

94th Congress }
1st Session }

COMMITTEE PRINT

GOVERNMENT

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NATO: PRESSURES FROM THE SOUTHERN TIER

REPORT OF A STUDY MISSION TO EUROPE
AUGUST 5-27, 1975

PURSUANT TO

H. Res. 315

AUTHORIZING THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS TO CONDUCT THOROUGH STUDIES AND
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U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

60-436

WASHINGTON : 1975



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
FOREWORD

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C., October 29, 1975.

This report has been submitted to the Committee on International Relations by Hon. Leo J. Ryan, who conducted a special study mission to visit various NATO and other European capitals, as well as NATO and SHAPE headquarters, during August 1975. Congressman Ryan was accompanied by James T. Schollaert, staff consultant to the Committee on International Relations.

The observations and findings in this report are those of the study mission and do not necessarily reflect the views of the membership of the full Committee on International Relations.

THOMAS E. MORGAN, *Chairman.*



LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

Hon. THOMAS E. MORGAN,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Transmitted herewith is a report of a special study mission which I conducted in Europe during the period August 5-28, 1975.

The purpose of the mission was to visit various NATO and other European capitals, as well as NATO and SHAPE headquarters, and NATO forces in the field, and thereby gain a firsthand assessment of the present state and future prospects of the NATO alliance.

I hope that this report will be helpful to the committee, to the Congress as a whole, and to any other readers interested in this important matter.

LEO J. RYAN.

OCTOBER 29, 1975.

(VII)

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

THE DIRECTOR, U. S. ARMY
WASHINGTON, D. C.
SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a report of a special
investigation which I conducted in Europe during the period August
1917 to 1918.
The purpose of the mission was to visit various (NATO) and other
European capitals as well as NATO and NATO headquarters and
NATO forces in the field, and thereby gain a firsthand knowledge of
the general character of the NATO situation.
I trust that the report will be helpful to the Committee on the
NATO, and to any other readers interested in this report.

Very truly,
L. J. HAY

Enclosure 10/10/17

(711)

SUMMARY

THE SITUATION

Recent developments within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in the international situation affecting NATO raise basic and important questions for future U.S. policy toward NATO.

First, formerly strong governments have suffered political downfall throughout Europe in the last several years, resulting in weak, thin majority governments in nearly all of the NATO countries. In particular, on the southern tier of NATO, we can see that Portugal and Italy face the strong prospect of increasing Communist strength and participation in their governments in the near future. Greece has overthrown a military dictatorship and has withdrawn from NATO's integrated military structure. Turkey has a weak interim government and has also called for a reevaluation of her defense relationship to the United States and NATO in the wake of the recent U.S. arms embargo to Turkey. Outside of NATO, but vital to the total defense posture in Europe, Spain is showing ominous symptoms of uncontrollable and unpredictable instability as General Franco approaches the end.

Second, economic pressures on defense spending have increased sharply. The economic downturn in the West and the oil crisis, together with the growing realization of resource scarcity, has made it more difficult to pay the escalating costs of high defense outlays in NATO's consumer societies facing the prospect of a deterioration in their standard of living. This is the pressure most directly felt in the Congress. The longstanding U.S. request for her European allies to share more of the burden of NATO defense costs has not been satisfied. The British have apparently even withdrawn some forces from their sector of the front line on the North German Plain, leaving a potential hole in NATO's defense posture.

Third, the much-touted détente between East and West, the United States and the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China, has weakened the ultimate *raison d'être* of NATO in the eyes of many, especially among U.S. voters.

Meanwhile, however, all the NATO countries visited, as well as Spain and even neutral Sweden, appear to regard the heavy U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe and the stationing of U.S. forces in Europe as vital to their own security. Nowhere in Europe did it appear that any alternative to NATO or to the predominate role of the United States in NATO was considered realistic or even feasible. There has, in the past, been much talk about ways to revitalize NATO or to change NATO in order to adapt to a changing world. But NATO has continued virtually unchanged despite all efforts to change it, exhibiting a considerable amount of institutional inertia.

(1)

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The United States should continue to regard NATO as the keystone and primary forum of our foreign policy with our major allies in Europe. It is readily apparent that no alternative to an alliance between Western Europe and the United States with the United States as the dominant factor in such an alliance, is considered realistic or feasible.

2. The United States should continue to press the Europeans to share more of the burden of the cost of such an alliance. Obviously, the easiest thing politically for European governments to do is to resist assuming more of the burden. Unless we insist and, if necessary refuse to pay more than our share, an undue proportion of the burden will continue to be carried by the United States, and popular support for NATO in the United States by the American taxpayer and voter, will erode. The United States should protest any British force cutback in its Army of the Rhine in Germany, as described by a British Parliamentary Committee report.

3. Before the power struggle in Portugal has abated, there may be significant armed conflict, especially if the leftist military circles behind the revolution find no peaceful means of restraining control. While watching closely for any Soviet involvement, the United States should take care not to confuse indigenous political struggle between the Portuguese left and right, with such involvement.

4. With the departure of General Franco, the United States should insist that Spain be brought into NATO. The southern tier of NATO is in sore need of full Spanish membership.

5. Foreign policy planners and military strategists should consider seriously what actions must be taken in the event that the Italian national elections, which must be held within 2 years, bring a Communist plurality to power. There is a strong possibility that such a circumstance will occur.

U.S. policy in Italy must take into account the growing political significance of the Italian Communist Party in the face of the continued inability of the other political parties to make any meaningful progress toward solving Italy's worsening economic and social problems. We can no longer pretend that the PCI does not exist, officially. The attitude of the PCI toward the United States just might be influenced to some extent by our attitude toward the PCI. A long, hard and honest look should be given to the PCI to determine their true degree of independence from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU).

6. Immediate consideration should be given to the present troop dispersal of those nations which have troops stationed along the East German border. It would be far more cost-effective and militarily sound to withdraw NATO troops positioned along the actual border to concentrated positions some distance behind the border. The West German border guard could then patrol the border itself, while multinational NATO troops, in brigade and division size, could remain in a ready position. In case of attack, there would be much greater flexibility in sending reinforcements when and where needed.

The present layer-cake system of each NATO country conducting movements by itself is both militarily unsound, and practically impossible to coordinate in case of attack.

INTRODUCTION

As a member of the Committee on International Relations and its Oversight Subcommittee, I conducted a study mission to selected NATO countries in August 1975. The countries visited were Portugal, Spain, Italy, NATO and SHAPE headquarters in Belgium, V Corps Army units on the border in West Germany, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Ireland. I was accompanied on the trip by James T. Schollaert, Staff Consultant, Committee on International Relations.

The purpose of the trip was to gain firsthand information about problems facing the future of NATO, which the Congress must eventually deal with in conjunction with domestic political considerations.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formally created on April 4, 1949, over 26 years ago. NATO, with the United States as the military backbone, was created to defend its member countries from a Soviet military threat, which was perceived as very real in 1949. The U.S. commitment to NATO since that time has remained wholehearted, and expensive. Today, the wholehearted commitment of our European Allies appears questionable. France since 1966, has withdrawn from NATO's integrated military command structure, and has denied the use of French soil to NATO forces. Greece, in 1975, has withdrawn from NATO's integrated military command structure. Turkey is in the process of reappraising its NATO membership in the wake of the cutoff of U.S. military sales and assistance by the Congress. In Portugal, the Communist Party presently is exerting considerable influence in a frail and unpredictable political situation in the wake of a coup by young left-leaning military officers. In Italy, the Communist Party (PCI) continues to gain political strength, gaining 35 percent of the Italian vote in the June 15, 1975, regional elections. There is a strong prospect of the inclusion of the PCI in the next government after the 1977 national elections. And the Italian military will soon cut the term of service from 18 months to 12 months.

Outside the southern tier, Great Britain, continuing its long economic decline, has cut its defense spending and ceased regular patrol of their northern end of the central front in Germany, and withdrawn some forces from Germany for use in Northern Ireland, weakening the defense of the North German Plain approaches to Western Europe. Only the Federal Republic of Germany has increased its contribution to the NATO forces.

The vital resource of oil has multiplied in price following an Arab oil embargo in the wake of the September 1973 war in the Middle East. This development has shaken the already faltering economic situation in all of the NATO countries and increased the difficulty of paying for rapidly escalating defense costs. It also raises the question of how the NATO countries would respond to a Soviet attack accompanied with an Arab oil embargo.

Détente continues, with the Helsinki Summit, which resulted in the signature by 35 states including the United States and the Soviet Union, of a document foreswearing the use of force to change any of the borders in Europe, and to otherwise relax tensions and increase trade.

Meanwhile, all the NATO countries visited, as well as Spain and Sweden, regard the heavy U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe and the stationing of U.S. forces in Europe as vital to their own security. None of these countries regard any alternative to the present NATO security alliance arrangement to be realistic or feasible. The Norwegians put it most bluntly and aptly by describing the presence of American forces as hostages and a guarantee to the Europeans that the United States would be involved in any war that might be initiated by an attack on Western Europe by the Warsaw Pact nations.

All of these developments raise many critical questions about the future of NATO, and the U.S. contribution to NATO, which may well come under increasing pressure from the dynamics of the domestic economic situation in the United States, apart from the overall political and security situation in Europe.

A detailed account of the study mission's visit to individual countries follows.

PORTUGAL

The study mission arrived in Lisbon on August 5, 1975, during a time of particularly tense unrest. A three-man military junta of Costa Gomez, Goncalves, and Carvalho had just been formed the previous week by the Revolutionary Council of Military Officers, to head the government of the country. Prime Minister Goncalves was already under mounting pressure from the right to resign. The first serious unrest and violence since the revolution was occurring in the north around Oporto. General Atelo de Carvalho, had just returned from Cuba to make some strong statements threatening opponents of the military government.

Opposition to the left direction of the government under Goncalves was coming chiefly from the Socialist Party Chief Soares, the former Foreign Minister, Maj. Melo Antunes.

The study mission met with Embassy officers for briefings, visited NATO's IBERLANT headquarters, and met with a leading figure of the Portuguese Military's Revolutionary Council, as well as a political leader of the moderate Popular Democratic Party.

PORTUGAL'S GEOGRAPHIC CONTRIBUTION TO NATO

A visit and briefing at IBERLANT, NATO's planning and coordinating headquarters for the southern Atlantic flank was conducted on August 6. Information concerning IBERLANT and Portugal's role in NATO was collected.

Geographic location appears to be the most important Portuguese contribution to NATO. NATO bases in Portugal and the Azores permit the southern Atlantic area which is crucial to shipping to be more effectively monitored.

If Portugal were to leave NATO, it appears that Spain could effectively replace the geographical location contribution to NATO, if Spain could be admitted to NATO. Also there remains the question of whether the Azores would remain a Portuguese possession if Portugal continues its leftward drift, in view of the strong pro-independence sentiment and conservative political leanings of the Azorean population.

PORTUGUESE ATTITUDES TOWARD NATO

Under the authoritarian Salazar and Caetano governments, the Portuguese people were not consulted or often even informed about Portuguese foreign policy commitments and the need or lack thereof for these commitments. Thus there was no reservoir of broad public support for NATO or even wide understanding of the need for NATO in Portugal following the downfall of Salazar and Caetano.

The Portuguese commitment to provide one division for the defense of Europe is of questionable value today, as it was even under the Salazar regime. This was especially true after the 1961 U.S. arms

embargo on Portugal. However, the present government, though totally involved in the domestic political upheaval at present, has evidently been very forthcoming in making good faith efforts to meet Portugal's staff and infrastructure obligations to NATO. This is not to say that all segments of the present Portuguese power structure and society are fervent supporters of NATO. But the clear consensus at present calls for no drastic changes in Portugal's policy toward NATO. The present Portuguese leadership does say, however, that they see themselves as a moderating influence within the NATO bloc, especially as détente grows.

One of the leaders of Portugal's influential Revolutionary Council of Military Officers offered the candid view to the study mission that NATO is in need of change. This, he said, was because one of the basic assumptions of NATO is no longer valid. The basic assumption that all Communists everywhere are in the service of the U.S.S.R. and are the chief threat which NATO was formed to combat, clashes, he said, with political reality in several NATO countries where the Communist Party already constitutes a significant domestic and even nationalistic political force such as in Italy, France, and now perhaps in Portugal.

He continued that NATO must decide what is more important, an unchanging alliance of increasingly unstable but staunchly anti-Communist governments, or an alliance of more stable governments including in some cases Communist participation, which is aimed not against communism per se, but against possible Soviet or Warsaw Pact aggression.

This officer maintained that national independence was Portugal's present priority, and that many Portuguese saw a need to diversify their relations with the rest of the world. However, he maintained that this did not mean that Portugal would even consider changing membership in one bloc, NATO, for membership in another bloc, the Warsaw Pact.

THE PORTUGUESE MILITARY

The real leadership of the revolution appears to be rather widely dispersed in a young officer corps tempered by bitter experience in the colonial wars in Africa. This dominant military force is not very sophisticated in the Western European sense and there appears to be no telling where many of them will wind up. Many are politically naive, and only now, after they find power in their hands, acquiring the knowledge and experience to fashion their political philosophy.

The Portuguese military at present holds the only real power in the country. And many of the officers and men, veterans of the bitter African colonial wars under the former Salazar regime, regard themselves as the true guardians of the revolution which swept the ultra-conservative regime from power. They promise to resist any efforts to reinstate the old power structure, under any name or form.

As an example of the kind of thinking going on in the ranks of the Portuguese military circles behind the revolution, a representative of the Revolutionary Council of the MFA told the study mission that the political forms of the Anglo-Saxon world or of the Communist Slavic world did not seem to fit Latin characteristics well. The Latin characteristics of more pronounced individualism and extremism in

opinion demanded a political form of its own which the Latins in Italy, France, Portugal, and Spain were searching.

For example, he said that, in Portugal, more involvement of the population in government is necessary than merely voting once every 4 years as in the United States. On the other hand, the idea of genuine grassroots popular organizations forming the true basis of the political structure, an idea now very popular in Portugal, is inimical to Eastern European communism, as well as to some but not all Portuguese Communists, in an apparent reference to Alvaro Cunhal, PCP chief.

THE CIVILIAN POWER STRUCTURE

A prominent leader of Popular Democrats, or PPD, the most conservative of the still legal political parties told the study mission that he was encouraged to believe that the final solution to political instability and social upheaval in Portugal would not be by armed force. He described three levels of power which he saw creating a balance of power, which although presently unstable, was sufficiently broad based to constitute some guarantee against a violent victory of one faction over the rest of the country. These levels were the MFA officers, the political parties and grassroots residents committees, workers committees, and other local committees of various kinds.

Within these levels were to be found people of various political convictions with the Communists lacking the broad support necessary in all three levels, or even in the military level, to attain power by themselves.

He said that the political situation was so fluid that the government lacked the power to even having its decisions implemented by unsympathetic administrators. Such a government he maintained, did not have much chance of grabbing all power in Portugal.

However, he did appeal for assistance from Western European Socialists and other moderate political parties, to the moderate political forces in Portugal. Without such assistance, he said, especially economic assistance, social tensions will increase in Portugal because of runaway inflation and unemployment, which will be good for nobody except perhaps the Communists.

There are rumors, he said, of foreign Communist financial assistance to the Portuguese Communists in amounts ranging up to \$54 million, but no hard evidence can be found.

SPAIN

Four days were spent in Spain by the study mission—from August 7 to August 11. While in Spain the study mission attended briefings at the Embassy, meetings at the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at the Spanish Ministry of Defense, and a visit to Torrejon Air Base, which included a briefing and a tour of the base.

LOOKING AT PORTUGAL

It is apparent that Spain is nervous about what is happening in neighboring Portugal. Especially since Spain is about to enter itself into a transition from a long period under an authoritarian regime. However, one thing which is apparent in Madrid which was not so evident in Portugal, was evidence of a growing middle class, and rapidly increasing material prosperity for the masses of people, as witnessed by the rapid growth in housing and marketing facilities. For this reason many observers feel that Spain has a large stabilizing element in its body politic, that is, a substantial segment of its society which has a stake in avoiding radical change.

SPANISH ATTITUDES TOWARD NATO

The Spaniards want a NATO reshaped for closer coordination with Spanish forces, if not formal acceptance of Spain as a member of NATO.

Embassy officials, as well as United States and Spanish military officers with whom the study mission talked generally agreed that Spain has irretrievably cast her lot with NATO, even though she has been refused membership in NATO consistently. This is somewhat embarrassing in view of NATO's acceptance of Portugal under the Salazar regime.

One Spanish official did maintain that Spain could become neutral unless it received better treatment from NATO and the United States. Why, he said, should Spain allow U.S. bases which cause Soviet missiles to be targeted on Spain, when the Western European countries which the U.S. bases protect, continue to insult Spain. But this statement stood alone, more as an expression of indignation, than as an objective analysis of the Spanish position.

Spanish spokesmen maintained that Spain over the last 10 years has changed significantly and that there is no logical reason for Spain to continue to be denied membership in NATO. There is clearly bitterness toward what is viewed as a little coterie of old liberal veterans of the Spanish Civil War who now wield great influence in their respective West European countries. Also, the Spaniards point with some justification to the deteriorating situation in all of the NATO countries in the southern tier, and maintain that NATO will be forced to turn to Spain for help in the south.

COOPERATION WITH U.S. MILITARY

A tour of the U.S. Air Base at Torrejon gave ample evidence of close United States-Spanish military cooperation. The Spaniards need only technology and know-how from the United States, and are more than willing to pay for it. They are very grateful for help which they receive from the United States and extend in return excellent hospitality.

Clearly there is excellent cooperation between the Spanish military and the U.S. military. And there is little doubt that part of the reason why other NATO countries continue to spurn Spanish applications for membership in NATO is because U.S. forces can take up the slack using Spanish bases on a bilateral basis to the clear benefit of all of NATO. The United States has wisely pushed strongly for closer ties between Spain and NATO and should pass up no opportunity to continue to do so.

ITALY

The big question looming over the future of Italy in NATO is the growing power of the Italian Communist Party (PCI). Therefore, the study mission originally requested a meeting with Communist Party officials to find out firsthand what the PCI says about NATO and the future role of Italy in NATO. However, we were unable to meet with any PCI spokesmen because of U.S. Embassy reluctance and the absence of many PCI officials during August, and thus spoke only with U.S. Embassy and Italian Foreign Ministry and Defense Ministry officials.

VISIT TO ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY

The first appointment of the study mission in Italy was with the NATO Affairs Section of the Foreign Ministry. There, a slightly more positive picture of the future of Italy in NATO was portrayed than elsewhere.

Italian officials took care to point out some recent positive developments for NATO. First, they maintained that the consultation process of the NATO allies in the MBFR talks in Vienna has worked very well and shown a great amount of desire and capacity to cooperate amongst the allies.

Second, concerning the rest of the southern tier the Italians also took a determinedly optimistic view. Portugal, they said, was far from being lost, and Turkey has shown a genuine readiness to repair her relations with the United States and NATO.

In Italy itself, they maintained that the growth in Communist power has not yet caused a qualitatively new situation. They saw 1977 as the deadline for attempts by other parties to make the necessary reforms to keep the Italian Communist Party out of the Government. They pointed to the fall elections of 1976 in Italy as the event to watch as an indication of how things might turn out.

VISIT TO ITALIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY

Officials here were markedly less optimistic. The consultation process of the NATO allies was criticized rather than praised as at the Foreign Ministry. The Italians were spectators at Helsinki for the finale of the CSCE talks, it was maintained. The NATO position was mostly the American position at the very end.

There was clear disappointment expressed for the U.S. performance at the CSCE talks. Also it was maintained that the United States wants to wrap up the MBFR talks in Vienna by the 1976 elections, no matter what. However the Europeans do not agree to this, we were told.

It was acknowledged that Spain should be integrated more closely in the NATO defense structure, but that it was still a political problem for anyone in Italy to call for Spanish membership in NATO.

On the question of prospects for the Italian Communist Party however, an Italian Defense Ministry spokesman also expressed the hopeful view that the Communists have gotten as many votes in the last election as they will ever get, and perhaps they will get less in the next election.

The Italian Army itself, it was maintained, is still loyal and non-Communist. However, dissatisfaction was voiced over a recent Italian Government decision to cut the term of service of Italian recruits from 18 months to 15 months.

In the event of PCI participation in government in the near future, it was not considered possible that Italy would voluntarily pull out of NATO. Even the PCI has gone on record as favoring a continued Italian membership in NATO. However this was viewed as a tactical position taken by the PCI in order not to frighten the generally pro-American Italian public.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE PCI

Clearly, U.S. policy in Italy must take into account the growing significance of the Italian Communist Party in the face of the continued inability of the other political parties to make any meaningful progress toward solving Italy's worsening economic and social problems. We can no longer pretend that the PCI does not exist, officially. The attitude of the PCI toward the United States just might be influenced to some extent by our attitude toward the PCI. This possibility at least deserves careful consideration. A long, hard, honest and fresh look should be given to the PCI to determine their true degree of independence from the CPSU.

On the other hand, Soviet intransigence toward any ideological deviation from Moscow style communism in Eastern Europe, such as was attempted in Czechoslovakia by Alexander Dubcek, should be cited to West European Communists. The NATO allies should continue to press for increased freedom of movement of people and ideas in Eastern Europe. The economic and political freedoms of the countries of Western Europe surely are attractive to many in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, among other countries in the East.

BELGIUM

The purpose of the visit to Belgium was not Belgium per se but rather NATO. Therefore, the study mission visited both NATO headquarters and SHAPE headquarters for briefings.

BRIEFINGS AT NATO HEADQUARTERS

Officials at NATO headquarters readily admitted the problems facing NATO in the coming years. And although no quick or easy solution was seen by them, they seemed nevertheless to have confidence that NATO would continue on, playing the same vital role as it has since World War II, solving, adapting to, or simply tolerating problems of the future as it has in the past.

The newest attempt to deal with the recurring problems of getting the allies to share equitably the growing defense costs is called standardization and rationalization. Earlier this issue was known as burden sharing. This newest initiative is seeking to reduce the disparity in equipment of the NATO forces and to increase interchangeability through standardization. The tricky part of this program calls for somehow parceling out defense contracts in such a way that each country gets a fair share, while somehow buying only the best equipment.

On the question of whether European governments are agreed to take some of the burden off the United States in paying for the huge costs of development and maintenance of NATO, officials at least privately agree it would be a good idea, but that the thin majority coalition governments cannot find the courage to pay the bill. The United States as the only superpower in NATO is seen as having special responsibilities whether it likes it or not. No end to this situation is anticipated in the foreseeable future. Although Western Europe is lurching slowly toward some kind of unity, military cooperation on a purely European basis is seen as very far off. None of the European governments seems prepared to yield the real sovereignty that such genuine cooperation and coordination would call for.

There is considerable resistance at NATO headquarters to the idea that NATO should change to allow for future changes in the governments of the southern tier countries, including possible participation of indigenous Communist parties. The view was expressed that NATO should not be like a salad bar where each country can take and give only what it wants or finds convenient.

VISIT TO SHAPE HEADQUARTERS

The Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe portrayed the basic military situation for NATO forces as good in the north, growing stronger in the center, and weaker in the south, al-

though they were quick to point out that the situation is not as bad as some depict.

Much concern was voiced over the arms embargo on Turkey which was voted by the Congress. However, allied military officials were heartened by the degree of cooperation which they continued to detect in the Turkish military. Cooperation on the military level was nevertheless, in the long-run dependent upon political cooperation, it was recognized. Likewise with the question of Spanish integration into the NATO forces, the military forces of the various countries have tried to improve liaison with the Spanish military. But without political backing, this effort cannot have much effect.

WEST GERMANY

VISIT TO GAO OFFICE

The study mission started with a visit to GAO offices in Frankfurt. By and large, the studies being conducted by GAO on NATO were necessarily narrow in scope and did not lend themselves to the purposes of this study mission. Also GAO complained of their inability to have access to NATO forces data.

VISIT TO FORCES IN THE FIELD

The chief purpose of the study mission's visit to West Germany was to inspect the forces in the field. Accordingly we visited 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment forces at Fulda where we were briefed on border operations. The study mission then went on to visit a border patrol on the actual frontier with East Germany.

The readiness and morale of the forces inspected was encouraging. However, the study mission was disturbed when it learned that, although combat readiness and vigilance was kept high in V Corps, in the British Zone to the north of V Corps, the British had apparently ceased their border patrols because of a cutback in the forces in Germany connected with budget cuts and the need for British forces in Northern Ireland.

Facilities in Fulda for the U.S. forces were also inspected. It was noted that some of the buildings were very old and in need of expensive repair which the regiment cannot afford. In some areas there were leaks in the roof and some dormitories had no latrine on every floor. Troop morale appeared high, nonetheless.

VISIT TO THE BORDER

A memorable part of the field visit was a helicopter ride to a border outpost, Grusselback Barrier, to see the actual interface between the NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

The East Germans had recently constructed a deep concrete trench together with a high chain fence, extensively mined, along that entire sector of the border which appeared to be defensive in nature and perhaps designed primarily to stop vehicles from crashing through into West Germany.

There are no Soviet forces stationed within 25 kilometers of the border, we were told. Only East German border police monitor the border. There are apparently few if any serious incidents of confrontation on the border itself. The East German villages on the other side of the border appear largely deserted.

A final portion of our visit to forces in the field was spent at the Wildflecken firing range near Fulda. Because of the expensive nature of the rounds fired by the Sheridan tanks, obvious economy measures

were being observed. Nevertheless the marksmanship of the tankers was impressive.

WEST GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD NATO

Briefings at the consulate general and conversations with German officials and journalists portrayed solid West German support for NATO. Only a small minority of radicals, which seemed to be shrinking, voiced serious objection to the presence of U.S. forces, notwithstanding the occasional incidence of crime or violence involving U.S. forces.

The West German contribution to NATO, at the same time, is very high we were told, and Germany has increased its share of the burden. This is not to say, however, that the Germans will readily continue to assume an increasing share of the NATO defense burden.

NORWAY

The look at NATO's northern tier began with a brief visit to Norway where the study mission was briefed by the Embassy and met with officials of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, as well the Norwegian Parliament. Norway's strategic position is clearly dominated by two large facts, that is, that it is firmly allied with NATO and the United States and that it has an actual border with the Soviet Union.

NORWEGIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD NATO

The great majority in Norway understand that there is no realistic alternative to membership in a NATO alliance, and further that the strength and anchor of the alliance is the United States. Without the United States, Norwegians would not see much worth in the alliance as a counterbalance to their Soviet neighbor to the east.

It was pointed out to the study mission that Norway applied on her own for membership in NATO following World War II. It could have chosen the neutral course of its neighbor Sweden but did not. Norway had some liabilities which it brought with it to the alliance, that is, its exposed northern position with a border on the Soviet Union. But clearly the Norwegians value their membership in NATO as a trip-wire in the north to dissuade Soviet incursions in that area. At the same time, Norway steadfastly has refused to allow foreign troops to be stationed on Norwegian soil to avoid provoking the Soviet Union. It is a delicate balance of deterrence without provocation which Norway seeks from its association with NATO. One Norwegian official bluntly described the need for a substantial presence of U.S. troops in Europe, as a need for hostages to guarantee U.S. involvement and retaliation for any Soviet or Warsaw Pact attack.

A NORWEGIAN VIEW OF THE SOUTHERN TIER

Norwegian officials unanimously criticized the U.S. arms embargo on Turkey. They viewed as indefensible, the denial by the United States of spare parts and materials to a NATO ally. Norwegians pointed to Great Britain as the biggest stumbling block to Spanish participation in NATO. This is because Spain wants Gibraltar back and the British refuse to return it. On the positive side, France's relations with NATO and the United States were viewed as improved. And France is regarded as a key ingredient to any European security arrangement by the Norwegians and much more important than countries like Greece and Portugal.

NORWAY'S IMPROVING PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

Solid popular support for NATO in Norway together with the obvious harmony of strategic interests between Norway and the NATO

alliance point to no foreseeable problems between Norway and NATO. In addition to this, the North Sea oil find which promises to make Norway independent of foreign oil and insure a sound economy for Norway for the foreseeable future, will guarantee that Norway will be able to pay her full share of the NATO defense costs, plus perhaps a little more—in proportion to the benefits which Norway obviously derives from her membership in NATO.

SWEDEN

The study mission received briefings from the Embassy and met with Swedish Foreign Ministry and Defense officials. A lecture was also given at the America House in Stockholm on the role of Congress in foreign policy.

THE SWEDISH VIEW OF NATO

Though Sweden is a neutral country, the officials which we spoke to saw the need for a balance of forces in Europe, with the United States and NATO clearly necessary to that balance. It is somewhat surprising to learn that Sweden's defense budget is the highest on a per capita basis in all of Europe. For a small country such as Sweden to have its own indigenous aircraft industry is a remarkable feat. The Viggan aircraft is the key to the Swedish defense posture. However, it is doubtful whether Sweden can afford to pay for another generation of aircraft in the rapidly escalating arms technology race which is becoming exorbitantly expensive. If, for this reason, the Swedish defense effort is in jeopardy for the future, then all the more reason for the Swedes to cheer a continued strong NATO and U.S. presence in Europe.

POPULAR SWEDISH ATTITUDES ABOUT NATO

Swedish officials pointed out a surprising 1972 public opinion poll which showed that in answer to the question, "Is NATO essential?", Sweden scored behind the FRG and Great Britain, but ahead of major NATO countries such as Italy and France.

Also there does not seem to be the same amount of public pressure on defense expenditures as in other European countries, according to our Swedish hosts. This is no doubt due to the higher level of prosperity in Sweden.

SWEDISH NEUTRALITY

Sweden's policy of neutrality has clear and overwhelming popular support, as a policy which has served the country well. This neutrality is difficult to define as it is based on their own perhaps shifting interpretation of the word neutral. By being neutral, the Swedes maintain that this can fulfill a useful function toward keeping the peace. However, the officials with whom we spoke were not overly optimistic about the results of the CSCE talks and the document signed in Helsinki.

One of their limits put on Swedish neutrality consists of the integration of the Swedish economy with the rest of the West. There is considerable influence exerted by the United States on the Swedish economy. Even the Swedish airplane, the Viggan, is 30 percent composed of American parts. And the growing importance of economic considerations in security matters promises to perhaps curb, even further, Swedish independence to pursue whatever policy she desires. This is true notwithstanding the fact that Sweden still has enormous iron ore deposits, vast reserves of forest products and low grade uranium, together with a highly skilled and proven workforce which may well be her most valuable asset.

DENMARK

THE DANISH ARMED FORCES

Both the Embassy officials and Danish military officers stressed the geographical and strategic importance of Denmark situated at the mouth of the Baltic Sea and linking Scandinavia to Central Europe. The Danish military are still struggling to make the Danish Defense Forces credible. The political climate in Denmark does not provide much support for the Ministry of Defense. The Danes are trying to make up in quality for what they lack in quantity. To this end, sophisticated U.S. equipment is very important to the Danish military and the Danes urged that advanced U.S. military technology continue to be available for the Danes to buy.

A DANISH VIEW OF NATO'S PROBLEMS

The Danish officials made the point that there may be a difference of opinion over the basic nature of NATO—within NATO itself. Danes in general, it was said, believed that NATO should be an alliance of functioning democracies, which at present does not include Spain. The other view of NATO which it was implied Denmark did not hold, was that NATO should be a military alliance cemented only by a common dislike and fear of communism. Therefore, it was not considered likely that Denmark would support any move by NATO toward Spain until after Franco's passing.

IRELAND

It was found that, unlike the other non-NATO countries such as Spain and Sweden which readily discussed NATO with the study mission, the Irish Defense Force apparently prefers not to discuss NATO matters. Also, August vacation schedules made the discussion of NATO matters with acting Irish officials even more difficult.

The study mission was interested in finding the Irish reaction to the withdrawal of British forces from the NATO border patrol force for use in Northern Ireland. However, the Irish Government is very hesitant to comment on this sensitive subject. The Irish Government, in its attempt to maintain its neutral stance, rules out any connection to NATO. This neutrality is marked, of course, with a firm pro-American policy.

APPENDIX

STUDY MISSION PROGRAM

Lisbon

August 5—Discussions with Embassy officers.

August 6—IBERLANT Tour and briefing by Admiral Corley, Captain Lacy.

Lunch with Ambassador and Portuguese Naval Capt. Antonio Estacio dos Reis.

Embassy briefing with Mr. Richard Melton, political section, Mr. James Lawler, executive section, Col. Clement H. Will, Chief of MAAG Mission, LTC Edward F. Grubbs, Jr., assistant Army attaché.

Meeting with Dr. Francisco Jose de Castro Pereira Pinto de Balsemeo, editor of the Popular Democratic Weekly, *Expresso* and assistant editor Dr. Antonio Patricio Gouveia.

August 7—Meeting with Ambassador Carlucci and Portuguese Adm. Antonio Alba Rosa Coutinho.

Madrid

August 8—Meeting with Ambassador Stabler.

Briefing by Embassy officers, Mr. Owen Lee, and Mr. Arthur Breisky (political section), Admiral Lemos (JUSMAG), Colonel Dixon (DAO) and Mr. Kent Goodspeed (economic section).

Meeting with Joaquin de Zavala y Alcibar-Jaurequi, Director of North American Atlantic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Lunch with Maj. Gen. Carlos Dolz de Espejo, Deputy Chief of Staff, Spanish Air Force.

Meeting with Maj. Gen. Edwin W. Robertson, USAF, Commander 16th Air Force, briefing and tour of Torrejon Air Base.

August 9—Meeting with Capt. Ricardo Minguez Suarez-Inclan, Division of Strategy, Navy General Staff and Capt. Richard T. Fox, Naval Attaché, U.S. Embassy.

Rome

August 12—Meeting with Deputy Chief of Mission Robert M. Beaudry.

Meeting with Consigliere Joseph Nitti, Director of Disarmament Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Meeting with Col. Giuseppe D'Ambrosio, NATO Officer, Supreme Defense Staff.

Luncheon with Ambassador Eugenio Plaja, Director General for Political Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Consigliere Joseph Nitti and Mr. Robert F. Hopper, Political Military Officer, U.S. Embassy.

August 13—Meeting with Embassy Political Section, DAO, MAAG.

Brussels

August 14—Meeting with U.S. Representative to NATO Military Committee, Adm. John P. Weinell.

Meeting with Acting Secretary General Paolo Pansa Cedronio of Italy.

Meeting with Acting Chairman of the Military Committee, Gen. Martin S. Colladay.

Meeting followed by lunch with the Charge, U.S. Mission to NATO, Edward J. Streater.

Visit to SHAPE headquarters and meeting with Deputy Saceur, Sir John Mogg, United Kingdom Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, Gen. Franz-Joseph Schulze (FRG), Assistant Chief of Staff Gen. Arnold Brasswell (U.S.) and U.S. Political Adviser for SHAPE, Minister Edward T. Long.

Frankfurt

August 15—Meeting at GAO, Frankfurt, Acting Director Joseph Kelley and associates.

Dinner with Acting Consul General Mr. Jack Sulser.

August 16—Helicopter flight to Fulda accompanied by Capt. F. T. Balzer, V Corps protocol officer.

Briefing by 11th Armored Cavalry Regimental Commander, Col. John L. Ballantyne, and subordinates.

Meeting with U.S. military personnel on actual border patrol along the frontier.

Visit to Grusselback Barrier border camp to observe border operations. Lunch at the camp.

Visit to Wildflecken Firing Range for viewing of live Sheridan fire.

August 18—Briefing by Lt. Gen. William R. Desobry, Commander, V Corps.

Discussion with Acting Consul General Jack Sulser.

Oslo

August 19—Dinner with Deputy Chief of Mission and Mrs. Thompson R. Buchanan, and Norwegian Foreign Ministry and Defense officials.

August 20—Meeting at Ministry of Foreign Affairs with Mr. Kjell Colding, Deputy Director Political Department and Haakon Freihow, Division Chief of NATO and Security Affairs, and Mr. Don Donchi, Political Military Officer, U.S. Embassy.

Meeting with Chairman of Parliamentary Defense Committee, Mr. Per Hysing-Dahl.

Meeting with Ambassador Thomas R. Byrne.

Working luncheon at Embassy with MAAG Chief Col. Herman, Mr. Donchi, and DCM Thompson Buchanan.

Stockholm

August 20—Lecture by Congressman Ryan at American Center entitled "The Role of Congress in Shaping U.S. Foreign Policy."

August 21—Briefing at U.S. Embassy, by Ambassador Strausz-Hupe.

Meeting at Swedish Foreign Ministry with Director of Political Affairs Leif Leifland, American Desk Officer, Jan Eliasson, Prof. Nils Andren, Consultant, and Dr. Ulf Ericson.

Lunch at residence of Ambassador Strausz-Hupe with Swedish Defense Ministry and Foreign Ministry officials.

Copenhagen

August 22—Briefing at U.S. Embassy by Ambassador Phillip K. Crowe and MAAG Chief, Capt. H. D. Mains.

Meeting at Ministry of Defense with Lieutenant General Jorgensen, Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral Radholm, Chief of Material Staff, and Major General Lind, Chief of Operations Staff.

August 25—Meeting at Ministry of Foreign Affairs with T. Abrahamsen, Acting Chief of MFA's NATO Office.

Dublin

August 27—Briefing at U.S. Embassy with Chargé John D. Rendahl, and staff. Luncheon hosted by Chargé John D. Rendahl.



