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REPORT

OF THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY
ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDING FEBRUARY 28, 1975



February 1975

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SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

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ALFONSO L. TARABOCHIA, *Chief Investigator*
MARY E. DOOLEY, *Acting Director of Research*

¹ Resigned from U.S. Senate as of Dec. 31, 1974.

² Resigned from U.S. Senate as of Dec. 27, 1974.

RESOLUTION

Resolved, by the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, That the attached report of the Subcommittee for the fiscal year ending February 28, 1975, is approved for transmittal to the Judiciary Committee with a recommendation that it be filed with the Senate, and for that purpose shall be printed but shall not be made public until approved by the full committee.

JAMES O. EASTLAND,
Chairman.

Approved: FEBRUARY 26, 1975.

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FOREWORD

The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee is authorized and directed by the United States Senate to make a complete and continuing study and investigation of (1) the administration, operation, and enforcement of the Internal Security Act of 1950; (2) the administration, operation, and enforcement of other laws relating to espionage, sabotage, and the protection of the internal security of the United States; and (3) the extent, nature, and effects of subversive activities in the United States, its Territories and possessions, including, but not limited to espionage, sabotage, and infiltration by persons who are or may be under the domination of the foreign government or organizations controlling the world Communist movement or any other movement seeking to overthrow the United States by force and violence.

In furtherance of the above duties, the subcommittee has engaged in a number of different activities during the fiscal year ending February 28, 1975. The two most extensive series of hearings were those on "Terroristic Activities" and "Marihuana-Hashish Epidemic and Its Impact on U.S. Security." In addition, the subcommittee did other important work, some of which is detailed in this report. Other duties were performed which cannot be publicly disclosed at this time because of security considerations.

I. MARIHUANA-HASHISH EPIDEMIC

In May and June of 1974 the Internal Security Subcommittee held extensive hearings on the "Marihuana-Hashish Epidemic and Its Impact on United States Security." All told, the subcommittee took testimony from 21 scientific witnesses, in addition to representatives of the armed services, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and others who had experience or information on the cannabis epidemic.

In his introduction to the record of the hearings on the marihuana-hashish epidemic, Senator Eastland said:

I consider the hearings which are the subject of this record to be among the most significant ever held by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, or, for that matter, by any committee of Congress. The widespread interest already generated by the hearings suggest that they may play a role in reversing a trend towards national disaster.

The scale of the cannabis epidemic which inspired the hearings is apparent from the tables submitted by the Drug Enforcement Administration. According to these tables, seizures of marihuana by the federal authorities increased tenfold in the 5 year period terminating December 1973, to a total of 780,000 pounds, while seizures of hashish increased 25-fold over the same period to a total of 55,000 pounds. Making some allowance for the countless smaller seizures made by state and local authorities, and multiplying by 8 or 10 to get a rough idea of how much entered the country and was consumed, one comes up with the frightening finding that during 1973 Americans consumed at least 10 million pounds of marihuana and in excess of 600,000 pounds of hashish.

As Senator Eastland pointed out, the spread of the epidemic was facilitated by the widespread tendency to regard marihuana as a relatively innocuous drug.

The Internal Security Subcommittee decided to look into the situation because there clearly were internal security considerations affecting the armed forces of the United States and government employees in various other departments involving sensitive information and operations. Because of its interest in the impact of cannabis use on security, the Subcommittee, in its hearings, focused heavily on the evidence of physical and psychological damage.

Among the eminent scientists who were called to testify before the Subcommittee were:

Dr. HARVEY POWELSON: Research Psychiatrist, Berkeley University; Chief of the Psychiatric Division of the Student Health Service at Berkeley from 1964 to 1972.

Dr. HENRY BRILL: Regional Director of the New York State Department of Mental Hygiene; member and/or chairman of drug dependence committees of American Medical Association, National

Research Council, the World Health Organization, and the FDA; senior psychiatric member of the Shafer Commission.

Dr. DONALD LOURIA: Chairman, Department of Preventive Medicine and Community Health, New Jersey Medical School; Chairman and President, New York State Council on Drug Addiction, 1965 to 1972.

Professor W. D. M. PATON: Head of the department of pharmacology at Oxford University; Chairman of committee overseeing the British Government's drug research program; author of a standard textbook on pharmacology and widely recognized as one of world's leading pharmacologists.

Professor MORTON STENCHEVER: Chairman of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the University of Utah Medical School.

Dr. GABRIEL NAHAS: Research Professor at the Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons; simultaneously Visiting Professor at the University of Paris.

Dr. AKIRA MORISHIMA: Research geneticist; Associate Professor, Department of Pediatrics, Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons; Chief of the Division of pediatric endocrine service at Babies Hospital, New York.

Dr. CECILE LEUCHTENBERGER of Switzerland: Head of the Department of Cell Chemistry at the Institute for Experimental Cancer Research in Lausanne; founder and first Director of Cell Chemistry Department at Western Reserve University.

Dr. JOHN A. S. HALL: Senior Physician and Chairman, Department of Medicine, Kingston Hospital, Jamaica, since 1965; Associate Lecturer in Medicine, University of West Indies and visiting Assistant Professor of Neurology at Columbia University.

Dr. ROBERT KOLODNY: Director of the endocrine research section at the Reproductive Biology Research Foundation in St. Louis.

Professor M. I. SOUEIF: Chairman of the Department of Psychology and Philosophy at Cairo University; member of World Health Organization Panel on Drug Dependence; author of classic study on consequences of hashish addiction in Egypt.

Professor NILS BEJEROT: Karolinska Institute, Sweden; author of "Addiction and Society" and several other standard texts on the epidemiology of drug abuse. Widely recognized as one of foremost international experts in this field.

Dr. ANDREW MALCOLM: Toronto psychiatrist; member, Drug Advisory Committee, Ontario College of Pharmacy; formerly Senior Psychiatrist, Rockland State Hospital, New York (1955-1958).

Dr. HAROLD KOLANSKY: Currently Associate Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine; twice President of the Regional Council (Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware) of Child Psychiatry; Director of Child Psychiatry, Albert Einstein Medical Center, Philadelphia, 1955-1969; Chairman, Department of Psychiatry, Albert Einstein Medical Center, 1968-1969.

Dr. WILLIAM T. MOORE: Currently Associate Professor in Clinical Psychiatry, University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine; Associate Professor of Child Psychiatry at Hahnemann Medical College for 13 years up until 1972; for the past five years Director of Training, Division of Child Analysis, Institute of Philadelphia Association for Psychoanalysis.

Professor ROBERT HEATH: Chairman of the Department of Psychiatry and Neurology at Tulane University Medical School.

Dr. PHILLIP ZEIDENBERG: Professor of Psychiatry at Columbia University; Chairman of the Drug Dependence Committee of the New York State Psychiatric Institute.

Dr. JULIUS AXELROD: Nobel Prize winning research scientist at the National Institute of Mental Health.

Professor HARDIN B. JONES: Professor of Physiology and Professor of Medical Physics at the University of California, Berkeley; Assistant Director of the Donner Laboratory of Medical Physics at Berkeley.

Dr. CONRAD SCHWARZ: Associate Professor, Department of Psychiatry, University of British Columbia and Consultant Psychiatrist to the Student Health Service; Chairman of the Drug Habituation Committee of the British Columbia Medical Association.

Dr. FOREST S. TENNANT, Jr.: Medical Director for several drug abuse programs in the Los Angeles area; officer in charge of the drug abuse program of the U.S. Army Europe, 1971-1972.

The testimony presented to the Subcommittee pointed to the following conclusions:

1. THC, the principal psycho-active factor in cannabis, tends to accumulate in the brain and gonads and other fatty tissues in the manner of DDT.

2. Marihuana, even when used in moderate amounts, causes massive damage to the entire cellular process.

3. Tied in with its tendency to accumulate in the brain and its capacity for cellular damage, there is a growing body of evidence that marihuana inflicts irreversible damage on the brain, including actual brain atrophy, when used in a chronic manner for several years.

4. There is also a growing body of evidence that marihuana adversely affects the reproductive process in a number of ways, and that it poses a serious danger of genetic damage and even of genetic mutation.

5. Chronic cannabis smoking can produce sinusitis, pharyngitis, bronchitis, emphysema, and other respiratory difficulties in a year or less, as opposed to 10 to 20 years of cigarette smoking to produce comparable complications.

6. Cannabis smoke, or cannabis smoke mixed with cigarette smoke, is far more damaging to lung tissues than tobacco smoke alone. The damage done was described as "precancerous."

7. Chronic cannabis use results in deterioration of mental functioning, pathological forms of thinking resembling paranoia, and "a massive and chronic passivity" and lack of motivation—the so-called amotivational syndrome."

The hearings had great impact on the press, on the public, on the scientific community generally, and on government drug policy.

Whereas TV programs on the subject of marihuana prior to the Subcommittee's hearings almost invariably featured proponents of the viewpoint that marihuana is an innocuous drug, several TV network news series that have been set up since the hearings have featured scientists on both sides of the controversy—thus giving a hearing for the first time to the rapidly growing body of scientific information on the adverse effects of marihuana.

There has, from the first, been intense public interest in the Subcommittee's hearings. Even before printed volumes were available, the Subcommittee had received almost 2,000 requests for copies of the testimony from members of the public. Some hundreds of these came from doctors, while hundreds more came from educators, law enforcement officers, and drug counselors.

In early January, pursuant to the passage of a concurrent resolution by the House and Senate, the Subcommittee received an additional quantity of 10,000 copies of the hearing record. Including several thousand copies that were mailed to law enforcement officers across the country and to drug educators, over 7,000 copies had gone out by the end of January, and it is anticipated that the remaining supply will be exhausted by March or April.

The scientific quality of the Subcommittee's hearings were praised in the following letter which Chairman Eastland received from Dr. Robert DuPont, director of the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention.

SEPTEMBER 6, 1974.

Hon. JAMES O. EASTLAND,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: I have followed with interest the Internal Security Subcommittee hearings on the potential dangers of marihuana use. The Committee—and you as its chairman—have performed a valuable public service in bringing the scientific evidence of the health hazards of marihuana to the public attention.

My congratulations for the excellent job done, and my sincerest thanks as well.

Cordially,

ROBERT L. DUPONT, M.D.,
Director.

In addition, Dr. DuPont, whose office has been in charge of producing annual reports on marihuana and health for Congress for the past 4 years, made the following point in his introduction to the 1974 report:

The original fourth edition was completed in draft form early this year before the availability of several important studies which may indicate more serious implications to cannabis use than previous research suggested. Release of that report was delayed so that these more recent studies might be included in this fourth edition and the present state of our scientific evidence placed into a more accurate perspective.

The "more recent studies" to which Dr. DuPont referred included some of the major studies that were reported by the scientists who testified in the course of the Subcommittee's hearings.

Dr. DuPont subsequently issued a warning that, in the light of recently available scientific evidence, marihuana must be considered a potentially quite dangerous drug.

In inserting the text of his introduction into the Congressional Record on October 3, 1974, Senator Eastland said that he had asked the staff of the Subcommittee to prepare a master memorandum

bringing together the evidence that had been presented in the hearings that has a bearing on the question of personnel security. Acting on this instruction, the Subcommittee staff went through the testimony carefully, excerpting all those passages which had some implications for the problem of security, and they prepared an analytical commentary based on these excerpts. This study, captioned "Marihuana and the Question of Personnel Security," is now completed. Over the coming period, copies will be sent to the heads of all executive agencies for the possible information of their security officers.

II. TERRORISTIC ACTIVITIES

A. CALIFORNIA ATTORNEY GENERAL

California Attorney General Evelle Younger, in a September 23, 1974 hearing, said that the Nation may be in for an era of "super-violence" from terrorists and the celebration of the United States' 200th anniversary could trigger it.

He said, "bits and pieces of information" are "appearing in underground publications indicating that plans are already being formulated to insure that the 200th anniversary year of the United States is marred with domestic violence."

Younger described the May 31, 1974 bombing of his Los Angeles office by the Weather Underground, and emphasized the fact that "California continues to be confronted by terrorism." He said groups and individuals engaged in this type of activity find many fertile areas to exploit from bombings to instigating riots in prison. In examining various terrorist groups in California, Younger said that one common characteristic emerges—they all have an unmistakable Maoist basis.

The most important tool in combating terrorism, he said, is intelligence.

He said he feels legislation is needed which would narrow the options available to political terrorists, but attempts to pass such legislation have been unsuccessful.

At the hearing the Attorney General displayed several types of weapons used by terrorists, and written material obtained from SLA "safe houses". He also furnished a collection of pictures of some of the leaders of Weather Underground, together with background information.

B. STATE DEPARTMENT BOMBING

In the early morning hours of January 29, 1975, a bomb explosion racked two restrooms on the third floor of the State Department building in Washington. At about the same time another bomb was placed in the Defense Department building in Oakland, Calif. A letter signed by Weather Underground, which was made available to Associated Press, claimed responsibility for both bombs. Fortunately, the Oakland bomb was found and exploded harmlessly in the street.

The Internal Security Subcommittee held a hearing on the bombings on January 31, and released the findings on Tuesday, February 4, 1975. The hearing included the full text of the letter signed by Weatherman, showing the identities of the targets typed in after the original text had been prepared.

Also included were various photographs of damage to the State Department Building, and a detailed report of the bomb search in Oakland prepared by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, U.S. Treasury Department.

C. REPORT ON WEATHER UNDERGROUND

At the time of the State Department bombing, the subcommittee had in final stages of preparation a 170-page report on the Weather Underground.

The report, released less than two weeks later on February 10, was, in the words of Chairman Eastland:

The result of an inventory and analysis of all information in the files of the subcommittee with respect to the Weatherman organization, its members and former members.

The report included photographs of 38 persons believed to comprise the hard-core Weather Underground, all of whom disappeared from public view in 1970. Also in the report is a summary of all available information about 157 individuals who, at one time or another, had been identified as members of, or as having associations with, the Weatherman from its founding in 1969. The 157 summaries are arranged in alphabetical order, including the 38 members of Weather Underground.

In his foreword, Senator Eastland noted that:

The material presented does not purport to be encyclopedic, but it is hoped the report will be helpful in any consideration of legislative proposals designed to deal with violent, terroristic, or other subversive organizations. It should also have interest and value for law enforcement agencies.

D. INSIDE VIEW OF WEATHERMAN

A revealing inside account of the Weatherman organization from its early months until top leaders went underground in 1970 was presented in testimony before the subcommittee by Larry Grathwohl, a former FBI informant with the organization. The hearing was released February 16, 1975.

Grathwohl volunteered to work for the FBI after being recruited for Weatherman in Cincinnati.

Grathwohl attended the National Council meeting of Weatherman in Flint, Mich., in late December 1969 and from then on actively associated with some of the top leaders of the organization. After the Flint meeting he quit his Cincinnati job and devoted full time to Weatherman, receiving financial help from the FBI.

Grathwohl said he had heard some members of the Weatherman discuss kidnapping high officials such as then-Vice-President Spiro Agnew, Former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, Henry A. Kissinger, who at that time had not yet become Secretary of State, and then-White House press secretary Ronald Ziegler. He said he knew of no attempts to put such plans into action.

A former Army sergeant with one year's service in Vietnam, Grathwohl said he was considered a demolitions expert by Weatherman. He said he heard many bombing targets discussed, including that of the U.S. Capitol, but the only one on which he was ordered to work personally was the attempted bombing of the Detroit Police Officers' Association Building in early 1970. In contrast to the usual procedure of bombing to avoid hurting people, Grathwohl said Weatherman

leader Bill Ayres said the bombing should be planned so as to "kill some policemen." Grathwohl said he was not actually involved in planting the bomb, but notified the FBI when he thought it was to take place. It was actually planted the day after, but did not explode because the fusing device was antiquated.

In February 1970, the Weatherman went underground. Grathwohl said he heard Mark Rudd personally announce at a meeting in Cleveland that the organization would go underground with "a goal of strategic sabotage against all symbols of authority".

In late February Grathwohl was assigned to a collective in Madison, Wis., at the end of March was instructed to join a group in Buffalo, N.Y. On April 15, 1970, his connection with the FBI became known after he was arrested in New York with Dionne Donghi and Linda Evans, two top leaders of Weatherman.

E. ANALYSIS OF URBAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT

The basis of urban guerrilla groups such as Weatherman and the Symbionese Liberation Army, was analyzed in a hearing before the subcommittee released on February 25, 1975. Dr. Frederick Charles Schwarz, president of the Christian Anti-Communism Crusade and director of numerous freedom seminars, anti-subversive seminars, and anti-communism schools, was the witness.

"Urban Guerrillas," he said:

Can be regarded as a Communist fringe group or sect. They combine many of the doctrines of communism with some of the practices of anarchism. They don't give priority to study, organization, discipline, and mass action. They take it for granted that the American economic, political, and governmental systems are utterly evil and that any means to destroy them is legitimate. They engage in armed propaganda or the propaganda of the deed. They depend on the news media to publicize their deeds and win recruits for their cause. The success of their program rests upon the cooperation given by the news media. To date the revolutionaries have no cause for complaint.

Dr. Schwarz said that revolutionary groups:

Have become disillusioned with the working class in the United States. They claim the workers have been bribed with the profits of imperialism so that they are no longer revolutionary. Since the working class will not rise in revolution, some other method must be found to destroy imperialist society.

"In a democratic society," Dr. Schwarz said:

The revolutionaries believe the oppression is real but concealed so that the workers are unaware of it. Therefore, the democratic society must be destroyed and replaced by an authoritarian society which will make the people conscious of oppression. If sufficient urban guerrilla bands can be formed and will engage in . . . violent acts, the people will demand an authoritarian government to provide order.

Dr. Schwarz said revolutionary theorists would then expect the police state to deprive the people of liberties and generate a revolutionary consciousness, leading eventually to popular revolt. "At this stage the Communists emerge and endeavor to lead the revolution and through it impose Communist dictatorship," he said.

III. INVESTIGATIONS DEPARTMENT

A. GENERAL ACTIVITIES

The investigative process during the year 1974 involved several facets of activities that came under the mandate of the Subcommittee.

During the preparatory phase of the hearings on the "Marihuana-Hashish Epidemic and Its Impact on United States Security," several interviews were conducted for the purpose of obtaining the necessary information from government agencies whose security was liable to be affected. This entailed analysis of security regulations, personnel attitude and other related matters. In addition, several cases where security had been affected were investigated and reported.

The investigation initiated in 1973 to determine the extent of subversion among U.S. military personnel based overseas was continued during 1974.

One of the most significant episodes of this investigation was the role of U.S. civilian citizens operating outside the legal jurisdiction of the United States in fomenting violations of Title 18 of the U.S. Code. Specifically, the incident of the U.S.S. "Midway" played a primary role in the investigation.

Further investigation into the inhuman treatment of U.S. POW's in North Vietnam yielded new information as to the nationality of the non-orientals involved.

The investigation of the Communist Threat to the U.S. through the Caribbean was continued as reported below.

B. THE VENCEREMOS BRIGADE

The continuing investigation of the Communist Threat to the United States through the Caribbean brought to light a facet of activity involving United States and foreign nationals which may affect the internal security of the United States for many years to come.

Specifically, it dealt with the degree of involvement of the General Directorate of Intelligence (D.G.I.), the Cuban equivalent of the Soviet KGB, in the infiltration of deep-cover agents into the United States, and the establishment of a vast network for the collection of intelligence of military, political, industrial, and economic nature directly affecting the security of the country.

As previously reported, the Subcommittee had followed with great interest the activities, in the United States and Cuba, of the members and veterans of the "Venceremos" Brigade. The investigation has been a continuing one. It was begun at the time of the Brigade's inception in 1969 for the alleged purpose of helping the Communist regime of Cuba in its sugar harvest by bringing in U.S. volunteers.

There had been good reason to believe that the Venceremos Brigade had been created for the purpose of acting as a screen and tool of the

Cuban intelligence apparatus. This has now been confirmed by a careful analysis of much new evidence, based on a variety of sources. This evidence points to the conclusion that the Venceremos Brigade is one of the most extensive and dangerous infiltration operations ever undertaken by a foreign power against the United States.

Genesis

The Venceremos Brigade was brought into being through the clever manipulation of a small group of U.S. leftist radicals, prominent among whom were some of the leaders of the SDS "Weatherman" faction. The creation of the Brigade stemmed from three basic priorities of the DGI:

1. The need for factual and current information on every aspect of activity in the United States. This was deemed essential in guiding the DGI in its long range plans to infiltrate a number of Cuban "illegals" into the United States in response to pressure from the Soviets.

2. The desire of the Cubans to turn to their own advantage any manifestation of dissent toward the established order in the Free World, especially when directed against the United States. This entailed exposure of selected individuals, representing a broad spectrum of revolutionary-terrorist groups in the United States, to carefully staged meetings with leaders of international revolutionary movements brought to Cuba under the auspices of the African-Asian-Latin American Peoples Solidarity Organization, commonly known as the "Tricontinental."

3. A show of solidarity toward North Vietnam and the Viet Cong, acting not only as a conveyor belt for anti-war propaganda but actually using the Brigade as a means to collect information useful to the North Vietnamese.

DGI Involvement

The involvement of the DGI in the genesis of the Brigade was so blatant that the name of one of its UN Center officers was openly mentioned in a letter to the leadership of the SDS Weatherman faction.¹ When active recruiting for the Brigade began in the fall of 1969, the DGI had to rely on a cadre formed mainly by New Left activists who had made one or more trips to Cuba. The results of the interviews were then reviewed by the DGI United Nations Center, which gave final approval. This procedure is still followed whenever a Brigade is being recruited.

Those selected for the Brigade undergo preliminary indoctrination at the hands of the cadre who, under the guise of assessing the involvement of the recruit, elicit information on a variety of subjects that are of great interest both to the DGI and the KGB.

Brigade members usually are transported to Cuba by passenger aircraft or converted freighter. The return trip is usually by converted cattleboat to Canada, although the 7th Brigade broke with this precedent and returned to the United States by air via Barbados. Every time a Brigade traveled to or from Cuba on a freighter, the DGI placed a number of its officers on board in order to take advantage

¹ Page 299, Part 4, *Extent of Subversion in the New Left*. (Julie Nichamin, author of the letter and one of the U.S. instruments of the DGI in the formation of the Brigade was recently in Puerto Rico as representative of the Puerto Rican Solidarity Day Committee.)

of any situation that might allow them to manipulate and establish control over the Americans.

Venceremos Brigade activities are of such great importance to the DGI that they are controlled by a special section of the Political and Economic Intelligence Division, ranking on a par with similar sections on the UN, the U.S. Department of State, and U.S. political parties. The Brigade section is under the direct supervision of the Deputy Director of the DGI, Ramon Oroza Naveran, known under the *nom de guerre* of "Demetrio."

Demetrio personally supervised the creation and subsequent activities of the Brigade, and he assigned such priority to the project that all other DGI operations were held to be subordinate to the collection of intelligence from the members of the Venceremos Brigade.

Practically every Cuban national attached to the Brigade camps, right down to the food service and maintenance personnel, is a member or a co-opted member of the DGI. These DGI operatives are so skilled in their impersonations that few Brigade members are aware of their true identities. In fact, so many DGI personnel are needed to staff these camps that nearly all other operations must be suspended when the camps are active. Even maintenance and clerical personnel of the Directorate are pressed into service, as numerous photographs obtained by the Subcommittee indicate.

DGI Subservience to KGB Directives

However extensive the involvement of the Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence may be in this and other operations, one needs to bear in mind the underlying factor of the subservience of the DGI to its supervisory organization, the KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti) of the Soviet Union.

Early in 1969, as revealed in testimony before the Subcommittee by Orlando Castro Hidalgo, a former DGI officer stationed in Paris, the Directorate issued new directives regarding relations with the Soviet Union. This stemmed from the fact that the Soviets had used oil as a blackmail weapon to bring the Cubans to heel. (Evidence of this is to be found in a lengthy philippic delivered by Raul Castro on January 24, 1968, during a secret session of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party.)

Ironically, the details of the whole affair are contained in a booklet, published by the Cuban government and brought to the United States by a returning member of the Brigade. The booklet is entitled "Information from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba on Microfaction Activities"—Instituto de Libro—Ediciones Politicas, Havana 1968.

As a result of a new agreement, the DGI was ordered to collect intelligence which was of little intrinsic value to Cuba but of very great interest to the Soviet Union. Immediately afterward, the number of DGI personnel stationed in Cuban embassies in Western Europe was increased sharply.

It was in this context that the KGB advisor to the DGI, Vitaliy Petrovich Semionov, insisted on the priority of establishing a good network of illegals in the United States instead of confining the Directorate's interest to the activities of the anti-Castro exiles. The DGI was eager to comply.

Cuban Illegals in the United States

At this point, it is important to go into some detail regarding the need of the Communists for factual and current information for the purpose of training "illegals" and situating them in the United States.

At the outset, the DGI infiltration candidates were handpicked members, well prepared, of long standing party allegiance, with extensive experience in intelligence matters. For better security, they had not been allowed to travel outside Cuba, and, as an additional precaution, they had never had personal contacts with prisoners. All were college trained and virtually all of them were fluent in English. To round out their training, they were to receive an 11 month training course in the Soviet Union. The initial group of illegals consisted of approximately 30 officers selected in 1970.

In addition to the extensive training that an illegal, who is to establish residence in the United States, has to undergo, there are other needs to be considered. Most important of all is establishing a new identity with corroborating evidence as to his person, family background, education, business, etc. The period of "incubation" can take 5 or 6 years or even longer.

Soon after the Soviets made the proposal, the DGI found out that it was totally unprepared, because of a lack of the necessary data, to embark on this operation. To furnish covers for illegals entailed a monumental task of collection and analysis of information that its agents attached to the UN Center in New York could not accomplish without inside assistance.

To remedy this, Demetrio, after having observed the attitude of American left-wing visitors to Cuba, came to the conclusion that the young Americans were an easy and accessible source of the information needed. Consequently, a plan was devised and the Venceremos Brigade was brought into existence.

The Venceremos Brigade in Cuba

As stated before, the Directorate was able to obtain the information needed through a program that brought the young students into constant contact with DGI agents working under cover.

In fact, every waking moment of the Brigade members while in Cuba was supervised and controlled by the Cubans, who used physical labor to soften resistance, criticism and self-criticism sessions, minority caucuses, and rap sessions skillfully directed in order to assess the political attitude of the Americans and at the same time collect the necessary intelligence.

To this should be added the fact that the Cubans used various means such as questionnaires, diaries, recorded interviews, speeches, and others to build individual files on each member of the Brigade. Among other things, the DGI formed a committee of Brigade members for the collection and transmission to Cuba of telephone directories from a variety of areas in the United States. A telephone directory can be a simple and ready source of corroborating evidence, even in a cursory background investigation. The importance of a telephone directory in intelligence operations is such that it is a crime in Cuba to mail a telephone directory out of the country.

Another committee was formed to collect technical books on industrial research, with heavy emphasis on university departments working

under a contract for the Department of Defense. Other committees were to report on the Latin community in the United States, the Cuban community in the United States, and the activities of U.S. citizens overseas. This last committee was to report the type of business, duties of embassy personnel, and other related matters.

In addition to the military-university research contracts, the DGI expressed interest in the University structure as related to its connections with the government and private corporations. Even the financial aspects of the contracts appeared to be of interest to the Cubans.

A committee was formed to report on the University of California (Berkeley) research programs relating to nuclear weapons; Los Alamos proving grounds; the Lawrence lab; a new biological lab near the naval base; the research on storing of bacteria, and survival in case of plague; and other related topics.

DGI agents showed interest in information on the ABM system instruments, MIRV, and the missile guidance systems of our Polaris submarines, the NASA Apollo program, and the NASA center near the university, a moving target indicator, a tunnel detector, and a helicopter project to be used in Vietnam.

The thoroughness of the Cubans was such that in addition to the few subjects described above, they also collected information on the Brigade members, including rumors, accusations, degree of intoxication when alcohol was served at parties, sexual relations, and other intimate data.

The Cubans were thus able not only to assemble a complete profile of a potential agent but gathered enough intelligence to satisfy both their own needs and those of their Soviet mentors.

Recruitment of Potential Agents

Usually out of a 200-member Brigade, 30 to 40 individuals were thought worthy of special consideration. Of these, 4 or 5 were recruited as contacts and, if future proficiency was consistent, they were developed as agents.

The questions submitted to Brigade members about trips to Europe and the need to know about the activities of U.S. citizens overseas were based on an immediate and real need: contact with potential agents. With a false U.S. passport, the recruited agent travels to Europe and then to Cuba for a 2 to 3 month training period, and then returns to the United States by the same route.

The contact in Europe is usually made after a lapse of a year or more, and after careful observation of the recruited agent by Soviet KGB agents to weed out U.S. counterintelligence agents.

Since the Cubans did not want the Brigade members to know that one of their number had been selected for a clandestine operation, it was necessary to isolate the individual for training and instructions. For short-term training, the selected Brigade member would be hospitalized and later spirited out of the hospital or, if this was not possible, kept in isolation for the length of time needed to impart the necessary instructions.

Targets in the U.S.

There are good reasons to believe that the DGI considers Operation Venceremos a highly successful venture in practically every respect. There were serious problems, mainly in the disciplinary field, but these

were offset by the wealth of information gathered and the objectives attained. The self-perpetuating structure of the Brigade is an indication that the Cubans intend to keep a tight control on the organization, especially in view of the recent moves to re-establish diplomatic relations with Cuba.

Again, it is most interesting to note that the DGI has had an extremely keen interest in the legislative and executive branches of the United States government. One of its objectives is to obtain not only information but also a base of influence.

Of paramount importance to the DGI is the influence that can be brought to bear on the matter of resuming relations by political and economic groups which favor such resumption.

In this context, the DGI, ever ready to exploit any available source to advance its objectives, has sought to enlist the help of the National Lawyers Guild to create a pressure group in the United States. A letter to members of the Washington, D.C., chapter announcing the names of the selected delegates for a trip to Cuba contained the following statement:

The recommending committee was overwhelmed by the number of qualified and desirable applicants. The process used to select the delegates and alternates was difficult, and of course, subjective to some degree. The first criterion was determined by the Cubans themselves. They asked that the Guild send men and women who would be able to serve them as contact and resource people in Washington during the upcoming period of transition in Cuban-U.S. relations; they desired a delegation which would have a broad background in governmental, professional and legal work. They (sic) Cubans stressed that the delegates should have a solid history of professional experience in the legal field, which is the reason why the selection was weighted towards lawyers rather than legal workers or students.

The letter closed with the word "Venceremos."

Conclusion

As the 8th contingent of the Venceremos Brigade prepares to leave for Cuba sometime in March of 1975, the number of veteran Brigade members who came under DGI control totals nearly 2,000. Although many of the members have dropped out completely, there is enough overt activity in the United States to indicate that the National and Regional Committees are determined to have a hand in directing the movement for "political and social change."

In Marxist jargon "political and social change" is a euphemism for revolution. The veterans of the Brigade left no doubt as to their intentions when they printed a leaflet in California to recruit new members. It stated:

We call ourselves Venceremos Brigade. Senator Eastland calls us "Human Missiles" because the message we bring with us is a call for solidarity among all the people who are fighting the common enemy: U.S. Imperialism.

The struggle in the Cuban canefields, on the front lines in Vietnam, in the world communities at home and against the war machine in our country is the same.

In view of the inherent danger to the security of the United States engendered by the activities of the "Venceremos Brigade" and its mentor and director, the Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence, the staff of the Subcommittee is in the process of preparing a comprehensive report on the Brigade to be released in the near future.

In the course of the subcommittee's investigative activities, liaison was maintained with Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies, including staff attendance at monthly meetings, annual conferences, and seminars.

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IV. RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

The Research Department continues to develop information, primarily from public sources, on a daily basis. Four daily newspapers and approximately twenty-five similar publications, as well as those identified as subversive publications, are reviewed weekly. In addition, other data is obtained from magazines, letters, the Congressional Record, and reports from various Federal, State and local agencies. It is estimated that more than 100 current items are added daily to the subcommittee's files.

In its development of information, the Research Department maintains liaison with various Federal and local law enforcement agencies nationwide.

Also, responses have been made to innumerable oral requests from the members of the subcommittee, or their staffs, for specific information.

A study totalling approximately 300 pages, which is in the rough draft stage, is being prepared for the use of the subcommittee. The purpose of the aforementioned study is to show the interlocking "directorates" and other relationships of certain organizations.

As time permits, the ongoing program (instituted in 1973) to retire from the files material which has served its purpose, or which appears not to be needed on an "immediate call" basis, has been continued. Approximately 45 cubic feet of material has been catalogued for transmittal to the Archives.

The subcommittee's budget was substantially reduced for 1974 which necessitated a personnel cut in all areas. The Research Department presently is comprised of two individuals—the Acting Director of Research and a secretary. The Acting Director of Research spends a minimum of 50–55 hours per week in order to keep the work current and maintain the department's efficiency. The secretary in the department carries the responsibility of maintaining the central files of the subcommittee.

RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

The Research Department is a branch of the Department of the Interior, and is organized to conduct research in the various fields of geology, mineralogy, and paleontology. The department is headed by the Chief of the Research Department, and is divided into several sections, each of which is headed by a section chief. The sections are: Geology, Mineralogy, Paleontology, and the Office of the Chief of the Research Department.

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V. STUDIES AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS

A. SOVIET DISARMAMENT PROPAGANDA AND THE STRANGE CASE OF MARSHAL GRECHKO

Senator James O. Eastland, Chairman of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, opened his introduction to this staff study with these words:

The documentation which has been compiled in this study is significant and timely because of the light it throws on the Communist disarmament propaganda campaign, and on the staggering Soviet arms buildup which has been the counterpart of this campaign. This propaganda campaign is of interest to the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee since it involves the entire Communist propaganda apparatus, domestic and international, including its numerous front organizations and its carefully fostered infiltrations in reputable non-Communist organizations with public influence.

The study and the accompanying documentation are also significant because of the enormous personal importance of Marshal A. A. Grechko, Soviet Defense Minister since April 1967. Even before his elevation to the Soviet Politburo in April 1973, Soviet experts in the West had come to regard Grechko as the single most powerful man in the Soviet military establishment and as the principal driving force behind the Soviet military buildup. His inclusion in the Politburo now makes it clear that, beyond his military influence and power, Grechko also commands an exceptional degree of political power in the ranks of the Soviet government.

The study contains a chapter devoted to an analysis of the Soviet disarmament propaganda campaign; another chapter dealing generally with the military, political, and diplomatic record of Marshal A. A. Grechko, Soviet Minister of Defense; a third chapter on the Soviet military buildup under Marshal Grechko, supported by charts and excerpts from national and international reports; a fourth chapter which provides a compendium of the views of Marshal A. A. Grechko as stated in some sample excerpts from his statements and writings; and a fifth chapter tabulating Marshal Grechko's remarkable range of meetings with political and military leaders, in Moscow and abroad, from the time he became Minister of Defense in 1967 until the end of 1973.

The study describes the major themes of the Soviet disarmament propaganda campaign in the following terms:

1. American imperialism is the chief source of world aggression and presents the chief danger to peace; the Soviet Union in contradistinction harbors no aggressive intentions, threatens no one, and works consistently for the strengthening of world peace.

2. NATO, SEATO, and CENTO are "bad," aggressive military blocs. The Warsaw Pact, in contradistinction, is "good," non-aggressive, and purely defensive.

3. The stationing of American forces, or the maintenance of American bases in any other country is "bad"—the bases should be dismantled and the forces should be withdrawn. The stationing of Soviet forces in Mongolia, Czechoslovakia, East Germany or other countries is "good," since it protects world peace against imperialist aggression.

4. All American military expenditures are "evil" and wasteful and should be cut back to the bone; all Soviet military expenditures are "good" in the sense that they protect world socialism and world peace. (Soviet propaganda does not explicitly say that Soviet military expenditures are "good"—but this is implicit in its failure to criticize any aspect of Soviet military expenditures and in the repeated boasting about the invincible might of the Soviet armed forces.)

5. All new weapons systems called for or procured by the American army, navy and air force are "bad"; the new weapons systems procured for the Soviet defense establishment, on the contrary, are "good." (Again, they do not say this in so many words—but their affirmative attitude toward new weapons systems when they are introduced into the Soviet armed forces is clearly implicit in the glowing accounts of the achievements of Soviet military technology.

6. All American military aid is "bad" because it is intended to support the forces of world reaction; all Soviet military assistance programs are "good" because they are intended to support the forces of progress and national liberation.

7. All industry involved in the production of weapons and weapon systems for the American military establishment is "bad"; industry involved in the production of weapons for the Soviet military establishment is "good."

8. All research programs designed to develop new weapons systems for the American defense establishment are "bad"; technological research for the Soviet armed forces is "good."

9. In America the draft is evil and anti-democratic; in the Soviet Union the draft is "good" because all Soviet citizens wish to participate in the defense of their socialist fatherland.

10. Military discipline in the case of the American armed forces is something intrinsically "bad" and should be subverted and diluted by every possible means; but iron military discipline is "good" in the case of the Soviet defense establishment because it helps to defend the cause of Socialism.

11. American patriotism is bad; Soviet patriotism is good.

Summarizing the extensive excerpts from the writings and statements of Marshal Grechko, the study said:

Needless to say, Marshal Grechko believes in the inevitable doom of the capitalist system. He considers it the duty of the Soviet Union and the international workers movement to expedite the downfall of capitalism by every

possible means, not excluding armed struggle. "Loyalty to proletarian internationalism," he says, "includes a unification of all the national detachments of revolutionary fighters into a single alliance for victory over international imperialism." The conflict between capitalism and socialism, he says, is not limited to the military or political spheres. It is a total systemic conflict, calling for "the complete and all-round use of the economic, political, morale, and military potentials, as well as the achievements of scientific thought."

Grechko believes the Soviet system to be superior economically and socially. He also says that if war should come between the Soviet Union and the capitalist world it "will be an acute class collision, a clash of two opposed social systems in which will be decided the fate of all mankind. We are firmly convinced that victory in this war will belong to us, to the socialist social structure." Despite his belief in the superiority of the Soviet system, and despite his stated conviction in the inevitability of Soviet victory, Grechko calls for "the constant strengthening of the armed forces" as "an objective necessity for successfully building socialism."

As for the diplomatic and political importance of Marshal Grechko, the study said:

That Marshal Grechko as Defense Minister should always have been on hand to greet visiting defense ministers, military delegations, military commanders and generals, is not at all surprising. Nor is it surprising that he should have been the primary participant for the Soviet side in the discussions that took place with visiting military VIPs. But the sheer volume of such meetings unquestionably establishes an all-time world record for ministers in charge of their national defense establishments. Also extraordinary is the constant attention which Grechko has lavished on his military visitors. . . .

Still more remarkable is the fact that Marshal Grechko has been on hand to greet virtually every monarch, president, prime minister, and foreign minister who has visited Moscow; that he very frequently participated in the conversations with them; and he has again been on hand to see them off when they left Moscow.

But perhaps most remarkable of all is the fact that Marshal Grechko in his visits to other countries has functioned as a kind of plenipotentiary of the Soviet government and of the Soviet Communist Party, conferring with presidents, prime ministers, and foreign ministers, as well as defense ministers, and obviously transacting political and military business of a vital nature.

B. INTERNAL SECURITY MANUAL

A revised edition of the Internal Security Manual was released by the subcommittee May 21, 1974.

The manual consists of provisions of Federal statutes, executive orders and congressional resolutions relating to the internal security of the United States. It is the most complete volume on that subject

ever published in a single work and is intended to serve as a useful tool for lawyer and layman.

Three previous editions of the manual, in 1953, 1955 and 1960, were presented by the late Senator Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin, onetime chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary. Basic work on the original, and on each revision, was done by the Congressional Research Service (formerly the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress).

In his introduction to this revision, Senator Eastland pointed out that it had been kept as closely as possible to the original purpose and format of the manual. "Now, as then, the data set forth herein is entirely factual and contains a minimum of descriptive comment."

In his introduction to the original edition, Senator Wiley said the document "is devoted to meeting the most basic challenge facing our Nation—its own self-preservation. It is intended as a reference manual on all phases of the problem of protecting our internal security."

The manual, he said, is "designed to enable the reader—layman and lawyer—to have for the first time within the covers of one book,¹ with extensive index, references to all the Federal legal tools with which to comprehend and perform his active duties of citizenship in helping to protect our security."

C. ABUSE OF PSYCHIATRY FOR POLITICAL REPRESSION IN THE SOVIET UNION, VOLUME II

This volume of personal testimony and documents was a follow-up on a hearing published by the subcommittee some two years ago. In September of 1972 the Internal Security Subcommittee took the testimony of Dr. Alexander Sergeyovich Yesenin-Volpin, a distinguished Soviet mathematician and poet who had survived five separate confinements in Soviet mental institutions. He had been committed to these institutions not because he was mentally ill, but because of his stubborn refusal to toe the Communist line. His testimony, supported by more than 200 pages of documentation, was printed under the caption of "Abuse of Psychiatry for Political Repression in the Soviet Union."

Dr. Yesenin-Volpin's testimony and the supporting documentation established that the confinement of political dissidents in psychiatric institutions is practiced on a massive scale by the Soviet authorities, with special psychiatric hospitals set aside for this purpose and even psychiatric colonies. He told the subcommittee that "this situation has implications for the security of the United States and the entire free world . . . The continued political psychiatric terror in the Soviet Union is a matter of international concern because it destroys any possibility of public restraint over the Soviet leadership . . . The Soviet people deserve and must be given the moral support of the entire free world."

The subcommittee has heard from a number of top-ranking experts on Soviet affairs that this initial publication is widely regarded as a basic text on the subject because it is the only place where one can find, in English translation, the complete text of the remarkable documentation which Vladimir Bukovsky smuggled out of the Soviet

¹The new edition is in two volumes.

Union in 1971—an act for which he was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment and exile.

Acting on the initiative of Senator Edward J. Gurney of Florida, the subcommittee voted in December of 1974 to published a follow-up volume on the "Abuse of Psychiatry for Political Repression in the Soviet Union." This volume consisted of an extensive staff interview with Dr. Norman B. Hirt, a distinguished Canadian psychiatrist who has made an in-depth study of the problem, and a documentation which carried the historical record through most of 1974.

Dr. Hirt in his testimony referred to numerous personal interviews with two former KGB psychiatrists, who told him, *inter alia*, that the real facts about the abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union far exceeded anything that had yet been published in the Western world. He also described the major chemicals used to perform what he called "chemical lobotomies."

Among other things, the supporting documentation in this volume shows that, thanks in part to the evidence contained in the first volume of testimony by the subcommittee, and thanks in part to the unremitting efforts of Dr. Hirt, a large number of national and international psychiatric organizations, in 1973 and 1974, adopted resolutions recognizing that the practice existed in the Soviet Union, calling for world condemnation of the practice, and calling upon psychiatrists in the Soviet Union to refuse to lend themselves to this flagrant abuse of human rights.

On November 16, 1973, for example, the British Royal College of Psychiatrists overwhelmingly approved the following resolution:

The Royal College of Psychiatrists deplores the current use of psychiatry in the Soviet Union for the purpose of political repression and condemns the activities of doctors who lend themselves to this work.

On January 21, 1974, Dr. Burness E. Moore, president of the American Psychoanalytic Association, wrote to the president of the All-Union Society of Psychiatrists of the USSR bluntly accusing Russian psychiatrists of allowing their practice to be perverted for political reasons. Dr. Moore's letter said:

To diagnose political dissent as a symptom of schizophrenia or paranoia, to regard original opinions in the behavioral sciences or on the political scene as mental aberrations, and to incarcerate persons for the expression of such views are actions contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Pointing out that the fraudulent confinement of intellectual dissidents was still an ongoing practice in the Soviet Union, Senator Gurney concluded his introduction with these words:

That international protests can be effective has been demonstrated in the case of Yesenin-Volpin, and in the more recent cases of General Grigorenko, who was released this last summer, and of Viktor Fainberg, who was subjected to psychiatric confinement for the second time in April of 1974, but was released in October and permitted to emigrate to Germany.

D. SOVIET INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES, VOLUME II

This publication, in the process of being printed when this annual report was submitted, is organized along lines similar to that of Volume I, published by the subcommittee in 1972. This is a bibliography of materials, mostly from Soviet sources, which documents the fact that the Soviet regime continues to indoctrinate the Soviet people with a spirit of distrust and hostility toward the West even though it claims that its foreign policy is directed toward the relaxation of international tensions. Soviet writings about its intelligence services are a relatively recent development, as was pointed out in the first volume, but to date the Soviets have completely omitted any official acknowledgement of their use of the legally admitted "diplomat" for espionage purposes. The responsible and objective study of the Soviet secret police and its impact on Western detente policies would seem more important than ever before.

VI. 1974 PUBLICATIONS

Annual Report of the Subcommittee—Senate Report No. 93-790. Released April 3, 1974; 34 pages.

Internal Security Manual, Revised to July 1973. Released May 1974; 1,017 pages.

Marihuana-Hashish Epidemic and Its Impact on United States Security. Released October 1, 1974; 430 pages.

Soviet Disarmament Propaganda and the Strange Case of Marshal Grechko. Released October 17, 1974; 108 pages.

Terroristic Activity, Part 1. Testimony of Evelle Younger. Released January 29, 1975; 89 pages.

State Department Bombing by Weatherman Underground. Released February 4, 1975; 29 pages.

The Weather Underground. Committee Print. Released February 10, 1975; 169 pages.

Terroristic Activity, Part 2, Inside the Weatherman Movement. Testimony of Larry Grathwohl. Released February 16, 1975; 63 pages.

Terroristic Activity, Part 3. Testimony of Dr. Frederick C. Schwarz. 24 pages.

Abuse of Psychiatry for Political Repression in the Soviet Union—Vol. II. Testimony of Dr. N. B. Hirt. 108 pages.

Soviet Intelligence and Security Services, 1966-1974, Vol. II. Being printed.

Marihuana and the Question of Personnel Security. (Committee Print. Compendium.) Being printed.



