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AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE ON THE CULTURAL
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND EASTERN
EUROPE

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATION 2276

A SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

FROM

THE UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL AND
CULTURAL AFFAIRS

Pursuant to Public Law 87-256



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FOREWORD

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C., April 5, 1976.

This report was submitted to the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, the Honorable Carl Albert, on December 29, 1975, pursuant to section 107 of Public Law 87-256 (the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961), and was referred to the Committee on International Relations.

It is published herewith as a committee print because of the committee's continuing interest in and oversight over followup to the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which was entered into on August 1, 1975.

It is hoped that this document will be useful also to other Members of Congress, the executive branch, and the public who are interested in this matter.

THOMAS E. MORGAN, *Chairman.*

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LETTERS OF TRANSMITTAL

Letter Of Transmittal From Hon. Leonard E. Marks

THE U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., December 29, 1975.

Hon. CARL ALBERT,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: Section 107 of Public Law 87-256 (the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961) instructs the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs to submit annual reports to the Congress and "such other reports as they deem appropriate."

In accordance with that mandate, I am submitting the attached report with reference to the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, entered into in Helsinki, Finland, on August 1, 1975. This report embodies the observations and recommendations reached by William French Smith and me during a recent official visit to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe.

Fifteen days after the signing of the Helsinki Agreement, we started on our mission, visiting Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and Hungary, and the U.S.S.R. Together with our Staff Director, we had extensive talks with high-ranking officials of the Ministries of Culture, Education and Foreign Affairs; we met also with Rectors of leading universities and museum directors, and with other representatives of cultural and educational groups in Eastern Europe.

We found a willingness to listen and to talk about the very real problems involved in increasing contacts with the United States. They spoke to us frankly about their suspicions of our motives, as well as about their hopes for better relations. We did the same.

We were encouraged by the growth in the rate of contacts, particularly at the scientific and academic levels, already under way in most of the countries we visited. In less than twenty years, these contacts have moved from virtually nil to a varied pattern of programs, involving exchanges at every level and almost every subject of mutual concern.

The dialogue, in short, has begun. It is still tentative. It is severely limited by heavy-handed political controls on their side and by pragmatic distrust on ours. Nevertheless, the basis for continued dialogue is there. It is this which encourages us in our belief that there are significant opportunities for raising the level of contacts in ways that will be beneficial to each of the countries involved.

It is relevant to note that we made our survey trip within a month after the signing of the Helsinki agreement. This gave us a chance to test official Soviet and East European reaction to a significant part of the agreement, the so-called "Basket Three" provisions, dealing with human contacts and with cultural, educational and information exchanges between East and West. We were informed of the Soviet reluctance to include this subject in the agreement, and of their hard bargaining to minimize their obligations in this area. We know that the final language on this subject is couched largely in terms of intent rather than obligation. And we know that the agreement's provisions involve, at Soviet insistence, a wide range of escape hatches for avoiding or minimizing the application of these provisions. We were pointedly reminded of these facts in our many discussions with Communist officials during our survey trip.

Nevertheless, we came away from these discussions with the conviction that, for all their inadequacies, the Basket Three provisions of the Helsinki Agreement represented a step forward. The Communist officials we talked with were uniformly aware of the fact that their country had signed an international agreement which committed them, in principle at least, to reciprocal actions in the fields of human contacts and other exchange programs; and they were made aware (by us, among other Western sources) that the United States and West Europe took this subject seriously. More significantly, they indicated, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, that their countries planned to take some measured steps towards compliance with at least some of the Basket Three provisions. This may be, admittedly, a small gain, and no doubt it falls somewhat short of the expectations generated in some quarters by the Helsinki agreement. Nevertheless, it is a gain.

We therefore believe that the United States has important opportunities for strengthening the mutual exchange of people and ideas with the Soviet Union and other East European countries in the coming years. These contacts can play a significant role in moving our relations with the Communist world to a more stable, constructive relationship. Accordingly, we recommend that U.S. Government Agencies, working with the private community, should develop an active plan for carrying out the educational, cultural and other provisions of "Basket Three." In particular, it should make sure that it has the resources ready to meet its obligations under these provisions.

We are not recommending the expenditure of significantly larger amounts of money, although some increases in funds and other resources will be called for. In this endeavor, more is not necessarily better. Our main point is that the United States, along with thirty-four other countries, made in Helsinki an important commitment to expand human contacts and other exchanges. It is a commitment very much in our democratic tradition and in our national interest. We will be pressing other nations, particularly those in the Communist area, to fulfill their commitments. We should not let inadequate planning or failure to program adequate resources get in the way of meeting our side of the bargain when useful opportunities arise.

In expressing our hopes about the possible impact of the Helsinki provisions on human contacts, we do not have any illusions about the political realities involved. We sensed in our talks the limits on

basic freedoms which still exist in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the continuing desire of the leadership in these countries to limit exchange programs for their own narrow ends. Rigorous controls still exist there over the kind of human dialogue we take for granted. We are also aware of the limited impact of any exchanges of people or ideas on the day-to-day lives of most people in the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe. Thus, in dealing with the Helsinki provisions for greater contacts, the Eastern Europeans will be inclined to promise more than they will deliver, to temporize, to substitute rhetoric for accomplishment, and they will also try to put the onus for "hindering" cultural and information exchanges on the West, and on the United States in particular. In part, this involves building up their case for the follow-up conference scheduled for Belgrade, Yugoslavia in 1977, which will review progress made in implementing the Helsinki Agreement. We must be prepared for this by establishing a mechanism to monitor their, and our, performances in support of Basket Three proposals.

These are realities. But they need to be matched against another set of realities: the considerable progress that has been made in opening the doors to greater dialogue and exchange between East and West during the past two decades. Instead of considering the great distance we have to go, it is useful to consider the distance we have come. For example: jamming of the Voice of America programs has ceased (but not those of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty); each country has significant, and growing, academic and cultural arrangements with the United States and other Western nations; East-West scientific and technological cooperation is expanding rapidly; Western information and cultural services have been permitted to expand their activities in most Eastern European countries.

These are, perhaps, small gains when measured against the overall pattern of restrictions on access to "outside" contacts, and they represent a reluctant response to internal and external pressures. Nevertheless, such contacts have already reduced the sense of sharp confrontation which marked the post-war years.

Evidence collected on our survey trip leads us to the conclusion that these contacts can and should be expanded in the post-Helsinki period. Communist officials and others with whom we talked generally saw this trend as being in their national self-interest, so they are likely to do something about it. Their priorities are, on many points, different from those of Americans, yet we found important areas of potential agreement on expanding programs in ways that can be mutually beneficial.

This calls for steadiness of purpose, both in recognizing our own national interests and those of the countries we are dealing with. This latter point deserves to be emphasized. To the degree that ideological policies prevent healthy dialogue, Americans have a right to be critical. We should avoid, however, being self-righteous when Russians or East Europeans find certain of our cultural values and products irrelevant or even undesirable. These are honest differences of traditions, taste, and purpose, and we should understand them. In our dialogue, we should stress, without compromising our own freedom of expression, the social and cultural values we share.

The best approach for the United States will be to work for measured progress in improving both the quantity and the quality of our exchanges. We do not foresee any sudden or dramatic breakthrough. It

is this approach which we have suggested in this report. We are not recommending any "crash programs" or other large-scale initiatives. Even assuming that the resources would be made available, such initiatives would not be realistic in view of the continuing suspicions of Communist leaders about alleged "ideological subversion." We believe, then, that the U.S. Government and private organizations should plan for steady incremental increases in the level of resources devoted to cultural and information exchanges with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe over the next five years, for we find the climate is propitious for improving the quality of our present exchange programs with Eastern Europe and for planning an expanded program of contacts in the years ahead. The end results could be a significant realization of proposals of the Helsinki Agreement in ways that will serve the interests of all nations involved.

Copies of the report, which is enclosed, will be sent to the committees of Congress interested in international activities. Since the report contains recommendations for legislation, I am hopeful that hearings will be held on these proposals.

Sincerely,

LEONARD H. MARKS,
Chairman.

Letter of Transmittal From Hon. William French Smith

THE UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION
ON INTERNATIONAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., January 15, 1976.

HON. CARL ALBERT,
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: On December 29, 1975, in accordance with provisions of Public Law 87-256, Mr. Leonard H. Marks, Chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, sent to you a report on a trip he and I made to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union last autumn. It is entitled "A Special Report on the Effects of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on the Cultural Relations of the United States and Eastern Europe."

Mr. Marks sent the report under cover of a letter of transmittal which summarized our findings and placed them in the political context of our times. Since Mr. Marks and I shared equally the responsibilities of the trip and the report, I believe it appropriate that I should indicate my full concurrence with the comments and recommendations carried in Mr. Marks' letter. I do so herewith and would be pleased to have this letter appear with that of Mr. Marks if our report is published as a House document.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM FRENCH SMITH,
Member.

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I. FOREWORD

From August 16 to September 7, 1975 the undersigned members of the United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, accompanied by the Commission's Staff Director, visited on official Commission business five Eastern European countries: Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Soviet Union, Romania and Hungary.

In the twenty-three days we spent in the area, we visited eight cities: Prague, Warsaw, Poznan, Leningrad, Moscow, Kiev, Bucharest and Budapest. We met formally with approximately 120 European officials in a series of 34 official meetings, which averaged over an hour each in length (see Appendix A for list of principal contacts); and we talked informally with approximately 100 more. We met about 75 American student and professor participants in formal exchange programs, and spoke at least briefly to most of them. We had the benefit of the advice and counsel of some thirty-eight U.S. officials at seven U.S. diplomatic missions, including three Ambassadors, two Consuls General, three Deputy Chiefs of Mission, seven Counselors for Press and Cultural Affairs, and five Cultural Attaches.

We believe that our study was one of the most intensive ever conducted at a high level of the cultural and educational exchanges between the United States and Eastern European countries. It was undertaken, in any case, at a most propitious moment: just a few weeks after the signing in Helsinki on August 1, 1975, of the "Final Act" of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The provisions of "Basket III" of this "Act" (i.e. the section dealing with "Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields") became the focal point of all our discussions; we will refer to them repeatedly in the body of our report.*

In the pages which follow we have summarized the background for our study and made general observations and recommendations which we believe are applicable to the region as a whole. We have followed this with a country-by-country account of our observations on, and

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*Although we shall in the following pages frequently refer to this "Final Act" for convenience sake as an "agreement," we are aware that it is not an official international agreement which carries the force of law, but only a declaration of mutually acceptable principles which the 35 signatories acknowledge as a basis for inter-state relations and cooperation.

suggestions for, action in each individual country on our itinerary.

Our aim is not simply to shed light on recent trends or developments in the area of this country's educational and cultural exchanges with Eastern Europe. We hope, rather, to point the way to specific actions which can and should be taken by various elements of our government and our private institutions to assure that the United States capitalizes on an unusual situation: an almost unprecedented opportunity to use effectively in our national interest one of the under-appreciated tools of diplomacy: international educational and cultural exchange.

If our purpose is achieved, if our trip can be counted in any sense "a success," the credit belongs as much to those who helped organize it as to those who undertook it. We therefore acknowledge here with deep appreciation the cooperation given to our mission by officers of the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the Department of State, both in Washington and in the field.

In Washington the idea of our on-the-spot survey was approved and supported by James Keogh, Director of the USIA, and by John Richardson, Jr., Director of the State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU). Under the aegis of the former we were provided a valuable briefing by John W. Shirley, Director of the USIA's Office of European Affairs, and his deputy, Philip Arnold. Under the aegis of the latter we were provided with essential documentation on our exchange programs with Eastern European countries and were generously briefed by Lee T. Stull, Deputy Assistant Secretary of CU, and Yale W. Richmond, Director of CU's Office of Eastern European Programs. The information and judgments given to us by these representatives of our government became the basis for much of our later discussions with foreign officials.

The State Department extended us an additional courtesy which contributed directly and significantly to the effectiveness of our mission. It named us the official U.S. delegation to the opening at the Pushkin Museum in Moscow of the exhibit, "One Hundred Masterpieces from New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art." The

exhibit was our part of the exchange which brought to this country the "Scythian Gold" treasures from the U.S.S.R. As the official U.S. representatives to this event, we were guests of the Ministry of Culture. Many doors were thus opened to us, many high-level contacts assured, which might otherwise not have been.

Without the assistance and understanding of our posts abroad, our mission would not have been possible. They provided both, and we are much in their debt. We should note that the timing of our trip was generally bad from each post's point of view because: a) many local officials who could contribute to our study were on holiday; b) the small Embassy staff was exhausted from recent responsibilities (e.g. President Ford's visit to Poland), or deep in preparation for imminent ones (e.g. Deputy Secretary Ingersoll's visit to Budapest). Yet our American Missions uniformly performed on our behalf above and beyond the call of duty. The programs they arranged for us were unfailingly responsive to our needs; the "talking points" papers and briefings they provided us were perceptive and helpful; the caliber of local officials whom they had arranged for us to meet was unexpectedly and gratifyingly high; the representational

activities they organized for us were pleasant and useful supplements to our official appointments; the routine "arrangements" for our visit were made with such efficiency that we were always able to concentrate on our professional concerns.

It is unfortunately impossible for us to identify in this report all those at each post, from Ambassadors to local translators, who contributed in some way to our well-being, but we would be remiss if we did not publicly acknowledge our indebtedness to the following, who bore the brunt of our visit.

1) Our Counselors for Press and Cultural Affairs: E. Frederick Quinn in Czechoslovakia; James E. Bradshaw in Poland; Raymond E. Benson in the U.S.S.R.; Aurelius Fernandez in Bucharest; Stephen F. Dachi in Budapest.

2) Their principal cultural assistants: George C. Kinzer in Prague; Robert Gosende in Warsaw; John Scott Williams in Poznan; Robert K. Geis in Leningrad; Lynn H. Noah in Moscow; Kathryn L. Koob in Bucharest; Anne M. Sigmund in Budapest.

3) Our top-ranking Mission personnel: Jack Perry, DCM in Czechoslovakia; John R. Davis, DCM in Poland; John W. Neubert, Consul General in Leningrad; Ambassador

Walter Stoessel, Jr. and his DCM, John F. Matlock, Jr. in Moscow; Ambassador Harry G. Barnes, Jr. and his DCM, Richard Viets, in Bucharest; Ambassador Eugene V. McAuliffe in Budapest.

Leonard H. Marks, Chairman
U.S. Advisory Commission on
International Educational and
Cultural Affairs

William French Smith, Member
U.S. Advisory Commission on
International Educational and
Cultural Affairs

December 12, 1975

II. THE BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF OUR TRIP

The "Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961" (Public Law 87-256) created the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs and defined its role. It was to "formulate and recommend to the President policies for exercising his authority under this Act and [to] appraise the effectiveness of programs carried out pursuant to it." And it was to "submit annual reports to the Congress and such other reports to the Congress as they deem appropriate and [to] make reports to the public in the United States and abroad to develop a better understanding of and support for the programs authorized by this Act."

The purpose of the Act was equally clearly stated. It was "to enable the Government of the United States to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries by means of educational and cultural exchange. . . and thus to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the United States and other countries in the world."

The burden, and opportunity, of carrying out this purpose devolved largely upon the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) of the Department of State; therefore the U.S. Advisory Commission has always worked closely with, and carefully scrutinized the activities of, CU. Over the years the methods, programs and/or emphases used by the Bureau to promote its aims have altered in conformance with alterations in the world and in U.S. foreign relations. In its most recent statement on the subject the Bureau defines its objectives as follows:

"... we seek to increase mutual understanding, cooperation and community between the people of the United States and other peoples by direct and indirect efforts to: 1) enlarge the circle of those able to serve as influential interpreters between this and other nations; 2) stimulate institutional development in directions which favorably affect mutual comprehension and confidence; 3) reduce structural and technical impediments to the exchange of ideas and information."

This, then, is the legislative and conceptual framework in which the Commission operates. But the country's exchange activities have so markedly increased

since 1961 that it has become impossible for the nine-member Commission and its staff of three regularly to appraise the effectiveness of all the government's exchange programs. Instead, it now annually selects for investigation a limited number of subjects, to which it hopes to be able to do justice.

At its annual planning session late in May of this year, the Commission decided to undertake as one of its 1975-76 projects an evaluation of our educational and cultural exchanges with Eastern European countries. It had never seriously addressed the subject, though stabilizing relations with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries has in recent years clearly been one of the most important aspects of this country's foreign policy. This was explicitly stated last spring in the State Department's United States Foreign Policy: An Overview/May 1975. In a chapter headed "Detente with the Soviet Union," this document points out that, although our search for a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union has been a continuing process, there is something new in the current period of relaxation of tensions, to wit: "its duration, the scope of the relationship which has evolved, and the continuity and

intensity of consultations it has produced. . . ."

By the end of the 1960's and the beginning of the 70's, the Overview continues, "the time was propitious for a major attempt to improve U.S.-Soviet relations."

Much has been accomplished. For example: Berlin's potential as Europe's perennial flash-point has been substantially reduced through the quadripartite Agreement of 1971. The SALT 1 (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) has placed a permanent limitation on defensive weapons and may lead to the long-sought process of arms reduction. And on July 3, 1973 we and our allies launched negotiations with the Warsaw Pact and other countries in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe -- a conference designed to foster East-West dialogue and cooperation.

On August 1, 1975 the "Final Act" of that conference was signed in Helsinki by the thirty-five participating nations, including of course all those within the Soviet bloc. A large section of the conference agenda dealt with subjects which did not have to do directly with political, economic or security matters. These were lumped together in what came to be called "Basket III," under the title, "Cooperation in

Humanitarian and Other Fields." The "Final Act" devoted twenty-three of its pages to recommendations for action in this general area. In signing the Act, the Eastern European nations "declared their readiness to take measures which they consider appropriate and to conclude agreements or arrangements among themselves. . . to proceed to the implementation of" such things as:

- facilitating the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds.
- encouraging the wider showing and broadcasting of a greater variety of filmed information from other participating states.
- establishing, developing or encouraging programs providing for the broader exchange of scholars, teachers, students, including the organization of symposia, seminars and collaborative projects, and the exchanges of educational and scholarly information.
- increasing substantially their cultural exchanges, with regard both to persons and to cultural works.
- promoting, for persons active in the field of culture, travel and meetings; encouraging in this

way contacts among creative and performing artists and artistic groups.

-- expanding and improving cooperation in the fields of education and science.

-- facilitating the extension of communications and direct contacts between universities, scientific institutions and associations.

-- developing the coordination of programs carried out in the participating states, and the organization of joint programs, in the areas of the humanities and social sciences.

-- encouraging the study of foreign languages and civilizations as an important means of expanding communications among peoples for their better acquaintance with the culture of each country.

Eastern European leaders speaking at the signing ceremony strongly implied that they took these semi-commitments seriously and planned to carry them out. Remarks by Dr. Husak, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, were typical:

"We consider the widest possible rapprochement of the true cultural values of mankind as an important element in the development of the conditions for peace. Therefore we are in favor of the widest mutual inspiration through cultural matters. We are in favor of the exchange of ideas and information which serve peaceful understanding and the all-round development of man. We are in favor of a wide exchange of persons which will help to produce beneficial cooperation and mutual understanding."

Many Western observers greeted such pronouncements with great scepticism and more than the usual cynicism. Their position was that the Soviet Union, and therefore presumably its allies, would give lip service to implementation of the "humanitarian" and "cultural" proposals of the agreement while exploiting the political and economic. Or as the New York Times correspondent in Moscow put it, "While the agreement signed in Helsinki today includes provisions for broader exchanges of people, information and for other human and civil rights considerations, the recent attitude of Soviet officials has offered little hope to citizens here

that their lives will be favorably affected by the signing of the documents."

In a retrospective piece in the Washington Post, Peter Osnos summed up this attitude as follows: "Just before the wind-up [of the Conference] Senator Jackson, exiled Soviet author Alexander Solzhenitsyn and others assailed the agreement for giving the Kremlin its long-sought hegemony over Eastern Europe in trade for unenforceable, limp pledges on an increased east-west flow of information, ideas and people. Criticism so outweighed support for the agreement. . . that President Ford and his entourage were almost apologetic about going to Helsinki for the summit-level signing." *

Although he wrote the following well after the signing of the Final Act, Georgi Arbatov, Director of the Institute of United States and Canada Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, expressed a point of view which had already contributed to doubts here that the Eastern European nations

*What the President actually said was: "The United States considers the principles on which this conference has agreed are part of the great heritage of European civilization which we all hold in trust for mankind. To my country they are not cliches or empty phrases. We take this work and these words very seriously."

seriously intended to implement the Basket III recommendations:

"In reference to the item in the Final Act on freedom of information, the Soviet Union intends earnestly to fulfill all provisions recorded. However, if some people regard them as an invitation to fling open the door to subversive anti-Soviet pro-violence propoganda, or to fan national or racial strife, then they are laboring in vain. Neither the document signed in Helsinki nor detente will permit such occurrences."

The Advisory Commission was, of course, deeply concerned with reactions in Eastern Europe to the proposals of the Final Act encompassed under "Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields," for the "Other Fields" covered with remarkable precision the questions of international educational and cultural exchange which are the Commission's business. The Commission's deliberations start from the premise that international educational and cultural exchange, when properly conducted, can and

will contribute to "mutual understanding," and thus to peaceful relations between the United States and other countries of the world. Experience has demonstrated that this country can establish cordial cultural relations with other countries, even when our political or economic relations are strained, and that these good cultural relations can lead in time to improved political relations. There has probably never been a more propitious time in our history to exploit for our good this technique of diplomacy. Therefore we were instinctively hopeful that the Helsinki accord might lead to increased and improved cultural relations with the Soviet Bloc, and that this greater interchange of experience, opinion, and achievements would contribute ultimately to the "more constructive relationship" with the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies which is the goal of our foreign policy.

But this potential significance of the Helsinki agreement was called into question by the doubts cast upon at least the Soviet intentions to

implement the provisions of Basket III, which we have noted above. We therefore decided that the first aim of our mission should be to determine what were the attitudes of Eastern European officials to the Helsinki agreement, and from this to project what effect the agreement might have on our exchange programs.

We might add parenthetically that we focused entirely on the educational and cultural implications of the agreement, feeling it was not within our mandate to probe European reactions to its political or economic provisions. We did, of course, meet with many high-ranking Foreign Office officials (e.g. the Acting/and Deputy Foreign Ministers in Czechoslovakia and Romania; the head of the Division of North American Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Hungary; the Chief of the Cultural Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow; the Vice-director of Department III of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs); but on such occasions any reference to political relationships served only as background to our discussion of cultural relationships. Generally, our contacts were with university and museum directors, impresarios, educational and cultural institutions,

representatives of cultural and educational ministries, and foreign office officials specifically concerned with international cultural, educational or informational affairs.

The point of departure in our talks with almost all of these officials was some variation on the question, "How do you think the Helsinki agreement will affect the cultural relations between your country and the United States?" From the discussions which ensued we learned much: not only about reactions to the Helsinki agreement, but also about the potential for educational and cultural exchanges with Eastern Europe and about our existing programs.

To learn what we could about our existing programs in Europe, and their prospects, was the secondary focus of our trip. The State Department had spent in the area, on direct program plus administrative costs: \$3,823,211 in fiscal year 1974; and \$4,104,800 in 1975. For fiscal 1976 it was requesting an increase of \$1,270,000, or a total of \$5,375,800. The proposed increase seemed justified in the spirit of detente which prevailed. As CU saw it (in its budget

presentation to Congress): "The Soviet Union has indicated a desire to broaden and increase cultural relations with the United States. In Poland and Romania our well established cultural relations activities have become an integral part of our bilateral relations, and the prospects for gradual expansion are favorable. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia, as in the Soviet Union, opportunities for cultural relations have been severely limited; however, these governments now show interest in concluding agreements which could provide a basis for new programs of cultural relations with the United States." CU therefore requested the following funding increases for programs in the countries we would visit.

	<u>Fiscal 1975</u>	<u>Fiscal 1976</u>	<u>Increase</u>
Czechoslovakia	\$ 65,488	\$ 131,953	\$ 66,465
Poland	758,467	966,849	208,382
U.S.S.R.	1,008,743	1,849,370	840,627
Romania	845,876	892,438	46,562
Hungary	34,597	144,551	109,954

In light of these developments it was evident that an objective, independent appraisal of this burgeoning U.S. program would be a useful adjunct to

research into post-Helsinki attitudes. Our observations and recommendations stemming from discussions with U.S. and foreign officials are reported in the following pages.

III. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

As we noted in our Foreward, certain of our observations apply across-the-board to all the countries we visited. These are listed and discussed in the paragraphs which immediately follow.

1. Officials of every country we visited were well informed on the provisions of Basket III of the Helsinki Agreement and gave every indication that they intended to implement those dealing with educational and cultural interchange.

We were somewhat surprised by this awareness, for we had been conditioned by American commentary from Moscow to suspect that we could expect from Bloc country officials only a "correct" reception and evasive answers. The contrary proved to be the case. Every responsible official we met was fully informed on the Agreement's proposals for increased exchanges of information, people, documentation, exhibits, etc. Not one expressed himself as opposed. A few frankly noted limitations: the Czechs that improved cultural relations depended on improved political relations; the Russians, Romanians and Hungarians, that they would not permit the importation of books featuring sex, violence,

pornography etc. But almost all echoed in one way or another the following sentiments:

-- We consider the Helsinki Agreement as a base for development, and we intend to put it into effect. (Y.I. Volskiy, Chief, Cultural Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, U.S.S.R).

-- The Helsinki "Final Act" has become official Soviet policy (L. I. Seleznyov, Pro-rector for Educational Affairs, Leningrad State University).

-- The government of Hungary worked for the Helsinki Agreement and is therefore all for it -- not only in words but in deeds. (Dr. Endre Rosta, President, Institute of Cultural Relations, Budapest).

-- It is difficult to say now what Helsinki may mean in terms of future relations between our countries for we are just beginning to implement the Agreement. But we are working now with other ministries to see how we can implement the Basket III provisions of "The Final Act." We are looking first at our legal agreements; can we improve them? Do existing agreements meet the criteria of

the "Final Act?" Can we make other agreements?
(Vasile Gliga, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Romania.)

-- We support the CSCE Agreement and the idea
of increased cultural exchange. You will find
in this country no barrier, no official who will
try to prevent cultural exchange. (Otakar Holan,
Deputy Minister of Culture, Czechoslovakia).

A less direct, but, we feel, still significant
evidence of the seriousness with which our hosts
regard the provisions of Basket III is found in the
level and nature of our reception wherever we went.
We expected to be received correctly; we were, in
fact, everywhere treated as visitors with a vital
mission. Some illustrations:

-- In Moscow we were scheduled to meet with
the Deputy Minister of Culture. When we arrived
at the Ministry, we were welcomed by the Minister
himself, P.N. Demichev. He spoke with us frankly
and cordially for an hour. The next morning he
participated unexpectedly in the ceremonies at
the opening of the Metropolitan Museum's exhibit

and continued with us informally the discussions of the previous day.

-- In Bucharest our first meeting was with the Deputy (and Acting) Foreign Minister. He talked with us cordially but very frankly about U.S.-Romanian relations for over an hour. At the end of our meeting he invited us to return at the conclusion of all our consultations to give him our impressions. Our Embassy reported as follows: "The final call on Gliga, at his request (and while he was in the role of Acting Foreign Minister), had particular significance since he indicated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will call a meeting of representatives from all institutions visited [by us] to review the state of all U.S.-Romanian exchange. Gliga accompanied us to the door of the Ministry

after the meeting, where he reiterated his appreciation for "the new impulse your visit has given to exchanges."

-- In Poznan we were received by the Poznan PZPR (i.e. Communist Party) First Secretary, Jerzy Zasada.

His comments [on U.S.-Polish relationships] were particularly interesting, for traditionally it has been more difficult to conduct our programs in Poznan than in other parts of the country. Moreover, it is interesting to note that the Consul's dinner in our honor was attended by guests who in the recent past had declined to attend functions at his residence.

-- In Kiev we were the official guests of the Ukranian government, whose Ministry of Culture assigned a full-time guide/escort to us and whose Acting Minister of Culture not only received us in his office but held a luncheon for us.

-- In Leningrad the world-famous Director of the Hermitage, Academician B.B. Piotrovskiy, spent four hours with us on a Sunday morning in August, guiding us personally through his fabulous collections.

-- Before we left the United States, our Embassy in Warsaw had recommended cancellation of our visit there on the ground that no Polish official of any stature would be available to see us. Yet we were entertained at lunch at the Foreign Office on our last day in Warsaw by the Vice Director, Department III, and the Director of the Press and Information Department of the Foreign Office. Both made unusual efforts to make the appointment.

-- In Prague we were received, in the absence of

the Foreign Minister, by his Deputy. He spoke to us on U.S.-Czechoslovakian cultural/political relations with a candor not ordinarily encountered in this area.

We believe that the only logical interpretation for the level, cordiality and seriousness of our meetings is this: the officials with whom we spoke looked upon us as an influential, high-level delegation, consciously dispatched from the United States to test their intentions concerning the Basket III recommendations of the Helsinki Agreement. For reasons which may or may not be obscure, they wished us to get and transmit the message that they knew what these recommendations meant, and that they intended to do their share to see that they were implemented.

We are not so naive as to believe that declarations of intent can be construed as positive action. We are aware that we may have been subjected to what the late Ambassador Bohlen decried as "ruthless Russian amiability:" it never really means a thing, he said, "and when it is over we're in worse shape than before." We are aware that very soon after our departure from the Soviet Union several things happened which could suggest that Russian promises on Basket III were just so much rhetoric. Representative John Brademas quotes Chairman Brezhnev as saying, "There is the third basket which refers to freedom of information. That is to be fulfilled according to agreements. But all this will have to be seen as time goes on." A Russian teacher married to an American professor has not been allowed to join her husband at the University of Virginia. A Soviet Ministry official has informed journalists that Moscow

will not permit an influx of Western ideas and publications "contrary to Soviet legislation and to the morality of socialist society."

These actions do not surprise nor discourage us. None of the Soviet officials suggested that the Helsinki agreement replaced and extended our bilateral cultural agreement with the U.S.S.R.; and yet a number of exchanges outside our formal agreement, including the Metropolitan-Pushkin exchanges, had taken place or are projected. We did not discuss the human-rights provisions of the Helsinki agreement, which call for the reunification of families, marriage between citizens of different states, improvement of conditions for tourism; and no official told us the U.S.S.R. had liberalized its positions on these matters. As we have noted above, officials of all the countries we visited candidly admitted that they would not permit importation of printed or filmed material which was contrary to their legislation and to the morality of socialist society. In the one area somewhat outside of educational and cultural exchange which we frequently touched upon, multiple entry visas for journalists, the U.S.S.R. has

taken positive action -- as we were told it would.

To conclude: We doubt that the Eastern European countries, and particularly the Soviet Union, will actively promote the noncultural human-rights provisions of the Helsinki agreement. We feel quite sure that they will not relax their prohibitions against the importation of materials which question their political or moral values, Helsinki notwithstanding. We cannot be absolutely certain that their expressed intentions to implement the cultural and educational exchange provisions of Basket III are more than bland deceptions which will lead to no concrete action. But we are inclined, on the strength of the evidence at hand, to accept at face value their statements on this subject. We would hope for an era of somewhat expanded cultural contacts, both governmental and private, between the United States and the Bloc countries; we should "give it a try" in the spirit of Helsinki, rather than encourage a continuation of the confrontation which existed in the Cold War years.

2. Officials in every country we visited strongly supported international educational and cultural exchanges as a means for promoting better relations with the United States.

This observation may seem obvious, particularly since it is closely related to the previous one; so it is perhaps instructive to recall that this was not always the case. Our official exchange program with Hungary is only two years old; that with Czechoslovakia, only three; and hard bargaining went into the establishment of our programs with the U.S.S.R. in 1959, and with Poland and Romania a few years later.

It was, then, with genuine interest that we asked the officials we met their views on the value of exchanges. Without exception they spoke affirmatively on the value of the principle. Any reservations they had were related to details of implementation. For example, in Warsaw we asked Mr. Jacek Dobierski, Director of the Ministry of Culture's Department of International Cooperation, point blank whether he thought cultural exchanges contributed to the improvement of Polish-American relations. Mr. Dobierski affirmed without reservations the importance of

cultural relations to Poland's foreign policy saying, "ours. is an open policy, necessitating that we learn about the cultural achievements of other countries while simultaneously making our own culture known to other countries."

Even in a country with a less "open policy," Hungary, we received a similar, if somewhat oblique, response from Mr. Laszlo Nagy, Head of the Foreign Ministry's Division of North America and Western Europe. After detailing at some length impediments to good U.S.-Hungarian political relations, Mr. Nagy stated: "These problems do not affect the cultural field. . .The Foreign Ministry deals with the formulation of foreign policy. The presentation of Hungarian culture abroad is an important aspect of policy, so we have established an organization at the deputy-ministry level, working closely with the Foreign Ministry, to work out cultural agreements with other countries."

3. The countries we visited do not act as a "bloc" on international exchange matters; on the contrary, they vary greatly in their approach to, and activity in, the field.

Although, as we have just noted, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Soviet Union, Romania and Hungary appear to agree on the value of international cultural exchange, and on their intention to implement the provisions of the Helsinki Agreement which deals with it, they do not offer identical, or even similar, problems and possibilities for the United States in this field. On the contrary, they vary markedly in their receptivity to increased exchanges with this country, in their methods of establishing and operating programs, and in the possibilities for implementing new activities.

These variations can be summarized as follows.

-- Czechoslovakia subscribes in theory to the increase of exchanges with the United States, and its cultural leaders are all for it; but significant expansion of the program in this

tightly controlled country depends upon negotiation of a cultural agreement, which in turn may depend in some respects upon settlement of an outstanding claims agreement.

-- Poland offers a vivid contrast to Czechoslovakia. It already has innumerable contacts with the United States through private as well as government-supported programs; and it is wide open to more. The only barriers to an almost unlimited exchange are funds on each side to finance additional activity, and a growing Polish sensitivity to the issue of reciprocity; i.e. a more equitable balance between information on Poland in the United States and information on the United States in Poland.

-- The Soviet Union is clearly on the record as favoring the increase of exchanges along the lines of the Helsinki Agreement, and for the first time since 1959 (when the formal U.S.-U.S.S.R. exchange agreement was signed) has given some evidence that she will permit institution-to-institution arrangements outside the terms of the agreement. But

will she deliver on her real and implied promises?

-- Romania seems generally receptive to exchanges with the United States. She alone among the countries we visited, has signed a cultural agreement with us which permits the U.S. to have an off-premises library in Bucharest and in general goes far beyond the proposals of the Helsinki Agreement. Yet, she is still a tightly-controlled socialist country where decisions are centralized. This affects her exchanges with the United States in at least two adverse ways: 1) over-cautious selection of her grantees to visit this country often causes her not to take full advantage of the exchange possibilities offered; 2) over-insistence on the principle that all grants contribute to the government's plan for national development limit the scope of her exchanges by putting a disproportionate emphasis on science and technology.

-- Hungary, like Czechoslovakia, would prefer to operate within the framework of an official cultural agreement; and although she professes interest in the immediate negotiation of such an agreement, it seems likely that she will drag her feet on it until certain "political" problems are resolved.

4. "Step-by-step" is the watchword as we move towards more, and more varied, exchanges.

We have maintained in paragraphs 1 and 2 above that the Eastern European countries favor increased exchanges with the United States and seem prepared to implement the cultural proposals of the Helsinki Agreement. This does not mean, however, that they are prepared for a sudden great leap forward. Over and over again we heard expressed the necessity for "orderly" step-by-step expansion of our exchange activities.

This comment by Dr. Robert Boros, Head of the Department of International Relations of the Hungarian Ministry of Culture, was typical: "It is our opinion that our relations with the capitalist countries have progressed well. We are now exploring the next phase: how best to take advantage of the Helsinki provisions." Nothing headlong here.

Czechoslovakia's Deputy Foreign Minister was more precise: "We are all for the improvement of U.S.-Czech relations, but we were offended by your failure to sign the trade agreement. We can make a new start by negotiating a cultural agreement,

but this must be done in an orderly way." His colleague, the Deputy Minister of Culture, expounded on what might be done when "all aspects of our relations which have hindered cooperation and are not a concern of the Ministry of Education [i.e. the trade agreement] have been clarified. We should first develop cooperation in spheres where we have already had good experience -- e.g. in universities and in scientific studies; then we might send you lecturers in Czechoslovak languages; then we could increase our mutual participation in scientific congresses in the United States and Czechoslovakia, and so on."

Perhaps the best exposition of the Bloc countries' point of view came from the Soviet Minister of Culture, Mr. Demichev. Here are some relevant excerpts from his long talk with us: "We have signed an agreement [with the United States]; we have our plans for 1976, '77 and '78. . . Our cultural relations are growing and are helping in the political field as well. The situation today is more favorable than it has ever been. We

should not only exchange performing arts groups but also develop conferences and symposia on the arts . . . The spiritual and cultural life of each of our countries is not developed at random but according to plan. We have different understandings and different approaches; we will find common ground, though it will not be easy. We should argue, prove our points and exchange our ideas." Toward the end of this part of our discussion, Mr. Demichev made an argument which is possibly more revealing (and perhaps even more encouraging) than any other statement we heard from a public official. We asked him when we might open an American bookstore in Moscow. In reply, Mr. Demichev raised the point that this would violate the Helsinki principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of another country. Then he added, almost wryly, words to this effect: "We regard freedom from a different point of view than you. We take as our task the spiritual health of our society. Any infection should be excised. Some people say, 'Let the people choose!' Some countries and parties feel responsibility

for future generations. So we would have to control what goes into your bookstore. This would lead to arguments between us."

In Poland and Romania what passes for the "private sector" -- university rectors, professors, writers, museum directors, impresarios -- implied that there were no restrictions on an immediate and large increase in exchanges with the United States -- except one: money. Our talks with those higher in the hierarchy convinced us that they were wrong on the first score, right on the second. Even in these countries, the centralized planning of international exchange, like everything else, could circumscribe the private initiatives, even if lack of money did not. But lack of money will, in Poland and Romania, as in Czechoslovakia, the U.S.S.R. and Hungary. In the final analysis, the State controls purse strings as well as policy. We saw no evidence in any country visited that the State was prepared to make greatly increased expenditures of hard currency to augment its exchange programs with the West.

The prognostication, then, is for a gradual, carefully orchestrated, step-by-step enlargement of our exchange programs with Eastern Europe. This is, we believe, as it should be.

5. There is a uniform desire throughout the area to increase exchanges with the United States in science, technology, and management.

We asked the chairman of Romania's National Council for Science and Technology, Mr. Ion Ursu, how he would use \$100,000 for an exchange program with the United States if he were suddenly presented with it. After a moment of token hesitation denoting reflection, Mr. Ursu avowed that he would use it all for the exchange of specialists in the hard sciences. It was a logical conclusion to his hour-long harangue on the need for Romania to move away from the purely academic type of exchange program into areas which provided greater technological and practical pay-off for the Romanian economy.

Mr. Ursu's position was an accurate, if somewhat heightened, reflection of a point of view we encountered wherever we went, with this elaboration. Many of our interlocutors included management techniques in their definition of science and technology. Here are representative comments:

-- Premyslav Jakos, Czechoslovakia's Deputy Minister of Education. "We must make use of

scientific knowledge any place in training our students. . . . Exchange in nonscientific fields is difficult but not impossible."

-- Jerzy Zasada, Poznan's PZPR First Secretary, summarizing his views on how existing good relations between the United States and Poland could be improved, suggested the following exchange activities in this order: 1) Exhibits of technology, particularly of agricultural technology; 2) Exchanges between universities, particularly in biological sciences; 3) Exchanges of musical groups.

-- Dr. Belik, Rector of Kiev University. When asked what the Soviets expected to gain from lecturer exchange, the Rector replied frankly that the U.S.S.R. tried to take advantage of the lecturer program to get teachers in fields in which they were weak and which were important to their national interest. They would particularly welcome lecturers in cybernetics, mathematics, economics, aesthetics in engineering and design, psychology of work and management.

-- Dr. Endre Rosta, President of Hungary's

Institute of Cultural Relations, when asked how we can improve our educational exchange programs.

"Our first priority is to send and receive scientists. . . We are pleased with our agreement with your National Science Foundation . . . We are also particularly interested in agriculture and management science."

-- Dr. Leonte Rautu, Rector of Bucharest's Stefan Georghiu Academy, which trains Romania's top-echelon government officials, when asked what role the United States can play in the Academy's training program. "Management! We want to learn from you about the introduction of computers to management, the organization of production, the use of manpower. . ."

The obvious desire of the Communist countries to get from us, at the least possible cost to themselves, what they badly need in the way of expertise in management, science and technology to advance quickly their own industrial development is nothing new, but it seems, if anything, to have taken a new lease of life as a result of the Helsinki agreement's emphasis on scientific exchange.

At the same time we detected what we felt were encouraging signs of willingness on the part of the Eastern Europeans to increase established exchanges in the cultural (principally performing arts) area and in the humanities and social sciences. For example, the University of Warsaw is about to open an institute of American Studies; in the U.S.S.R. Mr. Demichev openly advocated more conferences and symposia in the arts. All the countries we visited are eager to have their cultural achievements made known to Americans (see point 7 below). Mr. Ursu of Romania agreed that some of his hypothetical \$100,000 might be spent on grants for students who wished to study "folklore or language."

We must, then, somehow accommodate in our exchange programs the desire of these countries for American technical/management know-how, while not failing to capitalize on their awakening interest in exchanges in other fields.

6. There is, in the countries we visited, a growing interest in furthering institution-to-institution contacts, but procedures for doing so are not yet clearly defined.

The Helsinki Agreement makes frequent reference to the desire of the signatories to "promote the conclusion of direct arrangements" between universities and other institutions. This has always been a fundamental principle of our country's international cultural and educational policy. Consequently, we spent a good deal of time in our discussions probing the intentions of our hosts on the subject. What we discovered was generally encouraging, though here again there were fairly wide discrepancies from country to country as to what had been done or could be expected.

In Prague the Vice-rector of Charles University said he could work out an exchange of professors between Charles University and an American institution, and then it would be "approved" by the Ministry of Education. The Deputy Minister of Education saw it a bit differently. According to him there existed at the moment no university-to-university agreements. He suggested that a direct exchange between Charles University and the

University of California might be worked out like this. The United States cultural attache in Prague would inform the Rector of Charles University of the interest of the University of California in establishing a direct relationship. Then the two rectors would correspond and come up with a concrete proposal. This would then be "examined" (and presumably approved or rejected) by the Ministry of Education. "Since we have a centralized system," he concluded, "we prefer to work through a formal cultural agreement." In short, institution-to-institution arrangements in Czechoslovakia are, for all practical purposes, made by the central government.

At the other extreme was the situation in Poland. When Mr. Marks asked the rector of one university whether the Ministry imposed any restrictions upon his university, he snorted, "Mr. Ambassador, there is war between the Ministry and the universities." He backed up his implication that his university acted independently by noting that each year it sent abroad 330 of its professors and received 340!

Further discussion with the rector did, however, elicit the information that there was a small fly in the ointment of his independence: money. He could apparently do what he wanted with the money appropriated for his university, but the Ministry, "which is only interested in money," did not always give him all he wanted. While this did not act as a serious brake on Poznan's direct institution-to-institution arrangements, we discovered that in some places the central government could (but not always did) exercise veto power over proposed institutional contacts through its control of the purse strings.

The Soviet Union fell between the extremes of Prague and Poznan, and probably best illustrates the situation as it actually is. The Pro-rector for Educational Affairs at Leningrad State University seemed to think there would be no trouble in his negotiating a direct exchange with an American university, provided general approval for such actions was included in the U.S.-U.S.S.R. cultural agreement. His opposite number at the Polytechnic Institute of Leningrad felt the only way to arrange

an institution-to-institution exchange was through the Ministry, or at least with the Ministry's blessing in advance. The Rector of Kiev University said the correct procedure would be a simultaneous approach to him and to the Ministry of Education. The Vice-rector of the University of Moscow avoided an answer on the question of procedure by saying simply, "We have direct relationships with more than 100 countries. . .the Ministry doesn't hamper the relations of the university with other countries, but we work these out within the framework of a culture agreement." The Minister of Education said, "The U.S. university wishing to establish a direct exchange with a Russian university should address a proposal to the Russian university. After deciding it liked the proposal, the Russian university would take it to the Ministry. Financing would then determine what could be done."

The Hermitage Museum in Leningrad and the Pushkin Museum in Moscow departed from tradition (but presumably with the approval of an appropriate Ministry) by going outside the terms of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. cultural agreement to work out a series of art exchanges with the

Metropolitan Museum of Art and institutions associated with it in the project.

Paradoxically we take encouragement from this patternless situation. It indicates that countries which have never before thought very much about direct institution-to-institution exchanges are now beginning to think seriously about them. What emerges from our talks is that powerful institutions, like the universities of Leningrad, Moscow and Poznan, or the Hermitage and the Pushkin museums, can in practice negotiate international exchanges and receive almost automatic Ministerial approval; and that in this post-Helsinki world, the prospects for direct contacts between the United States and less-renowned Bloc institutions are enhanced.

Given the nature of Communist regimes, it is improbable that any Eastern European university or cultural institution will ever have the complete autonomy of action of an American institution; but it was nevertheless encouraging to us to note the few

tentative steps the Eastern European institutions are taking in this direction.*

*After our return the Rector of Moscow University, Dr. Rem Khoklov, visited thirteen universities in the United States and discussed bilateral agreements for the exchange of professors. Although his mission may have had prior approval of the Ministry of Education, his apparent willingness to conclude final arrangements confirms the impression that the Ministry is not directly involved in all negotiations.

7. "Reciprocity" in exchanges with the United States is a matter of concern in all the countries we visited.

In point 3 above we noted the concern of the Polish government that a great deal more information about, and material from, the United States was available in Poland than was true of the reverse. The same concern was evident in all the countries we surveyed, and with almost equal intensity.

The one exception was the U.S.S.R., but even the Soviets raised the question in a slightly different connotation. Since they have always insisted that our exchanges be governed by formal agreement, it would have been invidious (not to say humiliating) for them to complain that more American cultural material was translated and produced in the U.S.S.R. than there was Russian material produced in the United States. Yet Minister Demichev was at pains to point out to us, in detail, the number of U.S. books translated, films shown, plays produced -- ostensibly as evidence that reports on the Soviet Union's cultural isolationism were unfounded. We were struck, too,

by the strange coincidence that Tass carried on August 26, 1975, the day of our arrival in the U.S.S.R., a piece entitled "Inventions by Bourgeois Propoganda and the Realities." The first paragraph of the despatch read:

"It is often alleged in the Western press, without any grounds whatsoever, that Soviet people are isolated from Western, specifically American culture. Some contributors of such materials even go so far as to assert that works by Western writers and Western films are sort of 'banned' in the Soviet Union. These are absurd inventions, of course, and they could well be ignored if they had not, repeat not, been repeated systematically with the obvious purpose of giving the poorly informed reader a distorted view of the Soviet way of life."

The article went on to point out that in the last five years Soviet cinemagoers had seen over 500 foreign feature films and 200 plays by "specifically American" authors; and that American writers had been translated into 52 languages in the Soviet Union and printed in 170 million copies. (Full text at Appendix B.)

The Czechs, Poles, Romanians and Hungarians were less subtle. Their spokesmen were, armed with detailed figures: they cited us chapter and verse on U.S. books, films, plays, exhibits, etc. available in their countries and the contrast this represented to their materials available in the United States; and they were frank to state their dissatisfaction at the injustice of it all.

Thus, after telling us that Polish television had carried in 1974 and 1975, 67 U.S. films, 18 plays and seven serials, the Director of the Office of Foreign Cooperation of Polish Television and Radio told us bluntly: "Something must be done to fill the gap between U.S. products shown in Poland, and Polish products shown in the United States. There must come a time when we can say to our public that the gap is being filled."

The Hungarians were even more adamant, pointing out that in three years only three Hungarian books had been published in the United States, while "dozens" of U.S. authors, including

contemporaries, had appeared in Hungary in "millions" of copies. "We are for Helsinki," said one, "not only in words but in deeds. It is in your interest as well as ours to implement the Agreement. Though small, Hungary can make an intellectual contribution to the world, and we want to be respected for it. Sovereignty applies to intellectual life as well as to political."

We understand the strong feelings of these cultural spokesmen, but we doubt that the United States can do much to alleviate the sense of injustice they feel on this issue of reciprocity. The trouble lies in the basic differences between the social/political systems of the socialist countries and ourselves, a difference which it is impossible for them really to understand. Since the government of a socialist country controls, and often subsidizes, importation and distribution of products from abroad, it follows that all those American books and films are in the country because: a) they are in demand; b) the government wants them there. What the Poles and the Hungarians cannot comprehend is that only the first of these conditions prevails

in determining what reaches the American market: that if they produce things which Americans want badly enough (the Hungarian composer Bartok, the famous Russian novelists like Tolstoy, etc.) they will be widely distributed commercially in the United States -- but only if this is the case. What they seem unable to grasp is that the U.S. Government cannot, and will not, attempt to determine what cultural fare the American public should have.

In fairness to the officials with whom we discussed the matter, we should add that they do not expect one-for-one reciprocity. They do not expect a country of ten million to send to a country of 220 million as much intellectual or cultural material as it receives. Nor do we believe that this kind of reciprocity should be determined on a geographical basis or on a population basis. We do believe that our relations with Eastern European countries would be improved if they felt their cultural achievements were more widely known in this country. It therefore seems advantageous that both the public and private sectors of our country do what they can to assure that the real talents of Eastern Europe are discovered and made known to Americans.

To satisfy this overwhelming desire for recognition will not require a change in our free enterprise system. It is in our best interest to know what the Eastern Europeans are writing or thinking. Scholars in all disciplines are always eager to share knowledge with their contemporaries throughout the world. Currently there is an exchange of ideas between the United States and Eastern Europe. We are suggesting that the flow through the pipelines be stimulated in both directions.

8. American student and professor participants in exchange programs in Eastern Europe are generally contributing to the achievement of "mutual understanding;" but there is room for improvement in their selection and orientation.

We heard the first reference to U.S. grantees in the first post we visited, Prague. It was not an auspicious introduction to the U.S. side of our exchange program. What we learned was that in the 1973-74 academic year one of the very limited number of grants to Americans for study in Czechoslovakia (made by the State Department-supported International Research and Exchanges Board, or IREX) had gone to a woman who was sustained almost solely on a diet of carrot juice. This singular deficiency did not come to light until the grantee was in Czechoslovakia. Czech and American officials, in spite of the best will in the world, were unable to locate, much less reduce to juice, in snow-bound Czechoslovakia the many pounds of carrots the lady needed for survival. She was, consequently, shipped home, trailing behind her a certain understandable trail of ill will. Something had obviously gone very awry with the IREX selection process.

We learned later that this was an isolated case and that IREX had been deceived by the medical report filed by the grantee. But the case does illustrate the problems

that can arise, even when due diligence is exercised.

Our first exposure to American grantees was in Poznan, where we met with a group of young university professors who had spent one or more years at Polish universities. They were intelligent, articulate and adaptable. To our surprise they admitted that with the favorable rate of exchange accorded them, they had no financial problems; surely a first in the annals of the Fulbright program.* They also expressed satisfaction with the physical conditions of their lives in Poland, though we were later informed that they had, before the meeting, decided among themselves not to raise with us their very real problems of inadequate housing, of buying food and other personal necessities, of difficulties with Polish authorities. Their principal complaint, shared by about half of the group, was that Polish universities were not making proper use of them. Our reaction was that the complaints arose more

*Since our return to Washington we have received a letter from a Fulbright student grantee to Romania maintaining that student stipends are quite inadequate. We have referred the complaint to the Board of Foreign Scholarships for investigation.

from an exaggerated estimate of their own talents than from failures in the Polish system. There was, we felt, probably more justification for the report, which was almost unanimous, that at the beginning of their experience they had not been assigned to do the work they thought they would do when they accepted the assignment to Poland. Clearly there was room for improvement in their pre-assignment orientation, or in communications between U.S. and Polish officials. Yet even so they were unanimous in a favorable reaction to their assignments. In fact, the majority wished to return for a second year, and there was general agreement that three years was an optimum period of assignment -- an opinion we did not share.

We met our next group of American grantees in Leningrad. They were newly arrived and optimistic. Though, we were told, housing for them was bad, they recognized that they had been given the best rooms available, and generally superior to those of their Russian colleagues;

they therefore accepted the inconvenience with good grace. What struck us about this group of grantees was the rather esoteric nature of their projects. We therefore checked on our return to Washington the projects of Americans who would be studying in Leningrad and Moscow. Among them: "Aspects of Negation in Contemporary Russian;" "Latin Materials in the Rossica Collection;" "The Evolution and Distribution of the Bird-of-Prey/Bleak-Head Motifs in Eurasian Late Bronze-Early Iron Age Art;" "Aspects of the Genitive Plural in Contemporary Standard Russian;" "The Balto-Slavic Predicate Instrumental;" "Poetic Language in Russian Prose: Non-Referential Pronouns and their Emotive Effect;" "Ecclesiastical Policy of Grand Prince Witold of Lithuania, 1392-1430."

While we have no doubt that the American grantees engaged in these studies will profit personally from their year in the Soviet Union, we

wondered whether they were contributing in more than the most ephemeral way to the purposes of our exchange program. It was a concern we felt again, even more acutely, in Romania.

In Moscow we met, and were impressed by, American students who had completed the Summer Language Training Program at Moscow University and others who had just arrived to embark upon a year of graduate work. They were a mature, well-prepared and contented lot. The former group was pleased with the summer program and had clearly established rapport with their Russian hosts. Many in the latter group were returning to the Soviet Union for the second time, knew what to expect and were looking forward to the experience. We were under the impression that, here at least, the American side of the program was operating flawlessly.

We were disabused of this notion by the Ministry of Education official responsible for

U.S. - U.S.S.R. exchanges, Mr. L. B. Bazhanor
His reply to our question on how the U.S.-
U.S.S.R. academic exchange program can be
improved is worth summarizing because it
touches upon a number of points we have referred
to in this report. Bazhanor began by saying
that the U.S.S.R. is ready to consider an
increase in the number of grantees, but dealing
with IREX is "complicated." He complained that
IREX insists on sending candidates even if
"the situation here is not suitable." He went
on to say that Soviet nominees don't raise
problems "outside the realm of studies,"
as Americans sometime do. What he had in mind,
it developed, were the problems posed for his
government by U.S. grantees with families, and
by a recently arrived crippled student who is
confined to a wheelchair. He summed up by
saying he had the impression that IREX takes
just about anyone who applies, while the Soviets
have several applicants for each position, and
suggested that each side nominate more than the
50 to receive grants and allow the other side to

place 50 from the larger number. We found much food for thought in Mr. Bazhanor's observations.

Our contact in Bucharest with some 25 American grantees who had just arrived in Romania and our talks with U.S. officials deepened the questions about the selection and preparation of American grantees which had been growing as a result of our talks in Prague, Poland and the Soviet Union. Here again the projects of study of many of the grantees seemed far remote from everyday life, and not even designed to bring the grantee into contact with Romanians (e.g. "German Minority Adaptation in Romania," "Charge and Counter-charge: Romanian Peasantry in the Carpathians.")

We noted, too, a number of married couples, and several with children among the grantees and wondered whether they posed the same problems in Romania as they did in Moscow. When we asked a senior U.S. official his opinion on these and related matters we received a forthright reply. He was, he said, "very concerned about the quality of U.S. Fulbright

grantees," many of whom were selfishly motivated to accept grants, did not study seriously, spent much of their time in vacation and travel. He was equally concerned about the subject matter many studied, describing it "as of no national advantage." Grantees with families he bluntly characterized as "a pain," noting that they often became "a social welfare problem for the Embassy." He did not recommend barring grantees with family from the program, but he did think family status should be "a factor to consider" in the selection process.

Parenthetically, it should be said that his strictures applied more to the Fulbright grantees than to IREX grantees. He found the latter, on the whole, much better: good students, serious of purpose. We have talked since our return with the Director of IREX, Mr. Allen Kasoff. He has assured us that the IREX recruitment process is being refined so that there are several candidates for each available grant, that personal as well as professional factors are considered in selecting grantees, and that great progress has been made in recent years

in making grants to people whose research is relevant to U.S. interests.

Even so, the comments of this and other U.S. officers in Romania tended to confirm our growing feeling that, as Mr. Bazhanor had maintained, too many of our grants to Americans seemed to be made on a first-come, first-served basis. More careful selection of grantees, a better orientation for them on what they will find in Eastern Europe, and an insistence that the subject each studies can really contribute to the purposes of our exchange programs will, we believe, improve a program which has already proven its worth.

9. U.S. Embassies in the countries we visited are strong supporters of their exchange programs, and their officers are excellently equipped to deal with them.

This observation may sound redundant, but the time was, and not so long ago, when many "regular" Foreign Service officers thought international cultural and information programs played no part in our foreign policy and should not be a concern of our Embassies.

This is certainly no longer true in the Embassies we visited. On the contrary, the prevailing view appears to be that expressed by our Deputy Chief of Mission in Bucharest: "I would give higher priority to no other use of U.S. resources in this post." Other Ambassadors and DCM's whom we met gave explicit or implicit support to this position by saying they could effectively utilize more funds for educational and cultural exchange if they were available; and all proved that they were not just parroting a conventional truth by demonstrating a thorough knowledge of CU and IREX programs, and

by making specific suggestions for improved or expanded exchange activities. We felt that they saw the cultural and educational exchanges as a highly useful way to establish contacts and promote an understanding of the United States and its policies in areas where rapprochement on political or economic issues seemed remote. It was, in other words, clearly our impression that the top echelon of our Embassies genuinely believed that the exchange program could, and did, in the words of CU's concept paper, "strengthen patterns of informal two-way communication in ways which will favorably influence relations between the United States and other countries."

Mere interest in the programs, while undoubtedly important, is not enough to equip our personnel overseas properly to conceive and operate them. We were therefore gratified at the very obvious competence of our Chiefs of Mission and their Deputies. In each country we found them extremely knowledgeable about local customs, traditions and politics; shrewd judges of what could and could not be done through

exchanges; well accepted by high-level officials of the countries to which they were accredited; firm but "diplomatic" in their defense of U.S. interests; fully informed on all aspects of the work of their Embassies, and therefore respected leaders of their staffs.

Equally important to the success of our cultural efforts, of course, is the ability of the "working stiff" to function effectively in the cultural, political, social and economic environment to which they are sent. We were impressed in each post by the quality of our personnel who are responsible for the operation of the exchange programs. Our Counselors for Press and Cultural Affairs, and their Cultural Affairs Officers, were everywhere efficient, effective, dedicated. Each was thoroughly familiar with the cultural-educational climate in which he worked; each was surprisingly fluent in the difficult language of his country; each had a detailed knowledge of his exchange program; each was working enthusiastically yet without illusions in a difficult situation. Even the

four officers who were relatively new to their posts when we arrived had adapted with remarkable speed to their new conditions of work.

We left the area confident that the direction and operation of our international educational and cultural programs were in good hands.

IV. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS

The observations we have made in the preceding section of this report suggest to us the following recommendations for action.

1. The United States should in every way possible take advantage of the expressed intention of the Eastern European countries to implement the provisions of Basket III of the Helsinki Agreement.

This recommendation sounds vague and general, yet it represents the essence of our conclusions. We shall try to put flesh on its bare bones in this and succeeding paragraphs.

The Soviets and their Eastern European allies are on record -- in statements by their leaders, in talks with us, indeed in their signing of the Agreement -- as prepared to carry out all the recommendations of the Helsinki Agreement, not just those of primary interest to them. The West has much to gain by their fulfillment of the agreements on cooperation in humanitarian and cultural fields. We should therefore seize the opportunity presented by their expressed intention to cooperate in this field. We should not,

through inaction, allow the Eastern Europeans to renege on their promises; we should, on the contrary, constantly present them, as though we expected automatic acceptance, exchange possibilities and projects sanctioned by Helsinki. Ultimately, we should, if necessary and desirable, trade a Basket III quid for a Basket I or II quo in our official negotiations. In short, the cultural exchange iron is hot; and we should strike it hard before it cools.

2. The United States, unilaterally and in consort with its NATO allies, should maintain a record of actions they have taken to implement the Basket III provisions of the Helsinki Agreement, and another of actions by the Eastern European countries which defy them.

The Agreement calls for a conference in Belgrade in 1977 ". . . to continue the multilateral process initiated by the Conference." At this meeting the Eastern European countries will come armed with lists of all they have done, according to their lights, to cooperate with other nations in humanitarian and cultural fields. Many of their listed activities will be fictitious or inconsequential, yet the overall list will look impressive.

It is essential that the NATO allies be able to demonstrate that their overall record on Basket III proposals is superior to that of the Eastern European countries if they are to extract concessions from them; therefore, the NATO countries must know in detail what they have done, and what the Eastern countries have not done.

We understand that the State Department has already

taken steps to keep a record of this country's official actions in support of Basket III. We highly approve this, but would recommend that it enlarge its effort to include in its record whatever has been undertaken by private initiative.

We also have heard that preliminary moves have been made to have NATO coordinate the recordkeeping for its member nations. We commend this move and urge the United States to promote it and cooperate with it.

3. The United States should take the lead in promoting in 1976 a meeting of cultural representatives of the Western European countries which signed the Helsinki agreement.

We have referred above to the 1977 follow-up conference in Belgrade called for by the Final Act of the CSCE. The chapter of the Act which provides for Belgrade encourages other meetings, in this language: "The participating states. . . declare their resolve. . . to implement the provisions of the 'Final Act' of the Conference. . . multilaterally, by meetings of experts of the participating states, and also within the framework of existing international organizations, such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and UNESCO, with regard to educational, scientific and cultural cooperation."

We believe the United States should avail itself of this resolve to bring about in 1976 a meeting of cultural representatives of the Western European signatory countries. The purposes of the meeting would be: a) to review progress made by participating countries in carrying out the provisions of Basket III; b) to uncover areas of possible action which had received inadequate attention; c) to expose states which were not living up to their commitments; d) to make plans for cooperative

future actions; and thus e) to prepare the way for a productive discussion of Basket III at the Belgrade Conference in 1977. The logical and obvious agenda for such a meeting would be a point-by-point consideration of the main subjects (and subheads) in the Final Act's chapter on "Cooperation in Humanitarian and other Fields:" 1. Human Contacts; 2. Information; 3. Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Culture; 4) Cooperation and Exchange in the Field of Education.

We believe the following advantages would accrue to the United States from its sponsorship of such a conference:

-- It would have the psychological advantage of convincing the European nations of our genuine interest in international humanitarian and cultural causes.

-- It would have the practical effect of spurring international action in areas in which we are eager to cooperate, but in which the Socialist countries are reluctant to move.

-- It would help to prepare us for the more serious confrontation of Belgrade, 1977, by:

a) indicating the positions which the Socialist countries will take; b) enabling us to coordinate our approaches and projects with our allies.

The language of the Act implies that meetings of the kind we propose can be organized not only within the framework of existing organizations but also by individual states, or presumably by any other competent existing or ad hoc organization. UNESCO would obviously be an appropriate sponsor, but preferable from our point of view is a conference sponsored and organized in the United States. It could be done either by the U.S. Government or private interests. We recommend a combination of the two. We favor the strictly U.S. approach, for we do not believe we can realize maximum advantage from the meeting unless it is clearly seen to be an American initiative. We suggest that the conference be held in Williamsburg, Virginia, which is itself an illustration of American cultural achievement.

4. The funds requested by CU for its official exchange programs with Eastern Europe should be made available.

The State Department, in making its FY 1976 budget request to Congress indicated that it would spend \$3,986,000 in direct program costs to support exchanges with Eastern Europe if its total budget request of \$65 million were approved. We believe the circumstances justified the request. The sum was about a million dollars more than its actual 1975 expenditures on programs, but the possibilities for useful educational and cultural exchange had surely increased more than proportionately.

We were therefore distressed to learn on our return from Europe that Congress had cut CU's budget request and that CU now proposed to use only \$3,565,000 of its \$60 million appropriation for the direct support of exchanges with Eastern Europe. This represents an increase in the Eastern budget of only \$672,000 just at a time when possibilities for meaningful exchange have greatly improved.* We regret this unexpected development and believe it should, if at all possible, be rectified. Since there is no chance that Congress will increase CU's fiscal 1975 appropriation, the

*A graphic illustration of an opportunity missed for lack of adequate funding is found in the USIS library in Bucharest. This unique window on America in Eastern Europe remains open to the public only thirty hours a week because USIS lacks authority to hire the one more employee which would enable the library to be manned for at least the normal forty working hours per week.

only apparent way to increase its funds for Eastern Europe is for CU to take monies from other areas. This would seem possible to us in light of these tentative CU allocations for direct program costs:

For Eastern Europe	\$3,565,000
For Africa	4,405,000
For the American Republics	5,275,000
For Western Europe	4,650,000
For East Asia	6,535,000
For the Near East and South Asia	5,250,000

Although we are not informed on all the factors which led CU to this geographic distribution of its funds, we would recommend that CU reconsider its allocation of 1976 funds with a view to finding at least a modest increase (say up to \$4 million) for Eastern Europe. Anything less would appear to be a repudiation by this country of its support of the Basket III provisions of the Helsinki agreement.

Fiscal 1977 will give us a new opportunity to demonstrate our intentions concerning these provisions, and we should make it clear that our intentions are honorable.

If CU's budget request for fiscal 1977 is approved by the Congress, it proposes to spend \$5,645,000 on exchanges with Eastern Europe. We believe this is reasonable. Furthermore, we believe it important that the United States go to the Belgrade follow-up conference in 1977 with proof that it has given more than lip service to the Helsinki agreement: that it has in fact increased its educational and cultural exchanges with Eastern Europe. We therefore strongly recommend that the Congress authorize a fiscal 1977 appropriation for CU which will enable it to spend at least the projected \$5,645,000 in the area.

We do not make this recommendation in the belief that more is necessarily better; we are well aware that quality is vital in our exchanges. But we believe it is true that Americans have far fewer points of contact in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe or Latin America, where relationships in business supplement those in education or the arts. We therefore favor using U.S. government funds to increase contacts with Eastern Europe -- so long as the quality of the grantees remains high.

5. The United States should attempt to meet the desire of East Europeans for exchanges in science/technology/management.

This country has always insisted that in its exchanges with the Soviet Bloc a reasonable balance be maintained between science/technology on the one hand and social sciences/humanities on the other. We believe this policy is sound. But our trip has persuaded us that we can go farther than we have to accommodate the wishes of the Eastern Europeans for scientific/technological exchanges without giving away classified information or jeopardizing the main goal of the exchange program: ". . .to increase mutual understanding. . ." In fact, we believe it would be in our national interest to do so.

It is clear that the future leaders of the countries on our itinerary are going to come largely from the technically, scientifically trained elite. It is altogether to our advantage that these leaders have had exposure to the United States; to American methods, to American patterns of thought, to American people. It is not essential that they be students of

the social sciences or the humanities to establish the contacts with Americans which become the basis for "mutual understanding." A scientist or a management expert can develop as healthy a respect for America and Americans as can an historian.

We are not advocating the elimination of exchanges in the social sciences and the humanities; we recognize their value; we believe we should continue to insist upon some exchanges in these fields. What we are advocating is a greater exposure of Eastern European scientists, technologists, and experts in management to the American way of life. We believe we have nothing to fear in this, and perhaps quite a lot to gain.

6. The United States should encourage direct institution-to-institution exchanges with Eastern European countries and respond promptly to overtures from them.

This recommendation flows directly from our observation that universities and cultural institutions in the countries we visited seemed ready, often eager, to enter into direct relationships with their American counterparts, coupled with our assumption that an increase in such exchanges is desirable. We thought originally that, given the centrally controlled nature of socialist societies, the initiatives would have to come from U.S. institutions; but since our return we have been pleasantly surprised to learn that Moscow University has, of its own accord, proposed direct exchanges with several U.S. universities. Other powerful Eastern European universities may follow suit. We believe it is in the U.S. interest to respond affirmatively to such approaches, as well as to encourage U.S. institutions to take the first steps to establish such relationships.

We recognize that before the first part of this recommendation can mean very much, someone must spell out initiatives to be taken which give promise of leading to the desired end. Although we ordinarily avoid operational matters, we venture the following suggestions on how the

recommendation might be implemented.

In our opinion the first, and essential, step is to get the word out to selected American institutions that possibilities now exist for them to establish an exchange with an Eastern European counterpart. Once they receive the word, we think those with a genuine interest will make a direct approach to a European institution, and the process of establishing an exchange will go forward according to the system prevailing in the country concerned.

The word will undoubtedly spread by word of mouth along the academic grapevine; our Advisory Commission can mention it in its quarterly periodical, Exchange, and certainly individual institutions here and there will act without prodding. But we believe a particular organization should be charged with promoting and coordinating the whole process. In our opinion, the organization best qualified to do this is the Office of Eastern European Programs of the State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. We would therefore add this as a supplement to our recommendation: that CU's Office of Eastern

European programs be asked to develop a plan to promote and coordinate institution-to-institution exchanges between the United States and Eastern European universities, museums and other appropriate cultural organizations.

7. Private and governmental organizations should be alert to, and assist in, the "mutual exchange" of cultural materials between Eastern Europe and this country; specifically:

A) The question should be considered by the Government Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Programs (GAC).

B) The U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs should organize a meeting of film-makers, publishers, museum and gallery directors, producers of television programs and the like, to examine the problems and opportunities relating to the exchange of cultural materials from Eastern Europe.

We have already observed that the appearance of cultural materials from abroad on the American scene is governed by the laws of supply and demand, and

that there is therefore very little anyone can do to increase the flow; nevertheless, we believe the matter is of sufficient importance for us to see to it that at least that "little" is done. A small effort on our part may yield a large dividend of good will.

During our talks with East European officials we made many suggestions on the subject, for example: that distributors of noncommercial films be approached by Eastern European groups to distribute their productions; that American university presses be solicited to publish scholarly works from abroad; that foreign governments subsidize the translation and publication of books in English editions; that possibilities for increased broadcasting of foreign films and television programs by stations associated with the Public Broadcasting Service be thoroughly explored; that arrangements for wider (and more frequent) distribution of European films be negotiated with the Motion Picture Association of America; that cultural presentations (plays, musical groups, films, etc.) be directed towards the influential university circuit, rather than the tough commercial one.

Some of these suggestions may bear fruit, but they

are haphazard and obviously do not plumb all the possibilities.

We believe the Government Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Programs is the logical agency to examine what can and should be done to study the flow of books and related documentary materials from Eastern Europe. We know, furthermore, that the GAC is deeply interested in the ramifications of the Helsinki agreement on the book trade, and that it plans to take these up at a forthcoming meeting. Our Advisory Commission will be represented at this meeting, from which we hope some concrete suggestions for action will emerge.

We know of no existing body which can organize representatives of other media involved into a discussion of the issues at hand, as the GAC can the book industry. We have therefore recommended that our Commission itself take at least a first step in an effort to collect the advice of qualified authorities on ways in which the cultural productions of Eastern European states can be made more widely known here. We propose

to invite these authorities to meet with the Commission and offer suggestions. From such meetings we hope will come useful proposals for further action by the government and the private sector.

8. The State Department and the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) can and should improve the selection and orientation of their American grantees to Eastern Europe.

Our observations on American grantees suggest this recommendation. We do not say, and we do not mean, that the CU and IREX programs are ineffective. On the contrary, we felt them to be extremely useful. It is precisely because of their real value, and because of their greater potential value in the years ahead, that we recommend that everything possible be done to assure that the best possible Americans are chosen to represent us in Eastern Europe, and that they go to their assignments fully informed on what to expect and on what is expected of them.

We think, for example, that it should be possible to eliminate the kind of misunderstanding we found among our grantees to Poland, who claimed they were not used as they thought they would be. At the very least, the grantee should know that his bureaucracy is not unfailingly efficient, and that he should be prepared to adjust to the unexpected.

As for selection of grantees, we wish to stress at the outset that we are not proposing the elimination from the program of the handicapped or the married, or the married-with-families. But we do think that health and family status should be important factors in the selection of a grantee. If a man with a family will cause his host government so much trouble, because he has a family, that he engenders resentment, then he should not be sent. If an applicant's physical condition suggests that he will not be able to function effectively in an Eastern European country, or that he will embarrass his prospective country by his unusual demands, he clearly should not receive a grant. We are certain that CU and IREX share this view, yet our experiences in Prague, Moscow and Bucharest indicated that some troublesome grantees had been chosen so there must still be room for improvement in the selection process.

The weight which should be given to a candidate's project in the competition for grants is, we recognize, a controversial point. Perhaps there have been some

grants awarded for the study of esoteric subjects which may be of personal benefit to the grantee, but of not much help to the development of mutual understanding. Whether this has come about because selectors have consciously favored highly recherche projects or whether it has come about simply because there is a scarcity of candidates with a different kind of project, we do not know. We suspect the latter. In any case, our position is easily stated: we believe a higher percentage of grants to Americans should go to those with projects which give promise of making a direct contribution to U.S.-Eastern European understanding. If there are not enough applicants whose projects meet this criterion, then those responsible for the programs should make a conscious effort of recruitment. Here again we stress quality -- not quantity. Fewer projects of top quality are preferable to simply meeting a larger quota.

9. The United States Government should reinstitute a program which permits Eastern European publishers, booksellers, and film distributors to purchase American media products with their own currencies.

In the 50's and 60's, the United States Information Agency administered in some Eastern European countries a program known as the Informational Media Guarantee Program, or IMG. It worked like this. Eastern Europeans who wished to purchase American media products -- mostly books, periodicals and films -- were allowed to pay for them in their local currencies. Their payments were made to the United States Government, which used them to defray government expenses in the country of the payment. The government then reimbursed the U.S. seller in dollars the amount of his sale to the foreign buyer.

The scheme worked to the advantage of both the United States and the recipient country. The foreign purchaser was able to get the American products he wanted but for which he lacked hard currency to buy; the U.S. supplier increased his

sales -- and his profits; the U.S. Government gained a wider audience for U.S. cultural and scientific materials.

We believe the program, or something very much like it, should now be reinstituted. Every official with whom we spoke on our trip, American or European, believed such a program would increase the flow of materials from the United States to Eastern European countries and spoke in favor of it.

To serve fully our national interests, a revived IMG program would, of course, have to be carefully structured. It might, for example, be necessary to limit the amount of U.S. material a particular country could buy in its local currency. It would surely be necessary to define with care the nature of U.S. materials eligible for purchase under the program. But we believe these and other problems are easily soluble and that reinstitution of an effective IMG-like program would be yet another clear bit of evidence of this country's intention to conduct its international cultural relations "in the spirit of Helsinki."

V. COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY ANALYSIS

In the preceding sections of this report, we have made observations and recommendations which we believe apply to all five of the countries we visited. We have others which apply only to individual countries. The most significant of these are briefly outlined in the pages which follow.

1. CZECHOSLOVAKIA

We began our Eastern European travel in Prague. It was a good place to begin, for we were quickly introduced to the realities of negotiating exchanges with a "socialist" country. The Deputy Minister of Culture said there was no impediment to further exchange of serious performing arts groups. The Vice-rector of Charles University assured us that he would welcome American professors in history, literature, etc.; that exchanges could be worked out between universities and then approved by the Ministry. The Deputy Minister of Education said exchanges in the humanities were "difficult but not impossible," and opined that any

further activity in U.S.-Czech educational exchange could only come on a signal from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, following successful conclusion of a cultural agreement. The Acting Foreign Minister, Dusan Spacil, confirmed our growing conviction that here was where the buck really stopped.

Spacil told us frankly that we can't improve relations in the cultural field without making changes in our political relations. "You stress Basket III provisions," he said, "We stress Basket I. There is interdependence among the elements of the Helsinki Agreement." When asked why he emphasized this interdependence, why Basket III could not stand on its own, he replied: "We are suspicious. Don't forget we have been through a cold war. You must respect our way of life as we respect yours. You must stop viewing us as poor bastards behind the Iron Curtain who have to be liberated and taught democracy. This could happen if Basket I were implemented." Later we referred to an official publication which listed the "Cultural Centers of

Friendly Countries" which operated in Prague (the Soviet Union, German Democratic Republic, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Vietnamese Democratic Republic), and asked why, if he considered the United States a friendly country we were not allowed a cultural center outside the Embassy. Spacil replied, "We are friends of the United States, but we give preference to better friends. This doesn't exclude better relations as long as our mutual interests are served."

In spite of this attitude, Mr. Spacil made it clear that, although the Czechs are angry and offended at our failure to sign the claims agreement as they expected, they were willing to move forward immediately in negotiating a cultural agreement on which increased U.S.-Czech exchange activity largely depends. "The ball is now in your court," he insisted.

Recommendations:

1. The Senate should carefully review the Long-Gravel Amendment.

The United States did not sign the claims agreement which had been worked out between the two sides because the Long-Gravel amendment opposed it. Our failure to sign disrupted negotiations on a cultural agreement. We do not have enough background on the Long-Gravel Amendment to recommend whether or not it should be passed; but it does seem to have set back our cultural relations with Czechoslovakia. We therefore suggest that the Senate again review the amendment to determine whether its passage is doing our foreign policy more harm than good. As we understand the situation, the amendment prohibits U.S. adherence to a proposed claims agreement because certain U.S. commercial interests are adversely affected; and U.S. failure to sign the agreement has slowed cooperation in other fields, notably in cultural exchange. The issue, then, is for this government to determine whether the advantages to our commercial interests which accrue to passage of the Long-Gravel Amendment more than compensate for the disadvantages it causes to our cultural relations.

2. The United States should immediately reopen negotiations for a cultural agreement with Czechoslovakia.

While our chances of achieving a cultural agreement before we settle the claims agreement are not bright, we should nevertheless take Mr. Spacil at his word and reopen negotiations. So doing will demonstrate our continuing interest in improving relations with Czechoslovakia; and the Helsinki Agreement gives us a good opportunity to test Czech intentions in the cultural field. We believe the most likely way to elicit a favorable response from the Government of Czechoslovakia would be for our draft of a cultural agreement to be carried to Prague by a high-ranking U.S. official, the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

3. In the context of the cultural agreement
the United States should press hard for the right to
open a cultural center in Prague outside of the
Embassy.

We are convinced that there is a great appetite among the Czechs for American books, music, fashions, art, design etc., and that a typical American Cultural Center in downtown Prague would therefore be enormously effective. At present we have a library in the Embassy compound, but it is scarcely used because Czech police stand outside the door. In the "spirit of Helsinki," which calls for a free flow of information, we should push for the same rights as other "friendly" countries to illustrate our cultural achievements. If the Czechs ask for reciprocity on this point, we should agree to it.

2. POLAND

We have earlier noted the contrast between Czechoslovakia and Poland in attitudes towards exchanges with this country and in the number and variety of U.S.-Polish contacts. This is perhaps best exemplified by the respective approaches of the two countries to a cultural agreement with the United States. The Czechs, as we have seen, are reluctant to do business without one. The Poles, on the other hand, appear completely relaxed on the subject; not one official raised the question with us. We were pleased, for we see nothing to gain at this time by delimiting our widespread public and private exchanges by a formal agreement.

The visit of President Ford to Poland last summer gave a decided fillip to our existing cordial relations. The Poles were flattered by it and responded by publicizing widely in all media the President's words and actions while he was in their country. They were still full of it when we arrived.

Just two clouds loom over this cheerful scene, both in fact produced by the Poles' feeling that they have gone out of their way to demonstrate a kind of special relationship with the United States, and we should recognize this. In other words, they feel that the United States should not treat Poland as just any socialist country. They do not understand:

a) Why Polish cultural achievements are less publicized in this country than are U.S. achievements in Poland: That is, the question of "reciprocity" is felt very keenly in this country.

b) Why Radio Free Europe continues to beam "unfriendly prop ganda" into the country, constantly criticizing the present regime.

Recommendations:

1. The United States should make a particular effort to satisfy the Poles' desire for greater "reciprocity" in cultural exchange.

The suggestions we have made in Recommendation 7 above apply particularly to Poland. In addition, the following specific proposals which were made in our discussions with Polish leaders should be looked into:

- a) The United States should participate in the Poznan Fair (with a cultural exhibit), in the Warsaw Book Fair and in film festivals organized in Poland.

- b) If representatives of Polish TV visit the United States next year in an effort to locate outlets for their films, the Embassy, the State Department and USIA should help them plan and make contacts.

3. THE SOVIET UNION

Our appointments in the Soviet Union -- in Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev -- were so numerous, and our discussions so full, that it is difficult for us to summarize our impressions and ensuing recommendations in a few brief pages. Fortunately, our Embassy in Moscow has sent a series of excellent telegrams to the State Department outlining the possibilities for, as well as the problems of, increased exchanges with the USSR. These will serve as the primary "action" documents of our visit; this account only supplements those reports.

The main impression we derived from our talks was that, as Minister Demichev put it, the post-Helsinki climate was "most favorable" for expanded contacts. Chairman Brezhnev and President Ford, he went on, had signed the Helsinki document and in this positive atmosphere the next three years would be a time for more cultural contacts; he welcomed all proposals. Not surprisingly, perhaps, we found the Minister's sentiments echoing in educational corridors wherever we went. The

Director of the Cultural Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs hinted at the possibility of leader and lecturer exchanges, as proposed by the State Department. The Minister of Education agreed to consider an increase in the number of exchanges. The Vice-rector of Moscow University said he was prepared to negotiate agreements with universities abroad. The Pro-rector of Leningrad University proposed the sending of a high-level group of Soviet professors to the United States to negotiate institution-to-institution contacts. The Rector of Kiev University said he would like to establish a sister-city relationship between Kiev and a U.S. city with a wide range of exchanges between museums, schools and government organizations.

This reaction was stimulating and encouraging; but we were jerked back to reality every so often: by the guards discouraging access to our libraries in Leningrad and Moscow; by the veiled hint from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that expanded cultural exchange

might depend upon increased circulation of Soviet Life magazine and an increased sale of Soviet films in the United States; by the statement of the Minister of Education that Soviet universities could initiate exchanges with their U.S. counterparts, but that ultimately they must come to the Ministry for approval and funding; by Mr. Demichev's disarming reminder that the Soviet government would control the selection of books which went into an American bookstore.

At the conclusion of our visit we decided that Mr. Demichev's deputy, Mr. Popov, had correctly assessed the situation. In a toast at a luncheon given in connection with the opening of the Metropolitan Museum exhibit, he thanked those who performed the everyday work of bettering U.S.-U.S.S.R. cultural relations; then he made a special point of reminding them that this is delicate and fragile work which should go forward step-by-step. In short, we believe the

Soviets wish to take credit for a successful Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and are therefore prepared to implement at least some of the provisions of Basket III; but we cannot expect, and should not insist on, a sudden, dramatic expansion of our exchanges with them.

Recommendations:

1. In negotiating its next cultural agreement with the Soviet Union, the State Department should take advantage of the Soviet Union's intention to implement the provisions of Basket III of the Helsinki Agreement, seeking specifically the following:

a) A protocol sanctioning university-to-university exchanges worked out by the universities themselves. (Suggested by the Vice-rector of Leningrad University.)

b) Expanded lecturer and leader exchanges. (Apparently supported by universities of Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev; and the Ministry of Education.

c) Coproduction with the Soviets of symposia, conferences, plays, ballets. (Proposed by the Minister of Culture).

d) Unimpeded access to USIS libraries in Leningrad and Moscow. (The Minister of Culture assured us that we could raise this question "at any time.")

e) Smaller, less expensive performing arts groups from the United States which can reach a wide audience. (Suggested by Director of Goscontsent).

2. The United States should move expeditiously to open a Consulate in Kiev, to assign a Cultural Officer there, and to expand its cultural program in the Ukraine.

The Ministry of Culture of the Ukraine has 155,000 employes, and an annual budget of about 120 million rubles. The Acting Minister assured us of the Ukraine's willingness to enter into all manner of exchanges with the United States and demonstrated a certain degree of independence from Moscow. We therefore believe this is a propitious moment to multiply our cultural contacts with an influential republic of the U.S.S.R.

Two practical actions which should be considered for the immediate future are: a) presentation by USIA of a collection of books to Kiev University, whose Rector assured us he could, and would like to, receive such a collection; b) a delegation of cultural ministers from the Soviet Republics, including, of course, that of the Ukraine, should be invited to visit the United States. The Acting Minister of Culture confided to us that any minister of any of the republics "would go with pleasure."

3. Representatives of one or more American universities should visit universities of the Soviet Union in an attempt to establish direct institution-to-institution relationships.

Officials of each of the four Soviet universities we visited explicitly or implicitly suggested that the visit of American university officials to Soviet universities was the surest way for exchanges between universities to be initiated or developed. We therefore recommend that the Office of Eastern European Affairs of the Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs specifically encourage such visits to the Soviet Union within the context of its efforts to encourage institution-to-institution exchanges between this country and Eastern Europe.

(Recommendation 6).

4. ROMANIA

We found in Romania an openness to increased cultural contacts with the United States second only to Poland's. As we have noted earlier, our existing cultural agreement with Romania goes beyond the proposals of the Helsinki Agreement; the American library in Bucharest provided for by the agreement is a model for others in Eastern Europe whenever they can be established; and the Romanians seem willing to increase their exchanges with us.

The problems in our exchange programs, which we have also outlined earlier in this report need, perhaps, some elaboration. The first concerns Romanian grantees: all available grants for study in the United States are not filled; and grantees who are selected frequently arrive late in this country. These actions understandably disconcert the receiving American universities and discourage them from participating in our programs with Romania. The Romanian officials with whom we talked are well aware of the situation. Their explanation of it is that they are looking for their very best candidates (who speak English) to take advantage

of the unusual opportunity to study in the United States, and the search is not always successful nor timely. They have promised to refine and speed up the process. But we believe this is not the entire explanation. We also think the Romanians are perturbed by defections. In recent years they feel they have suffered a serious brain drain, as well as political embarrassment, as a result of the defections of some of its able scholars who have gone abroad to study. To combat this, they have set up a many-layered screening process to assure not only that "the best" go abroad, but also only those sure to return. The process is, obviously, slow -- but thorough.

The second problem also stems from this highly centralized system, which pretty well determines who is educated and how. In its developmental planning, Romania is now putting tremendous emphasis on acquiring technological, scientific and management knowledge. Since she

recognizes that the United States has much to teach her in these fields, she naturally tries to insist that a disproportionate number of exchanges with the United States be directed to this end. We have quoted two of Romania's leading authorities on this subject, on page the Chairman of Romania's National Council for Science and Technology, and the Rector of Bucharest's Stefan Georghiu Academy, which trains Romania's top-echelon government officials. Their frank admission that what Romania wants from the United States is advanced knowledge in these fields can be accepted as gospel.

But we must not imply that Romania is completely disinterested in specifically "cultural" exchange. She is eager to have more top-level performing arts groups from this country, but cannot afford them and so would like Embassy help. In this connection it is instructive to note that formal agreements with other Eastern European countries make it possible for Romania

to receive at least two "big" cultural presentations a year from each Bloc country. In addition, she can afford to bring twelve to fourteen individual artists from other Eastern European countries on a strictly commercial basis.

When it comes to exposition of her cultural achievements abroad, Romania is as eager as her neighbors. We uncovered one specific possibility for an excellent exhibit in the United States: her treasures of gold, which remind one of the Russians' Scythian gold recently displayed in Washington and Los Angeles. But there are a number of obstacles both in Romania and this country before these treasures could safely be exchanged for a U.S. exhibit.

Recommendations:

1. The Department of State should publicize the opportunities for museums in the United States to sponsor exhibits of Romania's treasures.

We know of U.S. museums which have expressed an interest in some Romanian treasures; and we have learned that Romania is prepared to let things go to institutions which are nationally known. The task now is to affect a marriage acceptable to both parties.

2. The State Department should route via Bucharest important cultural presentations going to or from the Soviet Union.

Such American cultural groups are sure to be well received in Bucharest and will help to remind Romanians that the West is not inferior to the "East" in cultural accomplishment.

3. In its official exchanges with Romania,
the State Department should accommodate to the
greatest extent possible the Romanians' desire
for more exchanges in science/technology/management,
without of course our giving away valuable scientific
knowledge.

The assumption that only the Romanians would gain from such exchange is, we think, erroneous. American, as well as foreign, scholars can be stimulated by discussions of mutual problems. Even though the transmission of hard information may not be equal from one side to the other, we believe American scholars can profit from exposure to the thinking of their Eastern European counterparts on the many nonsensitive subjects with which both are concerned.

4. The United States should provide the Stefan Gheorghiu Academy with as many short-term or long-term lecturers as the Academy will accept.

The aim of our exchange programs is to reach "key" people, and those who will have a "multiplier effect." The Stefan Gheorghiu Academy seems ideally suited for American grantees, since its students have been preselected as future leaders. It is surprising, and encouraging, that the Academy has received American lecturers and is ready for more. We should send as many as the Academy will take.

5. HUNGARY

Our first exposure to Hungarian officialdom came in the person of the President of the Institute of Cultural Relations. He asserted that the United States was blocking the establishment of a cultural agreement between Hungary and the United States; and that the United States was condescending about Hungarian culture and not doing enough to make it known to the United States.

Other Hungarian officials returned to these points, though less aggressively. Finally, we believe the Foreign Ministry spokesman put things in proper perspective. After outlining a number of "political problems" troubling U.S.-Hungarian relations he said: "There is no direct relationship between these problems and our cultural relations, though cultural and scientific relations can't be totally isolated. In other words, the political problems are not an important factor, but they do enter into the equation." Like his Czech counterpart, he maintained

that in the negotiations for a cultural agreement
"The ball was in our court."

This reserved attitude is perhaps understandable if we recall that there were literally no contacts between the two countries during the fifteen years that Cardinal Mindszenty lived in the United States Embassy. Since his departure in 1971, slow but steady progress has been made in re-establishing cultural links. Although no State Department "academic" program exists with Hungary, IREX does send graduate students and researchers to Hungary, and Hungarian officials are pleased with a relationship with the National Science Foundation. Hungarians have participated in CU's multi-regional programs and have agreed in principle to participate in the Department's International Visitors Program. We are permitted to have a library in our Embassy, though its use is not exactly encouraged. And, as we have noted,

Hungary has indicated a desire to negotiate a cultural agreement with us. Perhaps the most encouraging sign of all for continuing improvement in our relations is the assurance of Hungarian officials that they are committed to all provisions of the Helsinki agreement, or, as the Head of the Department of International Relations of the Ministry of Culture put it: "It is our opinion that our relations with capitalist countries have progressed well. We are now exploring the next phase: how best to take advantage of the Helsinki provisions." The step-by-step approach probably applies more surely to Hungary than to any of the other countries we visited. We do not believe any special concessions should be made to Hungary, and we do not expect any from it. But we do believe we can now, through a judicious use of cultural and educational exchange, make a contribution to improved U.S.-Hungarian relations.

Recommendations:

1. This country should take the initiative in reopening negotiations for a cultural agreement.

Hungary, like Czechoslovakia, clearly wishes to develop its cultural relations with us in an "orderly" way: that is, through a formal agreement. If, as Hungarian officials insist, the ball is in our court, we should hit it back without delay. The moment gives promise of progress towards increased exchanges, which we favor.

2. The United States should take steps to establish a modest cultural center in Budapest.

Whether this should be done in the framework of a cultural agreement we do not know. To us the modus operandi is less important than the establishment of a center. Our present library is badly located in the Embassy chancery, and the PAO uses his home for most cultural activities. We should have a properly equipped and staffed facility to carry out the normal U.S. Government cultural and educational exchange functions. Now, before the Helsinki declaration is forgotten, is the right moment to test Hungary's intentions.

We might point out in this connection that one of the "political problems" in U.S.-Hungarian relations, to which the Foreign Office spokesman referred in his discussion with us, is our retention in this country of the St. Stephen's crown. Its return is important to the present Hungarian regime, so it may well become an issue in the negotiation of a U.S.-Hungarian cultural agreement.

3. The State Department should continue to encourage Hungarians to participate in its International Visitor Program.

There are obviously several exchange activities of the Department which we would like to see instituted in Hungary. But mindful of the step-by-step approach, we believe the Department is correct to focus first on getting Hungarians into its "leader grant" program. We feel the Hungarians are ready to take this step; we feel the results will be salutary; and this leads us to hope they will then wish to enlarge the scope of their contacts with us through participation in other programs.

APPENDIX A

PRINCIPAL FOREIGN OFFICIALS CONSULTED BY THE AUTHORS OF THIS REPORT

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Deputy Minister of Education, Premyslva Jakos
Chief, International Relations, Department, Ministry
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Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
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Director, Department of International Cooperation,
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Director, Department of Plastic Arts, Ministry of
Culture, Konstanty Wegrzyn

Vice-Director, Department of Music, Ministry of
Culture, Jerry Sokolowski

Director of Film Polski, Ms. Alicja Ciezowska

Director PAGART, Henryk Maksara

Director, Office of Foreign Cooperation, Polish TV
and Radio, Sergiusz Mikulicz

Poznan:

PZPR First Secretary, Jerzy Zasada

Poznan Governor, Stanislaw Cosas

Poznan PZPR Secretary for Culture, Maciej Frajtek

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Director, Department of Philology, University of
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University, L.I. Seleznyov

Dean, Foreign Relations, Leningrad University, V. N.

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Chief, Foreign Relations Administration, Ministry of

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Pro-rector, Moscow University, Vladimir Tropin

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Sciences, Dr. Kolakov.

Director, Pushkin Museum, Mme. I. A. Antonova

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Director, Interkoncert, Joseph Horvath

APPENDIX B

INVENTIONS BY BOURGEOIS PROPAGANDA AND THE REALITIES

An article by Anna Tatarinova which was carried by TASS, the official Soviet wire-service, on August 26, 1975.

It is often alleged in the Western press without any grounds whatsoever that Soviet people are "isolated" from Western, specifically American, culture. Some contributors of such materials even go as far as to assert that works by Western writers and Western films are sort of "banned" in the Soviet Union. These are absurd inventions, of course, and they could well be ignored if they had not rpt not (sic) been repeated systematically with the obvious purpose of giving the poorly-informed reader a distorted view of the Soviet way of life.

But how do matters stand in actual fact?

One has only to look at the playbills in Moscow or any other city to see that many of the films shown at the Soviet cinemas are foreign productions. In the last five years, for instance, Soviet cinemagoers saw over 500 foreign feature films. Considering the fact that every person in the Soviet Union goes to the pictures approximately 19 times a year, this means that foreign films are seen by millions of people.

Moscow is a city of theatre-goers, the repertoires of the biggest Moscow companies always include plays by foreign, specifically American, authors. We were told at the Ministry of Culture of the USSR that about 200 plays by foreign authors have been staged at the biggest theatres of the country in the last five years. One of the most successful productions is Tennessee Williams play "A Street Car Named Desire" which invariably draws full houses at the Mayakovsky theatre in Moscow.

Readers in the Soviet Union know well foreign writers. Thus works by American authors have been translated into 52 languages in the Soviet Union and have come out in an impression of over 170 million copies. This year the Progress Publishers of Foreign Literature, one of the biggest Moscow publishing houses, are to bring out four more books by U.S. writers, including Robert Cryton and David Chandler, in impressions of 50,000 to 100,000 copies.

True, in the Soviet Union one will not see any pornographic films or productions propagating violence or misanthropy. But such films and productions may be rightly described as "anti-culture".

The Soviet people have every opportunity of enjoying and they do enjoy real works of art produced abroad.

The Soviet public, approving the results of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, welcomes the sections of its final document which stress the need for developing and deepening cultural contacts between countries and exchanging information. The Soviet Union is doing everything in its power to strengthen such contacts. As to the absurd inventions spread by certain bourgeois propaganda organs in the West such allegations are entirely on the conscience of those who make them.

