

GOVERNMENT

Storage

DOCUMENTS

MAR 30 1978

95th Congress }
2d Session }

COMMITTEE PRINT

FARRELL LIBRARY
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY

WAR IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: A FIRSTHAND
REPORT ON THE CHALLENGES FOR
UNITED STATES POLICY

REPORT

OF A

FACTFINDING MISSION TO EGYPT, SUDAN,
ETHIOPIA, SOMALIA, AND KENYA

DECEMBER 12 TO 22, 1977

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES



FEBRUARY 3, 1978

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1978

21-981



✓
E02569 009TTV
A11600 695703

WAR IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: A FIRSTHAND
REPORT ON THE CHALLENGES FOR
UNITED STATES POLICY

COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, *Chairman*

L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida
CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr., Michigan
ROBERT N. C. NIX, Pennsylvania
DONALD M. FRASER, Minnesota
BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
LESTER L. WOLFF, New York
JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Massachusetts
LEO J. RYAN, California
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
HELEN S. MEYNER, New Jersey
DON BONKER, Washington
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts
ANDY IRELAND, Florida
DONALD J. PEASE, Ohio
ANTHONY C. BEILENSON, California
WYCHE FOWLER, Jr., Georgia
E (KIKI) DE LA GARZA, Texas
GEORGE E. DANIELSON, California
JOHN J. CAVANAUGH, Nebraska

WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Illinois
PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois
JOHN H. BUCHANAN, Jr., Alabama
J. HERBERT BURKE, Florida
CHARLES W. WHALEN, Jr., Ohio
LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
TENNYSON GUYER, Ohio
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California
WILLIAM F. GOODLING, Pennsylvania
SHIRLEY N. PETTIS, California

JOHN J. BRADY, Jr., *Chief of Staff*

(II)

FOREWORD

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C., February 3, 1978.

This report has been submitted to the Committee on International Relations by Hon. Don Bonker, a member of the Committee on International Relations, and Hon. Paul Tsongas, a member of the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, who undertook a factfinding mission to the countries of Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya from December 12 to 22, 1977.

The findings in this report are those of the study mission and do not necessarily reflect the views of the membership of the Committee on International Relations.

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,
Chairman.

FOREWORD

This report, the first submitted to the Committee on International Relations by Hon. John H. Hogue, a member of the Committee on International Relations, is a study of the views of the members of the Committee on International Relations, and is a study of the views of the members of the Committee on International Relations, and is a study of the views of the members of the Committee on International Relations.

Committee on International Relations
Chairman

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D.C., January 24, 1978.

HON. CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Enclosed is a report on the factfinding mission to the Horn region of Africa which we undertook on behalf of the Committee on International Relations and the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs from December 12 to 22, 1977.

The principal objective of this trip was to evaluate rapidly changing events in this highly important part of Africa, and to assess the significance these events have for U.S. foreign policy. In our judgment, no other part of Africa is more volatile or has more immediate potential for conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union than the Horn. During the course of our visit we met with heads of state and high-ranking government officials in five countries, in addition to interviewing a multitude of individuals concerned about our country's interests and evolving role in the Horn.

We have returned from our mission at a time when U.S. foreign policy in Africa and the Horn especially is under complete review. At the same time, public debate is becoming more and more intense with press coverage of Soviet and Cuban activity in the area. Therefore, we are presenting our report to Congress in the hope that our colleagues will find it helpful in understanding the complexities and conflicts in the Horn of Africa. We are also sharing our findings and recommendations with the executive branch in the interests of working collaboratively to shape a responsive and appropriate strategy for helping to bring peace and ease tension in that part of the world.

We would like to take this opportunity to express our appreciation to the State Department and U.S. field mission personnel for the extensive cooperation given us during the course of our mission. We are also very grateful for the assistance of Mr. Bryant Salter from Assistant Secretary of State Richard Moose's office, who accompanied us on the trip. We were impressed with the high level of quality and dedication of State Department personnel we encountered during our travels. We would also like to give special thanks to our legislative assistants Mr. Alan Van Egmond and Ms. Susan Broh for their excellent help in drafting and editing our report, and to Ms. Barbara Black and Ms. Marsha McMullin who provided secretarial support.

Mr. Chairman, our report provides necessary background information on the conflicts besetting the Horn, how various interests are affected, and how U.S. policy options are assessed as viewed by leaders in the region and by ourselves. We hope that our findings and recommendations will help lead us toward a balanced and well-measured

policy as countries in the Horn encounter a period of great turmoil and stress, as well as provide helpful perspectives on questions about increasing Soviet involvement in African affairs.

Sincerely,

DON BONKER,
Member of Congress.
PAUL TSONGAS,
Member of Congress.

CONTENTS

	Page
FOREWORD.....	III
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL.....	V
INTRODUCTION.....	1
Horn of Africa.....	1
U.S. interests in the Horn.....	2
Russian interests in the Horn.....	4
ETHIOPIA.....	7
General.....	7
The reign of Haile Selassie.....	7
Eritrean secession.....	8
The Ogaden conflict.....	10
Human rights.....	12
The Ethiopian Government's perspective.....	14
Economic assistance.....	16
U.S. policy.....	17
SOMALIA.....	19
General.....	19
The Ogaden conflict.....	20
Somalia-Kenya dispute.....	21
Somali-Soviet relations.....	22
United States-Somali relations.....	23
Human rights.....	23
Economic considerations.....	24
SUDAN.....	26
General.....	26
Relations with Ethiopia.....	27
Relations with the U.S.S.R.....	29
Relations with the United States.....	30
Human rights.....	32
Economic aspects.....	33
Local government.....	35
KENYA.....	37
EGYPT.....	39
DJIBOUTI.....	42
U.S. POLICY OPTIONS.....	43
Direct military assistance.....	43
Indirect assistance.....	44
Diplomatic and political initiatives in the Horn.....	45
FINDINGS.....	47
The Horn of Africa.....	47
Ogaden conflict.....	47
Ethiopia.....	47
Somalia.....	48
Sudan.....	48
Kenya.....	48
Egypt.....	48
RECOMMENDATIONS.....	49

CONTENTS

1	Introduction
2	Chapter I. The History of the United States
3	Chapter II. The Constitution of the United States
4	Chapter III. The Federal Government
5	Chapter IV. The State Governments
6	Chapter V. The Local Governments
7	Chapter VI. The Judiciary
8	Chapter VII. The Executive
9	Chapter VIII. The Legislative
10	Chapter IX. The Military
11	Chapter X. The Navy
12	Chapter XI. The Air Force
13	Chapter XII. The Space Program
14	Chapter XIII. The Atomic Energy
15	Chapter XIV. The Environmental Protection
16	Chapter XV. The Health Care
17	Chapter XVI. The Education
18	Chapter XVII. The Social Security
19	Chapter XVIII. The Labor Union
20	Chapter XIX. The Consumer Protection
21	Chapter XX. The Housing
22	Chapter XXI. The Transportation
23	Chapter XXII. The Communication
24	Chapter XXIII. The Cultural Heritage
25	Chapter XXIV. The Foreign Relations
26	Chapter XXV. The International Law
27	Chapter XXVI. The Human Rights
28	Chapter XXVII. The Globalization
29	Chapter XXVIII. The Sustainable Development
30	Chapter XXIX. The Climate Change
31	Chapter XXX. The Future of the United States

WAR IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: A FIRSTHAND REPORT ON THE CHALLENGES FOR UNITED STATES POLICY

INTRODUCTION

HORN OF AFRICA

Nowhere in Africa is there more potential for major instability and violence than in the Horn. Not even in southern Africa are the problems as complex and acute. Nor on the African Continent is there an area where the potential for East-West confrontation is greater, or strategic interests more important. For the United States, both our security interests and close allies are threatened. For Africans, the challenge of self-determination and the unraveling of established borders are at stake.

What is happening in the Horn of Africa today is much more than a conflict between two African countries; it involves the potential use of coastal areas and ports for military operations in and around the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, and the control of naval and international commerce through this vital area.

Soviet strategists have recognized the importance of the Horn of Africa and have shown their willingness to make substantial investments to secure Russia's interests, first in Somalia and now Ethiopia. By undermining the fragile governments which exist in the Horn, Soviet influence could rapidly spread throughout the region and along the entire east coast of Africa.

The Horn of Africa is best described by Tom J. Farer in "War Clouds on the Horn of Africa: A Crisis for Détente:"

The Horn of Africa is roughly three-quarters of a million square miles in the northeast of the continent, consisting largely of eroding, ravine-slashed plateaus, seared bushland, and rubble-strewn volcanic desert. Being a metaphor rather than a political entity, it has no precise boundaries; but it is conventionally thought of as embracing Ethiopia, the Somali Democratic Republic, and the Territory of the Afars and the Issas, a French-controlled wedge between the Eritrean and Somali coasts often referred to by the name of its capital, only city, and port: Djibouti. The life of the vast bulk of its people is nasty, brutish, and short. An acute famine, which began in 1972 and killed at least 100,000 people and possibly several times that number, has obscured the chronic decimation by disease and malnutrition.

In the northern province of Eritrea, Ethiopia's outlet to the Red Sea, the land is bled by a brutal secessionist struggle. My Lais follow Guernicas in a random and revolting procession. An everpotential war between Somalia and Ethiopia will simply add to the agony of a population which presses remorselessly on the area's exiguous resources. And merely the risk of war complicates the task of ameliorating poverty and famine, a task to which the revolutionary governments of both Ethiopia and the Somali Democratic Republic have formally consecrated themselves.

As the author implies, the present and potential destruction of human values on the Horn would be reason enough for international concern, but its strategic importance touches the larger international

system at many sensitive points. Geographic considerations make the northeast edge of the African Continent part of the geopolitics of the Middle East. The Horn also constitutes an important part of the northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean, including the Persian Gulf. It is obvious that Israel's vital oil imports from Iran, plus other Suez-bound commerce from the gulf, East Africa and Asia, must pass near the Somalia coast, and into the Red Sea parallel to Ethiopia's coast, and ultimately to the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba.

The United States has been closely allied with Ethiopia for at least 25 years, dating back to a 1953 mutual defense agreement. Since this time the United States has supplied over \$200 million worth of military assistance to Ethiopia; nearly half of all our aid to Africa was allocated for that country.

Until 1971, the United States also enjoyed good relations with Ethiopia's feuding neighbor, Somalia. But our reduction of assistance to Somalia because of her trade relations with North Vietnam, plus our disdain for Somalia's experiment in "scientific socialism," caused it to tilt more heavily toward the Soviets. In 1963, Russia signed an assistance agreement with Somalia. This helped Somalia improve her army substantially, to the point where today it is one of the most respected in all of Africa. Equipped and trained by the U.S.S.R., the Somali Armed Forces consist of 23,000 men, 250 tanks, and 300 armored carriers and a significant air force.

Major power and regional alignments have changed completely in the Horn of Africa. A few years ago, Ethiopia, backed by the United States, could have effectively challenged a Somali-inspired insurgency. However, more recently, under massive Russian sponsorship, Somalia not only developed an effective defense capacity, but also had the capability to launch effective attacks in the Ogaden and to threaten her neighbor, Kenya, as well.

However, within the past few months, surprising shifts have occurred. Russia (for reasons discussed below) chose to support Ethiopia (including massive airlifts of military equipment and advisers) which led the Somalis to "throw out" the Soviets in retaliation. The United States, under constant attack in Ethiopia, now must decide whether to become directly involved in Somalia.

Regional conflicts and Russian initiatives have also proved unsettling for other African countries in the Horn. Djibouti, for example, is so new as an independent state and reasonably poor and defenseless that she is highly vulnerable to either Somalia or Ethiopia. Sudan, under Nimeiri, is showing signs of enlightened leadership, but is never completely free of coup attempts or border problems. Kenya is understandably nervous about both Somalia and Ethiopia, should either become militarily powerful or adventuristic. As long as there are festering border problems and major superpower interest in relating to these problems through military aid, there will be little chance for peace and stability in the Horn of Africa.

U.S. INTERESTS IN THE HORN

In recent years there has been an emerging uncertainty as to precisely what U.S. interests are in the Horn region, and what priority these interests should have in determining U.S. policy in Africa. The strategic, political, and economic value of the Horn to the United

States was emphasized in hearings before the Senate Subcommittee on Africa in 1976, primarily in support of continued U.S. military aid to Ethiopia.¹ In addition, over the past few years hearings related to the establishment of a major U.S. base at Diego Garcia have dramatized important U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean as a whole, prior to the departure of the Soviets from Somalia.

While a definitive assessment of U.S. interests in the Horn, taking into account recent developments, has yet to be conducted, it is likely that any such analysis would include the following factors:

Strategic—

(a) The threat to Suez Canal traffic, including the flow of oil which is vital to the United States, Europe, and Israel;

(b) The growing challenge of the Soviet Navy to the American Fleet in the Indian Ocean;

(c) The availability of air bases for gathering intelligence and conducting airlifts to the Soviet Union in support of operations in the Horn, east Africa, and southern Africa; and

(d) The importance of certain areas for communications such as Kagnaw Station near Asmara, Ethiopia.

Political—

(a) The expansion of Russian and Cuban involvement in African affairs;

(b) The threat posed by radical Arab States such as Libya to more moderate governments such as Egypt and Sudan, governments which are vital to achieving peace in the Middle East and in the Horn;

(c) The potential for expansion of Soviet influence along the East African littoral;

(d) The potential for confrontation between East and West through partners in the Horn;

(e) The potential for confrontation between Arab States; and

(f) The uncertainty and danger which lie ahead and how this affects the success of self-determination for African states.

Economic—

(a) The problem of increasing the flow of trade through the Cape route as a result of conflict in the Horn, at a time when political conditions are so unsettled in southern Africa; and

(b) The dependence of Israel on oil and commerce through the Suez Canal.

Moral—

(a) The need to support the position of moderate governments faced with a destabilizing expansion of Soviet and Cuban involvement in the region;

(b) The need to encourage resistance to the spread of imposed Marxism by offering countries viable alternatives to Soviet domination; and

(c) Concern for preserving as much as possible, valuable historical relationships the United States has developed with countries in the region, such as Ethiopia.

This is not to suggest that the United States and the Soviet Union have totally incompatible interests in the Horn. To the contrary, at

¹ "Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa," Aug. 4, 5, and 6, 1976.

least *in principle*, there are certain compatible interests such as reducing the potential for East-West conflict in the Indian Ocean area, and supporting the OAU's principle of respect for the territorial integrity of African states in the case of Ethiopia, and potentially Djibouti and Kenya. Unfortunately, however, recent experience has not been encouraging for those seeking to emphasize this compatibility of interests.

A fairly obvious conclusion therefore is that the West, and the United States in particular, has an important stake in the outcome of events in the Horn. A *laissez faire* approach is simply untenable when our adversaries are involved so heavily in the internal and external conflicts of the area. At the same time, it would be erroneous to exaggerate U.S. interests, to overreact to political developments in the Horn, or to adopt imprudent policies based on emotional reactions to Soviet and Cuban involvement. Our actions may hinge on the question of degree, and our involvement be measured according to how far Russian-supported initiatives are pursued, or how untenable the political situation becomes for the United States in the Horn of Africa.

RUSSIAN INTERESTS IN THE HORN

Recent Soviet initiatives in the Horn of Africa only cloud and confuse the true nature of the Kremlin's objectives in that region. Until they switched sides in the Ethiopia-Somalia dispute, the Russians seemed to be motivated primarily by military and strategic considerations. Their commitment to becoming a world naval power underscored the need to have a naval presence in the Indian Ocean, particularly at the southern entrance to the Red Sea. The Port of Berbera in Somalia is perfectly suitable for that purpose.

Soviet intentions may have been to lay the foundation for an active defense against the U.S. missile-bearing submarines that conceivably could be used to patrol the Indian Ocean. U.S. Polaris A-3 and Poseidon submarines, equipped with ballistic missiles, together with support stations in western Australia and Diego Garcia, all provide some advantage to the West, which may have alarmed Soviet strategists.

In any case, the Indian Ocean happens to be an area where the Russians suffer some disadvantages over the West and have greater need for littoral support facilities. The Western monopoly on naval diplomacy in the Indian Ocean has been challenged effectively. However, the Russian Navy is presently limited by its commitments in the Mediterranean and along the Atlantic coast of Africa, and perhaps by its overextended logistics and supply links to the Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean. African leaders we met envision a Soviet plan to use its growing naval power to erode Western influence through the classic means of encouraging friendly regimes and intimidating or facilitating the replacement of those deemed hostile.

In addition, the Indian Ocean is important to the Soviets as a link in the sea route to Russia's Pacific coast and to friendly governments, particularly India and Vietnam. Almost 50 percent of Russia's military and economic assistance now goes to the Indian Ocean littoral states. For the movement of heavy equipment or oil, the

sea route, in the eyes of the Soviet strategists, may require a protective presence.

Furthermore, as leaders of African states in the Horn pointed out, the Soviet Union's designs in the area may be also based on economic factors. The area's abundant mineral and sea-protein resources are the envy of Russians, who depend heavily on the sea as a source of protein, running in short supply these days. The Indian Ocean is an important operating area for Soviet trawlers. In view of widespread unilateral extensions of coastal state claims to fishing rights (usually 200-mile economic zones), this could threaten access to a vital resource for the Russians. Somalia's economic planner told us of ambitious fish propagation programs, fully sponsored by the Russians, to dramatically increase fish runs off the east African coast. This may also be reason for Russian naval presence and support in areas where they have traditionally fished. On the Atlantic coast of Africa, for example, the Government of Ghana seized two Russian fishing vessels and arrested their crews, which prompted Soviet warships to cruise along the Ghanaian coast in protest.

What does all of this mean in terms of Russian activity in the Horn of Africa? Their earlier investment in base and port facilities at Berbera in Somalia served as evidence of the strategic and military importance they attach to the region. These facilities secured for Russia both a deterrent role, and a provision of logistical support for operations in the Indian Ocean. Why then would Russia sacrifice these facilities? Such a loss must have been painful, even disastrous in the short term, to Soviet military leaders.

We raised this question in all our discussions. We found general agreement that Russia was attempting to maintain close ties with both Ethiopia and Somalia. However, as the Ogaden war intensified, Russia had to make a decision whether to supply military equipment to Ethiopia. Somalia of course opposed this, but the Russian Ambassador to Ethiopia told us that Somalia's pursuit of the war in the Ogaden infuriated his government. Therefore they backed Ethiopia. Having been forced to leave Somalia, the Russians will probably now seek and undoubtedly find an alternative site to Berbera along Ethiopia's coast.

There is another, albeit somewhat simplistic, explanation for Russia's surprise switch in her alignments in the Horn. The Russians simply are inept and awkward in dealing with Arab-African countries. So far, they have been thrown out of Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia. We found many expressions of Russian insensitivity and arrogance from those who have experience with the Russians. Egypt's Sadat can go on at length about the Russian mentality. It appears that the Soviets are most effective only when a country, or its leaders, are in dire need of arms or if the two have compatible aims and ideologies. Some even go so far as to say that it is only a matter of time before the Russians are tossed out of Mozambique and Angola. However, as long as African states experience periods of political instability and uncertainty, the Russians appear only too willing to back a faction or coup attempt, and are continually prepared to supply arms to advance the "Revolution".

The United States today is without a specific or firm policy in the Horn of Africa; indeed it may be a time of changing, or at least evolving policy and directions due to recent Soviet activity in the area. It is

an important time for U.S. policymakers in the Horn, and Congress will invariably be called upon to support any basic changes in our policy. As members of that body, we will need to know the real strategic implications of recent developments there, whether indigenous conflicts significantly affect the interests of other states, and how to achieve overall stability in the area. It is for these reasons we made a 12-day trip to all of the countries in the Horn of Africa.

As long as there is turmoil and conflict in the Horn of Africa, the United States cannot afford to be complacent. To do so would risk possible Soviet domination of the whole Indian Ocean area and a consequent threat to fundamental Western interests.

ETHIOPIA

GENERAL

Ethiopia's history predates all but the most ancient civilizations. In 1974, a new era began when Emperor Haile Selassie I was deposed and a Marxist-Leninist government assumed power.

The United States enjoyed a long and friendly relationship with Ethiopia under Haile Selassie, but has become increasingly concerned with the Marxist drift of the new government. In April 1977 the United States terminated military assistance to Ethiopia. In reaction, the Ethiopian Government reduced the American presence to a token level and embraced the Soviet Union. Over the past few months, Cuban and Eastern European military assistance has been pouring into the country in unprecedented proportions.

It is important to understand the background of events which led to the current shifts of political alignment to understand the nature of United States-Ethiopian relations and to determine policy options for the future.

THE REIGN OF HAILE SELASSIE

Haile Selassie, who traced his lineage to Solomon and the Queen of Sheba, was an historic figure who unified his country, and served as a world symbol of Ethiopian national pride. The image of Selassie calling upon the League of Nations for assistance against Fascist aggression—and being rejected—still preys upon the conscience of all thoughtful men. That image positively affected the U.S. support of Selassie's government, both economic and military, for over a generation.

However, internally the Emperor's rule was absolute. Dissidents were jailed or exiled. The status quo was guarded jealously. Educational opportunities which were provided to some young people exposed them to different ideas and created a yearning for modernization and social justice. Haile Selassie stubbornly refused to change the feudal order. Thus, while the face of the surrounding African Continent was rapidly changing, in Ethiopia, policies that made it preferable to be an Amhara, to be a Christian, and to be related by blood to the Emperor, continued to hold sway.

By 1974 this system's time had already passed. Isolated, mountainous Ethiopia could not be immune indefinitely from pressures for national development and greater equity. The fuse was ready, and the spark came in the great African drought which began in 1973. Hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians in the northeast part of the country perished while the Government refused even to acknowledge that there was a problem. This was more than the nation could tolerate. As Haile Selassie's hold on the country diminished, a power vacuum was created. Only the military was organized and united enough to fill that vacuum, and they exercised their will. Initially, there was a sharing of power. However, on September 12, 1974, Haile Selassie

was put in prison, and the military assumed total control. An Emperor for some 50 years, he died on September 13, 1975, under circumstances still not completely understood.

The tenure of the Lion of Judah was remarkable in many ways. But his short-sighted authoritarianism which held the country back in its feudal past also provided the seeds of his decline. Sadly, it also provided the seeds of the turmoil which continues throughout Ethiopia today.

Selassie's downfall also marked the decline of American influence and credibility in Ethiopia. The current rulers and many Ethiopians associate the faults and errors of Haile Selassie with the United States because of the two countries' close association during his reign. This legacy will remain for many years.

ERITREAN SECESSION

Eritrea, the northern portion of Ethiopia, is on the verge of secession. The subject of dispute and discord for centuries, the province is inhabited largely by Tigrinyan-speaking people, a majority of whom are Muslims (as contrasted to the Amharic-speaking Christians who ruled in Addis Ababa). Strategically, Eritrea is of great importance since it provides Ethiopia with its only access to the Red Sea, through the ports of Massawa and Assab.

Unlike the rest of Ethiopia, Eritrea was under Italian rule from the turn of the century until World War II. With the defeat of the Italians in 1941, the question of Eritrea became more acute. The Muslim community in Eritrea wanted independence; Haile Selassie insisted that Eritrea be part of the Ethiopian Empire. The situation soon became more volatile.

In 1950, the Big Four Commission (the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union) turned the issue over to the United Nations. The U.N. solution—a federal system creating an autonomous Eritrean unit within an Ethiopian context—was implemented in 1952 and satisfied no one. (U.S. interest in Eritrea heightened in the mid-1950's when we constructed Kagnaw Station, a critical communications post in the Eritrean capital of Asmara.)

Selassie undermined the federation from the outset. It took him 10 years to alter the situation, but in 1962, the Eritrean Parliament voted to join Ethiopia under circumstances of dubious legality.

Haile Selassie ruled Eritrea, but Eritrean liberation movements only intensified their efforts to seek arms and support. They were not unified, however, and their activities have been plagued by dissension.

Today, there are essentially three secessionist groups: the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), the original Muslim unit numbering 20,000–25,000 troops; the Eritrean Popular Liberation Front (EPLF), a Christian-Marxist group of equal size; and the Eritrean Liberation Front-Peoples Liberation Front (ELF-PLF), a small (5,000–6,000) group splintered off from the EPLF which is less radical and enjoys good relations with Arab countries.

The secessionist struggle continued to precipitate violence in Eritrea throughout the 1960's and early 1970's. The fall of Haile Selassie in 1974 gave rise to the possibility of a negotiated settlement. However, this soon dissipated after negotiations broke down in Addis Ababa.

In late 1974 the ruling clique in Addis (the Derg) clamped down in its internal policies. This culminated in serious violence November 23, 1974, when scores of Ethiopians were killed. Among these was Gen. Aman Michael Andom, an Eritrean who, while having limited power, served as head of the Ethiopian Government. He also served as the Government's main link to Eritrea. His death and the resultant large-scale violence by the Ethiopian Army in Eritrea served to cement support for full independence within Eritrea. It also helped bring together the various Eritrean splinter groups, and created a basis on which Arab League members such as Sudan, Libya, and Syria gave enthusiastic support for Eritrean independence.

The Derg focused its military priorities on Eritrea, determined to bring the secessionist movement to its knees. It did not succeed, however. In addition, when the Somali's highly trained, well-armed forces thrust across Ethiopia's southeastern border into the Ogaden in the spring of 1977, Ethiopian military power had to be diverted to meet the attack.

By the time of our December 1977 visit to Ethiopia, the Eritreans had gained control over all of the province with the exception of the cities of Asmara, Massawa, and Assab. The critical Asmara-Massawa road was cut on October 18, 1977, and remains useless; these two cities continue to be under strong attack.

The Washington Post reported on January 16, 1978, that Soviet and Cuban military equipment and troops had joined the Ethiopian Government's battle in Eritrea and that Soviet-built Mig 21's were dropping bombs on Eritrean towns. Eritrean guerrillas claim they have captured Soviet and Cuban prisoners. Rebel forces view these latest actions as a final desperate act before withdrawal of the Derg's army, rather than a serious attempt to regain control of the province.

Developments in Eritrea in the next few months are intertwined with occurrences on other fronts. The outcome, while still in doubt, will likely hinge on the following:

(1) The success of Eritrean liberation forces in taking Asmara and Massawa (the Port of Assab is more important to Ethiopia than to Eritrea and is not a military objective of the Eritreans at this point);

(2) The Derg's reaction if Eritrean independence is achieved;

(3) The ability of competing Eritrean factions to establish a coalition government;

(4) The effect of an Eritrean victory on the survival of the current regime in Addis Ababa;

(5) The success of Ethiopia's efforts to oust the Somalis from the Ogaden, which would permit Ethiopia to commit greater military priority to Eritrea; and

(6) The reaction of the Arab League states, specifically Egypt and the Sudan, if an independent Eritrea calls for their armed assistance to resist Ethiopian attempts to recapture the territory.

For the present, Eritreans are seeking full independence and are not likely to accept anything less. The various liberation groups reject a federal solution, especially while Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam holds power in Addis Ababa. Therefore, it is doubtful that the present Ethiopian Government will regain any control over Eritrea via a negotiated settlement. However, the fragile unified position of the various Eritrean liberation groups belies the continuing divisions

among them. If and when full independence is achieved, these divisions are expected to lead to serious problems in Eritrea, and perhaps even a continuation of bloodshed. Therefore, it is likely that peace will not come very soon in Eritrea.

THE OGADEN CONFLICT

The Ogaden is the name given to a sparsely inhabited, environmentally hostile area which encompasses southeast Ethiopia. It has been the subject of a long conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, with both countries desiring the area. The national flag of Somalia contains five stars—one of which symbolizes the Somali inhabitants of the Ogaden. This is seen by the Ethiopians as a clear statement of intention by Somalia to annex the area.

In the summer of 1977, the Somalis, fully equipped with Russian equipment, drove deep into the Ogaden. (The Somalis claim these troops are all natives of the Ogaden or have family roots there.)

For some time the Ethiopians had been concerned over the buildup of the Somali military by the Soviet Union. Once the invasion finally occurred, the Ethiopian military proved woefully inadequate despite over 25 years of U.S. military assistance to the country. As the war mounted, Ethiopia was shocked that the United States would refuse to honor its commitments to supply additional arms under a credit sales program. The Ethiopians naturally chose to seek support elsewhere, with the Soviet Union a logical choice in light of the two countries' similar ideologies.

United States-Ethiopian relations had deteriorated rapidly when the Ethiopian head of state, Gen. Tefere Bante, and six others were executed by the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) in February 1977. Between February and April 1977, the United States scaled down its military assistance to Ethiopia. The Soviet Union began to seize the advantage by encouraging Ethiopian feelers. The Russians seemed convinced that both Ethiopia and Somalia would subjugate their national interests on behalf of their interest in Marxism and Soviet support. There is evidence that the Soviet Union was not pleased with Somalia's invasion of the Ogaden in July 1977. Ethiopia's urgent needs forced the issue, and Russia opted for large-scale assistance despite the risks for her relations with Somalia.

The timing of the Ogaden campaign was strategically advantageous to the Somalis. The Ethiopian Second Division was tied up in Eritrea, having allegedly received assurances from the Soviets that the Somalis would not attack in the south. The Ethiopian's military supply situation appeared bleak—American equipment had been cut off and Soviet equipment was not yet in the pipeline. Also, the internal turmoil in Addis Ababa inhibited effective operations at the front line. The Somali campaign was successful in a variety of areas. They secured most of the Ogaden, including Jijiga, and were close to seizing the historic city of Harrar, a city both militarily and psychologically critical to Ethiopia.

At the same time, Ethiopians were greatly incensed with the United States when, shortly after the Somali invasion on July 29, 1977, the United States announced an "agreement in principle" to supply Somalia with defensive arms. It was a foolish move at best. The announcement was strongly protested by the Ethiopians and less than

2 weeks later it was withdrawn. Subsequently, the United States adopted the OAU's position on territorial integrity. Translated, this means U.S. support for the original boundaries.

The military situation in the Ogaden has reached an impasse. It is felt within Ethiopia, however, by Ethiopians and most foreign observers as well, that the pendulum is swinging back to Ethiopia's advantage. This is due primarily to the change in the military balance in the area. As a result of expelling the Soviets in November 1977, the Somalis are no longer receiving Soviet supplies. Without badly needed parts and ammunition, Somalia's military inventory is rapidly deteriorating. At the same time, she is unable to find a willing supplier in the West, since the United States has turned down an invitation to provide direct military aid. Even so, it would be of dubious value because the Somali Armed Forces have been equipped and trained by the Russians.

In addition, the Russians have engaged in a massive airlift of military supplies to Addis Ababa, supported by Cuban-Russian-Warsaw Pact military "advisers." We personally saw Soviet Mig's being assembled at the Addis Ababa airport plus a sizable number of Soviet transport planes. Such a major commitment by a superpower is likely to improve the Ethiopian military situation in the Ogaden in short order and enable her to regain the offensive.

There are other factors which may also help Ethiopia in the Ogaden conflict. While the Somali invasion has nationalistic overtones, it is more than matched by the Ethiopians who apparently fully support the Derg's prosecution of the war. In fact, it may be the one event that makes possible constituent support of the Derg. Those we talked to who were highly critical of Ethiopia's military rule, were supportive of efforts to reclaim the Ogaden.

Also, African public opinion is understandably against Somalia's military invasion of the Ogaden. African leaders hold dearly to the 1964 OAU recognition of boundaries and generally support the philosophy of territorial integrity. It should be noted however, that some leaders are disturbed about Russian-sponsored activities in the Horn and may well find themselves in a dilemma on the Ethiopian-Somali dispute.

The most troublesome question at the moment relates to Ethiopia's intentions when and if she is able to reverse the situation in the Ogaden. Once Ethiopia succeeds in reclaiming the Ogaden, fears are that the Ethiopian Army will then move into Somalia. This would ultimately signal the Soviets' real intentions in the Ogaden conflict. While constituting a violation of OAU principles, this option is not without its merits for the Ethiopians both as a negotiating lever, and a basis on which the Soviets can reclaim their lost naval base at Berbera.

In our meeting with Colonel Mengistu, we put the question directly to him: "Do you intend to advance into Somalia?" to which he replied, "We have no objective of crossing once we have thrown the Somalis out—we do not intend to repeat the same mistake as the Somalis." Should the Ethiopians push into Somalia, they will be facing not only Somalis, but also Sudanese and Egyptians who will undoubtedly become involved. All three countries are former Soviet clients who are distrustful of Soviet motives in the Horn and will collectively resist the growth of Soviet influence in the area.

It is our opinion that Russia would not encourage Ethiopia to advance beyond her own border. Since there is good reason to believe the Russians discouraged and even objected to Somalia going into the Ogaden in the first place, it is unlikely they would react any differently with Ethiopia. The Russian Ambassador to Ethiopia, when asked about this, assured us they would not encourage such activity.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Violence in Ethiopia is not limited to Eritrea and the Ogaden; we saw firsthand evidence of it in the capital city of Addis Ababa. Perhaps it would be naive to expect that the transformation of Ethiopia from a feudal aristocracy to a Marxist state could occur without substantial internal strife. But if the situation in Addis Ababa is reflective of conditions in the rest of the country, bloodshed permeates the present system. There is no doubt that a reign of terror exists in that beleaguered city today. We knew of the terror and killings before our arrival; our discussions with Embassy personnel and others reinforced it. Violence has simply become a way of life for Ethiopians.

But it was not until we were interrupted at breakfast our last day that the message was brought dramatically home to us. While nightly killings were commonplace, it appeared that the last evening had been exceptionally bad. We immediately departed in an Embassy vehicle for a firsthand tour of the city. What we found was shocking. At the first location, across the street from where U.S. Embassy personnel were living, there were two Ethiopians, bound by the hands, lying dead on the street. At another stop we found three who had been shot in an alley. Finally, near the public square, we discovered four dead men who were placed deliberately for public display.

The killings in themselves were bad enough, but the fact that they were intentionally left in open and crowded locations for public consumption was abhorrent. This apparently was unusual and indicated the Government fully intended to engender fear in the populace. It succeeded in that. Some of the bodies were bound by the hands, others had signs attached identifying the victims as "counterrevolutionaries." But reasons for the murders vary and there is no opportunity for explanations. It is a closed matter.

Who is responsible for these atrocities is never easy to determine, but the Government's involvement and support is undisputed. Some say the killings are out of control and the Government is helpless to prevent them.

In order to insure grassroots participation in local affairs, the Ethiopian Provisional Military Government established the Urban Dwellers Association, known as "Kebele", to select the local leadership and provide local indoctrination. In Addis there are 290 local Kebele units, which in turn select representatives to 20 higher units and, ultimately, this comprises the city government.

The so-called counterrevolutionaries, known as the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party (EPRP), who are considered generally more doctrinaire Marxists, began selective assassinations of Kebele leaders and Government officials. Nearly one-fifth of these leaders were eliminated. What has followed can be described as a Government-sponsored program of destroying the EPRP and its members through wholesale killings and inflicting fear among the people.

In March 1977, the Kebeles set up the Revolutionary Defense Squad, which patrols all of the 290 Kebele units, with local citizens assigned and armed to protect the revolutionaries. Most of these "patrol security officers" are uneducated and undisciplined, but they have license to kill anyone who is suspected of counterrevolutionary activities. Anyone accused of an assortment of unspecified crimes (example: having U.S. currency on person) can be summarily shot. Indeed, in our meeting with Colonel Mengistu he confirmed this by saying that such measures were sometimes taken "on the spot." The Kebele defense squad are an addition to the military which also periodically conducts raids and executions.

Ironically, it was Haile Selassie's authoritative rule and oppressive habits that led his military officers to demand reforms in 1974. Eventually the "Derg" came into being and a 120-man committee representing various military and paramilitary units was formed. Inevitably changes occurred and new faces appeared on the scene; many emerged from obscurity. The anonymity of the Derg left it unclear as to who was in charge.

By November 1974, the real powers began to emerge. So did the atrocities. On November 24, 1974, Mengistu Haile Mariam and Lieutenant Colonel Atnaфу ordered the execution of some 60 officials at the prison in Addis Ababa. This violence also spurred the move from negotiation to a military confrontation in Eritrea.

The Derg declared a policy of land reform both because they believed in it and because they knew this would win favor with the peasants and the increasingly restive student population. The rest of 1976 and early 1977 were marked by great tension, especially between the Derg and student groups, labor, and the intelligentsia who were outside the real centers of power. Students were arrested, schools were closed, and the pupils were forced to go to the countryside to serve the state. A general strike in September 1976 was forcibly squelched.

As political authority disintegrated, violence became a matter of course in Addis Ababa. The Derg continues to wage a bloody conflict with the Marxist EPRP (Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Party), a collection mostly of students, workers, and civil servants. Although cloaked in ideological terms, the struggle was for power, with one group intending to keep power (the Derg) and the other (the EPRP) demanding civilian rule.

In February 1977, head of state Teferi Bante was executed (like his predecessor, Gen. Aman Michael Andom) along with six other Military Council members at the PMAC headquarters in Addis. Lt. Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam was made the new PMAC chairman, with Col. Atnaфу Abate second in command. It is alleged that Mengistu was about to be arrested by Teferi and others, but acted first and emerged the victor. (In November 1977, Atnaфу himself was executed.)

Mengistu moved to consolidate his position. He embraced Marxist-Leninist ideology further, and his attacks upon the United States became more violent. Taking his cue from the Russian Revolution of 1917, Mengistu and his supporters see everything in that context. Thus, the killings are necessary to purge the revolution of "counter-revolutionaries."

Consequently, within this context of political upheaval, the issue of human rights has been lost in the struggle for survival. While we were in Addis Ababa we saw in the local newspapers an official call for "red terror" to replace "white terror," that is, for the pro-Derg forces to destroy the EPRP forces.

Colonel Mengistu has consolidated his position within the Derg, and there are few, if any, obvious rivals. In our meeting with him, we raised the human rights issue and voiced objections to the violence in Ethiopia. In his response, Mengistu did not hesitate to refer to what he considered American hypocrisy on the issue. He is not the only one in Ethiopia who reminded us of U.S. unqualified support of Haile Selassie when basic human rights were abused. He points to land reform as one example, and the military leader feels the revolution is conferring real human rights on an oppressed peasant population.

In this respect, Mengistu is correct. But it does not justify the level of violence in Ethiopia today or the denial of basic human freedoms there. Although some of the violence is precipitated by the "counter-revolutionaries," the rulers must ultimately be held accountable.

THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT'S PERSPECTIVE

On the morning of December 13, we were informed that Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) had agreed to meet with us. This was apparently a rare and unprecedented occasion, since no congressional delegation had been in Ethiopia since the revolution, and only one previous high-ranking U.S. official had met personally with Colonel Mengistu. It was widely believed that this meeting could prove valuable to a better understanding of our two Governments' policies.

In our 1-hour session with Chairman Mengistu, we made it clear that as individual Congressmen, we were not speaking for the U.S. Government and were accountable only to Congress and to ourselves. We also said that it was our hope that some of the misunderstandings between our two countries could be addressed in this session. We discussed briefly U.S. policy on human rights and concerns about reported violations in Ethiopia. We also stated that the United States was attempting to limit military assistance, and it was unlikely that there would be any military aid to any of the disputing countries in the Horn of Africa.

Colonel Mengistu proceeded to outline his government's attitudes and policies in Ethiopia today. He maintains that their system is based on justice, equality, and improved standards of living. He was aware of Representative Tsongas' tour of duty in the Peace Corps and invited him to compare today's Ethiopia with what it was like when ruled by tyrants. He went on to say that Ethiopia is endowed with great natural resources, but that rivers and lakes were left to wild animals and did not serve the people. "Ethiopia," he said, "is rich enough to have three harvests a year and enough minerals for her needs and a surplus to export. "What is in short supply," he said, "is trained manpower."

He referred to Ethiopia's experience with several colonial powers, which benefited only a select few while the majority lived in desperate poverty. He went on to say that in past years there were virtually no

schools—"the sons of the rich were sent off to Europe and America for education"—and that 95 percent of the people were illiterate. He added that hundreds of thousands were jailed and the whole nation was "one big prison." "But no one said anything about violation of human rights in those days," hinting that the United States remained silent during Selassie's reign.

Colonel Mengistu claims that those who were in prison are now free, and he has allowed people to form labor unions and urban associations to encourage participation in all facets of Ethiopia's economic, social, and political life. "It is true," he said, "that our revolution is still very young," but that the objective was not one of personal gain but to work for the benefit of all the people to create "social order and democratic rights for everyone."

He then commented on human rights, pointing to a difference of views between our two countries. "We look at human rights from a class dimension," which he maintains is the objective of the Ethiopian revolution. In foreign policy matters, the chairman said his position was one of nonalignment and that Ethiopia would "not be the tool of anyone." He insists that Ethiopia is sovereign in its decisionmaking and that it will take orders from no one. "However," he added, "we cannot do everything by our own efforts alone and we must cooperate with nations willing to help us".

Speaking as an acknowledged Socialist, Colonel Mengistu says that "we have learned from the struggle of hundreds of years that the struggle of the masses will be victorious." He had hoped that as young Congressmen, we would explain the "revolution" to the people of the United States. He felt that both Ethiopians and Somalis should want to spend all their time on internal problems of the countries. Ethiopia, he says, certainly has no desire to expand its territory or to export its revolution. "The resources should be used for the people, not for the expansion," he said. Both countries—that is Somalia and Ethiopia—have members of nationalities who have lived in peace for centuries, but the Arabs are traditionally enemies of the Ethiopians and are encouraging secession in Eritrea. As traditional enemies of the Ethiopian people, he accuses the Arabs of continuing to foment trouble.

Turning to the Ogaden conflict, Colonel Mengistu told us that the Somalis took advantage of the troublesome military situation in the north and America's failure to honor her obligations in supplying arms to Ethiopia. As a result, Somalia then launched its war of aggression. He urged us to use our influence on countries outside of Africa not to help Ethiopia's enemies. "Not doing so would be another historic mistake of the United States," he added.

In response to our question about violence in Addis Ababa, Colonel Mengistu referred to the "struggle going on" in Ethiopia. He said the struggle is first between the former landlords and the former tenants. In the cities and urban areas it is between those who want to return to the old order and those who want to consolidate the revolution. He referred to the several assassinations of elected officials of Urban Associations (the Kebeles) and other officials. He said the struggle was even going on in the school system between those who want to serve the nation and those who want to cause disturbances. He accused the latter of coming from the former landlord classes. In the beginning, he said, they distributed pamphlets, but now they are shooting. The

chairman said he did not want to hide the real situation and that measures are sometimes taken "on the spot". But he insisted that justice is being administered through the courts now and the guilty are punished. He said the punishments are reported quite regularly to the public through the media by the fact that the courts are open. (This is, of course, contrary to our personal observation of the indiscriminate killings in Addis Ababa referred to elsewhere in this report.)

We felt this information was revealing and important, so we asked the chairman whether we could make his statement available to our colleagues and the public, to which he replied "by all means, since this is the official Ethiopian position."

We explained to Colonel Mengistu our concern about Russia's involvement in Ethiopia. The chairman said that it was true that the Somali Government was armed with socialist weapons, but that the U.S.S.R. did not agree with Somali expansionism. He said he "admired" the Soviet Union which, having significant national interests in Somalia, turned to support the just cause of Ethiopia. "You Americans should admire their courageous policy," he said. He explained that the conflict in the northern part of Ethiopia was supported by Arab countries with surplus petrodollars. Relations between Ethiopia and the U.S.S.R. and other Socialist countries have their basis in that fact. He maintains that Ethiopia is paying for some of its weapons "but this situation cannot impair our standing as a nonaligned government." Ethiopia had maintained its nonaligned position when it was being supplied by the United States. Today, because the Soviets are willing to supply Ethiopia that does not mean Ethiopia is changing its nonaligned position. "Strict adherence to nonalignment is our responsibility to Africa," he added.

Finally, in response to our question about the Organization of African Unity's efforts to resolve the conflict in the Ogaden, the chairman reviewed the OAU position of territorial integrity. He maintained that if the OAU's principle of territorial integrity is abandoned, international wars will follow the redrawing of frontiers. "That is why the entire continent condemns Somali aggression," he said. "However," he asserts, "there is no force at the disposal of the OAU, and the Somalis will not budge. Do not expect the OAU to solve the problem," he said, "it is the duty of Ethiopia and its armed forces to expell the aggressors." He hoped fervently that Somalia would recognize its mistakes and voluntarily withdraw its troops. Without such a decision on the part of the Somalis, he did not see a political solution in the Ogaden.

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

Ethiopia's emphasis on military aid has dwarfed its efforts to receive economic assistance, although the country continues to receive limited economic aid. U.S. economic aid has dropped dramatically in recent years. Since 1951 U.S. economic aid has totaled \$311.1 million. Nonetheless, our total new obligations in fiscal year 1977 were the lowest in history, less than \$1 million. The total on-going aid grants and loans and Public Law 480 food assistance totaled \$11 million that year, and will reach \$15 million in fiscal year 1978. Fiscal year 1979 assistance reportedly will be slightly reduced, to \$10.8 million.

Presently, the U.S. AID mission in Ethiopia consists of 12 officials, a considerable drop from the normal complement of 28-30. The reduction was made last spring by the U.S. Government after other U.S. military and Embassy personnel were ordered to leave by the Derg. Approximately 30 Ethiopians work with the U.S. AID program and 15-20 Americans are in Ethiopia under contract to the Agency. At the same time, the United States has not proceeded with certain projects which the Ethiopians value highly. For example, a road building program designed to allow development in certain impoverished areas is stymied because of short-sighted opposition by the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee to infrastructure improvement in general.

Despite drastic reductions in the U.S. economic assistance program, Ethiopia continues to receive help from the World Bank and other countries, particularly the European Economic Community, Sweden, Eastern Europe, China, the Soviet Union, Canada, and West Germany. This assistance has been primarily for the agricultural sector, infrastructure improvement and manpower training.

We believe the United States should expand its economic and humanitarian aid. There is little doubt that such programs are needed and that onsite AID personnel can administer them properly. Since most of the Ethiopian officials who assist with these projects were trained in the United States, their working relations with U.S. AID personnel are good, and have not been affected by the deteriorating political relations. The violence in Addis Ababa and elsewhere does not automatically preclude effective economic assistance in certain needy areas. Everyone we met who sympathized with U.S. interests felt that we should expand our assistance agenda. These programs identify the United States with legitimate human interests rather than the military violence associated with the Soviets.

U.S. POLICY

The U.S. policy towards Ethiopia is confusing and ill-conceived and may prove counterproductive. A 30-year association with one of our closest allies is rapidly deteriorating as we attempt to cope with changing realities in that beleaguered country. Our long support and affection for Haile Selassie does not sit well with the revolutionaries now in power who perceive the former Emperor as oppressive. Ethiopia's recent pact with Russia and her attempts to impose a Marxist state are not alone reasons for the United States to react with negative policies.

We are guilty of losing our perspective by attacking Ethiopia for accepting Soviet military equipment when the Ethiopians have a legitimate right to defend the Ogaden and prevent the dismemberment of their country. At the same time, we have been virtually silent on the Somali invasion of that area which has been recognized internationally as the rightful property of Ethiopia.

While the Soviets have made Ethiopia a major diplomatic post, we have not had an ambassador there for 17 months.

We have criticized the human rights violations of the present regime (and rightly so), but we have never acknowledged the human rights policies of Haile Selassie's government, which we heavily supported.

In recent months we have come to treat the Ethiopians as an arm of the Soviet Union. This is a tragic error. Our own policy may succeed only in driving the Ethiopians into greater dependence on the U.S.S.R. The United States should recognize the long-term investment we have in this country and the good will that exists among the people that was so apparent on our recent visit. We should not be unmindful of recent Russian misfortunes with other countries in the Horn of Africa; Ethiopia may well follow suit and boot the Russians out after the military situation has settled down in the Ogaden.

While there is much room for criticism of Ethiopia's human rights violations and even U.S. dissatisfaction with the Derg's commitment to Marxism, we should not condemn their right to defend their own territory, or their heavy dependence on another superpower for arms to support that right. Our criticism should be limited to Russian motives and activities in the Horn and the possible exploitation of a country in a state of military and internal crisis.

It is also important that we respect Ethiopian nationalism. While the present government is committed to building a Marxist state in Ethiopia, it is unlikely that system will ever be accepted or will succeed. It is nationalism that will inevitably emerge, as it has in Sudan and other African countries. At some point there will be a renewed search for national identity, and that identity will preclude the heavyhanded self-interest of the Soviet Union. In our view the Ethiopians can, will, and should begin to reduce the Soviet influence and reassert their independence. Colonel Mengistu, his supporters, and his detractors all believe this will happen. The question is whether we will allow it to happen or whether we will drive them irreversibly together (as we did with Castro in Cuba).

If that happens, two objectives will suffer: first, the United States-Ethiopian relationship, and second, the hope for a return to peace, normalcy, and human rights in Ethiopia.

Despite strengthened ties between Ethiopia and the Soviets, and the low ebb of United States-Ethiopian relations, many Ethiopians have retained a feeling of friendship toward Americans. The tragedy of the current course of events rests not only in the inevitable violence which will touch the lives of many Ethiopians, but also the demise of a bond of friendship between two countries that could learn to work together.

SOMALIA

GENERAL

Somalia occupies a triangular slice of east Africa, stretching from Djibouti in the north to Cape Guardafui on the easternmost tip (roughly parallel to the southeastern coast of the Arabian Peninsula) and south to Kenya's northernmost corner. It comprises Italy's former territory of Somalia and the former British protectorate of Somaliland. The two entities merged in June 1960, pursuant to an agreement to establish a unitary republic with northern and southern regions. The Somali flag, we were told, carries a five-pointed star which represents the five fragments of the Somali nation created by the colonial impact on the Horn. The colonial presence in part supplied the roots of present boundary disputes, and Somalia's ambition to eventually annex those remaining areas that comprise the so-called "Greater Somalia."

The Somalis are as culturally uniform as the Ethiopians are diverse. Dispersed throughout the Horn, these proud people speak a common language, enjoy a rich oral literature which emphasizes a genealogy that can be traced back to Arab ancestry, and have a deep devotion to the Islamic faith. All of the Somali officials we talked to take great pride in their history and national character.

Siad Barre's Supreme Revolutionary Council was established in 1969 following a military takeover of the Government. The SRC promotes what it calls "scientific socialism," but we found in Mogadishu signs of capitalism which has persevered during 8 years of Russian influence. We also found in Mogadishu that Somali leaders are more preoccupied with the war in the Ogaden and economic development than with a brand of socialism. Proud of their race and strong individuality and imbued with a fervent sense of nationalism, Somalia seems an unlikely convert to communism.

In fact, Somalia is the latest example of failure as a potential Communist-client state. Egypt and Sudan encountered similar problems in dealing with the Communists. We saw one newspaper quote a Somali as saying, "The Somali people do not like socialism * * * it is another form of religion, but without God." Yet there is a collective spirit and a feeling that everyone must help "build the country."

However, the country is at a critical point in its history. Having completely broken relations with Russia there is no longer a dependable supply of military equipment and arms in the present hour of Somalia's seemingly greatest need. Furthermore, all of the Soviet-sponsored economic programs have been abandoned as periodic drought intensifies the enormous and desperate needs of the people. The Government in Mogadishu is far from secure from political adversaries, and some fervent Communists still exist. Should Somalia experience a humiliating defeat in its Ogaden policy, Siad Barre's regime may either be totally discredited domestically or overthrown.

This was the setting upon our brief visit to Mogadishu and, not surprisingly, Somali officials were anxious to explore avenues of U.S. assistance. There was a sense of urgency brought on by intense war with Ethiopia in the Ogaden.

THE OGADEN CONFLICT

Every Somali leader can recount almost verbatim the "historical facts" that are the basis for their claims to the Ogaden. It is a subject which preceded virtually every discussion we had with Somali officials and one that is obviously deeply felt by everyone in the country.

While Ethiopia and most outsiders accuse Somalia of being the aggressor, Siad Barre quickly refutes such charges and offers a few of his own.

As in many other areas of the African Continent, the immediate causes of conflict spring from arrangements made during the comparatively recent period of colonial domination. No fixed boundaries existed in the Horn until the late 19th century. During the turn of the century the British, Italians, and French agreed on boundaries which gave Ethiopia, and later Kenya, jurisdiction over sizeable tracts of territory inhabited by Somali-speaking nomads. After independence in 1960 the Somali's irredentist pursuit of a "Greater Somalia" led to hostilities with Ethiopia in the Ogaden in 1963-64. Somalia eventually relented from pursuing the conflict directly, and until recently provided low-key assistance to the Western-Somali Liberation Front, which mounted sporadic guerrilla attacks in the region.

The Ogaden conflict will probably never be resolved to everyone's satisfaction. Somalia can make a case by pointing to the "historical facts" and the close ties it has to Somali inhabitants of the contested area. In a court of law, their claim would possibly be valid, but it is in the political arena and the battlefield where the case is being prosecuted. And in both, it is not going well for Somalia.

Politically, Somalia is viewed as the aggressor because she has moved across boundaries recognized as inviolate by the Organization of African Unity in 1964. While there may be merit to Somalia's claim, no African leader today publicly wants to see an adjustment of existing boundaries, least of all by military action. Once begun, the unraveling of boundaries would have widespread and disastrous consequences for virtually every state in Africa.

Militarily, the Somali Armed Forces are highly rated, but cannot sustain a prolonged war in the Ogaden without outside assistance. Equipped and trained mostly by Russians in the early seventies, they will soon be in a quagmire without some immediate help. With the exception of Egypt's \$30 million in arms support, and possibly some Saudi money, there is no indication of further aid from any country. Meanwhile Ethiopia, now enjoying substantial contributions from the Soviets, will probably reverse the action in the Ogaden, and may even threaten Somalia itself.

In our discussions with President Siad Barre, Vice President Samatar, Minister of Finance Abdurahman Nur Hersi, and other key officials, we expressed concerns in the United States about the Somali-Ethiopian conflict, and raised questions about the role they expected the United States to play in settling the dispute. (We pointed out that

Congress will not go along with direct military aid but instead will provide economic assistance.) Mr. Nur Hersi, after a lengthy discourse on the historical facts which serve as the basis for their land claims in the west and the south, charged that Haile Selassie was obsessed with his empire, and that Colonel Mengistu is continuing the same ambitious plans, but under a different label. He said that the Ethiopian command now consists of eight Soviet military advisers, three Cubans, and four Ethiopians. The Somali official reminded us that his country was the only one to call for OAU mediation over the conflict.

Since there is a question as to whether the Somalis are directly involved in the Ogaden, the Vice President (who is also second in command in the military) was asked whether Somali soldiers were fighting in that region. His reply: "No, none." But, as we reiterated that no Somali soldiers were in the Ogaden, he carefully qualified himself by saying that there were some who had taken leave from the armed forces to fight with their brothers in that area. He pointed out that "Freedom Fighters" have been trained both inside and outside Somalia since 1964; they were formerly sent to Arab States and Europe for training and had also received military guerrilla training from Iran. (We noted at this point that he did not directly answer our questions about Somalia's direct involvement in the Ogaden conflict.) In response to a question as to whether Somali officers were trained by the Russians, he replied "No." Concerning Russian equipment, we were told that Somalia, as well as other Arab States, possesses Russian-made equipment which their men have been trained to operate. As to whether strategy decisions concerning the war are made in Mogadishu, we were informed that this was not the case. The Vice President claimed that Somalia was actually against war in the Ogaden and desired to negotiate a peaceful settlement. He pointed out, however, that Ogaden Somalis had started the conflict and that somehow the Somali National Government was drawn into it.

A subject very much on the mind of Somali leaders is the impending threat of Ethiopia advancing into Somali territory. They are indeed aware and deeply concerned about this possibility and have so informed the United States and the United Nations. They point out that if an invasion occurs it will be because the Soviets and the Cubans are supporting the Ethiopian cause.

SOMALIA-KENYA DISPUTE

Should Somalia ever succeed, militarily or politically, in the Ogaden it will likely act on a similar problem in the south with Kenya. Talk in Mogadishu of a "Greater Somalia" includes an area referred to as the Northern Frontier District (NFD) which presently happens to be northern Kenya. The NFD—comprising over a third of Kenya's territory but including less than 10 percent of its population and an even lesser proportion of its wealth—has had a history of separate administration under the umbrella of Kenya's colonial government.

The issue is not unlike the Ogaden where an area in one country contains an ethnic population with ties in another. Over 60 percent of the 400,000 inhabitants in the NFD are Somalis with cultural and religious links to their kin in Mogadishu. Over the last century, movement into and out of the region has been carefully controlled to prevent any further Somali migration southward.

Some time in the early 1960's, as Kenya progressed towards independence, the NFD population began to assert a distinct identity. Warmly supported from Mogadishu, a movement began that stressed the right to choose association with their kin or cultural cousins in the Somali Republic. This was followed by a British commitment to allow "an investigation * * * to ascertain public opinion in the NFD regarding its future * * *." After considerable procrastination, a commission was sent and in their report it was discovered that the Somalis (who made up 62 percent of the NFD population) "almost unanimously" favored secession from Kenya, with the object of "ultimately" joining the Somali Republic.

Apparently this option was never seriously considered. As Kenya moved towards independence the British found it expedient to include the NFD within the framework of Kenya's new constitution. This arrangement provoked understandable anger, and in some cases violence in the Somali Republic, and caused a break in Somalia's diplomatic relations with Great Britain and Kenya.

Ever since, this issue has been a source of bitter controversy between Kenya and Somalia. The Somalis claim that their kinsmen are being oppressed and it has become something of a political issue in Mogadishu. But realizing that Kenyans are extremely concerned about this issue, the Somalis maintain there is a solid basis for friendship between the two countries. Kenyan suspicion and fear over Somalia's intentions in the NFD are raised continually, at every political forum. Somalia, with trouble enough in the Ogaden, is not anxious (at least for the time being) to take on another territorial claim. Yet there are legitimate concerns about Kenya's neglect of basic needs in the NFD. For example it was alleged that Kenyan citizenship rights are not extended to the inhabitants of this region.

President Siad Barre expressed hope that the United States would play a major role in encouraging Kenya to negotiate the problem. This is a possibility discussed elsewhere in this report.

SOMALI-SOVIET RELATIONS

The Somali Finance Minister, Abdurahman Nur Hersi, said he speaks from experience when he tells us the Soviets are trying to socialize all of Africa ("the goal is to spread communism"). He was one of several Somali officials who mentioned Russia's "African strategy," which he said Somalia rejected. He also stated Somalia's desire to keep the Red Sea free of confrontation, which apparently is another reason why the break occurred with their former benefactor.

Our curiosity about Soviet intentions in the Horn of Africa led us to ask the Vice President about Somalia's former relationship with the Russians. He replied that the Soviets have a "plan for Africa" to link Somalia, Ethiopia, and Djibouti in an effort to curtail oil supplies in the Persian Gulf. As to whether the Soviets actually revealed this plan to him, he said "Yes", and added that President Siad Barre had rejected it. Apparently, the Somali leaders openly refused to be associated with such a strategy.

We were also interested in hearing Somali comments on how other African states see the Soviet approach to Africa. The Vice President said that the West has been identified with colonialism, which is

widely rejected and has left ill feelings lingering even today, while Russia has freely backed liberation movements. But they discovered, as others have, that there is usually a price to pay. In Somalia's case, Russia apparently had designs on its mineral and sea resources as well as the strategic importance of the Port of Berbera.

It was pointed out that the United States does not want to engage in an East-West confrontation over the Horn of Africa, and Somalia should take the lead in explaining to other African states what true Soviet intentions are. We were told that at least five African states were inclined to favor Somalia's position (but it is likely that no country will announce such support publicly at this time).

UNITED STATES-SOMALIA RELATIONS

We expressed our desire to continue economic and humanitarian assistance to Somalia, regardless of the political-military situation, while publicly denouncing Russian disrespect for African nationalism. Top officials were emphatic in stating that their country has "thrown out" the Russians and that major steps must now be taken by the West to curtail Soviet activities in the Horn. We reminded them of the contradiction—that Russia was previously in Somalia and, if we are to be consistent, we should stick to our existing policy of neutrality. Somalia would not have appreciated our condemnation of her when the Kremlin was directing activities in that country, so why should we now criticize Ethiopia? Referring to an earlier discussion we had with Russia's Ambassador to Ethiopia, we relayed what he said about the Soviets deciding to pull out when Somalia made its attack in the Ogaden. The Vice President, obviously perplexed by the comment, only remarked that Somalia had to back the "Freedom Fighters."

It was suggested that Somalia might invite Egypt and Sudan to assist in the war effort, particularly in view of the situation in the north. The Vice President said he would welcome support and that his troops are trained to operate both Russian and Western military equipment. As to the rumor that Egyptian soldiers may be deployed to protect the Port of Berbera, we were informed that Somalia was not expecting Egyptian soldiers in the near future. However, it is well known that Siad Barre has made several trips to Egypt (also Saudi Arabia) to generate more military support.

We inquired as to whether the Vice President and Somalia's Government supported Sadat's initiatives in the Middle East, to which he replied, "Yes." He said it is the only way to reach a peaceful settlement and will serve in the best interest of both parties.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Like Ethiopia, Somalia is an authoritarian state ruled by the military, albeit with much more substantial civilian participation. While the human rights picture in Somalia does not resemble the sordid violations occurring in Ethiopia, there are several examples of individuals being detained without charge or trial. Amnesty International has identified more than 50 political prisoners all of whom reportedly are kept in solitary confinement with no communication with the outside world or relatives. Many fundamental freedoms such

as the right of free expression and free association are either severely restricted or systematically repressed. To Somalia's credit, however, according to Amnesty International, there are no authenticated reports of torture, and beatings of those arrested are rare and isolated.

ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS

As we flew in a small aircraft from Nairobi to Mogadishu, it became obvious why Somalia is economically underdeveloped. Much of the land is coastal and sandy, contributing little by way of natural resources. Because of the scanty and irregular rainfall, agriculture is generally limited to the rivers and the dry farming areas between the Giuda and Uebi Scebeli Rivers and in the north around Hargessa.

Its economy is primarily dependent on livestock and agriculture, with untapped mineral resources and a lengthy coast for a potential fish industry. The biggest export item is livestock which reached record levels in 1975 as nomadic herders rushed animals to the market for fear that the drought would claim their herds.

In fact, frequent droughts often cause many hardships and greatly inhibit economic development. The 1973-74 drought particularly hurt the livestock industry, which accounts for 70 percent of the country's exports; it also seriously affected their balance of payments that year.

We met with one of the country's economic planners who outlined Somalia's economic development plan. The 5-year plan (1974-78) was to begin in 1973, but it was seriously disrupted by the drought. He told us 268,000 people were affected and they are having difficulties in the recovery effort. They need to redirect their recovery program, keep pace with inflation, and cope with the demands of war in the Ogaden.

There was some discussion about the fishing resources along Somalia's long coast. They specialize in lobster, whitefish, and tuna, all of which are potentially exportable. While the Russians had invested heavily in joint ventures in fishing, he was somewhat suspicious because of the Soviets' obvious protein needs. His government recently extended their fishing jurisdiction to 200 miles, as have most other nations, but admitted they have no means of patrolling and enforcing the new law. He emphasized that fish consumption is being encouraged by the Somalis.

Since the greatest worry is with drought, the Somali Government has emphasized the need to develop underground water resources. We also looked at maps depicting major rivers where dams are being either planned or are under construction. One is at Berbera, another at Lughgenani, and a third in Lower Guba. Apparently the West Germans have pledged to help with dam construction.

The United States cut off development funds to Somalia in 1971 after Congress included in the Foreign Assistance Act a provision forbidding aid to countries whose flag was flown on ships trading with North Vietnam.

Today the Somalis are eager to renew U.S. assistance in a number of areas. There are urgent needs to develop and use water resources, and for public health programs. In agriculture, the focus is on machinery and technical assistance. As pointed out earlier, livestock is terribly

important in Somalia, especially as an export item, but deserves higher priority in terms of quality standards and marketing techniques. (About 30 percent of their stock is destroyed by the "tsetse" fly.)

We have since learned that the State Department has decided to resume economic development aid to Somalia and will submit to Congress an agriculture research and training program for early next year. We were present on the morning that Ambassador John Loughlin and Finance Minister Abdurahma Nur Hersi signed a grant of humanitarian assistance under Public Law 480 for emergency food supplies to Somalia (caused by the suffering during the latest drought).

The aid program, as we understand it, will cost \$15 million over a 5-year period and includes funds for testing varieties of soils to improve crops in Somalia. It also will involve sending U.S. technicians to work with the Somali Agriculture Ministry on extension and training programs.

Apparently, the State Department is also considering a 4-year health project to start in fiscal 1979, which would set up centers to train Somali villagers in preventive medicine and health care.

Until U.S. aid was terminated in 1970, the United States provided \$57.3 million in economic development aid to Somalia starting in 1962. In the current fiscal year the United States is scheduled to give \$6 million in Public Law 480 food grants which will go to civilians who have evacuated the area of fighting in the Ogaden, and to nomads who have come to resettlement villages as a result of the drought.

Also, in September 1977, AID gave a \$1.5-million grant to the World Health Organization to fight smallpox, which had spread from Ethiopia to Somalia, and in October AID contributed to the International Committee of the Red Cross to relieve suffering of victims of the Ogaden conflict.

SUDAN

GENERAL

The Sudan lies across the middle reaches of the Nile River. It is bounded on the north by the Arab Republic of Egypt; on the west by Libya, Chad, and the Central African Republic; on the south by Zaire, Uganda, and Kenya; and on the east by the Red Sea and Ethiopia.

The modern history of the Sudan begins in the 1820's when an Egyptian Army was successful in occupying the country in part to secure the waters of the Nile. In the 1880's, a major revolution arose against Egyptian rule led by Mohammed Ahmed, who called himself the Mahdi (leader of the faithful). In 1889, an Anglo-Egyptian Army crushed the Mahdi's forces and ruled Sudan jointly through a "condominium" in which the British were the dominant partner. Until 1956, the British administered the Sudan, establishing an educational system, a civil service, and a small professional army. By the terms of an Anglo-Egyptian agreement in 1953, the Sudan was granted self-government. A parliamentary government was established on January 9, 1954, which opted for independence in December of that year. The Sudan then became an independent republic on January 1, 1956. The United States was one of the first countries to recognize the new republic.

Economic and political conditions, however, deteriorated to the point where, on November 17, 1958, the military took over the Government in a bloodless coup. During the same period, civil war broke out between north and south based on the resentment of Arab domination and exploitation of southern Sudan. After a period of general unrest, marked by abortive negotiations with southern leaders and Communist-inspired discontent, a general election was held in the northern provinces in April 1965.

Subsequent coalition governments proved unworkable, and on May 25, 1969, an armed forces group of "free officers" took over the Government in a military coup, proclaiming an Arab nationalist brand of revolutionary socialism. This was followed by several coups and countercoups which led to a plebiscite in September 1971 in which Gen. Jaafar Mohamed Nimeiri received 98 percent of the vote.

In addition to strengthening the central government structure, the Nimeiri regime embarked on a major effort to restore national unity. In March 1972, an agreement was finally reached in Addis Ababa which brought an end to the civil war by granting regional autonomy to southern Sudan.

During the last 5 years President Nimeiri and the Government of Sudan have increasingly followed a less ideologically bound policy, seeking, abroad and at home, pragmatic responses to its many problems. It has achieved a considerable level of political stability. In turn, this has engendered an environment conducive to economic development.

In recent years, a broad array of Western nations and Arab oil powers led by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have come to the economic and diplomatic rescue of the Nimeiri Government, which had depended heavily on Moscow for arms and aid.

Today, the Soviet Union and its new-found Arab ally, Libya, are regarded by the Sudanese as the country's prime enemies. The new basis of President Nimeiri's foreign policy is a triangular partnership with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which America favors.

It has been a long, hard, uphill struggle for those favoring closer Sudanese-American relations. A first step was to break a diplomatic log-jam dating back to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, when Sudan abruptly severed its ties with the United States.

Having taken the initiative among Arab States to renew relations with Washington in July 1972, Nimeiri saw his overtures to the United States spoiled by the assassination of the American Ambassador, Cleo Noel, and his top aide, George Curtis Moore, in March 1973. A heavy pall immediately fell over relations between the two countries, which was exacerbated by Nimeiri's decision under Arab pressure to release the Palestinian terrorists responsible and turn them over to a Palestinian liberation group in Egypt. United States-Sudan relations deteriorated to the point where in June 1974 the U.S. Ambassador was recalled to Washington for 6 months in protest.

Now, however, the situation is visibly changing, at a crucial moment in the life of Sudan. President Nimeiri has veered sharply toward the West and conservative Arab oil states in search of both economic and military assistance to bolster his hand against Libya and Ethiopia, the two neighboring nations he is convinced now are conspiring with Soviet blessings, to overthrow him. In fact, President Nimeiri is still recovering from the trauma of the nearly successful Libyan-sponsored coup against him in July 1976, an event that has led to a major improvement in relations between our two countries. Later in November, the United States intercepted a radio message among the conspirators involved in the July coup attempt and warned the President of the trouble that lay ahead shortly before his plane landed at Khartoum Airport. At the same time, President Ford ruled that Sudan was eligible to buy American military equipment.

Sudanese officials have long expressed a desire for close relations with the United States, but have been a little frustrated over the slow progress in American-Sudanese ties. During Nimeiri's visit to the United States last year, he traveled throughout the entire country and met, not only with Government officials, but with state officials and business leaders. He reportedly made an extremely effective plea on behalf of the Sudan, stressing its strategic importance and its economic potential. As a result of his personal diplomacy and also the growing attraction of Sudan as a long-term investment market, American firms, particularly agribusiness concerns, are showing considerable interest in his country.

RELATIONS WITH ETHIOPIA

Sudan has border problems in both the northwest and east. Several years ago, Libya supported a coup attempt as Nimeiri was returning from a visit to the United States. As revealed in more recent coup attempts, Colonel Quaddafi continues to be a source of danger for Sudan.

However, Sudan's long border in the east with Ethiopia is potentially more troublesome. The two countries have had festering problems along their frontiers for many years. This is a major reason why the Sudanese have committed most of their tanks and troops to this region. Sudan's accommodation and support (nonmilitary) of Eritrean insurgents may serve to intensify hostilities with her Ethiopian neighbor.

Concerning the possibility of Sudan's border being threatened by Ethiopia (especially with massive Russian aid), Nimeiri replied that his border is much too large to penetrate effectively, and it could only be accomplished through an air attack. But there are places within his country that would be easy targets (harbors such as Port Sudan, dams, and the city of Khartoum) which is why he needs to strengthen his air defense.

Nimeiri feels Ethiopia has considerable problems within and outside, but they could have been resolved if the Russians had not intervened. (This has been stated before accompanied by hints that U.S. termination of assistance caused Mengistu to turn to the East.) He said Soviet intervention has corrupted the revolution, conned Mengistu into believing he's surrounded by enemies and is the only one to lead the revolutionary struggle. This is perhaps what leads Mengistu to a psychopathic trend of eliminating his enemies and, according to Nimeiri, it is the Russians that inspire Mengistu to purge the opposition from the Emperor on down. (Nimeiri expressed concern that Mengistu is murdering all of his intellectuals and wants to purge the educated class. "The country will have no foundation on which to build if this continues," he asserts.) In Nimeiri's opinion, all of these factors have contributed to a Soviet campaign to lead Mengistu to appear as a hero (self-possessed image of himself). President Nimeiri is a little surprised that the United States does not speak out on human rights violations in Ethiopia—which according to Nimeiri is one of the worst violators in the world.

In his talks with President Ford, President Nimeiri said he raised the issue of the United States abandoning Ethiopia. "Ford asked should the United States arm Ethiopia," and I replied, "Yes, because they will turn elsewhere if not supplied," Nimeiri said. Ford then asked if it would not be dangerous for Sudan, if we armed Ethiopia, to which Nimeiri replied that Sudan would be hard to invade and that such arms should be "defensive" only. Nimeiri mentioned that we provided planes and spare parts, but the Soviets moved much faster. He said the United States should know better. He reminded us that Russian support of Somalia led them to invade the Ogaden.

Concerning the Ogaden conflict, Nimeiri said it was Somalia that first invaded OAU-recognized boundaries, a violation of an OAU principle which must be honored. Nimeiri said there is direct Somali military involvement in the Ogaden. He feels that Colonel Mengistu is "a tool of the Soviets" and they may cause Mengistu to advance across Somalia's borders. President Nimeiri has little respect for Ethiopia's Armed Forces—claims they are poorly trained, the air force is run by foreigners, and the Israelis are involved supposedly as a means of keeping a presence in the country. We pointed out that the U.S. policy of noninvolvement (militarily) was to avoid the mistakes of the past, to prevent East-West confrontation, and to allow Africans to determine their own destinies. Nimeiri's response to all this

is that the Russians will exploit the entire Horn of Africa if the United States is not there to stop them.

Nimeiri believes the ideal solution to the Ogaden conflict is autonomy for that area. He cites his own efforts to allow regional autonomy within Sudan, and feels strongly that this is the ultimate solution to conflicts within African states. Local autonomy is essential because of the political situation in the Ogaden. In his discussions with President Siad Barre, Nimeiri said there was general agreement that this region should have some local autonomy, even if it is not ruled from Mogadishu and remains in Ethiopia. According to Nimeiri, President Siad Barre is interested in negotiating the matter. However, the Sudanese President believes there is little likelihood that the Ogaden could be a separate state. It would be landlocked and just does not have the elements of statehood. It is also unlikely that Ethiopia would accept the conditions of independence for the Ogaden.

Nimeiri feels strongly that the idea of autonomy is necessary to insure freedom for African states, both from within and outside. Ethiopia's Mengistu, with Soviet backing, is disrupting progress towards that end. He cites Ogaden and Eritrea as examples.

When we were in Khartoum, Minister of State Francis Deng had just returned from Sierra Leone where the OAU Committee on Mediation had convened to reconcile issues involving Sudan and Ethiopia. Dr. Deng had presented two statements before the Committee in which he pointed out Sudan's position with respect to her dispute with Ethiopia, particularly the Eritrean question. He called for political and peaceful settlement of the dispute and confirmed President Nimeiri's readiness to mediate between the Ethiopian Government and Eritrean insurgents. He also discussed the dangers of foreign intervention in Africa; particularly the Soviet presence in the African Horn. Dr. Deng told us that the dispute between Sudan and Ethiopia reaches deep into the origins of relations between these two countries and is compounded by the Eritrean issue.

After several lengthy and intensive sessions, the Committee on Mediation endorsed specific recommendations pertaining to normalizing relations between the two countries, supposedly grounded on the principles and resolutions of the OAU. It was hoped that this would create a favorable atmosphere to help develop and improve relations between Ethiopia and Sudan. In this context, the Committee recommended a halting of propaganda campaigns, and the resumption of airline services between Sudan and Ethiopia.

At the same time, we were informed that the Committee was concerned about the necessity of settling political issues which influence good relations and endanger peace and security among the nations in the Horn of Africa. At the OAU's last summit conference in Gabon, the same committee rejected and denounced foreign intervention in the affairs of African states; obviously a slap at Russia's persistent involvement in African affairs.

RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.S.R.

Sudan's interlude with the U.S.S.R. in the early seventies has left the same bitter feelings we found in Somalia and Egypt (also former Russian clients). Similar scenarios have been repeated in each of those countries. A revolutionary movement produces a military coup,

usually backed by Russia, and in due course the government becomes less ideological and more pragmatic. Eventually the Russians are expelled and the countries turn to the West for political and economic assistance.

Either the Soviets are terribly awkward and inept in dealing with African states, or their goals are proving incompatible with developing countries. After lengthy discussions with African leaders, we conclude it is a little of both.

At his summer residence in Wod Medain, President Gaafar Mohamed Nimeiri shared with us his thoughts on Soviet motives and activities in the Horn of Africa. He told us that Russia's top priority is strategic, and they perceive the Horn of Africa as a means of achieving their strategic objectives. The spread of communism, he said, is a secondary goal, but it is not incompatible with their overall strategy in Africa.

The Russians are particularly interested in Ethiopia for strategic and ideological reasons, but they have little concern for the people. He maintains the Ethiopians are being pressed by the Russians into a larger Russian-oriented African strategy. This confirms what Anwar Sadat, Siad Barre, and others are saying about Soviet motives and designs in the Horn. They all speak with experience because of their former ties with the Kremlin.

What about goals in the Soviet's African strategy? Nimeiri echoed what others have said, namely, that the principal goals are: (1) control of the Indian Ocean, (2) access to resources, and (3) control of the shipment of oil. He says that through Libya, Russians control the Mediterranean and now want control of the Red Sea. The Sudanese President referred to recent action by South Yemen to extend territorial jurisdiction in waters to 200 miles which would prevent submarines from coming in " * * * this again reveals the behavior of the Soviets."

We asked how long will it be before the Russians are thrown out of Ethiopia (as Somalia, Sudan, and Egypt had done). He said they are in Ethiopia now (presumably to stay), and to keep a watchful eye on Kenya. He feels the United States should help with arms and in other ways. Kenya will potentially be unstable after Kenyatta and vulnerable to Soviet influence. According to Nimeiri, there are factions (secret organizations) that are Marxist-Leninist in Nairobi. Russia will control Uganda's Idi Amin through Libya.

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

What should the United States be doing in the Horn? In Sudan, Nimeiri said, they are preparing for autonomous local government. The OAU's policy confirms existing boundaries, but within countries rebellion creates problems. That is why regional self-government is important—to solve problems before people start complaining. The Soviet program thrives on agitation, and they will not hesitate to take whatever side they can to destabilize the situation.

At this point, we outlined the U.S. Government's policies concerning the Horn, that is, we will not supply arms to either side that is engaged in conflict. Yet it is difficult to sit idly by and watch the Russians pour in arms and serve as a disruptive influence in the Horn. President Sadat shared these concerns, but he has certain limitations in supplying

arms to Somalia. Could Sudan provide immediate assistance (by turning over Russian-made equipment to Somalia) if the United States over a period of time would resupply his military? Apparently Nimeiri was prepared for this question, because he gave a lengthy response. He pointed out that their Soviet equipment was badly in disrepair and, of course, there have been no parts coming in for some time. Whatever aircraft Sudan has (8-10 Mig fighter planes) and some transport planes, are not operational. His limited supply of Soviet tanks is presently deployed on the eastern border and whatever artillery they have is of World War II vintage. Nimeiri also referred to the U.S. military survey team which recently concluded a study on Sudan's military situation. The conclusion was that Sudan's military equipment was in pitiful condition and rendered almost useless, while its ground force was ranked high in morale and well-trained. He said Sudan operations are based more on political power than military preparedness. Sudan presently has 50,000 soldiers in its armed forces.

President Nimeiri stressed the importance of U.S. cooperation in assisting Somalia at this time. We discussed the possibility of a U.S. package that would help Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia, as well as enhancing our own security interests in the Horn. Nimeiri said that if we could provide repair teams from the West to make the fighter planes and other equipment operational, he would make them available to Somalia. I asked if that would cause any political problems for Sudan, to which he replied, "No." We discussed the timing of such a transaction. Sudan does not have immediate needs, but Somalia does. Training on U.S. equipment, to be fully integrated, would require 2 or 3 years. Nimeiri pointed out that Iranian or Saudi military assistance to Somalia at this time would be helpful.

When President Nimeiri and Siad Barre met recently, they discussed possible Sudanese military support. Nimeiri offered some troops if the situation becomes critical, but will provide them equipment only "under a flag of the OAU, Arab League, or the United Nations." We responded that this is politically impractical because of the political forces within these organizations. The President was reminded of Egypt's strong feelings about this matter and that even during difficult times in the Middle East, they have managed to supply Somalia with \$30 million in arms. Nimeiri assured us that Sudan was helping indirectly, because of their cooperation with the Eritreans in the north. Sudan, according to Nimeiri, also has had some financial problems which have required his personal attention. Therefore, he claims that it is difficult to take on a major fight with the Russians at this time. He feels that it is a larger problem and one that the United States should address directly.

What would be his response if the Ethiopians advance beyond the border into Somalia? Would that be sufficient reason for Sudan to become directly involved? President Nimeiri responded that he would still need some organization's blessing before taking such an action. Furthermore, President Nimeiri believes that the United States should strive to find ways of providing indirect assistance to Somalia during this time of crisis. Along these lines, it would be desirable if Sudan could provide Russian-made equipment to Somalia and the United States could possibly resupply the Sudanese Armed Forces with American equipment.

Sudan's Minister of State, Francis Deng, wondered about U.S. assistance in promoting peaceful initiatives in the Horn of Africa. The Kenya-Somalia issue was raised and Nimeiri offered to work with both countries in seeking a solution. It was pointed out that Somalia's Siad Barre was in a politically difficult situation regarding the Northern Frontier District in Kenya, and he would need to save face for something to be worked out. We suggested that if the Kenyans would make a public commitment to extending rights and services to the Somalis who live in northern Kenya, then Siad Barre could point out that concessions were made, and in return pledge not to invade that area. Mr. Deng, Minister of State, said such an arrangement would be a useful check of Soviet expansion.

We discussed briefly the current U.S. position to continue economic assistance to Ethiopia and whether this helps or hinders the Mengistu's regime. Nimeiri said there is a sergeant in Mengistu's army who is surfacing as a power and is responsible for much of the killing within Ethiopia (the U.S. Ambassador offered that U.S. intelligence has confirmed this statement). The second man, Atnafu, was a moderate and had open discussions with Sudan, but he was executed for favoring Ethiopian nationalism over Russian communism. Shortly before the end of the meeting, Nimeiri informed us that he will be receiving military supplies from China shortly. This will be mostly rifles and small weapons (approximately 10,000) to be used in keeping his border secure. He said that Sudan is trying to be self-sufficient, but many people depend on Sudan in such situations.

We commented on U.S. growing interest in Sudan and accelerated aid programs in that country. We recognized his leadership in the area and the model that Sudan could be for other African states, and we hoped the United States would recognize and reward his statesmanship. Nimeiri said he was looking forward to results of meetings with American businessmen which he had during a recent tour of the United States.

HUMAN RIGHTS

The Government of Sudan has experienced repeated coup attempts with persistent challenges from the Sudanese Communist Party and rightwing Arab sects. Also, until 1972, civil war between north and south Sudan hampered efforts to consolidate the country, but under President Nimeiri, the south has been granted local autonomy under a regionally elected government.

According to Amnesty International, major violations of human rights have occurred in the wake of attempted coups, particularly the one on July 2, 1976 (when reportedly 82 Sudanese soldiers and more than 700 rebels were killed in 2 days of fighting in the capital, Khartoum). Until recently there have been reported uses of detention without trial, torture, and the imposition of the death penalty sometimes in an arbitrary fashion. In addition, some detentions and executions have occurred in connection with disturbances in the south, such as an army mutiny in February 1976.

Such activities are not uncommon in the face of political turbulence, such as Sudan has experienced, but during 1977 the human rights picture has dramatically improved. Several amnesties were announced which substantially reduced, if not totally eliminated the population of political detainees in the Sudan. In August 1977, President Nimeiri announced a policy of reconciliation, which included amnesty and safe

conduct to Sudan for former Prime Minister Sadiq el-Mahdi and his followers, who had been sentenced to death *in absentia* for purportedly spearheading the 1976 coup attempt. According to Amnesty International, "The reconciliation agreement reportedly includes an amnesty for all political detainees in Sudan, a review of the cases of all persons sentenced to prison terms by the State Security Court for attempts to overthrow the state, the return without reprisal of all Sudanese in voluntary political exile, and future discussions on the extension of democratic rights in Sudan."¹

Therefore, particularly in light of the fragile political situation in the country, it is clear that President Nimeiri has demonstrated remarkable leadership and political maturity in his human rights policies. To openly forgive those who have plotted to assassinate a leader and overthrow his government is a rare act of statesmanship and courage, and it places Sudan in a position which most other countries in the Horn would do well to emulate.

ECONOMIC ASPECTS

There is no country in Africa today that has greater potential for economic self-sufficiency than Sudan. Although presently included on the list of the world's least developed countries, if properly developed, Sudan has the resources to serve as a reliable source of food for much of Africa and the Arab world. A highly ambitious plan designed to convert this potential into reality is testing the strategy of combining Arab oil money with Western technology to help some of the Third World's poorest nations develop more rapidly. If the plan succeeds, it could well become the basis for a new model of development, providing an alternative to the Socialist model that now exercises a magnetic attraction on an increasing number of developing countries.

Sudan comprises an area greater than one-fourth the size of the United States, but with a population of approximately 17 million people. It is estimated that there are over 200 million acres of arable land, of which only 15 million acres are under cultivation. Despite the problem of desert encroachment, Sudan has large quantities of water available from the two Nile rivers, an excellent climate and an initial base of technicians and administrators.

Obviously, substantial investments will be required for Sudan to develop. The Arab commitment to Sudan's economic development is embodied in the nascent Arab Authority for Development and Agricultural Investment, designed to implement an initial \$5.7 billion, 10-year Arab investment program in the country. This is part of a 25-year plan to make Sudan the primary source of food for the whole Arab world and to create an alternative source of investment to the industrial West for excess Arab petrodollars.

By 1985, Sudan is projected to be providing 42 percent of the Arab world's total vegetable oil consumption, 58 percent of its basic food, and 20 percent of its sugar needs, according to the plan drawn up by the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development.

But there is no lack of obstacles to rapid economic takeoff, including a small labor force, few good roads (only 200 miles of hard-

¹ Amnesty International Newsletter, September 1977.

top until recently), limited port facilities, inadequate overall transportation, and an easygoing work ethic, that has yet to adapt to the rigors of a would-be booming economy.

Although AID under the "New Directions Mandate" gives priority to the needs of the poorest areas of the world, at this stage the United States has been little more than a spectator in Sudan's economic development. Primarily because of political and diplomatic ruptures during recent years, it was not until 1977 that the United States provided significant levels of economic assistance. During fiscal year 1977, approximately \$10.1 million in aid to Sudan was expended, of which \$9 million was in the form of title I food aid intended for budgetary support.

The administration's request for fiscal year 1978 would not have greatly altered the previous year's level. However, through a congressional initiative spearheaded by Congressman Bonker, the aggregate level of economic aid to Sudan was increased substantially. Provisional figures for fiscal year 1978 indicate that \$17.6 million was appropriated for Sudan, of which \$7.3 million is in the form of development assistance, and \$10.3 million in title I food aid. For the administration's request in fiscal year 1979, estimates place U.S. aid levels at about \$18.5 million, of which \$10.9 million would be for development assistance, and about \$7.6 million programed as title I and title II food aid.

During the legislative review of the fiscal year 1978 foreign assistance program, it was felt that the United States should be encouraged to accelerate its response toward helping the neediest segments of Sudan's population who live in the southern and western parts of the country. Congressman Bonker offered a comprehensive rural development program for the Sudan which called for an initial investment of \$24 million in U.S. assistance. This program was endorsed by the House International Relations Committee, and subsequently by the Congress. The Sudan Development Program contains:

- (1) A \$6 million contribution toward the Sudan Government's efforts in desert encroachment control and rehabilitation;
- (2) \$8 million to study means of creating incentives for farmers in the south and west to increase agricultural productivity and marketing activity;
- (3) \$5 million for agricultural extension training; and
- (4) \$5 million to support badly needed work in improving primary health care.

At the same time as greatly increasing the scale of AID's commitment to development in Sudan, it is felt that the Peace Corps should be involved as well to help strengthen Sudan's capacity to provide essential support particularly for farming communities in rural areas. In essence, Sudan represents a rich environment in which Arab and Western donors can work collaboratively with a host government to achieve major improvements in infrastructure and bring development to rural areas.

Frankly, we were impressed on our visit to Khartoum. It appears to be one of the most promising countries politically and economically, not only in the Horn of Africa, but throughout the continent. President Nimeiri has surrounded himself with bright and able assistants, and his commitment to local autonomy is admirable. The United States

should not only recognize, but attempt to reward, such responsible leadership. The Sudan has great potential for becoming a model of democracy and economic progress for all of Africa.

There are at least four reasons why Sudan warrants increased U.S. assistance and support at this time.

1. *Commitment to economic progress.*—As stated earlier, Sudan has the potential of being the bread basket for all of Africa. The White and Blue Nile provide a marvelous natural resource for irrigation and development of the area. President Nimeiri's recent trip to the United States is further evidence of his desire to fully develop his country's resources. His visit was not limited to meeting with Government officials in Washington, D.C., for he traveled to many states and met with governors and businessmen to generate interest and, hopefully, investment, in his country. This is not only unprecedented, but it was deemed a great personal and economic success. In addition, Government and business leaders who generally are far removed from what is happening in Africa, were prompted to devote more attention to developments in Third World countries.

2. *Leadership in resisting Soviet expansion.*—If the Horn is to become a regional setting for future East-West confrontations, we can think of no better leader to thwart Communist activities than Gaafar Nimeiri. As a former Russian client, he fully understands and appreciates Moscow's intentions in the Horn, and Nimeiri is highly regarded by his colleagues throughout the African Continent. We could easily look to Sudan for political and economic leadership in the future.

3. *Human rights policies.*—Without great fanfare, President Nimeiri has made a major stroke for the cause of human rights. His policy of reconciliation is unprecedented and admirable. Not many leaders, even in the Western world, could openly forgive and accommodate those who were responsible for plotting assassinations. Yet President Nimeiri has attempted to not only forgive but to take in his political adversaries. At a time when the United States is deeply committed to human rights, we should not hesitate to endorse those whose are equally committed.

4. *Support of President Sadat's Middle East policies.*—Not many think of Sudan as an Arab country, but it very definitely is. President Nimeiri has consistently supported Egypt's steps towards a peaceful resolution in the Middle East. This support is not unappreciated by President Sadat because of the growing divisions within Arab countries over his policies. As this report is being prepared, Anwar Sadat is on his way to Khartoum for a 2-day visit. They will be discussing, among other things, developments in the Horn of Africa. While the United States cannot provide direct military assistance to Anwar Sadat, we can help indirectly by accelerating our assistance to Sudan.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Something should be said about President Nimeiri's commitment to local autonomy within his country. At a time when most developing countries are preoccupied with solidifying their political base and imposing their will on all sections of the country, President Nimeiri offers a refreshing example of democracy in action. Throughout our discussions with the Sudanese President, he made several references

to the concept of local government and its importance to a developing country. And he is prepared to back his rhetoric with action.

While in Khartoum, we happened to see a news release which highlights Sudan's commitment to local autonomy. Reference was made to the upcoming budget and the fact that the Provinces, not the Ministries, are to set the budgetary priorities. All of the Provinces' financial issues will be affiliated with regional commissioners. We were informed that this policy will allow more power to flow to local areas. In addition, the National Congress, to be held on January 10, 1978, would expand the base of democracy and enable the people to participate in the executive action of the various ministries. At the same time the Education Ministry will launch a program to open institutions for training teachers in scientific fields to overcome problems associated with the inavailability of teachers.

This new policy was underscored by our visit to Wad Medani, which is located approximately 100 miles south of Khartoum. In flying over the area, one was reminded of the fertile fields of midwest America, as the Nile provides a natural source of irrigation to the area. Wad Medani has the appearance of a kibbutz in that it is a collective effort to develop the resource. Its major commodity is cotton, which is an important export item. After a tour of the fields and some of the plants, we met with local economic manager. Revenue from the sale of cotton and other commodities is divided among the various entities involved in the business: no more than half goes to the central government, with the remainder split among the regional organization and the managers of the farms, and a small percentage is allocated for local services and education. Everybody seemed pleased with this arrangement and there were no complaints or criticisms directed at the Government in Khartoum. There was a sense of enthusiasm and pride, as well as a high degree of expertise, reflected among the people we met in Wad Medani.

EGYPT

The pattern of political alignments in the Ethiopian/Somali conflict reveals the importance attached to the Horn by Arab countries and rivalry among them for advancing their often divergent interests in the region. Reportedly Arab States such as Libya and South Yemen have given valuable direct financial and military assistance to Ethiopia, in addition to granting the Soviet Union necessary privileges to stage its military airlift. Ironically, Israel has also provided important support to Ethiopia reportedly in the form of technical assistance, and spare parts to maintain Ethiopian military equipment, much of which is still American in origin.

In contrast, countries such as Egypt, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia have looked with alarm at the rise of a Marxist state in Ethiopia and its burgeoning Soviet and Cuban presences. Now that Somalia has expelled its Soviet and Cuban advisers and looked elsewhere for support, it is likely that Egypt and Saudi Arabia will become more directly involved in the Horn in favor of Somalia. Sudan has already had serious difficulties in its relationship with Ethiopia over the war in Eritrea and has expressed support for possibly sending military advisers to Somalia within a multilateral framework.

When President Anwar Sadat visited Washington, D.C., earlier in the year, he demonstrated a strong interest in the Horn of Africa. In luncheon sessions with congressional leaders and meetings with administration officials, President Sadat warned the United States of the impending threat of the Russians in that part of Africa. At the time it seemed a little peculiar that the Egyptian leader would take this opportunity to bypass his own obvious needs to emphasize those of Africa.

In our meeting with President Sadat at his residence in Cairo, he was reminded of the statements he made during his U.S. visit. Sadat recalled that his forecast was accurate and that recent events in Africa have confirmed it. "The situation in Africa happened just as I had said," he asserted.

Sadat said he had raised the Russian-Ethiopian issue with Prime Minister Begin, when he met with him in Jerusalem, and that the Israeli leader confirmed that his country was supporting Ethiopia. According to Sadat, Begin shares Sadat's grave concerns about Russia's growing military commitments in the Horn of Africa.

Sadat said he also discussed the issue with President Carter, but added that he realizes the reasons why the United States may choose not to become directly involved at this time. However, President Sadat is concerned that the United States has seemingly no African policy at this time. The Egyptian leader recounted his country's deep interest in this area including the dependence of Egypt on the south for its water supply. He pointed out that Soviet control of the Red Sea would threaten this supply, which he insists is the lifeline of his country, and that Egypt would fight to protect its vital interests.

In our discussions, Sadat also referred to his meetings with Somalia's leader, Siad Barre, whom Sadat feels is very fearful of a possible Ethiopian invasion penetrating to the coast. Sadat says he has supplied over \$30 million in arms to Somalia, but he rejected an invitation to send Egyptians to occupy the Port of Berbera.

The possibility of a regional approach to contain the destabilizing Russian presence in the Horn of Africa was also raised. Sadat agreed that this is a desirable course to pursue and he has so informed Somalia. Sadat also reminded us he had advised Siad Barre it would be in his best interest to "kick out the Russians." In setting up some sort of regional alliance the only major question would be the position of Kenya. We told Sadat of our meetings with Kenyan officials and their preoccupation with a Somali invasion of the "Northern Frontier District." It would be desirable, we told Sadat, to seek a negotiated settlement between Somalia and Kenya concerning this area. Sadat readily agreed and said that he could personally guarantee that Somalia would never attack Kenya. His exact words were, "I guarantee that I will shut him off if he attacks Kenya."

We informed Sadat of Colonel Mengistu's statement to us that Ethiopia would never invade Somalia's borders. Sadat had doubts, and told us that Prime Minister Begin said that the Ethiopians have, in effect, turned over all the decisionmaking to the Soviets.

We eventually came to the subject of arms support to Somalia. We informed the President that the United States is not willing at this time to provide arms, but if Ethiopia becomes overly ambitious perhaps our policy would have to be reviewed. We inquired about the possibility of other countries helping Somalia at this time. Sadat said that he was already doing this and had even pledged one armored brigade along with a similar commitment from Sudan. He said that neither country was prepared to do this yet, but would be prepared to in the future if necessary.

He also said that Siad Barre has gone to Saudi Arabia for financial assistance, and that they have agreed to help. Sadat said he was prepared, again if necessary, to dispatch an Egyptian naval ship. In this context, he mentioned the Soviet base at South Yemen. As a practical matter, he said, the Soviet naval base there is not useful because it is within the firing range of Egyptian guns. He said that the Port of Berbera was strategically much better because it was located on higher ground. Sadat added that he had been upset with South Yemen for some time and was looking for an excuse to break ties—it occurred over the Tripoli meeting. Sadat also warned us to keep an eye on developments in Chad and Niger, saying that they also could be future trouble spots.

We had further discussions about the situation in the Ogaden, and how it would affect the Government in Mogadishu. Sadat felt that it would be very difficult for Siad Barre to survive politically if Berbera falls. He insists that Somalia needs military assistance now, and that Egypt may have to become more heavily involved. He also said that Eritrea has full right to self-determination and that it should join the Arab League.

We mentioned to Sadat that on the next day we would be going to Sudan to visit with President Nimeiri. He said we should ask the Sudanese leader about the newest developments on the so-called

Soviet plan. We asked him why the Russians preferred Ethiopia over Somalia. Sadat feels that the Russians wanted to have ties with both countries, but their massive military support of Ethiopia was too much for Siad Barre.

We asked him what he felt the U.S. position should be at this time. He said we should be blunt with Ethiopia and ask them what are they up to, communism or revolution? He feels the United States does not have to become involved in the Ogaden, but we should be very concerned about Russian movements in the area, especially if they advance onto Somali soil. He says that the Somalis must feel that someone of major importance is backing them.

He offered an interesting commentary on the situation in Ethiopia. He said the Russians will have a much better chance of surviving in Ethiopia, than they did in Egypt or Somalia, or Sudan, because the political situation is far more chaotic there. He said as long as there is tribalism and chaos, there will be no opportunity for nationalism to assert itself in curbing Soviet domination.

DJIBOUTI

It is likely that no country has suffered the repercussions of the Ethiopian-Somali conflict more than the former French colony of Djibouti. Up to its independence in June 1977, Djibouti's economy has subsisted on its trade with Ethiopia and on massive subsidies from France (estimated at more than \$60 million per year). Djibouti's deepwater port is strategically situated across the Bab el Mandeb Strait, connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden. Until recently the port supplied Ethiopia with over 50 percent of its trade via a railway line extending from Djibouti to Addis Ababa. As a result of the Ogaden conflict the railway line is not usable.

Further compounding Djibouti's dire economic situation, the political structure of the country is deeply divided along ethnic lines. Approximately 47 percent of the population (estimated at about 300,000) is Somali-speaking Issas. About 37 percent is Afars who traditionally have received favor from Ethiopia, and political support from France. Upon independence a shaky accord was reached whereby a member of the Issa tribe headed the new government, and Ethiopia and Somalia renounced any territorial claims over the area. Since this time the Prime Minister (an Afar) has resigned along with most of the other Afar ministers, leaving the future of the present government very uncertain.

As Djibouti's economy deteriorates and its political system suffers further through tribal conflict, Ethiopia and Somalia are making anxious statements about each other's intentions regarding this area. Djibouti is protected only by a small French garrison, which may or may not militate against the country's disintegration as an independent entity.

U.S. POLICY OPTIONS

The recent Soviet airlift of military equipment to Ethiopia is unprecedented in magnitude and scale in African history. Accompanied by growing numbers of Russian and Cuban personnel, this buildup will undoubtedly improve Colonel Mengistu's chances for victory in the Ogaden, enhance his military position in Eritrea, and thereby consolidate his political position in Addis. Reliable predictions are that the military balance between Ethiopia and Somalia will be tilted shortly in Ethiopia's favor. This will permit an Ethiopian counteroffensive in the Ogaden which will push the Somalis back to the border, and possibly beyond to Harghessa (Somalia's most populous northern city), and even to the Port of Berbera. Already there is evidence of Ethiopian air strikes against Somalia in these areas. This *volte-face* in the strategic situation can occur as early as February 1978, and is inevitable in due course unless military aid is rushed to Somalia.

Policy options for the United States to respond effectively to conflict in the Horn within a realistic time period are not very extensive. The United States could provide immediate bilateral military assistance to Somalia. Another option would be for the United States to permit third-party transfers of U.S. military supplies via countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, which the United States has refused to do thus far. A final option would be for the United States to assume a highly visible diplomatic and political profile, using whatever leverage the United States has in its relations with the Soviet Union, and to take initiatives leading to political accommodations among some, if not all of the conflicting parties.

DIRECT MILITARY ASSISTANCE

It would be difficult for the United States to provide bilateral military assistance to Somalia for at least five reasons. First, U.S. policy consistently has been one of "neutrality" in the Ethiopian-Somali conflict. The United States has preferred to support mediation efforts leading to a negotiated settlement. Second, U.S. military hardware would be of little immediate value to Somalia, which is presently supplied with predominately Russian equipment. It would require substantial time and training before U.S. military assistance could be effective in Somalia. Third, Kenya has an almost fanatical fear of possible encroachment by Somalia on Kenya's northern frontier. Kenya would be outraged if the United States equipped what Kenya perceives to be a potential enemy. Fourth, by supplying arms through direct or indirect means, the U.S. would help only to prolong the conflict and the bloodshed in the Ogaden, and risk, if not contribute to escalation of the war by both sides. Finally, the U.S. would also, in effect, add credence to Somalia's irredentist dreams in the Horn, which is contrary to the OAU principle recognized throughout Africa of respecting established borders.

Therefore, if the United States seeks to help Somalia, a more prudent course of action would be to seek indirect means of supplying this help. Below are some of the possibilities we discussed with various officials.

INDIRECT ASSISTANCE

The possibilities of resupplying Siad Barre's armed forces at this time are limited; any immediate assistance must be compatible with their Russian equipment and training. There are several former Russian clients who presently have this equipment and are sympathetic to Somalia, who could be persuaded to come to her rescue. Egypt has already provided \$30 million in arms support to Somalia, and President Sadat has offered more. However, Sadat is constrained by political developments in the Middle East, and is leery of further reductions in his own inventory. He claims that Egypt does not have the resources of a superpower. It would also go without saying that Sadat's generals would be very nervous about transfers of military equipment unless the United States begins to resupply Egypt. This, of course, is unlikely at the present time. Despite these drawbacks, Sadat appears concerned enough to become involved even to the point of sending troops to Somalia, if the Ethiopians push into Somali territory. He told us he has already pledged one brigade for this purpose.

A second possibility involves Sudan, which shares Sadat's anxiety about Russian intentions. However, Sudan has even greater problems with its very limited supplies of near-obsolete Russian equipment. Understandably, President Nimeiri is not as willing to become directly involved, and will commit active support (including matching Egypt's pledge of one brigade) only if the Arab League, OAU, or the United Nations passes a resolution requesting such action. This is not a realistic prospect at the moment.

Yet President Nimeiri is interested in helping Somalia, especially if the United States can resupply his own armed forces. In fact, a U.S. survey team just completed a study of Sudan's military situation as a first step in providing some security assistance. This is a long process, however, and the Soviet equipment now in use in Sudan is unreliable. Their aircraft inventory includes 10-12 fighters (Mig 21), 8-10 helicopters (M-18), and four transport planes (AW-24), none of which is currently operational. Nimeiri offered to make these available to Somalia, providing that technicians can be found quickly enough to repair the aircraft. Apparently technicians are now in Cairo to work on Soviet military equipment. They could be reassigned, and Sadat would probably not have major objections. Part of the bargain would be for the United States to escalate its commitment to provide security assistance to Sudan, preferably on a grant basis. Sudan also has 155 (T-55) Soviet tanks, desperately needed by Somalia, but Nimeiri is reluctant to remove them from his eastern border.

A third possibility is Iran, a pro-West country that still has Russian armaments that could be made available to Somalia. They apparently have armored carriers (M-113) and additional Russian-made items that may be obsolete by Iran's present standards, but are urgently needed by Somalia.

A fourth possibility would be for Saudi Arabia to finance the purchase of Soviet equipment from other countries willing to release stocks to Somalia.

However, at best these are short-term measures whose potential for a successful impact on the strategic equation between Ethiopia and Somalia would be relatively limited. Depending on the exigencies of the situation, measures described under the second option may be necessary, but they are not sufficient conditions to a restoration of at least the *status quo ante*. This then leads us to the third option for U.S. policy in the Horn.

DIPLOMATIC AND POLITICAL INITIATIVES IN THE HORN

There is a consensus that massive Soviet involvement has added a major dimension to escalating tensions in the Horn. Russian support and supply of Somalia led, directly or indirectly, to Siad Barre's incursion in the Ogaden. Now a Russian-backed initiative in Ethiopia is threatening to reverse the tables. It is also generally agreed, albeit in a less convincing manner, that if the United States would take a more active role in the Horn, this would provide a stabilizing balance in the region. Cited as examples are: (1) had we met our obligation in security assistance to Ethiopia last April, Mengistu would not have turned to Russia for assistance; and, (2) if we responded to Somalia's present need for military hardware and training we could check the Russians and confine their influence to Ethiopia.

The United States can continue to speak out on human rights and cite gross violations in Ethiopia, condemn Russian interference (a new form of colonialism), adhere to our policy of limiting arms support of African states, and maintain a program of economic and humanitarian aid, regardless of the political situation in these countries. But this would be perceived by African leaders as sitting idly by while Russia gains a strategic foothold in one of Africa's most important regions.

Clearly then, the United States must become more involved in reducing the immediate impact of Soviet-inspired policies in Ethiopia, while actively nurturing efforts by African states in the region to reduce tensions and negotiate resolutions to the conflicts besetting the Horn. Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia are all African countries that have several interests in common. They are former Soviet clients that now have a bitter dislike for and distrust of Russia. They also have Arab ties and are contiguous with Ethiopia, or are nearby. Newly independent, but politically very fragile Djibouti, and Kenya, as fearful as she is of Somali intentions, also share some of these interests. All these states have a direct interest in resisting the destabilizing consequences of Russian expansionism. They should be encouraged to collectively voice strong protestations of Soviet interference in African affairs.

The Somali-Ethiopian dispute thus becomes a regional problem for Africans to confront, with America's sympathy and support of their position. United these states could be a powerful regional force to oppose communism, and support an African resolution to conflicts in the Horn. These countries could press their case through the Arab League, the OAU, and the United Nations to isolate Ethiopia diplo-

matically. At the same time, this would have the benefit of alerting other African states that complacency toward Russian motives and disruptive activities in African affairs breeds doom for the continent as a whole.

The United States should not only actively encourage a formation of a regional approach to problems in the Horn, we should also incorporate some quid pro quo arrangements in our relations with the Soviets, at least in so far as they affect the region. United States-Soviet talks on the superpower's military presence in the Indian Ocean area, for example, should not proceed until the Soviets display a more responsible attitude in the Horn. The importance of other negotiations with the Soviet Union should also be assessed to determine whether it is in the U.S. interest to participate at this time.

FINDINGS

THE HORN OF AFRICA

The political situation in the Horn of Africa today is volatile and potentially dangerous. The Russian involvement in the Horn has proved both disrupting to the states involved and disturbing for U.S. security interests. The worst-case scenario would have the Soviets controlling or influencing potentially all but one (Sudan) of the countries in and around the Horn.

No country in the Horn is so stable and secure that it cannot be threatened internally or externally—Communist activities and coup attempts are never remote possibilities.

There are legitimate security implications for the United States and her allies in the Horn of Africa.

Recent Soviet activities are incompatible with African nationalism and threatening to countries striving to maintain self-determination. While not wanting to minimize the serious nature of these activities, the recent experience of Egypt, Sudan, and Somalia suggests that in the end African nationalism is a more powerful political force than communism in the African Continent. The United States should recognize this, for, left to their own devices, African nations can resolve their disputes both collectively and individually far more effectively than the superpowers can do it for them.

OGADEN CONFLICT

The Somalia-Ethiopia conflict in the Ogaden is serious and threatens the peace of the entire Horn. The conflict over the Ogaden will not be resolved militarily and a negotiated settlement appears unlikely at this time.

The Ogaden is an area deeply rooted in conflict between the two countries, intensified by the fact that most Somalis inhabit a region belonging to Ethiopia, now at war due primarily to heavy Russian military aid to Somalia.

The war is not just military adventurism, but it is an issue deeply felt at the grassroots in both Ethiopia and Somalia. It is a rallying point for political and military leaders in both countries engaged in the conflict.

The OAU has proved ineffective in dealing with the Ogaden conflict. African leaders are understandably nervous about the Ogaden issue because it represents a possible "unraveling" of African borders—thus, they hold clearly to OAU's 1964 recognition of existing boundaries.

ETHIOPIA

Addis Ababa is in a siege of terror and violence. Massive quantities of Russian military equipment and Russian-Cuban personnel are

being sent to Ethiopia, through a major airlift program and the Port of Mombassa in Kenya.

Colonel Mengistu is a thoughtful and determined, but unstable, leader who has permitted Russia to influence Ethiopia's political and military affairs, and allows terror and killings to purge opponents and solidify his power. His policies are seen in the context of a "revolutionary struggle" taken from post-Czarist Russia.

Eritrea continues to be a vexing issue for the Derg, as it was for Haile Selassie, but Ethiopian control is unlikely due to religious and tribal differences that exist in the internal disarray in Addis.

SOMALIA

Somalia's annexation plans for a "Greater Somalia" are a source of major problems in the Horn. President Siad Barre appears interested in ending the conflict in Ogaden through negotiation, but that includes a form of "self-determination" for the inhabitants of Somalia.

Somalia is in desperate need of security assistance and, if none is provided, will lose in the Ogaden. Possibly Harghessa and the strategic Port of Berbera may also be threatened, which could prove politically fatal to Siad Barre and pose security problems for the United States

SUDAN

Sudan feels threatened by Ethiopia on one side and Libya on the other. President Nimeiri is willing to assist (equipment and even one brigade) Somalia if supported by OAU, Arab League, or the United Nations. The Sudanese are helping the Eritreans in various non-military ways in their struggle against Ethiopia.

President Nimeiri is a responsible and moderate leader who is promoting local autonomy and economic development that could be a model for all Africa.

KENYA

Kenya is militarily weak and may prove vulnerable to surrounding states. She is somewhat paranoid about an impending Somali attack in the north and is preparing a case for an accelerated defense program.

While presently allowing Russia to use her ports and roads to send supplies to Ethiopia to help fight against the Somalis, Kenya's greatest concern is with Ethiopia, and for that reason she could be enlisted in a strategy to contain Soviet influence in the area.

The post-Kenyatta period could well be marked with political turmoil and uncertainty that could prove damaging to Western interests there.

EGYPT

Egypt has expressed concern over Soviet activity in the Horn of Africa and is prepared to support efforts to contain and impede their influence.

President Sadat has moral, religious, and political ties to Arab brothers in the Horn and has already demonstrated his support by giving arms (\$30 million) to Somalia and supplies to Sudan. He attaches great significance to north Africa and feels the United States should be more actively involved.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. *The United States should make clear its position of total neutrality between the disputing states in the Horn of Africa.*

(a) We should speak out against the Somali incursion into the Ogaden and urge that boundary issues be negotiated through the United Nations, the OAU, or among the states involved.

(b) The United States should express its concern over a possible Ethiopian invasion into Somalia, specifically the Harghessa-Berbera area. Should the Ethiopians cross the border into northern Somalia, there will be regional warfare involving the Somalis, Egyptians, Sudanese, and perhaps other Arab League states.

(c) We should cease criticizing Ethiopia simply for accepting Soviet equipment. Faced with the well-trained and equipped Somali forces in the Ogaden, Ethiopia had no choice if it hoped to regain what it considers its territory.

(d) The United States should treat Ethiopia as an independent country, not as a Soviet satellite. We should encourage African nationalism which runs counter to Soviet-Marxist influence, particularly in Ethiopia. We must avoid putting Mengistu and Ethiopia in the position that we put Castro and Cuba in 10 years ago—that is, having no place to go except to the Soviet Union. Rather than cutting off our relations with Ethiopia, they should be strengthened to nurture Ethiopian nationalism as an alternative to Marxism.

(e) The United States should use its influence to see that full rights and privileges are extended to the Somali inhabitants of the Ogaden section of Ethiopia and the northern frontier district of Kenya.

2. *At this time, the United States should not provide direct or indirect military assistance to Somalia.*

(a) U.S. arms supplies to Somalia would represent a departure from our policy of neutrality among the disputing states in the Horn.

(b) Military assistance will not help end the war; indeed it would prolong the fighting and contribute to an escalation of the arms race in that volatile area.

(c) By aiding Somalia militarily, the U.S. would, in effect, be endorsing Somalia's invasion of the Ogaden and add credence to that country's territorial claims in the North and Southwest.

(d) Such action would also be contrary to our support for the principle of respecting the territorial integrity of African states; it would be an affront to the OAU's position of recognizing the inviolability of existing boundaries in Africa, and risks the possible "unraveling" of borders throughout the African Continent.

3. *The United States must get involved politically in the Horn to ameliorate existing problems through negotiation.*

(a) The United States should promote alliances among affected states (Somalia, Sudan, Kenya, Egypt, Djibouti, Eritrea) that encircle Ethiopia—to demonstrate concern and opposition to Soviet interest and activities in the area.

(b) The State Department should explore additional policy options that can make us more effective in the Horn of Africa, while refraining from encouraging third parties to assist Somalia in ways which would allow her to do more than provide for her own defense.

4. *The United States should voice deep concern for human rights in Ethiopia and object to Russia's complicity and support of what is happening there.*

(a) The terrorism and killings in Addis Ababa are not only repugnant to the Free World, but offer no hope of long-term peace or reconciliation of competing groups in that war-torn country. Without such reconciliation, there is no end in sight to the bloodshed and fear.

(b) The United States should make clear to Ethiopia that our concern is not ideological, but for outside influence and overall instability in the area, and Ethiopia's excesses that lead to human rights violations.

(c) By contrast, praise should be given to President Nimeiri of Sudan for his policy of "reconciliation" and freeing of political prisoners, including adversaries who attempted a coup last year.

5. *The United States should continue and even accelerate economic humanitarian assistance to all of the countries in the Horn.*

(a) There is still no substitute for helping the people, regardless of the political situation. Most African leaders realize and value such aid and their political future rests with a contented population.

(b) In part the conflicts in the Horn have been nurtured by neglect and considerable need. We find the best cure to revolution and regional wars is a stable economy and people being cared for. This is the sort of thing the United States does best.

(c) Sudan's Nimeiri should especially be blessed with U.S. support because of his policy of local autonomy—in fact, Sudan has the potential of becoming a model for all of Africa. Somalia desperately needs help because of recurring droughts and Western neglect in the past. Siad Barre has obviously placed a high priority on economic development and the state's economic planner is quite impressive. We have a chance here to demonstrate the success of U.S. assistance vis-a-vis the Russians. It is a contest which we cannot lose.

(d) Ethiopia is a special case. Colonel Mengistu's preoccupation with the war and his internal revolutionary struggle leave little time for economic problems. Ethiopia, primarily because of our 30-year relationship, has a good base and potential for aid programs, and we saw more Western countries involved in Ethiopia than anywhere else. But diplomatic relations between our two countries are rapidly deteriorating and economic-humanitarian assistance may be our only link to that beleaguered country. We feel it is essential that this link continue, for the benefit of the people involved and because of the need to demonstrate there is an acceptable alternative to Russian Marxism and terror.

(e) The United States should be willing and prepared to offer assistance immediately to Djibouti which recently gained its independence and is in danger of losing it through a shattered economy.

(f) As for Eritrea, the United States should not be indifferent to the suffering occurring in that territory as a result of its efforts to regain an autonomous relationship with Ethiopia. Options such as providing greater assistance to Eritrean refugees should be pursued.

(g) As part of substantially expanded U.S. humanitarian aid to the Horn, immediate steps should be taken to establish Peace Corps programs, particularly in Sudan and Somalia. In discussions with government officials in both countries we sensed a willingness to discuss the possibility of Peace Corps involvement.

6. That the United States strongly denounce Russian motives and activities in the Horn of Africa.

(a) Its strategic objectives in the Horn of Africa and around the Red Sea-Indian Ocean jeopardize détente and are cause for U.S. alarm and possible response.

(b) It threatens the peace and security of African states in the area. Russian-equipped Somalia precipitated the war in Ogaden, and now large quantities of Soviet military equipment and personnel to Ethiopia have proved exceedingly dangerous to the area.

(c) The Russian "grand strategy" for Africa includes exploitation of that continent's valuable resources, a form of neocolonialism that should be strongly rejected by Third World countries.

(d) Russia-sponsored ports and bases in and around the Red Sea threaten the flow of world commerce through that vital area.

7. The U.S. Government should do more to educate the American people, and particularly the Congress, on the political situation in the Horn of Africa.

(a) Our foreign policies are influenced greatly by public opinion, which is molded primarily through the media. Often coverage is exaggerated and too late for sound decisionmaking.

(b) Vietnam is still too fresh and the desire to not become involved in another conflict too convenient, the comparisons between civil wars in those two continents too obvious for our Government to act assertively. But there are distinct political and strategic issues that should be emphasized.

(c) Egypt's Sadat can ill afford to become involved in the Horn, particularly through generous arms supplies to Somalia when his own military situation is what it is. He jokingly said, "I am even acting like a superpower," but in reality he is saying there is a void on the Western side and someone has to fill it. He is a courageous leader and, like other former Russian clients, he knows firsthand what the Kremlin is seeking to accomplish in the Horn of Africa.

(a) The United States should be willing to pay a reasonable amount of money to the Government of the Republic of China for the purpose of maintaining the Republic of China in the form of a government in exile. The United States should be willing to pay a reasonable amount of money to the Government of the Republic of China for the purpose of maintaining the Republic of China in the form of a government in exile. The United States should be willing to pay a reasonable amount of money to the Government of the Republic of China for the purpose of maintaining the Republic of China in the form of a government in exile.

(b) The United States should be willing to pay a reasonable amount of money to the Government of the Republic of China for the purpose of maintaining the Republic of China in the form of a government in exile. The United States should be willing to pay a reasonable amount of money to the Government of the Republic of China for the purpose of maintaining the Republic of China in the form of a government in exile. The United States should be willing to pay a reasonable amount of money to the Government of the Republic of China for the purpose of maintaining the Republic of China in the form of a government in exile.

(c) The United States should be willing to pay a reasonable amount of money to the Government of the Republic of China for the purpose of maintaining the Republic of China in the form of a government in exile. The United States should be willing to pay a reasonable amount of money to the Government of the Republic of China for the purpose of maintaining the Republic of China in the form of a government in exile. The United States should be willing to pay a reasonable amount of money to the Government of the Republic of China for the purpose of maintaining the Republic of China in the form of a government in exile.





