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THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT'S FIGHT
AGAINST YOUTH CRIME:

A REVIEW OF THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION OF THE LAW
ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION

PREPARED BY ROBERT W. WOODSON, CONSULTANT
TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME

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I. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This report on the Justice Department's fight against youth crime will examine the program objectives of the Office of Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP or Program) with a view toward assessing the extent to which congressional intent as expressed in the Juvenile Justice Act of 1974 (the Act) is being met. According to the Act, OJJDP is to protect the rights and well-being of both America's youth and its adult population by devising programs designed to control and prevent juvenile delinquency.

This study was conducted with a methodology which involved: (1) review of the legislative history of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, (2) examination of OJJDP program initiatives, (3) review of indigenous programs which have evidenced a capacity to control and prevent violent youth crime, and (4) analysis of the flow of OJJDP funds to grantees and contractors in terms of the seriousness of the youth delinquency targeted by these programs.

Tracing the flow of money tells the story. Both the impetus for the OJJDP legislation and the Agency's policy pronouncements focus on serious youth crime. Yet, OJJDP's funding pattern reveals that the majority of its money goes to the less juvenile delinquent populations in the country. The most severe and most difficult youth crime problems occur at one end of the problem/program continuum while the OJJDP program and research efforts are being concentrated at the other.

A review of the Program's budget for fiscal year 1978 and the flow of these expenditures to research and technical assistance grants and contracts reveals an overall OJJDP emphasis on advocacy, diversion and de-institutionalization—strategies which do not approach the more deeply rooted problems of the most serious youth crime. Additionally, while greater percentages of low-income whites and minority youngsters are to be found in higher at-risk populations,¹ the most popularly funded programs are those which actually give little or no attention to the needs of these youngsters.

There are communities in the country, however, in which violent youth have been reached with the result that the youth involved have ceased most of their violent acts and are now engaging in positive activities in the service of their own communities. For the most part, these activities are informal, unstructured, and un-analyzed by the Federal government.

In Fiscal Year 1978, OJJDP appropriations were \$100 million, to be divided among the three major divisions: \$65 million going to the states in formula grants, \$10 million to research, and \$25 million to spe-

¹The term "at-risk" refers to youngsters living in areas of the country characterized by high crime, severe unemployment, and social and economic decline. These youngsters run a greater risk of getting into trouble.

cial emphasis projects. Special emphasis had an additional \$43 million in carry-over funds diverted from unexpended formula grant monies. Initially, special emphasis funds were slated for new and innovative approaches to the youth crime fight. These programs were to support the positive functioning of major social institutions. It was acknowledged by OJJDP policy makers that the control and prevention of youth crime could not be achieved without involvement of youth, parents, and community forces. The flow of these grants reveals basic inconsistencies between the policy pronouncements and program activities of the Agency. In too many cases, direct service grants went to states with relatively small numbers of youth in need of the services while the larger states with higher concentrations of juveniles in trouble received limited grants.

In the State of Washington, for example, there were 430,000 juveniles ages 14-19 as of July 1, 1977. The State received a total of \$4,652,286 (an amount which far exceeds their formula grant allotment) from the formula grant office to enable them to carry out the separation and de-institutionalization of status offenders. By contrast, the State of Pennsylvania with a youth population between 14-19 years of age of more than 1,319,000 received a total of \$444,629 in direct service grants. More ironically, an advocacy grant of \$1,181,811 was awarded the Juvenile Justice Law Center in Philadelphia, in part so that the Center's staff can "visit and inspect various juvenile correction and detention facilities to ensure that youth are being properly cared for." In effect, Pennsylvania received more money to research the effects of juvenile justice anticrime programs than it did to combat the problems.

OJJDP's programs emphasize de-institutionalization to the detriment of the more serious violent youth crime problems and, in effect, fail to address adequately the fundamental Congressional intent to reduce those forms of youth crime most threatening to the American public.

With regard to the formula grants to states, there is a disturbing pattern of unexpended appropriations in this area. During the 3-year period from 1975 to 1977, a total of \$76.8 million was awarded to the states in formula grants. Only \$12.9 million was expended during this entire period with the balance of \$63.9 million or 83 percent of the total formula grant funds left unexpended for the youth crime fight. A more recent report indicates that from 1975 to November, 1978, a total of \$181 million was given to the states, only \$37 million of which was expended. This left a balance of \$144 million lying fallow in the banks.

This problem of unexpended funds raises serious questions about the efficacy of continuing to institute national initiatives whereby program priorities are established in Washington and imposed on the states. Centralizing the authority to design solutions for local jurisdictions has led to misplaced priorities and misguided funding in the Federal juvenile delinquency program. Furthermore, the practice of diverting funds from the special emphasis initiative to use them to subsidize further the state juvenile justice bureaucracies subverts the original purpose of the special emphasis office. This practice merely expands the criminal justice bureaucracy and supports the youth service agencies which largely address the nonhigh-risk youth population.

The bleakest fact revealed by demographic research, however, is the fact that while the overall American crime rate is expected to decrease over the next decade due to a decline in the birth rate, the crime rate for minority youngsters may not be reduced due to a differing birth rate pattern. Birth rates for minority groups have been such that the number of such youngsters between the ages of 15 and 17 during the foreseeable future will decrease more slowly than those for the general population.

The implication of this finding is that, in the 1980's a greater concentration of minority youth will be in the "at-risk" population, with the potential consequence that an even greater number of minority youth will be handled by juvenile and adult correctional facilities than is currently the case.

CONCLUSIONS

The threatening consequences of the current OJJDP program emphasis as indicated by its program initiatives and funding pattern is that the juvenile justice system is evolving in a manner that will force large numbers of minority youth into the adult corrections system. While this trend is emerging, there are reports of indigenous efforts that are finding answers to the problems of the more serious youth offenders. Yet, these community-based organizations are little understood and insufficiently funded by OJJDP. Congress and the public expect OJJDP's programs to deal effectively with the more serious youth population, and when they fail to do so, the conclusion is often reached that these youth should be treated as adults. The effect of this is to deny these youth the right to be treated in accordance with their status.

In brief, LEAA is piloting the demise of the poor and minority youngsters in this nation by pursuing policies and programs that are fostering the development of a separate juvenile justice system: One for the white, middle-income youngsters and one for the minority, lower-income youngsters. The principal cause of all this is OJJDP's missionary preoccupation with the deinstitutionalization of status offenders, a policy that fails to answer the need for policy leadership in the coordination of Federal resources mandated by provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act. Deinstitutionalization is important and should be continued, but not to the exclusion of aiding those communities and populations experiencing the most severe crime problems. A more comprehensive approach is needed in which indigenous leadership is developed, and in order for this to take place, OJJDP's staffing pattern must be changed to include individuals with more experience with the population-at-risk.

II. A REVIEW OF THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION

The vast majority of all the recent Federal juvenile justice programs have developed from legislation designed to do two things: (1) address the concern of the American public about the growing tide of youth crime, and particularly violent youth crime, and (2) ensure the rights and well-being of youth served by the juvenile justice system.

Despite this, the LEAA strategies for implementing this intent have fallen far short of legislative objectives. A review of the legislative history,² together with an assessment of the program initiatives undertaken by OJJDP supports this conclusion, and indicates that if steps are not taken to redirect program trends, grievous consequences may ensue. In summary, the data reveal that the most severe and most difficult youth crime problems occur at one end of the problem continuum while juvenile justice system programs and research efforts are being concentrated at the opposite end. While the Congress has charged OJJDP with the responsibility of coordinating the various Federal agencies that address youth issues, its programs continue to be fragmented.

While greater percentages of minority as opposed to white youngsters are to be found in high-risk populations, the most popularly funded OPPDP programs are those that give little or no attention to the needs of these youth. OJJDP's emphasis appears to be on advocacy, diversion and de-institutionalization—strategies which do not approach the more deeply rooted problems of the most serious youth crime.

The threatening consequences of these trends suggest that the Federally funded programs to combat juvenile crime are perpetuating class and racial segregation, while supplying few resources to the greater at-risk youth populations. Indigenous organizations which have demonstrated some capacity to change these youth are not the recipients of funds and technical assistance, nor are they the object of research. Rather, the result of this approach to dealing with this population has been either: (1) indifference and continued support of law enforcement and court systems which merely process the in and out movement of a small percentage of youth who eventually become "hard core," or (2) punitive incarceration of youth once individual criminal acts or records of crime become severe threats to society. The States of California, Illinois and New York, for example, recently passed laws lowering the jurisdictional age limit. That makes it possible for 14-year-olds charged with serious crimes to be tried as adults and subject to more severe sanctions.

It is estimated that within the next year, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention will spend nearly \$143 million, more money spent in the fight on youth crime than in any previous year since 1961. Although the Federal government spends only a fraction of the money expended by local governments in this area, local units look to the Federal government for leadership and policy direction. What goes on in Washington can and does make a difference!

PRINCIPLES GUIDING OJJDP'S YOUTH CRIME CONTROL AND PREVENTION STRATEGIES

There are several ways to approach youth crime prevention. One is to take a hard line by increasing criminal penalties and lowering the jurisdictional age limit to subject youths accused of committing the more serious offenses to the more severe sentences and adult institu-

² See Appendix A.

tions. An attractive alternative, however, is to influence the process by which youth acquire a legitimate identity and respect for law by improving the services provided by indigenous organization to develop programs which provide for youth involvement in program planning, organization and execution. According to its own literature, it appears that OJJDP has chosen this latter alternative as its basic framework for guiding its juvenile delinquency prevention efforts, and, to implement this concept, OJJDP has undertaken several national initiatives. These initiatives include efforts to:

- (1) decriminalize status offenses;
- (2) prevent delinquency;
- (3) divert juveniles from the traditional justice system;
- (4) provide alternatives to institutionalization;
- (5) increase the capacity of State and local governments as well as private agencies to conduct effective juvenile justice and delinquency prevention programs;
- (6) improve juvenile justice and services through advocacy programs; and

(7) duplicate project New Pride located in Denver, Colorado. Despite the fact that OJJDP has a Congressional mandate to work for the reduction of youth crime, there are at present no plans to address in a significant manner the problems of the more serious offender population. Plans were initially developed, but to a large degree cancelled, which would have aimed at the following:

- (1) the reduction of serious crime through rehabilitation programs for serious juvenile offenders.
- (2) the prevention of delinquency by improving neighborhoods and their services; and
- (3) the reduction of serious crime committed by juvenile gangs.

My attempt here is to assess the manner in which these OJJDP initiatives are being implemented in the context of the most serious aspects of youth crime problem, which is the growing incidence of violent crime. Researcher Frank Zimring,³ in a recent report for the Twentieth Century Fund, makes some observations about the nature of youth crime in America that are relevant to this report:

(1) Youth crime has increased dramatically over the past fifteen years, in part because of the growth of the youth population in the large urban areas that have been incubators of crime.

(2) Despite the fact that violent youth crime has increased, most youth crime is nonviolent; property offenses outnumber violent offenses ten to one.

(3) Although males between the ages of thirteen and twenty comprise only 9 percent of the population, they account for more than half of all property crime arrests and more than a third of all violent offenses.

(4) Most violent crime by the young is committed against youthful victims; only about 10 percent of all robbery by young offenders involves elderly victims.

³ Franklin E. Zimring: "Confronting Youth Crime," The Twentieth Century Fund, Task Force report on Sentencing Policy Toward Youth Offenders, Holmes and Meir Publishers, Inc.

(5) Most young offenders who commit acts of violence and pursue criminal careers come from minority ghetto and poverty backgrounds; so do their victims.

Another researcher, Dr. Marvin Wolfgang, in his landmark study of violent crime and the birth cohort, found that for a birth cohort of 9,946 boys studied in the City of Philadelphia, over half of the black youngsters were delinquent, as compared with 28.64 percent of white youngsters. Only 6.4 percent of the entire cohort accounted for over half of all the delinquencies.⁴

Dr. Wolfgang concluded that the violent offenses and serious property crimes should be the focus of any deterrence or prevention program. He also observed that most of the other forms of delinquency are relatively trivial and that the pivotal point for social cost reduction appears to be at the time of the juvenile's first offense. He also found that more non-whites go on after the first offense to more offenses, and suggested that perhaps the major concern should be with this racial group.

On any given day in California in 1970, one out of eight black men between twenty and twenty-four years of age was in prison, in jail, or on probation, compared to one of thirty whites. Extrapolation suggests that, during a one-year period, one of four black men in his early twenties spends some time in prison or jail or on probation or parole compared with one of fifteen whites.⁵

A report of the Philadelphia Department of Health indicated that the leading cause of death in that city for black males between the ages of 15 and 19 was homicide.⁶ (See attached Figure 1)

These and similar findings do not seem to be seriously considered and included in Agency policy development or program strategies to reduce the incidents of most serious juvenile crime.

In a recent report which summarized the findings of seven research studies on the serious juvenile offenders, it was concluded that the one consistent feature of serious offender populations was their composition: Predominately male, at the upper limits of juvenile court jurisdiction, from inner city areas, and disproportionately minority group youths.⁷

A quote from a former OJJDP official best describes the situation:

Historically as well as currently, the greatest incidence of crime and delinquency is in urban areas characterized by the problems of social disorganization . . . In contrast to needs related to these problems, private, not-for-profit youth serving agencies tend to locate services in middle income and affluent communities. The exclusion of support of those institutions and agencies from which the serious offender population derives a sense of self worth can have some serious consequences.⁸

Clearly there is a preponderance of data on the true nature of juvenile problems along with expert opinion which suggests program priorities and where major expenditures ought to be allocated. Yet, this

⁴ Marvin E. Wolfgang, University of Pennsylvania, "Youth and Violence," HEW Report, 1970.

⁵ C. E. Reasons, R. L. Kaplan, Some Functions of Prisons, Crime and Delinquency, October 1975, p. 370.

⁶ Philadelphia Inquirer, David Milne, 1973.

⁷ Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration "Proceedings of a National Symposium," September 19 and 20, 1977, Minnesota.

⁸ Milton Lugar, former OJJDP Administrator, July 1976 Memoranda.

professional advice does not appear to be heeded by the juvenile justice decision-makers in Washington.

Furthermore, juvenile justice officials themselves in conference-planning sessions repeatedly give lip service to the need for a national assault on the more serious juvenile problems by utilizing youth and community development strategies and by utilizing indigenous, community-based efforts.

In 1973, a conference held at Portland State University brought together experts in the field of juvenile justice. The consensus among those assembled was that if a significant long-term impact on delinquency rates is to be realized, forces within the community must be catalyzed. OJJDP officials attending that conference stated that their program guidelines would reflect this thinking in recognition of the need to: (1) influence the process by which youth acquire a legitimate identity and respect for the law, (2) improve the services provided by neighborhood and community institutions, and (3) recognize that funds can most effectively be used for programs which support more positive functioning of the youth and their families.

MISGUIDED PRIORITIES AND DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS

We would assume, in view of the fact that the most serious aspects of juvenile crime are well defined, that OJJDP would undertake initiatives to address the need of the larger society. However, the most recent Federal review of OJJDP's youth crime response initiatives indicates that the segment of the youth population perpetuating the greatest crime threat and those communities most afflicted by predatory crime have received very little attention. OJJDP's funding pattern reveals that most of its funds were spent on the de-institutionalization of status offenders and prevention and diversion of less serious offenders from the juvenile justice system. Moreover, millions of dollars were allocated to the juvenile courts for a restitution program.

Restitution approaches often seen as the innovative answer to serious crime, are also falling short of their earlier expectations primarily because: (a) the programs are being operated by many traditional agencies that fail to provide effective programs for most serious offenders; (b) victim compensation, a major attraction of the concept, is minimal; (c) indigenous youth-help organizations are not being fully utilized, and (d) the largest share of the 15 million dollars going to support the restitution program is used for criminal justice personnel and equipment, with only a small portion going into the hands of victims.

The problem was appropriately described by Michael E. Smith, director of the Vera Institute, when he appeared before the Senate Subcommittee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency in April 1978:

As we approach the day when the "virgins and boy scouts" have been leveraged out of incarceration into community-based treatment programs, we may be left with a small but very visible institutional population of chronic offenders for whom there are . . . no realistic and well-designed community-based treatment alternatives.⁹

⁹ Frank E. Zimring: "Dealing with Youth Crime, National Needs and Priorities," Office of Juvenile Justice (LEAA), 1975.

In a 1975 OJJDP commissioned study, Zimring makes the point that while overall youth crime rates will slowly abate over the next few years due to a decline in the number of births in the "at-risk" population, the members of minority youngsters between the ages of 15 and 17, will decrease only slightly (2%). The number of young urban black males between the ages of 18 and 20 will actually increase 8 percent, while there will be a substantial percentage decrease for white urban youth. Thus, he concludes:

. . . if all this occurs, the institutions dealing with youth crime—juvenile and adult courts and correctional facilities will experience a greater concentration of minority population.

III. BUDGET REVIEW

JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION PROGRAM

A review of the formula grant program and the Fiscal Year 1978 discretionary fund expenditures paints a picture of a near-missionary preoccupation with deinstitutionalization issues and with direct service grants directed at the non-urban, low crime areas of the country. Research and technical assistance grants along with contract amendments have nearly replaced the competitive bidding process and unsolicited grants are awarded to a limited number of individuals and groups. The new restitution initiative, while laudatory in principle, invested most of the money in the expansion of criminal justice bureaucracies.

On the surface, it appears that there are funds under the special emphasis division for innovation and funding of indigenous community-based programs which have demonstrated the capability to control and prevent serious youth crime. However, administrative juggling of these monies results in a subversion of the innovative intent of the special emphasis initiative. In effect, what has been happening is that special emphasis monies have been reprogrammed to the state formula mechanism with the stipulation that the funds be used for deinstitutionalization of status offenders. Ironically, this reprogramming is occurring while the majority of state formula funds are lying unexpended because of the numerous restrictions from Washington on the states as to how those moneys can be spent. The following breakdown of Fiscal Year 1978 monies is illustrative.

In Fiscal Year 1978, OJJDP appropriations totaled \$100 million: \$65 million going to the states in formula grants, \$10 million for research, and \$25 million for special emphasis programs. The latter, the special emphasis division, had an additional \$43 million in carryover funds in addition to other formula grant monies that were also available for special emphasis purposes.

More than 30 million of the special emphasis funds were reprogrammed with \$10 million being given to the states as supplementary funding with the provision that the funds be used for the deinstitutionalization of status offenders.¹⁰ The remaining \$20 million plus was transferred to the formula grants unit where the money was used to

¹⁰ Status offenses are non-criminal acts committed by children such as truancy, unruliness, or stubbornness. Children are often charged with offenses that would not be considered crimes if they were adults.

fund both state and private agencies for the deinstitutionalization of status offenders and the support of advocacy groups. While service to status offenders is important, it does not address the problems of those who commit the more serious offenses. Special emphasis programs are being funded out of the formula grants office with some interesting results. In some cases these direct service grants went to states with relatively small numbers of children in need of the service. The larger, more heavily populated states with higher concentrations of juveniles received limited numbers of direct service grants as the following example will demonstrate.

In the State of Washington, as of July 1, 1977, juveniles within the age group of 14 to 19 numbered 430,000, yet the State of Washington received a total of \$4,652,286 (an amount that far exceeds their formula grant allotment) from the formula grant office to enable them to carry out the separation and deinstitutionalization of status offenders. By contrast the State of Pennsylvania with a youth population of over 1,319,000 received a total of \$444,629 in direct service grants¹¹ (\$24,629 to Catholic charities in Wilkes Barre, Pennsylvania and \$420,000 to the Philadelphia City Manager's Office). More ironically, an advocacy grant of \$1,181,811 was awarded the Juvenile Justice Law Center in Philadelphia. One of its activities is to visit and inspect various juvenile correction and detention facilities to ensure that youth are being properly cared for.

The State of Illinois is another example of how the grant program avoided heavily populated areas. The cities of Moline, Kankakee, and Rock Island, Illinois were given direct service grants of \$100,000 each, None was given to the City of Chicago.

It is my sincere belief that OJJDP's preoccupation with the deinstitutionalization of status offenders diverts resources from what should be the principal goal: to explore creative programs that will offer young people better alternatives than a life of crime. The special emphasis office was to carry out the Congress' intent to explore new approaches to control and reduce youth crime. Unfortunately, for the youth in this nation, this effort is being abandoned.

Re Formula grants

Under Section 221 of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act the administrator is authorized to make grants to states and local governments to assist them in planning, establishing, operating, coordinating, and evaluating projects directly or through contracts with public and private agencies for the development of more effective delinquency prevention programs and for the improvement of the Juvenile Justice System. Funds are to be allocated annually among states on the basis of relative population under the age of 18. The administrative office of OJJDP is responsible for interpreting these guidelines and passing judgment as to the acceptability of each state's plan. If, for instance, the OJJDP central office decides that the deinstitutionalization of status offenders is an appropriate priority, then guidelines will be issued that will reflect this decision. The state plan will then be assessed against this priority. This practice has resulted in millions

¹¹ Programs which provide direct human services to youngsters, such as counseling, education, etc.

of dollars of formula grant funds standing idle in various banks through the country as the attached table illustrates: (See JJDP Formula Grant Flow Three-Year Review—Appendix C).

During the 3-year period from 1975 through 1977, a total of 76.8 million dollars was awarded to the states in formula grants. Only 12.9 million dollars was expended during this entire period, with the balance of \$63.9 or 83 percent of the total formula grant funds left unspent for the fight against youth crime.

There are serious questions about the efficacy of continuing the process of instituting national initiatives in Washington. This process assumes that answers to problems can be developed exclusively in Washington and that the task is to disseminate program priorities to the states or local non-profit institutions. This practice of the centralized authority designing solutions to fit local jurisdictions has led to waste and inefficiency in the administration of juvenile delinquency prevention funds, a situation in which only the American banking system benefits.

Special emphasis was to be the funding category in which new and innovative approaches to the crime fight were to take place. In past years, the announced strategies were to influence the process by which youth acquire a legitimate identity. Programs were to be funded that would support the more positive functioning of social institutions, youth and their families. It was acknowledged that the control and prevention of youth crime could not be achieved without involvement of youth, parents, and community forces. This strategy seems all but abandoned as the current OJJDP administration places its emphasis on expanding the criminal justice bureaucracy, and supporting non-indigenous youth-serving agencies to non-high risk youth populations. One serious consequence of continuing to balloon the bureaucracy is that those working in the criminal justice system are accountable to their organizations and their career objectives, and often feel less accountable to the youth they serve and the communities in which the youth reside. Figures from Portland, Oregon, point out the vulnerability of the program to this phenomenon when there is strict reliance upon the criminal justice bureaucracy to determine which youngsters should participate in the diversion program.

COURT REFERRALS TO YOUTH SERVICE CENTERS DECLINE IN FACE OF PROPOSITION IV

Youth service center ¹	1976-77		1977-78		Decrease/increase	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Southwest Portland ²	160	16	159	19	-1	-1
North Portland ³	209	21	136	16	-73	-35
Southeast Portland ⁴	272	27	240	28	-32	-12
Northeast Portland ⁵	368	36	323	38	-45	-12
Total	1,009	100	858	100	-151	-15

¹ A city funded division program.

² Highest proportion of wealth, white population.

³ High proportion of poor and nonwhite.

⁴ High proportion of white, working class.

⁵ Highest proportion of poor, nonwhite population.

Source: Office of the Mayor, the city of Portland, Oreg., regarding court referrals to youth service centers, dated Oct. 5, 1978.

In the city of Portland, there are four youth division programs serving four different geographic areas of that city. The southwest has the highest population proportion of wealthy whites. The northeast section of Portland contains the highest proportion of low income non-whites. Southeast has the highest proportion of white working class people. The northern section has the highest proportion of poor, non-white population.

In the wake of Proposition IV (Portland's tax cut bill), court referrals to the programs realized a 15 percent decline overall. However as the chart shows, there is a disparity between the dropoff of referrals from the southwest section, populated by middle- and upper-income whites, (Minus 1 percent), compared to a 35 percent decline in referrals from the northern parts of the city. This dropoff occurred with little or no decline in the incidence of offenses that result in a referral. This supports the conclusion that the bureaucracy was not responding to the real needs of the populations served by these programs, and raises a question about other similarly run programs in states facing tax cut legislation.

The restitution initiative also appears to be contributing more to ballooning the bureaucracy than serving directly the troubled youth and their communities. OJJDP developed a program through which convicted juvenile delinquents made restitution to their victims. In Fiscal Year 1978, 15 million dollars of special emphasis funds were directed toward this effort. Unfortunately, this initiative, like the other OJJDP programs, perpetuating the expansion of the criminal justice bureaucracy. The lion's share of the 15 million has gone to professional salaries, staff travel, equipment and supplies with a small percentage of the money getting into the hands of the victims or the youth through restitution-related work projects. Some examples of how the restitution program's funds are allocated will substantiate this observation.

The Geauga County Court, located in Chardon, Ohio, population 67,000, received a grant of \$749,542 of the \$832,824 total cost of the project. This program is to provide the restitution services for 322 convicted youths in a two-year period. The youths are to receive direct monetary payment through supported community service work. These youth are, in turn, to make restitution to the victims of their crime.

A review of the program's budget indicates that the total personnel cost for the two-year period is \$610,955; travel, equipment and supplies amount to \$124,537; overhead \$56,695, leaving a balance of \$74,400 to be used to pay youngsters, or 8 percent of the total project cost. It is out of this amount that victims are to receive compensation.

In Ventura, California, a county with a population of 438,000, the county received a grant of \$859,181 of a \$904,448 total project cost for a 20-month period to serve 890 juvenile offenders. Of the total project cost, \$559,357 is being spent in personnel, \$82,484 on travel, equipment and supplies. Another \$55,985 goes for overhead, leaving a balance of \$206,622 that will be going to the youths participating in the program and their victims.

There are two troublesome issues inherent in the practices these figures illustrate. One is the fact that too much of the restitution money

goes to administration of the programs. The other is the apparent inequitable distribution of these monies, whereby small communities with a relatively small "high-risk" population are securing larger allocations than the larger communities where there exists a much greater concentration of high risk youth.

IV. SUMMARY PROFILE OF POSITIVE INDIGENOUS PROGRAMS THAT HAVE DEMONSTRATED SOME CAPACITY TO CONTROL AND PREVENT YOUTH CRIME BY NON-COERCIVE MEANS

There are some communities throughout the country in which violent youth have been reached, with the result that they have "put down the gun" and are engaging in positive activities in the service of peace and respect for life—their own and others. For the most part, however, these activities are informal, unstructured, and have not been analyzed in order to determine how they work.

Over the past ten years, and now in the American Enterprise Institute's Mediating Structures Project, this author has monitored the activities in cities throughout the country where community members have used their own resources to deal with the problems of youth crime. In many of these cities, there are individuals and organizations which have had a positive impact on youth, and have "turned around" some young people to the point that they are now protecting their communities.

One such program is the House of Umoja in Philadelphia, where the efforts of a family with unorthodox ideas and no formal training in social work have actually inspired a "climate of peace" in the city's gang-ridden areas. Umoja is the spiritual creation of a woman named Falaka Fattah and her husband, David Fattah. In 1969, when they invited fifteen boys who were members of Philadelphia's Clymer Street gang to come live with them, the youth gang problem was so acute that the media had dubbed 1969 "the year of the gun."

One of Sister Falaka's six sons was a fringe member of a gang, however, and this intensified the family's concern about youth and the gang problem. Fifteen members of the gang with which their son was affiliated were invited to come to live with the Fattahs, and the only commitment they made to the young people was to help them to stay alive and out of jail.

The youths were encouraged by Sister Falaka to organize along the lines of the African extended family, a concept which she feels gives them the same emotional and material security as the street gang. The group met early each morning to discuss work assignments, problems of the day, and often to help each other by "role playing" in preparation for such outside activities as job interviewing.

Despite the shoestring nature of its operation, Umoja survived and attracted other street youths looking for shelter. As houses on the block became vacant, Umoja moved in and attempted to refurbish them with what meager resources it had at its disposal. The organization now owns twenty small rowhouses in what is still a rundown neighborhood. Yet, the houses are being made as attractive as they can be with bright paint and care.

As the family extended—some three hundred boys from seventy-three different gangs have been sheltered—so did the concept. Sister

Falaka and David Fattah, and the House of Umoja itself held youth conferences and meetings with gang members to spread the idea of faith or "Imani" pacts for peace. "Life-a-thons" were held on local radio stations to encourage gang members to pledge peace and end warfare and killing.

In 1972, a conference was held that was attended by more than seven hundred gang members. Many signed Imani pacts promising they would not fight others. A United Nations type of council was organized to deal with gang differences and to channel employment opportunities to the members.

Thirty young men now live at Umoja, and 270 others are served each day. The climate of peace has been extended to the point where the Philadelphia area, with an average of forty-two gang deaths per year when the program began, had only seven gang deaths in 1976. The diminished death rate continued downwards to one in 1977 and remained there in 1978. Recent police statistics report that youth crime is down from 27.6 percent to 24.3 percent, a first in that city's history.

Umoja is by no means the only program that deals directly with the needs of troubled youngsters. Other activities are being undertaken by local community residents to reach out to young people and to minister to their needs as opposed to demanding complaint behavior with threats and coercion. On the Island of Puerto Rico, the Community Service Center of Ponce has worked for the past seven years with the young people of La Playa to unite them in a common struggle to rid their community of crime. The Center tries to provide hope instead of despair to its young and poor, with programs for job development as well as other activities geared to uplift the community's spirit. Although supported in part by State Planning Agency funds, this program has not been the object of LEAA evaluation and study.

Similarly, in Hartford, Connecticut a unique dance was recently organized which included members of six or seven rival gangs. Youth members themselves policed the dance, and it was held without trouble. By agreement, the proceeds went to give a Halloween party for younger children and to raise food for a number of elderly people.

In another city, a gang member wrote a play depicting gang life. The play was performed on a Tuesday evening in a crowded community auditorium, and some nine hundred parents and children attended. Afterwards, a discussion was held as to why gang members should lay down their arms.

Almost all the above-mentioned efforts have gone unrewarded and unencouraged by the press and others. Yet, the people who are providing indigenous leadership for these efforts can be described as catalysts for life. There are many such catalysts for life in the cities, and we should learn to focus public attention on these positive aspects of communities, rather than viewing these areas as kaleidoscopes of interlocking pathologies.

APPENDIX A—LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE DELINQUENCY PREVENTION

With the enactment into law of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, block grants to states to improve and strengthen law enforcement became available by the terms of the

Act. While not specifically mentioning juvenile delinquency, this Act's broad crime control mandate authorized the funding of delinquency control programs.

In 1971, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act was amended specifically to include programs related to the prevention, control and reduction of juvenile delinquency, and grants were authorized for community-based juvenile delinquency programs.

In 1973, the Act was again amended, this time to require juvenile delinquency components in the comprehensive state plan for the improvement of law enforcement and criminal justice.

On September 7, 1974, the Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, Public Law 94-415, was signed into law. This Act authorizes a \$380 million program over three fiscal years designed to combat juvenile delinquency and improve juvenile justice. The program is administered by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) within the Department of Justice.

The Act substantially revised and extended existing Federal laws and Agency responsibilities regarding juvenile delinquency. Principal responsibility for coordination of the Federal juvenile delinquency prevention efforts was placed in LEAA, and new organizational entities were established to conduct research and to implement juvenile delinquency programs. Entities were also created to conduct far-ranging new grant programs to combat delinquency and assist runaway youth.

Essentially, the Act created within LEAA an Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, a National Institute to conduct research, an independent Coordinating Council, and a National Advisory Committee. It also authorized new grant programs to deal with juvenile delinquency and runaway youth, and established a National Institute of Corrections within the Federal Bureau of Prisons. Additionally, the Federal Juvenile Code, that portion of the United States Criminal Code dealing with juveniles, was updated, and the juvenile delinquency programs administered by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare were extended through fiscal year 1975 to ease their transition to LEAA.

Appropriations of \$75 million for fiscal year 1975, \$125 million for fiscal year 1976, and \$150 million for fiscal year 1977 were authorized by the legislation for LEAA programs. Another \$10 million was authorized for each of these fiscal years for use by H.E.W. The amounts actually appropriated in each fiscal year, however, varied from these amounts.

Concentration of Federal Efforts.—LEAA was given the responsibility for developing and implementing policy objectives for all Federal delinquency programs. Its progress is to be monitored carefully and the results thoroughly evaluated.

Coordinating Council.—The Coordinating Council consists of representatives of Federal agencies administering programs which affect juveniles. These programs are to be coordinated so that wasteful duplication of effort caused by overlapping programs is eliminated.

Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Office.—This Office within LEAA is responsible for administering the delinquency prevention and juvenile justice programs authorized by the bill. It is headed by an Associate Administrator appointed by the President.

National Advisory Committee.—A 21-member Advisory Committee, appointed by the President, advises the Office on various aspects of its operations. The members of the Advisory Committee are required to be knowledgeable in the areas of delinquency prevention and juvenile justice. A majority of the Committee cannot be government officials, and seven members must be under age 26 at the time of their appointment.

Formula Grants.—Formula grant funds are allocated to states and territories on the basis of the population under age eighteen. To be eligible, each state must submit a comprehensive plan which embodies the purposes of the Act, and once the plan is approved, each State determines how funds are to be used. Funds are administered by a State planning agency, (SPA), previously established to administer LEAA programs. All applications for funds are to go to these SPA's and seventy-five percent of the funds are to be used for advanced techniques to combat delinquency.

Discretionary Grants.—As amended in 1977, one-quarter of the available funds are to be used by LEAA as a discretionary fund. Grants and contracts are made to carry out six types of "Special Emphasis Prevention and Treatment Programs." Thirty percent of these funds are to go to private, nonprofit organizations who have had experience in dealing with youth, and successful programs are to receive continued funding.

SPECIAL EMPHASIS PREVENTION AND TREATMENT PROGRAMS

SEC. 224. (a) The Administrator is authorized to make grants to and enter into contracts with public and private agencies, organizations, institutions, or individuals to—

(1) develop and implement new approaches, techniques and methods with respect to juvenile delinquency programs;

(2) develop and maintain community-based alternatives to traditional forms of institutionalization;

(3) develop and implement effective means of diverting juveniles from the juvenile justice and correctional system;

(4) improve the capability of public and private agencies and other organizations to provide services for youths who are or are in danger of becoming delinquent;

(5) facilitate the adoption of the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Standards for Juvenile Justice and the National Institute for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention;

(6) develop and implement model programs and methods to keep students in elementary and secondary schools and to prevent unwarranted and arbitrary suspensions and expulsions;

(7) develop and support programs stressing advocacy activities aimed at improving services to youth impacted by the juvenile justice system;

(8) develop, implement, and support, in conjunction with the Secretary of Labor, other public and private agencies and organizations and business and industry programs for youth employment;

(9) improve the juvenile justice system to conform to standards of due process;

(10) develop and support programs designed to encourage and enable State legislatures to consider and further the purposes of this Act, both by amending State laws where necessary, and devoting greater resources to those purposes; and

(11) develop and implement programs relating to juvenile delinquency and learning disabilities.

(b) No less than 25 percent of the funds appropriated for each fiscal year pursuant to this part is to be available only for special emphasis prevention and treatment grants and contracts made pursuant to this section.

(c) At least 20 percent of the funds available for grants and contracts to private nonprofit agencies, organizations, or institutions who have had experience in dealing with youth.

When there is no other way to fund a delinquency program, the Assistant Administrator has the discretion to authorize States to utilize up to 25 percent of formula monies to meet the non-Federal matching requirement.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION

This Institute within the Office serves as a research evaluation and information center and provides training in the treatment and control of juvenile offenders. Demonstration projects established by the Institute and other Federal juvenile programs are to be carefully evaluated and standards for Juvenile Justice are to be swiftly developed and implemented according to the terms of the Act.

Runaway Program—A grant program to deal with the problems of runaway youth is administered by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The program is designed to develop public and private programs for runaways. A survey is to be made to determine the characteristics of the nation's runaway youth population.

National Institute of Corrections—Established within the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the main purposes of this Institute include training of personnel who work with offenders, dissemination of information regarding corrections, and the provision of technical assistance for states and Federal agencies.

Juvenile Code—Chapter 403 of Title 18, United States Code, was revised to guarantee adequate protection of juvenile rights, and to assure that Federal criminal procedures meet the needs of young people.

APPENDIX B

RECIPIENTS OF GRANTS AND CONTRACTS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1978

The URSA Institute, San Francisco (JS)-----	\$977, 461
National Board, YWCA (JS)-----	2, 007, 107
National Council of Negro Women (JS)-----	2, 818, 624
Indian Nurses of California, Urban Indian Child Resource Center (JS) -----	242, 446
Washington Department of Social Services, Olympia, Wash. (JS)---	467, 024
Narcotic Addicts Rehabilitation Center, Atlantic City, N.Y. (JS)----	292, 101
Open Harbor, Cambridge, Mass. (JS)-----	255, 913
Wisconsin Department of Health (JS)-----	1, 237, 930
Ventura California Corrections Service Agency (JS)-----	859, 181

APPENDIX B—Continued

Recipients of grants and contracts for fiscal year 1978—Continued

District of Columbia Division of Social Services-----	\$613, 660
Pierce County, N. Dak., County Courthouse-----	278, 153
Girls Clubs of America, New York, N.Y-----	499, 807
The Center for Children and Youth, Tallahassee, Fla-----	200, 000
City of Los Angeles, Office of the Mayor-----	493, 425
Boys Clubs of America, New York, N.Y-----	457, 501
Catholic Social Service of Wilkes-Barre, Pa-----	24, 629
Youth-GAP El Paso, Tex-----	432, 096
Washington UL Washington, D.C-----	433, 591
United Neighborhood House of New York-----	392, 974
City of Philadelphia, city managers office (project director Taris Montgomery)-----	420, 000
Law and Justice Planning, Olympia, Wash-----	3, 635, 262
County of Dane, Wis., Madison, Wis-----	238, 244
Johnson County Youth Service Bureau, Franklin, Ind-----	58, 287
National Federation of Settlements and Neighborhoods, New York, N.Y-----	568, 329
Venice Drug Coalition, Venice, Calif-----	499, 996
Rock Island Public School District, Rock Island, Ill-----	100, 000
Constitutional Rights Foundation, Los Angeles, Calif-----	25, 742
Dallas County Youth Service, Network Project, 623 Records Building, Dallas Tex-----	399, 535
Alabama Department of Youth Services, Tuskegee Institute-----	587, 686
Operation Helping Hand, Tulane, California Youth Bureau-----	109, 865
National Justice Law Center, St. Louis-----	699, 764
Juvenile Justice Center, Pennsylvania, 2100 Locust Street, Philadel- phia, Pa-----	1, 181, 811
United Way of New Haven, New Haven, Conn-----	585, 479
National Assembly of Social Welfare Organizations, New York, N.Y--	948, 581
New Mexico Council on Crime and Delinquency, Albuquerque, N.M--	512, 719
The Salvation Army, Atlanta, Ga-----	512, 719
Culmet City Youth, Service Bureau, Culmet City, Ill-----	50, 300
LINKS, Inc., Moline, Ill-----	100, 000
Hamilton County Girls Fund, Inc., Cincinnati, Ohio-----	50, 000
Neighborhood House, Seattle, Wash-----	550, 000
Suburban Crime Prevention Council, Des Moines, Iowa-----	112, 454
Pueblo Youth Service, Pueblo, Calif-----	107, 646
Springfield Police Department, Springfield, Ill-----	68, 678
Department of Social Services, County Orange, Goshen, N.Y-----	146, 870
CEFS Economic Opportunity Corp., Effingham, Ill-----	96, 458
Youth Opportunity, Unlimited, Kankakee, Ill-----	100, 000
New Life For Girls, Cincinnati, Ohio-----	100, 000
Arkansas Department of Human Resources, Little Rock, Ark-----	351, 796
Alameda County Probation Department, Alameda County, Calif-----	471, 796
Fremont County Department of Social Service-----	50, 315
Horsham Hospital, Horsham, Pa-----	167, 676
West Virginia Department of Welfare, Charleston, W. Va-----	129, 004
University of North Carolina, School of Social Work, Chapel Hill, N.C-----	192, 398
Utah State Department of Social Services, Division of Family Services, Salt Lake City, Utah-----	800, 000
University of Illinois, Board of Trustees, Champaign/Urban Campus, Urbana, Ill-----	1, 134, 544
University of Georgia-----	199, 680
Department of Youth Services, Boston, Mass-----	510, 699
Department of Youth Services-----	419, 280
Department of Health Rehabilitation Services, Tallahassee, Fla-----	209, 000
University of South Carolina, Columbia, S.C-----	200, 000
New State Division for Youth, Albany, N.Y-----	150, 000
Middlesex County, Probation Department, New Brunswick, N.J-----	148, 917
Camden County Law Enforcement Planning Agency, Pennsauken, N.J--	88, 308
Department of Corrections, Nashville, Tenn-----	200, 000
Vermont Agency of Human Services, Montpelier, Vt-----	779, 100

APPENDIX B—Continued
Recipients of grants and contracts for fiscal year 1978—Continued

Juvenile Justice Center, Pa. (for 4 months)-----	\$77,917
Women's Community Service, Inc., Lincoln, Nebr-----	97,725
National Council on Crime and Delinquency AFL-CIO, Labor Partic- ipation Department, Washington, D.C-----	331,082
Youth Emergency Services, Inc., Omaha, Nebr-----	87,642
Cochise County Juvenile Court, Bisbee, Ariz-----	74,990
Lancaster County Division of Public Welfare, Lincoln, Nebr-----	87,997
YMCA of Greater St. Louis, St. Louis, Mo-----	30,000
Lincoln County Circuit Court, Newport, Oreg-----	35,000
YMCA of Greater St. Louis, St. Louis, Mo-----	30,000
Larimer County Sheriff's Office, Fort Collins, Colo-----	101,580
Juvenile Court Center/Maricopa County, Phoenix, Ariz-----	135,560
West Arkansas County Judges Association, Ozark, Ark-----	79,590
Malheur County Juvenile Department, Malheur County, Vale, Oreg--	29,190
Douglas County Board of Commissioners, District Attorney, 18th Ju- dicial District, Littleton, Colo-----	50,000
Social Advocates for Youth, San Francisco, Calif-----	199,942
Mental Health and Corrections, Augusta, Maine-----	200,000
YUMA County Council on Alcohol and Drugs, Yuma, Ariz-----	64,800
Social Services Agency, Planning and Program Development Division, Sante Fe, N. Mex-----	109,853
Jackson County Juvenile Court, Kansas City, Mo-----	42,900
Logos, Inc., St. Louis, Mo-----	32,460
Graham Behavioral Health Services, Inc., Gafford, Ariz-----	74,667
Department of Social Services, Office of Children and Youth, Pierre, S. Dak-----	65,000
Central Texas Council of Governments, Belton, Tex-----	51,206
Oklahoma SPA, Oklahoma City, Okla-----	80,000
Barrio Youth Project, Inc., family counseling program-----	49,034
Coconino County, Juvenile Court Center, Flagstaff, Ariz-----	50,040
Kenyon College, Kenyon Public Affairs, Gambler, Ohio-----	10,724
American Justice Institute, Sacramento, Calif-----	200,000
Capital Area Planning Council, Regional Council of Governments, Austin, Tex-----	41,176
Santa Cruz Family Guidance Center, Mental Health, Nogales, Ariz---	73,744
Association of Idaho Counties, Boise, Idaho-----	100,000
Agency of Human Services, Montepellier, Vt-----	170,000
Open Harbor, Inc., JCAP, 11 Farwell Place, Cambridge, Mass-----	117,098
Opportunities Industrialization Center, Providence, R.I-----	72,966
Boys' Club of America, New York, N.Y-----	352,784
Academy for Contemporary Problems, Columbus, Ohio-----	2,493,241
Behavioral Research Institute, Boulder, Colo-----	561,336
National Center for State Courts, Program Division, Williamsburg, Va--	727,998
University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Ind-----	295,974
University of Southern California, Social Science Research Institute, 950 West Jefferson Boulevard, Los Angeles, Calif-----	481,739
Hahnemann Medical College and Hospital, Department of Mental Health Sciences, Philadelphia, Pa-----	247,143
National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Hackensack, N.J-----	999,618
District of Columbia Superior Court, Washington, D.C-----	202,237
Criminal Justice Research Center, Inc., Albany, N.Y-----	279,013
National Center for State Courts, Williamsburg Va-----	1,098,332
National Center for Juvenile Justice, Pittsburgh, Pa-----	443,300
National District Attorneys Association, Chicago, Ill-----	79,919
Rutgers College, Institute for Criminological Research, New Bruns- wick, N.J-----	399,749
National Council of Juvenile Family Center Judges, Reno, Nev-----	242,912
Harvard College, Cambridge, Mass-----	361,452
Association Children With Learning Disabilities, Pittsburgh, Pa-----	492,060
Socio-Environmental Research Center, Ltd., Milwaukee, Wis-----	99,883
Department of Sociology, University of Arizona, Tucson, Ariz-----	49,488
Harvard College, Cambridge, Mass-----	343,898

APPENDIX B—Continued
Recipients of grants and contracts for fiscal year 1978—Continued

Blackstone Institute, 2309 Calvert Street, N.W., Washington, D.C-----	\$192, 682
National Council Juvenile Family Court Judges, Reno, Nev-----	171, 602
Social Action Research Center, San Rafael, Calif-----	1, 372, 756
Constitutional Rights Foundation, Los Angeles, Calif-----	175, 776
American Institutes for Research, Washington, D.C-----	110, 372
Social Action Research Center, San Rafael, Calif-----	192, 033
Center for Human Services, Washington, D.C-----	178, 542
University of Delaware, Sociology Department-----	52, 759
Associates for Youth Development, Inc., Tucson, Ariz-----	88, 274
Pennsylvania Child Advocate, Inc., Pittsburgh, Pa-----	16, 437
Boston University, Center for Criminal Justice, Boston, Mass-----	301, 848
American University, Massachusetts and Nebraska Ave. NW., Washington, D.C-----	155, 700
Read, Inc., Project Read, Silver Spring, Md-----	467, 760
University of Pennsylvania, administration building, Philadelphia, Pa-----	89, 557
University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill-----	189, 394
Behavioral Research Institute, Boulder, Colo-----	425, 204
Institute of Judicial Administration, New York, N.Y-----	125, 870
Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, Calif-----	155, 985
Girls Clubs of America, New York, N.Y-----	181, 466
National Association of Counties, Research, Inc., Washington, D.C--	158, 004
National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C-----	299, 800
A. J. Nellum & Associates, Washington, D.C-----	275, 000
Kenyon College, Kenyon Public Affairs Forum-----	103, 179
Puerto Rico Department of Addiction Service, Rio Piedras, Puerto Rico-----	279, 620
City of New Bedford Juvenile Court, New Bedford, Mass-----	354, 575
Camden County Probation Department, Camden, N.J-----	278, 148
County of Cumberland, Portland, Maine-----	299, 412
Jefferson County Fiscal Court, Department of Human Services, Louis- ville, Ky-----	411, 655
Department of Social and Health Services, Olympia, Wash-----	467, 024
Snohomish County Juvenile Court, Everett, Wash-----	261, 260
Lucas County Juvenile Court, 429 Michigan St., Toledo, Ohio-----	247, 501
Summit County Juvenile Court, 650 Dan St., Akron, Ohio-----	212, 071
Trident United Way, Voluntary Action Center, Charleston, S.C-----	208, 235
New York State Division of Probation, Tower Building, Empire State Plaza, Albany, N.Y-----	2, 298, 325
Camden County Probation Department, 327 Market St., Camden, N.J-----	278, 148
Supreme Court of New Jersey, administration office of the court, 349 State House Annex, Trenton, N.J-----	520, 375
County of Wayne, Juvenile Division, Probate Court, 1025 East Forest, Detroit, Mich-----	538, 439
Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Community Service, West Wilson, Madison, Wis-----	1, 237, 930
County of Dane, 210 Mona Ave., Madison, Wis-----	238, 244
City of New Orleans, Office of the Mayor, New Orleans, La-----	510, 046
District of Columbia Superior Court, Washington, D.C-----	613, 660
The Family Court of Delaware, Wilmington, Del-----	832, 596
City of Lynn, Lynn Youth Resource Bureau, Yynn, Mass-----	370, 925
Youth-Gap, Inc., 214 City County Building, El Paso, Tex-----	432, 096
The Friends Program, Inc., Concord, N.H-----	110, 615
County of Cumberland, Portland, Maine-----	299, 412
Association for the Support of Human Services, Inc., 42 Arnold Street, Westfield, Mass-----	171, 842
City of New Bedford, Juvenile Court, Municipal Building, New Bed- ford, Maine-----	354, 575
County of Ventura, Corrections Service Agency, Ventura, Calif-----	859, 181
Hennepin County, Department of Finance, Minneapolis, Minn-----	458, 690

APPENDIX C

JJDP FORMULA GRANT FLOW 3-YR REVIEW

State	Fiscal year 1975		Fiscal year 1976		Fiscal year 1977	
	Awarded	Expenditures	Awarded	Expenditures	Awarded	Expenditures
Alabama	¹ NR				\$813	\$75
Alaska	\$200	\$189	\$250	\$123	200	75
Arizona	200	69	250	67	425	0
Kansas	200	188	250	86	432	7
California	680	354	2,450	615	4,373	738
Colorado	² NP		286	49	510	15
Connecticut	200	130	378	55	673	130
Delaware	200	161	250	80	200	111
Florida	216	108	779	124	1,390	80
Georgia	200	136	607	108	1,083	12
Hawaii	NR				200	0
Idaho	200	112	250	67	200	4
Illinois	389	241	1,402	470	2,501	0
Indiana	200	108	679	24	1,213	62
Iowa	200	151	360	56	643	7
Kansas	NP		NP		NP	
Kentucky	NP				734	0
Louisiana	200	122	512	191	915	65
Maine	200	196	250	93	227	253
Maryland	200	84	510	124	910	30
Massachusetts	200	200	693	539	1,236	150
Michigan	333	240	1,200	590	2,142	65
Minnesota	200	104	510	85	910	60
Mississippi	NP	NR	NP		NP	
Missouri	200	17	573	7	1,024	26
Montana	200	183	250	62	200	309
Nebraska	NP		NP		NP	
Nevada	NP	NR	NP		NP	
New Hampshire	200	117	250	104	200	29
New Jersey	245	222	881	NR	1,571	NR
New Mexico	200	172	250	50	268	0
New York	599	0	2,157	111	3,850	70
North Carolina	NP		NP		NP	
North Dakota	21	NR	20	NR	NP	
Ohio	383	72	1,380	0	2,463	89
Oklahoma	NP		NP		NP	
Oregon	200	35	258	12	460	0
Pennsylvania	395	NR	1,420	NR	2,536	NR
Rhode Island	NP		250	3	200	0
North Carolina	200	153	353	60	629	60
South Dakota	200	52	250	30	200	0
Tennessee	97	NR	NR		874	NR
Texas	410	362	1,476	170	2,635	296
Utah	NP		NP		NP	
Vermont	200	NR	250	169	200	4
Virginia	NP		587	53	1,047	43
Washington	200	140	429	115	764	235
West Virginia	NP		NP		NP	
Wisconsin	200	159	584	66	1,044	15
Wyoming	NP		NP		NP	
American Samoa	NP		62	NR	50	NR
Guam	50	0	62	NR	50	0
Puerto Rico	200	195	435	86	776	119
Virgin Islands	50	36	62	1	50	0
Trust territories	50	50	62	62	50	NR
District of Columbia	200	101	250	5	200	0
Total	9,118	4,959	24,417	4,712	43,271	3,234


Summary formula grant (millions)

	Fiscal year 1975	Fiscal year 1976	Fiscal year 1977	Total
Funds awarded	9.118	24.417	43.271	76.806
Funds expended	4.959	4.712	3.234	12.905
Total unexpended	4.159	19.705	40.037	63.901

¹ No report.² Not participating.

Source: Comptroller H-1 reports.

**Causes of Death:
Black Males in Philadelphia
Age 15 to 19 Years
(1973 figures)**



Source: City Health Department.

Philadelphia Inquirer / DAVID MILNE

