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COMMITTEE PRINT

REVOLUTION INTO DEMOCRACY: PORTUGAL AFTER THE COUP

A REPORT

BY

Senator GEORGE MCGOVERN

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

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AUGUST 1976

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

August 20, 1976.

Hon. John Sparkman,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: The Portuguese revolution which was set into motion by the military coup of April 25, 1974, is by all interpretations an event of major historical consequence, not only for Portugal but also for the world outside. Within Portugal herself, the rush of forces loosed after decades of repression is now working a profound, if unpredictable, transformation upon a society which for a half century had experienced only the most gradual change. Outside Portugal, the effects, though equally unpredictable, are also as unmistakable. For the vast Portuguese empire in Africa, a domain of immense natural wealth and potential, Portugal's revolution has brought a sudden independence the impact of which is now reverberating inexorably through all of southern Africa. For Spain, Portugal's Iberian neighbor and long her anachronistic twin, the Portuguese revolution has shown the inevitability and probably the imminence of political change. For the democracies of Europe, from whom Portugal was so long isolated, the revolution has produced both hope and anxiety: a strong collective aspiration for expanded contact with a new Portugal, and simultaneously a disturbing uncertainty about Portugal's future which has revived simmering ideological passions and domestic debate. Finally, for the United States and the Soviet Union, each concerned with the process of normalizing East-West relations, Portugal's revolution has acquired a certain strategic significance—by raising fundamental questions about allegiance, interference, and the nature of détente.

To learn more about Portugal's revolution and its effects, I visited Europe in September 1975 and again in January 1976 under the auspices of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In September, I traveled first to England and France, where from the perspective of those two countries I discussed Portugal with host government and U.S. Embassy officials; I then proceeded to Lisbon for a schedule of appointments which included a full spectrum of Portuguese military and political leaders, journalists, and businessmen, as well as personnel from the American Embassy. In January, en route to South Asia, I returned to Lisbon so as to bring my earlier findings up to date.

Among those with whom I conversed in Portugal were President Francisco da Costa Gomes and Foreign Minister Melo Antunes, both military officers intimately involved in the revolution from its origins; and Mario Soares, who as foreign minister and Socialist party leader—and now prime minister—has played a major role in events since the April coup. My talks also included representatives from each of the

other major Portuguese political parties, from the Communists to the Center Social Democrats. Accompanying me in these discussions was John Ritch of the Foreign Relations Committee, with whom I have worked in the preparation of this report.

Having followed events in Portugal for some time, I entered onto my travel with two preconceptions: first, that the complexity of Portugal's revolution defies neat description; second, that the proper posture of the United States, as witness to this revolution, is that of concerned and magnanimous observer—firm in the defense of legitimate American interests, free in the advocacy of American ideals, but scrupulously respectful of Portuguese sovereignty. Nothing on my trips produced evidence contrary to these assumptions. Indeed, my appreciation of the complexity of events in Portugal was only enhanced, and my conviction about America's proper role only strengthened.

Following travel on other occasions, I have normally confined my report to a discussion of the current state of affairs, relating my conversations and any insights which my trip produced. In attempting to report on Portugal, however, I soon concluded that a different approach was necessary. In analyzing other countries, it is often reasonable to assume among readers a bedrock of familiarity with the countries' modern history and general circumstances. Regarding Portugal, however, such an assumption is less valid. Even among practitioners of American foreign policy, Portugal has traditionally received little study. And though journalistic reportage on Portugal expanded dramatically following the coup of April 1974, it has generally produced as much bewilderment as understanding. Further, a report confined to the current state of affairs in Portugal at the time of my visits would have been the equivalent of a snapshot of a swiftly moving event, with the final truth dependent upon variables still unforeseeable. Because there is much for us to learn from Portugal's revolution, I thought it was essential to view it as a whole. I have therefore attempted in this report, first, to describe as succinctly as possible the conditions which shaped Portugal before the revolution, then to analyze in more detail the complex events which began to unfold following the overthrow of the old regime, and finally to discuss Portugal in its context as a European nation and a NATO ally. This sequence seems to me necessary, for it is only logical that understanding the event itself should precede any appraisal of its implications for the world outside.

Today Portugal's revolution remains unfinished, her future uncertain. For the United States, born in the oldest revolution of the New World, this newest revolution in the Old World should be an occasion for reflection and appraisal, and it is toward that end that I submit this report.

Sincerely,

GEORGE MCGOVERN.

CONTENTS

	Page
Letter of Transmittal	III
I. PORTUGAL BEFORE THE COUP	1
The Republican Years	2
Estado Novo: Salazar's "New State"	4
Origins of the Coup	13
II. PHASES OF THE REVOLUTION	19
Spinola versus the MFA (April 25, 1974–September 28, 1974)	20
"Institutionalization" (September 28, 1974–April 1, 1975)	33
A Sort of Election (April 1, 1975–April 25, 1975)	40
What Kind of Revolution? (April 25, 1975–August 29, 1975)	43
A Question of Authority (August 29, 1975–February 26, 1976)	51
The Timetable Complete (February 26, 1976–April 25, 1976)	59
Democratic Beginnings (April 25, 1976 Onward)	62
III. PORTUGAL IN CONTEXT	65
Spain and "The Idea of Portugal"	66
The West European Response	72
Soviet and East European Interests	75
American Policy Before the Coup and After	82
APPENDIX:	
Glossary	91
The Program of the Armed Forces Movement	92
Remarks by Senator George McGovern in Lisbon	96
U.S. Aid to Portugal from 1946–1974	99
Portuguese-American Base Agreements	100
U.S./NATO Strategic Interests in Portugal	103
The Azorean Independence Movement	109

I. PORTUGAL BEFORE THE COUP

Crushed in the western strip of the Peninsula, between powerful neighbors and the ocean, our existence is necessarily one long drama: but by the favor of Providence we can count eight centuries of toil and suffering, struggle and liberty, and if the danger remains, the miracle remains also. . . . It was in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that Portugal assumed its present frontiers in the Iberian Peninsula, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that it acquired vast dominions in Africa, Asia, Oceania, and America, defending Roman and Christian civilization against Islam and spreading civilization through new worlds. And this victory, of transcendental importance to humanity, was won by us at a time when the other nations of Europe were immersed in the strife of dynasties, scisms and heresies which steeped them in blood . . . We are the sons and heirs of an ancient civilization whose mission it has been to educate and train peoples to a higher idea of life, to form real men through the subjection of matter to spirit, of instinct to reason. . . . Here and afar we have right on our side, the right of occupation, conquest, discovery and colonization, of the substance and blood of the Portuguese watering the earth in all parts of the world, cultivating the soil, opening up wastelands, trading, pacifying, teaching. It is the will of the people. . . .

—Antonio de Oliveiria Salazar

The regime which died in Portugal on April 25, 1974, was the "New State" of Antonio Salazar, a despotism shaped and rigidly preserved by its creator through four decades and bequeathed in 1968 to his designated custodian, Marcello Caetano, who was fated by history to preside over its demise. Influenced from the outset by Salazar's enduring admiration for Mussolini, the Estado Novo was a calculated anachronism, a closed world of linkages between Portugal and her possessions which depended for its long existence not only upon the docility of the colonies, but even more upon the economic backwardness and political passivity of the Portuguese people themselves—a condition effectively sanctioned through the years by the Church and ruthlessly enforced by Salazar's pervasive secret police. If, after the coup, the language of Marxist ideology suddenly burst forth to suffuse the politics of revolutionary Portugal, it was largely because the old order had so clearly embodied those basic concepts: fascism, colonialism, imperialism, monopoly, and capitalist exploitation. It was, moreover, a regime which had borne out the Marxist prediction—by disintegrating under the weight of its own contradictions.

Though Salazar did not survive to see the collapse of his structure, its undoing may be traced to the early 1960's while he still ruled and, more directly, to the inflexibility of vision which he personified. Until then Portugal had been little affected by the European experience of

the 20th century. The Second World War, revolutionizing the political and economic life of most of Europe, had left Salazar's order untouched; and the colonial unrest which had dissolved other European empires had not yet spread to Portugal's "overseas territories." A deceptive peace prevailed throughout, dominated by the great family monopolies which were the handmaidens of Salazar's rule. Within metropolitan Portugal, much of the population remained rural, illiterate, and poor. To the north, small landowners labored with traditional methods to squeeze subsistence from unyielding soil; while to the south, in the richer Alentejo region, vast absentee estates were farmed under a "special leasehold" system which consigned workers to virtual serfdom. Centered in Lisbon and Oporto, a select grouping of giant financial and industrial conglomerates, privately-owned but government-supported, managed the lucrative colonial empire which channeled lavish affluence to an extraordinarily privileged Portuguese elite. Steady emigration by Portuguese workers to the territories, a system of colonial "assimilation," and the appearance of universal calm gave credence to the official axiom that Portugal and her possessions were forever one.

What broke this calm, though only faintly at first, was the rise of black nationalist movements, which emerged nearly simultaneously in each of the three African colonies that together comprised the essence of Portugal's overseas empire. Guerrilla resistance began in Angola in 1961, and not long thereafter in Guinea and Mozambique. Furtive and militarily weak at the outset but steadily gaining in strength, these movements—and the Portuguese effort to combat them—were eventually to produce the fall of the old order. And though the end did not come until years after his death, it was Salazar himself who by then had made the fateful decisions. Like the American counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam which it paralleled and actively emulated, Portugal's three-fronted colonial war would drag on for a decade, dominating the nation's life and sapping its energy. But, as in Indochina, when the collapse came finally in 1974, it was in truth no more than the inexorable result of a futile course charted years before. For Portugal, however, it was the end not simply of a policy, but of an entire way of life.

* * *

The Republican Years

On August 30, 1898, Arthur (later, the Earl of) Balfour, temporarily in charge of the British Foreign Office, concluded a secret Anglo-German convention assigning spheres of influence in Portugal's African colonies. With the declining Portuguese monarchy so abysmally poor as to be incapable of the competent administration of empire, such preparation for an orderly dismemberment by stronger imperial powers seemed clearly to be indicated. Within months, however, rivalry between Britain and Germany had prevailed over mutual greed. Aiming to rebuff German interest in Portugal's colonies, the British Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, repudiated Balfour's agreement, reasserting the historic Anglo-Portuguese relationship. Two decades hence, as the colonial spoils of the Great War were divided, it was thus to be Germany's empire that was

dismantled, while Portugal—still weak but on victory's side—retained its empire intact. Yet whether, through these events, fortune had truly been kind to Portugal was a question which history would not forget.

By his fateful action, Salisbury had perpetuated a Portuguese empire whose chronic weakness had, in an important sense, been predestined by an earlier act of Anglo-Portuguese diplomacy. Under the Metheun Treaty of 1703, Britain and Portugal had defined what amounted to a special relationship. Britain, already far the stronger, became the "protector"; Portugal, though a colonial power, a kind of dependency. By the treaty's terms, Portugal would accept industrial imports from England in exchange for exports of wines and agricultural produce. Portugal's colonial holdings meanwhile would be preserved with British assistance. By thus compromising the future development of Portugal's fledgling industries, the Metheun Treaty had a profound consequence. As other European nations gradually entered full force into the industrial age, Portugal was to remain predominantly agricultural and commercial, her undeveloped economy heavily dependent upon the exploitation of foreign land and labor. And as technological advance slowly transformed the political as well as the economic face of Europe, Portugal was to continue as an almost feudal society, largely rural and illiterate, her political life, commerce, and colonies firmly in the hands of a small aristocracy.

Though Salisbury's diplomatic shift on the eve of the 20th century delivered a new lease to the Portuguese empire, it could not do the same for the Portuguese monarchy. In 1876, Portuguese intellectuals had formed the Republican Party with the aim of ending not only the monarchy, but the pervasive dominance of the Roman Catholic Church as well. Now, lacking a sound economic base and under assault by this rising republican movement, the monarchy was steadily weakening. Finally, on February 1, 1908, King Carlos and his heir were assassinated as they rode in an open carriage in Lisbon. King Manuel II, succeeding Carlos, found no unity among monarchist politicians; and within 2 years, the increasingly militant republicans had overthrown the monarchy, proclaiming a new republic.

Portugal's first years under the new regime produced a great upheaval of institution and spirit, as the republicans set out to implement their secular and egalitarian principles. Republican goals touched on all aspects of Portuguese life: establishment of fundamental civil rights, separation of church and state, development of education, increased autonomy for the overseas territories, and greater industrialization and trade. In a number of areas, the new regime acted with unity and dispatch, quickly expanding the educational system, curbing religious orders, and establishing freedom of the press and the right to strike. But a true social transformation by democracy was not to be. The struggle to break the tyranny of monarchy and church had been the republicans' unifying bond. This accomplished, they now dissolved into a welter of contending factions; and almost from the outset the new parliamentary republic was plagued by the steady interparty feuding and sporadic violence that were to characterize the chaotic years ahead.

With the outbreak of World War I, Portugal affirmed its adhesion to the English alliance and, in the war's course, Portuguese soldiers

fought limited engagements against German forces both in Africa and France. Even war, however, could not temper the political antagonisms that had now emerged. Both in 1915 and 1917, attempts were made by the military to reestablish dictatorship. In each case, the republicans eventually prevailed, but without gain in unity or effective purpose.

Underlying and in large measure causing this political turmoil was a fundamental economic fact: whether monarchy or republic, Portugal remained a poor agricultural country so backward as to fall short of self-sufficiency even in the production of food. Domestic industry remained embryonic. And as for the empire which had so narrowly survived, such was the neglect and stagnation that it was for the most part liability rather than asset, much of its production having long since passed into the hands of chartered companies under foreign, particularly British, control. That Portugal might be better off if divested of this burden of empire—indeed that Portugal had been trapped by an empire which now constituted the major obstacle to Portugal's own economic modernization—were ideas whose time had not yet come. Rather, accepting the empire as an unquestionable fact, a kaleidoscopic succession of governments endeavored with consistent failure to reverse the nation's deteriorating financial plight, a decline only accelerated by the continuing agitation of the workers' organizations and unions which the republican regime itself had made legal. In Portugal, as elsewhere in Europe, fascism was to be built on a foundation of failed democracy.

The New State

The military dictatorship which took control to restore order in 1926 was initially without program or doctrine. But into that government came the self-effacing university professor who was to shape a new national ideology and, almost singlehandedly, to control the destiny of Portugal and her colonies for over 40 years. Although chaotic, the years of the republic had at least produced certain democratic freedoms, as well as the separation of church and state. But for Antonio Salazar, and a generation of Portuguese traditionalists and Catholics, life under the anticlerical republic had been a torment. Blaming their country's plight upon democratic libertarianism and cherishing an exalted view of her golden past, they envisioned Portugal as a small but gallant nation, still the possessor of a vast empire and a future of possible glory—if only a new order could be established. After years of ferment and decline, it was a vision of Portugal with broad appeal to traditionalist and republican alike, and it was to the pursuit of that vision that Salazar now summoned his countrymen.

First as finance minister from 1928, then as prime minister from 1932 on, Salazar set out to build a regime free of the political and economic chaos of the past. Guiding him were two considerations, one inspirational and the other practical: an unbridled admiration for Italian fascism, and an obsessive desire to insulate Portugal against the dangers of foreign influence, whether political or economic. With the new constitution of 1933, Salazar formally established his design:



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the New State would be a republic, but one organized on corporate principles so as to centralize effective control. In the economy, national trade unions—*sindicatos*—would represent all workers, while employers' guilds—*gremios*—represented management. Between *sindicatos* and *gremios*, government would arbitrate, having first approved their leaders. Strikes would be illegal. Within the government itself, a single approved civic association, the National Union, would provide all members to the elected national assembly. As prime minister, Salazar, though technically appointed by a popularly elected president, would ordain on all important questions, ruling through a Council of Ministers. When necessary, the constitution would be bypassed through the use of decree-orders which, being of an administrative character, would fall outside effective judicial control.

To secure the corporate state against its critics, Salazar called upon three institutions. The first was already well established: the Roman Catholic Church, which had suffered during the republican years and now welcomed Salazar's ascendancy. The second was a new organization: the *Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado* (PIDE), secret police who were given virtually unlimited powers to prevent crimes of a political and social nature. The third institution was at the outset a government process but soon a state of mind: censorship, to prevent the dissemination of matter corrupting to the state or the people.

To this system of corporate structures and controls, Salazar then added a unique law by which, over the years, he was to shape and build the New State's economy. Prohibiting the creation or even expansion of any enterprise without government permission, the law in itself was neutral in effect, a tool adaptable to almost any economic aim. As applied by Salazar, the goal was concentration. During decades when many other governments endeavored, however falteringly, to resist the consolidation of economic power, Salazar's regime actively encouraged the process. In those industries where monopolies already existed, they were protected. In others, monopolies and oligopolies were fashioned by use of the law. The result over time was inevitable: extraordinary economic power gravitated into the hands of a few dozen very rich and powerful Portuguese families. Not surprisingly, the plutocracy which he nurtured gave Salazar its unwavering loyalty in return.

By the time World War II erupted in Europe, Salazar's regime was well established. Opposition had been eliminated, often ruthlessly, and the great edifice of conglomerate monopolies had been erected, closely linked to the government and protected against competition either

from small business or abroad. Yet even with its consolidation, the empire was far from strong, and the war now placed Portugal in a precarious position. By basic sympathy, Salazar's ruling establishment favored the Axis powers. But like Franco, who was a constant source of frustration to Hilter, Salazar could see little advantage in active alliance. What mattered most was preserving the empire; and Salazar recognized that whatever Portugal's posture, the Nazis in victory would probably take over not only Britain's colonies, but Portugal's as well. Moreover, close collaboration or alliance with the Nazis could result in a British takeover of Portugal's colonies immediately. Salazar therefore engaged in the delicate politics of neutrality, extracting economic advantage wherever he could. Wolfram, a vital strategic mineral from the colonies, was sold to the Axis—but also in lesser amounts, to the Allies.[1] In the colonies, the Germans were allowed to maintain centers for spying on shipping movements—but Lisbon was also open as a major transit point for Jews fleeing Hilter. By 1943, however, it was possible to foresee Nazi defeat, and Salazar granted the Allies base rights in the Azores. For those Portuguese who opposed Salazar, and the Nazis as well, it was gratifying that at least Salazar's *real politik* had brought Portugal onto the right side.

Following the war and having observed the Nazis' fate, Salazar tempered the overt signs of fascism in Portugal. The basic instruments of political repression, however, were retained and indeed employed all the more harshly, to insure that Portugal's new alignment with the democracies did not register itself in effective domestic dissent. Along with Spain, Portugal was denied entry into the United Nations. But as the turn of world events produced a mounting confrontation between the Soviet Union and the West, Salazar found his international position improving—so much so that in 1949, mainly due to British and American influence, Portugal became a founding member of NATO. In joining, Salazar was explicit that Portuguese participation by no means signified adherence to the liberal democratic principles invoked in the NATO charter. Such ideas, Salazar mantained, were irrelevant to Portugal. This difference between allies, however, was overlooked. For in the sharing of a fervent anticommunism, Salazar's Portugal and the Western democracies had found common ground.

His international position secured, Salazar was able during the 1950's to preside comfortably over the New State he had created. To

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[1] Indeed, British debts incurred during the war were used to buy out much of British ownership that had accumulated in Portuguese Africa.

outside observers who saw Portugal as a place of backwardness and repression, Salazar might have answered as he once wrote: "true liberty can only exist in the spirit of man . . . there can be no absolute freedom; there can only be absolute authority; order has always been the true conditon of beauty." The colonies by now were profitable. And outside influence had been kept to a minimum.

Though Salazar as prime minister ruled absolutely, the pretense of political freedom was maintained. Every 7 years, elections were held for the National Assembly and also for Portugal's president, the latter being theoretically empowered to choose the prime minister. The suffrage, however, was highly restricted and opposition candidates were carefully watched to insure that no real assault was mounted against the status quo. From Salazar's perspective, such activity was but a harmless pressure valve as well as a useful means for the PIDE (secret police) to identify his opposition.

Only in 1958 did the pretense of freedom threaten to become real. Surprising everyone, Portugal's delegate to NATO, General Humberto Delgado, returned to oppose Salazar's official candidate, Admiral Thomaz. A prestigious and cosmopolitan figure whose duties had included service in America, Delgado now called for a "constitutional coup d'etat." If elected, he boldly proclaimed, Salazar would be dismissed. In a nation growing slightly restless under Salazar's heavy hand, Delgado's move had a dazzling effect, and thousands were soon rallying publicly in his support. The voting system, however, was Salazar's, and in an election that was obviously fixed, Delgado was credited with only a third of the vote. Unwilling to accept his loss, Delgado continued to agitate, first seeking unsuccessfully to persuade his senior military colleagues to resist Salazar's fraud, and then forming a movement by which he hoped to mobilize resistance to the regime. Two figures associated with this activity were a young army officer, Capt. Vasco Goncalves, and a lawyer, Mario Soares—both of whom were to figure prominently in events many years later. Ultimately, Delgado's effort proved unavailing, and following a pathetic coup attempt in 1962, he fled Portugal, dying 6 years later in Spain, reportedly at the hands of Salazar's secret police.


The years after World War II had seen colonial nations far stronger than Portugal relinquish empires, sometimes peacefully, sometimes only when driven by force. Portugal's empire had meanwhile remained tranquil. In the early 1960's, however, there occurred an event which might have signaled to Salazar the new reality of Portugal's overseas position. For over four centuries, the tiny enclave of Goa on the western coast of the Indian subcontinent had been a Portuguese colony. Following the British withdrawal from India in 1947, although pressure had grown for the Portugese to follow, Salazar had remained steadfast, unmoved by Nehru's repeated invitation to negotiate Goa's decolonization. Portugal, the New State's leader had announced, would never abandon her "epic achievements in the Orient." But Goa was not to be retained forever by moral force alone, and when in 1961 India finally invaded, it took only hours for current facts to overcome the appeal to history. The small Portuguese garrison was routed, and Portugal's smallest colony simply disappeared with little protest from the world community.

The incident, though revealing of Portugal's real strength, did not prove instructive to Salazar. Refusing to acknowledge defeat, he continued for years to regard Goa as "occupied territory." It was, moreover, the same attitude that he now directed at the far larger colonies in Africa, where the appearance of guerrilla liberation movements, supported from neighboring African countries, presented an ominous threat to the heart of Portugal's empire.

Significantly, the alternative to a war of counterinsurgency was broached to Salazar in 1961, a time when alternatives may still have been possible. With the first signs of unrest in Angola, Portuguese officers in Africa had begun sending back their warnings to a colonel on the army general staff in Lisbon, by the name of Francisco da Costa Gomes. Their collective view was that in the event of widespread guerrilla fighting in the colonies—territories many times the size of metropolitan Portugal—no satisfactory military outcome was conceivable; timely negotiation was therefore a necessity. A formal paper to this effect, prepared by Costa Gomes, soon gravitated upward to Salazar. But to Portugal's leader, who himself had never been to the colonies and was virtually innocent of any travel farther than Franco's Spain, such ideas were apostacy. Preservation of the empire was a cultural, almost religious imperative, as well as an economic need. Rejecting the analysis out of hand and reassigning its proponents including Costa Gomes, Salazar presented himself on television to affirm Portugal's unbending determination to remain in Africa to defend Western and Christian civilization. By the end of 1961, following an armed African rising, Portugese troop strength in Angola had swollen from 3,000 to 50,000. Thereafter, and as fighting spread to Guinea and Mozambique, potential military dissent on policy was subordinated to the growing commitment in battle. Not until 13 years later, with the policy by then an abject failure and the empire a shambles, was Costa Gomes once again to serve as a vehicle for the army's view—this time by assuming the nation's Presidency.

Until the wars began, Portugal's economy operated largely as a closed system, the colonies providing raw materials and markets for the industrial monopolies of Lisbon and Oporto as they prospered comfortably behind a high protectionist wall which denied both foreign investment and competition. By the early sixties, however, Portuguese businessmen had begun to turn an eye toward Europe. In 1960, Portugal had joined the European Free Trade Association (benefitting from a special agreement which allowed a continuance of many Portuguese tariffs), and increasing links now seemed promising.

But if any impetus were needed for a new policy on investment and trade, the wars themselves soon provided it. As the fighting escalated and the army grew to a force exceeding 200,000, support for a farflung war effort placed an onerous and growing burden on the limited resources of the Portuguese economy. Soon the old objections to foreign capital were paling against the urgent need for new sources of income, and traditional barriers were being not only lowered but replaced by incentives for foreign capital. In many cases, the new investment which resulted took the form of links between multinational corporations and the Portuguese conglomerates; in other cases, multinationals simply bought into Portuguese industry or created it. The result was a re-



"Portugal is not a small country"

(facsimile of a map used in schools during Salazar's regime)

markable and indeed dramatic change: in the space of a single decade, from 1960 to 1970, foreign ownership rose from 1½ percent to 27 percent of all Portuguese industry.

The early effect of this capital influx was a pleasing illusion: not only did investment subsidize the war effort, but Portuguese living standards actually registered an impressive gain. Indeed for a time,

except for the little-publicized deaths of Portuguese soldiers, the African policy seemed to have few costs attached, a burden well worth the benefit. The phenomenon, however, was not sustainable—Portugal could only be sold once—and by the late 1960's the costs began to be felt. Foreign investment tapered off, and as the multinationals began to extract profit from their earlier investments, the net capital flow turned negative, only compounding the drain on the economy which continued with the wars. Ironically, it was for such reasons that Salazar had always resisted foreign intrusions. Now, in financing his war to preserve empire, he had permitted a kind of colonization of Portugal herself.

The rise in industrial wages drew many Portuguese from the poor agrarian countryside into the cities to meet the new demand for labor. Others continued on to France and Germany, where the European boom provided still higher wages, even for unskilled workers, and also, for those who needed it, a haven from conscription into the war. It was indeed an astonishing phenomenon that during the old order's final decade over 1 million people—a 10th of the population—chose to emigrate, many of them doing so illegally. The regime, which might earlier have sought to halt such a process, now quietly abetted it. For the remittances of Portuguese workers abroad provided a lucrative source of foreign exchange—accounting, by the end of the decade, for a full third of Portugal's foreign earnings. Still another new and sizable source of invisible (nontrade) earnings was the Portuguese tourist industry, which in the sixties virtually exploded with the help of foreign investment and the spur of European prosperity.

Yet even as they financed and fortified the older order, tourism and emigration were also having a profound subversive effect, gradually eroding the domestic passivity upon which the status quo had long depended. European travelers were arriving in Portugal with opinions as well as foreign currency; and Portuguese laborers—whose extraordinary migration had suddenly made Paris the second largest Portuguese city in the world—were sending back not only remittances but also fresh ideas born of their new experience. Fostered by such eye-opening contact with the outside world, a mounting discontent with fascist repression was inevitable. And indeed, as the sixties progressed, it was clear to careful observers of Portugal that interaction with Europe and the burden of war were spawning an unrest among Portuguese workers and students that would soon sorely test Salazar's powers of dominance and control.

Coping with the legacy of his own policy, however, was a task which Salazar now left behind. In September 1968, at the age of 79, the Estado Novo's creator and embodiment suffered a serious fall and lapsed into a coma, never to recover. His successor as planned was Marcello Caetano, like Salazar a university professor and a trusted supporter of the New State from its earliest days.

Recognizing the tensions that were developing in Portugal, Caetano set out to strengthen the old regime, although by methods which Salazar would surely have condemned. Within weeks, the new prime minister was advocating agricultural reform, sympathizing with the "understandable impatience" of university students, and moving to permit greater freedom of expression. Soon he had allowed Socialist leader Mario Soares back from exile, released a number of political

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prisoners, and renamed the PIDE, hoping to bury its reputation for brutality and terror (while rather inattentatively failing to note that the new title, Direccado General de Securance, DGS, was the same as that of Franco's secret police). Sensing a liberalization, some enthusiasts went so far as to label Caetano's first months "the Lisbon spring."[1]

Yet for all his efforts to reform and thereby preserve the old regime, the new leader of Portugal shared the fatal weakness of his predecessor—an unshakable attachment to the Portuguese role in Africa. Like Salazar, Caetano saw Angola, Guinea, and Mozambique as no less than extensions of Portugal herself. Accordingly, the so-called "liberation" movements, despite their growing strength, could be viewed as no more than a form of domestic unrest, to be defeated at whatever cost necessary.

By 1970, however, whether the Portuguese economy could continue to bear the load was a mounting question. In Salazar's Portugal, inflation had been considered an ultimate evil, and prices and wages had been strictly controlled. Yet in edging more and more into the world economy, the New State had become increasingly vulnerable to international pressures; and now, just as the negative consequences of foreign investment were starting to tell, world inflation began to accelerate rapidly from the mild level of the sixties. The effect was devastating. With alarming suddenness, Portuguese prices began to climb at a rate far beyond precedent, quickly cracking the stable structure of costs to which both workers and companies were accustomed and upon which the economy had long been based.

Meanwhile, another, even more ominous fissure was appearing, as union elections in 1970 began to return antigovernment majorities to the executives of a surprising number of the old Salazarist *sindicatos*, which remained vital to to the regime's system of worker control. This threat from inside the system was, moreover, soon matched by a threat from without, when for the first time workers in sizable numbers began to form into unsanctioned factory committees to organize their discontent. By the fall, the trend was pronounced. Not only had these new non-government unions appeared all across the industrial scene, they had allied themselves through a national umbrella organization named Intersindical.

At first Caetano allowed Intersindical to operate legally, believing he could contain it. But the new organization soon showed that its ambitions were more than modest, that indeed it wanted to operate as a free trade union, with full freedom of association, regular elections, and the right to strike. Briefly Caetano marked time, hoping that Intersindical could be undercut by wage increases arranged quietly by the government; but within months his limit was reached. In mid-1971, after the new group had boldly sought recognition in the International Labor Organization, Caetano acted, outlawing Intersindical and purging each of the unions associated with it.

By this time, however, Caetano's decision could do no more than mark a new phase in the struggle. Having already gained wide support, Intersindical now simply moved underground, continuing to

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[1] The tone of the liberalization was perhaps captured best in Caetano's formal decree extending the franchise to all literate women, which stated reassuringly that "it has been verified that women are more conservative than men and much more afraid of adventure and chance."

organize and plan. For Portugal's small clandestine Communist Party, its leadership regularly imprisoned and hounded by the secret police, Intersindical became a perfect vehicle. Indeed the close-knit clandestine organization now forged around Intersindical was to be a major source of Communist strength in the years ahead.

Intersindical's method was to encourage "unity committees" in factories where worker dissatisfaction might be converted into strike action. The regime, for its part, responded in accord with its oldest traditions, frequently using riot police and the PIDE–DGS to break up disputes and arrest strike leaders. Each brutal incident, however, served only to incite additional workers. Inexorably strikes grew bigger and more determined. Adding to the growing chaos was the marked tendency of foreign- and domestic-owned companies to respond differently to wage demands: the foreign companies being more inclined to reach a deal, the domestic companies to resist all negotiation. The glaring deficiencies in pay which resulted simply fueled worker dissatisfaction. By 1973, industrial unrest had overcome the regime's best efforts at repression; and at least 40 major strikes crippled the economy.

The wars in Africa were now bleeding Portugal of resources which were no longer being generated by economic growth at home. Not only had foreign investment dwindled, but Portuguese companies were starting to lose money on their African interests, as well as failing to come to terms with inflation and worker discontent inside Portugal. France and Germany meanwhile, faced with an end to the boom conditions of the late sixties and early seventies, had begun to tighten up on "guest workers," thereby curbing remittances while also blocking the release valve that emigration had provided for surplus Portuguese labor. European recession, moreover, had produced a sharp drop in the tourist trade upon which Portugal's war economy had come to depend. By late 1973, when the world energy crisis struck, it was only the last straw. In the early months of 1974, Portuguese inflation soared to an annual rate of over 60 percent, while unemployment rose alarmingly.

To the clandestine unions, bent upon intensifying the struggle, these problems were only grist for the mill. Month by month, as the economic plight of industrial workers worsened, new recruits had joined those who were prepared to act, secretly and then openly, whatever the risk. In March 1974, Intersindical reached a new level of sophistication, raising enough money to support a 3-week strike at the great Leiria engineering works in Lisbon. And in the buildup to May Day, industrial unrest was expected, not least by the government itself, to rise to a climax. But it was not only in the ranks of workers that discontent was now nearing a pitch.

Origins of the Coup

To counter the African insurgencies, Salazar had turned in the early sixties to a Portuguese military which had not seen combat since the First World War and had in the intervening decades languished into the ritualized amateur existence typical of peacetime armies. Beginning in 1949, NATO membership had afforded Portuguese forces liaison with more experienced allied militaries, but had imposed little responsibility on Portugual other than self-defense. Reflecting the nation's traditional class stratification, the Portuguese military

manned its ranks routinely with peasants and colonial natives, drawing for officers upon the aristocracy and an emerging wealthy bourgeoisie. Displaying the comfortable intertwining of the Portuguese establishment, officers of senior grade often doubled as board members in industry and finance. In the defense ministries, as in other bureaucracies in Salazar's Lisbon, lax administration provided a quiet haven for incompetence and corruption. Abroad, in the peaceful remoteness of the colonies, the army's small officer cadres enjoyed a garrison life of casual work, horseback riding, and sociality—customarily filing false reports to Lisbon so as to supplement poor logistical support with the wages of nonexistent troops.

The escalation of the African wars not only brought an abrupt end to this leisurely style of life but also soon worked a profound change upon the very composition of the officer corps itself. By expanding the need for young officers just as the prospect of actual war service was blunting traditional recruitment, the war created a void which could be filled only by opening wide the doors of access to the previously elite military academies. The result was that an entirely different breed of young men now came forward to man the junior ranks of the officer corps. Most were from the provinces of metropolitan Portugal or the sons of Portuguese emigrants to the colonies. Poor, accepting the need for war, and faced with the alternative of conscription, they chose the new opportunity for a university education and duty as officers. Upon graduation, it was they who became the first generation of Portuguese officers to experience combat. While establishment politicians and generals directed the war from Lisbon, it was they who took command of the small units which braved the prolonged hardship of guerrilla fighting in the swamps, jungles, and savannas of Africa. It was they who faced the enemy; and with officers steadily in short supply and the wars continuing, it was they who remained on duty for years at a time, receiving only occasional respite and perhaps a transfer from one war to another. Finally, too, after years of fighting, it would be they—men who had passed through the military academies as the wars began—who were to shape the extraordinary conspiracy which was to bring the wars to such a surprising and sudden end.

The escalation of Portugal's colonial wars coincided with the increasing involvement in Indochina of her closest NATO ally, the United States. As the American officer corps focused itself upon the philosophy and strategy of counterguerrilla warfare, so too did Portugal's officers, many of them traveling to America for periods of study at U.S. Army counterinsurgency schools. Among Portuguese officers, as in the U.S. officers corps, two general tactics vied for ascendency: "search and destroy" and "hearts and minds." Reflecting these contrasting approaches were two Portuguese officers, each of whom achieved celebrity while in command of a colonial war theater: Gen. Kaulza de Arriaga in Mozambique and Gen. Antonio de Spinola in Guinea.

Embodying the "search and destroy" philosophy, Arriaga was convinced that the insurgents could with sufficient determination be beaten into submission. A friend and admirer of U.S. Gen. William Westmoreland, Arriaga gained a hero's reputation for his exploits in the forests and bush of Mozambique. At the same time, however, the

FRELIMO insurgents continued to make gains; and in 1973 the consequences of the Arriaga strategy gained world attention when Portuguese massacres were revealed to have occurred in Mozambique's northern provinces. In much smaller Guinea, meanwhile, Spinola had adopted the opposite tack. Taking command in 1968 and immediately recognizing the battle as militarily unwinnable, he had reoriented Portuguese operations to a highly political "hearts and minds" approach. The aim for Spinola was not to accede to the guerrillas' liberation goals, but to undercut their appeal. Using his troops to perform public services, he achieved remarkable success, greatly slowing guerrilla gains. A dashing horseman, Spinola returned to Lisbon in 1972 to become the army's deputy chief of staff, a hero to his fellow soldiers and his nation.

Like their American counterparts who were posted to Vietnam, Portugal's young officers sought knowledge of their enemy in the revolutionary writings of Mao, Che, and Ho Chi Minh. As these books became standard texts at West Point and Fort Bragg, so too were they incorporated into basic officer training in Portugal. For the Portuguese officer, however, there was in practice far greater opportunity to learn how these revolutionary ideas actually moved men to fight and die. Separated from his enemy by language and culture, an American officer in Vietnam could spend his relatively brief tour without truly contacting or comprehending his adversary. In Africa, however, Portugal's young officers were shielded by no barrier of language and served far longer tours. Inevitably, as they operated in native villages and sought to understand the enemy's appeal, and as they captured and interrogated the enemy himself, they came to know the guerrilla as the American never did. With this knowledge came understanding, and from there it was not a long step to a growing sense that the guerrilla was right and that Portuguese soldier and guerrilla alike were victims of a worthless war.

What crystallized this growing disillusion was, as it happened, a detail of military administration. In the summer of 1973, the Portuguese Minister of Defense, endeavoring to overcome the chronic shortage of officers, made a decision designed to attract the reentry of university-graduate officer conscripts who had already done their service. The decree provided that returning conscript officers could count former service toward promotion in the regular corps, the effect being to enable a returning officer to bypass many regular officers. For officers of the regular corps, many of whom had entered the army because their families could afford no other form of education, this decision was not only a professional setback but a personal humiliation—an obvious example of the privileged status of those wealthy enough to obtain a university degree. Increasingly sensitive to the vast social and economic gap which separated Lisbon from those who fought Lisbon's war, they were now moved in their resentment to action.

After unsuccessfully protesting the decree, a number of junior officers determined to coordinate their complaint; and by the fall of 1973, a sizable group had been formed, calling itself the Armed Forces Movement, the MFA. Meeting secretly at various points in Portugal, the young officers soon became aware that they shared not only a professional grievance but a larger bitterness and disillusion with a war that was being lost and the system for which it was being fought. Had

their grievance been met, it is well possible that the "captains' movement" would have dissipated. But even with the support of Gen. Francisco da Costa Gomes, who had survived to become Army Chief of Staff, their protests went unanswered. The MFA officers thus resolved to continue, fortified in a growing sense that the regime was no longer worthy of support. In October they formalized their organization by the establishment of a coordinating committee, the future importance of which even its most ardent members could not then have predicted.

As winter approached, secret meetings of MFA "delegates" turned increasingly to matters of politics, gradually revealing a polarization between those officers who wished to limit their protest to the matter of professional grievance and those who had developed an appetite for more drastic action, possibly even a coup. As might have been expected, those who were most actively involved in the MFA's meetings were those of a more radical view. And it was the more active, radical officers who from the outset gained dominance on the 19-man Coordinating Committee which constituted the MFA's leadership and shaped its plans.

With a growing belief that some kind of action should and could be taken, the Coordinating Committee began to think of outlining a definite political program and of organizing its military strength. Working on the "MFA Program" were two officers of an intellectual bent, Majors Vitor Alves and Melo Antunes. Piecing together the MFA's military infrastructure was another major whose orientation, at least at the time, was entirely nonpolitical, Otelo Carvalho.

In late February 1974, a publishing event occurred which may well have determined Portugal's first President after the coup: the appearance of *Portugal and the Future* by General Spinola, a book that quickly became a sensation both inside Portugal and out. Serving as Deputy Army Chief of Staff under Costa Gomes, Spinola had with his superior's blessing placed into words his solution to Portugal's increasingly desperate situation in the colonies: the wars should end and the colonies should be given increased autonomy under a new federation with metropolitan Portugal. Although many observers translated this as a call for decolonization, Spinola's intention was quite the opposite. His concern was that Portugal stay in Africa, not pull out; and his plan was but a variation of the old "hearts and minds" approach at which he had previously excelled: in short, give the colonies a form of autonomy and they will no doubt see it in their interest to remain joined to Portugal in economic union. The response to Spinola's book was electric. For those large economic interests which foresaw the dire consequences of continuing the wars and wished to draw closer to the European Community, Spinola's solution represented salvation. But for those in the ruling establishment whose economic and emotional interests were rooted in the colonies, Spinola's prescription was virtually treason. This division produced a crisis in the highest echelons of government. Forced to decide, Caetano came down on the side of the ultracolonialists and perpetuation of the war. When Costa Gomes and Spinola declined in early March to attend a ceremony reaffirming existing colonial policy, Caetano was left with little choice. Both were dismissed.

One week before these firings, a majority of nearly 200 members of the MFA had agreed that the old regime must be overthrown. While

they had reached no conclusion as to the precise form of government which should replace it, they had affirmed a populist principle which would later become a theme of the revolution: "The MFA is with the people: the people is with the MFA." For some officers, this simply meant ending the wars and restoring the nation's prestige. For others, however, such as Melo Antunes who was drafting the MFA program, it held the hope for a more positive effort at social transformation.

The program soon completed by Antunes stated the motive for a coup: "After 13 years of struggle in the overseas territories, the prevailing political system has been unable to formulate, concretely and objectively, an overseas policy which would lead to peace among Portuguese of all races and creeds." It stated further that, following the coup, a new provisional government would include "representative personalities from political groups and trends and independent personalities who identify themselves with this program." The provisional government would prepare for elections within a year for a constituent assembly which would in turn create a new Portuguese constitution. Vis-a-vis the colonies, a new government should recognize the right of self-determination and the need for a political solution. Economically, meanwhile, the new regime would follow a policy "geared to the interests of the Portuguese people, in particular to those strata of the population less favored until now . . . which will of necessity imply an antimonopoly strategy." In foreign affairs, the provisional government would "respect international commitments resulting from treaties which are in force."

During March and April, MFA planners continued their work, meeting on several occasions with Costa Gomes and Spinola, both of whom had now acquired the status of martyred heroes. The existence of a captains' movement was no longer a secret, but with the military traditionally the one area of Portuguese life not penetrable by the secret police, discussions could continue with relative candor. The affair of Spinola's book had further demonstrated the intransigence of the regime and the need for action. It had also established Spinola as a figure of national and international prominence, perceived as holding an enlightened and progressive approach to Portugal's future. As the MFA political planners discussed their program with Spinola, his response indicated a basic orientation far less radical than their own, particularly on the question of the colonies but also on the general shape of Portugal's own future. By now, however, events were developing a momentum which could not be slowed by philosophical debate, no matter how profound. Two days after the firing of Costa Gomes and Spinola, some of the units with which Carvalho had been in contact had made a false start, undertaking a coup effort which quickly fell apart and resulted in dozens of arrests. Further preemptive efforts by the regime might be taken without notice, so time was vital. Major Carvalho, meanwhile, had studied the abortive coup, particularly the response of the secret police and the conservative Portuguese Legion which served as the palace guard, and had learned much that was useful.

II. PHASES OF THE REVOLUTION

I can tell you, Sirs, what I would not have;
tho' I cannot what I would.

—Oliver Cromwell, 1641

Beginning in the predawn hours of April 25, 1974, a neatly organized and nearly bloodless coup brought the long years of Salazar-Caetano rule to an end. With cool precision, army units advanced on Lisbon, sealed the city's main access routes and airport, took control of key communications facilities, and surrounded the barracks into which Caetano had moved for safety. Shortly after noon, in a courteous ceremony, General Spinola arrived to take Caetano into custody, attentively receiving his admonition not to let power fall into the streets. The day's only notable violence occurred when the secret police, having gathered in their headquarters, fired mindlessly into an excited crowd, killing several civilians.

Toward evening, the program of the Armed Forces Movement was announced[1] and a formal presentation was made of the country's new rulers: a seven-member Junta of National Salvation, comprising General Spinola as President and two senior officers from each of the three armed services. Among them were Gen. Costa Gomes who was to serve as head of the armed forces, and two other figures, both from the navy, who would figure prominently in the events ahead: Capt. (soon admiral) Rosa Coutinho and Adm. Pinheiro de Azevedo. Within 24 hours, Caetano and President Thomaz had been transported safely from the country.

The jubilant events of the days which followed are by now an oft-told tale: the release of political prisoners from the infamous Caxias prison, the spontaneous demonstrations, the holiday from work and education, the gleeful sacking of PIDE-DGS headquarters, the street camaraderie of soldiers and citizens, the return of exiled political leaders, and the overwhelming sense of hope symbolized by a red carnation fixed in a cap or buttonhole or blossoming from the barrel of a gun. The exhuberance of those first days, however, could but briefly mask the harsh reality of Portugal's plight. For if the old order had collapsed under the weight of its contradictions, the contradictions themselves remained. Coup or no coup, Portugal was still mired in unpopular, unwinnable wars in colonies upon which she was psychologically and economically dependent. Coup or no, dissatisfaction in the domestic economy—over inflation and the maldistribution of income—was now intense; indeed, with expectations further excited by the coup itself, labor unrest could quickly bring the economy to a standstill. How, then, would the wars be brought to an

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[1] The MFA program in its entirety appears in the appendix.

end? And what would be done with a failing national economy in which ownership reposed in the hands of a few? These two questions were to dominate the months ahead.

Spinola versus the MFA
(April 25, 1974–September 28, 1974)

Long after the April coup, it was not uncommon for foreign journalists to describe the revolution as having begun with an uprising of "the Armed Forces Movement led by General Spinola." That phrase, however, disguised the most important truth in Portugal: that the coup had been planned and executed almost entirely by the young officers of the MFA, that General Spinola and other senior officers of the Junta had been at most only peripherally involved, and—most significant—that Spinola and the MFA represented very different answers to the questions Portugal now faced.

Two broad considerations had guided the MFA planners in selecting Spinola and a senior level Junta to take command of the postcoup government. The first was the practical desire to effect a smooth transition: the assumption of power by prestigious high-ranking officers would have a reassuring effect, minimizing the posibility of backlash and bloodshed. The second consideration was one of deference and habit: while confident and competent enough to have conceived, planned, and executed the coup, the young officers still felt that propriety dictated leadership by officers of senior grade. Indeed, Lt. Col. Vasco Goncalves, an engineering officer of mild manners but radical view who would later become premier, had already acquired something of a unique position within the MFA simply by being the only officer above the rank of major who had been fully involved with the MFA from the outset. This respect for rank did not prevent the MFA from arranging, immediately after the coup, for the retirement of senior officers who were clearly unsympathetic to MFA aims, but it did mean that despite their revolutionary conduct, MFA officers still felt a predisposition to obey orders and observe protocol. Nowhere was this feeling apparently stronger than in the mind of Maj. Otelo Carvalho, who, in planning and commanding the military side of the coup, referred frequently to the need to restore the dignity and prestige of the army.

Thus, both practicality and propriety dictated an anonymous, secondary role for the MFA in the days immediately following the coup. Spinola meanwhile confidently took full charge, and it might well have come as a surprise to many of the MFA officers to be informed that they would soon be directly at odds with Portugal's most prestigious general and new President. To some minor extent, the conflict which soon arose was one of style and personality. Even among his fellow senior officers of the Junta, Spinola was said to have quickly become arrogant and overbearing—an attitude which, when directed at the younger officers of the MFA, seemed less than appreciative. But to a far larger extent, the conflict was to be one of substance.

On the most pressing matter, the colonial question, basic disagreement between Spinola and the MFA had been foreshadowed in the hours before the coup, in an argument between the MFA planners

and Spinola over the relevant passage in the MFA program. As drafted by Maj. Melo Antunes, the program had called for immediate independence. Spinola, however, had objected, insisting on vaguer wording which would indicate a new approach without a commitment to complete colonial freedom. Faced by Spinola's intransigence and the urgent need to assemble the coup's components, including Spinola himself, the MFA planners had acquiesced, but without any real change of view.

Conflict over the economic question had also been presaged—by the vision of Portugal's future which Spinola had presented in his famous book. While the incidents surrounding the book had enhanced Spinola's reputation even among the young officers of the MFA, the book itself, when examined closely, embodied a philosophy dramatically at variance with ideas which had gained force among MFA leaders. Arguably, both views were revolutionary, but in an entirely different way. What Spinola foresaw amounted to turning Portugal's existing corporate apparatus away from dependence upon the colonies into a new, modern relationship with the nations of Europe. The colonies, in this view, should not be simply released, but rather given a form of self-determination that would result in a continuing relationship with Portugal. For the MFA, however, simply reorienting the existing structure was not a true revolution. Indeed, it was the existing structure—of concentrated ownership and uneven distribution—which, in waging the war for selfish interests, had brought Portugal to its current lowly state. Though still without clear shape or articulation, the vision shared by key MFA officers was of a revolution within Portugal herself—a revolution which did not simply turn the existing structure, but instead turned it over.

Ultimately both questions—decolonization and Portugal's future economy—came together on a single point of focus: the great family monopolies which for decades had been the New State's foundation. Typifying the conglomerates was Portugal's largest, the mammoth CUF—Companhia Uniao Fabril—combine, directed by Jorge de Melo. Founded decades earlier upon a near monopoly in tobacco, CUF had through the years expanded into chemicals, shipbuilding, fertilizers, refining, insurance, mining, textiles, real estate, soap, and tourism; had joined with foreign multinationals in numerous ventures beginning in the 1960's; and was linked through its control of a dominant Portuguese bank with a variety of giant firms in each of the African colonies. On the day of the coup, the CUF conglomerate encompassed nearly 200 distinct enterprises, and held total assets approaching $2½ billion. And if CUF stood unparalleled in overall scale—indeed it ranked high among the world's largest corporations—Portugal's other industrial magnates presided over networks of economic interest no less pervasive and diverse. The family names of Champalimaud, Quina, and Espirito Santo, were, with Melo, synonomous with huge pyramids of private wealth, names which meant vast power. Nowhere throughout the empire was any change even conceivable which did not affect these interests directly and fundamentally.

Although the coup signaled clearly the imminence of important change, the industrial magnates were not without hope in observing General Spinola's peaceful assumption of power. Neither personally nor ideologically was Portugal's new leader a stranger. In the custom

of the old regime, the general had for years doubled as a director on the Champalimaud board; moreover, in *Portugal and the Future*, the book which had elevated him to heroic martyrdom, Spinola had actually pointed the way toward the conglomerates' most cherished goals: peace in the colonies and expanded links with the European Community. While Spinola's proposal of a negotiated compromise with the colonies had been branded in some circles as dangerously progressive, few in the economic hierarchy had disagreed with the general's broader aims. Like Spinola the industrial magnates wished to see a rapid modernization of the Portuguese economy, by which they meant the further elimination of small, under-capitalized businesses and a further strengthening of larger enterprises in preparation for the rigors, and advantages, of European competition. Indeed, in the months now ahead, as Portugal's new President made plain his commitment to expanded industrialization and economic rationalization, the leaders of the conglomerates were to respond enthusiastically, quickly offering up their own proposals for creation of the new Portugal. Not surprisingly, their invitation would be for intensified government investment in existing industry.

Nor between Spinola and the magnates was there basic difference on the question of decolonization. Spinola's message, after all, was peace, not withdrawal. Retention of the colonies was indeed fundamental to the vision of Portugal's future that Spinola and the conglomerates held in common. While Guinea might be of minor economic importance, Mozambique and Angola most certainly were not. Not only did both colonies provide large, protected markets for Portuguese textiles, wines, and processed foods; more vital still was the colonial product. From Mozambique, the full annual production of cotton and sugar was brought to Portugal at well below world prices, while the wages of Mozambique miners working in South Africa were converted into gold shipments to Lisbon averaging over $200 million a year. And of even greater importance was Angola, where joint ventures with the foreign multinationals, although extensive, had only begun to realize the full wealth which inhered in the colony's oil, iron ore, diamonds, coffee, fishing, and tropical crops. To lose these resources now would be to consign Portugal forever to a future of paucity and limited means.

But how could Mozambique and Angola possibly be retained without continuing the war the MFA had made the coup to end? And how could Portugal possibly be transformed, as MFA leaders had come to envision, without fundamental changes in the economic structure which Spinola and the industrial magnates wished only to strengthen? Within these dilemmas lay the seeds of a conflict so fundamental as to be resolvable only by the eventual victory of one side over the other.

With this deep fissure lying only barely beneath the surface of events, the days immediately following the coup were given over to the urgent practical business of establishing a government. The MFA program prescribed elections within 1 year for a constituent assembly which would draft a new national constitution. Thereafter, in perhaps another year a parliament or president would be elected under whatever terms the new constitution had established. The task in the meantime was to erect a government sufficiently representative to exercise competent authority.

On May 4, less than two weeks after the coup, occurred the first major gathering of leaders of the emerging political parties. A curious and revealing aspect of the meeting was that many who attended thought they had been invited to meet with Spinola and the Junta. Instead, they found themselves in the presence of the MFA Coordinating Committee, which, already suspicious of Spinola, wished to evaluate the parties independently. Although the MFA program envisioned a long period in which a new political system was to be defined, the new landscape of Portuguese politics had taken form with remarkable speed. Three parties would dominate, each conceiving of itself as standing somewhere on the political spectrum between center and left.

Occupying the center would be the Popular Democratic Party (PPD), formed immediately after the coup and featuring such leaders as Francisco sa Carneiro and Malgalhaes Mota, men who had taken advantage of Caetano's political liberalization to stand as opposition candidates for the National Assembly, and had in the course made considerable reputations for themselves as liberal reformers. This grouping could also count on support from Francisco Balsamao, the young founder and editor of Expresso, a weekly newspaper which despite censorship had already become a respected vehicle for economic and social analysis and which would soon become a major source of interpretation for foreign journalists as they poured into Portugal in the weeks after the coup. It was in the PPD that Spinola was soon to vest both his prestige and his hopes for the creation of a broad base of personal support. That the party as yet lacked anything like a national organization was for Spinola not necessarily disadvantageous. Most Portuguese citizens had, after all, either approved of or acquiesced in the old system. It was therefore doubtful that they would be quickly attracted by the revolutionary appeal of leftist parties; rather, they would more likely be drawn to the centrist, reforming coalition which Spinola could now fashion around his own popularity into the dominant political force of the new order.

To the left of the Popular Democrats were the Socialists (PSP) led by Mario Soares, a lawyer and teacher who had spent years in exile; Raul Rego, editor of the newspaper Republica who like Soares had been arrested more than once under the old regime; and Salgado Zenha, a respected lawyer. Founded by Soares in Germany a year before the coup and already a member of the Socialist International, the party featured a strong Europeanist orientation, based largely upon Soares' close personal relations with such prominent European social democrats as Willy Brandt, Francois Mitterand, and James Callaghan. Indeed, if in the days ahead Spinola seemed to be pinning his hopes on the strength of the PPD, much of Europe appeared to be rooting for the success of the Portuguese Socialists, eventually sending in substantial contributions to match the heavy outside support being supplied to the Portuguese Communists. Somewhere between the "within the system" reformer of the PPD mold and the clandestine radical organizer of the Intersindical stripe, Soares was a man who had lived on the margin of legitimacy under the old regime, surviving skirmishes with the Portuguese secret police, living sometimes in exile, sometimes not. Now, braced by a triumphal return, he found himself in command of a party which, like the PPD, was potentially strong but as yet totally lacking in national organization.

And it was in organization that the third major party, the Communists (PCP) of Alvaro Cunhal, excelled. With a network born of years of clandestine activity and recently expanded through the medium of Intersindical and the strike movement, the PCP extended into every local authority, trade union, government ministry, and university. Like Soares, Cunhal had just returned from exile—he had fled to Eastern Europe years before following a legendary prison break—but a powerful apparatus now awaited his leadership. To be sure, the Communist hold on the radical left was far from monolithic. The PCP's traditional appeal in the universities, for example, had in recent years been steadily eroding as the young radicals of the new generation, repelled by the party's dour dogmatism and slavish support for Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia, gravitated toward ideologies still further to the left. Nonetheless, the PCP now constituted the one radical party possessing both a broad organization and a practical, calculated sense of purpose. It was, moreover, during the tumult of the weeks ahead, to be the first major party to grasp the full political significance of the young officers of the MFA.

The lesser parties—though by no means were they unimportant—stood on the flanks of the major three. On the right were a number of groups and leaders, prominent among them being Freitas do Amaral, a wealthy lawyer who was later to form the Center Social Democrat Party (CDS). Though constantly under attack for old Salazarist connections, these elements would find considerable strength in the rural north and other localities where the conservative influence of the church remained strong. Eventually, too, they would provide added support for Spinola in his coming test of strength with the MFA. To the left of the major three, a number of radical parties—Maoist, anarchist, and Trotskyite—would supply a continuing pyrotechnic display of enthusiasm and emotion, but without any real possibility of broad appeal. By outflanking the Communists to the left, they would in the months ahead tend alternately to embarrass the PCP for being too conservative and to legitimize it as being a responsible leftist alternative.

By the middle of May, a myriad of meetings involving Spinola, the remainder of the Junta, the MFA Coordinating Committee, and the emerging political parties had produced the first provisional government. Spinola would serve as President; Adelino Palma Carlos, a law professor and Spinola friend, as Prime Minister; and, in the remainder of the cabinet, a cross-section from the political forces that had appeared in the hectic weeks after April 25. Major posts went to Soares (PSP), who became Foreign Minister, and Sa Carneiro (PPD) and Cunhal (PCP), each becoming a minister without portfolio. In addition to this Council of Ministers, a Council of State would act as a kind of supreme legislative body to insure adherence to the MFA program. On it would sit the seven-man Junta, the seven-man MFA Coordinating Committee, and seven public figures selected generally to Spinola's satisfaction.

Two aspects of the new governmental arrangements were remarkable. The first was the presence of Cunhal. Even Spinola, whose conservatism would soon become apparent, had perceived that Portugal could not be ruled without the Communists and had himself sought Cunhal's participation. Not only would PCP cooperation help the

government to moderate wage demands, which undoubtedly would be explosive after a winter of savage inflation and brutal police repression; it would also force upon the Communists some share of responsibility, and blame, for the turbulence which inevitably lay ahead. Moreover, Spinola surely hoped, the PCP's Moscow-orientation could be useful in encouraging the Soviet-supported liberation movements to accept the federative colonial solution that Spinola envisioned. In return for the PCP's cooperation, Spinola could promise the government's full support against the PCP's competitors on the left.

For his part, Cunhal readily accepted government participation, realizing that by so doing the PCP sacrificed little and gained much. Well aware of the lesson of Chile, where the revolution was lost through alienation of small businessmen and the middle class, Cunhal and the party had long before fixed upon the importance of forming alliances with as broad a segment of the population as possible and of minimizing industrial disruption once the revolution began. Thus, on the wage front, the PCP's plan was to act with moderation, whether inside the government or out. As for the colonial question, such hopes as Spinola may have harbored for PCP assistance were built on air. Not only did the PCP lack influence with the liberation movements—as for that matter did the Soviet Union if it ever came to compromising the aim of total independence—but the party was simply not concerned with the issue. Confident that decolonization was inevitable, the PCP intended to focus its energies on the future, which meant within Portugal herself. Finally, as for the rival extremist parties, if Spinola wished to assist the Communists as against their competitors, the PCP was only too pleased to accept.

The second notable aspect of the new government—ultimately even more significant than Communist participation—was the formal presence of the young officers of the MFA. Though only a minority on the Council of State, they had nonetheless retained a foothold from which to monitor and influence the course of national policy. To be sure, any visible measure of strength showed Spinola in a position of dominant control. A popular and prestigious figure, he now directed the Cabinet, dominated the Council of State, and commanded the armed forces. Indeed only one question remained unanswered: whether the armed forces were in fact subject to his command. In conducting the coup, the MFA had demonstrated an impressive network of friendship and personal commitment which cut across normal lines of military control; and at this early point, it was simply not clear what would happen in a sudden test of allegiance. Thus, as he sought to return the MFA to the barracks and to consolidate his own position, prudence required of Spinola that he proceed with a measure of caution, at least at the outset. Personifying the uncertainty was Gen. Costa Gomes, who, as Chief of the Defense Staff, was a longtime Spinola friend but also a sincere sympathizer with the young officers of the MFA.

During its first 2 months, the overwhelming domestic problem facing the provisional government was a wave of major industrial strikes brought on by rising wage demands. Having immediately legalized strikes as a matter of principle, the government now had to cope with them—a dilemma the pre-Salazar republicans of a half century earlier would have well understood. Cunhal's participation in the cabinet did afford a direct link between the government and the Communist-con-

trolled Intersindical, which was now not only legal but indeed the nation's principal union organization. But even the PCP, despite apparently genuine efforts to cooperate with the government, could exercise only a limited moderating effect in the face of workers' expectations that now knew no constraint. It was in fact a marked irony, in light of Intersindical's antigovernment origins, that to the degree it now attempted to cooperate with the government, it soon found workers organizing spontaneously outside its framework, spurred on by parties of the farthest left.

Nor was the government successful in satiating demands even with a package of semi-radical economic policies, including establishment of a high minimum wage, rent and price controls, widespread dismissal of management personnel from what were essentially government patronage positions under the corporate state system, and the promise to reorganize the money market which was still controlled by the family conglomerates. In dealing with the growing chaos in industry, the one alternative which the government wished to avoid at all costs was strikebreaking by resort to military force—not only because of the adverse psychological effect but also because it was by no means certain that ordinary soldiers, who were now rapidly being swept up in the spirit of the revolution, would obey such a directive.

On the colonial question, meanwhile, little was being accomplished. As the new Foreign Minister, Mario Soares flew immediately to Guinea to meet with liberation (PAIGC*) leaders, who had already proclaimed independence 8 months before the coup. The talks, however, were inconclusive, as were Soares' subsequent efforts to negotiate with the leaders of FRELIMO in Mozambique. As for the three revolutionary movements in Angola, Soares spoke with Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA; but Agostinho Neto, leader of the Marxist MPLA, and Holden Roberto, head of the more conservative FNLA, could not even be contacted. In all three countries, it was clear that the revolutionary leaders were suspicious of Spinola's true intentions.

As the summer of 1974 progressed and arguments over the colonies and the economy flared in the councils of the new government, Spinola's relations with the MFA moved steadily toward confrontation. Although his political strength appeared impressive, Spinola could not be certain that in a showdown he could count either on the loyalty of the army or the support of the population itself, which seemed generally enthusiastic about both Spinola and the MFA, failing to distinguish between the two. Apparently recognizing this, Spinola began to travel through the country, in effect campaigning with speeches both to army units and rallies of citizens. As he did, there was in Spinola's conduct—especially in his grandiloquent references to the state, the people, and himself—something reimiscent of the Charles DeGaulle of 1958, a parallel of which many observers felt Spinola was all too keenly aware. Though the weekly newspaper Expresso was in some sense the paper of the PPD, the centrist party upon which Spinola hoped to base his civilian support, an issue in early June featured a lengthy comparison of Spinola's language with DeGaulle's, concluding not optimistically that "without doubt we have seen the birth of Spinolism."

In mid-June, President Spinola flew to the Azores to meet briefly with President Nixon, who was returning from his Middle East tour.

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*The appendix of this report contains a glossary of organizational names involved in the Portuguese revolution.

Within the American Government, questions about Portugal's NATO role, the participation of Communists in the government, and the fate of the colonies had raised considerable concern, one result of which was soon to be the replacement of U.S. Ambassador Nash Scott for his "soft" reporting on events which Washington found alarming. In fact, however, none of the players in the Portuguese drama had advocated any change at all in Portugal's NATO role. For the Portuguese military, from Spinola to the MFA, Portugal's NATO participation was a considerable source of pride, and the domestic ideological questions which were now arising bore no relation to Portugal's international alignment. Even Cunhal, whose presence in the government was widely recognized in Portugal as a necessity, had been silent on the matter of NATO. Only on the colonial issue did American concerns seem to relate closely to Portuguese reality. For unlike Portugal's NATO role, the future of the colonies was now genuinely at issue. According to Expresso, President Nixon indicated clearly that the United States did not recognize the "right" of Angola and Mozambique to independence, a view which Spinola most probably welcomed, but which the MFA most surely did not.

In the second week of July occurred two events which were to have major significance in determining the outcome of the conflict between Spinola and the MFA. The first was the establishment of a new military command headquarters which effectively institutionalized the lines of sympathy and support that extended from the young MFA leaders to army units throughout Portugal. During the months of May and June, as strikes and demonstrations had spread, the need for government intervention to handle extreme situations had become increasingly clear. However, with the spread of revolutionary ideas throughout the army, it was also becoming evident—as several incidents had confirmed—that army units could not always be relied upon to deal firmly with demonstrators. In short, the regular operational channels of the armed forces were now of dubious value for duties inside Portugal. The most reliable channels for action and response were, generally stated, those which had been employed in the conduct of the coup—linkages which did not show on an organization chart but existed instead in connections of friendship, confidence, and respect. Thus it was that on June 8 the Council of Ministers, faced with the rising prospect of domestic chaos, approved the establishment of a new military comand—the Operational Command for the Continent (COPCON), intended to act as a military support to existing police organizations in maintaining law and order. Heading COPCON would be Otelo Carvalho, the major who had directed military operations during the coup and who now advanced meteorically to the rank of Brigadier. COPCON was not to be a new military unit, operating separately from the remainder of the army, but rather a special command headquarters staffed by a small group of officers chosen by Carvalho. In special circumstances requiring military intervention, COPCON could call into action army units from the regular hierarchy, relying particularly on units preselected for loyalty and reliability.

For the provisional government, COPCON represented the possible answer to a pressing national need. But its significance went far beyond the handling of civil disorder. Since the day of the coup, Spinola's clear aim had been the dissolution of the MFA's influence.

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Now, however, the creation of COPCON meant that, without directly challenging Spinola, the MFA had not only survived but been institutionalized, at least militarily. While COPCON would answer directly to Costa Gomes and through him to the President, Spinola now had to contend with the knowledge that the MFA had achieved an operational military command that extended into every regiment in the army.

If the creation of COPCON was a military change with political significance, the second major event of mid-July was explicitly political. It arose from a bid for expanded power by Spinola and Prime Minister Palma Carlos—a ploy which, in the end, Spinola's power base simply could not sustain. The bid came as a formal proposal by Palma Carlos that three fundamental changes be made: a widening of his own authority, a postponement of the Constituent Assembly elections until sometime after November 1976, and the holding within 3 months of presidential elections. The implications of the proposal were sweeping. By capitalizing on his personal popularity, Spinola would be able to win quick election, thereby legitimize his presidency, and thus supersede the popular legitimacy which he and the MFA now shared as a result of the April coup. Moreover, by delaying the Assembly elections, he could neutralize all political parties for over a year, while building his own party—perhaps the PPD or, some now speculated, even a party bearing his own name.

The Spinola-Palma Carlos proposals brought on the direct conflict which had long lain in wait. In the fashion that was to characterize other decisive moments of the revolution, however, the crisis took shape as a marathon of almost interminable meetings of the Council of State and Council of Ministers, and also of the MFA Coordinating Committee convening alone. But if the form was soporific, the result was dramatic. In the end, even Spinola's personally selected partisans on the Council of State declined to support him, realizing that to do so would mean a break—indeed probably an open test of strength—with the MFA. On the ground that such a plan was in conflict with the announced program of the MFA, the proposal was overwhelmingly rejected. Since Spinola himself was at least ostensibly the head of the MFA, the rejection was not a direct rebuff. In effect, however, the tide had begun to turn. Palma Carlos resigned; a Spinolist replacement was rejected; and when on July 13 Spinola appeared on television to present the new Prime Minister, the man beside him was Vasco Goncalves, the quiet army colonel whose principal distinction was in being the most senior officer on the MFA Coordinating Committee. As prime minister, Goncalves was soon to become an international symbol of a radical leftist drift often portrayed as fanatical. Ironically, he had emerged as the MFA choice less for reasons of ideology than precisely because of his seniority and the MFA's sense of decorum and military propriety.

To be sure, Goncalves' views were leftist, and had been so as far back as the 1950's when as a young officer he had been associated, along with Mario Soares, with the odyssey of Herman Delgado's political insurrection. But whether in fact Goncalves had ever been a member of the Communist Party—soon a matter of international conjecture—was really a distinction without a difference. While serving as a regular officer, he had most certainly mingled regularly in those in-

tellectual circles where drastic remedies for Portugal's injustice were a common theme. He was, as best the term could be used, a radical—though no more so, it would then have been judged, than other officers on the MFA Coordinating Committee, such as Melo Antunes.

The real meaning of the Goncalves selection was not that the MFA had "shifted left," but rather that the MFA leaders had acted to preserve the revolutionary movement of events against what they increasingly perceived as the reactionary intent of a man who was only titularly their leader. In so doing, the MFA had interjected itself, more publicly than ever, into the political process. Not only did Goncalves now replace Palma Carlos, but Melo Antunes and Vitor Alves, drafters of the original MFA program, also entered the cabinet replacing civilians.

Thus, nearly 3 months after the coup, did the MFA finally emerge as an overt political force. The coup's military planner, Otelo Carvalho, had assumed command of a special headquarters, institutionalizing the lines of command that had achieved the coup. The MFA's chief political planners, Antunes and Alves, were in the cabinet. And, most prominently, the MFA Coordinating Committee's senior officer, Goncalves, had become Prime Minister. The lines of battle were thus clearly drawn for the MFA's final conflict with Spinola.

But MFA officers had other concerns as well. For having entered visibly into a political role, they had now assumed the task of administering, as well as protecting, the revolution. In the weeks prior to the Goncalves accession, the MFA's concern about Spinola's intentions had fostered an increasing affiliation between MFA officers and the Communist Party under Cunhal, which had shrewdly offered its support. Now a marriage of convenience was born. To the MFA, confronted with the imperative to govern effectively, the Communists represented a vital ally. For the Communists—faced with unpopularity to the right, attack from the left for participation in the government, and aware already that their electoral appeal might be limited—an attachment to the emerging political power of the MFA offered both a shelter and a share in power.

The one immediate effect of the appointment of the Goncalves government was a sharp—indeed momentous—shift in the area of policy where Spinola and the MFA had been most clearly opposed. The result was manifest on July 27, when Spinola appeared on television to announce, with visible reluctance, the government's unequivocal recognition of the colonies' right to independence. Guinea was to be granted independence forthwith; while "periods of transition" were to begin immediately in Angola and Mozambique.

Within weeks, productive negotiations toward that end had taken place with representatives from each colony. In a series of meetings with PAIGC leaders in Algiers, Foreign Minister Soares arranged first an immediate cease-fire in Guinea, and soon thereafter signed an agreement providing for formal independence in September, at which time all 25,000 Portuguese troops would leave the colony. For Mozambique, negotiations proved equally decisive. On September 9, having by then arranged a cease-fire with FRELIMO, Soares and Antunes signed what was termed the Lusaka accord, providing for full independence in June 1975 and, during the transition, for a provisional government to be headed by an MFA officer. Unfortu-

nately, whereas the agreement on Guinea had in effect blessed an accepted reality, the immediate result of the Lusaka accord was a violent white backlash in Mozambique, touching off weeks of bitter interracial violence between blacks and the 200,000 Portuguese colonials. Nonetheless, with the Lisbon government and FRELIMO in agreement, Mozambique's eventual independence was no longer in doubt.

In the case of mineral-rich Angola, however, Spinola's acceptance of decolonization remained dubious. At their June meeting, Spinola had assured President Nixon that there would be no rush to deliver Angola into the hands of the left-wing independence movements; and indeed it was clear to all around him that Spinola envisioned Angola's graduation into self-determination as nothing less than a highly protracted process. Responsibility for negotiations with the three Angolan rebel groups fell jointly upon Soares and Adm. Rosa Coutinho, a member of the original Junta and persistent Spinola critic who in July had been sent to Angola as governor. Later it would be speculated that, in dispatching Coutinho to Angola, Spinola fully expected him to find the situation unmanageable, hoping that Coutinho's failure would pave the way for Spinola's own direct involvement in the negotiations. Whatever Spinola's tactical plan, however, basic conflict over Angola's future was clearly in order. For if the MFA sympathized with any one rebel group, it was Agostinho Neto's left-wing MPLA, which had long received support from the Soviet Union and also from such respected black African leaders as Nyerere of Tanzania. Indeed, as governor in Angola, Coutinho did little to disguise his preference for the MPLA and reportedly missed few opportunities to strengthen the MPLA's relative position. Spinola, on the other hand, clearly favored Holden Roberto's more conservative FNLA, which drew support from Roberto's brother-in-law, President Mobutu of neighboring Zaire, and from the United States, China, and South Africa. The Western anti-Communist orientation of the Roberto-Mobutu team was in keeping with Spinola's vision of an Angola which, though perhaps nominally autonomous, would retain strong economic links to Portugal.

The general awareness of these basic differences, however, did nothing to diminish the shock of amazement and alarm which reverberated through the entire Portuguese Government when it was learned in mid-September, several days after the event, that Spinola had traveled secretly to Portugal's Cape Verde Islands to negotiate secretly with Mobutu, Roberto, and certain MPLA defectors with a view to establishing a provisional Angolan Government from which the MPLA was to be effectively excluded. Neither Coutinho nor Soares, the two men most directly responsible for Angola, had been informed; indeed Spinola had bypassed virtually the entire government. When word of the negotiations leaked out—with Coutinho learning only by way of the daily Luanda newspapers—Spinola's colleagues were outraged, all the more when he responded to their repeated demands for an explanation by reiterating insouciantly that he had simply decided to assume control of Angola's future. Coming in September atop other events which were now unfolding domestically, Spinola's machinations on Angola became one of the last straws for the tenuous relationship between the MFA and its nominal leader.

The creation in July of the Goncalves government, which had resulted in a marked shift in colonial policy, had produced a new departure on the domestic front as well. Theretofore, under Palma Carlos, the government had failed, despite assistance from the Communist Party and Intersindical, to find any effective remedy for the explosive rise in prices fueled by wage demands and the epidemic of strikes. Thus, within days of its formation, the Goncalves government had promulgated a new labor law which, while formally legalizing strikes for the first time in a half century, placed a strict ban on the sudden wildcat strikes that had afflicted the economy since the coup. The new law also gave the government strong strikebreaking powers.

Yet in the effort to employ its new authority, the government continued to encounter a basic dilemma. Workers were rebelling against the very economic system that the government—the MFA—purported to intend to change. Thus any attempt by the government to enforce participation in the system, or to repress revolutionary wage demands, quickly elicited the charge that the MFA was acting in complicity with the "ruling class" of the old order. Having no legitimacy other than the widespread enthusiasm and trust it had accrued as a result of the April coup, the MFA was soon reduced to uncertainty and endless debate whenever faced with a decision involving the imposition of economic "discipline." The result was that while the Goncalves government was from the start alert to the dangers of uncontrolled inflation, it soon proved to be little more successful than its predecessor in restoring economic order or in arresting the economy's ominous decline.

Meanwhile, viewing both the economic chaos and the rising influence of the MFA, Spinola found himself more isolated but also more certain than ever that growing disillusion with the revolution could be turned to his favor. Confident of his own solid base with a large number of conservative Portuguese who were surely viewing the growing disorder with dismay, Portugal's President began in early September what he must surely have expected would be a final showdown between himself and the MFA. On September 10 in a speech soon widely publicized, Spinola borrowed a phrase from his American counterpart and called upon all of Portugal's great "silent majority" to rally in his support in a huge weekend demonstration to be held in Lisbon on September 28. Almost immediately, political parties of the center and right began organizing all over Portugal to turn Spinola's rally into an overwhelming show of strength—political and, perhaps if necessary, brute.

As the day of the rally approached, Lisbon grew rife with rumors of alarming plans by elements of the right and the left. Among groups on the left, word spread quickly that Spinola's rally would be used as the occasion for a rightwing coup, replete with assassinations of major figures—including, in some versions, even Spinola himself. The right, for its part, took alarm at the rumored plans of the left to stop the Spinola rally at any cost, including the resort to arms. However valid the rumors, the clear danger was that they would be self-fulfilling: that civilians of the left and right would clash violently in the streets on September 28, turning the revolution from its relatively peaceful course into civil war.

On September 27, with Spinola's supporters from all over Portugal having already begun the long ride to Lisbon, the Council of Ministers met in emergency session to discuss the imminent danger of bloodshed. Though almost totally isolated, Spinola refused to call off his rally, arguing the right of the nation's majority to express itself. Nor would Spinola, as commander in chief, yield to the pleas of his colleagues that COPCON be deployed to search all demonstrators for weapons and to prevent confrontations between rally supporters and opposition groups seeking to disrupt the assemblage. Confident that his supporters would be formidably armed, Spinola apparently judged COPCON to represent a greater threat to his rally than the inchoate efforts of left-wing disrupters. But even while the Council of Ministers continued its debate, the initiative was passing quickly from the government's hands into the streets, as a disparate variety of left-wing groups, acting for the moment in concert, moved into blockade positions at strategic points around Lisbon—sites which would have been occupied by COPCON had Spinola permitted it to act. Events were now flowing rapidly toward a violent test of strength, with the outcome wholly uncertain.

In the early morning hours of September 28, one of the crucial moments of the revolution occurred when Spinola, suspicious that COPCON might act independently to curb his rally, summoned its leader Otelo Carvalho to Belem Palace. By then, but without directly violating Spinola's orders, COPCON under Carvalho's instruction had taken control of key radio and television installations as a precautionary measure. Arriving at Belem, Carvalho was immediately instructed by Spinola, in the presence of the Junta, to transmit to COPCON a series of orders which, if followed, would have had the effect of eliminating COPCON's quasi-independence and returning its units to Spinola's direct control. Reluctant, but unwilling to engage in overt disobedience, Carvalho complied, phoning the orders to COPCON headquarters at Alto do Duque, some miles away. The negative response, however, was soon obvious: Carvalho's colleagues, suspicious that he was acting under duress, were simply unwilling to comply. Calls from army units seeking confirmation of the situation flooded into Belem palace; and in a tense and complicated situation, it eventually became clear to Spinola that he could not control COPCON by coercing its leader. Unable to exercise command through Carvalho and now apprehensive that he himself might be arrested if he arrived at COPCON headquarters, Spinola granted Carvalho his leave. For Spinola it was the beginning of the end.

Departing, Carvalho ordered COPCON units to move in to take over the barricades around Lisbon that were being manned by the variety of leftist groups waiting to block access to the rally; and as the morning progressed, COPCON troops took full command of the situation, turning back all vehicles bound for the rally. At mid-day, Spinola issued a communique which simply acceded to the facts: "in order to avoid possible confrontation," he now considered it "inappropriate" for the rally to proceed as planned. Spinola's announcement of his rally's cancellation was close to being a political obituary. Disregarding the specter of bloodshed, he had sought to create a mass demonstration which would reverse his political fortunes; and he had failed.

On the day following the aborted rally, members of the Council of State, the Junta of National Salvation, and the MFA Coordinating Committee assembled at Belem Palace. After a full day of jockeying in which the MFA proved stronger than ever, Spinola agreed to resign. His successor was to be Gen. Francisco da Costa Gomes, the pragmatic and avuncular figure to whom the young officers of the MFA had turned repeatedly for counsel in the days before and after the April coup.

The five months of growing conflict between Spinola and the MFA had, in an important sense, been a crucible—determining indeed whether April 25 was to have marked only a coup or the beginning, for better or worse, of a genuine revolution. Arguably, Portugal's prospects for peaceful transition to democracy and greater economic justice could have been enhanced had Spinola conducted himself differently. A charismatic leader with a wide following, Spinola was perhaps uniquely equipped to bridge the differences in Portugal, to quell the tendencies toward factionalism and indiscipline among both civilians and military, and to oversee a progressive reform of the entire Portuguese political economy. But to do so would have required of Spinola a far broader, more sweeping interpretation of the revolutionary implications of April 25 than he was ever willing to countenance. Ultimately, it would in fact have required that Spinola be a man very different from what he was. For if the revolution had been about anything, it had been about withdrawal from the colonies. Yet, in power, Spinola had viscerally resisted even that—accepting the inevitability of military withdrawal, but remaining steadfastly unreconciled to the idea of total independence. He had represented himself as a kind of Charles de Gaulle, a visionary leader above party or faction. But whereas De Gaulle had maneuvered a reluctant army out of colonial involvement, Spinola, in trying to perpetuate the empire in some form or another, had attempted precisely the opposite. And whereas De Gaulle had made credible his promise to represent all the people, Spinola's inclinations were too obviously to favor one segment of the people at the expense of the others. The heterogeneous group of MFA officers who, at the beginning, had been prepared to grant Spinola power and at least conditional support, were five months later, united in opposition to him if nothing else.[1] In the contest with Spinola, the MFA had not only coalesced, it had emerged into public view as a popular force with which any aspiring political party would now have to reckon.

"Institutionalization" (September 28, 1974–April 1, 1975)

Portuguese politics during the revolution's first 5 months had been largely the struggle between Spinola and the MFA over decolonization and the basic character of the revolution itself. Serving as a kind of opposition, the MFA had played largely a role of resistance—

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[1] Long after his downfall, Spinola would continue to argue that the MFA betrayed the April revolution, that the coup's aims were narrow in conception, and that the MFA leaders—to a degree which Spinola did not at the time realize—were influenced by and secret participants in, the Communist Party. Even his old friend and colleague, Costa Gomes, is now accused by Spinola of having become a Communist years before the coup, an allegation heard nowhere else. (Conversation with Foreign Relations Committee staff, November 1975.)

to Spinola's efforts to delay or subvert colonial independence and to establish himself fully in power with a base which the MFA perceived as resembling too closely that of the old regime. With Spinola's downfall, the young MFA officers moved to center stage. But though popular, generally unified, and militarily strong, the MFA now faced the task of governing Portugal without any single leader clearly in command and without any focused idea of what to do either immediately or over the long term.

Nor did the political parties—which, with the exception of the Communists, remained weak and disorganized—appear to offer any solution. The three principal groups in the coalition government—the Communists, Socialists, and Popular Democrats—seemed too hopelessly at odds to be able to cooperate in a purely civilian government which would be strong enough to impose political and economic order, overcome reactionary tendencies, and proceed with the revolution. Elections for a constituent assembly charged with drafting a new constitution were due in the spring, but it was unclear what should be done in the meantime, and for that matter thereafter, to further the revolution's course.

While one of the two practical questions which had dominated the 5 months under Spinola—decolonization—had now been resolved, the other question—what to do with the economy—had grown only more acute. Although withdrawal from the colonies had been a principal purpose of the revolution, the economic effects now being felt were no less severe. Moreover, Portugal's other sources of foreign income, tourism and remittances, already in sharp decline before the coup, had been curtailed still further by the general impression of bloody anarchy which the foreign press continued to carry to the outside world, much to the government's dismay. (Rarely, for example, was it pointed out in the international press that "peaceful" Spain was experiencing more violence than revolutionary Portugal.) Ironically, even those Portuguese abroad who had received the revolution hopefully had also added to the problem: returning home, they had simply compounded the growing number of unemployed.

Meanwhile, despite the Goncalves government's effort to limit walkouts, the right to strike was still producing an upheaval in the nation's industrial life. With unemployment rising and busines confidence plummeting, strong government measures were a necessity. Yet no consensus existed as to what principles should underlie such action. What should be done about anarchic trade unions? And what should be done with the giant centers of economic power—the banks and conglomerates—which had been the subject of endless revolutionary rhetoric but which, a half year after the coup, remained virtually untouched?

The MFA's first act of leadership addressed none of these basic questions but was rather designed to restore a sense of unity after the nearly disastrous events of September 28. Sunday, October 6, Prime Minister Goncalves announced, would be a national "day of labor." The results were extraordinarily succesful. Young people in large numbers turned out to scrub and whitewash the accumulated political graffiti from Lisbon's walls. Office workers and housewives cleaned the streets, while political and social groups did voluntary work in hospitals and asylums. Musicians played in the parks and squares, and the Catholic



Church sanctioned the symbolic day by declaring that all such work, though occurring on a Sunday, would be free from sin.

This impressive if artificial display of national unity opened what was to become an extended period of intense debate, both within the MFA and in the nation at large, concerning the respective roles of the military and the political parties in the governance and guardianship of Portugal's revolution. Should the MFA withdraw from the politi-

cal scene as originally planned and promised, or if not, under what rules or concept should they stay? The issue was first drawn within the ranks of the military itself. Following Spinola's resignation, elections were held at various levels throughout each of the three military branches to elect delegates for a fully representative MFA assembly. These elections and the meetings of the assembly itself soon provided the occasion for endless hours of debate over the MFA's future.

One dominant issue was the question of how a revolutionary army should be organized. In short, within an army dedicated to promoting a democratic revolution, what concepts were to govern rank, privilege, hierarchy, and obedience? For the most part, the officers of the MFA leadership attempted to steer the debate in favor of discipline, arguing that the success of the revolution depended upon the resolution and good order of the military. In the barracks, however, where many soldiers had been captivated by the spirit of revolution, no proposal was too brash to merit considerable interest.

Related to the question of intramilitary democracy was the question of the MFA's proper role in the revolution. Here again the MFA leaders strove to discourage any tendency toward MFA decisionmaking by plebiscite. For it was by no means clear—indeed it was doubtful—that the military officer corps as a whole shared the far-reaching social aims of the MFA leaders. And just as military elections could foster indiscipline, they could also dilute the revolutionary force of the MFA leadership. Elections to the Junta vacancies and the MFA assembly had shown that the armed forces could by no means be relied upon to vote for left-wing officers. In fact, many officers were now arguing that the MFA should, as expeditiously as possible, withdraw from the political process, just as the original MFA program had envisioned. Others, however, including most of the MFA leaders, argued that, in view of the demonstrated weakness of the political parties, the MFA should somehow be "institutionalized" in the nation's governing apparatus, so that the army—under MFA leadership—could monitor and when necessary energize the extended revolutionary process which lay ahead.

Outside the military, the debate over "institutionalization" also took shape, with the issue dividing those parties which felt dependent upon the MFA and those which felt threatened by it. The Communists and other parties of the radical left were vigorous in support of the direct involvement by the MFA in any future constituent assembly. The reasons were not difficult to discern. From the beginning, the radical parties had seen in the MFA a vehicle for change far more powerful than their own lonely efforts. Thus, they had gone to the streets in support of the MFA's coup in April, had sought to assist the new government by imposing some measure of discipline on Portuguese workers, and had returned to the streets in September to oppose Spinola's rally. Early opinion polls now showed that their prospects in the sping elections were not sanguine—the fear of communism ingrained under Salazar and the church was not easy to assuage—so their best hope continued to be allegiance to the MFA.

For their part, Mario Soares' Socialists (PSP) and Sa Caneiro's Popular Democrats (PPD) held a mirror view. Given the MFA's popularity and power, they had sought assiduously to avoid disassociating themselves from the MFA or giving offense to MFA leaders. But with the opinion polls predicting that the PSP and PPD

could each garner double the Communist vote, their interests were clear. For the MFA to withdraw to a nonpolitical role would leave the radical parties isolated and weak, and allow the two dominant parties freedom to cooperate in, or at least compete for, the exercise of power.

As the debate proceeded through the winter, however, it became clear that the question was not to be *whether* the MFA should be institutionalized, but in what manner. To skeptical observers, the military's gradual drift toward perpetuating itself in power was only the typical conduct of a military regime. From the perspective of the MFA, nevertheless, the case for institutionalization was persuasive. In organizing and competing for the coming elections, the parties were becoming increasingly strident and aggressive, and displaying far less interest in national policy than in national power. Demonstrations and counterdemonstrations were coming perilously close to open battle in the streets,[1] and the fight between the parties showed little sign of resolving itself in effective government either by one party or a coalition.

As the winter progressed, the economic prognosis for Portugal eroded from bad to worse, although by now the Goncalves government was beginning to achieve some partial success in reducing strikes and industrial unrest. The announcement in mid-December that the United States, after months of uncertainty, had decided to extend economic aid to the provisional government, while affording some encouragement, provided little in substantive help.[2] Indeed it was soon clear that there would be difficulty in planning just how such aid would be used. With the parties now devoted largely to organizing for the coming election, it remained for the MFA to devise and promulgate whatever economic program was to obtain. Finally, in late February, the MFA's economic and social program was unveiled by Major Melo Antunes.

Suffused with the pragmatism which characterized the MFA, the points of the new program were surprisingly moderate. Taxation would be more redistributive; wages and prices were to come under a system of government review; and housing, health and unemployment benefits were to be increased. The government, however, would intrude only marginally into the operation of the economy. Explicitly disavowing radical change, the program promised untrammeled activity for free enterprise except in those limited areas marked out for government control. In fact, viewed broadly, what the plan envisioned was no more than the effective exercise of those governmental powers inherited from the Caetano regime; the structure of the corporate state was simply to be turned toward socialist goals. Notably, the banks and insurance companies—bulwarks of the great family conglomerates—were to go virtually untouched, the intention being to leave them in private hands while insuring that they operated in a way consistent with the public interest.

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[1] In Oporto, a stadium rally of the center-to-right Christian Democratic Party, attended by a number of European conservatives, resulted in an internationally published incident when the arena was surrounded by leftists demonstrators, entrapping the ralliers for a day and a night when the army failed to intervene decisively. As commonly portrayed abroad, the incident was proof that freedom was dying in Portugal. By another interpretation, however—the MFA's—the real story was the ability of the army units to intercede gradually, with the finesse necessary to defuse a dangerous situation with a minimum of violence.

[2] The last American economic aid to Portugal had been in 1972; see appendix.

By almost any interpretation, the new program represented a victory within the MFA of the moderates over the radicals, or in terms of their counterparts in the political parties, of the Socialists over the Communists. But if it reflected the results of internal debate, the plan had at least in part been shaped by outside considerations. The European Community was now indicating serious interest in extending both assistance and new terms of trade; and the Antunes program, being indeed no more radical than the policies of several West European governments, was well calculated to calm foreign apprehensions and to attract the outside support which the economy so urgently needed.

As the winter of 1974–75 neared its end, then, two developments had marked the post-Spinola period. On the political side, the parties had begun to organize and compete in earnest for the coming elections, while an indeterminate debate over the MFA's future had produced only a general consensus that some formal role was inevitable. On the economic side, faced with continuing decline, the government had announced a gradualist program designed to further socialist purpose while encouraging confidence both at home and abroad. Both of these developments were now to be affected sharply by the events of March 11—Spinola's final gambit.

The approach of the April elections was accompanied by rising tension and uncertainty, owing to the growing acrimony among the political parties and the still-unresolved question of the MFA's post-election role. The MFA question was further complicated when new elections within the army and air force now indicated a considerable lack of support for the basic leftwing inclination of the MFA leadership. With the MFA's revolutionary drive thus appearing to falter on the eve of the election and with the more conservative political parties, the CDS and PPD, under continual attack in the streets by leftwing agitators, it was not surprising when rumors began to circulate that a leftwing coup was imminent—intended to forestall the elections and impose a radical dictatorship. Nor was it any more surprising when rumors arose of an impending rightwing coup—intended to capitalize on the MFA's wavering unity and reverse the government's leftist course. Compounding the sense of instability was a growing belief that COPCON, itself plagued by internal wrangling over the issue of democracy in the ranks, was no longer sufficiently united to maintain order.

The precise origins of the rightwing coup attempt of March 11 remain a matter of speculation. The seeming cause was a rumor, which soon gained wide credence among conservatives and centrists, that leftwing extremists were planning to arrest and possibly kill several hundred of their opposition, ranging from Mario Soares to Spinola. In response, it is now generally agreed, a preemptive coup plot was quickly hatched among a small group of officers still loyal to Spinola, with Spinola himself being informed only one day before the event. Given the speed of planning and the small number of scattered military units whose support was definite, the coup's planners were obviously relying on a massive, spontaneous swing in Spinola's favor once the coup began. Whether Spinola himself fully perceived the gamble remains unclear; his later claim was that he learned of the coup only as it began and was misled as to the extent of the support which awaited

him. In any case, whatever hopes the plotters nurtured were soon dispelled. Set into motion in late morning on March 11, the plan was stopped short almost immediately when the plotters' frantic series of phone calls to key army units proved universally unavailing. Within hours, Prime Minister Goncalves was able to broadcast to the nation that matters were fully under control. By then, most of the plotters, Spinola among them, were fleeing in helicopters across the Spanish border.

If the coup effort itself had been pathetic, its effects were nonetheless electric. Immediately the MFA Assembly convened in emergency session; and on the following day, after nightlong debate, there began a dramatic series of announcements which so clearly reflected the desires of the more radical MFA officers, and of the Communist Party, as to arouse a lasting, though unsubstantiated, suspicion that they had plotted to encourage Spinola's futile coup solely in order to precipitate drastic MFA action in defense of the revolution. In any case, that was precisely the result.

First to come was a sweeping political announcement: A new Supreme Revolutionary Council would assume full government control, replacing the Junta and the Council of State and subsuming the MFA Coordinating Committee. The new Supreme Council would be autonomous, comprised solely of MFA officers and responsible only to the larger MFA Assembly when it met. The change, though it meant a major streamlining in the efficiency of government decisionmaking, also had an obvious political significance, ominous even if unclear. For what had been a military-civilian patchwork became, virtually on the eve of the election, a full-fledged military regime, devoid of any of the checks and balances which had existed since April 25 under the terms of the MFA's own program.

Soon following came an announcement of equal moment—concerning the economy. In the weeks since its promulgation, the failure of the Antunes program to provide for nationalization of the banks had been highly unpopular, not least among the bank workers themselves. The tumultuous months of revolution had afforded bank employees their first opportunity ever to scruntinze the records of their own institutions; and what they had found, not surprisingly, was complete documentation on a national financial system which functioned solely for the benefit of the wealthy few. Spurred by their own revelations, bank workers had organized to demand workers' control; and the Spinola coup attempt provided a timely occasion for a general bank strike, aimed at a state takeover. Thus, upon its creation, the first and pressing task facing the new Supreme Council was to respond. The decision, soon announced by Prime Minister Goncalves on television, was to accede: All banks, and all insurance companies as well, would be nationalized as "the first firm and decisive step toward implementing the antimonopolistic principles embodied in the country's social and economic program." Henceforth, bank credit would be used "for productive investment and not to build a consumer society" that benefitted only a limited number. Although this first decision by the Revolutionary Council was quickly interpreted in the short-hand of the international media as further proof that Portugal was fast "shifting left," in perspective what was really surprising about the bank nationalization was that it had taken so long. Indeed, the takeover

quickly proved to be one of the most popular and effective measures of the revolution. In a remarkably orderly fashion, bank workers assumed administrative positions and responsibilities; and soon a new loan investment policy was in operation, favoring small business and employment-intensive activity.

Finally, soon after the announcements on government structure and economic policy, a third major decision was announced, concerning the elections: extreme parties on both ends of the spectrum were to be banned from participation. On the right, the small Christian Democrat Party was to be excluded, although another vehicle for center-right views—the larger CDS—was still to be allowed. On the left, two parties were to be banned—not the Communists, but two radical groups that were not only violence-prone but also in serious competition with the PCP for worker allegiance. The election itself was to be held on April 25, the anniversary of the coup and the last day on which the MFA's promise for elections within a year could be fulfilled.

A Sort of Election
(April 1, 1975–April 25, 1975)

The formal campaign for Portugal's first genuine election in a half century opened on April 1, under what by any account were extraordinarily fair campaign procedures. Public opinion polls were prohibited, radio and television time was equally divided among all 12 registered parties, and newspapers were monitored to insure that each party received equal attention. To be sure, exacting fairness had been imposed only after a number of parties of the right had been gradually eliminated through harassment or, at the end, by government ban. Indeed, the 12 registered parties were the survivors of a total of 50 which had appeared at various times during the year; and of the 12, only 4 could be considered as being to the right of the Communists. But of those four, the Socialists and Popular Democrats (PPD) clearly had dominant support, and the Center Social Democrats (CDS) also had at least a sizable following. To the left of the Communists, on the other hand, the array of Maoist, Trotskyite, and other radical groups would clearly have only marginal appeal at the polls, despite their considerable zeal.

Opinion samples taken before the campaign were subject to a wide margin of error, in that most Portuguese after years of scrutiny and coercion were highly circumspect about revealing their preferences. Despite such uncertainty, however, it was already safe to say that Mario Soares was the most popular figure in Portugal. Most observers also agreed that Soares would benefit additionally in the election from the very name of his party: "socialism," after all, had been the touchstone of revolutionary rhetoric on all sides for a full year. Cunhal, on the other hand, while personally popular—though considerably less so than Soares—had to contend with the psychological legacy of 50 years of anti-communist fascist doctrine, not to mention the passionate anti-communism which continued in much of the Portuguese church. Still another indication of the polls was that, for all the revolutionary talk of nationalization and workers' control, the electorate's dominating interest, apart from the cost of living, was in the creation of basic social programs such as health services and

pensions—benefits entirely lacking under the old regime which were now likely to be provided in due time no matter who won the election.

Even, however, as the parties were commencing to make their electoral appeal, still another aftershock of March 11 swept across the scene. On the first day of the campaign, all party leaders were summoned to a meeting arranged by the new Supreme Council and "requested" to adhere to a plan prepared by the MFA. Described as a "pact with the parties," the plan was the culmination of the long winter's debate on the institutionalization of the MFA. It provided, in effect, for the military to hold a dominant position for the next 3 to 5 years, notwithstanding the results of the coming elections. Specifically, the military would retain direct control of certain key areas of government, notably defense and the economy, while retaining veto power over the general line of domestic and foreign policy. In addition, the new constitution, whatever else it eventually contained, was not to provide universal suffrage for the presidency—a measure intended to prevent any recurrence of Spinola's attempt to build a base totally independent of the MFA.

Having little choice, the parties acquiesced. Characteristically, the Communists and parties of the left signed on with enthusiasm; the Socialists and Popular Democrats, only with reluctance. Later, it would be speculated that the parties might successfully have resisted the pact had they tried. At the time, however, lacking as yet any electoral legitimacy and with no certainty that the elections would even be held, the parties were not in a position of strength. Though he signed with protest, Mario Soares would continue, even through the difficult months ahead, to maintain that acquiescence in the pact was the moderate parties' best choice. To reach the elections was the overriding goal. For once the parties achieved electoral legitimacy—and the moderates could clearly expect a strong vote—the rules of the game would be permanently altered.

Exactly what those new rules might be, of course, remained uncertain. The elections were to have had two purposes. The first was to elect an assembly to draft a new constitution; yet now, preemptively, the MFA's future dominance had been ordained. Second, the elections were to provide a basis for immediately structuring a new provisional government representative of demonstrated electoral strength; yet now, with the military in full control through the Revolutionary Council, the governmental changes which would follow an election were far from clear.

Any such doubt about the election's significance, however, was soon subsumed in the ardor of the campaign itself; and from the outset, it was evident that all participants were competing in deadly earnest. Throughout the country, party rallies were assiduously planned and conducted, posters and graffiti appeared on every available space, and endless hours were spent in public debate and pamphleteering. Nor was enthusiasm for the election confined to party workers. All across Portugal, in cities and small market towns alike, cafes with televisions served as small campaign cockpits, staying open late into the April nights as Portugal's newly enfranchised voters alternately watched and echoed the debate.

For the MFA, having already limited the election's significance, April might appropriately have been a month of quiet watchfulness.

This, however, proved far from the case, as various MFA officers stepped forward repeatedly to air views concerning the election and its significance. Understandably, MFA leaders were apprehensive that Portuguese voters—inexperienced, imbued with fascist doctrine, fearful of change, and a third of them iliterate—might register such a conservative vote as to subvert the hope for real change. But another motive also appeared to be at work. As the campaign progressed and various civilian leaders gained popularity and acclamation, something akin to jealousy began to enter into the statements of a number of MFA leaders. The MFA had always been somewhat skeptical of the politicians, seeing them as too much interested in power and too little interested in fulfilling the revolution. Now, 1 year after the coup, as the politicians were about to divide the electoral pie, certain MFA officers began to exhibit what appeaerd to be a palpable resentment and an attitude of outright competition. Indeed, beginning in mid-April, a number of MFA leaders—notably Rosa Coutinho, who had been the architect of the "pact with the parties"—talked increasingly of the need for a new party based upon direct allegiance to the MFA and about a blank ballot as a desirable way to register support for the MFA without a commitment to any of the existing parties.

Coming on the anniversary of the coup, the election day itself afforded an extraordinary spectacle of celebration, of both revolution and democracy. Carnations and festive music returned to the streets, and by early morning it was evident that most Portuguese intended to exercise their new voting right. With 6 million voters eligible, the country was divided into 14,000 polling places, with no more than 500 voters to a table. For the benefit of 2 million eligible voters who were illiterate, the ballot showed party symbols as well as names. To insure both the perception and reality of fairness, each polling place was held open to scrupulous inspection, both by journalists and party representatives.

For those officers who had called for a direct "MFA vote" by means of the blank ballot, the results on election night proved a sore disappointment. The turnout had been astonishingly high—92 percent of eligible voters, possibly the highest ever in a free national election—but of the total vote, only 7 percent were blank. Clearly victorious were the Socialists with over 2 million votes (38 percent). Trailing, but not far behind, were the Popular Democrats with 1½ million (26 percent); and well behind were the Communists with 700,000 (12.5 percent). Even the center-rights CDS, with nearly 8 percent, had outdistanced the MFA's blank vote.

But if, by their enthusiastic turnout and their rejection of the blank vote, Portugal's newly enfranchised citizens had given a clear victory to multiparty democracy, they had also, by their choices, indicated a strong preference for the creation of some form of Portuguese socialism, which had after all been the MFA's guiding theme. Indeed, set against the goals embodied in the original MFA program, the election—having affirmed both democratic and socialist purpose—was a dramatic success. Only in their skepticism about politicians, and perhaps in their new pleasure in power, could any of the MFA's leaders now have found cause for dejection.

In winning the election, the Socialist Party had demonstrated considerable strength in every region of Portugal, scoring best in the towns and industrial areas. Support for the Popular Democrats and Communists, in contrast, was highly localized. The PPD stronghold was the rural north, the region of small landowners, where the church's anti-communism still exercised a powerful influence. Here a majority of voters had chosen either the PPD or still more conservative CDS, while as predicted the Communists had gained no more than 2 or 3 percent. Communist support, in turn, came from the industrial areas of Lisbon and Setubal, and from the Alentejo farming area of the south—the region of large estates and absentee owners. The PCP's urban industrial support reflected the party's extensive organizational efforts dating back to the days of clandestinity, while Communist strength in the Alentejo had been organized and built largely after the April coup. Here, among the landless and itinerant peasants where the church's influence was weak, the vote had been the converse of that in the north: the Communists dominated, while the PPD was limited to a few percent.


The parties' reactions to the election results were predictable. While the Socialists and Popular Democrats trumpeted the election as a major triumph, the Communists sought rather unpersuasively to discount its significance almost entirely. The reaction which mattered most, however, was the one which remained to be seen: that of the MFA. When on election night Mario Soares proclaimed, "Portugal is now entering a new era," it sounded less like a prediction than an expression of hope.

What Kind of Revolution?
(April 25, 1975–August 29, 1975)

Just as the April coup had been only the beginning of a prolonged struggle over the coup's real meaning, so now the anniversary election had set the stage for what would be an acrimonious and eventually violent dispute over what significance, if any, was to be accorded the poll. If earlier the question had been whether Portugal was to have a genuine revolution, the issue now was what form the revolution would take. Were the armed forces to retain control, shaping some kind of "benign dictatorship," rooted perhaps in committees of peasants and workers? Or were they to recede, giving way to a more conventional political process which carried Portugal toward some variant of West European socialism? Despite the election, the reality of power meant the answer must again emerge from the armed forces. Indeed, where previously the battle had been between Spinola and the MFA, the contest now was for ascendency within the MFA itself—to determine whether the military's will to power, fortified by skepticism about political parties, was to prevail over the MFA's original commitment to pluralist democracy. The parties, for their part, could but hope to shape the climate within which the MFA's internal maneuverings took place—the Communists seeking to ride farther on the military's strength, the Socialists and Popular Democrats wanting some practical acknowledgement of the election result.

On the Revolutionary Council, three vaguely defined factions could now be discerned. The first group, smallest but centered on Prime

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Minister Goncalves, was closely identified with the Communist Party and seemed inclined to carry the MFA-Communist alliance as far as possible. The second faction, coming to be called the "moderates," was led by Melo Antunes, who had taken over the Foreign Ministry from Soares in the shake-up after the abortive right-wing coup of March 11. This group, which had the support of the Socialists, continued to favor the general approach that Antunes had written into the original MFA program. Like most of his colleagues in the MFA leadership, Antunes had no wish to see the MFA withdraw entirely, but

he recognized that Portugal could simply not be governed effectively without multiparty participation—moreover, that any attempt now to do so would almost surely provoke a violent backlash from a citizenry whose expectations the election had clearly shown. Tacitly, the Antunes group appeared to have the the support of Costa Gomes, though the President continued to perform the general role of mediation which he had begun during the MFA's dispute with Spinola. The third faction was clustered around the increasingly flamboyant Otelo Carvalho, whose earlier aversion to politics had disappeared as he found himself becoming the closest thing Portugal now had to a charismatic revolutionary hero. This group, which included Rosa Coutinho, who had now returned from Angola, was fascinated by the populist idea that Portugal's new order should be constructed from the bottom up, on a base of democratic workers and peasants committees, Cuban-style. Carvalho's control over COPCON gave this view added weight, and he was courted assiduously by the other MFA factions while being lionized by the small parties of the far left.

To those who hoped that the election would be respected, the days immediately ahead gave ample cause for despair. For months, as they gained in organizational strength, Socialists had been making steady inroads into Communist dominance over Portugal's trade unions. Within Intersindical, the enormous superstructure that now linked most of the country's three hundred unions, the Communists continued to hold organizational control; but they were losing control of the workers themselves—to the Socialists in some cases, and to the far left in others. The Socialists had made Intersindical a major issue, demanding the right to form parallel unions; and the battle had dragged on through the election, with the government under Prime Minister Goncalves tending to back Intersindical. On May Day, at a workers' rally held in Lisbon's newly-titled May First Stadium, Goncalves and senior MFA officers addressed a hugh crowd of Intersindical Communists who had packed the stands and blocked entry to all others. Unwilling to let this show of Communist-MFA unity go unchallenged so soon after the election, Mario Soares and a band of indignant Socialist followers arrived, battled their way in, and took up the defiant chant, "The people have voted—the Socialists have won," interrupting Goncalves' speech. It was but a momentary triumph. Soares, for this trouble, was escorted from the arena by soldiers and denounced from the podium for showboat tactics. Less than a week later the Revolutionary Council conferred upon Intersindical a formal monopoly over all trade union activity.

If Soares now felt the need for a *cause celebre* to focus Portuguese and international concern on the Socialists' postelection plight, events soon obliged. For some time, the newspaper Republica had been the scene of a festering dispute between Communist printers and Socialist management over matters of pay and political philosophy. Republica was not the official Socialist organ, nor by most accounts a great newspaper. But under the direction of Raul Rego, a courageous journalist whose criticism of the old regime had earned him an intimate acquaintance with Salazar's jails, the paper was unquestionably an important national institution. Even more significant, as worker and leftist takeovers had progressively excluded Socialists in one area of the media after another, Republica had become the only major daily not effec-

tively controlled by parties of the far left. When the newspaper's printers now celebrated the Intersindical decision by occupying Republica headquarters and demanding Rego's dismissal, the challenge to the Socialists was clear. Not only did the takeover mean the practical loss of a major tool of party communication; a matter of fundamental principle was at stake. The Revolutionary Council's own press law explicitly prohibited such takeovers where journalists were opposed. For the government now to allow the takeover would thus be a flagrant, illegal abuse of the Socialists' election mandate. It was the kind of issue which Soares needed.

Within days, and with no small encouragement from Soares himself, the Republica affair began to attract more press attention in Europe and America than any event since the revolution began. It was an issue that could be easily summarized and discussed, even by people who knew nothing about Portugal: a question of freedom of the press for the party which had won the election. For its part, the Revolutionary Council, faced with resolving the dispute, took the line of least resistance and simply closed the paper down, stationing COPCON troops outside it until the dispute could be negotiated. The issue was further complicated by the dislike which many of the MFA officers felt for Soares. From the beginning, they had viewed him as a salon liberal who had lived comfortably in Paris while they fought Salazar's war, who had returned to pursue his personal ambition in their revolution, and who was all too ready to try to bring European opinion to bear against them whenever it suited his own interest. Now they could find little to appreciate in Soares' effort to raise among outsiders the specter of Communist dictatorship, when he knew that such talk generated paroxysms of alarm about Soviet control of Portugal, something they had no mind to allow. At the end of May, Goncalves and Coutinho, attending the NATO summit in Brussels, were subjected to a barrage of criticism about the MFA's politics in general and the Republica affair in particular. Whatever the sobering effect, it was also the kind of thing that intensified the MFA's resentment of Soares.

As the Republica dispute dragged on, however, Soares was to find a strong ally in another quarter. A week after the Republica occupation, workers had also "liberated" Radio Renascenca, the national station of the Portuguese Catholic Church. During the year since the April coup, the Church had been extremely discreet, making only the most general pronouncements on the course of the revolution. But now, fortified by the anti-Communist election result and angered by the radio seizure, Catholics throughout Portugal went on the offensive, staging mass rallies and demanding that the station be returned.

Sufficiently impressed by the outcry over the Republica and Renascenca takeovers, Goncalves decided to recede, ordering COPCON to restore the newspaper to its owners and the radio to the Church. Ironically, he now found himself unable to accomplish the concession he sought to make. Army discipline had continued to disintegrate, so that orders were now given less by command decision than by negotiation, and only then after careful calculation of the likelihood that they would be carried out. COPCON particularly was prone to go its own way, as it now showed upon receiving Goncalves' orders to return the properties. Displaying the fine vagaries of revolutionary disci-

pline, units surrounding Republica promptly delivered the building into the hands of the printers, while troops at Renascenca proceeded to join the workers who were occupying the station.

If the MFA and the Communists had long ago formed a marriage of convenience in the effort to run the government, so now the Socialists and Catholics joined ranks to oppose the way it was being run. As the summer arrived, the Revolutionary Council made a few conciliatory gestures, but the MFA assembly, basically antipathetic to both Soares and the Church, quickly revoked almost every compromise the council conceived. Finally, in early July, Soares delivered an ultimatum to Costa Gomes, listing his conditions for remaining in the government. When there was no reply, he withdrew the Socialists from the coalition; and within days the PPD followed. Since the Revolutionary Council was now totally dominating government action anyway, the act was solely symbolic. Nonetheless, the symbolism was powerful: in mid-July, Portugal's government contained no members of the two parties that had triumphed less than 3 months earlier—in an election which the MFA had promised would shape Portugal's future.

By summer, the international press, quoting Soares heavily, was filled with dire forebodings of Communist dictatorship in Portugal. But while directed at events deserving of concern, the phrase in itself was misleading. The implication was that the MFA, or more specifically the Supreme Revolutionary Council, was being manipulated, influenced, or controlled by a Communist Party closely linked to Moscow. In fact, there was little basis for such influence. To be sure, the close affiliation of the Communists and certain leading members of the MFA was self-evident, but at no time did the Revolutionary Council give sign of being other than its own master—except in those instances when the momentum of events seemed the master of all. The real danger was less of a Communist Portugal than that the country would soon lose the instinct for amelioration that had kept the revolution so astonishingly free of bloodshed. Thus far, through the coup and the human tumult of a thousand emotional rallies and angry confrontations, only perhaps two dozen people had died. But now the special magic of the revolution was fast giving way to disillusion, cynicism, and bitter faction. For four decades, Portugal had had the unifying myth supplied by Salazar, and for a few months the myth of the MFA. Now both were gone, and one fact remained: the psychological landscape of the country was simply too uneven—too many currents were now loose—for Portugal to accept a totalitarian regime of either right or left—without a convulsion of bloodletting first.

It did not take long after the Socialists' withdrawal to see exactly what the potential for violence might be. Previously, the Communists had held the balance of power in the streets—displaying a remarkable ability to go to the barricades that had been effectively used against the Spinolist gambits in both September and March. Now it was the Socialists' turn. Fully organized as a consequence of the election campaign, inspired by their triumph at the polls, and indignant over postelection events, Socialist Party supporters quickly began a series of rallies to assert their opposition to the MFA's clear drift toward a workers' state. In Oporto on July 18, Mario Soares,

buoyed by 3,000 supporters armed with clubs, surged past Communist demonstrators into a sports stadium to address a crowd estimated at 75,000. By the following day in Lisbon, the explosive potential had been perceived. Acting on Carvalho's orders, COPCON took over barricades manned by leftist vigilantes, so that the Socialists could conduct a similar rally unimpeded.

But if COPCON could deter violence in the cities, it had little ability to do so in the countryside, and a revolution that had been remarkably peaceful now turned destructive and mean. In the months after the coup of April 1974 Communist Party groups, having the only thing like a coherent organization in most areas, had seized control of many local administrations. In the south, after doing so, they had generally been able to build and consolidate support. But in the small towns and countryside of the north, the Communists' presence in local offices had been a festering source of bitterness, particularly where Communist officeholders had used their new power to favor Party comrades. There, with the elections having emphasized the Communists' minority position, the Socialist–PPD withdrawal now triggered a surge of angry indignation, encouraged not a little by the Catholic Church itself. Soon party rallies were turning into emotional anti-Communist demonstrations, and within days a sporadic series of violent outbursts had escalated into a near anarchy that saw Communists' homes, offices, and headquarters sacked and burned by roving gangs in town after town. As the violence mounted, it could hardly have been said that the Church looked on with disfavor. Ironically, having risked much under the old regime but recklessly overreached in revolution, Communists in many areas now found themselves unable even to walk the streets, forced back into clandestinity as Socialist and PPD members retook positions in local governments, union executives, and workers committees.

Viewing this mayhem from Lisbon, the government found itself nearly powerless to act. Although the MFA had by now solidified its command structure throughout the army, the troop units themselves—being manned generally from the same areas where they were stationed—could simply not be relied on to disperse demonstrators with whom the soldiers basically sympathized. Just as units in the industrial areas had often shown reluctance to clash with leftists, so in the north soldiers were now showing a comparable unwillingness to defend them. In certain instances where the threat to life was obvious, units were successfully deployed, but the violence brought death regardless. Repeatedly MFA leaders issued warnings that the anti-Communist fervor was being manipulated by counterrevolutionary forces. Soares, for his part, replied that he deplored the violence—adding with emphasis, however, that he could understand why it was occurring.

But even if it were true, as some charged, that Soares had joined with the conservative Church in an unholy alliance, the zeal of the outbursts in the north could simply not be ignored. In late July, at a meeting of the 240-man MFA Assembly, President Costa Gomes warned that the MFA was fast losing the wide support it had originally enjoyed, noting in military parlance the difficulties which the MFA must overcome in traversing Portugal's political terrain toward the goals of the revolution: "We have in Lisbon an area capable of absorbing revolutionary advance, but it stretches only through an in-

dustrial belt of 20 miles. The rest of the country runs the risk of losing connection with the front of the column." He was also warning that the front of the column was fast losing connection with the country.

In addressing the MFA Assembly, Costa Gomes also proposed, and had accepted, a wholly new constitutional organization: The Supreme Revolutionary Council was to be replaced by a military triumvirate consisting of himself, Vasco Goncalves as Prime Minister, and Otelo Carvalho as head of COPCON. Under the new plan, the Revolutionary Council would join the MFA Assembly as a purely consultative body. By first impression—and it was that which quickly reached the outside world—the new structure meant a further consolidation of totalitarian power in the hands of MFA officers on the radical left. Costa Gomes himself, though known to be pragmatic, was seen as vacillating and weak. Goncalves was clearly identified with the Communist Party. And Carvalo was now on a trip to Cuba from which he would soon return likening himself to Castro. The impression of totalitarian control was only reinforced by the immediate resignation from the SRC of a number of the leading MFA moderates led by Melo Antunes.

But this interpretation overlooked important nuances. For one, Carvalho, flush by now with his own revolutionary cosmology, despised Goncalves and his Communist friends, holding them in contempt as "fascists of the left." For another, Costa Gomes was shrewder than his detractors often implied. Indeed, subsequent events were soon to make plausible the hypothesis that, in creating the triumvirate, Costa Gomes had actually undertaken a circuitous course to bring the MFA back toward middle ground. The Revolutionary Council had, since its creation in March, been heavily biased toward the left. Thus, little was lost by the "moderates" in leaving the SRC, especially now that Costa Gomes had successfully relegated it to consultative duties. It was in fact arguable that the organizational changes, by lifting Goncalves from the protective cover of the Revolutionary Council, had rendered him not stronger but precariously and glaringly isolated, subject to debate on his own merits alone. Whatever Costa Gomes' intentions, this was precisely the result. Just as Soares had previously taken the Socialists outside the government to appeal to the country, so now Antunes and the moderates were about to go outside the Revolutionary Council to appeal to the armed forces. Their goal, shared with Soares, was a reversal of the MFA's drastically leftward course—which meant, as a start, the removal of Goncalves.

As Prime Minister, Goncalves had three times before formed provisional governments, each time at a critical juncture of the revolution: the first, when he assumed office in July 1975 after the MFA had defeated Spinola's bid for expanded power; the second, following Spinola's resignation in September; the third, after Spinola's coup attempt in March 1975 had precipitated formation of the Revolutionary Council only 1 month before the election. Now, in early August with the furor over the Socialist-PPD withdrawal having left the country without a government for weeks, Goncalves put together his fourth cabinet, a group composed entirely of leftwing officers and civilians unattached to any of the main political parties. It was the revolution's fifth provisional government; it was also to be Goncalves' last. Even during the swearing-in, President Costa Gomes referred to

it as being merely a "transitional administration." But more significantly still, the whole event was boycotted by Antunes and eight other well-established MFA officers who had quit the Revolutionary Council in protest and who now issued their own manifesto in the form of a letter to the President. The document minced no words, denouncing the "facist spirit" of the radicals' effort to install a "bureaucratic dictatorship" in Portugal, rejecting the new cabinet as being manifestly incapable of governing, and demanding adherence to the terms of the original MFA program. Within days the actions of Nine were to result in an extraordinary political soul searching which extended throughout the army. For in demanding socialism by democratic process, Antunes and his colleagues were now calling upon the Armed Forces Movement to determine, once and for all, just what kind of revolution Portugal was to have.

Already, in many units a clandestine Army Democratic Movement had been circulating petitions aimed at coalescing the substantial body of MFA opinion not represented within the Revolutionary Council. Now, with the Antunes manifesto acting as a spark, this growing sentiment suddenly ignited. Working with the army's general staff, the Nine obtained official permission for the manifesto to be disseminated and discussed, and soon units all over Portugal were alive with rousing deliberations which constituted no less than a military plebiscite on the future of the country. After months of revolutionary "dynamization," soldiers had acquired confidence enough to express their political views forthrightly, even to their commanders, and before long barracks and drill fields were the scene of vocal political seminars. Officers and soldiers alike turned out for demonstrations, visited other units, exchanged views, and confirmed allegiances. Whole units rallied and debated. It was, as one observer noted, the most remarkable military phenomenon since the days of Cromwell's New Model Army. For two weeks the debate raged, but before long the tenor was clear: at the end of August, the Nine reported to Costa Gomes a convincing estimate that 85 percent of the army were behind the manifesto. The inference was obvious: Goncalves' tenure was drawing to a close. Carvalho, for his part, carrying no brief for Goncalves, holding no real governmental position, and still boasting a margin of popularity in the army and the country, simply stood back and waited for the imminent change.

On August 29, a gaunt Vasco Goncalves—visibly exhausted after more than 12 months of revolutionary ferment and the countless nightlong meetings of the MFA—resigned from office. In his last major public appearance a few days earlier, he had attacked the "bourgeois spirit" of his enemies, likening the persecution of Portuguese Communists to that which occurred throughout Europe in the early days of fascism. But these were words in the wind, for Goncalves himself was now Portugal's principal political issue. Like Spinola before him, he had become, in the words of Army Chief of Staff Carlos Fabiao, a man "who does not contribute to the unity of the armed forces—who indeed does the reverse." Nonetheless, the legacy of his year in office could not be ignored. The African wars had been ended. Independence had been granted to Guinea and Mozambique, and scheduled for Angola (for November). Portugal's social and economic system, clearly hated by the majority of Portuguese, had been changed

by far-reaching measures intended to redistribute the nation's wealth and to operate its economy for the benefit of the entire citizenry. Portuguese life and culture had been opened to new ideas. And all this had been achieved with a minimum of conflict—until the backlash.

But it was in the very reason for the backlash that Goncalves' failure was to be found. In the early, decisive days of the revolution, the MFA had turned to Goncalves as a counter to Spinola, a man whose confidence in the ballot box was clear but whose commitment to social transformation and decolonization was not. With the MFA, Goncalves had played a central role in the victory over Spinola's self-centered conservatism. Yet in the final analysis, Goncalves as Prime Minister had shown himself to be too much Spinola's opposite: a man whose commitment to change predominated over any concern for democratic process. Now, as Goncalves resigned, the question for the MFA, and for Portugal, was whether the balance could be struck.

A Question of Authority
(August 29, 1975–February 26, 1976)

Following the catharsis of Goncalves' resignation, three weeks of meetings and machinations among MFA and civilian political leaders produced agreement that a new government would be formed, reflecting in composition the results of the April election. At its head would be Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo, a member of Spinola's original junta and a man who, though widely regarded as a left-winger, was recognized as being considerably more pragmatic than Goncalves and not at all allied to the Communist Party. The Socialists and Popular Democrats would return to government, and indeed, due to their electoral supremacy the previous April, would occupy the preponderance of civilian positions, the Socialists taking four portfolios and the PPD two. In turn, as a result of their weak showing in April, the Communists would receive only one post.

As the Azevedo government took shape, contention centered on the Communists' angry opposition to participation by the PPD, whose local supporters they held mainly responsible for the vicious sacking of Communist Party headquarters throughout the north. For their part, the Popular Democrats balked at entering into any compromise with the PCP, which they despised and wished to expell from government once and for all. Reflecting prevailing military sentiment, however, Azevedo insisted upon a broad-based coalition, while taking care to award five posts to moderate military men. Among them, Antunes returned to the foreign ministry, while Major Vitor Alves, the other drafter of the original MFA program, became minister of information.

Once assembled, the Azevedo coalition held a significance that was, in one sense, momentous: for the first time in a half century, Portugal had a government based, even if indirectly and imperfectly, upon the results of a free, democratic election. Yet it was for good reason that the key party leaders—Soares of the Socialists, Sa Caneiro of the Popular Democrats, and Cunhal of the Communists—chose to remain personally outside the cabinet. For if the issue of the government's form had seemingly been resolved, the desperate problems of the

nation's economy were no closer at all to solution, and had indeed grown only more pronounced during the long months of political struggle. Nor had the Goncalves resignation meant any more than a turning of the corner toward democracy. Fundamental questions remained outstanding: the future role of the military, the willingness of the left-wing parties to cooperate with a democratically-composed government, and the final terms of the national constitution still being drafted by the Constituent Assembly. Over the course of nineteen months of revolution, virtually every institution in the country had fallen victim to political factionalism and a contest of wills. The test therefore was whether the Azevedo government, however balanced its composition, could achieve the authority necessary to contain still-powerful centrifugal forces and advance Portugal further along its revolutionary path toward some form of stable socialist democracy.

Despite their diminished government role, what the Communists chose to do remained critically important, for the specter of civil war still hovered over the nation's politics. Within the PCP, there was now serious disagreement over tactics. A hard-line Stalinist, Cunhal had for months been given virtually a free hand as his party's leader. But in the wake of the PCP's recent debacle, a number of his comrades were advocating caution, arguing that survival, not power, was the party's most urgent concern. Displaying his own special blend of courage and fanaticism, however, and still decisively popular with his own rank and file, Cunhal stoutly rejoined that a continued offensive was the best defense against any resurgence of the nation's right wing. Isolated or not, he said, the Communists would fight on, gaining advantage where possible, operating with practicality but not caution. The party's marginal participation in the coalition government was not to interfere with the continuing agitation necessary for the revolution's progress toward a workers' state.

Uncertainty on the civilian front was mirrored in the military. Antunes and his "moderate" colleagues regained seats on the Revolutionary Council, which continued to hold dominant power. But the Army's overwhelming repudiation of Goncalves had by no means produced unanimity within the MFA. Although pro-Communist officers on the ruling body were now reduced to a marked minority, the extreme left, represented by Carvalho and his network of officers in units comprising the COPCON security force, remained formidable. Indeed, for a government faced with continuing disorder in the national economy, Carvalho's ability to determine when the army would—and would not—be deployed gave him a control against which MFA and civilian moderates remained largely helpless. It was generally speculated, moreover, that whatever his dislike for the Communists, Carvalho would quickly resort to a tactical alliance with the PCP if moderates on the Revolutionary Council attempted any action against the far left.

Critically related to this political fragmentation within the military was the question of discipline. In the ranks, months of experimentation in intra-army democracy, capped by the free-wheeling referendum on Goncalves, had produced an epidemic of disobedience at all levels of the heirarchy. Units in the north, reflecting that region's political leanings, were now openly unwilling to obey any but conservative officers; while units elsewhere, politicized by the revolution, con-

tinued to view themselves as forces for social change. Among the latter, some were now blatantly defying orders to Angola, where they were intended to police the final stages of the Portuguese withdrawal. Only in a few units led by exceptional commanders did traditional military discipline still prevail. Notable in this regard was Portugal's crack commando regiment, which was stationed at Amadora on the outskirts of Lisbon and headed by Colonel Jaime Neves, whose personal apoliticism was soon to acquire a considerable political significance.

By October, with the Azevedo government having yet to establish real authority, the calm created by Goncalves' resignation was fast giving way to renewed tension, especially in the armed forces where soldiers and officers, attending little to normal military duties, conspired in a myriad of official and clandestine meetings. In the ranks, a new network of leftist conscripts and enlisted men—operating under the title of United Soldiers Will Win (SUV)—began agitating for intra-military democracy and radical government policy; while on the Supreme Revolutionary Council, coteries committed to conflicting viewpoints continued to jostle for position. Although angered by Carvalho's open sympathy with riotous workers' demonstrations, the Council's moderate majority remained stymied in attempts to replace him as COPCON commander. Indeed, with new pledges of support at special meetings of navy and army unit delegates, Carvalho appeared if anything to be strengthening his hand.

Further weakening the Azevedo government was leftist opposition in the nation's media. In March, through the sweeping nationalization of banks and insurance companies—many of which owned leading newspapers—the government had inadvertently inherited an important sector of the press. At the time, the media's leftist cast—the result of a succession of take-overs by journalists and workers—was well attuned to the Goncalves government and had indeed fortified Goncalves' strength. Now, however, the Azevedo government was finding, with little amusement from the irony, that its principal opposition was coming from media which it supposedly controlled but which continued to be dominated by Communists and groups still further to the left. Any suggestion, moreover, that the media be reorganized to provide greater balance and objectivity immediately triggered violent journalistic reaction and aggressive demonstrations in the streets.

Particular tension surrounded the approaching date set for Angolan independence, November 11th. During the summer, the four-party settlement between Portugal and Angola's three liberation groups had fractured into a civil war in which the FNLA and UNITA, aided by the United States and South Africa, were joined in a tactical alliance against the MPLA, which had been bolstered by an influx of Soviet arms and a complement of Cuban soldiers numbering over 10,000. Showing dominant strength, the MPLA was favored in Portugal not only by Portuguese Communists but also by many MFA officers—moderate and leftist alike—who judged it to be the faction most genuinely representative of Angolan nationalism. Thus, with the Azevedo government attempting to maintain a policy of strict neutrality while Angolan independence grew imminent, speculation gained strength that military and civilian leftists would conspire in a coup timed to enable the Lisbon government to deliver Angola to the MPLA on the date of independence. The sobering truth that

events in Lisbon could now scarcely affect Angola's future did little to quell the rumor, which was soon surging through all of Portugal.

Characteristically, this rightist rumor had its leftist opposite. On October 31, Alvaro Cunhal warned that "the country will go through a dangerous time until November 11," arguing the need for a Socialist-Communist alliance against the "September 28 and March 11 men who are preparing a coup d'etat." [1] On the same day, giving credence to Cunhal's concerns, COPCON made several arrests in Lisbon and Braga, interrupting secret meetings of two right-wing groups, the Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Portugal and the Portuguese Liberation Army, both rumored to have large numbers of well-armed supporters among Portuguese who had crossed the border to Spain and were poised to return.

By early November, the military's continuing turmoil had given an armed showdown between far-left and moderate soldiers an air of grim inevitability, with only a point of tactics appearing to preserve the peace. Both sides seemingly sensed that the first to take the initiative and swarm out of the barracks would likely suffer defeat. On March 11, during a period of comparable uncertainty, conservative officers loyal to Spinola had sought to stem the tide of leftward drift by staging a right-wing coup. Now the situation was reversed. The trend was toward moderation, and it was the far-left that was likely to move—encouraged perhaps by the government weakness so evident in late November when Azevedo, along with half of the 247-member Constituent Assembly, was imprisoned for two days in Sao Bento Palace by a mob of 60,000 construction workers seeking a 30 percent increase in pay.

Finally, on November 25th, precisely that occurred: a leftist uprising, equally as confused as the rightist effort in March and, by its failure, equally as decisive in result. Taken together, the several mutinying units—the Tancos paratroop regiment, the Lisbon Light Artillery Regiment, and the military police, all dominated by leftist officers loyal to Carvalho—could well have wielded considerable strength. But in the event, their disparate actions on the 25th were so curiously ineffectual as to give rise to immediate speculation (ironically similar to that which followed the rightist coup in March) that the rebels had been lured by their enemies into a fatal move. Even as the mutinying units sought to seize control of tactical objectives around Lisbon, the loyalist commandos of Colonel Jaime Neves had moved onto the offensive, quickly bringing the situation under control. Within hours, the uprising had been thwarted and its leaders taken into custody without a fight. Casualties occurred only in one brief flutter of gunfire, when four soldiers were killed almost by accident.

Again, miraculously, a major intra-military confrontation had transpired in the fashion of a game of chess, yielding decision virtually without violence. Yet only in style was there similarity with the previous crises of September 28th and March 11th. For whereas earlier events had propelled the country leftward, the leftist defeat of November 25th was now to have comparable force in the opposite direction.

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[1] September 28, 1974, was the day scheduled for Spinola's grand national rally, by which he had hoped to salvage his tottering presidency. March 11, 1975, was the date of Spinola's abortive attempt to regain power through a rightist coup.

Acutely aware of the dangerous implications of a failed leftist coup, the Communist Party acted quickly, publishing a communique even before nightfall on the 25th, disclaiming any culpability and warning against such "desperate moves" by the left as being an invitation to right-wing forces to impose a "hegemony." It was an accurate assessment, but of little avail. Civilian political leaders, including Mario Soares, immediately attacked the Communists for seeking to foment the government's overthrow, while far-leftists fumed over the Communists' cowardly treachery in failing to take to the streets at a moment of truth. Fearing the worst, many Communists quickly went underground.

On the following day, President Costa Gomes addressed the nation, declaring that "the country has just been through a critical moment, the origins of which have not yet been determined satisfactorally." With the President in his television appearance were the effective victors in the failed uprising, Melo Antunes and other members of the Revolutionary Council's moderate Nine, who now had what they needed: a rationale for taking concerted action against officers on the far left. Absent significantly was Otelo Carvalho, whose role in the affair was as yet unknown, but a matter of intense suspicion.

Faced with the widespread presumption of Carvalho's guilt, Costa Gomes—who owed his presidency to Carvalho's bold stand against Spinola more than a year before—now had little choice. Within days Portugal's most famous revolutionary leader had been stripped of his command as the Azevedo government began a formal investigation into the events of November 25th. Months later, after the inquiry had led to his brief arrest and demotion, as well as to COPCON's dissolution, Carvalho would continue to assert—plausibly—that the supposed coup had been no more than a limited attempt by military leftists to oust certain conservative commanders and that he, moreover, had not been directly involved. The confused reality of November 25th, however, was far less important than the perception—and the opportunity it afforded the Azevedo government to consolidate its position. Carvalho, who had begun two years before as an unknown colonial warrior and catapulted himself into stardom as the charismatic proponent of a chaotic grassroots style of democracy, was inevitably a victim of the process. Ousted from the Supreme Revolutionary Council with Carvalho were General Carlos Fabiao, the Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral Rosa Coutinho, long a major MFA figure, both of whom had been implicated in the failed coup.

Newly configured, the Revolutionary Council acted quickly with the momentum of events, focusing immediately upon the government's most obvious irritant: the pervasive left-wing domination of the Portuguese press. Early in December, with unaccustomed decisiveness, the Council decreed a far-ranging government intervention in the nation's media—nationalizing nine maior radio stations and the entire television network, and suspending publication of eight prominent newspapers which, though already state-owned, had engaged in "tendentious, distorted and monolithic" reporting and thereby "contributed to the atmosphere leading up to the coup." Promulgated in accompaniment was a comprehensive plan for the media's reorganization, intended to bring about "pluralism and objectivity." To run

the radio stations and television, autonomous public corporations would be established, similar to those in other European countries. For the newspapers, new management and editorial boards were to be named, with an emphasis on independence and variety. Long overdue, this effort to diversify the media was within weeks to prove broadly successful, giving the Azevedo government its first relief from the unruliness of an ideologically aggressive press.

Indeed, if the fall of Goncalves in August had returned the military moderates to office, the failed leftist coup of November had now served to confirm them solidly in power, setting the country more squarely than ever on the path toward "pluralist democracy." Yet exactly what was entailed by this touchstone phrase remained to be seen. Did it require the MFA's return to the barracks? The exclusion of Communists from government? For Melo Antunes, still the country's foremost revolutionary theoretician, the answer to both questions was most emphatically that it did not. Speaking in the aftermath of the suppressed rebellion, he left little doubt: "Control of the military situation," he stated, would now enable the MFA to "regain its unity and its ability to lead . . . The major parties must be brought together on a single platform for political action for us to be able to progress, with the Armed Forces Movement, toward the building of socialism." It was essential, he added, that the Communist Party take full part. Supporting Antunes in this view were well-placed colleagues, including Azevedo and key military commanders.

Yet others of growing prominence disagreed—at least on the question of the MFA's future role. Among them were General Ramalho Eanes, installed by Azevedo as Army of Chief after the abortive uprising, and Colonel Jaime Neves, whose efficient defense of the Azevedo government on November 25th had transformed him suddenly into a national hero. Increasingly assertive, these two conservative officers argued that the MFA's exercise of political power was not only crippling the armed forces, but dividing the nation. Without opposition from MFA moderates, Eanes and Neves now took the lead in purging from command all officers suspected of complicity in the events of November 25th.

By some accounts, the danger at this point was that the military might shift precipitously to the right, just as it had lurched to the left after the failed rightist coup in March. But the real significance of the conservative officers' new prominence consisted not in their desire to move the military rightward along the political spectrum, but rather in their hope that the armed forces could be withdrawn from politics altogether. Called the "operationals," after their conviction that the military should revert to a traditional role, these officers represented the growing belief that the days of the MFA—which had always been more an idea than an organization—should now be brought to an end. It was time, Eanes dryly noted, for Army officers to quit acting like movie stars and return to their jobs.

By December, however, such questions as the military's future political role appeared almost academic as against the ominous decline of the nation's economy. For nearly two years of revolution, the country had lived off the fat of the old regime, rapidly drawing down Salazar's vast foreign currency reserve to finance a balance of payments

deficit now approaching $100 million per month. Even with this supply of unearned imports, inflation had soared, and with the currency reserve now nearing depletion, total economic collapse was at hand. To begin expending the country's $4 billion gold reserve, still largely untouched, would be to sacrifice the only collateral Portugal could offer for the foreign loans on which any hope for the economy's rehabilitation would depend. In October, responding to Portugal's progress toward "pluralist democracy," the European Community had come forward with an offer of some $200 million in economic aid. But this could be of little value unless joined with stringent domestic measures to bring the country to terms with its post-colonial plight.

In late December, with the restoration of military order affording the government its first solid underpinning, Prime Minister Azevedo drew the year to a close by announcing a broad program of economic discipline, including a wage freeze, tax increases of up to 40 percent on nonessential goods, and strict regulations to establish industrial order and protect foreign investment. But this was at best a first step. It would be "hypocritical," Azevedo warned, to wish the nation a prosperous new year, for a prolonged period of austerity now lay ahead. A country consuming 30% more than it was producing simply could not survive.

The sobering condition of the economy and the tempering of revolutionary zeal in the military were now reflected in the waning political energy of the nation at large. In mid-January thirteen Communist-led unions staged a noisy rally in Lisbon where thousands of demonstrators protested the new austerity program as being "anti-working class." But even on the far left, the fervor of the revolution's earlier days had faded. In contrast, the conservatism of the north, which had surged into the violent summer backlash against the Communists, was now staunch and indeed gave indication of settling over the whole country. The Center Social Democrats (CDS), conservatives who had struggled to remain a viable party in the earler election, were known to be gaining strength. And speculation was growing that the national election anticipated in April might well provide a plurality not to the Socialists but instead to the center-right Popular Democrats (PPD), who might then form a coalition government of the right.

In one important sense, however, the drift in favor of the more conservative parties was misleading. For the legacy of nearly two years of revolution was more than a cascade of radical rhetoric now gone stale. All across Portugal, at the grass roots, laborers were organized as never before to influence their own economic and social conditions. In almost every factory, freely-elected workers' commissions were in operation, engaged not only in wage bargaining but also in basic decision-making concerning factory management and product. Similar to such worker groups were the residents' commissions which had coalesced in urban neighborhoods to organize improvements in working-class housing, a matter sorely neglected under the old regime. In Lisbon, where a speculative boom in the dictatorship's last years had produced a large surplus of privately-owned houses and flats—many of them adjacent to squalid shanty towns—more than 300 residents' commissions had overseen the takeover of some 25,000 homes in an organized, democratic fashion. Following the occupations, moreover,

the same residents' commissions, embodying a kind of popular power, were working with government authorities to prompt construction of additional housing appropriate to worker needs.

In the countryside, meanwhile, an analogous process had been at work. All through the course of the revolution, but at a faster pace in the latter part of 1975, impoverished farm workers had organized into cooperatives to occupy vast tracts of land owned by aristocrats and wealthy farmers, especially in southern Portugal. Inevitably, some of the occupations were opportunist and adventurous. But in the main the process was producing not only a form of economic justice, but also an increase in productivity. Whereas large portions of land on the great estates had previously gone uncultivated—most of it serving as private game preserves—the freshly occupied tracts were now being tilled assiduously by their new owners. The results had shown in small but significant increases in agricultural production, first in 1974 and again in 1975.

As it happened, the cooperatives were also pròviding many of the new landowners with an unprecedented technique for marketing the farm product. When first formed, the cooperatives had encountered boycotts by food distribution merchants accustomed to purchasing from wealthy single owners; and the resulting breakdown in food distribution had created serious shortages in the larger towns and cities, even while surplus produce rotted in the countryside. To overcome the boycott, farmers' cooperatives had linked up directly with the new residents' commissions in the cities, thereby by-passing the traditional middle men and providing much-needed savings on food for factory workers whose earnings were now strained to the limit by rising prices.

Whether such new activities would prove durable, of course, remained to be seen. For by early 1976, the desire of many Portuguese to consolidate hard-won gains was running, throughout the country, at cross-currents with the powerful yearning for a return to normalcy. In factories in Lisbon, as well as the north, workers were now welcoming back owners and managers who had fled to Spain during the zenith of revolution. Reemerging, some said, was that traditional strain in the Portuguese mentality, describable as a boss complex, which for decades had allowed the Portuguese proletariat to submit to, and even admire, those who had ruthlessly dominated the society and prospered with lavish wealth. This was not to say, for example, that the exiled Melo brothers were about to be handed back the multibillion dollar CUF empire, over which their dynasty had long exercised absolute power. Now nationalized, the big trusts were never likely to be returned to their original owners. But in those businesses where the state, without taking over capital, had stepped in to replace management "in exile," pressure was mounting among workers for pragmatic solutions which would bring a resumption of orderly production. Without fear of castigation, laborers now spoke of "nationalization taken to extremes"; while union leaders, though still decrying the evils of capitalism, debated openly as to what forms of private production might best serve the worker interest.

By February 1976, the descent of Portuguese workers from the heady politics of social transformation was fast being reinforced by drastic cuts in the size of the military. Under the hand of General Eanes, whose

"apolitical" star was now climbing steadily, the uniformed chaos of Portugal's radicalized and disintegrating 200,000-man colonial army had been cut by two-thirds as plans proceeded for an eventual reduction to 25,000. Clearly focused on the removal of officers on the far left, Eanes was also known, however, to be taking pains to prevent the military's infiltration by clandestine organizations of the radical right. It was Portugal's benign fortune that even the conservative "operationals," who were now bringing the army under control, shared the fear voiced repeatedly by President Costa Gomes of "a reaction from the right that could lead to a regime similar to that in Chile."

An obvious corollary of the military's withdrawal from politics was extensive revision of the "pact" which MFA leaders had imposed on the parties the previous April, at the outset of election campaigning for the Constituent Assemby. Then, offered little choice, the parties had formally consented to a dominant MFA role for several years to come. Now, less than a year later, principal MFA figures—Goncalves, Coutinho, and Carvahlo—had fallen precipitously from power. And even among those military moderates who remained in key positions—Costa Gomes, Azevedo, Antunes, and others—the need for a contracted MFA role was an acknowledged, if disappointing, imperative.

Finally, on February 26th, with legislative elections in prospect for the spring, a new pact was concluded. Under its terms, the Revolutionary Council was to relinquish the controlling veto power it had assumed over all legislation, while in exchange the parties agreed to support a military figure for the nation's presidency in an election to be held in June. The parties, however, would retain a deciding voice in the selection of presidential candidates; and as for the long term—the next four years—the military was to act only in an advisory capacity rather than as an agent of change. In sum, instead of the cutting edge of revolution, the MFA was now to become the government's guarantor, serving as a responsive arm of authority for a genuine Portuguese democracy.

The Timetable Complete
(February 26, 1976—April 25, 1976)

Throughout March the Constituent Assembly, little noticed during the revolutionary events of past months, sought final agreement on the terms of a new national constitution. Within the Assembly, a slim leftist majority favored an explicit incorporation of socialist principles, to include guarantees of workers' participation in industry and the creation of a centralized planning structure. Strongly opposed were delegates from the PPD and CDS, who saw in such stipulations the incongruity that any government formed by their parties—an increasing possibility—would automatically find itself guilty of a wide variety of constitutional sins of omission. Many moderate military men, including General Eanes, also expressed concern about using the constitution as a socialist blueprint.

For the Socialists themselves, the question was problematic. Answering his own right wing, which held that the constitution should be a purely political document, Mario Soares argued that the party could retain working-class support only by forceful insistence upon a

"socialist" revolution. To fail in this would lose votes to the Communists and thereby weaken the party as a unique vehicle for reconciling Portugal's twin thrusts toward socialism and democracy. Thus guided, the Socialists held to a leftist course; and when the new constitution was announced in early April, it bore the unmistakable economic stamp of the Assembly's Socialist-Communist majority. The clear danger in this result was the real possibility that a PPD–CDS plurality in the coming election could yield a governing coalition adamantly opposed to principles which the constitution now embodied.

Under the constitution's political provisions, a National Assembly—to be elected on April 25th, the revolution's second anniversary—would become the basis of Portuguese government. The new government would be formed, however, only after the Presidential election in June. The President then elected would assume broad powers: to select the cabinet, to veto any legislation, and to dissolve the National Assembly, calling for new elections. He would also sit as chairman of the Revolutionary Council, which would continue—though without direct legislative power—as the one vestige of the MFA. The constitution thus implied, in accord with the MFA's new "pact with the parties," that the President would be from the military. Also in keeping with the pact, however, it was generally understood—and indeed the rigors of a Presidential election would virtually insure—that no military man would be elected who was not acceptable to the major political parties.

In obvious aspects, the election campaign of April 1976 closely resembled that of a year before. As earlier, the principal competing parties were, from left to right, the Communists, Socialists, Popular Democrats, and Center Social Democrats. Again, the campaign featured a wholly chaotic war of posters and graffiti, as partisans on all sides sought to cover every available space in the cities and market towns of Portugal with slogans of ideological superiority. Again, potential violence lay just beneath the surface of events, erupting occasionally into street hostilities that reflected passionate animosities and conflicts still unresolved. But if the two elections were similar in form, the import of the two differed dramatically. A year earlier, with a leftward-drifting MFA holding a tight grip on power, the national vote had been for a civilian Constituent Assembly with uncertain powers and significance. Now, on April 25, 1976, the election would determine the composition of a new national legislature from which would be formed Portugal's first genuinely democratic government in fifty years.

Reenforcing this break with the past was the final breach now occurring between Portugal and her former African colonies—Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and Sao Tome, all of which were now led by Communist-inclined governments. From April 1974 until late 1975, the connections between Lisbon and the African governments had been ideologically attuned; and virtually all Portuguese had held out hope that long-standing economic and cultural ties in the erstwhile colonies might, in some form, be resumed. By early 1976, however, Portugal's evolution to a social democratic system was fast widening the gap between Lisbon and the revolutionary African regimes. In Portugal, the MFA leftists who had generated the decolonization were now in eclipse, the influence of their PCP

supporters had been decisively curtailed, conservatism had regained legitimacy, and over a half-million colonialist *returnados*—most of them bitter and unemployed—provided constant agitation against any accommodation by Lisbon with the black nationalists who had overturned the African empire. From the perspective of the erstwhile colonies, meanwhile, even the preeminence in Portugal of Mario Soares, who had always been a strong proponent of colonial freedom, offered little enticement for continued relations. Portugal's center of political gravity was now clearly to Soares' right; and there was, regardless, scant advantage in perpetuating the relationship by which a small European country had extracted one-third of its national income at Africa's expense. Later, in May 1976, when the post-colonial regimes began openly to coordinate their policies in a hard line toward Lisbon, some observers would perceive the hand of Moscow attempting indirectly to lever the Portuguese Communists back into power through pressure via the colonies. A less complicated explanation, however, was the simple absence of any real interest for the colonies in preserving the relationship intact.

The approach of the revolution's second anniversary election day was accompanied by rising apprehension—centering not, as a year before, on whether an election would in fact be held—but rather on growing concern that the voting might, by producing an ambiguous result, fail to provide the strong governing mandate the country now so desperately needed. Each of the four major parties, and ten peripheral parties as well, had made a determined effort to generate enthusiasm. But among Portuguese voters, a fatigue with political rhetoric was clearly evident, and by the campaign's closing days, the four major party lenders were confining themselves to remarkably similar platitudes about the need to avoid the excesses of the past, to halt further nationalizations, and to restore investor confidence. Though publication of opinion polls remained illegal, private surveys showed nearly half the electorate as undecided virtually on the election's eve. Certainty could be found only in the improved position of the Center Social Democrats (CDS), whose young conservative leader, Professor Freitas do Amaral, had traded effectively on the fact that his party had played no part in any of Portugal's six provisional governments. The Popular Democrats, who at first had held hopes of surging into an election plurality, were now seen to be losing ground to the CDS on their right and the Socialists to their left.

Conducted without incident, the April 25th election produced a tally distinctly like that of the previous year. As expected, the one major swing was toward the CDS, which doubled its vote, from 8% to 16%. In turn, the Socialists, the Popular Democrats, and Communists all slid back 2–3% but maintained their basic constituencies intact. Overall voter turnout, if somewhat lower than earlier, was still strong at 83%, showing that Portuguese citizens, whatever skepticism they had developed about platform promises, remained far from apathetic about the ballot box itself. Indeed, the most significant aspect of the election was the very constancy implicit in the result—a sign that Portugal's revolution might, for all its commotion, have yielded a reasonably stable democratic process. Two years earlier—on April 25, 1974—the young officers of the MFA had, in abruptly terminating the old regime, announced a dramatic plan to deliver liberty to the colonies

and democracy to Portugal. While the newly-launched political careers of many original MFA conspirators had been dashed in the process, their gallant timetable was nonetheless now complete.

	1975	1976
Socialists	37.87	34.97
Popular Democrats (PPD)	26.38	24.03
Center Social Democrats (CDS)	7.65	15.91
Communists and related parties (PCP)	16.65	14.58
Others	4.55	5.74
Blank or spoiled papers	6.90	4.76

Democratic Beginnings (April 25, 1976 Onward)

If the parliamentary election had indicated a certain stability in Portugal's new democracy, it had failed—as feared—to provide a clear governing mandate. Though victorious, the Socialists would hold only 35% of the parliamentary seats. And while Mario Soares could know that no feasible coalition was possible without the Socialists, he was also keenly aware that the Socialists themselves were sharply divided between those favoring a leftist alliance with the Communists and those preferring a more conservative partnership with the PPD. Thus faced with the likelihood that any coalition would split his party, Soares immediately affirmed his intent to form a minority Socialist government following the Presidential election on June 27th. Leaders from the other major parties quickly responded that Portugal could only be governed by a majority coalition—though each found in this imperative a different conclusion. Sa Caneiro of the Popular Democrats called for a Socialist-PPD alliance, while Freitas do Amaral called for a three-party coalition that would include the CDS. Cunhal, meanwhile, touted the "victory of the left" that had given the Socialists and PCP a total of 146 parliamentary deputies as opposed to 112 for the PPD and CDS.

By mid-May, the outlines of candidacy and support in Portugal's first Presidential election had taken shape—and in such a way as to make nearly inevitable the result. All three major democratic parties—Socialists, Popular Democrats, and Center Social Democrats—had rallied around the figure of the strongest man in the army, General Ramalho Eanes. As chief of staff since the failed leftist uprising in November, Eanes had spent nearly six months quietly reorganizing the army into a much smaller but effective military force, purging it of political soldiers and preaching the necessity of discipline. Almost mysteriously self-effacing, Eanes was assumed to be a conservative. But it was not his personal political preferences—rather his commitment to democratic civilian rule—that made Eanes the consensus candidate. Only the Communists, who had for so long sought to ally themselves with the army's leadership, now advocated the election of a civilian. It was an irony which many could appreciate.

Along with the Communist nominee—deputy party leader Octavio Pato—two other candidates of note came forward, neither with major

party backing but both with devoted personal followings: Admiral Azevedo, the bluff, amiable prime minister who continued to preside over the sixth provisional government which the election would bring to an end; and Otelo Carvalho, now demoted to major and freed after brief imprisonment but still under investigation for his part in the November coup. On the Presidential ballot, Azevedo and Carvalho together represented the remaining vestiges of the MFA: one a moderate, the other a flamboyant leftist—both now little more than symbols of a revolution Portugal was leaving behind.

The two-month period between the parliamentary and presidential elections passed with relative quiet, giving Portugal its lowest international silhouette in two years. Even with his solid three-party support, General Eanes' stern message and dour manner did little to generate excitement. And while Otelo Carvalho, campaigning with undiminished flair, managed to rekindle fires of leftist enthusiasm, his principal accomplishment was in siphoning off support from the official Communist candidate, Octavio Pato. Admiral Azevedo, exhausted after nine months as prime minister, confined his campaign primarily to the equal television time accorded each candidate. There appeared little doubt—either that Eanes would win or that, in the election's aftermath, the serious business of government would finally have to begin. Eanes announced in advance that he would support Soares in the establishment of a minority Socialist government.

Given the presumption of Eanes' victory, the Presidential election of June 27th was remarkable primarily in providing a margin so large as to obviate any need for a run-off. Taking 62%, General Eanes had clearly become the hope of a broad majority of Portuguese who wished to see the establishment of orderly, democratic civilian rule. Carvalho nonetheless took a surprising 16%; while Azevedo, who suffered a heart attack just days before the polling, received 14%. Pato's minimal 8% provided a serious blow to the lingering Communist hope for a Socialist-PCP alliance, forcing Communists to counter that the overall leftist tally—Carvalho and Pato together—was virtually one-fourth of the vote.

In mid-July, at a formal and meticulously organized ceremony in Sao Bento Palace, General Antonio Ramalho Eanes was inaugurated as Portugal's first President to be elected by free, universal sufferage. Addressing the newly assembled parliament, Eanes pledged support for the Portuguese people's long-denied and hard-won democratic rights, cautioning severely that the days of "coups and anarchy" were at an end. Interrupted frequently by standing applause from the benches of his major-party supporters, Eanes was watched in silence by the parliamentary deputies of the PCP.

Later in July, having been officially appointed Prime Minister, Mario Soares formed the first government under Portugal's new constitution. Comprised largely of moderate Socialists, with several independents and military officers, the Soares Cabinet was the first in two years with no Communist representation. In ten days, Soares announced, and after final consultations with the opposition parties, the Socialists would present their program—the first and obvious task being the implementation of a stringent program of economic recovery and development. With 20% of Portuguese workers now un-

employed and inflation running at over 50%, it was difficult not to agree.

In the Assembly, Soares' colleague Salgado Zenha, finance minister in the outgoing provisional government and now the Socalists' parliamentary leader, spoke of signs of economic recovery. Emigrants' remittances, vital to the balance of payments, were returning to normal, as was tourism. Grain production continued upward, despite widespread confusion in the program of agrarian reform. The number of Portuguese companies working at capacity was now 57% as compared to only 32% a year before. Yet there could be little doubt that the country's condition was critical. The colonial wartime economy had yet to be truly conformed to Portugal's new circumstances. Though the nation's energy bill was nine times higher than in 1973, not a single effective conservation measure had yet been undertaken. Imports continued at twice the level of exports, though it made no sense for Portugal to buy abroad meat, fish, corn and vegetable oils which could be produced at home. With the economy functioning like a sieve, "We've got to fill in the holes," Zenha said. "We must live like Portuguese, not like Americans, Germans or Russians."

On August 2nd, Mario Soares presented his legislative program to the Assembly of the Republic, emphasizing the importance of a permanent dialog and reconciliation among the competing parties. Beyond immediate measures of economic austerity, Soares promised to construct a strict national budget by November 15th and to create, by May 1977, a comprehensive four-year plan for the nation's development. Though he was well aware of the existence of the continuing class struggle taking place throughout the country, Soares said, the clash of social groups must be resolved by discussions, with strikes only a last resort. The nationalizations, agrarian reform, and workers' participation in industrial management were achievements of immense importance, which no government should reverse. But there could be no riches without toil; Portugal must seek more than a "socialism of misery."

Whether Soares' hopes, and those of his fellow citizens, would be fulfilled was now the question of Portugal's future—to be determined not by the revolution, which was over, but by the fate of Portuguese democracy, which had begun.

III. PORTUGAL IN CONTEXT

Without Africa we would be a small nation . . .
—Marcello Caetano, 1970

Divested of empire, Portugal has finally and inevitably become the "small nation" that Salazar and Caetano would never accept. The special advantage which history once bestowed upon the Iberian location—a salient into the Atlantic during an age of discovery and colonization—has been reduced relentlessly by time. And the sparsity of Portuguese resources which made colonies seem a necessity will now, with colonies gone, ineluctably impose a future of limited means.

For Portugal's 9 million people, the loss of empire was destined to be a revolutionary event: the last, long-delayed reckoning of an ancient order which had become glaringly obsolete. To fashion from its vestiges a new order—a "small" but modern Portugal—will necessarily be an extended process, blending awakened aspiration, reaction, dislocation, dissension, and—as 2 years of revolution upheaval have amply shown—the full panoply of human conduct. As they join the nations of Europe, the hope for the Portuguese people is that their own endemic potential may hold a richer life than came with empire. Their fear, in the course, must be of the civil tragedy they have sought so admirably to avert: a relapse—at worst, after a spasm of national violence—into the grim political repression that has burdened their past. The essential question of their still unfinished drama is whether, through unfamiliar institutions of democracy, they can accomplish peacefully their nation's transformation.

Whatever the outcome, however, Portugal's objective circumstances should now suggest only the most modest geopolitical role. Yet it was to be the New State's final irony that in the very struggle to replace it, Portugal would acquire in extreme what Salazar had always sought: a global significance out of all proportion to Portuguese size and strength. Among the world superpowers and nations throughout Europe, Portugal in revolution became the focus of intense concern, gaining sudden and widespread prominence in both international and domestic debate. Though propelled in fact by Portugal's own "internal dynamics," as Secretary of State Kissinger at one point conceded, the Portuguese revolution was soon cast in larger terms, not least by the Secretary himself. Like Cuba and Chile before it, the word "Portugal" became a metaphor, the nation itself a supposed object lesson or testing ground, an "issue" influencing attitudes and forcing responses far beyond Portugal's borders—so that, in its unfolding, the Portuguese revolution gained significance less in the actual event than in the perceptions and misperceptions of those at a distance, filtered through prisms of ideological assumption. Finally, though tiny in itself, Portugal became a mirror, reflecting much of the world outside it.

Spain and "The Idea of Portugal"

As the Portuguese revolution began to attract world attention in the summer of 1974, it was common among foreign observers, accustomed to viewing Spain and Portugal in a single category, to infer that fascism's fall in Lisbon would inevitably have consequences in Madrid. While this soon proved to be true, the connection was due much less to any closeness of the two regimes than to a powerful psychological nexus which arose, due largely to a coincidence of events. At another time, Spain might have viewed the fall of Salazarism with greater equanimity. But, as it happened, the tumultuous drama of the Portuguese revolution began to unfold at the very moment when Spaniards, so long focused upon the person of Francisco Franco, were approaching the crisis of his passing.

Given their superficial similarities, the actual separation of the two regimes could hardly in fact have been more pronounced. For though joined by geography and culture, the twin states of the Iberian peninsula have evolved through centuries of history, even through the parallel rigors of fascism, as remarkably distinct and independent, separated significantly by the oldest border in Europe. Portugal, whose very identity involves a denial of being Spanish, has traditionally faced outward—if only, in the Salazar-Caetano years—to the "overseas provinces" of greater Portugal. Spain meanwhile, long without major colonies and ostracized over recent decades from Europe, has focused inward—upon the discordant development of a nation far larger and more diverse. The fascist ideology shared by the two regimes, though it distanced both from the world community, did little to fasten them in active partnership. Indeed, with fascism in each country resting upon the appeal to "national unity," similar ideology was actually a reflection of separate concerns. For homogeneous Portugal, national unity meant the preservation of empire; for heterogeneous Spain, the cementing of a clashing domestic mosaic. If Salazar's call was for a continuance of Portugal's epic transoceanic role, Franco's imperative was to fuse the disparate elements—the Basques, Asturians, Galicians, Catalonians, Extremadurans, and Andalusians—which continued to resist adherence to Spain's Castilian core. Economically, under fascism, the two regimes built independent corporate systems, interacting only marginally through trade. Portugal, moreover, remained largely agricultural and poor, drained steadily by a futile overseas war; while Spain, laboring under a tyranny of domestic peace, created her "miracle" of urban industrial growth. Militarily as well, the regimes stayed essentially unconnected, confining their bond to a mutual pledge of nonaggression. As each government deployed its own devices to suppress internal dissent, it looked primarily to the United States for an external tie.[1]

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[1] Portugal, with American and British sponsorship, gained charter NATO membership in 1949; Spain, consistently rejected by NATO, has depended since 1953 upon the presence of U.S. bases to afford at least an aura of American protection.

But if ideological kinship did not produce strong positive links, Spain and Portugal were nonetheless joined in recent decades by a kind of negative interdependence, as the fascism of each protected the other from the stark contrast that an adjoining liberal regime would provide. For Salazar, presiding over his tiny Iberian enclave, this "shield effect" was of particular value. Indeed, in the 1930's, creating such a barrier had been Salazar's decisive consideration as he contemplated Portugal's response to the outbreak of civil war in Spain. Although Franco's Nationalist rebellion against the Spanish Republican government had drawn a sharp ideological division between fascism and the left, the conflict from Salazar's perspective was not without ambiguity. For though Portugal's ruler was the quintessential ideologue at home, his approach to foreign affairs was strictly real politik. Accordingly, in assessing the Spanish war, Salazar found his strong ideological affinity for Franco and Hitler at odds with serious practical apprehensions that a triumph by Franco's Nazi-supported Nationalists might eventually lead to dangerous German encroachments into Iberia, or possibly to Spanish expansionism, either of which would be well beyond his ability to control.[2] A victory by the Spanish Republicans, on the other hand, would not only keep German power at a safe distance; it would most probably lead to the dilution of Spanish power as well. Franco had rebelled against the Republican government after, and indeed partly because, the Basque provinces and Catalonia had been granted autonomy. A Franco defeat and a continuation of the Republican policy of democratic representation therefore offered the promising prospect that Spain would divide into some kind of federation of Iberian states, each more comparable in size and power to to Portugal. Finally, however, any benefit which might accrue to Portugal from a Republican victory was outweighed, in Salazar's analysis, by the danger to the Estado Novo that would inhere in a major triumph for liberalism in Iberia. Thus it was that, even as he continued to pay rhetorical heed to the neutrality demanded by the League of Nations, Salazar contributed a special Portuguese legion to the strategic eastward push of the Spanish Nationalists. Franco's victory in turn afforded Salazar the lasting shield he sought against the liberal influences of Western Europe.

While Franco, through the years of his own rule, was to appear less dependent upon the reciprocal shield provided by fascism in Portugal, the manner of its sudden disappearance in April 1974 raised quick and undisguised alarm throughout his regime. It was in fact well known that during the final months of his life and reign, Spain's aged leader spoke of little else than the Caetano fall and its aftermath. For Franco, and the entire Spanish establishment, the surprising events in Portugal signaled the clear need for increased vigilance and national discipline. Thus arose the inevitable paradox of the Portuguese

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[2] Later, during World War II, Salazar would be similarly concerned about the possible consequences were Germany to take control of those British colonies in Africa which adjoined the Portuguese territories.

revolution: that even as it marked the start of an historical epoch of political change in Iberia, its most immediate effect was to entrench still further the forces of reaction and delay in Spain.

The months before Caetano's overthrow in Portugal had witnessed portentous developments in the life of Spain. Indeed, by late 1973, the signs of unrest that had begun to appear throughout Spanish society were combining in a crescendo. Workers, who saw their considerable gains of the past decade being lost in a weakening and inflationary economy, were now organizing heavily in illegal labor groups dominated by the Spanish Communist Party. Universities, traditionally the centers of Spanish discontent, were mounting fresh resistance to the government's intellectual puritanism and political repression. The Church, once intimately linked to the regime, was rapidly drifting into the camp of the opposition. And in the regions, separatist sentiment, long festering particularly among Basques and Catalans, was showing powerful resurgent strength.

In December 1973 (the month in which the Armed Forces Movement in Portugal was agreeing to stage a coup), this mounting dissent came to a head in Spain when Prime Minister Carrero Blanco was assassinated by Basque guerrillas. His successor, appointed by Franco, was Carlos Arias Navarro, a well-known authoritarian whose experience included direct supervision of the Spanish secret police and who was generally expected to administer an immediate crackdown. Instead, Arias soon gave surprising indication of intending the kind of institutional reform that rightwing politicians are sometimes uniquely capable to lead. Within a month of taking office, and over the opposition of many conservatives, the new prime minister announced a cautious but highly significant program of liberalization. Presented to the Cortes (the Spanish parliament) for consideration, the Arias program provided for the election of mayors and other local officials throughout Spain (rather than their selection by the central government); legalization of "political associations"; and greater genuine representation in the national syndicates (the official trade unions) and in the Cortes itself.

While it was inevitable that the Arias proposals would create a considerable and prolonged controversy, the Lisbon coup in April 1974 sharply intensified the Spanish debate. Predictably, Spaniards on all sides of the liberalization question quickly found in the Portuguese revolution evidence for their positions. Staunch members of the old guard saw Caetano's fall as added reason to enforce tight controls on Spanish political life, lest they awake one day to find the regime swept away in a tide of liberalization or chaos. Moderate reformers argued that Portugal demonstrated the urgent need for such concessions as Arias had proposed—if only to temper the pressure for more sweeping reform. And those whose explicit goal was a thorough transformation of Spanish institutions also found encouragement, for Portugal showed that change was in fact possible. Three days after the coup, the clandestine Radio Independent Spain broadcast a

statement by Spanish Communist Party leader Santiago Carrillo, who drew the parallel:

> The events in Portugal have deep repercussions in Spain . . . the dictatorship of Oliveira Salazar did not survive him. This is a lesson for those who imagine the Francoite dictatorship can survive Franco by placing Juan Carlos at the head of state.

At no time, from this point on, was it ever possible to discern the degree to which Portugal was invoked by Spaniards simply to justify positions already held, as distinguished from the measure in which Portugal's experience might actually be playing a causal role in Spanish life. But the existence of some kind of nexus was indisputable, for the Portuguese revolution quickly became, and for more than a year remained, a dominant idea in the national consciousness of Spain. Soon, in their regular clashes with Spanish students, the regime's police found themselves taunted with cries of "Long live Portugal's revolt." In the controlled Spanish press, references to Portugal began to appear in the form of veiled analogies to Spain. And even among officers of the generally conservative and apolitical Spanish armed forces, there were said to be glimmers of interest in the glamorous coup of the Portuguese MFA.

Signs that the regime was disturbed by these developments were not long in coming. Of particular concern was the attitude of the armed forces, specifically that of General Manuel Diez Alegria, chairman of the Spanish defense staff since 1970, an officer well known and widely respected for his progressive views. When Diez Alegria came due for reappointment a few weeks after the Portuguese coup, he was unexpectedly removed—primarily, most observers thought, because of his potential similarities to Portugal's new President, General Antonio de Spinola. Simultaneously the regime began to crack down on the Spanish press, focusing especially on those commentators who saw parallels between Portugal and Spain.

During the summer of 1974, as the Portuguese revolution produced an internationally publicized commotion of rallies, strikes, and governmental strife, two important events occurred in Spain, one weakening the regime, the other strengthening its enemies. The first was a sharp decline in Franco's health, which forced him to transfer power indefinitely to his designated successor, Prince Juan Carlos. The second was the creation of the Junta Democratica, a broad coalition of Spanish opposition groups which, theretofore fragmented and still illegal, had finally overcome their antagonisms to join hands in the quest for Spanish democracy. Set against a backdrop of Portuguese turmoil, Franco's failing health and the formation of a united anti-Franco coalition combined to produce a pervasive—and for the regime—frightening sense of uncertainty and impending change. Only adding to the aura of crisis was the continuing arrival of "refugees" from across the Portuguese border. The first wave had

come in April when members of the Portuguese secret police and their cohorts had fled into Spain. Now, as the Portuguese revolution actually began to take hold, they were followed by members of Portugal's dispossed elite—clear symbols to the Spanish regime of the perils of change.

By late 1974, it was clear that the Portuguese revolution, for months an inspiration to Spanish democrats, had become a serious liability for them. Indeed, when Spinola resigned in late September, warning ominously of an impending Portuguese anarchy, the news was greeted by entrenched Spanish conservatives not with alarm but instead with extreme satisfaction, for the dangers of liberalization were now "proven." In turn, moderate Spanish reformers felt themselves increasingly immobilized by the right wing's constant references to Portugal. And even on the far left, while some Spaniards continued to take pleasure in seeing that Portugal was experiencing a true revolution, others—including Communist Party leader Santiago Carrillo—were deeply distressed. Having broken with Moscow and adopted the "historic compromise" approach of the Italian Communists, Carrillo now feared that the notoriety of the aggressive Portuguese Communists would jeopardize his own party's aspiration to gain legality and eventual democratic legitimacy in the post-Franco era. Among all Spaniards, there was a sense that revolution in Portugal had strengthened the hand of the old guard in Spain. And if any proof were needed, it was soon reported that Prime Minister Arias was shelving his proposals for liberalization—largely because Portugal had weakened the case for Spanish reform.

During the first half of 1975, events in each country evolved inexorably toward climax. In Portugal, the abortive Spinola coup was followed by the April election which in turn led to the extended and uproarious contest over the meaning of the election result—the sequence producing constant turbulence and, as seen from Madrid, nothing less than a rampage of godless chaos. In Spain, meanwhile, the reform program ground to a halt as the government, fortified in its position by the "Portuguese situation," went to the barricades against the forces of change. Franco, defiantly resisting his own demise, returned to command, directing the regime's full energy into throwing back the "subversive" challenges of industrial workers, civil servants, university students, and journalists—all disappointed over the fate of the reforms. Rising to the battle, the illegal Spanish labor movement now began to flex its clandestinely built strength, as Socialist and Communist organizers suddenly took a large majority in the spring elections for key posts in the state-approved unions—a phenomenon, the government could not fail to note, such as had occurred in Portugal in the period leading to the coup.

Inexorably, as the regime's repression encountered increased resistance, the level of violence mounted; and soon Spanish leftist groups were met in a guerrilla war of terror and counterterror with fanatical groups of the Spanish ultraright, which operated illegally but with the regime's tacit and sometimes active support. That Franco intended to carry the fight to the end was beyond doubt when the most obdurate of Spanish conservatives, the old Falangists—Franco's original base of support but long in eclipse—began to gain renewed influence in the

government, soon promoting enactment of a stiff antiterrorist law which provided for summary trial and execution.

In September of 1975, the tensions in both Portugal and Spain rose to a dramatic finale. With the great armywide debate in Portugal having resulted in a decisive consensus favoring "pluralist democracy," the long months of boisterous struggle over the basic character of the Portuguese revolution now drew to a close. And as Admiral Azevedo formed a new, broadly based government, the nations of Western Europe enthusiastically welcomed the sign that Portugal had begun the formidable but essentially hopeful task of shaping a modern European society. In Madrid, meanwhile, the still-unresolved battle over Spain's future was now symbolized in a harsh and dramatic episode as Franco, brandishing the regime's resolve, ignored all protests and executed five men under the new terrorism law. Predictably, the act raised an impassioned outcry in Europe and quickly produced still another wave of Spanish violence. The contrast, finally, was vivid and not a little ironic. Whereas Portugal appeared to have turned the corner toward assimilation into the European community, Franco's executions had only exacerbated the mutual hostility of Europe and Spain. It was in fact a telling coincidence that the governments of Western Europe now committed their first major financial assistance to revolutionary Portugal only days after withdrawing their ambassadors from Madrid.

Little more than a month later, with the executions his final statement to the world, Francisco Franco—Spain's leader and embodiment for 40 years—succumbed finally to failing health and passed away. If the event resolved none of the questions about Spain's future, it nevertheless marked a momentous beginning. For it was unquestionably true that for so long as Franco had clung to life, he had remained a source and focus of Spanish resistance to change. Month after month, Spaniards had stood poised on the brink of the post-Franco era, paralyzed until their living attachment to the past was dead.

It was in this surreal atmosphere of extreme uncertainty that Portugal had loomed so dominantly in the Spanish mind. Now, as it happened, Franco's death, ending Spain's anxious wait, coincided with the waning of turbulence in Portugal. The overlap of these dramatic periods in each nation's history—Portugal's decisive months of revolution and Spain's final months under Franco—had created a remarkable psychological nexus. But as Spaniards now turned toward their future, with Juan Carlos newly instated as their King, Spanish concern over Portugal's revolution was fast fading. Some assumed that the Portuguese lesson, having tempered Spanish reformers and entrenched the regime, would continue to exercise a moderating effect on the pace of Spanish change. Yet, such a judgment met a countervailing consideration: that any addition to the regime's rigidity also raised the likelihood that change would come suddenly, through a cataclysm of violence.

As the reign of King Juan Carlos began, the dominant question for Spain was whether, under his hand, the institutions bequeathed by Franco could accommodate the powerful forces seeking full democratic representation in Spanish life. Virtually all Spaniards could agree that Spain would benefit immeasurably from a closer relationship with Europe, and all knew that progress toward democracy was the pre-

requisite. Now, as the nearby revolution carried Portugal slowly toward both democracy and participation in Europe, Spain was again looking inward. But for those Spaniards who would occasionally glance across the border, it would be to a Portugal that had become less a specter than a model.

The West European Response

In viewing events in Portugal which were at once promising and alarming, and in groping for a collective response, the nations of Western Europe were not burdened by a wide range of choices. To begin with, the principal "Atlantic" organization, NATO, simply had few avenues of direct influence, though it was the one regional forum in which Portugal had a formal part. The Portuguese NATO delegation in Brussels had always been small, and neither it nor Portuguese forces had ever played a significant NATO role. The NATO relationship had in fact been largely one of mutual passivity: Portugal allowing base rights, NATO ignoring Portugal's fascism and later the colonial wars. Between Portugal and NATO, there existed few personal links.[1]

Nor did the attitude of Europe's main ally, the United States, suggest that an "Atlantic" response would be promising, whether through the NATO mechanism or any other. In December of 1974, the U.S. Government, prompted by Congress, did announce a modest aid program. But the American disposition was largely negative, exhibiting scant understanding of, or sympathy for, the complexities of Portugal's new politics. As early as the fall of 1974, President Costa Gomes and a party including Foreign Minister Soares, making a first and presumably triumphal postcoup visit to the United States, were surprised and then angered at being chastised by Secretary of State Kissinger for allowing Communist participation in the Portuguese Government.[2] And by the late spring of 1975, as events in Portugal turned increasingly rambunctious, the United States gave every indication of having concluded the very worst—an outlook, many Europeans worried, which carried with it a self-fulfilling quality. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger mused aloud over the procedural obstacles to expelling a NATO member. President Ford openly lamented it to be "very tragic" that "because of the CIA investigations and all the limitations placed on us in the area of covert operations," the United States could not intervene in Portugal in the customary manner.[3] And Secretary Kissinger, seeming finally to disapprove of the Portuguese revolution as being an event the United States had neither planned nor authorized, was reported to have coined a wry "vaccination theory" under which Portugal's impending "loss" would at least have the benign effect of frightening the rest of Western Europe back into strong, anti-Communist unity. It was hardly an affirmative approach.

For the nations of Western Europe, then, the absence of an "Atlantic" alternative meant that if they were to participate in shap-

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[1] For those Portuguese officers who had done NATO duty, however, it was often a career highlight, generally producing a favorable disposition toward Portugal's NATO membership.

[2] Ironically, on the same trip, President Costa Gomes visited the Atlantic command headquarters in Norfolk and was reported to have greatly enjoyed renewing his NATO contacts.

[3] As news accounts were later to reveal, the "tragic" constraints on CIA activities in Portugal were not so prohibitive as the President's remarks indicated.

ing a coordinated multilateral response, the forum would have to be their own: the European Community. The expansion of the European Community in 1972, from six nations to nine,[1] had meant that the EC was now synonymous with the major power centers of Western Europe, possessing enormous strength in foreign affairs, at least potentially. And while the addition of three governments had complicated the problem of devising common policy, the Nine were already showing—through their cooperation to produce the basic Western positions for the European Security Conference—that the expanded Community could work effectively as a unified entity in international political affairs. Yet however impressive their Security Conference performance, and whatever the importance of the Helsinki agreement which was finally to emerge in mid-1975, the exercise itself was largely rhetorical. A considerably more substantive and difficult challenge was posed by the Portuguese revolution as it began to unfold in the months after the April coup.

Portugal had first approached the European community requesting a trade agreement as early as 1962, when Portugal's principal trading partner, Britain, was making its first bid for EC membership. Both then, however, and throughout the sixties, the Community rejected Portuguese requests, even for an association agreement, as the very fact of the Salazar-Caetano dictatorship continued to block any possibility of closer links. In 1970, when Britain and several other members of the European Free Trade Association were about to enter the EC, Portugal, as an EFTA member being left behind, did negotiate with the Community to arrange new trading terms which would soften the impact on the Portuguese economy. Taking effect in 1973, these "cushion" terms made generous allowance for Portugal's low level of development and were highly favorable.[2] Still, the Community continued to deny Portugal any formal tie.

The fall of the old regime in April 1974, however, removed the barrier to Portuguese-EC relations which no negotiation could have overcome, and without delay the EC Commission issued a formal declaration welcoming the end of Portugal's "fascist dictatorship" and looking forward to the day when a democratically elected Portuguese Government would apply for Community membership. For the meantime, the EC statement called on all Community members to give Portugal practical help. Within days, the new Portuguese foreign minister, Mario Soares, had begun talks with Community officials, with the emphasis on assistance.

But while the EC was favorably disposed, the issue of aid to Portugal did not come to the top of the Community agenda until autumn; and by then the turbulence of Portuguese political life and the signs of Communist influence were raising serious concern in West European capitals. For several crucial months, the Community was un-

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[1] France, West Germany, Italy, and the three Benelux countries, joined by the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark.

[2] Portugal's benefits under the cushion agreement remain considerable even today. In the industrial sector, Portugal gains from the elimination of customs duties for her exports to the EC, while being allowed to retain her own duties well into the 1980's. In the agricultural sector, notwithstanding the Community's Common Agricultural Policy, Portugal benefits from tariff concessions for her major exports such as tomato concentrate, canned sardines, and port and madeira wine. As a result of these terms, Portugal in 1974 ran a $1.2 billion trade surplus with the EC, with exports amounting to $3.3 billion and imports of $2.1 billion.

able to decide whether to offer aid or not—a lack of commitment which, among other things, fueled the extreme left within Portugal by presenting the image that the revolution faced a hostile environment. Nevertheless, both the EC Commission and the individual foreign ministries had become reluctant to move ahead.

In February 1975, the Community foreign minister, Christopher Soames, visited Lisbon for talks with Prime Minister Goncalves and, especially in view of Portugal's grave economic plight, was disconcerted to hear Goncalves disparage EC links as being a form of neocolonialism. Even more important, however, was the opposition which had arisen on the EC side, in France particularly. President Giscard d'Estaing, having himself only narrowly defeated a Socialist-Communist alliance, reportedly did not want the EC giving aid that bolstered a coalition in which Socialist and Communists served side by side, for fear that its success in Portugal would make such an alternative to his regime more attractive in future French elections. Indeed, many surmised that Giscard rather appreciated the chaos in Portugal with its suggestion that the left could not govern. The Italian Government, faced with a similar domestic situation, supported the French. And so too did Britain, despite its Labor Government. On the other side, West Germany, led by the Social Democrats, was strongly in favor of direct aid, and Bonn even went so far as to budget $30 million in bilateral assistance. Holland, Denmark and Belgium also advocated immediate support. But with the split unresolved, those opposed to aid continued to prevail, as the Community's operative truth—that disagreement means inaction—continued to hold sway.

In July of 1975, however, the issue came to a head. As it happened, the crisis in Portuguese Government occasioned by the Socialist-PPD withdrawal coincided with a regularly scheduled meeting of the Community's foreign ministers and heads of state. With Soares waging his defiant campaign throughout Portugal against subversion of the election result, the moment for influential EC action, if it were to be taken, had obviously arrived. The circumstances produced decision. Quickly and for the first time, EC leaders agreed on what amounted to an explicit Portuguese policy: the Community would definitely assist Portugal, and generously, but only if there were clear progress toward "pluralist democracy." Publicly announced, the policy held a meaning that was not obscure. The Community was pledging itself to help any Portuguese Government that reflected the Socialist and PPD victory and the military "moderates."

As to whether the EC's conditional offer constituted interference in Portuguese domestic affairs, Christopher Soames expressed the Community view as follows: "We have a free trade area agreement with Portugal, and we don't have agreements of that character with any country other than a democracy. We have an agreement with Greece and when the colonels took over in Greece that agreement was frozen and we just did not give any aid to Greece until they came back to the way of democracy again." (For the sake of cogency, Soames omitted that the agreement with Portugal had been negotiated while Portugal was a dictatorship.) Interference or not, the significance of the EC decision was immediately obvious to the Lisbon leadership and soon became known to the Portuguese public. In the face of continuing economic decline, the conditional promise of extensive aid

gave added strength to the voices of moderation, both civilian and within the military, during the crucial summer battle over the revolution's future. Whether the Community's posture played a major role in the outcome was a matter of judgment. It was significant in itself, however, that many Portuguese thought that it did. For those moderates arguing that Portuguese socialism could and should be built in a European context, the EC policy had provided an explicit statement, generous yet rigorous, of what would be required.

In October, a month after the fall of the Goncalves government led to creation of the "moderate" coalition under Admiral Azevedo, the Community made good on its pledge. The EC's July announcement had alluded to the figure of $700 million over 3 years. The amount actually announced in October was lower—an immediate loan of $187 million in preferential loans from the European Investment Bank, to be guaranteed by the nine countries. But additional assistance in the form of commodities and medicines was also offered to help Portuguese refugees returning from Angola. There was, moreover, the promise of further, longer range assistance. Indeed, within weeks EC technicians were arriving in Lisbon to assist in economic planning and management, supplementing Portuguese skills which were sadly deficient after decades of oligarchic and oligopolistic rule.

While the ultimate relationship between post-Salazar Portugal and the European Community now remains to be worked out over the years ahead, the interaction thus far appears to have had a constructive effect on both. By all indications, the Community's stance played an affirmative role in turning the course of Portuguese events back in the direction of "pluralist democracy"; and the EC's assistance itself will likely provide Portugal considerable benefit during a difficult economic transition. For the long term, there would seem little doubt that Portugal's interest lies in a growing association with the European Community; and the EC's policy, in its combination of firmness and generosity, appears to have served that Portuguese interest by encouraging both the political and economic conditions in Portugal necessary for a sound relationship.

Equally important, however, has been the reverse effect: that of the Portuguese revolution on the European Community. Portugal gave the opportunity—or forced—the EC to find a common foreign policy under difficult circumstances. The EC's basic dilemma—whether to provide aid to encourage Portuguese democracy or to make democracy a condition of aid— mixed for months with complicating considerations of domestic EC politics to produce indecision. But ultimately, the Community arrived at a prudent and magnanimous policy which not only became the most pronounced external influence on Portugal during the revolution's decisive months, but also moved the Community itself a firm step toward becoming a unified international force.

Soviet and East European Interests

During the excitement that spread throughout Portugal in the weeks after the April coup, leftist and labor groups—which suddenly constituted the principal organized forces in Portuguese civilian so-

ciety—emerged from clandestinity into clear and prominent view. While it was inevitable, and also just, that these groups play an important role in the new Portuguese politics, their evident strength and visible determination raised immediate concern in the West, particularly in the United States. For although such forces had organized to battle the old regime—a cause with which many, perhaps most, Americans could sympathize—denotations of "Marxist" and "Communist" quickly shaped the American perception, causing revolutionary Portugal to be viewed not in its own complicated terms, but instead abstractly as an erstwhile "ally" now imperiled by "instability." Even as the clear majority of Portuguese citizens continued to celebrate the fall of Salazarism, American observers and policymakers—burdened by little previous concern or knowledge about Portugal—were growing increasingly alarmist, all the more as weeks passed and Portugal failed to lapse quietly into the camp of prosperous and tranquil social democracies.

The predisposition to cast Portugal in global, ideological terms was only confirmed when it became apparent that the Portuguese Communist Party was receiving financial support from the Soviet Union. Soon in American discussion Portugal had become nothing less than a cockpit of superpower rivalry; and it was a commonplace that the Soviet Union, operating through surrogates, was attempting a "takeover"—an assertion which, however baldly simplistic, gained easy acceptance as geopolitical wisdom. Even later, when the Portuguese Communists had fallen at least partially into eclipse, it was equally common to hear of the "Soviet effort that almost worked." In the process, what was generally overlooked was how ambiguous were the Soviet interests involved in the Portuguese revolution, how small was the actual Soviet ability to influence events in Portugal, and how diverse were the attitudes about Portugal even among the countries of the Communist "bloc."

THE AMBIGUITY OF SOVIET INTERESTS

That the Soviet Union would view Portugal's revolution with ambivalence was a truth readily discernible without recourse to the mysteries of high Kremlinology. Conflicting Soviet interests simply inhered in the Portuguese situation. On the one hand, of course, the coup and the leftist orientation of much of the new Portuguese leadership did suggest at least the possibility that Portugal might drift from NATO into a neutralist or even pro-Communist posture, receptive to a cordial relationship with the Soviet Union conceivably involving military basing privileges or, in the extreme, formal ties of alliance. On the other hand, however, stood a formidable constraint: that any perceptible movement in this direction would raise the most serious concern in Western Europe and the United States, thereby jeopardizing a detente to which the Soviet leadership was committed as a matter of fundamental national interest. Soviet activity in Indochina and Africa was one thing; it would be quite another if the Soviet Union were viewed as making advances within NATO itself. Soviet officials could thus be certain that even the appearance of a Soviet "gain" in Portugal—an area perceived on both sides as involv-

ing vital Western interests—would entail liabilities on a far broader scale.

Related to this "détente constraint" was the damage that flagrant Soviet action would likely do to the prospects of Communist parties throughout Western Europe. The future of these parties, of course, was in itself a subject of growing ambivalence for Soviet policymakers. On the other hand, having long supported West European Communist parties, Soviet officials could now see unmistakably that these "allies" were steadily advancing toward a formal share in power, particularly in Italy and France. But equally unmistakable was the countervailing fact that even as they gathered strength—indeed, as the very means of doing so—West European Communists were discarding the basic tenets of old-fashioned Marxism, including the need for a "proletarian dictatorship," in favor of a growing commitment to Western democratic practice. Moreover, the Communist parties of Western Europe were, in the process, losing their orientation toward Moscow. It was, in fact, becoming arguable that the advent of genuinely cooperative Communist participation in West European government, if and when it occurred, would constitute not a triumph for the Soviet Union, as long expected, but rather a singular setback. For such a development would not only further diversify world communism, and thus dilute Soviet leadership in general, it would pointedly undermine a proposition upon which the Soviet Union has long relied to justify strict Russian hegemony over Eastern Europe: that a strong Soviet hand is necessary to protect Eastern Europe from communism's implacable enemies in the West.

How such Soviet concerns related to Portugal was complex indeed. To the degree in which Portuguese Communists participated "democratically," they would be contributing to a process of Communist diversification which Soviet policymakers could see as an increasing danger. On the other hand, to the degree that the PCP behaved aggressively, in the "Stalinist" mode, it would threaten both détente and the reputation of the West European Communist Parties to which the Soviet Union was still habitually and ostensibly committed. These very real and complicated considerations were bound to weigh heavily and uncertainly as Soviet policymakers pondered any response to the Portuguese revolution.

THE LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET INFLUENCE

While these ambiguities in Soviet interests were significant in indicating that the Soviet Union would likely respond cautiously to opportunities for "gain" in Portugal, such constraints were rendered somewhat if not largely academic by the very real limitations which surrounded the actual Soviet ability to influence Portuguese events. For despite the common American perception of brash Soviet intervention, there was in fact scant opportunity for a significant Soviet role. Without doubt, a financial link connected the Soviet Union to the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP). But this in itself was not unique, for the Soviet Union has long given financial assistance to West European Communist Parties. Nor did it give Portugal's Communists a particular advantage, for groups on all sides in the Portu-

guese political struggle were receiving and welcoming outside support, with only the slightest regard to appearances.[1]

The irony was that Soviet influence was limited for the same reason it was so easily overestimated: that at the very heart of Portuguese events were the young officers of the MFA, about whom few outsiders knew anything and whose purposes and affiliations were therefore readily misunderstood. To be sure, by the time of the April coup, a number of key MFA officers had developed decidedly Marxist views, and over the ensuing months such ideas blossomed often wildly among their colleagues. But the MFA's Marxism, such as it was, was not an international scheme but rather a rhetorical, at best vaguely conceptual, framework for reforming Portugal. Not, by all evidence, was there ever in the long MFA debates any serious interest expressed in a basic shift in Portugal's international alignment. What many outsiders were not inclined to understand was that the Portuguese revolution was, in the most fundamental sense, an internal event, requiring of foreign observers—as Prime Minister Goncalves told the NATO ministers in Brussels—"less apprehension and more comprehension."

Of course, for those officers such as Melo Antunes[2] who thought seriously about the international implications of the revolution, a certain broadening of Portugal's general international perspective was both an obvious and appropriate development. But this meant something quite different from simply a shift out of one camp into another. Rather, as Antunes and other MFA theoreticians reasoned, a new Portuguese role in international life was inherent in the nature and purpose of the coup. From a fascist state at war to preserve its extensive colonial empire, Portugal had been transformed into a small, underdeveloped country bent upon revolutionary change in its own social and economic life. Whereas the fallen regime had been hermetically closed, revolutionary Portugal now had a natural interest in a broad range of associations—with the West for reasons of geography, culture, and economic growth; with certain Communist states for reasons of egalitarian ideology and general diplomacy; and also with the Third World for reasons of shared poverty and aspiration. Such an expanded and diversified international perspective was not seen, however, as requiring a significant alteration in basic security arrangements—namely NATO—and certainly did not entail becoming a Soviet dependency.

The plausible instrument of Soviet influence, if any, was the Communist Party itself, directed by Alvaro Cunhal. But even this assumed that Cunhal was subservient to Moscow and would willingly remain so should he ever succeed. There were, of course, strong indications—often explicit statements, given casually in interviews—of Cunhal's acceptance of "proletarian dictatorship" as the ideal path to revolution. It was Cunhal's tragedy that his many years in Salazar's jails and then in exile had left him behind—still a hero to many Portuguese leftists, but dedicated to the aggressive, opportunistic tactics that other West European Communist leaders have gradually repudiated. Yet however anarchronistic Cunhal's views, they were

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[1] The one donor from which all parties sought assiduously to be disassociated was the American CIA, which was widely assumed to be an enemy of the revolution. Accusations of CIA support thus became a common technique of political attack.

[2] Drafter of the original MFA program, later Portuguese Foreign Minister and the officer who, from the MFA's inception, was to exercise the most sustained influence on its intellectual direction.

indeed his own and thus hardly more controllable by Moscow than the views of many other Communist leaders who have rejected Soviet dominance. Without question, Cunhal's doctrinaire zealotry did lead him into dependence upon the Soviet Union and its more reliable satellites for outside support. But the reasons were at least as much circumstantial as ideological: Cunhal's explicit refusal to adopt a gradualist approach respectful of democratic process, by alarming and alienating his potential allies in the Communist parties of Western Europe, left no possible outside support other than from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.[1] Ultimately, whether the path to Portuguese revolution required allegiance of party or country to the Soviet Union was, even for Cunhal, most probably an open question to be answered pragmatically.

Although Western observers repeatedly expressed alarm about "communist domination" of the Armed Forces Movement, the phrase distorted much more than it conveyed. The relationship between the Communist Party and the officers of the MFA was from the outset a marriage of general convenience, which deteriorated into a marriage of desperation—between the PCP and a limited number of MFA officers—with the approach of the anniversary elections of April 1975, and then quickly began to dissolve as MFA moderates asserted themselves during the summer. For the MFA, the appeal of the PCP was always its willingness under Cunhal's direction to serve MFA purposes; and if there was any "domination," it was in the subservience of the Communists as they sought power as an appendage of the MFA.

Unquestionably, there was always within the MFA a temptation toward totalitarian solutions—arising from a combination of the nation's profound problems, the MFA's cynicism about political parties, and the natural inclination among MFA officers to retain control once they had acquired it. This tendency was at the heart of the MFA debate through the winter of 1974–75 over the question of whether the MFA should be "institutionalized" as a part of the Portuguese political process; and was again, during the summer of 1975, the central issue in the great armywide debate over the future of the revolution and the MFA. But outside observers too often overlooked the diversity among those who wished to perpetuate a strong MFA role. Otelo Carvalho,[2] for example, favored a strong MFA connection to far left groups that wished to build "popular power" from the grassroots up. Melo Antunes, on the other hand, favored a dominant and extended MFA role while a traditional democratic process gradually evolved. Both—each a key MFA leader—strongly opposed any disproportional Communist role in the government.

Over the long run, the hope for Cunhal and the PCP—and, tenuously, for Soviet influence—lay in a strong Communist performance in the elections of April 1975. For the bond in the MFA-PCP marriage was the important civilian support the Communists could "deliver." The course of events, including Soviet actions, which might

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[1] In addition, certain pro-Soviet elements in the French Communist Party did serve as a conduit for, if not a source of, outside support.

[2] Military planner of the coup and head of COPCON, the national security force. Although the New York Times chose at one point to describe him as Portugal's Beria (after Stalin's notorious executioner). Carvalho in fact openly despised the Communists as being "social fascists," and there was no evidence that COPCON was ever deployed in a brutal manner. Indeed, from the point of view of MFA moderates seeking to restore order, the problem was indeed that Carvalho often failed to deploy COPCON at all.

have followed an impressive Communist showing in the April elections must remain a matter of conjecture, even for Soviet policymakers. For as it happened, the electoral weakness of the PCP placed the MFA-PCP marriage on a narrow ledge, able to continue only in clear violation of the original MFA program. And while efforts in this direction was made—largely because of the pro-PCP leanings of Prime Minister Vasco Goncalves—these efforts, and Goncalves himself, fell finally in the face of overwhelming pressure, first from the country at large and then from within the MFA itself, against any subversion of the election result.

DIVERSITY WITHIN THE COMMUNIST "BLOC" ITSELF

While Portugal was highlighting the Soviet dilemmas posed by European Communist parties outside the Warsaw Pact, it was also reflecting a significant diversity of attitudes among the Communist countries themselves. Superficially, a general uniformity prevailed, owing to the common conceptual framework by which Soviets and East Europeans tend to proceed from the same principles as employed in the West but to find opposite meanings. "Support for Portugal's democratic forces," for example, was generally interpreted in the Communist countries to refer to the MFA, the PCP, and Portuguese workers in general, whereas in the West the principle usually meant support for the Portuguese Socialists and Popular Democrats. Likewise, while Western observers were condemning the Soviet "intervention," meaning the outside financial support for Portuguese Communists, the Soviet and East European press were focusing attacks upon the presumed counterrevolutionary activities of the American CIA and the considerable support being lent by West European Socialists to their Portuguese counterparts. Beneath this surface similarity among Communist nations, however, were real distinctions—attributable, as in the West, to varying national perceptions of self-interest.

At one end of the spectrum of Warsaw Pact attitude was East Germany, which exhibited the strict doctrinaire approach of Communist Party leader Eric Honecker and the continuing East German imperative to maintain ideological contrast with West Germany, notwithstanding the recent bilateral relaxation. Repeatedly, as the Portuguese drama unfolded, Honecker expressed absolute support for Cunhal, while attacking such Western leaders as Willy Brandt for complicity in counterrevolutionary activities in Portugal. In accord, East Germany served also as a principal channel, if not source, for outside assistance to the Portuguese Communists. Neighboring Poland, typically, was less dogmatic and more circumspect, apparently supplying no material aid while publicly supporting the idea of a successful "socialist" revolution in Portugal that would not damage détente. During a visit to Portugal in early 1975, Polish Communist Party leader Edward Gierek reportedly voiced this position personally to both Goncalves and Cunhal, warning each against draconian measures which would intensify outside concern.

Meanwhile, at the very opposite extreme from East Germany, Romania was characteristically exhibiting an approach almost en-

tirely free of ideology. Apparently hoping to enhance the principle of diversity-within-alliance, Romanian leaders advocated a cooperative compromise among all of Portugal's competing leftist groups in order that Portugal might pursue socialist advances while remaining in NATO. Stressing his own independence, Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu cultivated the more moderate leftist groups in Lisbon, including the Antunes Nine, who appeared to offer the best hope of turning Portugal into a Western version of Romania—a tolerated nonconformist. Outside the Warsaw Pact, Yugoslavia evidenced a similarly nondoctrinaire, self-interested approach, indicating hope that a socialist Portugal might eventually gravitate out of the Western alliance, to join Yugoslavia in the "non-aligned" category, independent of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Viewing Cunhal as reckless and tied to Moscow, the Yugoslavs explicitly supported Soares and the Portuguese Socialists.

The significance of such differing policies consisted less in their influence on Portugal, which was minimal, than in the variety itself. Turned toward Eastern Europe, what the Portuguese mirror reflected was the divergency of interests among the Warsaw Pact nations, and that in turn provided pertinent emphasis to an essential, though often neglected, geopolitical truth: that the Soviet Union's predominant European concern is not to extend Russian power over Western Europe, but rather to preserve it in Eastern Europe, against continuing centrifugal tendencies.

Given the complex implications of Portugal's revolution for this and other Soviet interests, compounded by the perplexities of comprehending what was actually happening in Portugal, it is hardly surprising that Kremlin politics were punctuated over the months after April 1974 by an extended, sometimes heated, ideological debate about the proper Soviet posture. Strict ideologues in the Soviet Politburo—including such powerful figures as Suslov and Ponomarev—inevitably saw the Portuguese Communist Party as a worthy exemplar of the hard-line, Moscow-oriented style which they hoped to maintain in the Warsaw bloc and revive among Communist parties in the West. But for Soviet pragmatists such as Party Secretary Brezhnev, the PCP's grab for power plainly posed a most unwelcome dilemma. Internationally, the appearance of Soviet support for the aggressive methods of the PCP not only jeopardized détente but also risked alienating Communist parties seeking democratic legitimacy within the Western countries. On the other hand, to fail to display strong ideological solidarity with the Portuguese Communists was to foresake the Soviet Union's self-appointed role as protector of the Communist faith—particularly important vis-a-vis Eastern Europe. Within the context of Kremlin politics, moreover, to be overly pragmatic was to become politically vulnerable domestically to those within the Party preaching the ideological hard line. With such cross-currents at work, internal Soviet dissent was unavoidable, and eventually discernible. Finally, indeed, it seemed reasonable for an outside observer to conclude—not that the Soviet Union had made a bold, carefully calculated move in Portugal—but rather that Soviet policymakers may in fact have remained as chronically confused and uncertain as those in the West.

American Policy Before the Coup and After

Although the United States is often characterized as having "maintained" the Salazar-Caetano regime and then as having sought to undermine the revolutionary government which replaced it, such a description is considerably overdrawn. Portuguese fascism was scarcely an American contrivance, nor through its long life was Salazar's New State actively sustained by U.S. assistance, either economic or covert.[1] As for the convulsion of events begun by the coup, the overturnings in Portugal since April 1974 have been largely attributable to the interaction of domestic forces, the principal though limited outside influence having been the European Community.

But if not a decisive factor in Portugal, either before the coup or after, U.S. policy toward this one country has nonetheless provided a striking illustration of the broader priorities, principles—and shortcomings—of postwar American foreign policy. Both in its European and African aspects, Portugal has reflected much about the official American posture toward social change throughout the world. In each area—Portugal and her colonies—the coup of April 1974 triggered extraordinary human upheavals long in the making and little subject to outside control. Yet in both areas, the United States responded as if the questions at issue had arisen overnight, as if ideology were somehow separate from the forces at play in the social and economic situation, and as if the sole American interest lay in blunting a dangerous Soviet advance. With a kind of sad inevitability, a narrow and shortsighted ideological perspective placed the United States, after the coup as it had been before, instinctively on the side of reaction.

AFRICAN ASPECTS

All policies, however expedient, have long-term consequences. Thus it should have come as no surprise—though it seemed to nonetheless—that it was U.S. policy toward Portugal before the coup which was to have the most pronounced effect upon American concerns after the old order had finally fallen. For it was that longstanding choice—to ally with the Salazar-Caetano regime—which was at the root of U.S. policy toward Portuguese Africa. And it was the latter policy which in turn led directly to the inflamed "crisis of détente" that arose over the war in Angola.

Although present fashion discounts as naive any analogy with Vietnam, the Angola situation in 1975 came quickly to resemble—at least in its American dimension—the great superpower "test of will" which U.S. policymakers assumed to be taking place in Indochina a decade before. Not only was there similarity in the frenzied atmosphere of confrontation which characterized public discussion within the United States. There was also, in the specifics of administration pronouncements on Angola, a haunting similarity to the fateful statements of Secretary of State Dean Rusk as he set out an American policy toward Indochina built upon the singleminded insistence that

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[1] The limited level of U.S. assistance to Portugal from 1946 to 1974 is shown in the appendix. Regarding covert connections, PIDE (secret police) documents published following the coup indicate the existence of direct links between the PIDE and the CIA. The PIDE, however, hardly required U.S. assistance in conducting the domestic surveillance, coercion, and torture at which it, by all accounts, excelled.

all difficulties would end only if the "other side would simply stop doing what it is doing." The problem with this prescription, in the southern Africa of the mid-seventies as in the Indochina of the mid-sixties, was that it overlooked the historical background of the conflict, what the "other side" was, and why we were not on it.

Traced from the origins, U.S. policies toward French Indochina and Portuguese Africa in fact show a similarity which is both extensive and instructive.[1] In each case, the defense of postwar Europe against the Soviet Union was perceived as justifying American support of an anachronistic colonialist regime. In the one instance, to secure alliance with France immediately after World War II, the United States supported the French reassertion of colonial rule in Indochina. In the other, to secure Portuguese Azorean facilities deemed important to Soviet containment, the United States championed Portugal's entry into NATO in 1949, thereafter consciously overlooking the fascist and colonialist character of the Portuguese regime. In each case, an American policy oriented toward buttressing NATO aligned the United States against forces in the Third World whose ultimate ascendency was virtually inevitable, although in neither case were those forces inherently inimical to the United States. In Indochina, after the Japanese defeat in 1945, Ho Chi Minh—an admirer of American ideals—actively sought U.S. support against the renewal of French colonialism; and similarly in Portuguese Africa during the 1950's and 1960's liberation leaders made repeated attempts—particularly during the Kennedy Administration where there was some receptivity—to obtain American support for their anticolonial efforts. In both cases, those solicitations proved unsuccessful, as the United States fatefully chose to side with the European power, in effect inviting a Soviet alignment with the forces of nationalist liberation. Having thus been fostered, this alignment was then promptly interpreted by U.S. policymakers as representing global Communist expansionism, so that in each case an American policy which began with a "European" justification grew lamentably and inexorably into an ideological commitment—against Third World liberation forces—that survived even after the colonizing power had withdrawn.

The results of this pattern of policy were, in Indochina, disastrous, as the United States gradually committed a half million soldiers, and eventually the national energy of a decade, seeking, with tragic irony and immensely destructive effect, to defeat a movement which had initially hoped for American support. In southern Africa in 1975, the same pattern was again ominously visible after the Portuguese withdrawal, as U.S. policymakers, having long acquiesced in Portugal's use of NATO-designated men and materiel for colonial war, undertook what amounted to a desperation effort to support an "anti-Communist" Angolan faction, vehemently criticizing the Soviet Union's involvement as a violation of the spirit of détente. What this

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[1] Misdrawn historical "lessons" have, of course, been the bane of recent American foreign policy, which perhaps explains the current depreciation of references to Vietnam. Nonetheless, striking parallels exist—particularly in the evolution of U.S. policy.

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criticism omitted was that the Soviet Union, and also China—not to mention several West European countries—had regularly for years supported liberation groups in the Portuguese colonies, an "intervention," as it was, which had the active or tacit support of much of Africa. Significant U.S. involvement, on the other hand, began only after the Portuguese defeat, in a last-ditch effort to avoid the legacy of past policy. This distinction, if veiled in American debate, was never lost on African leaders. Even those with no Soviet or Communist sympathies saw the sudden American concern as frantically ideological and plainly hypocritical. History, as they were quick to point out, did not begin yesterday. And their common question was, Where had the United States been during the struggle for liberation? The answer, of course, they knew: On the other side.[1]

The parallel evolution of U.S. policies toward Vietnam and Angola did not, fortunately, require that the latter policy also be carried to a disastrous conclusion; and the purpose of Congressional initiatives forestalling further American military involvement in Africa was to cut the parallel short. The premise for such action was an ordinary idea which, in the American approach to Indochina, was never properly appreciated: that liberation forces do not fight against colonialism merely so that upon victory they may deliver themselves into the hands of superpower control, either Soviet or American. In Indochina, as emotions on both sides ebb, there is every reason to believe that the new regimes will be receptive to normal and proper relations with the United States.[2] Similarly, in Angola, there is no evidence that any new government, whatever its composition, will be any more grateful for Soviet colonization than for Portuguese.[3] With the "European connection" severed by Portugal's defeat and withdrawal, the opportunity now exists to shape a fresh American approach toward southern Africa—divorced from alliance with Portuguese colonialism, free of distorting notions of superpower rivalry, and oriented entirely to the complex concerns and currents of the region itself. This might have been done in Indochina after the French defeat, with immeasurable but obviously immense benefit to the American interest, and the opportunity should not be missed in Africa.

EUROPEAN ASPECTS

If sudden decolonization in Portuguese Africa touched upon large questions of American policy toward political change in the Third World, the revolution within Portugal itself raised fundamental questions about change among America's European allies: specifically, how the United States should respond to the mounting prospect of Communist participation in the governments of Western Europe.

By the mid-1970's, the growing strength of Communist parties in Italy, France, and Spain had brought to the horizon the clear possibility of their eventual government participation. Thus in the spring

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[1] Expressing this policy most explicitly was the classified but now well-known National Security Study Memorandum of the early Nixon administration, which concluded with a nearly perfect lack of prescience that white rule in Portuguese Africa, Rhodesia, and South Africa was unlikely to be overturned by black liberation activities and that U.S. policy should therefore involve closer ties to the existing white minority regimes.

[2] Such possibilities are discussed in some detail in my report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee following a January 1976 trip to Vietnam.

[3] Indeed by July 1976, only months after the victory of the "pro-Soviet" MPLA, clear evidence was already available that Angola was moving toward nonalignment.

of 1974, when Portugal's revolution suddenly propelled Communists into a NATO Government, although U.S. policymakers might have been excused for not anticipating the specific event, the phenomenon itself should have come as no surprise. Subsequently, as the Portuguese revolution unfolded, there would be fair reason for outsiders to view the authoritarian methods of the PCP with concern. Yet it was from the very beginning—even as Spinola formed his first broadly based government, including Cunhal—that U.S. officials adopted a negative posture toward Portugal's revolution. It was clearly an attitude that derived not from the PCP's methods, which were not yet evident, but rather from an instinctive reaction to the Communists' name itself and to the very fact that uncertain changes—however promising for the Portuguese people themselves—were obviously underway.

Two years later, as Prime Minister Mario Soares assembled the first government under Portugal's new democratic constitution, the PCP had been decisively repudiated by the Portuguese electorate. There appeared, however, a significant probability that at some future point Portuguese Communists and other far left groups would, after revising their methods and aims, play a role in governing Portugal. Moreover, in other West European countries with significant Communist parties, particularly Italy, the likelihood of eventual Communist participation had continued to increase. It therefore remained for U.S. policymakers to assess, in the most carefully objective way, the implications—and perhaps opportunities—presented by the evolution of West European Communist parties. Given the well-established assumption that Communist participation would *per se* constitute a Muscovite bridgehead into Western Europe, the prerequisite for such analysis was clear: a willingness to discard stereotypes and examine instead what is actually happening today.

For 30 years the Communist parties of Western Europe have lived in a kind of political ghetto, their membership and influence remaining limited despite good organization, discipline, and steady purpose. Until recently, among the majority of party members, the Stalinist heritage tended to live on, giving the parties a dogmatic, elitist character which fared ill in the electoral contests of European democracy. Indeed it was, for the most part, only where European fascism survived—in Spain and Portugal—that Communist parties showed admirably, displaying genuine heroism during the prolonged underground struggle against economic and political repression. Elsewhere, in Italy and France, Communists built an appeal based upon rigid class distinctions and successfully assembled a significant section of the working class. But in neither country was the party ever able to exploit its strength to achieve anything but local or regional office. To most voters, the liturgical repetition of Communist dogmas seemed foreign if not fanatical, contributing little to the enrichment of national debate. And constantly in the background was the spectre of the parties' uncertain connection to Moscow, a liability compounded when the Soviet Union resorted to force to maintain control of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.

By the early 1970's, however, it had become evident that the Communist parties of Western Europe were growing steadily more doubtful about the efficacy of their tactics, and increasingly aware that, to succeed, they must adjust to their political surroundings. What began, as a result, was a gradual attempt—particularly by the parties in Italy,

Spain, and France—to break out of their isolation, to become more attractive to groups outside their own ranks, and to gain credibility as prospective democratic participants. To accomplish this, it soon became apparent, required a shedding of the fundamental—indeed distinguishing—elements of Communist ideology. Yet the process, spurred by the parties' long-frustrated desire to partake in power, proceeded nonetheless. By skeptics, the parties' overt adjustments would continue to be viewed as no more than a tactical device. But this was to dismiss too quickly the most interesting possibility: that tactical needs were inducing genuine change.

The hypothesis that such change has in fact occurred can best be judged in terms of the three Marxist-Leninist principles around which the battle between social democracy and communism has for decades been fiercest. For however ludicrous to nonbelievers, these principles have embodied the essential difference separating Communists from Socialists. Their genuine abandonment by the Communist party in any West European nation would thus mean no less than a removal of the crucial barrier between the Socialist and Communist movements—at least in that country—leaving them distinguished by name and nuance but adjoined on the same democratic political spectrum.

First is the principle of "proletarian internationalism," a euphemism for Soviet domination of the international Communist movement. Through the entire post-Second World War history of European communism, no more important thread is apparent than the steady growth of intolerance for this idea—a trend accelerated, ironically, as much by the principle's enforcement as by its breech. Begun in Yugoslavia during the 1940's by Tito, the notion of "individual roads to socialism" spread to the West in the mid-sixties when the concept was championed by the Italian Communist leader Togliatti. Along the way, the brutal Soviet repression in Budapest had caused serious embarrassment to Western Communist parties; and when Brezhnev presented the principle of the Soviet Union's uncompromising paternalistic supremacy as an absolute doctrine during the Czechoslovakian tragedy of 1968, it was plain that Communists in Western Europe could no longer profess an ideological-political dependence on Moscow and still hope to increase their domestic support.

From there the trend was inexorable; and today, in the final stages, it must be acknowledged as a development of major historical consequence that the most prominent West European Communist leader, Enrico Berlinguer of Italy, now affirms his party's unequivocal support for the Italian commitment to NATO (through Berlinguer continues to note that Europe could be a better place without either NATO or the Warsaw Pact). In France, moreover, the Communist party under Georges Marchais has undertaken an unprecedented attack on the existence of camps for political prisoners in the Soviet Union and against the trials of Soviet dissidents. And the Spanish party, led by Santiago Carrillo, now spares no effort to disassociate itself from Moscow. By 1976, if some singular demonstration of the total decay of "proletarian internationalism" were desired, it was available in midsummer during the long-postponed Berlin conference of European Communists, when the Soviet Union—facing resistance from Italy, France, and Spain, as well as from Yugoslavia and Rumania—was unable even to have the phrase included in the final document concerning Communist principles and aims.

Second, and of equal import, has been a steady decline in dedication within West European Communist parties to an eventual "dictatorship of the proletariat," a dogma never well calculated to attract large groups of voters. In France, the Communists have joined with French Socialists in a formal union of the left, which has already neared an electoral plurality. In Spain, the Communist party has joined in a broad antifascist front supporting the creation of Spanish democracy. And in Italy, the well-known Communist aim is a "historical compromise" joining the Italian Communists and the slightly larger Christian Democratic party in organized governmental cooperation. For all three Communist parties, the Portuguese revolution provided a revealing barometer, as the PCP's unreconstructed tactics quickly cast doubts throughout Western Europe as to the sincerity of Communist parties' professions of democratic intent. The Italian and Spanish parties responded decisively, castigating Cunhal and explicitly favoring Soares and pluralist Portuguese democracy. French Communists, struggling to resist assimilation by a larger Socialist Party, were by contrast ambivalent—caught at first between a desire to affirm party identity by siding with Cunhal and a conflicting desire not to be associated with the PCP's authoritarian tactics. The temptation to support Cunhal, however, was soon enough brought under control when it proved a liability with French voters, and the overall effect of the experience was, if anything, to push the French party further toward complete commitment to democratic principle. For all three parties, demonstrating allegiance to democracy has, of course, necessitated a renouncement of the belief in revolutionary development and an acceptance of reformist change in Western Europe. Thus the "dictatorship of the proletariat" has been gradually deleted from Communist rhetoric and texts, and is now quickly fading into the history of the major Western Communist parties as little more than a conceptual curiosity.

The third distinguishing principle fast disappearing from Western Communist philosophy is that of "democratic centralism," the Leninist concept of an omniscient and omnipotent avant-garde embodying the democratic will. Little has been needed to discredit this notion beyond the obviously stultifying, bureaucratic and not very efficient character of the Soviet and East European regimes—unlikely monuments to the virtues of benign central control. But even further undermining the idea's appeal is its basic inconsistency with the strong populist movement, now prevalent throughout the Western industrial countries themselves, toward a decentralization of power and the exercise of influence at all levels of society. For West European Communist parties seeking to present themselves successfully to voters, a litany including "democratic centralism" has clearly become of little value and, accordingly and not surprisingly, the concept has been unceremoniously shelved.

Much more than a matter of dry theory, the dissolution of these three principles as tenets of the major West European Communist parties marks a change of major historical proportion. That the ultimate consequences of this evolution are both significant and as yet uncertain is reflected in the common apprehension with which the change has been viewed by the superpowers on both sides of the NATO-Warsaw Pact alignment. Responding from habit, American observers have continued to interpret electoral advance by Western European Communists as

potential gain for the Soviet Union. But to the Russians, the deeply disturbing aspect of such supposed gains has been the metamorphosis their "fraternal" parties have undergone in the course of seeking a share in power.

In the resulting situation, a domino theory of Europe has become an apt metaphor for describing the fears on each side. From the Western perspective, the dominoes are the European democracies, and the threat is of a Trojan-horse invasion whereby the NATO allies are toppled, one by one, by Communist parties which assume a democratic cloak but remain in reality Soviet surrogates dedicated to authoritarian aims. Conversely, from the Soviet perspective, the dominoes are the East European satellites, and the danger is of an invasion by contagious example whereby Russian domination of the Warsaw Pact countries is steadily weakened as the ideological disintegration of the West European Communist parties spreads eastward.

For U.S. policymakers, the latter perspective has become well worth considering. For in responding to the Communist parties of Western Europe, it is precisely in seeking what Soviet leaders fear that the Western opportunity lies. If Communist parties were indeed to become normal government participants genuinely committed to the values of West European social democracy, they would almost certainly in the process become highly influential examples for Communist parties within the Warsaw Pact. And if so, the greatest challenge to the Soviet Union's heavy-handed control of Eastern Europe would then come not from the armies of the Western Alliance, whose role is essentially defensive, but rather from the transnational fraternity of Communist parties themselves. Were this to happen—and events such as the Berlin Conference of European Communists leave little doubt that the process is well underway—history would find fine irony in seeing Western Communist parties, once viewed as extensions of Russian influence, become the principal medium for conveying democratic values back into the Soviet domain.

A recognition on the part of American officials that West European Communist parties represent an edge which may cut both ways need not entail an attitude of self-delusion or wishful thinking. Nothing indeed is called for beyond a practical approach. Though the eventual significance, benign or otherwise, of the major Western Communist parties remains unclear, there can be little doubt that the collective response of NATO members, and importantly the United States, will have much to do with the outcome. And it is, quite simply, impractical to view West European Communists in terms of outdated stereotype while ignoring their ideological reassessment.

If, of course, American objections to the West European Communist parties derive from a fear of the socialist economic measures they advocate, which might indeed impinge upon the profit interests of some U.S. multinational corporations, then our policy is being guided by the capitalist imperialism of which our worst enemies have long accused us. But if, as we have always professed, our overriding concern is to defend Western political democracy, then our standard of judgment should be the commitment of any West European Communist party to genuine democratic practice. Properly understood, this one criterion is sufficient for assessing both our political and our geopolitical interests, for a commitment to democracy *entails* an unwillingness to allow one's country to fall under the influence of such an antidemocratic force as the Soviet Union.

As to the matter of secrecy within NATO—a legitimate question which immediately arises in discussion of Communist participation—there is clearly no blanket answer. The issue ought, however, to be set squarely in perspective. Even without Communist participation, the NATO organization is recognized as being highly vulnerable to espionage, and accordingly *ad hoc* procedures were long ago adopted by major NATO members as the only logical means for the handling and limited sharing of critical information. Given the operative presumption of NATO's "leakiness," the advent of Communist participation in a NATO-member government thus hardly implies sudden jeopardy to vital secrets—an image sometimes invoked.[1] The question of classified information is indeed a diversion. For the strength of NATO lies much less in contingency plans prepared in Brussels—many of which can be inferred even if not explicitly discovered by Soviet strategists—than in the continued commitment of each NATO nation to fight in the common defense. That commitment is determined not in the meeting rooms of NATO headquarters, but in the political evolution of each NATO member. And the way in which Communist participation affects that commitment—favorably or unfavorably—ought to remain the focus of Western concern.

Perhaps, in the final analysis, it is a matter of self-confidence. If our belief in the superiority of social democracy, upon which Western policy has long been based, is in fact sincere, then it should not be too difficult to believe that others could be persuaded of the validity of this view. And if West European Communist parties have begun to profess their belief in democratic freedom, if they are expressing a desire to defend fundamental human rights, if they are displaying a determined independence from Soviet influence and an acceptance of change through gradual reform, should these developments not be seen as an opportunity rather than as a threat? At least we should be willing to take some comfort from the realization that if we are without power to shape the internal politics of Europe, the Soviets suffer from the same condition. And we should have some confidence, too, in the democratic traditions and sensibilities of the people of Western Europe. Communist parties there are finding that they can achieve political respectability only by breaking loose from Moscow. To respond with the conditioned reflexes of the 1950's is to both overstate the danger and miss the chance to promote shared political values, even among those with sharply different economic aims. At a minimum, we can afford to be far less frightened than we have appeared to be in recent years.

In adopting this approach, it may be wise not only to recognize the impracticality of automatically excluding participation by the Communist parties, but to acknowledge as well the possibility that they may in fact have something positive to offer the political process. In Italy, the effectiveness of local government under elected Communist officials is widely respected, and has challenged the more moderate parties to reform. And in a broader sense, it is clear that the socialist ideas of communist doctrine—which are what remain when the totalitarian politics have been stripped away—hold a considerable relevance to the needs and values of modern Europe. In Sweden, where democratic politics have been successfully joined with socialist economics

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[1] NATO procedures in regard to Portugal since the coup are discussed in the appendix.

to produce the world's most prosperous society,[2] Prime Minister Olaf Palme has expressed the idea well:

> Communism or capitalism no longer represents a dream of freedom for the peoples of Europe. How can communism attract those who want to have a say in the decisions affecting their workplaces, who want to develop local autonomy, want to broaden their sphere of activity and get more and more people involved in political life? And how can capitalism attract those who want to replace the injustices of the industrial society with economic democracy, the rapacity of the market forces with solidarity and a healthy environment, for those who see how repressive regimes draw their strength from multinational corporations, how capitalism opposes the struggle for liberation from colonial rule? . . . Were [the reassessment of West European Communists] to go so far as that they in deed as well as in word live up to their proclamations of "no democracy without socialism, no socialism without democracy," then they will have accepted not only Rosa Luxemburg's basic doctrine on socialism but also the fundamental values of the Socialist International.

In Portugal, to be sure, a more openminded approach to Communist participation would not necessarily have produced a dramatically different American policy. For ultimately the tactics of the Portuguese Communists did not meet the test of democratic commitment. Such an approach might, however, have precluded the negativism that suffused the attitudes of U.S. officials virtually from the revolution's beginning. It might, instead, have prompted judgment to be withheld and inspired an objective curiosity about the complexity of an extraordinary human event, as opposed to a pessimistic presumption of understanding. It might, in short, have caused Portugal to be viewed in its own perplexing and poignant terms, rather than through the lens of superpower rivalry—and might, for example, have caused Secretary Kissinger some hesitation before discounting Mario Soares as Portugal's unwitting Kerensky and prevented still other affronts which for determined Portuguese democrats became an embittering provocation. And, finally, it might have allowed more naturally of the possibility that the Portuguese people themselves could, with support from magnanimous allies, find their own way to a better life.

Eventually, in Portugal, the question of Communist participation was—at least for a period—decided by the ebb and flow of internal events. But for Western Europe as a whole, the issue is unlikely to disappear. And so the question remains whether American interests will truly be served by a policy based upon adamant and unconditional opposition to government participation by any European party—however popular, efficient, and committed to democratic practice—which, for reasons of historical origin and socialist belief, bears the name of Communist. Would not a wiser course be to focus far less on whether Communists participate and far more on what they stand for when they do? In posing the question of Communist participation in the governments of NATO, the Portuguese revolution had only broached this rising issue, which will, in the not distant future, demand the most creative and prudent response from American foreign policy.

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[2] Recent per capita income statistics put Sweden and Switzerland in first place, while the United States shares fourth place with Denmark.

APPENDIX

GLOSSARY

CDS—Center Social Democrat Party (*Centro Democratico Social*).
COPCON—Operational Command for the Continent (*Comando Operacional do Continente*).
DGS—Directorate General of Security (*Direccao Geral de Securanca*, successor of PIDE).
FNLA—National Front for the Liberation of Angola (*Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola*).
FRELIMO—Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (*Frente de Libertacco de Mocambique*).
MFA—Armed Forces Movement (*Movimento das Forcas Armadas*).
MPLA—Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. (*Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola*).
PAIGC—African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde Islands (*Partido Africano Para a Independencia da Guine e de Cabo Verde*).
PCP—Portuguese Communist Party (*Partido Communista Portugues*).
PIDE—International Police for Defense of the State (*Policia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado*).
PPD—Popular Democratic Party (*Partido Popular Democratico*).
PS—Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista*).
UNITA—National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (*Uniao Nacional Para a Independencia Total de Angola*).

The Program of the Armed Forces Movement

(Proclaimed April 25, 1974)

Whereas, after 13 years of fighting in the overseas territories, the prevailing political system was unable to formulate, concretely and objectively, an overseas policy which would lead to peace among Portuguese of all races and creeds;

Whereas, the definition of that policy is only possible through the revision of the present domestic political system and its institutions, by turning them, through democratic process, into unquestioned representatives of the Portuguese people;

Whereas, the replacement of the present political system should be pursued without internal disturbances that affect the nation's peace, progress and welfare;

The Portuguese Armed Forces Movement, in the deep conviction that it interprets the aspirations and interests of the overwhelming majority of the Portuguese people and that its action is fully justified on behalf of the salvation of the fatherland, does, making use of the strength which is conferred on it by the nation through its soldiers, proclaim and pledge to guarantee the adoption of the following measures, a platform which it understands to be necessary for the resolution of the deep domestic crisis which Portugal is now experiencing:

A. IMMEDIATE MEASURES

1. A Junta of National Salvation shall exercise political power until the formation, within a short period of time, of a civil provisional government. This junta shall choose the President and Vice President.

2. The Junta of National Salvation shall decree:

(*a*) The immediate removal of the President of the Republic and of the present Government; the dissolution of the National Assembly and of the State Council; and measures that will lead to the convocation, within a period of 12 months, of a Constituent National Assembly, elected by universal suffrage, direct and secret, in accordance with an election law to be drawn up by the provisional government.

(*b*) The removal of all civil governments on the continent, governors of the autonomous districts on the outlying islands, and the governors-general in the overseas provinces, as well as the immediate abolition of the National Action Party [the government-sponsored party].

(1) The governments in the overseas provinces will be taken over by the respective general secretariats, until the naming of governors-general by the provisional government.

(2) The affairs of these civil governments will be handled by the respective legal substitutes, until new governors are named by the provisional government.

(*c*) The immediate abolition of the domestic D.G.S., Portuguese Legion, and youth political organizations. Overseas the D.G.S. will be restructured by being organized as police for military intelligence, as long as military operations require it.

(*d*) The surrender of individuals guilty of crimes against the established political order to the armed forces for trial and sentencing process.

(*e*) Measures that permit rigorous vigilance and control over all international economic and financial operations.

(*f*) Immediate amnesty for all political prisoners, except those guilty of common crimes who will be handed over to the appropriate forum, and the voluntary reinstatement of state servants who were removed for political reasons.

(*g*) The abolition of censorship and preexamination.

(1) Recognizing the necessity of safeguarding military secrets and preventing disturbances in public opinion caused by ideological aggression by the more reactionary media, an "ad hoc" commission will be created for the control of the press, radio, television, theater and cinema. The commission will be directly dependent upon the Junta of National Salvation and will be kept in operation until the publication of the new press, radio, television, theater, and cinema laws by the provisional government.

(*h*) Measures for the reorganization and revision of the armed forces.

(*i*) Measures for the control of the borders, which shall be among the duties of the armed forces until a suitable service is created.

(*j*) Measures that lead to the effective fight against corruption and speculation.

B. SHORT-TERM MEASURES

1. Within 3 weeks after taking power, the Junta of National Salvation shall choose, from among its members, the person who will exercise the functions of President of the Portuguese Republic and will hold powers similar to those provided in the present Constitution. The remaining members of the Junta of National Salvation will exercise the functions of chief of staff of the armed forces, chief of staff of the navy, chief of staff of the army, and chief of staff of the air force; and they will be part of the Council of State.

2. After assuming his duties, the President of the Republic will name the provisional civil government, which will be composed of representative persons from political groups and trends and independent personalities who identify with this program.

3. During the period of emergency, imposed by the historical necessity of political transformation, the Junta of National Salvation shall be maintained for safeguarding the objectives herein proclaimed. The period of emergency will end as soon as, in accordance with the new Political Constitution, the President of the Republic and the legislative assembly are chosen.

4. The Provisional Government will govern through Decree Laws which will abide by the spirit of this proclamation.

5. The Provisional Government, having in mind that fundamental reforms can only be adopted under the auspices of the future constituent National Assembly, will immediately promote:

(*a*) The study and application of preparatory measures of an economic, social and cultural nature to guarantee the future exercise of true political freedom by citizens.

(*b*) The freedom of assembly and association. In the application of this principle there will be permitted the formation of political associations, possible embryos of future political parties; and syndical freedom will be guaranteed in accordnace with a special law that will regulate its practice.

(*c*) The freedom of expression and thought of any form.

(*d*) The enactment of a new press, radio, television, theater, and cinema law.

(*e*) Measures and provisions aiming to assure, within a short period, the independence and the dignification of the judicial power:

(1) The special courts shall be abolished and the criminal process in all its pases shall be dignified.

(2) The crimes committed against the State in the new regime will be heard by a judge who considers only questions of law, and will be tried in common courts, with the defendants being given every guarantee.

Investigations will be entrusted to the judicial police.

6. The Provisional Government will create the foundations of:

(*a*) A new economic policy, geared to the interests of the Portuguese people, in particular to those strata of the population less favored until now, having as its immediate concern the struggle against inflation and the excessive size of the cost of living, which will of necessity imply an antimonopoly strategy.

(*b*) A new social policy which, in every field, will have as its essential objective the defense of the interests of the working classes and the progressive, but accelerated, increase in the quality of living of all Portuguese citizens.

7. The Provisional Government will be guided in the matter of foreign policy by the principles of independence and equality between States, of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries, and of the defense of peace, by broadening and diversifying international relations based on friendship and cooperation.

(*a*) The provisional government will respect international commitments resulting from treaties which are in force.

8. The overseas policy of the provisional government, having in mind that its definition will be up to the nation, shall be guided by the following principles:

(*a*) Recognition that the solution to the overseas wars is political and not military.

(*b*) Creation of conditions for a frank and open discussion, at the national level, on the overseas problem.

(*c*) Creation of the foundation for an overseas policy that will lead to peace.

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1. As soon as the Constituent National Assembly and the President of the Republic are elected by the nation, the Junta of National

Salvation shall be dissolved and the action of the armed forces shall be restricted to their specific mission of the defense of national sovereignty.

2. The Armed Forces Movement, convinced that the principles and objectives proclaimed herein express a commitment assumed before the nation and are imperatives to serve the higher interests of the nation, addresses to all Portuguese a strong appeal for their sincere, enlightened participation in national public life and exhorts them to guarantee, through their work and peaceful coexistence, whatever social position they occupy, the conditions necessary for the definition, within a short period, of a policy that leads to the solution of the serious domestic problems and to the harmony, progress, and social justice indispensable to the melioration of our public life and the attainment of the place to which Portugal is entitled among nations.

Remarks by Senator George McGovern in Lisbon

(September 23, 1975)

I came to Portugal to see and learn about the revolution.

I leave Portugal with a firm belief that this nation and my nation should be close friends.

For many years our countries have been united in the common defense of Europe. Now the Portuguese revolution can make that alliance more secure, because it can be based on mutual values as well as mutual security.

America was born in the oldest revolution of the new world. Portugal is being reborn in the newest revolution of the old world. Our revolutions are separated in time, but not in spirit. On April 25, 1974, the Portuguese people asserted the same revolutionary principles which the first Americans declared on July 4, 1776—that all people are created equal; that they are endowed with inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and that whenever any government fails to secure these rights, the people have a right to overthrow it.

A respect for those revolutionary principles must shape future relations between Portugal and the United States.

My country has no right or way to impose a particular economic system upon Portugal. Some economic difficulties predate the revolution, or were predestined by the policies of the past. Others are the inevitable result of change after a half century of repression. The waves of revolution are bound to disturb a stagnant economy. Now it is for Portugal to set its own priorities, to decide its social destiny and develop practical means to achieve it.

In that endeavor the United States can provide assistance, and so can other nations, especially Portugal's neighbors in Europe. That assistance, which is critically needed, need not interfere with Portuguese self-determination. The test of aid should not be subservience to any other nation or any corporation, but that it will help Portugal realize its hope for economic justice and political liberty.

In my discussions with President Costa Gomes and other officials and political leaders, men of many differing viewpoints, I found a unanimity of view that the economic events of the coming months may determine the political fate of Portugal for years into the future. Problems of unemployment, inflation, and the balance of payments could be exacerbated and exploited to restore another version of the old regime or to impose an equal oppression from the other side. Only the forces which oppose freedom have a stake in the economic failure of the new provisional government.

Therefore, I shall recommend urgently upon my return to Washington that the United States join with European nations to offer Portugal substantial financial and technical assistance on reasonable terms. To the maximum possible extent, this assistance should be provided under multilateral auspices and administration. An Atlantic Con-

sortium for Portugal, which I will propose, would demonstrate that the purpose of aid is not domination, but development—not manipulation by one country, but the friendship of many. This consortium would facilitate Portuguese development not only by the amount of its assistance, but by its method of operation. A concerted source of aid would mean more efficient planning and the most productive use of available resources.

Such a consortium would not involve extended processing of each project. Rather it would function as a clearinghouse to prevent project redundancy and provide compatibility, and to make recommendations to both donor countries and Portuguese authorities. It would not be another bureaucracy, but a small, select, international team of experts to direct and coordinate existing national bureaucracies. Its aid patterns should reflect Portugal's preference for labor intensive development—which has been stressed repeatedly in my meetings here.

The ultimate aim must be to enable Portugal to establish a just and prosperous economy. The first priority must be to enable Portugal to overcome the immediate crisis.

The doing of this task cannot be delayed even for expedited negotiation of a multilateral approach. As an adviser to an American President once said, "People don't eat in the long run." The plight of the Angolan refugees represents a particularly serious, potentially explosive problem. Without sufficient food or adequate shelter, embittered by the losses they have already endured, they could upset the delicate stability of the new government.

Therefore, I will also recommend emergency American assistance for the Portuguese nationals who are coming home from Africa. Upon the request of Portugal, the United States should assign the required number of additional planes to the refugee airlift and supply basic necessities of life for refugee families, who are being forced to leave nearly everything behind them. Their homeland has too little to give them enough, even though their pressing needs are for simple, essential things. Major Food for Peace allocations to Portugal now would be not only a direct response to the refugee crisis, but an indirect means of restraining Portuguese inflation.

Yet no amount of foreign assistance can help a nation which does not help itself. Happily, Portugal now seems intent on self-help and self-determination at the same time. Portuguese leaders, in my conversations with them, emphasized that revolutionary principles must be pursued at a pragmatic level. They recognize that decent wages require high productivity and that social progress must be financed by stable economic growth. As their new government undertakes the hard work of economic reform, Portugal's friends must be generous and understanding.

In turn Portugal can be a unique example to the third world, for it stands between two worlds. In terms of economic development, Portugal is behind other European nations. At the same time, Portugal is by geography and history a member of the European family. Its revolution has inspired the increasing respect of Europe. As I learned in my recent discussions with European leaders, their nations welcome the new Portugal and want its fuller participation in Europe—at a pace which the Portuguese people choose for themselves, through democratic means. In the course of such an evolution, the Portuguese can

become citizens of the two different worlds, the industrial and the developing, a nation from which all others can learn.

In closing, let me speak as a free American to a Portugal which is free at last.

We Americans rejoice at your revolution just as we revere our own. We admire your decision to withdraw from the colonies just as we were relieved by the decision of our own Congress to withdraw from Vietnam. We congratulate you for the April elections, which were a model of civic responsibility and democratic participation. We share your happiness that the new provisional government reflects the results of that election.

Above all else, we look back to history so that with you we may look forward in hope.

To those who complain that the Portuguese revolution has brought some turmoil and instability, we reply that it was not until 6 years after American independence was won that we wrote and ratified the permanent form of our own constitutional government.

To those here, or in my own country, who insist that American aid must or should be a means of domination, we reply that it is possible to give the Portuguese a tiller, but no one can tell this nation of navigators where to sail.

And to any who cynically ask why should America care, we reply that Portugal's voyages of discovery opened a way to the new world which we Americans inhabit; that in part we trace our origins to these shores; and that now we are ready to do our part to help the Portuguese as they continue a world revolution which their explorers helped to begin more than five centuries ago.

I spent time this weekend in the Portuguese countryside, visiting religious shrines and villages, talking with shopkeepers and workers. This is a breathtaking and beautiful land. The Portuguese are a brave and good people. As a member of the United States Senate, I pledge my best effort to help them keep their bright promise. As a visitor who has come to know the Portuguese as gracious friends, I say: "Obrigado."

U.S. AID TO PORTUGAL FROM 1946–1974

(U.S. Fiscal Years - Millions of Dollars)

PROGRAM	U. S. OVERSEAS LOANS AND GRANTS - OBLIGATIONS AND LOAN AUTHORIZATIONS															REPAYMENTS AND INTEREST 1946-1974	TOTAL LESS REPAYMENTS AND INTEREST
	POST-WAR RELIEF PERIOD	MARSHALL PLAN PERIOD	MUTUAL SECURITY ACT PERIOD	FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT PERIOD											TOTAL FAA PERIOD 1962-1974	TOTAL LOANS AND GRANTS 1946-1974		
	1946-1948	1949-1952	1953-1961	1962-1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974					
I. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE[a] – TOTAL	–	51.2	27.3	43.8	3.0	1.5	2.2	2.0	–	–	28.5	–	–		81.0	159.9	67.6	92.3
Loans	–	36.1	3.4	22.6	–	–	–	–	–	–	28.5	–	–		51.1	90.6	67.6	23.0
Grants	–	15.1	24.1	21.2	3.0	1.5	2.2	2.0	–	–	–	–	–		29.9	69.3	–	69.3
a. A.I.D. and Predecessor Agencies	–	51.2	-0.1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–		–	51.1	35.3	15.8
Loans	–	36.1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–		–	36.1	35.3	0.8
Grants	–	15.1	-0.1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–		–	15.0	–	15.0
(Security Supporting Assistance)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)		(-)	(-)		
b. Food for Peace (PL 480)	–	*	27.6	43.8	3.0	1.5	2.2	2.0	–	–	28.5	–	–		81.0	108.8	32.3	76.5
Title I - Total	–	–	3.4	22.6	–	–	–	–	–	–	28.5	–	–		51.1	54.5	32.3	22.2
Repayable in U.S. Dollars - Loans	–	–	–	22.6	–	–	–	–	–	–	28.5	–	–		51.1	51.1	29.9	21.2
Payable in Foreign Currency - Planned for Country Use	–	–	3.4	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–		–	3.4	2.4	1.0
(Total Sales Agreements, incl. U.S. Uses)	(-)	(-)	(7.1)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)	(-)		(-)	(7.1)	(-)	(7.1)
Title II - Total	–	*	24.2	21.2	3.0	1.5	2.2	2.0	–	–	–	–	–		29.9	54.3	–	54.3
Emergency Relief, Econ. Development, & World Food	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–		–	–	–	–
Voluntary Relief Agencies	–	*	24.2	21.2	3.0	1.5	2.2	2.0	–	–	–	–	–		29.9	54.3	–	54.3
c. Other Economic Assistance	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–		–	–	–	–
Peace Corps	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–		–	–	–	–
Other	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–		–	–	–	–
II. MILITARY ASSISTANCE – TOTAL	–	12.3	282.0	34.9	2.4	1.0	0.5	1.3	1.1	1.0	7.5	1.1	0.9		51.7	345.8	–	345.8
Credits or Loans	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–		–	–	–	–
Grants	–	12.3	282.0	34.9	2.4	1.0	0.5	1.3	1.1	1.0	7.5	1.1	0.9		51.7	345.8	–	345.8
a. MAP Grants	–	10.6	270.1	33.8	1.6	1.0	0.5	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.1	0.9		42.8	323.5	–	323.5
b. Credit Sales under FMS	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–		–	–	–	–
c. Military Assistance Service-funded (MASF) Grants	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–		–	–	–	–
d. Transfers from Excess Stocks	–	1.7	4.1	1.1	0.8	*	–	0.4	0.1	*	*	–	–		2.4	8.0	–	8.0
e. Other Grants	–	–	7.8	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	6.5	–	–		6.5	14.3	–	14.3
III. TOTAL ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE	–	63.5	309.5	78.7	5.4	2.5	2.7	3.3	1.1	1.0	36.0	1.1	0.9		132.7	505.7	67.6	438.1
Loans	–	36.1	3.4	22.6	–	–	–	–	–	–	28.5	–	–		51.1	90.6	67.6	23.0
Grants	–	27.4	306.1	56.1	5.4	2.5	2.7	3.3	1.1	1.0	7.5	1.1	0.9		81.6	415.1	–	415.1
Other U.S. Government Loans and Grants	– NO PROGRAMS PRIOR TO FY 1962 —			32.2	–	5.7	4.5	2.7	3.7	17.1	1.9	12.9	33.1		113.8	117.3	54.3	63.0
a. Export-Import Bank Loans				32.2	–	5.7	4.5	2.7	3.7	17.1	1.9	12.9	33.1		113.8	117.3	54.3	63.0
b. All Other				–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–		–	–	–	–

*Less than $50,000.


[a]Equivalent to Official Development Assistance (ODA).

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Portuguese-American Base Agreements

Portugal's modern military significance traces to October 1943, when Salazar ended his World War II balancing act between the Axis and Allied powers by granting rights to the British RAF to develop and use an airfield on Terceira Island in the Azores. Thirteen months later, at the time of the Normandy invasion, the United States entered into a formal agreement with the Salazar regime to use a companion field on Santa Maria Island, and thereby began the official American military presence in Portugal which continues today. The initial Portuguese-American agreement provided that in return for use of the Santa Maria Base, the United States would support Portugal's goal of regaining at war's end the Portuguese colony of Timor in Southeast Asia, then occupied by Japan. Thus, from the very outset, a connection was forged between American use of the Azores and at least passive U.S. support for Portuguese colonialism.

Following the war, the United States relinquished the Santa Maria Base and entered into a new agreement providing for transit rights at Lajes Field, which had been a British RAF facility. With an extension in 1948, this agreement lasted until 1951, by which time the United States and Portugal were joined in the NATO alliance.



The new agreement executed in September 1951 had separate provisions for wartime and peace. For wartime uses, the United States was to have access to the base facilities for so long as NATO remained in effect and under condition that Portugal and the United States were both involved in the hostilities within the NATO framework. Peacetime American use, on the other hand, was authorized only for a 5-year period. It is thus the peacetime use of the base which has been the subject of periodic Portuguese-American renegotiation.

In 1956, with the end of the first 5-year period of peacetime use approaching, the United States proposed a 5-year extension. Though the Portuguese counterproposal was for 1 year, protracted negotiations ultimately produced a 5-year agreement in late 1957. There were clear indications, however, both in the language of the agreement itself and in the accompanying statements of Portuguese officials, that Portugal anticipated terminating U.S. base rights when the extension expired in 1962.

In June 1962, the Kennedy administration nevertheless proposed a second 5-year extension. By this time, however, the outbreak of insurgency in Angola and the rapidly progressing decolonization in Africa by other European countries had surrounded the base negotiations with new issues. Already incensed by the absence of world outrage over the Indian seizure of Portuguese Goa, the Salazar government was further offended by public criticism in the United States of Portugal's African policies and the formal (if ultimately difficult to enforce) embargo which had been instituted against the shipment of American arms and equipment to Portugal for use in Africa. Thus, as a matter of principle, Salazar declined to negotiate with the United States on an extension of base rights. On the level of practicality, however, Salazar carefully failed to bring the negotiations to a formal close, with the result that for nearly a decade—from 1962 to 1971—U.S. forces remained in the Azores under a *de facto* continuation of the expired agreement.

In 1969, with Caetano having assumed power, Portugal proposed resumption of the talks, and in 1971 another 5-year agreement was concluded and formalized through an exchange of notes between the Secretary of State and the Portuguese Foreign Minister. In response, the U.S. Senate, viewing the agreement as significant and seeking to restore its treaty power under the Constitution (an effort still in progress), passed a resolution declaring the sense of the Senate that the agreement with Portugal, and also a similar agreement with Bahrein concerning American military bases, should be submitted in treaty form. When the Nixon administration failed to comply, the Senate responded by approving an amendment to the annual Foreign Assistance Act denying the use of funds to implement either agreement until it had been submitted to the Senate as a treaty. Opposition to this provision in the House of Representatives and the administration, however, led to an impasse, which caused foreign aid to be funded for the entire year by continuing resolution and which had the practical effect of allowing the Azores agreement to stand.

Although executed in 1971, the 5-year extension was back-dated to 1969, and thus expired in February 1974, only 2 months before the fall of the old regime. No extension had by then been negotiated, and the new government soon asked that negotiations be held in abeyance indefinitely. The United States presence in the Azores is thus now based on a *de facto* continuation of the 1971 agreement, a situation such as that which prevailed from 1962 to 1971.

U.S./NATO Strategic Interests in Portugal

American and NATO strategic interests in Portugal today include facilities both in the Azores and on the mainland designated for a variety of military functions, both naval and air. The Azores facilities—by far the more important—provide capabilities for submarine and surface surveillance and combat in the mid-Atlantic; the staging of aircraft enroute from America to Europe and the Middle East; and naval fuel storage. The principal mainland facility, the Iberian Atlantic Command (IBERLANT) near Lisbon, is a NATO command headquarters created in 1966 to oversee naval operations in a designated Atlantic sector, not including the Azores, during both peacetime and war. Facilities of the Portuguese armed forces located throughout the country are generally designated for the defense of Portugal itself.

THE AZORES FACILITIES

U.S. security interests in Portugal center on the use of two Azores facilities: Lajes Air Base on Terceira Island and a nearby high frequency/direction finding (HF/DF) station located at Aqualva. U.S. defense planners also accord importance to the NATO naval fuel storage facility at Ponta Delgada on San Miguel island, and two Portuguese-operated Loran (long-range) air navigation sites on Flores and Santa Maria islands. (Flores is also the site of a French missile-tracking station.)

At Lajes, the Naval air facility provides an operating base for land-based, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft, principally Lockheed P–3's, which carry sophisticated equipment enabling them to detect, track, and destroy both attack and ballistic submarines operating in the mid-Atlantic. A tactical support center at Lajes processes the magnetic tapes and other materials utilized by the P–3. The HF/DF station at Aqualva, which is a part of the Atlantic Fleet HF/DF net, supports the P–3 operations. Employing the principle of triangulation, the HF/DF system can locate and track aircraft, submarines, surface combatants, merchant ships and fishing vessels. In peacetime, the system functions *inter alia* as a primary source of intelligence on ocean shipping traffic.

As a base for aircraft staging and enroute support, Lajes has been assigned roles for (a) peacetime, (b) Middle East and North African contingencies, and (c) general war in Europe.

(a) In peacetime, Lajes is used to a limited extent in support of C–141 and C–5 missions of the Military Airlift Command (MAC). It also supports tactical aircraft deliveries, exercises, and rotations; and serves as an alternate base for tactical and strategic aircraft, [Deleted.] in the event of missed refueling or emergency. Relatedly, Lajes provides flexibility in air routing to avoid adverse weather conditions on the northern Atlantic route. The aeronautical station at Lajes sup-

ports command and control of all U.S. aircraft transitting the mid-Atlantic.

(b) For contingencies, Lajes is one of the several forward bases considered important in facilitating movements of U.S.-based support to crisis areas in the Middle East or North Africa. For the missions of such large and long-range cargo aircraft as the C–5A and C–141, U.S. bases in Spain are preferred for enroute support. Lajes, however, can serve as an effective substitute, as it did during the Middle East war of October 1973 [deleted]. For the C–130, a smaller cargo aircraft of shorter range, the use of Lajes is necessary if transatlantic missions are not to be limited to the northern route. Finally, in addition to its cargo role during contingencies, Lajes provides an excellent staging base for tactical aircraft.

(c) In the event of a major NATO confrontation with the Warsaw Pact involving the immediate augmentation of U.S. forces in Europe, Lajes would serve as a main staging base for C–5A and C–141 troop transport and materiel missions (exceeding 20 per day if necessary), tactical planes, and aircraft of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). (For the staging of CRAF aircraft, the civil airport at Santa Maria island would also be used.) [Deleted.]

THE MAINLAND FACILITIES

The IBERLANT facility, on the mainland coast just north of Lisbon, is a subordinate headquaters under NATO's Allied Command Atlantic. Staffed by American, British, and Portuguese naval personnel, with a U.S. admiral in command, IBERLANT has an area of responsibility covering 600,000 square miles, including the Atlantic approaches to the Strait of Gibraltar and extending north to the 49th parallel, south to the Tropic of Cancer and west, short of the Azores, to the 20th meridian (see map). Within this assigned area, IBERLANT is responsible during peacetime for planning and coordination and during wartime for employment of forces. [Deleted.]

PORTUGAL'S FUTURE STRATEGIC ROLE

The evaluation of Portugal's strategic significance involves complex questions not susceptible to brief analysis. Several aspects of Portugal's military role, however, merit comment.

(a) *Antisubmarine activities.*—It is the Azores' role as an operating base for antisubmarine surveillance and combat to which defense planners tend to ascribe the greatest importance. Yet it must surely pose some problem to the nonexpert to comprehend the rationale for these activities.


In peacetime, there would appear to be little value in knowing of the presence of Soviet ballistic submarines in the Atlantic. Their existence is common knowledge and their presence in various operating vicinities in the Atlantic a logical expectation. As for Soviet attack submarines, defense planners emphasize the utility of monitoring patterns of deployment, in that a change in pattern might signal hostile intent. Yet, knowing this, Soviet planners with aggressive intentions and a desire to surprise would surely make a point of maintaining past patterns. The most that could be said is that under such circumstances the

awareness of American surveillance might induce Soviet submarines to enact normality temporarily when they might otherwise have been employed elsewhere.

In the case of war, of course, the submarine destruction capabilities of the P–3 might well be applied against Soviet attack submarines, assuming that the war were of a conventional character and thus of some sustained duration. Under that same assumption, however, it seems reasonable to expect that the Azores operating base itself would be a major and highly vulnerable Soviet target—one hardly likely to survive unscathed. As for efforts to destroy Soviet ballistic submarines, it is exceedingly difficult to imagine the circumstances under which U.S. decisionmakers would find it rational to attempt such attacks, either simultaneous or individual, considering that the very act of attacking would raise the likelihood of a Soviet missile launch, either by a submarine under attack or by a sister submarine apprehensive of subsequent attack.

These points are made only as a brief demurrer to the argument frequently heard that the Azores facilities are "absolutely essential" because of the antisubmarine functions which they support. To be sure, the Lajes facility provides a highly efficient base for P3 operations. To perform exactly the same functions without the availability of the Azores—using aircraft carriers and smaller aircraft (the P3 requires land basing)—would be prohibitively expensive both financially and in terms of the allocation of the overall U.S. air and naval resources. The question, however, is how essential these functions are.

P3 ANTI-SUBMARINE COVERAGE IN THE ATLANTIC



Cross-lined area is that which can be covered by P3 flights only through use of the Azores facility.

(Note: Areas represent 1,000 nautical mile range for P3 aircraft; but distances can vary due to many conditions such as wind and weather.)

(b) *Classified Information.*—As one of the 12 founding members of the Atlantic Alliance, Portugal has since 1949 enjoyed virtually full participation in the NATO organization, an involvement limited only by Portugal's small size and marginal contribution to NATO defense. The one element of the NATO headquarters in which Portugal has not participated is the nuclear planning group (NPG). The most sensitive of the NATO planning elements, the NPG has four permanent members—the United States, Britain, West Germany, and Italy—and eight other members participating, three or four at a time, for 18-month periods on a rotational basis.

By ironic coincidence, it was in late 1973, even as the young officers of the MFA were secretly reaching agreement to overthrow the old regime, that Portugal was for the first time made eligible for participation as a periodic member of the nuclear group. By the time of Portugal's scheduled accession to the NPG in mid-1974, the

turbulent aftermath of the April coup had aroused deep concern among NATO members about Portugal's reliability as an ally, and it was only the new Spinola government's voluntary decision not to participate in the nuclear group that conveniently averted what might quickly have become for NATO a considerable institutional dilemma. Officially, Portugal remained eligible to participate in the NPG, but lost its turn at least until 1977.

In October 1974, immediately after Spinola's fall, [deleted].

In September 1975, the month in which Goncalves fell and the moderate Azevedo government was installed, [deleted].

By early 1975, as the Azevedo government began to show staying power [deleted].

(c) *Resupply of Israel.*—There was some illogicality, and not a little arrogance, in the editorial expressions of American outrage when the new Portuguese regime announced that facilities in the Azores would no longer be available for the resupply of Israel in the event of Middle East hostilities. Although interpreted in some quarters as demonstrative evidence that Portugal's new government was no longer reliable as a NATO ally, this decision in fact only served to bring Portuguese policy into conformity with the rest of NATO's European membership, and Spain as well. The anomaly indeed was in the previous availability of the Azores for that purpose—a policy of the old regime which was an implicit quid pro quo for American support elsewhere.

Having chosen to assist Israel until such time as a peaceful settlement is achieved in the Middle East, the United States may well wish that other nations adhered to a similar policy. This most clearly, however, is not the case. And while many Americans may have become accustomed to thinking of the Azores facilities solely in terms of Israel, the use of the Azores for non-NATO purposes is fully and properly subject to regulation by the Portuguese Government without any violation of Portugal's NATO obligations. The unavailability of a key base of course complicates the problem of Israeli resupply, but this could as truly be said of British, French, or German facilities. The fact is that for practical reasons—there being indeed little choice—the United States has been required to divorce its policies toward NATO and the Arab-Israeli dispute, and there is no sound reason to set a different standard for Portugal. This point bears emphasis because at least some of the American negativism toward revolutionary Portugal seems attributable to the new Azores policy.

As for the actual effect on Israel, the loss of the Azores appears to be as much psychological as logistical. With her current prodigious strength supported by competent U.S. planning for resupply, including the use of aerial refueling capabilities which have been greatly enhanced since 1973, Israel continues to possess the solid defense capability necessary to maintain a sound negotiating position. Portugal's decision does, however, add further emphasis to Israel's pronounced diplomatic isolation and the urgent need for a lasting Middle East settlement.

(d) *Positive and Negative Value.*—United States and NATO possession of the Azores base provides two kinds of value: the positive value of the capabilities it affords and the negative value of deny-

ing the base to the Soviet Union. The Azores' positive value consists primarily in flexibility and economy: By its optimum location, the base provides a refueling and staging point which allows greater payloads on MAC aircraft than would otherwise be possible, and it facilitates certain activities that would otherwise be prohibitively expensive (for example, submarine surveillance, leaving aside questions concerning the utility of the function itself). The negative value consists in denying Soviet access to these and similar conveniences—a naval refueling point would be an obvious Soviet interest—and in avoiding whatever psychological loss NATO and Western Europe might suffer were the Soviet Union, by acquiring the base, to gain the aura of an encircling Atlantic power. Defense planners tend to agree that losing the positive value of the Azores base through its neutralization would be much less significant than losing both positive and negative value through the site's shift into Soviet possession. It should be noted that the same holds true of similar U.S.–NATO facilities in the North Atlantic, at the Keflavik Base in Iceland. Each site, though useful in itself, derives much of its strategic importance from the value attached to preventing its availability to Soviet use.

The Azorean Independence Movement

The Azores, nine lovely volcanic islands spread across 350 miles of the eastern mid-Atlantic, have for over 500 years been both an integral part of Portugal and also a distinct entity, with a population of fishermen, farmers, and craftsmen possessing a unique Azorean personality. Having long felt their economic contribution to mainland Portugal to be unmatched by corresponding gain, Azoreans had developed, well before April 25, 1974, a bitter sense of Lisbon's injustice, a feeling which, over time, had surged periodically into a mood of separatism. It was this longstanding resentment, aggravated by sudden concern over the ideological drift of the postcoup mainland government, which gave rise in 1975 to a formal movement for Azorean independence.

Like the Portuguese of the mainland, the 350,000 Azoreans are divided by sharp lines of economic wealth, but have in common the conservative Catholicism characteristic of the northern provinces of the mainland. In the Constituent Assembly elections of April 1975, the pattern of the Azorean vote was indeed remarkably similar to that in the Portuguese north: The center-right Popular Democrats (PPD) predominated, while Communists proved extremely weak. It was in that election's aftermath, during the height of alarm over the continuance of Communist influence in Lisbon, that the Azorean Liberation Front (FLA) made its first appearance.

After decades of Azorean quiesence under Salazar and Caetano, a certain irony could be found in the independence movement being triggered by the advent of a metropolitan government likely, if anything, to be less exploitative in terms of taxation and trade than the old regime. Nonetheless, powerful motives, rational and otherwise, were at work. Among economically prosperous Azoreans, there was a fear of losing the privileges of the past. Among all Azoreans, there was concern that the islands' economy would inevitably be pulled down by the severe economic conditions in prospect on the mainland. And among most islanders, there was a powerful instinctive revulsion, encouraged not a little by wealthy Azoreans, against the radical ideology that had apparently gained hold in the Lisbon regime.

Early FLA activities were confined to the spread of graffiti. However, as summer approached and protest against the Goncalves government rose in a crescendo on the mainland, FLA members began to participate in demonstrations. Finally, as the violent anti-Communist backlash spread across northern Portugal in July of 1975, a similar surge swept across the Azores, leaving PCP offices sacked and burned, and prominent Communist figures fleeing for their lives.

In the late summer of 1975, recognizing that anti-communism was the driving force of the independence movement, the Goncalves government sought to assuage Azorean sentiment by establishing a local Junta Governativa, composed of four Popular Democrats and two

Socialists, to represent the Azorean position in discussions concerning the islands' future status. Viewed initially as an expedient, the Junta soon gained substantial significance. For though the Junta's formal powers were vague, rampant confusion on the mainland soon resulted in virtually all decisions on matters of consequence to the Azores being made by the Junta or on the basis of its advice.

In September 1975, the fall of Goncalves and the return of Socialists and Popular Democrats to prominent positions in the Lisbon Government could have been expected to engender conciliation between Azoreans and the mainland. This proved, however, not to be the case. In October, as the moderate Azevedo government moved into its second shaky month, the FLA, whose leadership remained clandestine, circulated its manifesto on Sao Miguel Island. Charging that "for five centuries the Azores have been dominated by Portugal in strictly colonial terms . . . from politics to economics and finance, to the social and cultural fields," the program called for Lisbon's approval of an independence plebiscite and the establishment of a sovereign Azorean government modeled after Western European social democracy. In response, the Portuguese Government issued a statement attacking the FLA as being an unrepresentative group controlled by wealthy Sao Miguel landowners fearful that the new order would bring an end to the feudal agricultural system from which they had profited. For those in the Lisbon Government who had accomplished decolonization against the wishes of Portuguese conservatives, it was ironic that the rhetoric of decolonization was now being used against the revolutionary government by conservatives in the Azores.

Meanwhile, the Azorean Junta, increasingly confident and powerful, continued discussions with an Azevedo government still seeking to secure its own position. Illustrating the atmosphere within which negotiations would occur, the Junta issued a statement in mid-November virtually threatening independence if Lisbon could not govern properly. As if to add emphasis, the declaration was accompanied by large and enthusiastic demonstrations of support throughout the Azores. In the face of such strong sentiment, the mainland government had little power of coercion to deploy: as elsewhere in Portugal, the army detachment in the Azores was manned primarily by local conscripts and thus embodied Azorean opinion. In December, after the failed leftist coup in Lisbon had further strengthened the forces of moderation, the Azevedo government, hoping that developments had by now defused separatist sentiment, sought to reduce the powers of the Azorean Junta. The Junta stood firm, however, and the government acquiesced, granting to the Junta the official powers of a minister.

As 1976 began and the elections for a national legislative assembly approached, each of the major Portuguese parties adopted a stand on the Azorean question and major political figures visited the Azorean conspicuously. Most sympathetic to the cause of Azorean autonomy were the more conservative parties, the PPD and the Center Social Democrats. The Socialist Party meanwhile sought middle ground, advocating continued unity along with a higher degree of self-administration, increased Azorean revenue from the U.S. military base, and more advantageous policies on taxation and trade. Socialists also charged that much of the impetus of the independence movement

was now coming from wealthy Portuguese on the mainland who were transferring capital to the Azores and lobbying for autonomy in hopes of escaping the government's new monetary controls. Clearly more popular on the mainland, where most Portuguese felt their nation had shrunk far enough, the Socialist line also had appeal among those Azoreans who still felt loyal to Portugal and who feared the uncertainties of independence, including the prospect of American domination.

Meanwhile, as a gesture of good will, the Lisbon government made a $4 million grant to the islands' municipal councils, approved a line of credit for the governing Junta, and opened the first university-level school in the islands' history. Moreover, in the final deliberations of the Constituent Assembly, agreement was reached to include in the new Portuguese Constitution specific provisions for broad powers of Azorean self-administration. Nonetheless, in late January, the FLA launched a renewed campaign for independence, marked by bombings and demonstrations; and in February the Azorean Junta presented a list of demands to the Lisbon government involving economic, monetary, and political autonomy well beyond that theretofore envisioned by the Constituent Assembly. This time, however, the Socialist minority on the Junta dissented, and the Lisbon government showed little sign of making further concessions. The Azorean future thus appeared to rest in considerable measure upon the results of the national parliamentary election—both as a determinant of Lisbon policy and as a register of Azorean opinion.

In neither regard did the April election prove decisive. But on both sides, the election result gave indication that reconciliation was in prospect. The reaffirmation of the moderates' political strength among the national electorate, making it probable that Portuguese Government would be dominated by Socialists and Popular Democrats for some time to come, meant that Azoreans' ideological concerns about the mainland regime would likely subside. Meanwhile, the Azorean vote itself showed a resistance to extreme solutions. Of the six parliamentary seats allocated to the Azores, four went to the PPD and two to the Socialists—a shutout for those candidates, from a splinter of the CDS, who had called for full Azorean autonomy.

Two months later, in the Presidential election of late June 1976, the trend toward rapprochment with the mainland was reinforced when Azorean voters showed overwhelming support for the winning candidate, General Ramalho Eanes. On the same day, Azoreans also elected a regional assembly to provide local government and to continue the process of negotiating with Lisbon the terms of a new relationship. Predictably, PPD candidates dominated the assembly election, taking 29 out of 43 seats. But Socialists gained most of the remainder, meaning that—in terms of party politics and ideology—the new Socialist government in Lisbon would be no more distant from the Azores than from many areas of the mainland. Thus, by mid-1976, the surge toward Azorean independence appeared to be steadily receding, yielding to a process of political negotiations; and the tranquility returning to the Azores-mainland relationship seemed unlikely to be overcome by a resurgence of separatism unless and until Portugal's new democratic institutions proved unable to survive.

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