

Y 4
.F 76/2
So 8/6

GOVERNMENT

Storage

1039

4th Congress }
1st Session }

COMMITTEE PRINT

DOCUMENTS

DEC 23 1975

THE LIBRARY
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY

CONGRESS AND UNITED STATES-SOVIET
RELATIONS

REPORT OF A CONFERENCE BETWEEN MEMBERS
OF THE U.S. SENATE AND DELEGATES TO THE
SUPREME SOVIET OF THE SOVIET UNION

MOSCOW AND LENINGRAD

JUNE 29-JULY 5, 1975

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE



NOVEMBER 1975

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1975

56-510

KSU LIBRARIES



✓
E46426 924943
A11900 924943

SENATE DELEGATION

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota, *Cochairman*

HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania, *Cochairman*

ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina

JOHN C. CULVER, Iowa

ROBERT MORGAN, North Carolina

GARY W. HART, Colorado

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont

JACOB K. JAVITS, New York

JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas

CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois

CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., Maryland

JAMES A. McCLURE, Idaho

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico

(II)

CONTENTS

	Page
Letter of Transmittal-----	V
I. Background of the Conference-----	1
II. Composition of the U.S. and Soviet Delegations-----	1
III. Discussions at the Conference-----	3
1. Trade Relations and the Emigration of Soviet Jews-----	5
2. Arms Control and Other Security Questions-----	8
3. Other Issues-----	10
IV. Concluding Observations-----	10
Separate views of Senators McClure, Domenici, and Morgan-----	13
Appendices :	
A. Opening remarks by Senator Humphrey-----	15
B. Opening remarks by Senator Scott-----	17
C. Statement by Mikhail A. Suslov-----	19
D. Statement by Senator Ribicoff-----	25
E. Letters from President Ford to Congressional Committee Chairmen -----	29
F. Article by Melvin R. Laird from the July 1975 Readers Digest and response by G. A. Arbatov and G. A. Zhukov-----	31
G. Summary of the discussion at a meeting between delegation mem- bers and Soviet Jewish activists-----	37

7. 1. 1915

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

NOVEMBER 20, 1975.

HON. NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER,
President of the Senate.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Pursuant to Senate Resolution 86 on March 18, 1975, the Presiding Officer of the Senate appointed a delegation of members of the Senate to participate in discussions in the Soviet Union with a delegation from the Supreme Soviet, that country's legislative body.

Attached is a copy of the Senate delegation's report of that conference.

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY,
Cochairman, U.S. Senate Delegation.

HUGH SCOTT,
Cochairman, U.S. Senate Delegation.

(v)

THE SYSTEM OF TRANSMISSION

1. The system of transmission is a method of conveying information from one person to another.

2. It is a process of communication which involves the use of a medium or channel through which the message is sent.

3. The system of transmission is a method of conveying information from one person to another.

4. It is a process of communication which involves the use of a medium or channel through which the message is sent.

5. The system of transmission is a method of conveying information from one person to another.

6. It is a process of communication which involves the use of a medium or channel through which the message is sent.

7. The system of transmission is a method of conveying information from one person to another.

8. It is a process of communication which involves the use of a medium or channel through which the message is sent.

9. The system of transmission is a method of conveying information from one person to another.

10. It is a process of communication which involves the use of a medium or channel through which the message is sent.

11. The system of transmission is a method of conveying information from one person to another.

12. It is a process of communication which involves the use of a medium or channel through which the message is sent.

13. The system of transmission is a method of conveying information from one person to another.

14. It is a process of communication which involves the use of a medium or channel through which the message is sent.

15. The system of transmission is a method of conveying information from one person to another.

16. It is a process of communication which involves the use of a medium or channel through which the message is sent.

17. The system of transmission is a method of conveying information from one person to another.

18. It is a process of communication which involves the use of a medium or channel through which the message is sent.

19. The system of transmission is a method of conveying information from one person to another.

20. It is a process of communication which involves the use of a medium or channel through which the message is sent.

CONGRESS AND UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS

I. BACKGROUND OF THE CONFERENCE

On June 29, 1975, fourteen members of the U.S. Senate arrived in Moscow for the first formal meeting in the Soviet Union between a delegation from the U.S. Congress and the Supreme Soviet, the Soviet Union's national legislative body. This visit was in return of a visit to the U.S. Congress in May 1974 by a delegation of eight members of the Supreme Soviet. Six of those delegates also participated in the discussions in Moscow.

The meeting between the two groups was approved by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and was authorized without opposition by the full Senate by S. Res. 86. A delegation from the U.S. House of Representatives travelled to the Soviet Union in August for similar discussions with members of the Supreme Soviet.

II. COMPOSITION OF THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET DELEGATIONS

The Senate delegates were chosen from both parties and represented a broad cross-section of the nation and the Senate. In the delegation were members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Finance, Armed Services, Commerce, Agriculture and Forestry, Aeronautical and Space Sciences, and other committees with jurisdiction over subjects of common concern.

U.S. DELEGATES AND SENATE COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS

Hubert H. Humphrey (Cochairman), Agriculture and Forestry, Foreign Relations, Joint Economic Committee, Chairman.

Hugh Scott (Cochairman), Foreign Relations, Judiciary, Rules and Administration.

Abraham Ribicoff, Government Operations, Chairman; Finance, Joint Economic Committee.

Ernest F. Hollings, Appropriations, Budget, Commerce, Post Office and Civil Service.

John C. Culver, Armed Services, Public Works.

Robert Morgan, Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Public Works.

Gary W. Hart, Armed Services, Public Works.

Patrick Leahy, Agriculture and Forestry, Armed Services.

Jacob K. Javits, Foreign Relations, Government Operations, Labor and Public Welfare, Joint Economic Committee.

James B. Pearson, Commerce, Foreign Relations, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

Charles H. Percy, Foreign Relations, Government Operations, Joint Economic Committee.

Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Appropriations, District of Columbia, Judiciary.

James A. McClure, Budget, Interior and Insular Affairs, Public Works.

Pete V. Domenici, Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Budget, Public Works.

The Soviet delegation consisted of representatives from both chambers of the Supreme Soviet; the Soviet of the Union, and the Soviet of Nationalities. As in the U.S. Congress, representation in the Supreme Soviet is based on the proportional principle in one body and geographic/ethnic factors in the other. Representation in the 767 member Council of the Union is on the basis of one deputy for every 300,000 inhabitants in each election district. In the 750 member Council of Nationalities, each of the fifteen republics of the Soviet Union is represented by 25 deputies; lower ranking ethnic subdivisions are represented by one, five, or eleven deputies, depending on the level in the administrative hierarchy.

While the delegation from the U.S. Senate represented only one body of one branch of the U.S. Government, many members of the Soviet delegation also held high ranking positions in the government, the Communist Party, or other branches of the Soviet hierarchy.

The importance which the Soviet Union attached to the conference was shown by the caliber of, and the positions held by, the Soviet delegates.

U.S.S.R. SUPREME SOVIET MEMBERS PARTICIPATING IN DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. SENATE DELEGATION

Vitaly P. Ruben, Chairman, Soviet of Nationalities, U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet.

Boris N. Ponomarev, Chairman, Foreign Affairs Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities; member of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat; and non-voting member of the Politburo.

FROM THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMISSIONS

Georgy A. Arbatov, Director, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences Institute of USA and Canada Studies.

Georgy T. Beregovoy, Air Force Major-General, Head, Gagarin Cosmonaut Training Center.

Georgy A. Zhukov, Political observer, "Pravda".

Leonid M. Zamyatin, Director-General, TASS.

Nikolai N. Inozemtsev, Director, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

Pyotr T. Pimenov, Secretary, All Union Central Council of Trade Unions.

Lev N. Tolkunov, Editor-in-Chief, "Izvestia".

Ivan I. Udalthov, Board Chairman, Novosti news agency.

Alexander B. Chakovsky, Editor-in-Chief, "Literaturnaya Gazeta".

Lev B. Shapiro, First Secretary, CPSU Regional Committee, Jewish Autonomous Region.

Mikhail A. Suslov, Chairman, Foreign Affairs Commission of the Soviet of the Union; member of the Politburo.

FROM THE LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES COMMISSIONS

Vasily I. Prokhorov, Secretary, All Union Central Council of Trade Unions.

FROM THE AGRICULTURAL COMMISSIONS

Vladimir A. Karlov, First Deputy Head, Agricultural Department, CC CPSU.

Leonid Y. Florentyev, Minister of Agriculture, RSFSR.

FROM THE PLANNING AND BUDGET COMMISSIONS

Nikolai I. Maslennikov, Deputy Chairman, Council of Ministers RSFSR; Chairman, State Planning Committee, RSFSR; Chairman, Planning and Budget Commission, Soviet of Nationalities.

FROM THE PUBLIC EDUCATION, SCIENCE, AND CULTURE COMMISSIONS

Genrikas O. Zimanas, Editor-in-Chief, "Komunistas".

FROM THE YOUTH AFFAIRS COMMISSIONS

Victor S. Paputin, First Deputy Minister of the Interior of the U.S.S.R.

FROM THE PUBLIC HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE COMMISSIONS

Vladimir D. Timakov, President, U.S.S.R. Academy of Medical Sciences.

FROM THE NATURE PROTECTION COMMISSIONS

Evgeny K. Fyodorov, Director, Applied Geophysics Institute of Hydrometeorological Service under Council of Ministers of U.S.S.R.

Lev. N. Smirnov, Chairman, U.S.S.R. Supreme Court.
Boris I. Stukalin, Chairman, U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers State Committee for Publishing, Printing, and Book Trade.

REPRESENTATIVES OF MINISTRIES AND GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

Vladimir S. Alkhimov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, U.S.S.R.
Jermen M. Gvishiani, Deputy Chairman, U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers State Committee for Science and Technology.

Boris A. Runov, Deputy Minister of Agriculture, U.S.S.R.

Georgy M. Kornienko, Collegium Members, U.S.S.R. Foreign Ministry, Head of U.S.A. Department.

III. DISCUSSIONS AT THE CONFERENCE

The formal discussions took place in Catherine Hall of the Grand Kremlin Palace in Moscow, over a period of three days. The delegation was also received by General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and spent

more than two hours in conversation with him. In addition, many other informal discussions with Soviet officials took place outside the meeting hall, both in Moscow and later in Leningrad which the delegation visited after the conclusion of the conference. Also, many U.S. delegates met privately in Moscow with Soviet officials to pursue matters of special interest, such as agriculture and trade.

The meetings were chaired on the Soviet side by Mr. V. P. Ruben, Chairman of the Soviet of the Nationalities, who was assisted by Mr. B. N. Ponomarev, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Soviet of the Nationalities and a non-voting member of the Communist Party Politburo. They handled the talks with fairness and efficiency and made every effort to accommodate the U.S. delegation.

The atmosphere for the talks was businesslike. Both sides presented their views with firmness and conviction. Although it could be said that the conference began with both sides talking *at* each other, there was a consensus among the U.S. delegates that it ended with both talking *to* each other.

In opening remarks Senator Humphrey stressed the great responsibilities of the two superpowers, saying: "As the two strongest nuclear powers, the United States and the Soviet Union have a special responsibility to create the conditions that will make possible peace and security. Our mutual task is to reduce *tensions* and promote understanding. . . . We are but pioneers in the search for peace in the nuclear and space age. We must dare to do great things—to try new approaches—to reach beyond the barriers of the past and to probe the opportunities of tomorrow."

Senator Scott also stressed the need for working to achieve common goals in his opening remarks, saying: "The world's two most powerful nations are still separated by vast differences in culture, geography, and political philosophy. But there is a growing awareness on both sides that the basic problems facing mankind today have no national identity and wear no political label." The texts of both speeches are printed in the appendix.

During the opening session Mr. Mikhail Suslov, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Soviet Union and a member of the Communist Party Politburo, gave the basic Soviet position on general U.S.-Soviet relations. His remarks are printed in full in the appendix. He stressed that "direct, personal contacts by the leaders of the U.S.S.R. and the United States, offering opportunities for a businesslike discussion of bilateral relations and outstanding international issues, play an important role in improving and developing relations between our countries." He went on to say that "the world today is entering a crucial period when the task of implementing the principles of peaceful co-existence and mutually advantageous cooperation in everyday ordinary affairs is being put forward as the first order of business." "But," he said, "the impression is forming (in the Soviet Union) that recently the opponents in the U.S. to relaxation of tension have become more active. They are trying to assert that relaxation is beneficial only to the Soviet Union, and that the U.S. and other Western countries derive no benefit." He then touched on the Soviet position on arms control issues, the European Security Conference,

the Middle East, trade relations, and other matters. It was a nonsense, businesslike speech. But it ended on an appropriate note. "We firmly support," he said, "the view that relaxation in Soviet-American relations can and must be deepened further."

After the opening statements by both sides, the conference got down to specific topics.

1. TRADE RELATIONS AND THE EMIGRATION OF SOVIET JEWS

No issue was discussed at such length as trade and the problem of Jewish emigration, interrelated as a result of the Jackson-Vanik amendment.

After a quarter-century of relatively minor trade relations the May 1972 Moscow summit marked a significant turning point in U.S.-Soviet economic relations. The "Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" signed by President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev stated that the "USA and the USSR regard commercial and economic ties as an important and necessary element in the strengthening of their bilateral relations and thus will actively promote the growth of such ties." Five months later a U.S.-Soviet trade agreement, signed for the United States by Secretary of Commerce Peter G. Peterson, pledged: "Each government shall accord *unconditionally* to products originating in or exported to the other country treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like products originating in or exported to any third country . . ." (*italic* supplied) Unfortunately, nothing in the agreement stipulated that the pledge could only be carried out if and when Congress changed the existing law which prohibited the granting of most-favored-nation tariff treatment to goods from all communist countries except Poland and Yugoslavia, although it should have been understood that the impending Trade Act would determine all questions of legal authority for a U.S.-USSR trade agreement. This legal authority was finally supplied by the Trade Act of 1974.

Many members of Congress, led by Senator Henry Jackson and Representative Charles Vanik, urged that the United States, before granting favorable trade terms to the Soviet Union, should require liberalization of Soviet emigration policies and the Jackson-Vanik Amendment was passed as part of the Trade Act of 1974. The basic provisions of that amendment prohibit the extension of most-favored-nation tariff status, U.S. government credits, credit guarantees, or investment guarantees to a Communist country, other than Poland or Yugoslavia, if the President determines that the country:

"(1) denies its citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate;

"(2) imposes more than a nominal tax on emigration or on the visas or other documents required for emigration, for any purpose or cause whatsoever; or

"(3) imposes more than a nominal tax, levy, fine, fee, or other charge on any citizen as a consequence of the desire of such citizen to emigrate to the country of his choice . . ."

As to credits, the joint communique issued at the conclusion of President Nixon's visit to Moscow stated that the two countries "agreed on

the desirability of credit arrangements to develop mutual trade . . .” The Stevenson amendment to the Export-Import Bank Amendments of 1974 imposed a limit of \$300,000,000 on the amount of Export-Import Bank credits and guarantees that could be provided for U.S. exports to the Soviet Union, unless Congress, by concurrent resolution, approved a higher amount.

In January the Soviet Union informed the United States that because of these restrictions and conditions it would not put the 1972 Trade Agreement into force.

The Soviet delegates made it clear to the U.S. delegation that they view the Jackson-Vanik amendment as interference in their internal affairs and in contravention of the 1972 Trade Agreement which, they stated pledged “unconditional” most-favored-nation tariff treatment. Also, they objected to being singled out as the only country in the world on which the U.S. law would impose a ceiling on Export-Import Bank credits.

Senators Ribicoff, Javits and Percy took the lead in the discussion of trade issues but other members of the delegation also participated throughout the conference. Senator Ribicoff pointed out that “any agreement which would result in a commitment which limits Congressional freedom of action must be approved by Congress” and went on to explain aspects of the U.S. Constitutional separation of powers system as they relate to the U.S.-Soviet trade problem.

Senator Javits stated that the moral decision involved in the Jackson-Vanik Amendment emanated from the character of the U.S. people, notwithstanding the claimed commercial attractions of trade. Senator Javits also emphasized the importance of the reunion of families, especially as to emigration to Israel, and the intimidations, job firings and persecutions imposed on Soviet Jews and their families applying to emigrate. Senator Percy also pointed out the harassment of those seeking to emigrate and urged unilateral Soviet action on emigration policy so that restrictions on trade could be eliminated.

While in Moscow the delegation also met with representatives of the resident American business community. The businessmen argued that American business was being denied a fair chance to compete in trade with the Soviet Union. They expressed an understanding of the moral issue of human rights involved in the Jackson-Vanik amendment, and a recognition of the American commitment to individual freedom. However, they maintained, the denial of most-favored-nation status, under this amendment, and the \$300 million limit placed by the Stevenson amendment on Export-Import Bank credits and guarantees, were seen as an affront to national pride in the Soviet Union, causing a progressive reduction in contracts with American firms, which are presently focused on the purchase of high-technology resources. Moreover, in strictly economic terms, the Soviet Union, with a very limited reserve of foreign currency, must have outside credit.

In the formal discussions a Soviet delegate pointed out that in the last year the Soviet Union had received over \$9 billion in credits by other non-communist countries, but that it still extended more credit than it received. Another Soviet delegate said that U.S. restrictions have cost the U.S. \$800 million in Soviet orders which have gone to other countries.

Credits extended to the Soviet Union

Austria, million	\$150
Canada, million	490
France, billion	3,300
Great Britain, billion	1,750
Italy, million	850
Japan, billion	1,350
Sweden, million	100
West Germany, million	960
Total, billion	8,950

Source: U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council

UNITED STATES-UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS TRADE DATA

	1971	1972	1973	1974	Estimated 1975
U.S. Exports:					
Manufactured goods	118.0	102.4	264.9	293.3	450
Other	42.5	444.2	922.2	318.6	400
Total	160.5	546.6	1,187.1	611.9	850
U.S. imports	56.8	95.4	214.6	349.5	450
Trade turnover	217.3	642.0	1,401.7	961.4	1,300
U.S. trade balance	103.7	551.2	972.5	262.5	400

Source: Department of Commerce.

There was a full and, at times, heated exchange of views by many delegates on both sides on the issue of the emigration of Soviet Jews. Before leaving Washington the delegation had agreed that the co-chairmen, Senators Humphrey and Scott, and Senators Ribicoff, Javits, and Percy as well as any other Senators who wished to participate, would meet privately in Moscow with a representative group of Soviet Jews in order to hear first hand about their problems and to exchange views on the situation in the light of developments since passage of the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments. That meeting proved to be most beneficial. There was mutual recognition that two issues must be addressed simultaneously: Respecting the national sovereignty of the government of the Soviet Union; and liberalizing Soviet emigration policy implementation. It was felt that the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights must be clearly affirmed, including a political commitment to the freedom of movement of people. Soviet Jews at this meeting noted that Soviet law prohibits discrimination, and that full compliance in the administration of this law would substantially alleviate current serious problems, including economic, social, and political persecution, that are confronted in applying for exit visas. A summary of the discussion at this meeting is included in the appendix.

According to Department of State data, emigration of Soviet Jews has followed this pattern:

1970	1,000
1971	14,000
1972	31,500
1973	33,500
1974	21,000
1975, Jan.-May (approximately)	5,500

There were grave differences of view about the backlog of applications. The Soviets claimed there were 1,400 but a member of the U.S.-delegation claimed that, but for intimidation, there would be 135,000-140,000.

Soviet delegates (three members of their delegation were Jewish) argued that a lack of applicants is the reason for the decline in the number of visas granted and stated that there is no policy deliberately to restrict the flow of Soviet Jews in retaliation for Congress' action on trade and credits. Members of the U.S. delegation turned over to Chairman Ruben lists, supplied to them by their constituents, of specific individuals who had been denied permission to emigrate. He assured the group that each case would be looked into.

Members of the U.S. delegation stated strongly the viewpoint, which they maintained was widely held by the American people, that a fundamental issue of human rights is involved, and that the normalization of relations among nations should include a political commitment to the freedom of movement of people.

Under the present circumstances, neither the objective of obtaining the release of Soviet Jews and others who wish to emigrate nor that of normalizing trade relations is being achieved. The texts of President Ford's letters of June 27 to the Chairman of the four major Congressional committees with jurisdiction over the trade and credits legislation, stating his intention to submit remedial legislation, designed to remove restrictions on the U.S. side, after appropriate consultations, were handed to Secretary Brezhnev and Chairman Ruben by Senator Scott who noted that the reaction of the Congress to the President's new initiatives could not be positively predicted. The texts of these letters are included in the appendix.

Members of the U.S. delegation returned from the discussions with the Soviet officials and the Jewish dissidents convinced that means should be explored to break the present impasse. It is the consensus of the U.S. delegation that movement by both sides is the key to changing the existing unsatisfactory situation. Members of the delegation promised to do their part to insure that Congress is not found wanting in this respect if the Soviet Union also acts in that spirit.

2. ARMS CONTROL AND OTHER SECURITY QUESTIONS

There was a full exchange of views between the two delegations on arms control and security issues—the SALT II negotiations, nuclear testing and proliferation matters, military force reductions in Europe, military spending, and U.S.-USSR military involvement in the Indian Ocean.

In his comments to the U.S. delegation, Secretary Brezhnev placed great stress on the need for controlling the arms race and lessening the danger of war. "Scientists today," he said, "can invent almost any kind of weapon more terrible than what we have known in the past. Thirty years ago, no one had the atomic bomb, but it was developed; then came missiles with MIRV's. No one knows what scientists will come up with next."

The delegation was much impressed with the earnestness and sincerity with which Secretary Brezhnev and the Soviet delegates spoke on the need to reach agreement on issues that would lessen the danger of nuclear war and responded in kind. During the meetings the Soviet

delegation expressed concern over what appeared to them to be growing opposition to detente within the United States. A recent article by former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird was cited as proof. The U.S. delegation asked for a Soviet response to that article and both are printed in the appendix.

A point stressed by several members of the U.S. delegation was the significance of obtaining additional information concerning the Soviet military budget and Soviet nuclear strategy in establishing better public understanding and trust in the United States. The availability of more detail concerning Soviet military matters is especially important to the Congress in examining and passing judgment on the military budget request and other proposals from the Executive Branch. The Soviet military budget consists of a single item, whereas volumes of statistics are available on U.S. military spending through the Congressional hearing process and other sources. "If mutual trust grows, perhaps we can declassify some of our data," a Soviet delegate said in reply to the statements by U.S. delegates.

The U.S. delegation hopes that its suggestions will be given serious consideration by Soviet officials and that there will be definite progress in this field before the Senate and the Supreme Soviet delegations meet again.

The U.S. delegation raised the possibility of reaching an agreement to limit a U.S.-USSR military buildup in the Indian Ocean. One suggestion advanced was a limit on ship-days for U.S. and Soviet vessels, but there was no positive reaction from the Soviet side. However, the Soviet side did indicate an interest in negotiating on the general issue of military restraint in the Indian Ocean and the U.S. delegation urges that Executive Branch officials explore this matter with Soviet officials. Military competition in the Indian Ocean between the U.S. and the Soviet Union will not be in the interests of either country, the region, or world peace.

Conclusion of the European Security Conference at a July summit meeting was a matter of considerable importance to the Soviet Union, we were told by their delegation. Secretary Brezhnev said to the U.S. group; "If the European Security Conference is successfully concluded, then all disarmament questions can be solved more easily." Arrangements for an August 1st signing were concluded shortly after the Moscow conference ended.

Members of the U.S. delegation discussed problems of verification involved in reaching a SALT II agreement, but they expressed a unanimous view that momentum must be maintained toward achieving this further agreement on the control of strategic nuclear weapons as a matter of the highest priority, particularly in light of the continuing race in the development and sophistication of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

Differing viewpoints or perceptions on military force reductions in Europe were discussed, as well as problems involved in achieving a comprehensive test ban treaty, but there was common agreement that negotiations on these matters must continue to move forward.

Members of the U.S. delegation expressed particular concern over the dangers of nuclear proliferation. Recent agreements on the sale of nuclear reactors were frankly acknowledged to require urgent attention, due to the possibility of theft or diversion of reactor enriched

plutonium for nuclear weapons development. Proposals discussed included the strengthening of I.A.E.A. inspection standards, achieving bilateral agreements to halt nuclear proliferation, and agreements on the establishment of so-called nuclear-free zones.

3. OTHER ISSUES

A number of members of the U.S. delegation brought up matters concerning U.S.-Soviet relations on agricultural matters. They emphasized the world-wide dimensions of food supply-and-demand problems and urged greater Soviet cooperation in providing timely crop production and other information. In reply Soviet delegates referred to the difficulty of making accurate early predictions on grain production, and cited how original U.S. crop estimates ended far off the mark in 1974. However, recognizing the hazards of early crop estimates, the U.S. delegation hopes that, in the interest of effective management of the world's limited food supplies, a full and frank exchange of production and other agricultural information can be developed between the two countries.

The Middle East problem was discussed at some length. Members of the U.S. delegation urged that the Soviet Union attempt to use its influence to obtain public acknowledgement by the Arabs of Israel's right to exist. Delegates from the U.S. pointed out that, to be successful, a Geneva conference must be founded on mutual understandings in advance and that joint efforts were essential.

There was also much discussion of world environmental problems with delegates from both sides urging a global approach to conservation of natural resources. Support for reaching an agreement to prohibit weather modification for military purposes also came from delegates from both sides.

Educational and cultural exchanges were among other issues discussed, with general agreement that an expansion of such contacts would contribute to mutual understanding and improved relations.

IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

There is an old Russian proverb which generally translated says: "One swallow does not make a spring." United States relations with the Soviet Union have not yet reached the full bloom of springtime. But they are also much changed from the frigid winter climate of the Cold War. The Senate delegation did not journey to Moscow under the illusion that the discussions would result in dramatic progress in relations with the Soviet Union. The group did not go to negotiate but to engage in a mutual learning process. Congress has played an important role in U.S.-Soviet relations, especially since the 1972 summit, and it is essential that Soviet leaders have a good understanding of the role of Congress in the U.S. political system.

This is a matter which is often puzzling to foreigners, especially to those from socialist systems. In the U.S. the making of foreign policy is a responsibility shared by Congress and the President. It is the Congress which controls the government's purse strings, which grants, withholds or limits authority for trade, foreign assistance and other tools of foreign policy, and which must pass judgment on all significant international agreements. Congress has vast power to aid or thwart a

President in the conduct of foreign policy and in recent years has been exercising those powers in a more independent fashion than at any time during recent decades. Although the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Trade Agreement purported to make an unconditional pledge to grant most-favored-nation tariff treatment to Soviet goods, it was not within the power of the Executive Branch to make good on that pledge without Congressional approval. What the Soviets thought was a deal was, in actuality, not a deal until Congress said so. We believe that as a result of the visit by the Senate delegation the Soviet leaders now have a much better understanding of how our Constitutional system of separation of powers works.

Therefore, this second meeting between members of the Senate and members of the Supreme Soviet, who were also leaders in various components of the Soviet hierarchy, augurs well for the future. Members of the U.S. delegation were told by Soviet officials that the meeting was considered the most significant one between the U.S. and the Soviet Union since the Vladivostok summit. It is the consensus of the Senate delegation that these contacts should be repeated from time to time.

Most members of the delegation came away more firmly convinced of the dedication of the current Soviet leadership to the lessening of tensions—to detente, to use that much misconstrued word. The Soviets are as desirous of furthering this process as Americans are. Secretary Brezhnev spoke eloquently and emotionally of his goal to eliminate the danger of war. "We need," he said, "to look ahead at what will happen twenty years, thirty years, from now, and be concerned about what we will leave as a legacy for younger generations." He then went on to say that eliminating the danger of war "is the most cherished goal of my life." We were impressed with his determination and that of other Soviet officials on this point.

"Detente" is an ill-chosen word to describe the present state of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. Its widespread use in official rhetoric since the 1972 summit has created public expectations far beyond those justified by the modest agreements reached at that time and since. Detente is not instant peace, and we have not yet achieved a state of complex mutual trust with each other. But both nations now recognize that to prevent a nuclear holocaust they must learn to live together and are taking small, positive steps to find common ground. A more accurate description of the relationship would be to call it moving toward a lessening of tensions or toward a normalization of relations.

It has been estimated that the arsenals of both countries are equivalent to the destructive power of 1,000,000 Hiroshima bombs. It follows as a simple fact of life for both countries that to maintain world peace we must get along together. Both countries have the means to destroy each other many times over and there is nothing that either side can do to escape that awesome truth.

The process of lessening tensions does not mean that the United States and the Soviet Union can expect to see eye to eye on everything. No one should assume a sudden total convergence of interests. What it means is that both agree not to let differences explode into nuclear war. There will continue to be political competition but we are now

in agreement that the major problems which threaten an outbreak of nuclear war can be resolved. Both nations recognize this as the basic objective.

"Drops of water gouge rocks," a Russian proverb says. That is the process under way in eroding the hard residue of the Cold War. There will be no giant steps that abruptly reverse the course of history. Unless either falters, there will continue to be a cautious step-by-step approach with hard bargaining at each stage. Our relationship is likely to remain one of arms-length, businesslike dealings for the foreseeable future. There is no cause for euphoria or despondency at the rate of progress. The important point is that regardless of temporary setbacks, such as the difficulty over implementation of the trade agreement, both sides remain determined to continue working to ease the burdens of the arms race and enhance the prospects for world peace.

We hope that the Soviet leaders were equally impressed with our dedication, and that of the American people, to these goals. Hopefully, the visit to Moscow by fourteen members of the U.S. Senate will lead to continued progress in that direction.

SEPARATE VIEWS BY SENATORS McCLURE,
DOMENICI, AND MORGAN


We believe that the delegation report is at best incomplete and at worst misleading. There were a number of important issues discussed upon which a sharp disagreement between the U.S. delegation and the Soviet group was evident. We agree that the trip was significant and very worthwhile but we think it important to point out that it did not produce total harmony. In stating this, we would want to reaffirm, however, that we were treated with courtesy and cordiality. We very much appreciate the warm hospitality of our hosts which was very evident throughout our visit.

The delegation visit contributed a great deal, but it can make its most solid contribution if the limitations are confessed as openly and candidly as its gains are discussed. We believe that further contacts both in the Soviet Union and in the United States can further contribute to broadening our understandings and narrowing our differences.

JAMES A. McCLURE,
U.S. Senator.

PETE V. DOMENICI,
U.S. Senator.

ROBERT MORGAN,
U.S. Senator.



APPENDIXES

A. OPENING REMARKS BY SENATOR HUMPHREY—JUNE 30, 1975

Mr. Chairman: First of all, on behalf of the entire American delegation, I want to tell you and your colleagues how pleased and honored we are to be here and how appreciative we are of the cordial hospitality you have extended. We have been looking forward to this opportunity to exchange views with you.

We are here in our capacities as United States Senators, members of an equal, coordinate, and independent branch of the United States Government. In what each of us says here, we will be expressing our personal, individual views which may or may not coincide with those of the President, the Secretary of State, or our good friend the Ambassador. Indeed, with respect to some matters we may even disagree among ourselves.

But I also want to emphasize the essential unity of the American government and the American people.

Our approach to foreign policy is nonpartisan. We have a delegation here composed of both Democrats and Republicans. One co-chairman is of the Democratic Party, the other from the Republican Party.

However, as the late President Johnson used to say, "The things that unite us are stronger than the things that divide us"—a statement which I suggest applies to our respective countries.

Everybody wants and needs food to eat, clothes to wear, a house to live in. On a more basic level, nobody wants to be the victim of disease, poverty, ignorance and war.

As the two strongest nuclear powers, the United States and the Soviet Union have a special responsibility to create the conditions that will make possible peace and security. Our mutual task is to reduce tensions and promote understanding.

But even more important, together we have a very special responsibility on behalf of generations to come. That responsibility goes far beyond political parties, individual personalities or current governments.

We are but pioneers in the search for peace in the nuclear and space age. We must dare to do great things—to try new approaches—to reach beyond the barriers of the past and to probe the opportunities of tomorrow.

The most important business of our two governments is to reach an agreement to control and hopefully to reduce nuclear weapons. These measures should be accompanied by steps to reduce tensions generally—for example, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction talks, the efforts to achieve a just and durable settlement in the Middle East.

These are the immediate priorities. Whatever the United States and the Soviet Union may do will have a significant impact on the entire world. Therefore, we owe it to ourselves and all of mankind to seek through the patience and perseverance in negotiations, agreements on these vital matters.


Knowing each other is an indispensable first step. Hopefully, our visit here will be a worthwhile contribution in this respect.

Let me say also that there is a good deal more to Soviet-American relations than simple mutual survival. The Soviet people can justifiably be proud of their accomplishments in industry and agriculture, in the arts, science and technology.

The first Soviet-American Space Mission, only two weeks from now, will certainly set a new standard in international collaboration. I hope it will lead to further cooperative endeavors in other fields, in health, in agriculture, in expanded cultural and educational exchanges, and in the broader areas of science and technology.

All of these things—whether astronauts working together in space or legislators talking together on the ground—are the building blocks of peace. The mortar that holds them together is mutual respect.

Let us begin.



B. OPENING REMARKS BY SENATOR SCOTT—JUNE 30, 1975

I am delighted to be in Moscow. I know that your cordial welcome is a good omen for our talks over the next three days.

On behalf of the entire American delegation, I want to express our pleasure at being here—although we are three months late. Perhaps your exposure to the scheduling problems of our Congress has contributed to your education about some of the ideosyncrasies of our political system.

We are here to return the visit a number of you and your colleagues paid to the United States Congress last year. Your visit to our country and our visit to yours are important steps in the essential process of furthering mutual understanding.

Less than two months ago, both our countries celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of the end of the war against fascism in Europe. The sacrifices made by the Soviet people in that struggle serve as historic monuments to the courage of your people and their love for the Soviet Motherland. Americans and Soviets worked, fought, and died together to achieve a common objective. Unfortunately, the spirit of that common cause did not long survive Hitler's defeat. The era of wartime cooperation was succeeded by a long and bitter period of suspicion and distrust. As a consequence, a generation has grown to adulthood under the threat of swift mutual destruction through a single misstep by either side.

Now there has been a realization by the leaders of both countries that the normalization of relations is vital to our people and to the entire world.

The world's two most powerful nations are still separated by vast differences in culture, geography, and political philosophy. But there is a growing awareness on both sides that the basic problems facing mankind today have no national identity and wear no political label. The American and the Soviet people share common goals.

We both seek a world free of poverty and disease;

We both seek a richer, more satisfying life for our children and grandchildren;

We both seek to preserve a clean and healthy environment for future generations;

We both seek a world free of the fear of war and the burdens of armaments.


Perhaps we cannot achieve all these goals in your or my lifetime. But we can try.

There is an ancient proverb that "You cannot thaw three feet of ice in a single day." A weak morning sun is now shining on the ice jam created by a quarter century of frigidness in our relations. We are here in an effort to help speed up the melting process.

In only two weeks Soviet cosmonauts and United States astronauts will link up in space, demonstrating again how small and fragile is the globe on which we live. With the growing destructive power of weapons in both our arsenals, it is increasingly evident that surely we must learn to live together or we will all surely die together. Let us make this link-up of parliamentarians a significant step back from confrontation and toward cooperation.

I look forward to the discussions over these next three days. We are here to talk frankly and candidly about matters of common interest. Let us hope that when we finish our talks on Wednesday that both sides will have a better understanding of each other's viewpoints.

I am confident that we will learn much from you. I hope the process will be mutual.



C. SPEECH BY MIKHAIL A. SUSLOV AT THE JUNE 30, 1975 MEETING IN THE KREMLIN
WITH THE SENATE DELEGATION

Distinguished Senators Scott and Humphrey, Distinguished Members of the U.S. Senate: A little more than a year has passed since a delegation from the USSR Supreme Soviet visited the US, and now today we are able to welcome in our country a return delegation of members of the US Senate. Your arrival, as well as the visit expected in August by members of the House of Representatives, reinforces our view that favorable conditions for the expansion of direct contacts between the parliaments of our two countries are being created.

I think you will agree with me that your current return visit may be regarded as a natural outcome of the general improvement in the climate of Soviet-American relations, in which important positive changes have taken place in recent years.

It seems to us that these changes are not only an important component of the general process of relaxation of international tension, but in and of themselves have rendered and continue to render a favorable effect on the entire international situation, reducing first of all the threat of a world thermonuclear war, and helping to assert the principles of peaceful coexistence in relations between states with differing social systems.

Direct personal contacts by the leaders of the USSR and US, offering opportunities for businesslike discussion of bilateral relations and outstanding international issues, play an important role in improving and developing relations between our countries. It is as a result of the four Summit meetings of recent years that documents of such paramount significance have been adopted as, "The Basic Principles of Relations between the USSR and US" and the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, and that the vitally important agreements and understandings were reached concerning strategic arms limitations.

The world today is entering a crucial period when the task of implementing the principles of peaceful coexistence and mutually advantageous cooperation in everyday ordinary affairs is being put forward as the first order of business. *This process, however, is not proceeding swimmingly, without a hitch.* It is necessary to overcome the frenzied resistance of the enemies of the relaxation of tensions, including those who, in words paying homage to slogans of peace, in fact count on reviving Cold War policies and call for whipping up the arms race and for hostile actions in relation to the socialist countries, and relaxation must be further deepened.

For this it is necessary that states take into account mutual interests and, not seeking one-sided advantage, undertake and carry out mutual obligations, first of all in the area connected with the preservation of peace and the strengthening of international security and cooperation.

I cannot but note that with us, in the Soviet Union, the impression is forming that recently the opponents in the US to relaxation of tension have become more active. They are trying to assert that relaxation is beneficial only to the Soviet Union, and that the US and other Western countries derive no benefit. One cannot help being amazed by discussion about who benefits and who is harmed by relaxation of tension, or in other words, who benefits and who is harmed by living under conditions of strengthened peace and diminished danger of war.

Sometimes we are told that the attempts to call into question the benefits of relaxation of tension are made for purely internal political and tactical considerations. However—as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR L. I. Brezhnev noted recently in his speech before the voters—speaking frankly, we are convinced that the strengthening of peace is a matter too serious for the current and future generations to be subordinated to some transient considerations or calculations.

There cannot really be doubt that *peace is needed equally by all peoples*, notwithstanding differences in ideological beliefs. All states have an interest in the removal of the danger of a world nuclear war. This is the main basis for joint efforts to strengthen peace and security.

Gentlemen! It can hardly be questioned that, from the standpoint of the long-term interests of the very fates of our peoples and those of all mankind, measures

to ensure the reliable elimination of the danger of nuclear war as a practical matter hold the primary, or central place in the development of Soviet-American relations.

We have a right to feel satisfaction over the first major successes achieved on this pivotal course. The ABM Treaty and the interim agreement on certain measures in the area of limiting strategic offensive weapons signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972 laid the beginning for an effective limitation on the growth of nuclear arsenals. And the signing on June 22, 1973 of the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War was an important step on the road to ensuring international security.

We value highly the understanding reached during the Vladivostok meeting between General Secretary Brezhnev and President Ford concerning a new long-term agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive weapons. The main provisions agreed upon at the Summit along with the limitation on the total numbers of strategic weapons are significant in that they are the first measures of a qualitative nature, and are especially important, in that they aim at continuing and moreover accelerating joint efforts for the limitation of nuclear weapons.

In this connection I would like especially to note the understanding that new negotiations on further limitations and possible reduction of strategic arms will begin long before the expiration of agreement now in preparation, encompassing, as is known, the period until 1985.

Recently in Geneva negotiations resumed between the Soviet and American delegations concerning the working out of this new agreement. We understand that it is still necessary to overcome considerable difficulties, including those connected with technical questions in this basically new area of international treaty relations. And we feel that parliamentarians of both countries can substantially assist these so important efforts by not permitting the piling up of any sort of debris around this problem, but on the contrary, by all means encouraging the quickest possible successful solution.

In this connection I would like to touch on the question of the Treaty between the USSR and the US on the *Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests* of July 3, 1974. According to this treaty, both sides agreed to cease testing after March 31, 1976 of a magnitude greater than 150 kilotons, and to limit new testing to a minimum number (I wish to note, by the way, that the USSR came out in favor of a more radical agreement, but thus far it has failed to be reached.)

The Soviet Union ratified this treaty. As to the American side, unfortunately it has not yet started the ratification process, tying up this question with the solution of the problem of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. At present negotiations are going on concerning the preparation of an agreement on this problem, and we hope that they will lead to positive results.

And still one other question in this area.

The Soviet Union attaches great importance to the drafting of an international convention on the *prohibition of environmental modification for military purposes*. As is known, a corresponding resolution, finding broad international support, was adopted at the 24th UN General Assembly. This question is now being discussed simultaneously in bilateral Soviet-American negotiations and at the Geneva Committee on disarmament. One hopes that it will reach a positive decision.

Distinguished Senators! As a result of agreements reached in recent years, it has been possible to some extent to restrain the arms race in some areas. But, unfortunately, the arms buildup has not been ended. True, without these agreements the arms race would have been more intensive and dangerous. But the fact remains clear. The buildup of arms continues. This represents an acute and urgent problem.

Among certain Western powers, including the US, military budgets are actively expanding. The Soviet Union feels that things should be going in the other direction. We are for the reduction of military budgets and call upon the other powers to do so. Our country has been and remains a firm advocate of arms limitations and reductions—an advocate of disarmament.

The relaxation of international tensions can be consolidated and developed only if there is a consistent reduction of arms, with the prospect of general and complete disarmament. This gives special urgency to the task of ensuring the participation of all states in agreements in this area already in force, and of achieving the earliest convening of a *World Disarmament Conference* and the reduction of military budgets.

The development of science and technology breeds the danger of creating new, all the more terrible types of weapons of mass destruction. It is becoming urgent that all states—and first of all the big powers—conclude an *agreement banning the creation of new types of weapons of mass destruction*. We think that the Soviet Union and the US, moving in the same direction in this matter, could make a not inconsiderable contribution.

Because of the objective role of the USSR and US in the modern world, the improvement in relations between them makes a substantial contribution to the improvements of the international situation in key regions of the world. I would like to mention in this connection such a continent as Europe. Certain positive changes have occurred here in the approach to the solution of such an important problem as that of European security.

The second stage of the *Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, now going on in Geneva, is already close to completion. Considerable progress has been achieved. No doubt this was facilitated to some extent by the realization of relevant understandings contained in joint Soviet-American documents. But the positions taken by some Western European countries on a number of questions still hampers the successful completion of the work of the Conference. It seems to us that the US could contribute more actively toward the earliest movement to the final phase of this conference. We are convinced that new major steps can be taken toward a more stable peace in Europe and the entire world. This will be facilitated by the successful conclusion in the nearest future of the all-European conference at the highest level.

I would like to say a few words about the *negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe*, now taking place in Vienna. It is clear to everyone that the achievement of a mutually acceptable understanding on this matter would contribute to the lessening the tension, associated with opposition to each other in the center of Europe of the two military groupings. The main thing in our approach is the principle that a reduction here of military forces and armaments should be carried out in such a way that it would not upset the existing balance in this area and would not harm the security of either side. The approach of the Western participants boils down to an attempt to alter the existing correlation of forces in Central Europe to their advantage. We would like once again to emphasize that such an approach, designed to obtain for the NATO countries a one-sided military superiority in contradiction to the principle of not harming the security interests of either side, as stated in the number of joint Soviet-American documents, cannot serve as a basis for achieving a mutually beneficial understanding.

We would like to direct the attention of our American colleagues to this question and call on them for greater realism in the approach to an agreement on reducing armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

Permit me now to draw your attention to the question of the *situation in the Middle East*. Through the efforts of the aggressive forces of Israel and their protectors, the explosive situation there continues. Forces opposed to the relaxation of tension in general and to the improvement of Soviet-American relations are doing everything possible in order to prevent a just resolution of this question.

Allow me once again to reiterate our position: the Soviet Union is consistent in favoring a resolution of the central, key questions of a settlement, without which the achievement of a firm peace in the Middle East is not possible. This means—the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories occupied in 1967; satisfying the lawful rights of the Arab people of Palestine, including their right to form their own state; and the securing for all states and peoples of the region, including Israel, of corresponding international guarantees for their independent existence and development under conditions of peace and security.

All these issues are parts of a whole—a genuine solution requires that they all be resolved, without exception.

In this connection it is necessary to emphasize the importance of the resumption of the work of the Geneva peace conference, with proper preparation, to discuss the entire complex of Middle East problems with the participation of all interested sides, including the representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and in full accordance with the well known resolutions of the UN Security Council and the General Assembly.

Coordinated actions in the proper direction by the Soviet Union and the US could ensure a prompt settlement in the Middle East and finally extinguish the dangerous hotbed of war smoldering there.

The resolution of the matters set out above falls mainly within the competence of governments. However, it depends obviously not only on governments. Parliaments can make a large contribution.

Finally, there is still one issue. There is an expression in English, "Last but not least". In accordance with this rule I would like now to touch on that area of Soviet-American relations in which not the government of the US, but the American Congress has made a major and, unfortunately, a negative contribution. I have in mind, as you can guess, the *issue of trade and economic relations between the USSR and US*.

In recent years appreciable changes for the better have taken place in this area. Business contacts have become substantially more active. The volume of Soviet-American trade, which in 1971 amounted in all to 184 million rubles, in 1972 reached 538 million rubles, in 1973 grew to 1.161 billion rubles, and in 1974 amounted to 742 million rubles. Large transactions for the purchase in the US of equipment for the KamAZa (Kama Truck Factory Complex), the agreement with Occidental Petroleum for cooperation in the construction of a chemical complex in the Kuibyshev region, and a number of other transactions aroused general interest.

The development of Soviet-American trade and economic ties had been facilitated by joint measures in the area of organizational and legal matters, particularly the conclusion of the October 18, 1972 trade agreement, providing for the granting to each other of unconditional most-favored nation treatment. The June 29, 1974 Long-term agreement for the promotion of economic, industrial and technical cooperation also represented an important step on the way to ensuring the stable development of trade and economic ties between the USSR and the US.

It seemed that at last Soviet-American economic cooperation was established on a firm footing. However, this did not come to pass. As is well known, at the end of 1974 the US Congress adopted a trade bill which in relation to the USSR provided for direct and in no way justifiable discrimination, amounting to obvious interference in our internal affairs.

The Soviet side repeatedly made reminders that trade and economic ties between the USSR and the US must not be linked with issues having no connection with trade and falling within the domestic competence of the Soviet government, just as they would in the case of any government in general. After the adoption by Congress of the Bill, the Soviet government declared that it does not consider it possible to put the 1972 trade agreement into effect under the terms stipulated in that Bill.

Naturally, no other response could have been expected by us to the Bill passed by the Congress.

And so, as a result of actions by the U.S. Congress, the development of trade and economic relations between our countries has been seriously damaged.

How do we see the existing situation? Obviously, Soviet parliamentarians feel a certain bitterness and disappointment. And the issue here is not just on the economic side, beneficial both for the U.S. and for us. After all, even without those benefits which would come from the development of Soviet-American trade, we will in the future successfully develop our economy.

Yet we cannot but also see the *political side of the issue*, giving rise to serious uneasiness on our part—and I think on the part of all sincere supporters in the U.S. of relaxation of tension. We cannot but see that the development of trade and economic ties with the U.S. on an equal and non-discriminatory basis is without doubt an important element in the improvement of Soviet-American political relations. In this sense the damage inflicted on these ties affects the latter as well.

At the same time we do not wish to be pessimists. We are sure that in the present international climate the process of recognizing the political realities of our day will continue, undercutting the position of those who try to maintain the spirit and practice of the "cold war" and who also undertake efforts, doomed to failure, to interfere in others' affairs.

The U.S.S.R. will continue to carry on trade with the U.S. However, its volume under the current conditions will be significantly less than it could have been. The elimination of discriminatory treatment would revitalize considerably Soviet-American economic ties. But if the conditions for this have still not ripened in the U.S. Congress, we will wait until they become convinced in the U.S. that the expansion of Soviet-American trade is mutually advantageous.

The Soviet Union has no shortage of partners. At present it is successfully developing trade and economic ties with 90 countries on the basis of trade agreements providing for the granting to each other of the *most favored nation principle*. The granting of credits for the sale of machines and equipment, a normal practice in modern international trade, is widely used in trading by the U.S.S.R. with other countries. In the course of the past year alone the Soviet Union was extended credits on normal terms by a number of Western countries including France, England, Italy, the FRG and Japan for a total exceeding \$7 billion.

This accordingly affects the size of their trade with us, which as we see it has for them considerable importance under the conditions of the present economic recession in the capitalist countries.

As you know, besides trade and economic issues there are many other matters, growing out of the agreements concluded as a result of Soviet-American meetings. They involve *cooperation in the area of science, culture, education etc.* I will not dwell on them, not wishing to abuse your patience. I would only like to emphasize that deputies of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet, along with the entire Soviet people, fully support the policy of our government towards developing many-sided cooperation with the U.S. We firmly support the view that relaxation in Soviet-American relations can and must be deepened further. For this it is necessary that our two states properly take into account reciprocal—that is, reciprocal and not one-sided—interests and undertake treaty commitments on the *basis of reciprocity*. It was on this basis, as a matter of fact, that relaxation of international tensions began. We hope our American colleagues will take a similar position.

Permit me to close on this.

I believe that we can, in a friendly atmosphere, with great benefit for our future relations, *exchange* opinions and discuss these issues.

I hope that the stay in our country will bring you satisfaction.

Thank you for your attention.

D. STATEMENT BY SENATOR RIBICOFF

THE FUTURE OF DETENTE

This meeting marks an important step in the evolution of U.S.-Soviet relations, and especially in the further definition of detente. This meeting, and this visit to Moscow generally, provide opportunities for representatives of Congress to broaden the dialogue of detente.

Up to now, the Congress has stood in the background, reacting to executive branch initiatives and adding its own interpretations and constraints as supplements to Executive proposals. This no doubt has created confusion in the minds of some officials here in Moscow, as they find arrangements worked out with the executive branch reshaped by the Congress.

Let me explain why that happens. In the whole, in our governmental system, the Secretary of State and the President are responsible for dealings with other governments.

However, any agreements reached which would result in a commitment which limits congressional freedom of action must be approved by the Congress. The Congress might in some cases be asked by the executive branch to pass new laws to implement such agreements. Or the Senate might be asked to ratify a treaty.

In the case of commercial relations between the U.S. and other nations, there is a further and more basic complication. As you know, we in the U.S. are constrained by our constitution, which among other things assigns specific powers to the Executive, to the Congress, and to the Judiciary. The drafters of our Constitution dealt with commercial questions differently from the rest of foreign relations: they explicitly provided that "Congress shall regulate foreign commerce"—not the Executive.

Thus, when the Executive sends representatives to deal with Soviet Union officials on trade questions, these officials must come to Congress for approval and implementing authority. The Congress has the right to disapprove, or to reshape the Executive proposals.

Sometimes, officials of our Executive fail to take sufficient account of this basic element of our constitution and our governmental structure, and there results an inadequate flow of communication between the two branches. This can in turn lead to frustrations for the Executive and unpredictable results for our trading partners. We are trying, in the context of the Trade Act of 1974, to remedy this situation by intensifying the congressional-executive dialogue in advance of the negotiation of international agreements. It means the Executive must give up some of its inclination to negotiate in secret, but the results, based on more open discussion, ought to be more likely to survive.

Thus, we decided in Congress last year to introduce a ceiling on Export-Import Bank credits for transactions with your nation. The executive branch vigorously objected to this change, first introduced by Senator Stevenson. The executive was surprised, and your officials, I gather, were dismayed. From the point of view of Congress, however, this was simply a matter between the Congress and the executive. It was an effort to force the executive to come to Congress periodically to explain the nature and scope of U.S.-U.S.S.R. economic relations affected by official credits. It was intended that the ceiling be lifted to higher levels whenever the executive put forward good arguments, but that the executive not be free to act without further opportunity for Congress to become involved in the evolution of U.S.-U.S.S.R. economic relations.

Another area of difficulty emerged, as we all know, in relation to the interest in our Congress in the free flow of people as well as trade. The Executive did not want to mix trade conditions with conditions on the movement of people, but the Congress found this important in its own deliberations on the future of detente. I do not now wish to dwell on this delicate subject, except to explain to you that the rigidity of the trade act was to a significant extent the result of inadequate congressional-executive communication. There developed a growing feeling in Congress consequently that formal constraints had to be placed on the freedom

of action of the Executive in the absence of an open dialogue based on mutual confidence. Had this dialogue been handled differently, officials of the USSR would have been aware earlier of the political mood in the Congress, and a more flexible form of accommodation might have been found.

In the future, it may be possible in an informal way to develop an accommodation to our respective positions, which is in accord both with the laws of the Soviet Union and the views of the legislative body of the United States.

Turning to the more basic theme of detente policy, let me say that the Congress does on the whole support detente. The time has come, however, to develop the concept further and give it more concrete meaning. Detente cannot be just a mood. It has to develop beyond dialogue of a handful of diplomats. Detente needs to involve more people, at more levels, in your government and ours, in the enterprises of your economy and in the business firms of ours. Detente should also result in further institutionalization of our relations—in more bilateral consultations, and in more multilateral coordination.

Let me explain this further. Detente is meant to allow our two systems to develop mutual interests in those areas where our interests do not diverge. In some cases, these areas of mutual interest can be found in particular aspects of our respective economies. But there are also areas of mutual interest in a worldwide context. Cooperation in exchange of information on environmental policy, administrative practices, and technology is obviously one example. We are finding increasingly the need to look beyond our respective borders on these matters, as we face problems of pollution or degradation of our whole biosphere or ecosystem. The recent discovery in the U.S. of dangers to the global ozone layer is a case in point. I wonder in a similar way what thought you have given, for example, to the potential damage to the ozone layer from frequent flights of supersonic transport aircraft—a consideration which led the U.S. Congress to look with disfavor at a U.S. aircraft of the same type.

In such global matters, our mutual knowledge and concern ought to be grounds for collaboration, and for transmitting our concerns together to other nations in the multilateral institutions such as the U.N. What we have been doing together in the past is good, such as in cooperation and restraint in space technology, but we should do much more if we are to have the broad support of our peoples for continuing cooperation. In this connection I think we must both make greater efforts in our attitudes towards use of the oceans and the seabeds, and in reducing our respective pollution of the seas with our shipping and our naval fleets.

I think we both have the same vital interest in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons, on a global basis. Up to now, however, your official concerns and ours have been somewhat limited.

The potential spread of nuclear weapons is a global problem which respects no borders. We know that the day could come when threats are made on the basis of weapons in the wrong hands, not transported by missiles but simply by primitive smuggling activities.

We must move to a global perspective, and talk to each other far more about our mutual interest in stabilizing the world situation. In the west, the commercial eagerness to sell in some nations is moving ahead of progress on safeguards internationally. Simply because some nations look at this solely in terms of selling alternative sources of energy does not mean that we should or can ignore the other dangers. Very little time remains for both of us to bring the present situation under control.

At a minimum, we should both pursue with the other supplier nations new safeguards.

It seems to me that your nation and ours ought to be able to work together on this problem, using our joint knowledge and our joint influence to curb the present forces at work internationally. We should not let our world become subject to nuclear blackmail in any place—once one nation is subject to such pressure, no other nation will ever again be safe. Our peoples demand at least this minimum amount of mutual concern in our two governments.

We might also do far more in our respective relations with the developing nations of the world. We are both concerned with having stable supplies of raw materials, and having economically stable prospects for use of them. Even your nation and your socialist partners have become heavily influenced by changing world oil prices and commodity prices.

We also both have an interest to see to it that the developing nations develop, and that the economic situation of the poorest peoples of the world be improved drastically, we both want this for humanitarian reasons. But we both need this

in relation to the problems of global resource balance too. World population will not be adequately limited in relation to world resources and land until economic conditions are greatly improved in the poorer lands. We both also hope to remove the so-called third world as a possible source of friction between us. The third world will remain in ferment, with antagonisms towards both of us, and all of the industrialized world, until the developing nations have made reasonable progress from their present depressing circumstances.

What this means is that we should do more together in our mutual relations with the third world—more to open our markets to their trade: more to assist them technologically: and more to assist them financially.

Your nation, in your own interest, should play a greater role, I believe. I would hope the time would soon come when you could involve yourselves in the activities of the world bank, for example, so that we could actually say that all of the industrialized nations were working together to assist the poorer nations of the world.

We might, as a start, begin to explore together what our mutual interests and objectives were, and where our differences were, in relation to the reshaping of the U.N. system and the world economic order. This reshaping of the system, you will recall, is a question before a special session of the general assembly of the U.N. on September 1 through 16, this year.

In the food area, world needs and world supplies have not kept pace with each other at certain times in recent years.

You have occasionally found yourselves with external needs; and we have found ourselves with domestic shortages and higher food prices as a result of world demand, including your demand. Our stocks of grain have been reduced drastically, and our reserves of land are no longer held in reserve. Looking ahead, if we are all lucky in the next year or so there will be world surpluses, it will be possible to begin to build world reserves to protect all peoples, rich and poor, socialist and non-socialist. The U.N. World Food Conference in Rome called for a new reserve system. Months have passed, and the Western market economies are still at odds over how to create and manage such a system. But your nation has also been very unclear about what you conceived your own role to be.

This is a vital question. Let me explain.

If the market economies of the west develop a food reserve, and the costs are mutually shared among those who agree to build stocks, there will be an automatic conclusion that nations that do not join in developing and paying for such reserves will have to be discriminated against in times of shortage. Otherwise, there would not be any incentive for the members of such a group to continue membership. They would all take a free ride if any other nation could take a free ride. So, any commercial agreement in grains, involving stocks, will have to have two sets of rules: those which apply to "cooperators" and those which apply to "noncooperators." And if the executive branch did not write up such a distinction in its trade and stockpile agreement, you can be assured that the Congress would send the negotiators back to the bargaining table. So from your own point of view, you have a vital stake in active participation in the development and management of world food stocks. If you are not party to any new system, your access to external supplies will be subject to penalties of one kind or another.

But the political benefit to the USSR of participating in this way with the West, and of assisting the developing nations, would far transcend questions of food. The mood in the Congress and in the U.S. public would be immeasurably improved as regards detente if our nation and yours were seen to cooperate on this vital humanitarian and economic question.

This mood was very adversely affected by the way in which your agricultural purchases were made in the U.S. market in spring 1972 and again in late 1974. May I add on this that our mutual impact on world markets also provides a market imperative for collaboration. I believe you would serve your own interests by participating at least in an observer capacity in the current trade negotiations in Geneva. This could be done flexibly—the nations negotiating deliberately decided to negotiate without reference to the G.A.T.T., so that non-members could participate freely, and without institutional commitment.

As you develop greater trade ties internationally I believe you will need to protect your own interests with multilateral rules, as well as bilateral agreements. The door has been opened to you. The choice is yours.

I would also think that there would be scope for East-West exchange of views in furtherance of detente on a somewhat broader basis. It seems to me that there would be much to be gained from a series of exploratory meetings between the

major trading nations of the West and the Soviet Union and its socialist trading partners. Could there not be some imagination applied to the problem of exchanging views on pollution, trade, production of food and other resources, and relations with the third world by convening discussions of the O.E.C.D. developed nations and representatives of the Soviet Union and Eastern European nations?

I strongly urge that you give this thought. It makes sense in so many ways that it ought to be possible to overcome the natural resistance of our respective bureaucracies, which are always opposed to innovation in institutional dialogues. But it would be a powerful way of consolidating detente, without sacrificing our basic national interests and philosophical differences.

There will remain differences in our ways of doing things politically and economically. And there will be common interests. Detente is supposed to make possible a better relationship, taking into account this basic reality. The time has come to consolidate detente and give it real institutional and economic meaning. We must move beyond selective and secret diplomacy between us. But that will require a more intense dialogue, at more levels. It will require greater awareness of the whole globe on which we both live and must coexist in some type of harmony.

We cannot disrupt the interests of each other economically in one area without damage to our mutual interests in other areas, any more than we can pressure each other militarily in one part of the world without adverse military and political effects elsewhere. Our relationship is a relationship in a world context.

We are the two most powerful nations in the world. Our influence on the world is enormous. Detente must recognize our respective power, and utilize it for the betterment of all men. In that way we can truly seek peace between us—a peace that encompasses the globe, and allows improvement in the welfare of all peoples of the world.

E. LETTERS FROM PRESIDENT FORD TO COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, June 27, 1975.

The Hon. HENRY REUSS,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR HENRY: As I indicated in my foreign policy address of April 10 to the Congress, I believe that remedial legislation on credits and most favored nation treatment for the Soviet Union and other Communist countries is urgently needed. The Trade Act of 1974, as it relates to this subject, has proved to be both politically and economically harmful to our national interest and has not achieved the objective which its authors intended.

I intend to submit legislation to remedy the present unsatisfactory situation in both instances. Prior to doing so, I shall ensure that adequate consultations are held with you and other appropriate members of the House and Senate. I am hopeful that Congress will join me in recognizing the need for prompt corrective action.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, June 27, 1975.

The Hon. WILLIAM W. PROXMIRE,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR BILL: As I indicated in my foreign policy address of April 10 to the Congress, I believe that remedial legislation on credits and most favored nation treatment for the Soviet Union and other Communist countries is urgently needed. The Trade Act of 1974, as it relates to this subject, has proved to be both politically and economically harmful to our national interest and has not achieved the objective which its authors intended.

I intend to submit legislation to remedy the present unsatisfactory situation in both instances. Prior to doing so, I shall ensure that adequate consultations are held with you and other appropriate members of the House and Senate. I am hopeful that Congress will join me in recognizing the need for prompt corrective action.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, June 27, 1975.

Hon. AL ULLMAN,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR AL: As I indicated in my foreign policy address of April 10 to the Congress, I believe that remedial legislation on credits and most favored nation treatment for the Soviet Union and other Communist countries is urgently needed. The Trade Act of 1974, as it relates to this subject, has proved to be both politically and economically harmful to our national interest and has not achieved the objective which its authors intended.

I intend to submit legislation to remedy the present unsatisfactory situation in both instances. Prior to doing so, I shall ensure that adequate consultations are held with you and other appropriate members of the House and Senate. I am hopeful that Congress will join me in recognizing the need for prompt corrective action.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, June 27, 1975.

HON. RUSSELL B. LONG,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR RUSSELL: As I indicated in my foreign policy address of April 10 to the Congress, I believe that remedial legislation on credits and most favored nation treatment for the Soviet Union and other Communist countries is urgently needed. The Trade Act of 1974, as it relates to this subject, has proved to be both politically and economically harmful to our national interest and has not achieved the objective which its authors intended.

I intend to submit legislation to remedy the present unsatisfactory situation in both instances. Prior to doing so, I shall ensure that adequate consultations are held with you and other appropriate members of the House and Senate. I am hopeful that Congress will join me in recognizing the need for prompt corrective action.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

F. ARTICLE BY MELVIN R. LAIRD FROM THE JULY 1975 READERS DIGEST AND
RESPONSE BY G. A. ARBATOV AND G. A. ZHUKOV

IS THIS DÉTENTE?

ALL OVER THE WORLD, THE SOVIET UNION IS CALLOUSLY AND CONSISTENTLY IGNORING
AGREEMENTS WITH THE UNITED STATES THAT WERE DESIGNED TO REDUCE TENSIONS.
HERE IS THE SOBERING SCORECARD

(By Melvin R. Laird)

Over the past several years, the United States has made major concessions and numerous gestures of goodwill to induce the Soviet Union to help defuse world powder kegs that could explode into war. We still hope that such efforts will eventually succeed. Certainly, everyone hopes to avoid renewal of Cold War confrontations. But it would be dangerously foolish to confuse hope with reality. Therefore, I am now persuaded that the American people ought to be told some unpleasant facts about the true status of détente, so that they can intelligently judge the Kremlin's current intentions.

The facts are that, in recent months, the U.S.S.R.—secretly and openly—has repeatedly committed deliberate acts that mock détente and threaten the free world. Let's look at six deeply troubling actions:

1. The U.S.S.R. has violated agreements to limit strategic weapons

On May 26, 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union concluded two important arms agreements. One treaty strictly limits both countries in their future development of anti-ballistic-missile systems. A vital component of any such system is powerful, sophisticated radar that tracks incoming missiles. Article VI of that treaty explicitly forbids testing any radar for ABM use. Yet our government now possesses evidence that the Russians have conducted radar tests specifically forbidden by the treaty. The Russians have not disputed our intelligence, but have insisted that the tests were for "safety or instrumentation" purposes only. The disingenuousness of this reply cannot conceal the fact that the Russians have cheated on the treaty and may be developing an ABM system that would endow them with a significant strategic advantage.

The second accord limits the United States and the Soviet Union to approximately the same number of nuclear delivery systems. Critical to this SALT I agreement was the clear American understanding that neither side would appreciably increase the size of its intercontinental ballistic missiles—for larger missiles could carry more warheads and render the limitation on numbers meaningless. Now reconnaissance and other reliable sources have provided incontrovertible proof that the Soviets have cheated on this understanding. In some 50 silos, they have installed new missiles called the SS19, 50-percent bigger than most of their previous rockets. Deployed in large numbers, the SS19 will give the Soviet Union the capability to destroy our land-based missiles and bombers in a surprise attack. Six years ago, we and the Russians could deliver nuclear warheads of about the same destructive force. Today the Soviets can outfire us in destructive power by two-to-one.

2. The Soviet Union actively assisted North Vietnam in making a shambles of the Paris peace accords and overrunning South Vietnam

At Paris in January 1973, the North Vietnamese pledged to respect South Vietnam's right to determine its own political future. They pledged not to send more troops and arms into South Vietnam. Both pledges were promptly broken. The Russians, by continuing to supply North Vietnam with offensive war matériel beyond prescribed limitations, played a direct role in the treaty's sabotage. We sent less matériel to South Vietnam than the treaty allowed, and all of it was demonstrably for defense.)

After the ceasefire, the Russians and Chinese poured into North Vietnam aid conservatively valued at \$2.5 billion. Among Soviet shipments: 115 modern tanks

and armored vehicles, 300 tactical missiles, 1100 big military trucks. Such equipment was for one purpose only: renewed military attacks in violation of the Paris accords. And when the North's offensive began in the spring of 1974, Soviet tanks spearheaded it.

3. The Soviet Union has reneged on its promise to guarantee unimpeded civilian access to West Berlin

Ever since the Cold War began with the Berlin blockade in 1948, the Russians have employed stratagem after stratagem to strangle West Berlin economically, isolate it politically and capture it for themselves. In June 1972, we signed a pact with the Russians to ease the situation there. With Britain and France, we agreed to allow the Russians to establish a consulate in West Berlin and, at about the same time, to support United Nations membership for East Germany. The Soviets in turn pledged to ensure that the flow of people and goods through East Germany to West Berlin would not be obstructed.

However, once the consulate opened and East Germany was in the U.N., the Russians broke their word. From July to October last year, the communists deliberately—and repeatedly—stalled cars and trucks en route through East Germany. The latest treaty notwithstanding, the Russians still seem to look upon West Berlin as a hostage.

4. The Soviet Union is abetting terrorism and guerrilla warfare in the Middle East

In Syria, East Germany and the Soviet Union itself, communist agents are training hundreds of young Arabs in the techniques of terror. The Russians have supplied to Libya's dictator, Muammar el Qaddafi, deadly SA-7 heat-seeking missiles that can home in on the jet engines of commercial airliners. Predictably, Qaddafi has turned these portable weapons over to terrorists, allowing some to be shipped in diplomatic pouches. In September 1973, Italian police captured five terrorists armed with SA-7s on an apartment balcony near Rome's airport, poised to shoot down a Boeing 747. But the attempts go on.

And Russia continues to sustain a little-noticed but sinister guerrilla war on the strategic Arabian peninsula. The immediate Soviet target is the Sultanate of Oman, perched on the narrow Strait of Hormuz. Through this strait pass 17 million barrels of petroleum daily, bound for Japan and Western Europe. At camps maintained in neighboring South Yemen, Russians supervise guerrilla training of Omani tribesmen. Armed with Soviet weapons, the tribesmen raid the countryside—their avowed aim (despite almost total lack of support among the people of Oman) being to win a "war of national liberation" in support of Soviet policy. Such control would enable Russia to cut at will half of Western Europe's supply of oil and three fourths of Japan's.

5. In Portugal, the Soviet Union is sponsoring a massive campaign to impose a communist regime subservient to the Kremlin

The strategic location of Portugal makes it a key member of NATO. In April 1974, a coup ousted Portugal's right-wing dictator, Marcello Caetano, and hope arose that the country might peacefully transform itself into a democracy. However, with the coup, the communists sprang out of hiding as the country's best-organized and richest political party, even though the recent advisory election indicated that they had the backing of only about 13 percent of the people. But they did have the backing of the Soviet Union, which, in the past 12 months, has clandestinely provided them with at least \$40 million to pay party workers and hire street demonstrators to intimidate the opposition. With secret Soviet aid, the communist minority has gained control of the national labor federation and is exploiting the press to spread virulent anti-American propaganda. Opponents to communism are still being purged from key government and military posts, to be replaced by communists and their sympathizers.

Absorption of Portugal into the Soviet empire would expose Spain to subversion, cost NATO indispensable bases in the Azores, open up the Atlantic to Soviet submarines, and fundamentally alter the world balance of power.

6. The Soviet Union has engaged in a relentless effort to attain military supremacy

In the last six years, the United States has reduced its armed forces by 1.4 million men and women, cut the Army in half and lowered the number of Navy combat ships to the level of the year 1939. In constant dollars, we have slashed our military spending by 34 percent. This year, the defense budget will consume only 5.8 percent of the gross national product—the smallest percentage since 1950.

Yet our disarmament overtures have brought an *increase* in Soviet military allocations. Although the Russian economy has less than half our productive capacity, the Soviets are currently outspending us by 20 to 25 percent in every significant defense category. Their 4.2 million troops now outnumber our forces by more than two-to-one.

Meanwhile, we have granted the Russians long-term unsecured loans at interest rates below what the American home buyer, farmer, businessman or government must pay. And the Soviets continue to seek further credit, technology and other help from us. This adds up to a situation in which we subsidize the U.S.S.R.'s faltering civilian economy so that it can afford to mount an enormous arms build-up. For example, American engineers and money help construct in Russia the world's largest truck factory—and the Kremlin ships trucks to North Vietnam to help crush South Vietnam.

Clearly, we must shed any lingering illusions we may have that *détente* means the Russians have abandoned their determination to undermine Western democracy and impose their system upon the world. We must communicate to the Russians that the only alternative to *mutual* arms reduction is an American rearmament that would doom them to permanent military inferiority. We must show them that we will no longer tolerate the use of *détente* as a Russian one-way street.

WHAT IS DETENTE AFTER ALL?

(Reply to Melvin Laird article by G. A. Arbatov and G. A. Zhukov)

Those in the Soviet Union who follow the American press are well aware of discussion that has developed in the United States over the concept of *detente* and its basic problems. We also see differing motives on the part of those who have doubts, who are puzzled by one or another problem, who question this or that event or circumstance. But there are no differing motives. Mr. Laird's recent article in the Reader's Digest "Is This Detente?" is confined to one single point of view in the sense that its author does not like the relaxation of tensions which marked the development of Soviet-American relations in recent years and he is quite frank about it.

We know Mr. Laird is not alone in taking this stand, though we know that judging from recent public opinion polls, this negative position is not shared by the majority of the American public.

This is why we felt we should respond to his article.

We shall not enumerate the basic points of this article. Let us look into its general idea. The idea is that the U.S.A. allegedly made major concessions to the Soviet Union in the process of *detente* and received nothing in return. Moreover, it alleges that *detente* is used by the Soviet Union in a most dishonest way to the detriment of American interests.

We—and we have all grounds to speak about the Soviet Government's official point of view and of the unanimous conviction of Soviet public opinion—radically disagree with such an interpretation.

We think that positive changes which have taken place were to the benefit of both sides.

Firstly, they were to the benefit in the sense that we have stepped away from the fatal brink beyond which the nuclear catastrophe could break out.

We have benefited also in the sense that both Americans and we can now concentrate more efforts, attention, and resources on the solution of our own internal problems, which exist in the Soviet Union and in the United States of America.

And our main gain is in the sense that we have embarked on an encouraging road which we are sure may lead us to ever more radical changes in international relations capable of creating reliable guarantees of peace, to put an end to the arms race, to help us use our influence for improving the overall international atmosphere and move on to wide-scale, mutually advantageous bilateral and multilateral cooperation in all spheres—trade, science, technology, culture, etc.

Mr. Laird has formulated six points which in his opinion prove that the Soviet Union has allegedly "repeatedly committed deliberate acts that mock *detente* and threaten the free world."

With full responsibility we state that all six points are wrong, and are dangerous in that they can mislead the American public. Even if the American side had some doubts about facts cited by Laird (he refers to someone who detected "testing" of new types of radars subject to agreements and the "replacement" of

several dozen missiles), there exists a specially set up body for their clarification, the Permanent Consultative Commission. But it was an official Pentagon spokesman who publicly declared recently that the United States had no claims whatsoever on the Soviet Union's implementation of signed agreements on the limitation of strategic armaments. This was also confirmed recently by the President of the United States at his press conference. Mr. Laird's claims that the Soviet Union had, in violation of agreements, attained "military supremacy" over the United States are in absolute disagreement with reality, and official American data.

The second point of Laird's article accuses the Soviet Union of actively assisting North Vietnam in breaking down the Paris peace accords. Specific mention is made of 115 tanks, 1,100 trucks and other types of Soviet equipment which, according to Laird, were shipped to Vietnam and ensured the military success of the opponents to the Thieu regime. It is our opinion that only the most naive people with no knowledge of the matter can believe that the reason for the defeat of the Thieu regime is these tanks and trucks. Even if we take as correct the figures given by Mr. Laird, then the volume of help given to Vietnam by the Soviet Union and other countries in last years will amount to 2.5 billion dollars, while the United States spent all in all some 130 billion dollars to help Thieu. These are incomparable sums. The Thieu regime has given the possibility to create one of the best equipped armies in the world today. Nevertheless, it was impossible to preserve that regime. It was impossible to save it because it had rotted to the core, and could rely only on a 500,000-strong American army and, as soon as the latter was withdrawn from Vietnam, it was clear to every person with common sense that its days were numbered. A change in the political situation within South Vietnam was envisaged in the Paris peace accords. And if this main stipulation of the Paris agreements has not been carried out, the fault certainly does not rest with the Soviet Union. We think that something different has happened. Following the cease-fire in Vietnam no efforts had been exerted to eliminate the root of the civil war connected precisely with the existence in that country of a corrupt, terrorist regime and it is precisely this that made this result so inevitable.

Laird's assertion with regard to West Berlin is completely inconsistent with reality. It suffices to read a recent statement on this question by such a competent individual as former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, Willy Brandt, to see this.

The same should be said about the fourth point of the article about the allegations that the Soviet Union supports terrorism in the Middle East. We are against terrorism. Even if you admit that some terrorists had Soviet weapons, it is not the Soviet Union which is to be blamed. There are plenty of weapons of the most varied origin in this area of the world, including weapons supplied by the United States, France and other countries. These weapons could just as easily have fallen into the hands of terrorists. Laird obviously reads newspapers and he could acquaint himself with many authoritative statements by the Soviet side published in them, which resolutely condemn terror in all its manifestations.

Mr. Laird's statement about Portugal is really surprising. What has happened in Portugal is in no way the work of Communist conspirators." This is a legitimate result of the situation in which the country found itself following in the course of the policy of NATO. We have in mind its poverty and economic backwardness, its terrorist fascist regime which enjoyed the support of "western democracies" for the sole reason that it was anti-Communist, as well as hopeless colonial wars which Portugal had waged for so many years—an explosion there was inevitable and neither the Soviet Union nor detente are the causes of it. The allegation that the Soviet Union finances the activity of Portuguese Communists is preposterous and, by the way, it is not original. Such tales about "Soviet gold" had been spread even in the 20's. But they vanished like smoke even then when little was known about the Soviet system. One can presume that they have even less chance now for success.

And, finally, the sixth point that, contrary to the principle of equal security written down in the agreements, the USSR allegedly tries to attain "military superiority" over the United States. This also does not correspond with reality and is based on nothing. The military budget in the Soviet Union is not increasing. In recent years it has been reduced: although on a small scale. We wanted it to be cut further, but this to a great degree depends on the course of detente.

We set aside Laird's speculations about trade and credits due to its insignificant volume and mainly because the development of trade (and in all

countries this is based on the provision of credit) is of equal benefit to both sides. Our economy, despite Laird's assertions, is developing quite successfully and we wouldn't advise him, contrary to the facts, to assert the opposite (having also in mind the well known British proverb, which says that "Those who live in glass houses shouldn't throw stones").

Our trade with the United States last year amounted to a modest figure of 700 million rubles and the United States was only in the seventh place in volume of trade among other Soviet trade partners of the developed countries of the capitalistic world and was behind not only West Germany and Japan but even Italy and Finland.

We will mention in passing that the defense might of the Soviet Union Mr. Laird complains about was built up in the condition of almost complete absence of trade with the West. We would like to add also another point. The trade with the Soviet Union is not some kind of charity on the part of the United States. It develops only in areas and to the extent where it is advantageous to Americans since it opens up new jobs, gives the United States a chance to obtain many kinds of essential goods (including goods that the United States considers strategic such as diamonds, titanium, etc.) and also to improve the American balance of payments.

But the concluding part of Laird's article evokes the greatest objections; where he proposes to tell the Russians that the United States should give the U.S.S.R. an ultimatum: either do as Washington wants or the United States will step up the arms race and in this way doom the U.S.S.R. to "military inferiority." We would like to tell Mr. Laird that this is not a new proposal. This is just the road which the United States had followed for many decades. Where it has led is well known—of course, it brought nothing good to the Soviet Union but it also seriously damaged the United States. It was precisely after the United States began to realize the fruitlessness of the previous course that the shift toward detente began. In which direction does Mr. Laird summon the United States again?

G. SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSION AT A MEETING BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE
SENATE DELEGATION AND SOVIET JEWISH ACTIVISTS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION, MEETING OF SOVIET JEWISH ACTIVISTS WITH
U.S. SENATE DELEGATION

Participants

Jewish Activists.—Anatoly Schazansky, Lev Ovsischez, Alexander Lunts, Efim Davidovich, Elias Essas, Vladimir Slepak, Dina Beylina, Vladimir Prestin, Prof. Benjamin Levich, Vitaly Rubin, Ida Nudel, Alexander Lerner, Vladimir Lasaris, Benjamin Fain, Victor Brailovsky, Pavel Abramovich, Mark Azbel, and Mrs. Levich.

Senators.—Senator Javits, Senator Ribicoff, Senator Humphrey, Senator Scott, Senator Percy, Senator Mathias, Senator Morgan, Senator Leahy, Senator Hart, and Senator Domenici.

Others.—Peter Lakeland (Sen. Javits), Ken Davis (Sen. Scott), Scott Cohen (Sen. Percy), Al Saunders (Sen. Humphrey), Mrs. Javits, and Mrs. Ribicoff.

Place.—Rossiya Hotel, Moscow.

Date.—June 29, 1975.

Senator Javits opened the meeting by explaining the nature and purpose of the visit of the Senate delegation to the USSR and introduced individual members of the delegation present at the meeting. He emphasized the interest of the individual Senators in the cause of the Jewish activists and other dissidents in the Soviet Union who were making a stand on moral grounds in support of basic human rights and dignity. He explained that the group, by its nature was not on a negotiating mission, negotiations being the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Branch. Nonetheless, the Senate Delegation had official status from both the American and Soviet points of view. In this connection, no statement would be issued respecting the meeting with the activists while the delegation was in the USSR, but the exchange of views with them would be most valuable for the official discussions to follow with the Soviets and would be most valuable with respect to any follow-up actions that might ensue upon the return of the delegation to the United States.

Senator Ribicoff joined Senator Javits in welcoming the activists, assured them of the sympathy and knowledge of the delegation members respecting their plight. He stressed the potential usefulness of the discussion being commenced and asked the dissidents to be free and frank in expressing any advice they had for the Senators.

Senator Scott joined in greeting the activists and assured them that their views would be conveyed to all members of the delegation. He said that what the activists had to say would be very important to members of the delegation and that the Senators wanted to hear the views of the activists first-hand. He said that a serious deadlock had now developed respecting trade and emigration and that President Ford, just before the Delegation's departure, had written to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Members of the Senate, and House Banking Committees, the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee requesting that they explore ways to reopen the emigration question and see if some new legislative flexibility may be possible to help break the deadlock.

Senator Mathias said that the members of the delegation want to hear from the activists; the Senators know some part of their struggle and their coming to meet with the activists was evidence of their deep personal concern.

Prof. Lerner expressed the thanks of the activists to the Senators and to the U.S. Congress for the Jackson amendment which he characterized as "tremendous work". He wishes to dispel any idea that such activity by the Congress could bring harm to the activist of their movement. "We think we have benefited; one hundred thousands Jews have been able to leave for Israel as a result of the Jackson amendment struggle and many more will leave. We are grateful to the Senators, the U.S. Congress and the American people who have sacrificed their own material interests in support of their concern for our plight. We are deeply moved."

Senator Scott said that the Soviets state that the decline in emigration is due to a decline in applications. Is this so, or is it due to harassment?

Prof. Lerner said that they brought a letter with them addressed to the Senators describing what has happened since enactment of the Jackson amendment.

Senator Javits said that he had the letter and would circulate a copy to all members of the delegation. (Text of the letter is attached.)

An activist said that the KGB is trying to destroy the dissident movement in two ways: a) by harassment of the 'refuseniks' and b) by intimidation of potential applicants for permission to emigrate. He said there had been an increase in anti-Semitic propaganda and noted a recent article published which attempted to justify the pogroms of Czarist days.

Senator Ribicoff said "Let's talk conclusory realities; some say the Jackson amendment has hurt. What is your view?"

Dr. Lasaris said that pursuant to the understandings reached in the Fall of 1974 Soviets were supposed to allow Jews to emigrate but instead they have entered a campaign of repression. After the Stevenson amendment, the campaign of repression became more forceful and more open. The campaign begun in the provinces against Jews reached Moscow. The campaign became more systematic, the methods of refusal, discouragement and harassment became more open and more coordinated. He said that this was not due to the Jackson amendment but due to the Stevenson amendment which caused the Soviets to break the agreements they had entered into in the Fall of 1974.

Prof. Lerner said that the Jackson amendment has been helpful. It was the Stevenson amendment which turned the Soviets off on the compromise agreement.

Senator Scott said that at his request, President Ford has written a letter asking the Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the four involved committees of the Senate and House to reexamine the legislative restrictions concerning Export-Import Bank Credits for the Soviet Union, as effected by the Stevenson amendment and the Jackson amendment. He was hopeful that something could be done on the credit issue which might also be helpful on the emigration question.

Prof. Lerner said that the fact of the Jackson amendment compromise which the Soviets had agreed to proved that the Soviets were willing to accept the Jackson amendment.

Mr. Fain said that the worsening of the situation for Soviet Jews was due to the Stevenson amendment limits on credits. This led to more severe harassment by the KGB.

Mr. Davidovich said the Jackson amendment had been a very positive development for Soviet Jews. They had benefited from it. He said the main principles for the activities were (a) a close connection between Jewish emigration and foreign policy cooperation by the U.S. such as trade with the USSR; and (b) the presence of a juridical obligation on the part of the Soviets on emigration policies and procedures, tied to trade benefits sought by the USSR. He said ideology and prestige are especially important to the USSR. A way out of the present situation of stalemate will be easier if the two principles he mentioned are adhered to. There should be a way out for the Soviets to save face. Let the Soviets know that they can gain, or lose, on such matters as trade, credit, scientific exchanges and technical cooperation. The objectives of the principles he mentioned could be gained not only through state to state agreements, but also by the attitudes of individual scientists in the U.S. who are being asked to engage in scientific and technical exchanges. Such individuals in the U.S. and the West can convey the principles, and the advantages and disadvantages entailed, to Soviet scientists who desire cooperation and this can help the pressure through official government channels.

Senator Javits said he had been personally involved in the negotiations of the Jackson amendment compromise and wished to point out that the Soviets had never promised a figure or a quota of persons who would be permitted to leave. In the exchange of letters between Senator Jackson and Secretary Kissinger, the Congress told the U.S. President that it would expect an emigration rate of 60,000. But, the Soviets never promised any figure and therefore never broke any promise in that regard. He then asked whether the activists felt that Soviet dignity must be maintained to get a resolution of the stalemate. (They answered in the affirmative.) He asked whether they felt that it would be necessary for the Soviets to get some benefit out of the agreement. (They answered in the affirmative.)

Prof. Levich said the important question was what should be done after the compromise agreement on the Jackson amendment was broken by the Soviets.

The more timid Jews had stopped and are now watching to see what happens. The KGB is carrying on a big campaign of intimidation. Many letters are being circulated by the authorities from Jews who emigrated to Israel and are having some difficulties in adjusting. He said that he agrees that it is impossible to have some piece of paper that is only for Jews. The most important emigration issue, he feels is the "government clearance" requirement. This has a very hard effect on intellectuals. Every intellectual, every educated person needs to get a clearance sometime. A clearance is required for instance, just to do research in the library. Every educated person learns some "secrets" sometime in his career. There must be some agreement on the clearance requirement; since clearances are indispensable for all intellectuals, the emigration of intellectuals is made more difficult by the Soviet refusal of emigration permission to persons who have clearances. There must be some formal agreement on the clearance question.

Senator Humphrey said he would be most interested to learn the views of the activists as how to satisfy Soviet pride which has been wounded by the Jackson amendment, and how to get some emigration results. The present situation is one of stalemate with emigration down and the Soviet's feelings wounded. Is some revision of the Jackson amendment legislation required to break the stalemate? Soviet officials constantly say the Jackson amendment is unacceptable as explained publicly by Senator Jackson in his press conference. He asked whether the same results might be achieved by some modification or revision of the present law. Would it be possible to use language which ties MFN and credits to observation of the Declaration on Human Rights, which the USSR had signed, if combined with a monitoring device by Congress to assure actual and continuing compliance? He said the Senators needed practical suggestions. The Senators could leave the Soviet Union saying the Jackson amendment should remain as is; is there something else they should be saying? We, as Senators are interested in how best we can help human rights and Jewish emigration.

Dr. Slepak said the Jackson amendment showed that the Soviets are ready to compromise. But after the passage of the Stevenson amendment the Soviets couldn't say that \$300 million was too little in exchange for the Jews. Thus, they have maintained officially that the Jackson amendment is the reason for breaking the trade agreement. However, the activists think it was the Stevenson amendment which caused the Soviets to break the trade agreement. Now after, stating this officially so many times, the Soviet government cannot retreat without some modification of the Jackson amendment.

Senator Percy said he had made a specific suggestion to the Soviets. He proposed that in the delegation's meetings with their Soviet counterparts that it could be put forward that emigration in 1975 should equal the 1973 figure of 33,000 and that the Soviets be told that the trend established in 1971-73 be re-established and maintained. The U.S. is interested in action, not words. If the Soviets keep to their policy of 1971 to 1973, the U.S. can change the Jackson amendment.

Mr. Brailovsky said that acceptance of such a proposal by the Soviets could be dangerous to the activists because it would allow the Soviets to choose who is allowed to go with no objective criteria covering emigration principles. This would allow the KGB too much room to operate against individuals. The activists would have no objective criteria to appeal to.

Senator Percy asked if the same objection would remain if the percentage of Jews among those permitted to emigrate would have to be maintained.

Mr. Brailovsky said that would not solve the problem because the KGB could block the emigration of all intellectuals.

Senator Javits said that the Senate delegation could not negotiate an agreement with the Soviets on these matters. Only the President and Secretary of State can negotiate on behalf of the United States.

Senator Humphrey noted that the Soviet Union was a signatory to the Declaration on Human Rights. He suggested that perhaps the Jackson amendment could be modified to say that the United States would extend MFN and credits to all nations which are signatories to the Human Rights Convention, with a requirement that the President must certify annually that nations receiving MFN and credits under this provision are fulfilling their obligations under the Convention.

Several activists commented that this was an excellent suggestion.

An activist pointed that the Declaration of Human Rights was only a statement of intent and was not obligatory in the Soviet Union. He stressed the importance of linking MFN and credits to provisions of Soviet law that are binding. He said that an important aspect of the present situation is that Soviet laws are

not being observed by the Soviet authorities. The Jackson amendment does not contradict the various present laws of the USSR. Much of the present campaign against Jewish activists is in violation of present Soviet laws. Nobody is holding the KGB to account for its violations. He noted the viciousness of some current propaganda which alleges that Zionist ideas influenced Hitler, who got his idea of being Fuhrer from Herzl. Therefore, it is said in propaganda, all Jews applying for emigration are Zionists and are breaking Soviet law by encouraging ideas used by Hitler.

Senator Ribicoff said that no solution to the problem could be settled in this meeting. However, it will be very useful to get the ideas of the activists and their suggestions. He plans to tell the Soviets that under the U.S. Constitution, the Congress has authority over trade agreements. All the Senators present at this meeting are in full sympathy with the activists.

Alexander Lunts commenting on Senator Percy's suggestion said that it isn't just a question of the rate of emigration. Discussion of numbers per se can be set aside. Three things are needed: a) no harassment or intimidation of applicants for emigration; b) no arbitrary refusals of applications, 'ungrounded' in law; c) emigration permission should be granted first to 'refuseniks' who had been denied emigration arbitrarily and 'groundlessly' and to 'prisoners of Zion.' An agreement with the Soviets on these three principles would be enough. The agreement must have provisions for violations.

Prof. Levich said we are not politicians and it is hard for us to give precise answers to politicians' questions, but we will try. The starting point for an agreement with the Soviets on the 'essence of the problems' should cover all points mentioned in the discussion. He doubted that any such agreement would be published by the Soviets in any form in the USSR. Therefore, it would lack status and legal prestige. In any written agreement, the main point should be the Declaration of Human Rights, suggested by Senator Humphrey. The Declaration is not a law, but there could be an agreement between the U.S. and the USSR to fulfill or implement the moral obligations of the Declaration. That would be very important. The U.S. Congress would have the responsibility to decide whether there was conformity and to monitor compliance by the USSR.

Senator Leahy said he has talked individually with some of the activists present on other occasions over the phone. He emphasized that basic human rights transcend any single ethnic group and stressed that he was very devoted to their cause although he is not personally Jewish and he has a very tiny percentage of Jews among his constituents.

Senator Hart said he agreed with what Senator Ribicoff had expressed very well. In the U.S., Jews and non-Jews both are very concerned with the basic human rights issue. We will do all we can to help you.

Senator Morgan said that the people of North Carolina know of the plight of the activists and are very concerned. The Jewish community in North Carolina is not very large, but has been active in making everyone aware of the problem and getting their sympathy and support. As a new Senator, he would look for guidance in handling this problem from Senators Humphrey, Javits and Ribicoff.

Senator Javits summed up the discussion to this point. We have come as Senators and as friends of human rights from the freest country in the world to hear from you what we can do to advance human rights here. We have given some of our individual ideas frankly to you to see if they would fit into your situation. But, they are only ideas not negotiations. We appreciate receiving your views and suggestions. He asked if their views could be summarized as follows: a) the Jackson amendment gave hope and brought results in getting 100,000 Jews out of Russia; b) there has been a serious deterioration in the situation since the breakdown of the Trade Agreement; c) the dignity of the Soviet Union must be preserved in any solution; d) a new solution should concentrate not on numbers but on rights. The obligations under the Declaration of Human Rights, and existing Soviet law, are two starting points; e) the importance of timely action to resolve the stalemate is implied from the discussion.

Senator Ribicoff added that it seems to be the view of the group that it was the Stevenson amendment, not the Jackson amendment that caused the breakdown of the Trade Agreement.

Mrs. Levich said the importance of the concern of Congress and individual Senators should be included in any summary of the discussion.

Several Activists reiterated that the essence of the Jackson amendment should be preserve. Congress must retain a mechanism for monitoring and control because Soviet practice and Soviet words are often not the same. An example was given of amnesty and release from prison for war veterans, in

connection with the twenty-fifth anniversary of the victory over Hitler, being denied to a Jewish activist. Under the regulations he is entitled to amnesty and release from prison but, it is not being accorded. A number of individuals cases for presentation to Soviet authorities are contained in written material presented to the Senators at the outset of the meeting.

Prof. Lerner said we have placed a hard responsibility on the U.S. Senate and the American People for the fate of Soviet Jewry. We are profoundly grateful to them for assuming the burden of our fate. We trust our fate to your true hands. But for this support, many of us would not be here this evening, but rather would be in camps and prisons at this moment. We shall do our part in this struggle. We know the Americans help those who help themselves.

Senator Javits replied by saying the Senators understand and appreciate the courage shown by the activists, including the courage required to come to the meeting tonight.

Senator Humphrey said the presence of the activists and the presence of the Senators was the most important thing. Both the U.S. and the Soviet authorities know we are here and that you are here with us. We are all strong supporters of civil rights and human rights. It is important to get your counsel.

Dr. Slepak closed the meeting by thanking the Senators on behalf of all those present and on behalf of those they represent. He asked that the Senators please tell all their colleagues in the Congress about the meeting this evening.

Attached: Letter from Soviet dissidents.

DEAR SIRs: The national rebirth of Jews in the Soviet Union and their struggle for their right to go to Israel meet with constant support of the American people and its representatives in the U.S. Congress. Your visit gives us a pleasant opportunity to thank you, and in your person the whole American people for its sincere support.

We should like to inform you—our friends—of now existing situation and of possible turn of events.

It is nearly six months since the Soviet Union broke the trade agreement with the U.S.A. and the Soviet emigration policy entered its new phase. What is then this new emigration policy and what are its trends? We must say that it is not easy answer this question even for a person living in the U.S.S.R. and following these processes very closely. The analysis of the situation becomes more complicated owing to the impossibility of getting more or less complete information on the events taking place in the provinces and fear of majority of the people even to speak on this subject.

However, even the incomplete facts at our disposal give us sufficient reasons to draw to very disturbing conclusions. *A massive well planned operation is under way now—carried out mainly by the KGB and aimed at a suppression of the Jewish emigration movement.* What does then this operation consists in?

I

Since early 1975 the Soviet authorities have been pursuing an intensive policy of repression of any expression of the Jewish emigration movement and all its active elements.

(1) On March 31, 1975, in Moscow for the first time in all these years there took place a trial of Jews fighting for their right of repatriation. *Boris Tzitzljenok and Mark Nashpitz were sentenced to 5 years of deportation* for their participation in a 20-second-long peaceful demonstration of protest against a refusal to allow them to leave for Israel. Formerly the maximum punishment for such "an offence" had been a 15-day administration arrest.

(2) *A number of Jews—refusniks (Eliah Essas, Vladimir Lazaris, Benjamin Fain, Gregor Rosenstein, Isaj and Gregor Goldstein from Tbilisi, Leo Zhigun from Leningrad and many others) have been officially notified by the KGB that if they did not stop their active struggle for emigration they would be charged with criminal activity. They were accused of contacts with Jewish refusniks in other cities, writing and signing appeals to Jewish and international organisations, collecting and passing over to the West the information about the Jewish trials, etc. This time these were not mere threats, definite judicial steps have been taken starting criminal proceedings and the pertinent material has already been sent to the Prosecutor's Office.*

(3) *A similar notice has been served to Professor Mark Azbel—the head of a scientific seminar on macroscopic physics. He has been informed that the seminar in which several dozens of Jewish scientists who lost their jobs after their ap-*

plication for emigration visas have been taking part for over three years, *is in fact an anti-Soviet and Zionist assemblage and must be closed*. In case he does not comply Professor Azbel will be prosecuted.

A similar warning has also been given to Doctor Gregor Rosenstein, the head of a seminar of theoretical biology.

The seminar for retraining engineers has to work under an ever increasing pressure from the authorities. After numerous attempts to intimidate one of the lecturers of the seminar, Doctor of Sciences, Professor Leo Karp, the newspaper "Pravda"—organ of the C.C. of C.P.S.U. submitted a petition for depriving of his scientific degree and professorship.

(4) *Criminal proceedings have been started in connection with an independent type-written Jewish journal "Jews in the U.S.S.R."* This journal was founded by Professor Alexander Voronel about 2 years ago and on its pages there were published discussions of cultural and religious problems of Soviet Jews, essays, poems and plays. The journal deliberately did not deal with any political issues.

At present there is an investigation under way, apartment of I. Rubin, R. Nudelman, S. Shapiro and I. Gindis have been searched, a number of people have been called for interrogations.

One must state that if all these demands of the KGB are met, any vestige of the spiritual life of the Jewish emigration movement will disappear and the outside world will know nothing about the situation with Jewish emigration in the U.S.S.R. Besides, these demands may be followed by others and who knows how far they can go.

II

All the above said is only the visible part of the iceberg—which is called a policy of suppression of the Jewish emigration. *A much broader and invisible operation is been conducted to lessen the number of new applications for emigration.*

(1) Many obstacles to applications, mentioned elsewhere, have now increased. Thus we know of *many families that for months have been unable to receive invitations from Israel*, necessary for application for a visa. Though it is known that such invitations have been sent them. Every person wishing to emigrate from the U.S.S.R. irrespective of his age must submit his parents' permission. Recently there have been many cases when parents giving such permission lost their jobs, certain privileges etc. *More and more people expressing their wish to emigrate face public accusations at places of their employment with charges of treason.*

(2) *The atmosphere of fear which makes it impossible for many Jews to declare their wish to emigrate has recently become much more intense.* It has been strengthened by a number of Jewish trials resulting in long-term imprisonment (Doctor Stern's trial in Vinnitza—8 years of hard labour).

(3) *At present a number of trials are being prepared of young men (who applied for permission to go to Israel).* Following their application for visas they were drafted into the army. In case they joined the army, then after a 2 years service they may not get a permission to emigrate (for a space of time 5–10 years) because of "knowledge of military secrets".

One of those arrested is a Moscowite Natan Malkin, who refused to serve in the army about a year ago. But the authorities have decided to put him on trial just now. This is an example of what may await all young people from 18 to 30 if they apply for permission to emigrate.

(4) *The atmosphere of fear has also been increased by special operations carried out by the KGB in many cities of the Soviet Union on a wide scale.* Thus, in May, in Donetsk members of 3 families who were going to apply for emigration to Israel were interrogated for 3 days in the KGB. Threats and pressure were applied. In the end they were told that the KGB had plenty of material to sentence them to several years of hard labour, but if they kept quiet and did not attempt to leave they would be forgiven.

(5) *Even a recent information about a special tax on money remittance from abroad also "favours" the suppression of the Jewish emigration movement.*

(6) *The atmosphere of fear, lack of information, the growing anti-Israel and anti-Zionist, but in fact antisemitic propaganda* (recently the Soviet press has even justified the terrible Jewish pogroms in Russia at the beginning of the century)—*all these factors may make these methods of KGB more effective.*

All this is taking place against the background of tragedy witnessed by the whole world: *over 2 million Jews are being deprived of any opportunity to participate in any way in their cultural heritage and traditions.*

This repressive tendency is becoming apparent in the worsening conditions of prisoners of conscience now kept in the Soviet prisons and concentration camps. *One crying example: Lazar Lubarsky, a war veteran, decorated with military orders and sentenced to 4 years of corrective labour camps after he had applied for permission to go to Israel, was denied amnesty although his case falls under the Decree of Amnesty for war veterans issued on May 7, 1975.*

Such has been the development of the Soviet emigration policy and such are in our opinion main reasons for a decrease in the number of applications for emigration from the U.S.S.R. to Israel within the last six months.

Can the American public and Congress, who follow the process of the Jewish emigration with sympathy, change the existing trend of events? We believe that answer to this question is yes.

At the same time in case of any compromise we consider it correct to preserve the basic stipulations worked out by Congress in its action in support of the right of Soviet Jews to emigrate. By this we mean the following:

First, the problem of Jewish emigration should be inseparably linked with the aspects of Soviet-American cooperation essential to the U.S.S.R. (for example, trade and credits, as it was stipulated in the Foreign Trade Bill of 1974);

Second, there should exist definite juridical and procedural obligations on the part of U.S.S.R. concerning various aspects of this problem;

Third, there should exist a permanent controlling organ which will allow the American party to discontinue the action of certain privileges depending on the U.S.S.R. observing its obligations.

It should be emphasized that any specific steps (such as allowing a number of Jewish activists to go to Israel) isolated from other aspects of Jewish emigration movement will not solve by themselves the problem in its entirety.

Yours very truly,

Victor Brailovsky, Moscow; Benjamin Fain; Vladimir Prestin; Mark Azbel; Eliah Essas; Leonid Koshevoy; Pavel Abramovitch; Vladimir Lazaris; Dov Ramm; July Kosharovsky; Lidia Cornfeld; Leo Karp; Josef Begun; Isay Goldstein, Tbilisi; Gregor Goldstein; Vladimir Kislik, Kijev; Alexander Tzatzkis; Israel Varnavitsky, Leningrad; Valery Kaminsky, Riga; Benor Goorfel, Tallin; Peter Adamsky, Vilnus; Simon Girshas, Kaunas; Mihail Mager, Vinnitza.



