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UNITED NATIONS SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT

New York City, May-June 1978

REPORT

SUBMITTED TO THE

COMMITTEE ON

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES



OCTOBER 31, 1978

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(II)

FOREWORD


HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C., October 31, 1978.

This report has been prepared for the committee by Congressman Charles W. Whalen, Jr. on the basis of his service as a member of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament held in New York from May 23 through June 30, 1978.

The findings contained in this report are those of Congressman Whalen and do not necessarily reflect the views of other members of the Committee on International Relations.

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, *Chairman.*

(III)




LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C., October 31, 1978.

HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations.


DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I am submitting herewith a report on my service as a member of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, held in New York from May 23 through June 30, 1978, having been appointed thereto by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

CHARLES W. WHALEN, Jr.



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REPORT OF HON. CHARLES W. WHALEN, JR., CONGRESSIONAL MEMBER OF THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE U.N. SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT, MAY-JUNE 1978

INTRODUCTION

During the period May 23-June 30, 1978, I had the privilege of serving as a member of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD). The other four delegates, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, were our Permanent Representative to the United Nations Andrew Young; former Governor Averell Harriman; Senator George McGovern (D-S. Dak.); and Paul Newman. The five alternate delegates included Ambassador Adrian S. Fisher, representative to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament; Ambassador James F. Leonard, Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations; Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr. (R-Md.); Representative Paul Simon (D-Ill.); and Mrs. Marjorie Craig Benton of Illinois.

Ably coordinating the efforts of our 10-member delegation and support staff were Ambassador Lawrence Weiler, U.S. Coordinator for the SSOD; Charles Flowerree of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA); and John L. Hirsch of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. Richard B. L. Creecy, senior fellow for Arms Control and Disarmament, Members of Congress for Peace Through Law, provided invaluable counsel and assistance to Congressman Simon and me prior to and throughout the disarmament session. In addition, 56 Members of Congress and 7 public representatives were appointed to serve as special advisers to the delegation [appendix 1].

HISTORY OF SSOD

BACKGROUND

The United Nations Special Session on Disarmament was convened as a result of an initiative of the nonaligned nations, led by Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, and Algeria, with strong support from Mexico, Sweden, Nigeria, and Argentina. At the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Nonaligned Countries, held at Colombo, Sri Lanka, August 16-19, 1976, dissatisfaction was expressed with the extremely slow progress of disarmament negotiations over the past decade. The Conference, therefore, recommended that the United Nations hold a special session devoted entirely to disarmament. In response, the 31st U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 31/189-B on December 21, 1976, calling for such a special session and establishing a Preparatory Committee of 54 member states.

(1)

The Preparatory Committee, under the chairmanship of the Argentine Ambassador to the United Nations, Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, held its initial meeting on March 28, 1977. It completed its work after 5 sessions and 42 plenary gatherings on April 21, 1978. In its report of May 3, 1978, the Preparatory Committee proposed the following substantive agenda for the conference:

- (1) General debate;
- (2) A review and appraisal of the present international situation in the light of the pressing need to achieve substantial progress in the field of disarmament;
- (3) Adoption of a declaration on disarmament;
- (4) Adoption of a program of action on disarmament;
- (5) A review of the role of the United Nations in disarmament and of the international machinery for negotiations on disarmament.

The Preparatory Committee also submitted a draft final document for consideration by the special session. This draft was heavily "bracketed," which in U.N. language meant that there were many alternative wordings in the various sections. This, in turn, indicated the existence of differences of opinion among the various states and blocs of nations.

SSOD

General Assembly President Lazar Mojsov, of Yugoslavia, gaveled to order the Special Session on Disarmament on May 23, 1978. The recommended agenda was quickly approved the same day and general debate began the following morning. During the course of general debate, delegates were addressed by 20 heads of government and 51 foreign ministers. In particular, the speeches by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany, French President Giscard d'Estaing, British Prime Minister James Callaghan, and Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau were generally well received by those assembled. It was a source of disappointment, not only to the U.S. delegation, but also to representatives of other member states, that President Carter failed to appear before the General Assembly. His absence may have accounted for the SSOD's low media visibility. Regrettably, the speech by Vice President Mondale on May 24 was disappointing to most participants who felt it was unduly militaristic for a disarmament conference and lacking in significant initiatives.

On June 1, the General Assembly voted to establish the ad hoc committee of the special session, again under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas, for the purpose of arriving at a consensus on the final document. The general debate ended on June 9, and agreement on the final document, after three hectic late night sessions, was reached by the ad hoc committee during the evening of June 29. The General Assembly approved the final document on June 30, after which the special session was then adjourned by President Mojsov.

RESULTS OF THE SSOD

The purpose of the special session on disarmament was limited in scope. It was intended by the leaders of the nonaligned nations to generate worldwide interest in disarmament issues, to provide to all

countries an accurate appraisal of the dangers of the nuclear arms race, and, hopefully, to stimulate progress toward actual disarmament.

The special session was never designed to be a negotiating body which would agree on specific measures under a prescribed timetable. Nor was it expected to achieve a major breakthrough on disarmament. Such tasks obviously could not have been accomplished in 5 weeks.

Thus, the principal outcome of the special session was the reaching of consensus on the final document (appendix 2). This 31-page agreement contains four parts: "Introduction," "Declaration," "Program of Action," and "Machinery."

INTRODUCTION AND DECLARATION

For the first time, all U.N. member states were able to agree upon a complete set of principles and objectives for disarmament. Previously, U.N. disarmament resolutions addressed various issues in a piecemeal fashion, with a number of nations either abstaining or voting against the resolution. Thus, the mere fact that all governments represented at the SSOD could concur by consensus came as somewhat of a surprise to many experienced U.N. observers. For this reason alone, many count the SSOD as a success. Among the most significant provisions incorporated in the SSOD-approved Declaration are the following paragraphs:

11. Mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced. Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth. Failure of efforts to halt and reverse the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

15. It is essential that not only Governments but all the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present situation.

19. * * * The principal goals of disarmament are to ensure the survival of mankind and to eliminate the danger of war, in particular nuclear war. * * *

20. Among such measures, effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. To this end, it is imperative to remove the threat of nuclear weapons, to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race until the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems has been achieved, and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

28. All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations.

30. An acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States should be strictly observed.

32. All States, and in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war.

36. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal concern.

PROGRAM OF ACTION

While also accepted by consensus, the Program of Action failed to reconcile several of the differences which emerged during the special session. In order to achieve agreement, the delegates found it necessary, in some instances, to generalize the final language. Nevertheless, the Program of Action is still a useful part of the final document, since it contains agreed guidelines for the negotiations which will take place in the newly established Committee on Disarmament (see following section: "Machinery"). The program represents the first text endorsed by all nations that covers such a broad range of disarmament topics.

In addition to measures on nuclear disarmament, it focuses upon chemical weapons, conventional disarmament, limitations on conventional arms transfers, reductions of military budgets, the need for additional studies, and the activities of nongovernmental organizations.

MACHINERY

That part of the final document dealing with "Machinery" creates two new disarmament fora—the United Nations Disarmament Commission (located in New York) and the Geneva-based Committee on Disarmament (COD).

Paragraph 118 of the final document provides that the U.N. Disarmament Commission will consist of all 149 member nations of the United Nations and will meet annually, commencing in 1979, for a period not to exceed 4 weeks. It further declares:

The General Assembly establishes, as successor to the Commission originally established by resolution 502(VI), a Disarmament Commission composed of all Members of the United Nations.

The General Assembly decides that:

(a) The Disarmament Commission shall be a deliberative body, a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, the function of which shall be to consider and make recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and to follow up the relevant decisions and recommendations of the special session devoted to disarmament * * *

Paragraph 120 directs that the Committee on Disarmament (COD) serve as a negotiating body which will meet in Geneva not later than January 1979. It will replace the current Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), which is cochaired by the United States and the U.S.S.R. The cochairmanship will be eliminated and replaced by a rotating chairman. The ties of the COD to the United Nations General Assembly have been strengthened and it is expected that France, which has not participated in any disarmament negotiations since 1960, will now join the new Geneva Committee. The People's Republic of China, which heretofore has never been involved in any disarmament discussions, is not expected to join in 1979. Many observers, however, believe that it may decide to do so early in the next decade.

Additionally, in approving the "Machinery" provisions, the delegates mandated that the First Committee of the General Assembly in the future consider only those questions dealing with disarmament and international security.

Finally, it was determined (paragraph 119) that "a second special session devoted to disarmament should be held on a date decided by the General Assembly at its 33d session."

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Not since 1932 has a major worldwide conference been held during which representatives of every country sat down for nearly 6 weeks to discuss and argue about the single topic of disarmament. Thus, for the first time in almost a half century, all nations were required to think through, concurrently, their respective positions regarding this subject.

As a result, the serious issues of nuclear war, nuclear proliferation, security assurances by the nuclear-weapon states to the non-nuclear-

weapon states, and the enormous sums of money now being spent annually on the arms race—over \$400 billion—were debated in a sober and responsible manner.

A single publication, the "Final Document of the Special Session of the General Assembly on Disarmament," was adopted by all 149 members of the United Nations, including France and the People's Republic of China, both of which had boycotted disarmament conferences since 1960. Stressed repeatedly was the sobering fact that nuclear disarmament is a matter of concern for all nations, for it involves the very survival of mankind.

This perception notwithstanding, the Conference highlighted a clear polarization of views between nuclear-weapon nations and non-nuclear-weapon states as well as between the two superpowers and both France and China. These differences have been more or less clear to the middle-level diplomats who, for several years, have been negotiating at the Geneva Disarmament Conference. But this is the first time that all issues have been vented publicly for the whole world to see.

The two overriding issues at the special session, which are closely interlinked, were: (1) The reduction of nuclear weapon stockpiles by the nuclear-weapon states; and (2) the prevention of further spread of nuclear weapons capability to non-nuclear-weapon states.

As is evident from a comparison of the draft final document submitted to the General Assembly by the Preparatory Committee at the beginning of the special session and the final document actually adopted at the end of the Conference, the positions of India, France, China, and the two superpowers are irreconcilable. India refuses to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) on the grounds that it is "discriminatory." India can and will block all efforts to prevent further proliferation unless the United States and the Soviet Union agree to the "cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes," as provided in paragraph 50 of the final document. Yet given our country's present political climate, the administration and the Congress clearly are unwilling to take any such action for some years to come. Furthermore, even if the U.S. Government eventually decides to move in this direction, it undoubtedly would be impossible to obtain even tacit Soviet concurrence in such an objective unless France and China agreed to participate.

France, however, has made it obvious during the past year, and again at the special session, that it will not sign the NPT or the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, stop underground nuclear testing, or take any steps toward nuclear disarmament until the "discrepancy" between the nuclear weapons stockpiles of the superpowers and that of France is "reduced."

Finally, China continues to refuse to participate in actual disarmament negotiations. Interestingly, however, the Hua Government did play a role in the deliberative discussions of the special session.

In the light of these circumstances, it seems clear that India and the other important nonsignatory nations of the NPT, such as Brazil, Argentina, and Pakistan, will persist in thwarting efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union to halt further proliferation of nuclear weapons. In addition, the unfortunate, and in my opinion, unnecessary delays in reaching a SALT II agreement during the last 2 years have complicated an already exceedingly complex situation. Technology for

the past decade has been outrunning the glacial pace of SALT, and Senate ratification of the proposed SALT II Treaty now appears unlikely before mid-1979.

I conclude, therefore, that the capacity to produce nuclear weapons will spread to other nations and the risk of nuclear war will mount.

Despite this pessimism, my answer to the central question—Will nuclear war occur?—remains optimistic. The special session on disarmament had a profound impact, for it clearly demonstrated the seriousness of nuclear proliferation, the increasing danger of nuclear conflict, and the utter devastation wrought by a nuclear exchange. This concern was starkly expressed in paragraph 18 of the final document which presents the alternatives facing the peoples of this Earth: "Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation." Yes; problems and differences still exist. But for all of those who served as delegates to the special session on disarmament, there can be only one choice.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) At the beginning of the 96th Congress, the Committee on International Relations should hold hearings on the plans of the executive branch to implement the program of action spelled out in the SSOD final document. It would be appropriate to conduct this inquiry within the context of a general review of American foreign policy and the status of U.S./Soviet relations. In particular, the Committee on International Relations should seek to ascertain the true strategic balance between the United States and Russia, since allegations that the Soviet Union has attained, or will soon achieve, strategic superiority over this country appear to be the main factor preventing progress toward nuclear disarmament.

(2) From time to time, congressional advisers should be appointed to take part in the deliberations of the newly created Committee on Disarmament which is scheduled to meet in Geneva not later than January 1979.

(3) Congressional members and advisers should be appointed to the U.S. delegation to the new U.N. Disarmament Commission, scheduled to convene in New York for 4 weeks in 1979. I strongly urge that the congressional members be appointed at least 2 months prior to the opening of the Commission meeting.

APPENDIX 1
SPECIAL ADVISERS
CONGRESSIONAL

House of Representatives

Bill Alexander
John B. Anderson
Thomas L. Ashley
Robin L. Beard
Berkley Bedell
Anthony C. Beilenson
Jonathan B. Bingham
Michael T. Blouin
Don Bonker
William S. Broomfield
George E. Brown, Jr.
John Buchanan
M. Caldwell Butler
Bob Carr
John Conyers, Jr.
Robert K. Dornan
Thomas J. Downey
Robert F. Drinan
Frank E. Evans
Donald M. Fraser
Willis D. Gradison, Jr.
William Green
Lee H. Hamilton
James M. Hanley
Elwood Hillis
Elizabeth Holtzman
Frank Horton
Robert W. Kastenmeier
Jack F. Kemp

House of Representatives

Joseph A. Le Fante
Robert L. Leggett
William Lehman
Manuel Lujan, Jr.
Mike McCormack
Matthew F. McHugh
Abner J. Mikva
Stephen L. Neal
Shirley N. Pettis
Melvin Price
Edward R. Roybal
Philip E. Ruppe
Patricia Schroeder
Richard T. Schultze
John F. Seiberling
Robert L. F. Sikes
Newton I. Steers, Jr.
Charles H. Wilson (Calif.)
Charles Wilson (Tex.)
Clement J. Zablocki

Senate

James Abourezk
John H. Glenn, Jr.
Gary W. Hart
Jacob J. Javits
Claiborne Pell
Charles H. Percy
Mike Gravel

PUBLIC REPRESENTATIVES

Ms. Katherine L. Camp, president of the Womens International League for Peace and Freedom.
Ms. Ruth Clusen, president of the League of Women Voters.
Ms. Jean Eckstein, president of the National Council of Catholic Laity.
Mr. George Kistiakowsky, Harvard University professor.
Ms. Josephine Pomerance, consultant for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
Mr. Harold Willens, president of the Factory Equipment Corp. in Los Angeles, Calif.
Ms. Margaret Bush Wilson, president of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People.

APPENDIX 2

UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL
ASSEMBLY



PROVISIONAL

A/S-10/23(Part II)
30 June 1978

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Tenth special session
Agenda items 9, 10, 11 and 12

REVIEW AND APPRAISAL OF THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE
LIGHT OF THE PRESSING NEED TO ACHIEVE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS IN THE
FIELD OF DISARMAMENT, THE CONTINUATION OF THE ARMS RACE AND THE
CLOSE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISARMAMENT, INTERNATIONAL PEACE
AND SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

ADOPTION OF A DECLARATION ON DISARMAMENT

ADOPTION OF A PROGRAMME OF ACTION ON DISARMAMENT

REVIEW OF THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN DISARMAMENT
AND OF THE INTERNATIONAL MACHINERY FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON
DISARMAMENT, INCLUDING IN PARTICULAR THE QUESTION OF
CONVENING A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Tenth Special Session

Rapporteur: Mr. Abdelkader BENSMAIL (Algeria)

Draft Final Document of the tenth special session
of the General Assembly

The General Assembly,

Alarmed by the threat to the very survival of mankind posed by the existence of nuclear weapons and the continuing arms race, and recalling the devastation inflicted by all wars,

Convinced that disarmament and arms limitation, particularly in the nuclear field, are essential for the prevention of the danger of nuclear war and the strengthening of international peace and security and for the economic and social advancement of all peoples, thus facilitating the achievement of the new international economic order,

Having resolved to lay the foundations of an international disarmament strategy which, through co-ordinated and persevering efforts in which the United Nations should play a more effective role, aims at general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

Adopts the following Final Document of this special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament:

/...

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Attainment of the objective of security, which is an inseparable element of peace, has always been one of the most profound aspirations of humanity. States have for a long time sought to maintain their security through the possession of arms. Admittedly, their survival has, in certain cases, effectively depended on whether they could count on appropriate means of defence. Yet the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind. The time has therefore come to put an end to this situation, to abandon the use of force in international relations and to seek security in disarmament, that is to say, through a gradual but effective process beginning with a reduction in the present level of armaments. The ending of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament are tasks of primary importance and urgency. To meet this historic challenge is in the political and economic interests of all the nations and peoples of the world as well as in the interests of ensuring their genuine security and peaceful future.

2. Unless its avenues are closed, the continued arms race means a growing threat to international peace and security and even to the very survival of mankind. The nuclear and conventional arms build-up threatens to stall the efforts aimed at reaching the goals of development, to become an obstacle on the road of achieving the new international economic order and to hinder the solution of other vital problems facing mankind.

3. Dynamic development of détente, encompassing all spheres of international relations in all regions of the world, with the participation of all countries, would create conditions conducive to the efforts of States to end the arms race, which has engulfed the world, thus reducing the danger of war. Progress on détente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other.

4. The Disarmament Decade solemnly declared in 1969 by the United Nations is coming to an end. Unfortunately, the objectives established on that occasion by the General Assembly appear to be as far away today as they were then, or even further because the arms race is not diminishing but increasing and outstrips by far the efforts to curb it. While it is true that some limited agreements have been reached, "effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" continue to elude man's grasp. Yet the implementation of such measures is urgently required. There has not been either any real progress that might lead to the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Furthermore, it has not been possible to free any amount, however modest, of the enormous resources, both material and human, that are wasted on the unproductive and spiralling arms race, and which should be made available for the purpose of economic and social development, especially since such a race "places a great burden on both the developing and the developed countries".

5. The Members of the United Nations are fully aware of the conviction of their peoples, that the question of general and complete disarmament is of utmost importance and that peace, security and economic and social development are indivisible and have therefore recognized that the corresponding obligations and responsibilities are universal.

/...

6. Thus a powerful current of opinion has gradually formed, leading to the convening of what will go down in the annals of the United Nations as the first special session of the General Assembly devoted entirely to disarmament.

7. The outcome of this special session, whose deliberations have to a large extent been facilitated by the five sessions of the Preparatory Committee which preceded it, is the present Final Document. This introduction serves as a preface to the document which comprises also the following three sections: a Declaration, a Programme of Action and recommendations concerning the international machinery for disarmament negotiations.

8. While the final objective of the efforts of all States should continue to be general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the immediate goal is that of the elimination of the danger of a nuclear war and the implementation of measures to halt and reverse the arms race and clear the path towards lasting peace. Negotiations on the entire range of those issues should be based on the strict observance of the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, with full recognition of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and reflecting the vital interest of all the peoples of the world in this sphere. The aim of the Declaration is to review and assess the existing situation, outline the objectives and the priority tasks and set forth fundamental principles for disarmament negotiations.

9. For disarmament, the aims and purposes of which the Declaration proclaims, to become a reality it was essential to agree on a series of specific disarmament measures, selected by common accord as those on which there is a consensus to the effect that their subsequent realization in the short term appears to be feasible. There is also a need to prepare through agreed procedures a comprehensive disarmament programme. That programme, passing through all the necessary stages, should lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Procedures for watching over the fulfilment of the obligations thus assumed had also to be agreed upon. That is the purpose of the Programme of Action.

10. Although the decisive factor for achieving real measures of disarmament is the "political will" of States, and especially of those possessing nuclear weapons, a significant role can also be played by the effective functioning of an appropriate international machinery designed to deal with the problems of disarmament in its various aspects. Consequently, it would be necessary that the two kinds of organs required to that end, the deliberative and the negotiating organs, have the appropriate organization and procedures that would be most conducive to obtaining constructive results. The fourth and last section of the Final Document has been prepared with that end in view.

/...

II. DECLARATION

11. Mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced. Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth. Failure of efforts to halt and reverse the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, increases the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Yet the arms race continues. Military budgets are constantly growing, with enormous consumption of human and material resources. The increase in weapons, especially nuclear weapons, far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it. The vast stockpiles and tremendous build-up of arms and armed forces and the competition for qualitative refinement of weapons of all kinds to which scientific resources and technological advances are diverted, pose incalculable threats to peace. This situation both reflects and aggravates international tensions, sharpens conflicts in various regions of the world, hinders the process of détente, exacerbates the differences between opposing military alliances, jeopardizes the security of all States, heightens the sense of insecurity among all States, including the non-nuclear-weapon States, and increases the threat of nuclear war.
12. The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes and is incompatible with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or the political independence of any State, peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. It also adversely affects the rights of peoples freely to determine their systems of social and economic development, and hinders the struggle for self-determination and the elimination of colonial rule, racial or foreign domination or occupation. Indeed, the massive accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of armaments technology by racist régimes, as well as their possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, present a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm. It is, therefore, essential for purposes of disarmament to prevent any further acquisition of arms or arms technology by such régimes, especially through strict adherence by all States to relevant decisions of the Security Council.
13. Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. At the same time, the causes of the arms race and threats to peace must be reduced and to this end effective action should be taken to eliminate tensions and settle disputes by peaceful means.

14. Since the process of disarmament affects the vital security interests of all States, they must all be actively concerned with and contribute to the measures of disarmament and arms limitations, which have an essential part to play in maintaining and strengthening international security. Therefore the role and responsibility of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, in accordance with its Charter, must be strengthened.

15. It is essential that not only Governments but also the peoples of the world recognize and understand the dangers in the present situation. In order that an international conscience may develop and that world public opinion may exercise a positive influence, the United Nations should increase the dissemination of information on the armaments race and disarmament with the full co-operation of Member States.

16. In a world of finite resources there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. Military expenditures are reaching ever higher levels, the highest percentage of which can be attributed to the nuclear-weapon States and most of their allies with prospects of further expansion and the danger of further increases in the expenditures of other countries. The hundreds of billions of dollars spent annually on the manufacture or improvement of weapons are in sombre and dramatic contrast to the want and poverty in which two thirds of the world's population live. This colossal waste of resources is even more serious in that it diverts to military purposes not only material, but also technical and human resources which are urgently needed for development in all countries, particularly in the developing countries. Thus, the economic and social consequences of the arms race are so detrimental that its continuation is obviously incompatible with the implementation of the new international economic order, based on justice, equity and co-operation. Consequently, resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be used in a manner which will help to promote the well-being of all peoples and to improve the economic conditions of the developing countries.

17. Disarmament has thus become an imperative and most urgent task facing the international community. No real progress has been made so far in the crucial field of the reduction of armaments. However, certain positive changes in international relations in some areas of the world provide some encouragement.

Agreements have been reached that have been important in limiting certain weapons or eliminating them altogether, as in the case of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, and excluding particular areas from the arms race. The fact remains that these agreements relate only to measures of limited restraint while the arms race continues. These partial measures have done little to bring the world closer to the goal of general and complete disarmament. For more than a decade there have been no negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament. The pressing need now is to translate into practical terms the provisions of this Final Document and to proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament.

18. Removing the threat of a world war - a nuclear war - is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. Mankind is confronted with a choice: we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation.

19. The ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

The principal goals of disarmament are to ensure the survival of mankind and to eliminate the danger of war, in particular nuclear war, to ensure that war is no longer an instrument for settling international disputes and that the use and the threat of force are eliminated from international life, as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.

Progress towards this objective requires the conclusion and implementation of agreements on the cessation of the arms race and on genuine measures of disarmament taking into account the need of States to protect their security.

20. Among such measures, effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority. To this end, it is imperative to remove the threat of nuclear weapons, to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race until the total elimination of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems has been achieved, and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

At the same time, other measures designed to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and to lessen the danger of the threat or use of nuclear weapons should be taken.

21. Along with these, agreements or other effective measures should be adopted to prohibit or prevent the development, production or use of other weapons of mass destruction. In this context, an agreement on elimination of all chemical weapons should be concluded as a matter of high priority.

22. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, negotiations should be carried out on the balanced reduction of armed forces and of conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security. These negotiations should be conducted with particular emphasis on armed forces and conventional weapons of nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant countries. There should also be negotiations on the limitation of international transfer of conventional weapons, based, in particular, on the same principle, and taking into account the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States, as well as the need of recipient States to protect their security.

23. Further international action should be taken to prohibit or restrict for humanitarian reasons the use of specific conventional weapons, including those which may be excessively injurious, cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects.

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24. Collateral measures both in the nuclear and conventional fields, together with other measures specifically designed to build confidence, should be undertaken in order to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the adoption of additional disarmament measures and to further relaxation of international tension.

25. Negotiations and measures in the field of disarmament shall be guided by the fundamental principles set forth below.

26. All States Members of the United Nations reaffirm their full commitment to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and their obligation strictly to observe its principles as well as other relevant and generally accepted principles of international law relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.

They stress the special importance of refraining from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence; non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States; the inviolability of international frontiers; and the peaceful settlement of disputes, having regard to the inherent right of States to individual and collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter.

27. In accordance with the Charter, the United Nations has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. In order effectively to discharge this role and facilitate and encourage all measures in this field, the United Nations should be kept appropriately informed of all steps in this field, whether unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral, without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

28. All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have the right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security. While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament, and, together with other militarily significant States for halting and reversing the arms race. It is therefore important to secure their active participation.

29. The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage. At each stage the objective should be undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.

30. An acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations for nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States should be strictly observed.

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31. Disarmament and arms limitation agreements should provide for adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned in order to create the necessary confidence and ensure that they are being observed by all parties. The form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement. Agreements should provide for the participation of parties directly or through the United Nations system in the verification process. Where appropriate, a combination of several methods of verification as well as other compliance procedures should be employed.

32. All States, and in particular nuclear-weapon States, should consider various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, and the prevention of nuclear war. In this context, while noting the declarations made by nuclear-weapon States, effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security.

33. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of agreements or arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the zone concerned, and the full compliance with those agreements or arrangements, thus ensuring that the zones are genuinely free from nuclear weapons, and respect for such zones by nuclear-weapon States, constitute an important disarmament measure.

34. Disarmament, relaxation of international tension, respect for the right to self-determination and national independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the strengthening of international peace and security are directly related to each other. Progress in any of these spheres has a beneficial effect on all of them; in turn, failure in one sphere has negative effects on others.

35. There is also a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly to the realization of the latter. Therefore resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be devoted to economic and social development of all nations and contribute to the bridging of the economic gap between developed and developing countries.

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36. Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal concern. Measures of disarmament must be consistent with the inalienable right of all States, without discrimination, to develop, acquire and use nuclear technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their national priorities, needs and interests, bearing in mind the need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be conducted under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied on a non-discriminatory basis.

37. Significant progress in disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, would be facilitated by parallel measures to strengthen the security of States and to improve in general the international situation.

38. Negotiations on partial measures of disarmament should be conducted concurrently with negotiations on more comprehensive measures and should be followed by negotiations leading to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

39. Qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race. Efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the development of new means of warfare so that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes.

40. Universality of disarmament agreements helps create confidence among States. When multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament are negotiated, every effort should be made to ensure that they are universally acceptable. The full compliance of all parties with the provisions contained in such agreements would also contribute to the attainment of that goal.

41. In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament, and display a constructive approach to negotiations and the political will to reach agreements. There are certain negotiations on disarmament under way at different levels, the early and successful completion of which could contribute to limiting the arms race. Unilateral measures of arms limitation or reduction could also contribute to the attainment of that goal.

42. Since prompt measures should be taken in order to halt and reverse the arms race, Member States hereby declare that they will respect the above-stated objectives and principles and make every effort faithfully to carry out the Programme of Action set forth in section III below.

III. PROGRAMME OF ACTION

43. Progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament can be achieved through the implementation of a programme of action on disarmament, in accordance with the goals and principles established in the Declaration of Disarmament. The present Programme of Action contains priorities and measures in the field of disarmament that States should undertake as a matter of urgency with a view to halting and reversing the arms race and to giving the necessary impetus to efforts designed to achieve genuine disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

44. The present Programme of Action enumerates the specific measures of disarmament which should be implemented over the next few years, as well as other measures and studies to prepare the way for future negotiations and for progress toward general and complete disarmament.

45. Priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces.

46. Nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently.

47. Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. It is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. The ultimate goal in this context is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

48. In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility.

49. The process of nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way, and requires measures to ensure, that the security of all States is guaranteed at progressively lower levels of nuclear armaments, taking into account the relative qualitative and quantitative importance of the existing arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States and other States concerned.

50. The achievement of nuclear disarmament will require urgent negotiation of agreements at appropriate stages and with adequate measures of verification satisfactory to the States concerned for:

- cessation of the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems;
- cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;
- a comprehensive, phased programme with agreed time-frames, whenever feasible, for progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, leading to their ultimate and complete elimination at the earliest possible time.

Consideration can be given in the course of the negotiations to mutual and agreed limitation or prohibition, without prejudice to the security of any State, of any types of nuclear armaments.

51. The cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States within the framework of an effective nuclear disarmament process would be in the interest of mankind. It would make a significant contribution to the above aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of such weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. In this context the negotiations now in progress on a "treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests, and a protocol covering nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, which would be an integral part of the treaty," should be concluded urgently and the result submitted for full consideration by the multilateral negotiating body with a view to the submission of a draft treaty to the General Assembly at the earliest possible date.

All efforts should be made by the negotiating parties to achieve an agreement which, following General Assembly endorsement, could attract the widest possible adherence.

In this context, various views were expressed by non-nuclear-weapon States that, pending the conclusion of this treaty, the world community would be encouraged if all the nuclear-weapon States refrained from testing nuclear weapons. In this connection, some nuclear-weapon States expressed different views.

52. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America should conclude at the earliest possible date the agreement they have been pursuing for several years in the second series of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT II). They are invited to transmit in good time the text of the agreement to the General Assembly. It should be followed promptly by further strategic arms limitation negotiations between the two parties, leading to agreed significant reductions of, and qualitative limitations on, strategic arms.

It should constitute an important step in the direction of nuclear disarmament and ultimately of establishment of a world free of such weapons.

53. The process of nuclear disarmament described in the paragraph on this subject should be expedited by the urgent and vigorous pursuit to a successful conclusion of ongoing negotiations and the urgent initiation of further negotiations among the nuclear-weapon States.

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54. Significant progress in nuclear disarmament would be facilitated both by parallel political or international legal measures to strengthen the security of States and by progress in the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and other States in the regions concerned.

55. Real progress in the field of nuclear disarmament could create an atmosphere conducive to progress in conventional disarmament on a world-wide basis.

56. The most effective guarantee against the danger of nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

57. Pending the achievement of this goal, for which negotiations should be vigorously pursued, and bearing in mind the devastating results which nuclear war would have on belligerents and non-belligerents alike, the nuclear-weapon States have special responsibilities to undertake measures aimed at preventing the outbreak of nuclear war, and of the use of force in international relations, subject to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, including the use of nuclear weapons.

58. In this context, all States and in particular nuclear-weapon States should consider as soon as possible various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and related objectives, where possible through international agreement and thereby ensure that the survival of mankind is not endangered. All States should actively participate in efforts to bring about conditions in international relations among States in which a code of peaceful conduct of nations in international affairs could be agreed and which would preclude the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

59. In the same context, the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon-States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The General Assembly notes the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States and urges them to pursue efforts to conclude as appropriate effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

60. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, constitutes an important disarmament measure.

61. The process of establishing such zones in different parts of the world should be encouraged with the ultimate objective of achieving a world entirely free of nuclear weapons. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account. The States participating in such zones should undertake to comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones, thus ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons.

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62. With respect to such zones, the nuclear-weapon States in turn are called upon to give undertakings, the modalities of which are to be negotiated with the competent authority of each zone, in particular:

- (a) to respect strictly the status of the nuclear-weapon-free zone;
- (b) to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against the States of the zone.

63. In the light of existing conditions, and without prejudices to other measures which may be considered in other regions, the following measures are especially desirable:

(a) Adoption by the States concerned of all relevant measures to ensure the full application of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), taking into account the views expressed at the special session on the adherence to it.

(b) Signature and ratification of the Additional Protocols of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by the States entitled to become parties to those instruments which have not yet done so;

(c) In Africa, where the Organization of African Unity has affirmed a decision for the denuclearization of the region, the Security Council shall take appropriate effective steps whenever necessary to prevent the frustration of this objective;

(d) The serious consideration of the practical and urgent steps, as described in the paragraphs above, required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East in accordance with the relevant General Assembly resolutions where all parties directly concerned have expressed their support for the concept and where the danger of nuclear-weapon proliferation exists. The establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security. Pending the establishment of such a zone in the region, States of the region should solemnly declare that they will refrain on a reciprocal basis from producing, acquiring, or in any other way, possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices, and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory by any third party and agree to place all their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Consideration should be given to a Security Council role in advancing the establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone;

(e) All States in the region of South Asia have expressed their determination of keeping their countries free of nuclear weapons. No action should be taken by them which might deviate from that objective. In this context, the question of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia has been dealt with in several resolutions of the General Assembly which is keeping the subject under consideration.

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64. The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world, under appropriate conditions, to be clearly defined and determined freely by the States concerned in the zone, taking into account the characteristics of the zone and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in conformity with international law, can contribute to strengthening the security of States within such zones and to international peace and security as a whole.

In this regard, the General Assembly notes the proposals for the establishment of zones of peace, inter alia, in:

(a) South-East Asia where States in the region have expressed interest in the establishment of such a zone, in conformity with their views;

(b) Indian Ocean, taking into account the deliberations of the General Assembly and its relevant resolutions and the need to ensure the maintenance of peace and security in the region.

65. It is imperative as an integral part of the effort to halt and reverse the arms race, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The goal of nuclear non-proliferation is on the one hand to prevent the emergence of any additional nuclear-weapon States beside the existing five nuclear-weapon States, and on the other progressively to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. This involves obligations and responsibilities on the part of both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, the former undertaking to stop the nuclear-arms race and to achieve disarmament by urgent application of measures outlined in paragraphs 47-53 of this document, and all States undertaking to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

66. Effective measures can and should be taken at the national level and through international agreements to minimize the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons without jeopardizing energy supplies or the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Therefore, the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States should take jointly further steps to develop an international consensus of ways and means, on a universal and non-discriminatory basis, to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

67. Full implementation of all the provisions of existing instruments on non-proliferation, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and/or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) by States parties to those instruments will be an important contribution to this end. Adherence to such instruments has increased in recent years and the hope has been expressed by the parties that this trend might continue.

68. Non-proliferation measures should not jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable rights of all States to apply and develop their programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for economic and social development in conformity with their priorities, interests and needs. All States should also have access to, and be free to acquire technology, equipment and materials for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, taking into account the particular needs of the developing countries. International co-operation in this field should be under agreed and appropriate international safeguards applied through the International Atomic Energy Agency on a non-discriminatory basis in order to prevent effectively proliferation of nuclear weapons.

69. Each country's choices and decisions in the field of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing their respective fuel cycle policies or international co-operation, agreements, and contracts for the peaceful use of nuclear energy provided that agreed safeguard measures mentioned above are applied.

70. In accordance with the principles and provisions of Resolution 32/50, international co-operation for the promotion of the transfer and utilization of nuclear technology for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries, should be strengthened.

71. Efforts should be made to conclude the work of the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation strictly in accordance with the objectives set out in the joint communiqué of its organizing Conference.

72. All States should adhere to the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

73. All States which have not yet done so should consider adhering to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. (3)

74. States should also consider the possibility of adhering to multilateral agreements concluded so far in the disarmament field which are mentioned below in this section.

75. The complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represent one of the most urgent measures of disarmament. Consequently, conclusion of a convention to this end, on which negotiations have been going on for several years, is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations. After its conclusion, all States should contribute to ensuring the broadest possible application of the convention through its early signature and ratification.

76. A convention should be concluded prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons.

77. In order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements may ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements. Efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. Specific agreements could be concluded on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which may be identified. This question should be kept under continuing review.

78. The Committee on Disarmament should keep under review the need for a further prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques in order to eliminate the dangers to mankind from such use.

79. In order to promote the peaceful use of and to avoid an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, the Committee on Disarmament is requested - in consultation with the States parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil Thereof, and taking into account the proposals made during the 1977 Review Conference and any relevant technological developments - to proceed promptly with the consideration of further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race in that environment.

80. In order to prevent an arms race in outer space, further measures should be taken and appropriate international negotiations be held in accordance with the spirit of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

81. Together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures, the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons should be resolutely pursued within the framework of progress towards general and complete disarmament. States with the largest military arsenals have a special responsibility in pursuing the process of conventional armaments reductions.

82. In particular the achievement of a more stable situation in Europe at a lower level of military potential on the basis of approximate equality and parity, as well as on the basis of undiminished security of all States with full respect for security interests and independence of States outside military alliances, by agreement on appropriate mutual reductions and limitations would contribute to the strengthening of security in Europe and constitute a significant step towards enhancing international peace and security. Current efforts to this end should be continued most energetically.

83. Agreements or other measures should be resolutely pursued on a bilateral, regional and multilateral basis with the aim of strengthening peace and security at a lower level of forces, by the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons, taking into account the need of States to protect their security, bearing in mind the inherent right of self-defence embodied in the Charter of the United Nations and without prejudice to the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples in accordance with the Charter, and the need to ensure balance at each stage and undiminished security of all States. Such measures might include:

84. Bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences where appropriate conditions exist with the participation of all the countries concerned for the consideration of different aspects of conventional disarmament, such as the initiative envisaged in the Declaration of Ayacucho subscribed in 1974 by eight Latin American countries,

85. Consultations should be carried out among major arms supplier and recipient countries on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons, based, in particular, on the principle of undiminished security of the parties with a view to promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security as well as the inalienable right to self-determination and independence of peoples under colonial or foreign domination and the obligations of States to respect that right, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States.

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86. The 1979 United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects should seek agreement, in the light of humanitarian and military considerations, on the prohibition or restriction of use of certain conventional weapons including those which may cause unnecessary suffering or which may have indiscriminate effects. The conference should consider specific categories of such weapons, including those which were the subject-matter of previously conducted discussions.

87. All States are called upon to contribute towards carrying out this task.

88. The result of the Conference should be considered by all States and especially producer States, in regard to the question of the transfer of such weapons to other States.

89. Gradual reduction of military budgets on a mutually agreed basis, for example, in absolute figures or in terms of percentage points, particularly by nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States would be a measure that would contribute to the curbing of the arms race, and would increase the possibilities of reallocation of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries. The basis for implementing this measure will have to be agreed by all participating States and will require ways and means of its implementation acceptable to all of them, taking account of the problems involved in assessing the relative significance of reductions as among different States and with due regard to the proposals of States on all the aspects of reduction of military budgets.

90. The General Assembly should continue to consider what concrete steps should be taken to facilitate the reduction of military budgets bearing in mind the relevant proposals and documents of the United Nations on this question.

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91. In order to facilitate the conclusion and effective implementation of disarmament agreements and to create confidence, States should accept appropriate provisions for verification in such agreements.

92. In the context of international disarmament negotiations, the problem of verification should be further examined and adequate methods and procedures in this field be considered. Every effort should be made to develop appropriate methods and procedures which are non-discriminatory and which do not unduly interfere with the internal affairs of other States or jeopardize their economic and social development.

93. In order to facilitate the process of disarmament, it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States. Commitment to confidence-building measures could significantly contribute to preparing for further progress in disarmament. For this purpose, measures such as the following and other measures yet to be agreed, should be undertaken:

(1) The prevention of attacks which take place by accident, miscalculation or communications failure by taking steps to improve communications between Governments, particularly in areas of tension, by the establishment of "hot lines" and other methods of reducing the risk of conflict.

(2) States should assess the possible implications of their military research and development for existing agreements as well as for further efforts in the field of disarmament.

(3) The Secretary-General shall periodically submit reports to the General Assembly on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and its extremely harmful effects on international peace and security.

94. In view of the relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development and the necessity to release real resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development in the world, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, the Secretary-General should, with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts appointed by him, initiate an expert study on the relationship between disarmament and development. The Secretary-General should submit an interim report on the subject to the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session and submit the final results to the Assembly at its thirty-sixth session for subsequent action.

95. The expert study should have the terms of reference contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Group on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development appointed by the Secretary-General in accordance with General Assembly resolution 32/88 A of 12 December 1977. It should investigate the three main areas listed in the report, bearing in mind the United Nations studies previously carried out. The study should be made in the context of how disarmament can contribute to the establishment of the new international economic order. The study should be forward-looking and policy-oriented and place special emphasis on both the desirability of a reallocation, following disarmament measures, of resources now being used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries and the substantive feasibility of such a reallocation. A principal aim should be to produce results that could effectively guide the formulation of practical measures to reallocate those resources at the local, national, regional and international levels.

96. Taking further steps in the field of disarmament and other measures aimed at promoting international peace and security would be facilitated by carrying out studies by the Secretary-General in this field with appropriate assistance from governmental or consultant experts.

97. The Secretary-General shall, with the assistance of consultant experts, appointed by him, continue the study of the interrelationship between disarmament and international security and submit it to the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, as requested in resolution A/RES/32/154.

98. The thirty-third and subsequent sessions of the General Assembly should determine the specific guidelines for carrying out studies, taking into account the proposals already submitted including those made by individual countries at the Special Session, as well as other proposals which can be introduced later in this field. In doing so, the General Assembly would take into consideration a report on these matters prepared by the Secretary-General.

99. In order to mobilize world public opinion on behalf of disarmament, the specific measures set forth below, designed to increase the dissemination of information about the armaments race and the efforts to halt and reverse it, should be adopted:

100. Governmental and non-governmental information organs and those of the United Nations and its specialized agencies should give priority to the preparation and distribution of printed and audio-visual material relating to the danger represented by the armaments race as well as to the disarmament efforts and negotiations on specific disarmament measures.

101. In particular, publicity should be given to the final documents of the special session.

102. The General Assembly proclaims a week starting 24 October, the day of the foundation of the United Nations, as a week devoted to fostering the objectives of disarmament.

103. To encourage study and research on disarmament, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should intensify its activities in the presentation of information concerning the armaments race and disarmament. Also, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), is urged to intensify its activities aimed at facilitating research and publication on disarmament, related to its fields of competence, especially in developing countries, and should disseminate the results of such research.

104. Throughout this process of disseminating information about the developments in the disarmament field of all countries, there should be increased participation by non-governmental organizations concerned with the matter, through closer liaison between them and the United Nations.

105. Member States should be encouraged to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament to avoid dissemination of false and tendentious information concerning armaments and to concentrate on the danger of escalation of the armaments race and on the need for general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

106. With a view to contributing to a greater understanding and awareness of the problems created by the armaments race and of the need for disarmament, Governments and governmental and non-governmental international organizations are urged to take steps to develop programmes of education for disarmament and peace studies at all levels.

107. The General Assembly welcomes the initiative of UNESCO in planning to hold a world congress on disarmament education and in this connexion, urges UNESCO to step up its programme aimed at the development of disarmament education as a distinct field of study through the preparation, *inter alia*, of teachers' guides, textbooks, readers and audio-visual materials. Member States should take all possible measures to encourage the incorporation of such materials in the curricula for their educational institutes.

108. In order to promote expertise in disarmament in more Member States, particularly in the developing countries, the General Assembly decides to establish a programme of fellowships on disarmament. The Secretary-General, taking into account the proposal submitted to the special session, should prepare guidelines for the programme. He should also submit the financial requirements of 20 fellowships at the thirty-third regular session of the General Assembly, for inclusion in the regular budget of the United Nations bearing in mind the savings that can be made within the existing budgetary appropriations.

109. Implementation of these priorities should lead to general and complete disarmament under effective international control, which remains the ultimate goal of all efforts exerted in the field of disarmament. Negotiations on general and complete disarmament shall be conducted concurrently with negotiations on partial measures of disarmament. With this purpose in mind, the Committee on Disarmament will undertake the elaboration of a comprehensive programme of disarmament encompassing all measures thought to be advisable in order to ensure that the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control becomes a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the new international economic order is strengthened and consolidated. The comprehensive programme should contain appropriate procedures for ensuring that the General Assembly is kept fully informed of the progress of the negotiations including an appraisal of the situation when appropriate and, in particular, a continuing review of the implementation of the programme.

110. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of States to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary for an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

111. General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control shall permit States to have at their disposal only those non-nuclear forces, armaments, facilities and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens and in order that States shall support and provide agreed manpower for a United Nations peace force.

112. In addition to the several questions dealt with in this Programme of Action, there are a few others of fundamental importance, on which, because of the complexity of the issues involved and the short time at the disposal of the special session, it has proved impossible to reach satisfactory agreed conclusions. For those reasons they are treated only in very general terms and, in a few instances, even not treated at all in the Programme.

It should be stressed, however, that a number of concrete approaches to deal with such questions emerged from the exchange of views carried out in the General Assembly which will undoubtedly facilitate the continuation of the study and negotiation of the problems involved in the competent disarmament organs.

IV. MACHINERY

113. While disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field, has become a necessity for the survival of mankind and for the elimination of the danger of nuclear war, little progress has been made since the end of the Second World War. In addition to the need to exercise political will, the international machinery should be utilized more effectively and also improved to enable implementation of the Programme of Action and help the United Nations to fulfil its role in the field of disarmament.

In spite of the best efforts of the international community, adequate results have not been produced with the existing machinery. There is, therefore, an urgent need that existing disarmament machinery be revitalized and forums appropriately constituted for disarmament deliberations and negotiations with a better representative character.

For maximum effectiveness, two kinds of bodies are required in the field of disarmament - deliberative and negotiating. All Member States should be represented on the former, whereas the latter, for the sake of convenience, should have a relatively small membership.

114. The United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, has a central role and primary responsibility in the sphere of disarmament. Accordingly, it should play a more active role in this field, and in order to discharge its functions effectively, the United Nations should facilitate and encourage all disarmament measures - unilateral, bilateral, regional or multilateral - and be kept duly informed through the General Assembly, or any other appropriate United Nations channel reaching all Members of the Organization, of all disarmament efforts outside its aegis without prejudice to the progress of negotiations.

115. The General Assembly has been and should remain the main deliberative organ of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and should make every effort to facilitate the implementation of disarmament measures.

An item entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session" shall be included in the provisional agenda of the thirty-third and subsequent sessions of the General Assembly.

116. Draft disarmament multilateral conventions should be subjected to the normal procedures applicable in the law of treaties. Those submitted to the General Assembly for its commendation should be subject to full review by the General Assembly.

117. The First Committee of the General Assembly should deal in the future only with questions of disarmament and related international security questions.

118. The General Assembly establishes, as successor to the Commission originally established by resolution 502 (VI), a Disarmament Commission composed of all Members of the United Nations.

The General Assembly decides that:

(a) The Disarmament Commission shall be a deliberative body, a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, the function of which shall be to consider and make recommendations on various problems in the field of disarmament and to follow up the relevant decisions and recommendations of the special session devoted to disarmament. The Disarmament Commission should, inter alia, consider the elements of a comprehensive programme for disarmament to be submitted as recommendations to the General Assembly and through it to the negotiating body;

(b) The Disarmament Commission shall function under the rules of procedure relating to the committees of the General Assembly with such modifications as the Commission may deem necessary and shall make every effort to ensure that, in so far as possible, decisions on substantive issues be adopted by consensus.

The Disarmament Commission shall report annually to the General Assembly. It will submit for the consideration by the thirty-third session of the General Assembly a report on organizational matters. In 1979, the Disarmament Commission will meet for a period not exceeding four weeks, the dates to be decided at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly.

The Secretary-General is requested to furnish such experts, staff and services as are necessary for the effective accomplishment of the Commission's functions.

119. A second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament should be held on a date to be decided by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session.

120. The General Assembly is conscious of the work that has been done by the international negotiating body that has been meeting since March 14, 1962 as well as the considerable and urgent work that remains to be accomplished in the field of disarmament.

The General Assembly is deeply aware of the continuing requirement for a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of limited size taking decisions on the basis of consensus. It attaches great importance to the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States in an appropriately constituted negotiating body: the Committee on Disarmament.

The General Assembly welcomes the agreement reached following appropriate consultations among the member States during the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament that the Committee on Disarmament will be open to the nuclear-weapon States, and 32 to 35 other States to be chosen in consultation with the President of the thirty-second session of the General Assembly;

that the membership of the Committee on Disarmament will be reviewed at regular intervals; that the Committee on Disarmament will be convened in Geneva not later than January 1979 by the country whose name appears first in the alphabetical list of membership; and that the Committee on Disarmament will:

- (a) Conduct its work by consensus;
- (b) Adopt its own rules of procedure;
- (c) Request the Secretary-General of the United Nations, following consultations with the Committee on Disarmament, to appoint the Secretary of the Committee, who shall also act as his personal representative, to assist the Committee and its Chairman in organizing the business and timetables of the Committee;
- (d) Rotate the chairmanship of the Committee among all its members on a monthly basis;
- (e) Adopt its own agenda taking into account the recommendations made to it by the General Assembly and the proposals presented by the members of the Committee;
- (f) Submit a report to the General Assembly annually, or more frequently as appropriate, and provide its formal and other relevant documents to the Member States of the United Nations on a regular basis;
- (g) Make arrangements for interested States, not members of the Committee, to submit to the Committee written proposals or working documents on measures of disarmament that are the subject of negotiation in the Committee and to participate in the discussion of the subject matter of such proposals or working documents;
- (h) Invite States not members of the Committee, upon their request, to express views in the Committee when the particular concerns of those States are under discussion;
- (i) Open its plenary meetings to the public unless otherwise decided.

121. Bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament.

122. At the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation.

123. In order to enable the United Nations to continue to fulfil its role in the field of disarmament and to carry out the additional tasks assigned to it by this special session, the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be adequately strengthened and its research and information functions accordingly extended.

The Centre should also take account fully of the possibilities offered by United Nations specialized agencies and other institutions and programmes within the United Nations system with regard to studies and information on disarmament. The

Centre should also increase contacts with non-governmental organizations and research institutions in view of the valuable role they play in the field of disarmament. This role could be encouraged also in other ways that may be considered as appropriate.

124. The Secretary-General is requested to set up an advisory board of eminent persons, selected on the basis of their personal expertise and taking into account the principle of equitable geographical representation, to advise him on various aspects of studies to be made under the auspices of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and arms limitation, including a programme of such studies.

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125. The General Assembly notes with satisfaction that the active participation of the Member States in the consideration of the agenda items of the special session and the proposals and suggestions submitted by them and reflected to a considerable extent in the Final Document have made a valuable contribution to the work of the special session and to its positive conclusion.

Since a number of those proposals and suggestions, 1/ which have become an integral part of the work of the special session, deserve to be studied further and more thoroughly, taking into consideration the many relevant comments and observations made both in the general debate of the plenary and the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Committee, the Secretary-General is requested to transmit, together with this Final Document, to the appropriate deliberative and negotiating organs dealing with the questions of disarmament all the official records of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, in accordance with the recommendations which the Assembly may adopt at its thirty-third session. Some of the proposals put forth for consideration of the special session of the Assembly are listed below:

(a) Text of the decision of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party concerning Romania's position on disarmament and, in particular, on nuclear disarmament, adopted on 9 May 1978 (A/S-10/14);

(b) Views of the Swiss Government on problems to be discussed at the tenth special session of the General Assembly (A/S-10/AC.1/2);

(c) Proposals of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on practical measures for ending the arms race (A/S-10/AC.1/4);

(d) Memorandum from France concerning the establishment of an International Satellite Monitoring Agency (A/S-10/AC.1/7);

(e) Memorandum from France concerning the establishment of an International Institute for Disarmament Research (A/S-10/AC.1/8);

1/ See A/S-10/PV.1-25, A/S-10/1-14 and 17, A/S-10/AC.1/PV.1-16, A/S-10/AC.1/1-39, A/S-10/AC.1/L.1-17.

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- (f) Proposal by Sri Lanka for the establishment of a World Disarmament Authority (A/S-10/AC.1/9 and Add.1);
- (g) Working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany entitled "Contribution to the seismological verification of a comprehensive test ban" (A/S-10/AC.1/12);
- (h) Working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany entitled "Invitation to attend an international chemical-weapon verification workshop in the Federal Republic of Germany" (A/S-10/AC.1/13);
- (i) Working paper on disarmament submitted by China (A/S-10/AC.1/17);
- (j) Working paper submitted by the Federal Republic of Germany concerning zones of confidence-building measures as a first step towards the preparation of a world-wide convention on confidence-building measures (A/S-10/AC.1/20);
- (k) Proposal by Ireland for a study of the possibility of establishing a system of incentives to promote arms control and disarmament (A/S-10/AC.1/21);
- (l) Working paper submitted by Romania concerning a synthesis of the proposals in the field of disarmament (A/S-10/AC.1/23);
- (m) Proposal by Uruguay on the possibility of establishing a polemological agency (A/S-10/AC.1/25);
- (n) Proposal by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America on the strengthening of the security role of the United Nations in the peaceful settlement of disputes and peace-keeping (A/S-10/AC.1/26 and Corr.1 and 2);
- (o) Memorandum from France concerning the establishment of an International Disarmament Fund for Development (A/S-10/AC.1/28);
- (p) Note verbale transmitting the text, signed in Washington on 22 June 1978, by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela, reaffirming the principles of the Declaration of Ayacucho with respect to the limitation of conventional weapons (A/S-10/AC.1/34);
- (q) Memorandum from Liberia entitled "Declaration of a new philosophy on disarmament" (A/S-10/AC.1/35);
- (r) Statements made by the representatives of China on 22 June 1978, on the draft Final Document of the tenth special session (A/S-10/AC.1/36);

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(s) Proposal by the President of Cyprus for the total demilitarization and disarmament of the Republic of Cyprus and the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations (A/S-10/AC.1/39);

(t) Amendments submitted by China to the draft Final Document of the tenth special session (A/S-10/AC.1/L.2 to L.4, A/S-10/AC.1/L.7 and L.8);

(u) Proposals by Canada for the implementation of a strategy of suffocation of the nuclear arms race (A/S-10/AC.1/L.6);

(v) Draft resolution submitted by Cyprus, Ethiopia and India on the urgent need for cessation of further testing of nuclear weapons (A/S-10/AC.1/L.10);

(w) Draft resolution submitted by Ethiopia and India on the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war (A/S-10/AC.1/L.11);

(x) Proposal by the non-aligned countries on the establishment of a zone of peace in the Mediterranean (A/S-10/AC.1/37, para. 72);

(y) Proposal by Austria for the transmission to Member States of working paper A/AC.187/109 and the ascertainment of their views on the subject of verification (A/S-10/AC.1/37, para. 113);

(z) Proposal by the United States of America for the establishment of a United Nations Peace-keeping Reserve to be made up of national contingents trained in United Nations peace-keeping methods and earmarked by their Governments for United Nations duty (A/S-10/AC.1/37, para. 124);

(aa) Proposal by the non-aligned countries for the dismantling of foreign military bases from foreign territories and withdrawal of foreign troops from foreign territories (A/S-10/AC.1/37, para. 126);

(bb) Proposal by Mexico for the opening, on a provisional basis, of an ad hoc account in the United Nations Development Fund to use for development the funds which may be released as a result of disarmament measures (A/S-10/AC.1/37, para. 141);

(cc) Proposal by Italy on the role of the Security Council in the field of disarmament in accordance with Article 26 of the United Nations Charter (A/S-10/AC.1/37, para. 179);

(dd) Proposal by the Netherlands for a study on the establishment of an international disarmament organization (A/S-10/AC.1/37, para. 186).

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126. In adopting this Final Document, the States Members of the United Nations solemnly reaffirm their determination to work for general and complete disarmament and to make further collective efforts aimed at strengthening peace and international security; eliminating the threat of war, particularly nuclear war; implementing practical measures aimed at halting and reversing the arms race; strengthening the procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes; reducing military expenditures and utilizing the resources thus released in a manner which will help to promote the well-being of all peoples and to improve the economic conditions of the developing countries.

127. The General Assembly expresses its satisfaction that the proposals submitted to its special session devoted to disarmament and the deliberations thereon have made it possible to reaffirm and define in this Final Document fundamental principles, goals, priorities and procedures for the implementation of the above purposes, either in the Declaration or the Programme of Action or in both. The Assembly also welcomes the important decisions agreed upon regarding the deliberative and negotiating machinery and is confident that these organs will discharge their functions in an effective manner.

128. Finally, it should be borne in mind that the number of States that participated in the general debate, as well as the high level of representation and the depth and scope of that debate, are unprecedented in the history of disarmament efforts. Several Heads of State or Government addressed the General Assembly. In addition, other Heads of State or Government sent messages and expressed their good wishes for the success of the special session. Several high officials of specialized agencies and other institutions and programmes within the United Nations system and spokesmen of 25 non-governmental organizations and six research institutes also made valuable contributions to the proceedings of the session. It must be emphasized, moreover, that the special session of the Assembly marks not the end but rather the beginning of a new phase of the efforts of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

129. The General Assembly is convinced that the discussions of the disarmament problems at the special session and its Final Document will attract the attention of all peoples, further mobilize world public opinion and provide a powerful impetus for the cause of disarmament.



