Africa, has become remarkably stabilized. The United States faces this world still caught up in the mood of withdrawal from excessive global commitments generated by defeat in Vietnam. Secretary Kissinger perceived the Third World as a component of regional power in the larger context of a balance of global power between the Soviet Union and the United States. He stressed the necessity of maintaining regional balances so that the larger global balance might be preserved. The Congress, when faced with a test, could not be persuaded that American interests were being served by intervening in Angola to preserve the regional balance

of power in that quarter. Thus the transcending issue on the limits of U.S. involvement abroad in order to checkmate expanding Soviet global influence and power, especially in the Third World, remains unresolved and has been carried over to the Carter administration.

It is expected that under the Carter administration Kissinger's balance of power approach to diplomacy would be deemphasized and a new concept called "trilateralism" become one of the most important components of its foreign policy. The Kissinger style of 19th century classical European diplomacy with its stress on elitism, secrecy, and manipulation was expected to give way to a more open, moralistic, democratic diplomacy in the Wilsonian tradition.


The Soviet approach to the Third World would appear to raise three basic problems for U.S. foreign policy: the problem of defining U.S. national interests in the Third World; the problem of Soviet incrementalism; and the problem of interdependence. The United States has national interests in the Third World that derive from the necessity of: preserving an acceptable international system in which the Third World must necessarily be a considerable part; protecting its strategic interests, notably maintaining the principle of freedom of the seas and denying Soviet control; preventing Soviet incrementalism, that is, an unacceptable accretion of Soviet power in a given area, from eroding the perception and reality of American power abroad because losses in marginal areas of the Third World could have adverse consequences nearer the heart of the Soviet-American rivalry; and maintaining a satisfactory economic relationship with the Third World upon which the United States and its allies depend for materials and resources, for example, oil.

Certain realities seem evident in considering the parameters of U.S. policy and the limits of involvement, particularly in the Third World—for example, the continued expansion of Soviet influence and power on a global scale. Given these realities, isolationism, or even "selective isolationism", and globalism do not seem to be viable policy options. The option of "selective involvement" might strike a reasonable point between the two extremes.

Essential criteria for a U.S. policy in the Third World would appear to fall into economic, military/strategic, and political/ideological categories, and that concerned with timing. A determination would have to be made on the extent to which the Third World country satisfies such economic needs as raw material resources, military/strategic needs as access to vital sea lanes, those political/ideological expectations relating generally to respect for democratic principles, and finally the matter of timing and setting priorities when the other criteria should be met.

Whatever the design of policy, the United States approaches the Third World with significant assets and advantages over its Soviet competitor, among which are: the scale, diversity, and dynamics of the American economy which places the United States at the center of the international economic system; American leadership in science and technology, so vital for the economic development the Third World is striving for; and the "primacy of liberty" and the "centrality of pluralism," forces of substantial attraction to the Third World.

What the United States seems to need in its approach to the Third World is a vision of its proper role, a policy to give it structure, and a broad-based, democratic sanction of the Congress to give it strength and authority. In general, the best instincts of this country and basic national interests would seem to require it to play a larger, creative role in the community of nations, particularly among those less economically advantaged. Determining the degree to which the United States will continue to "stimulate change" and to play the role of a "globally creative and innovative society"—that is, the limits of policy and involvement abroad—would seem to be a task of considerable importance as this Nation enters its third century.



I. PURPOSE, DESIGN AND LIMITATIONS OF STUDY¹

A. SOVIET COMMITMENT TO THE THIRD WORLD: AN APPRAISAL AT MID-1970's

On January 27, 1976, the Department of State released a study prepared by its Bureau of Intelligence and Research entitled, "Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1974."²

The study pointed out that,

—During the two decades from 1954-74, the Soviet Union extended \$9,610 million in economic credits and grants and \$12,010 million in military assistance to the less developed countries (LDC's);³

—Since 1956, nearly 65,700 students have gone to Communist countries, mostly to the Soviet Union, for academic study, and to date nearly 32,000 LDC nationals have taken technical instruction in Communist countries, notably the Soviet Union;⁴ and

—The Soviet Union helped construct 90 educational establishments in North Africa and the Arab Middle East, 68 of which were operational by the end of 1974, mainly in Egypt, Algeria, and Iraq, and provided training for 130,000 students.⁵

In the main report to the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on February 24, 1976, General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev said:

Comrades, in the period under review [1971-1975] the ties between the Soviet Union and the countries which have liberated themselves from colonial dependence, or developing countries, have expanded and become more lasting. It is especially important that the political content of our ties has become richer. * * *

Our party is rendering and will render support to peoples who are fighting for their freedom. The Soviet Union is not looking for any benefits for itself, is not hunting for concessions, is not trying to gain political supremacy and is not seeking any military bases. We are acting as our revolutionary conscience and our communist convictions permit us. * * *

Glancing at the world today, one cannot fail to notice such an important factor as the appreciably increased influence of those states which only recently were either colonies or semicolonies. With mounting energy they defend, in confrontation with imperialism, their political and economic rights in an effort to consolidate independence and raise the level of their social, economic and cultural development. * * *

From the rostrum of our congress we emphasize once again that the Soviet Union fully supports the lawful aspirations of the emerging states, their deter-

¹ The authors wish to acknowledge and express their gratitude to the following CRS staff who reviewed the study and made numerous constructive suggestions: Dr. John P. Hardt, Senior Specialist in Soviet Economics; George D. Holliday, Analyst in International Economics, Economics Division; and Francis T. Miko, Analyst in International Relations, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division.

² U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1974. Washington, Jan. 27, 1976, 20 pp. (Report No. 298, unclassified). (Hereafter cited as "Department of State, Communist Aid and Trade to LDC's in 1974.")

³ Ibid., p. 13.

⁴ Ibid., p. 10.

⁵ Ibid., p. 11.

mination to rid themselves completely of imperialist exploitation and to manage their national resources themselves.⁶

During the Nairobi meeting of the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD IV) in June 1976, Jamaican delegate Herbert Walker told Soviet journalists: "Socialist countries are the traditional and natural allies of the developing countries. They have given us plenty of support at this session too."⁷

At the close of the 29th U.N. General Assembly in September 1974, Permanent Representative of India to the U.N. Rikhi Jaipal remarked: "The activities of the Soviet delegation at the session showed once again the Soviet Union deeply understands and shares the aspirations of the Third World."⁸

These four factual statements are appraisals of Soviet-Third World relations at the mid-1970's. They sum up the essence of this study; namely, that the Soviet Union maintains a firm and active commitment to the developing nations of the Third World, and that the Third World holds an important, perhaps even vital, place in the Soviet worldview of international relations today.⁹

B. FRAME OF REFERENCE

1. PURPOSE AND DESIGN OF STUDY

The main purpose of this study is to provide the underpinning for this judgment which rests upon response to the following five basic questions:

- (1) What are the trends of the Soviet experience in the Third World?
- (2) What has been the rationale for Soviet involvement in the Third World?
- (3) What have been the instrumentalities of policy?
- (4) What is the current attitude (1975-76) of the Brezhnev regime towards the Third World?
- (5) What is the meaning of Soviet involvement in the Third World and what are the implications for U.S. foreign policy?

The structure of the study takes on the design suggested by these questions. A general overview of the Soviet experience in the Third World since the end of World War II from Stalin to Brezhnev is given,

⁶ Brezhnev, Leonid. Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Party's Immediate Tasks in Domestic and Foreign Policy. Moscow Domestic Service, Feb. 24, 1976, in, FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress, vol. 1, vol. 3, No. 38, Supp. 16, Feb. 25, 1976, pp. 11-13. By and large the translated material used in this study is taken from the Daily Reports for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe published by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.

⁷ Asoyan, B. and G. Skobelev. The Conference Is Over, the Struggle Continues. New Times (Moscow), No. 24, June 1976, p. 24.

⁸ Quoted in, Moynihan, Daniel P. The United States in Opposition. Commentary, vol. 59, March 1975, p. 35.

⁹ Dr. Roger E. Kanet, a specialist on Soviet-Third World relations, underscored the importance of the Third World to Soviet policymakers today when he wrote: "In 1953, after the death of Stalin, Soviet contacts with the developing world were virtually nonexistent, while in 1974 the Soviet Union maintained relations with virtually all countries in the third world and, in areas close to Soviet borders, played an extremely important role." (Kanet, Roger E. The Soviet Union and the Developing Countries: Policy or Policies? In, Roger E. Kanet and Donna Bahry, eds. International Slavic Conference, 1st., Banff, Alberta, Canada, 1974. Soviet Economic and Political Relations with the Developing World. New York, Praeger, 1974, p. 19. Hereafter cited as, Kanet/Bahry, Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations.)

Probably Brezhnev best described the global aspect of Soviet foreign policy when he told the 25th Party Congress: "Comrades, the activity of our party in the international arena is extraordinarily widespread and varied. There is probably no spot on earth where the state of affairs has not been taken into account in one way or another in the formulation of our foreign policy." (Brezhnev, Report to 25th Congress of the CPSU, p. 7.)

stressing the changing attitudes and policies, the direction of interest, and in a very general way assessments of successes and failures.

An effort is made to explain the "whys" of Soviet involvement in the Third World, emphasizing the importance of the Third World in international relations, the ideological dimension of Soviet involvement, the political and economic dimension, and finally the strategic aspects.

The study examines various instrumentalities used by the Soviets in dealing with the Third World, notably, the economic, the military, and the political.

An effort is made to get a reasonably current reading (1975-76) on Soviet involvement in the Third World, noting particularly, the character of involvement, recent policy declarations, analyses by Soviet writers, and the possible implications of the Angolan intervention, the Nairobi Conference of UNCTAD IV, and the August Colombo Conference of Third World nations.

The study concludes with a brief analysis of the meaning of Soviet involvement in the Third World and possible implications of this matter for current U.S. foreign policy. A major problem facing the United States appears to be the nature of its response to what is perceived to be a reassertion of a global Soviet policy at a time when this Nation is still caught up in the post-Vietnam mood of neo-isolationism. Another relevant problem concerns the U.S. approach to interdependence and the prospects of this concept as a viable link between America and the Third World.

2. LIMITATIONS OF STUDY

a. Magnitude of Third World

A study of this nature has great limitations, the most important being the sheer magnitude of the Third World. It is tricontinental; indeed, viewing the Third World from the North-South perspective, it seems almost global. For, excluding the developed world of the United States and Canada, Western Europe, Australia, and Japan, along with the Communist countries, the Third World comprises most of Asia, Oceania, and Latin America, and of Africa. In the last 35 years the number of nations in the world community have more than doubled from a total of 70 in 1939 to 157 by 1976; the greatest concentration of newly independent nations lay in the Third World.¹⁰

b. Diversity of Soviet policy

Diversity of Soviet policy towards the Third World imposes another limitation. Soviet policymakers did not develop a single uniform policy towards the LDC's. Rather they have increasingly diversified their policies and activities, focusing on specific geographical regions and countries, stressing, for example, relations with the Middle East and South Asia where their economic and defense interests are far more important than areas more remote from the Soviet border.¹¹ The main area of Soviet interests can, perhaps, be perceived in the form of a

¹⁰ U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Status of the World's Nations. Geographic Bulletin. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 1. (Publication 8735).

¹¹ Kanet, The Soviet Union and the Developing Countries: Policy or Policies? In Kanet/Bahry, eds. Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations, p. 10.

politically and militarily fertile crescent, extending from North Africa along the periphery of the Soviet Union through the Middle East to South and Southeast Asia. This area has been termed the "national liberation zone."

c. Timespan of three decades

Finally, the timespan of some three decades within which historical events of great magnitude and complexity occurred imposes limitations that are readily apparent.

d. Objective: Present main thrust of Soviet policy

Given such limitations perhaps the most that a brief study of this nature can hope to accomplish is to suggest the main thrust and broad lines of Soviet policy and activity in the Third World, illuminating these lines where possible with selected illustrative data. At most only the Soviet approach to the Third World can be shown and then only in a very general way. Judgments on recent Soviet involvement must necessarily be tentative.¹² The study focuses entirely on countries within the "national liberation zone" of Asia and Africa, the principal geographic area of Soviet activity in the Third World.

3. DEFINITION OF TERMS

The terms "developing countries," "emerging countries," "less developed countries," and "Third World countries," are used interchangeably in this study. By and large they are to be construed as meaning the definition given to "developing countries" (LDC's) in the State Department's report, "Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1974"—though excluding their reference to Malta, Spain, and Portugal in Europe. According to this definition, "developing countries" refer to non-Communist countries and specifically includes the following: all countries of Africa except the Republic of South Africa; all countries in East Asia except Japan; all countries in Latin America except Cuba; and all countries in the Middle East and South Asia.¹³ No attempt has been made in this study to differentiate the degrees of development among the Third World countries. All are considered collectively as part of a chain of development extending from fairly primitive societies to those that are well advanced but not sufficiently to qualify as a developed country.

In assessing Soviet successes and failures, judgments were based strictly upon the above criteria for countries of the Third World. However, it should be remembered that the successful spread of communism since World War II into China, North Korea, Eastern Europe, Cuba, and Indochina has been extraordinary and understandably a continuing source of satisfaction for the Soviet Union. Many of these areas would normally fall in the economic category of developing countries.

¹² Dr. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, a specialist on Soviet affairs, concludes an anthology on Soviet and Chinese influence in the Third World with a statement on the deficiencies in the study of this problem and urges that in-depth case studies be undertaken. (Rubinstein, Alvin Z. *Observations*. In Alvin Z. Rubinstein, ed. *Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World*. New York, Praeger, 1975, ch. 10, p. 224. Hereafter cited as, Rubinstein, ed., *Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World*.)

¹³ Department of State, *Communist Aid and Trade to LDC's in 1974*, p. iii.

While acknowledging these successes, it should also be remembered that they were achieved by military conquest and that subsequently the Soviet Union suffered serious failures, even within this Communist world, with the defection of Yugoslavia (1948), revolution in Hungary (1956), the split with China in the early 1960's, followed by the defection of Albania, and the military invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 to maintain control. These failures were monumental; they have had a profound and enduring effect on the contemporary international scene and particularly the irrepressible dispute with China has had continuous and serious repercussions in the Third World.

Generally Communist literature users the term "socialism" to include not only the Communist countries but also Socialist oriented governments of the Third World and the so-called "forces of national liberation." Where possible in this study a distinction is made between the clearly Communist countries as in the case of the Soviet Union and Socialist oriented Third World countries like Burma, Algeria, Guinea, and Somalia. Use of the term "capitalist" (for example, to describe the United States and its Western allies) generally and collectively refers in Communist terminology to the non-Communist and non-Socialist oriented countries of the Third World.

II. THE THIRD WORLD IN SOVIET PERSPECTIVE

A. REJECTION DURING POSTWAR STALINIST YEARS

1. ROOTS OF SOVIET INTEREST IN THE THIRD WORLD

Soviet interest in the Third World has its roots in the thought of Lenin. Politically sensitive to the potentialities of what he termed the "revolutionary and nationalistic East," Lenin perceived that it was here where the great historical struggle would take place between the forces of communism and imperialism; that is to say, capitalism. Revolution in the colonial empires of the East against the "counter-revolutionary and imperialist West," Lenin insisted, would undermine the West's economic and military power and promote socialist revolution in the "weakest link" of the imperialist system. The October Bolshevik Revolution was to be the revolutionary model.¹

Accordingly, at the Second Congress of the Communist International in July 1920 Lenin urged his followers that "all Communist parties must give active support to the revolutionary movements of liberation" carried on by the national bourgeoisie. Lenin's views were accepted by the Communist movement.²

Other Soviet leaders in this early period voiced Lenin's views on the "revolutionary East." Stalin saw the Bolshevik Revolution as "the first revolution in the history of the world to break the age-long sleep of the oppressed peoples of the East and to draw them into the fight against world imperialism."³

But the Soviet Union lacked the resources to utilize the potential revolutionary energy emanating from the Third World. Occasional efforts were made, as at the Congress of the Peoples of the East in Baku (1920). On this occasion Gregory Zinoviev, head of the Communist International, summoned "the peoples of the East * * * to a Holy War first of all against British Imperialism," and military and economic assistance was extended to potential anti-Western nationalist leaders such as Kemal Ataturk in Turkey.⁴

The world revolutionary tide was, however, receding by the early 1920's, and the Soviet leaders became far too involved in problems of survival to pay much attention to the Third World.

Though failing to revolutionize Europe, the first objective of the young Soviet state, and lacking the resources to take full advantage of developments in the "revolutionary East," Lenin still did not lose faith in the potentialities for revolution in the colonial areas and the political gains that the Soviet Union could eventually reap. In his last article before his death in 1924 Lenin left this prophecy for future Soviet leaders:

¹ Schwartz, Morton. *The U.S.S.R. and Leftist Regimes in Less Developed Countries*. Survey, vol. 19, spring 1973: 210.

² Kanet, Roger E. *The Soviet Union and the Colonial Question, 1917-1953*. In, Rober E. Kanet, ed. *The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations*. Baltimore, Md., the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974, ch. 1, p. 3.

³ Quoted in, Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 210-211.

⁴ Ibid., p. 211.

In the last analysis, the outcome of the struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, India, China, and so forth, account for the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe. And it is precisely this majority that, during the past few years, has been drawn into the struggle for emancipation with extraordinary rapidity, so that in this respect there cannot be the slightest shadow of a doubt concerning the final victory of socialism which is fully and absolutely assured.⁵

2. STALIN'S HOSTILITY TOWARDS THE THIRD WORLD IN THE POSTWAR ERA

Stalin rejected any alliance with the national bourgeoisie in the Third World. He did this despite Lenin's linkage of the assured future of communism with the destiny of the liberated colonies and notwithstanding his own earlier avowals of this connection. Ironically, this doctrinaire stance was taken at a time of potentially great opportunity in the Third World. World War II had brought about the collapse of the Western imperial systems in Asia and Africa, and in the course of time newly independent nations, imbued with an intense anti-colonial and anti-Western spirit, emerged from the ruins. Stalin failed to recognize the revolutionary implications of this development.

Viewing the outer world of international politics through the prism of Zhdanov's manichean two-camp thesis, Stalin perceived the alinement of world forces along sharply delineated Communist and capitalist lines. The emerging nations and their nationalist leaders, however much their interests may have coincided with that of the Soviet Union, were looked upon as allies of the capitalist camp. Real salvation, it was held, could only come about through Communist revolution. As Soviet theorist Ivan Potekhin outlined Stalin's theory of colonial revolution in 1950: "Stalin's theory of colonial revolution proceeds from the fact that the solution of the colonial question, the liberation of oppressed peoples from colonial slavery, is impossible without a proletarian revolution and the overthrow of imperialism."⁶

Accordingly, instead of extending support to the newly independent states, recognizing their new governments and attempting to reach agreements with them based on a common hostility towards the West—in brief instead of taking full advantage of the surging nationalism within the Third World, Stalin rejected these forces and renewed the Soviet drive for world revolution, creating cold war conditions internationally and bipolarity in East-West relations. Waves of Communist inspired insurrections erupted in territories still under colonial rule, as in Indochina and Malaysia, and also under the governance of nationalist regimes, as in the case of Burma and Indonesia.⁷

This rigidly doctrinaire anti-Third-World stance clearly worked against Soviet interests: it was out-of-joint with the objective realities of the times; it proved to be counterproductive. In Indonesia, a textbook illustration of Soviet failure to capitalize effectively on radical nationalism and on the policies of the "revolutionary democrats" in the Third World, Stalin's policies had little or no success and hardly benefited the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). These aggressive revolutionary policies weakened the PKI, sowed general distrust, if not hostility among government officials and the people, and alienated those nationalist forces which later would join with the PKI in effec-

⁵ Quoted in, Kanet, *The Colonial Question*, in Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, p. 6.

⁶ Quoted in, Klinghoffer, Arthur Jay. *The Soviet Union and Africa*. In, Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, ch. 3, p. 53.

⁷ Kanet, *Colonial Question, 1917-1953*, in, Janet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, pp. 20-21.

tively broadening the base of Communist power and Soviet influence.⁸

In Africa, the colonies were seen as reserves of the imperialist camp. Nationalist leaders, seeking political independence, were looked upon as national bourgeoisie prone to collaborate with the imperialists and who would develop capitalism once in power.⁹ Leading African nationalists like Nkrumah and Kenyatta were not considered "progressive," and Soviet comments on Nasser following his rise to power were not particularly favorable. As late as 1953, Potekhin described Nkrumah's government in the preindependent Gold Coast as "a screen concealing the actual rule of English imperialism."¹⁰

The Soviet approach was to stress the revolutionary role of the proletariat and organizational abilities of the African Communist Parties and not support non-Communist nationalist movements. Little attempt was made to win over nationalist leaders while Stalin lived.¹¹

Stalin's Russia treated Arab nationalist leaders of the Middle East in a similar fashion, viewing them and their states as being still bound to the imperialist West by a network of military and political ties.¹² Even in the United Nations the Soviet Union pursued a defensive strategy until Stalin's death and thus failed to seize opportunities provided by an emerging constellation of power as new Afro-Asian members were admitted to membership.¹³

3. STIRRINGS OF A CHANGE IN SOVIET ATTITUDES, 1952

In 1952, a year before Stalin's death, there were signs of a change in the Soviet attitude towards the Third World. By this time the Stalinist revolutionary outward thrust appeared to have been spent. Checkmated in Europe, stalemated in Korea, and deprived of success in the Soviet-inspired insurrections in Southeast Asia (war in Indochina had reached an indecisive point), the Soviet Union had come to an end of policy.

Seemingly isolated and contained within the political frontiers of the cold war and with relations between the Soviet Union and the newly independent states of Asia and the Middle East extremely strained, Stalin explored the possibilities of modifying Soviet policy to enable an expansion of Soviet influence in the Third World. With the failure of the Communist revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia, Soviet support for them was dropped.

The beginning of a Soviet reconsideration of policy became more clearly discernible at an economic conference held in Moscow during April 1952. The president of the Soviet Chamber of Commerce announced that the Soviet Union wanted to increase its trade relations, especially with the LDC's; he outlined a list of desirable products for trade, and indicated that problems in reaching agreement could be resolved. Accounts of the meeting revealed a Soviet desire to make contacts with the Third World.¹⁴

⁸ Van der Kroef, Justus M. *The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia*. In, Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, ch. 4, pp. 96-98.

⁹ Klinghoffer, *Soviet Union and Africa*, in, Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, p. 53.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Campbell, John C. *The Soviet Union and the Middle East*. In, Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, ch. 6, p. 169.

¹³ Mansbach, Richard W. *The Soviet Union, the United Nations, and the Developing States*. In, Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, ch. 9, p. 262.

¹⁴ Kanet, Roger E. *Soviet Attitudes Toward Developing Nations Since Stalin*. In, Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, ch. 2, p. 27.

Recognizing in the developing nations an area of potential Soviet influence but blocked and isolated from the area by their rigid, hostile policy followed since 1947, the Soviets were now clearly moving in the direction of change. While nothing concrete developed, still these new ideas and attitudes laid the groundwork for the more flexible approach that appeared soon after Stalin's death in March 1953.¹⁵

B. COMMITMENT AND ADVENTURISM UNDER KHRUSHCHEV

1. POLICY CHANGE TOWARD THIRD WORLD

a. From continentalism to globalism

Khrushchev was the catalyst of change in Soviet policy towards the Third World.

The end of Stalinism had turned loose an energizing spirit within Soviet society. Having recovered from the destructive effects of World War II, having reconstituted the industrial base of the Soviet state, and having succeeded in building a formidable defense capability, the new Soviet leadership, imbued with renewed self-confidence, seemed ready for a global thrust. This outward global thrust took the Soviet Union from what was essentially a restrictive defensive posture of continentalism to one of expansive aggressive globalism.¹⁶

Locked in on all fronts of the cold war and seemingly contained by a wall of anti-Soviet alliance systems stretching from Europe through the Middle East to the Far East, Stalin's successors looked for new opportunities, and they found them in the emerging neutralist bloc of developing nations. There in the Third World were the means and the opportunity for breaking out of or "leap-frogging" what they perceived to be the "capitalist encirclement."

An awareness of this changing correlation of world forces coincided with the existing reality of a Soviet Union politically and diplomatically isolated and immobilized. Both came together in the person of Khrushchev, a daring, dynamic, ebullient, ambitious leader, innovative, imaginative and stirred by an irrepressible compulsion to act.

And act he did: He transformed Soviet policy from an isolationist continental mode into an expansionist global mode; he mounted a new global offensive; he redirected and permanently set the pattern of Soviet policy toward the Third World that continues to this day; he sought to establish a symbiotic relationship between the Soviet Union and the developing nations.

b. Factors contributing to policy shift

Certain factors contributed to this shift in Soviet policy and foremost among them was the fact that by the early to mid-1950's a vast neutralist bloc of emerging former colonial nations had taken shape. Sympathetic to Marxism, if not actually having a strong socialist orientation, this bloc constituted a formidable constellation of political and economic power. The first Afro-Asian conference in Bandung during April 1955 provided dramatic and concrete evidence of just

¹⁵ Ibid. and Mansbach, Soviet Union, United Nations, and Developing States, in, Kanet, ed., Soviet Union and Developing Nations, p. 252. For an examination of Stalin's reconsideration of policy, see Marshall D. Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963, 320 pp. (Russian Research Center Studies, 48).

¹⁶ Prybyla, Jan S. The Sino-Soviet Split and the Developing Nations. In, Kanet, ed., Soviet Union and Developing Nations, ch. 10, p. 275.

how formidable this bloc had become. The Soviet leadership, perceiving the world in their unique manichean worldview, tended to see international politics as a zero sum game in which losses to one side were automatically gains for the other. Capitalism's loss in the emerging LDC's was, therefore, communism's gain. Aware of powerful anti-Western and anti-imperialist sentiments among the LDC's, they perceived elements of linkage to common goals and purposes, not least of which was the appeal of the Soviet model for economic development.¹⁷

Moreover, Khrushchev saw in the Third World the answer to the dilemma then facing the Soviet Union; namely, the reality of tension and stalemate in Europe and the ideological imperative of communism to continue its advance. An aggrieved Third World, stirred up by a strong spirit of nationalism and anticolonialism and negatively if not hostilely inclined towards the West, thus opened great opportunities for properly formulated Soviet foreign policy.¹⁸

Finally, the Third World gave Khrushchev a setting where he could continue to "struggle" against the capitalist West at a lower level of risk in the economic, political, and ideological spheres. By this time nuclear weapons had raised the threshold of danger to an unacceptable level for both superpowers. The Third World, therefore, provided a new and appealing arena for presumably peaceful competition where the danger of superpower confrontation could be controlled and minimized.¹⁹

2. ADJUSTMENTS IN IDEOLOGY

a. *Return to Lenin's ideas*

Khrushchev's policy towards the Third World amounted to a rejection of Stalin and a return to the ideas of Lenin. As Khrushchev proclaimed at the 20th Party Congress in 1956, when speaking of the decline of Western colonialism and the rise of newly independent states, "The new period in world history which Lenin predicted has arrived."²⁰ However, reversal of policy on this scale, one that embraced the entire national liberation movement with all its political and ideological imperfections and variations, required ideological justification, and, accordingly, a radical revision of doctrine.

b. *Third World: "Zone of Peace," cooperation, and commitment*

Accommodation with changing realities and policies took place at two levels: one at the larger global level, taking into account the changing perception of the correlation of world forces that determined the place of the LDC's in the revised Soviet world outlook; the other at the lower regional level, taking into account regimes and national leaders whose ideas and underlying philosophies did not fit into accepted Communist criteria as it had been formulated up to that time.

As for the first, the 20th Party Congress provided Khrushchev the occasion for laying down his reformulation of global Soviet doctrine. In a radical departure from Stalin's two-camp worldview, Khrushchev projected a world divided into three parts: the Communist, the capitalist, and the third sector, that of the emerging neutralist bloc.

¹⁷ Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 211-212.

¹⁸ Horn, Robert C. *The U.S.S.R. and Southeast Asia: The Limits of Influence*. In, Kanet/Bahry, eds. Baniff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations, ch. 9, p. 156.

¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 158-59.

²⁰ Schwartz, op. cit., p. 211.

He saw the Communist and Third World united in common goals and purposes to establish a "vast zone of peace." The weight of this configuration of power was sufficient to radically shift the balance of world power against capitalism and in favor of socialism. This unity of power destroyed the much-feared "capitalist encirclement" of the past. But more importantly, it prevented the capitalist world from launching a new world war. Accordingly, Khrushchev concluded that "war was no longer a fatal inevitability" and that the world entered a new era of peaceful coexistence.

The basic characteristics of peaceful coexistence, in Khrushchev's view, included: (1) the possibility of states with differing social systems coexisting in peace in order to avoid war and annihilation of the human race; (2) economic competition between the two systems as the means for deciding the final victory in the struggle between communism and capitalism; and (3) a sharper ideological struggle because there could be no peaceful coexistence in ideology and accordingly the world remained the battleground in the contest between the competing capitalist and Communist ideologies.

The essence of peaceful coexistence is the presumption that the socialist system is stronger than the capitalist, that it would be able to contain the latter's alleged warlike inclinations, and that through the use of power for political purposes it would eventually achieve victory through peaceful means. According to Soviet writers, Khrushchev did not perceive peaceful coexistence as a state of tranquillity, but, on the contrary, one of development and struggle that assumed the revolutionary transformation of society and the accelerated disintegration of imperialism. Nor would the revolutionary movement in the capitalist world be weakened but rather strengthened in its task of promoting the successful development of socialism. Nevertheless, Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence contained a paradox; namely, how to advance the cause of communism using the instrumentalities of power without inviting the risk of nuclear war.²¹

Thus from the Third World perspective Khrushchev's reformulation of doctrine meant two things: it linked the fortunes and destiny of the Third World to the Soviet Union and world communism; and it invested with doctrinal justification and authority policies that were designed to foster a close interrelation between the two.

c. Acceptance of national leaders, their states, and institutions

In the course of fleshing out the details of this new departure in ideology over the next few years, Khrushchev and his theoreticians made two major innovations and numerous refinements in the Soviet approach (and justification for this approach) to the Third World, its leaders, their states, and institutions. They were based on the revisionist principle advanced by Khrushchev acknowledging "other roads to Socialism."

Unlike Stalin who had linked the national leaders, the so-called "national bourgeoisie," as loyalists to their former colonial overlords, Khrushchev separated the two, making the national bourgeoisie acceptable as allies in the anti-imperialist struggle and in the movement towards progressive social change in their countries. Thus the Nehrus, Sukarnos, and Nassers were transformed from enemies to

²¹ Kanet, Roger E. *Soviet Attitudes Toward Developing Nations Since Stalin*. In, Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, ch. 2, pp. 30-31. Also, Schwartz. op. cit., p. 213.

allies, from pariah to constructive instruments for building world socialism.

One of the clearest expositions of this changing attitude came from Rostislav Ulyanovsky, a noted Soviet academic scholar closely associated with the CPSU's Third World department. According to Ulyanovsky, writing in 1966, "petty bourgeois ideology" which usually has "a nationalistic and anti-imperialist spearhead and religious overtones" dominated the masses in the Third World in one form or another and would evidently do so for a long time to come. He reasoned that the working class movement in the Third World, along with the Communist Party, the spearhead of revolutionary change, were too weak, too poorly organized and too closely connected with its petty bourgeois environment, while the positions of "scientific socialism," that is, communism as understood and practiced in the Soviet Union, were not strong enough to warrant relying on them alone. Accordingly, the "realistic revolutionary approach," Ulyanovsky said, was to accept the reality that "socialism must often be built not out of the ideal matter that an advanced working class alone can be, but of poor material that objective reality puts at the revolutionary's disposal," that is, the various "progressive" leaders and other essentially bourgeois elements within the Third World countries. Thus Ulyanovsky concluded:

In terms of present and future interests, the important thing is not so much the fact that national democracy is still a non-Marxist trend as its actual fight against imperialism, against capitalism as a social system and that revolutionary democrats make a constructive effort to build a new society. This is what determines the Marxist attitude to revolutionary democratic programs and parties.²²

The second major innovation flowed from acceptance of the "national bourgeoisie;" namely, acceptance of their state, but within a reformulation that invested it with the status of a "national democratic state." To achieve this status, various criteria had to be met that variously called for the nationalization of private investment; an expanded state sector; pursuit of an anti-imperialist (i.e., anti-Western) foreign policy; establishment of extensive economic and cultural relations with the Communist countries at the expense of the capitalists; granting democratic rights and freedom to "progressive" political parties, labor unions, and other social organizations, including the Communist Party; and the introduction of major social change, especially agrarian reform in the interests of the people. Egypt and Algeria, Iraq, and Syria in varying degrees were held up as prime examples of former colonial countries which with the aid of the "socialist camp" were proceeding along a proper "non-capitalist path of development."²³

Acceptance of the national bourgeoisie and the formulation of the national democratic state concept did not envisage a Communist takeover, at least not in the short term. Rather it called for a strong Communist partnership of state power in coalition with undefined national or revolutionary democratic forces. The concept of the national democratic state remains the principal ideological formulation of what is institutionally and politically acceptable in the Third

²² Quoted in, Gupta, Bhabani Sen. *An Approach to the Study of Soviet Policies for the Third World*. In, Kanet/Bahry, eds., *Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations*, ch. 3, p. 36.

²³ This matter is discussed in, Kanet, *Soviet Attitudes Toward Developing Nations Since Stalin*, in: Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, pp. 32-35. See also, Tansky, Leo. *Soviet Foreign Aid, Scope, Direction, and Trends*. In, U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies*, 93d Cong., 1st sess., Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973, pp. 767-768.

World. And the national bourgeoisie are given to understand, in the words of Bhabani Sen Gupta, the Indian scholar of Soviet affairs, that "they are pushing their societies not toward communism but toward 'progressive social change.'" ²⁴

Thus in the ideological realm, Khrushchev adapted ideology to changing objective realities on the world scene: he integrated communism with nationalism in the Third World; he attempted to fortify and justify, through ideology a radical policy change; he reconstituted the ideological base of Soviet foreign policy for the era of peaceful coexistence; he placed ideology in the service of Soviet *realpolitik*.

3. SOME ASPECTS OF SOVIET-THIRD WORLD EXPERIENCES UNDER KHRUSHCHEV

a. General characteristics of relations

(1) Political opportunism

Political opportunism was the predominating characteristic in Khrushchev's approach to the Third World.²⁵ Targets of opportunity emerged in the Third World as the old imperial systems disintegrated and as leaders of the newly independent states welcomed Soviet participation in the nation-building process. They also welcomed Soviet support in redressing real or imagined grievances against the former colonial overlord. Politics and power were the driving forces behind Khrushchev's thrust into the Third World.²⁶

(2) Highly propagandistic

Khrushchev's approach was also highly flavored with propaganda much in keeping with his outgoing and combative political style. Marked by an absence of economic rationality, this approach placed politics above economics; it valued points gained in the cold war over the commonsense of careful economic planning; it relied on propaganda as the instrument of persuasion and attack.

Little evidence was apparent in pronouncements inaugurating trade and aid programs to suggest a rationally designed venture to promote economic development among recipients and bring tangible economic gains to the donor. "The West had to compete against lavish gifts of hotels and sports stadiums, huge credits for steel works, generous purchases of surplus commodities," wrote Elizabeth Kridl Valkenier, a specialist on Soviet foreign economic policy, "all of which were announced with a barrage of extravagant claims on behalf of radical protosocialist economic policies and with nasty attacks against the 'imperialist powers.'" Extensive nationalization, the development of heavy industry, and expansion of the state sector with Soviet

²⁴ Gupta, Bhabani Sen. *The Soviet Union and South Asia*. In Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, ch. 5, p. 122-123.

²⁵ Rubinstein observed: "Since 1955 Soviet courtship of the Third World, with few exceptions, has been a skillful blend of opportunism, largesse and salesmanship." Noting the efforts of Soviet ideologues to structure Third World politics in an ideologically acceptable form, he went on to say, "but Soviet leaders approach opportunities and dilemmas in piecemeal, pragmatic fashion, ever alert to pitfalls and rewards, and with an incisive understanding of *Realpolitik*." "Shrewd opportunism, not ideology," he concluded, "has been the impelling force behind Soviet behavior." (Rubinstein, Alvin Z. *Soviet Policy Toward the Third World in the 1970's*. *Orbis*, vol. 15, spring 1971, p. 110.)

²⁶ According to Kanet, in the 1950's and early 1960's "Soviet economic interests in the developing countries were subordinated to political interests. In establishing economic contacts with almost all the countries of Asia and Africa, the Soviets were willing to suffer negative trade balances during an initial period, while they presumably wished to indicate to exporting countries the possibilities for expanded markets in the Soviet Union." (Kanet, *The Soviet Union and the Developing Countries: Policy or Policies?* in Kanet/Bahry, *Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations*, pp. 14-15.)

aid were pictured, Valkenier continued, "as assuring a straight and speedy road to prosperity, independence, and progress, whereas Western policies, it was said, would keep the former colonies in perpetual dependence as raw-material suppliers to the capitalist world."²⁷

(3) *Exaggerated optimism*

Exaggerated optimism, moreover, permeated the Soviet approach and from all accounts seemed largely genuine.²⁸ Reflecting Khrushchev's ebullient personality and his self-confirming belief in the positive destiny of socialism as a world force, the Soviet approach rested more on rosy expectations of assured success and excessive dependence on erroneous theoretical formulations than on objective reality and hard factual information. Too much theory and insufficient factual knowledge produced unwarranted optimism about Soviet capabilities in the Third World.²⁹

b. Direction of Soviet interest: South and Southeast Asia, Middle East, and Africa

The main thrust of Soviet action was in South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and to a lesser extent Africa. The crucial year was 1955. Symbolic of the new direction of Soviet policy was the extended Khrushchev-Bulganin trip through South Asia, the outspoken Soviet support for the nonaligned Bandung Conference, and the Soviet decision to extend military aid to Egypt and build its Aswan Dam—all in 1955. Khrushchev aimed at uniting and solidifying Soviet interests with those of the Third World. The instrument of penetration was economic and military aid. As Prof. Morton Schwartz, a Soviet specialist at the University of California, wrote in describing Soviet activities in the Third World throughout the latter half of the 1950's, "Moscow courted what it considered potential allies—from Afghanistan on the Soviet border to distant Indonesia—with political flattery and economic and military aid."³⁰

Perhaps nothing better demonstrates the direction of Soviet interest under Khrushchev than the magnitude and distribution of aid to the LDC's. In the decade 1955–65 (Khrushchev was removed in late 1964), the Soviet Union extended more than \$5 billion in economic credits and grants to non-Communist LDC's. Approximately 42 percent was extended to Asian countries and about 41 percent to those in the Middle East. Afghanistan, India, Indonesia, Iran, and the United Arab Republic received nearly two-thirds of total Soviet extensions. India and the United Arab Republic alone accounted for 40 percent.³¹ During the same period the Soviets provided about \$4 billion in military assistance to 16 LDC's. The major recipients were Indonesia and the UAR, each obtaining more than \$1 billion in

²⁷ Valkenier, Elizabeth Kridl. *Soviet Economic Relations with the Developing Nations*. In, Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, ch. 8, p. 216.

²⁸ Schwartz, op. cit., p. 232.

²⁹ Kanet observed: "One could say that Soviet policy and ideology concerning the developing nations in the late 1950s were based on a minimum amount of factual information and a large amount of Marxist theory—theory which the rapidly increasing knowledge of Soviet diplomats and scholars has proved to be inaccurate or inapplicable in Asia, Africa, and Latin America." (Kanet, *Soviet Attitudes Toward Developing Nations Since Stalin*, in, Kanet, ed. *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, p. 32.)

³⁰ Schwartz, op. cit., p. 212.

³¹ Tansky, Leo. *Soviet Foreign Aid to the Less Developed Countries*. In, U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. *New Directions of the Soviet Economy*, 89th Cong., 2d sess., Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966. pt. IV, p. 951.

military equipment. Other important recipients were India, Iraq, and Syria.³²

c. Results: Some successes and failures

(1) *Some of Khrushchev's successes in the Third World*

(a) *Established global Soviet presence.*—Khrushchev had both long-term and short-term successes and failures in the Third World.³³ The Soviet Union established a strong global presence, extending from Cuba to Indonesia. The base of Soviet foreign policy was thus effectively broadened; it was no longer essentially continental; it was now global. A connection was established with the Third World. Neutrality, recognized as a vigorous international force, became firmly linked to Soviet foreign policy.³⁴ The West was placed on the defensive. The structure of global relations that emerged in these years remains essentially the same today. Khrushchev demonstrated that the Russians had a global reach and perhaps even a global base of power.

(b) *Soviet image changed, prestige enhanced.*—The Soviet image in the Third World was changed and its prestige enhanced as a result of Khrushchev's Third World policies. Soviet willingness to aid the LDC's and to build major projects on the scale of the Aswan Dam in Egypt and the Bhilai steel mill in India contributed to creating a positive image throughout much of the Third World.³⁵ This development, along with the growing awareness of increased Soviet power, stimulated in part by Khrushchev's political offensive against the West (missile diplomacy it was called) and in part by his success in space politics, enhanced Soviet international prestige and strengthened its international position.³⁶

(c) *Penetrated LDC's.*—Through its foreign economic policy, the Soviet Union was able to penetrate the LDC's with its men, material, and ideas and to impinge on what had been almost exclusively a Western political and economic preserve. The West was now challenged in what was once its own political and/or economic imperial domain by a powerful Soviet Union in league with the newly independent states. Nowhere was this fact more evident than in the Middle East where the Soviet presence, notably in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, became a new and disturbing reality in international politics.

With some success the Soviets sought to convince the countries of the Third World that it would be safe and advantageous to tie their

³² Ibid., p. 965.

³³ Many of the ideas developed in this section are drawn from Tansky, *Soviet Foreign Aid*, in JEC' report, *New Directions of the Soviet Economy*, 1966, pp. 968-972.

³⁴ With respect to African neutralism and Soviet policy, Klinghoffer wrote: "Among the successes in the Soviet approach toward Africa has been the support of African neutralism, especially during the surge toward independence in the 1950s. At this time, the United States was generally unwilling to accept neutralism, and pressures were put on African states to lean more toward the West. Acceptance of neutralism and the formulation of a 'peace zone' concept were greatly beneficial to the Soviets, for their image in Africa became more favorable." (Klinghoffer, *Soviet Union and Africa*, in Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, p. 77.)

³⁵ Referring to the impact of Soviet economic and military assistance in the LDCs, Tansky noted that it had changed "the previously prevailing Soviet image from a menacing scowl to an almost benevolent smile." (Tansky, *Soviet Foreign Aid*, in JEC's report, *New Directions of the Soviet Economy*, 1966, p. 968.)

Concerning the changed Soviet image in Africa, Klinghoffer wrote: "Another notable success has been the ability to replace the revolutionary, Communist, Soviet image with one of willingness to give aid to nationalist governments and to advocate stability and peace. African Communists were detrimentally affected by this new Soviet approach, but the Soviets' influence certainly increased as a result of its inception in the mid-fifties." (Klinghoffer, *Soviet Union and Africa*, in Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, p. 77.)

³⁶ The close association between the Soviet Union and the Third World and the Third World's recognition of Soviet political power was apparent in the United Nations where colonial and racial issues brought them together against the West. For a general discussion of Soviet-Third World relations in the U.N., see Mansbach, *Soviet Union, United Nations, and Developing States*, in Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, pp. 253-255 and 262.

economic future to the Soviet Union both as a source of industrial equipment and as a model for economic development. Accordingly, the spectrum of opportunities was widened for the Soviet Union to participate in the economic life of the Third World, to influence the direction its development, and to affect its foreign policy preferences. Khrushchev's success in Nasser's Egypt, described by John C. Campbell, a specialist in Soviet and Middle East affairs, as the "centerpiece of the Soviet position in the Middle East," was a classic case of expanding opportunities not only for the Soviet Union in Egypt but also throughout the entire Middle East.³⁷

(d) *Success with nationalist movements.*—Soviet support for the nationalists movements—or national liberation movements as the Soviets term them—in many of the LDC's had paid off. It was an important factor in weakening, or eliminating, Western political and economic influence in such diverse areas as Indonesia, the Middle East, and Cuba. Khrushchev gave the Third World nations an alternative. He gave them leverage resting on the solid base of Soviet power to use against the West. They could now look to the Soviet Union as a source of political, military, and economic support in initiating confrontations with the West. Nasser's seizure of the Suez Canal (a vital international waterway for Western Europe), Sukarno's belligerent and adamant attitude towards Dutch New Guinea, and Castro's defiant stand against the United States were encouraged by their knowledge of Soviet support, both real and potential.

(e) *Favorable impact of nationalization actions.*—Nationalization of foreign-owned enterprises in the Third World proved to be a double asset for the Soviet Union; it weakened the Western presence and strengthened the state sector of the national economies, an essential first step toward ultimate socialization. Soviet political support, and to a lesser extent actual and promised economic assistance to the state sector, encouraged this tendency toward nationalization. Third World leadership was already sympathetic to the idea that rapid economic development could occur only through government participation and control. The Soviets attempted to channel this tendency towards economic centralization into specific Communist institutional forms. With advice from Soviet technicians a number of countries established Soviet-type state farms, planning commissions, foreign trade monopolies, and industrial organizations.

(2) *Some of Khrushchev's failures*

(a) *Khrushchev's approach: Oversimplified, overoptimistic, and oversold.*—Failures appeared to cancel out or at the very least balance off some of the Soviet successes in the Third World during the Khrushchev era. In moving from proclamation to program, the Soviets discovered in time that they had no magic formula for overcoming the institutional, human, economic, and social obstacles that have hampered any foreign aid program. The complexities of international development and the massive problems arising from backwardness in the Third World affected them as much as anyone else.

The Khrushchev approach to Third World development was oversimplified, overoptimistic, and oversold. It subordinated economics to

³⁷ Campbell, Soviet Union and Middle East, in Kanet, ed., Soviet Union and Developing Nations, p. 160.

politics. It lacked rational economic planning. It failed to take into account, for example, the low absorptive capacity of primitive infrastructures, particularly the negative effects on development of an inadequate supply of skilled and professional manpower. It failed to perceive the multitude of problems arising from attempts to impose the Soviet experience on primitive cultures. For example, the development of heavy industry was emphasized since full industrialization was looked upon as the best assurance for progress in the formerly exploited colonial areas;³⁸ yet basic economic inadequacies worked against any possible success.

Soviet awareness in 1961-62 that two large-scale aid programs in Cuba and Indonesia were, in Valkenier's words, "disastrous failures" sparked a reevaluation of Soviet foreign economic policy. Occurring at a time when the Russians began to discuss publicly ways of reviving their own lagging economy, Khrushchev reduced aid commitments to a bare minimum and began to search for ways to get a better return from Soviet investments in the Third World.³⁹

(b) *Rise of Soviet influence questioned.*—Secondly, the decline of Western influence in the Third World during the Khrushchev era did not necessarily lead to a corresponding rise of Soviet influence. Many Third World leaders, as in the case of Nasser, used the Soviet Union as leverage against the West while pursuing their own foreign policy interests that did not always coincide with those of Moscow.⁴⁰ Others went headlong in pursuit of their own interests, ignoring Moscow. In Indonesia, Sukarno launched a campaign against the Malaysian Federation in the early 1960's, a move ill-suited to Soviet foreign policy concerns in Asia and elsewhere, and gradually shifted toward a pro-Peking orientation despite Soviet generosity in granting economic and military assistance. According to Justus M. Van der Kroef, a specialist on Indonesian communism, "it is remarkable that Moscow remained hopeful (or desperate) enough to continue its arms deliveries to Indonesia and even agreed to new ones, as well as to a moratorium on repayments."⁴¹

It is a matter of fact that much of Third World nationalism was inner-directed; only incidentally was it pro-Soviet.⁴² It led not only to the pursuit of individual foreign policies but also to the formation of regional movements such as pan-Arabism and pan-Africanism that worked against Soviet long-term interests.⁴³ As an irritated Khrushchev complained during a visit to the UAR in May 1964—

³⁸ Kanet, *Soviet Attitudes Toward Developing Nations Since Stalin*, in Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, p. 46.

³⁹ Valkenier, Elizabeth Kridl, *New Trends in Soviet Economic Relations with the Third World*, *World Politics*, vol. 22, April 1970, p. 415.

⁴⁰ As Malcolm H. Kerr, a Middle East specialist at the University of California observed: "On a general level, we may regard the Soviet-Egyptian relationship over the years as a rather typical one between the dominant Communist state and a Third World country that is relatively poor, backward, and tradition-ridden and whose leaders have no intention of espousing communism or becoming Soviet satellites but do have considerable ambitions to modernize their society and increase their international prestige in the name of revolution and national liberation, tend to see the leading Western powers as obstacles in this path, and are quite ready to profit by whatever leverage the Soviets will give them." (Kerr, Malcolm H. *Soviet Influence in Egypt, 1967-73*, in Rubinstein, ed., *Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World*, ch. 3, p. 90.)

⁴¹ Van der Kroef, Justus M. *Soviet and Chinese Influence in Indonesia*. In Rubinstein, Alvin Z. ed. *Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World*. New York, Praeger, 1975. ch. 3, p. 60.

⁴² With regard to Soviet-Third World relations in the U.N., Mansbach observed: "To a large extent, it appears that the Western position in the U.N. has declined, although it is less clear that the Soviet Union is emerging as a 'leader' of the Third World. Rather, the U.S.S.R. is behaving more as a 'follower' of the Afro-Asians, particularly on colonial and race issues, in which its stake is marginal." (Mansbach, *Soviet Union, United Nations, and Developing States*, in Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, p. 262.)

⁴³ For a discussion of pan-Africanism, see Klinghoffer, *Soviet Union and Africa*, in Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, pp. 68-74.

It would be wrong to set the unity of all the revolutionary forces of the world against any grouping of forces by color or skin or religious conviction. * * * The Arab worker, Arab peasants, and Arab intellectuals should unite against exploitation. You will find a place in this union for the Russians, a place, too, for other people, not for the sake of nationalism.⁴⁴

(c) *Limited impact of Communist Party and ideology.*—And then the Soviets failed to gain any appreciable number of adherents to Communist ideology either among the new national leaders or the masses. Most of the Third World leaders professed their own brand of socialism that varied sharply from the “scientific socialism” of Marxism-Leninism, the official Soviet ideology. They sought Soviet sanction. These home-grown Socialists in the Third World were committed to carrying out a “socialist” political and economic transformation of their own countries but along lines of their own national experience. They were also determined to maintain the national identity of their own countries and not merge it with the larger cause of communism. Khrushchev had expressed Soviet disappointment over this tendency in bitter remarks about those national leaders who “call themselves Socialists,” but who had no understanding of what “scientific” socialism really meant.⁴⁵

The impact of Communist ideology on the masses in the LDC's was also negligible. Traditionalism prevailed in Third World societies; it constituted a formidable barrier to radical social change. Besides, many national leaders imposed severe restrictions on indigenous Communist parties. Even states called “progressive” by the Soviets in the early 1960's (Guinea, Mali, UAR, Ghana, and Algeria) prohibited the creation or functioning of open Communist parties.⁴⁶ Under some regimes, as in the case of Kassem's and that of the Ba'ath in Iraq in 1959 and 1963 respectively, Communists were executed and massacred.⁴⁷ Yet the Soviets were willing to accept these setbacks for the indigenous parties for the sake of maintaining cordial relations on the state-to-state level and hopefully for the sake of broadening their own influence.⁴⁸

(d) *Staying power of leftist regimes wanting.*—Finally, the staying power of the Soviet supported regimes in the LDC's proved to be seriously wanting. Perhaps more than anything else this fact demonstrated the shortcomings of Khrushchev's approach to the Third World. Khrushchev himself was removed in October 1964 by a coalition of rivals, including those who had become disenchanted with his overoptimistic, irrational Third World policies.

Brezhnev, his successor, was to reap the whirlwind.

In less than a decade four of the Third World leaders, recipients of large-scale Soviet economic and military aid and considerable political support, were overthrown—Ben Bella in Algeria, 1965; Sukarno in Indonesia, 1965; Nkrumah in Ghana, 1966; and Keita in Mali, 1968.⁴⁹ In the wake of these failures the Soviets had to bear the

⁴⁴ Khrushchev's speech at Aswan on May 17, 1964. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, June 10, 1964. Quoted in, Tansky, Soviet Foreign Aid, in JEC's report, New Directions of the Soviet Economy, 1966, p. 970.

⁴⁵ Khrushchev's speech in Sofia on May 19, 1962. The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, June 13, 1962. Quoted in Tansky, Soviet Foreign Aid, in JEC's report, New Directions of the Soviet Economy, 1966, p. 970.

⁴⁶ Kanet, Roger E. Soviet Attitudes Toward Developing Nations Since Stalin, in, Kanet, ed., Soviet Union and Developing Nations, p. 34.

⁴⁷ Campbell, Soviet Union and Middle East, in, Kanet, ed., Soviet Union and Developing Nations, p. 165.

⁴⁸ Klinghoffer discusses this aspect of Soviet policy toward African parties. See Klinghoffer, Soviet Union and Africa, in Kanet, ed., Soviet Union and Developing Nations, pp. 58-59.

⁴⁹ Schwartz, op. cit., p. 218.

burden of their close association with these charismatic leaders and in some cases the reverse swing of the political pendulum.

Thus, Khrushchev had serious failures in the Third World along with his successes. Expectations with regard to these new revolutionary states proved to be, in Schwartz's words, "largely fanciful."⁵⁰ Perhaps the judgment of David Dallin, a specialist on Soviet foreign policy, best sums up the Khrushchev experience:

Although the process of decolonization continued and the number of independent nations was growing, and although "neutralism" was often preferred by the new governments, all Soviet efforts to assume the role of guide and create a real alliance between the Soviet bloc and the "neutralists" and thus, in an evolutionary way, enlarge the number of "socialist" states were in vain.⁵¹

C. PRAGMATIC INVOLVEMENT UNDER BREZHNEV, 1964-74

1. SOME ASPECTS OF SOVIET-THIRD WORLD RELATIONS

a. *Awareness of failure and limitations*

There seems little doubt that Khrushchev's innovative Third World policies were among the "hare-brained schemes" (in the words of the indictment against him) that contributed to his downfall in October 1964.⁵² Early in the 1960's Soviet analysts began to have doubts and reservations.⁵³ Soviet optimism rapidly dimmed with growing awareness that not all was going well in Soviet-Third World relations. Khrushchev's exuberant courtship of the revolutionary democratic forces and his vociferously proclaimed great expectations of their destiny in the Soviet scheme of things were seen to be excessive. Instances of waste in Soviet economic aid programs, especially in the case of Indonesia where none of the Soviet-supported industrial projects had been completed, caused much chagrin.⁵⁴

Criticisms and doubts were openly expressed in the period after Khrushchev's removal; they focused on such matters as anticommunism in the Third World, excessive expectations on both sides, the barriers posed by traditionalism, corruption, and the tendency towards one-man rule.⁵⁵ That the Brezhnev regime would undertake a radical reevaluation of its Third World policy was evident from the observations by Ulyanovsky in 1965. In commenting on the socioeconomic backwardness in the Third World, he observed that "not one of the countries following the non-capitalist path promises to become an industrial or even an agrarian-industrial state in the near future. This will require * * * a minimum of 100 to 150 years."⁵⁶

b. *Brezhnev's approach: Rational, realistic, pragmatic, cautious*

Four adjectives most consistently used in the literature to describe Brezhnev's approach to the Third World were "rational," "realistic,"

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 218.

⁵¹ Quoted in, Kanet, *Soviet Attitudes Toward Developing Nations Since Stalin*, in Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, p. 32.

⁵² Valkenier, Elizabeth Kridl. *The Soviet Union and the Third World: From Khrushchev's "Zone of Peace" to Brezhnev's "Peace Program."* In, Kanet/Bahry, eds., *Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations*, p. 4.

⁵³ Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 232-233.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 218.

⁵⁵ Schwartz discusses these criticisms in pp. 220-225 and 233. For example, in a general discussion of anti-Communism in the Third World and the Soviet reaction, he writes: "The single most often cited criticism of the 'revolutionary national-democratic leaderships' is their persistent hostility to communism in general and to their native communist parties in particular. The overt antipathy towards communism expressed by many of the Kremlin's favourite 'revolutionary democrats', their policies of repression and imprisonment of local communists, the banning of the communist party in their respective countries—policies adopted by many 'progressive leaders', especially in the Middle East—is a source of continuous embarrassment." (pp. 224-225).

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 233.

"pragmatic," and "cautious." In many respects these words reflect the coloration of Brezhnev's entire regime in its relations with the outside world. This coloration was probably best summed up in the term he himself has frequently used; namely, "businesslike."

Valkenier discussed and analyzed in great detail the Brezhnev approach to the Third World. A theme that predominates in her commentary and throughout the literature on the subject is rationalism in Soviet economic policy.⁵⁷ Briefly, Brezhnev reversed Khrushchev's priorities in which the Soviet Union was willing to accept economic costs for expected political gains. Now economics was to take precedence over politics; the principle of cost/effectiveness was to prevail; economics in the service of larger political goals had to pay its way.

Accordingly, Brezhnev placed greater emphasis on economic rationalization. As Valkenier summed up Soviet behavior since Khrushchev's departure:

A less one-sided and more constructive approach to economic development also was adopted. Doctrinaire assumptions about the role of industrialization and state controls in bringing about a speedy break with the colonial past were replaced by more realistic views that recognize the role of private business, light industry, and productive agriculture. Soviet aid, as well as theories of economic development, discounted the political and institutional impact of protosocialist projects and emphasized the proper functioning of the economy as a whole. Thus, Khrushchev's successors would turn down the impulsive demands of ambitious leaders of backward countries for steel mills and offer instead more economically feasible, although less spectacular, projects.⁵⁸

Thus such ideas as coordinated planning, joint ventures, gearing Third World production to the specific needs of the Soviet Union and vice versa, effective use of raw materials, balanced industrial-agricultural development—all of these ideas and more were introduced. For example, permanent bilateral economic commissions were set up with India, Iran, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Besides providing a forum for regular consultations, these commissions also worked out long-range plans. Thus, under this arrangement the Soviet-Iranian Commission agreed to work out 12- to 15-year projections for increased economic collaboration and trade based on the natural resources of both countries as well as other economic and technical potentials.⁵⁹

Since 1965, integration of Soviet aid and trade into the planned development of the Soviet Union and some of its major economic partners has, in the words of Valkenier, "proceeded apace."⁶⁰ Moreover, the role of Western investment in the Third World and that of private business have been recognized and appreciated as a contributing force in Third World development so long as they did not predominate.⁶¹

⁵⁷ See, Valkenier, *Soviet Union and Third World: From Khrushchev's "Zone of Peace" to Brezhnev's "Peace Program,"* in Kanet/Bahry, eds., *Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations*, ch. 1; Valkenier, *Soviet Economic Relations with the Developing Nations*, in Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, ch. 8; and Valkenier, *New Trends in Soviet Economic Relations with the Third World*, *World Politics*, vol. 22, April 1970, pp. 415-432.

⁵⁸ Valkenier, *Soviet Union and the Third World: From Khrushchev's "Zone of Peace" to Brezhnev's "Peace Program,"* in Kanet/Bahry, eds., *Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations*, p. 5.

⁵⁹ Valkenier, *Soviet Economic Relations with the Developing Nations*, in Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, p. 221.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 220.

⁶¹ On the matter of Western capital in the Third World Valkenier added: "What the Soviets favor is not wholesale expulsion but arrangements that recognize the sovereignty of each nation over its natural resources and leave as large as possible a share of profits at home." Valkenier went on to note that "the Russians are likely to advise against hasty nationalization." (Valkenier, *New Trends in Soviet Economic Relations with the Third World*, p. 428.)

In ideology Brezhnev did not abandon Khrushchev's conceptual formulations; he retained them as part of the ideological infrastructure of peaceful coexistence but changed their functions to suit his pragmatic approach. Under Brezhnev these concepts have been less frequently invoked. Thus the habit of grading the LDC's (by designating them as national or revolutionary democracies) according to the degree of their acceptability to Soviet criteria for socialism and a pro-Soviet stance in foreign policy was discontinued in 1968. The use and meaning of such terms as "the noncapitalist path of development" were changed. No longer implying a prescriptive program for rapid shortcuts to socialism, they came to describe a long transitional period. Various economic prerequisites were to take place during this period for the eventual social and political transformation of society. Such terms now indicated the length of the road ahead to socialism in the Third World rather than the speed of travel. In brief, socialism was not just over the horizon as Khrushchev had claimed; but rather a long arduous process to be worked out and achieved in the unfolding of history.⁶²

With respect to the national liberation movement, Brezhnev did not renounce the traditional theoretical claim that it is part of the world revolutionary process and that it will unite with the socialist and international workers' movement to bring down world capitalism. Significant modifications shifting the whole idea from action to that of "pious hopes" were, however, detectable. These modifications suggested to Valkenier that "the Soviets have adopted a Menshevik-like view of the readiness of the Third World for revolutionary transformation, a view that could justify considerable disengagement."⁶³ In other words, expectations of revolutionary transformation, exaggerated by Khrushchev, were now downgraded.⁶⁴

c. Lowering of priorities

Accordingly, this decline in expectations produced a lowering of Soviet priorities in the Third World. But Khrushchev's long-term commitment to expand Soviet interest in the Third World was not abandoned. The principle of Soviet support for leftist regimes remains. Unaltered also are Soviet geopolitical interests in the Third World that impinge upon Soviet strategic necessities. In brief, Soviet priorities may have been downgraded but not fundamental long-term Soviet interests as a nation-state.⁶⁵

⁶²Valkenier, *Soviet Union and Third World: From Khrushchev's "Zone of Peace" to Brezhnev's "Peace Program,"* in Kanet/Bahry, eds., *Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations*, pp. 5-6.

⁶³Ibid., pp. 8-9.

⁶⁴Schwartz concludes an analysis of Soviet writings on the matter of pace of revolutionary change: "Obviously, expectations regarding the imminence of 'revolutionary advance' has been downgraded. The transition of the new states to socialism, it is now generally felt, will be a very lengthy process. As one authoritative source described it, 'the non-capitalist development of the Afro-Asian countries will continue for several decades'. Others see the assimilation to scientific socialism as 'a process that may span an entire historical epoch' ". (Schwartz, op. cit., p. 234.)

⁶⁵Tansky noted that Khrushchev's successors did not share his euphoria with respect to the future of the Third World and accordingly were less sanguine about such achievements in the near future particularly after the demise of leading "revolutionary democrats." But he added this qualifier: "Nevertheless, Soviet literature still expounds on the use of aid to achieve Khrushchev's goals. One no longer sees the emphasis on the national democratic state, but theoreticians still claim to judge progress in terms of nationalization, expansion of relations with the 'socialist camp,' and the domestic roles played by 'progressive elements.' " (Tansky, *Soviet Foreign Aid*, in JEC's report, *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies*, 1973, pp. 767-768.)

Schwartz explains how Soviet interest in radical leftist regimes "has sharply diminished," but he goes on to distinguish between political coloration of regimes and pragmatic Soviet foreign policy interests. Speaking of India and Nigeria he writes: "Though neither has been elevated to the status of a 'national democracy' the inherent importance of both countries to future developments in South Asia and Africa has been sufficient to stimulate and sustain considerable Soviet interest." And he continues: "* * * though the apparently natural symbiosis between Moscow and the Third World left has failed, the Kremlin leaders do not appear disillusioned. They still insist that Soviet power continues to exert a vital influence on the developing countries." Some theorists warn Soviet leaders about the serious risks of involvement in the Third World, but, according to Schwartz, "most Soviet analysts continue to emphasize the positive role to be played by the Soviet Union." (Schwartz, op. cit., p. 242.)

Changing Soviet priorities in the Third World were evident in its foreign aid programs. According to Leo Tansky, an American specialist in Soviet foreign economic policy, (writing in 1973), the cost of foreign aid, as measured by the net outflow of economic resources, was rather less than 0.03 percent of GNP. Soviet aid leveled off in recent years, he said, while LDC aid repayments rose rapidly, reducing even further the Soviet burden of foreign aid. Thus aid, the primary instrument for Soviet influence, was pragmatically adjusted to suit the new purposes of Soviet policy in the Third World.⁶⁶

Indicative also of the change in priorities was the rather low profile the Soviet Union maintained in most of Africa. Sub-Sahara Africa has been referred to as a "disaster area" for Soviet relations with radical regimes and Africa itself as "the graveyard of 'scientific socialism.'" ⁶⁷ Still, Brezhnev would not overlook a "target of opportunity", as in the case of Allende's rise to power in Chile, however distant it may be from the central focus of Soviet interest in the Third World.

Various reasons have been attributed to the causes for diminishing Soviet interest in the Third World. Most important perhaps was the primary focus of Soviet concerns in recent years on the West, notably the United States, and China. Moscow viewed relations with the LDC's primarily within the context of these two overarching foreign policy problems. It was seen that the LDC's did not significantly affect relations among the major powers, though at times as in the case of the Middle East and Southeast Asia they could play a important role. Consequently, Soviet interest in the Third World declined. And notwithstanding the revolutionary rhetoric, Soviet policymakers came to view "the national liberation movement" as having only tangential importance. Pragmatic foreign policy and strategic considerations predominated.⁶⁸

Another reason for the lowering of priorities was apparently Soviet awareness of the modest impact the Soviet Union had actually made on shaping the domestic and foreign policy behavior of the courted Third World countries.⁶⁹ A measure of how modest that impact was is the conclusion by Schwartz that the Soviet effort of two decades to influence the leftist regimes of the Third World was a "bitter and frustrating experience" with very few successes to show.⁷⁰

2. DIRECTION OF SOVIET INTEREST

a. Criteria for economic aid: Preeminence of Soviet bloc interest

The direction of Soviet interest in the Third World followed along the general pattern laid down during the Khrushchev years with some variations. With respect to economic aid the general criteria appeared

⁶⁶ Tansky went on to say: "As long as the economic costs remain low and the political and economic returns high, Moscow will continue to employ foreign aid as the primary instrument for expanding its influence in the Third World." (Tansky, *Soviet Foreign Aid*, in JEC's report, *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies*, 1973, p. 766.)

⁶⁷ Schwartz, *op. cit.*, p. 241. See also, Kanet, *Soviet Attitudes Toward Developing Nations Since Stalin*, in Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, pp. 43-44.)

⁶⁸ Schwartz observed: "Whether it be a *coup* in Algeria or a counter-*coup* in Indonesia, a 'national democratic regime' in Guinea or a 'bourgeois' government in Ceylon, these are matters usually of only local political importance and therefore of little immediate consequence to the Kremlin rulers." (Schwartz, *op. cit.*, p. 241.)

⁶⁹ Rubinstein, Alvin Z. *Observations*. In, Rubinstein, ed., *Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World*, ch. 10, p. 221. On the basis of essays in this anthology, Rubinstein concluded that Soviet and Chinese influence on the domestic and foreign policies of the Third World countries they courted were "modest." The essays made clear, he said, that "the amount and kind of aid does not appear to make much difference when it comes to exercising influence; the donor can seldom dictate policy to the recipient."

⁷⁰ Schwartz, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

to be contained in a Pravda editorial of October 27, 1965, entitled, "The Supreme Internationalist Duty of a Socialist Country." That editorial made three points, reflecting both the internal debate and the decisions of the leadership: (1) Soviet aid could play only a secondary role in solving the problems of national liberation, the primary burden being carried by the LDC's themselves; (2) the Soviet Union had only limited resources to be allocated—aid came not from surpluses, it said, but resources needed in the socialist countries themselves; and (3) the further economic and political development of the Soviet Union and its East European allies was the essential precondition for assistance to the Third World.⁷¹

b. Direction of economic and military aid: From Mediterranean to Arabian Seas

During the period 1965–72, the Soviet Union extended a total of \$4,402 million in economic aid to the LDC's. About 80 percent was concentrated in countries that form a crescent extending from the East Mediterranean through the Red Sea to the Arabian Sea. The Middle East ranked first with \$1,907 million; South Asia second with \$1,581 million; and East Asia last with a total of \$7 million. The Soviets allocated aid to Latin America (\$415 million) as opportunities opened up in Chile and Peru. Africa was secondary in Soviet policy considerations, having reduced Khrushchev's commitment of 20 percent to 10 percent (\$492 million). About half of that went to Algeria and Morocco in North Africa.⁷²

Soviet military aid commitments continued at a steady flow into the Third World, running at a total extension of \$8.5 billion during 1955–72. Some 95 percent went to 8 countries—about 70 percent to Egypt, India, Indonesia, and Iraq. Nearly 30 percent of total commitments occurred in 1970–71. This increase reflected the large Egyptian air defense buildup, Indian preparations for war with Pakistan, Syrian-Iraqi tensions with Israel, and Iraq's concern for Iran's arms acquisitions. During the 2 years these four Soviet arms clients acquired some \$2 billion in arms aid.⁷³

c. Pragmatic, cautious, and selective assessment of Soviet interest

Thus Brezhnev directed Soviet activity in the Third World along the general lines laid down by his predecessor with some variations dictated by his pragmatic, cautious, and selective assessment of Soviet interests. The Middle East, the scene of two wars (1967 and 1973) and seemingly unending tension and great power involvement, continued to receive a high degree of Soviet attention.⁷⁴ The level and development of Soviet involvement in South Asia continued to expand as disputes between India and Pakistan erupted and as Moscow attempted to create an Asian security system.⁷⁵ Soviet involvement

⁷¹ Aspects of this editorial are discussed in, Gupta, *An Approach to Study of Soviet Policies For Third World*, in Kanet/Bahry, eds., *Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations*, pp. 23 and 35; and in, Schwartz, *op. cit.*, pp. 218–220.

⁷² Tansky, *Soviet Foreign Aid*, in JEC's report, *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies*, 1973, pp. 768–769.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 772.

⁷⁴ Kanet, Roger E. *The Soviet Union and the Developing Countries: Policy or Policies?* In, Kanet/Bahry, eds., *Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations*, ch. 2, p. 18.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

in non-Communist Southeast Asia virtually ceased after the failure of the Indonesian coup and the overthrow of Sukarno in 1965.⁷⁶ The tendency towards neutralism suggested to Van der Kroef the allure of a "low-keyed, flexible Soviet attitude, benevolently pragmatic" towards non-Communist Southeast Asia.⁷⁷ In sub-Sahara Africa the Soviets pursued a policy of "benign neglect," in the words of Roger E. Kanet, professor of political science at the University of Kansas and specialist on Soviet-Third World relations. Only in Somalia and Sudan (prior to the abortive coup) did Soviet leaders indicate a substantial interest.⁷⁸ And the Soviets continued their essentially peripheral interest in Latin America, taking advantage of unique opportunities as in the case of Allende's rise to power in Chile.⁷⁹

3. COSTS AND BENEFITS FROM BREZHNEV'S THIRD WORLD POLICY

a. *Political costs: Coups and expulsions*

Brezhnev's Third World policy has yielded costs and benefits. He lost when a succession of Soviet-supported leaders in Africa and Asia were overthrown—Ben Bella of Algeria, June 1965; Sukarno of Indonesia, September 1965; Nkrumah of Ghana, February 1966; and Keita of Mali, November 1968. Other setbacks followed. Numeiry expelled the Soviets from Sudan in July 1971, after the failure of a Communist-led coup believed to have been Soviet inspired. Sadat expelled the Soviets from Egypt in July 1972, inflicting a serious blow to Soviet prestige and raising doubts about the vast Soviet investments in economic and military assistance. These were serious setbacks for Brezhnev's Third World policy.⁸⁰

b. *Political benefits: Expansion of Soviet power*

Brezhnev also accrued political benefits. Viewing the Soviet role in the Third World from a very general perspective, it is possible to suggest such apparent political gains as—

- The affirmation of the Soviet presence in the Third World, particularly in strategically important areas of the Middle East and Africa;
- The further waning of Western influence in the Third World;
- The introduction of Soviet power in the Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, and Indian Ocean;
- The successful thrust of Soviet influence into the northern tier states of Iran and Turkey; and

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Van der Kroef, *Soviet Union and Southeast Asia*, in Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, p. 118.

⁷⁸ Kanet, *Soviet Union and Developing Countries: Policy or Policies?* In Kanet/Bahry, eds., *Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations*, p. 17; and Klinghoffer, *Soviet Union and Africa*, in Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, pp. 51-52 and 67.

⁷⁹ In 1971, not long after Allende's election to the presidency in Chile, the Soviet Union extended \$39 million in credits to his government; in 1972, the figure was increased to \$144 million. (Kanet, *Soviet Union and Developing Countries: Policy or Policies?*, in Kanet/Bahry, eds., *Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations*, p. 17.) For a discussion of the re-establishment of Soviet diplomatic relations with various Latin American countries, see Hamburg, Roger, *Soviet Union and Latin America*, in Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, ch. 7, pp. 179-180.

⁸⁰ These setbacks are discussed within the context of Soviet Third World relations in, Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 229-231; Freedman, Robert O. *The Soviet Union and the Communist Parties of the Arab World: An Uncertain Relationship*. In Kanet/Bahry, eds., *Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations*, ch. 7, pp. 113-116; Kerr, *Soviet Influence in Egypt, 1967-73*, in Rubinstein, ed., *Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World*, pp. 101-104, 106-107; and Campbell, John C. *Soviet Policy in the Middle East*. In Kanet/Bahry, eds., *Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations*, pp. 90-93.

—Predominating Soviet influence among the great powers in South Asia, notably in India and Afghanistan, with growing influence in Pakistan.⁸¹

c. Economic benefits: Soviet economic needs satisfied, Third World connection reinforced

The Soviet Union derived many economic benefits from Brezhnev's Third World policy.⁸² The primary benefit was the satisfaction of Soviet economic needs flowing from joint projects and beneficial aid/trade arrangements. The trend towards a rapid growth of these arrangements, an outgrowth of Brezhnev's economic rationalism, was expected to continue. The secondary benefit was the reinforcement of Soviet connections with the Third World.

Soviet economic benefits from two-way arrangements with the Third World were readily apparent in such matters as natural gas, port facilities and fishing, oil, and the importation of manufactured goods. Briefly:

- Soviet-built pipelines in Afghanistan and Iran carried low-priced natural gas to the Soviet Union as aid repayments, supplementing dwindling supplies in the Azerbaijan and Turkmen Republics and saving the Soviets distribution costs of piping gas from the distance fields in Central Asia;
- Soviet assistance in building port facilities and developing fishing industries was repaid by building merchant ships for the Soviet Union (as in the case of the Soviet-built shipyard at Alexandria) and by providing repair facilities, storage, food and fuel supplies for Soviet vessels and shore privileges for crews (as in the cases of Chile, Peru, Senegal, Guinea, Algeria, Egypt, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh) enabling Soviet vessels to operate for longer periods at sea before returning to home ports;
- Repayment in oil of Soviet aid for Middle East oil development (nearly \$450 million) enabled the Soviets to supplement domestic needs, contribute to filling East European requirements, and export to Western Europe; and
- Aid repayments and trade in other manufactured goods (tractors, industrial machinery, footwear, clothing, furniture and other consumer goods) from Soviet-built plants helped the LDC's repay their aid debts, use much of the unused capacities of Soviet-built plants, and help the Soviet Union meet some of its domestic demands. Such imports, largely from newly created industries, have grown from almost nothing to about 20 percent of Soviet imports from the LDC's.⁸³

⁸¹ Various aspects of these apparent benefits are discussed in, Rubinstein, *Soviet Policy Toward Third World in 1970's*, p. 112-114; Donaldson, Robert H., *Soviet Policy in South Asia: Aspirations and Limitations*. In, Kanet/Bahry, eds., *Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations*, ch. 12, pp. 221-223; Campbell, *Soviet Union and Middle East*, in Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, ch. 6; Campbell, *Soviet Policy in Middle East*, in Kanet/Bahry, eds., *Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations*, pp. 90-93; Barnds, William J., *Soviet Influence in India: A Search for the Spoils That Go With Victory*. In, Rubinstein, ed., *Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World*, pp. 45-46; and Horn, *USSR and South-east Asia: Limits of Influence*, in Kanet/Bahry, eds., *Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations*, pp. 174-175.

⁸² This section is based upon Tansky, *Soviet Foreign Aid*, in JEC's report, *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies*, 1973, pp. 772-774.

⁸³ As one Soviet writer observed: "Soviet purchases of their traditional exports and of products of their young national industries are of great importance for this group of countries. Our economic ties with these countries have also begun to play a greater role in solving the Soviet Union's national economic tasks. Our increased purchases in these countries, and the delivery of their products in repayment of Soviet credits enable the USSR to organize a better supply of many types of raw materials for its population for foodstuffs and consumer goods more fully. (Quoted in, Tansky, p. 774.)"

A beneficial secondary spinoff from these two-way arrangements, both economic and political, was the development of an international specialization of labor between the Socialist countries and the Third World. Economic returns were not a major Soviet concern in the near term, and the Soviets were not likely to permit any economic dependence. But the trend toward specialization of labor was significant, and, as Tansky wrote, "is more likely to establish the long range abiding Soviet-LDC ties than any of Moscow's other foreign policy tools."⁸⁴

Thus Brezhnev, like his predecessor Khrushchev, had reaped costs and benefits from his decade-long Third World policy. A balance of costs and benefits may be difficult to strike, but one overarching generalization can be made, and it is that Brezhnev had built on Khrushchev's policy to affirm the reality of Soviet power and a global Soviet presence.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

A general assembly of the two-way arrangement
 both economic and political was the development of an international
 organization of Japan, between the countries and the
 world. Economic relations were not a subject of concern
 for the Soviet government, no doubt with good reason.
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III. RATIONALE FOR SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD

A. THE THIRD WORLD: WHY IT IS IMPORTANT

1. SIZE, POPULATION, AND LAND AREA

The foregoing survey of the Third World in Soviet perspective suggests the question, why such involvement? The answer has ideological, political, economic, and strategic dimensions. But the first question to be addressed is the more general one; namely, why is the Third World important at all in international politics?

The first point to be made is size, population, and land area. The physical dimensions of the Third World are imposing. Consider these geographic and demographic statistics. Over two-thirds of the world's nations, now numbering 157, are found in the Third World. The Third World occupies over 40 percent of the globe's total land area of 51.4 million square miles, excluding Antarctica. Its people constitute almost half of the world's total population of 3.9 billion, including China. Thus the Third World, though differing in cultures, races, politics, economics, and historical roots, possesses the physical requirements of a new center of international power and influence.

Given the enormous physical size and rapidly expanding population of the Third World, it is not surprising that in recent years it has begun to play an increasingly important role in international politics. Combining size and population with its richly endowed natural wealth, the Third World offers political and economic potentialities which cannot be ignored by the great powers.

2. HISTORICAL SETTING: FROM COLONIALISM TO INDEPENDENCE

a. Process of decolonization: Its effects

The colonial heritage of the Third World has had important consequences for present day international relations. The rapid disintegration of the Western colonial system in the post-World War II period resulted in the emergence of a large number of newly independent nations on the world scene over a period of two decades. These nations offered the possibilities for a new correlation of forces between the world's two major competing systems and in the process created new low-risk areas for great power rivalry.

In this early period of decolonization, underdeveloped nations, though nominally independent, found their freedom of action circumscribed and undermined by their own economic backwardness. The interplay of superpower politics often left them in their familiar colonial roles as "pawns" of the established world powers.

b. Independence: The postcolonial experience

In the immediate postwar period true independence for the nations of the Third World proved elusive. The continued subordination of

Third World economies to what their leaders perceived as exploitive and unequal Western trade practices soon resulted in political frustration and sluggish and uneven economic development. In this period the economic and political affinity which might have been expected to exist between the former colonies and the metropolitan countries was replaced by a strong Third World hostility towards the developed nations of the West.

By the 1970's national economic development and freedom from Western "exploitation" had become the central political and economic themes for much of the Third World. Today, Third World economic independence is seen as an essential requirement for "true political independence."¹ President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia voiced a common complaint of the Third World when he told the Colombo Conference of the world's nonaligned nations on August 16, 1976:

We are opposed to the present system whereby the wealthier and industrialized countries retain the monopoly of making decisions affecting all other states. We believe in power-sharing as an important guarantee for peace within the international community.²

c. Establishment of a Third World identity

The changing role of underdeveloped nations in international relations from "pawns" to actors was largely the result of two complementary developments: (1) a growing cohesiveness among the nations of the Third World, and (2) recognition among Third World leaders that their unity represented potential political and economic power.

The Bandung Conference in 1955 offered the first substantive statement by the nonaligned nations of Africa and Asia that they did in fact consider themselves a group or bloc of nations separate and free from attachments to the two dominant "camps" in what was then a bipolar world. However, it was not until the late 1960's and the early 1970's that they began to coordinate their actions and develop the political and economic "muscle" necessary to support these assertions. Conferences, such as that at Bandung, were periodically held. The Colombo Conference of 1976 was the fifth such meeting of Third World leaders. The formation of "Group of 77" in 1971 marked an important step towards solidarity and cooperation in their dealings with the industrialized West. In 1973, the success of the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) oil embargo showed clearly that the LDC's possessed economic power and indeed were capable of utilizing economic pressure for political purposes.

In 1976, the unified and well-orchestrated position of the Third World nations at UNCTAD IV and the Colombo Conference (to be discussed in chapter V, p. 116) illustrated the strength and sophistication of the Third World in its dealings with the developed nations. As a result, no longer are the demands of the Third World taken lightly, much less ignored. Today many of the most important issues on the contemporary international scene center around questions directly concerning the Third World. International relations special-

¹ The Soviet Union, as noted in section II, has itself capitalized on this theme and made it an important part of its appeal to the Third World. The following is an example from the Soviet press: "Economic development occupies the center of attention of the developing countries today. This is because, although political independence has been achieved, the struggle for national sovereignty is not yet completed. For the developing countries, economic independence, for which they are fighting now, is necessary to completely shake off all old and neocolonialist influences." (Vasilyev Commentary. The Developing Countries' Economic Needs and Peking's Deeds. Radio Moscow in Mandarin to Southeast Asia, Jan. 29, 1975, FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, Feb. 3, 1975, p. C3.)

² Borders, William. Nonaligned Open High-Level Phase. The New York Times, Aug. 17, 1976, p. 9.

ists and perceptive world statesmen now speak of a possible shift of primary interest from East-West relations to North-South relations.

In brief, the Third World has become an international force to be reckoned with.

3. RESOURCES IN THE THIRD WORLD

a. A source of potential wealth and power

To a large extent the strength of the Third World derives from its numbers, size, and population, but most importantly it derives from an abundance of natural resources.

The Third World is rich in natural resources. In many LDC's raw materials represent over 80 percent of their total exports.³ These resources fuel the economies of the industrialized West. Western Europe and Japan are heavily dependent upon imports for their requirements.⁴ To a considerable degree these needs are supplied by the nations of the Third World.

Since raw material resources constitute almost 75 percent of the Third World's exports, they represent an important source of income.⁵ Increasingly in recent years the leaders of the Third World have recognized the important role played by their natural resources, not only in their own balance of trade, but also in the productive processes of the Western economies. As a result, Third World nations appreciate more than ever before the value of their natural resources; they are now exhibiting a keen awareness of the relative scarcity of these resources; they see clearly the potential use of these resources for political as well as economic purposes.

b. Third World attempts to control their resources

Recent calls by Third World representatives for a "new economic order" are largely based upon the desire to eliminate what they perceive to be exploitive economic relations with the developed nations.⁶ The Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, sponsored by Third World nations and passed by the U.N. General Assembly in May 1974, stated that "the present international order is in direct conflict with current developments in international political and economic relations."⁷ The Colombo Conference reaffirmed the principle of establishing a "new economic order" as a goal of the Third World.⁸ Thus, that regional and commodity-oriented trade organizations have been formed is not surprising; it illustrates the strong movement among these nations to improve their economic positions vis-a-vis the industrialized West.

³ Kebschull, Dietrich. Raw Materials in the Foreign Trade of the LDC's. Intereconomics, No. 12, December 1975, p. 374.

⁴ In 1973, the dependence of Europe and Japan on imports was 75 percent and 90 percent respectively. (U.S. Council on International Economic Policy. Special Report: Critical Imported Materials. Washington, 1974, p. 4.)

⁵ Hansen, Roger D. The U.S. and World Development: Agenda for Action 1976. New York, Praeger, 1976, p. 179.

⁶ Johnson, Thomas A. Third World Believes New Economic Order is at Hand. The New York Times, Oct. 13, 1975, p. 14.

⁷ United Nations. General Assembly. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order. New York, May 9, 1974 (United Nations Document A/RES/3201, S-VI, p. 2.)

⁸ Borders, William. Colombo Meeting of Third World is Opening Today. The New York Times, Aug. 16, 1976, p. 1.

4. POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THIRD WORLD IN ERA OF INTERDEPENDENCE

a. *A new focal point of power in international politics*

The emergence of the Third World is one of the most important political developments in the postwar period. The entry of a large number of new nations onto the international scene in a very short span of time has markedly changed the complexion and workings of international politics.

Over two-thirds of the United Nations' current membership is composed of nations of the Third World. These countries share mutual problems and goals. Economically backward, the Third World has firmly committed itself to domestic development and a restructuring of the international economic order. Politically, the underdeveloped nations are becoming much more active in the international arena. Their attempts to assume a positive role in the determination of international politics are becoming increasingly well-coordinated. Whether it be by forming a Third World voting bloc in the United Nations or a regional trade organization to combat "Western monopolies," the nations of the Third World are uniting politically and economically to achieve shared goals and aspirations.

b. *Politicization of international economics*

In October 1975, Thierry de Montbrial, Chef du Centre d'Analyse et de Prevision, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and professor of economics at Ecole Polytechnique in Paris, wrote in Foreign Affairs, "we must accept the politicization of economic relations as a given fact."⁹ De Montbrial drew this conclusion from what he perceived to be a growing tendency among states to link political goals with the conduct of international economic relations.¹⁰

With respect to the Third World, De Montbrial's observation is particularly relevant. Recent actions, the most striking example being OPEC's oil embargo in 1973, have forcefully illustrated the power of such linkage. The LDC's see Western dependence on Third World resources as a "weakness"; the industrialized West is vulnerable; the LDC's now have a leverage to compensate for their relative inferiority in other areas, for example, in military strength. Third World leaders thus look upon the use of economic pressure as an important means of enhancing their political power vis-a-vis the West. For them economics has become an instrument of politics.

c. *Interdependence*

On June 25, 1976, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger stated:

The process of development is crucial not only for the poorer nations but for the industrial nations as well. Our own prosperity is closely linked to raw materials, the markets, and the aspirations of the developing countries. An international order can be stable only if all nations perceive it as fundamentally just and are convinced that they have a stake in it. Over the long term, cooperative North-South relations are thus clearly in the interest of all, and the objectives of industrial and developing countries should be complementary.¹¹

This statement, a recurring theme in Kissinger's foreign policy pronouncements during the past 2 years, indicates what has become

⁹ De Montbrial, Thierry. For a New World Economic Order. Foreign Affairs, vol. 54, October 1975, p. 63.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ U.S. Department of State. Address by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger before the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, England, June 25, 1976, P R 329, p. 8.

a political truth; namely, the West increasingly realizes that economic relations with the LDC's are an important, perhaps even vital, component of contemporary international relations. World stability depends upon establishing a harmony of interests among all actors in the international arena. Developments in the Third World, whether they be economic or political, are, therefore, of great importance not only to the democratic West but also to the Communist East, for they too are part of this complex world economy and are not immune from its reverberations and shocks.

Third World dissatisfaction with its position in the current economic order may have direct political repercussions. The reverse may also be true. Political problems may find their manifestation in economic relations. The complementary nature of the world economy now makes cooperation and stability necessary prerequisites for development in the Third World and continued economic growth in the industrialized West and in the East. Interdependence is now a reality which cannot be ignored either by West or East. The Third World understands this very well.

5. THE THIRD WORLD IN MILITARY AND STRATEGIC MATTERS

a. Strategic importance of Third World: Straits and bases

The United States and the Soviet Union are global powers; their military power has a global reach; nations of the Third World hold key strategic areas. Thus the Third World is capable of vitally affecting Soviet and American global military positions.

Third World nations border on most of the world's important strategic straits, described in naval terminology as "chokepoints." Indonesia, Malaya, and Thailand surround the Straits of Malacca and Lombok; they connect the Indian Ocean with the south seas, leading on to the Pacific Ocean and East Asia. This vital waterway controls sea communications from East Africa and the Middle East to East and North East Asia. Saudi Arabia, North and South Yemen, Ethiopia, and Somalia surround the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb at the southern end of the Red Sea; Iran, Saudi Arabia, the Trucial Coast, and Oman border on the Strait of Hormuz in the Persian Gulf—both straits are vital sea communications extending from the Middle East and East Africa.¹²

In addition to control of vital waterways by Third World nations, it is significant that 23 of the 31 essential U.S. foreign trade routes listed by the U.S. Maritime Administration are flanked by Third World nations.¹³ It is no less significant that vital Soviet sea communications through the Dardanelles, Bosphorus, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean border on Third World nations in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia.

Another aspect of the importance of the Third World to the global military position of the Soviet Union and the United States are military bases. A large number of American overseas military bases have been located in underdeveloped nations. In recent years, however, many of these nations have become less willing to grant base rights

¹² Schumacher, Edward. *Arms and the Third World: Threat to the Superpowers*. The Washington Post, July 11, 1976: p. C2.

¹³ U.S. Department of Commerce. Maritime Administration. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1975, 79 p.

to the United States. On the other hand, some Third World nations have allowed the Soviet Union to establish military bases on their territory, often in areas where there had been no previous Soviet military presence. These developments have created new areas of Soviet-American competition. They have made the global projection of U.S. military power more difficult, while facilitating that of the Soviet Union. The effect has been to enhance the bargaining position of the Third World and increase its leverage in world politics.

b. Growing military strength of the LDC's

A related matter to the role of the Third World in maintaining the Soviet-American global military posture is the growing military strength of the LDC's and its effects on international politics. Third World military capabilities are growing at a very fast rate, adding to the forces that have made the LDC's a cockpit of international tension, instability and war for over two decades.¹⁴ In many emerging countries the military sector is often more sophisticated than the backward economic sector. Infusions of military assistance from the great powers have often altered regional balances of power, resulting in instability and occasional confrontation between neighboring Third World nations. The current turbulent scene in Africa is a striking example.

Third World regional conflicts also have repercussions on global affairs. Superpower patronage of sympathetic and friendly Third World nations often leads to situations where the great powers "take sides" in disputes involving underdeveloped nations, as for example in the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973. The potential for great power confrontation is increased; and so is the political value of the developing country in bargaining for a preferred position.

The strategic and political positions of the superpowers are also affected by the emergence of regional Third World military powers. Their presence in a particular region may be inhibited by a hostile Third World country that has increased its military capabilities. For example, the role of the United States in Southeast Asia has been radically reduced by the military successes of the Communists in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. The reverse may also be true. The cultivation of a sympathetic Third World military power may enhance the strategic and political position of a superpower in a particular region. A case in point is the role the Soviet Union has played in the Middle East, notably in Iraq, Syria, and until recently, Egypt.

Thus, no longer are superpower actions in the Third World necessarily uncontested and completely under their control. The emergence of LDC's with increasing military capabilities has visibly altered the past patterns of great power behavior in the Third World. The super-

¹⁴ The potentially explosive nature of the LDC's was demonstrated by David Wood in a study entitled, "Conflict in the Twentieth Century." (Adelphi Papers, June 1968, p. 19.) He noted that the majority of conflicts during the post-1945 years to 1967 had taken place in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. He cited a list of 80 such conflicts. A large number of them followed on or had been associated with the breakup of colonial empires and the subsequent emergence of new states, often small, poor, and insecure. All but eight of these 80 conflicts involved Third World participants on both sides. Since 1967, major wars have erupted in Nigeria, between India and Pakistan, in October 1973 between the Arabs and Israelis, and in Lebanon during 1976. The United States has been involved directly in many of these upheavals within the LDC's, most notably Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) and the Middle East, where even today it finds itself deeply entangled. In many of these wars the Soviet Union, while not directly involved militarily, played an important role as supplier of military assistance. (Discussed in, U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Issue of International Scientific Mobility. By Dr. Joseph G. Whelan, Senior Specialist in International Affairs, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1974, p. 253. Series: Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy.)

powers have been forced to adapt their global strategies to these new regional developments. The point to be made is that in military matters, as in those concerning economics and politics, the Third World has become a force to be reckoned with.

6. A SUMMING UP

The Third World is, therefore, important. Its size, population, and land area give it the physical dimensions of a new center of international power and influence. By possessing raw material resources vital to the progress of the industrialized nations and by having the will to organize and use economic leverage for political as well as economic purposes, the leaders of the Third World have drawn attention to the importance of this new power center in this era of interdependence. The instability of the Third World has drawn great powers into regional disputes, risking confrontations sometimes of grave magnitude. The existence of vital strategic sea communications along its littoral has generated great power involvement. And growing military capabilities of the Third World have limited great power freedom of action. Contemporary history has shown that developments in the Third World have contributed to the rise and fall in the prestige, power, and influence of great powers, invariably affecting their standing in world affairs.

In brief, the Third World cannot be ignored; nor has it been ignored by the Soviet Union which has looked upon it as a vital component in the correlation of world forces and an integral part of the Soviet ideological design of the world as seen from Moscow.

B. THE IDEOLOGICAL DIMENSION

1. COLONIES AS IMPERIALISM'S "WEAKEST LINK"

Soviet ideologists assigned a unique role to the Third World in creating the Soviet world outlook. From the days of Lenin what is now the Third World was seen destined to be allied with the Soviet Union in the larger global struggle between communism and world capitalism: the Third World was to be a vital force in eventually establishing a world Communist state.

Lenin initially formulated the idea of linking Western colonialism to the goals of communism in his adaptation of the phenomenon of imperialism to Marxism. Drawing upon the economic theory of imperialism from the British scholar, J. H. Hobson, Lenin sketched out a theoretical design asserting imperialism to be the "highest stage of capitalism" that would hasten the "general crisis of capitalism," ultimately bring down the world capitalist system, and make way for a new international socialist order. For in Lenin's view imperialism extended the class struggle on a global scale as the European metropolitan powers built colonial empires in Asia and Africa and exploited their peoples. Competition, rivalry, and war among the capitalist states were inevitable as each attempted to seize new markets and expand its imperial system in a world of declining opportunities. The colonies, the "reserve of imperialism," were the main prop of the system. They enriched both the metropolitan capitalists and the proletariat, temporarily satisfying the

proletariat, assuaging their social grievances, and in so doing forestalling inevitable revolution. But the colonies were also the "weakest link" in this imperial system. Exploited and abused, they would rise up in a national liberation movement against their imperialist exploiters, generate international instability, exacerbate great power rivalry, and in the ensuing armed conflicts bring down the capitalist system.

Lenin was convinced that capitalism was inevitably doomed, just as Brezhnev today believes the capitalist to be "a society without a future."¹⁵ And both perceived the underdeveloped colonial areas of the world to be an ally in bringing this about.

2. EXPECTATIONS OF THE FUTURE

Soviet theorists have perceived the relationship between the Soviet Union and the national liberation movements in the Third World as symbiotic, that is, the success of each promoting the cause of the other. In commentaries on the contemporary world scene they continually stress an "invincible unity" between the "world socialist forces" led by the Soviet Union and the national liberation movements in the LDC's. The relationship between and among these "main components" of the "world revolutionary process," combined with "the revolutionary struggle of the working classes in capitalist countries," are understood to be both close and interdependent. Each component is seen as a main contributor in the continuing historical struggle to destroy international capitalism. An official Soviet statement explained:

World socialism helps the national emancipation of the oppressed people while the liberation struggle contributes to the struggle for socialism and strengthens its positions. The national liberation movement deals heavy blows at the common enemy—imperialism. The national liberation movement bolsters up the socialist and democratic forces in the world arena, opens up new opportunities for launching an active struggle against the imperialist policy of plunder and conquest.¹⁶

Thus the Third World is not comprehended merely as a part of the global struggle against imperialism; it is regarded as a likely stage for new socialist revolutionary transformations. "Of paramount significance," Soviet writers aver, "is the fact that after gaining national independence the former colonies and semicolonies are now moving in the direction of socialism, adding to and making more universal its experience."¹⁷

Historically, the principal criteria for this special relationship has been anti-imperialism. Leaders of the Third World nations, particularly those emerging from the British Empire, though others had only a slightly different experience, came on to the contemporary postwar scene harboring deep-rooted Socialist predilections on the organization of their newly independent societies and in many respects harboring also profound anti-American and anti-European prejudices. As Daniel Patrick Moynihan summed up these attitudes in his critique of the Third World, "There were scores to be settled.

¹⁵ Brezhnev, Report at 25th Congress of the CPSU, p. 24.

¹⁶ Quoted in, Schwartz, op. cit., p. 210.

¹⁷ Ibid.

Internally and internationally.”¹⁸ Accordingly, the interests of the LDC’s coincided remarkably with those of the Soviet Union and its Communist allies. And so Ferenc Varnai, a Hungarian theorist, could write on the eve of the Colombo Conference of 1976:

Thus, considering the objective position of the countries pursuing a nonaligned policy and the positive aspirations of most of them, we regard a large part of them as a *natural ally* of the world socialist system and the international workers movement and as an important pillar of the struggle for improving international conditions, independence, disarmament and the liquidation of the vestiges of tension. To attain their objectives, these countries cannot dispense with the support of the community of the socialist countries, without which not even the movement of the nonaligned countries would have come about. * * * However, in its struggle in the international arena, the community of socialist countries pursuing a coordinated policy cannot dispense with the anti-imperialist determination of the nonaligned countries either, with concerted action.¹⁹

Where the nations of the Third World fit into the Soviet ideological design is thus fairly clear, at least in the contemporary era: they are, as Varnai says, “a natural ally.” But in the longer term Soviet ideologists regard them as an important component in a much larger international system that, at least theoretically, they envision for the distant future; namely, the creation of a Soviet world state. In the historical transformation of world society the LDC’s seem destined to play a key role.²⁰

Meanwhile, in the immediate and practical short term the Soviets expect that the urgency of social and economic development will lead the LDC’s over time to radical social change. Accordingly, they add great importance to the anti-imperialist struggle because, among other things, this social transformation, as Gupta wrote, “radicalizes the masses and compels the leaders to make hard decisions and choices.”²¹ In brief, the exigencies of development and the politics of anti-imperialism are the catalyst for radical social change leading to socialism.

3. IDEOLOGY AS A GUIDE TO POLICY

In the movement toward this theoretically ultimate Socialist world order, ideology plays a unique role: it acts as a guide to Soviet policy and action in the Third World. As a mechanism governing the belief

¹⁸ Moynihan, *op. cit.*, p. 34. Moynihan finds the roots of these critical attitudes of the LDC’s in British socialism. He wrote: “These new nations naturally varied in terms of size, population, and resources. But in one respect they hardly varied at all. To a quite astonishing degree they were ideologically uniform having fashioned their politics in terms derived from the general corpus of British socialist opinion as it developed in the period roughly 1890-1950.” (p. 31). Moynihan perceived the political traditions in the French, Belgian, Dutch, and Portuguese only “slightly different” from that of the British. Viewed from Mars, London, Paris, and the Hague, he wrote, “are not widely separated or disparate places. By the time of the granting of independence, all were democratic with a socialist intelligentsia and often as not a socialist government.” (p. 34.)

¹⁹ Varnai, Ferenc. Consultation; the Nonaligned Countries. *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), June 5, 1976, pp. 4 and 5, in, FBIS, *Daily Report, Eastern Europe*, vol. 2, June 16, 1976, p. F8. [Italics added.]

²⁰ Dr. John A. Armstrong, a Soviet specialist at the University of Wisconsin, wrote: “* * * the Soviet Union is not a national state, but (to use Vernon Aspaturian’s term) an ‘arrested world state.’ From the start, Lenin based his system’s claim to incorporate a diverse group of nations on the assertion that the Soviet state was only a step toward a Communist union of all nations.” With regard to alternatives in future Soviet foreign policy, Armstrong writes: “Clearly, the United States leaders will need strong wills and resolute public support to demonstrate beyond question that a Soviet drive for a world Communist state is doomed to failure.” (Armstrong, John A. *Ideology, Politics, and Government in the Soviet Union*. 3d ed., New York, Praeger, 1974, pp. 199 and 221.) For a discussion of Soviet expectations for the future, see Goodman, Elliott R. *The Soviet Design for a World State*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1960. 512 pp. Goodman concludes: Soviet totalitarianism “recognizes no legitimate bounds to its power. Within the confines of the existing Soviet state the Kremlin claims the right to direct and control man totally, in his body, mind, and spirit. The ambition of the Soviet regime is also total for the world beyond its borders. The conscious and continuing outward thrust of Soviet power maintains as its objective the absorption of all nations of the world into the Soviet body politic and, ultimately, the reshaping of their patterns of life into the single, all-embracing mold of a Soviet world state.” (p. 472.)

²¹ Gupta, *An Approach to Study of Soviet Policies for Third World*, in Kanet/Bahry, eds., *Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations*, pp. 30-31 (ff).

system of the ruling elite, it established the doctrinal context and a larger schematic framework for policy conception, analysis, formulation, and execution. It is a guide to cognition and action. A stock expression among Soviet writers is that ideology "illuminates the path ahead" and in the words of one theorist, "enables us not only to chart a correct path through the labyrinth of social contradictions, but to predict the course events will take, the direction of historical progress and the next stage of social development."²²

With an operational code drawn from ideology, the Soviets are thus able to establish criteria for advance, retreat, and temporizing. A system that is attuned to the vagaries of history, it induces a type of flexibility and adaptability to a changing international environment that places a premium on rationality, acute perception, strength of will, and sufficiency in power resources. This quality of maneuver accounts for tactical changes recorded above during the Khrushchev-Brezhnev regimes and for the varying doctrinal formulations designed to accommodate client states and target regimes. It also accounts for Soviet willingness to accept setbacks, as presently seen in the case of Egypt, adjust to changing realities, and advance at the most propitious moment. (Despite the expulsion of Soviet personnel from Egypt, the Soviet presence remains in the form of continuing economic aid commitments. Reportedly, the Soviet Union is continuing to supply weapons, ammunition, and spare parts to Egypt through third countries.)

Ideology also recognizes the imperative requirements of nation-building essential to the Third World.²³ Moreover, it provides the theoretical justification for Soviet intervention not only in local wars between so-called imperialists and the forces of national liberation (e.g., the U.S. in Vietnam) but also in specific cases between what they would perceive as native forces of oppression and the mass of revolutionary people (e.g., the Angolan civil war).²⁴

Soviet ideology is thus a guide to policy and action in the Third World. Whether power interests or ideological drives underlie these policies and actions may be a matter of difference, but contradictions tend to be temporary and are more apparent than real. As Prof. George Lenzowski, a specialist on Soviet policy in the Middle East, observed, "Ultimately, a dynamic Soviet state interest to expand and dominate is complemented by Communist ideology and vice versa." "Applied to the long run," wrote Campbell, "the proposition is unexceptional."²⁵ For ideology, whatever its operational value and its legitimizing functions for the ruling elite, creates a synthetic world, a mixture of myth and hope, an amalgam of expectations and utopianism, combined with a directed destiny in which theory is assumed to create historical reality. But ideology is more than a guide to action; it is a patina for power; both are interdependent and self-reinforcing.²⁶

²² Quoted in, Gupta, *An Approach to Study of Soviet Policies for Third World*, in Kanet/Bahry, eds., *Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations*, p. 23.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 35, ff. 27.

²⁵ Campbell, *Soviet Union and Middle East*, in Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, p. 168.

²⁶ Prof. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, a Soviet specialist at the University of Pennsylvania, discounts the role of ideology in Soviet policy towards the Third World. He writes: "Whatever legitimizing function ideology plays within the Soviet communist hierarchy, and whatever its importance as a medium for communication and conflict within the communist international system, ideology is not central to Soviet policy formulation toward developing countries; it is more a fig leaf of Western imagination than a determinant of Soviet policy in the Third World." (Rubinstein, *Soviet Policy Toward the Third World in 1970's*, p. 115).

C. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSION

1. POLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THIRD WORLD FROM SOVIET VIEW

a. Factor in sustaining Soviet global role

Ideology establishes the global parameters of Soviet action in foreign policy, and within those parameters the Third World, by its nature and history, attracts Soviet political participation. As noted above, the Third World is politically important: it constitutes an impressive constellation of power on the international scene; it is organized; it is vocal; it is politically active; its interests often coincide with those of the Soviet Union; it inclines toward socialism in form and rhetoric; it seeks allies in support of its goals; it presents political opportunities. Samora Machel, the Soviet-educated President of Mozambique, could well have spoken for many of the LDC's when he recently said of his country's relationship with the Soviet Union: "We are naturally socialist allies."²⁷ The Soviets readily perceive the possibilities of this connection. A principal factor in the Soviet calculation of the correlation of world forces, the Third World has become in Soviet eyes a prize to be won.

Thus for the Soviets the Third World has political value, mainly because it presents political opportunity and because it is the instrumentality for expanding and globalizing Soviet influence and power. The Third World enables the Soviet Union to magnify its great power role on the world scene as regional interests of the individual LDC's merge with Soviet global interests. The Third World connection sustains the Soviet compulsion to maintain both its prestige and its status as a great world power.

b. Denial of Western and Chinese influence

The other side of the Soviet thrust toward globalism is denial of Western and Chinese influence in the Third World. This factor underlies Soviet political purposes. The Soviet Union pursues the political goal of detaching key LDC's from the so-called capitalist-imperialist world system and aligning them as potential allies in the "anti-imperialist struggle." In this process the Soviet Union is selective, mindful particularly of Soviet strategic needs.²⁸

Accordingly, Soviet policy in the Middle East during the last quarter century has followed two main lines: to reduce the Western commitment and influence in the northern tier countries, Turkey and Iran, bordering on the Soviet Union; and to support Arab nationalism and radical Arab regimes in conflict with the West for the purpose of reducing Western influence and the Western presence.²⁹ The Middle East is vital to the Soviet Union in that it offers opportunities for creating a Soviet sphere of influence, useful in asserting its world role and in blocking that of the United States and China.³⁰ Though Soviet aims may be difficult to define, they are nonetheless guided by this larger generalized political purpose and as such tend to operate, in Campbell's words, "on a sliding scale, moving up or down in relation to the changing possibilities."³¹

²⁷ The Christian Science Monitor, June 29, 1976, p. 6.

²⁸ Gupta, An Approach to Study of Soviet Policies for Third World, in Kanet/Bahry, eds., Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations, p. 23.

²⁹ Campbell, Soviet Union and Middle East, in Kanet, ed., Soviet Union and Developing Nations, p. 157

³⁰ Ibid., p. 175.

³¹ Ibid., p. 175.

Similarly in Africa, the prime Soviet objective has been to spread its influence and decrease Africa's reliance on the Western Powers. Once that power is eliminated, the next step, according to Klinghoffer, "will be to bring the African states into the Soviet orbit." Enjoying the advantage of a noncolonial past (at least with respect to Africa) and using the instrumentalities of economic and military aid, the Soviets have the capability, in Klinghoffer's judgment, of "effectively" pursuing this policy.³²

Soviet policy has also been aimed at denying the Chinese influence and a presence in the Third World. The Sino-Soviet dispute, once contained, has in recent years spilled over into the LDC's. Each has competed vigorously for favors and position. The rhetoric on both sides, always vitriolic and bitter, has intensified. Typical of official Chinese statements critical of Soviet foreign aid was that in the Peking Review of July 11, 1969. It charged the Soviet Union with "fleecing" the peoples of the LDC's and seeking their conquest. The Soviet Union, it said, "wants to dominate the recipient countries politically so as to establish a colonial rule of the new tsars." Soviet aid, it went on, "is adapted to and closely coordinated with its counterrevolutionary global strategy."³³

On its part the Soviet did more than respond in kind to the rhetoric of the dispute: they took concrete policy actions against the Chinese in the Third World. In June 1969, Brezhnev launched the Soviet Asian collective security system. Though denying anti-Peking purposes, this proposal was nonetheless generally judged to be directed at containing China. The Chinese perceived it that way; they have consistently accused the Russians of attempting to isolate and "encircle" China.

Thus, Soviet policy in the Third World has served two political purposes: to build and maintain the Soviet Union's position as a global power; and to reduce and deny the United States, the West, and China influence and power in the Third World.

2. ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF THIRD WORLD FROM SOVIET VIEW

a. Economic asset for Soviet economy

The Third World has a special economic importance for the Soviet Union: it has served as a market for Soviet economic goods, military weapons, supplies and equipment; it has provided a source for raw materials; it has created an opportunity for economic integration to the Soviet advantage.

During the Brezhnev era, particularly with the onset of economic rationalization in dispensing economic aid and concluding trade agreements, the Soviets came to appreciate the Third World as an asset in Soviet economic development. Many aid agreements recorded in the early 1970's, as economic considerations were becoming more important, were designed largely to increase the importation of fuel, raw materials, and consumer goods from the LDC's, and to create markets for Soviet machinery and equipment.³⁴ Soviet-supported development

³² Klinghoffer, Soviet Union and Africa, in Kanet, ed., Soviet Union and Developing Nations, p. 77.

³³ Quoted in, Prybyla, Sino-Soviet Split and Developing Nations, in Kanet, ed., Soviet Union and Developing Nations, p. 267.

³⁴ Tansky, Soviet Foreign Aid, in JEC's report, Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies, 1973, p. 766.

projects, like factories in India producing shoes and mining equipment, were increasingly directed to serve Soviet domestic needs and provide resources in the recipient countries for repayment of credits.³⁵

Such a development strategy served Soviet political purposes in addition to the economic by creating conduits for the inflow of materials, personnel, and ideas from the Soviet Union into the Third World, thus expanding the potential area of Soviet influence and power. Valkenier observed that "closer economic cooperation, involving as it does measures of integration, is bound to bring the developing nations into the Soviet orbit." She concluded that "a well-coordinated and well-executed economic program has in many respects successfully replaced political infiltration as a method of Soviet penetration in the Third World."³⁶

b. Third World raw material resources vital to West

Third World raw material resources, vital to the dependent industrialized West, has enhanced the economic value of the Third World to the Soviet Union. The oil embargo of 1973 demonstrated the leverage this gives the LDC's in their relations with the West. The Soviets have understood this leverage and have sought to exploit it for their own purposes. To them the Third World is "a zone with colossal material and manpower resources":³⁷ its economic potential is matched by the political opportunities it presents.

Underlying Third World grievances against the industrialized West is a general dissatisfaction with the structure of their economic relations. Particularly irritating to the LDC's is what they perceive to be the "exploitive" prices offered for their natural resources on the international market. The Soviet Union has tried to capitalize on this dissent in an effort to discredit the West and win the favor of the LDC's. In their political attacks the Soviets have emphasized the "neo-colonialist" nature of this trade, particularly its "inequality and injustice." But more importantly they point out the important role that Third World resources have played in maintaining the world capitalist system and the growing dependency of the West on these resources.³⁸

In the economic sphere Soviet purposes have seemed fairly clear; namely, to satisfy Soviet economic needs through the Third World connection; to widen the breach of misunderstanding between the Third World and the industrialized West; and in the long term to deny

³⁵ Kanet, Soviet Union and Developing Countries: Policy or Policies?, in, Kanet/Bahry, eds. Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations, p. 15.

³⁶ Valkenier, Soviet Economic Relations with Developing Nations, in Kanet, ed., Soviet Union and Developing Nations, pp. 235-236. See also, Tansky, Soviet Foreign Aid, in JEC's report, Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies, 1973, p. 767.

³⁷ Apalin, G. Peking and the "Third World." International Affairs (Moscow), No. 3, March 1976: 90. For a discussion of U.S. dependency on certain strategic materials from abroad and the continuous need to control adequate ocean transport for delivery of such materials, see, Ackley, Richard T. The Weak Link in U.S. National Strategy: USSR is Self Sufficient; U.S. is not. Sea Power, vol. 17, August 1974: 24-27. The article analyzes a book by Soviet Major General A. N. Lagovskiy entitled, "Strategy and Economics." Lagovskiy terms this dependency the "weak link" in American military capability and argues for a Soviet effort to control such strategic materials as a means for exerting influence on the American economy. Ackley concludes that while the "possibility of adverse Soviet pressure on the U.S. economy in any protracted conflict now seems neither inevitable nor imminent; however, the Lagovskiy thesis is indeed credible and warrants the attention of American strategic planners." (p. 27.).

³⁸ Rheingold, Otto. Some Features of the Contemporary Crisis of the Capitalist Economy. Kommunist, No. 7, May 1974. (JP RS 62292: June 2, 1974, p. 145.)

the latter vital raw material resources.³⁹ In pursuit of these goals the Soviets have emphasized to the LDC's a point that they themselves have been well aware of; namely, that "true political independence" can only come when they win their economic independence.⁴⁰

c. Soviet model for socialism and development

Related to Soviet economic interest in the Third World is Soviet insistence on putting forward their brand of socialism as a model for development and building socialism. An underlying purpose of Soviet economic aid, according to Tansky, was to convince Third World countries that the Soviet Socialist system offered the only solution to their economic problems.⁴¹ In reality, however, the Soviet model prescribed what Charles K. Wilber, professor of economics at American University, termed was a "war economy harnessed to the attainment of one overriding objective—economic development." In this type of economy fundamental freedoms are suppressed, while "all physical and human resources are concentrated on the one basic objective of promoting economic development."⁴²

Despite its imperfections the Soviet model, nonetheless, has appealed to many in the Third World, largely no doubt from the Soviet Union's rapid success in achieving the stature of a great world power and from political, economic and social realities and historical experiences that have encouraged socialist-oriented solutions. Gupta explained the appeal of the Soviet model in this way. Where Soviet strategies proved to be more or less successful, the anti-imperialist struggle provided "the mutual value responsiveness": Soviet aid met felt needs; political and military support helped achieve, sustain, and defend shared objectives; Soviet global interests and the regional interests of the LDC's converged. The entire process helped to establish orientations. Thus, the Soviet Union "is seen as a friend, a great power that seeks not subjugation but interdependence, and the socialist system as something to be learned from, to be adapted to local conditions."⁴³

³⁹ American dependence on raw materials from abroad much of which comes from the Third World is indicated in the following excerpt from Lester Brown's *World Without Borders* (N. Y., Random House, 1972, p. 194): "Of the thirteen basic industrial raw materials required by a modern economy, the United States was dependent on imports for more than one half of its supplies of four of these in 1950: aluminum, manganese, nickel and tin. By 1970 the list has increased to six, as zinc and chromium were added. Projections indicate that by 1985 the United States will depend on imports for more than one half of its supplies of nine basic raw materials, as iron, lead and tungsten are added. By the end of the century it will be dependent primarily on foreign sources for its supply of each of the thirteen raw materials except phosphate." (Quoted in, Nye, Joseph S., Jr. *Independence and Interdependence*. Foreign Policy, No. 22, spring 1972:132.)

The overall dependence of the industrialized West on the LDCs for raw materials was indicated by John K. Cooley, Middle East correspondent for *The Christian Science Monitor*, who reporting on the Algiers conference of the nonaligned LDCs in September 1973 wrote that the delegates represented countries that "contain over half the world's oil and two-thirds of most of its other vital resources." The 1973 report of the U.S. National Commission on Materials Policy stated: "The less developed regions of the world have held the principal sources of materials imported by industrial countries." (National Commission on Materials Policy, *Material Needs and the Environment Today and Tomorrow*, Final Report, 1973, pp. 9-11.)

⁴⁰ Illustrative of the Soviet stress on this theme of economic independence was the Radio Moscow broadcast to Southeast Asia: "Economic development occupies the center of attention of the developing countries today. This is because, although political independence has been achieved, the struggle for national sovereignty is not yet completed. For the developing countries, economic independence, for which they are fighting now, is necessary to completely shake off all old and neocolonialist influences." (Vasilyev commentary. Moscow Radio in Mandarin to Southeast Asia, Jan. 29, 1975, FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, Feb. 3, 1975, p. C3.)

⁴¹ Tansky, Soviet Foreign Aid, in JEC's report, *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies*, 1973, p. 767.

⁴² Wilber, Charles K. *The Soviet Model of Economic Development: A Reexamination*. Chapter 4, in Kanet/Bahry, eds., *Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations*, p. 44.

⁴³ Gupta, *An Approach to Study of Soviet Policies for Third World*, in Kanet/Bahry, eds., *Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations*, p. 30.

Andrei Amalrik, a Soviet dissident writer who emigrated to the West, presents Soviet-Third World relations from a contrasting perspective, suggesting points of Soviet identity with the Third World and the universality of the Soviet condition seen in the larger North-South context. He visualized Russia in the midst of the great North-South conflict, between rich and poor countries, developed and underdeveloped, and having a foot in each. Russia, he said, "combines within itself traits of both a developed, rich country, and an underdeveloped, extremely poor country." As such it was drawn economically to the West and ideologically to the Third World, a position which he termed unstable and with inherent contradictions. Amalrik asked himself whether the Soviet historical experience, the tragic confrontation between the affluent, educated society and its poor and backward society, did not foreshadow a world-wide condition. (Starr, Frank. *Amalrik's Views Cause Pain for Moscow—and Kissinger*. The Chicago Tribune, Sept. 13, 1976, p. 8.)

d. Merging economic and strategic interests

Finally, Soviet economic and strategic interests in the Third World merged in the Soviet Union's offers to improve port facilities and develop commercial fishing under aid agreements that in time evolved into a Soviet naval presence. As Valkenier described the process: "Years of patient preparation of naval facilities and the gathering of intelligence under the guise of economic aid preceded the dramatic appearance of the Soviet fleet in distant seas."⁴⁴

Thus, the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and in other contiguous waterways was preceded by extensive Soviet foreign aid operations to improve harbor facilities at Hodeida in Yemen, Berbera in Somalia, and in the UAR. These operations began in the late 1950's and the mid-1960's.⁴⁵

Development of commercial fishing was a prominent feature in the overall Soviet aid program, particularly in states not receiving Soviet military aid. This device served as another strategic wedge for insinuating Soviet power into the Third World. The construction of fishing facilities required extensive use of ports and coastal waters. This requirement produced the desired result: a Soviet presence in those assisted nations with facilities provided for gathering intelligence.⁴⁶

What often began as a request for permission to dock Soviet trawlers at certain ports in return for economic assistance in developing ocean fishing eventually expanded into requests for providing naval facilities for the Soviet fleet. For example, an agreement with Mauritius (located east of Madagascar in the Indian Ocean) in August 1969 for the construction of a modern fishing fleet was followed by several visits of Soviet warships. Thus without much effort and publicity the Soviet Union added another port of call for refueling and supplying their growing Indian ocean fleet.⁴⁷

To sum up, Soviet interest in the Third World has a political and economic dimension that served many purposes not least of which was the strategic needs of a great power that was developing a global reach.

D. STRATEGIC DIMENSION

1. GEOPOLITICAL IMPORTANCE OF THIRD WORLD

That areas in the Third World have great geopolitical importance for the Soviet Union is a commonly accepted truth. As noted above, size, population, and resources make the Third World a potentially immense configuration of power. But equally important, for the developed countries of West and East, is the fact that many of the key strategic areas of the world, particularly straits, the "choke-points" of ocean traffic, lie within the Third World. For example, the Persian Gulf, surrounded by LDC's varying in size, is the largest single source of exported oil and is shut in by the Strait of Hormuz. About 90 percent of Japanese oil passes through the Straits of Malacca and Lombok that connect the Indian and Pacific Ocean and are

⁴⁴ Valkenier, *Soviet Economic Relations with Developing Nations*, in Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, p. 232.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 233.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 233.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 233-234.

bounded by Third World countries.⁴⁸ Access to the Turkish straits is vital for the Soviet Union; yet it lies within the jurisdiction of Turkey, and beyond direct Soviet control. Principal Soviet anchorages in the Mediterranean are mainly near "chokepoints" in the eastern Mediterranean and North Africa where the free flow of traffic could be interrupted in the event of war. LDC's rim that area of the Mediterranean.⁴⁹

Soviet interest in the Third World thus has a strategic dimension; for the thrust of Soviet power into the Third World has been a global policy in pursuit of global goals, a movement from traditional continentalism into a new era of globalism. The effect was to place a heavy burden on Soviet strategic requirements. The principal instrument for this outward thrust has been the Soviet Navy, and to properly provide for its new mission has required the building of an elaborate and carefully selected infrastructure of overseas bases, port facilities, refueling stations, and so forth. As Campbell observed in a comment on the totality of the new Soviet naval strategy, the Soviet naval forces "in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean serve the general aim, pursued since the early 1960's, of making the Soviet Union a global naval power capable of flexing its muscles on all the world's seas."⁵⁰

Soviet strategic requirements in the Third World were thus to serve four overarching purposes: to maintain Soviet security; to expand Soviet power and influence in the Third World; to contest and reduce the Western presence; and to deny to the West key strategic areas for maintaining control and expanding political influence and power.⁵¹

2. DIRECTION OF SOVIET INVESTMENTS IN AID AND POLITICAL ENERGY: THE "NATIONAL LIBERATION ZONE"

Soviet aid and political energy have been carefully—and rationally—invested in areas of the Third World which clearly serve Soviet strategic and political interests. Undifferentiated aid to small out-of-the-way LDC's, having no significant impact on international politics—aid motivated strictly from humanitarian impulses—does not fit into Soviet designs. They have felt no shared responsibility with the United States and the West for underdevelopment and poverty in the Third World: this was the West's burden; as the colonial-imperial powers, by Soviet reasoning, the West was responsible, not the Soviet Union.⁵²

⁴⁸ Schumacher, Edward. Arms and the Third World: Threat to the Superpowers. The Washington Post, July 11, 1976, p. C2.

⁴⁹ Cooley, John K. Soviets Step up Naval Power in Mediterranean. The Christian Science Monitor, June 22, 1976, p. 4.

⁵⁰ Campbell, Soviet Union and Middle East, in Kanet, ed., Soviet Union and Developing Nations, p. 155. Campbell goes on to discuss strategic characteristics of the Third World, particularly the Middle East, as they relate to Soviet power and purposes.

⁵¹ The literature on the Soviet approach to the Third World uniformly cites Soviet strategic aims as an underlying purpose of its Third World policy, particularly in the post-Khrushchev period. Klinghoffer, for example, writes with respect to Africa: "Seeing the search for allies as almost chimerical in the rapidly changing African political arena, the Soviet Union became primarily concerned with pure strategic interest. Largely disregarding the existence of military rule or of clearly nonsocialist economic programs, the Soviets began to seek beneficial economic agreements, port facilities, overflight rights, naval bases, and an advantageous military position." (Klinghoffer, Soviet Union and Africa, in Kanet, ed., Soviet Union and Developing Nations, p. 63.)

With respect to Soviet military aid to Somalia, Schwartz wrote: "The Kremlin obviously is less concerned with Somalia's progress in its 'transition to a settled way of life' (according to *Pravda*, the country's main problem), than with the recent agreement that allows it to build a major naval base and military headquarters on Somalia's southern coast, facilities which could be of use as a fueling point for a Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean." (Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 234-235.)

⁵² Larrabee, F. Stephen. Colombo and Beyond: Moscow and the Nonaligned Countries. Radio Liberty Research. RL 396/76, Aug. 31, 1976, pp. 3 and 8.

Soviet criteria for recipients of foreign aid and other favors was simple: whoever served Soviet strategic and political interests. Accordingly, the Soviet Union concentrated on what has been termed the "national liberation zone." This zone, shaped like a crescent, extends from North Africa, bordering on the strategically important Mediterranean, through the Middle East and South Asia, whose countries are contiguous to the Soviet Union or like India constitute a counterweight to China, and then on to Southeast Asia. Only in recent years have the Soviets directed a great deal of attention to sub-Saharan Africa as opportunities began to open up. Latin America has lain on the periphery of Soviet strategic interests and has been treated accordingly.

From the Soviet view this "national liberation zone" is "supremely important," as Gupta observed, because of the strategic raw materials and human resources that lie within it, the commercial and communications lifelines that intersect it, and the geographic reality that it is adjacent to the U.S.S.R. and the socialist bloc. Within this zone most local conflicts of the postwar era had been fought—and still are being fought; and within it also are the leading contingents, the "vanguards" as the Soviets would say, of the national liberation struggle. In the Soviet perspective this "national liberation zone" has provided the "main link" in the chain of the anti-imperialist struggle in the contemporary era. The outcome of that struggle is expected to lead to further retreats of the imperialists forces from the Third World.⁵³

Accordingly, the Soviet Union has targeted this "national liberation zone" for the bulk of its foreign aid and the investment of its political energy. During the period 1954–72, the Soviet Union extended about \$8.2 billion of economic aid to 44 LDC's. Nearly 75 percent of the total committed went to countries in the Middle East and South Asia. Afghanistan, Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey were allocated about 65 percent.⁵⁴ During 1964–72, about 80 percent of the total Soviet economic aid of \$4.4 billion was concentrated within the arc of LDC's running from the eastern Mediterranean, through the Red Sea and to the Arabian Sea. About half of the 10 percent allocated to Africa went to the North African states of Algeria and Morocco.⁵⁵

Over two decades the tactics of Soviet aid has not been changed. Economic and/or military assistance was used to establish, maintain, and expand the Soviet presence in aid receiving countries. In the initial Khrushchev years, economic aid was used to penetrate such South and East Asian countries as Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka. Military aid was used in the Middle East; and not until Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen concluded arms agreements did they receive economic aid. During the period 1955–72, the Soviets extended about \$8.5 billion in arms assistance. Some 90 percent went to 8 countries, all within the "national liberation zone"; about 70 percent was allocated to Egypt, India, Indonesia, and Iraq.⁵⁶

The magnitude of aid allocated within the "national liberation zone" for Soviet strategic purposes was thus formidable. According to Valkenier, this commitment during the decade of the 1960's and early

⁵³ Gupta, *An Approach to Study of Soviet Policies for Third World*, in Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, p. 28.

⁵⁴ Tansky, *Soviet Foreign Aid*, in JEC's report, *Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies*, 1973, p. 768.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 768–769.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 771–772.

1970's exceeded predictions about Soviet efforts to establish their presence and influence abroad.

Military aid was generally the principal, if not exclusive, means for gaining strategic footholds overseas. Overlooked, however, was the significance of skillfully placed and coordinated aid programs that were connected with military projects, such as, the building of airfields and airports; improving harbor and naval facilities; expanding communications facilities, including road building; the granting of overflight rights and developing indigenous aviation capabilities. These forms of assistance provided a more lasting and assured basis of Soviet influence than just arms and armaments. The effect of concentrating on dual purpose projects was to create an infrastructure that could serve Soviet military power on a global scale.⁵⁷

In retrospect, therefore, Soviet strategic purposes were clear; namely, to build an infrastructure to buttress the Soviet policy of globalism. Their prime target area was and continues to be the "national liberation zone."

E. COMPOSITE OF MOTIVATIONS: A SURGE TOWARD GLOBALISM

The Third World constitutes an impressive configuration of potential power:

- It has the physical dimensions of an international power center;
- It has a will to organize and the capacity to act collectively as shown in the oil embargo;
- It possesses enormous raw material resources, giving the beholder effective leverage against the industrialized West;
- It is the most unstable area in the world, where continuing conflicts are generated, new risks of great power confrontation are constantly produced, and new opportunities are given to the adversaries of the United States and the West;
- It commands vital strategic sea communications of the world, making its friendship an imperative for pursuers of a globalist policy; and
- It has come onto the world scene, socialistically oriented, politically favorable toward the Soviet Union in varying degrees, and with real or imagined scores to settle with the former imperial West.

In brief, the Third World has become a force to be reckoned with in contemporary international politics.

⁵⁷ Valkenier, *Soviet Economic Relations with Developing Nations*, in Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, pp. 231-34.

According to the most recent information on Soviet civil air activities in the Third World, *Aeroflot* operates regularly scheduled flights to the following cities in the Middle East and North Africa: Aden, South Yemen; Algiers, Algeria; Amman, Jordan; Ankara and Istanbul, Turkey; Baghdad, Iraq; Cairo, Egypt; Casablanca and Rabat, Morocco; Damascus, Syria; Khartoum, Sudan; Larnaca, Cyprus; Sana, Yemen Arab Republic; Tehran, Iran; Tripoli, Libya; and Tunis, Tunisia.

In Africa, *Aeroflot* operates regularly scheduled flights to Accra, Ghana; Bamako, Mali; Bangui, Central African Republic; Bissau, Guinea-Bissau; Brazzaville, Congo; Conakry, Guinea; Cotonou, Benin; Dakar, Senegal; Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania; Kampala (Entebbe), Uganda; Lagos, Nigeria; Luanda, Angola; Malabo, Equatorial Guinea; Maputo, Mozambique; Mogadishu, Somalia; Nairobi, Kenya; N'Djamena, Chad; and Nouadhibou, Mauritania.

Aeroflot could not operate the above scheduled commercial flights without first negotiating with the host country an agreement setting forth that country's assent to *Aeroflot's* presence and the terms of its activities.

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has civil air agreements on register between the Soviet Union and the following additional Third World countries: Cape Verde, March 2, 1976, and Mauritius, November 23, 1973.

In 1975, the Soviet Union was reported to be negotiating an agreement with Ethiopia. In 1973, an agreement was reportedly signed with the African states of Burundi and Ruanda. In 1974, talks on new route rights were to be held with Zaire.

(This information was provided by the Defense Intelligence Agency.)

The Soviet Union has reckoned with this new reality for reasons that are rooted in its political, economic, ideological, and strategic interests. For the Soviets, the Third World is an integral part of their ideological design of the world as they now perceive it and as they theoretically expect it to be with the unfolding of history; it is a vital component in the correlation of world forces that in the Soviet view implies a shift in the balance of world power in their favor. The Third World presents them, moreover, with political opportunities to achieve the goals of this design and to fulfill their historical expectations; for it has become the instrumentality for expanding and globalizing Soviet influence and power, and for reducing or denying that of the United States, the West, and Communist China.

Economically, the Third World serves as a market for Soviet economic goods, military weapons, supplies, and equipment; a source for raw materials; and an opportunity for economic integration to the Soviet advantage.

In the political and ideological realm the Soviet Union puts itself forward as an appealing model for development and progress toward modernity, and pursues a carefully designed political and propaganda campaign to win over the friendship and loyalty of the Third World.

The pursuit of a globalist policy imposes on the Soviets the imperative need to control strategic areas in the Third World. Accordingly, Soviet aid and political energies have been directed toward expanding Soviet influence and power in the national liberation zone of Asia and Africa.

For many reasons, therefore, the Third World is important in Soviet foreign policy. Each element—political, economic, ideological, and strategic—relates to the other to form an integrated whole. The composite suggests one transcending idea; namely, a surge toward globalism.

IV. INSTRUMENTALITIES OF SOVIET POLICY IN THE THIRD WORLD

A. INSTRUMENTS OF INFLUENCE AND POWER

The Soviet Union has employed various instruments in pursuing its goals in the Third World: economic aid and trade; military assistance and the use of military power for political purposes; and policies and political actions designed to support Third World causes and interests while, incidentally, simultaneously serving those of the Soviet Union.

Students of Soviet-Third World relations tend to agree that the foremost instruments for achieving Soviet Third World purposes are economic aid, trade, and military assistance. These instrumentalities provide the initial point of penetration, the opening wedge, so to speak, for the expanding arc of Soviet influence and power.

B. ECONOMIC AID AND TRADE

1. IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF SOVIET THIRD WORLD POLICY

Since 1954, the Soviet Union has granted over \$11 billion in economic aid to the Third World.¹ In the 1970's alone Soviet economic aid grew from \$194 million in 1970 to \$1.2 billion in 1975.²

Soviet-LDC trade has also increased significantly in recent years. In the period from 1972 to 1974 Soviet trade with Third World nations of the Near East and Southeast Asia increased by almost 100 percent.³

However, despite its size and rapid growth, the Soviet Union's economic aid and trade with the Third World is still small by Western standards. Whether as a result of its low priority status in relation to other Soviet foreign policy considerations or the limitations of the Soviet Union's own economic capabilities, this disparity in aid and trade has been the case since the inception of the Soviet program.

Historically, the prime imperative of Soviet aid and trade with the LDC's, particularly in the Brezhnev era, has been effective utilization. For the efficient allocation of Soviet economic aid and the careful formulation of Soviet-LDC trade were necessary if maximum political, economic, and strategic returns were to be realized.

¹ Information provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.

² Department of State, Communist Aid and Trade to the LDC's in 1974, p. 5.

³ Cooper, Orah. Soviet Economic Aid to the Third World. in, U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee: Soviet Economy in a New Perspective. Committee print, 94th Cong., 2d sess., Oct. 14, 1976, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 192.

2. SOVIET ECONOMIC AID PROGRAM: DESIGNED TO MEET SOVIET NEEDS IN THE THIRD WORLD

a. Characteristics of program

In a recent study, Orah Cooper, a specialist on Soviet aid programs to the Third World, stated that Soviet aid "remains a political-economic instrument to influence and gain entry into strategically located areas and to develop markets and sources of supply for goods needed in the USSR."⁴ This dual function is clearly reflected in the program's form and scope. According to Cooper, the Soviet aid program exhibits the following features:

- Soviet economic aid is generally given to strategic border nations;
- It is generally in the form of highly visible industrial projects;
- It is almost always tied to Soviet equipment purchases; and
- Very little of it is given in the form of outright grants.⁵

Other important characteristics are:

- Aid is invariably given to the state sector of the recipient nation; and
- It is almost never disbursed through multilateral institutions.⁶

b. Strategic function of Soviet economic aid

In August of 1973, Semen Skachkov, Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Committee for Foreign Economic Relations and a full member of the CPSU Central Committee, stated:

One of the promising lines of economic relations with the "third world" countries is the intensification of cooperation between the USSR and neighboring developing countries.

The intensification of such cooperation could lead in the course of time to the development of economic complexes in the border areas. * * * The creation of such complexes, consistent with reciprocal economic interests of the partners, strengthens the zone of friendship and peace in the border areas of neighboring countries, and serves the cause of peaceful coexistence and friendship among countries with different levels of development and different social systems.⁷

Skachkov's interest in economic cooperation with neighboring nations illustrates the Soviet Union's own longstanding interest in creating friendly "buffer states" on its periphery. This interest is clearly reflected in the pattern of disbursement of Soviet economic aid. According to Cooper, over 80 percent of Soviet economic aid has gone to a narrow band of nations "extending from the Mediterranean to China's southwestern borders," the so-called "zone of national liberation."⁸

Soviet economic aid has thus been invested close to home. Strategic considerations, in particular the neutralization of Soviet border regions, is clearly the most important factor shaping the Soviet Union's economic aid program to the LDC's. Other considerations flow from the need to create a "neutral Southeast Asia" and cultivate friendly relations with the nations of the more distant eastern Mediterranean and Suez Canal region.

⁴ Ibid., p. 189.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 189-190.

⁶ Department of State, *Communist Aid and Trade to LDC's in 1974*, p. 5.

⁷ Skachkov, Semen. *Economic Cooperation Between the USSR and the Developing Countries*. *Kommunist*, No. 12, August 1973. (JPRS 60163: Sept. 28, 1973, p. 52.)

⁸ Cooper, *op. cit.* p. 189.

c. Public relations function of Soviet economic aid

(1) General criteria

Soviet economic aid has always represented an important facet of the Soviet propaganda effort in the Third World: it has served a significant public relations function. This was the case in the Khrushchev years. It has been the case under Brezhnev, though more carefully rationalized to meet stricter criteria.

This public relations function of Soviet economic aid has operated in the following manner. First, aid has usually taken the form of extremely large industrial projects, for example, the Aswan Dam in Egypt and the Bokaro and Bhilai steel mills in India. Second, for purposes of high visibility, the Soviet Union has historically disbursed very little of its economic aid through multilateral organizations, thus preserving its own identity as the generous donor.

(2) Stress on large industrial projects

The continued emphasis by Soviet leaders on large industrial projects as the primary element of the Soviet Union's economic aid program results from two important considerations: first, a desire by the Soviet leadership, past and present, to make its aid as highly visible as possible, and second, a wish to capitalize on what many Soviet experts feel is the strong appeal exerted on Third World leaders by the Soviet Union's own example of rapid economic development through heavy industrialization. As Gleb Starushenko, Deputy Director of the Institute of Africa of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, observed:

They [the newly independent nations of the Third World] have been convinced by the example of the socialist countries that it is possible to raise a backward nation to the modern level within the course of one to three generations.⁹

(3) Direct disbursement

In general, the Soviet Union has consistently avoided the relative anonymity offered by dispensing its aid through multilateral organizations. Instead, the Soviet Union prefers to deal with the LDC's on a direct one-to-one basis. This approach clearly identifies the Soviet Union as the aid source.

Continued Soviet emphasis on individual disbursement and large industrial projects seems to indicate their satisfaction with this approach to economic aid, for both features give Soviet aid high visibility and establish a clear delineation of its source. Such characteristics provide the optimum in political, economic, and ultimately strategic dividends.

d. Disbursal of loans and requirement to purchase Soviet equipment

The form in which Soviet economic aid is dispensed also serves an important political/economic function for the Soviet Union. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union disburses the majority of its economic aid in the form of loans. Current estimates indicate that approximately 95 percent of the Soviet aid program is in the form of credits.¹⁰

Dispensing aid through loans is beneficial to the Soviet Union for two reasons. First, it eases the overall financial burden of the Soviet

⁹ Starushenko, Gleb. *Africa Makes A Choice, the Development of Socialist Oriented States*. Moscow; Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1975, p. 11.

¹⁰ Cooper, *op. cit.* p. 190.

aid program; and second, it binds the LDC recipient to the Soviet Union by establishing long-term repayment schedules.

Another related facet of the Soviet economic aid program is the strong Soviet emphasis on economic cooperation in carrying out aid projects. Almost without exception Soviet economic aid is tied either to a particular project or the purchase of Soviet equipment. Provisions are also made for the participation of Soviet technicians, as in the case of the building of the Bokaro steel mill in India. These arrangements insure Soviet participation, create markets for Soviet goods, and help minimize the overall cost of the Soviet aid program.

Since these projects are generally constructed from Soviet plans, with the aid of Soviet technicians, and utilizing Soviet equipment for both the construction and operation of the project, a form of industrial dependency is created. Contingencies such as the continued flow of industrial know-how, the need for replacement parts for Soviet equipment, and highly technical maintenance skills increase the Soviet Union's role as an industrial supplier of goods, services, and technology.¹¹

e. Attractive credit terms

The Soviet Union attempts to make its economic aid program as attractive as possible. As a result, Moscow offers extensive credits to the LDC's for financing economic aid. In the past Soviet credit terms were carefully tailored to Third World capabilities to repay. On the whole, this is still the case today. According to Soviet sources, Soviet credits exhibit the following features:

- They are granted without political or economic consideration;
- They are generally long-term credit extensions with repayment usually beginning only after construction of a particular aid project or the delivery of purchased equipment;
- They have low interest rates (2 to 2½ percent); and,
- Payment is generally made in traditional exports, local currencies or industrial goods produced by national enterprises (often from those projects constructed with the help of Soviet aid).¹²

The validity of the first characteristic, that of granting aid without political or economic consideration, is at best specious; but the others are fairly accurate. Soviet credits are generally long term and carry low interest rates. Barter arrangements and repayment in local currencies have also been quite common in the past. However, in recent years the Soviet Union has become increasingly interested in repayment of economic credits with hard currency.

f. The state sector: Focal point of Soviet economic aid

Soviet economic aid is almost always given to the state sector of the Third World economies. This is another important characteristic of the Soviet aid program. This approach serves two important functions. First, the Soviet Union has consistently stressed the economic and political importance of a strong, independent state sector in Third World economies. From the Soviet view this is "progressive." As one Soviet writer explained:

¹¹ McLaurin, R. D., and Mughisuddin, Mohammed. The Soviet Union and the Middle East. Special report prepared for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs, Department of Defense). Washington, American Institutes for Research, October 1974, p. 142.

¹² Gorbakov, Oleg M. *Sotrudnichestvo SSSR so Stranami Arabskogo Vostoka i Afriki*. Moscow, Science Publishing House, 1973, pp. 250-251.

The establishment of the state sector has undoubtedly been a very progressive thing for the newly-liberated countries of Asia and Africa, providing the state with a foundation for carrying out both economic and social measures on a nation-wide scale. The very existence of the state sector has been performing a most necessary function, that of concentrating the most advanced forms of production due to the building by the state of large-scale industrial enterprises.¹³

The state sector, therefore, becomes the most important instrument of social and economic change. This idea is further stressed by V. Sergeyev, Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, who wrote, "the Soviet Union's economic and technical assistance to the developing countries presupposes first and foremost the establishment and expansion of the state sectors of their economies. * * * " ¹⁴

Soviet economic aid to the state sector also helps to strengthen the political and economic base of the government in power. Since most Soviet aid is given to nations which are actively sympathetic with the Soviet Union, the Soviet aid program further insures their continued "friendship" as well as making secure their domestic position. Economic stability contributes to political stability.

3. SOVIET TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND TRAINING PROGRAMS

a. Soviet technicians in the LDC's

Another important aspect of Soviet aid to the LDC's is technical assistance. This is done in two ways; namely, by providing Soviet technicians to the LDC's, and by training Third World personnel both in their own countries and in the Soviet Union. The number of Soviet technicians in the Third World has grown substantially in recent years. In 1974, there were almost 15,000 stationed in various LDC's.¹⁵ The majority of these technicians were in Southeast Asia and the Near East, thus further illustrating the focus of Soviet interest in these regions.

Soviet technicians are generally associated with specific industrial aid projects. Their function is primarily economic, facilitating the construction and maintenance of Soviet sponsored industrial projects.

b. Soviet training programs

While the Soviets train LDC personnel both in their native countries and in the Soviet Union, they place greater stress on the training of "native cadres" in their homelands where they provide teachers, buildings, and materials.¹⁶ Once again the LDC's of Southeast Asia and the Near East are the major recipients of this sort of aid.

According to a U.N. report written by three Soviet academicians, between 1955 and 1970 "Soviet specialists trained, by individual and group methods, more than 150,000 skilled workers and technicians in the course of construction and operation of various projects (in the LDC's)." ¹⁷

¹³ Bragina, E. Role of the State in the Newly-Free Countries' Socio-Economic Development. International Affairs (Moscow), No. 1, January 1975, p. 62.

¹⁴ Sergeyev, V. The Soviet Union and Developing Countries. International Affairs (Moscow), No. 5, May 1975, p. 26.

¹⁵ Department of State, Communist Aid and Trade to LDC's in 1974, table 5 of the appendix.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁷ United Nations. Institute for Training Research. Soviet Experience in Transfer of Technology to Industrially Less Developed Countries, by A. N. Bykov, M. P. Strepetova and A. V. Letenko, UNITAR Research Report No. 15, New York, United Nations Institute for Training and Research, 1973, p. 114.

The Soviet Union carefully controls these training programs. The facilities, teachers, educational materials, and curriculum are Soviet supplied. As the U.N. report observed:

The Soviet Union usually takes upon itself all design and construction work, supply of equipment and organization of study for educational centers in developing countries. This includes auditoriums, laboratories, shops, administrative buildings, dormitories, etc. At the same time the Soviet Union delivers laboratory and other equipment, textbooks, visual aids and methodological documentation.

* * * Training is done according to curricula and methods practiced in the Soviet Union which guarantees its high standard.¹⁸

This arrangement presumably allows for maximum control over the educational processes, while at the same time presenting the opportunity for political indoctrination.

c. Soviet technicians and technical training programs: A physical presence in the Third World

Soviet technical assistance to the Third World serves two functions: one economic; the other political. Economically, Soviet technicians are often an indispensable part of Soviet economic assistance. Soviet sponsored industrial projects frequently require highly skilled technicians. Such personnel are not always available in the LDC's. The Soviet Union's training program offers a solution. Therefore, until Third World nations develop skilled manpower in their own labor forces, the presence of large numbers of Soviet technicians in the LDC's will likely continue.

Politically, Soviet technicians and especially Soviet training programs constitute a substantial Soviet presence in the Third World. Although Soviet technicians are noted for their lack of contact with the general populations of Third World nations, the Soviet training program does allow ample opportunity for influencing Third World personnel in both economic and political matters.

As a result, the continued presence of Soviet technicians in Third World countries appears likely and unavoidable so long as a dependency on Soviet aid exists. Soviet training programs will also remain an important facet of Soviet involvement in the LDC's.

4. SOVIET TRADE WITH THE THIRD WORLD

a. Increasing political and economic importance

(1) Growth in Soviet trade with LDC's

Soviet-LDC trade is small when compared with trade between the Western industrial nations and the LDC's. In 1973, Soviet trade with the Third World accounted for less than 5 percent of the LDC's total trade turnover.¹⁹ However, despite its relatively small size, Soviet-LDC trade has grown significantly in recent years. According to V. Morozov, First Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, "the USSR's cooperation with the developing countries is one of the major sectors of the Soviet Union's foreign economic relations."²⁰

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 115-116.

¹⁹ Department of State, *Communist Aid and Trade to LDC's in 1974*, p. 17.

²⁰ Morozov, V. *The USSR and the Arab East: Cooperation Developing*. Pravda, Jan. 9, 1975, FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, Jan. 14, 1975, p. F5.

(2) *Political dividends of foreign trade*

The Soviet Union views trade as an important instrument of foreign policy. In this respect trade with the Third World is of great importance, for it is in trade with the LDC's that industrially developed nations of the West have been most successful. The Soviets recognize this fact. V. Golosov, a Soviet writer on trade matters, observed, "the strong bonds which tie most of the developing countries of the World capitalist market are still yet intact and put foreign trade in a special place among neocolonialism's instruments."²¹ And the importance of the trade relationship which exists between the industrialized West and the Third World for the LDC's themselves has not escaped the Soviet Union. O. Orestov, a specialist on Soviet foreign economic relations, explained the relationship this way:

One cannot ignore the fact that irrespective of which road of development they have chosen, African countries are closely associated with the world capitalist market. It remains their principal source of technology and manufactured goods, and it is in that market that they sell the greater part of their raw materials. Dependence on the world market will for a certain period continue to exert an important influence on the development of African countries.²²

Therefore, in order to diminish the LDC's strong economic links to the West—links which the Soviet Union views as contributing to political dependence—the Soviet Union attempts to dilute this relationship through its own trade with the Third World. "An alternative to the existing situation," Golosov wrote, "is offered by the extension of economic cooperation between developing countries and the countries of the socialist economic system."²³

(3) *Third World development and Soviet-LDC trade as an element of Soviet economic growth*

The Soviet Union generally stresses the importance of Soviet trade as a necessary element of Third World development. According to Andrey Borisov, "foreign trade is an important factor in implementing the economic development plans of the developing countries, and the Soviet Union has always tried to assist the national economic development of such countries."²⁴

However, it is increasingly evident that Soviet-LDC trade is becoming an important factor in the growth of the Soviet Union's own domestic economy. In recent years this has become a major feature of Soviet trade with the LDC's.

b. Main features of Soviet-LDC trade

(1) *Some essential characteristics*

From the above it is clear that Soviet trade with the Third World plays an important role in Soviet-LDC relations. In order to perform this function the Soviet Union has carefully formulated its trade policy with the Third World, a fact easily illustrated by the form and scope of Soviet-LDC trade. As indicated above an important feature is the economic function which it performs for the Soviet Union's own economy. However, there are other important features

²¹ Golosov, V. Restructuring of International Relations. International Affairs (Moscow), No. 1, January 1975: 41.

²² Orestov, O. Independent Africa in the Making. International Affairs (Moscow), No. 11, November 1975, p. 78.

²³ Golosov, op. cit., p. 50.

²⁴ Borisov, Andrey. Trade and Economic Cooperation Between the Soviet Union and the Developing Countries, Including Thailand. Moscow in Thai to Thailand. Feb. 2, 1976, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, Feb. 11, 1976, p. K3.

of Soviet-LDC trade which should also be noted and can be summed up as follows:

- The majority of Soviet-LDC trade is with the nations of the Near East and Southeast Asia;
- The Soviet-LDC trade pattern is generally Soviet industrial and technological goods in return for Third World resources and semifinished goods;
- A large portion of Soviet exports to the LDC's is in the form of military materials;
- Trade arrangements between the Soviet Union and the LDC's are generally bilateral and long-term; and
- Soviet aid and trade are very closely related.

(2) *Geared toward maximizing economic returns*

The Soviet Union's trade pattern with the LDC's is remarkably similar to that of the highly industrialized nations of the West. Foodstuffs and raw materials make up a majority of the Soviet Union's imports from the Third World while manufactured goods—in particular machinery and industrial equipment—comprise a major portion of Soviet exports to the LDC's. Valkenier points out, "in return for their machinery and raw materials, the Russians get consumer goods (especially clothing and foods) and raw materials—such as rubber, natural gas, or copper—which are in short supply either at home or among the European Satellites."²⁵ Carole Sawyer, a specialist on Communist trade with the Third World, describes the Soviet-LDC trade pattern in the following manner: "This arrangement has the effect of perpetuating a trade pattern which in another context the Communists label 'imperialistic'."²⁶

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, defends the composition of its trade with the LDC's by emphasizing, as Borisov observed, that "Soviet exports to the developing countries include machinery, raw materials and other commodities essential to industrial development, agricultural improvement and the development of transportation and energy."²⁷

(3) *Soviet strategic interests reinforced*

Just as the Soviet Union's aid program is focused in the primary areas of Soviet strategic interest so also is Soviet-LDC trade. In 1973, over 70 percent of Soviet-LDC trade was with Third World nations within the "national liberation zone" of the Near East and Southeast Asia.²⁸ Latin America and other areas outside of the Soviet periphery comprised only 23 percent of the Soviet Union's total trade turnover with LDC nations.²⁹ Accordingly, Soviet-LDC trade further reinforces Soviet interests in areas of strategic importance to the Soviet Union.

(4) *Military component of Soviet-LDC trade*

Arms transfers to the Third World represent an important part of Soviet-LDC trade. In 1972 and 1973, Soviet arms transfers to the Third World accounted for approximately 50 percent of Soviet

²⁵ Valkenier, *Soviet Economic Relations with Developing Nations*, in Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, p. 218.

²⁶ Sawyer, Carole. *Communist Trade with Developing Countries: 1955-1965*. New York, Praeger, 1966, p. 54.

²⁷ Borisov, op. cit., p. K3.

²⁸ Department of State, *Communist Aid and Trade to LDC's in 1974*, p. 19.

²⁹ Ibid.

exports to the LDC's.³⁰ Since the Soviet military-industrial complex is considered the most efficient sector of the Soviet economy, arms sales to the LDC's is especially attractive to the Soviet Union from an economic point of view. Soviet arms sales are largely responsible for keeping Moscow's overall trade balance in a surplus, thus performing an important trade function.³¹

Another important consideration is that the primary purchasers of Soviet arms are the nations of the Middle East, countries which are, unlike the vast majority of Third World nations, able to pay for Soviet arms either in hard currencies or in goods (e.g., oil) which can be easily sold on the world market for hard currencies. As a result the Soviet Union's own hard currency problems are partially eased by arms sales to the Third World, in particular the Middle East.

(5) *Bilateralism and long-term trade agreements*

Soviet-LDC trade is invariably the product of bilateral trade agreements between the Soviet Union and individual Third World governments. The agreements are generally for 5 years, although both longer and shorter agreements have been signed.

Both bilateralism and long-term trade agreements are viewed by Soviet observers as "factors encouraging and expanding trade with developing countries."³² They offer Third World nations trade stability and insulation from Western inflation. In return, trade conducted in this manner complements a planned economy like the Soviet Union's, where "stability" is the essential requirement for plan fulfillment.

(6) *The close relation of aid to trade*

Soviet aid and trade are very closely related. As Orah Cooper pointed out in her recent study on Soviet aid to the Third World, "Moscow's largest aid clients have become its major trading partners."³³ According to O. Bogomolov, Director of the Institute of Economies of the World Socialist System of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, the Soviet Union's "biggest trading partners" among the LDC's are Egypt, India, Syria, Algeria, Iraq, Pakistan, Morocco, Afghanistan, and Iran; "these countries account for over 80 percent of the overall volume of economic cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and developing countries."³⁴ The nature of Soviet aid to the LDC's—almost always in the form of loans and tied to the purchase of Soviet equipment—creates a strong connection between Soviet trade with the Third World, a fact which partially explains why the Soviet Union's major aid clients in the Third World are also its primary LDC trade partners.

c. *Soviet-LDC trade in perspective*

Soviet-LDC trade, like most other aspects of Soviet-Third World relations, is well-conceived. Although economic considerations have in recent years begun to take on greater importance, Soviet trade with the Third World is still designed primarily to fulfill Soviet political and strategic needs. Soviet-LDC trade, therefore, remains a vital facet of Soviet-Third World policy.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 18.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Borisov, op. cit., p. K3.

³³ Cooper, op. cit., p. 192.

³⁴ Bogomolov, O. The Foreign Economic Relations of the USSR. *Kommunist*, No. 5, March 1974. (JPRS 62118: May 30, 1974, p. 124.)

5. SUMMING UP: EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENTS OF SOVIET THIRD WORLD POLICY

Since 1954, Soviet economic aid, technical assistance, and trade with the Third World have been important instruments of Soviet Third World policy. This importance has been growing in recent years. Soviet economic relations with the LDC's, whether they be aid or trade, continue to expand.

Moscow seems well aware of the Third World's need and desire for developmental assistance. The Soviet Union also seems cognizant of the increasingly important role of Soviet economic aid in Third World development, though in the past it has always given such aid on a highly selective and concentrated basis and may continue to do so.³⁵ Consequently the Soviet leadership views economic aid and trade as important instruments of Soviet foreign policy: these instruments are capable of creating goodwill and enhancing Soviet prestige, influence, and power in the Third World. Continued growth of aid and trade indicates Soviet satisfaction with their effectiveness. Valkenier explained the operational value of Soviet economic aid and trade in the following manner: "In short, a well-coordinated and well-executed economic program has in many respects replaced political infiltration as a method of Soviet penetration in the Third World."³⁶

C. SOVIET MILITARY AID AS AN INSTRUMENTALITY OF SOVIET THIRD WORLD POLICY

1. AN IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY INSTRUMENT

Since its initiation in 1954, Soviet military assistance to the LDC's has been as important facet of the Soviet Union's Third World policy. (See tables 1 and 2, pp. 68-69.) In this period nearly every aspect of the Soviet military aid program has grown significantly, thus clearly reflecting a continuing commitment by the Soviet leadership to the use of military aid as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy.

TABLE 1.—*Annual Soviet military aid extensions to less developed countries, 1955-74*

	Millions		Millions
1955-60-----	\$1, 285	1969-----	\$340
1961-----	830	1970-----	985
1962-----	415	1971-----	1, 375
1963-----	390	1972-----	830
1964-----	875	1973-----	1, 735
1965-----	260	1974-----	1, 265
1966-----	450		
1967-----	515	Total-----	12, 010
1968-----	460		

Source: U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1974. Washington, January 27, 1976, table 7 in appendix. (Report No. 298, unclassified.)

³⁵ Tiul'panov, Sergei. *Politiko-Ekonomicheskie Problemy Razvivaiushchikhsia Stran*. Leningrad, Leningrad University Publishing House 1969, p. 57.

³⁶ Valkenier, Soviet Economic Relations with Developing Nations, Kanet, ed., Soviet Union and Developing Nations, p. 236.

TABLE 2.—Soviet military aid extended to less developed countries, 1955-74

	Millions		Millions
Africa-----	\$682	Latin America-----	\$35
Algeria-----	350	Peru-----	35
Burundi-----	(¹)		
Congo-----	15	Near East and South Asia-----	10, 183
Equatorial Guinea-----	2		
Ghana-----	10	Afghanistan-----	490
Guinea-----	35	Bangladesh-----	35
Mali-----	10	Cyprus-----	25
Morocco-----	45	Egypt-----	3, 450
Nigeria-----	10	India-----	1, 400
Sierra Leone-----	(¹)	Iran-----	850
Somalia-----	115	Iraq-----	1, 600
Sudan-----	65	Lebanon-----	3
Tanzania-----	5	Maldives-----	(¹)
Uganda-----	20	Pakistan-----	60
		Sri Lanka-----	10
East Asia-----	1, 110	Syria-----	2, 100
Burma-----	(¹)	Yemen (Aden)-----	80
Cambodia-----	10	Yemen (Sana)-----	80
Indonesia-----	1, 095		
Laos-----	5	Total-----	12, 010

¹ Negligible.

Source: U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1974. Washington, Jan. 27, 1976, table 8 in appendix. (Rept. No. 298, unclassified.)

2. GOALS OF SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Soviet military aid to the Third World is a carefully formulated program, designed to fulfill specific Soviet political and strategic needs. Political penetration, the securing of strategic position, and the impairment of Western (and more recently, Chinese) influence in the Third World are its major goals.

In order to accomplish these goals the Soviet military aid program has been applied opportunistically, often taking advantage of instabilities created by international crises or regional conflicts. At the same time it has remained purposeful; it has increased steadily despite setbacks. The program has also been extremely flexible. Ideological considerations have not been an overriding factor in determining its allocation. In fact the opposite appears true. Soviet military aid has often been given to regimes which have openly persecuted their domestic Communist parties. Syria and Egypt are examples.

3. SOVIET MILITARY AID: WEAPONS AND MATERIALS

a. Size and scope

The Soviet Union has been the largest Communist arms supplier to the Third World.³⁷ From 1954 to 1974, Soviet military aid to the Third World totaled well over \$12 billion.³⁸ The annual amount of Soviet military aid given to the Third World has also been growing rapidly. In the recent 5-year period from 1970-74, Soviet military aid to the LDC's increased by over 20 percent.³⁹ In the same period

³⁷ Department of State, Communist Aid and Trade to LDC's in 1974, p. 13.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid.

Soviet military aid to the Third World more than doubled its economic aid program.⁴⁰ This is a significant indicator of the importance that the Soviet Union places on its military aid program.

The main reason for the size and growth of the Soviet military aid program has been its overall effectiveness. As Tansky stated: "Soviet military assistance to the less-developed countries has been the primary vehicle for achieving a position of influence in some regions vital to Western interests and has had an immediate impact on regional balances of power."⁴¹

b. Highly selective character of Soviet military aid

(1) Criteria: Potential for political and strategic returns

The Soviet Union's military aid program for the Third World historically has been concentrated in a few key countries or regions. In most cases these countries have also been the prime recipients of Soviet economic aid. For Soviet military aid, like its economic counterpart, is generally focused in areas where the level of Soviet interest is high and the potential for political and strategic return great.

Soviet military aid is clearly intended as a means of either cultivating new areas of sympathy for Soviet interests or reinforcing already existing friendly relationships. As Kanet observed, Soviet military aid "has been centered, with few exceptions, in those countries with which Soviet relations have been quite good and whose leaders agree with the Soviets on major policy issues."⁴²

This fact is clearly demonstrated by statistics on Soviet military aid. Since 1955, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, India, and Indonesia (prior to 1965) have been the prime recipients of Soviet military aid.⁴³

(2) Middle East: Central focus of Soviet military aid

The Soviet pattern of disbursing military aid clearly indicates that the Middle East is an area of primary interest to the Soviet Union. From 1955 to 1974, Middle Eastern countries received almost 75 percent of all Soviet military aid to the Third World.⁴⁴ In this same period Egypt, Syria, and Iraq alone received nearly 60 percent.⁴⁵

And this pattern has not changed. In fact, it has become even more accentuated. For example, from 1971 to 1974 Soviet military aid to the Middle East was 87 percent of the total amount extended to the Third World. Three major Middle Eastern recipients, Egypt, Syria and Iraq, alone accounted for almost 69 percent.⁴⁶

c. Attractive terms in extending military aid

(1) Easy credit terms, discounting, low purchase price and quick delivery

Until 1974, approximately two-thirds of the Soviet Union's military aid to the LDC's was financed by the extension of Soviet credits.⁴⁷

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Tansky, Leo. Soviet Military Aid, Technical Assistance, and Academic Training. In Duncan, Raymond W. ed. Soviet Policy in Developing Countries. London, Ginn-Blaisdell, 1970, p. 42.

⁴² Kanet, Roger E. Soviet and American Behaviour Toward Developing Countries. Canadian Slavonic Papers, vol. 15, No. 4, winter 1973, p. 456.

⁴³ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade in 1973, 1974, p. 13.

⁴⁴ Ofer, Gur. Soviet Military Aid to the Middle East—An Economic Balance Sheet. In U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Soviet Economy in a New Perspective. Committee print, 94th Cong., 2d sess., Oct. 14, 1976, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 222.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid., table 3, p. 221.

⁴⁷ Department of State, Communist Aid and Trade to LDC's in 1973, p. 14.

Credit terms were generally considered easy. Soviet interest rates were low (from 2 to 2½ percent), and the repayment period was long (8 to 10 years).⁴⁸

Another important characteristic of Soviet military aid appealing to Third World purchasers was the Soviet practice of discounting. Some sources estimated the discount factor on Soviet arms deliveries to Third World countries as high as 40 percent of the list price.⁴⁹

In addition to easy credit terms and the practice of discounting, the Soviets offered their weapons at a low list price in comparison with those marketed by the West. Also, they could insure quick delivery: most Soviet weapons sold to Third World nations could be provided from existing Soviet inventories; in contrast, U.S. weapons would often take years to produce and deliver. All these factors combined to help make the Soviet military aid program extremely attractive to the Third World.

(2) Third World repayment problems

Despite what appear to be favorable terms, payment for Soviet weapons and equipment has caused certain financial problems for many Third World countries. The struggling economies of the LDC's have often found their repayment obligations difficult to meet. Recent Egyptian difficulties illustrate the potential financial burden which can be created by massive inputs of credit-financed Soviet military aid.

The repayment problem has been further aggravated in recent years by a tightening of Soviet credit. Terms have become noticeably harder. Prices for Soviet weapons have begun to approximate more closely those of the West, and the Soviet Union is now asking that repayment schedules be more strictly observed.

Perhaps the most important of these recent trends has been the growing Soviet demand that repayment be made in the form of hard currencies. This requirement has proven to be particularly onerous for the majority of Third World nations (the most notable exceptions being the oil producing countries of the Middle East) whose limited hard currency reserves are needed for trade with the industrialized nations of the West.

For example, it was reported during the October 1973 Middle East War that the Soviet Union demanded and received hard currency payment for military supplies delivered to Egypt.⁵⁰

d. Economic burden for the Soviet Union

Soviet military aid to the Third World is a growing economic burden on the Soviet Union's own domestic economy. As the Soviet military aid program has increased, resource allocations for defense production have also increased. According to a recent study by Dr. Gur Ofer, a specialist on Soviet aid to the Third World, the Soviet Union's military assistance program to the Third World is requiring an increasingly large portion of the total Soviet defense production effort. Ofer states that from 1955-74 the Middle East alone absorbed approximately 6 percent of total Soviet arms production.⁵¹ Ofer also adds that if the burden is considered "in terms of conventional weapons only (ex-

⁴⁸ Pajak, Roger F. *Soviet Arms and Egypt*. Survival, vol. 17, No. 4, July/August 1975, p. 165.

⁴⁹ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. *The International Transfer of Conventional Arms*, a Report to Congress from the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. (Committee print) Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974, p. 37.

⁵⁰ Pajak, op. cit., p. 170.

⁵¹ Ofer, op. cit., p. 227.

cluding expenditures on the space effort, nuclear weapons, and most of the production of the navy)," then the estimates "could probably go up to 8-9 percent."⁵²

e. The dependency factor

An important characteristic of the Soviet military aid program is the dependency it creates for the recipient upon the donor. Tansky explained:

As the recipient becomes further entangled in the web of Soviet accommodation and its inventory of Soviet arms increases, a large degree of dependence on the USSR is created for spare parts, ammunition and the like. A recipient government's political survival may well depend upon Soviet willingness to continue its program.⁵³

Strong political and military linkages are created between donor and recipient. Weapons are constantly being updated. Worn out equipment must be replaced. Sophisticated weapons systems require highly skilled personnel for both operation and maintenance. In most cases Third World nations are incapable of fulfilling these requirements. The recipient, therefore, becomes heavily dependent upon the supplier for the provision of these needs.

This dependency is further compounded when the Soviet Union is the sole military supplier. The problems confronting a Third World nation attempting to change suppliers, or even to diversify its military inventory, are extensive. Egypt offers an excellent example of the difficulties involved. It has been estimated that it would take the Egyptian army, which is almost totally Soviet trained and supplied, from five to ten years to be reequipped and resupplied by another source.⁵⁴

4. SOVIET MILITARY TECHNICIANS AND TRAINING PROGRAMS

An important component of the Soviet Union's military aid program is the training of Third World military personnel. Soviet-LDC military aid agreements generally provide for such training either at home in their native countries or in the Soviet Union. In the period from 1955 to 1974, over 33,000 trainees traveled to the Soviet Union for military instruction.⁵⁵ And the number of LDC personnel training in the Soviet Union is increasing yearly. In 1974, approximately 3,000 LDC trainees were reported in the U.S.S.R.⁵⁶

Soviet military technicians also train Third World personnel in their home countries. They offer extensive training in the operation and maintenance of Soviet military equipment. In addition, they insure the proper assemblage, operation, and maintenance of sophisticated Soviet weapons systems. In 1974, there were nearly 7,000 Soviet military technicians reported in various Third World countries.⁵⁷

The role played by Soviet military technicians is often of vital importance to the receiving nations. As Tansky wrote:

The rapid influx into the less-developed countries of large quantities of modern complex military equipment has demanded military skills that either are in short supply or nonexistent in these countries. This lack of skilled military manpower

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Tansky, op. cit., p. 43.

⁵⁴ Pajak, op. cit., p. 173.

⁵⁵ Department of State, Communist Aid and Trade to LDC's in 1974, p. 14.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

has poised more serious problems than a similar human resource gap in the economic sector because of the rapid rate at which military equipment has been delivered. The manpower base in these countries has been unable to supply in a short time enough men capable of being trained to command, operate, and maintain the modernized military establishments. The acceptance of military personnel for training at Soviet military installations and the dispatch of large numbers of Soviet military technicians to less developed countries subsequently have proved to be important elements of the Soviet military assistance program.⁵⁸

From the Soviet perspective the presence of large numbers of Soviet military technicians in the LDC's offers an excellent opportunity for penetrating Third World military establishments. According to Pajak, the large number of Soviet military technicians in Egypt during the period following the June 1967 war up until their expulsion in mid-1972 made it possible for the Soviet Union to penetrate "the Egyptian military establishment to a depth she had never before achieved in any non-communist country."⁵⁹

5. THE CHINESE FACTOR

A relatively recent development in the Soviet aid program, both military and economic, has been its use to counterbalance perceived Chinese advances in the Third World.

As noted earlier in this study, the bitter dispute in Sino-Soviet relations during the past decade has now overflowed into the Third World where the two countries find themselves locked in an intense competition for influence and power. The predominant weapon in this struggle has been, and continues to be economic and military aid. Both the Soviet Union and China have increasingly focused their aid in areas where their primary adversaries are not "Western imperialists" but rather each other. In Southeast Asia and central and southern Africa where Western influence has subsided visibly in recent years, competition between the two leading Communist states has intensified significantly.

The consequences of China's emergence as an openly hostile and active competitor for Third World influence vis-a-vis the Soviet Union are important. First, Chinese competition in the Third World has added a new element to the Soviet Union's Third World policy. Soviet aid programs are no longer formulated solely to combat Western influence. Rather, Soviet concern has shifted perceptibly as Chinese advances in the Third World have become more evident. Second, Chinese pressure has forced the Soviet Union to expand its already existing aid programs and to initiate new programs in areas, formerly of little interest to the Soviet Union, where Chinese influence is viewed as growing and where the Soviet Union is not willing to lose ground by default.

6. SUMMING UP

The Soviet Union's military aid program is large; it is growing yearly; and the Soviet commitment remains strong. The reason for this is clear: despite numerous setbacks the Soviet Union continues to view its military aid program as one of the most successful and durable instruments of its Third World policy.

⁵⁸ Tansky, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

⁵⁹ Pajak, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

Without question there have been costs. Supposed Soviet gains have often proven ephemeral. And as the size of the Soviet military aid program has grown, so has the economic burden. Finally, the growing presence of both Soviet material and personnel in the Third World, often in highly volatile areas, has greatly increased the chances of Soviet entanglement in regional conflicts involving one or more of its recipient nations.

Thus, the Soviet leadership has had to assess carefully its military aid program to the Third World, taking into account its relations with the West, the Chinese factor, its larger global interests, and finally, balancing returns against costs. Apparently, the assessment has been favorable, for the Soviet military aid program remains an active and dynamic component of the Soviet Union's Third World policy.

D. POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR THIRD WORLD CAUSES AND INTERESTS

1. IDENTIFICATION WITH THIRD WORLD

a. Predominating idea in Soviet-Third World relationship

Soviet economic and military aid established the beachhead for Soviet penetration of the Third World; political instrumentalities have enlarged the perimeter of Soviet influence. One idea has predominated in this Soviet-Third World relationship; namely, Soviet identification with the Third World, its causes and its interests.

Once fixed by Khrushchev in the Soviet ideological universe as the "zone of peace," disconnected from the Western powers, and predisposed toward the "camp of socialism," the Third World became a political prize to be won. Differentiating what the Soviets would term the socialist world of peace, progress, and freedom, from that of the capitalists, imperialists, and Western colonizers—all warmongers and oppressors, the Soviets have persistently supported the causes and interests of the Third World as an essential part of the newly prescribed correlation of world forces. Thus, in pursuing the goal of expanding Egypt's influence in the Arab world to the detriment of the West, Nasser found in the Soviet Union a firm and loyal supporter. This behavioral pattern has become rather securely fixed in the Soviet-Third World experience.

Within this larger, generalized framework of policy, the Soviets have championed Third World causes and interests, using the many political instrumentalities long familiar in international relations to achieve their goals—propaganda, foreign radio broadcasts, conclusions of friendship treaties, exchanges of state visits and other types of international exchanges, recognition of outcast revolutionary regimes, and the skillful use of conference diplomacy within the United Nations and other international organizations. Through such political instrumentalities the Soviets tied their prestige, influence, and power to the Third World with the expectation of establishing a lasting relationship.

Thus, economic development may have been the overriding goal of policy for Third World nations—"the cornerstone of national survival," one observer described it⁶⁰—and development assistance an

⁶⁰ Prybyla, *Sino-Soviet Split and Developing Nations*, in Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, p. 265.

important component of Soviet relations with such nations, but politics provided the binding cement for this relationship.

b. India in the Soviet-Third World perspective

India is a unique example of Soviet policy in the Third World, particularly Moscow's efforts to identify the Soviet Union with India's interests and causes. Since the beginning in 1955, when Khrushchev initiated the Soviet thrust into the Third World by a visit to India, the Soviet Union has generally pursued this course, and with much success.

In a commentary on Soviet-Indian relations Gupta observed that the Soviet Union "has played a major part in ushering in a new regional subsystem in South Asia." The dominant power in this subsystem, he wrote, is India which is bound by treaty to the U.S.S.R.⁶¹ This new subsystem was based on the principle of shared mutual interests. India found in the Soviet Union a convenient counterweight against the potential Chinese threat and against any expanding American presence in South and Southeast Asia; the Soviet Union was perceived to be a useful ally in its struggle against Pakistan, and a source and model for economic development. On its part, the Soviet Union found in India the strongest and stablest power in the area; an effective instrument for establishing a foothold in South Asia; a counterforce to contain Chinese power, an imperative for Moscow; and an opportunity to exploit the anti-imperialist radicalism of the Third World against the United States.⁶² Out of this convergence of interests and interplay of forces, the Soviet Union has been able to construct a durable partnership. As Gupta concluded, "If it is a marriage of convenience, it has proved to be a convenience of long duration."⁶³

What solidified this partnership was no doubt Soviet initiatives in mediating the Indo-Pakistani war at Tashkent in January 1966 and the subsequent conclusion of an important security treaty in 1971. In the 1965 conflict the Soviet Union had formulated a geopolitical doctrine of intervention in South Asian affairs: it could not remain indifferent to a war that broke out in an area adjacent to the Soviet Union. This was the beginning of an attempt to bring South Asia into the orbit of security of the Soviet state as the perception of China as the real danger to the subcontinent deepened.⁶⁴ The Soviet-Indian treaty of 1971 formalized this idea: it created a coalition-type relationship in which collaboration for attaining shared objectives did not preclude efforts by each to influence the other in pursuit of strategic interests. The treaty also expanded the range of Soviet involvement in Indian development.⁶⁵

The security aspects of the treaty made the "profoundest impression" upon the Indian elite, according to Gupta. Indian public opinion almost unanimously agreed that the treaty ended India's "loneliness" and gave it a feeling of effective strength. Indian Minister of External Affairs Swaran Singh was confident that the treaty would "act as a deterrent to any powers that may have aggressive designs on our territorial integrity and sovereignty."

⁶¹ Gupta, *Soviet Union and South Asia*, in Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, p. 140.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 146.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

And the Financial Express observed editorially on August 10, 1971, "In the present context of strained relations with Pakistan, and the possibility of armed clash between the two countries and the likelihood of Chinese intervention in support of Pakistan, the assurance of military support from the Soviet Union is of no small significance."⁶⁶ From the Indian perspective the treaty symbolized Soviet solidarity with India's interests and causes that was to be carried to the ultimate degree by Soviet support in the December 1971 Indo-Pakistani war over Bangladesh.

That the Soviet Union had successfully established a close identity with the interests and causes of India and that this relationship produced some specific foreign policy benefits for the Soviet Union, there seems little doubt. India did maintain its reserve on joining the Soviet Union in publicly calling for the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam during 1967-71. It still has refused to adhere to Brezhnev's Asian security plan. But in 1969, the Soviet Union was able to get an Indian statement after the clashes on the Ussuri river supporting the Soviet position in the Sino-Soviet border dispute.⁶⁷ And in general the Soviet-Indian relationship could project the image of a useful and favorable model for the emulation of other Third World nations.

Gupta provided the following estimate of Soviet success in India, which suggests the magnitude of Soviet involvement in South Asia. This estimate measured not only Soviet success in achieving its foreign policy interests; it reflected also the degree that the Soviet Union has been able to effectively identify with the interests and causes of India. He wrote:

The Soviet Union today is generally perceived to be the dominant external power in South Asia. Russian popularity has reached its zenith. To the peoples and governments of South Asia, the Soviet Union appears to have succeeded in besting the United States, as well as China, in the competitive intervention that has characterized the politics of this region, Soviet intervention and influence-building in South Asia has proved to be more effective than that of its two great power rivals.⁶⁸

c. In the service of Soviet interests

(1) Taking advantage of Third World anti-imperialist radicalism

Inherent in Soviet identification with Third World causes and interests is the assumption that the Soviet Union too has specific causes to advance and interests to achieve. This was particularly the case in Soviet efforts to take advantage of the anti-imperialist radicalism permeating the Third World and directed against the United States and the West, and to contest and contain Chinese influence and power using the political resources of the Third World.

How the Soviet Union has taken advantage of Third World anti-imperialist radicalism has become commonplace. For this theme has dominated Soviet political propaganda and in varying degrees has permeated Soviet foreign policy actions for the past quarter century. Particularly in the 1960's the Soviets approached the Third World on a competitive, zero sum basis where any loss to the West was perceived as a gain for the Soviet Union.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 132.

⁶⁷ Gupta, Soviet Policies for Third World, in Kanet/Bahry, eds., Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations, p. 31.

⁶⁸ Gupta, Soviet Union and South Asia, in Kanet, ed., Soviet Union and Developing Nations, p. 119.

Accordingly, Soviet policy was largely characterized by attempts to undercut the position of the United States and the West in any part of the world on the assumption that any increase in Soviet contacts would almost automatically result in a reduction of American influence. In recent years this approach has been somewhat modified under pressure of economic rationality as fostered by the Brezhnev regime. The tendency has been to be less willing to conduct their policies toward the LDC's primarily as a reaction to American or Chinese initiatives.⁶⁹

That Soviet aid has benefited the LDC's during these years cannot be gainsaid; but there can also be no doubt that Soviet concern for them has by and large been self-serving.

(2) *Containing and contesting Chinese influence and power*

The matter of containing and contesting Chinese influence and power in the Third World has taken on two forms: (1) a general effort to construct an Asian security system among nations bordering on or in close proximity to China; and (2) specific efforts designed to counteract Chinese penetration of Third World areas.

Brezhnev launched his proposal for an Asian security system in his June 1969 address to the World Communist Conference in Moscow. What Brezhnev specifically had in mind was not clear; the proposal was brief; it was presented in a somewhat offhand manner; no further light has since been shed upon it. But it was clear at the time and since that this proposal for regional collective security was, as Rubenstein judged it to be, "a major Soviet diplomatic effort to isolate Communist China in Asia."⁷⁰ A secondary rationale later emerged with the pronouncement of the Nixon doctrine that signaled American retrenchment in the Far East and sparked Soviet interest in filling the void. Such a move could maximize Soviet influence in the area and thwart that of the Chinese.

Asians responded to the initial Brezhnev proposal, according to Thornton, "with awesome disinterest." Since then the plan has lain fallow. Though the Soviets attempted to revive it in 1971 on the occasion of concluding the Indo-Soviet treaty—India was believed to be a model for the system—and the Indo-Pakistani war later in the year, there was a little response, even from the Indians.⁷¹

Though unsuccessful thus far, Brezhnev's Asian security plan remains, nonetheless, a serious effort to achieve, not Third World goals, but rather Soviet foreign policy goals through association with Asian LDC's.

Parallel with the Asian security proposal have been Soviet efforts to counteract Chinese economic and political thrusts into the Third World. In recent years, however, the intensity of the Soviet response to Chinese initiatives and the structuring of its Third World policy accordingly has somewhat diminished, not because of a declining competitive spirit, but rather for reasons of rationalism in planning Soviet foreign economic policy and a diminishing interest in sub-Saharan Africa.⁷² (A major Chinese aid effort was the construction of

⁶⁹ Kanet, *Soviet Union and Developing Countries: Policy or Policies?* in Kanet/Bahry, eds., *Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations*, p. 16.

⁷⁰ Rubinstein, *Soviet Policy Toward Third World in 1970's*, p. 105.

⁷¹ Thornton, Thomas Perry, *The Soviet Union and the Future of Southeast Asia*, ch. 10, in Kanet/Bahry, eds., *Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations*, pp. 193-194.

⁷² Kanet, *Soviet Union and Developing Countries: Policy or Policies?*, in Kanet/Bahry, eds., *Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations*, p. 16. And Klinghoffer, *Soviet Union and Africa*, in Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, pp. 65-67.

the Tanzania-Zambia railroad project, costing more than \$400 million; it was the largest aid project ever undertaken in Africa by a Communist state, comprising more than one-half of all Chinese aid to Africa since 1954.)⁷³ Conferences of the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization were often scenes of intense Sino-Soviet contention.⁷⁴

In these efforts to checkmate the Chinese in the LDC's as in those attempts to construct an Asian security system, the Soviets were seeking their own foreign policy goals, not those of the LDC's.

Thus Soviet identification with the causes and interests of the Third World, as the case of India demonstrated, was a determined and often successful political effort. It often served Third World interests, particularly in matters of development; but most of all it served the causes and interests of the Soviet Union.

2. POLITICAL USE OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER

a. Role of Soviet Navy

Use of Soviet military power for political purposes (in addition to the extension of military assistance as noted above) was still another way in which the Soviet Union demonstrated its political support for nations of the Third World. This was particularly the case with the expansion of the Soviet Navy for the navy has traditionally been the principal instrumentality of any great power for extending and maintaining political influence and power beyond its continental limits. In a very real sense the Soviet Navy has come to represent Soviet power-in-being on a global scale; it must be reckoned with by its potential adversaries in the West and also by those nations in the Third World which seek an advantageous political connection with the U.S.S.R.⁷⁵

An important link between the Soviet Union and the Third World are bases and port facilities. The Soviet Navy's great reliance on overseas bases, far greater than that of the U.S. Navy's, has imposed upon its political leaders a particular incentive to establish a close and expanding relationship with nations in the Third World particularly those that are situated along strategically important sea lanes.⁷⁶ In this sense, Soviet military necessity converged with the interests of Third World countries which in turn could use the Soviet presence to further their own political goals.

b. In the Mediterranean

The rapid and impressive expansion of the Soviet Navy in recent years, particularly in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean, has enabled Soviet leaders to accrue benefits that come to a nation that is attempting to build a global position on the strategic level and to translate its military power into specific political action in different conflict areas of the world. The latter is evident in the role of the

⁷³ Ibid., p. 67.

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 65.

⁷⁵ For an examination of the role of the Soviet Navy in foreign affairs both historically and in the contemporary era, see U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Commerce, Soviet Oceans Development, 94th Cong., 2d sess., Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976. Political-Strategic Framework for Soviet Oceanic Policy by Dr. John R. Thomas (pp. 23-46), and Historical Continuity in Russian and Soviet Oceans Policy by Nicholas G. Shadrin (pp. 47-182). Other chapters in this document provide useful insights into Soviet oceans policy particularly as it relates to foreign policy. See, for example, Michael McGuire's chapter entitled, "Naval Power and Soviet Oceans Policy," (pp. 79-182).

⁷⁶ McGuire writes: "In 1973, Admiral Sergeev, Chief of Naval Staff, was asked by a Western naval attache what his greatest problem was as the result of the shift to forward deployment. He replied without hesitation: 'Bases'." (McGuire, Naval Power and Soviet Oceans Policy, in, Senate study, Soviet Oceans Development, p. 146.)

Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean, the Vietnam war, and in the second Indo-Pakistani war.

A Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, confronting the once predominant U.S. 6th Fleet, has radically altered political and military relationships in that area. No longer can the U.S. Navy operate with the complete independence that it once enjoyed. Nor is it possible to exclude Soviet political influence from the area that has evolved, partly, if not largely, from its naval presence. As Adm. Sergei Gorshkov, Russia's leading naval authority, noted, the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean "insures the state interests of the USSR in this region"—meaning that the Soviet Navy has become an instrument of Soviet national policy in the Mediterranean basin, surrounded incidentally by the Third World nations of North Africa and the Near East.⁷⁷

c. During Vietnam war

During the Vietnam war, the Soviet Union kept the Communist forces in North and South Vietnam well supplied with war materials despite obstacles thrown in the way by Peking to the transit of supplies overland through Chinese territory. In all probability such a continued demonstration of loyalty to a "fraternal ally" enabled the Soviets to strengthen their political relationship with the Vietnamese Communists, contributing no doubt to the improvement of the Soviet position in Southeast Asia when peace had come. Possession of a formidable oceangoing merchant marine with naval support forces made this political gain possible.

d. In second Indo-Pakistani war

The second Indo-Pakistani war in December 1971 provided the Soviets with a unique opportunity to use their navy as a political instrument. At a critical point in the fighting in East Pakistan, the United States, then tilting in favor of Pakistan, dispatched a task force of the 7th Fleet, including the nuclear carrier *Enterprise*, to move into the Bay of Bengal, ostensibly to evacuate American citizens but, apparently, primarily as a "show of force." The Soviet Union, a strong supporter of India and in close communication with its government, also ordered naval forces into the area. Units of the Soviet Pacific Fleet steamed through the Strait of Malacca 3 days after the American task force and headed for the Bay of Bengal. Apparently before the crisis could crest, the Indian Government announced a unilateral cease-fire on December 16 and its acceptance by the Pakistani Government. The war ended; a Soviet-American naval confrontation may have been avoided; West Pakistan was preserved; and peace came to South Asia.

Deployment of Soviet naval units in the Bay of Bengal illustrated, according to Gupta, "more vividly than anything else" the incremental change that had taken place in the U.S.S.R. as a power since the first Indo-Pakistani war in 1965. The Soviet Union now had naval power to back up its diplomacy. Perhaps equally important with the growth of Soviet naval power was the fact that this power was used at a critical moment for the clear political purpose of showing Soviet

⁷⁷ Kanet, Soviet Union and Developing Countries: Policy or Policies?, in Kanet/Bahry, eds., Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations, p. 14.

support for India. Gupta referred to the cease-fire, and presumably the entire matter, as "a triumph of Soviet diplomacy in South Asia."⁷⁸

With this example in mind, and the preceding ones noted above, Gupta observed that—

The Soviet Union is now in a position to confront the world's other superpower on a global scale in dealing with local conflicts. This relatively new factor has introduced a qualitative change in the strategy of superpower intervention in local conflicts.⁷⁹

Said in another way, the Soviet Union has in its navy an effective instrumentality for seeking political goals.

e. Soviet Navy as arm of Soviet diplomacy

Thus, it is apparent that the Soviet Navy has begun to play an important political role in Soviet diplomacy, particularly in the Third World. As Rubinstein explained so well, the navy could be used to advantage in "establishing a greater Soviet presence in the Persian Gulf, East Africa and the Indian Ocean." In the Mediterranean, "it has already limited, or at least raised the cost of, American options for intervention." It has, moreover, been a "valuable prop for shaky clients, serving to stiffen the resolve of anti-Western elites who may be emboldened to pursue radical courses they would have been deterred from had Western power predominated in the area" (e.g., Syria, Sudan, Libya, and possibly even the UAR and Iraq.) Soviet propaganda has certainly made much of the benefits of the Soviet naval presence to the Arabs. Moscow has also been using "naval power as an instrument of foreign policy to buttress emerging propensities toward less engaged alignments and more obvious nonalignment on the part of previously pro-Western partisans."

In a word, Rubinstein concluded, "The Soviet Union is using sea power in the classic way, as an arm of diplomacy, to attain political goals."⁸⁰

3. CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

a. A complementary instrument in Soviet approach to Third World

Another important, and often overlooked instrument of Soviet-Third World policy, is cultural diplomacy. Although not enjoying as high a priority with the Soviet leadership as military and economic aid, cultural relations with the Third World have, nonetheless, played an important role in Soviet foreign policy since the early 1950's.

Like other instrumentalities of the Soviet Union's policy in the Third World, the Soviet cultural program has been carefully conceived and applied throughout the Third World. Its goals are similar. For throughout the history of the program, political considerations, in particular the currying of political favor, have been of utmost importance.

Soviet cultural diplomacy is, however, dissimilar from its economic and military assistance counterparts in that generally it provides an important point of direct contact between Third World peoples and the Soviet state. This characteristic—not often found in the more depersonalized government-to-government agreements on military

⁷⁸ Gupta, *Soviet Union and South Asia*, in Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, p. 140. According to columnist Jack Anderson who claimed to be quoting from CIA reports to the White House, Soviet Ambassador Pegov told the Indian Government that "a Soviet fleet is now in the Indian Ocean and the Soviet Union will not allow the Seventh Fleet to intervene" in Bangladesh. (p. 139.)

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 126.

⁸⁰ Rubinstein, *Soviet Policy Toward Third World*, pp. 109-110.

and economic aid—gives Soviet cultural diplomacy special value. Thus, Soviet cultural diplomacy effectively complements the other instrumentalities that the Soviet Union uses in the Third World.

b. Cultural agreements

Cultural agreements constitute the formal basis of Soviet cultural diplomacy. These agreements establish an operational framework within which specific programs may be carried out. Educational training, the exchange of printed material, the exchange of cultural groups, the creation of "Friendship Societies," and other such programs, are invariably preceded by the signing of a cultural agreement. As a result, Soviet-Third World cultural agreements represent an important first step in Soviet cultural penetration.

c. Friendship societies and other "fraternal" groups

Soviet friendship societies and other similar groups provide an essential organizational base for Soviet cultural programs in the Third World. These groups sponsor films, exhibitions, exchanges, and are often responsible for the selection of students to be sent to the Soviet Union for academic study. More importantly, they offer the opportunity for a Soviet presence at the local level—a position allowing for direct contact with the general populace.

d. The media

Soviet radio stations (e.g., Radio Peace and Progress) regularly broadcast foreign language programs to the Third World.⁸¹ These broadcasts reflect Soviet views and, according to Moscow, provide an alternative source of news—one not prejudiced by "imperialist dominated" news organs.

Soviet magazines, books, and other publications are also found in increasing numbers in the Third World. Their function is to offer a Soviet interpretation of economic, political, and international events.

e. Exchanges: Cultural and academic

Soviet-Third World exchange programs range from reciprocal visits by indigenous cultural groups, such as dance troupes and athletic teams, to large scale academic exchanges. The Soviet Union regularly sends Soviet cultural groups of all types to the Third World and in turn receives similar groups in the Soviet Union. Since 1955, Egypt alone has been visited by the Bolshoi Ballet, the state ballet companies of Leningrad, Novosibirsk, and Tashkent, and folkdance troupes from Moldavia, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.⁸² A unique asset for the Soviet Union is the multinational character of the Soviet state, particularly the great number of non-Slavic peoples many of whom, notably the Muslims of Soviet Central Asia, share common cultures and religions with many Third World nations.

The Soviet Union also operates an extensive academic exchange program. However, this program differs significantly from its "dance troupe" counterpart in that the exchange is primarily one way: fairly large numbers of Third World students travel to the Soviet Union for academic training in return for very small numbers of Soviet scholars.

Of all the Communist nations currently offering education to Third World nationals, the Soviet Union is by far the most active. Approximately two-thirds of the Third World students educated in Communist

⁸¹ McLaurin, op. cit., p. 184.

⁸² Dwisha, Karen. Soviet Cultural Relations with Iraq, Syria, and Egypt, 1955-70. Soviet studies, vol. 27, July 1975, p. 426.

countries have been taught in the Soviet Union.⁸³ In its academic exchange program the Soviet Union has not only admitted Third World students for study in the Soviet Union's own university system; it has also created special educational institutions in the U.S.S.R. The Patrice Lumumba People's Friendship University is the most famous of this type. Its primary purpose is to serve Third World nationals.

f. The effects

The main contribution to date of the Soviet cultural program in the Third World has been to help bolster already existing friendly relations. The program itself does not appear to have a life of its own. Thus, if the overall state of relations between the Soviet Union and an individual LDC is on the decline, then cultural relations would usually suffer accordingly. In brief, cultural relations lie essentially on the periphery of political relations: politics is the real determining factor in Soviet-Third World relations.

Significantly, in Soviet-Third World cultural relations the Soviet leadership appears to have placed its greatest hopes for ultimate success in the academic exchange program. Today, many Third World students who received their university education in the Soviet Union during the early years of the program are now beginning to rise to positions of importance in their own countries, as in the case of President Machel of Mozambique.⁸⁴ The question, therefore, becomes: How successful has the Soviet academic training program been in "cultivating" friends for the Soviet state? To date this question remains unanswered. There are, however, some indications that exposure to the Soviet system may in fact have alienated many more Third World students than it has converted, a liability which the Soviets may not have expected.⁸⁵

E. MULTIPLE INSTRUMENTALITIES FOR ACHIEVING THIRD WORLD GOALS

The Soviet Union has thus used various means in pursuing its Third World goals. Economic aid, technical assistance, and trade—primary instrumentalities—have been most effective, as has also been military assistance, perhaps the most successful and durable instrument of Third World policy. Large and growing yearly, military assistance commands a strong Soviet commitment.

In the political sphere the Soviet Union has been able to establish a mutually identifiable connection with the Third World, its causes and interests, and conversely has been able to turn this connection to advantage in its struggle against the West and the Chinese. Through the development of its navy, the Soviet Union has also been able to use its seapower as an effective arm of diplomacy in attaining political goals. Finally, in cultural diplomacy the Soviet Union has found an important instrumentality for expanding the beachhead of its influence and power in the Third World.

In brief, the Soviet Union has utilized many instruments in pursuing its goals in the Third World, and it has done so with apparent vigor and constancy, determination and imagination.

⁸³ Department of State, *Communist Aid and Trade to LDC's in 1974*, p. 10.

⁸⁴ CIA, *Communist Aid to LDC's in 1975*, p. 9.

⁸⁵ There have been numerous reports of dissatisfaction among LDC students with their treatment while studying in the Soviet Union. Complaints concerning excessive indoctrination, racial prejudices, and the general hostility of the Soviet population are common and often leave a bitter taste among Third World students. (Toth, Robert C. *African Students Assail Soviet Society*. Los Angeles Times, Nov. 23, 1975, pt. 7, pp. 6, 8-9.)

V. BREZHNEV AND THE THIRD WORLD, 1975-76: A CURRENT ASSESSMENT

A. SOVIET UNION IN WORLD OF MID-1970's: AN OVERVIEW

1. WORLD IN POLITICAL DIVERSITY

a. From simplicity to complexity

In the mid-1970's, the Soviet Union faces a world of political diversity. Historical forces have radically changed the simplified, more manageable, more clearly perceived bipolar world of the early postwar Stalinist era. Then, it was simply East and West, good and evil, friend and foe, Free World and Communist—all seemed distinguishable and identifiable.

This is no longer the case.

The political world of the mid-1970's has been transformed radically: it is now far more complex, more dangerous, more divisive, and paradoxically far more interdependent. Power has become diffused within the Western alliance systems, appreciably reducing the formerly hegemonic role of the United States. Similarly, polycentrism has loosened Soviet control over international communism, generating a first class power dispute between Peking and Moscow, and diminishing accordingly Soviet predominance within the world Communist system. As the only superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States may now command great resources of destruction, but their power is no longer commensurate with effective political use.

Adding to the further complexity of world affairs in the mid-1970's is the North-South issue, that is, the alinement of the dispossessed LDC's of the Third World against the industrialized nations of the northern hemisphere in a drive to achieve an equal distribution of the world's wealth and resources. Once virtually apolitical as a determining force in international relations, preferring the comfort of nonalignment between East and West, the Third World has now become a force to be reckoned with. The fulcrum of its leverage rests on possession of raw material resources in short supply and in great demand by the industrialized North. The Soviet ideological and political presumption of a symbiotic connection between their Socialist world and the Third World is now further questioned as the latter, much to Moscow's displeasure, links the Soviet Union with the industrialized developed countries of the North in its design for a new international economic order.

This changing configuration in the distribution of power suggests to many foreign policy observers the emergence of a new era of international relations in which nations of the world will be increasingly drawn into global arrangements for the orderly and fair distribution of essential resources and for the resolution of mounting global problems in which all nations have a stake. Interdependence is the term

used to describe what is believed to be a newly emerging structure of international relations, and "spaceship Earth" the symbol of man's shared destiny.

The urgency of interdependence is said by advocates to impose a new requirement on nations, that of achieving interdependent solutions through functional diplomacy and international cooperation. Interdependence is offered as mankind's only route to survival.¹

b. Soviet perception of changing world order

The Soviet perception of the changing world order in the mid-1970s differs markedly from that of the West. As noted above, Soviet ideology imposes a prescribed and uniformly structured worldview that by any objective standards distorts reality. But it does create a unique mind-set that projects, however imperfectly, apparent Soviet goals and expectations. Herein lies its value for the outsider.²

The principal elements in the current Soviet perception of international relations could be summarized as follows:³

- The essentials of the Khrushchevian worldview remain intact, modified only to take into account changing international political realities.
- The crisis of capitalism has intensified; the capitalist system, though still powerful, has been further weakened; while the socialist system, linked symbiotically with the Third World and the national liberation forces, has decisively gained a leading position in the world balance of forces.
- Continued strengthening of the economic and military power of the Soviet Union and the socialist nations is the most important single factor in insuring the ascendancy of socialism over capitalism.
- Bipolarity in superpower relations no longer holds center stage; they are limited to controlling the arms race and preventing nuclear war; détente, a product of these conditions, permits the socialist community to draw on the advanced capitalist technology for further economic development, while intensified ideological struggle preserves the purity of their socialist orientation.
- The forces of imperialism are still strong and belligerent, requiring the waging of the global anti-imperialist struggle with renewed vigor.
- Success of the anti-imperialist struggle (the Soviet Union has established a power presence in the "national liberation zone") is insured by the growing military and economic strength of the Soviet Union and its ability along with that of the socialist community to intervene in wars of national liberation.
- Imperialism is changing its Third World strategies and adjusting to the new realities dictated by the world balance of forces.

¹ This concept is discussed in, Whelan, Joseph G., "Political Goals and Purposes of the U.S.S.R. in Space," U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. Soviet Space Programs, 1971-75: Goals and Purposes, Organization, Resource Allocations, Attitudes Toward International Cooperation and Space Law, vol. II, staff report, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, ch. I. pp. 12, 26, and 27. (Hereinafter cited as, Soviet Space Programs, 1971-75.)

² For a comprehensive analysis of the current Soviet view toward the Third World, see, Ulyanovsky, Rostislav. The Developing Countries: Economic Front. New Times (Moscow), No. 34, August 1976, pp. 18-22 and Ulyanovsky, Rostislav. The Developing Countries: Aspects of the Political Scene. New Times (Moscow), No. 38, September 1976, pp. 18-22.

³ This commentary draws upon Gupta, Soviet Foreign Policy Strategic Thinking for the Seventies, pp. 334-339. For an extensive commentary on the Soviet worldview, see Brezhnev's Report to the 25th Congress of the CPSU.

Limited success may result, but new polarizations will also be created leading to new local conflicts requiring Soviet intervention in "just" wars on behalf of the victims of aggression and oppression.

- The scientific-technological revolution has enabled the capitalist system to resolve temporarily some of its contradictions, but the main result of the revolution for capitalism is an unprecedented deterioration of the "fundamental contradiction" of the capitalist system.
- By applying science and technology to development, the socialist community has changed the world balance of forces in favor of socialism. To maintain this position they must further develop their military capability in order to defend the socialist system and assist those fighting for national liberation.

2. DÉTENTE IN RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES

a. *Definition of détente*

A central feature in the Soviet view of contemporary international relations is détente in relations with the United States.⁴

Détente is generally understood to mean an easing of tensions in international relations. The Soviet Union and the United States have perceived détente as an ongoing process, not a permanent achievement. Each side has accepted the realities of power in its relationship and the conflictual differences issuing therefrom. Restraint is the first requirement of détente. Other requirements are: recognition of the limits of power in seeking political goals; a willingness to resolve differences within an agreed international framework; and an awareness of and respect for mutual vital interests.

b. *Elements in changing relationship*

Détente has changed Soviet-American relations since early 1972. The cold war has been further decompressed. The modalities of relations have changed from hostility to apparent reasonableness and responsibility. The magnitude of the change can be gauged, at least formally, by the multilevel framework of orderly negotiations that has been established. Tendencies toward global interdependence and the durability of factors creating the rationale for détente have encouraged an element of optimism.

Détente has rested upon a balance of interests agreeable to both nations, the most significant of which are: the Soviet achievement of near-strategic nuclear parity, and a mutual concern for the danger of thermonuclear war and a mutual desire to avoid it. Still, serious barriers to détente remain; namely, ideological incompatibility; existing power realities; and an enduring mutual distrust rooted in memory of the cold war.

c. *Course of détente*

The course of détente in Soviet-American relations suggests the magnitude of the seemingly irrepressible strains that lay deep in this relationship and the difficulty in achieving its purposes. In late 1974, skepticism in the United States, fed by the belief that détente was not evenhanded, appeared to deepen and broaden, despite a "break-

⁴ This section is based on, Whelan, Joseph G. *Détente with the Soviet Union*. Issue Brief No. IB74120. Washington, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Oct. 7, 1976, 45 pp.

through" at the Vladivostok summit. In the spring and summer of 1975, détente seemed to reach a plateau. American skepticism increased as the momentum stalled with Soviet cancellation of the 1972 trade agreement, failure of negotiations on SALT II and Mutual and Balanced Forces Reductions (MBFR), and dissatisfaction over the European Security Conference (CSCE), particularly the requirements on human rights and the presumed Western recognition of Soviet wartime conquests. By autumn, the Soviets responded to what they perceived to be an accumulation of grievances against the United States. Among these was irritation at the lukewarm reception by the United States of the CSCE's Final Act.

By the end of 1975 and through the first 8 months of 1976, détente underwent many stresses and strains as a result of continued deadlock in arms control negotiations, Soviet intervention in Angola, growing U.S. concern that the balance of strategic power was shifting in favor of the Soviet Union, and the adverse effects of détente becoming an issue in the Presidential election campaign.

d. Prospects for détente

Prospects for détente are, therefore, mixed. Relations have changed markedly in 3 years. Outstanding problems have been solved, but hard-core differences remain, notably SALT II and MBFR, for military détente continues to be the principal dividing issue. Nonetheless, détente remains the centerpiece of Soviet-American relations—indeed Soviet relations with the entire West. It is an essential element in the Soviet view of contemporary international relations and accordingly has an important bearing on Soviet-Third World relations.

3. SOVIET UNION AND THIRD WORLD

a. Continuation of interest

(1) Détente and Third World policy in contradiction

The connection between détente and Soviet-Third World policy lies in Soviet insistence that accommodation in East-West relations does not rule out the pursuit of ideological and revolutionary goals in the Third World. Brezhnev has thus pursued in parallel what many American observers perceive as two essentially contradictory lines of policy; namely, SALT II negotiations with the United States aimed at controlling the arms race, along with other measures designed to decompress tensions in bilateral relations; and a deep military involvement in Angola and elsewhere in southern Africa intended to reinforce the national liberation cause in that region.

That there has been a continuation, perhaps even a vigorous renewal, of Soviet interest in the Third World, there seems to be little doubt. This Soviet effort appears to have moved along two lines; namely, (1) the pursuit of military and strategic goals (i.e., the search for bases and extension of military assistance, etc.); and (2) the consolidation of the Soviet power presence in traditional Third World areas, penetration, and expansion of Soviet influence into other regions of the "national liberation zone."

(2) *Pursuit of military and strategic goals*

(a) *Soviet military assistance to Africa.*—In pursuit of its military and strategic goals in the Third World, particularly in Africa, the Soviet Union has left little doubt of its intentions. The "major role", in Soviet words, of Soviet military aid in the African national liberation movement was a subject of discussion at a recent Soviet conference on Africa held in the wake of the Angolan victory. In light of this conference and other Soviet commentaries on Africa, Soviet policy in that region seems clearly designed to stimulate armed conflict and radicalize African politics.⁵

Selected press reports of recent months suggest the scope of Soviet activity in Africa. Soviet military assistance, along with that of Cuba, has continued to pour into Angola and other African countries. As a result of this support Mozambique, as well as Tanzania and Zambia, have fast been becoming bases of operations for Soviet supported guerrilla activities against Rhodesia.⁶

The victory of the MPLA faction in Angola was largely brought about by Soviet military assistance. During the height of civil war in 1975 and early 1976, the Soviet Union extended an estimated \$300 million in military assistance. It was reported in July 1976 that Angola had just received, presumably an additional, \$200 to \$300 million in Soviet arms, the largest single buildup anywhere on the African continent during the past year.⁷

With the help of Soviet military aid of \$132 million and more than a thousand military advisers, Somalia, located on the strategically important horn of East Africa, has one of the largest and best equipped armies in black Africa.⁸

The Soviet Union is the principal backer and military provider in Uganda and increasingly in Libya.⁹

(b) *Search for military and naval bases.*—Suggestive also of continued Soviet activity in the Third World and use of the military instrumentality are efforts to improve upon their network of military and naval bases in the South Atlantic along the West African coast, the Pacific, and the Indian Ocean.

The Soviet Union has footholds in each of the three Guineas—Republic of Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and the Democratic Republic of Equatorial Guinea. Reportedly, the Equatorial Guinea army is controlled by Soviet specialists and advisers to President Francisco Nguema; naval facilities along the coast will give the Soviets a toehold in the Bay of Biafra. On the nearby islands of Sao Tome and Principe the Soviets have been permitted to develop naval facilities. Mauritania concluded with the Soviet Union a joint fishing agreement providing for a fish processing complex in the Port of Nuadibo. Such agreements are usually forerunners to an expanding naval presence. The week-long visit to Moscow in May 1976 of Angolan Premier Lopo do Nascimento and Angolan acceptance of Soviet assistance "in consolidating its defensive capacity" led one observer of the Soviet scene to conclude

⁵ Victor Zorza discusses this conference and commentaries in Soviet publications in "Moscow's African Strategy," *The Washington Post*, Oct. 1, 1976, p. A23.

⁶ Willis, David K. Soviets Crank Up Southern Africa Strategy. *The Christian Science Monitor*, Aug. 12, 1976, p. 4. Wright, Robin, Mozambique Holds Key to Fighting in Rhodesia, *the Washington Post*, Oct. 3, 1976, p. A22, and Kaufman, Michael T. War, Southern Africa's Alternative, *the New York Times*, Oct. 3, 1976, p. E2.

⁷ Ottaway, David B. U.S. Gets into Africa Arms Race. *The Washington Post*, July 6, 1976, p. A1.

⁸ Weinraub, Bernard. U.S. to Sell Kenya 12 F-5's in \$70 million Arms Deal. *The New York Times*, June 17, 1976, p. 1.

⁹ Ottaway, David B. Israeli Raid Underlines the Helplessness of African States. *The Washington Post*, July 7, 1976, p. A17.

that "there is little doubt that the Soviets are preparing to establish footholds along the coast of West Africa from Guinea-Bissau south of Senegal to the southern border of Angola."¹⁰ On October 8, 1976, Angola and the Soviet Union further solidified their relationship by concluding a treaty of friendship and cooperation; a treaty of cooperation was also concluded at the party level between the CPSU and the MPLA.¹¹

Possession of naval facilities along the West African coast enables the Soviet Union to exercise some influence on African politics, but perhaps more importantly it enables the Soviets to project their naval power in the South Atlantic and along the South Atlantic-Indian Ocean sea routes around Africa's southern tip. This is one of the principal sea lanes of the world for the traffic moving from southern Asia and the Middle East to Western Europe.

In recent months the Soviets have turned their attention to the South Pacific, specifically to Tonga Island and Western Samoa, both independent Pacific island states. In return for building fishing facilities, the Soviets were said to offer economic aid, notably in the form of building much desired international airports on both islands to encourage tourism. The United States, New Zealand, and Australia, suspecting Soviet intentions, have reacted strongly (but apparently not officially) to this penetration of Soviet naval power into these strategically important islands.¹² Some observers see the move as a Soviet attempt to outflank the U.S. position in Guam and the northern Marianas.

Both the New Zealand and Australian Governments have publicly expressed their apprehension for the increasing number of Soviet ships and submarines in waters adjoining their countries. Such preoccupation with the Soviet naval activity suggested to some observers a concern that the ANZUS security pact might in some way be eroded by the Soviet Union.¹³

In response to expressed concern for Soviet penetration of the South Pacific islands, the Soviets contend that the so-called "Soviet danger" in the Pacific "comes down to the establishment and development of normal relations between the Soviet Union and independent Pacific Ocean states."¹⁴

Soviet naval interest in the Indian Ocean, a source of sustained anxiety for both Australia and New Zealand, has continued apparently undiminished.¹⁵ The Soviet Union has footholds at various points

¹⁰ Wohl, Paul. Why Moscow's Eye is on West Africa. *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 23, 1976, p. 5.

¹¹ Moscow Tass, 1:00 GMT, Oct. 8, 1976, in FBIS Wire Service 80.

¹² A spokesman for the American Pacific Command in Hawaii observed, "It is common usage for the Russians to go in for one purpose and use it [a facility of the type proposed] for everything else." (Francis, David R., Soviets Angle for Samoan Base. *The Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 3, 1976, p. 3.)

¹³ Carthew, Alistair. Soviet Subs Near New Zealand. *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 29, 1976, p. 6.

¹⁴ From an *Izvestia* editorial quoted in, Kent, Thomas. New "Nations" in a Strategic Location: East and West Spar Over Tiny Pacific Isles. *The Christian Science Monitor*, Oct. 5, 1976, p. 12. See also, Carthew, Alistair. Soviet Expansion Courted. *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 22, 1976, p. 12.

¹⁵ According to a report on the visit to the United States of Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser in mid-1976, Fraser had set out on "something of a holy crusade to convince the world that the Soviet Union was trying to turn the Indian Ocean into a Russian lake." President Ford assured Fraser privately that American forces in the area would be maintained to match Soviet forces there and promised publicly that the development of the U.S. base on Diego Garcia, the British-owned Indian Ocean island, would continue. Both leaders had acknowledged that Soviet power in the Indian Ocean was expanding. (Costigan, Peter. United States-Australian Strain Eased by Fraser's Visit. *The Washington Post*, Aug. 3, 1976, p. A10.)

New Zealand's concern for the Soviet buildup in the Indian Ocean was dramatized in 1976 when Prime Minister Robert D. Muldoon called a special news conference to produce photographs of Soviet warships taken at surface level by Royal New Zealand Air Force Orion aircraft based in Singapore. According to Muldoon, the average daily Soviet naval presence in 1975 in the Indian Ocean was 22 ships, compared with fewer than 10 American ships. He also pointed to the construction of Soviet naval bases in Somalia and at Umm Qasr, Iraq, on the Persian Gulf. (Carthew, Alistair. Soviet Subs Near New Zealand. *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 29, 1976, p. 6.)

along the shore of the Indian Ocean, notably in Somalia on the horn of Africa opposite the large port of Aden in leftist ruled South Yemen. For more than 15 years Soviet scientific vessels have conducted hydrological surveys of the entire Indian Ocean giving the Soviet Union a fairly complete knowledge of the ocean.

On May 24, 1976, for example, Radio Vladivostok announced that the expeditionary ship *Kallisto*, flagship of the Far Eastern scientific center, had left for a 117-day voyage to the Indian Ocean, India, Sri Lanka, and the Andaman and Maldiva Islands ostensibly "for the purpose of research into marine fauna," but undoubtedly for strategic naval purposes.¹⁶

That the Soviets move quickly to exert their influence and secure a strategic advantage when the opportunity arises was amply demonstrated in the case of the Seychelles Islands. This former British colony of about 100 islands with an aggregate area of 400 square kilometers and a population of 60,000, proclaimed its independence on June 28, 1976. On the following day Nikolay Podgorny, President of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet Presidium, sent a congratulatory message to President James Mancham of the the Seychelles Republic, extending recognition and offering to establish diplomatic relations. Soviet Ambassador to Madagascar A. Alekseyev attended the independence ceremony, adding the weight of Soviet prestige to the affair.¹⁷

The Soviets had actually been laying the groundwork in Seychelles for over a year. In April 1975, a Soviet delegation visited the island where it conferred with its leaders on matters of trade and economic relations. On a return visit to Moscow in September, the delegation from Seychelles confirmed its government's desire for peace and cooperation and exchanged opinions on developing "friendly contacts" in the future.¹⁸

The reason for this seemingly excessive and prompt Soviet attention to the island republic is not hard to divine. Seychelles lies northeast of Madagascar in the Indian Ocean along the principal sea routes touching on South Asia, the lower Middle East, and the northeast coast of Africa stretching from Somalia to northern Mozambique. According to Dr. Boris Khuzmukhamedo, a Soviet economist, the islands "occupy a favorable strategic position in the western part of the Indian Ocean." For this reason, he said, the British did not want to part with them.¹⁹ Soviet strategic interest in the Indian Ocean was thus a factor in their quick move into the Seychelles Islands.

Furthermore, the islands' leaders declared that their new republic would pursue a policy of peace, nonalignment, and friendly relations with all countries, including the socialist. Specifically, they advocated the creation of a "zone of peace" in the Indian Ocean and the exclusion of all foreign military bases, notably the U.S. military base at Diego Garcia. All of these positions coincided with current lines in Soviet foreign policy.

¹⁶ Wohl, Paul. How Soviet Navy Refuels Its Submarines at Sea. *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 29, 1976, p. 6. Wohl explained a new procedure the Soviets developed for refueling submarines at sea that offsets the need for shore facilities and is being used in the Indian Ocean. Early in 1976 the Soviets began dropping large containers of jellified fuel from surface vessels into shallow ocean waters, according to Wohl. The submarines are guided to these fuel dumps by electronically equipped markers 90 feet below the surface of the water. Jellified fuel minimizes vapor pressure and can be reliquified easily once the submarines have picked it up.

¹⁷ New State in the Indian Ocean. *New Times (Moscow)*, No. 27, July 1976: 25. Also, Moscow Tass, June 25, 28, and 29, 1976, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, June 29, 1976, pp. H1-H2.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Moscow Radio in English to South and Southeast Asia, June 28, 1976, in FBIS, Daily Report, vol. 3, June 29, 1976, pp. H1-H2.

In brief, the strategic importance of Seychelle in the Indian Ocean and the many intersecting lines of foreign policy, at least as reflected in Soviet sources, have encouraged the Soviets to establish the foundations for a secure presence in this strategically important island group.²⁰

At the close of 1976, John K. Cooley, Middle East correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor, filed a comprehensive report from Manama, Bahrain on the Soviet naval presence in the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, and the Indian Ocean.²¹

Cooley began: "As the United States seems about to lose, at Bahrain's request, the shore command and home porting facilities it has had here for its small Persian Gulf naval force, the Soviets are extending and consolidating their watch over the vast expanses of seas in this area." Soviet warships and naval aircraft were expanding their operations throughout the region, Cooley reported, though in the gulf itself their activity was, according to one professional analyst, "surprisingly restrained." Soviet ships were making port visits to Umm Qasr in Iraq where along with Western firms the Russians were helping to build port installations. "But neither they nor any one else is trying to bring in any aircraft carriers or anything much bigger than a frigate or a destroyer here," the analyst told Cooley.

According to apparently authoritative naval sources in Bahrain, the Soviet Indian Ocean force numbered at that time from 15 to 20 ships with an average of 6 fighting ships among them. The capability of the Soviet fleet to support their ships at sea with other ships, and their further support by the 10,000-mile range Soviet Bear and IL-38 naval patrol aircraft operating out of Somalia, have made home ports or shore bases practically unnecessary. The IL-38's, Cooley noted, normally flew from the Soviet Union over Iran's airspace, bypassing the gulf, down over the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean, and were able to go as far as Diego Garcia, the U.S. base and communications facility in mid-ocean, before returning to their home base.

In addition to air facilities at Belladi Amin near Mogadishu, the Somali capital, the Soviets used missile testing and other shore installations on the Somali coast. They also have free use of the larger harbor and free port at Aden, the capital of the People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen; United States and other Western ships have been denied these facilities. The Soviets were using anchorages in many places around the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea. One of their main permanent anchorages was off South Yemen's Socotra Island.

In sum, there would seem to be little doubt that the Soviet Union, aided by its supporting naval aircraft, has established, or is in the course of establishing, a naval presence in vital sectors of the Third World.²²

²⁰ During the spring and summer of 1976, the Soviets pushed vigorously their proposal for making the Indian Ocean a "zone of peace", presumably seeking to catch the attention of the two major conferences of Third World countries at Nairobi and Colombo. The proceedings at Seychelles coincided. In an article appearing in *Izvestia* on June 27, 1976, V. Skosyrev sharply criticized the construction of a U.S. naval and air base at Diego Garcia. Skosyrev vowed that "the Soviet Union has not had and still does not have any intentions of building military bases in the Indian Ocean." (Skosyrev, V. *The Strategy of Exacerbating Tension*. *Izvestia*, June 27, 1976, p. 3, in FBIS, *Daily Report, Soviet Union*, vol. 3, July 2, 1976, pp. J1-J2.)

²¹ Cooley, John K. *Soviets Make Presence Visible on Arab Seas*. *The Christian Science Monitor*, Dec. 30, 1976, p. 4.

²² For a commentary on the Soviet Pacific Fleet, its size, mission, and capabilities, see, *The New Pacific Power Balance: Post-Vietnam Strategy Must Reckon with Soviet Naval Might*. Excerpted report from the 1976 yearbook of the Hong Kong newsweekly, "Far Eastern Economic Review," in, *Atlas: World Press Review*, February 1977: 11-14. The report states: "The Soviet Pacific Fleet has grown by about one-third in the past ten years and its firepower has tripled;" (p. 13.) "The pattern of bases and airfields suggests that even today the Soviet Pacific Fleet is still in transition from a coastal defense to a maritime attack force;" "The picture would be radically altered if the Soviets gained access to bases in southern Africa. So far there is nothing to suggest that their quest has been successful. So the Soviet Pacific Fleet must make do for the foreseeable future with its present inadequate bases and its limited supply of powerful new ships." (p.14).

(c) *Okean 1975: display of Soviet naval power*.—Perhaps the most conspicuous and impressive display of Soviet naval power for the viewing of friends in the Third World and potential foes in the technologically advanced world was the naval exercise termed, "Okean 1975." Operations employing over 220 ships and submarines were conducted by three main groups, including a convoy serial in the North Atlantic; a cruiser group in the western Mediterranean; "in-house" squadrons in the Black Sea towards the Turkish straits area; a force in the Arabian Sea; and four groups in the Western Pacific. Support by naval strike and reconnaissance aircraft took place in the North Atlantic and Pacific from bases in the Soviet Union, in the Central Atlantic by Bear aircraft based in Cuba and Guinea, and in the Indian Ocean by planes from Somalia and the Soviet Union.

Jane's Fighting Ships underscored the significance of Okean 1975 with this comment in the foreword:

With Admiral Gorshkov and Marshal Grechko embarked for a period this was a sign to both the Western World and the Politburo that here was a major, self-contained navy with excellent communications and friendly havens in foreign countries.²³

Adm. Stansfield Turner, U.S. Navy, Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces Southern Europe, made this evaluation of Okean, placing the exercise in the larger context of the growth of Soviet naval power:

During the *Okean* fleet exercise of 1975, the Soviets rehearsed tactics for cutting open-ocean sea-lanes [a tactic directed against the U.S. naval goal of maintaining these lanes open]. With the realization of a wide-ranging capability for sea denial, they had progressed from the basic concept of defense of Mother Russia to the more grandiose capability of posing a global offensive threat to free world use of high seas. In less than 30 years, the Soviet Navy had developed from an insignificant coastal defense force to one that aspired to: (1) strategic deterrence; (2) naval presence; and (3) sea denial.²⁴

Thus the Soviet Union continues to pursue its military and strategic goals in the Third World with apparent vigor and determination. And while the above data cannot be otherwise than very sketchy, still in combination with other points developed below it does suggest that the military component continues to be a significant part of Soviet policy toward the Third World.²⁵

(3) *Consolidation, penetration, and expansion of Soviet power in the Third World*

(a) *Consolidating ties with India*.—Consolidation of the Soviet power presence in traditional Third World areas, penetration and expansion of Soviet influence in other regions of the "national liberation zone" constitute the political component of Soviet policy toward the Third World. Selected examples of these three lines of action are evident in recent Soviet activities in India, the Philippines, and in southern Africa.

²³ Moore, John E. Captain, ed. *Jane's Fighting Ships*. London, England, 1976, p. 95. In July 1976, the Soviets conducted large scale combined naval, army, and air force maneuvers in the North Pacific close to Japan. (Tokyo, Kyodo in English, 1248 GMT, July 7, 1976, FBIS Wire Service 50.)

²⁴ Turner, Adm. Stansfield. *The Naval Balance: Not Just a Numbers Game*. Foreign Affairs, vol. 55, January 1977, p. 342.

²⁵ While North Vietnam is not considered part of the Third World in this study, it is important to note that in early 1976 it was reported that there were signs in North Vietnam of the Soviet Union embarking on what could be the first stage of a military base program. The Soviets started to build repair-and-refuelling facilities for their submarines in North Vietnam; they also agreed to equip the Vietnamese Navy with its first Whisky class Soviet-built submarine. Understandably such a base would serve Soviet naval interests in Southeast Asia and in the area of southern China.

Soviet efforts to consolidate still further its ties with India were clearly visible in the 5-day visit of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to Moscow during June 1976.

In addition to apparently achieving this purpose, the leaders of both countries were anxious to get renewed assurances of friendship in view of India's recent decision to upgrade its relations with China. Gandhi gave these assurances, noting that the "new friendship moves" toward China "do not mean repudiation of old friends," while Brezhnev and Kosygin went to great lengths in extending Soviet hospitality to their Indian guest and in pledging their nation's friendship and cooperation.²⁶

Over the years the Soviet Union has become deeply committed to India. The U.S.S.R. is one of India's largest trading partners, growing to a two-way annual total exceeding \$8 million; it is also a major aid donor. Soviet economic aid has reached about \$1.5 billion; large scale military aid has also been extended, but the figure remains secret.²⁷ Moreover, India has become a veritable model for Soviet relations with the Third World, and accordingly while in Moscow Gandhi was housed in the Kremlin's most lavish apartments, feted, toasted, extended the greatest courtesies, and generally treated, in the words of one report, as what she has become in fact: "Moscow's closest friend in the Third World, a formidable voice for the Soviets in the top councils of the nonaligned states."²⁸

The Gandhi visit seemed to achieve its purposes for both sides, though no major changes or breakthroughs occurred. Ties appear to have been strengthened and friendships reaffirmed. And while Gandhi resisted Soviet pressures to support Brezhnev's Asian security plan, long in gestation and short in any positive Asian response, she did agree to a Soviet formulation in the communique urging that foreign military bases should not be established in the Indian Ocean—an obvious reference to the U.S. base at Diego Garcia.²⁹ The overall importance of the visit was apparent Soviet success in consolidating its relations with India. As if to underscore this fact, Brezhnev and Kosygin agreed to a return visit to India, and further agreed to holding regular meetings with India's leaders in the future.³⁰

(b) *Penetrating the Philippines*.—Penetration of the Philippine Islands marked another line of action in Soviet relations with the Third World. For at least 5 years President Ferdinand Marcos had been moving towards full diplomatic and commercial relations with the Soviet Union as part of an emerging strategy designed to strike a balance among the competing interests of the United States, China, and the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia. The strategy was culminated

²⁶ Osnos, Peter. Gandhi Visit Underlines Soviet Ties. The Washington Post, June 13, 1976, p. A15.

²⁷ Borders, William. Mrs. Gandhi set for Soviet Visit. The New York Times, June 6, 1976, p. 25.

²⁸ The Washington Post, June 13, 1976, A15.

²⁹ Larrabee, F. Stephen. Indira Gandhi's Visit to Moscow. Radio Liberty Research, June 14, 1976, p. 2 (RL 307/76).

³⁰ Pond, Elizabeth. Soviet-Indian Relations: Moscow Gives New Friendship Pledge. The Christian Science Monitor, June 14, 1976, p. 5.

The high esteem with which India is held by the Soviet leadership was reflected in Brezhnev's remarks at the Kremlin dinner honoring Gandhi: He said: "We highly value the constantly strengthening Soviet-Indian friendship and attach to it, I would say, a principled significance. We regard it as an embodiment of the inviolable friendship and unity of two great forces of our times—the world of socialism and the countries which have freed themselves from the colonial yoke and have embarked on the road of independent progressive development. * * *" (Text of Brezhnev Speech at Kremlin Dinner for Indira Gandhi. Moscow Tass in English 1826 GMT, June 8, 1976, FBIS Wire Service 107.)

in Marcos' 5-day visit to Moscow beginning May 31, 1976, and the conclusion of an agreement to establish diplomatic and commercial relations.

Filipino perception of their self-interest coincided with the design of Soviet policy in Southeast Asia. Moscow's aim has been to establish a foothold in this important Southeast Asian country, expand its influence and power, further reduce that of the United States, and in the long term establish an Asian presence in the form of Brezhnev's Asian security plan.³¹

American loss of the Vietnam war had created conditions favorable to Soviet policy. With the collapse of U.S. power in Southeast Asia and subsequent retrenchment of its commitments, the Philippine leadership sought greater independence from the United States, their mentor of some three-quarters of a century. They undertook to renegotiate base agreements that gave the United States extensive rights at the strategically important Clark Air Base, headquarters for the U.S. 13th Air Force, and Subic Naval Base, a major repair and supply facility for the 7th Fleet, with a goal of reclaiming complete Philippine sovereignty and control.³²

They established diplomatic relations with China and other Communist states, including North Vietnam. They moved progressively into the position of nonalignment. Moscow encouraged these manifestations of Philippine independence.³³ The ultimate step was the Marcos visit to Moscow and his declaration at the Kremlin banquet held in his honor in which he said, "The visit is a landmark in the evolution of relations between the Philippines and the rest of the world, an evolution from colonialism to a special approach to national independence, reliance on one's own forces and pursuance of the same policy of friendship with all countries."³⁴

That the Soviets reacted favorably to this turn in Philippine foreign policy, there can be little doubt. As President Podgorny said at the

³¹ The Washington Post, June 3, 1976, A23.

³² James Reston discusses these negotiations and their significance for the U.S. position in the Pacific in, "Another Forgotten Problem," The New York Times, June 20, 1976, p. E17.

Both the Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base have grown in importance with the American defeat in Vietnam, the withdrawal of American forces from Thailand, and the increase of Soviet naval power in the Indian Ocean. Reports on the still secret negotiations indicate that the Philippine Government does not appear to want an American military withdrawal though engaged in tough bargaining. Marcos' goal of symbolic and legal Filipino jurisdiction over the bases and replacement of a long-term rent-free lease agreement with more favorable terms would increase his prestige as a nationalist and also make it easier for the Philippines to assume a more independent stance as a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations which has been trying to fill the economic and political vacuum left by the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. (Moritz, Frederic A. Philippine Leader Sets Objectives: Muslim Ties, U.S. Bases Absorb Marcos. The Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 15, 1976, p. 17.)

³³ N. Romanov reviewed the history of the Philippine independence movement. He referred to the "substantial changes" that have been occurring in Philippine foreign policy which is "now freeing itself from the fetters with which American imperialism had earlier bound the country." He noted the Marcos government's advocacy of the review of "one-sided military and economic agreements" with the United States, of the status of the American bases on Philippine territory, elimination of the "outmoded SEATO bloc" and expansion of relations with the non-aligned states. "In its foreign policy," Romanov wrote, "the Philippines supports the principles of peaceful coexistence and opposes colonialism and racial discrimination advocates universal and complete disarmament and opposes the policy of diktat and inequality in international economic relations." Romanov went on to discuss the Philippine's changing relationship with the socialist community and the importance of the Marcos visit. (Romanov, N. Following an Independent Course. Selskaya Zhizn, Moscow, June 16, 1976, p. 3, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, Vol. 3, No. 119, June 18, 1976, p. K1.)

In radio broadcasts to Southeast Asia the Soviets emphasized the anomaly of foreign bases on Philippine territory at a time of growing independence for Asian countries. (Moscow in English to South and Southeast Asia, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, Vol. 3, No. 131, July 7, 1976, p. K2.)

³⁴ Moscow Tass in English, 2112 GMT, May 31, 1976, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, Vol. 3, No. 106, June 1, 1976, p. K5.

Kremlin dinner, the Marcos visit and the agreements reached "will open a new page in Soviet-Philippines relationships."³⁵

The Marcos visit and the subsequent opening of diplomatic and commercial relations (the last major Southeast Asian country to do so) marked a significant step towards securing the Soviet position in an area of the world where U.S. power was formerly predominant and China is now actively promoting its interests. Viewed in the larger context of Soviet-Third World relations, this new development in Soviet-Philippine relations, along with reestablishing economic ties with Indonesia after a decade of inactivity, was a decided plus for the Soviets in their quest to expand their influence and presence in Southeast Asia.³⁶

(c) *Expanding influence in southern Africa; Angola and Mozambique.*—Soviet success in India and the Philippines was broadened by the successful expansion of its influence and power in southern Africa, notably in Angola and Mozambique. In the months following victory in the Angolan civil war the Soviets were able to consolidate and expand their influence in that quarter, win over Mozambique leaders from Chinese influence, establish close ties with their government, and align the Soviet Union securely with the liberation cause of Black Africa in the impending struggle with Rhodesia.³⁷

In late May 1976, Angola's Prime Minister Lopo do Nascimento headed a most important delegation of Angolan political, military, intelligence, and economic leaders to Moscow to express their gratitude to the Soviets for their assistance during the struggle for power and independence, and to consolidate already close relations with the Soviet Union.³⁸ The visit, highlighted by discussions with Brezhnev

³⁵ Podgorny went on to say that "the speedy establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the Philippine Republic would raise these relations to a qualitatively new level and would assist their stable advances on the bases of peaceful co-existence." In an apparent boost for the Brezhnev Asian security plan, he cited the example of Europe and the success of the Final Act concluded at the Helsinki Conference that represents, he said, "a code of principles for inter-state relationships based on peaceful co-existence." Podgorny noted that success in this quarter "can undoubtedly be used to promote a durable peace and security in the countries of Asia, prosperity and happiness for the peoples of that continent." (Moscow Tass in English, 1808 GMT, May 31, 1976, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, No. 106, June 1, 1976, pp. K1-K3.)

³⁶ A statement and communique issued on the conclusion of the visit contained what are now stock expressions of Soviet policy in the Third World; for example, confirmation of solidarity with peoples embattled against imperialism and colonialism "in all their forms and manifestations"; support for the declaration of decolonization that was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly; the sovereign right of nations to dispose of their natural resources for development purposes; and a generalized plea for relaxation of world tension and peace. (FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, No. 122, June 8, 1976, pp. K1-K2.)

With respect to Indonesia, the Soviet Union has made what one report from Jakarta termed a "massive re-entry" over the last few months into aid to Indonesia, terminating a freeze on Soviet projects that began with the ill-fated Communist coup of 1965. Dr. Mohammed Sadli, Indonesia's Minister of Mines, recently announced that the Soviets agreed in principle to give technical assistance for a proposed \$360 million alumina smelter. Late in 1975, the Soviets agreed to help build a 600-megawatt hydroelectric power plant in west Java and a 180-megawatt plant in central Java. The three projects will require the inflow of Soviet technicians for the first time since the coup. Relations between both governments are described as correct rather than friendly, but both sides see distinct advantages in widening their relationships. Indonesia is said to be "hungry" for development capital; it can also use the Soviet connection to counter accusations of becoming an American satellite or America's "policeman" in Southeast Asia following the Communist takeover in Indochina. While the Soviet benefit is slight (volume of trade currently is only about \$30 million a year), still its principal gain is in competition with China for influence. A major thrust of Soviet diplomatic and propaganda activity in Indonesia has been to sow distrust of Peking's intentions in Southeast Asia. (McDonald, Hamish. *Soviets Resume Aid to Indonesia*. The Washington Post, May 24, 1976, p. A20.)

The Soviet Union has been openly encouraging Indonesia's favor. In a broadcast on May 24, 1976, the commentator discussed the improving condition of Soviet-Indonesia relations, citing the visit of Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, the Minister of State for Research, and the many projects noted above along with the increase in trade and Indonesia's use of Soviet ships. The visit of the Minister was seen to encourage an improving relationship along with the drafting of plans to undertake a number of cooperative mining projects. (Moscow Radio, in Indonesian to Indonesia, 1500 GMT, May 24, 1976, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, No. 103, May 26, 1976, p. K1. See also, New Times (Moscow), No. 31, July 1976 pp. 14-15.)

³⁷ For a recent commentary on the Soviet role in Africa, see Solodovnikov, V. and N. Gavrilov. *Africa: Tendencies of Non-Capitalist Development*. International Affairs (Moscow), No. 3, 1976, pp. 31-39.

³⁸ Howe, Marvine. *Angola's Premier is Off to Soviet to Improve Ties*. The New York Times, May 24, 1976, p. 3. See also, Murphy, Caryl. *Angolans Tout Moscow Visit*. The Washington Post, May 24, 1976, p. A14; and Osnes, Peter. *African Leaders Converge on Newly Influential Moscow*. The Washington Post, May 30, 1976, p. A18.

and Soviet military and economic leaders, provided the Soviet Union the opportunity to reaffirm its support of the People's Republic of Angola and to pledge further assistance in transforming Angola into a socialist state. Soviet pledges of military, economic, and political support—"all-round cooperation," as the communique said—were forthcoming on the occasion of formal speeches by Kosygin and in the joint communique published at the conclusion of the visit.³⁹

In the wake of the civil war Soviet influence has increased steadily in Angola. Though the Russians numbered only about 200, according to Western diplomatic sources, they have extended their control through the Cubans (20,000–25,000), East Germans (1,000–2,000), and Portuguese Communists. The Soviet KGB was said to be effectively in control of the Departments of Information and Security.⁴⁰

Reportedly, Soviet advisors helped the new government organize its military and security forces; labor union organizers trained Angolans; and Soviet fishing experts have been helping to revitalize the country's fishing industry.⁴¹

Angola needs Soviet economic and military assistance, and this need no doubt could create a substantial dependency and provide solid political leverage for the Soviet Union. As June Goodwin, staff correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*, wrote from Luanda, Angola, "Given Angola's need for technicians and aid of every kind, it appears highly unlikely the Soviets or Cubans will be moving out in the near future. Indeed, the MPLA government appears to need the foreigners just to stay in existence."⁴²

The Soviet Union significantly extended its influence over Angola with the conclusion on October 8, 1976, of a formal 20-year treaty of friendship and cooperation and an agreement of cooperation at the party level between the CPSU and the MPLA.⁴³ Present at the signing of the documents were Brezhnev and Soviet party and government leaders. Agostinho Neto, President of the APR, assisted by his foreign policy, economic, and military aides, signed for Angola. An extensive statement, issued at the conclusion of the meeting, clearly associated Angola with major foreign policy positions taken by the Soviet Union on a broad range of issues, particularly those emerging in southern Africa. In return, the Soviet Union gave the following all-inclusive pledge to Angola:

The Soviet side confirmed its readiness to continue to give Angola support and assistance in solving the tasks facing the MPLA and Angolan Government

³⁹ In a speech at a Kremlin dinner honoring Nascimento, Kosygin recalled Soviet assistance rendered Angola in its struggle for independence, expressed "friendly interest and sympathy" with Angolan efforts to establish political and economic independence, reasserted the need to overcome the "aggressive forces of imperialism and reaction," and pledged to "continue to do everything incumbent upon us to consolidate our relations and raise the effectiveness of our cooperation for the benefit of the peoples of both countries and in the interests of peace and progress." (*Pravda*, May 25, 1976, p. 4, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, May 28, 1976, pp. H1-H3.)

For an elaboration on the visit and the Soviet role in Angola, see the reference to the joint communique and Petrov Commentary on the declaration of principles in, *Moscow Radio Peace and Progress to Asia*, 1330 GMT, May 31, 1976, and *Moscow Tass in English* 1817 GMT, May 31, 1976, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, No. 107, June 2, 1976, pp. H1-H4.

⁴⁰ Goodwin, June. Soviet Influence Increasing in Angola. *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 7, 1976, p. 1.

According to Paul Wohl, a specialist on Soviet Affairs, East Germany has emerged as a major Communist supplier of weapons and military instructors for the Third World. More than \$83 million a year, he writes, has been set aside for this purpose in the East German budget. During the past few years, groups of 20 to 100 instructors from the National People's Army have been sent to six Arab and nine black African countries. (Wohl, Paul. East Germans Cement Soviet Bloc Unity. *The Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 24, 1976, p. 4.)

⁴¹ Murphy, Caryle. Angolans Tout Moscow Visit. *The Washington Post*, May 24, 1976, p. A14.

⁴² *The Christian Science Monitor*, July 7, 1976, p. 1.

⁴³ Soviet-Angolan Talks End in Kremlin: Documents Signed. *Moscow Tass in English*, 1700 GMT, Oct. 8, 1976, FBIS Wire Service 80. Janke, Peter. Moscow Tightens Grip on Africa. *Soviet Analyst*, vol. 5, No. 22, Oct. 28, 1976: 1-2. *The Washington Post*, Oct. 15, 1976, p. A14.

in eliminating the legacy of the colonial past and the consequences of the recent foreign intervention and in consolidating a united, independent and democratic Angola and strengthening its defense capability.⁴⁴

Thus the Soviet grip on Angola tightens. As the *Christian Science Monitor* said editorially in a commentary on Angola's first anniversary and on its steady movement into the Soviet orbit of influence and power, "Russia, in short, is more firmly entrenched in Angola than ever."⁴⁵

In a somewhat similar fashion Mozambique, having abandoned China, has gravitated towards the Soviet Union. Briefly, the swing towards Moscow followed swiftly on the successful use of Cuban troops in Angola. In April 1976, Albert Chipende, the Mozambican Defense Minister, conferred with his counterpart in Moscow. In May, President Samora Machel visited Moscow at the invitation of President Podgorny. Within less than 4 months, six series of agreements, covering fishing, commerce, industry, shipping, and aviation had been signed. In October, the Soviets announced they were setting up five technical schools in Beira. Aeroflot arranged for regular service to Maputo in July.⁴⁶

Military aid has continued to flow into Mozambique to strengthen its defense capacity and to support 12,000 guerrillas who have been fighting Rhodesia from Mozambique territory. As in the case of Angola, the Cubans and East Germans are instruments of expanding Soviet influence in Mozambique.⁴⁷

That the Soviet Union has established a reasonably secure position of influence in Mozambique, there seems at this juncture to be little doubt. Machel looks upon the Soviets and the other socialist states as Mozambique's "natural allies." As he said in Moscow last spring, "It is they that gave us the main material support and helped us win a victory over colonialism."⁴⁸ On their side the Soviets have much to gain from this relationship. For both Mozambique and Angola are key components in the Soviet strategy in southern Africa of encouraging guerrilla action against Rhodesia, undermining American policy intended to bring about a peaceful settlement there, identifying the Soviet Union closely with radical black Africa, and ulti-

⁴⁴ Soviet-Angolan Statement. *Pravda*, Oct. 14, 1976, pp. 1 and 2, in, FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, No. 201, Oct. 15, 1976, pp. H1-H5. In a telegram to President Neto and Prime Minister Do Nascimento on the occasion of Angola's first anniversary of independence, the Soviet leaders noted with satisfaction that relations of solidarity and close cooperation between both nations at the government and party level "are deepening and expanding on the basis of mutual respect, equality, non-interference in the internal affairs and comradely reciprocal assistance." Recalling the October visit and the documents signed, the telegram noted that these "important joint documents" are of "fundamental significance for all-round development of relations between our countries." (Soviet Leaders Greet Neto, Do Nascimento on Anniversary. Moscow Tass in English, 1859 GMT, Nov. 10, 1976, in FBIS Wire Service 04.)

⁴⁵ Angola: One Year After. (Editorial.) *The Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 11, 1976, p. 32. Russell Brines, a writer on foreign affairs, interprets the Soviet hold on Angola as just the beginning of the struggle for southern Africa. He writes: " * * * the Soviet power thrust thousands of miles from Moscow is not new opportunism in Africa but another campaign in Moscow's long political-military struggle for dominance on this most tumultuous continent. It has global as well as local significance. The Soviets can profit only by creating war or the atmosphere of war in nations outside of Angola, and this quite clearly will be the basis of their policy as long as black aspirations remain unfulfilled. A peaceful settlement of the Rhodesian problem would be a highly significant holding action, but it would not end the conflict." He concludes: "The struggle for southern Africa, in reality, is just beginning." (Brines, Russell. *Moscow's Angolan Foothold*. *The Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 11, 1976, p. 31.)

⁴⁶ Janke, Peter. *Moscow Forces the Pace in Africa*. *Soviet Analyst*, vol. 5, No. 18, Sept. 2, 1976, pp. 1-2 and Janke, *Moscow Tightens Grip on Africa*, pp. 1-2.

⁴⁷ Janke, *Moscow Forces Pace in Africa*, pp. 2-3.

⁴⁸ Pond, Elizabeth. *Mozambique President Shows Shift to Soviets*. *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 18, 1976, p. 9.

mately expanding Soviet influence and power in that part of the continent.⁴⁹

(d) *Affirmation of Third World policy by Izvestia, mid-1976.*—The Soviet Union appeared to take great satisfaction in the consolidation, penetration, and expansion of its influence and power in the Third World that was reflected in its diplomacy of the preceding months. And it said so in an *Izvestia* editorial on June 17, 1976, entitled, "Strong Foundation of Friendship."⁵⁰ The editorial,

- Acknowledged the "profound sociopolitical shifts in vast regions of the world" that have changed the political map of the world "beyond recognition;"
- Affirmed that the aspirations and desires of the developing countries "have the complete understanding and support of the Soviet Union—a reliable and tested friend of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America;"
- Acclaimed the Gandhi visit as a "most important event of international life" that constituted "the visible embodiment of inviolable friendship and unity between two great forces of modern time—the world of socialism and the states which have liberated themselves from the yoke of colonialism and embarked on the path of independent progressive development;"
- Described the Machel and Do Nascimento visits as "a graphic demonstration of Soviet people's solidarity with the peoples who have liberated themselves and of fidelity to the principles of proletarian internationalism bequeathed to us by the Immortal Lenin," and noted that the agreements concluded were "an important contribution to further strengthening the positions of freedom-loving Africa and all progressive forces;"
- Acknowledged Soviet "satisfaction with the positive results" of the Marcos visit that had "given an impetus to deepening mutual ties and contacts;" and

⁴⁹ Willis, David K. Moscow's New Tack in Africa. *The Christian Science Monitor*, Sept. 27, 1976, p. 3. Janke writes: " * * * the Soviet Union is struggling to secure the permanent establishment of pro-Soviet Marxist States from which it can extend its influence over the whole of central and southern Africa." (Janke, *Moscow Forces Pace in Africa*, p. 3.)

The degree of Soviet involvement in Mozambique as well as Tanzania in the effort to undermine the white Rhodesian government was apparent in a report on Nov. 17, 1976, that, according to U.S. intelligence sources, the Soviet Union was increasing its military aid to Rhodesian guerrillas. Reportedly, a Soviet ship unloaded 18 heavily gunned armored vehicles and ammunition in Tanzania in recent days. Tanzania was said to serve as a relay point for Soviet arms bound for the black Rhodesian guerrillas. This report followed an intelligence dispatch a week ago saying that a Tanzanian ship had delivered Soviet 122-millimeter multiple-rocket launchers and armored vehicles to Mozambique, a staging area for guerrilla attack into Rhodesia. An estimated 5,000 Rhodesian guerrillas were to be moved gradually from Mozambique to camps in Tanzania for training. Soviet military advisers have been reported in Mozambique at least since the spring, and in recent weeks American intelligence reports indicated that Mozambique military officers were leaving for long-term training in the Soviet Union. (*The New York Times*, Nov. 18, 1976, p. 6.)

A report from Maputo, Mozambique on Nov. 29, confirmed the extent of Soviet involvement and suggested Cuban participation in the guerrilla war against Rhodesia. The report stated that the Machel government was preparing Mozambicans for "expanded war." At the ports of Maputo and Beria on the Indian Ocean, Soviet arms for guerrillas operating from bases along the Rhodesian border were being unloaded. At the Maputo airport, a Soviet-built helicopter camouflaged with paint was a reminder "of the advanced equipment the Russians can still throw into the struggle." In South Africa, intelligence sources insisted that direct Cuban involvement in the conflict was, the report said, "an approaching reality." These sources pointed to reports of Cuban military advisers and Soviet T-54 tanks being airlifted from Angola, where a Cuban military force contributed to the MPLA victory. A West European diplomat, who had discussed the Rhodesian issue with President Machel, said, "We certainly can't rule the Cubans out of it." Machel was believed to have been the moving force behind the recent declaration by five African presidents that said the only means by which black rule in Rhodesia could be assured was by war. The Anglo-American peace effort was dismissed, and friendly nations, primarily the Communists, were asked to step up military support. Within days, Tanzanian soldiers were reported to have been moving into Mozambique. Soviet ships were said to have begun unloading armored cars and rocket launchers. (Burns, John F. *Mozambicans Are Being Prepared for Wider Rhodesia Guerrilla War*. *The New York Times*, Nov. 30, 1976, pp. 1 and 6.)

⁵⁰ Strong Foundation of Friendship. (Editorial), *Izvestia*, June 17, 1976, p. 1, in, FBIS, *Daily Report Soviet Union*, vol. 3, No. 120, June 21, 1976, pp. A10-A12.

—reaffirmed the “principled line of Soviet foreign policy,” supporting “the development of friendship and cooperation with countries which have thrown off the colonial yoke.”

In a word, performance matched expectations. Success was measurable. And the Third World proved indeed to be a fruitful field for Soviet activity.

b. Impact of Sino-Soviet dispute

(1) Continuing Animosity

Such Soviet success in the Third World could only deepen China's hostility. During 1975-76, the Sino-Soviet dispute appeared to have lost little of its virulence. Momentarily, some moderation was detectable some weeks after Mao's death in September 1976, but by mid-November Peking flatly rejected any return to friendly relations with Moscow.⁵¹

Reverberations of the dispute still permeate parts of the Third World, in varying degrees of intensity. Indicative of China's deep hostility towards Soviet activities in the Third World is the vehemently worded article issued by Hsinhua, the Chinese News Agency, on September 13, 1976. The article, entitled, “Soviet Quack Medicine, Go to Hell!”, denounced Soviet economic penetration of the Third World. Hsinhua charged that Soviet foreign aid was a “very poisonous drug” and accused the Soviets of pushing “sales of outdated equipment and materials to the developing countries at high prices while buying their raw materials at low prices.”⁵²

Attempts to pressure India into adherence to Brezhnev's Asian security arrangement, though failing during the Gandhi visit, underscored Moscow's persistence in containing Chinese power in East and South Asia.⁵³ Soviet efforts through diplomacy to reconstitute its influence in Indonesia, penetrate the Philippines, and in general

⁵¹ The New York Times, Nov. 16, 1976, p. 2.

⁵² Butterfield, Fox. Soviet Condolences Rebuffed by Peking. The New York Times, Sept. 15, 1976, p. 7. In a recent review of Soviet attitudes towards the Chinese in the Third World, Morris Rothenberg makes the following points: Moscow recognizes that Peking “can deal with the Third World from what it considers essentially cost-free irresponsible positions and has watched with some discomfiture as Peking efforts increasingly have focused on undermining whatever positions Moscow takes with governments, communist parties and revolutionary movements;” Moscow perceives Peking's prime target to be Southeast Asia since the United States defeat in Vietnam and there Moscow charges that Peking seeks “the Balkanization of Indochina and continuation of an American presence in the area. It warns governments of Peking support for insurgencies, and insurgents of their betrayal by Peking;” it is with almost “undisguised satisfaction that Moscow contemplates Chinese-Indian hostility which is seen as a prime obstacle to Peking's aspirations in the Third World;” competition between the two Communist powers “is especially keen in Africa where Peking has made significant efforts to get at the Soviet Union through aid to revolutionary groups and selected countries.” (Rothenberg, Morris. Soviet Perceptions of the Chinese Factor. CAIS-ARPA Workshop on Soviet Perceptions, Jan. 26-27, 1976, Working Agenda, pp. 20-21.) See also, Apalin, G. Peking and the “Third World.” International Affairs (Moscow), No. 3, 1976, pp. 88-97.

⁵³ A Pravda editorial on June 26, 1976 emphasized Asian security as a main task, linking the European experience at Helsinki with the needs of Asia. The editorial quoted Brezhnev on the significance of peaceful coexistence in a speech during the Gandhi visit; cited the five principles of coexistence; noted the growing favorable conditions for security, namely, peace in Indochina, Korean reunification, and the growing normalization in Indo-Pakistani relations; underscored the significance of the Gandhi visit in advancing peace in Asia; attacked China for pursuing a “hegemonist” policy in Asia, sowing dissension, opposing détente, and sabotaging efforts to establish peace and security in Asia; and concluded that the Soviet Union was prepared to support initiatives aimed at insuring peace and security—“Asia can and must become a zone of peace, good neighborliness and cooperation.” (Peace and Good Neighborliness for the Asian Peoples. Editorial. Pravda, June 26, 1976, p. 1, in, FBIS, Daily Report Soviet Union, vol. 3, No. 127, June 30, 1976, pp. A10-A12.)

It was reported in August 1976 that Soviet diplomats were letting it be known that the Soviet Union would be contented with a series of lesser treaties, possibly even bilateral ones, in its pursuit of an Asian security pact. The reason given was that China should have a place in an Asian security pact, and this was impossible until after Mao's death. So it was necessary to work on a more modest basis. Reportedly, what was behind this diplomatic explanation was the fact that the Soviet proposal has been greeted with a notable lack of enthusiasm even by pro-Soviet governments in Asia.

For an optimistic appraisal of Soviet prospects, see Sergeyev, A. Political Realities and Security in Asia. International Affairs (Moscow), No. 6, 1976: 44-53. According to Sergeyev, “There are innumerable indications that the idea of collective security is gaining ground in Asia and the world, despite objective difficulties and the obstacles erected by the enemies of détente, the most rabid among whom are China's Maoist leaders.”

strengthen its role in Southeast Asia in the post-Vietnam war era, were directed towards reinforcing its anti-Peking posture in that quarter. China remained the principal adversary in Asia, and Russia sought to balance and contain its power.⁵⁴

(2) *Focus on southern Africa: Contest for Mozambique*

By and large Sino-Soviet rivalry in the Third World during the past 2 years has seemed to focus mainly on the struggle for liberation in southern Africa. That Africa should be contested by the great Communist powers ought not to be surprising: it is the most politically volatile area of the Third World; accordingly, both the Soviets and Chinese have invested a great deal of political, economic, and military capital to achieve their purposes. Nearly two-thirds of China's economic aid commitments during 1970-74, \$1.5 billion, have been made to some 23 black African nations. China's military aid has been modest, some 75 percent going to Pakistan and only 10 percent going to Tanzania. In contrast, the Soviets have given far less in economic aid but have focused on military aid which is more visible and has more impact on unstable African governments. Events have proved the wisdom of the Soviet choice.⁵⁵

During 1975-76, Mozambique became the target of intense Sino-Soviet rivalry. As late as 1975, diplomats and observers in Mozambique had agreed that relations between Mozambique and China were solid.⁵⁶ The new Frelimo government seemed more Maoist than Marxist, basing its first priority, agricultural reconstruction, on the Chinese model. Prior to independence on June 25, 1975, Machel received a hero's welcome on a visit to Peking, and in a return courtesy the Chinese received preferential treatment at the independence celebrations. China was the first to offer aid; its Ambassador was the first to be received.

The Soviet Union was clearly on the outside, even though foreign assistance during the decade long war of liberation came largely from Moscow. At a Soviet Embassy reception in November 1975, Mozambican Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano revealed his anti-Soviet feeling by publicly rebuking the Soviet Union, charging that assistance did not give a country the right to dictate Mozambique policy.

And then came Angola; it produced a dramatic shift in Mozambique loyalties.⁵⁷ Soviet- and Cuban-supported MPLA forces advanced rapidly in the civil war. The Chinese had backed a loser, the pro-Western National Front for Liberation of Angola. Mozambique favored the MPLA. Within 6 weeks after Chissano's public rebuke of Russia, Mozambique moved into the Soviet camp. Taking advantage

⁵⁴ For a discussion of Soviet policy in Indonesia, see above and McDonald, Hamish. Soviets Resume Aid to Indonesia. *The Washington Post*, May 24, 1976, p. A20. For a review and analysis of Soviet efforts to establish close relations with Singapore, see, Wohl, Paul. Soviets Seek Stronger Toehold in Singapore. *The Christian Science Monitor*, June 3, 1976, p. 3. The article shows a constancy of Soviet purpose in an important strategic part of the world where it seeks to establish a position of influence in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, to balance any Chinese thrust into the area, to strengthen the Soviet presence in a key sea communications area of the world, and in general to add an increment of Soviet power in Southeast Asia. For general discussions on the future of Soviet policy in Asia, see, Donaldson, Soviet Policy in South Asia, in, Kanet/Bahry, *Soviet Economic and Political Relations with Developing World*, Banff Conference, p. 231, and Thornton, pp. 184-186 and 198-199.

⁵⁵ Ching, Frank. China's "Interest-Free" Foreign Aid. *The Wall Street Journal*, Nov. 12, 1976, p. 12; Kun, Joseph. Sino-Soviet Competition in Africa: The Crucial Role of Military Assistance. *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 153/76, Mar. 23, 1976, pp. 2-3; and Wright, Robin. Moscow Advances in Africa. *The Washington Post*, April 16, 1976, p. A1.

⁵⁶ This section draws heavily on Robin Wright's report from Maputo, Mozambique published in *The Washington Post* on Apr. 16, 1976 (p. A1).

⁵⁷ Legum, Colin. The Soviet Union, China, and the West in Southern Africa. *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 54, July 1976, p. 753.

of the break with Peking, Moscow sent a prestigious new Ambassador; invited high level Frelimo officials to an international Congress; sealed the friendship with a pact of mutual cooperation in February 1976; and stepped up the flow of military shipments (a third of all Soviet ships docking at Beira and Nacala in April were reported to be carrying weapons and armored cars). Cuban technicians and advisers reportedly moved in, as they had done in Angola.

The significance of this radical turn-around in southern Africa cannot be overestimated. Mozambique is strategically important; it has a 1,500-mile coastline on the Indian Ocean and several good ports for naval bases; it borders on key pressure points, namely, Rhodesia and South Africa, and now serves as a main base for the Rhodesian guerrilla army, armed and trained by the Soviet Union. Economically, Mozambique has potentially vast unexploitable resources in gold, iron ore, coal, natural gas, graphite, and bauxite. Politically, it is playing an increasingly important role in the radical politics of southern Africa; it has become, in short, a power broker in the struggle over Rhodesia.

Mozambique has thus been lured away from China, and the implications are significant. As one Maputo-based Chinese journalist confided in what is a gross understatement, "I think we've been edged out by the Russians." The Soviet position is, in the words of Robin Wright, "a major victory in the race for influence." This shift could have broad ramifications for southern Africa, particularly when linked with the already growing Soviet influence in Angola. The Soviets are believed to have ambitions of establishing a commanding presence in Rhodesia when white rulers give way to the black. That would give them a belt of friendly nations from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, strategically, politically, and economically important; it would deny the Chinese an important sphere of influence; it would contest an American political presence.

Thus, there appears to be much truth in the observations of Peter Osnos, Moscow correspondent of the Washington Post, who wrote that the visits by the Mozambican and Angolan leaders to Moscow in 1976 were "symbols of Moscow's emergent predominance over the United States and China in the volatile politics of the region."⁵⁸ They were symbols also of the widely differentiated worldview of both the Soviet Union and the United States.

4. WORLD VIEWS IN CONFLICT

The real world of the mid-1970's, as generally perceived by Americans, is one of diversity, complexity, uncertainty, insecurity, and interdependence. East-West issues are giving way to North-South issues as limits on the exercise of power and the requirements of security in the nuclear age and as international economic problems increasingly coming to the fore impose on the superpowers and lesser powers an awareness of other problems in other places, from which they cannot escape.

Through the distorted prism of Marxism-Leninism, the world, as the Soviets perceive it, is remarkably different from the Western view: it is more orderly, more purposeful, more directed. Symbiotically linked

⁵⁸ Osnos, Peter. African Leaders Converge on Newly Influential Moscow. The Washington Post, May 30, 1976, p. A18.

to the Third World and the forces of national liberation, this Socialist world follows an assured destiny prescribed by history leading to the triumph of socialism. In the present era of the "general crisis of capitalism," the balance of forces favors socialism. Realistically, this view, while recognizing that history is on its side, nonetheless, insists on action, "struggle", and the "conquest of power" in the pursuit of its goals. Accordingly, it utilizes the advantages of the scientific and technological revolution; values the preeminence of military power in achieving ultimate goals; and allows for intervention into the "national liberation zone" to insure socialism's success. Détente is the centerpiece of this view, but construed in a way that does not impede the pursuit of revolutionary goals in the Third World.

The Soviet worldview in the mid-1970's is thus a mixture of unsubstantiated utopian expectations and a reality that contrasts sharply with that of the West. In this worldview the Third World is featured prominently. Consolidation of relations with India, penetration of the Philippines, expansion of Soviet influence in southern Africa, the pursuit of long established strategic designs—all are part of the continuing commitment to revolutionary activism, carefully orchestrated to suit the needs of time and place, but directed toward long-range ideological goals. The dispute with China may impede the advance, but presumably it is regarded only as a momentary aberration that does not impair the vision of fulfillment in the future.

B. 25TH CONGRESS OF CPSU AND THE THIRD WORLD

1. THIRD WORLD IN BREZHNEV'S REPORT

a. Paradox of goals

Brezhnev's report to the 25th Congress of the CPSU on February 24, 1976, gives perhaps the most accurate current reading on the Soviet worldview, particularly with respect to the Third World.⁵⁹ For, in his report Brezhnev assessed world affairs from the summit of Soviet power and authority; took stock of the Soviet Union's participation in international affairs since the last 24th Congress in 1971; and judged its impact to be global and significant.

Ordinarily, such reports contain the distilled essence of Soviet thinking on foreign policy. New foreign policy goals are often set forth, old ones reaffirmed; successes are magnified, failures minimized, or muted; priorities assigned, expectations proclaimed—and all within an ideological framework that assumes the assured and ultimate victory of Communism and the defeat of capitalism.

Generally, the Brezhnev foreign policy report constitutes a summary statement of major foreign policy concerns of the Soviet Union as seen from Moscow. Specifically, it recreates the paradox of a Soviet Union simultaneously seeking revolutionary goals, while affirming a policy of détente. Central to this issue is the Third World.

b. Support for national liberation movement in Third World

Brezhnev's report, requiring more than 5 hours to deliver, focused on two central foreign policy problems, in this order: (1) Soviet

⁵⁹ Brezhnev, Report to 25th Congress of CPSU, pp. 6-29. This section draws upon, Whelan, Joseph G. Soviet 25th Party Congress: Foreign Policy Aspects of Brezhnev's Report. Issue Brief: IB76020. Washington, the Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Mar. 23, 1976. 5 pp. (Major Issues System.) Quoted material is taken directly from the issue brief and is not cited in this text.

support for the national liberation movements in the Third World; and (2) the viability of détente with the West.⁶⁰

Perceiving a further upsurge of the revolutionary spirit in the Third World and a "deepening of the crisis of capitalism"—and thus new opportunities—Brezhnev reaffirmed Soviet policy of support for the national liberation movements. Soviet relations with the liberated or developing countries "have expanded and become more lasting." The political content of "our ties has become richer." Despite difficulties, "profound progressive changes are taking place" within the Third World; "the class struggle is intensifying"; its influence in world affairs has increased "appreciably." The Soviet attitude toward "the complex processes" in the Third World was "clearcut and definite." Brezhnev explained:

The Soviet Union does not meddle in the domestic affairs of other countries and peoples. Respect for the sacred right of each people and each country to select their own road of development is a firm principle of Leninist foreign policy. However, we do not hide our views. In the developing countries, as everywhere, we are on the side of the forces of progress, democracy and national independence, and we treat them as our friends and comrades-in-arms. Our party is rendering and will render support to peoples who are fighting for their freedom. The Soviet Union is not looking for any benefits for itself, is not hunting for concessions, is not trying to gain political supremacy and is not seeking any military bases. We are acting as our revolutionary conscience and our Communist convictions permit us.

Accordingly, the Soviet Union looked favorably upon the Communist victory in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; the continued achievements of socialism in Cuba; and the success of the People's Republic of Angola in its struggle "to defend its independence," receiving in the process the "support of progressive forces throughout the world." Policies of support for the emerging states of the Middle East and Asia and pledges of "solidarity" with the struggle for African national liberation were reaffirmed—

From the rostrum of our congress we emphasize once again that the Soviet Union fully supports the lawful aspirations of the emerging states, their determination to rid themselves completely of imperialist exploitation and to manage their national resources themselves.

In this era of "radical social changes," Brezhnev continued, socialism has continued to "strengthen and expand." Victories of the national liberation movements have opened up "new horizons" for the countries gaining their independence. The "class struggle" of the working people against oppression, monopolies, and exploitation was "gaining strength." "The revolutionary-democratic, anti-imperialist movement" was assuming "ever larger proportions." Altogether these forces constituted "the development of a worldwide revolutionary process."

c. Viability of détente

Détente with the United States and the West was reaffirmed as a viable and successful policy, though serious differences in the area of military détente persisted and were acknowledged. According to Brezhnev, experience has "confirmed" what he labeled the realism and wisdom of the 1971 peace program which had laid out the course of moving from cold war to peaceful coexistence. The "normalization

⁶⁰ For a commentary on the linkage between the socialist world and the National Liberation Movements, see, Tarabrin, E. National Liberation Movement Today. International Affairs (Moscow), No. 5, 1976, pp. 21-31.

of the international climate" was "convincing proof" that the attainment of a "lasting peace" was "a fully realizable task."

Among the positive gains of peaceful coexistence were: the "normalization" of relations with Western Europe; recognition of the inviolability of frontiers; improving relations with France, West Germany, and the other countries of Western Europe; success of CSCE (i.e., the Helsinki agreement) in securing the "interests of détente and a stable peace in Europe"; continuing improvement in relations with the United States based upon a series of agreements the most important being, "The Basic Principles of Mutual Relations," "The Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War," and the series of strategic arms limitations treaties and agreements; positive developments in relations with Japan, despite "direct foreign instigation" (i.e., China) in preventing a final peace settlement; and finally the enrichment of relations with Canada and the noticeable expansion of those with Latin America in an environment characterized by the "strengthening of their political and economic independence."

d. Barrier to détente: Arms race

Economic, scientific-technological, and cultural cooperation with the capitalist states increased "significantly," Brezhnev continued, but the main barrier to peace remained; namely, "the struggle to end the arms race and to achieve disarmament."

To achieve this goal—an "urgent" task—the Soviet Union has advocated: "general and complete disarmament" as "our ultimate end"; restrictions on the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the banning and destruction of chemical weapons; agreement on SALT II, a matter "of very great importance" for the developing Soviet-American relations and for "consolidating general peace"; restrictions on building bases in the Indian Ocean; reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe (MBFR), the responsibility for the failure of which rested on NATO for trying to "insure for themselves unilateral military advantages"; and a proposal "to conclude a worldwide treaty on the nonuse of force in international relations."

The "main motive" of the proponents of the arms race, Brezhnev argued, was "the so-called Soviet threat." There "is no such thing as a Soviet threat, either to the West or to the East. This is a monstrous lie from beginning to end. The Soviet Union has no intention of attacking anyone. The Soviet Union has no need of war. The Soviet Union is not increasing its military budget." Since "opponents of détente and disarmament" possessed "considerable resources" and "imperialism's aggressive activity" continued, "peace-loving forces must, therefore, show a high degree of vigilance." Accordingly, the CPSU "has paid the necessary attention to strengthening the defense capability of our country and the perfection of the armed forces."

e. Revolution and détente: Concepts in harmony

Brezhnev viewed success in international relations with great satisfaction and pledged to continue his policies "with redoubled energy." He neither doubted the superiority nor the historically assured destiny of Communism; nor did he doubt the vigorous growth of the revolutionary process as a continuing world reality and its movement in the direction of communism. "The events of the past few years," he said, presumably having in mind "the deepening crisis of capitalism"

and growing political disorders within the Third World, confirmed with "new force that capitalism is a society without a future." Counter-revolution and international imperialism (i.e., the forces of democracy, capitalism, and democratic socialism) were forces "doomed to failure," and the "cause of freedom and the cause of progress" (i.e., communism) were "invincible."

Brezhnev also renewed the Soviet ideological commitment to revolution. "New horizons" (new targets of opportunity?) were opening, especially in the Third World. And yet possible contradictions between adherence to the principle of communist revolution and that of détente were disallowed. "Détente does not in the slightest way abolish, and cannot abolish or change the laws of the class struggle," Brezhnev said, adding, "We do not conceal the fact that we see détente as a way to create more favorable conditions for peaceful Socialist and Communist construction. This merely confirms that socialism and peace are indivisible."

f. Flawed logic: Persisting contradiction

Brezhnev's judgment on the global significance of Soviet foreign policy suggests a full appreciation of Soviet power and a will to act in its role as an international superpower and arbiter of world events. It suggests also that the Third World remains a prime target of Soviet foreign policy for the 1970's.

But Brezhnev's analysis of the world around him is seriously flawed: it assumes that it is possible to pursue a policy of peaceful accommodation with the United States and the West, while simultaneously adhering to, advocating, and indeed carrying out a policy of revolution and intervention in the Third World. This is a contradiction in policy and use of power that, however much may be glossed over with casuistic argument, objectively could invite risks of superpower confrontation and possibly even war. Such were the essential ingredients in the Angolan civil war late in 1975: a superpower confrontation was in the making; and only congressional rejection of indirect military involvement, proposed by the administration, prevented a test of policy.

The potentiality remains; for the contradiction is still unresolved.

2. RECOGNITION OF THIRD WORLD INTERESTS AND DELEGATIONS

Formal actions taken by the 25th Party Congress implicitly affirmed the judgments of Brezhnev and gave renewed assurances of support to the Third World. The draft directives for the 1976-80 5-year plan, approved by the Congress, cited as one "main task":

To develop and consistently deepen comprehensive cooperation with the socialist countries. To promote the strengthening of the world socialist system. To expand economic and scientific and technical ties with the developing countries * * * ⁶¹

With respect to developing foreign economic relations, the draft directive pledged:

The USSR's economic, scientific and technical relations with developing countries are to be extended and strengthened on a long-term, stable and mutually advantageous basis, contributing to the development of the national economies and economic independence of these countries and to the growth of their scientific and technical potential.⁶²

⁶¹ Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress, vol. 3, No. 1, supplemental 1, Jan. 2, 1976, p. 13.

⁶² Ibid., p. 60.

Clearly indicative of the high regard in which the Soviets held Communist and leftist political leaders from Third World countries were the special courtesies extended to them. Many, including those from India, Guinea, Somalia, Syria, and Angola, headed delegations to Moscow and were invited to speak at the Congress. In his closing address on March 5, Brezhnev personally acknowledged that members of the "communist and workers' parties, national democratic parties and movements" in the Third World were among the more than 100 delegations participating in the Congress.⁶³

Speaking for Angola, Alves Bernardo Batista, member of the MPLA Central Committee's Political Bureau and Minister of Internal Administration in the PRA, extended "ardent, revolutionary and fraternal greetings" to the Congress and the Soviet people "whose efforts to maintain peace in the world and whose moral, political and material support granted to the liberation movement exemplify a consistent policy within the framework of proletarian internationalism, which the MPLA and the Angolan people will never forget." After recounting the struggle for liberation, Batista emphasized that "Soviet aid made possible our victory over Portuguese colonialism." From this "solemn rostrum," he continued, "we reiterate our gratitude, respect and affection to the CPSU, to the Soviet people, and to all socialist countries."⁶⁴

Batista could well afford this high praise and gratitude to his Soviet mentors; for along with the Cuban contribution, Soviet assistance was clearly a decisive factor in the MPLA victory. This bold and aggressive military intervention in Angola, in open defiance of détente with the United States, raised the question whether this marked a new trend in Soviet policy in the Third World, particularly in southern Africa.

C. ANGOLA: NEW TREND IN SOVIET-THIRD WORLD POLICY?

1. BOLD AND AGGRESSIVE SOVIET BEHAVIOR IN ANGOLA

Generally, Soviet activity in the Third World has been carefully modulated and low-key. While extremely vocal in supporting the LDC's in their "struggle against imperialism", the Soviet Union has, nonetheless, been careful to avoid direct confrontation with the United States. Rhetoric and serious commitment have always been distinguished. Caution and deliberateness have thus characterized Soviet policy toward the Third World. Brezhnev has adhered closely to this policy—at least up to 1975-76.

Soviet involvement in Angola was, however, openly aggressive and uncompromising; it conflicted sharply with the past Soviet style of caution and moderation. Many observers in the West saw here evidence of a shift in policy, a first step in a new, more belligerent, Soviet approach to the Third World.⁶⁵

⁶³ Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress, vol. 9, Mar. 10, 1986, p. 4.

⁶⁴ Proceedings of the 25th CPSU Congress, vol. 4, Mar. 3, 1976, pp. 16-18.

⁶⁵ Vanneman, Peter and James, Martin. *The Soviet Intervention in Angola: Intentions and Implications*. Strategic Review, No. 3, vol. 4, summer 1976, p. 97.

In January of 1976, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger expressed American concern for what he described as "the Soviet Union's massive and unprecedented intervention in the internal affairs of Africa."⁶⁶

Particularly disturbing to the United States was the "surrogate participation" of Cuban troops on behalf of the MPLA. There was little doubt that the Soviet Union's approval and extensive logistical support made Cuban participation possible, and, in the final analysis, successful. Some observers in the West viewed the Soviet-Cuban partnership in Angola as a new "formula" for Soviet involvement in the Third World.

Soviet intervention in Angola clearly threatened détente. But the Soviets perceived no such contradictions; they justified intervention. In the summer of 1975, M. A. Suslov, member of the Politburo and chief ideologist of the CPSU, explained the compatibility between peaceful coexistence and the commitment to "struggle." According to Suslov, "the principle of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems, as is well known, has nothing in common with class peace between the exploiters and the exploited, the colonialists and the victims of colonial oppression, or between the oppressors and the oppressed."⁶⁷

Suslov's justification was later applied in the Soviet press specifically to Soviet involvement in Angola. The Soviet journal *New Times* carried an editorial in January of 1976 which stated explicitly:

No one seeks to deny that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries render moral and material assistance to the Angolan people and its vanguard, the MPLA. This assistance contributed to the successes of the Angolan patriots in their armed struggle against colonial rule, and now helps them defend the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of their country. As for the contention voiced from time to time even by responsible Western government leaders that this policy does not accord with the spirit of détente, it only testifies to a false understanding of the meaning of détente, which never implied and cannot imply giving a free hand to aggressors.⁶⁸

Pravda echoed the same argument:

The policy of peaceful coexistence and the relaxation of tensions in relations between states with different social systems—a policy which is generally recognized in our time—cannot be interpreted as a ban on the national liberation struggle of the peoples who oppose colonial oppression or as a ban on the class struggle.⁶⁹

Thus, Soviet intervention in Angola was justified in the Soviet view; it was not incompatible with détente. This interpretation presented two perplexing problems for the United States. First, it threatened to destabilize a regional balance of power in Africa and create a possible point of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Second, it threatened to undermine détente as a governing principle in Soviet-American relations.

⁶⁶ U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on African Affairs. Angola, hearings, 94th Cong., 2d sess., Jan. 29, Feb. 3, 4, and 6, 1976. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 14.

⁶⁷ Suslov, M. A. The Communist Movement in the Vanguard of the Struggle for Peace and Social and International Liberation. *Kommunist*, July 21, 1975, FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, Sept. 11, 1975, p. R4.

⁶⁸ *New Times*. (Editorial.) The People of Angola are Not Alone, No. 2, January 1976, p. 1.

⁶⁹ Zhukov, Yuriy. In Defiance of the Skeptics and Sowers of Doubt. *Pravda*, Jan. 9, 1976, p. 4.

2. SOVIET INVOLVEMENT AND THE CUBAN FACTOR

a. Soviet military assistance

Foreign military assistance, both in men and material, proved to be a determining factor in the Angolan civil war. The Soviet Union's military assistance program to the MPLA was extensive, easily dwarfing America's truncated military aid program to the MPLA's adversaries. In February of 1976, Secretary of State Kissinger stated that the Soviet Union had delivered nearly \$300 million in military equipment and supplies to the MPLA.⁷⁰ Perhaps sensing American unwillingness to become involved in another "Vietnam type" conflict, the Soviet Union supplied the MPLA with a steady flow of weapons and material, despite strongly worded administration protests.

According to Western sources, by February of 1976, the Soviet Union had supplied the MPLA over 100 T-34 and T-54 battle tanks, large numbers of PT-76 amphibious light tanks and armored personnel carriers, Mig-15 and Mig-21 fighter-bombers, Bm-21 40-tubed 122-mm rocket launchers, and large quantities of light weapons, ammunition, and replacement parts.⁷¹

Soviet military assistance to the MPLA was a carefully calibrated mix of weapons. It was clearly intended to insure victory for the MPLA in the Angolan civil war. Soviet T-34 and T-54 tanks, and Mig-15 and Mig-21 fighter-bombers, though not front-line equipment in the Soviet Union's own military inventory, were, nevertheless, sophisticated and supplied in sufficient numbers to insure MPLA air and ground superiority.

In addition, Moscow provided military advisers for the training of MPLA troops and the operation and maintenance of advanced Soviet weapon's systems. Soviet logistical support was also extensive. Soviet air and sea transports maintained a steady flow of materials to the MPLA as well as ferrying Cuban troops to Angola.⁷²

b. Cuban troops: A "proxy war?"

Equally disturbing to the West was the large scale intervention of Cuban combat troops in support of the MPLA. The number was variously estimated by authoritative Western sources from 15,000 to 20,000.⁷³

Cuba's "fraternal assistance" and the Soviet Union's material support were decisive in determining the outcome of the Angolan civil war. According to Secretary Kissinger, "The MPLA did not score a military victory. Cuba scored a military victory backed by the Soviet Union."⁷⁴

⁷⁰ U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. Office of Media Services. Press Conference with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. PR 64/87, Feb. 12, 1976, p. 1.

⁷¹ Massive Soviet Arms Shipments to Angola, *International Defense Review*, vol. 9, No. 1, February 1976, p. 20.

⁷² On January 29, 1976, Secretary Kissinger stated during his testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs that "a total of at least 46 flights of Soviet heavy and medium military transports have ferried Soviet military equipment from the USSR to Luanda and Congo-Brazzaville, while a steady stream of Soviet and Cuban aircraft has continued to bring Cuban troops across the Atlantic." U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on African Affairs. Angola, hearings, 94th Cong., 2d sess., Jan. 29, Feb. 3, 4, and 6, 1976. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 19.

⁷³ The International Institute of Strategic Studies. *The Military Balance, 1976-1977*. London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976, p. 65.

⁷⁴ U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. Office of Media Services. Press Conference with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. PR/64/87, Feb. 12, 1976, p. 4.

Soviet logistical support insured the effectiveness of Cuban participation. Cuban troops reportedly arrived in Angola armed only with sidearms. Soviet supplied T-34 and T-54 tanks and Mig-21 fighter-bombers, weapons completely familiar to the Cuban troops since they were standard equipment in the Cuban army, were awaiting them on their arrival. The cost of maintaining Cuban troops in Angola was very high, and once again Soviet military assistance was essential.

Clearly, Cuban involvement in Angola was predicated upon Soviet approval and material support. Without it Cuban involvement on a large scale would have been virtually impossible.

3. SOVIET MOTIVATIONS FOR INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA

a. Political interests

The Soviet decision to become heavily involved in Angola, possibly at the cost of détente, was based upon three fundamental but not necessarily coequal considerations: political influence, strategic importance and future economic considerations. These motivating factors, representing traditional areas of Soviet concern, were evident in Moscow's policy in the Angolan civil war.

The Soviet Union's traditional support for Third World countries in their "anti-colonial struggle" was reflected in its Angolan policy. Soviet intervention performed a twofold function: it laid the groundwork for friendly political relations with the new MPLA-headed Angolan Government; and, it served as a concrete illustration of the Soviet commitment to the Third World. In his speech before the 25th Party Congress, Brezhnev stated bluntly that the Soviet Union "is rendering and will continue to render support to peoples who are fighting for their freedom." Brezhnev alluded to Soviet aid to Angola in its "struggle to defend its independence" as a prime example of this support.⁷⁵

Another important Soviet consideration in Angola was concern for what Moscow perceived as the growing Chinese influence in Africa. Angola further enflamed the rivalry between the two nations. The People's Republic of China openly supported an anti-Soviet faction, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola. In Moscow's eyes the successful curbing of the pro-Chinese faction by a Soviet supported client would be an important victory for the Soviet Union in its struggle with the PRC for "leadership of the progressive forces of the Third World."

Angola thus offered Moscow an opportunity to increase its stature in the Third World, particularly in the increasingly volatile area of southern Africa. The Soviets were quick to divine the potentialities of Angola; their strong sense of political opportunism was well exhibited.

b. Strategic considerations

Soviet strategic interest in Angola was both regional and global in nature. On the regional level, friendly relations with Angola were viewed as a means of access to southern Africa. A Soviet foothold in Angola would presumably allow Moscow to play a major role in military and political developments in this region.

In global terms a Soviet presence in Angola, especially if it included extensive use of air and sea bases in Angola, would significantly enhance the Soviet Union's strategic position in the South Atlantic.

⁷⁵ Brezhnev, Report to 25th Party Congress of CPSU, p. 12.

High-ranking American Government officials were well aware of the potential military consequences of successful Soviet involvement in Angola. On February 3, 1976, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Ellsworth stated that "if the Soviets are successful in establishing either military bases or obtaining operating rights in Angola, their strategic and tactical capabilities would be greatly enhanced."⁷⁶

Strategic considerations, therefore, constituted an important factor supporting the Soviet Union's decision to initiate and maintain an extensive military assistance program to the MPLA.

c. Economic motivations

Soviet economic interests in Angola appear to be secondary to political and military considerations. Though considered by many observers to be among the richest of the African nations, particularly in raw resources and fertile agricultural regions, Angola's economic potential was not an overriding consideration prompting Soviet involvement. Rather, Moscow viewed economic relations with Angola as a possible long-range dividend of its Angola policy. Positive economic developments were expected to proceed from the establishment of friendly political relations. Therefore, it was not surprising that the Declaration of the Principles of Friendly Mutual Relations and Cooperation Between the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of Angola, signed on May 26, 1976, was also accompanied by the signing of a Soviet-Angolan trade agreement.⁷⁷

Although the potential value of Soviet-Angolan economic relations was appreciated by Moscow, the most immediate areas of Soviet concern were unquestionably centered around strategic and political considerations.

4. ASSESSMENT: EXPANDING SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE THIRD WORLD

Soviet involvement in Angola was significant for two reasons. In one respect, it conformed to the Soviet Union's traditional policy toward the Third World: it was opportunistic, deliberate, carefully conceived and executed. Yet, at the same time it also represented a notable deviation from past patterns of Soviet behavior in the Third World. Traditional Soviet caution appeared to have been partially set aside in favor of more aggressive actions. As a result, détente was placed in jeopardy, the risk of confrontation was accepted, and an already volatile region of the world was further destabilized.

Some observers in the West have viewed Soviet intervention in Angola as the beginning of a new, more openly aggressive, imperial phase of Soviet policy in the Third World. There is much evidence to support this judgement, notably the Soviet role in consolidating the MPLA victory in Angola, and Soviet efforts in building a black guerrilla force in Mozambique and Tanzania to fight against white Rhodesia. What the Angolan case illustrated is that Soviet interests in the Third World are no longer relegated to regions close to the Soviet periphery and within the traditional "national liberation zone."

⁷⁶ U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on African Affairs. Angola, hearings, 94th Cong., 2d sess., Jan. 29, Feb. 3, 4, and 6, 1976. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 62.

⁷⁷ Moscow Domestic Service, May 26, 1976 in FBIS, Daily Report. Soviet Union, May 26, 1976, p. H2, and Foreign Trade (Moscow), No. 10, October 1976, p. 53.

Rather these interests have been extended to take advantage of new opportunities arising in such areas as southern Africa.

D. NAIROBI AND COLOMBO CONFERENCES FROM SOVIET PERSPECTIVE

1. UNCTAD IV CONFERENCE AT NAIROBI

a. Third World purposes

Less aggressive than military involvement in the Angolan civil war but illustrative in a more strictly political way of the Soviet Union's attitude toward the Third World was Soviet reaction to the fourth United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD IV) meeting in Nairobi, Kenya, during May 1976, and the fifth Non-Aligned Nation's Summit Conference in Colombo, Sri Lanka, during August.

Briefly, Third World purposes at Nairobi were to restructure the international economic order so that the poorer, less developed nations could become more economically secure and share more equally in the benefits of the world economy. A common position was established at a ministerial meeting of the Group of 77 (comprising 111 countries by May 1976) in Manila during February 1976. This position was formalized in the so-called Manila Declaration and Program of Action, a statement of 17 objectives which included action on the following matters: an integrated program on commodities designed to guarantee prices; industrial production and trade; expansion of export capacity; reforms in the international monetary system; increased financial assistance; debt relief; technology transfer; controls over multinational corporations; expanded trade with Communist countries; and special measure to aid the LDC's.⁷⁸

An American scholar at Nairobi described the declaration as, "the Third World's vision of how to structure world trade financial institutions and institutions for helping the least-developed countries."⁷⁹

b. Issues and results in brief

The Nairobi Conference, attended by nearly 2,000 delegates from 139 countries, opened on May 5 and closed on May 30, 1976. It was a major dialog between North and South with the latter playing a more assertive role. As one West German observed, "The stars of the show this time are the Third World people. They overwhelmed us."⁸⁰

The issues that shaped the Conference were comprehensive and complex; they were contained in the Manila Declaration and Program of Action and in the initiatives put forward by Secretary of State Kissinger in his May 6 address to the Conference. Secretary Kissinger presented a comprehensive American proposal for improving the economies of the LDC's (e.g. through technology transfer, establishing an international resource bank, checking "brain drain," from the LDC's, etc.), placing emphasis on free enterprise and private initiatives.

The Conference ended in a compromise: the Third World did not get all it asked for from the capitalist countries; the West, "outgunned

⁷⁸ Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. 22, 1976, p. 27829.

⁷⁹ Quoted in, Novak, Jeremiah, Third World Forces Industrialized Nations to Compromise. The Washington Post, May 31, 1976, p. A12.

⁸⁰ Ibid. For general information, see, Fourth Session of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Nairobi, 5-31 May 1976. UNCTAD. Monthly Bulletin No. 118, June-July 1976, 8 p.

and outmaneuvered" by Third World delegates—as one press report put it—was forced to compromise on two main issues, commodities prices and international debts.⁸¹ But the overall results were positive. According to one assessment of the conference, Kissinger's proposals for the International Resources Bank, though not adopted by the Conference, as well as other U.S. proposals, were largely responsible "for establishing a generally constructive atmosphere" at the Conference and "turning it from a potentially confrontational course." Thus the greater degree of flexibility "introduced into this phase of the ongoing North-South dialog promoted cooperation and negotiation at UNCTAD IV."⁸²

c. Soviet reaction to Conference

(1) Central themes

The Soviet reaction to UNCTAD IV revolved around three central themes; namely, (1) to emphasize Soviet strength, wisdom, and capabilities as a world force, particularly in assisting the Third World in solving its problems; (2) to reinforce the presumed connection between the Third World and the Socialist community; and (3) to depict the capitalist West, notably the United States, as using the conference to achieve neocolonialist ends and to denigrate its economic strength. In brief, the events of the conference and the Soviet reaction were predictably structured within the design of the Soviet world-view; the validity of analysis was reaffirmed by frequent references to the judgments of the 25th Party Congress in matters of foreign policy, trade, and international development.

(2) Iordanskiy commentary

Thus in a commentary on the day before the Conference opened, Vladimir Iordanskiy, a Tass economic analyst, cited three factors in the international economic order that would greatly influence the Conference: (1) a "deep economic crisis that has hit the capitalist countries and led to reduction of their industrial production and trade"; (2) the "struggle of developing countries for economic independence which impelled them to insist on elimination of all vestiges of colonialism in the sphere of international economic relations"; and (3) "the steady growth of the economy of the Soviet Union, other countries of the socialist community which is accompanied by the growing international recognition of their role in [the] solution of world economic problems."

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Commerce America, vol. 1, June 7, 1976, pp. 16-17. The principal results of the conference were: agreement on a compromise proposal with respect to regulation of international commodity markets; rejection of the U.S. proposal for an International Resource Bank, designed to increase private investment in the resources of the LDC's; adoption of a three-point program relating to debt problems in which broad international guidelines will be negotiated and applied on a case-by-case basis; recommendation that a special inter-governmental group of specialists be convened to study the debt problem; and plans to expand exports of the LDCs and increase their access to markets of the developed countries.

For a discussion of the results of UNCTAD IV, see Land, Philip S. UNCTAD IV: So What? America, vol. 135, July 24, 1976: 25-28. Land concluded: "The outcome of the negotiations at Nairobi may, on review, look slim. But in truth, significant advances were made in the ongoing North-South negotiations for a more just and equitable new international economic order." (p. 28).

For a comprehensive survey and commentary on the conference, see Lewis, Paul. The Have-Nots Are Gaining Ground in Their Drive to Gain Concessions. National Journal, June 5, 1976:774-782. Lewis concludes: "* * * the Nairobi agreement shows at the very least that rich and poor once again have avoided an outright breach in their relations. The months ahead will reveal whether they can now agree on specific proposals for a new international economic order that will be acceptable to both, and that may, therefore, come into being." (p. 782).

For the Soviet view of the U.S. role at UNCTAD IV, see Ivanov, I. D. United States at UNCTAD Conference. USA (Moscow), No. 9, September 1976, pp. 68-75, (JPRS:L/6609, pp. 56-65).

According to Iordanskiy, the crisis of capitalism exposed its "predatory nature" toward the Third World which now found itself caught between the drop in raw material prices and a rise in that of industrial commodities. The crisis also exposed the "viciousness" of the Western system of economic assistance to the LDC's which is "a means of consolidating the positions of monopoly capital" in the Third World. The expected American proposal for an international resources bank was viewed as another attempt of the "American monopolies to widen control over their natural resources."

On the other hand, Iordanskiy insisted that the Soviet Union and the Socialist community intended to contribute to solving the pressing world economic problems. "Acting in the Helsinki spirit," he said, "they consistently come out against all manifestations of discrimination and inequality in international trade." They attach "particular significance" to consolidating their cooperation with Third World nations and "comprehensively support their struggle for economic independence."⁸³

(3) *Joint statement of Socialist countries*

The essence of these and other ideas permeate the 34-page joint statement introduced into the Conference proceedings by the Socialist countries on May 5. The statement, comprehensive and detailed, a highly sophisticated formulation, laid out the Soviet position in formal and restrained language. It projected the Soviet view of the international order and provided prescriptions for the solution of its problems.

The document took its cue from the 25th Party Congress. Détente, "coming to be irreversible," was prominently featured as a determining factor in contemporary world affairs. It was credited with modifying the overall economic political climate of the world; it permitted the greater linkage of economies, fostering economic, scientific, and technological cooperation; it opened up opportunities for the growth of trade with the LDC's and the inclusion of interested countries in specialization, cooperation, and multilateral investment projects. The aims of UNCTAD; namely, the further development and normalization of trade and the acceleration of international development, were expected to be furthered "in a climate of détente." The Helsinki agreement, symbolic of détente in Europe, was credited with having a universal impact.

The statement echoed the familiar theme of neocolonialism as it linked détente with the movement toward economic independence in the Third World. "It is entirely logical," the statement said, that "in such conditions a movement should be gaining strength among the developing countries for the radical restructuring of the capitalist international division of labour inherited from the colonial past and upheld by modern-day neo-colonialism." Accordingly, the statement noted the importance of continuing "to struggle to eliminate from the practice of international economic relations all manifestations of inequity, domination and discrimination and of the policy of restrictive monopolism."

Perhaps the essence of the Soviet position was summed up by the statement's expressed support for the Manila Declaration and the Program of Action. In this respect the Socialist community supported

⁸³ Moscow Tass, May 4, 1976, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, May 5, 1976, pp. A10-A12.

the "legitimate desire" of the LDC's to safeguard their sovereignty over their own resources and economic activity, develop their economies for national ends, and escape from "neo-colonial exploitation by, *inter alia*, the establishment of control over the activities of foreign capital and, above all, of transnational corporations."⁸⁴

(4) *Patolichev proposals*

In the course of the Conference Nikolai S. Patolichev, Soviet Minister for Foreign Trade, formally presented the Soviet proposals. Among the proposals, drawn from the joint statement, were the following: to extend the practice of concluding long-term trade and economic agreements as well as long-term cooperation programs in specific fields; to help interested LDC's to develop their natural resources on terms guaranteeing genuine sovereignty; to increase the volume of technical assistance in the next 5 years by 50 percent; to expand the transfer of technical knowledge to the LDC's by promoting the establishment in these countries of their own science and education infrastructure.

With respect to commodities, Patolichev said, the Soviet Union welcomed in principle the integrated approach and supported programs to expand and diversify exports of manufactures and semi-manufacturers from developing countries; it denounced the use of preferences for the purposes of economic reprisals; it called for more effective control over the multinational corporations of the West; and was prepared to participate in drafting a code covering the transfer of technology. With respect to the debt question, Patolichev said any decision must bear in mind the different credit system of the Socialist countries, and, he noted, there was always the possibility of bilateral restructuring of debts by mutual agreement.⁸⁵

(5) *Post-Conference assessments*

Soviet post-Conference assessments, emphasizing familiar Soviet political themes, reflected a decided triumphalist tone. According to Andrey Klimov, Pravda's commentator, the common platform of the LDC's "mirrored their resolve to liquidate the order left over from the colonial times and the unequal economic relations with the capitalist world." Attempts by the imperialist powers to make the LDC's "respect the status quo" in international economic relations and push other unacceptable conditions for trade and development on them, he said, were rejected. The developing countries showed no interest in the Kissinger proposal to establish an international resources bank because "they justifiably see this as a wish to protect the interests of the imperialist powers and intensify control over raw material resources in the Third World."

Klimov emphasized that the "firm position" taken by the LDC's and the Socialist countries "on quite a few of the most important problems" made the imperialist states retreat; and accordingly the Conference "adopted highly-principled resolutions that pave the way to constructive talks." According to Klimov, the LDC's "highly appreciate the support given by the Socialist countries to their policy line."

⁸⁴ United Nations. Conference on Trade Development. Fourth Session, Nairobi, May 5, 1976, Joint Statement by Socialist Countries, 34 pp. (TD/211, May 28, 1976).

⁸⁵ Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. 22, 1976, p. 27830.

Klimov noted particularly that UNCTAD IV produced results that have "economic as well as political significance." They testify, he said, "to the wish of the emerging states to be absolutely free and indicate that only the combined action of the Socialist and developing countries can guarantee the restructuring the international economic relations on a just and progressive basis."⁸⁶

d. Third World criticism of Soviet Union

Reality at Nairobi contrasted sharply with published Soviet views. Delegates from Third World nations criticized the Soviet Union as well as the West without distinction. Criticism centered on Soviet trade practices which restricted the LDC's to a barter system. According to this system, revenues made by sales to the Soviet Union must be spent on Soviet goods.

The LDC's have wanted this changed and have sought payment in convertible currency.⁸⁷

LDC delegates at Nairobi made their complaints publicly known. "We're madder at the Soviet Union and its friends than even at the West," a Bolivian delegate remarked, echoing, according to the press report from Nairobi, "a sentiment expressed by many Third World delegates who say that trade with the Communist bloc is a one-way street." An African delegate pointed out the inequities inflicted upon those who must trade on Soviet terms: convertibility is ruled out; prices for industrial goods are often higher in Communist countries; and as he put it, "so our trade really brings us less." Another delegate complained that while Western Europe, the United States, and Japan granted trade preferences to the LDC's, "the Communist countries have never given us preferences." When China's ambassador to Kenya, Wang Yuer-yi, accused the Soviet Union of "criminal exploitation of the Third World," many delegates murmured agreement. A Yugoslav pointedly remarked, "There's no question about it, the U.S.S.R. is not popular here."

The Soviets were not oblivious to such criticism. When a Soviet delegate was asked about the Soviet Union's problems with the Third World, he "sighed wearily," the report said, and responded, "Let's talk about something more positive."⁸⁸

As explained elsewhere in this study, Soviet trade and aid with the developing countries are highly selective and restrictive. Soviet rhetoric has not matched performance. As Secretary Kissinger and Treasury Secretary William E. Simon declared at Nairobi, the Communist contribution to "the development of the poorer countries of

⁸⁶ Moscow Tass, June 6, 1976, in, FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, June 9, 1976, p. A10. For other commentaries on the Nairobi Conference, see, *Profound Analysis, Significant Proposals*. New Times, No. 22, May 1986: 12-24, and Asoyan, B. and G. Skobelev. *The Conference is Over, the Struggle Continues*. New Times, No. 24, June 1986: 24-24. These articles, along with others that were reviewed contained essentially variations on the same themes as noted above. See also, Volkov, N. *The Developing Countries and International Economic Relations*. International Affairs (Moscow), No. 9, 1976, pp. 57-67.

⁸⁷ Kaufman, Michael T., *U.N. Trade Talks: The Have Nots Demand a Fair Share*. The New York Times, May 17, 1976, p. 14. This matter is discussed in, U.N. UNCTAD IV. *Trade Relations Among Countries Having Different Economic and Social Systems* (Item 15—Main Policy Issues), Nairobi, May 1976, 20 pp.

⁸⁸ The Washington Post, May 28, 1976, p. A23.

the world is negligible." This attitude was amply demonstrated at Nairobi.⁸⁹

M. Claude Cheysson, a specialist on development policy and participant in UNCTAD IV, explained the Soviet role at Nairobi in this way. The Eastern countries, he said, had taken no part in the dialog because they were not involved in the most important problems. For the Socialist countries absorbed only 5 percent of the Third World's foreign trade and granted it only negligible economic aid.⁹⁰

In its weekly report on Nairobi, Time magazine observed that for the first time the LDC's pressed the Communist nations for concessions. The Soviet bloc has always argued that colonial expansion was the cause of the Third World's poverty and that the Communist nations were thus under no obligations to make "reparations". "Unconvinced by this argument," Time noted, "the LDC's demanded more aid, better access to East Bloc markets and payment in hard currencies—but won no commitments from the Communist delegates."⁹¹

Similar criticisms were recorded by Michael T. Kaufman in a special report to the New York Times from Nairobi. Kaufman cited the problems of barter trade, nonconvertibility, a restrictive accounting system that prevented the application of credits earned in one Communist bloc country against purchases in another, and indebtedness—problems that affect Third World relations with the Soviet bloc. Speaking for the developing countries, Kaufman observed: "They resent the Soviet Union's standing aloof from such questions and insisting that the world economic disarray is a consequence of capitalist contradictions over which it has no control and for which it bears no responsibility."⁹²

e. Precedence of North-South over East-West issues; implications.

For the Soviets, the Nairobi Conference tested its connection with the Third World, and found it wanting. Notwithstanding the appealing but oversimplified ideological construct that links the Third World with the Socialist community in a common destiny, the Conference revealed a fissure in this linkage. For many Third World nations, North-South issues are taking precedence over East-West issues, particularly as the memories of the colonial past fade away and as a

⁸⁹ Bernard Gwertzman of The New York Times summed up the judgments of specialists on Soviet aid to the LDCs when he wrote shortly after the close of the Nairobi Conference: "Despite the strong political support the Communist powers have routinely given demands of the developing countries, the Communists have provided comparatively little economic assistance of their own to the less developed nations. And although Communist ideology focuses on aiding the downtrodden to break their shackles, Moscow and Peking have avoided most international efforts to do just that." (Gwertzman, Bernard. *The East's Aid is Largely Ideological*. The New York Times, June 13, 1976, p. E4)

In his report on UNCTAD IV, Senator Abraham Ribicoff (D-Conn.) noted: "To me it is very significant that, in seeking a new international economic order, the developing countries are primarily addressing their demands to the United States. We are their objective, and not the communist countries. The reason is simple: the communists have little, aside from guns, to offer the developing world." (U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Finance. UNCTAD IV and the New Diplomacy of Interdependence. Report of Senator Ribicoff to the Chairman. 94th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office., 1976, p. 2.)

At the Manila meeting of the Group of 77 in February the Communist performance in aid was criticized. The assembled delegates called for actions rather than words, and urged the Communist countries to increase their financial and technical assistance to at least the GNP aid target established in the United Nations' International Development Strategy. The fact is that Soviet aid allocation reached only 0.05 percent of the Gross National Product in 1974 compared to 0.38 percent for Britain and an average for Development Assistance Committee donor countries of 0.33 percent. (Tied Aid for Third World. Soviet Analyst, vol. 5, April 22, 1976: 5.)

For other criticism of Soviet aid allocation, see Willis, David K. Soviets Hit on "Third-World" Aid. The Christian Science Monitor, Oct. 5, 1976, p. 6.

⁹⁰ Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. 22, 1976, p. 27832.

⁹¹ Time, vol. 107, June 7, 1976, p. 69.

⁹² The New York Times, May 17, 1976, p. 14.

new generation of leaders is taking over upon whom rests the problems of rule and survival. The Soviet Union is now being perceived as a modern developed industrial state, having many of the same attributes, interests, needs, and responsibilities as other developed industrial states in the West—for good or ill. For them, the distinction, at least as the North-South issues impact upon them economically, is not so great.

But the Soviets, sensitive to the implications of guilt, have denied responsibility for Third World poverty, arguing that this was the heritage of Western colonialism which they after all did not share. The Soviets are thus faced with a contradiction: on the one hand, of insisting on the Third World connection as an ideological and political imperative; but on the other, denying that connection when the imperatives of economics requires a price to be paid. Furthermore, this contradiction exposes still another question much deeper and more profound, and that is, whether or not the Soviets can even pay the price.

This idea of a fissure in the Soviet-Third World connection and its implications seemed to surface at Nairobi; it became more visible at the Colombo Conference of the nonaligned in August.

2. FIFTH SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF NON-ALIGNED COUNTRIES, COLOMBO, SRI LANKA

a. Third World purposes

The Fifth Summit Conference of Non-Aligned Countries met in Colombo, the capital of Sri Lanka, from August 16–19, 1976. Heads of states and governments from 86 countries, formally but not practically disassociated from the East-West power alignment, attended the Conference.⁹³

Third World objectives in calling the Conference appeared to be mainly threefold: (1) to advance generally the political and economic interests of the Third World countries; (2) to reinforce the “new international economic order” conceived by the Group of 77 at Manila in February and formally presented at Nairobi in May; and (3) to take a collective stand in making the Indian Ocean a genuine “zone of peace”.

b. Changing Third World targets: Political to economic

In essence, the Conference demonstrated the significant change that has occurred in recent years both in international politics and in the nonaligned movement itself. Détente has reduced, but not eliminated, tensions in East-West relations. Residual problems of the cold war have been increasingly overshadowed by the emergence of the North-South controversy over the distribution of the world's wealth and resources.

The nonalignment movement is now in a period of transition. The trend is away from traditional political aspirations toward insistence upon economic equality, from political independence to economic independence. Most of the anticolonial battles that had sapped Third World energies in the past have been won; the target has shifted to establishing a “new international economic order” based on equality and justice.

⁹³ For a commentary on the Nonaligned Movement from the Soviet perspective, see, Bondarevsky, G. and V. Sofinsky. *The Non-Aligned Movement and International Relations*. (Moscow), no. 7, 1976, pp. 50–58.

c. Issues. New international economic order; Indian Ocean as zone of peace

For the nonaligned LDC's, Colombo provided an opportunity to advance the ideas presented at UNCTAD IV in Nairobi. These ideas were contained in formal Conference documents approved by consensus without vote. They included a political declaration, a declaration on economic problems, an action program for economic cooperation, and a number of resolutions on economic questions. Again, the call for a new international economic order was based upon the premise of collective responsibility among all great industrial powers, including the Soviet Union. A sense of gravity was evident in the declaration on economic problems. The most dangerous source of world conflict and tension, it warned, was the growing economic disparity between the developed and the developing countries.⁹⁴

With respect to making the Indian Ocean a "Zone of Peace", the Conference referred to the U.N. General Assembly's Resolution 2382 (XXVI), formally declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. In this context, the Conference—

- Assured all nations that the proposal would "not limit the right to free and unimpeded use of the Indian Ocean by their vessels in conformity with international law as long as such vessels pose no military or strategic threat to the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the littoral and hinterland states";
- Condemned "the creation, maintenance and expansion of foreign and imperialist military bases and installations, such as Diego Garcia by the great powers * * * as well as the continuing escalation of great power military rivalry and tension in the Indian Ocean"; and
- Invited littoral and hinterland states to "dismantle existing foreign bases and military installations."⁹⁵

In her speech to the Conference, Prime Minister Sirmavo Bandaranaike of Sri Lanka emphasized her country's concern for super-power rivalry in the Indian Ocean.

We must stand together,

She said—

and demand the dismantling of the Diego Garcia base, and we must also demand that the great powers which have no littoral interests withdraw their navies and military presences from the Indian Ocean region, for detente and international security are not concepts that can have one meaning to powerful nations and no meaning at all to the rest of humanity.⁹⁶

Bandaranaike mentioned only the United States directly in her speech. But the speech and the Conference statement strongly inferred that the Soviet Union shares equal responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the Indian Ocean.

⁹⁴ The conference is discussed in, Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. 22, 1976, pp. 27977-27980; Borders, William. Colombo Meeting of Third World is Opening Today. The New York Times, Aug. 16, 1976, p. 1; Willis, David K. Big Powers Woo Nonaligned. The Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 16, 1976, p. 3; Mendis, A. B. Afro-Asia Summit: Probing its Goals. The Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 16, 1976, p. 3; and Mendis, A. B. Third World Seeks Indian Ocean Peace Zone, Own Bank. The Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 20, 1976, p. 3.

⁹⁵ Keesing's Contemporary Archives, v. 22, 1976, p. 27979.

⁹⁶ Mathews, Jay. Sri Lanka Blasts U.S. Buildup Plan for Diego Garcia. The Washington Post, Aug. 17, 1976, p. A4.

President Tito of Yugoslavia supported the Sri Lankan position. The Indian Ocean, he said, should be free of foreign bases, nuclear weapons, and naval fleets of the great powers. But, Tito significantly extended the boundaries of the zone to include the Mediterranean Sea, which he said like the Indian Ocean, should also become a zone of peace. Both the Soviet Union and the United States maintain formidable naval forces in the Mediterranean.⁹⁷

d. Soviet reaction to Colombo Conference

(1) Elements in accord

During the weeks prior to the Colombo Conference, the Soviets insisted in a barrage of articles in Pravda and Izvestia that the non-alignment movement was essentially anti-colonial.⁹⁸ Great pains seemed to be taken to lay out the Soviet view on the Third World and nonalignment, stressing their positive values in furthering the cause of socialism and reinforcing their presumed symbiotic connection with the Socialist community.⁹⁹ A corollary theme was directed at the Chinese; namely, the value of Brezhnev's Asian security plan for the peace and security of Asia.

Moscow could, therefore, derive satisfaction from many aspects of the proceedings in Colombo: the strong emphasis on themes of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism in the conference proceedings and documents; the favorable appraisal of détente and peaceful coexistence as the "main trend of international development"; positive references to Brezhnev; the emphasis given to the importance of disarmament, international security, and transforming the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace; the value of nonalignment as a force in world affairs; favorable recognition given to the success of the national liberation movement in southern Africa; demands for removal of U.S. troops from South Korea; and, as one writer said, the denunciation of the "establishment and enlargement of foreign imperialist military bases and installations such as the U.S. base on Diego Garcia."¹⁰⁰

Many of these and other ideas and political formulations expressed and recorded at the Conference fit neatly within familiar Soviet foreign policy categories. For there were many points of intersecting common interests. Thus in a report to the October Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, Brezhnev could speak approvingly of both the Conference and the movement itself. "The non-alignment movement has become a noticeable factor of international life," he said, "an important link of the world-wide front of struggle by the peoples against imperialism, colonialism and aggression." The political and

⁹⁷ Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol. 22, 1976, p. 27978.

⁹⁸ The Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 16, 1976 p. 3.

⁹⁹ Leonidov, O. A Voice That Carries Weight. Pravda, May 15, 1976, p. 4, in, FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, May 21, 1976, pp. A6-A10; Skachkov, S. A. Mutually Advantageous Cooperation. Izvestia, June 17, 1976, p. 4, in, FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, June 22, 1976, p. A6; and Varnai, Ferenc. Consultation: the Nonaligned Countries. Nepszabadsag (Budapest), June 5, 1976, pp. 4 and 5, in FBIS, Daily Report, Eastern Europe, vol. 2, June 16, 1976, pp. F7-F10. Varnai concludes: "All this justifies the expectation that, in Colombo, they will adopt a stance in favor of such consolidation of peace and security in Asia and throughout the world as has occurred in Europe and in favor of this consolidation leading to international military détente and the guaranteeing of the independence of peoples and nations. This policy, the objective identity of interests, enables the socialist countries to continue to rely on intensified collaboration with the movement of the nonaligned countries. And the nonaligned countries' strength is multiplied by the fact that they can safely rely on the support of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries in every respect in their struggle." (p. F10)

¹⁰⁰ Sofinsky, V. A Major Factor in World Affairs. New Times (Moscow), No. 35, Aug. 1976: H 6.

economic documents adopted by the Conference, in "sometimes difficult discussions," according to Brezhnev, "confirmed that on the whole non-alignment movement retains a progressive nature."¹⁰¹

(2) *Variation on Indian Ocean issue and Soviet objections*

Still, the Soviets were not completely satisfied with the treatment of the Indian Ocean issue. Western observers in Moscow perceived Soviet displeasure at the failure of the Conference to name the United States, in the words of one report, as "the ogre of the Indian Ocean."¹⁰² But the Soviet objection was more finely tuned. There was a variation in the response to this issue among delegates, and the Soviets took sharp exception to it; for a major Soviet objective at Colombo was support for the "zone of peace" idea, but without letting the concept widen to the point of restricting the increasingly active Soviet Navy in the area.¹⁰³ The conference widened the concept to embrace by implication the Soviet Union.

Soviet criticism centered on the point in the political document expressing concern that the Indian Ocean might become a seat of great power rivalry. It referred directly to the proposed U.S. base at Diego Garcia, but generally made little distinction between the United States and the Soviet Union as great powers. According to F. Stephen Larrabee, a Soviet specialist with Radio Liberty's research staff, this was "a source of no little chagrin to Moscow."¹⁰⁴ In essence, this interpretation was tantamount to accepting Peking's thesis in its dispute with the Soviet Union that "imperialism is imperialism, whether it is capitalist imperialism or social imperialism under a socialist signboard."¹⁰⁵

Vsevolod Sofinsky, a Soviet foreign policy analyst, elaborated on Soviet objections to this formulation in his analysis of the Conference. He reported "strange, even false notes to be heard in some speeches" by "reactionary elements" who emphasized the "notorious" thesis on the "hegemonism of the superpowers." The "legend was peddled," he said, "that the threat to peace emanated not from imperialist aggressiveness, but from 'division into blocs and rivalry.'" It was contended, for instance, that "what was preventing the Indian Ocean from becoming a zone of peace was not imperialist bases, but the same old 'great-power rivalry.'" Sofinsky insisted that this criticism was intended "to sow discord at the conference, to mute the anti-imperialist and anti-colonialist tenor of the non-aligned movement, weaken it and isolate it from other progressive forces."¹⁰⁶

Clearly, the Soviets resented being lumped with the United States as a rival for military power and thus tainted with the stigma of imperialism. As Pravda's commentator Pavel Demchenko asked rhetorically, "Doesn't this look like an attempt to resort again to the unwarranted device of placing socialism and imperialism on a par, ignoring the indisputable fact that the social and political goals and the basis of the policies are opposite."¹⁰⁷

¹⁰¹ Text of Leonid Brezhnev's speech at the plenary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee of Oct. 25, 1976. Moscow Tass, Oct. 25, 1976, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, Oct. 26, 1976 pp. A18-A19.

¹⁰² Willis, David K. Soviets Admit Some Setbacks in "Third World." The Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 23, 1976, p. 4.

¹⁰³ The Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 16, 1976, p. 3.

¹⁰⁴ Larrabee, F. Stephen. Colombo and Beyond: Moscow and the Nonaligned Countries. Radio Liberty Research (RL 396/76), Aug. 31, 1976, p. 4.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Sofinsky, Major Factor in World Affairs, p. 4.

¹⁰⁷ Pravda, Aug. 19, 1976, quoted in, Larrabee, Colombo and Beyond, p. 5.

(3) *Dissent from "equal responsibility" in Third World's new international economic order*

The Soviets vigorously objected to another "notorious" thesis emphasized at Colombo, that of sharing "equal responsibility" with other industrialized developed states, regardless of social systems, for the economic backwardness of the Third World. Inferred in the concept of "equal responsibility" is equal blame and equal obligation for restitution.

The Soviets deny coresponsibility. As Sofinsky wrote, "The socialist countries have had no part whatever in anything hamstringing the social and economic effort of the developing countries." Responsibility "for their plight," he noted, "are exclusively the imperialist powers and their monopolies which crave by neo-colonialist means to perpetuate the unequal, dependent position" of the developing states. "Hence, neither in theory nor in practice," Sofinsky concluded, "will the socialist countries accept any concept presupposing an identical approach to socialist and imperialist states as regards 'equal responsibility.'" ¹⁰⁸

Sofinsky charged that such concepts were devised by those who have sought to drive a wedge between the Socialist and developing countries and to place "artificial barriers" (in the way of further joint action). ¹⁰⁹

But Soviet objections to "equal responsibility" in the Third World's new international economic order are rooted in deeper sources. In addition to the ideological and political aspects noted above, there are the economic. For the new economic order raises questions about the role the Soviet Union is to play; most importantly, the extent to which it can and should be expected to share the burden of Third World development. At a time of mounting internal economic difficulties and increased indebtedness to the West, such calls for burden-sharing would not be welcomed in Moscow and could cause embarrassment. ¹¹⁰

Judging by other Soviet responses since the Colombo Conference, notably the official Soviet Government statement circulated in the United Nations entitled, "On the Restructuring of International Economic Relations," the Soviet Union has no intention of accepting the Third World notion of "equal responsibility." ¹¹¹ In this matter

¹⁰⁸ Sofinsky, Vsevolod. On the Eve of the Non-Aligned Conference. New Times (Moscow), No. 32, August 1976, p. 20.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Larrabee, Colombo and Beyond, p. 3.

¹¹¹ With respect to the matter of "equal responsibility," the Soviet statement objected to "the exploiter policy" of involving the socialist community in the scheme of dividing countries into "poor and rich ones and thereby to place the socialist states on a par with the imperialist powers on the question of historical responsibility" for the economic backwardness of the developing countries and for the "consequences of colonial oppression and for the neocolonialist exploitation of these countries."

The statement rejected the demands of the developed capitalist states, including the "compulsory surrender" of a fixed proportion of the GNP to the developing countries as economic aid. The statement cited the following reasons: (1) the socialist states "do not bear the responsibility for the economic backwardness which the developing countries inherited from the colonial past"; (2) they have "never pursued and do not pursue the economic exploitation of any countries whatever;" (3) the socialist countries are "in no way involved in the grave consequences" for the LDC's resulting from economic crises, the collapse of currencies and "other manifestations of production anarchy in the capitalist system." According to the statement, there were "no parasitic classes making profits and superprofits" out of exploiting their own peoples and those of other states.

With respect to economic aid, the statement noted that socialist aid to the LDC's "is not recompense for damage inflicted or payment for old sins: it is aid from a friend and ally in the struggle against the common enemy—imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism." Without the intervention of the socialist community,

Moscow shuns involvement and solutions that would compromise the Soviet Union ideologically and thrust upon it an unwanted economic burden.

3. MEANING OF NAIROBI AND COLOMBO CONFERENCES FOR SOVIET UNION AND THIRD WORLD

The Nairobi and Colombo Conferences appear to have a special meaning for the Soviet Union and the Third World. For the Soviets, they were occasions for reaffirming their Third World policy and reiterating the familiar rhetoric of such symbolic foreign policy themes as peaceful coexistence, colonialism, imperialism, and the value of the Soviet-Third World connection. The Conferences also compelled the Soviets, probably for the first time, to face up to the hard realities of the North-South controversy as it affected Soviet-Third World relations, coming to grips with inherent contradictions in the Soviet position, rejecting "equal responsibility" as a premise for policy, and shunning the economic burden of Third World development as prescribed by the non-Socialist community.

For the developing countries of the Third World, the Conferences were occasions for advancing their plans for equality and justice in the distribution of the world's resources and wealth. But these efforts revealed limitations in the Soviet connection which stimulated misgivings and growing doubts about the Soviet Union's role in their new international economic order. Presumably they came to realize what American specialists on Soviet foreign economic policy have long contended; namely, that Soviet economic assistance to the Third World was not dispensed across a broad range of recipients for mainly humanitarian purposes as they seemed to imply, but rather its dispersal was based on carefully targeted, highly selective, and differentiated criteria designed to advance specific Soviet foreign policy and strategic interests.

"imperialism would have nipped in the bud any attempts" by the liberated states "to achieve genuine national independence."

The statement noted the Soviet Union's potential for extending economic aid as "not infinite." The Soviet state had to take into account the well-being of its own people and also the "great load" it carries in insuring peace and the peoples' security against "the encroachments of aggressive imperialist circles, and, like the other socialist countries, is concerned with strengthening the economic, scientific and technical potential of world socialism. * * * "Thus, the Soviet Union allocates funds for economic and technical assistance to the LDC's "on the basis of its own capabilities." (In the interests of Cooperation. Pravda, Oct. 5, 1976, p. 4, in FBIS Wire Service 51.)

Essentially the same ideas were contained in, Gromyko, A. A. The Leninist Peace Strategy: Uniting Theory with Practice. Kommunist, No. 14, September 1976, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, Oct. 26, 1976, p. 11.

In his October 1976 speech to the CPSU Plenum, Brezhnev gave a very generalized but seemingly approving statement on the new international economic order of the LDC's. He said: "Active steps are being taken on our part in support of the just demands by the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America for the restructuring of international economic relations on the basis of equality, for removing all forms of exploitation by capitalist states of weaker partners in the 'Third World'. The interests of socialist and developing countries coincide in this field, as well as in many other fields." (Brezhnev's Speech at October 1976 CPSU Plenum, Moscow Tass, Oct. 25, 1976, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, Oct. 26, 1976, p. A17.) This statement, in so far as it relates to restructuring the international economic order for the benefit of the LDC's, is at variance with stated Soviet policy. On this contradiction Larrabee writes: " * * * this verbal rhetoric belies actual Soviet policy, since Moscow has consistently refused to accept any financial responsibility for the plight of the Third World, blaming this on the West; and with its own allies, such as India, Moscow has been unwilling to consider a cancellation of outstanding debts—one of the main demands of the developing countries in the North-South dialogue." (Larrabee, F. Stephen. Foreign Policy Aspects of Brezhnev's Speech to the October Plenum. Radio Liberty Research, RL 456/76, Oct. 28, 1976, pp. 3-4.)

E. ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID, 1975-76

1. SOVIET ECONOMIC AID, 1975-76


a. *Shifting emphases and technical changes*

The basic characteristics of the Soviet military and economic assistance program, as outlined earlier, remained fundamentally unchanged in 1975 and 1976. Moscow continued to supply military hardware to traditional clients and expand existing economic relations. However, there were also a number of perceptible shifts in the form and focus of Soviet aid programs. New clients and changing economic relations were interpreted by some observers in the West as demonstrating a new expansionary trend in Moscow's Third World policy.

In the economic sphere, Soviet aid extensions to the Third World rose sharply in 1975. (See figure 1 below.)¹¹²

Soviet Economic Aid Extended to LDCs, by Recipient

Figure 1



¹¹² Central Intelligence Agency. Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries. 1976, p. 5.

TABLE 3.—COMMUNIST ECONOMIC CREDITS AND GRANTS EXTENDED TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, 1954-76 AND YEARS 1975 AND 1976 ¹

[In millions of U.S. dollars]

	1954-76			1975			1976		
	Total	U.S.S.R.	Eastern Europe	China	Total	U.S.S.R.	Eastern Europe	China	Total
Total.....	21,739	11,446	6,389	3,904	1,998	1,307	418	273	1,015
Africa.....	5,254	1,807	1,249	2,198	452	75	195	182	501
Algeria.....	1,331	715	524	92	183		183		290
Angola.....	20	2 10	10						2 10
Benin.....	49	5	(3)	44	(3)		(3)		(3)
Botswana.....	(3)			(3)					(3)
Burundi.....	20			20					
Cameroon.....	79	8		71					
Cape Verde Island.....	(3)	(3)							(3)
C.A.E.....	6	2		4					
Chad.....	60	10		50	9	9			
Comoro Islands.....								(3)	
Congo.....	42	14	3	25					
Equatorial Guinea.....	1	1							
Ethiopia.....	209	105	19	85	4	2	2		1
Gambia.....	17			17	17			17	
Ghana.....	237	93	102	42					
Guinea.....	383	201	105	77					
Guinea (Bissau).....	31	14		17	18	1		17	13
Kenya.....	66	48		18					
Madagascar.....	177	86	23	66	55			55	
Mali.....	90	5		68	2			2	
Mauritania.....	35			85					
Mauritius.....	180	98	50	35	32			32	(3)
Morocco.....	62	2	1	59	59			59	2
Mozambique.....	53	2		51					3
Niger.....	50	7	43						
Nigeria.....	23	1		22					
Rwanda.....	(3)	(3)		(3)	(3)			(3)	(3)
Sao Tome/Principe.....	93	9	35	49					35
Senegal.....	58	28		30					
Sierra Leone.....	292	154	5	133	63	63			
Somalia.....	299	64	153	82					
Sudan.....	391	20	13	358					27
Tanzania.....	45			45					
Togo.....	235	82	113	40	10		10		85
Tunisia.....	31	16		15					55
Uganda.....									30

See footnotes at end of table.

TABLE 3.—COMMUNIST ECONOMIC CREDITS AND GRANTS EXTENDED TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, 1954-76 AND YEARS 1975 AND 1976 i—Continued

	1954-76			1975			1976		
	Total	U.S.S.R.	Eastern Europe	China	Total	U.S.S.R.	Eastern Europe	China	Total
Upper Volta.....	61	1	-----	60	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Zaire.....	100	-----	-----	100	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Zambia.....	362	6	50	306	-----	-----	-----	-----	27
Europe.....	45	-----	-----	45	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Malta.....	45	-----	-----	45	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
East Asia.....	809	156	346	307	37	1	35	1	5
Burma.....	126	16	26	84	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Cambodia.....	134	25	17	92	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Indonesia.....	482	114	263	105	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Laos.....	31	1	4	26	6	1	4	1	-----
Philippines.....	36	-----	36	-----	31	-----	31	-----	5
Western Samoa.....	(3)	-----	-----	(3)	-----	-----	-----	-----	(3)
Latin America.....	1,996	655	1,188	153	213	53	150	10	109
Argentina.....	537	245	292	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Bolivia.....	64	31	33	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	(34)
Brazil.....	560	83	477	-----	203	53	150	-----	100
Chile.....	423	238	120	65	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
Colombia.....	15	10	5	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	(34)
Costa Rica.....	2	-----	2	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	(34)
Ecuador.....	19	-----	19	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	4
Guyana.....	36	-----	-----	36	10	-----	-----	10	-----
Jamaica.....	10	-----	-----	10	-----	-----	-----	-----	1

TABLE 4.—COMMUNIST ECONOMIC AID TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, EXTENSIONS AND DRAWINGS

[In millions of U.S. dollars]

	Total		U.S.S.R.		Eastern Europe		China	
	Extended	Drawn	Extended	Drawn	Extended	Drawn	Extended	Drawn
Total..	20,529	9,282	10,859	5,900	5,830	1,722	3,840	1,660
1954-65.....	6,295	2,657	3,833	1,915	1,719	487	743	255
1966-75.....	14,234	6,625	7,026	3,985	4,111	1,235	3,097	1,405
1966.....	1,699	500	1,241	335	294	75	164	90
1967.....	473	520	291	305	132	115	50	100
1968.....	638	495	379	305	205	120	54	70
1969.....	933	520	494	350	426	100	13	70
1970.....	1,101	570	198	375	175	125	728	70
1971.....	2,171	770	1,125	430	484	150	562	190
1972.....	2,188	735	802	370	828	110	558	255
1973.....	1,569	805	657	435	484	140	428	230
1974.....	1,610	1,030	575	665	764	145	271	220
1975.....	1,852	680	1,264	415	319	155	269	110

Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1975. July 1976, ER 76-10372U, p. 5.

This trend appeared to continue into 1976 as Moscow established economic relations with new nations and renewed cooperative agreements with old clients. (See tables 3 and 4, pp. 123-126).

Soviet trade with the Third World also remained significant. In 1975, trade with developing countries was estimated at nearly 13 percent of the Soviet Union's total trade turnover.¹¹³

Moscow's military aid program also remained an active instrument of Soviet foreign policy in 1975 and 1976. Although Soviet arms deliveries in 1975 were below the record high levels of 1973 and 1974, they were, nevertheless, higher than any year prior to the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.¹¹⁴ While Soviet arms deliveries to the Middle East continued to account for the majority of Soviet military aid to the Third World, Moscow also began to provide significant amounts of military hardware to selected countries in Africa.

The Soviet Union's physical presence in the Third World also grew in 1975 and 1976. Soviet military advisers and economic technicians were found in increasing numbers throughout the Third World. (See tables 5 and 6, p. 127). The initiation of new industrial projects and the delivery of increasingly sophisticated military equipment produced this growth as skilled technicians became a nearly indispensable requirement for the successful implementation of military and economic aid programs.

¹¹³ Brougher, Jack. USSR Foreign Trade: Greater Role for Trade with the West. in, U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. Soviet Economy in a New Perspective. Committee print, 94th Cong., 2d sess., Oct. 14, 1976, Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 693.

¹¹⁴ Central Intelligence Agency. Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries. 1976, p. 1.

TABLE 5.—COMMUNIST ECONOMIC TECHNICIANS IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ¹

	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Total.....	24,010	35,050	39,295	43,960	47,355	55,290
China total ²	8,110	18,600	22,165	23,540	22,945	23,590
Africa.....	6,960	17,200	20,275	22,010	20,675	21,325
East Asia.....	150		30	40	75	35
Europe.....					3120	370
Latin America.....			30	50	75	70
Near East and South Asia ⁴	1,000	1,400	1,830	1,440	2,000	2,090
U.S.S.R. total.....	10,600	11,025	11,200	13,095	14,685	17,785
Africa.....	4,010	4,200	3,760	4,590	6,000	5,930
East Asia.....	100	150	25	25	10	25
Latin America.....	35	75	190	185	300	330
Near East and South Asia.....	6,455	6,600	7,225	8,295	8,375	11,500
Eastern Europe total.....	5,300	5,425	5,930	7,325	9,725	13,915
Africa.....	3,150	3,300	3,805	5,075	7,450	10,290
East Asia.....	60	75	20	10	25	30
Latin America.....	140	150	130	165	175	225
Near East and South Asia.....	1,950	1,900	1,975	2,075	2,075	3,370

¹ Minimum estimates of persons present for a period of 1 mo or more.

² Including laborers in some countries, especially Tanzania, Zambia, and Somalia.

³ Malta.

⁴ Excluding the large number of Chinese personnel reported working on the Karakoram Highway in Pakistan.

Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1975. July 1976, ER 76-10372U, p. 8.

TABLE 6.—COMMUNIST MILITARY TECHNICIANS ¹ IN THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, 1975

	Total	U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe	China
Total.....	9,300	8,090	1,210
Africa.....	3,745	2,605	1,140
Latin America.....	35	35	
Near East and South Asia.....	5,520	5,450	70

¹ Rounded to the nearest 5 persons. Data are minimum estimates of the number of persons present for a period of 1 mo or more. Persons engaged solely in commercial activities are excluded.

Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Communist Aid to the Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1975," July 1976, ER 76-10372U, p. 4.

b. Economic aid: Same basic characteristics with some variations

Soviet economic aid to the Third World continued to be in the form of "expensive, eye-catching heavy industrial public sector projects."¹¹⁵ Soviet observers continued to stress the importance of the public sector as the primary focus of Soviet economic aid.¹¹⁶ According to the Soviet media, industrial and energy related projects accounted for more than 75 percent of the total volume of Soviet economic aid.¹¹⁷

Generally speaking, the geographic distribution of Soviet economic aid also remained fundamentally the same in 1975 and 1976. The nations of the Middle East and Asia continued to receive the majority of Soviet economic assistance. However, it also became apparent that economic aid was no longer strictly relegated to countries in these two regions. Soviet aid extensions to Africa grew in 1975 and 1976, and Moscow continued its selective aid program to Latin America.

¹¹⁵ Central Intelligence Agency. Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries. 1976, p. 7.

¹¹⁶ Ulyanovsky, Rostislav. The Developing Countries: Aspects of the Political Scene. New Times, No. 38, September 1976, p. 18.

¹¹⁷ Moscow Tass, commentary by Sergey Stoklieskiy, May 19, 1976, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union vol. 3, May 21, 1976, p. A16.

c. Regional distribution of Soviet economic aid, 1975-76

(1) Middle East

In Egypt, despite the deterioration in Soviet-Egyptian relations, Soviet technicians continued work on previously authorized projects being built with Soviet assistance. The Soviet press reported that even after "the well-known unfriendly measures taken by the Egyptian leadership" the Soviet Union was continuing to supply spare parts for the Hulwan metallurgical complex, the Aswan complex, and other Soviet assisted projects.¹¹⁸ However, the gradual deterioration in relations was reported by Western sources to have had its costs for Moscow's aid program; Soviet aid to Egypt had been largely displaced by economic assistance from other Arab nations.¹¹⁹

On the other hand, economic relations between Iraq and the Soviet Union increased in 1976. In separate agreements, the Soviet Union agreed to help Iraq develop the north Rumalia oil fields and establish a domestic fishing industry.¹²⁰ In July of 1975, a major new step toward expanded economic cooperation with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was taken by Baghdad when it signed a multilateral economic and scientific-technical cooperation agreement with the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).¹²¹ Thus, according to an Iraqi study prepared for the UNCTAD IV Conference, economic relations between Iraq and the socialist countries had reached an "advanced stage."¹²²

Although the major emphasis of Soviet assistance to Libya was on military materials, economic relations were also on the upsurge in 1975 and 1976. A 1975 protocol called for increased economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and Libya. The agreement provided for Soviet assistance in the development of a metallurgical complex, a ferroconcrete plant, the Libyan gas industry, agriculture, and energy.¹²³

Soviet-Syrian economic relations also expanded as the two countries signed a protocol in 1975, providing for Soviet assistance in large scale oil prospecting in Syria. In January 1976, a 5-year trade agreement was signed by Moscow and Damascus.¹²⁴

Iran was another major recipient of Soviet economic aid. Moscow allocated aid to the development of the Isfahan steel mill, new rail links, and electrification projects in Iran.¹²⁵ Cooperative efforts between Iran and the Soviet Union also increased as the two nations signed an agreement in early 1975 which provided for joint production projects in both the Soviet Union and Iran.¹²⁶ In October of 1976, Moscow and Tehran signed a trade agreement which provided for a sharp rise in Soviet-Iranian trade.¹²⁷

¹¹⁸ Moscow in Arabic to the Arab World, commentary by Nikolay Lopatin, Oct. 31, 1976, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, Oct. 31, 1976, p. F3.

¹¹⁹ Central Intelligence Agency. Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries. 1976, p. 22.

¹²⁰ Moscow Radio Peace and Progress, July 27, 1975, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, July 29, 1975, p. F5, and, Moscow in Arabic to the Arab World, Feb. 20, 1976, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, Feb. 24, 1976, p. F1.

¹²¹ Moscow Tass, July 4, 1975, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, July 7, 1975, p. A12.

¹²² United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Trade Relations Among Countries Having Different Economic and Social Systems: Trade and Economic Relations Between Iraq and the Socialist Countries of Eastern Europe. Note by the Secretary General of UNCTAD. Fourth Session, Nairobi, May 5, 1976, p. 13. (United Nations. Document TD/197, Mar. 25, 1976.)

¹²³ Skripkin, A. Soviet-Libyan Cooperation. Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, No. 23, June 2, 1976, p. 21.

¹²⁴ Moscow Tass. Deepening Cooperation. Pravda, Jan. 27, 1976, p. 5.

¹²⁵ Central Intelligence Agency. Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries. 1976, p. 25.

¹²⁶ Ibid.

¹²⁷ Izvestiya, Oct. 20, 1976, p. 3.

Buttressed by a growing number of bilateral and multilateral aid agreements, economic relations between the Middle East and the Soviet Union expanded considerably in 1975 and 1976. New projects stressing industrial development and mutual profitability and stronger formal economic relations were the main trends in Moscow's economic aid program for the Middle East.

(2) *Asia*

Selected countries in Asia continued to receive large allocations of Soviet economic assistance in 1975 and 1976. Both Afghanistan and Turkey concluded large aid agreements with the Soviet Union.

Under the terms of its new agreement with Moscow, Afghanistan was reported to have received long-range credit extensions valued at \$437 million.¹²⁸ Turkey, which signed a similar agreement in mid-July of 1975, was expected to receive an estimated \$650 million in Soviet economic assistance.¹²⁹ The Turkish credits were to be used to expand the Iskandrum steel complex, add facilities to the Seydesehir aluminum complex, and to develop other projects in Turkey.¹³⁰ In mid-1976, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union signed a 5-year trade agreement which called for a 50 percent increase in Soviet-Afghan trade by 1980.¹³¹

Soviet economic aid to India remained fairly static in 1975 and 1976. However, trade between the two nations continued to increase at a steady rate.¹³² A major problem in Moscow's aid program to India was New Delhi's high level of indebtedness to the Soviet Union. Indian debt repayments to the Soviet Union were reported to be more than new Soviet credit extensions.¹³³

In Pakistan, Moscow began construction of the Karachi steel mill and agreed to explore for oil.¹³⁴

Sri Lanka was another major recipient of Soviet economic aid in 1975. Moscow extended approximately \$57 million to Sri Lanka for the construction of the Samanawala hydropowerplant and an extensive irrigation network.¹³⁵ A 1-year trade protocol was reportedly signed by Sri Lanka and the Soviet Union in February of 1976.¹³⁶

Moscow's economic policy in Asia remained the same in 1975 and 1976: highly selective and directed at strategic border nations. The Soviet Union's large aid extensions to Turkey and Afghanistan seemed to reaffirm this policy.

(3) *Africa*

Growing Soviet interest in Africa was clearly demonstrated by Moscow's expanding economic relations with nations on the African Continent. Although Soviet economic aid to Africa in 1975 and 1976 remained small, it increased, nevertheless, significantly from preceding years.

The major recipient of new Soviet aid extensions in 1975 was Somalia. In 1976, Algeria and Tunisia received the largest amounts of

¹²⁸ Central Intelligence Agency. *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries*. 1976, p. 15.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 29, and, Moscow Tass, July 9, 1975, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, July 10, 1975, p. G1.

¹³⁰ Central Intelligence Agency. *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries*. 1976, p. 29.

¹³¹ Pravda, June 19, 1976, p. 5.

¹³² Central Intelligence Agency. *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries*. 1976, p. 24.

¹³³ Cooper op. cit., p. 193.

¹³⁴ Central Intelligence Agency. *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries*. 1976, p. 27.

¹³⁵ Ibid., p. 28.

¹³⁶ Moscow Domestic Service, Feb. 19, 1976, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, Feb. 24, 1976, p. J1.

Soviet economic aid. Soviet aid extensions to Algeria in 1976 were estimated at \$290 million while Tunisia was reported to have received approximately \$55 million.¹³⁷

Soviet credit extensions to Somalia in 1975 were estimated at over \$60 million.¹³⁸ Trade and economic relations between the Soviet Union and Somalia were further enhanced by the signing of a protocol on economic aid and technical cooperation in June 1975 and a Soviet-Somalian agreement on cooperation in the development of the Somalian fishing industry in February 1976.¹³⁹

The Soviet Union expanded its economic relations with other African nations as well. Soviet Foreign Trade Minister N. S. Patolichchev's visit to Guinea in early 1976 resulted in the signing of a trade protocol for 1976 and 1977.¹⁴⁰

In Ghana, Soviet specialists were reported to have resumed work on Soviet assisted projects for the first time since the fall of Nkrumah in 1966.¹⁴¹

Economic agreements were also signed with the Malagasy Republic, the Republic of Niger, the People's Republic of the Congo, and, the People's Republic of Angola.¹⁴²

In Africa, Moscow utilized its aid program carefully. Though small by Western standards, the Soviet economic aid program was applied in much the same way as in the Middle East and Asia: optimum efficiency and maximum returns were the primary considerations. Soviet economic aid to Africa laid the groundwork for other types of penetration by formalizing economic relations and cultivating political friendships on the basis of economic cooperation.

(4) *Latin America*

Except Brazil, there were no major economic aid extensions to Latin America in 1975. But Moscow's interest in this region did not diminish. The signing of a Soviet-Colombian agreement on trade and economic cooperation illustrated the Soviet Union's continuing desire to establish economic relations with Latin American countries.¹⁴³

The Soviet Union continued to supply aid to Argentina and Peru under the terms of previous agreements. And in August of 1975, Mexico became the second Third World nation to sign a comprehensive agreement on economic cooperation with CMEA.¹⁴⁴ In October of 1976, the Soviet Union and Mexico signed an extensive intergovernmental agreement on economic and technical cooperation.¹⁴⁵

Thus, Soviet economic relations with Latin America were not extensive. However, new agreements demonstrated Moscow's willingness to accommodate Latin American countries if they showed a desire to establish economic relations with the Soviet Union.

¹³⁷ Figures provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.

¹³⁸ Central Intelligence Agency. *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries*. 1976, p. 15.

¹³⁹ Moscow Domestic Service, June 19, 1975, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, June 23, 1975, p. H1, and, Moscow in English to Africa, Feb. 9, 1976, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, Feb. 12, 1976, p. H11.

¹⁴⁰ Moscow in English to Africa, Feb. 4, 1976, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, Feb. 26, 1976, p. H3.

¹⁴¹ Central Intelligence Agency. *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries*. 1976, p. 17.

¹⁴² Moscow Domestic Service Oct. 31, 1975, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, Nov. 4, 1975, p. H3, Moscow Domestic Service, Sept. 12, 1975, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, Sept. 15, 1975, p. H3, Moscow Tass, June 30, 1975, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, July 1, 1975, p. H3, and, Foreign Trade (Moscow), No. 10, Oct. 1976, p. 53.

¹⁴³ Pravda, Dec. 13, 1975, p. 4.

¹⁴⁴ Moscow Tass, Aug. 13, 1975, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, Aug. 13, 1975, p. N1.

¹⁴⁵ Pravda, Oct. 19, 1976, p. 4.

d. *Recent developments in Soviet economic aid*

(1) *"Zero aid": A growing problem*

Despite what Soviet commentators asserted as "easy credit terms," repayment of Soviet aid debts was a growing problem for many Third World countries. According to one Western expert, a number of the Soviet Union's major aid recipients had either reached the point of "zero aid"—new credit extensions were equal to debt repayments—or, were in fact paying more to service their debt to the Soviet Union than they were receiving.¹⁴⁶

Moscow's leading aid recipients found themselves in this financially difficult situation. The potential consequences of which were illustrated by the Soviet-Egyptian break, a major causal factor of which was reportedly Soviet unwillingness to reschedule Egypt's massive aid debt to Moscow.

(2) *Multilateral aid: CMEA and the Third World*

In a deviation from its past practice of dealing with Third World nations on a strictly bilateral basis, the Soviet Union agreed to grant aid to Mexico and Iraq under the auspices of CMEA. And according to East German press reports, CMEA and Angola are currently negotiating a similar treaty.¹⁴⁷

The Soviet press is stressing the growing role of CMEA in economic relations with the Third World.¹⁴⁸ Changes within CMEA, in particular the creation of a special transferable ruble for use in trade with the LDC's, have also been made in order to facilitate Third World-CMEA economic relations.¹⁴⁹

These arrangements represent an attempt to expand economic relations between the LDC's and the nations of CMEA. The potential dividends are clear: increased economic integration and closer institutional ties.

(3) *Emphasis on Soviet Union as "economic alternative"*

Closely related to CMEA-Third World economic cooperation was Moscow's continued emphasis on its role as a viable economic alternative to the capitalist countries of the West. Rostoslav Ulyanovsky, a leading Soviet spokesman on Third World economic relations, has stated that "experience shows that the very fact that the developing countries can turn to the socialist states as an economic alternative to capitalist (aid) compels the imperialist quarters to grant credits and loans to them on terms less onerous than they would otherwise impose."¹⁵⁰

Soviet commentators also refer to the Soviet Union as a "reliable trading partner for the young states." According to one Soviet commentator:

The Soviet Union buys from them both traditional export commodities and products of the young national industry. This insures the developing countries stable incomes from export not only of raw materials but also of half-finished products and finished goods.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁶ Cooper, op. cit., p. 193.

¹⁴⁷ East Berlin Domestic Service, Dec. 8, 1976, in FBIS, Daily Report, Eastern Europe, vol. 2, Dec. 8, 1976, p. AA3.

¹⁴⁸ Pelekhin, A. Iraq-CMEA. *Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya*, Apr. 29, 1976, p. 3.

¹⁴⁹ Lowenthal, Richard. Soviet "Counterimperialism". *Problems of Communism*, vol. 25, November-December 1976, p. 60.

¹⁵⁰ Ulyanovsky, op. cit., p. 22.

¹⁵¹ Stoklitskiy, op. cit., p. A16.

In addition, the Soviet Union has exhibited a keen awareness of the Third World's technological dependence. Moscow emphasizes its importance as a major source of technology, and as such, a clear alternative to the "technological colonialism" of the capitalist West.¹⁵²

Thus, the Soviet Union's economic appeal to the Third World was multifaceted. It played on the LDC's economic weaknesses and offered the Soviet economic system as a viable trade and aid alternative.

(4) *Demands of the "New Economic Order" and Soviet aid limitations*

Demands by Third World nations for increased developmental assistance from the socialist countries as well as the capitalist states, as noted earlier, were rejected by Moscow. As one Soviet commentator observed:

While giving large-scale aid, the socialist states consider at the same time that the resources for doing away with the economic backwardness of the developing countries must be received in the first place at the expense of the profits of the capitalist monopolies and unproductive spendings on the arms race imposed by imperialism. This will make it possible to release tens of billions of dollars for economic needs.¹⁵³

Soviet irritation and displeasure at being included among the "rich" nations in the North-South dialog was quite evident and repeatedly illustrated by articles in the Soviet press.

Moscow's apprehension appeared to be based upon an awareness of its own aid limitations. In an unusually blunt statement, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko described the constraints placed on the Soviet aid program:

It is natural, however, that the Soviet Union's potential for rendering economic assistance is not infinite. Of course, the Soviet state cannot fail to be concerned for the well being of its own people. The Soviet Union * * * allocates funds to render the developing countries economic and technical assistance on the basis of its own capabilities.¹⁵⁴

In earlier days, Soviet economic aid had been self-initiated. Now it was demanded by the Third World. Despite Moscow's attempts to disassociate itself from the former "colonial exploiters", many Third World nations have considered the Soviet Union among the "rich." Thus, it was rather ironic that while the Soviet press hailed the accomplishments of the Soviet economy, Soviet leaders were forced to answer Third World demands for increased aid by calling attention to their country's own economic limitations.

e. Main trends in Soviet economic aid, 1975-76

In 1975 and 1976, Moscow maintained its economic aid program at a high level and continued to disburse assistance to traditional clients in strategically important regions. Soviet aid continued to be focused on the public sector and was largely in the form of eye-catching industrial projects.

Perceptible changes were, however, discernible. The growing trend toward aid projects with economic utility for both the Soviet Union and Third World recipients became clearer. In this respect, CMEA

¹⁵² Ulyanovsky, op. cit., p. 20.

¹⁵³ Moscow Tass, commentary by Ivan Ablamov, Oct. 8, 1976, in FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, Oct. 12, 1976, p. A13.

¹⁵⁴ Pravda, Oct. 5, 1976, p. 4.

involvement appeared to be emerging as a new approach to economic relations with the Third World.

There were also indications in 1975 and 1976 that Soviet aid was not without its liabilities. Many of Moscow's leading aid recipients were reported to have reached "zero aid"; a Soviet leader had stated bluntly that Soviet aid capabilities were not "infinite"; and finally, there were indications that the Soviet populace viewed the Soviet aid program with increasing negativism, charging that it inhibited their own development and was not appreciated by the Third World.

2. SOVIET MILITARY AID PROGRAM, 1975-76

a. *New clients, old goals*

Although the Middle East received the majority of new Soviet military aid in 1975 and 1976, the delivery of weapons to a new client, Angola, appeared to reap the greatest reward. In addition to Angola, other countries outside of the Soviet Union's traditional zone of interest, such as, Somalia, Peru, and Guinea, received varying degrees of military assistance in 1975 and 1976. Africa was clearly becoming a new priority. The goals of these new programs remained the same as the old: to acquire new strategic and tactical positions, and to expand political influence. (For data on Communist military agreements with and deliveries to the LDC's, see table 7 below. For data on LDC military personnel trained in Communist countries during 1955-75, see tables 8 and 9, p. 134.)

b. *Regional breakdown of military aid*

TABLE 7.—COMMUNIST MILITARY AGREEMENTS WITH AND DELIVERIES TO LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES¹

[In millions of U.S. dollars]

	Total		USSR		Eastern Europe		China	
	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries	Agreements	Deliveries
Total..	16,600	14,375	14,350	12,475	1,675	1,375	575	525
1955-65....	4,750	3,675	4,025	3,075	625	575	100	25
1966-75....	11,850	10,700	10,325	9,400	1,050	800	475	500
1966.....	525	625	450	500	25	50	50	75
1967.....	675	550	525	500	100	25	50	25
1968.....	575	600	500	500	50	75	25	25
1969.....	450	525	350	450	100	50	(2)	25
1970.....	1,150	1,100	1,025	1,000	50	75	75	25
1971.....	1,625	1,000	1,450	850	100	75	75	75
1972.....	1,150	925	925	800	150	50	75	75
1973.....	2,025	2,225	1,900	2,075	100	75	25	75
1974.....	2,750	1,600	2,475	1,450	200	125	75	25
1975.....	925	1,550	725	1,275	175	200	25	75

¹ Including cash payments.

² Negligible.

Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Communists Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1975. July 1976, ER 76-19372U, p. 1.

TABLE 8.—MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES TRAINED IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES,¹ 1955-75

	Total	U.S.S.R.	Eastern Europe	China
Total.....	44,200	37,225	3,975	3,000
Africa.....	12,925	9,575	650	2,700
Algeria.....	2,200	1,975	200	25
Burundi.....	75	75		
Cameroon.....	75			75
Congo.....	800	325	50	425
Equatorial Guinea.....	200			200
Ghana.....	175	175		
Guinea.....	1,250	850	50	350
Guinea (Bissau).....	100	100		
Libya.....	925	900	25	
Mali.....	250	200	(²)	50
Morocco.....	150	75	75	
Mozambique.....	250	200		50
Nigeria.....	500	475	25	
Sierra Leone.....	150			150
Somalia.....	2,475	2,375	75	25
Sudan.....	525	300	25	200
Tanzania.....	1,900	875	(²)	1,025
Togo.....	25			25
Uganda.....	775	650	125	
Zaire.....	75			75
Zambia.....	50	25		25
East Asia.....	9,275	7,575	1,700	
Cambodia.....	25	25		
Indonesia.....	9,250	7,550	1,700	
Latin America.....	250	250		
Peru.....	250	250		
Near East and South Asia.....	21,750	19,825	1,625	300
Afghanistan.....	3,550	3,300	250	
Bangladesh.....	400	400		
Egypt.....	6,225	5,675	550	
India.....	2,125	2,075	50	
Iran.....	275	275		
Iraq.....	3,200	2,950	250	
North Yemen.....	1,050	1,050		
Pakistan.....	350	50		300
South Yemen.....	750	725	25	
Sri Lanka.....	(²)	(²)		(²)
Syria.....	3,825	3,325	500	

¹ Rounded to the nearest 5 persons. Data refer to the number of persons departing for or in training but not necessarily completing training.

² Negligible.

Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1975. July 1976, ER 76-10372U, pp. 31-32.

TABLE 9.—MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM THE LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES BEING TRAINED IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, AS OF DECEMBER 1975

	Total ¹	U.S.S.R. ¹	Eastern Europe ¹	China ¹
Total.....	4,400	3,575	200	625
Africa.....	3,025	2,325	100	600
Latin America.....	50	50		
Near East and South Asia.....	1,325	1,200	100	25

¹ Rounded to the nearest 5 persons. Data refer to the number of persons departing for or in training but not necessarily completing training.

Source: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1975," July 1976, ER 76-10372U, p. 4.

(1) Middle East

In the Middle East, with the exception of Egypt, the Soviet Union continued to supply large quantities of military equipment to its traditional clients. Moscow also substantially increased its arms sales to Libya and offered to sell an air defense system to a traditional Western client, Jordan.

In 1975 and 1976, Libya emerged as a major purchaser of Soviet arms. According to the Central Intelligence Agency, the delivery of large quantities of Soviet military hardware, reportedly more than the Libyan army was capable of operating effectively, had given Libya "arsenal status" in the Middle East.¹⁵⁵ Western sources estimated that arms deliveries resulting from the 1975 Soviet-Libyan arms agreement would eventually total over \$500 million.¹⁵⁶ By 1976, the Libyan armed forces were reported to have Soviet Tu-22 supersonic bombers, Mig-23 fighters, T-62 tanks, and, SA3 and SA6 missile systems.¹⁵⁷

In sharp contrast, the Soviet military aid program to Egypt was largely inoperative by 1976. Deteriorating political relations between the two countries had resulted in sharply reduced deliveries of Soviet arms. Once the leading recipient of Soviet military equipment in the Middle East, Egypt found itself cut off from Soviet weaponry in 1976. There were also reports that Moscow had in fact organized a carefully controlled arms embargo. According to these reports, not only was the Soviet Union not delivering weapons to Egypt, it was not allowing its East European allies or India to supply Cairo with spare parts or new equipment.¹⁵⁸

On the other hand, according to a report in February 1977 from senior Israeli intelligence sources, the Soviet Union was continuing to supply weapons, ammunition, and spare parts to Egypt through third countries; that is, through Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and North Korea. American analysts agreed that these supply routes existed, but they differed with the Israelis as to their size and influence on the Middle East military balance.¹⁵⁹

Both Syria and Iraq continued to rely heavily on the Soviet Union for the bulk of their military equipment. In 1975, Western news sources reported that Syria was receiving new injections of Soviet weaponry, particularly in the area of fighter aircraft and air defense systems.¹⁶⁰ Despite reports that Iraq was shopping for arms in the West in an attempt to diversify its military inventory, the Soviet Union remained its main source of military hardware. A Soviet-Iraqi arms agreement signed in August of 1976 provided for massive infusions of sophisticated Soviet weaponry and increased cooperation between the two nations.

In early 1976, Jordan, not normally a Soviet arms client, expressed interest in purchasing an air defense system from the Soviet Union. The request, reportedly the result of American reluctance to supply a comparable system, was well received by Moscow.¹⁶¹ However, no

¹⁵⁵ Central Intelligence Agency. *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries*. 1976, p. 2.

¹⁵⁶ Lippman, Thomas W. *Libya Seen Deluged with Soviet Arms*. *The Washington Post*, May 25, 1976, p. A10.

¹⁵⁷ Pajak, Roger. *Soviet Arms Aid to Libya*. *Military Review*, vol. 56, No. 7, July 1976, pp. 85-86.

¹⁵⁸ Taylor, Trevor. *Setbacks for Soviet Policies in the Middle East*. *The Middle East*, No. 23, September 1976, p. 14.

¹⁵⁹ Middleton, Drew. *Soviet Arms to Cairo Reported Continuing*. *The New York Times*, Feb. 2, 1977, p. A6.

¹⁶⁰ Middleton, Drew. *Soviet Expands Weapon Aid to Syria*. *The New York Times*, Oct. 26, 1975, p. 3.

¹⁶¹ Oberdorfer, Don. *Jordan Considers Soviet Arms Buys*. *The Washington Post*, May 26, 1976, p. A8.

major Soviet-Jordanian arms deal was forthcoming as Jordan and the United States reached an accommodation on the American system.

In 1975 and 1976, the major developments in Soviet arms aid to the Middle East were Egypt's fall from grace with the Soviet Union and Libya's ascendancy as a prime target for Soviet military sales.

(2) *Africa and Asia*

As discussed earlier in this chapter, Soviet military assistance to the MPLA in Angola was an important factor determining the outcome of the Angolan civil war. However, Angola was not the only African nation to receive sizable quantities of Soviet military equipment in 1975 and 1976. The Soviet Union and Somalia signed a major weapons agreement in 1975, and future deliveries of weapons were expected to give Somalia one of the largest military inventories in Africa.¹⁶² Soviet weapons were also reported being delivered to Mozambique, particularly to guerrilla forces along the Mozambique-Rhodesian border.

In Asia, Afghanistan and India continued to rely on Moscow for the majority of their military equipment. Furthermore, the existence of long-range arms agreements between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan and India made it unlikely that this situation would change in the near future.

In 1975 and 1976, Soviet military assistance to Africa was on the upswing, while arms deliveries to Asia remained constant.

(3) *Latin America*

Although Soviet military aid to Latin America was not substantial, reports in late 1976 of Soviet arms transfers to Peru did arouse concern in the West. Western news sources reported that Peru had agreed to purchase 36 Su-22 supersonic fighter-bombers from the Soviet Union for an estimated \$250 million.¹⁶³ The terms of the agreement were considered "easy" by Western standards, 10 years for repayment with a 2-year grace period.¹⁶⁴ The per unit price of \$7 million per plane was also considered a bargain price for modern weaponry.¹⁶⁵

Some observers in the West believed that the low unit price and easy credit terms were indicative of Moscow's willingness to undersell the West in Latin America in order to penetrate this region.¹⁶⁶

The Soviet-Peruvian arms deal demonstrated that Soviet opportunism applied even outside the so-called "national liberation zone."

c. *Related developments in Soviet-Third World military relations*

(1) *High level military meetings*

The Soviet Union's military aid program was complemented by high level meetings between Soviet and Third World military leaders. In February of 1975, in an unprecedented visit, all three Soviet service chiefs (Defense Minister and Army Chief, Marshal Andrei Grechko, Navy Chief Sergei Gorshkov, and Air Force Gen. Pavol Kutakhov) traveled to India to confer with Indian military leaders.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶² Central Intelligence Agency. *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries*. 1976. p. 15.

¹⁶³ Oberdorfer, Don. Peru Purchase of Soviet Jets Reported. *The Washington Post*, Nov. 3, 1976, p. A3.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ De Onis, Juan. Peru Said to Accept Soviet Built Planes After Delay by U.S. *The New York Times*, Oct. 13, 1976, p. 5.

¹⁶⁷ Murarka, Dev. High-Power Soviet Arms Mission to India. *The Christian Science Monitor*, Feb. 24, 1976, p. 1.

Third World military chiefs also traveled to Moscow to confer with their Soviet counterparts. In 1975, Soviet sources reported that Marshal Grechko met with Alaphaix Kourouma, Guinean Minister of the People's Army; Brig. Gen. Abdala Mohamed Fadil, Chief of the General Staff of the Somali National Army; and, Lt. Gen. M. A. Bashir, Chief of the General Staff of the Sudanese People's Armed Forces.¹⁶⁸ Army Gen. A. A. Yepishev, Chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, was also reported to have met with his Somalian counterpart, Maj. Mohamed Hussein Daud, Chief of the Political Directorate of the Somali National Army.¹⁶⁹

Such meetings—and there were many more than here recorded—were an important aspect of the Soviet military aid program. For close relations between Soviet and Third World military leaders could offer dividends in other spheres such as political relations.

(2) Base rights and naval facilities

Soviet attempts in 1975 and 1976 to secure base rights and the use of naval facilities in the LDC's were viewed by some observers as an important function of the Soviet military aid program. Events in 1975 and 1976 appeared to confirm the close linkage of port rights to the allocation of military aid. Large deliveries of military equipment to Libya and Angola were reportedly followed by Soviet requests for port rights.

A significant reversal of this relationship of military aid to port rights occurred in the case of Egypt. The Egyptians ended Soviet ship preferences at Egyptian ports in apparent reprisal for Moscow's failure to resume arms deliveries.¹⁷⁰

(3) Increased political use of Soviet military aid

The Soviet Union has consistently used its military aid program as an instrument of political leverage. The years 1975 and 1976 were no exception.

Soviet military aid to Syria was reportedly stepped up as a reward for the decision by Damascus not to cooperate with the United States in the Middle East peace talks.¹⁷¹ Yet in 1976, when Syria refused to comply with Soviet requests that it end its involvement in the Lebanese civil war, Moscow reportedly threatened to cut off deliveries of spare parts.¹⁷²

Perhaps the best example of this practice occurred in recent Soviet dealings with Egypt. Moscow's withholding of military aid from Cairo evoked an extremely negative reaction from the Egyptians. According to Sadat, Moscow attempted to "exert pressure on me and bring me to my knees."¹⁷³ Egypt's response to this tactic was to abrogate the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship.

These developments demonstrated that Soviet military aid, if used tactfully, could have positive political results. Yet, as the Egyptian case illustrates, there were also potential liabilities. Soviet military aid as an instrument of political leverage was clearly a double-edged sword.

¹⁶⁸ Krasnaya Zvezda, July 9, 1975, p. 1; Krasnaya Zvezda, July 26, 1975, p. 3; and, Krasnaya Zvezda, Dec. 24, 1975, p. 1.

¹⁶⁹ Krasnaya Zvezda, July 26, 1975, p. 3.

¹⁷⁰ Beecher, William. Egypt Ends Soviet Ship Preference. The Washington Post, July 20, 1975, p. A1.

¹⁷¹ Taylor, op. cit., p. 14.

¹⁷² Watson, Douglas. Beirut Left Receives Warning by Assad. The Washington Post, July 22, 1976, p. A17.

¹⁷³ Tanner, Henry. Sadat Acts to End Pact with Soviet. The New York Times, March 15, 1976, p. 1.

d. Main trends in Soviet military aid, 1975-76

In 1975 and 1976, the Soviet military aid program remained a vital component of the Soviet Union's Third World policy. Arms deliveries to selected LDC's remained high, and the signing of new arms agreements indicated Moscow's intent to remain a major arms supplier to the Third World.

In terms of regional distribution, most Soviet military aid continued to be directed to nations in the Middle East and Asia. However, selected countries in Africa and Latin America, particularly in black Africa after the victory of the MPLA in Angola and subsequent expansion of Soviet interests in southern Africa, also became new clients in 1975 and 1976.

Events in 1975 and 1976 illustrated that although the Soviet military aid program would continue to be an important instrument of political leverage, its successful use could not be insured. While in some instances (e.g. Syria during the Middle East peace talks) it had been successful, in others (e.g. recent developments in Egypt), it had not succeeded.

Despite setbacks, the Soviet military aid program remained a viable instrument of Soviet policy. Its future growth seems assured as the number of Soviet clients in the Third World continue to grow.

3. SOVIET ECONOMIC AND MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE THIRD WORLD

An important, and according to many observers, increasingly indispensable facet of the Soviet Union's aid program is the assignment of Soviet personnel to the Third World. The number of Soviet military advisers and economic technicians in the Third World has been on the upswing again in recent years. In 1975, almost 18,000 Soviet economic technicians were reported in the Third World, 3,000 more than in 1974.¹⁷⁴

Located in regions where Soviet military and economic aid programs are most active, skilled Soviet technicians are often the only people able to install, maintain, and when necessary, operate Soviet supplied equipment. As Soviet weapons systems and industrial equipment being delivered to Third World nations become more sophisticated and complex, the presence of Soviet military and economic technicians will be increasingly necessary. Thus, in the future their presence in the Third World will likely increase.

4. SUMMING UP

Both Moscow's military and economic aid programs continued to grow in 1975 and 1976. New agreements and increased aid extensions illustrated the Soviet Union's continuing commitment to these programs.

In the past, Soviet aid has proven its usefulness as an instrument of penetration. However, new trends in 1975 and 1976 seemed to indicate a desire by Moscow to strengthen and expand, not only political relations with the Third World, but also military and economic relations as well.

Moscow's only reservations concerning its aid program appeared to be dictated by its own internal economic weaknesses. Thus, as

¹⁷⁴ Central Intelligence Agency. *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries*. 1976, p. 8.

Gromyko stated explicitly, when it came to an effective allocation of scarce resources, the needs of the Soviet people came first, even over the demands of the LDC's for developmental assistance.

F. PATTERN AND IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THIRD WORLD, 1975-76

However complex the world of the mid-1970's may seem to the Western foreign policy observer, it is not so with his Soviet counterpart. Soviet ideology imposes a prescribed, uniformly structured worldview that, compared with Western perceptions of the world around us, is orderly, more purposeful, more directed, and, being predestined by history, more secure in its ultimate destiny. Though projecting an essentially utopian view, it is, for all its false assumptions and erroneous conclusions, nonetheless, rooted in the hard realities of power. It is a view that prides itself in an appreciation of the correlation of world forces; albeit similarly flawed in its assumptions and conclusions, at least has the virtue of offering some design of the future.

The Soviet worldview in the mid-1970's is thus a mixture of unsubstantiated utopian expectations and an assessment of a reality within which the Third World is featured prominently. The multiple instrumentalities for achieving Soviet goals in the Third World—the economic, military, and political—are used with calculation, vigor, and notable effect. Soviet activity has now extended beyond the Eurasian Continent and the traditional “national liberation zone” into Black Africa, suggesting to some close observers of Soviet foreign policy the emergence of a new imperial phase in Russian history.¹⁷⁵

Risks are apparent in the pursuit of a policy that seeks to reconcile the requirements of detente in the West with the ideological imperative of revolutionary action in the Third World. Within this persisting unresolved contradiction lay the seeds of potential confrontation and war.

¹⁷⁵ Sonnenfeldt, Helmut. American-Soviet Relations: Informal Remarks. Parameters, Journal of the U.S. Army War College, vol. 6, No. 1, 1976: 12-17. Kissinger holds a similar view. See, Lewis, Flora. Kissinger Policy Seeks “Balance”. The New York Times, Dec. 21, 1975, p. 7.

Gromyko stated explicitly, when it came to an effective allocation of scarce resources, the needs of the Soviet people came first, even over the demands of the U.S. for development and assistance.

E. PATRICK AND LAMARCAON ON SOVIET INVESTMENT IN THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES

How ever, to place the world of the mid-1970's not seen to the Western foreign policy observer, it is not so with this Soviet Union. Soviet foreign policy is described, primarily, as a response to the world's needs, rather than a response to the world's needs. It is only in the past few years that the Soviet Union has been mentioned by history, and even then in a limited way. The Soviet Union is essentially a response to the world's needs, and not a response to the world's needs. It is a new kind of response, one that is not based on the needs of the world, but on the needs of the Soviet Union. It is a new kind of response, one that is not based on the needs of the world, but on the needs of the Soviet Union. It is a new kind of response, one that is not based on the needs of the world, but on the needs of the Soviet Union.

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There are a number of points in the pursuit of a policy that seeks to recognize the requirements of defense in the West with the ideological imperatives of revolutionary action in the Third World. Within this context, the Soviet Union's foreign policy is a response to the world's needs, and not a response to the world's needs.

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VI. SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD: ITS MEANING AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY¹

A. RESPONSES TO BASIC QUESTIONS

1. TRENDS IN SOVIET EXPERIENCE

At the outset of this study a series of basic questions were asked pertaining to the Soviet experience in the Third World, the rationale for such involvement, the instrumentalities of Soviet policy, the current attitude of the Brezhnev regime, and its meaning and implications for U.S. foreign policy. The responses to the first four of these questions, as this summary indicates, provided the structure and essence of the study along with the underpinnings for the initial judgment that the Soviet Union "maintains a firm and active commitment to the developing nations of the Third World, and that the Third World holds an important, perhaps even vital, place in the Soviet worldview of international relations today."²

The Soviet approach to the Third World is rooted in Lenin's thought. Lenin's was a global, historical, and ideological perception that understood the relationship between the undeveloped colonial areas of Asia and Africa and the advanced metropolitan countries of Europe. He grasped the meaning of the natural tensions that would inevitably rise between the two and accordingly perceived a destiny of revolution and independence. The colonies were the "weakest link" in this European imperial system; they were the natural allies of the Socialist revolution, and when united in common purpose, together they would spell the doom of world capitalism. However, the time was not ripe in Lenin's day to achieve this goal.

Not until World War II was the right combination of rising nationalism in the colonial areas, declining Western imperial power, and a resurgent Soviet Union created. But Stalin misread the signals

¹ The authors wish to acknowledge and express their gratitude to the following staff of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division of CRS who reviewed this chapter and made numerous constructive suggestions: Dr. William W. Whitson, Chief of the Division; Dr. Edward T. Lampson, Specialist in West European Affairs; and Alva M. Bowen, Specialist in National Defense. Alfred Reifman, Senior Specialist in International Economics, CRS, offered helpful suggestions on those parts of this chapter that he reviewed.

² A mixed panel of 14 foreign policy/national security specialists—7 from academia and research organizations, including Rubinstein; 2 from the business community; 4 from the Department of Defense and the military; and Peter Abbruzzese, Consultant on the House International Relations Committee—made the following evaluation of future Soviet involvement in the Third World:

"The panel agreed that the Soviets seem to have a realistic understanding of the transitory nature of both gains and losses in the Third World. Moscow becomes neither excited nor depressed to the point that further efforts to attain its objectives are abandoned. *Clearly, the Soviets are in the Third World for the long haul.* There was agreement that Soviet policies could, in general, be characterized as cautious and low-risk. Here, though, a cautionary note was sounded by several of the participants, who warned that Moscow's recent increase in relative military power and strategic position may have served to erode some of the traditional Soviet caution and that we may see a more activist Soviet policy in the future. There was no feeling that economic objectives loomed large in Soviet thinking, nor that they were apt to in the 1980s. The Soviets are motivated more by a desire to deny economic advantages to the West than they are by the intent to acquire these advantages for themselves." (Rubinstein, Alvin A. and Maj. Mathew C. Harrison, USA. *The Third World and US-Soviet Relationships*. Chairman's Plenary Session Summary and Rapporteur's Report of Panel Discussion. In, *The National Defense University. National Security Affairs Conference. Long range US-USSR Competition: National Security Implications*, July 12-14, 1976. Washington, National Defense University, 1976, p. 97. Italics added.

that were clear to Khrushchev who in the mid-1950's reversed Stalin's policy of instant global revolution; established the principle and policy of a close and hopefully enduring relationship with the national liberation movements and the newly independent countries in the Third World; proclaimed a new era of peaceful coexistence; and devised a new ideological formulation to embrace these radical changes.

But Khrushchev's approach to the Third World was overzealous, oversimplistic, and oversold. And while the successor Brezhnev regime accepted Khrushchev's new ideological formulation and indeed built upon it, still in the decade 1964-74 it had made significant changes: it eliminated the many excesses of the Khrushchev approach that had produced failure; imposed economic rationalism as a guiding principle in Third World relations; induced greater caution; and downgraded future expectations. In brief, experience and failure had tempered the Soviet approach and produced an attitude of restraint and a policy of limited gains.

2. RATIONALE FOR SOVIET INVOLVEMENT

Why the Soviet Union should be at all concerned with the Third World can be briefly summed up: because it is there, and because it is a vital component of the Soviet ideological design and of international politics today. The Third World has become a new center of international power and influence that, owing to its unique attributes (possession of much needed but in short supply natural resources, to name only one), cannot be ignored, particularly as the world enters an era of interdependence.

For the Soviet Union and its leadership, the Third World is an integral part of the Soviet ideological design of the world as they now perceive it and as they theoretically expect it to be in the course of history. It is a vital component in their calculation of the correlation of world forces that infers a shift in the balance of world power to the Communist advantage. It is an area of political opportunity for expanding and globalizing Soviet influence and power and reducing or denying that of the United States, the West, and Communist China. The Third World is in brief a convenient lever for the exercise of Soviet political power against its class enemies and a source of political and ideological fulfillment.

Economically, the Third World is for the Soviet Union a market, a source of raw materials, and an opportunity for economic integration. The Soviets offer themselves as an economic, political, and ideological model for development and progress toward modernity. Possession of many key strategic areas, essential for pursuing a globalist policy, makes it strategically imperative for the Soviets to direct their energy toward winning the confidence and loyalties of the Third World.

In brief, each element—political, economic, ideological, and strategic—relates to the other to form an integrated whole; the composite suggests one transcending idea, a surge toward globalism.

3. INSTRUMENTALITIES OF SOVIET POLICY IN THIRD WORLD

In pursuit of its goals in the Third World, the Soviet Union has used the following instrumentalities: economic aid and trade; military assistance and the use of military power for political purposes; and

policies and political actions designed to support Third World causes and interests, while simultaneously serving those of the Soviet Union. The foremost instruments are economic aid, trade, and military assistance. They provide the initial point of penetration for the expanding arch of Soviet influence and power. In general, these instrumentalities of Soviet policy have been targeted at strategically located border nations in the Third World and those within the "national liberation zone."

4. CURRENT ATTITUDE OF BREZHNEV REGIME, 1975-76

The Brezhnev regime has continued to build and expand upon the 20-year Soviet commitment to the Third World. Elements of potential conflict persist in the contrasting East-West perceptions of the international order. The Third World is featured prominently in the Soviet worldview of the mid-1970's; indeed, it remains a prime target of Soviet foreign policy.

Consolidation of relations with India; penetration of the Philippines; expansion of Soviet influence and power in southern Africa, notably by using the military instrumentality; the pursuit of long established strategic designs as in the case of the Indian Ocean; the successful use of the navy as a means for establishing a global Soviet presence; the effective and extended use of aid and trade as instruments for expanding Soviet influence, particularly in the "national liberation zone" and other targets of opportunity as in Latin America; the thwarting and contesting of American and Chinese power wherever their presence is felt, as in Angola and Mozambique, respectively—all are part of the continuing commitment to revolutionary activism that is directed toward long-range ideological goals.

Contradictions in the Soviet position are visible in their attempts to pursue a policy of détente with the West, while simultaneously carrying on a policy of revolution and intervention in the Third World. Other contradictions have become more visible with the shift in international concern from East-West to North-South issues, and as the economic and political interests of the Third World come in conflict with the presumed interests of the Soviet Union.

Undeterred by these contradictions, the Soviets continue on their course of globalism, holding their sights firmly set on targets in the Third World and using multiple instrumentalities for achieving their goals with calculation, vigor, and notable effect. Soviet activity has now extended beyond the Eurasian Continent and the traditional "national liberation zone" into Black Africa, suggesting the emergence of a new imperial phase in Russian history. Risks are apparent in the pursuit of this unmistakable imperialist policy that seeks to reconcile the requirements of détente in the West with the ideological imperative of revolutionary action in the Third World. Within this persisting, unresolved contradiction lie the seeds of potential confrontation and conflict.

B. SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD

1. ESTABLISHING A GLOBAL PRESENCE

That the Soviet Union has succeeded during the past two decades in establishing an impressive global presence embracing much of the Third World is perhaps the most significant generalization that emerges from this study.

Whatever Khrushchev's faults, amply recorded in the indictment of his successors, he had, nonetheless, achieved a formidable purpose when he redirected Soviet energy and policy from an inward, isolationist continentalism to an open, expansive globalism.

Brezhnev built upon the foundations of this revised policy and newly constituted ideological schema of peaceful coexistence, accepting the essence of policy and the redirection of Soviet interests, but rejecting the excesses and gross misjudgments of the Khrushchev era.

Brezhnev has continued this Khrushchevian forward strategy, expanding Soviet activity now beyond the traditional border areas and "national liberation zone" to new targets of opportunity in southern Africa and even the western Pacific.

Circumspect yet aggressive, Brezhnev has thus far succeeded in pursuing two essentially contradictory policies: détente with the West and revolutionary activism in the Third World. Nowhere is this carefully designed balancing act more skillfully demonstrated than in the case of Angola where the cautious Brezhnev successfully orchestrated the Soviet supported revolutionary drive of the MPLA to victory in the correct belief that the United States with whom he had professed to pursue a policy of détente would protest but not intervene.

Stripping away the excess baggage of ideology and the official assertions of innocence, Brezhnev's Soviet Union is, indeed, what Klinghoffer has judged it to be, a "practitioner of superpower Realpolitik" whose actions are similar to those of the former Western imperialist powers whom they have always condemned.³ Seasoned observers of Soviet foreign policy, perceiving the quantitative and qualitative growth of Soviet military power and the expansion of Soviet political activity globally, have suggested that the Soviet Union is entering a new imperial phase of Russian history. This imperial perception may not necessarily mean direct physical control over parts of the Third World as in the 18th and 19th century brand of European imperialism but rather the achievement of a commanding global presence where Soviet political, economic, military, and strategic influence transcends all others and by the nature of the power dynamic exert sufficient pressure to achieve and protect Soviet foreign policy interests and goals.

Thus, the Third World plays a key role in Soviet efforts to establish its imperium and to expand its power and influence as a great superpower. For it is in this relationship with the Third World that the Soviets can seek those incremental gains in their power and influence which in the course of time, more distant perhaps than immediate, can make the essential difference in international politics.

³ Klinghoffer, *Soviet Union and Africa*, in Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, p. 66.

2. CONSTANCY OF SOVIET COMMITMENT TO THE THIRD WORLD

This study also suggests the constancy of the Soviet commitment to the Third World. Major Soviet foreign policy formulations, as in the case of Brezhnev's report to the 25th Party Congress, unfailingly link the destiny of the Soviet Union and the Socialist world community with that of the Third World. For over two decades this idea has been a fixed concept in Soviet thinking on international relations. As Schwartz observed, the Soviets assume a symbiotic relationship with the Third World, and despite failures, they have not been disillusioned.⁴

It is instructive to cite two examples that support not only this judgment but also suggest the underlying opportunism that motivates Soviet policy in the Third World; namely, the resumption of Soviet economic aid to Indonesia in 1976, notwithstanding the disastrous experience following the anti-Communist coup a decade ago; and the restraint exercised by the Soviet Union in Egypt where the Soviet economic aid program still functions and reportedly military aid still flows in from third countries despite Sadat's expulsion of Soviet personnel 2 years ago.⁵

Vigorous and active Soviet support of radical forces in southern Africa during 1975-76 suggests that the Soviet commitment to the Third World, rather than diminishing, has in fact been deepening and expanding. This successful thrust of Soviet revolutionary activity, coupled with the prominence of the Third World in the evolving era of interdependence, enhances the possibility of an even broader and more intense Soviet involvement in Third World affairs.

3. FACTORS FAVORING SOVIETS IN THE THIRD WORLD

a. Positive value of ideology

Certain factors seem to favor the Soviets in pursuit of their Third World goals. Briefly, they relate to positive aspects of ideology, expansion of Soviet power, appeals of economic aid and military assistance, exploitable characteristics of the Third World, and the ambivalent nature of détente.

Soviet ideology provides a unique and politically effective theoretical design for policy and action on a global scale. It links Soviet purposes to the historical process and according to the Soviet view assures fulfillment and success in time. It embraces, sanctions, and justifies those revolutionary elements, such as the national liberation movements, that are necessary building blocs for expanding Soviet influence and power in the Third World. It perceives Soviet geopolitical interests and interactions on the international scene as a protracted conflict of irreconcilable forces (Communism vs. capitalism) in which intervention is justified. It provides a perception of international relations that

⁴ Schwartz, *op. cit.*, pp. 242-243.

⁵ In the matter of Soviet opportunism, Rubinstein observed in his concluding remarks on Soviet-Chinese relations with the Third World: "The essays reveal that neither of the Communist powers conducts its diplomacy in the Third World according to any preprogrammed track. Rather, they react to opportunities in pursuit of limited objectives, conscious (especially in recent years) of the constraints inherent in the situation and of the need to adapt means to circumstances. The ad hoc responses do not mean that Moscow or Peking lack a strategic rationale for a 'forward policy,' but only that the particular response is a function of the specifics of the situation and that pragmatism acts as a restraint on ambition." (Rubinstein, *Observations*, in, Rubinstein, ed., *Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World*, p. 222.)

accepts the dynamics of power as a continuing, natural, and irrepressible phenomenon in the affairs of men. And finally, it values rationality, realism, and pragmatism—all important assets in foreign policy analysis—as instrumentalities for achieving goals.

b. Expansion of Soviet power

The magnitude of Soviet physical power, the global reach of its military systems, the willingness of the Soviet leadership to use that power to achieve political purposes—all have been essential elements in advancing Soviet interests in the Third World. For power has its own inner dynamic that commands respect, generates influence, and attracts admirers, clients, and allies—in short, power begets power. Continued expansion of Soviet power, an assured reality by all accounts, provides the underpinnings for its global presence and a continuing assurance of an enlarging influence within the Third World.

c. Appeals of economic aid and military assistance

Soviet economic aid and military assistance programs have been the primary instrumentalities of Soviet policy in the Third World. They have been effective because they have appealed to the needs of many Third World countries, while effectively serving the interests of Soviet foreign policy and internal economic policy. Accordingly, as Tansky prophetically observed in 1973, "The aid program will remain a major element in Soviet policy toward the Third World. The program remains the only effective tool for expanding Soviet influence in these countries and for countering the influence of other major powers."⁶

Recent data presented in this study indicates an expansion rather than a diminution of these programs in the near term. This trend suggests that Soviet aid programs, both economic and military, have not lost their appeal in the developing world, and despite shortcomings noted above, they have a continuing foreign policy (and domestic policy) value to the Soviet Union.

d. Exploitable characteristics and grievances of the Third World

Certain characteristics and grievances, as this study points out, have preconditioned the Third World in a way that favors Soviet interests. Most Third World governments are socialistically inclined; most have authoritarian regimes. Democratic traditions as known in the West are virtually nonexistent; and the organization of economies and societies, many in the most primitive stages of development, have little in common with the advanced forms produced under the influence of Western capitalism.

Many developing countries still harbor profound anti-imperial and anticolonial feelings toward the West and its capitalistic system. Vivid memories of an historical past of repression and exploitation still linger on in many areas of the Third World. Emergence of the North-South issue—which is at bottom an organized revolt, a drive for economic independence, of the poor and dispossessed former colonial areas against the industrial nations of the North—seems to have aggravated these feelings and stirred up these memories in some

⁶ Tansky, Soviet Foreign Aid, in JEC's report, Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies, 1973, p. 774.

quarters. Since the root of most Third World problems lies in underdevelopment and underdevelopment may be an unsolvable problem, it is likely that these deeply held prejudices will remain for some time.

All of these characteristics and grievances of the Third World have struck a sympathetic response in Moscow, not strictly for humanitarian reasons but rather for those relating to the drive for power.⁷ For there are many areas of agreement. The Soviets have not hesitated to exploit them for their own political interests. And Third World leaders have often times reacted to the blandishments of Moscow in a spirit of appreciation and understanding, like that of the Indian representative at the 29th General Assembly of the United Nations who said, "The activities of the Soviet delegation at the session showed once again that the Soviet Union deeply understands and shares the aspirations of the Third World;"⁸ and the Jamaican delegate to UNCTAD IV who remarked that the "Socialist countries are the traditional and natural allies of the developing countries."⁹

Thus, the Soviets may not have established a close symbiotic relationship with the Third World in the absolute sense; but by exploiting characteristics and grievances and other interests shared in common, they have created a unique relationship that is a formidable and conceivably durable asset in Soviet-Third World relations.

e. Détente and national liberation: Contradiction and opportunism

A final factor favoring the Soviets in their approach to the Third World is their ability to pursue simultaneously a "peace" policy of détente with the West and a revolutionary policy of support for national liberation movements in the Third World, as currently manifested in southern Africa. In brief, the Soviets appear to be seeking the best of both worlds: to mollify the West with détente, while pressing their revolutionary forward strategy in the Third World.

Americans who hold a strict construction of the term détente could perceive a contradiction in this policy, because to them détente connotes a lessening of international tension; yet support for national liberation movements in the Soviet manner generates tension and conflict. But the Soviets perceive no such contradiction. To them the ideological "struggle" continues; the historical process cannot be arrested; there can be no peaceful coexistence in ideology. As Brezhnev said at the 25th Party Congress, "Détente does not in the slightest way abolish, and cannot abolish or change the laws of the class struggle."¹⁰ Accordingly, the Soviets argue, they must support national liberation movements; it is a cardinal principle of their beliefs.

What this interpretation demonstrates, as Rubinstein observed in summing up Soviet-Third World relations, is the element of opportunism that permeates Soviet policy in the Third World. The Soviets

⁷ An example of this Soviet response was evident in S. A. Skachkov's articles in *Izvestiya* of June 17, 1976. Skachkov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, wrote: "At the present stage of the national liberation revolution and achievement of economic independence and elimination of social backwardness are coming to the fore as the main tasks. The Soviet state actively supports the young countries' desire to eliminate imperialist exploitation, to control their national resources themselves and to achieve just and equal economic relations. And here the Soviet Union is seeking no advantages whatever for itself, is not hunting concessions, is not striving to achieve political domination and is not soliciting military bases." (In, FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, June 22, 1976, p. A6.)

⁸ Quoted in, Moynihan, op. cit., p. 35.

⁹ Quoted in, Asoyan and Skobelev, op. cit., p. 24.

¹⁰ Brezhnev, Report at 25th Congress of the CPSU, p. 27.

may have an elaborate conceptual framework for analyzing, formulating, and carrying out policy, but practical application is more a matter of hitting targets of opportunity than blindly pursuing some course laid down solely on abstract principles.

Angola was such a target of opportunity, and the Soviets were willing to risk damage to detente in order to increase their influence and power in southern Africa. They intervened in the correct belief that the United States (at least the Congress) would not sanction a forceful riposte. For as Brezhnev explained in his 25th Party Congress address, "We do not conceal the fact that we see détente as a way to create more favorable conditions for peaceful socialist and communist construction"—a euphemism for expanding and consolidating Soviet interests.¹¹

What this Soviet interpretation and the recent Angolan experience mean is that the range of potential aggressive Soviet action in the Third World has been broadened, at least in areas where American interests have not become clear and its policy remains undefined.

4. FACTORS WORKING AGAINST SOVIETS IN THE THIRD WORLD

a. Doubtful ideological assumptions

It would be a mistake to assume that countervailing forces are not working against Soviet purposes in the Third World. There are; and they arise from such matters as: doubtful Soviet ideological assumptions; Soviet failures and limitations imposed on their activities; durable problems endemic to the Third World; and the negative aspects of "Social imperialism"—a pejorative term Peking uses to describe Soviet policy in the Third World.

The Soviet approach to the Third World appears, first of all, to be based on some doubtful ideological assumptions. Soviet calculations of the balance of world forces, claimed to be favoring the socialist world against the capitalist, is based on the erroneous assumption that Khrushchev's "zone of peace" (i.e., the former colonial areas of the Third World) can be counted on as common ideological kindred with the Soviet Union, sympathetic if not allied to Soviet interests. The assumption of such a symbiotic relationship, particularly with radical leftist regimes and national liberation movements, hardly seems valid in the light of the Soviet experience as recorded in this study and in those by Schwartz and other scholars of the Third World.

Try as they might the Soviets have not been able to create in their brand of "scientific socialism" values and criteria that were in common with the home-grown varieties of socialism that have emerged in the Third World. What Campbell has written about Arab socialism could probably apply to other countries and cultures in the Third World. According to Campbell, the Arab variety of socialism "never found real common ground with Soviet socialism and is moving further away from it. Algeria has gone its own way. Libya has Islamic radicalism; Syria and Iraq, two variants of Ba'ath doctrine." "Anti-imperialism was the real cement of the Soviet-Arab working partnership," Campbell declared, "but this was a matter of interest, not ideology, and some of the interests have changed."¹²

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 27-28.

¹² Campbell, Soviet Union and Middle East, in, Kanet/Bahry, eds., Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations, p. 97.

Doubtful also is the Soviet assumption that world development is historically determined to take on the form of a world Socialist system, arrested at some point in time in some sort of grand historical solution. The history of mankind is the history of the rise and fall of civilizations and empires. Soviet ideology notwithstanding, the historical process is not likely to be any more respectful of the special claims of Marxism-Leninism than it has been of other philosophies of history.

If it can be assumed, as the Soviets do, that the Third World is to be a vital part of this new world system, then recent history does not augur well for the Soviet cause. Kanet does not deny that after more than 15 years of concerted activity throughout Asia and Africa, and a shorter period in Latin America, the Soviets can "look upon significant success in the expansion of their influence;" but he qualifies this generalization with the judgment that "they have not achieved—nor are they likely to achieve—their stated goal of creating a Communist commonwealth throughout the developing nations."¹³

b. Failures and limitations

(1) Soviet failures in Third World

The Soviet record of failures during the past two decades and the limitations imposed by forces beyond their control make it clear that the Third World has by no means an assured destiny of an inseparable link with the Soviet Union.

Recorded in this study are the many Soviet failures, such as those in Indonesia, Ghana, Algeria, Mali, Sudan, and more recently in Egypt—failures not only in misplaced and exaggerated expectations ("largely fanciful," according to Schwartz), but in a very real political sense.¹⁴ The near two decades of Soviet experience with the left in the LDC's, wrote Schwartz in 1973, was "bitter and frustrating."¹⁵ Sub-Sahara Africa was in particular "a disaster area."¹⁶ Accordingly, Schwartz concluded:

Thus, much to the dismay of Moscow, the expected symbiotic relationship has never fully developed. Even where prospects seemed especially propitious, radical leftist regimes in the underdeveloped countries have proved both inadequate as socialists and undependable as allies.¹⁷

Symbolic of Soviet failure in the Third World, at least in a specific policy sense, is the refusal of even its closest friends in Asia to subscribe to Brezhnev's Asian security plan. As Thornton observed, the plan when proposed in 1969 was met "with awesome disinterest" by Asians; and since, it has not fared much better, despite Soviet efforts to revive it.¹⁸ Prospects for success in the near term do not appear to be very bright.¹⁹

¹³ Kanet, *Soviet Attitudes Toward Developing Nations Since Stalin*, in Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, p. 44.

¹⁴ Schwartz, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 241.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

¹⁸ Thornton, *Soviet Union and Future of Southeast Asia*, in, Kanet/Bahry, eds., *Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations*, p. 193.

¹⁹ Jukes, Geoffrey and Ian Clark. *The Soviets and Asian Collective Security, 1969-74*, ch. 8, in, Kanet/Bahry, eds., *Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations*, p. 151.

(2) *Limitations on political leverage*

Failures are compounded by limitations on influence. For Soviet influence over the direction of policy in Third World countries for its benefit, beyond a natural convergence of policies and interests, appears to have been very limited. As a first observation, Rubinstein concluded a review of essays by specialists on Soviet and Chinese activities in the Third World that their influence "on the actual domestic and foreign policy behavior of courted Third World countries has been modest." There was, he said, "substantial consensus on this point" among the contributing scholars. The essays demonstrated that the amount and kind of aid did not appear to make much difference when it came to exercising influence. The donor could not dictate policy to the recipient. In case after case—Ghana, Cuba, Indonesia, Iraq, and Egypt—Rubinstein wrote, "Soviet/Chinese inputs produced gains that were marginal at best and in areas that were of little consequence to the Third World country."²⁰ He observed further: "Soviet leverage on issues of importance to the leaderships of countries such as India, Indonesia, Ghana, and Egypt was marginal at best." For Rubinstein this "strongly" suggested that "the gratitude of these Third World countries does not convert to any willingness to tolerate Soviet interference in domestic decisionmaking on key issues."²¹

Richard Lowenthal, a West European specialist on Communist affairs, reached a similar conclusion in an analysis published in late 1976. He acknowledged that the Soviets "have on the whole strengthened their influence in their target area" within the "national liberation zone," but he added: "they have not succeeded in turning any significant part of it into a zone of their exclusive or even predominant influence." To this "political limitation of their success," he noted, "must be added an economic one: their share in the foreign trade and capital imports of their preferred target countries has notably increased, but it remains in most cases substantially smaller than that of the West."²²

These observations are generally corroborated from other sources. Even Soviet specialists on the Third World concede limitations on the extent of Soviet influence.²³

²⁰ Rubinstein, *Observations*, in, Rubinstein, ed., *Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World*, p. 221.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 223.

²² Lowenthal, Richard. *Soviet "Counterimperialism."* *Problems of Communism*, vol. 25, November-December 1976, p. 63.

²³ Gupta, *An Approach to Study of Soviet Policies for Third World*, in Kanet/Bahry, eds., *Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations*, pp. 30-31.

With respect to Soviet influence in India where the Soviet Union has one of the closest relationships of any Third World country, William J. Barnds, a Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, concluded that "Soviet officials receive a hearing, and their views are carefully considered when New Delhi makes the decisions" but "Soviet influence is not the key determinant in Indian decisions." Barnds judged Moscow's influence to be "quite modest—and is likely to remain so." According to Barnds, "New Delhi has backed Soviet policies wherever it feels they do not conflict with India's basic interests, and has refrained from opposing Soviet policies in most instances—or has opposed them with notable re-

Other limitations, noted below, could intrude to restrict the range and effectiveness of and the options open to Soviet policy in the Third World:

- Soviet gains and losses in the Third World (as the recent case of Sadat's Egypt well demonstrates) depend largely on policies and internal politics of the indigenous states over which Soviet leaders have no control and whose behavior has often proven to be unreliable and unpredictable.
- With the closing down of the last Western colonial empire, that of Portugal, the world is running out of areas where wars of national liberation can erupt and that in the past have provided the occasion for Soviet intervention.
- The overriding importance of East-West relations in Soviet foreign policy priorities could take precedence over activities in the Third World, as was the case in the first years of the Brezhnev regime, thus creating a necessary, but temporary, diversion from the pursuit of Third World goals. As noted above, detente has tended to stabilize East-West relations, notably in Europe. This favorable development has enabled Moscow to pursue its secondary priorities in the Third World with greater vigor. Southern Africa is a case in point. But a heating up of the cold war in Europe, triggered perhaps by some destabilizing development in Eastern Europe, could compel the Soviets to redirect their interests and activities accordingly.
- The introduction of American power and influence in certain Third World areas in an effort to establish a regional counterforce to the Soviet presence, as in the case of the Middle East after the 1973 war and to a very limited extent in the current case of Rhodesia, could act as a restraint on Soviet ambitions.

straint." (Barnds, *Soviet Influence in India*, in, Rubinstein, ed., *Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World*, pp. 45 and 42.)

Soviet influence in Egypt has been no more successful. Kerr observed: " * * * in the Soviet-Egyptian case, one of the most substantial effects (and, most probably, purposes) of Soviet support over the years up to 1973 was to encourage the Egyptians to do what they wanted to do anyway." (Kerr, *Soviet Influence in Egypt, 1967-73*, in, Rubinstein, ed., *Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World*, p. 93.)

In his commentary Campbell suggests the independence of the Middle East countries in their relationship with Moscow: "Moscow has been working for two decades to create the image of the great friend of the Middle East peoples, and especially of the Arabs. But the role has to be made good every day, and the terms are set by the Arabs. No state so favored has any commitment to stay in the Soviet camp. There is no exclusive sphere of influence. * * * Individually or collectively, they can deal with the West quite effectively without asking or paying for the patronage of the Soviet Union."

In the matter of a Soviet military presence on Arab territory, Campbell wrote: "Except for the presence of Soviet naval power on the high seas, subject to Moscow's sole determination, the Kremlin cannot count on a solid military position anywhere in the Middle East. Like the United States in its dealings with the third world, it has found that its military forces and missions stationed outside the area of its allies are there on sufferance, and that while arms deliveries help create 'client' states, the relationship can cause more ill will than satisfaction." (Campbell, *Soviet Policy in Middle East*, in, Kanet/Bahry, eds., *Banff Conference, Soviet-Third World Relations*, p. 96.)

With respect to Africa, Klinghoffer wrote (in 1974) that Soviet influence in Africa had to increase "for the Soviets had none during the years of colonialism, and the initiation of socialist programs in many American states had little to do with Soviet entreaties and more to do with the economic needs of developing societies. Africa may become anti-Westernized and socialized, but it is unlikely to become sovietized or communized." (Klinghoffer, *Soviet Union and Africa*, in, Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, p. 77.)

- The Chinese may choose to intensify their rivalry with the Soviet Union in the Third World by investing more economic and foreign policy resources. This action, especially in southern Africa, could limit the impact of Soviet policy.
- The growth of regional organizations, such as the Asian Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN, that perceive their first priority to be advancing their more strictly regional interests over those related to associations with a great power, could reduce Soviet influence. Another factor, as in the case of ASEAN, could be a desire to play off the Soviet Union against China, again to advance its own regional interests. The effect would be to put a restraint on Soviet policy.

(3) *Economic restraints and limitations*

There is one final limitation on Soviet involvement in the Third World and restriction on its influence and that is one imposed by economic restraints existing within the Soviet Union itself and within Third World countries receiving Soviet aid.

Foreign aid has placed a significant burden on the Soviet economy which already has serious problems. Soviet aid has been cost-effective in the short term. Political returns have often been great. But recently many Soviet aid programs have begun to have unexpected liabilities. Long-term involvement with nations such as Egypt have been costly, draining much needed Soviet resources and offering little possibilities of economic return. As a result, strained relations between Moscow and long-time aid recipients have surfaced in recent years, and in the case of Egypt a serious break has actually occurred. Conceivably, the Soviet impact on the Third World through aid could in the future be reduced should these liabilities continue to increase.

With respect to the Soviet military aid program, arms sales to the Third World represent an important and profitable component of Soviet-Third World trade. It is an increasingly important source of hard currency and a positive input in the Soviet Union's overall balance of trade. Yet, there are indications that Soviet military aid is demanding a growing segment of the Soviet Union's own resources that are allocated for defense production. It is possible that should these demands become too great, the Soviet Union may at some point have to make a hard choice the effect of which could reduce its influence in the Third World.

Similarly, Third World demands for developmental aid may become increasingly difficult for the Soviet Union to meet. As noted above, Gromyko has publicly indicated restrictions on the Soviet Union's ability to increase its aid programs to the LDC's because of limitations imposed on its own economy.

From the Third World perspective, the Soviet Union's aid program may in the long run also prove to be too heavy a financial burden and accordingly affect its relations with Moscow. Long-term aid recipients are already beginning to feel the strain of aid repayment as their debt-servicing problems become more critical. According to Cooper, in 1975, India and Egypt "paid more for servicing their aid debt to the USSR than they received as aid"; Iran and Iraq have also approached "zero aid."²⁴ As a result many long-term Soviet aid clients may begin

²⁴ Cooper, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

to doubt the utility of Soviet aid as an instrument of development and as a means of easing chronic economic problems. Western aid, which is composed of a much larger percentage of outright grants and generally is extended on a far larger scale than the Soviet Union's, may become more attractive in the Third World. Such a development could result in shifts in various Third World regions where Soviet-American competition has been most intense and in turn cause a corollary loss of Soviet influence.

Finally, the analogy of the U.S. experience presented by Rubinstein as a means of measuring Soviet influence through aid is instructive. Judging by the American experience, he said, "neither money (aid) nor its deprivation necessarily brings influence or benefits when these are most desired." He cited examples in American-South Vietnamese relations to buttress his point. Secretary of State William P. Rogers also emphasized the limitations on influence through aid when he observed: "It is interesting to me that we have had a study of how many times we have been able to influence the policy of another government by withholding military aid, and we find that it has not been successful in any instance." Thus Rubinstein concludes: "It is reasonable to assume that Moscow and Peking encountered comparable frustrations in their attempt to extract influence from aid given to Third World countries."²⁵

c. Durable problems in the Third World

Durable problems endemic to the Third World constitute a major obstacle to Soviet success. Economic deficiencies, problems of institution-building, difficulties inherent in transforming traditional cultures and societies, the formidable task of creating a scientific-technological infrastructure so essential in international development—all are problems that must be solved in order to complete the transition from underdevelopment to modernity, a necessary stage in the building of communism. Added to this is the more demanding task of transforming Third World societies, many still at the primitive stage of development, from nations that are a mixture of political authoritarianism, economic "national socialism", and social traditionalism to a modern Communist state according to the Soviet rubrics of "scientific socialism." In brief, the greatest obstacle to Soviet success in the Third World arise from underdevelopment and from absolutist Soviet requirements for building communism.

That the Soviet Union can overcome these obstacles seems to be highly problematical, if this study and the assessments of Western scholars and even Soviet specialists on international development can be accepted as a reasonable basis for judgment.²⁶ At least in the two decades of Soviet experience in the Third World there appears to be little evidence to support their assumption that the Third World

²⁵ Rubinstein, Alvin Z. *Assessing Influence as a Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis*, chp. 1, in, Rubinstein, ed., *Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World*, p. 4.

²⁶ In 1965, Ulyanovsky, one of the Soviet Union's leading specialists on Third World development, wrote: "not one of the countries following the non-capitalist path promises to become an industrial or even an agrarian-industrial state in the near future. This will require . . . a *minimum* of 100 to 150 years." (Quoted in, Schwartz, op. cit., p. 233, italics added.) On this matter of transition to socialism, Schwartz writes: "The transition of the new states to socialism, it is now generally felt, will be a very lengthy process. As one authoritative source described it, 'the non-capitalist development of the Afro-Asian countries will continue for several decades'. Others see the assimilation to scientific socialism as 'a process that may span an entire historical epoch'." (Ibid., p. 234.)

now or in the foreseeable future belongs to them. There seems to be only one reasonably safe assurance at this juncture in history; namely, that if the Third World belongs to anyone, it belongs to the nations and peoples that make it up.²⁷

d. "*Social Imperialism*"

A final factor working against the Soviets in the Third World is what the Chinese have termed "social imperialism"—that is, the charge that the Soviet Union is attempting to establish its own "social imperial system" throughout the Third World.

However much the Soviets may dissent from this charge, the fact remains that their approach to the Third World—their goals, purposes, and methods—is not remarkably different from the essentials of Western imperialism and colonialism of an earlier age. Divested of its patina of ideology, Soviet policy in the Third World has taken on the coloration of what Klinghoffer called the Soviet Union, a "practitioner of superpower Realpolitik" whose "actions have become similar to those of the imperialist powers they have always condemned."²⁸ For Soviet post-World War II expansionism appears to have progressively taken on the form of establishing a new imperium. In recent years this outward thrust has been aided substantially by the American mood of withdrawal from globalism that has prevailed in the post-Vietnam era. Hence the charge that the Russians are entering a new imperial phase of their history. That a certain continuum exists is historically self-evident: the Russian experience, Imperial and Soviet, has been one of conquest of non-Russian peoples residing along the borderlands. Critics of Soviet imperialism have often emphasized the clearly colonial relationship that has existed for example, in Soviet Central Asia where the predominant ethnic group is Turkic and its culture Moslem.

Thus, the spirit of imperialism pulsates through the Russian historical experience, and while its manifestations in the Third World may differ from an earlier age of the European experience, still the

²⁷ Charles K. Wilber, Professor of Economics at American University and a specialist on economic development, made the following observation on fundamental weaknesses in the Soviet model for economic development: "More important [than the short-run problems of the Stalin era which was 'terribly destructive of human values and dignity for many'], the failure of post-Stalin Russia to move toward a more liberal and human society is an indictment of the structure that developed under Stalin. A smothering bureaucracy; a structure and habit of dictatorial control with the attendant rewarding of sycophancy; the systematic punishment of dissent and individual creativity that is perceived as a threat to the bureaucracy—all these retard individual and communal human liberation, presumably the ultimate goal of development." (Wilber, Charles K. *The Soviet Model of Economic Development: Reexamination*, Ch. 4, in, Kanet/Bahry, eds., Baniff Conference, *Soviet-Third World Relations*, p. 56.)

Dr. James E. Dornan, Jr., Associate Professor of Political Science at Catholic University and Senior Research Consultant at Stanford Research Institute, made the following observations on Soviet prospects in the Third World: "Nonetheless, the Soviets continue to confront difficulties in so 'managing' their client states as to achieve maximum advantage from their Third World operations, as the cases of Egypt, and earlier of Indonesia and Ghana, clearly show. There is no indication that the acceptance of Soviet aid by a Third World nation destroys that nation's freedom of action, or that a client relationship, once entered into, must become a permanent one. As yet, there is no evidence that Third World nations are sufficiently dazzled by Soviet strategic power to bend their policies consistently to suit the U.S.S.R. The Soviets confront the same problems in dealing with Third World nations as does the United States: varying cultural and religious traditions, a lack of social cohesion, proclivities toward kaleidoscopic political change, sensitive nationalism, and deep-seated resentments toward the advanced industrial nations throughout the Third World all make it difficult for the superpowers to influence consistently the policies of Asian, African, and Latin American States. Like the United States, therefore, the U.S.S.R. will 'win some and lose some' The relevant point—again illustrated by the Egyptian case—is that the Soviets have proven to be enormously persistent." (Dornan, James E., Jr. *Détente and Superpower Relations in the Third World*, in, the National Defense University. National Security Affairs Conference. Long Range U.S.-U.S.S.R. Competition: National Security Implications, July 12-14, 1976. Washington, National Defense University, 1976, pp. 114-115.)

²⁸ Klinghoffer, *Soviet Union and Africa*, in, Kanet, ed., *Soviet Union and Developing Nations*, p. 66.

essential ingredients of imperialism are sufficiently evident to arouse renewed suspicions of Soviet intentions.²⁹

If the Soviet approach to the Third World has in reality overtones of "social imperialism" as the Chinese claim, then the Soviet Union is saddled with still another formidable burden; namely, to counteract nationalism and anti-imperialism, perhaps the most powerful forces in the modern era. The decomposition of the old imperial systems under the impact of rising nationalism in former colonial areas of Asia and Africa has been one of the major historical trends in the post-World War II era. This process was completed in 1976 with the collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Africa. What had been essentially a political struggle for national independence in the Third World since perhaps the early 1970's has been transformed into a struggle for economic independence and equality within the evolving international economic system. As Prof. Stanley Hoffmann of Harvard University recently put it, "we have been faced with a spectacular third-world revolt."³⁰ This is the meaning of the North-South confrontation that has emerged in the United Nations, at UNCTAD IV, and the Colombo Conference of the unaligned.

As noted elsewhere in this study, the Third World is now a force to be reckoned with. No longer does it seem possible to establish an imperial system in the classic European form of the 18th and 19th centuries, given the growing power and influence of the LDC's, the interdependent nature of the world economy, and the complexity of the multipolar world system existing today.

Imperialism and colonialism, whether socialist or capitalist, appear at this junction to be historical anachronisms; and while the Soviets may hold sway over Eastern Europe by force, it seems doubtful if its imperium could be extended into the Third World on any substantial scale; for there, history and reality would seem to be against them. As Lowenthal recently concluded, despite "unmistakable progress" in establishing "a reserved sphere of influence embracing a group of developing countries," the Soviets "remain imperialists without an empire—at least in that part of the world."³¹

5. A MATTER OF PERCEPTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS

Thus it seems clear that the Soviet Union has no assured destiny of success in its approach to the Third World. Life itself dictates the complexities and realities of international relations; and history thus far teaches that there exists no ultimate mystical formula that necessarily preordains favorable outcomes in the unfolding of history.

Still, the Soviet Union has its own perception of history and reality; its own designs for national and international life; its own principles and beliefs for organizing society to achieve its purposes. Faith in these

²⁹ In a discussion of the relationship of Soviet Moslems with the Russian ruling elite, Prof. John A. Armstrong of Wisconsin University writes: "... it is easy to see how risky it would be for the Soviet regime to emphasize East Slavic solidarity to the point of hegemony in the Soviet multinational political system. As long as the regime emphasizes its doctrinal basis and seems to be making significant progress toward Communist millennial goals, it can continue (though with uncertain success) to claim to represent the interests of the numerous non-Slavic nations. The day the Soviet regime admits the practical irrelevancy of these goals, it will stand revealed as the master of the last of the world's great colonial empires." (Armstrong, *op. cit.*, pp. 190-191.)

³⁰ Hoffmann, Stanley. *The Kissinger Legacy*. The New York Times, Jan. 16, 1977, p. E19.

³¹ Lowenthal, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

perceptions, designs, principles, and beliefs have no doubt been reinforced, rather than diminished, by a successful national experience of some 60 years and by the successful expansion of communism by military force over Eastern Europe, China, Cuba, and Indochina. It is perhaps more in these perceptions and expectations and a willingness to act upon them than in the realities as perceived by the outsider wherein lies the danger in the future for the United States. For the expanding global presence of Soviet power and influence and the undiminished fervor of Soviet leaders to achieve their intended purpose of establishing a new international system constitute a challenge of the first magnitude to American national interests and to the democratic principles, beliefs, and values that are rooted in this country's own national history.

C. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FOREIGN POLICY ³²

1. DEFINITION OF U.S. ROLE IN THE WORLD

a. Major trends in a multipolar interdependent world

The Soviet approach to the Third World has fundamental implications for U.S. foreign policy: it compels Americans to define anew their role in the world; to reassess the value of the Third World to U.S. national interests; and to formulate a national policy toward the Third World to achieve those interests, a policy directed at the Third World as a whole rather than an excessive concern for just the Soviet competitor which is only one component of what ought to be a much larger national concern.

The United States faces a politically multipolar and economically interdependent world which, except for southern Africa, has become remarkably stabilized. Europe, having somewhat stabilized along frontiers acknowledged in international accords, appears to be entering an era of extended peace similar to that existing on the continent between 1815 and 1914. The Far East also seems to have become reasonably stable with the emergence of China, the opening of relations with the United States, and the creation of a quadrangular balance of power among the Soviet Union, China, United States, and Japan. Once the Vietnam war ended and the United States withdrew its forces, the nations of Southeast Asia established a new relationship in which stability has been a marked characteristic. So, too, is the case of South Asia where India has established its hegemony. The contest for power continues in the Middle East, but in a form less acute than in the past as the interested powers move somewhat closer to the conference table.

Southern Africa is the exception; it now seems to be the new trouble spot of the world; the Angolan civil war may well have opened up an era of acute instability that could threaten regional peace and produce superpower confrontation.

These forces of stability and instability interact within a multipolar world of competing political centers far more complex than in the cold

³² Some of the ideas developed in this section were drawn from a series of seminars on "Major Issues in U.S. Foreign Policy" organized and led by Dr. William W. Whitson, Chief, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, CRS. These seminars, meeting biweekly from the spring through the autumn of 1976 drew upon specialists, both Government and non-Government, in the foreign affairs and national defense community in the Washington area.

war days a quarter century ago. Adding to the complexity of international life is the emergence of the Third World as a vigorous, viable political force with power and a voice to be reckoned with, and the growing awareness of interdependence as an imperative of international relations today.

b. Post-Vietnam syndrome of withdrawal

The United States faces this multipolar and interdependent world seemingly still caught up in the mood of withdrawal from extensive global commitments that set in with the defeat in Vietnam. This mood was clearly manifested in the refusal of Congress to follow the administration's lead in undertaking some form of military assistance to the anti-MPLA forces in Angola. Fear of another involvement similar to that in Vietnam was a major factor in congressional opposition. How long this mood will continue to permeate American thinking is no doubt a prime consideration in determining the limits of American foreign policy and the willingness of the American people to counter Soviet thrusts into the Third World. These can be tested only with time and experience.

c. The Third World and the balance of power

Secretary of State Kissinger perceived the Third World as a component of regional power in the larger context of a balance of global power between the Soviet Union and the United States. For him the problem of this age was how to manage the emergence of the Soviet Union as a superpower; for him the solution was to be achieved essentially through constructing an intricate balance of power system. In what Hans Morgenthau called "the paradox of impotent power," Kissinger understood the limitations of nuclear power as a practical factor in international relations, believing that neither side could gain a strategic advantage that could be translated into political utility.³³ But the prediction of the 1950's, untrue then, was true now; namely, that the strategic balance provided increased opportunities for regional pressures. "If strategic forces are today less important," he said, "regional balances gain more significance." "In these circumstances," Kissinger declared, "our task is to find ways to restrain Soviet power over an historical period"; and in his view this was to be achieved by balancing "off Soviet power around the world through a combination of political, military and economic means."³⁴

With respect to the Third World, Kissinger emphasized on numerous occasions the necessity of maintaining regional balances so that the larger global balance might be preserved. In a speech on March 22, 1976, in Dallas, Tex., he called attention to the "new and long foreseen problem" under conditions of nuclear balance; namely, that "our adversaries may be increasingly tempted to probe at the regional level." This temptation "must be discouraged"; for if leaders around the world came to assume that the United States lacked either "the forces or the will to resist while others intervene to impose solutions, they will accommodate themselves to what they will regard as the

³³ Morgenthau, Hans J. Three Paradoxes. *The New Republic*, vol. 173, Oct. 11, 1975, p. 20.

³⁴ State Department summary of Kissinger speech to U.S. Ambassadors at a meeting in London during December 1975. *The New York Times*, April 7, 1976, p. 2.

dominant trend." And an "unopposed superpower may draw dangerous conclusions when the next opportunity for intervention beckons." Taking the larger view, Kissinger warned: "Over time the global balance of power and influence will inevitably shift to the advantage of those who care nothing about America's values or well-being."³⁵

d. On the U.S. role in world affairs

However valid the Kissinger balance of power analysis may have been, particularly with respect to its regional implications, the significant fact is that the Congress, when faced with a test, could not be persuaded that American interests were being served by intervening in Angola to preserve what Kissinger would term the regional balance of power in that area.

Thus the transcending issue on the limits of U.S. involvement abroad in order to checkmate expanding Soviet global influence and power, especially in the Third World, remains unresolved and has been carried over to the Carter administration.

Elements of the Carter administration's approach to U.S. foreign policy were revealed during the Presidential campaign and towards the close of 1976. Though no clear-cut design was laid out, still sufficient data was available to suggest that Kissinger's balance-of-power approach is to be deemphasized and a new concept called "trilateralism" is to become one of the most important components for the incoming administration's foreign policy. Greater stress is to be placed on U.S. relations with Japan and its allies in Europe. And greater attention is to be given to North-South affairs (though in the last few years of Kissinger's term, he, too, began to emphasize the importance of interdependence and U.S. participation in the North-South dialog.) Finally, greater attention is to be given to human rights issues, a sensitive matter to Americans often downgraded by Kissinger.³⁶

The Kissinger style of personal, secretive, manipulative, and some would say, amoral diplomacy, more characteristic of 19th century classical European diplomacy than that in the American democratic tradition, is to be replaced by a more open, moralistic, democratic diplomacy—a return to Wilsonianism.

³⁵ Kissinger, Henry A. Secretary of State. Foreign Policy and National Security. Speech in Dallas, Tex., on March 22, 1976. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. Office of Media Services, PR 141, p. 6.

Perhaps one of the clearest and most practical explanations of this relationship between regional and global balances of power came from Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor in the State Department and Kissinger's closest advisor on Soviet affairs. Both shared a common perception of what the American response should be to expanding Soviet power. This was brought out in commentaries on the Angolan problem. For Sonnenfeldt, the United States "had no intrinsic interest in Angola as such." But, "once a locale, no matter how remote and unimportant for us, becomes a focal point for Soviet and in this instance, Soviet-supported Cuban military action, the United States acquires a derivative interest which we simply cannot avoid." Thus, Sonnenfeldt argued, "we need the capacity to meet our requirements, the will to meet these requirements, and we need to achieve consensus to give expression to that will." To Sonnenfeldt, "it really does no good at all to preach the need for military superiority and to practice regional retreat. It will get us nowhere in the end." (Sonnenfeldt, Helmut. *American Soviet Relations: Informal Remarks. Parameters*, Journal of the U.S. Army War College, vol. 6, No. 1: 15-16. (An article adapted from an address before the 22d Annual National Security Seminar at the U.S. Army War College, June 3, 1976.) For another explanation of this relationship, see Sonnenfeldt's testimony in, U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs. U.S.-U.S.S.R. Relations and Strategic Balance, hearings, 94th Cong., 2d sess. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976, pp. 1-25.

³⁶ A condensation of the 95-page report of a scholarly task force of the Trilateral Commission was published in *The Christian Science Monitor* on Feb. 15, 1977, pp. 15-16. The report analyzed the concept of interdependence as it related to problems in the contemporary era and the role of the United States. In a foreword the Monitor wrote: "Can cooperation keep mankind on an upward road? In what may become an outline for Carter administration foreign policy, scholars, some of whom are now Carter advisers, have set forth a potentially controversial plan to guide the industrial countries to solutions of their common problems—and those of their poorer neighbors."

Still, despite stylistic changes and perhaps some reordering of priorities, the substance and goals are expected to retain the Kissinger imprint upon which a broad consensus already exists on such Kissinger objectives as: agreement with the Soviet Union on arms control, improved relations with Peking, a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East, majority rule in southern Africa, and a better understanding between North and South.³⁷

The validity of Kissinger's theory on the regional balance of power in the Third World and a determination on the limits of American involvement abroad are considerations high on the Nation's foreign policy agenda. Whatever the response by the American people, their Congress and administration, U.S. freedom of action appears to be circumscribed by certain inescapable realities. Problems bearing on Soviet-American relations extend beyond strictly bilateral relations; they are global. The global nature of these problems; the revolutionary elan impelling a Soviet policy of interventionism in the Third World, sometimes in areas that may be vital to American national interest; the reality of Soviet and American power; and the values that each seeks to protect and propagate—all seem to virtually preordain continued superpower involvement. The problem, however, lies in the definition of the limits of involvement, particularly with respect to Soviet thrusts in the Third World.

2. THIRD WORLD FROM U.S. PERSPECTIVE

a. Basic problems for U.S. foreign policy

The Soviet approach to the Third World would appear to raise three basic problems for U.S. foreign policy: the problem of defining U.S. national interests in the Third World; the problem of Soviet incrementalism; and the problem of interdependence. Considerations on these problems would seem to suggest basic questions on the value of the Third World to the United States, the limits of American involvement in the Third World, and the possible parameters of policy.

b. A criticism of U.S. policy in the Third World

According to Robert L. Rothstein, a fellow of the Rockefeller Foundation, the United States "has not had a coherent policy" toward the Third World; rather it has had "a set of reactions, usually negative," to demands by Third World spokesmen and international secretariats, or a set of "tactical improvisations" to manage the latest crisis or meet the next deadline. To begin a useful quest, Rothstein suggests an attempt to understand "the connections between what we want *for* the developing countries and what we want *from* them."³⁸

This quest suggests in turn a more basic question, what are the nation's interests in the Third World?

c. Problem of defining national interests in the Third World

(1) On preserving an acceptable international system

In a larger geographical sense, the Third World would appear to be vital in achieving the central objective of U.S. foreign policy, for reasons which have been brought out implicitly in this study's examination of the Soviet approach to the Third World. This "central objective" has been defined simply and comprehensively by Secretary of

³⁷ Editorial Research Reports. Kissinger, Stamp Likely to Linger on U.S. Policy. The Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 26, 1977, p. 13.

³⁸ Rothstein, Robert L. A Different Table for America's Third World Policy. The New York Times, an. 27, 1977, p. 35.

Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld in the Defense Department's January 1977 "posture statement" to the Congress; namely, "*to maintain an international order* that assures the physical security of the United States, its economic well being, and the preservation of its institutions and values."³⁹

A declared Soviet objective is to transform this "international order"; the Third World is a key component in this effort; and in pursuit of this objective the Soviets have developed in recent years a growing capability of asserting itself as a geopolitical force in the world, which is expected to continue in the future.⁴⁰ It is for this reason that the United States has determined, according to Rumsfeld, that, "The Soviet Union is and will remain for the foreseeable future the major threat to the United States and the international system on which we depend."⁴¹

Given these perceptions and realities, there seems to be little doubt that some role for the United States in the Third World is an imperative: it has an "international system" to protect and preserve.

(2) *The strategic/military dimension*

American interests in the Third World have also a strategic and a military dimension. These interests derive largely from the geopolitics of the global role that has been thrust upon the United States since the close of World War II. Many date from prior times and have their roots in U.S. history.

Historically, the United States has been a trading nation and commerce its life's blood. Freedom of the seas, a principle vital to its existence, had been rooted deeply in the American Revolutionary experience. From its infancy as an independent republic, the seas were perceived as holding the promise and reality of the Nation's survival and greatness. Accordingly, the need to use the U.S. Navy in a global sense was early recognized, and its fundamental mission has never changed; namely, sea control.⁴² The United States entered two major wars, in 1812 and 1917, because, among other reasons, it was being denied the right of freedom of the seas. Thus, Rumsfeld could say with the force of history and national tradition behind him, "we must be vitally interested in the freedom of the seas and the narrow waters that connect them"—which, as noted in this study, border largely on the nations of the Third World.⁴³

A similar need for freedom of access to space in both its military application and peaceful uses has emerged with the rapid evolution of the Space Age. Space offers opportunities for communications, geodesy, meteorology, and a host of vital military activities; and, in the judgment of the Defense Department, "the demand is rapidly growing in importance." Indeed, the Nation's interest in freedom of access to space "has already become great"⁴⁴—and accordingly so has been its interest in access to vital facilities many of which have been constructed in countries of the Third World.

³⁹ Rumsfeld, Donald H., Secretary of Defense. Annual Defense Department Report, Fiscal Year 1978. U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, 1977, p. 22. [Italics added.]

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 26.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 31.

⁴² Turner, Adm. Stansfield. The Naval Balance: Not Just a Numbers Game. Foreign Affairs, vol. 55, January 1977, p. 342.

⁴³ Rumsfeld, op. cit., p. 20.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 20.

Similarly in its peaceful uses, access to space and to Third World countries is vital for fulfilling the purposes of the American space program. The peaceful uses of outer space has been a central effort in U.S. space activities from the beginning of the Space Age, the benefits of which have been shared with the Third World. Space meteorology and communications have especially served the converging interests of the Third World, the United States, and the United Nations in their efforts to solve problems relating to food and agriculture, population, and education.⁴⁵

Rumsfeld sums up the Department of Defense's assessment of the Nation's strategic and military requirements abroad with this "most important" judgment: because ours is a geopolitical world in which conventional and nuclear power play a geopolitical role, "we continue to have worldwide strategic interests"⁴⁶—strategic interests, it might be added, which may not be fully achieved without giving some concerned attention to the Third World.

That the Third World plays a significant, and in some instances a vital, role in enabling the United States to sustain its vital national interests on the seas, in space, and throughout this "geopolitical" world, appears to be an accepted truth in the historical evolution of this Nation as a world power.

(3) *Economic dependency, trade, and the Third World*

Finally, the economic security of the United States and its allies depends increasingly upon raw material resources imported from abroad, some having strategic value and many short in supply and great in demand. The main sources of these materials are located in the Third World. The impact of the OPEC oil embargo of 1973 dramatically demonstrated the vulnerability of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan to any prolonged disruption of the flow of oil.⁴⁷ Because of this dependency for resources, the United States and its allies have a substantial interest in the Third World. (For data on U.S. imports and mineral and material resources, see tables 10, 11, and 12, pp. 162-164.)

The United States is also a major source of international investments currently valued at more than \$100 billion. U.S. corporations have invested some \$30 billion in the Third World, and these investments, much of which are in raw materials, are growing at about 10 percent a year.⁴⁸ Hence another link in the United States-Third World connection.

⁴⁵ Information provided by Mrs. Eilene Galloway, former Senior Specialist in International Relations, CRS, and a leading authority on space matters.

⁴⁶ Rumsfeld, op. cit., p. 20.

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 18-20. Third World predominance in possessing the world's minerals is a fact of nature that the industrial nations are rapidly becoming aware of. John K. Cooley, Middle East correspondent for *The Christian Science Monitor*, reporting on the Algiers conference of the non-aligned LDC's in September 1973, wrote that the delegates represented countries that "contain over half the world's oil and two thirds of most of its other vital resources." The 1973 report of the U.S. National Commission on Materials Policy stated: "The less developed regions of the world have held the principal sources of materials imported by industrial countries." According to C. Fred Bergsten, senior fellow at Brookings Institution, four countries control more than 80 percent of the exportable supply of world copper; two countries account for more than 70 percent of world tin exports, and four countries raise the total close to 95 percent; four countries produce more than 50 percent of the world supply of natural rubber; four possess over one-half the supply of bauxite (the inclusion of Australia raises the total above 90 percent); a few countries are coming to dominate each of the regional markets for timber, said to be a truly vanishing resource. "A wide range of Third World countries thus have sizeable potential for strategic market power," concludes Bergsten. The data also suggests the high degree of dependence of the industrial West upon the resources of the Third World. (Whelan, Brain-Drain: A Study in the Persistent Issue of International Scientific Mobility, pp. 260-263.)


⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 263.

TABLE 10.—Percentage of U.S. mineral requirements imported during 1972



Source: "The International Scope of the Materials System," Figure 2.32. The United States imported varying amounts of metal, nonmetallic, and fuel minerals from more than 40 countries or areas of the world in 1972. No major nation of the world is completely self-sufficient in all the minerals required to sustain an industrialized economy. U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines, 1973. (Reproduced from: National Commission on Materials Policy, Materials Needs and the Environment Today and Tomorrow: Final Report. U.S. Congress. Senate. 93rd Congress, 2d Session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1974, p. 2.25. Doc 93-97.)

TABLE 11.—Imports supplied significant percentage of minerals and metals consumption in 1976



*APPARENT CONSUMPTION = U.S. PRIMARY
± SECONDARY PRODUCTION + IMPORT
RELIANCE

**NET IMPORT RELIANCE = IMPORTS-EXPORTS
+ ADJUSTMENTS FOR GOVT AND INDUSTRY
STOCK CHANGES EXCEPT FOR PETROLEUM
AND NATURAL GAS (+ WITHDRAWALS;
- ADDITIONS)

BUREAU OF MINES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR (import-export data from Bureau of the
Census)

Source: U.S. Dept. of the Interior. Bureau of Mines. Minerals & Materials: A Monthly Survey. Wash-
ington, D.C., January 1977, p. 14.

TABLE 12.—CHANGING IMPORT REQUIREMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES

[Net imports as percent of domestic use]

	Net imports ¹		
	1950	1960	1970
Ferrous metals:			
Iron ore	5	25	30
Chromium	100	94	100
Cobalt	92	75	96
Columbium	100	100	100
Manganese	77	92	94
Nickel	99	88	91
Tungsten	80	40	(²)
Vanadium	(³)	41	1
Nonferrous metals:			
Aluminum (bauxite)	71	77	86
Beryllium	89	96	(³)
Copper	35	9	8
Lead	59	59	40
Magnesium	0	1	0
Mercury	92	36	38
Platinum	91	95	98
Tin	100	100	100
Titanium	32	30	47
Zinc	37	54	60
Other basic materials:			
Petroleum	8	17	22
Natural gas	0	1	3
Uranium		47	0
Timber products ⁴	11	11	8
Natural rubber	100	100	100

¹ Net imports include semirefined forms (e.g., ferromanganese).² Stockpile transactions distort proportions.³ Withheld for disclosure reasons.⁴ Net imports in 1972 are up 50 percent from 1970.

Source: Interim report (April 1972) National Commission on Materials Policy and Minerals Yearbook, Bureau of Mines. Reproduced from: "National Commission on Materials Policy, Material Needs and the Environment Today and Tomorrow, Final Report, 1973," p. 2.23.

The United States is, moreover, a trading nation whose current imports and exports are totaled at more than \$200 billion a year.⁴⁹ This trade depends upon continuing access to uninterrupted sea lanes of the world. What makes southern Africa important to the United States, for example, is a combination of economic and strategic necessity: the sea lanes around the Cape of Good Hope are vitally important for the flow of valuable strategic materials, notably oil, from Asia, the Middle East, and Africa to Western Europe and the United States.⁵⁰

American policy planners are thus faced with a twofold problem; namely, increasing economic dependency of the United States and its

⁴⁹ Rumsfeld, *op cit*, p. 16.⁵⁰ Middleton, Drew. World Military Situation Confronting Carter Shows Changes Have Favored Soviet. The New York Times, Jan. 4, 1977, p. 8.

There is a question, however, as to U.S. dependency on the continued supply of chrome from South Africa and Rhodesia for making high quality steel. Evans and Novak concluded an article on the Soviets in Rhodesia with this observation: "In Angola, the U.S. Congress refused to allow the Ford administration to raise a finger on behalf of the West. Repetition of that congressional policy in Rhodesia would go far toward elevating the Soviets to political power in southern Africa. That African raw materials and control of sea lanes around the Cape of Good Hope just happen to be essential for the West's security has made no impression yet on Capitol Hill." (Evans, Rowland and Robert Novak. Soviet Scavenging in Rhodesia. The Washington Post, Jan. 13, 1977, p. A27.) Middleton also stresses the point of American dependency on chrome from South Africa and Rhodesia citing as his source military analysts in the Pentagon. "High quality steel cannot be made without chrome," he wrote, "and the bulk of American imports of this metal come from the two countries."

However, the New York Times disputes this thesis in an editorial on Feb. 17, 1977 (p. 38) entitled, "Rhodesia and the Diplomacy of Chrome." It writes "Two developments have combined to nullify the economic issues. One is technological: the perfection of a process called argon oxygen decarburation, which permits use of lower-quality chrome, more widely available, in stainless steel. The second development is political: the closing of the Mozambique-Rhodesia border last year, impeding the flow of exports."

major allies on each other and on the Third World for raw materials and energy; and their vulnerability to any significant disruption in the flow of these goods.⁵¹

American interests in the Third World are accordingly magnified and deepened by these two problems. For the Soviets have been actively seeking to expand their influence to the detriment of the West. At the same time they have developed a military capability for projecting their power at long distances from the Soviet Union. As a result they have been able to establish their influence in such areas as sub-Saharan Africa and to employ higher levels of aggressiveness in doing so. Increased naval capability, expected to continue, has also provided the Soviets with a "forward presence" and a basis for contesting American influence.⁵² (A naval "presence" is defined as "the orchestrated use of naval forces below the level of hostility in support of foreign policy.")⁵³ By thus expanding their "presence" and "sea denial" capabilities, the Soviets have increased the vulnerability of the sea lanes that the United States has judged to be vital to American interests.

*d. Problem of Soviet incrementalism*⁵⁴

(1) Process of political incrementalism

A second major consideration on the Third World in the American perspective is the problem of Soviet incrementalism. Political incrementalism can be defined as a process whereby marginal gains accumulating over the longer term lead to a gradual accretion of power which at some undefinable point in time can become sufficiently great and impressive to reduce the options open to an adversary and progressively diminish the adversary's power, influence, and position.

This process is especially relevant in a situation of strategic deterrence such as that existing in the contemporary era where American strategists have tended to place a premium on maintaining a mutual balance of terror, while tending to dismiss or depreciate marginal gains in marginal areas.⁵⁵ This is precisely the problem that Kissinger addressed in Dallas when he explained the danger of acquiescing in regional balances of power and in turn its impact on the larger global power balance in an environment of deterrence.

The Soviet Union has established an impressive global presence to the extent that Brezhnev could rightly claim on the occasion of his 70th birthday celebration in the Grand Kremlin Palace on December 19, 1976: "Never before during all its history has our country enjoyed such prestige and influence in the world."⁵⁶

Even so, the Soviet Union cannot establish an imperium on the classical 19th century model, though, as Adm. Stansfield Turner, U.S.

⁵¹ Rumsfeld, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁵³ Turner, *op. cit.*, p. 344. Elaborating on the definition, Turner says: "Naval presence tasks range from informal ship visits intended to maintain ties with an ally and formal ship visits to cement a burgeoning friendship, to a menacing patrol just outside a nation's waters." Turner explained further: "When the United States and the Soviet Union have competing interests in an event or a place—and when they use their navies to demonstrate just how interested they really are—then the relative quantity, quality and character of these forces *in situ* can tip the balance and can affect what happens. Here seapower becomes a direct arm of foreign policy without a shot necessarily being fired. The U.S. Sixth Fleet and the Soviet Mediterranean fleet are such 'presence' forces in direct competition along the Mediterranean littoral."

⁵⁴ Some of the ideas presented in this section were drawn from discussions with Alva M. Bowen, a former Captain in the U.S. Navy and presently a Specialist in National Defense, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, CRS.

⁵⁵ For a discussion of political incrementalism in the Soviet-American context, see Rubinstein, *Soviet Policy Toward Third World in 1970's*, pp. 108-109.

⁵⁶ Osnos, Peter. Brezhnev Gets a Hero's Praise on 70th. *The Washington Post*, Dec. 20, 1976, p. A33.

Navy observed, it has exhibited many of its traits "exercised with all the resources of supertechnology."⁵⁷ But this does not mean that the Soviet Union cannot build an imperium of influence and power in the Third World (and for that matter elsewhere) where through the process of political incrementalism it can by its presence and power affect the policies, attitudes, and options of other peoples. For the Third World offers not only the opportunity but also a minimum risk of a major war for marginal advantages that in the course of time could have important consequences nearer the heart of the Soviet-American rivalry.

(2) *Danger of Soviet incrementalism*

Soviet incrementalism in the Third World appears to be a form of imperialism by indirection and stealth. Essentially a tactic of equivocation, its validity derives not from direct physical control (an unlikely prospect in today's world), but from the presence of Soviet power and demonstrated Soviet ability to deny areas of influence to the United States, create an environment where political and economic interests of Third World nations converge with theirs, and reduce once available options open to them and to the United States. Supporters of the Ford-Kissinger policy could point to Angola as an example of Soviet incrementalism in action.

(3) *Implications of Soviet incrementalism*

Assessments of Soviet incrementalism in the Third World are a matter of dispute, judgments on the relative danger seeming to lie in the eye of the beholder. Representatives of the Department of Defense point of view tend to heighten the danger to U.S. interests. Others stress the constraints, for example, on the use of Soviet naval power, and cite other limitations on Soviet activity discussed above.

According to the best official judgment of the Department of Defense, the Soviet Union was expected to continue certain established patterns of policy, including, "seeking to expand its influence by manipulating local tensions and conflicts, particularly in the Third World."⁵⁸ The Soviets were further expected to regard the Third World as "a primary arena for competition both with the West and with China." The expansion of Soviet strategic and conventional forces was believed to have given them "more room for maneuver in support of their clients and in attempting to intimidate neutrals and friends of the United States." Dangers were perceived in challenging the United States directly in such critical areas as Europe, the Middle East or Asia. And despite an apparent desire to minimize risks of direct military confrontations with the United States, still they "have not been willing to exercise notable restraint in all areas of the Third World." Use of Cuban forces as surrogates in Angola, according to the Defense Department, "introduced a disturbing new dimension to their methods of operation."⁵⁹

Soviet activity in the Third World is thus expected to increase rather than diminish. Perhaps the most serious implication, if this assessment is borne out, lies in the danger inherent in political incre-

⁵⁷ Turner, op. cit., p. 354. At the time of the publication of this article, Turner was Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe. A Rhodes Scholar, he has directed the Systems Analysis Division of the Chief of Naval Operations, commanded the U.S. Second Fleet, and served as President of the Naval War College. In February 1977, he was made Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

⁵⁸ Rumsfeld, op. cit., p. 33.

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 34.

mentalism. In a discussion of the Soviet-American naval balance, Admiral Turner, a professional American naval officer and Rhodes Scholar, reached a conclusion that suggests a useful political analogy. "The argument from the facts," he said, "will tend this way: that as a seagoing power, we are moving into a shrinking range of political options, and a higher level of risk."⁶⁰ Turner explained. As the U.S. Navy constricts and draws back from traditional deployment patterns, the Soviet Navy "has been demonstrating increasingly imaginative and frequent global deployment of forces in response to developments in international politics—as in Angola, Mozambique, the Indian Ocean, and West Africa." To Turner, this behavior seemed to confirm the claim that "we are a declining sea power and that they are a growing and restive one. The invalidity of that claim is academic if it is universally believed."⁶¹

What this analogy suggests in political terms is that at most expanding Soviet power and influence in certain parts of the Third World seem to hold out prospects for a declining role for the United States and at the very least an opening for the interacting forces of Soviet incrementalism.

Yet, as Dr. John R. Thomas, a specialist on Soviet military and scientific affairs, has pointed out in an analysis of Soviet oceanic policy, the transformation of the Soviet Union from a landlocked insular nation to a global competitor of the United States "has given rise to political dilemmas and strategic dangers which may limit the benefit the U.S.S.R. may derive from its new status as an oceanic power." For example, as a seapower the Soviets have developed a vested interest on oceanic issues such as preserving unrestricted passage of straits and limiting the expansion of territorial water claims, a posture that could put them in conflict with some LDC's. The strategic dilemma arises from ambiguities inherent in the "two-front threat"; that is, the threat from Germany in Western Europe and China in the Far East which also could have a constraining effect. For these reasons, Thomas concludes: "It would seem appropriate for the United States to take note of both the Soviet achievements and constraints so that it neither underestimates nor overestimates Soviet capabilities on the oceans to the detriment of its own interests."⁶²

e. Problem of interdependence

(1) Imperatives of interdependence

The third and final consideration on the Third World in the American perspective is the problem of interdependence. This concept has a direct bearing on the relationships and interests between the United States and the Third World.

Interdependence has been defined as meaning "a situation of reciprocal effects or mutual dependence."⁶³ The Soviets define it as an

⁶⁰ Turner, op. cit., p. 339.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 346.

⁶² Thomas, Political-Strategic Framework for Soviet Oceanic Policy, in, Senate Commerce Committee's study on Soviet Oceans Development, pp. 28, 32, and 36-37.

In placing Soviet oceans policy in the larger strategic context Thomas underscores the enormity of the Soviet problem: "In sum, the Soviets, as a result of post-Stalin aspirations, have been confronted by the gigantic problem of developing separate and non-interchangeable capabilities to counter a nuclear-missile attack from the United States, to defeat a ground attack on the Eurasian continent from either or both the East and the West, and to support non-peripheral national liberation struggles. They have had to address this problem in the context of a severely strained economy and rising demands from the Soviet people to satisfy their consumer needs at home." (p. 29)

⁶³ Nye, Joseph S., Jr. Interdependence and Independence and Interdependence Foreign Policy, No. 22, spring 1976, pp. 129-130.

ideological weapon in the service of Western "neocolonialism" designed to undermine the solidarity of the developing countries in their struggle for economic independence and to counteract "anti-imperialist passion" on the international scene.⁶⁴

Interdependence is the term used by foreign policy specialists and statesmen to describe what they perceive to be a new cycle of change in international politics. Looked upon as a conceptualization of the world in transition, it is presented as a workable rationale for continuity in a time of change.

The idea of interdependence is not new. John Donne expressed it centuries ago in his phrase, "No man is an island." F. Scott Fitzgerald explained it with surprising accuracy as a young novelist when he wrote in "This Side of Paradise" published in 1920: "Modern life," began Amory again, "changes no longer century by century, but year by year, ten times faster than it ever has before—populations doubling, civilizations unified more closely with other civilizations, economic interdependence, racial questions, and—we're dawdling along. My idea is that we've got to go very much faster."⁶⁵

—Interdependence has been given currency and momentum in recent years by the rising expectations of detente in East-West relations; by the emergence of the Third World, especially those countries resource rich, as a serious power factor to be reckoned with in international relations; by the global nature of today's problems, such as, overpopulation, environmental pollution, scarcity of resources in great demand notably energy and food, arms control, international development, equitable use of the oceans and seabeds, establishing a fair and just international economic system, to name some of the most important. The universal appeal of interdependence arises from the fact that it purports to offer a route for common survival.

Described as a modern Copernican revolution and a fallout of the Space Age, the idea of interdependence views man's Earth from space, and perceiving his problems in totality, advocates solutions through the imperatives of cooperation dictated by the sharing of a common fate. Barbara Ward expressed the idea in terms of "Spaceship Earth", a closed ecological system of nations bound to a common destiny in which interdependence is the key to survival. Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh, president of Notre Dame University, told Britain's Ditchley Park Conference in September 1974, that interdependence is an idea whose time has come.⁶⁶ U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, addressing the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on April 23, 1975, reinforced this view when he said: "Only through

⁶⁴ Sergiyev, A. Bourgeois, Theories of "Interdependence" Serve Neocolonialism. *International Affairs* (Moscow), No. 11, 1976: 103-111. Sergiyev gives the following explanation of interdependence: "Thus, the conception of 'interdependence' pursues several different goals. It is aimed at rallying the main capitalist countries behind the USA, at setting up a united front of the capitalist states to oppose the demands of developing countries. At the same time it is aimed at making the developing countries to agree to a compromise with imperialism under the slogan of the 'common destiny' of the bourgeoisie of the developing nations and the main capitalist countries."

"In other words, the conception of 'interdependence' is called upon to be an ideological weapon with which the diplomacy of the USA and other Western countries is seeking to undermine the solidarity of the developing countries in their struggle for a radical restructuring of international economic relations on democratic principles, to take the heat out of the anti-imperialist passion of their actions on the international scene." (p. 106)

⁶⁵ Fitzgerald, F. Scott. *This Side of Paradise*. New York, Scribners, 1920 (1970 ed.), p. 272.

⁶⁶ Hesburgh, Theodore M., C.S.C. *The Problems and Opportunities on a Very Interdependent Planet*. Ditchley Foundation Lecture, Sept. 20, 1974, in, *Congressional Record*, May 8, 1975, p. S7736 (daily edition).

the interdependence of all nations can the independence of each nation be assured.”⁶⁷ For Henry Kissinger, interdependence is the “dominant fact of our international relationships.”⁶⁸

In practical terms interdependence requires renewed emphasis on functional diplomacy, a type of conduct in international relations that places a high premium on international cooperation. Its advocates assume that through the cooperative interaction of nations international relations will become infused with a moderating and harmonizing spirit. Solutions to common problems can issue from this new spirit, it is argued; peace and security for all may be achieved. The binding force of this new functionalism, unlike other times, is the common desire to survive. Mankind has no other choice, it is said; interdependence offers a route for common survival.

(2) *Interdependence and the Third World*

The Third World plays a central role in the politics and economics of interdependence. The international position of the Third World has been strengthened—

- By its control over resources in short supply but much needed by the industrial North;
- By the development of transnational communications, bringing to its people a sense of national and regional unity;
- By the growth of international organizations, such as UNCTAD and Conferences of Non-Aligned Countries, in which it exercises power and influence often beyond its real capabilities and strength;
- By the declining capacity of the superpowers to maintain hegemonic control (though deterrence still plays its critical role), thus allowing a wider degree of latitude for initiatives among the emerging regional powers; and
- By the growing inability of the superpower to control outcomes in the international system as a whole.⁶⁹

In brief, interdependence has magnified the role of the Third World in contemporary international relations and reduced that of the great powers, creating a new political environment and new challenges for U.S. foreign policy.

(3) *Interdependence and United States-Third World relations*

Given the multiplicity and complexity of the global problems making interdependence an imperative, the United States would seem to have no alternative to accepting interdependence as a reality of

⁶⁷ Text inserted in Congressional Record, May 12, 1975, p. S7841 (daily edition).

⁶⁸ The New York Times, April 7, 1976, p. 2. The growing awareness of the imperatives of interdependence has been manifested in international conferences of Western leaders. In an address to a ministerial meeting of the International Energy Agency in Paris on May 27, 1975, Secretary Kissinger quoted Goethe as saying that “the web of this world is woven of necessity and change.” And he added: “We stand at a point where those strands intertwine. We must not regard necessity as capricious nor leave change to chance. Necessity impels us to where we are but summons us to choose where to go. Our interdependence will make us thrive together or decline together. We can drift, or we can decide. We have no excuse for failure.” (The New York Times, May 29, 1975, p. 19.)

The idea of interdependence was also emphasized at the May 1975 summit meeting of NATO leaders where world economic conditions was a major subject for discussion. Premier Aldo Moro of Italy spoke of “the changing world” and the “imperative of interdependence” and linked the new but now familiar issues: energy, raw materials, food, environment, development. He warned: “The West will survive in the measure to which it can face, assimilate and manage the changes.” Speaking of the durability of the alliance and its defensive role, Belgian Premier Leo Tindemans said, “But it can become more than that. Moving beyond the idea of confrontation, it should be, in a universe of mutation, the stimulus for considering the global problems which are bringing a new notion of equilibrium.” (The New York Times, June 2, 1975, p. 8.)

⁶⁹ Nye, Joseph S., Jr. Independence and Interdependence. Foreign Policy, No. 22, spring 1976, pp. 140-145.

international life in the contemporary era and gear its foreign policy accordingly. Even the Soviets understand this choice for the United States in contrast to that of pursuing a neo-isolationist course.⁷⁰

Interdependence embraces many global problems and many nations large and small; but in strictly the context of Third World concerns a major problem is economic development. And it is here where the Third World and U.S. interests converge and where the United States and its allies hold the greatest competitive advantage over the Soviet Union.

The United States is far more capable of satisfying Third World economic demands than the Soviet Union. In developmental assistance, it has a decided advantage, both quantitatively and qualitatively. American technology is more advanced, the Western economic system more sophisticated and flexible, and existing Third World-Western infrastructure of institutional trade mechanisms more mutually compatible. Furthermore, the U.S. aid program is substantially larger than that of the Soviet Union and enjoys greater potential for growth without constituting a prohibitive burden on the U.S. economy. In training of skilled and professional manpower, the United States has established an impressive record over the years which has won for it the designation, "the graduate school of the Third World." (At present more than 150,000 foreign students are studying in the United States on nonimmigrant visas, approximately half from Asian countries, about 17 percent from Latin America, then Africans, Europeans, and other North Americans; or well over two-thirds from the LDC's with the percentage increasing in recent years.)⁷¹

On the Soviet side, prospects are not favorable. Soviet technology is in most instances considered second-best by Third World countries. Soviet developmental assistance is often unwieldy, unevenly applied, and in many cases predicated on political tradeoffs which Third World leaders often find unappealing. As noted earlier in this study, the Soviet response to the demands of the Third World for developmental aid is also restricted by the smallness of the Soviet program. Compared with that of the West, the Soviet aid program has serious limitations in size. In spite of this limitation, the aid program constitutes a significant economic burden for the Soviet Union. Soviet reactions to Third World demands for aid have often reflected these weaknesses. Soviet leaders have not hesitated to draw attention to their aid limitations by clearly inferring that increased aid to the Third World represents a zero-sum equation in which the Soviet citizenry is often the loser.

Thus, considerable problems face the Soviet Union in responding to the economic demands of the Third World. Though many of these

⁷⁰ A. A. Kokoshin concludes an analysis of interdependence and U.S. foreign policy: "All this testifies that at the present stage of development of international relations the United States, taking advantage of its economic, scientific, and technical potential and of its continuing overwhelming military-political superiority over the other capitalist states, is by no means abandoning its role of leader of the capitalist world and has no intention of allowing a further weakening of its positions. Its foreign policy strategy is subordinated to the preservation of the socioeconomic status quo in the world through a slight restructuring of the hierarchy of relations in the capitalist part of the world. * * * This policy is objectively directed against the fundamental long-term trends of world development, including the national liberation movement, the further consolidation of the developing countries, political and economic independence, and the strengthening of the norms of equal and mutually advantageous cooperation." (Kokoshin, A. A. "Independence": Realities, Concepts and Policy. USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology (Moscow) No. 1, Dec. 20, 1975, pp 11-22, in, FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, Jan. 27, 1977, p. 12.)

⁷¹ The Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 7, 1977, p. 22.

problems are shared by the United States, still this Nation's ability to respond effectively appears to be much greater. The United States has thus many assets in the field of international development which hold the potentiality for creating a positive image of the United States in the Third World, for limiting new Soviet inroads, and for restricting the further growth of already existing Soviet influence.⁷²

(4) *Test of interdependence*

The test of interdependence, as applied to the larger stage of international relations, would seem to lie in the extent to which the greater and lesser nations of the world can perceive the full implications of the "Spaceship Earth" concept and accordingly modify their national interests to accommodate the needs of the whole. Interdependence would seem to ask a great deal of peoples and nation-states, requiring a cosmic overview of world affairs and a kind of conduct in foreign affairs and perception of national interests that transcends generations, even centuries, of deeply engrained habits, traditions, beliefs, and modes of conduct. As Hesburgh put it, "Interdependence is a thought and a theme that runs counter to many of our shibboleths of the past: nationalism, ethnocentrism, rugged individualism, empire, cold war, East and West with never the twain meeting, declarations of independence."⁷³

For the great powers, interdependence would seem to test their ability to move from leadership by hegemony to one of persuasion in their relations with the Third World and in a spirit of justice and equality establish an orderly and equitable system of relations. For the Third World, it would seem to test their ability to live with the physical and economic limitations that nature has imposed upon them and accept a mutually agreeable and satisfying harmony of interests with the great powers. And among the great powers, interdependence would seem to test their ability to subordinate their power interests and restrain the dynamic impulses that power generates.

Interdependence would thus seem to demand much of mankind, perhaps too much; but the alternative to this option could be less appealing.

3. THE THIRD WORLD IN AMERICA'S FUTURE ⁷⁴

a. *New cycle of change in international relations*

That the world is entering a new cycle of structural change in international relations, there seems little doubt. The cold war in East-West relations seems to have been decompressed and modified somewhat by détente. Bipolarity has given way to multipolarity as new power relationships have emerged on the global scene. The Third World has been recognized as a force to be reckoned with. And, the changing requirements of international politics have introduced a new functionalism in the conduct of international relations with the growing awareness of interdependency among nations.

⁷² Some of the ideas contained in this section were drawn from discussions with Dr. John P. Hardt, Senior Specialist in Soviet Economics, CRS; George D. Holliday, Analyst in International Economics, Economics Division, CRS; and Theodor W. Galdi, Analyst in International Relations, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, CRS.

⁷³ Hesburgh, *op. cit.*, p. S7727.

⁷⁴ Some of the ideas developed in this section were drawn from discussions with Dr. John P. Hardt, Senior Specialist in Soviet Economics; Dr. Stanley J. Heginbotham, Assistant Chief, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division (FAND); Dr. William C. Gibbons, Specialist in U.S. Foreign Policy, FAND; George D. Holliday, Analyst in International Economics, Economics Division; and Francis T. Miko, Analyst in International Relations, FAND, CRS.

Strategic deterrence continues to be a primary governing principle in the seemingly irrepressible rivalry between the superpowers and remains a fair measurement of the balance of their global power. But pressures have been building up in important areas of the Third World, bringing to the fore the factor of regional balances and their effects on the overarching global balance.

Decolonization has come to an end, lifting a heavy burden from the West and robbing the Soviets of one of their most formidable charges against the West. The emerging nations in the Third World, strengthened by the imperatives of interdependence, have thrust upon the table a new agenda of grievances and have demanded a response from all the industrial nations of the North.

In sum, the world as America enters its third century remains complex and potentially dangerous; but it is a radically changing world, creating new challenges, but also new opportunities for U.S. foreign policy. The central point of attention could be the Third World.

b. On the value of the Third World for U.S. interests

It would be very difficult to argue against the proposition that the Third World has great value for American interests. The United States has a political interest in maintaining an acceptable international system in which the Third World must necessarily be a considerable part. Related to this is the interest in preventing Soviet incrementalism from eroding the perception and the reality of American power abroad. For an accumulation of political losses in marginal areas could in the course of time have important consequences nearer the heart of the Soviet-American rivalry.

Economically, United States-Third World interests are closely intertwined. The West, especially the United States, controls the world market and the technology upon which the Third World depends. This factor, together with American dependence and that of their allies on raw materials from the Third World, and their collective concern for expanding markets and sources of investments, suggest the degree of this binding interest. Economic interdependency creates a unique relationship based on necessity rather than sentimentalism.

The Third World has also a two-dimensional strategic value for the United States: one of control over vital sea lanes and raw materials; the other of denying Soviet control. Requirements for bases, ports of call, and all the infrastructure for maintaining a global naval presence assume a favorable political relationship with many Third World nations. In short, Mahan's principles of seapower still have relevance in the nuclear age for the unchanging mission of the Navy; namely, to maintain the freedom of the seas.

c. Parameters of policy and limits of involvement

Certain realities seem evident in considering the parameters of U.S. policy and the limits of involvement particularly in the Third World:

- The United States faces a changing world order of great complexity and uncertainty;
- The Soviet threat is officially judged to be real both in the short term and the long term;

- Problems in Soviet-American relations extend beyond strictly bilateral relations; they are global, and the fundamentally conflicting interests of each virtually preordains continued superpower involvement;
- A fairly close relationship between the United States and many countries of the Third World seems possible given the imperatives of interdependence and the convergence of many interests;
- The Vietnam syndrome of withdrawal from globalism (some have termed it "neo-isolationism") seems to persist, creating continued doubts and uncertainties on the limits of foreign policy;
- The Angolan experience demonstrated the limits of détente, revealing Moscow's intention of attacking targets of opportunity in the Third World and building up regional pressures, while ignoring its pledge of restraint to the United States, for the sake of furthering its revolutionary goals;
- The Soviet Union remains firmly committed to the pursuit of its long established goals in the Third World; and
- Continued expansion of Soviet influence and power on a global scale raises the transcending issue of what should be the limits of American involvement abroad.

Given these realities, it seems clear that isolationism, even a substantially reduced national profile or a resort to what might be termed "selective isolationism," is not a viable option. The United States has a role to play in the Third World: this is an imperative; but some balance will have to be struck and a consensus reached in the Nation somewhere between the excessive globalism of the 1950's and 1960's and the excessive isolationism of the 1920's and 1930's.⁷⁵

d. Option of "Selective Involvement"

(1) Linkage between containment and globalism

If the isolationism and the globalism of yesteryear are not viable options for the Nation's Third World policy, then perhaps the option of "selective involvement" might strike a reasonable point between the extremes of the two. Such a posture would more likely be supported

⁷⁵ Looking forward to the 1980's, the panel of foreign policy/national security specialists at the National Security Affairs Conferences, speculated on probable trends that might affect US-Soviet interaction in the Third World. The following specific trends were identified:

(1) The adversarial character of US-Soviet rivalry would very likely intensify in part because both superpowers believe that their response to each other in key Third World regions will have consequences in other regions and on their global rivalry.

(2) The continuation of instabilities in various regions will involve the superpowers. The internal stability of the local regimes is likely to remain precarious. The Middle East, Southern Africa, and East Africa were cited as areas where local tensions would remain high.

(3) Arms levels in volatile Third World regions will, for various reasons remain high, and as such constitute a potential exacerbating factor in crisis situations—more likely to cause superpower confrontation as threshold weapons capabilities become involved.

(4) The Soviet capability, and willingness to use that capability to advance strategic and political objectives, would increase. A few panelists would not rule out worst-case scenarios, suggesting that the USSR was seeking a war-winning capability and that it might be tempted, possibly through the use of amply provisioned surrogates, to take full advantage of any opportunity to press Soviet imperial ambitions in such areas as the Persian Gulf or East Africa.

(5) The combination of rapid advances in weapons technology, the accelerating pace of obsolescence and high attrition rates on the battlefield serve to heighten a client's dependence on a supplier power, which may be prompted to use this position to try to wield more influence over a client than was the case heretofore.

(6) Internal cleavages and local animosities with spill-over possibilities will likely generate regional conflicts involving the superpowers.

(7) Overall, China was not expected to be a major actor in the Third World in the next decade.

(8) Economically, Third World countries will look increasingly to the United States for food, technology, and investment rather than to the Soviet Union. This could serve as an important basis for improved U.S. leverage in priority areas. (National Defense University, National Security Affairs Conference, 1976, pp. 101-102.)

by American public opinion.⁷⁶ The dangers of isolationism are recorded in the history of the interwar period; the dangers of unreasoned containment and excessive globalism are self-evident from recent history. For, however valid this concept of containment may have seemed in 1947, the fact is, as Robert W. Tucker, a specialist in American foreign policy, observed, that "by a dialectic as old as the history of statecraft, expansion proved to be the other side of the coin of containment"; "to contain the expansion of others, or what was perceived as such, it became necessary to expand ourselves. In this manner, the course of containment became the course of empire."⁷⁷

(2) *Absence of Third World policy*

All the more necessary therefore, that the United States formulate a Third World policy, particularly since American public opinion, as the noted American specialist on foreign policy and presently adviser to President Jimmy Carter on national security affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski observed, seemed potentially ready to sustain "a constructive global attitude."⁷⁸ The Soviets are not likely to wait for American policymakers to make up their minds; they have their perceptions; their goals; and their seasoned methods. Nor are the mounting problems of the Third World likely to wait. Thus far, to repeat Rothstein's complaint, the United States has not a policy but "a set of reactions" and "tactical improvisations." And as George Kennan similarly complained a year ago, "* * * this government has still to evolve principles and methods for asserting its influence in overseas territories which would save it from the sort of failures it has experienced in the past—not just in Vietnam but elsewhere as well."⁷⁹

(3) *Soviet Union as one component in comprehensive Third World policy*

A Third World policy would seem in very general terms to require a design with an extended time frame, structured not just as a crisis response to perceived or real Soviet expansionist thrusts as in the Angolan manner to be manipulated accordingly—the Soviets are only one part of this vast, complex problem—but as a longer term projection into the future of the Nation's interests, desires, expected outcomes, and goals in the Third World—a policy that would help close the gap between the political libertarianism of the American tradition and the economic egalitarianism of the underdeveloped world and bind the strands of converging interests.

Since the Soviet Union is only one component in the overall requirements of a Third World policy, such a policy ought to differentiate between the rhetoric of Soviet statements on goals and the objective

⁷⁶ A public opinion survey by Potomac Associates of internationalist/isolationist trends during 1964–1975 shows the progressive tendency of "Total Internationalist" to decrease from 65 percent in 1964 to 42 percent in 1974 with an increase to 45 percent in 1975. The "Total Isolationist" trend increased from 8 percent in 1964 to 23 percent in 1964 with a decrease to 20 percent in 1975. The percentage of "Mixed" views increased from 27 percent in 1964 to 35 percent in 1974–1975. Zbigniew Brzezinski interpreted this and other polls as closing out the option of isolationism. "In brief, despite the sharpening cleavage within public opinion," he wrote, "isolationism was not the dominant mood. Indeed, the data even suggested a potential for a constructive global attitude and it indicated relatively little predisposition in favor of a crusade either on behalf of capitalism or of liberal democracy. * * *" (Brzezinski, Zbigniew. *America in a Hostile World*. Foreign Policy, No. 23, summer 1976, pp. 87–89.)

⁷⁷ Quoted in, Wright, C. Ben. Mr. "X" and Containment. *Slavic Review*, vol. 35, March 1976, p. 31.

⁷⁸ Brzezinski, *America in a Hostile World*, p. 88.

⁷⁹ Kennan, George F. Containment of the Kremlin: A Response by George F. Kennan to Secretary of State Kissinger's Speech of Feb. 3, 1976. *The Washington Post*, Feb. 16, 1976, p. A15.

reality of their achieving those goals, carefully weighing American interests in the calculus. The American experience in recent years in dealing with the Soviet Union (and for that matter communism generally) as a rival in the Third World has emphasized the need for a better balance between the focus on symbolic differences and a realistic assessment of this Nation's needs and interests as well as those of the Third World.⁸⁰

(4) *Kennan's policy prescription*

Instructive as general guidelines, particularly in instances of counteracting Soviet expansionist pressures is Kennan's policy prescription published as a response to Kissinger's speech of February 3, 1976, in which the Secretary explained the need to thwart Soviet expansionism. Kennan acknowledged that the United States and the Soviet Union "must find means of dealing with individual conflicts of interest between the two peoples by means short of all-out war, or even of the serious risk of war." But, when it came to "this complicated problem of Soviet expansionism, or the appearance of it," there were, he said, "certain nuances and reservations that could usefully be added to what Dr. Kissinger had to say." Kennan cited four:

First of all, it is important to recognize that not all places and regions are of equal importance from this standpoint. There are some, such as Korea and Cuba, that are of high strategic importance in the sense that they affect the interests of this country and other great powers in an intimate and sensitive way. There are others which have what might be called a local strategic importance, especially from the standpoint of their immediate neighbors, but are of minor significance from the standpoint of the world balance of power. The two must not be equated.

⁸⁰ The policy of foreign policy/national security specialists at the National Security Affairs Conference in July 1976 discussed the options for the United States in the Third World. Since the focus of the panel was on the 1980s and given the diversity of the Third World which involved innumerable unanticipated changes, they proceeded to "make a few general statements concerning U.S. policy options that would have broader, long-term relevance." The following recommended options were suggested:

- (1) The United States should try to promote and assist democratic governments and societies.
- (2) The U.S. Government should work more closely with the private sector to coordinate its relations with LDCs whose governments are suspicious of private enterprise and whose economies are centrally directed.
- (3) Where feasible, the U.S. should encourage its allies to play a greater role in the Third World.
- (4) The U.S. should be more selective in the choice of Third World countries on which it would concentrate commitments and assistance.
- (5) Multi-lateral forms of economic assistance should be explored.
- (6) The U.S. Government should respond more forthrightly, in appropriate forums and ways, to unjustified attacks on the U.S. and its policies.
- (7) There should be a re-exploration of linking Soviet activities in the Third World with improvements in U.S.-Soviet relationships.

The report of the Chairman of the Plenary Session and the Rapporteur of the panel discussion continued with the following commentary on the divergency in views:

"There were, of course, understandable areas of disagreement. In particular, several participants felt that the panel concentrated unduly on the economic aspects of United States policy options. These panelists suggested that the United States has, in fact, essentially only two options: (1) to engage the Soviet Union throughout the Third World; or, (2) not to engage the Soviet Union. According to this line of argumentation, not to engage the Soviets has the same effect as losing an engagement. Not only are the U.S. interests in the specific area of contention sacrificed, but the other nations of the Third World are spectators, making judgments that affect U.S. interests in many other regions. The point made by these participants is that if the United States does not engage the Soviet Union in the Third World, Washington abdicates its position as a superpower.

"Another approach to the determination of policy options that was suggested was referred to as an 'averaging strategy.' This approach is predicated upon a belief that policymakers in Washington cannot know and understand the political situation in each of the Third World countries. As a consequence, it is impossible for U.S. policymakers to base their decisions on sufficient knowledge or understanding of the relevant political forces. Therefore, the U.S. requires the development of a set of rules which will, in general, produce more often than not, results favorable to the United States.

"Another perspective on the development of policy options was suggested by the observation that U.S. decisionmakers will find it difficult to implement policies because of the constraints placed on the government by the limits of U.S. power and resources and by domestic politics. Therefore, it is important to realize and acknowledge that there are limits on what the U.S. can accomplish in the Third World in the years ahead."

(Rubinstein and Harrison, *The Third World and U.S.-Soviet Relationships*, National Security Affairs Conference, July 1976, pp. 102-103.)

Second, one is obliged to consider the nature of such gains as a great power—in this instance, the Soviet Union—might hope to make through an attempt to establish influence in a region far from its shores. There are many variations of the colonial and neocolonial relationship—and not all of them are greatly advantageous to the dominant external power. Short of total occupation of the territory and suppression of the indigenous government, the attempt to turn the resources of that territory to the exclusive benefit of the outside power is subject to a host of complications. Available evidence suggests that Cuba, for example, has been for years a financial stone around the Soviet neck. While it is certainly important to prevent the Soviet Union or any other great power from gaining positions on other continents from which world peace could be threatened or world stability seriously impaired, there is no reason the United States should feel itself obliged to protect any other power from the assumption of responsibilities that are going to be an awkward burden to it.

Third, most careful attention has to be given to the nature of the tools or the allies we have to work with. What happens if direct intervention is barred and our efforts are restricted to the attempt to assist an existing political faction in a foreign territory? The limits of the quality of that faction as a military and political competitor within the territory affected become the limits of the effectiveness of our own action. If there is any one factor, the ignoring of which has gone farthest to frustrate previous efforts of this sort on our part, it is this. It is not everyone who can be made successful, even with the greatest effort of outside aid.

Finally, there is the recognition that what we wish will not, in many instances, be anything we can hope to achieve with our efforts alone. For this, we will need the support of world, or at least regional, opinion; and we must be careful not to forfeit this by casting ourselves in the same light as our opponents. People are of course sensitive to the show of strength, but they are sensitive to other things, too.⁸¹

(5) Other questions for other regions

Looking beyond the Soviet rivalry, it would seem that American policy must address itself not only to the larger and more general question of determining the limits of the Nation's role in the Third World but also in determining what that role should be in specific regional areas. What should its policy be in Southeast Asia where historically Americans have been ambivalent and uncertain as to the extent of involvement, reacting only with a military response in moments of crisis? In Africa, where it lacks an historical tradition of diplomatic involvement and where the perception of its interests remains unclear and uncertain? And in the matter of international development as a larger international problem, where the growing needs of the Third World have been met by a waning commitment from the industrial nations of the North?

(6) Essential criteria for Third World policy

(a) Criterion of economic utility.—The essential criteria for a U.S. Third World policy that seeks security of vital material resources as a primary national interest and stability in the Third World as one of its long-range goals (in contrast to the Soviet approach of encouraging instability) would appear to fall into four categories: the economic, the military/strategic, the political/ideological, and that concerned with timing.

If, indeed, the world is at the threshold of a new era of "interdependence" in which the resource rich Third World has gained new power and political leverage on the international scene, then the criterion of economic utility would seem to take on a new importance and accordingly assume a high priority. The energy crisis of 1973 exposed U.S. vulnerability (and that of its allies) to dependency on Third World material resources. Though the United States has

⁸¹ Kennan, *Containment of the Kremlin*, A15.

abundant resources, it is not self-sufficient; and its allies are far less favored. This economic reality, along with intensive U.S. involvement in Third World investments, magnify the importance of the Third World to U.S. interests on two counts: (1) it enhances the potentialities of Third World restriction on or manipulation of supply to the detriment of U.S. interests; and (2) it exposes U.S. investments abroad to the threat of nationalization.⁸²

In brief, what makes the criterion of economic utility important is the linkage between U.S. raw material needs (also that of its allies) and dependency upon Third World suppliers. And it is in this linkage where considerations on Third World policy might begin.

(b) *Criterion of military/strategic utility.*—Concern for raw material suppliers suggests the second criterion, that of military/strategic utility. Preservation of the sea lanes takes on a new importance in this era of interdependence and nuclear standoff between the superpowers. The Third World is increasingly looking to the oceans, and strategy seems to be shifting away from Europe and toward the Third World, from the consumer to the supplier. The United States has an advantage in the flexibility of exterior lines; the Soviet Union, still continental-bound geographically with limited access to the seas, lacks this flexibility.

The central point in the criterion of military/strategic utility is the need to maintain control of the sea lanes and the flexibility that comes with command of exterior lines in order to have open access to raw materials in the Third World. In particular, "choke points," many of which lie along the Third World littoral as this study has pointed out, take on a new importance.

Thus, the criterion of military/strategic utility is a vital part of the linkage between U.S. material needs and dependency on Third World suppliers. Considerations on this linkage, focusing specifically on Third World countries that adjoin critical sea lanes and "choke points", suggest the second step in devising a Third World policy. A secondary consideration might be changes in U.S. overseas forces based on new recognition of raw materials and sea lanes.

(c) *Criterion of political/ideological acceptability.*—The third criterion is political/ideological acceptability. The changing requirements of interdependence place a premium on recognizing and accepting pluralism as a major characteristic of the Third World. In the past, American perceptions were highly colored by alignments in the cold war, though even then they demonstrated on occasion an accommodating flexibility. Diffusion of power and decolonization have radically changed heretofore clearly identifiable categories. And variations on kinds of socialism emerging in the Third World have rendered that category even more ambiguous.

Yet, Americans have a special political/ideological preference for those who respect democratic principles. This preference has been made most emphatic by the Carter administration's stress on human

⁸² The vulnerability of the United States to pressures from resource rich Third World countries upon which it depends is increased by the fact that 15 of the 26 companies from the advanced industrial countries involved in the foreign extraction and production of oil, copper, aluminum, and nickel have their headquarters in the United States. Nationalization, or threat of nationalization, is always the ultimate recourse in a changing bargaining relationship, and for the United States the cost could be considerable. U.S. corporations have invested some \$30 billion in LDCs and these investments are growing at about 10 percent a year. "Confiscation of its investments in the Third World," wrote Bergsten, "could thus create major costs for the United States." Much of this investment, he went on, is in raw materials; so "Third World action could affect the United States doubly (as it already has in oil) by both raising our costs and reducing our earnings." Thus dependency inevitably creates vulnerability. (Whelan, Brain Drain, p. 263.)

rights. Hence, the criterion of political/ideological acceptability could present difficulties for those considering future Third World policy.

(d) *Criterion of timing.*—The criterion of timing suggests assessments on the degrees of urgency and the setting of priorities when the other criteria should accordingly be met. An historical example would be the case of Secretary of State William Henry Seward who in the 1860's advanced a strategic design as a matter of public policy that required the acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands, a canal across Central America, and island possessions in the Caribbean. In the pursuit of his policy Seward met all the criteria suggested here, except one: his timing was out-of-sync with the mood of the American people; he was rejected; and not until the turn of the century were the American people prepared to accept what was then a far-reaching strategic design.

Planners of future Third World policy face the far more complex task of judging American interests selectively and globally. And equally important is the task of planning within an extended time frame, structured, as noted above, not just as a crisis response in the Angolan manner, but as a longer term projection of the Nation's interests, goals, and expected outcomes in the Third World. The criteria noted here suggests a possible framework for guidance.

e. Assets and advantages for United States

Whatever the design of policy, the United States approaches the Third World with significant assets and advantages over its Soviet competitor. The United States and its Western allies control the world market. They alone can really satisfy such Third World needs as preferential tariffs and higher prices for raw materials. As Robert Gilpin noted, "The scale, diversity, and dynamics of the American economy will continue to place the United States at the center of the international economic system. * * * The universal desire for access to the huge American market, the inherent technological dynamism of the American economy, and America's additional strength in both agriculture and resources * * * provide a cement sufficient to hold the world economy together and to keep the United States at its center."⁸³ The United States also holds the commanding heights of world science and technology so vital for the economic development the Third World is striving for. The United States has been rightly called, "the graduate school of the Third World," providing the skilled manpower needs for development.

The American penchant for pragmatism and flexibility enables a heterogeneous and wide-ranging approach to the Third World and its problems, unlike the rigid, narrowly constricted doctrinal approach of the Soviets. America's strength lies in its acceptance of diversity and pluralism; its tolerance for the unlike and mismatched; its emphasis upon rationality and a free spirit of inquiry; its faith in science and technology as tools of progress; its belief in man's individuality and in freedom of the human spirit;⁸⁴ and its historic commitment to the principles of international cooperation within the community of nations.

⁸³ Quoted in, Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 94.

⁸⁴ Bayless Manning elaborates on the ideological appeal of the United States in, *Goals, Ideology and Foreign Policy*. Foreign Affairs, vol. 54, January 1976, pp. 271-284.

Brzezinski contends that the broad historical message of America still retains much of its validity particularly the "primacy of liberty" and the "centrality of pluralism." "On the global scale," Brzezinski writes, "pluralism means diversity and not a march toward a homogeneous world based on a single ideological model." That message remains valid particularly with the emergence of some 150-odd sovereign nation-states. "Tied to more specific proposals for global cooperation," he concluded, "it could serve as the point of departure for a relevant concept of a new and more diversified international system."⁸⁵

In contrast, the Soviets have been saddled with an outdated ideology that has become petrified in an unusable past and a repressive political system that is ruled by the heavy hand of an autocratic bureaucracy. In Brzezinski's judgment, "America still provides to most people in the world the most attractive social *condition* (even if not the *model*) and that remains America's special strength;" while the Soviet Union "is not even a rival in this respect."⁸⁶

Soviet charges against Western imperialism and colonialism had no doubt an appeal to the Third World in the era of decolonization, but the world has entered a new historical phase, perhaps even a watershed in great power policy towards the Third World; that argument has been spent; the needs of the Third World are not irrelevant reminders of an unjust colonial past, but economic development and recognition of a changing international economic order in which the industrial North has a responsibility to the deprived and depressed South.

In sum, the Soviet Union offers the Third World the past; the United States offers it the future.⁸⁷

f. Some future requirements

A prime requirement of this future would seem to be a vision of the American role in the Third World, a policy to give it structure, and a broad-based democratic sanction to give it strength and authority. Prof. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., a U.S. foreign policy specialist at Harvard University, advised that in any policy embracing the issues of interdependence which invariably involve the Third World, Congress has a "vital" role to play. Such issues encompass foreign and domestic matters. The congressional process would serve as a democratizing and unifying function: it would legitimize what Nye called "hard trade-offs" in many of these issues; its hearings would provide a structured public involvement; it would in all help to create the consensus needed for an effective foreign policy. "The central consideration in organizing for interdependence," Nye cautioned with respect to the diversity of interests and concerned groups and agencies, "is to insure that collectively shared interests prevail over narrowly defined interests, and that both domestic and foreign constituencies are taken into account."⁸⁸

In general, the best instincts of this country and its basic national interests would seem to require it to play a larger, creative role within the community of nations, particularly among those nations less

⁸⁵ Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 94-95.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 95.

⁸⁷ For a comparative analysis of the Western and Soviet approaches to development, see, Zagladin, V. and I. Frolov. Global Problems of the Present Days. *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 16, Nov. 5, 1976, pp. 93-104, in, FBIS, Daily Report, Soviet Union, vol. 3, annex 74, Dec. 15, 1976, pp. 2-12 and Dec. 16, 1976, pp. 2-3.


⁸⁸ Nye, op. cit., p. 127.

economically advantaged. As Brzezinski, philosophized, "For all its shortcomings, America remains the globally creative and innovative society. It impacts on the lifestyles, mores, and aspirations of other societies to a degree not matched today by any other system." The overall impact of America, he concluded, is "to stimulate change."⁸⁹

Determining the degree to which the United States will continue to "stimulate change" and to play the role of a "globally creative and innovative society"—that is, the limits of policy and involvement abroad—would seem to be a task of considerable importance as this Nation enters its third century. This is the underlying meaning of this study, and the basic question which it raises. Perhaps the admonition of F. Scott Fitzgerald to his post-World War I generation still has relevance to this post-Vietnam generation: "* * * we're dawdling along. My idea is that we've got to go very much faster."

⁸⁹ Brzezinski, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-92.

ESSENTIAL UNITED STATES FOREIGN TRADE ROUTES



TRADE ROUTE	U.S. COASTAL AREA	FOREIGN AREA
1	Atlantic	East Coast South America
2	Atlantic	West Coast South America
4	Atlantic	Caribbean
5	North Atlantic	Scandinavia and Baltic
6	North Atlantic	United Kingdom and Continent
7	North Atlantic	United Kingdom and Continent
8	North Atlantic	United Kingdom and Continent
9	North Atlantic	United Kingdom and Continent
10	North Atlantic	United Kingdom and Continent
11	South Atlantic	United Kingdom and Europe North of Portugal

TRADE ROUTE	U.S. COASTAL AREA	FOREIGN AREA
12	Atlantic	Far East
13	South Atlantic and Gulf	Mediterranean and Black Sea
14	Atlantic Service 1	West Africa
14	Gulf Service 2	West Africa
15-A	Atlantic	South and East Africa
15-B	Gulf	South and East Africa
16	Atlantic and Gulf	Australia-New Zealand
17	Atlantic and Gulf	Indonesia-Malaysia
18	Atlantic and Gulf	India, Persian Gulf, and Red Sea


TRADE ROUTE	U.S. COASTAL AREA	FOREIGN AREA
19	Gulf	Caribbean and East Coast Mexico
20	Gulf	East Coast South America
21	Gulf	United Kingdom and Continent
22	Gulf	Far East
23	Pacific	Caribbean and East Coast Mexico
24	Pacific	East Coast South America
25	Pacific	West Coast Mexico, Central and South America
26	Pacific	Western Europe
27	Pacific	Australia-New Zealand
28	Pacific	Southwest Asia, Red Sea and Gulf of Aden

TRADE ROUTE	U.S. COASTAL AREA	FOREIGN AREA
29	Pacific	Far East
31	Gulf	West Coast South America

TRADE AREA	U.S. COASTAL AREA	FOREIGN AREA
I	Great Lakes	Western Europe
II	Great Lakes	West, South and East Africa
III	Great Lakes	Caribbean, East and West Coasts South America
IV	Great Lakes	Mediterranean, Red Sea, India and Pakistan
V	Great Lakes	Far East, Indonesia-Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand

SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD

Economic and Military Aid; Naval Presence



Soviet Military Aid, 1955-1974 and Soviet Economic Aid, 1954-1976
(in millions of U.S. dollars)

RECIPIENT COUNTRIES	MILITARY AID, 1955-1974	ECONOMIC AID, 1954-1976	TOTAL MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID
ASIA			
Afghanistan	490	1,251	1,741
Bangladesh	35	300	335
Burma	negl.	16	16
Cambodia	10	25	35
Cyprus	25	—	25
India	1,400	1,943	3,343
Indonesia	1,095	114	1,209
Iran	850	750	1,600
Iraq	1,600	699	2,299
Laos	5	1	6
Lebanon	3	—	3
Maldives	negl.	—	negl.
Nepal	—	20	20
Pakistan	60	652	712
Sri Lanka	10	95	105
Syria	2,100	417	2,517
Turkey	—	1,180	1,180
Yemen (Aden)	80	39	119
Yemen (Sana)	80	98	178
AFRICA			
Algeria	350	715	1,065
Angola	—	10 a/	10 a/
Benin	—	5	5
Cameroon	—	8	8
Cape Verde	—	b/	b/
Central African Republic	—	2	2
Chad	—	10	10
Congo	15	14	29
Egypt	3,450	1,300	4,750
Equatorial Guinea	2	1	3
Ethiopia	—	105	105
Ghana	10	93	103
Guinea	35	201	236
Guinea-Bissau	—	14	14
Kenya	—	48	48
Mali	10	86	96
Mauritania	—	5	5
Morocco	45	98	143
Mozambique	—	2	2
Niger	—	2	2
Nigeria	10	7	17
Rwanda	—	1	1
Sao Tome and Principe	—	b/	b/
Senegal	—	9	9
Sierra Leone	negl.	28	28
Somalia	115	154	269
Sudan	65	64	129
Tanzania	5	20	25
Tunisia	—	82	82
Uganda	20	16	36
Upper Volta	—	1	1
Zambia	—	6	6
LATIN AMERICA			
Argentina	—	245	245
Bolivia	—	31	31
Brazil	—	83	83
Chile	—	238	238
Colombia	—	10	10
Mexico	—	b/	b/
Peru	35	28	63
Uruguay	—	20	20
Total Aid	12,010	11,362	23,372

a/ Estimate
b/ Agreement signed, but information on amount of aid extended not available.

Sources: Military Aid, 1955-1974, U.S. Dept. of State. Communist Aid and Trade to LDC's in 1974. Economic Aid, 1954-1976, Material provided by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

APPENDIX

NOTES ON SOVIET NAVY'S USE OF PORT FACILITIES IN THE THIRD WORLD¹

1. The appearance of the Soviet Navy in oceans distant from homewaters has inevitably meant visits to the ports of the Third World and use of foreign shore facilities. Although the Soviet Navy is in large measure self-sufficient in its logistical practices, the Soviets have made serious, high level efforts to obtain regular and dependable access to naval facilities in Third World countries. Soviet writers carefully eschew the use of the word "base" in discussions of these arrangements and host countries probably do not acknowledge any Soviet extraterritorial rights; however, the Soviets have in fact sought to construct and maintain facilities for their own exclusive use.²

2. In the past the Soviets had continual access to facilities in Albania from 1958 to 1961 and in Egypt, principally in Alexandria, from 1967 to the spring of 1976. Current port facilities over which the Soviets have some degree of control are located in Berbera, Somalia and Cienfuegos, Cuba. The Soviets have built several facilities at Berbera including barracks, a communications relay facility, an airfield, and a missile handling and support element.³ The facilities in Cuba include a housing and recreation area; submarine nets are positioned there and a Soviet rescue tug is normally berthed there.

3. There are also facilities utilized by Soviet naval aircraft in Somalia, Cuba and Guinea. Sites in Cuba and Guinea have permitted the Soviet Navy to conduct aerial reconnaissance of Atlantic sea lanes and U.S. carrier transits while facilities in Somalia permit surveillance of much of the Indian Ocean. The Soviet presence in these areas is also related to Moscow's economic and political support for these countries.

4. The Soviet Navy is currently using ports in Syria and Yugoslavia for ship repair and overhaul. The Syrian ports of Latakia and Tartus are quite crowded, however, and only a few naval ships can be accommodated at any one time. Under a law passed in 1974 the Yugoslav Government permits foreign ships to undergo repair under strict conditions. The Soviets have taken advantage of this opportunity for the repair of naval ships and are probably seeking to increase their use of Yugoslav facilities.

5. As is the case with other navies, Soviet ships take advantage of visits to foreign ports to obtain fresh produce and water, to undertake some minor repairs and to allow their crews liberty ashore (although their navymen are always under much heavier supervision than is customary for Western sailors). Routine port visits are scheduled for good will and to demonstrate Soviet power while visits during crises serve to display support to a friendly government or to deter outside intervention. Soviet naval writers proudly point to the role of their ships in promoting the USSR's state interests—claiming to have visited 150 ports in 65 countries during the years 1969–1975; in 1975, a Soviet admiral has written,

¹ U.S. Department of the Navy, February 1977.

² See George S. Dragnich, "The Soviet Union's Quest for Access to Naval Facilities in Egypt Prior to the June War of 1967," Professional Paper 127 Arlington, Va.: Center for Naval Analyses, 1974, pp. 53–54.

³ A full description of these facilities appeared in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations: *Report to the Committee on Appropriation, U.S. Senate by Members of the Fact-Finding Team Sent to Somalia at the Invitation of the President of Somalia: Visit to the Democratic Republic of Somalia*, 94th Cong, 1st sess., 1975 (committee print) and U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services: *Soviet Military Capability in Berbera, Somalia: Report of Senator Bartlett to the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate: Soviet Military Capability in Berbera, Somalia*; 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975 (committee print).

Soviet naval ships visited 82 ports in 50 nations and more than 80,000 seamen, petty officers, and officers went ashore. Certain ports in the Third World are used on a fairly regular basis by combatants for logistical purposes. Besides the ports previously mentioned, these include Aden, PDRY; Umm Qasr and Basra in Iraq; and various ports in the Mediterranean littoral.⁴ The Soviets have also secured bunkering rights in Mauritius and Singapore for naval auxiliaries. These countries cannot be said to contain "Soviet facilities" but their utilization on a recurring basis is an important aspect in supporting extended Soviet operations. Furthermore, in many cases Soviet civilian ships can obtain fresh water and fresh produce from littoral countries on a normal basis and transfer them to combatants at sea.

6. The Soviets have also established fleet anchorages in international waters at several locations in the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. In the Mediterranean, they have anchorages in the Gulf of Sallum, Gulf of Hamamet, Alboran Basin, and at Kithira. Indian Ocean anchorages include those near Socotra Island, the Comoro Islands, the Chagos Archipelago, and the Cargados Carajos Shoals.

7. Even at current levels of operations, access to facilities for reprovisioning, crew rest and minor repairs is highly important for sustaining long-term operations. The heavy economic and political investment that the Soviets make to obtain such access may indicate a concern for more extensive operations in distant areas which would require heavier reliance on foreign facilities. In addition, regular use of a Third World country's port facilities, or more significantly, facilities under Soviet control as in Somalia or Cuba, encourages a feeling of a "mutuality of interest" or an implicit or explicit understanding of superpower protection in the event of local crises. Conversely, it might tie the Soviets to a local client or ally where the latter is involved in the pursuit of its own interests. In any event, increased Soviet political and military involvement in the Third World is occurring and distinctions between protection of Soviet strategic interests and promotion of Moscow's political interests have become blurred. The Soviet Navy has become only one, albeit a principal, instrument of a global Soviet policy.

⁴ These include Annaba, Algeria in addition to Bizerte and some smaller ports in Tunisia.

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