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CRISIS ON CYPRUS: 1974

A STUDY MISSION REPORT

PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE PROBLEMS
CONNECTED WITH REFUGEES AND ESCAPEES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION



OCTOBER 14, 1974

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PREFACE

By Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Chairman

This is a perilous time for the people of Cyprus—as it also is for the renewal of democracy and freedom in Greece, and for the future of NATO and of progress and peaceful relations in the Eastern Mediterranean. The repercussions of recent events in this part of the world have been widespread, and will continue to aggravate international relations and bedevil United States foreign policy for many months to come. This report examines some of these events, but concentrates on the Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

The Turkish invasion turned the island into shambles. In political terms, it violated the integrity of an independent state. In economic terms, it shattered the island's flourishing economy. And in human terms, it brought personal tragedy to thousands of families—and turned half the population into refugees, detainees, or beleaguered people caught behind ceasefire lines.

In too many quarters—including our own government—the human dimensions of the Cyprus crisis, and the plight of Cypriot civilians, has taken second place to the political and military issues at stake—and to the special interests of those who have much to lose or to gain by the outcome of the conflict. But the civilians of Cyprus—both Greeks and Turks—also have interests. And for hundreds of thousands, recent weeks have been a nightmare of death and tragedy and grief.

This report reviews the human and political tragedy of Cyprus. It is based on the findings of a recent Study Mission to the area, public hearings before the Subcommittee, and additional inquiry. As the report indicates, a drive along the roads of Cyprus quickly tells the tragic tale of the Cypriot people—of the human consequences of an armed invasion and deadlocked diplomacy, of bombing and napalm, of ceasefire violations, of military occupation, and man's inhumanity to man.

In the Turkish occupied northern areas only a small percentage of the population remains—including an estimated 8,000 Turkish refugees bombed or shelled out of their homes. Desolation and destruction mark many areas. Whole villages and towns and cities are empty of people, who fled their homes in fear of advancing Turkish forces. The 15,000 to 20,000 Greeks who remain are being held as virtual hostages—confined to their villages or elsewhere, and usually separated from family members and without adequate food and water and medical care. Some 500 of these people, for example, are being cruelly detained by Turkish forces in Kyrenia's Dome Hotel.

Government controlled areas of the island have been inundated with refugees from the north. Since the invasion on July 20, over 200,000 men, women and children—at least a third of the population—have

sought shelter wherever they could find it—in open fields, under trees, along the roadsides, and in schools, monasteries and public buildings. Only in the last few weeks have relief supplies begun to arrive in meaningful quantities; but food, blankets, medicines, other relief goods, and shelter are still in short supply. And, with the onslaught of the rainy season and the winter cold, the condition of the people will inevitably deteriorate—unless adequate relief measures are taken now, or a political settlement is accomplished, which will permit refugees to return to their homes. The overwhelming majority of needy people in government controlled areas are Greek Cypriots. But significant numbers of Turks—including some 10,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees—also command our help and concern.

A great deal has been said over America's role in the Cyprus crisis—and over the apparent complicity of our government in the human and political tragedy of the Cypriot people.

Our government suggests, for example, that Americans should recognize and appreciate legitimate Turkish grievances over developments on Cyprus, since independence more than a decade ago. Americans are told by their government that "the position of the Turkish community on Cyprus requires considerable improvement and protection. We [the U.S. Government] have supported a greater degree of autonomy for them." And, given this, we Americans must be practical in our approach to the Cyprus crisis. What has happened is understandable, and we must accept, therefore, the "new realities" on the island.

But what are these "new realities"? And what are we being asked to understand and accept?

Are we to condone the invasion and occupation of Cyprus? Are we to condone ceasefire violations? Are we to condone the nibbling away of an independent state, and a continuing threat of a new offensive in the so-called Turkish "peace operation"? Are we to condone the human tragedy brought about with the illegal use of American supplied weapons? Are we to condone the failure of our government to condemn the Turkish invasion? Are we to condone the omissions in our diplomacy, and the efforts by our Government to cover up these omissions and the tilt toward Turkey? Are we to stand silent in the face of *these* realities.

I believe the American people expect more of their government, and this is clearly reflected in the views and recent actions of Congress. The time is long overdue for the President and members of the Administration to give some greater evidence of concern and action over the human and political tragedy of Cyprus—and over the needed diplomacy by our government to help restore the island's territorial integrity and the right of the Cypriot people, working together, to determine their own destiny. We must do all in our power to accomplish this end. Important first steps should include a strengthened United Nations presence on the island, the orderly and phased withdrawal of Turkish troops, and the return of refugees to their families and homes.

With such goals in mind, the United States should also strengthen its support of relief and rehabilitation efforts by the Cyprus Government, the Turkish Cypriot Administration, the United Nations High

Commissioner for Refugees, (UNHCR) the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and others.

The United States can assist in a number of ways. For example, we should be doing more to encourage greater international support of UNHCR and ICRC relief efforts on Cyprus. We should lend our diplomacy to help guarantee the free access of these international relief agencies to the Turkish occupied areas of the island. And we should also be doing more to encourage the reopening of the Nicosia airport, which would, among other things, greatly facilitate the work of the relief agencies.

Of immediate importance is a more substantial American contribution to the UNHCR relief program of some \$22,000,000 through the end of this year. So far, we have committed only \$3,000,000—a paltry sum which falls far below our normal share of support for UNHCR programs. This token contribution for humanitarian programs is distressing, particularly in light of the millions of dollars in military hardware we are continuing to ship to Turkey.

If Cyprus today is on the brink of new conflict and even greater tragedy, our government's policy bears a special responsibility. For the omissions in our diplomacy over Cyprus, our support of the Turkish position, and the President's insistence on maintaining a business-as-usual attitude toward military shipments to Turkey, only encourages Ankara's intransigency and feeds frustrations on Cyprus and among our friends in neighboring Greece. It is long overdue for us to rescue our foreign policy from a course that is disastrous both to our best traditions and interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The first part of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that every entry should be supported by a valid receipt or invoice. The second part outlines the procedures for handling discrepancies and errors, including the steps to be taken when a mistake is identified. The third part provides a detailed explanation of the accounting cycle, from identifying the accounting entity to preparing financial statements. The fourth part discusses the role of internal controls in preventing fraud and ensuring the integrity of the financial data. The fifth part covers the requirements for external audits and the importance of transparency in financial reporting. The sixth part addresses the legal implications of financial misstatements and the consequences of non-compliance with accounting standards. The seventh part discusses the impact of technology on accounting practices and the need for continuous learning and adaptation. The eighth part provides a summary of the key points discussed in the document and offers recommendations for improving financial management practices. The ninth part includes a list of references and sources used in the preparation of the document. The tenth part contains a concluding statement and a signature line for the author.

INTRODUCTION

The Subcommittee has closely followed humanitarian problems on Cyprus since the outbreak of violence and the Turkish invasion of the island in mid-July 1974. As the situation deteriorated, and following consultations with officials in the United Nations and the Department of State, on August 8, the Chairman expressed in the Senate the Subcommittee's public concern over the plight of the Cypriot people. Among other things, the Chairman stated:

Reports from the area—including official reports to our own Government and elsewhere—fully confirm the human tragedy of Cyprus. Tens of thousands of women and children have been forcibly expelled from their villages—especially in Turkish occupied areas—or have fled their homes as refugees. Thousands of able-bodied men have disappeared—and some apparently have been deported to camps or prisons in southern Turkey. Refugees tell of 'much suffering' and 'systematic' arson, looting, murder, and rape. And civilian casualties—both wounded and dead—number in the hundreds, if not the thousands.

I do not rise to offer any magic solution for meeting the immediate political and humanitarian problems of Cyprus. But I do rise to express a deep personal concern over the plight of Cypriot civilians—especially over the continuing violations of human rights and the rules of common human decency which are evidenced in Turkish occupied areas. A spokesman for our own Government suggests that 'some very rough stuff' continues. This is a deplorable situation, and I appeal to the Turkish Government and all parties involved to make every effort in behalf of bringing peace and relief to Cyprus.

Apart from securing a meaningful separation of forces and a political settlement at the conference table in Geneva, there are three items of immediate concern to me as chairman of the Subcommittee on Refugees:

First, the emergency relief needs of refugees and others in distress—including food, water, shelter, medicine, and protection;

Second, the condition, treatment, and release of civilian detainees—including those who may have been deported to Turkey or other areas; and

Third, the free movement of international relief convoys and humanitarian personnel from the United Nations or the International Committee for the Red Cross—ICRC—including the free access of Red Cross personnel to detention centers on both sides.

Nearly a week later, on August 14, and following important "land grabs" by Turkish forces in violation of the United Nations sponsored ceasefire, Ankara ordered phase two of the invasion. Sensing the growing humanitarian needs on Cyprus, and particularly in light of new appeals for relief assistance by the Cypriot government, on August 16 the Chairman made a personal appeal to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, for his "favorable consideration of good offices for meeting humanitarian needs and for providing care and protection to the refugees." The United Nations responded to the Cypriot Government's appeal for help. On August 20, United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim designated the High Commissioner as "coordinator of United Nations humanitarian assistance for Cyprus." Shortly thereafter, during a visit to the island in late August, the High Commissioner established a field office in Nicosia to help meet humanitarian needs among both Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Also on August 20, during the sweep of Turkish forces over more than forty percent of Cyprus, the Subcommittee held a public hearing on the escalating humanitarian problems with Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, the Honorable Arthur A. Hartman, and others from the Executive Branch. And shortly thereafter, the Chairman dispatched a Study Mission to the Eastern Mediterranean.

The field study was conducted by Mr. Dale S. deHaan, Staff Director to the Subcommittee; Mr. Jerry M. Tinker, Staff Consultant; and Dr. Dennis Skiotis, Assistant Professor of Greek and Turkish History at Harvard University and a Special Consultant to the Subcommittee. The Study Mission's departure for the field was delayed for several days. Citing the violent and senseless death of U.S. Ambassador Roger P. Davies on August 19, and very strong anti-American feelings among Greek Cypriots, the Department of State, at the highest levels, expressed concern over the physical safety of the Study Mission and over other factors relating to the national interest. Finally, with the approval of the Department, the Study Mission left Washington on the evening of August 27. It returned on September 12.

The Study Mission spent a week on Cyprus, and traveled extensively in both government controlled and Turkish occupied areas. On the government side, the team visited Greek refugee concentrations in greater Nicosia, the Larnaca area where the bulk of the refugees are located, the Limassol area on the southern coast, and the British Sovereign Base areas at Akrotiri and Dhekelia. The Study Mission also visited Turkish Cypriot detainees and other Turks in government controlled areas. The Cypriot Government was fully cooperative, and readily accommodated the Study Mission's interests and concerns.

In the Turkish occupied areas, the Study Mission visited Turkish Cypriot refugees in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia, and traveled north to Kyrenia and east to the port of Famagusta. In addition to visiting some 450 Greek civilians detained in Kyrenia's Dome Hotel, the team also visited the Greek population remaining in Bellapais, a village near Kyrenia. Although the Study Mission was received cordially by the Turkish Cypriot Administration in the occupied areas, its movement in the northern part of the island was restricted. Permission to travel west of Kyrenia was not granted, and requests to visit the

Karpasian peninsula in the northeast, where several thousand Greeks remain as virtual hostages, were never cleared by "the authorities".


In addition to talking with hundreds of refugees and others in distress in all parts of the island, the Study Mission met twice with the Acting President of Cyprus, Glafcos Clerides, and with members of his Government and representatives of the Cyprus Red Cross. Talks were also held with Rauf Denktash, the constitutional Vice President of Cyprus and head of the Turkish Cypriot community, and with members of his administration and representatives of the Turkish Cypriot Red Crescent Society. Representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the UNHCR, the United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP), and others were readily available for consultations, and in London the Study Mission met with the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios. The American Embassy in Nicosia extended every courtesy to the Study Mission, and useful conversations were held with Ambassador William Crawford and members of his staff.

After leaving Cyprus, the Study Mission traveled to Ankara, Athens, Geneva and London. In Ankara, the team met with Turkish Foreign Ministry officials, and with representatives of the Turkish Red Crescent Society and the ICRC. Extensive conversations were also held with U.S. Ambassador William B. Macomber, Jr., and members of his staff.

In Athens, the Study Mission met with Acting Foreign Minister Dimitrios Bitsios and other Greek officials, as well as with members of the U.S. Embassy staff. In Geneva, additional meetings were held with the ICRC and the UNHCR, and in London talks were held with appropriate officials in the British Foreign Ministry and others.

As suggested in the Chairman's preface, this report—based mainly on the recent field study—is part of the Subcommittee's continuing effort to underscore the distressing human consequences of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, and to make the case again that normalizing the life of the Cypriot people and restoring the territorial integrity and full independence of Cyprus must be a matter of vital concern to the American people and their government. A preliminary report of the Study Mission's findings and recommendations was presented by Dr. Skiotis at a Subcommittee hearing on September 26. Secretary Hartman also testified at this hearing.

Copies of the Subcommittee's hearings on Cyprus are available by writing the Subcommittee office.




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
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SEEDS OF CONFLICT

Cyprus is situated in the eastern Mediterranean, 40 miles south of Turkey, 60 miles west of Syria and 500 miles east of mainland Greece. It is the third largest island in the Mediterranean (after Sicily and Sardinia) with a maximum length of 138 miles and a maximum breadth of 59 miles. Its total area—some 3572 square miles—is only about half the size of the state of New Jersey.

Two thirds of Cyprus is mountainous. Two mountain ranges stretch from east to west. One, the Kyrenia range, is in the north. The other, the Troodos range, rises in the southwest. Between these two ranges lies the chief agricultural area, the Mesaoria plain, where the capital Nicosia is situated.

In recent years, Cyprus had attained a considerable degree of prosperity. The economy was doing well and living standards were increasing year after year. In 1973 the per capita income was \$1,313. While not as wealthy and advanced as western nations, Cyprus was much better off than most countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Its economy is usually compared with that of Israel.

Of Cyprus' estimated population of 650,000, some 80% speak Greek and are Greek Orthodox Christian by religion. Some 18% are Turkish speaking Muslims. Armenians and Maronites are prominent among the remainder.

I. INDEPENDENCE

The presence of Greeks on Cyprus can be dated to the end of the thirteenth century B.C. But down through the ages to 1960, the island was conquered and ruled successively by Phoenicians, Egyptians, Assyrians, Persians, Macedonians, Romans, Byzantines, Lusignans, Venetians, Ottomans, and the British. It was in 1571 that Cyprus was conquered by the Ottoman Turks, and it is from this time that the emergence of a Turkish speaking Muslim community on the island can be traced. Ottoman rule in Cyprus lasted until 1878 when Cyprus was leased to the British. The British annexed it in 1914 when Turkey became Germany's ally in World War I. Cyprus was made a Crown Colony in 1925.

During the late Ottoman and British periods, the political movement among the Greek Cypriot majority for union with Greece—*enosis*—became the most powerful force in Cypriot politics. By and large, agitation for *enosis* was successfully contained—sometimes even suppressed by the force of arms (1931)—until the 1950's, when matters came to a head and the Greek Cypriots launched a guerrilla campaign against the British. The Greek Cypriot revolt, led by Archbishop Makarios and Colonel Grivas, proved impossible for the British to crush.

In reaction to the greatly increased threat of *enosis*, the Turkish Cypriots sided with the British and supported the maintenance of

British rule. They argued, however, that, if British rule were to end, Cyprus should revert to Turkish sovereignty. In the late 1950's, the idea of partitioning the island into separate Greek and Turkish areas was advanced by Ankara and endorsed by the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

The Greek Cypriot campaign was terminated by the conclusion of the Zurich and London agreements of February 1959.* These agreements, aimed at solving the Cyprus problem, were worked out among the governments of Greece, Turkey and Britain, and members of the western alliance (NATO). Archbishop Makarios, the leader of the Greek Cypriots, had serious reservations about the arrangements, particularly regarding the constitutional structure of the new state that was to be founded. But, in the end, he accepted. Dr. Kutchuk, the leader of the Turkish Cypriots, also initialed the agreements on February 19, 1959.

According to the terms of these agreements, Cyprus was to become an independent republic. Britain, however, would have two military bases over which she would maintain sovereign rights. Greece and Turkey were also to maintain small military contingents on the island. The three powers would jointly guarantee the independence of, and respect for, the constitution of the new republic. Both union with any other state, and partition, were expressly forbidden. Although the three powers pledged joint consultations with each other in the event of a breach of the treaty, each also reserved the right to act unilaterally to defend the treaty provisions.

The agreements provided for a presidential form of government, with the President a Greek, elected by the Greek community, and the Vice President a Turk, elected by the Turkish community. The President and the Vice President were both granted a veto right over foreign affairs, defense and internal security. In the Council of Ministers and the House of Representatives, the Turks were granted 30% of the seats, again elected on separate rolls. They were also given 30% of the posts in the civil service and security forces, and 40% in the Army. The Turks were also granted complete legislative and administrative autonomy in educational, religious, and cultural affairs, and in matters of personal status and taxation. Moreover, any modification of the constitution's articles, which were open for amendment, required the consent of a separate two-thirds majority from representatives of each community. In sum, the recognition of specifically designated and separate rights for the Turkish community form the distinguishing feature of the Cyprus constitution. But the effort to minimize misunderstandings between the two communities, with detailed provisions in all areas of government and administration, had the opposite result—the institutionalisation of governmental dualism and ethnic separatism between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

From the very establishment of Cyprus as an independent state on August 16, 1960, the constitutional machinery failed the new republic. The Greek majority saw the aspects of the constitution described above as hindrances to their becoming masters in their own house, and as legislating the maintenance of a state within a state. The Turks, on the other hand, feared that any erosion of their constitutional guarantees

*For the complete text of these agreements, see Appendix VII.

would leave them with no rights at all. Given the peculiarities of the constitution, political conflict was probably inevitable. And such conflict intensified as the Greeks tried to show that only a unitary system of government would work on Cyprus, and as the Turks took every opportunity to block government business whenever they felt that their rights were infringed upon or their needs unmet. The two communities were soon deadlocked on a host of issues: civil service staffing, the Army, separation of municipalities, and the use of the Turkish veto on central government taxation, among other things.

2. COMMUNAL CONFLICT OF 1963-64 AND 1967

All this forms the background to the ethnic conflict that erupted in 1963. Makarios, the Republic's first President, suggested a number of constitutional amendments whose primary purpose was to reduce separatism and bring about a greater measure of majority rule. Ankara, followed by the Turkish Cypriots, rejected his proposals. Intercommunal fighting broke out five days later, in December 1963, with each side accusing the other of having planned war beforehand.

The pattern of events which occurred during the first Cyprus crisis (1963-64) was closely paralleled during the 1967 flare-up. On both occasions, the Greek Cypriots, being far more numerous than the Turkish Cypriots, seemed about to overwhelm them in the early stages of the conflict. Turkey would then threaten to intervene militarily—and in August 1964 Turkish fighter bombers did indeed strike Greek Cypriot positions—and this, in turn, would lead to real dangers of war with Greece. Since both Turkey and Greece were NATO allies, the U.S. would become immediately involved, as would Britain, a guarantor of Cyprus independence. The Soviet Union would then react quickly to NATO military and diplomatic activity in the eastern Mediterranean. And finally, as a non-aligned nation, Cyprus would count on the concern of a great many states, which together with the great powers, would call for the United Nations to undertake the thankless task of peace-keeping and even mediation on the island.

It should be stressed, however, that in both the 1963-64 and 1967 confrontations over Cyprus the U.S. played the active and crucial role, as the leader of the western alliance, in defusing the crises. High level American diplomats, George Ball and Cyprus Vance, worked diligently to avoid war. In 1964, for example, Turkey was warned in the strongest terms that the U.S. would not tolerate precipitate action or invasion. And in 1967, the Greek colonels were forced to suffer a humiliating diplomatic defeat requiring the recall of Grivas from Cyprus and the withdrawal of 9,000 Greek soldiers from the island.

However, American efforts to arrange for NATO peace-keeping forces on Cyprus (advanced by George Ball in 1964), as well as the "Acheson plan" (union of Cyprus with Greece, one or two Turkish cantons and a Turkish military base on the island, and the cession of the remote Greek island of Castellorizon to Turkey), were not acceptable to President Makarios, who was abandoning Enosis and becoming increasingly identified with a policy favoring independence and neu-

trality. Makarios' own view was that greater reliance should be placed on the U.N., regarding both peace-keeping functions and guaranteeing the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus.

3. ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Thus, since March 4, 1964, a U.N. peace-keeping force (UNFICYP) has been present on Cyprus. The Security Council mandated UNFICYP "to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions." Until the most recent crisis, UNFICYP has played a very important role in the stabilisation and maintenance of peace on Cyprus, and there was general agreement that it has been one of the more successful operations of the international organization.

The U.N. also appointed a mediator whose report (Galo-Plaza Report), published in 1965, was intended to serve as the basis for a new solution. The main points of the Report were:

1. Cyprus should remain an independent state renouncing its right to unite with Greece.
2. The island should be demilitarised. The question of the British bases was set aside for later consideration.
3. There should be no partition or physical separation of the Greek and Turkish communities. However, Turkish Cypriot rights should be guaranteed by the U.N. and supervised by a U.N. commissioner on Cyprus.
4. A settlement should depend in the first place on agreement between the people of Cyprus themselves and talks should take place between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

This plan was rejected summarily by Turkey. It was, however, "noted" by the Political Committee of the General Assembly and so it can be said to have been approved to that extent by the U.N. Moreover, in December 1965, the General Assembly adopted a resolution which took "cognizance of the fact that Cyprus should enjoy full sovereignty and complete independence without any foreign intervention or interference," and which called on "all states to respect the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus."

4. COMMUNAL TENSIONS

As a result of the upheavals of 1963-64, the Turkish Cypriots abandoned many of their villages and gathered for self-protection and the facilitation of partition in the more defensible areas. According to the U.N., there were some 25,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees who were forced to relocate in this manner. Greek Cypriots were not permitted to enter these areas, nor were Turks permitted to leave their enclaves without permission from their leaders. Confined in these enclaves, without sufficient resources, it was only direct economic aid from Turkey (an estimated \$25 million annually) that enabled the Turks to survive as a separate entity.

Although intercommunal tensions eased after 1967, the situation on Cyprus remained at an impasse. The most promising signs of progress

were the discussions that began in early 1968 between Glafcos Clerides and Rauf Denktash (representing the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities) aimed at resolving the differences between them. In 1972, these inter-communal talks were expanded to include, in advisory capacities, a U.N. Special Representative and constitutional experts from Greece and Turkey.

At about the same time, however, the Greek Cypriots found themselves plunged into a domestic political crisis of their own. President Makarios' policy of abandoning enosis for the "unfettered independence of a unitary state" was opposed both by the extreme right wing in Cyprus (EOKA-B) and by the military junta that had seized power in Athens in April 1967. In contrast to the dictatorship in Greece, Makarios was democratically elected, enjoyed the support of the left wing AKEL party in Cyprus, and pursued a policy of non-alignment.

Former EOKA leader Grivas returned to Cyprus clandestinely in 1971, and plots and attempts to assassinate Makarios became frequent. In late 1973, there were several armed clashes between the rebels and security forces. And Christos Vakis the Cypriot Minister of Justice, was kidnapped by EOKA-B terrorists.

CYPRUS, 1974: SCENARIO FOR TRAGEDY

In the summer of 1974, the terrorists intensified their activities on Cyprus. On July 2, Makarios complained to the Greek Government that the 650 Greek officers commanding the Greek Cypriot National Guard were planning to overthrow him, and he demanded their immediate recall. By this time the plot was something of an open secret. The Greek Foreign Minister, Tetenes, his aides, and over 20 Greek officers resigned in disgust. And on July 5, the Nicosia newspaper *Apoyevmatini* printed an account of the plot against Makarios, adding that the Greek officers and their EOKA-B henchmen planned to kill the President and put a "puppet" in his place.

1. COUP AGAINST MAKARIOS

This is almost exactly what happened 10 days later. On July 15, Greek officers, on instructions from the military junta ruling in Athens, overthrew the legitimate government of Cyprus in a coup d'état. Nikos Sampson was appointed President. But Makarios escaped death and was flown to London by the British. In London, as well as at the U.N., Makarios called for the restoration of Cyprus' independence and sovereignty.

In spite of later statements by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, that information about the coup "was not exactly lying in the street," there is abundant evidence suggesting that the U.S. knew of the impending coup well in advance. But there are doubts that Washington was fully successful in conveying a warning signal to the Greek junta to refrain from action on Cyprus. Trying to establish what happened at this period is complicated by the fact that the U.S. apparently was in the habit of communicating with the junta via the C.I.A. station chief, while the regular Embassy channels in Athens were rarely used. In any case, much more forceful and forthright measures should and could have been employed at this early, critical stage of the Cyprus crisis; for the half-hearted, complacent tactics of the U.S. failed to deter the junta.

After the coup on Cyprus, Britain—a guarantor power—and other NATO countries condemned Sampson and came out strongly for the restoration of Makarios. Once again the U.S. dragged its feet and carefully refrained from putting the responsibility for the coup on the junta. The State Department spokesman called for "moderation" and a return to "constitutional arrangements", and Makarios' status was left deliberately ambiguous.

And in the United Nations, Ambassador John Scali was putting the best possible face on the Greek Cypriot junta. On July 19, he told the Security Council—which had just heard a plea from Makarios—that "my government has always opposed intervention in

the internal affairs of one country by another, and to the extent that *this may be the case in Cyprus*, I repeat we deplore it." (italics added) Thus, Scali and the United States Government, far from labeling the Athens inspired Sampson coup as "intervention," was saying "it may be" and that "it would be a serious error to rush to judgment on an issue of this gravity."

These "even-handed" statements emanating from the State Department were interpreted by Ankara as tacit U.S. acceptance of the new state of affairs on Cyprus. To Turkey, Sampson's elevation to power signalled the strong possibility of enosis, and Ankara therefore immediately prepared for a military solution to the problem. Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit first flew to London to consult with the British. In London he demanded the recall of the Greek officers and the establishment of a federal system of government on Cyprus to be worked out immediately in talks between Clerides and Denktash. Here again clear-cut U.S. support of the Turkish *diplomatic* position would probably have significantly reduced the chances of Turkey opting for military action. Instead, Under Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco was dispatched to shuttle between Athens and Ankara in a futile effort to effect, apparently, a compromise on Cyprus that would save face for the Greek military junta. And, it now appears, that he did not seriously warn the Turks that, if they were determined to seek a military solution, the U.S. would find itself obliged to at least consider cutting off military assistance to Ankara.

2. TURKISH INVASION

On July 20, Turkish forces began landing on Cyprus. They were resisted stubbornly by the Greek Cypriots who managed, surprisingly in view of their military inferiority, to limit initial Turkish gains to a slim corridor from Kyrenia to Nicosia. On that same day, the U.N. Security Council adopted the first of a series of strongly-worded resolutions calling for an immediate ceasefire; urging an end to foreign intervention and the withdrawal of all foreign troops; and requesting the guarantor powers of Cyprus—Greece, Turkey and Britain—to start negotiations for a settlement.

The first of a series of ceasefires was effected on Cyprus on July 22; but, from the outset, the Turkish military kept reinforcing its forces and steadily expanding the width of its Kyrenia-Nicosia salient. During this time, the U.S., in public statements, professed to be unconcerned about what it called minor military actions.

The Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the ensuing possibility of war with Greece so concerned the Greek junta that it recalled Constantine Karamanlis to Greece to form a civilian government of national unity. On the same day, July 23, Clerides replaced Sampson as Acting President of Cyprus.

The renewal of democracy and constitutional government in Greece (after 7 years of military rule), as well as on Cyprus, raised hopes throughout the world for a negotiated settlement. Indeed, under British leadership, the three guarantor powers met in Geneva on July 26, and on the 30th signed a declaration in which they agreed to implement the U.N. sponsored cease-fire on Cyprus. The second phase of the Geneva Talks, to consider political issues, opened on

schedule on August 8. The following day, Greek, Turkish, British and U.N. military observers agreed on a cease-fire line separating opposing forces on Cyprus.

But the negotiations reached an impasse when Turkish proposals—first, for a federal system under which Turkish Cypriots would have a separate administration in a zone covering 38% of Cyprus, and secondly, for a cantonal system under which the Turkish Cypriots would administer several smaller areas—were received coolly by the Greek negotiators and Clerides, who requested 36 hours to discuss the Turkish proposals with their governments. Turkey, probably intent upon winning on the battlefield what it had demanded at the conference table, rejected the Greek request for an adjournment. The British describe the Turkish position as “arbitrary and unreasonable”. But once again the U.S. did very little, and failed to prevail upon the Turks to remain at the negotiating table.

In an incredible move of bad timing, if not bad policy, the Department of State at this crucial juncture of the talks issued a statement, which stressed the equity of the Turkish position. The following is the text of the statement issued by Department spokesman Robert Anderson at a news briefing on August 13th:

“The U.S. position is as follows:

“We recognize the position of the Turkish community on Cyprus requires considerable improvement and protection. We have supported a greater degree of autonomy for them.

“The parties are negotiating on one or more Turkish autonomous areas. The avenues of diplomacy have not been exhausted. And therefore the United States would consider a resort to military action unjustified.

“We have made this clear to all parties.”

Regrettably, the statement was not clear to Turkey. Moreover, it appeared—from the timing of the statement and the stress made on Turkish grievances—that Washington was supporting Ankara’s position in Geneva.

Thus, one day later, on August 14, before dawn, the Turkish Army, heavily reinforced with armor and wielding the advantage of complete air superiority, slashed across Cyprus towards both east and west. In three days, this overwhelming military thrust sliced off at least 40% of Cyprus which was slightly more than what the Turks had been demanding in the Geneva talks. The rapid and effortless Turkish advance on Cyprus had both a profound repercussion at the international level and a devastating effect on the population of the island.

At the international level, the Karamanlis government in Greece considered war with Turkey, then rejected that option, but withdrew militarily from NATO. Both widespread public disillusionment and the military’s bitterness dictated this course of action regarding the U.S. and NATO. This is a development of profound significance in Greek history—at a critical juncture in the fresh democratisation process—which has already fostered a radical move towards the left in the country’s political profile.

U.S. policy, which at every crucial stage of the Cyprus crisis seems to have been one of hasty improvisation and coldly calculated to mini-


mise disturbances within NATO, failed in the end. Not only did it achieve the opposite result, but more importantly in human terms, it failed the defenseless people of Cyprus.

APPROXIMATE AREAS OF TURKISH OCCUPATION AFTER 1ST PHASE OF INVASION



—from The Economist, Aug. 10, 1974

APPROXIMATE AREAS OF TURKISH OCCUPATION AS OF OCTOBER 1974



--- Approximate Demarcation
—from The Economist

CONSEQUENCES OF THE INVASION

There are today two stark realities on Cyprus. The first is the presence of an army of occupation—approximately 40,000 heavily armed Turkish troops. The second is the humanitarian crisis confronting over 282,000 Cypriots—nearly half the population of the island—who are now refugees, civilian detainees, prisoners of war, or others in need of humanitarian assistance, on both sides of the uncertain cease-fire line.

Regrettably, there is too little understanding outside of Cyprus as to the consequences of the invasion and conditions in the field. To comprehend what has happened to Cyprus—and especially to appreciate how central the resolution of humanitarian issues is to a settlement of the Cyprus problem—it is important at the outset to review current refugee and related humanitarian problems on the island.

1. HUMANITARIAN CONSEQUENCES OF THE INVASION

As Table 1 outlines, there are several categories of displaced persons and other people in need of help. The first, and by far the largest category, are the Greek Cypriot refugees in the Government controlled area of the south. Official statistics in the field estimate that at least 200,000 Greek Cypriots have been displaced from Turkish occupied areas. Some 30,000 of these people have found shelter with relatives or friends, and need a minimum of relief assistance. The remainder, however, have needed shelter as well as general relief. In addition to these "semi-permanent" refugees, thousands of other Greek Cypriots, living in areas bordering the ceasefire line, have been temporarily displaced, because of actual Turkish troop movements in their area or the fear and threat of new military operations by Turkish forces.

TABLE 1.—*Humanitarian Problems in Cyprus*¹

I. Refugees:	
1. In Government controlled areas:	
Greek Cypriot refugees.....	194, 400
Post-ceasefire refugees (from Athna and other areas along cease-fire line).....	20, 000
Turkish Cypriots displaced or cut-off.....	34, 000
2. In Turkish occupied areas:	
Greek Cypriots displaced or cut-off.....	20, 000
Turkish Cypriot refugees.....	8, 000
II. Prisoners of war and detainees, both sides.....	6, 000
 Total	 ² 282, 000

¹ Based upon statistics of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and International Committee of the Red Cross, as of September 15, 1974.

² Subsequently, revised statistics on displaced persons in Cyprus, compiled as of Nov. 1, 1974 by the Government of Cyprus, UNFICYP, the UNHCR and ICRC, indicate the total has been reduced slightly. According to sources in the field, this is accountable to the subsequent release and repatriation of over 6,000 detainees and prisoners of war on both sides, a more accurate census of Greek Cypriot refugees by the Government of Cyprus, and revised U.N. estimates of Turkish Cypriot refugees.

[Footnote 2 Continued on Following Page]

To drive along the roads of southern Cyprus, is to drive through an endless refugee camp. In early September, refugees were encamped under trees, along the roadside, in cars, in open fields, under small lean-to huts made of pine branches and sticks, and in tents provided by International Relief agencies. Every available public building and accommodation was filled with refugees—schools, churches, monasteries, and civic buildings. District towns had been flooded with refugees, and with idle men swelling the unemployment rolls. Small towns and villages along the way had doubled or tripled in size.



Athna Forest.—Following the second phase of the Turkish invasion, some one hundred thousand Greek Cypriot refugees fled south for safety. They brought whatever they could cart along with them, as this old woman from the Famagusta area, standing beneath the trees of Athna Forest with her family's meager household goods.

Footnote 2—Continued

The following table presents the revised estimate of displaced persons and others in need on Cyprus, as of Nov. 1, 1974:

I. Refugees:

1. Greek Cypriots in Government-controlled areas:

Satisfactorily sheltered with friends/relatives or in second homes rented.....	57,600
Living in public buildings, schools, etc.....	5,800
Housed in permanent structures, but overcrowded conditions and will have to move.....	89,700
Living in shacks, garages, unfinished structures.....	11,000
Living in tents.....	9,000
Living in the open, under trees, in makeshift, open shelters.....	7,700

Total 180,800

2. Turkish Cypriots in Government-controlled areas:

Living in tents on British Sovereign Base areas.....	8,500
In isolated villages, cut off, or in controlled villages/enclaves	22,000

Total 30,500

3. Greek Cypriots in Turkish-occupied area:

Living in cut off villages, or displaced.....	9,000
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4. Turkish Cypriot refugees in Turkish-occupied area:

Moved from the south to the north, and includes some refugees from 1963-64.....	8,500
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II. Prisoners of war and detainees, both sides:


All have been released under U.N. auspices.....	6,000
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Total 234,800

The Larnaca district, around the British Sovereign Base Area of Dhekelia, was overwhelmed by refugees, mostly from Famagusta. A typical situation was that of Ormidhia town, whose population had jumped by some 300%. Refugee families were scattered everywhere, and relief supplies were just beginning to arrive—over two weeks after many of the refugees first moved. An empty soccer field was being turned into a refugee city of tents—camping tents for six people, now holding one or two families with as many as 14 men, women and children huddled together.



Xylophaghou village.—On the outskirts of a small town, an old man sits idly beneath the trees of the roadside. To drive through the southern portions of Cyprus is to drive through an endless refugee area, where this old man and his grand-daughters, await the prospect of returning to their home, but with little to do, and with even less hope, in the meantime.



Athna Forest.—The fear of the Turkish army is widespread after the reports of brutality at the end of the first phase of the invasion. As a result of this fear—real or imagined—people fled at the instant they saw or thought Turkish forces were on their way—dropping everything, and taking very little with them. Here two women sit in their “home” of straw, blankets, and a small canvas overhead.



Athna Forest.—A former high school teacher from Famagusta, whose only shelter is a lean-to canvas and straw bed among the bushes of Athna Forest, talks to the leader of the Study Mission, Dale S. deHaan, about his narrow escape from the Turkish sweep into Famagusta and the dispersal of his family—many of whom are still missing.




Nicosia.—A mother huddles two of her children, anxiously awaiting news of their missing father—caught on the Turkish side of the ceasefire line. Thousands of men are still missing on both sides; a constant theme heard by the Study Mission was the systematic rounding-up of village men between the ages of 16 to 65—many of whom are still unaccounted for or are still held hostage.



Ormidhia town.—The population of the small town of Ormidhia has jumped by over 300% after the influx of refugees. Here Study Mission member Dennis Skiotis speaks to a refugee family eating its lunch beneath the trees on the outskirts of the town. They hope soon to receive tents, but even more, they hope to be able to return to their homes only a few miles away.



Nicosia school.—Refugees are everywhere and every available public building and accommodation is filled with refugees—schools, churches, monasteries, and civic buildings. Here Study Mission members, Jerry Tinker (left) and Dale S. deHaan, meet with children in a school in Nicosia—living as refugees in the schools they should be attending.



Ormidhia town.—Shelter has now begun to arrive for the refugees. Here an empty soccer field has been transformed into a small refugee city of tents—camping tents for six people, now holding one or two families with as many as 14 men, women and children huddled together until more tents arrive.



Ormidhia town.—Sanitation and other facilities for refugee camps are only now being established. Here a mother bathes a child in the only place she can—outdoors. As winter approaches, and refugee camps become more crowded, serious sanitation and other health problems must be anticipated.



Nicosia, Turkish Quarter.—Although there are approximately 8,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees from the current crisis, whose needs are the same as those on the Greek Cypriot side, the refugees most mentioned, by Turkish Cypriot officials, are the refugees displaced from the 1963–64 communal violence. Vice-President Denktash emphasizes their long neglect, and provided the above photographs showing the crowded and unsanitary conditions in which these Turkish Cypriot refugees of 1963–64 still live.

Reflecting the fluidity of the refugee movement, and the serious lack of shelter and relief supplies in many areas of Larnaca district, a substantial number of the refugees were moving westward to the Limassol district. In early September, the Limassol District Officer estimated that some 1,200 refugees were arriving daily in and around Limassol city. And, because of a lack of adequate shelter and the approaching winter cold, thousands of refugees who had fled to the Troodos mountains from Northwest Cyprus, were heading for greater Nicosia and other populated areas.

The critical problems of the Greek Cypriot refugees are all the classic problems which confront refugees everywhere—the need for shelter, blankets, food, medicine, and other necessities of life. In Cyprus, all are still in short supply, and in some areas many are unavailable. In particular, there was, and remains, a desperate need for blankets. Despite the arrival of thousands of blankets in September, there was clear evidence of the need for more. In the town of Xylophaghos, for example, the school was crowded with refugee families who were forced to sleep on cold, concrete floors. Food supplies were rapidly dwindling, but a Government sponsored food distribution and rationing program was getting underway. Starting with a daily distribution of bread, relief officials were hoping to expand the ration program to include protein foods, milk, and other supplies, *if*—and it was a big “if”—relief supplies from abroad arrived on schedule before government stocks were depleted.

During the Study Mission's visit to the Dhekelia area, the Turkish army undertook what United Nations officials later described as “armed reconnaissance in force” along the ceasefire line above Athna. This type of military action or its threat, which occurred regularly in August and September—and variously described as Turkish “land grabs” or “salami tactics”—produced thousands of new refugees or temporarily displaced persons. Like the thousands before them, they fled for safety out of fear of the Turkish army.

Whether real or imagined—and it is probably real—the fear of what the Turkish military might do is widespread. Whenever and wherever the Study Mission talked with Greek Cypriot refugees, the story was basically the same: People moved the instant they saw or thought the Turkish army was advancing towards their town or village. And they moved *instantly*—dropping everything, taking very little with them, and by foot, car, tractor, truck, bus, or wagon, moved to safety in Government controlled areas. The stories of rough and sometimes brutal treatment of civilians by Turkish forces in Kyrenia, after the first phase of the invasion, had spread over the island like wildfire. Thus, during the second phase of the invasion, Greek Cypriots fled the moment there was rumor or sight of military forces—creating a virtual vacuum into which the Turkish army could and did move without resistance and without the presence of people.

The Study Mission saw direct evidence of this the day it visited the Athna forest, bordering the British Base Area at Dhekelia. Cars and trucks were moving down the road from Athna town, loaded with people and with whatever they could carry—clothes, baskets, mattresses, a few pots and pans—and heading for the safety of the British Base and the shelter of the trees. But conditions were miserable—hot, dusty, no tents, few blankets, no water, little sanitation, and a meager

amount of food distributed by the British. Yet the refugees continued to come that day—by the hundreds.

The night before the fall of Famagusta, some 8,000 refugees came into the forest area, and in the days that followed some 7,000 more arrived. It was, for many, a first stop before moving onward, but over 9,000 refugees were still encamped last month under the trees. Before long, the winter cold and rains will come, and a major question for the refugees is whether tents will arrive in time, or other shelter will be found.

Another category of refugees and persons in duress are the Turkish Cypriots in Government controlled areas—a total of some 34,000. Approximately 10,000 are refugees at Episkopi (on the Akrotiri British Base), where camps have been established under the auspices of the ICRC and the UNHCR. In almost every way, the plight and the needs of these refugees are identical to that of their Greek Cypriot counterparts. In addition, about 24,000 Turkish Cypriots are cut-off or isolated—either by choice or by circumstance—in Turkish villages or in the Turkish quarter of larger towns in the south. These beleaguered villages are under the observation and protection of United Nations Forces in Cyprus, and are also receiving relief assistance under international auspices.

The Study Mission visited one mixed village, Kalokhorio, where the Turkish quarter has not been disturbed—having hoisted a white flag above the mosque as a signal of the lack of hostile intentions. There was no indication of any harm being done to these Turkish Cypriots. However, there can be no question that other Turkish villages are, and do, feel beleaguered and isolated. International observers indicated that physical conditions in these cut-off villages and towns are not as bad as suggested by the Turkish Cypriot administration in Nicosia. As one United Nations official, who has been on the island for many months, stated: “Objectively nothing has changed in these Turkish villages, except the fear that something has changed.” But in the context of the violence and random mass killings that have occurred on the island since the fighting broke out, the apprehension that conditions may change for the worse does not reassure Cypriots huddled in enclaves, on whatever side of the ceasefire line they find themselves at the moment.

The last categories of refugees and persons in need are those in the Turkish occupied areas. These people include some 8,000 Turkish Cypriot refugees, and an estimated 20,000 Greek Cypriots displaced or cutoff. The Turkish Cypriot refugees are those reportedly displaced during the fighting, such as around the old city of Famagusta, and those who have fled from the south to the north. In September, some of these refugees were in schools in the Turkish sector of Nicosia. They appeared to be in good condition, with no overcrowding, and adequate relief assistance from the Turkish Cypriot Red Crescent Society.

However, the refugees the Turks most often mention are not those from the current conflict, but rather those from the 1963 intercommunal violence, when some 25,000 Turkish Cypriots were displaced. One deserted and run down area bordering Nicosia, called Omorphita, remains a symbol of the neglect the Turks feel the Greek Cypriots and others paid to their needs 11 years ago.

The sense of Turkish Cypriot grievance is real and runs deep. As Vice President Denktash told the Study Mission, “the many drops of

Greek injustice to the Turkish minority has, over the years, filled the ocean in which we are all now drowning." And to many officials of the Turkish Cypriot community, the current suffering of the Greek Cypriots, although quantitatively far greater, is in principle the same as that suffered in the past by the Turkish Cypriots. As one official phrased it "the refugee problem is not the numbers involved, it's the principle." And, given what they feel has been world indifference to suffering among Turkish Cypriots, they only grudgingly recognize the current plight of Greek Cypriots and say they do not understand the current international concern over these victims of the Turkish "peace operation" in Cyprus.

The second type of refugee problem in the Turkish occupied areas is that of some 20,000 Greek Cypriots isolated in such places as Kyrenia and Bellapais, and in several villages cutoff in the so-called panhandle area of Karpasia.

In Kyrenia, about 450 Greeks are still being cruelly detained by Turkish authorities in the waterfront Dome Hotel. They had been rounded up from their nearby homes by the Turkish military during the early stages of the invasion, or had fled on their own to the hotel in search of safety.

Bellapais, a small village of some 400 Greek Cypriots and in normal times a favorite tourist spot, has now become a virtual prison for the local population as well as some 450 Greek Cypriot refugees who are also held within the confines of the village. At the peak of the fighting during the first phase of the Turkish invasion, well over 2,000 refugees fled to the sanctuary of this small village. But after the Turkish military occupied the village, cordoning it off, most were forcibly moved across the Green Line in Nicosia. The Turkish army also rounded-up the male population, taking some 150 men to destinations unknown. At the time of the Study Mission's visit, the families of these men still had no word as to their fate—whether they were in prisons or dead.

The situation in Bellapais had improved from the worst days of over-crowding and panic. But although the number of refugees in the village had decreased, the conditions had become more desperate physically as well as psychologically, as the days of uncertainty and confinement press on. Only minimal food was being provided through the Red Cross. And, contrary to the official Turkish line that there are only local people in Bellapais staying in their homes, there were at least 450 refugees cut-off and separated from their families, and told by Turkish authorities that "reunification of families is not sufficient grounds for permission to move."

In the abandoned city of Famagusta, with the old Turkish quarter of the city sealed off by the Turkish army, no life stirs on the empty streets, which were once home for over 40,000 people. The only population left behind are an undetermined number of old people—old men and women, hiding in their homes, some too feeble or ill to move, others afraid to come out in sight of the Turkish army. The Swedish contingent of UNFICYP located in the new city area, has reported sighting a number of old people scavenging for food and supplies in the darkness of night.

In Famagusta, as elsewhere, Turkish authorities said they have attempted to search abandoned areas in order to find elderly Greek Cypriots who have stayed behind. They indicated that whenever these old people were found and were unable to care or provide for them-

selves—as was generally the case—they were then handed over to representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross to be reunited with their families in refugee areas in the Government-controlled zone. While visiting Famagusta, the Study Mission witnessed such a round-up of old people, observing six or seven old men and women, huddled together in the back of a guarded Turkish army truck, with troops at fixed bayonet, hauling a group of old people from their homes—a scene tragically reminiscent of pictures from Germany in 1939.

As noted earlier, the Study Mission was not able to arrange a visit to Karpasia, and United Nations officials have had only very limited access to the area. Reports suggest, however, that the Greeks remaining in Karpasia are in increasingly desperate straits. They are, in fact, prisoners of the Turkish Army. They are confined to their villages or are being detained in churches and other civic buildings. The younger men have been taken away. Food, medicine and other materials are in short supply. And international relief is generally denied by the Turkish authorities.

Until outside observers and relief officials are able to freely deliver relief supplies and to have unrestricted access to refugees in the Turkish occupied areas, the world will not know the full tragedy of Cyprus, nor will international relief agencies be able to provide all the help they can. And until the Turkish policy of isolating inhabitants of Karpasia ends, the world must assume the Turkish authorities have something to hide. This policy contrasts sharply with the free access enjoyed by the United Nations and the Red Cross throughout the Government controlled area in the south.

Finally, there is the humanitarian problem of releasing prisoners of war and civilian detainees—some 6,000 on both sides. Considerable and very encouraging progress has been made in this area, resulting from the recent talks, under U.N. auspices, between President Clerides and Vice-President Denktash. Two prisoner exchanges have been made, and more are promised in the coming weeks.¹

2. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE INVASION

It is exceptionally difficult to quantify the full extent of the damage and destruction caused by the conflict, nor all the ramifications the invasion has had, and will have, on the economy. But, for a state as small as Cyprus, there can be no doubt that it has been catastrophic.

Regarding the extent of physical destruction, the evidence suggests that minimal bomb or structural damage occurred—with the exception of areas in and around the Kyrenia-Nicosia enclave, which was the site of the original Turkish landing and the staging ground for phase two of the invasion. Considerable looting has occurred in many areas. Kyrenia city, for example, has been looted beyond description, and in driving across the island to Famagusta, there is wide-spread evidence of looting of Greek Cypriot villages along the road. In fact, the Study Mission observed two military trucks and a lorry loaded with miscellaneous pieces of furniture heading for some unknown destination down the road from Famagusta.

The new city of Famagusta—the “Miami Beach” area known as Varosha—is the major exception to the problem of looting. As of early

¹ By the end of October, 1974, nearly all of the prisoners of war and detainees on both sides had been released under a series of exchanges at the Ledra Palace Hotel, arranged under the auspices of the United Nations and the ICRC.

September, evident care had been taken by Turkish military commanders to seal this area off from all potential looters. It was relatively untouched. However, it symbolizes what has happened to the economy of Cyprus. This once bustling city, a key element in the island's tourist industry, is now a ghost town. Standing on the empty main street—"John F. Kennedy Blvd."—amid high-rise hotels and apartments and expensive shops, one can see only a few stray dogs and cats, and a lonely contingent of Swedish U.N. troops. The Greek population had fled.

Since the Turkish invasion, the Government of Cyprus estimates that the country is losing some \$4.5 million in economic production every day. The vast citrus industry in the Morphou area rots on the trees. The wheat fields, which should have been planted, lie fallow. Unknown numbers of livestock and cattle are dead because of the lack of food and water. The mines and light industry lie idle. And not a single tourist remains on the island. It will not be too many months before the foreign exchange crisis becomes critical—a fact that has only been delayed temporarily by the action of Greece in providing some direct financial support to the Government of Cyprus.

There can be little doubt today that the damage to the economy of Cyprus will only serve to heighten the plight of the people, and make the life of the refugees all the more precarious. With each passing day the economic situation worsens, as will the condition of the refugees, if something more is not done soon.

3. POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE INVASION

There can be little doubt today that the Turkish invasion succeeded in altering the political situation on Cyprus. Indeed, it is generally accepted that the invasion has destroyed the constitutional framework and political structure of the Government of Cyprus, as it was established in 1960, and there can be no turning back the clock. The future of Cyprus will be a future governed by a new and different governmental and political structure. The precise form of this new structure will be a primary focus of negotiations in the days and weeks ahead. There are currently a number of options and arrangements being discussed in Nicosia, Athens, Ankara, and other capitals.

Most frequently mentioned, particularly in Ankara and Washington, is some form of Federal system involving territorial separation of the two communities on the island—of geographic separation between Turkish and Greek Cypriots, in order to create a Turkish majority area on Cyprus. By whatever name it is called, this is tantamount to partition, and it will mean traumatic shifts in the current economic and population patterns of the island.

To an outside observer, it may seem possible, even easy, to work out some new "bi-regional", "zonal", or "federal" arrangement on Cyprus. It may seem today only a question of where the line should be drawn. But the central question is whether any Greek Cypriot government can be found that would accept a settlement imposed by the force of arms, and predicated on the non-return of two out of five of the Greek Cypriot refugees. If that kind of "solution" is forced upon the Greek Cypriots, there can be little question that they will resist it, perhaps with violence and guerrilla war—with all that that implies for the future peace and stability of the Eastern Mediterranean. The very likely outcome, then, would probably be *de facto* partition in its

extreme form—in effect, double enosis. With a political, or at the very minimum, administrative and economic union of the two separate parts of Cyprus with Greece and Turkey, Cyprus would cease to exist.

Turkey insists that this is not the outcome it seeks, even as the Greek Cypriots insist that it is an outcome they cannot accept. In the middle lies a solution. Where that is today, much less tomorrow, is for all parties to negotiate.

The Greek Cypriot position, supported by Greece, is that before negotiations can resume, there must be some gesture, on Turkey's part, to accommodate Greek Cypriot demands to have a substantial number of refugees return home. Greek Cypriot spokesmen have indicated privately and publicly that the Government of Cyprus will be flexible in negotiations—that it is prepared to accept new constitutional arrangements, including perhaps some form of "cantonal" system granting Turkish Cypriots full communal security and autonomy. But Greek Cypriots insist that progress must be made at the very outset on the return of refugees to their homes.

The Turkish Cypriot position, as well as Ankara's, emphasizes that speedy progress on a political solution involving biregionalism would enable both sides to address the refugee problem on a permanent basis. Their spokesmen emphasize the past failures and long-standing grievances of the Turkish Cypriots, and speak of new realities on Cyprus. They stress that Turkey does not seek partition, either political or economic, and that they wish to preserve the independence of the island. Precisely how these contrary objectives can be accommodated is the large unanswered question.


4. IMPACT OF PARTITION

Whatever name or label is used to describe partition in Cyprus—whether it is called "bi-regionalism," "geographic federalism," "consolidated cantonments," or "double enosis"—the reality of any partition on an island the size of Cyprus is that there will inevitably be serious human and economic consequences.

The partition line most frequently envisaged in discussions on Cyprus, particularly within the Turkish community, relates to the so-called "Attila line." This line was first proposed by the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber in 1964, and was raised again this past July by Turkey during the Geneva talks. As the accompanying map indicates, the Attila line runs from Kokkino in the northwest, via Xerarkaka, south of Lefka, Akaki, through Nicosia, east through Angastina and Prestio, to Famagusta. The area north of this line is approximately 1,170 square miles, comprising roughly one-third of the territory of Cyprus. Currently, the Turkish Army occupies land considerably beyond the Attila line.

But no matter where a line is finally drawn, any artificial division of the island will bring immense economic problems as well as massive population dislocation—the general character of which can only be imagined after an analysis of important economic and population factors. The following information was obtained from official sources in the field, and serves to document some of the population and economic factors related to partition in Cyprus.

THE ATTLA LINE PROPOSED BY TURKEY



--- Approximate Demarcation

a. *Impact of Partition on Population Patterns*

Drastic changes in the population patterns of Cyprus would come with partition—changes every bit as serious and disruptive as those which have already come with the Turkish military invasion, which has, in effect, turned the island upside down. Most severely affected, of course, is the Greek Cypriot community, which comprises some 78% of the population.

A partition along the Attila line, which would require a significant segregation of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots into separate areas—and which seeks to assure a Turkish majority in their area—would mean moving nearly half the total population and resettling them elsewhere on a permanent basis. Based on 1972 population estimates, this would amount to moving some 51,800 Turks (44.6% of the total Turkish Cypriot population) from scattered areas around the island into the northern zone. In turn, this would require moving out of that northern area at least 147,500 Greek Cypriots (or some 29.3% of the total Greek Cypriot population), who, until the invasion, lived there.

Official estimates indicate that such a shift could involve as many as 40,000 families, and it would significantly alter the population density in each of the two ethnic areas.

According to Cyprus Government estimates, this would reduce the density of population in Turkish areas by half—from 185 to only 76.9 persons per square mile. Yet, at the same time, it would force the population density in the Greek area to jump from 181 to 202.6 persons per square mile. The following table, based on official estimates from the last detailed census in 1960, provides a population profile of Cyprus.

Table 2.—Population profile of Cyprus

Total population :	1972
Greek (78%) -----	503, 100
Turkish (18%) -----	116, 100
Armenians, Maronites, others (4%) -----	25, 800
Total (100%) -----	<u>645, 000</u>
Average population density per sq. mile -----	181
Population of area north of the Attila lines :	
Greek (67.7%) -----	147, 500
Turkish (29.5%) -----	64, 300
Others (2.8%) -----	6, 000
Total (100%) -----	<u>217, 800</u>
<i>Population of important urban centers in the northern area</i>	
Morphou (120 Turks, 7,360 Greeks) -----	7, 480
Kyrenia (1,383 Turks, 2,800 Greeks) -----	4, 183
Lefka (Turks, no Greeks) -----	5, 400
Famagusta (6,900 Turks, 27,700 Greeks, 4,800 others) -----	39, 400
Nicosia :	
Turkish sector -----	27, 400
Greek sector (Greeks) -----	72, 600
Others -----	10, 500
Total -----	<u>110, 500</u>

In short, if partition in Cyprus is to mean significant segregation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and if it also means the Turks are to have a majority in their area, as Turkey now seems to demand, it would require a drastic rearrangement of existing population patterns—rearrangement that cannot help but be painful, and probably inequitable, to the Greek Cypriots. An example is the city of Morphou, which falls above the Attila line, and which seems clearly within the Turkish area from the Turkish point of view. If Morphou were made to become a Turkish majority area, well over half of 95% of the city's current population would have to leave their homes. In Kyrenia, 30% to 60% of the population would have to leave and be replaced by Turks.

The impact upon land ownership would be no less severe, and would obviously be a major stumbling block in any partition plan. It would require compensation for Greek privately owned land in the northern areas of Cyprus, as well as extensive land exchange programs between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Because the Greeks own more land in the north than the Turkish Cypriots do in the south, land exchange would obviously be complicated no matter whose statistics one uses on current land ownership. The Government of Cyprus claims the 1960 Census shows some 20.4% of the total agricultural land in Turkish hands, while the Turkish Communal Chamber says arable Turkish land is 30%.

The discrepancy may not seem great in terms of total land tenure, but when the critical differences of land location, its level of development, and its crop, are added to land distribution patterns, exchanging land on an equitable basis would be difficult, if not impossible—regardless of what the actual total of land may be respective to the two communities.

b. Impact of Partition on the Economy

Being a relatively small island, the economy of Cyprus is necessarily homogeneous and, even as it has prospered and grown remarkably over the past decade, it remains a fragile and developing economic system. Partition of this totally integrated economy would have disastrous consequences, and to partition it in an equitable fashion would try the wisdom of Solomon—because it works, prospers, and grows only as a whole.

If the Attila line forms the basis of partition, it would include many of the principal foreign exchange earning portions of the economy on the Turkish side. It would include the copper mining region in the Morphou Bay area, the whole of the highly-developed agricultural Morphou plain (including the mostly Greek citrus industry), all of the perennial springs in the Kyrenia mountain range, most of the irrigated plain of the eastern Mesaoria, large areas of citrus groves in the Serrakhis river valley, large forest areas in the Kyrenia region (although two thirds were burned during the invasion), many of the best tourist resorts, and portions of Famagusta, including the largest port facilities on the island.

In comparison, the Greek controlled area, although retaining a sizeable portion of the fertile Mesaorian plain, would contain a high proportion of uncultivable mountainous and forested terrain (the Troodos Mountain area), and undeveloped land.

Agriculture.—Because Cyprus is basically an agricultural country, with approximately 47% of the land cultivated and well over half of the population engaged in some form of agriculture, partition would inevitably have a severe impact upon its agricultural sector.

For example, the fertile Mesaorian plain, the breadbasket of Cyprus, contains the bulk of the island's cultivable lands. Its principal crops are wheat, barley, vegetables, and citrus fruits. Extensive irrigation in the area is required during the summer dry season, and this has been developed over the past decade. If this plain is partitioned along the Attila line, it would place within Turkish control some 37% of all croplands, and provide the Turkish Cypriot community with more than half of the valuable irrigated crop land, and over half of the wheat cultivated areas—to feed less than a quarter of the island's population.

The Morphou plain would also fall in the Turkish area, and as a result Turkish Cypriots would control two thirds of the best citrus growing region of Cyprus. These include the orange and grapefruit groves in the Famagusta and Morphou areas, and the lemon orchards near Karavas and Lapithos in Kyrenia. Citrus fruits represent the most important export of the island, valued at some \$17.3 million in 1970 according to Cyprus Government statistics.

Turkish controlled areas would also have the second best potato growing region of Cyprus, along the Nicosia-Morphou road, as well as approximately half of the carob and olive producing areas. The value of potato exports, mostly to England, was almost \$16 million in 1970.

A breakdown of what partition of the Mesaoria plain would do to cultivation of cropland, is outlined in Table 3, based upon data from a 1956 British land utilization map and from a 1967 Government of Cyprus directory on Commerce.

TABLE 3.—PARTITION OF MESAORIA

Overall crop lands	Irrigated crop lands	Area under barley cultivation	Area under wheat cultivation
Area of 456 square miles (37.7 percent) Turkish control.	184 square miles (50.3 percent).	57,812 acres (45 percent)...	43,045 acres (62 percent).
Area of 692 square miles (57.5 percent) Greek control.	168 square miles (46 percent).	56,527 (44 percent).....	23,049 acres (33.2 percent).
United Kingdom sovereign base of 56 square miles (4.8 percent) territory Dhekelia.	14 square miles (3.7 percent).	14,131 (11 percent).....	3,332 acres (4.8 percent).
Total 1,204 square miles (100 percent).	366 square miles (100 percent).	128,470 acres (100 percent).	69,426 acres (100 percent).

Tourism.—In recent years, tourism has grown as a significant foreign exchange earner for Cyprus, and it has almost been exclusively Greek Cypriot investments and management that have made it possible. Partition of the island, especially if Famagusta is divided differently than it is now, would also cut the tourism business in half.

The Greek controlled areas would retain many of the tourist and ski attractions in the western part of the island and in the Troodos mountains. But the tourist trade concentrated in the Kyrenia and northern coastal resorts would fall into Turkish hands. Loss of

Kyrenia would be especially hard for Greek Cypriots, largely because of its flourishing, Greek-owned hotel business. In 1970, Kyrenia and Famagusta (now both in the Turkish occupied area), and Nicosia, together accounted for 82% of the tourist accommodations and are clearly the most significant aspects of the foreign exchange earnings of tourism.

Forestry.—Although the timber resources of Cyprus provide less than 30% of its timber requirements, the forests represent a key resource in the island's economy. Partition would mean that the northern area, which contains some 197 square miles of timber, or about 29% of all state and privately owned forest land, would be in Turkish hands. Roughly one-third of the island's timber output would be reserved for less than a quarter of the population.

Mining.—The Turkish occupation of the Morphou Bay area brings within its control the U.S.-owned Cyprus Mines Corporation, the island's largest copper producing company and another significant foreign exchange earner. According to information in Nicosia, this copper mine's output in 1970 totalled some 18,000 metric tons, a substantial drop from the peak years of the 1960's, and it would, officials say, decline further unless there are new investments of capital equipment. All other mining areas would remain in Greek held territory.

Industry.—Officials indicate that this branch of the economy would be least affected by partition, largely because there is little heavy industry on the island aside from the mines. Light industry is largely concentrated around Nicosia, and the southern port cities, and remain in Greek controlled areas. The significant winery industry, almost wholly Greek-owned, is in the Limassol areas and would be in Greek areas under a partition plan.

5. THE HAZARDS OF ECONOMIC PARTITION

Over the past decade, the economy of Cyprus has grown at a remarkable rate, and it has become one of the most dependable members of the International Monetary Fund, and one of the highest rated recipients of United Nations Development Program funds. Indeed, Cyprus has prospered and has developed economically at a far better rate than its neighbors, including Turkey and even Greece. It has one of the highest per capita incomes in the Eastern Mediterranean—nearly three times that of Turkey.

However, this prosperity and economic performance has been based upon the integrated economy of the whole island. What political partition would mean in economic terms is anyone's guess—even if the intention is not, as Turkey says it is not, to divide the island's economy. But how a political partition line can be drawn without also dividing or disrupting the economy of the island, is clearly one of the most troubling questions confronting negotiations over the fate of Cyprus.

The results of the Turkish invasion have already, in less than three months, wrecked havoc with the economy of Cyprus. As already noted, the losses from physical damage and dislocation, caused by the military activity since July, have already run into the millions. But as serious as the economic effects of Turkish occupation have been to

date, consequences of partition may be even more damaging. Every indicator suggests that Cyprus could not easily recover economically from a permanent political partition—certainly not in the near future, and perhaps not for many years to come.

6. COSTS OF THE INVASION TO TURKEY

Whatever sense of national fulfillment and political triumph Turkey may feel over its action on Cyprus, it clearly has come at considerable cost. According to the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, the invasion and occupation of Cyprus adds heavily to the already substantial problems of Turkey—of a 35% inflation rate, an unofficial unemployment rate of 20%, and a potential reduction of foreign exchange earnings from remittances of a declining number of Turkish migrant workers in Western Europe. Now the costs of the Cyprus occupation are added, which, according to official estimates in the field, will total some \$1 billion by the end of this year.

Nearly 10% of Turkey's military force is now stationed on Cyprus, and there have been heavy logistical and support requirements. Civilian "technicians" and others have also gone to the island. Moreover, there were considerable losses during the invasion. According to responsible military sources in the field, the performance of Turkey's armed forces during the first phase of the invasion was very poor. Although Turkey apparently employed a basic plan its general staff had drafted and perfected over a period of several years, military observers say there was poor operational planning, inadequate communications, and a near total failure of joint operations among Turkish air, sea, and ground forces.

As a result, through tactical errors Turkey lost an estimated 15 aircraft during the invasion. It sank one of its own destroyers. Casualties were considered light, but included some 300 men killed and another 500 wounded. Had there been any substantial Greek Cypriot forces and tanks in the northern part of the island, casualties undoubtedly would have been considerably higher. One military observer suggested, for example, that because the Turkish airborne assault came at too high an altitude, a better organized and equipped Greek Cypriot army could have easily eliminated an entire Turkish airborne regiment swinging helplessly in the air.

Currently stationed on the island are some 40,000 mainforce Turkish troops, with more than 200 tanks. There are some naval vessels around the island, but the presence of aircraft is limited until airstrips can be improved and extended.

Recent field reports suggest that Turkey is digging in to stay on Cyprus. Unconfirmed reports indicate that the Turkish army has already erected barriers along the ceasefire line, and has established extensive fortifications across the island. And as a "Berlin wall" divides Cyprus, Turkish currency, laborers, equipment and goods pour in from the mainland to fill the vacuum created by the isolation of the north from the island's economy.

HUMANITARIAN NEEDS AND INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

Within days after the first phase of the Turkish invasion, when some 40,000 Greek Cypriots had fled the Kyrenia area, it was apparent that a serious refugee problem was developing on Cyprus. Both the Government of Cyprus, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and UNFICYP responded in mid-July. Subsequently, in August, the UNHCR assumed principal responsibility for the international relief effort.

Massive humanitarian relief needs were created by the advance of the Turkish army, particularly after the second phase in August. Within a month, some 40% of the Greek Cypriot population was rendered homeless, fleeing into government controlled areas of the south. Their need for shelter, food, medicine, blankets, and other supplies, were immediate and serious. As refugees moved from one area to another in search of shelter, the Government of Cyprus attempted to marshall the stocks of food, tents and blankets on the island. But supplies were clearly inadequate.

The relief requirements for some 160,000 Greek Cypriot refugees who are unable to move-in with relatives or find accommodation with their own resources, have been listed down by the Cyprus Government in the following quantities: 30,000 tents to accommodate five persons each, also 100 large tents for camp sites; 320,000 blankets, counting two blankets for each refugee, particularly children; 156,000 camp-beds; 33,000 heating sets for winter; 320 mobile kitchens; and continuing outside food supplies.

The office of "Special Services for the Relief and Rehabilitation of Displaced Persons" in Nicosia has estimated that to establish refugee camp sites for all those who are now in need of shelter will cost over \$22 million. The Government of Cyprus is currently planning for between 70 to 90 such camp sites, accommodating between 1,000 and 4,000 people each. The UNHCR has urged the government to avoid establishing large refugee camps, and to place all sites around existing communities.

The leveling of ground, provision of water, sanitary and medical facilities, and the erection of tents and support facilities, are now well underway. The Government of Cyprus has pledged to provide shelter for all refugees by the middle of October, and to have all schools reopened which have until now been occupied by refugees. The speed and thoroughness of the government's response to the refugee crisis is evidence of its capacity to undertake relief programs and to absorb outside relief assistance. The government has the talent, the energy, the infrastructure, and most of all, the concern, to carry forth a meaningful and significant relief effort—if they are given the tools and the resources to help them help themselves.

1. INTERNATIONAL RELIEF ASSISTANCE

Although there was a commendable and early response from many nations to the plight of Cyprus—particularly from Greece, the European Economic Community, and the United States—the appeals of both the ICRC and the UNHCR have not been fully met to date. In fact, the UNHCR's appeal for some \$22,000,000 through the end of this year has only met with token response from the United States and the world community, and the initial enthusiasm and support for Cyprus relief now threatens to dry up.

Bi-lateral aid from Greece has been substantial, and by far the largest contribution to Cyprus. In addition to providing some \$17.7 million per month in budget support to the Government of Cyprus, Greece has also contributed well over \$5 million in relief supplies, principally tents, clothes, blankets and food.

Although the United States has so far pledged no budgetary support to the Cyprus Government, it has made some relief contributions. As of October 1st, the United States had allocated or pledged, in cash and kind, close to \$6,000,000—mainly through the ICRC and UNHCR. U.S. assistance to date breaks down as follows:

TABLE 4.—U.S. Government assistance to date (as of Oct. 10, 1974)

Ambassador's fund.....	\$25,000
Grant to ICRC.....	725,000
Grant to UNHCR.....	¹ 1,000,000
Blankets (64,570 wool and cotton).....	264,814
Tents, family—5,600 each.....	690,890
Tents, general purpose large, 100 each.....	102,300
Cots, folding—9,998 each.....	101,625
Body bags—200 each.....	4,120
Red Cross markers—79 each.....	4,090
Water cans—10,000 each.....	10,500
Tent repair kits.....	218
Water trailers—4 each.....	8,000
Tent flies—5,600 each.....	¹ 400,000
TDY expertise, FDR coordinator and staff.....	5,515
Estimated air transport commodities.....	1,282,043
U.S. Government total.....	<u>4,624,115</u>

¹ Obligations of \$1.4 million against \$3 million UNHCR pledge.

2. ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN CYPRUS

For over ten years, the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force on Cyprus (UNFICYP) has helped to reduce communal tensions and prevent the spread of violence by interposing itself between the two Cypriot communities. The direct costs to the U.N. of keeping UNFICYP on the island have totaled some \$350 million since 1964.

The effectiveness of UNFICYP's role on Cyprus was shattered with the invasion of the Turkish Army. The mandate of UNFICYP under these conditions made it a "peace-keeping force" in name only. As it watched the Turkish army move across Cyprus, UNFICYP became more of a "peace observing force," watching the breakdown of peace, with no power to maintain it, much less to enforce it. This is stated

neither to denigrate the important role of the United Nations in the past, nor to underestimate its potential contribution in the future. Rather, it is to indicate the severe limitations under which UNFICYP now labors, and the critical need to revise and expand the scope of its mandate.

Today, as before the Turkish invasion, UNFICYP's operations are primarily based around a framework of static posts, which have been established wherever possible, but particularly in sensitive places. These static posts are supplemented by frequent mobile patrols, of regular military units or U.N. Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL). Since the invasion, UNFICYP has had relatively free and unrestricted access only to districts outside of the Turkish occupied areas.

According to UNFICYP officials, their main activity under current conditions is an effort to generate a feeling of confidence and to obtain information concerning the local situation—particularly in areas where humanitarian and relief measures, including the security of population, are required. A special problem exists in Nicosia, where military confrontation continues to exist along the so-called "Green Line" separating the Greek and Turkish quarters. UNFICYP is endeavoring to interpose itself along the line to prevent violence. There are several UNFICYP posts along the line and active patrolling between them. Still, violence has erupted, and numerous fires have been started in buildings along the line on the Greek side—fires reportedly set by the Turks.

Within the Turkish occupied area, UNFICYP activities are very limited. UNFICYP provides trucks for the delivery of food and other supplies to Kyrenia, Bellapais and some other areas. But, in the main, UNFICYP is restricted to the few static posts it was able to hold through the invasion—such as the Swedish post in the abandoned city of Famagusta. There is little, if any, freedom of movement.

As noted above, in the Government controlled areas, UNFICYP has relatively free access, and is making special efforts, in cooperation with the Government, to provide care and protection to the Turkish Cypriot population. The complete resources of UNFICYP, including logistic support, are made available to the ICRC and UNHCR through a special humanitarian/economics office established at UNFICYP headquarters on July 22.

The humanitarian efforts of UNFICYP cover the following items:

1. Information gathering to spot areas of humanitarian need;
2. The transport of supplies, principally to Turkish Cypriot villages cut-off in Government controlled areas;
3. The provision of warehouse and logistic assistance to the Red Cross, UNHCR, and the Government of Cyprus;
4. Medical care and medivac, particularly in Turkish Cypriot areas;
5. UNICIVPOL assistance to investigate alleged atrocities and to support ICRC efforts in tracing the missing;
6. Assisting in the restoration of water and electricity across communal zones; and,
7. Agricultural support efforts, including the provision of food and water to abandoned livestock and other animals.

The current strength and composition of UNFICYP, nearly doubled in response to an urgent request by Secretary-General Waldheim in August, stands as follows:

Austria -----	300
Canada -----	950
Denmark -----	432
Finland -----	626
Ireland -----	4
Sweden -----	575
United Kingdom -----	1,391
Hospital unit (Austria) -----	14
Total UNFICYP personnel -----	4,292

In addition, UNCIVPOL personnel is being increased from 153 to 200. The U.S. has also doubled its contributions to UNFICYP operations.

3. ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS

On July 19, shortly after the coup against President Makarios, and before the Turkish invasion, the ICRC sent two delegates to Cyprus. Within three days, as conditions deteriorated, 14 additional ICRC delegates, including three doctors, arrived in Nicosia. Some 3.5 tons of medicaments, including blood plasma and other emergency supplies, were air lifted to the island. This early and swift response by the ICRC to the crisis developing in Cyprus was the first alert the international community had as to the scope and dimension of humanitarian needs.

Within a week, the ICRC, in close cooperation with the local Cypriot Red Cross, had established a full scale relief operation in addition to their normal responsibilities during conflict. Some forty ICRC delegates are now stationed on the island, and the ICRC role is in transition from general relief operations to its more traditional mandate under the Geneva Conventions. This mandate includes tracing missing persons, inspection of civilian detainee and prisoner of war facilities, and similar responsibilities. Relief operations are being absorbed by UNHCR.

Throughout the crisis on Cyprus, the leadership and activities of the of the ICRC have been crucial. The ICRC assumed, without hesitation, relief responsibilities when no other organizations were available to help, and their presence and contributions on Cyprus continue as important links in the international effort to help meet the humanitarian needs of Cyprus.

4. ROLE OF U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES

Since August 20th, and following an appeal by the Cyprus government, the UNHCR has been the focal point for international humanitarian assistance on Cyprus. The UNHCR, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan visited Cyprus in late August, and has established a field office in Nicosia, headed by Mr. John Kelley.

Initially, the UNHCR concentrated on supplementing the emergency relief efforts already underway by the ICRC, in cooperation with the local authorities. Concurrently, however, the UNHCR also

initiated, with the Cyprus government, the necessary planning for longer term relief and rehabilitation efforts. On August 30, the UNHCR issued an international appeal for contributions to an emergency relief fund of \$9,000,000. Several days later the amount was increased to \$22,000,000 to cover anticipated relief needs through the end of this year. As of October 3rd, the total amount received, in cash and kind, has only been \$6,800,000—less than a third of the total need.

The UNHCR has representatives in both the Turkish occupied zone and the Government controlled areas. UNHCR has complete and free access in Government controlled areas, and effective mechanisms for coordination has been established in Nicosia with Government relief officials. However, in Turkish occupied areas, the UNHCR, like other international agencies, has been unable to travel freely. It was not until late September, for example, that the UNHCR representative was permitted to travel to Karpasia and other areas of serious need in the occupied territories. Moreover, relief convoys are severely limited in their efforts to reach people in need.

5. ROLE OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN MIGRATION (ICEM)

The primary purpose of ICEM is the movement of refugees and migrants, mainly in Europe, to resettlement areas elsewhere. In recent years, however, ICEM has also assumed important responsibilities in arranging air charters and sea movements, of both people and materials, for the U.N. and its specialized agencies. In this connection, ICEM is currently supporting UNHCR efforts on Cyprus, by arranging for the transportation of thousands of tons of blankets, tents and relief supplies for the refugees and others in need on the island.

NOTES ON UNITED STATES POLICY

In his August 8th statement on the Senate floor, the Chairman made these comments:

"I fully appreciate the immense difficulties in the Cyprus issue. It is a complex matter for diplomats and humanitarians alike. But should not our Government give more evidence of concern? What are American policy objectives? What is the substance of our activities? What have we done to help meet humanitarian needs among the Cypriot civilians who are refugees or detainees on either side?"

"The American people and their representatives in Congress deserve some answers, and should not be in the dark over United States policy toward Cyprus. I am extremely hopeful, that the administration will finally give some additional evidence of a very active concern over the needed efforts to bring peace and relief to the people of Cyprus."

These comments by the Chairman in the early stages of the Cyprus crisis were prompted by the virtual silence at the highest levels of our government over developments on the island. Apart from some rather routine statements at the United Nations, and some occasional comment by "sources" or spokesmen in the Department of State, American officials said very little about Cyprus—or at least about the substance of American policy.

Although flatly denied in all quarters of the Administration, to many observers there has been a perceptible "tilt" toward Turkey in the American approach to Cyprus—especially following the demise of the short lived Sampson regime in Nicosia. But, as suggested elsewhere in this report, given the variety and rapidity of developments in Cyprus and related events, United States policy in these early days seems to have been one of hasty improvisation, coldly calculated to minimize disturbances within NATO, more than anything else. This has not only achieved the opposite result in the end, but more importantly in human terms, it has failed the defenseless people of Cyprus—and, for many observers, has confirmed a Turkish "tilt" in United States policy toward Cyprus.

After a month of virtual silence at the highest levels of our government, on August 19, immediately following the senseless death of Ambassador Davies in Nicosia, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger held a news conference and finally made a public statement in behalf of the President over American policy toward Cyprus. The statement,¹ in part, reads as follows:

President Ford has asked me to make the following statement on behalf of the United States:

First, the United States shall insist on the strict maintenance of the cease-fire on Cyprus.

¹ For the complete text of this statement, as well as other official United States statements on Cyprus, see Appendix IV.

Second, the imperative and urgent need is to begin negotiations.

Third, we will continue to support efforts to bring the parties to the negotiating table.

Fourth, the United States will play any role requested by the parties. We are also prepared to support the able efforts of the British Foreign Secretary, (James) Callaghan, in this regard.

Fifth, in these negotiations, we believe it will be necessary for Turkey, as the stronger power on the ground, to display flexibility and a concern for Greek sensitivities, both in terms of territory and the size of military forces on the island. I have made this point directly this morning to the Prime Minister of Turkey. I have been assured that the Turkish Government considers the demarcation line negotiable and that it will carry out the provisions of the Geneva agreement calling for phased reductions of troops on Cyprus.

Sixth, the United States greatly values the traditional friendship of Greece. It has the highest regard for Prime Minister Karamanlis and wishes every success to his democratic government. We will use our influence in any negotiation to take into full account Greek honor and national dignity. At the same time, we assume that all of our allies, including Greece, join in collective defense in their own interests. We are willing to strengthen these common alliance ties and to help the Greek Government in any way possible. We will not be pressured by threat of withdrawal from the (NATO) alliance, or anti-American demonstrations, which in any event are totally unjustified by our record.

I repeat that this statement has been gone over by President Ford.

On its face, the Secretary's statement was well-rounded in generally defining the immediate issues and possible American contributions toward a resolution of the Cyprus crisis. Notably missing, however, was, among other things, any acknowledgement that the territorial integrity and independence of Cyprus had been violated, and any evidence of regret or concern over the Turkish invasion of the island, the continuing and blatant "salami tactics" of the Turkish occupation army, or the important fact that nearly half of the island's people were becoming refugees or virtual hostages as a result of advancing Turkish forces.

These are significant omissions in the Secretary's statement. And, when combined with other statements by Administration spokesmen—including those in hearings before the Refugee Subcommittee—the Study Mission's findings in the field and the Administration's general record on Cyprus, an American "tilt" toward Turkey seems to characterize American policy towards Cyprus.

Nothing dramatizes this more, perhaps, than the simple fact that the Study Mission was told again and again, by Turkish spokesmen in the field and in Washington, that they felt that United States policy toward Cyprus was "right", "equitable", "fair", and "good". Needless to say, the same kinds of feelings were not expressed in Athens or in the Government controlled areas of Cyprus.

What is some of the substance in the American "tilt" toward Turkey? It is readily seen in the omissions of our diplomacy, in our apparent acquiescence in the Turkish invasion, in our tacit recognition of a Turkish *fait accompli* through the force of arms, in our clear association with the fundamentals of the Turkish negotiating position, and in our cynical use of humanitarian aid for Greek Cypriot refugees to support our political and diplomatic ends.

Some omissions in our diplomacy have been referred to elsewhere in this report, and they have been widely discussed in the press and elsewhere. Suffice it to say that a listing of missed opportunities can be dismissed as hindsight, and it is conceivable that nothing beyond what we did would have worked. But, America's public silence, and private timidity and vacillation, in the early stages of the crisis—beginning with the overthrow of President Makarios—add up to a failure of diplomacy. If nothing else, a better record of our efforts to help maintain the peace, would at least counter the widespread feeling today that the United States was unconcerned over the issues of national independence and human suffering in a small, non-aligned country.

The United States has never fully acknowledged that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of an independent government and state has been violated through the invasion and occupation of the island by foreign troops. This seems to be of little concern to American policy makers. In the field, for example, the Study Mission was told by our diplomats that the United States was well aware of Turkish plans, but, in contrast to American actions in previous and similar crises on the island, we really did nothing effective to stop phase one of the invasion, and, very little, if anything, to discourage phase two.

Apart from the omissions in Secretary Kissinger's statement on August 19, other public indicators support this general conclusion. For example, as noted earlier in this report, on August 13, State Department spokesman Robert Anderson issued a statement which not only stressed equities in the Turkish position and American concurrence in some general Turkish objectives, but which also gave tacit approval to some of the reasoning given by Turkish authorities to justify their "peace operation" on Cyprus. And, during an August 18 interview over CBS, Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger expressed little concern over the reality of 40,000 Turkish occupation troops on Cyprus, but he did say that "we've understood the desire of the Turks to protect the minority Turkish problem, but the Turkish moves at this point have gone beyond what any of its friends or sympathizers would have accepted. . . ." Secretary Hartman, in commenting on the Cyprus issue and the Schlesinger statement, spoke in a somewhat similar vein before the Refugee Subcommittee.

In this regard also, the legitimate Government of Cyprus is given little standing in public statements by American officials—apparently because, as part of what some of our diplomats call the "new realities," we conveniently ignore the presence of an occupation army and for all intents and purposes accept a *de facto* form of partition on the island as a result of the Turkish invasion. And so, like the Turkish Cypriot and mainland leadership, American officials seem to all but accept the demise of a legitimate Cyprus government, and prefer to speak of separate and equal administrations on the island. A good

example of this is Secretary Hartman's comment to the Subcommittee on August 20. In referring to "the two communities on Cyprus", he said: "It really is quite a divided country now. There is no single administration, and there really has not been for some time. Mr. Clerides heads up the Greek Cypriot administration and Mr. Denktash heads up the Turkish administration." The omission of references to the legitimate Government of Cyprus is a small item, perhaps, but one which carries some importance when put in the total context of American statements on developments in Cyprus, beginning with the Sampson coup, and in the overall perspective of recent American policy toward the island.

Given the omissions in our country's diplomacy, and our apparent acquiescence in the Turkish invasion, it is inevitable, perhaps, that the United States would give its tacit recognition to Turkey's *fait accompli* on Cyprus, and clearly associate itself with the fundamentals of the Turkish negotiating position—a bi-regional settlement, or geographical separation of the Greek and Turkish communities. This conclusion—based on what some American diplomats call the "new realities"—was fully confirmed in the Study Mission's conversations in the field, as well as in conversations in Washington and in Secretary Hartman's testimony before the Refugee Subcommittee on August 20 and September 26. Also, this is clearly implied in Secretary Kissinger's August 19 statement on American policy towards Cyprus. The Secretary states that, in negotiations, "we believe it will be necessary for Turkey . . . to display flexibility . . . both in terms of territory and the size of military forces on the island. . . . I have been assured that *the Turkish Government considers the demarcation line negotiable . . .* [italics added]." In short, the United States agrees that there should be some "demarcation line" across Cyprus—in effect some form of partition, which was a stated objective of the Turkish invasion—and we are publicly committed to this objective in our diplomacy over the future of the island.

In responding to a reporter's question over American initiatives toward Cyprus, the Secretary also said on August 19: "We have not yet made any specific proposal as to a particular solution, but you will see in the statement that I have just read our view as to *the direction in which the negotiations should go* [italics added]."

And this raises the issue of American policy towards the refugees and humanitarian needs on Cyprus. There can be no doubt that the 200,000 Greek Cypriot refugees—about a third of the island's population—want to return to homes they fled in the Turkish occupied areas. And the return of refugees is a key element in the negotiating position of the Cypriot and Greek governments—in terms of both a resumption of negotiations and a final settlement over the future of Cyprus. Regarding a resumption of negotiations, most Cypriot and Greek leaders are looking first for a "gesture of goodwill" from Turkey, which would involve the orderly withdrawal of Turkish troops from some areas and the return of refugees to their homes.

The record of American policy on the refugee issue is not only a said commentary on the callous nature of American policy towards the vast human tragedy in Cyprus, but it also helps to define our bias toward Turkey, and it confirms once again that the lives of people

caught in the crunch of disaster and war are not very important in our efforts to build a structure of peace—even when people problems are immediately central to resolving the issue at stake. Secretary Kissinger's policy statement of August 19, for example, is silent on the refugee issue. So are the President's two messages to Congress vetoing legislation to bar further military assistance to Turkey. Secretary Kissinger's September 23 statement to the United Nations General Assembly does refer to "the conditions under which refugees can return to their homes and reside in safety"; but, in testimony before the Refugee Subcommittee on September 26, Secretary Hartman, in response to the Chairman's question, seems to define more fully the Administration's position and policy bias toward Turkey.

Although Secretary Hartman suggested that "the refugee question will be one of the most important issues [in negotiations over a settlement of the Cyprus dispute]", he did not tie the issue to the Administration's efforts to find "common ground" between Greece and Turkey for a resumption of negotiations or to any gesture of goodwill Turkey could make "as an aid to the negotiating process." In fact, Secretary Hartman, while conceding that "the refugee question will be one of the most important issues [in negotiations]", seems to follow the basic Turkish position, that any return of refugees would be an end result of negotiations and part of the final settlement over the future of Cyprus. The hearing record, in part, reads as follows:

SENATOR KENNEDY. Is it our position that there is going to have to be a withdrawal of all foreign troops?

MR. HARTMAN. Well, let me state what the last agreed position of the parties was.

On July 30th they agreed to a declaration in Geneva calling for the phased withdrawal of forces. . . .

SENATOR KENNEDY. Well, should not—

MR. HARTMAN. They both agree there should be a phased withdrawal of forces. Clearly, 40,000 Turkish troops on the island is not—

SENATOR KENNEDY. Should there not at least be some gesture on the part of the Turks?

MR. HARTMAN. As an aid to the negotiating process?

SENATOR KENNEDY. That is right.

MR. HARTMAN. Yes, and I think, as a matter of fact, that gesture might be more difficult if they thought they were being called upon to do that under pressure. I think their reaction would be to decline to make a gesture of reduction, to perhaps reconsider that now, so that it does not look as if they are doing it under pressure.

SENATOR KENNEDY. Are not the Greeks under a lot of pressure, too? What about the pressure on all of those refugees? People cannot go home. That is pressure on them.

MR. HARTMAN. That is right.

SENATOR KENNEDY. They are being pressured, too—I imagine every day they are denied the right to go home or see their friends. That is what I do not understand—pressure is a one-way street, evidently.

We are reluctant to say very much about the refugees. . . .

Well, are we calling on the Turks to make a gesture? What are we calling on them to do? You say on the one hand it may very well be advantageous for us to continue our military assistance, because then we have some degree of influence.

What are we trying to influence them on, rather than the general kind of vague hopefulness for some fruitful negotiation that you say will help resolve the conflict? Other than those generalities, what do you expect? What can we look forward to? What have we asked Ankara to do?

Mr. HARTMAN. It seems to me that we must start with what the parties themselves are now prepared to discuss, and that is changing as time goes on. . . .

The real questions that must be decided in the negotiations, and we are discussing these with all parties, are the questions of the degree of separation of the communities, with the Turkish government taking the position that it should be almost a complete separation. . . . And another significant feature of the negotiations will be what are the powers if they move toward a Federal solution? What are the powers of the Federal authority? The refugee question will be one of the most important issues, and here again you have a difference of view as to whether or not there should be a major movement of population to accomplish this virtual separation of the populations of the communities, or whether it should be voluntary with some people going north or some people coming south, but not a completely exclusive two zonal concept with no Greek Cypriots in the north and no Turkish Cypriots in the south.

So the issues in the negotiation are the form of government, the territorial agreements, the withdrawal of foreign forces, and the guarantee for the eventual outcome.

Those are really the four major issues and what we are talking to the parties about is trying to find out what their positions are and whether we can see any common ground that can be suggested. That has been the purpose of our talks with all of the parties. . . .

Senator KENNEDY. But I would hope, as you can well understand, that our government will consider the pressure on these refugees, when the Administration is considering what our public posture is going to be—that their interests and their well-being will be put high on the roster of priorities in terms of any of these negotiations.

I can think of no more important item on any agenda than the well-being of the people of Cyprus who have been absolutely devastated and in many respects decimated on that island.

But “common ground” between Greece and Turkey that the Administration says it is trying to find to facilitate a resumption of negotiations—let alone a final settlement—must be more than finding “flexibility” in the Turkish position, or some way to take “into full account Greek honor and national dignity”. And if we can publicly

meet Turkish sensitivities over the need for a "demarcation line" across Cyprus, the least we can do is publicly recognize Cypriot and Greek sensitivities over the importance of the refugee problem and the need for a return of refugees to their homes. And silence on this later point, is an inexcusable omission in American policy toward Cyprus.

The Administration, undoubtedly, feels it is doing enough for the Greek refugees. As in the earlier case of Bengali refugees in India, Administration spokesmen point with pride to America's relief efforts and projected increases in contributions to international relief agencies. And most Americans will strongly encourage and support our country's humanitarian leadership on Cyprus.

But some of the policy considerations behind this humanitarian leadership, raise troubling questions over the intent of our humanitarian assistance. In fact a good case can be made that this assistance is closely tied to our political and diplomatic objectives in the Cyprus issue and our policy "tilt" toward Turkish interests. For example, evidence available to the Study Mission, including conversations with American officials, suggest that some of the policy considerations, in giving humanitarian aid to Greek refugees, included the need to improve the political/diplomatic climate. It included the need to show the Greek and Cypriot Governments that we are following a balanced policy. It included the need to keep the refugee problem contained, so as to buy time to assist Ankara in consolidating its position on the island. Indeed, it was intended as well to help refurbish Turkey's international image, thereby strengthening its bargaining position in pursuing its bi-regional objectives on Cyprus.

Further evidence of the cynicism with which elements of our government have viewed the refugee crisis on Cyprus, is suggested in an August cable sent from the Department of Agriculture here in Washington to the United States Embassy in Nicosia. A few days after the second phase of the Turkish "peace operation", the Agriculture Department wanted to know if it were true that the Cyprus citrus crop would be lost this year to Turkey, and therefore probably unavailable for export to England and France. The Department hoped the United States could secure early confirmation of this report, so that American interests could beat the competition in filling the gap.

The above notes on American policy toward Cyprus speak for themselves. They help to confirm some of the worst fears of Congress and many Americans over our "tilt" toward Turkey, and over the failure of our efforts to help bring peace and relief to the people of Cyprus.

As indicated earlier, in response to this kind of conclusion, all quarters in the Administration flatly deny any "tilt" toward the Turkish position in American policy toward Cyprus. Officials in the Department of State and elsewhere suggest instead that the United States is following a policy of "neutrality" in the Cyprus problem. These officials assert that, initially, nothing short of sending in the Marines or using the Sixth Fleet would have kept Ankara from carrying out its plans for Cyprus; for we had no other leverage. And because we are not the world's policeman, our only alternative was what these officials call "neutrality".

These same officials now argue, however, that the United States should not tamper with or cut off military aid to Turkey, because that


would reduce new found "leverage" with the Turkish government, and would not be "helpful" to our objective of seeking a negotiated settlement on Cyprus. Furthermore, it would destroy our "neutrality". But the Administration's record on Cyprus confirms that such a policy of "neutrality", in the face of aggression against an independent country, not only tolerates but implicitly aids and abets that aggression, and does, in fact, constitute a "tilt". And this stance by our government—in the face of the human and political tragedy of Cyprus, and in the face of the dismemberment of a small and defenseless nation—should be rejected by all Americans who care deeply about our country's role in the world, and our national efforts to help build a meaningful structure of peace.

Finally, a great deal of speculation is seen in the press and heard among American officials over the impact of Watergate and impeachment proceedings on our policy making toward Cyprus.

It has been argued by some observers that senior officials of our government were so preoccupied during the collapse of the Nixon Presidency, that American policy toward Cyprus hung suspended during the most crucial days of late July and early August. Many omissions in American policy and the bad timing of public statements, for example, were due, these observers say, to a preoccupation by our national leadership with domestic considerations.

Only history can judge the validity of this line. Whether Turkey would have, or could have, seized the military initiative it did in the face of more active American diplomacy prior to August 9th—especially if there had been clear signals of disapproval from a White House that was a full-time White House—history will tell. It will tell if the failure of United States policy towards Cyprus was a casualty of the failing Nixon Presidency.

But if this is really true, to the degree suggested by some observers, it leaves unanswered a basic question: why, then, have not the fundamentals of American policy toward Cyprus changed since?



SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The longer the time required to achieve a resolution of the crisis on Cyprus, the greater will be the suffering of the people of the island. And it is the tragedy of Cyprus today that time is not on the side of peace.

It is the peculiar tragedy of Cyprus that its fate, now, as in the past, rests less upon solutions to be found among the Cypriots themselves—Turks and Greeks—than it does upon a resolution of outside forces and factors. It is to this extent that the tragedy of Cyprus will now be compounded by the current political instability in Greece and Turkey. No final solution to Cyprus can be anticipated until both Greece and Turkey are able to put their houses in order, to hold elections, and to establish governments with firm political foundations. This, it appears, cannot be expected until the end of 1974.

Meanwhile, the situation on Cyprus festers. And, as in the past, such frustrations will undoubtedly spawn more violence and even greater human suffering, with no end in sight. Until the central issue of the return of the refugees to their homes is resolved, there will be no peace for Cyprus.

I. SEEDS OF CONFLICT

1. Communal tensions began to build in modern Cyprus history during the British rule, as the majority Greek Cypriot community organized guerrilla war to violently end British colonialism on the island. To the Turkish Cypriot minority the spectre of an end to British rule under these circumstances would threaten a union of Cyprus with the Greek motherland—an ancient objective of the Greek Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots sided with the British and organized themselves into a counter political force, which they remain today.

2. The establishment of an independent Republic of Cyprus in 1960, with constitutional guarantees for the minority, and international guarantees for the integrity of the island, was intended to end the threat of enosis and reduce communal polarization. Through the 1960's, communal tensions mounted, however, as the constitutional provisions designed to minimize conflict between the two communities achieved the opposite: governmental dualism and further ethnic separatism between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

3. The communal conflict of 1963-64 brought United Nations intervention, and the formation of the U.N. Peace-Keeping Forces (UNFICYP) on the island. A second major crisis in 1967 ended in a humiliating defeat for the Greek colonels and with the withdrawal of 9,000 Greek troops from Cyprus. In both crises the United States played an active and helpful diplomatic role vis-a-vis Greece and Turkey, and the preservation of Cypriot independence.

4. Communal tensions continued after 1967, but under the U.N. auspices a series of communal talks began in 1968 between Clerides and Denktash, representing the Greek and Turkish communities respectively. Moderate, but frustrating, progress was made.

II. CYPRUS, 1974: SCENARIO FOR TRAGEDY

5. A growing strain in relations between Athens and President Makarios over the presence of 650 Greek mainland officers, and the underlying issue of enosis with Greece, culminated in a violent coup against Makarios on July 15, 1974.

6. The U.S. learned of the coup in advance, warned Makarios of it, but it was not taken seriously—although the CIA in Athens must have known better. Makarios escaped death and was evacuated to London by the British. American policy appeared to place in the best light events in Nicosia and the intervention of the Greek junta; no official statement was made condemning the coup and supporting Makarios.

7. Turkey appears to have interpreted U.S. policy at that time as a signal of tacit acceptance by the U.S. of the Nikos Sampson military clique. Ankara perhaps felt it had no alternative (as well as a great opportunity) to take the military option it had long planned, ostensibly in behalf of the Turkish Cypriots whose security they felt threatened. Thus, on July 20, five days later, Turkey invaded Cyprus, and within two days established a firm beachhead in Kyrenia before the first of several ceasefires were announced.

8. The Turkish invasion and the ensuing possibility of war with Greece, undermined what credibility the Athens junta had, and it was forced to recall civilian leadership. On the same day, July 23rd, Clerides replaced Sampson as acting President of Cyprus.

9. The restoration of democracy in Greece and the return of constitutional government in Cyprus, raised hopes that a negotiated settlement might be achieved. The guarantor powers met in Geneva on July 26, and negotiations began. They reached an impasse two weeks later when the Turkish proposals for a federal system under which Turkish Cypriots would have a separate administrative area in 38% of the island, and a second proposal for a cantonal system, were received coolly by the Greeks. A 36-hour Greek request to study the proposals was met by the launching of the second phase of the Turkish invasion—achieving on the battlefield what they had not been given at the negotiating table.

III. CONSEQUENCES OF THE INVASION

10. Within a week, 40,000 Turkish troops swept across and occupied over 40% of Cyprus. In the process, some 282,000 Cypriots—both Greeks and Turks—became refugees, detainees, prisoners of war, or cut-off and in need of relief assistance.

11. The humanitarian consequence of the invasion was the creation of a massive refugee problem, the resolution of which has, in turn, become crucial to a resolution of the political problems created by the Turkish action.

12. With the exception of the area around the first Turkish landing in the Kyrenia-Nicosia enclave, there is minimal bomb or structural damage. However, widespread looting has occurred.

13. The impact of the invasion upon the Cyprus economy has been more devastating. The Government estimates that some \$4.5 million is lost each day in production. Agriculture, which comprises half the island's economy, is dying—both crops and animals. The vast citrus crop rots on the trees.

14. The political impact of the invasion was to destroy the constitutional and political framework of the Government of Cyprus as it was established in 1960. The future of Cyprus will be a future governed by a new and different governmental and political structure. There are currently a number of options; most frequently mentioned in Ankara and Washington is some form of territorial separation of the two communities. Whatever name is used, it is tantamount to partition.

15. Arranging some form of "bi-regionalism," or "zonal" division, or "federal" structure on Cyprus, may seem to outsiders as only a question of where the line will finally be drawn. But it is questionable whether a Greek Cypriot government can be found which would accept such solutions under the current threat of arms. Subject to negotiations, the current stalemate risks *de facto* partition—double enosis—of an administrative and economic union of the two separate parts of Cyprus with Greece and Turkey. A drift in this direction is already apparent on the Turkish occupied side, with the introduction of mainland Turkish currency, Turkish supplies, Turkish labor, etc. If this is allowed to continue for long, Cyprus will cease to exist.

16. The impact of partition along the Turkish Attila line, which Turkey has demanded, will have serious human and economic consequences. It will require moving and resettling half the population in order to create majority Turkish Cypriot areas above the line. It could involve moving 40,000 families and it would significantly alter the population density and characteristics of the island. Impact upon land ownership would be equally severe and extremely difficult to divide equitably. Impact upon the island's homogeneous economy would be to cut it in an inequitable half, with most of the foreign exchange earning portions of the economy left on the Turkish side.

17. The costs to Turkey from its military activity on Cyprus has been considerable. The actual costs of the invasion—military equipment lost, supplies, etc.—when added to the growing costs of military occupation, suggests that the cost to Turkey will total \$1 billion by the end of the year.

IV. HUMANITARIAN NEEDS AND INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

18. Massive humanitarian relief needs were created by the Turkish invasion. Within a month, some 40% of the Greek Cypriot population was rendered homeless, and the need for shelter, blankets, medicine, food, and other supplies, was immediate and serious. The Government of Cyprus estimates that to establish refugee camp sites for all those who are now in need of shelter, will cost over \$22 million.

19. The Cypriot administration has demonstrated a commendable capacity to undertake relief programs and to absorb outside relief assistance. A "Special Services for the Relief and Rehabilitation of Displaced Persons" was established in late July, and has—under the

most difficult circumstances—provided emergency relief aid, as well as longer-term assistance.

20. Although there was a commendable and early response from many nations to the plight of Cyprus—especially the International Committee of the Red Cross, Greece, European Economic Community, and the United States—the appeals of both the ICRC and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees have only received token amounts to date. Of the UNHCR appeal for \$22 million for relief to the end of the year, only \$6.2 million has been received or pledged from all sources—less than a third of the sum required.

21. The United States has allocated, as of October 10, \$4.6 million for Cyprus relief, with another \$1.6 million pledged to the UNHCR in the coming weeks.

22. The needs of the refugees of Cyprus will escalate until a negotiated settlement is achieved, even as the initial enthusiasm and support for Cyprus relief within the international community now threatens to dry up. Massive relief needs remain to be met.

23. The role of the United Nations on Cyprus remains crucial. The UNFICYP forces, although restricted in their movement in the Turkish occupied areas, play an important humanitarian role. The newly augmented 4,292-man UNFICYP force is attempting to generate a feeling of confidence and to obtain information concerning the local situation, particularly in areas where humanitarian and relief measures, including the security of population, are required. They provide logistical support to the UNHCR, which has become the focal point for international relief assistance.

24. The work of the UNHCR has been constrained to primarily the Greek Cypriot refugees in the southern part of the island, in part because they form the bulk of the refugee problem, but also because the UNHCR has not been granted free and unrestricted access to Turkish occupied areas.

V. UNITED STATES POLICY

25. Although flatly denied in all quarters of the Administration, the evidence in the field suggests a perceptible “tilt” in American policy toward Turkey during the Cyprus crisis. In the early days, U.S. policy seems to have been one of hasty improvisation, coldly calculated to minimize disturbances within NATO. This not only achieved the opposite result, but, in the end, it failed the defenseless people of Cyprus.

26. The substance of the American “tilt” towards Turkey can be seen in the long list of omissions in United States diplomacy—in our apparent approval of, and “understanding” over, the Turkish invasion; in our tacit recognition of a Turkish *fait accompli* through the force of arms; in our clear association with the fundamentals of the Turkish negotiating position; and in our cynical use of humanitarian aid for Greek Cypriot refugees to further our political and diplomatic ends.

27. Available evidence suggests that some of the policy considerations in giving humanitarian aid to Greek refugees included the need to improve the political/diplomatic climate, to show the Greek and Cypriot governments that we were following a “balanced” policy, to

keep the refugee problem contained, so as to buy time to assist Ankara in consolidating its position, and to help refurbish Turkey's international image, thereby strengthening its bargaining position. All this evidence confirms the worst fears of Congress and many Americans over the "tilt" towards Turkey and over the failure of American efforts to help bring peace and relief to the people of Cyprus.

and the refugee problem continues to be a major problem of the Middle East. It is essential that the United States should continue to support the efforts of the United Nations and other international organizations to help bring about a just and lasting settlement of this problem. It is the policy of the United States to support the efforts of the United Nations and other international organizations to help bring about a just and lasting settlement of this problem.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Over the coming weeks and months—as they have since the beginning of the Cyprus crisis—the Chairman and members of the Subcommittee will continue to be as tenacious in their concern and suggestions for action as they feel the important situation on Cyprus warrants.

For the purposes of this report, however, the Chairman and the Study Mission make the following recommendations, relating to diplomatic and political problems and humanitarian needs.

1. RESTORING THE FULL INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF CYPRUS

Restoring the full independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus must be a clearly understood and primary objective in American policy and diplomacy over Cyprus. No other goal better satisfies justice or the bringing of peace and relief to the people of Cyprus.

As in past crises, Cyprus today is a pawn in international politics—caught in an extremely complex network of conflicting interests involving Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Soviet Union, other countries, NATO, the United Nations, and, most important of all, the divided people of Cyprus. Viewed in this perspective, the Greek junta's engineered coup on Cyprus last July was a clear attempt to impose an unacceptable solution on the festering communal conflict between the Greek and Turkish communities. So too, was the subsequent military intervention of Turkey, which now threatens a partition of the island.

Perhaps a new constitutional structure and more equitable arrangements between the Greek and Turkish communities are needed on Cyprus; but responding to Cypriot aspirations for maintaining an independent country should be central to the policies and actions of all parties concerned. New guarantees for the future independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus must be achieved through the early resumption of the Geneva negotiations or appropriate alternative arrangements.

2. SUPPORT FOR THE INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS BETWEEN ACTING PRESIDENT CLERIDES AND VICE-PRESIDENT DENKTASH

The periodic talks, on humanitarian and related problems, between Acting President Clerides and Vice President Denktash, the respective leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, must be given the time and chance to succeed. Despite difficulties, these talks, under the auspices of the United Nations, have already produced agreements on the repatriation and exchange of prisoners of war. The talks

could be crucial ingredients in helping to resolve Cyprus problems, and they must be very actively encouraged and supported by the United States and all parties concerned. For in the final analysis it will be the Cypriots themselves who will contribute the most toward restoring the mutual trust and harmony which can rescue this island from the tragedy now present.

3. IMPLEMENTING U.N. RESOLUTIONS AND THE GENEVA DECLARATION ON THE REDUCTION AND WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS

The United States Government, and all parties concerned, must very actively support repeated calls by the United Nations—as well as the Geneva declaration of July 30, agreed to by Greece and Turkey—for the orderly reduction and withdrawal of foreign troops from Cyprus. A viable solution to the Cyprus problem, much less peace on the island, cannot be imposed by the force of arms. Many observers are particularly concerned that the continuing presence of foreign troops on Cyprus threatens guerrilla-style warfare that would probably turn the entire island into a battlefield once again. Steps must be taken to disarm Cyprus.

4. RETURN OF REFUGEES TO THEIR HOMES

Some observers feel that, under a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem, the exchange of some population between Greek and Turkish areas of control may be necessary and, indeed, desirable. Nevertheless, a viable solution to the Cyprus problem, much less peace on the island, will not be accomplished unless and until a significant number of Greek Cypriot refugees are permitted to return safely to their lands and homes in areas currently occupied by Turkish forces.

In this regard, the United States must finally use its vast influence and good offices with Turkey to persuade Ankara of the need for a “gesture of goodwill”, which includes the withdrawal of occupation forces and the return of refugees to their homes. Such a “gesture of goodwill”—involving perhaps the orderly return of refugees to the Famagusta and Morphou areas of the island—could break the deadlock over the resumption of negotiations and serve as a meaningful first step toward a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem.

5. GREATER AUTONOMY AND SECURITY FOR THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY

There is little doubt that the Turkish invasion and occupation of Cyprus has forever destroyed the present constitutional framework and political structure of the island. Given a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem, the future clearly includes new arrangements.

It is equally clear that any new arrangements must enhance the Turkish Cypriot community's security, autonomy, and participation in the economic and social and political life of the country. Their grievances over the past decade have, in the main, been legitimate and serious. If there is to be any peace on Cyprus, these grievances must be answered.

Proposals aimed at achieving greater autonomy and security for the Turkish Cypriots were already well advanced in the inter-communal talks before the latest crisis. And there was substantial recognition of this during the Geneva talks after the Turkish invasion. These proposals must now be reactivated, and worked out in practical and useable form for immediate and permanent application. If the Turkish invasion serves to side-track this process, it will have defeated its own stated goals.

6. STRENGTHENED UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE ON CYPRUS

Previous crises on Cyprus have involved and brought forth constructive responses from the United Nations. And over the past decade UNFICYP has played a useful and important role. But there can be little doubt today that the current Cyprus crisis has called into question the effectiveness of the United Nations. Recently, for example, Secretary General Kurt Waldheim warned the Security Council, that the situation on Cyprus raises questions about "the very essence of the United Nations Charter, weighing upon the credibility of the organization and its future effectiveness."

United Nations problems on Cyprus involve both its peace-keeping functions and its humanitarian purposes.

In part, the present difficulties or failure of the United Nations is due to the severe limitations of the UNFICYP mandate, which is outdated and unrelated to the current situation—the presence of a foreign occupying army. In this connection, the United States, in concert with others, should actively support efforts to strengthen and broaden the mandate of UNFICYP, so it can better perform its peace-keeping mission on the island.

The United Nations humanitarian purposes on the island have been seriously compromised, mainly because of the very restrictive access international personnel and relief convoys have to the Turkish occupied areas. Humanitarian needs, especially among the remaining Greek population, have been substantial in some areas, and all reports suggest the condition of these people is deteriorating. This is deplorable, and the United States must urgently lend its diplomacy to remedy the situation and facilitate United Nations' humanitarian efforts on Cyprus.

7. THE UNITED STATES MUST ESCALATE HUMANITARIAN AID TO CYPRUS

Our government—both the Executive Branch and the Congress—should escalate its concern and efforts on behalf of relief and rehabilitation programs among the refugees and others in need on Cyprus.

In the early days of the Cyprus conflict the United States responded commendably to international emergency appeals for humanitarian aid by the ICRC. In late August the UNHCR assumed, from the ICRC, the responsibility for international humanitarian assistance and appealed for \$22,000,000 through the end of 1974. To date, the United States has committed \$2,000,000—of which only \$1,400,000 has been allocated and the remaining \$1,600,000 pledged. This is a small commitment, compared to what we can and should do. Tokenism must be replaced with generosity and compassion. An increased com-

mitment of up to \$10 million—now, not later—to the UNHCR's emergency program would be consonant with our general contribution to relief efforts elsewhere, and would hopefully encourage other nations to respond more generously as well. In this connection, pending foreign aid legislation—introduced by the Chairman and other members of the Senate—to establish a Cyprus Relief Fund should be enacted at the earliest opportunity.

Apart from making a more meaningful contribution to the current emergency relief program of the UNHCR, the United States must also be prepared to continue providing humanitarian relief and rehabilitation assistance well into 1975. Among the anticipated needs are food supplies, as well as support for various public works and other projects, being initiated by the Cyprus Government, to employ idle refugees.

The United States should support, hopefully through international channels, a variety of programs to help meet these needs. Public Law 480 "food for work" and related food programs, for example, could help meet both food and unemployment problems. In consultation with the Cyprus government, the American Embassy in Nicosia has recommended such programs, and they should be accepted in Washington. Additional kinds of assistance should also be considered by our government.

8. UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT TO BREAK RELIEF BOTTLENECKS

There are at least two bottlenecks, involving humanitarian relief, that some greater measure of United States diplomatic concern might help to break.

Since the second phase of the Turkish invasion, the island's only major airport in Nicosia has been closed, due to bomb damage but more importantly to diplomatic deadlock. The Turkish army attempted to take the airport during the invasion, but was stymied by the stiff resistance of the Greek Cypriots. Turkish forces now surround the airport on three sides, with the other side held by the Government. UNFICYP forces hold the airport proper. All sides, except Turkey, have agreed to the speedy restoration and opening of the Nicosia airport under United Nations control. Among other things, observers agree that it would greatly facilitate international relief operations, which now must use the overtaxed British air field in the south.

Similarly, the Government of Turkey has unilaterally declared the sea lanes surrounding Cyprus to be "dangerous" because of a state of war. The result has been the cessation of regular sea shipments to Cyprus, in part because of prohibitive insurance costs. This has had a serious impact upon relief shipments, both discouraging foreign ship owners to allow the use of their vessels for Cyprus, as well as adding greatly to the costs of those relief ships which do travel to the island.

Both these restraints on the international relief effort for Cyprus—the closed Nicosia Airport and the restricted sea lanes—must be items high on the diplomatic agenda, and the United States should be doing considerably more in trying to remove these restraints. Progress towards peace and relief on Cyprus will be undertaken in steps, and there can be no better steps than removing bottle-necks to humanitarian relief.

APPENDIX

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APPENDIX I

ADDRESS BY SENATOR KENNEDY ON THE CYPRUS CRISIS DELIVERED AT TESTIMONIAL DINNER HONORING ARCHBISHOP IAKOVOS, NEW YORK, OCTOBER 20, 1974

The following is the text of an address made by Senator Edward M. Kennedy before a commemorative dinner in New York City at the Waldorf Astoria on October 20, 1974, in honor of Archbishop Iakovos, Primate of the Greek Orthodox Church in the Americas. Proceeds from the dinner went to the Cyprus Relief Fund.

TEXT OF SENATOR KENNEDY'S ADDRESS

I am grateful for the privilege to join in this tribute to His Eminence, and to share your concern over the human suffering and political tragedy on Cyprus.

The Turkish invasion of Cyprus turned the island into shambles. In political terms, it violated the integrity of an independent state. In economic terms, it shattered the island's flourishing development. And in human terms, it turned half the population into refugees, detainees, or beleaguered people caught behind ceasefire lines. Personal tragedy has been the lot of thousands of Cypriot families—many with relatives and friends in the United States.

Since the outbreak of violence on Cyprus—and as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Refugees—I have shared your deep personal concern over the plight of your relatives and friends—and over the suffering of all Cypriots affected by the war. The Subcommittee has held public hearings on this issue, and I have introduced legislation, which calls for the withdrawal of foreign troops, and for a special Cyprus relief fund in our foreign assistance program. I also sent a Study Mission to the island to survey humanitarian needs—and their report was issued just a week ago.

A drive along the roads of Cyprus today quickly tells the tragic tale of the Cypriot people—of the human consequences of an armed invasion, of bombing and napalm, of ceasefire violations, of dead-locked diplomacy, of military occupation, and of man's inhumanity to man. In the Turkish occupied areas of the North, only a small percentage of the population remains—including some 8,000 Turkish refugees bombed out of their homes. Desolation and destruction are everywhere. Whole villages and towns and cities—like Famagusta, Kyrenia, and Lapithos—are empty of the Greeks who lived there. In understandable fear, and with only the cloths on their backs, they fled to safety from advancing Turkish forces. But many of their neighbors died.

The Greek Cypriots who remain in the occupied zone face a desperate future. They are a beleaguered and hostage people—prisoners of the Turkish army. Reports from Karpasia and other areas say that the Greeks are confined to their villages—or forcibly detained by Turkish authorities in churches or public buildings. And nearly 500 Greeks—a good share of them elderly people—have been cruelly and needlessly detained in Kyrenia's Dome Hotel—since the early days of the invasion.

The younger men in the occupied zone have been taken away. Food, medicine, and relief goods are in short supply. And international humanitarian agencies are denied regular access, for the purpose of bringing relief to those in need.

Government controlled areas of the island have been inundated with refugees from the North. Over the last three months, more than 200,000 men, women, and children have sought shelter wherever they could find it—under trees, along the roadside, in open fields, in cars, in fragile huts made of pine branches and sticks, and in tents provided by international relief agencies. Schools, monasteries and public buildings have been crammed with refugees—and the population of many towns has suddenly doubled or tripled in size. Only in recent weeks have relief supplies been arriving in significant quantities—mainly from Greece, Western

Europe and the United States. But there is still not enough food and blankets and shelter. Vaccines to ward off epidemics are sometimes difficult to get. And dysentery has stricken children and older people in many areas.

With the onslaught of the rainy season and the winter cold, the condition of the people can only deteriorate—unless adequate resources are made available to the Cyprus government and the relief agencies—or some real progress is made in negotiations, which will permit refugees to return to their homes.

The vast majority of needy people in government-controlled areas are Greek Cypriots. But some 10,000 Turkish refugees also need our help and concern. Human suffering, personal tragedy, and the anguish common to the homeless all over the world, are everywhere present on Cyprus. But like the Greeks of old, Cypriots today are meeting their disaster undefeated. As Pericles put it in his classic Funeral Oration: "We do not have to spend our time practicing to meet sufferings . . . And when they are upon us, we show ourselves just as brave."

And "take heart," wrote Aeschylus. "Suffering, when it climbs highest, lasts but a little time." These lines from a play described his spirit—as it describes today, the spirit of Cyprus.

Our spirit—America's spirit—should be no less. And so we must mobilize our country—and we must do all that we can to assist the children, the orphans, the refugees, and the people in distress on Cyprus. Your efforts here tonight, and those in the weeks to come, reflect America's compassion for people in need. They will surely make an important contribution to the survival and welfare of all the refugees on Cyprus.

Much has been said about America's role in the Cyprus crisis—and about the apparent complicity of our government in the human and political tragedy of the Cypriot people. Our government suggests—and few will disagree—that Americans should recognize and appreciate legitimate Turkish grievances on the island. But our government goes much further. We are told that what has happened on Cyprus is understandable. We are told we must be practical in our approach to the Cyprus issue. And so we must accept the "new realities" on the island.

But what are these "new realities?" And what are we being asked to understand and accept?

Are we to condone the invasion and occupation of Cyprus? Are we to condone the nibbling away of an independent state—and continuing threats of a new offensive in the so-called "Turkish Peace Operation"? Are we to condone the human tragedy brought about with the illegal use of American supplied weapons? Are we to condone a policy of national silence over the fate of refugees on Cyprus? Are we to condone the failure of our government to condemn the invasion, and to try actively to prevent it? Are we to condone the omissions in our diplomacy, and the efforts of our government to cover-up the "tilt" toward Turkey?

I ask you tonight—are we to stand silent in the face of these realities? I believe the American people expect more of their government. This is clearly reflected in your presence here tonight—and in the recent actions of Congress over the issues of military aid to Turkey, and humanitarian contributions to the refugees on Cyprus.

If Cyprus today is on the brink of new conflict and even greater tragedy, our government's policy bears a special responsibility. For the omissions in our diplomacy over Cyprus—our largely uncritical support of the Turkish position—our casual attitude toward human need—and the President's insistence on maintaining a business-as-usual attitude toward military shipments to Turkey. All of these acts only encourage Ankara's intransigency. And they feed frustrations on Cyprus, and among our friends in neighboring Greece. The time is past due for us to rescue our foreign policy from a course that ignores our best traditions as a nation, and threatens our broader interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

American goals on Cyprus, and the implications for our foreign policy, are clear. *First*, restoring the full independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus must be a clearly understood and primary objective of our diplomacy. No other goal will satisfy the demands of justice—or really bring peace and relief to the people of Cyprus.

Second, the President must finally show some real evidence of concern for the humanitarian needs and fate of the refugees. The policy of silence on this issue, at the highest levels of our government, is an affront to common human decency, and the moral sensibilities of all Americans. Spokesmen for our government speak

of the "new realities" on Cyprus, and freely talk about bi-regionalism and a "demarcation line" for the de facto partition of the island. But what about the "new reality" of homeless people brought about by the Turkish invasion, and the yearning of refugees to return to their families and homes?

I submit tonight that the fate of these people is central to the Cyprus issue, and to any negotiations over the future of the island. The time is long overdue for a "tilt" in American policy toward the people of Cyprus—toward the men and women and children who are suffering on that tortured island, especially the refugees, both Turkish and Greek. The time is long overdue for our country to put the problem of Cypriot refugees at the top of our agenda for Cyprus. And I call upon the President to publicly show that America cares about their plight—and that we will do everything we can to help them lead normal lives.

The Administration says it is trying to find some "common ground" between Greece and Turkey to facilitate a resumption of negotiations over Cyprus. But finding "common ground" must be more than finding what officials call "flexibility" in the Turkish position—or some way to take "into full account Greek honor and national dignity." If we can so freely meet Turkish sensibilities over the need for what Secretary Kissinger calls a "demarcation line" on Cyprus—the least we can do is publicly recognize the importance of refugees, and also recognize Greek and Cypriot sensitivities over the need for a return of refugees to their homes. And the President's continuing silence on this issue is an inexcusable omission in American policy toward Cyprus.

We must finally recognize that the lives of people caught in the crunch of disaster and war are important in any effort to build a structure for peace—especially when these problems are immediately central to resolving the issue at hand. In this connection, the United States must finally use its vast influence and good offices with Turkey, to persuade Ankara that a gesture of goodwill is needed to break the dead-lock in negotiations. The orderly withdrawal of Turkish forces from the Famagusta and Morphou areas, for example, would permit the return of many refugees to their homes, and be a real first step toward a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem.

The President argues strongly that continuing military aid to Turkey is not only important to our national security, but also gives us some leverage to constructively influence Ankara's policy on Cyprus. The President now has this so-called leverage, for 60 days more. So let him use it—in the interests of bringing peace and relief to the people of Cyprus. There may be national security interests at stake—but there is also human suffering on Cyprus. To protect the one—and to prevent or remedy the other—there is no effort too great for us to make.

And, finally, our government must make a dramatic increase in its humanitarian concern over Cyprus, and fully encourage and support private relief efforts among our citizens on behalf of Cyprus.

Conditions among Greek Cypriots in the Turkish-occupied areas, and the heavy restrictions placed upon the movement of international relief personnel, are deplorable, and we must urgently lend our diplomacy to remedy this situation.

Also, generosity and compassion must replace the tokenism and casualness of our support for relief programs by the United Nations and the Cypriot government. There is no excuse to be lax on this issue—especially in light of the millions of dollars we freely spend in military shipments to Turkey. The legislation I introduced for this purpose passed the Senate nearly two weeks ago. And I pledge my best efforts for the full enactment of this bill when Congress returns in November.

On Cyprus today we are seeing a very important struggle, by a courageous and spirited people, for self-preservation and the maintenance of national independence. Despite the presence of a well equipped occupation army, and despite continuing threats from Ankara of new military operations, the Cypriot people are standing their ground. They have not lost hope, and their spirit serves as an inspiration for free peoples around the globe. They love their country and their freedom—and they are patriots in the cause of Cyprus. But what is love of country? And what is patriotism?

Several years ago, my brother, Senator Robert Kennedy, asked these questions, and gave this answer:

"[Love of country and patriotism] is more than merely the physical attributes of the nation in which we live. It is the mountains, the seas, the streams and lakes, the forests, the villages, the cities, the farms—it is all these but it is much

more. . . . It is a feeling for a system which recognizes the individual, where the individual can fulfill himself, where the opportunity of progress, of hope, is always present. The Greeks said 'happiness is the exercise of vital powers along the lines of excellence, in a life affording them scope.' "

That should be true today, for Cyprus. So let us dedicate ourselves "to tame the savageness of man and make gentle the life of the world." Let us dedicate ourselves to that goal on Cyprus—and say a prayer for our country, for Cyprus, and the world.

APPENDIX II

TEXT OF SENATOR KENNEDY'S STATEMENT AND SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 110 RELATING TO CYPRUS

[From the Congressional Record, Senate, Aug. 8 and 13, 1974]

HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS ON CYPRUS

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, events on Cyprus have been a source of deep concern for many Americans and people around the world. But after days of intense violence and political turmoil, reports now suggests some hopeful signs that at least the violence is subsiding—and that additional efforts will now be made by all parties concerned to effect a meaningful separation of forces under United Nations auspices. Hopefully, as well, new efforts to resume negotiations on a political settlement of the conflict will be diligently pursued—and will not only restore the security of civilians and constitutional rule to all of Cyprus, but also the island's territorial integrity and full independence.

In pursuing these objectives, however, the parties concerned—and all men of good will—should not lose sight of the human tragedies which have hit the people of Cyprus. Regrettably, their situation has taken second place to the military and political issues at stake—and to the special interests of those who have much to lose, or to gain, by the outcome of the conflict. But the civilians of Cyprus—both Greeks and Turks—also have interests. And for many thousands, apparently—especially among the Greek population in the Turkish salients—recent weeks have been a nightmare of death and horror and grief.

Reports from the area—including official reports to our own Government and elsewhere—fully confirm the human tragedy of Cyprus. Tens of thousands of women and children have been forcibly expelled from their villages—especially in Turkish occupied areas—or have fled their homes as refugees. Thousands of able-bodied men have disappeared—and some apparently have been deported to camps or prisons in southern Turkey. Refugees tell of “much suffering” and “systematic” arson, looting, murder, and rape. And civilian casualties—both wounded and dead—number in the hundreds, if not the thousands.

Mr. President, I do not rise to offer any magic solution for meeting the immediate political and humanitarian problems of Cyprus. But I do rise to express a deep personal concern over the plight of Cypriot civilians—and especially over the continuing violations of human rights and the rules of common human decency which are evidenced in Turkish occupied areas. A spokesman for our own Government suggests that “some very rough stuff” continues. This is a deplorable situation, and I appeal to the Turkish Government and all parties involved to make every effort in behalf of bringing peace and relief to Cyprus.

Apart from securing a meaningful separation of forces and a political settlement at the conference table in Geneva, there are three items of immediate concern to me as chairman of the Subcommittee on Refugees:

First, the emergency relief needs of refugees and others in distress—including food, water, shelter, medicine, and protection;

Second, the condition, treatment, and release of civilian detainees—including those who may have been deported to Turkey or other areas; and

Third, the free movement of international relief convoys and humanitarian personnel from the United Nations or the International Committee for the Red Cross—ICRC—including the free access of Red Cross personnel to detention centers on both sides.

The United Nations and the ICRC are the primary international agencies charged with the care and protection of Cypriot civilians. Reports from the U.N. and elsewhere suggest, however, that difficulties continue in all three areas of my immediate concern—especially in the Turkish salients of the country.

The humanitarian services of the U.N. and the ICRC have been indispensable in helping to bring peace and relief in many areas of the world. And today in Cyprus the services of these organizations deserve the full support of the parties to the conflict, our own Government, and others as well.

In conclusion, let me express some concern over the course of U.S. policy toward Cyprus. We have heard a great deal about the travels of our diplomats to the area, but we have heard very little about the substance and objectives of American policy toward developments on Cyprus and related issues.

I fully appreciate the immense difficulties in the Cyprus issue. It is a complex matter for diplomats and humanitarians alike. But should not our Government give more evidence of concern? What are American policy objectives? What is the substance of our activities? What have we done to help restrain Turkish forces? And how are we responding to help meet humanitarian needs among the Cypriot civilians who are refugees or detainees on either side?

The American people and their representatives in Congress deserve some answers, and should not be in the dark over United States policy toward Cyprus. I am extremely hopeful, Mr. President, that the administration will finally give some additional evidence of a very active concern over the needed efforts to bring peace and relief to the people of Cyprus.

SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 110—SUBMISSION OF A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
RELATING TO THE SITUATION IN CYPRUS

(Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.)

Mr. KENNEDY submitted the following concurrent resolution:

S. CON. RES. 110

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),

Whereas a settlement of the present conflict in the Republic of Cyprus is vital to the peace and security of the eastern Mediterranean and is in the best interests of world peace and stability; and

Whereas a settlement depends upon the right of the Cypriot people to determine their own destiny and the efforts of the United Nations to act as a negotiating body; and

Whereas Resolution 2077 (xx) adopted by the General Assembly on December 8, 1965, "calls upon all states . . . to respect the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from any intervention directed against it"; and

Whereas the continued presence of foreign troops in Cyprus undermines the ability of the Cypriot people to resolve their own crisis and the efforts of the United Nations to restore peace; and

Whereas Resolution 353 adopted by the Security Council on July 20, 1974, "demands an immediate end to foreign military intervention in the Republic of Cyprus" and "requests the withdrawal without delay from the Republic of Cyprus of foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international agreements . . ."; and

Whereas the declaration on Cyprus signed by the foreign ministers of Britain, Turkey, and Greece, in Geneva on July 30, 1974, calls for a "timely and phased reduction of the number of armed forces" from Cypriot soil; and

Whereas the continued presence of foreign troops in Cyprus violates international agreements and United Nations resolutions threatens the independence and territorial integrity of the island, jeopardizes peace and stability in the eastern Mediterranean, and imperils the very existence of NATO; Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),

That all foreign troops currently involved in Cyprus be withdrawn immediately so that the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross may be permitted to restore peace to the island, and to guarantee the protection and civil rights of all persons and communities and the right of the Cypriot people working together to determine their own destiny.

APPENDIX III

TEXT OF SENATOR KENNEDY'S AMENDMENT FOR RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ASSISTANCE TO CYPRUS, AFRICA, AND BANGLADESH

[Adopted in the Senate, Oct. 2, 1974; introduced on Sept. 17, 1974]

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1974—AMENDMENT

AMENDMENT NO. 1878

(Ordered to be printed and to lie on the table.)

Mr. KENNEDY (for himself and Mr. McGee) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by them jointly to the bill (S. 3994), supra.

RELIEF AND REHABILITATION FUNDS FOR AFRICA, BANGLADESH, AND CYPRUS

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I am submitting today an amendment to S. 3394, the pending Foreign Assistance authorization bill. The amendment provides special funds for disaster relief and rehabilitation programs in the drought-stricken areas of Africa, for flood relief in Bangladesh, and for refugee assistance in Cyprus.

The amendment authorizes the use of existing funds—an estimated \$119,000,000 available under scheduled loan repayments administered by AID—to permit our Government to respond to the massive human tragedies in these areas, and to possible disasters in other parts of the world.

The current crisis in Cyprus, the massive flooding in Bangladesh, and the spreading drought and famine in Africa, are only the latest links in the chain of ravaged populations which have circled the globe in recent years. Such humanitarian crises have always brought forth an immediate response from the American people—in fulfillment of our Nation's longstanding leadership in helping, to the extent we can, all people in need. Just last spring the Congress responded to the famine needs of Africa, and the disaster relief requirements of Pakistan and Nicaragua, by enacting the Foreign Disaster Assistance Act. And, during consideration of the foreign assistance bill last year, the Congress enacted section 639B, which provided substantial famine and disaster relief to the African Sahel for the first time.

The amendment I am introducing today continues our country's record of concern for our fellow man, and the longstanding support of Congress for disaster relief overseas. The amendment was prepared in very close cooperation with AID, and carries with it the support of the Ford administration.

For the people of Cyprus, Mr. President, this is especially a perilous time—as it is also for the renewal of democracy and freedom in Greece, and for the future of peaceful relations in the Eastern Mediterranean. Regrettably, the plight of Cypriot civilians has taken second place to the military and political dimensions of the Cyprus problem—and to the special interests of those who have much to lose or to gain by the outcome of the conflict on the island. But the civilians of Cyprus—both Greeks and Turks—also have interests. And for tens of thousands, the past weeks have been a nightmare of death and tragedy and grief.

1. CYPRUS

This week I received a preliminary report from a special study mission to Cyprus, which visited the area on behalf of the Subcommittee on Refugees, which I serve as chairman. The study mission visited refugees in all parts of the island, including the Turkish occupied areas. The study mission met with both Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders and United Nations relief officials, and also held extensive conversations on humanitarian and related problems with officials in Ankara and Athens.

The study mission reports that nearly 300,000 Cypriots—mostly Greeks—are now refugees. They fled the advancing Turkish Army, leaving their homes and nearly all of their belongings behind. This is close to half the island's population—without sufficient food and medicine, with little shelter, with few clothes and blankets, and with increasingly little hope for an early return to their villages and homes.

A drive along the highways of Cyprus, especially in the southern zone, quickly tells the tragic tale of the events of July and August—of the human consequences of an armed invasion, of constant ceasefire violations, of military occupation, and of man's inhumanity to man.

Refugees are still fleeing down the roads of Cyprus. During the team's recent visit some 20,000 people fled the town of Athna, in advance of what the Turkish Army calls "armed reconnaissance in force"—or what simple language would label a ceasefire violation. These thousands of refugees, like the tens of thousands before them, are today seeking protection and safety in the towns of southern Cyprus, swelling the local population in some areas by at least 500 percent. They are seeking shelter wherever they can find it—in open fields, under trees, along the roadsides, and in schools, churches, and civic buildings. In the first days they had no shelter, and few blankets. And only in the past 2 weeks have relief supplies begun to arrive in meaningful quantities, and clusters of tents are beginning to sprout around towns and cities in the government controlled areas of the island. The overwhelming majority of those in need are Greek Cypriots, but significant numbers of Turks also command our help and concern.

The economy and life of Cyprus has been shattered by the Turkish invasion, with some 80 percent of the economic base located in the occupied areas which now have less than 10 percent of the population. The vast citrus industry rots on the trees. Farms on the plain lie idle, as cattle and other livestock die from lack of food and water. The tourist center of Kyrenia has been looted beyond recognition, and the city of Famagusta—a city of over 40,000 people—is now a ghost town, with empty streets, houses, and hotels. The population of whole cities have become refugees.

For many refugee families, the tragedy is still too fresh, their flight to safety too recent, for them to realize fully what has happened. And few in the international community have recognized the full tragedy of Cyprus. Our Government's role during the crisis—our early silence and later vacillation toward the political and military problems of the island—must not characterize our Nation's attitude or response to the escalating human crisis which has gripped all of Cyprus.

The study mission reports that important relief efforts have now been undertaken, in cooperation with Cypriot authorities, by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Committee of the Red Cross, among others. But these initiatives, and programs for humanitarian relief in Cyprus, are just getting off the ground and need the immediate support of the United States—support which this amendment will provide. It is estimated that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees will alone need some \$22 million for emergency relief through the end of this year, and that an additional sum will be required for returning the refugees home or resettling them elsewhere on the island. Our Government must be in a position to actively encourage and generously support this important humanitarian work of the United Nations and the Cypriot authorities. Peace and relief for all Cypriots in need must be our goal on Cyprus.

2. BANGLADESH

In Bangladesh, there can be no doubt today that great tragedy has once again hit the Bengali people. A recent hearing before the Subcommittee on Refugees indicated that flood refugees number in the millions, as the worst floods in over 20 years have inundated the land and people of Bangladesh. Crops have been destroyed, and food reserves have been lost. Housing, schools, health clinics and other facilities have been swept away. And all reports confirm that this latest disaster seriously compounds existing economic and social problems brought about by the dislocations of the 1971 war for independence.

In testimony before the Refugee Subcommittee recent travelers to the area report that there is more human suffering than ever before, that the country stands on the brink of starvation, and that epidemic and disease threaten the

well-being and lives of millions, and, perhaps, the nation as a whole. In purely human terms, there is great suffering today in Bangladesh, which must call forth a greater response from the United States—out of humanitarian concern, as well as concern for the stability and peace of South Asia. The United States cannot assume the full responsibility for meeting the massive human needs in Bangladesh. The United Nations and other governments must help. But we, too, must do what we can with what we have.

3. AFRICA

And in the Sahel and other parts of Africa, the food situation continues to deteriorate as famine conditions spread across the continent. Contrary to our Government's general optimism over the past year, recent reports, even within the government, tell of catastrophic consequences from the Sahelian drought, and that the situation among the people is precarious in some areas. The number of famine refugees is growing. Relief camps are over-burdened. Last year's logistical bottlenecks and administrative delays in the movement of food and relief supplies continues. Malnutrition and disease still threaten the lives of many thousands, and unless something more is done the death rate will continue to climb.

Mr. President, it is the purpose of this amendment to make available already appropriated funds to support international relief and rehabilitation programs in Cyprus, Bangladesh, Africa, and other areas of possible need over the coming year. This amendment authorizes the Agency for International Development—AID—to use 50 percent of the fiscal year 1975 scheduled loan repayments, which now revert to the Treasury, to be used for the relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction purposes mandated in the amendment—especially in Cyprus, Bangladesh, and Africa. Current estimates by AID suggest that some \$119 million is immediately available. And by using the loan repayments, under specific Congressional authorization, it will not be necessary to appropriate a new obligational authority this fiscal year.

The humanitarian concerns today—in Cyprus, Bangladesh, and Africa—illustrate once again that those foreign policy variables involving people are crucial elements in our foreign policy. Little will be achieved in building a structure of peace unless governments place a higher priority on the welfare and real-life problems of people—whose neglect fosters instability and spawns conflict around the globe.

Political wisdom and simple humanity demands of our country that we do more to help the critical humanitarian needs in today's world. The extraordinary needs in Cyprus and elsewhere demand that we take extraordinary steps to utilize all readily available sources of funds—including those scheduled loan repayments which will revert to the Treasury, unless Congress and the administration act to use them for humanitarian purposes in the interest of world stability and peace. The amendment I introduce today will help accomplish this end.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the amendment, as well as a section-by-section analysis of its provisions, be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the amendment and analysis were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

AMENDMENT No. 1878

At the end of the bill, add the following new section:

RECONSTRUCTION, RELIEF, AND REHABILITATION

SEC. 33. (a) Section 203 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by inserting immediately after "of this part." the following: "The balance of such receipts for fiscal year 1975 is authorized to be made available for the purposes of sections 639B, 639C, and 639D of this Act."

(b) Section 639B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding at the end thereof the following: "Notwithstanding any prohibitions or restrictions contained in this or any other Act, the President is authorized to furnish assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, for reconstruction and economic development programs in the drought-stricken nations of Africa."

Such assistance shall be furnished solely out of funds made available under section 203 of this Act to carry out this section."

(c) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding after section 639B a new section 639C as follows:

"SEC. 639C. RELIEF AND REHABILITATION IN BANGLADESH AND CYPRUS.—(a) The Congress finds that the recent flooding in the People's Republic of Bangladesh, and the civil and international strife in the Republic of Cyprus, have caused great suffering and hardship for the peoples of the two Republics which cannot be alleviated with their internal resources. The President shall make every effort to develop and implement programs of relief and rehabilitation, in conjunction with other nations providing assistance, the United Nations, and other concerned international and regional organizations and voluntary agencies, to alleviate the hardships caused in these two nations.

"(b) Notwithstanding any prohibitions or restrictions contained in this or any other Act, the President is authorized to furnish assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, for disaster relief, rehabilitation, and related programs in the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the Republic of Cyprus. Such assistance shall be furnished solely out of funds made available under section 203 of this Act to carry out this section."

(d) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by striking after section 639C, as added by subsection (c) of this section, the following new section:

"SEC. 639D. DISASTER RELIEF AND REHABILITATION.—Notwithstanding any prohibitions or restrictions contained in this or any other Act, the President is authorized to furnish assistance, on such terms and conditions as he may determine, for disaster relief, rehabilitation and related programs in the case of disasters that require large scale relief and rehabilitation efforts which cannot be met adequately with the funds available for obligation under section 451 of this Act. Such assistance shall be furnished solely out of funds made available under section 203 of this Act to carry out this section."

(e) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 is amended by adding after section 639D, as added by subsection (d) of this section, the following new section:

"SEC. 639E. INTERNATIONALIZATION OF ASSISTANCE.—Assistance for the purposes set forth in Sections 639A, 639B, 639C, and 639D shall be distributed wherever practicable under the auspices of and by the United Nations and its specialized agencies, other international organizations or arrangements, multilateral institutions, and private voluntary agencies."

SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF THE AMENDMENT

The purpose of this amendment is to permit the President to respond to the disasters in Cyprus and Bangladesh, to have the authority to respond to future disasters of a like nature, and to permit him to complement disaster relief for the drought-stricken nations of Africa with long-term development and reconstruction assistance which will facilitate a reorientation of the Sahelian and Ethiopian economies and will halt the advance of the desert. Absent such efforts, the African nations are likely to endure a perpetual and ever-growing disaster.

This amendment also directs that both reconstruction and relief assistance be undertaken with other donors, international organizations, and voluntary agencies.

Subsection (a): This subsection provides a funding source for the Sahelian and Ethiopian development authority, the Bangladesh and Cyprus relief authorizations and future large scale disasters which other portions of this amendment create. Presently, A.I.D. may use 50% of the scheduled loan repayments for new loans under its regular development accounts. The balance reverts to the Treasury. This subsection makes the 1975 balance available for loans or grants for the purposes set forth below. A.I.D. estimates that this balance will total 119 million. Although only 1975 receipts will be used, the funds need not be used during this fiscal year but will remain available for use as multilateral programs for the Sahel, Bangladesh and Cyprus develop. By using the loan repayments, it will not be necessary to appropriate new obligational authority.


Subsection (b): Last year the Congress enacted Section 639B which urged the Executive to develop, in conjunction with other donors and international organizations, long-range development plans in the drought-stricken African nations. Congress indicated its belief that the short-range reaction to the disaster

(authorized by Section 639A) must be followed by reconstruction and development that will halt or reverse the advance of the desert, if the inhabitants of the area are ever to overcome their misfortune and participate in a self-sustaining economy. This subsection complements that directive by authorizing the President to furnish such assistance. There are some restrictions in the Act that will work against this effort, however. One example is the 25% local participation requirement of Section 110(a). The drought-stricken regions of Africa are confronted with such enormous problems that their scant resources cannot provide even 25% of the cost of reconstruction. For this reason, the language "notwithstanding any prohibitions or restrictions . . ." is included. The amendment's sponsors believe that this authorization will greatly facilitate the executive Branch's attempts to involve other nations and organizations in development plans by showing the seriousness of our commitment.

Subsection (c) : This subsection responds to the misfortunes of the people of Cyprus and Bangladesh. In both cases, events beyond the control of the local populace—armed conflict in one case and devastating flooding in the other—have caused great suffering and hardship to the respective populations. Emergency relief and rehabilitation in large but still undetermined amounts is needed in both situations. The Congress recognizes this need and authorizes and encourages the President to make every effort to work in concert with other concerned nations and organizations to provide assistance to these two areas. As in subsection (b), a waiver of the restrictions of the Act is necessary. Such restrictions as sections 620(a)(3) and (n), which prohibit assistance to countries whose ships carry cargoes to Cuba and North Vietnam respectively, must be overcome. Other disaster relief provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act contain similar language which permit the Act's prohibitions to be overridden.

Subsection (d) : Rather than reacting to disasters some time after they occur, this subsection will give the President the authority to respond quickly to large-scale disasters the nature and consequence of which cannot yet be foreseen. Drawing on the same funding source as the other portions of this disaster oriented provision, this subsection will be available for efforts beyond those possible under the Contingency Fund of Sec. 451. This section will allow response when disasters are so serious and on such a large scale that an extensive effort will be needed. The funds allocated under Sec. 451 are authorized primarily for disaster relief purposes, but are limited to \$30 million under current authorizations. This subsection makes it possible for the U.S. to respond promptly to the Sahels, Cypruses and Bangladeshes of the future without obtaining new authorizing and appropriating legislation. Since this subsection does focus on a need that will transcend normal policy restrictions, this provision includes a waiver of the restrictions of this and other laws. Such a waiver is consistent with the other disaster relief provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act.

Subsection (e) : Stipulates that the assistance provided under all the above sections "shall be distributed wherever practicable under the auspices of and by the United Nations and its specialized agencies, other international organizations or arrangements, multilateral institutions, and private voluntary agencies."



APPENDIX IV

TEXT OF SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF AUGUST 19, 1974, AND OFFICIAL STATEMENTS ON THE CYPRUS ISSUE BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF AUGUST 19, 1974

Secretary KISSINGER. I would like to begin with a few observations about the tragic death of Ambassador [Rodger P.] Davies.

Ambassador Davies has been a close associate for all the years that I have been in Washington. He worked closely with me on Middle East problems when he was Deputy Assistant Secretary. His performance after he was appointed Ambassador in Cyprus has been outstanding. I think I can do no better than to read to you two cables which I sent to him, one on July 22, the other on August 10.

On July 22 I sent him the following cable :

"I would like to express my thanks for your performance and that of your staff during the last week. I relied heavily on your good judgment and on the excellent reporting from Nicosia. The steadiness and courage displayed by you and your staff under dangerous conditions were exemplary. The Embassy's overall performance deserves the highest commendation. Please convey my congratulations and profound thanks to all members of your staff. Hopefully, and in great measure due to your efforts, the situation will calm in Cyprus."

Then on August 10 I sent him another cable :

"Art Hartman [Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs] has just reported to me in some detail on the magnificent performance of all of you under the most dangerous and trying circumstances. Your courage under fire, your accurate, perceptive and calm reporting, and your continued efforts to further our policy and protect American citizens with a reduced and overworked staff are a credit to you and are in the finest tradition of the Service."

My associates will tell you that the highest praise they usually get from me is the absence of criticism. And I want to call your attention to these two cables which express the extraordinary performance of Ambassador Davies. Those of us who have known him will miss him for his outstanding human qualities.

The Foreign Service, which is often criticized, has produced no better representative. And his work is in the best traditions of a Service to which dedication and the performance of a national duty are the principal objectives.

I have sent the following message to Ambassador Davies' children :

"You both have my deepest sympathy in this tragic time. While there is little that anyone can say at a moment such as this to lessen the sorrow, I want you to know that we share your deep sense of loss. Your father was loved, respected and admired by all of his colleagues in the Foreign Service and the State Department. You should be very proud of him; we are. Mrs. Kissinger and I stand ready to do anything we can to help in the difficult months ahead."

You know that the White House has already announced that the President has ordered that a plane be sent for the children. I have asked our Deputy Under Secretary of State, [L. Dean] Brown, whose distinguished service includes service as Ambassador in Jordan in very difficult circumstances, to go out with this plane, to represent the United States in Cyprus until we can appoint an Ambassador and get him in place. The designation of an officer of the distinction of Ambassador Brown leaves no doubt of the importance we attach to a speedy and peaceful resolution of the Cyprus issue.

This morning also, President Clerides called me to express his personal sorrow at the loss of Ambassador Davies, whom he described as a close personal and very trusted friend. I assured President Clerides that the United States fully understood the lack of responsibility of the Cyprus Government for this tragic event. I assured him that the United States would continue a major effort to

bring about peace, and he urged us to make such an effort. I emphasized to him, however, that these efforts would not be helped by anti-American demonstrations that were unjustified by the record and that could only create conditions to hamper these efforts.

I also have had an opportunity this morning to speak with President Ford about the situation in the eastern Mediterranean. We were in close touch by telephone yesterday, and we have met personally several times in the preceding days. President Ford has asked me to make the following statement on behalf of the United States:

First, the United States shall insist on the strict maintenance of the cease-fire on Cyprus.

Second, the imperative and urgent need is to begin negotiations.

Third, we will continue to support efforts to bring the parties to the negotiating table.

Fourth, the United States will play any role requested by the parties. We are also prepared to support the able efforts of the British Foreign Secretary, [James] Callaghan, in this regard.

Fifth, in these negotiations, we believe it will be necessary for Turkey, as the stronger power on the ground, to display flexibility and a concern for Greek sensitivities, both in terms of territory and the size of military forces on the island. I have made this point directly this morning to the Prime Minister of Turkey. I have been assured that the Turkish Government considers the demarcation line negotiable and that it will carry out the provisions of the Geneva agreement calling for phased reductions of troops on Cyprus.

Sixth, the United States greatly values the traditional friendship of Greece. It has the highest regard for Prime Minister Karamanlis and wishes every success to his democratic government. We will use our influence in any negotiation to take into full account Greek honor and national dignity. At the same time, we assume that all of our allies, including Greece, join in collective defense in their own interests. We are willing to strengthen these common alliance ties and to help the Greek Government in any way possible. We will not be pressured by threat of withdrawal from the [NATO] alliance, or anti-American demonstrations, which in any event are totally unjustified by our record.

I repeat that this statement has been gone over by President Ford.

Question. Will we get a copy?

Secretary KISSINGER. You will have a copy—I suppose we will have a copy available.

Question. May I ask, has the President been in touch with Prime Minister Ecevit?

Secretary KISSINGER. I have been in touch with him, and I affirm that the answer is "Yes."

Question. Will you take questions?

Secretary KISSINGER. Reluctantly.

Question. Last week, one of your associates described as plain "baloney" suggestions that the United States has tilted toward Turkey. Do you share in that view? And can you tell us specifically the consideration that was given to cutting off arms to Turkey and why arms were not cut off during the building crisis?

Secretary KISSINGER. With the speaker sitting here and looking balefully at me, my options, as they say, are severely limited—I completely support the statement of Mr. McCloskey [Ambassador at Large Robert J. McCloskey].

The situation on Cyprus tilted toward Turkey not as a result of American policy but as a result of the actions of the previous Greek Government which destroyed the balance of forces as it had existed on the island.

The United States did not threaten the cutoff of military aid to Turkey, for these reasons: First, it was considered that such an action would be ineffective and would not prevent the threatening eventuality; secondly, as was pointed out in this statement, we are giving economic and military aid as a reflection of our common interest in the defense of the eastern Mediterranean. Once such a decision is taken, it will have the most drastic consequences and not just over a period of time covering a few days but over an extended period of time.

For all these reasons, it was judged that the United States would be both ineffective and counterproductive to threaten the cutoff of aid.

Short of this, however, we made the most repeated and urgent representations to Turkey in order to prevent the military action that happened. We have

criticized the action, and we believe also that the inflexibility of all of the parties in Geneva contributed to it.

Question. Mr. Secretary, I don't know the exact wording, but back earlier you said, "The United States will play"—this is in the President's statement—"The United States will play any role requested by the parties." Is that correct? You will await some request from them, or do you have any initiatives to take on your own?

Secretary KISSINGER. First of all, I think the exact status of the statement I read is that it is not a statement "by" the President. It is a statement approved and directed by the President—and I don't know what the distinction is but generally, Presidential statements are made at the White House.

But the practical consequences are the same, because it has been gone over with the President, and he has asked me to make it in his name.

Now on "Have practical steps been proposed?"—it is my understanding that the British Government is considering an initiative, which we shall support. We have also made clear to the parties that we are prepared to use any alternative method that promises results.

As you know, during the last week, we offered to all of the parties a more active American role, and it is up to them to avail themselves of it.

We have not yet made any specific proposal as to a particular solution, but you will see in the statement that I have just read our view as to the direction in which the negotiations should go.

Question. Can I follow that up, Mr. Secretary? Has there been any request by the parties to get you more personally involved by either going there personally—and what would be the reaction if you were asked?

Secretary KISSINGER. There has not been any formal request, and our first effort now is to get the parties to the conference table.

We would be prepared to entertain any request that offered a prospect of success.

Question. Mr. Secretary, there has been widespread criticism around the world from diplomats, as well as from public demonstrators, that the United States used "quiet diplomacy" which was so quiet during the past four weeks that it was ineffective. Can you address yourself to whether the United States at an earlier point might have done what it has done today, if it had issued a firm, specific statement?

Also, you have been burned in effigy on Lafayette Square, I believe for the first time.

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, I am honored—is it really only the first time? [Laughter.]

Question. In Lafayette Square, I believe.

Secretary KISSINGER. I hope you all realize that half of the demonstrators were State Department employees. [Laughter.]

Let us understand the context within which the negotiations have taken place.

Until early August, until in fact August 8, it was the general judgment of all those dealing with the negotiations, including specifically that of the United Kingdom, that the conference in Geneva would lead to a settlement and that in fact it would, after an initial phase which would be conducted by Foreign Ministers, break up into working groups that would settle the issue.

Under those circumstances, it would have been highly inappropriate for the United States to make a public statement of the solution that it advocated.

After it became apparent that the negotiations in Geneva were heading for a stalemate, the United States, first, responded to every request by the principal mediator, the British Foreign Secretary, for specific assistance and specific proposals. In addition, the United States made many demarches to Turkey to prevent the threatened military action.

And it [the United States] would have preferred if, perhaps, some more flexibility could have been shown by all of the parties in Geneva.

Our judgment was that a public statement would freeze the positions and that it would not achieve the objective of thwarting a military attack.

After the event, it is never possible to prove whether some other course might not have been successful. Our judgment was that under the circumstances quiet diplomacy would lead to these results. But there is a limit to what diplomacy can achieve. It cannot substitute for an existing relationship of forces.

We understand the frustrations of the Greek community. We understand also the frustrations and disappointments of the Greek Government—but it is

important to remember that the original dislocations were not of our own making and that the United States, while it will try to be helpful, cannot solve all problems around the world.

With respect to the demonstrations, it is worth while to remember that a few years ago the demonstrators were complaining about excessive American involvement. Now the complaint seems to be the opposite.

Question. Mr. Secretary, has the perception of the United States as "tilting toward Turkey," regardless of whether it's correct or incorrect, in any way hampered your efforts to serve as an effective mediator between the two sides?

Secretary KISSINGER. I think that it is understandable that Greek emotions run very deep at this moment.

I believe that upon calmer reflection the responsible Greek leaders will recognize that the United States has shown deep sympathy for the Greek Government, that we welcome the present democratic government in Greece, and that within the limits of what was possible we have attempted to pay a constructive role.

I think the Greek Government will also realize that the U.S. roles can be very important in bringing about a result consistent with the dignity and honor of all of the parties—and we hope it will realize that anti-American demonstrations and anti-American gestures do not contribute to our effectiveness.

Question. Mr. Secretary, yesterday, Secretary [of Defense James R.] Schlesinger talked about the arms embargo and the continued Turkish advances, and it sounded like it was still an active possibility if the Turks continued their military operations on Cyprus. Is it? And to what point do we invoke some form of embargo?

Secretary KISSINGER. I do not wish to speak of circumstances that have not arisen. We have been given assurances by the Turkish Government that it would strictly abide by the cease-fire—and these assurances were reiterated in my conversations with Prime Minister Ecevit this morning.

I do not want to consider what our point of view would be if it turned out that these assurances weren't correct.

Question. Mr. Secretary, on the question about military assistance, please, the Foreign Assistance Act stated—

Secretary KISSINGER. Where is the question?

Question. I am asking the question from back here. The Foreign Assistance Act states—

Secretary KISSINGER. I thought I was looking at Bernie Gwertzman.

Question. That defense services to any country shall be furnished solely for internal security and for legitimate self-defense. It also states that any country which uses articles which we have given them in substantial violation of the act shall be immediately ineligible for further assistance.

The question that I am asking is whether or not, what your understanding of the legal terms of the act are, whether or not we are not required under the terms of the act to cut military assistance to Turkey?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, I will have to get a legal opinion on that subject, which I have not done. The considerations from a policy point of view that were at the mind of the President and myself have been stated here.

Question. In your conversation with the Prime Minister of Turkey today, just to broaden one of your points, do you have the understanding that the one-third of Cyprus which is now under Turkish control can be significantly reduced in size?

Secretary KISSINGER. I have the understanding that it can be reduced in size.

Question. But not significantly.

Secretary KISSINGER. I did not go into that much detail.

Question. Mr. Secretary, in view of the crisis in Cyprus, can you assess, or could you reassess, the capability of the United States to stop or limit local wars between smaller states?

Secretary KISSINGER. Well, the United States has never claimed, and could not accept the proposition, that it must stop every local war between smaller states wherever they occur.

Secondly, it is also clear that the United States cannot be asked to redress any upset in any balance, regardless of how it has occurred and where it has occurred, by its own military forces.

We are disappointed by the outcome, by the actions of various of the parties at various times on Cyprus.

We chose—in order not to internationalize the issues too much—to support Britain, which had a legal position as a guaranteeing power in its mediating effort. We are prepared to continue to do this, and we are prepared also to make other efforts.

I do not think it is fair to generalize from this one event, which had a long and complicated history, on a global basis.

Question. Mr. Secretary, earlier you spoke about a new British initiative. Could you give us an idea as to what it would be, what would be the direction of it?

Secretary KISSINGER. I saw a ticker before I came here in which this had allegedly been announced by the British Foreign Office, and I do not want to go into the details of it, because it has been the subject of confidential discussions over the weekend. I simply wanted to indicate the U.S. support for it.

Question. Mr. Secretary, on the one hand, just a couple minutes ago, you did not rule out totally the cutting off, or the possible cutting off, of military aid. You merely said you didn't want to discuss circumstances which have not yet arisen. But on the other hand, you gave us two very good reasons why the cutoff of military aid would not be effective anyway. Why can you not rule it out?

Secretary KISSINGER. The cutoff of military aid was judged not to be effective in the circumstances existing last week. It is a step we would take only in very extreme circumstances which, I repeat, have not arisen, and which I do not foresee. We cannot rule it out for all time, but we do not foresee it, and we are not threatening with it now.

Question. Mr. Secretary, what is happening on the negotiations on the Jackson amendment? Where does that stand? When do you expect that that will come to a fulfillment?

Secretary KISSINGER. As the three Senators said after the meeting with President Ford the other day, we made good progress in the negotiations. We hope that we can make further progress during this week.

Question. Mr. Secretary, in your conversations with the parties involved in the Cyprus situation, would you care to characterize the situation now as a winding down, or do you expect it to go on indefinitely?

Secretary KISSINGER. No, my impression is that the military operations have substantially wound down. It is of course a serious problem for Greece whether and under what circumstances it will enter negotiations. We favor early negotiations because we do not believe that the situation will improve. Indeed, the status quo will tend to be confirmed the longer the negotiations are delayed.

I have stated the American position with respect to the negotiations and with respect to the role we would play in a negotiation, and we expect to have clearer responses about that in the next few days.

Question. Mr. Secretary, could you explain the American position on the next step in the diplomatic dialogue in the Middle East? Yesterday's U.S.-Jordanian communique said that at an appropriately early date there should be a Jordanian-Israeli disengagement agreement. Does this now mean that the United States sees the next step being between Israel and Jordan?

Secretary KISSINGER. First of all, let me say that there are many versions of disengagement schemes between Jordan and Israel, and the United States did not imply by this statement that it backed any particular scheme between Jordan and Israel.

As to which negotiation should be next, I think we cannot decide until the round of discussions is completed which involves the Foreign Minister of Syria, who is arriving this week, the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, who is arriving next week; and we have also invited the Prime Minister of Israel to come here in the first half of September for discussions with the President. It is only after all of these discussions are completed that we can make a judgment as to what the next move should be.

Question. Following up on that, do you expect on your scheduled trip to India to stop off in the Middle East to possibly begin some shuttle diplomacy between Amman and Jerusalem?

Secretary KISSINGER. I think that as a general practice a foreign government must not expect that every time there is a crisis the Secretary of State will come rushing into the area and spend all of his time settling that particular crisis. On that basis we could never conduct a consistent American foreign policy. And it cannot become the rule that every issue is settled by the personal shuttle diplomacy of the Secretary of State.

I'm prepared to go to the Middle East for a specific trip. And I may, if there is an especially critical point, engage in a brief shuttle diplomacy. But I do not think it is in the U.S. interests nor in the interests of other countries to expect me personally to settle every issue no matter where it arises.

So we will support further diplomatic moves, but one must not expect the same degree of extended absences from Washington which characterized the last negotiations.

Question. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

U.S. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO CYPRUS

Following is a statement read to news correspondents on August 20 by Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations.

The Secretary has authorized an additional cash grant of \$500,000 to the International Red Cross to meet urgent needs that that group is in the process of identifying on the island of Cyprus.

This is in addition to a previous grant of \$225,000 that was made available through the American Red Cross to the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross].

In addition, the United States has made available from its AID regional disaster stockpile in Leghorn, Italy, over \$600,000 worth of tents, blankets, water containers, and other material which have been requested by the Red Cross.

The Secretary also instructed Ambassador [L. Dean] Brown, who is proceeding to Cyprus as his personal representative, to assess current needs urgently with the aid of a disaster relief expert from AID and report urgently on these needs.

The Secretary also welcomed U.N. Secretary General Waldheim's decision to ask the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to use his best efforts to actively pursue a humanitarian relief effort to help the people of Cyprus.

The Department is contacting representatives of European governments to encourage them to make a greater effort to meet what we are certain will be additional requirements for food, shelter, and medical supplies.

UNITED NATIONS CALLS FOR CEASE-FIRE IN CYPRUS: STATEMENTS BY THE U.S. DELEGATE

Following are statements made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative John Scali on July 16, 19, and 20 and by U.S. Deputy Representative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., on July 22 and 23.

AMBASSADOR SCALI, JULY 16

USUN press release 88 dated July 16

The United States strongly deplores the violence which has upset the delicate balance on the island of Cyprus. Unhappily, such violence and bloodshed have all too often influenced the fate of this Republic.

We have listened with keen attention to the report of the Secretary General on recent developments there. I am sure that all of us share a common sense of relief that Archbishop Makarios is alive and free. Unfortunately, there is much more we still do not know about the emerging situation on Cyprus, and it is difficult at this moment to see clearly whether and how the Council can make a positive contribution.

We continue to support the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus and its existing constitutional arrangements. We urge all other states to support a similar policy. We wish to urge in particular that all interested parties exercise the utmost restraint and statesmanship and avoid actions which might further worsen the situation.

AMBASSADOR SCALI, JULY 19

[USUN press release 91 dated July 19]

We are gathered at a moment when peace is clearly threatened in the eastern Mediterranean. As responsible members of the Security Council I believe that we all have an obligation to ask ourselves what is the most useful contribution we can make to avoid conflict and to stabilize peace.

We have listened with great attentiveness to the words of Archbishop Makarios. We join in the sense of relief that all of us feel that he is able to be with us today and to express his views so eloquently.

My government looks forward to welcoming President Makarios in Washington to discuss with him what additional steps can be taken to resolve this crisis and to help end the suffering and the agony of the Cypriot people.

Let there be no misunderstanding about the attitude of the U.S. Government in this situation. As I stated in the Council on Tuesday, the U.S. Government continues to support the independence, the sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of Cyprus and the existing constitutional arrangements.

Further, I would like to emphasize a fundamental point. The United States does not consider *enosis*, or union between Greece and Cyprus, as an acceptable solution of the Cyprus problem. The United States continues to believe in the future of a free and independent Cyprus as a sovereign nation capable of making its own decisions in full equality with the rest of the independent countries of the world.

We do not consider military intervention by any party for any reason to be justified in the present situation. In our view, Mr. President, the first and very important step is that all interested parties continue to exercise the utmost restraint and good judgment to prevent this crisis from taking further unfortunate turns. In particular, the U.S. Government is firmly opposed to any attempt to bring about a military solution to the present problem. Such attempts would severely, perhaps irretrievably, set back the negotiating process, which alone can bring about the peaceful and constitutional solution which we all desire.

Therefore we most earnestly appeal to all governments concerned to resist the temptation to settle this issue by force. We ask them instead to pursue the much harder but wiser course of negotiation.

Having said this, however, I am sure that all of us around this table will recognize that there are many critical uncertainties in the present situation. We are gratified to note that the fighting on the island apparently has ceased. Yet the threat of military action in this area remains a grim prospect.

I note with considerable interest that the Representative of the Soviet Union is impressed by the fact that American citizens have sent messages to his Embassy expressing their view on this crisis. I am not surprised that he is impressed; American citizens have the right to communicate with anyone, regardless of the point of view they wish to express.

We are all aware of the special treaty provisions which govern the relationships of the governments concerned in Cyprus and the historically unique constitutional arrangements which were established to provide an acceptable basis of association between the Greek and Turkish communities.

Given the forcible overthrow of the existing government, it is quite understandable that strong emotions are widely felt about how to resolve the problem. It is also quite natural that many members feel compelled to pronounce themselves quickly on some of the very complicated issues involved.

At the same time, the Security Council does have very definite responsibilities which we must always keep clearly in mind. Our obligation is first and foremost to contribute to a peaceful resolution of disputes. Thus in considering what action we should take, we should ask ourselves precisely what it is that we are trying to achieve. What we clearly should not be seeking are pronouncements which serve only propaganda purposes or are without practical effect or which because of their nature would serve to inflame an already aggravated situation.

For example, one suggestion proposed in informal consultations is to have the Council demand that Greece remove its officers in the Cypriot National Guard. At this point I merely suggest that if such a proposal is pursued, members of the Council should carefully weigh the implications. Would it perhaps lead to an even more unstable situation? What would be the prospects of compliance with such an appeal? I raise these questions without foreshadowing or prejudicing my government's ultimate position on this matter.

And lest there be any misunderstanding about the general attitude of the United States, my government has always opposed intervention in the internal affairs of one country by another, and to the extent that this may be the case in Cyprus, I repeat we deplore it. We believe that this Council is unanimous in its view that the Cyprus crisis demands a peaceful and constitutional solution. But what we need to search for, of course, before we can pronounce wisely, is the best way to achieve this result.

In our view, it can only be accomplished through discussions among the parties who are themselves directly involved. These discussions are already underway. Intensive consultations have been taking place in London between the British and Turkish Governments and a representative of my own government. Other consultations are taking place urgently in the area.

Under these circumstances, the United States considers it to be a serious error to rush to judgment on an issue of this gravity. We have an obligation to peace, to statesmanship, to allow enough time for a peaceful resolution of this crisis, no matter how difficult or insurmountable the deadlock may seem.

My government has had some experience in bridging differences which have defied solution in this part of the world. Let us not at this stage permit over-hasty actions in another crisis in this important region complicate and delay efforts and processes outside this chamber. Together, we can achieve what neither can achieve alone. Let us give peace a chance.

AMBASSADOR SCALI, JULY 20

First Statement

[USUN press release 92 dated July 20]

We convene here today in the wake of open military action in the eastern Mediterranean. To our deep regret, Turkish troops have landed on Cyprus. This Council, all too familiar with the antagonisms which have shaped Greek-Turkish relations on Cyprus, needs no reminder of what the Turkish landing forebodes for the stability of the island and what a serious threat is posed for peace in the area. Regrettably the process of diplomacy was not given a chance to run its course. The people of Cyprus are the tragic losers, once more overtaken by events sadly beyond their capability to control. Indeed, Mr. President, we are all losers as international peace hangs most precariously and dramatically in the balance.

My government deplores the pressures and interventions which contributed to the Turkish action on Cyprus and for which Greece must bear a heavy share of the responsibility. However, this invasion in no way serves the hopes for peace of the Turkish community on Cyprus or, indeed, the cause of peace in the world. Neither can we be convinced that foreign military intervention in Cyprus, from whatever quarter and by whatever means, has at any time been justifiable.

We oppose any intervention in the internal affairs of a member state of these United Nations.

My government has worked untiringly these past days in an attempt to forestall the escalation toward intervention in the eastern Mediterranean. Tragically, with the Turkish intervention last night, another step has been taken toward exactly that which we have attempted to forestall.

Turkey is and will remain an ally of the United States; Greece is and will remain an ally of the United States.

It is in the interest of the people of Greece and the people of Turkey to insure that Greece remains the ally of Turkey. As friends for a generation, both peoples have made giant strides; as enemies, they stand to lose all.

It is in the interest of the people of Cyprus as well as those of Greece and Turkey and all members of this Council that Cyprus not become a Mediterranean battleground.

The United States will continue to work with its friends toward this goal. We urge the Governments of Greece and Turkey to display to the members of this Council the maximum spirit of restraint and compromise in the interest of peace.

We believe that with good will, common sense, and extraordinary statesmanship by all concerned, it is still not too late to avert major tragedy.

We appreciate that all members of the Security Council have joined in calling for an immediate cease-fire. We owe the embattled people of Cyprus no less.

All the members of this Council have wisely joined with us in a request to the Governments of Greece and Turkey to accept immediately the United Kingdom proposal for negotiations among the guarantor powers. We believe that at this time the Security Council can make no greater contribution to the cause of peace and constitutional government in Cyprus.

Second Statement

[USUN press release 93 dated July 20]

Again the Representative of the Soviet Union has peeked into some mysterious corner and discovered that it is really NATO, the North Atlantic Pact, which is instigating the tragic developments on Cyprus. It seems to be a curious recurring nightmare, a sort of James Bond-ish twist of the real facts.

The NATO allies who have spoken up at this Council table have deplored all violations of the independence, the sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

Along with the United Kingdom and France, we have sought to promote and encourage negotiations in London for the purpose of restoring peace and the return of constitutional government to the island of Cyprus. If this is plotting, I submit to you perhaps the world needs more of it.

AMBASSADOR BENNETT, JULY 22

[USUN press release 94 dated July 22]

It is indeed high time that the cease-fire take effect. My government, as is well known, has taken a very active part in trying to supplement the work of this Council and to arrange a cease-fire, with very active diplomacy in the capitals concerned.

All parties in the fighting, certainly the two governments away from Cyprus, have publicly accepted the cease-fire. Now, the firing did not immediately cease at 10 o'clock. I believe that is fairly usual in such circumstances. There are many technical complications. But I would call on the parties to give their best efforts, and I would call on the population of Cyprus similarly. To the best of our most recent information, the two armed forces involved, Greece and Turkey, have begun to observe the cease-fire. There is still communal fighting going on. That may be the most difficult to stop. But I would hope that we can, before this day is over, have a genuine cease-fire.

Let the killing cease! It seems to me that is our priority and primary purpose and objective at this time. And then let us go forward with the negotiations, as our British colleague has described them, negotiations which hold such tremendous importance for the future, if we are going to have some resolution of this age-old problem and allow the decent people of Cyprus, whatever their historical or ethnic origin, to have a life of their own and to live in peace in their own way.

The Secretary General has described to us the extreme tests which are being imposed on UNFICYP [United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus]. My government has always supported UNFICYP. It continues to do so, and if more men are needed there, as circumstances would seem to dictate, then we would support what the Secretary General has outlined as the means of supplementing the present force.

And so, Mr. President, despite the tragedy through which we have been living—the people of Cyprus living it most intensely of all—this past week, I would agree with our British colleague that this is a time for looking forward. Let us bind up the wounds of war. Let us try to look at this in an objective way to give to each side of this communal situation its own right to exist. We can look forward to an independent and single Cyprus. Let us go forward toward a better fate for Cyprus.

AMBASSADOR BENNETT, JULY 23

[USUN press release 95 dated July 23]

I think that little needs to be said here. The facts as we know them and as we have just heard them from the Secretary General speak for themselves, and they are somber enough for all of us. The cease-fire in Cyprus agreed to yesterday by all the parties is not being observed. The guns are still firing; the innocent are still dying.

The resolution which this Council has just adopted, as the resolution we adopted on the 20th, was unanimously adopted. The new resolution is short and to the point. In this resolution we demand that the parties, all the parties, comply immediately with the cease-fire provisions of Resolution 353 and cease the hostilities in Cyprus, hostilities which have brought suffering and death to countless innocent people and which so clearly threaten international peace and security.

The United States has joined in supporting the resolution adopted by this Council because of our determination that the cease-fire ordered by the Council on July 20 should be made fully effective at the earliest possible moment. My government believes that the governments and peoples of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, as well as all the rest of us, want an end to the fighting and that they want it now.

Nothing is more difficult, Mr. President, nothing requires greater political leadership and courage, than to stop hostilities once they have started. I call on the parties to exercise that leadership and that courage now. I call on the parties to stop the blood-letting and turn to the negotiating table. The cease-fire has to be the first step toward peace. It must be the basis for other efforts toward conciliation and for other developments which can lead on to a brighter future for the people of Cyprus.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR BENNETT

[USUN press release 97 dated July 31]

The United States is deeply gratified by the agreement reached in Geneva among the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. In that connection, Mr. President, I should like to read a statement issued yesterday by the White House in Washington:

"The United States welcomes the announcement in Geneva of the agreement reached by the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey. We consider this an important step toward the restoration of peace and stability in Cyprus.

We commend the intensive and patient efforts of the three governments concerned which brought about this achievement. In particular, we wish to pay tribute to the skill and persistence of Mr. Callaghan, the Minister of State of Great Britain, who, as leader of the conference, deserves great credit for its success, and to the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey."

We believe this agreement justifies the wisdom of this Council in adopting Resolution 353 and thereafter in supporting the intensive efforts at Geneva to negotiate the serious issues involved in this Cyprus crisis.

I want to reiterate the view of my government that we consider this agreement an important step toward the restoration of peace and stability in Cyprus.

We particularly welcome the recognition by the three Foreign Ministers of the "importance of setting in train, as a matter of urgency, measures to adjust and regularize within a reasonable period of time the situation in the Republic of Cyprus on a lasting basis," having regard to the international agreements of 1960 and Resolution 353 of the Security Council. My government wants to see strict maintenance of the cease-fire in the area and the prompt implementation of other portions of the agreement signed in Geneva. My government very much hopes that this agreement foreshadows a quick return to more normal conditions in Cyprus, conditions which will bring to all the people of Cyprus a return to constitutional government and a new measure of political stability and general well-being.

We note that the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus is asked to undertake certain responsibilities under the terms of the agreement of July 30. UNFICYP has been on duty now for more than 10 years. And we may recall that Security Council Resolution 186 of March 4, 1964, recommended in paragraph 5 "that the function of the Force should be, in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions." We consequently believe it appropriate to urge the Secretary General to take immediately any necessary steps to this end. Consistent with this view, my delegation supports the resolution before the Council requesting the Secretary General to take appropriate action, and we urge its approval without delay.

Mr. President, an important first step has been taken toward the normalization of conditions in Cyprus, and it points the way toward the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 353 of July 20. We believe it is now the obligation of this Council to maintain and encourage the momentum toward peace which has now been generated. We strongly urge members of this Council to support the efforts of the parties and to place no doctrinal or procedural barriers in their way. Our individual and collective support for this Geneva agreement and its

continuing implementation will be our most important contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security in the area.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI

[USUN press release 90 dated Aug. 1]

• Mr. President [Yakov A. Malik]: I salute you as you return refreshed and relaxed from the Soviet Union in time to assume the Presidency of the Security Council. I express the hope that with your broad experience we can all join together in this month to help promote the peace. I wish to pay particular tribute to the skill and the wisdom with which Ambassador [Jovier] Perez de Cuellar has guided our deliberations in this past rather difficult month. This Council has seen many distinguished Presidents, but I am sure that the performance and the gentle wisdom of the Ambassador of Peru will rank among the very highest.

I am glad that we have done today what we should have done yesterday.

As Ambassador Bennett told this Council last night, the U.S. delegation believes it entirely appropriate to urge the Secretary General to take immediately any steps necessary to fulfill the recommendation in paragraph 5 of Security Council Resolution 186 of March 4, 1964. It reads as follows: "that the function of the Force should be, in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions."

Mr. President, in voting the two previous resolutions which this Council has considered in the past few days, some important first steps already have been taken to normalize conditions on Cyprus. In approving today's resolution, we can speed up the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 353 of July 20. The Council has now acted to maintain and to encourage the momentum toward peace which has been generated. We are confident that all parties involved in the complex Cyprus situation will do their utmost to keep the peace, to maintain the cease-fire without which prospects for negotiation toward a just and durable settlement would remain dim.

As we have done throughout these debates, we urge all members of this Council to support the efforts of the parties and to place no barriers of doctrine or procedure in their way. Our individual and collective support for the resolutions of the Security Council and the Geneva declaration—a roadmap for peace—will be a most important contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security in the area.

Mr. President, like the majority of the Council, my delegation was disappointed and concerned when it proved impossible yesterday to take prompt action of the kind needed to help make the cease-fire effective and thus to enhance the prospects for peace. We are concerned that delay offered opportunity for further violence. Today we have acted, and I believe we can congratulate ourselves that the Security Council has again acted as it should in a moment of crisis.

RESUMPTION OF CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS URGED IN U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL

STATEMENTS BY AMBASSADOR SCALI

Statement of August 14

[USUN press release 100 dated Aug. 14]

My delegation deeply regrets that almost a month after the approval of Security Council Resolution 353, we have found it necessary to meet once again in this hall to consider new steps to end violence on the island of Cyprus. We regret this all the more because this return of violence was so unnecessary. Promising negotiations had been going forward in Geneva pursuant to Resolution 353 and in keeping with the Charter of the United Nations and treaties of guarantee establishing the state of Cyprus. But, unhappily, in the absence of a conciliatory spirit at the conference table, these negotiations have been interrupted and the guns of war are speaking again.

The United States, Mr. President, is convinced that only through such negotiations can a settlement emerge which will restore constitutional government to Cyprus and peace and stability in the eastern Mediterranean. As this Council

is aware, the United States has lent its total support to this process. My government did this because of its close relations with its allies Greece and Turkey, because of its commitment to the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, because of its concern for the welfare of the Cypriot people of both communities, and also, but not least, because of its overriding concern for peace in the area.

We have given our full support to the valiant and tireless efforts of the United Kingdom, a guarantor power under the London-Zurich agreement, to bring about a measure of common understanding at Geneva which would point the way toward a new constitutional arrangement in Cyprus which takes into account the new realities. In this role we have been in constant touch with all of the parties to do whatever we could to encourage the negotiating process.

The United States has taken heart from the restoration of constitutional government in Greece so ably led by Prime Minister Karamanlis. The Greek Government has pursued with diligence the search for arrangements to restore constitutional government in Cyprus. As a guarantor power, Greece has legitimate interests which must be fully recognized.

We also pay tribute to the people of Cyprus of both communities, who have endured many hardships in the past month. The Acting President of Cyprus, Mr. Clerides, and the Turkish Vice President, Mr. Denktash, have both made major contributions in this complicated process of negotiation.

Turkey also has legitimate interests which must be fully recognized. My government made clear yesterday in a public statement its view that the position of the Turkish community on Cyprus requires considerable improvement and protection as well as a greater degree of autonomy.¹

My government, Mr. President, considers that it is the duty of this Council to do everything in keeping with Resolution 353 to aid in bringing the parties back to the negotiating table. It is only at that table that a consensus can emerge leading to a settlement which will be satisfactory to all the parties and which will bring peace and stability once again to this area.

The duty of this Council tonight is simply this: We must call for an immediate end to the fighting, and we must call for the earliest resumption of negotiations. My government pledges that it will continue its own efforts toward the end that the voice of reason will again be heard and the voice of the cannons once more stilled.

Statement of August 15

[USUN press release 107 dated Aug. 15]

It is with a sense of deep appreciation to those who seek to keep the peace on behalf of the United Nations that we have voted for this resolution [359] tonight, which was sponsored by five member countries. It is also with a sense of grief, however, because of the tragic news that three Austrian members of UNFICYP [United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus] have been killed while carrying out their duties on Cyprus. Our government extends its profound condolences to the Austrian Government and to the families of these brave men who have sacrificed their lives for the peace which is the goal of us all.

We further note with a feeling of deepest sorrow that an additional number of UNFICYP troops have been wounded in the fighting, 27 by the latest count of the Secretariat. These men are international heroes. They deserve not only our gratitude but our support so that their task can be facilitated, not hampered, as they carry out their tasks far from home, like other United Nations peacekeepers in the Middle East and in other areas. We, the representatives of our governments, who sit here in the safety of this chamber, must remember them because, regardless of nationality, they are our sons. We must make sure that they and their successors patrolling distant battlefields have the capacity and the mandate to carry out their dangerous assignments without requiring of them that they give up their lives.

¹ In a news briefing on Aug. 13, Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations, said:

"The U.S. position is as follows:

"We recognize the position of the Turkish community on Cyprus requires considerable improvement and protection. We have supported a greater degree of autonomy for them.

"The parties are negotiating on one or more Turkish autonomous areas. The avenues of diplomacy have not been exhausted. And therefore the United States would consider a resort to military action unjustified.

"We have made this clear to all parties."

Statement of August 16

[USUN press release 108 dated Aug. 16]

We can all take satisfaction from the Secretary General's report that at long last the guns are stilled on Cyprus. The cease-fire seems finally to be in effect. Regrettably, the U.N. peace forces, UNFICYP, have suffered further casualties. We extend our deepest sympathy to the Danish Government and to the bereaved families of these soldiers of peace who have given their lives selflessly in the service of others.

Mr. President, with the cease-fire now taking hold, we must also turn our attention to forging the peace, to establishing conditions under which the good people of Cyprus may live undisturbed and walk in paths of their own choosing.

My delegation hopes that, on reflection, all parties to the Cyprus dispute will decide it is in their own national interests to move on to Geneva without delay to resume the peace negotiations suspended earlier this week.

The success of these talks, under the chairmanship of the distinguished British Foreign Secretary, involves the peace of the eastern Mediterranean. The world is watching. The participants have an obligation to mankind to enter into negotiations in a spirit of conciliation and fairminded compromise to reach an understanding which will renew and indeed reinforce the historic friendship of the peoples of the area.

U.S. CALLS FOR INTERNATIONAL ACTION TO ASSIST REFUGEES IN CYPRUS

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI

[USUN press release 111 dated Aug. 30.]

First I would like to express to the Secretary General the thanks of my delegation and my government for his recent visits to Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey to discuss the situation on that island. In particular, we commend him for his statesmanlike role in bringing about a meeting on humanitarian questions in which Acting President Clerides, Vice President Denktash, and the [U.N.] High Commissioner for Refugees have participated. The value of such talks between the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities cannot be overemphasized.

For the sake of all of the people of Cyprus, we urge the international community to make every effort to help create a negotiating climate which can produce constructive solutions, particularly of humanitarian questions.

Mr. President, we have heard at length today from one delegate of a special formula for peace which his government is going to sell. To persuade others to accept it, we have heard some fairy tales from another era—the bold charges of mysterious machinations by unidentified members of NATO. Mr. President, these stories might amuse or titillate the readers of summertime fiction on the beaches of the Crimea, but such fairy tales will not help us solve the real problems of Cyprus. I think in this regard that we can all agree that an absolute prerequisite for solving the critical humanitarian problems on Cyprus is strict compliance with the cease-fire as called for in previous Security Council resolutions.

The United States shares the concern of the Secretary General and the parties for the plight of the refugees from both communities who have been made homeless. We commend the International Committee of the Red Cross and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, as well as other humanitarian organizations, for their outstanding efforts to give emergency assistance particularly to those whose lives have been dislocated. We urge all of the parties concerned to adhere scrupulously to international agreements concerning the human rights of civilians during times of conflict.

Upon the recommendation of the late American Ambassador to Cyprus, Rodger Davies, the United States has responded to appeals from the International Committee of the Red Cross for emergency humanitarian assistance. We have donated \$3.1 million as of now. This sum includes a cash contribution of \$725,000 plus airlifts of relief supplies, and emergency equipment such as tents, blankets, and other provisions. The United States stands ready to provide additional assistance based on recommendations from the International Red Cross and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. It is our view that such assistance goes to the heart of the issues before the Council today. We therefore appeal to the international community to join with us in responding to this humanitarian effort.

The United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has performed courageously in assisting the parties and international relief agencies in carrying out their crucial humanitarian responsibilities. The United States underscores its support for Security Council Resolution 359, which demands that all parties cooperate with UNFICYP in carrying out all of its tasks, "including humanitarian functions, in all areas of Cyprus and in regard to all sections of the population."

The effort to render assistance to the people of Cyprus is a necessary emergency measure. However, the imperative and urgent need is to resume negotiations. A negotiated settlement of the Cyprus dispute offers the best hope for all of the people on the island to live in peace and security.

The U.S. delegation supports the resolution before this Council and commends the spirit of compromise with which various points of view converged to produce it. Perhaps each delegation—and I would not exclude my own—would have preferred some variations in the text. Nonetheless, in our view, passage of this resolution can make positive contributions to easing the plight of refugees and should pave the way for further efforts to get broader negotiations under way again.

In closing, Mr. President, may I say a simple but no less heartfelt "thank you" to those who have spoken words of condolence on the memory of Ambassador Rodger Davies.

SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER'S COMMENT ON CYPRUS IN HIS ADDRESS BEFORE THE 29TH SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NEW YORK, SEPTEMBER 23, 1974 [excerpt from his address printed below]

CYPRUS

The tormented island of Cyprus is another area where peace requires a spirit of compromise, accommodation, and justice. The United States is convinced that the sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity of Cyprus must be maintained. It will be up to the parties to decide on the form of government they believe best suited to the particular conditions of Cyprus. They must reach accommodation on the areas to be administered by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities as well as on the conditions under which refugees can return to their homes and reside in safety. Finally, no lasting peace is possible unless provisions are agreed upon which will lead to the timely and phased reduction of armed forces and armament and other war material.

The United States is prepared to play an even more active role than in the past in helping the parties find a solution to the centuries-old problem of Cyprus. We will do all we can, but it is those most directly concerned whose effort is most crucial. Third parties should not be asked to produce miraculous outcomes not anchored in reality. Third parties *can* encourage those directly involved to perceive their broader interests; they can assist in the search for elements of agreement by interpreting each side's views and motives to the other. But no mediator can succeed unless the parties genuinely want mediation and are ready to make the difficult decisions needed for a settlement.

The United States is already making a major contribution to help relieve the human suffering of the people of Cyprus. We urge the international community to continue and, if possible, to increase its own humanitarian relief effort.

APPENDIX V

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS ON CYPRUS, 1974

(Security Council Resolutions of 1974, Nos. 353, 354, 355, 357, 358, 359, 360, and 361)

RESOLUTION 353, JULY 20

The Security Council, having considered the report of the Secretary-General at its 1779th meeting about the recent developments in Cyprus,

Having heard the statement made by the President of the Republic of Cyprus and the statements by the representatives of Cyprus, Turkey, Greece and other member countries,

Having considered at its present meeting further developments in the island, Deeply deploring the outbreak of violence and continuing bloodshed,

Gravely concerned about the situation which led to a serious threat to international peace and security, and which created a most explosive situation in the whole Eastern Mediterranean area,

Equally concerned about the necessity to restore the constitutional structure of the Republic of Cyprus, established and guaranteed by international agreements,

Recalling Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and subsequent resolutions of the Security Council on this matter,

Conscious of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Calls upon all States to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus;

2. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting as a first step to cease all firing and requests all States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any action which might further aggravate the situation;

3. Demands an immediate end of foreign military intervention in the Republic of Cyprus that is in contravention of operative paragraph 1;

4. Requests the withdrawal without delay from the Republic of Cyprus of foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international agreements including those whose withdrawal was requested by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, in his letter of 2 July 1974;

5. Calls on Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to enter into negotiations without delay for the restoration of peace in the area and constitutional government in Cyprus and to keep the Secretary-General informed;

6. Calls on all parties to co-operate fully with UNFICYP to enable it to carry out its mandate;

7. Decides to keep the situation under constant review and asks the Secretary-General to report as appropriate with a view to adopting further measures in order to ensure that peaceful conditions are restored as soon as possible.

RESOLUTION 354, JULY 23

The Security Council, reaffirming the provisions of its resolution 353 (1974) of 20 July 1974,

Demands that all parties to the present fighting comply immediately with paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 353 (1974) calling for an immediate cessation of all firing in the area and requesting all States to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any action which might further aggravate the situation.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION 355¹

The Security Council, recalling its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964, 353 (1974) of 20 July 1974 and 354 (1974) of 23 July 1974,

Noting that all States have declared their respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus,

Taking note of the Secretary-General's statement made at the 1788th meeting of the Security Council,

Requests the Secretary-General to take appropriate action in the light of his statement and to present a full report to the Council, taking into account that the cease-fire will be the first step in the full implementation of Security Council resolution 353 (1974).

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM

As members of the Council are aware, at 5 p.m. New York time on July 30, that is, yesterday, I received a communication from Mr. Callaghan, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, on behalf of the three Foreign Ministers who had been negotiating in Geneva, communicating to me the text of the declaration and statement which have been agreed to by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. The texts of the declaration and statement have been circulated as an official document (S/11398). I am sure the members of the Council will wish to give their urgent consideration to that document. I hope that the agreement reached in Geneva on the cease-fire will be a first step to the full implementation of Security Council Resolution 353 (1974).

Members of the Council will note that the declaration envisages certain tasks for UNFICYP. In particular, the declaration calls for action in consultation with UNFICYP to determine the size and character of the security zone, which will be entered by no forces other than those of UNFICYP. Other important functions are also foreseen for UNFICYP.

I wish to inform the Council that I have requested my Special Representative and the Force Commander of UNFICYP to give me a preliminary assessment of the practical implications of the declaration as far as UNFICYP is concerned. I shall report to the Council on the practical consequences involved.

The total strength of UNFICYP as of July 31 is 3,484 men. That total comprises 3,332 military personnel and 152 civilian police. By August 7 the total strength of UNFICYP will, it is estimated, be 4,238 men. When all the reinforcements currently pledged have arrived—by about August 12—the total strength of UNFICYP will be approximately 4,443.

I take this opportunity to draw the attention of members of the Council to the question of the nature of UNFICYP's continued presence in the Turkish area of control, which I mentioned to the Council on July 29 and which needs clarification. As you know, UNFICYP has been playing, and should continue to play, a most useful humanitarian role in all parts of the island of Cyprus in assisting the civilian population—Turkish and Greek Cypriots alike—who have been afflicted by the recent hostilities. This matter is now under discussion by UNFICYP with the Turkish Military Command in Cyprus. I am confident that these discussions will enable UNFICYP to continue to perform its role in all parts of the island with the full agreement of all the parties concerned.

I think that is as much as I should say at this stage. I am sure that the members of the Council are fully aware of the complexity of the situation. I do not have to say that I and my colleagues in the Secretariat, both here and in Cyprus, are prepared fully to cooperate with the parties in order to restore peaceful conditions in the island, so that negotiations can continue and Security Council Resolution 353 (1974) can be fully implemented.

RESOLUTION 357, AUGUST 14²

The Security Council, recalling its resolutions 353 (1974) of 20 July 1974, 354 (1974) of 23 July 1974, and 355 (1974) of 1 August 1974,

Deeply deploring the resumption of fighting in Cyprus contrary to the provisions of its resolution 353 (1974),

¹ U.N. doc. S/RES/355 (1974); adopted by the Council on Aug. 1 by a vote of 12 (U.S.) to 0, with 2 abstentions (Byelorussian SSR, USSR) and with the People's Republic of China not participating in the vote.

² Adopted by the Council unanimously on Aug. 14.

1. Reaffirms its resolution 353 (1974) in all its provisions and calls upon the parties concerned to implement those provisions without delay ;
2. Demands that all parties to the present fighting cease all firing and military action forthwith ;
3. Calls for the resumption of negotiations without delay for the restoration of peace in the area and constitutional government in Cyprus in accordance with resolution 353 (1974) ;
4. Decides to remain seized of the situation and on instant call to meet as necessary to consider what more effective measures may be required if the cease-fire is not respected.

RESOLUTION 358, AUGUST 15³

The Security Council, deeply concerned about the continuation of violence and bloodshed in Cyprus,

Deeply deploring the non-compliance with its resolution 357 (1974),

1. Recalls its resolutions 353 (1974), 354 (1974), 355 (1974) and 357 (1974) ;
2. Insists on the full implementation of the above resolutions by all parties with the immediate and strict observance of the cease-fire.

RESOLUTION 359, AUGUST 15⁴

The Security Council, noting with concern from the Secretary-General's reports on developments in Cyprus, in particular S/11353/Add.24 and 25, that casualties are increasing among the personnel of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus as a direct result of the military action which is still continuing in Cyprus,

Recalling that the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus was stationed in Cyprus with the full consent of the Governments of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece,

Bearing in mind that the Secretary-General was requested by the Security Council in resolution 355 (1974) of 1 August 1974 to take appropriate action in the light of his statement made at the 1788th meeting of the Council in which he dealt with the role, functions and strength of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus and related issues arising out of the most recent political developments in respect of Cyprus.

1. Deeply deplores the fact that members of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus have been killed and wounded ;
2. Demands that all parties concerned fully respect the international status of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus and refrain from any action which might endanger the lives and safety of its members ;
3. Urges the parties concerned to demonstrate in a firm, clear and unequivocal manner, their willingness to fulfil the commitments they have entered into in this regard ;
4. Demands further that all parties co-operate with the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus in carrying out its tasks, including humanitarian functions, in all areas of Cyprus and in regard to all sections of the population on Cyprus ;
5. Emphasizes the fundamental principle that the status and safety of the members of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, and for that matter of any United Nations peace-keeping force, must be respected by the parties under all circumstances.

RESOLUTION 360, AUGUST 16⁵

The Security Council, recalling its resolutions 353 (1974), 354 (1974), 355 (1974), 357 (1974) and 358 (1974).

Noting that all States have declared their respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus,

Gravely concerned at the deterioration of the situation in Cyprus, resulting from the further military operations, which constituted a most serious threat to peace and security in the Eastern Mediterranean area.

³ Adopted by the Council unanimously on Aug. 15.

⁴ Adopted by the Council on Aug. 15 by a vote of 14 (U.S.) to 0, with the People's Republic of China not participating in the vote.

⁵ Adopted by the Council on Aug. 16 by a vote of 11 (U.S.) to 0, with 3 abstentions (Byelorussian S.S.R., Iraq, U.S.S.R.), with the People's Republic of China not participating in the vote.

1. Records its formal disapproval of the unilateral military actions undertaken against the Republic of Cyprus ;

2. Urges the parties to comply with all the provisions of previous resolutions of the Security Council, including those concerning the withdrawal without delay from the Republic of Cyprus of foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international agreements ;

3. Urges the parties to resume without delay, in an atmosphere of constructive co-operation, the negotiations called for in resolution 353 (1974) whose outcome should not be impeded or prejudged by the acquisition of advantages resulting from military operations ;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to it as necessary with a view to the possible adoption of further measures designed to promote the restoration of peaceful conditions ;

5. Decides to remain permanently seized of the question and to meet at any time to consider measures which may be required in the light of the developing situation.

RESOLUTION 361 (1974)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 1795th meeting, on August 30, 1974

The Security Council, conscious of its special responsibilities under the United Nations Charter,

Recalling its resolutions 186 (1964) 353 (1974), 354 (1974), 355 (1974), 357 (1974), 358 (1974), 359 (1974) and 360 (1974),

Noting that a large number of people on the island have been displaced, and are in dire need of humanitarian assistance,

Mindful of the fact that it is one of the foremost purposes of the United Nations to lend humanitarian assistance in situations such as the one currently prevailing in Cyprus,

Noting also that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has already been appointed as Co-ordinator of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance for Cyprus with the task of co-ordinating relief assistance to be provided by United Nations programmes and agencies and from other sources,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General contained in document S/11473,

1. Expresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for the part he has played in bringing about talks between the leaders of the two communities in Cyprus ;

2. Warmly welcomes this development and calls upon those concerned in them to pursue the talks actively with the help of the Secretary-General and in the interests of the Cypriot people as a whole ;

3. Calls upon all parties to do everything in their power to alleviate human suffering, to ensure the respect of fundamental human rights for every person and to refrain from all action likely to aggravate the situation ;

4. Expresses its grave concern at the plight of the refugees and other persons displaced as a result of the situation in Cyprus and urges the parties concerned, in conjunction with the Secretary-General, to search for peaceful solutions of the problems of refugees, and take appropriate measures to provide for their relief and welfare and to permit persons who wish to do so to return to their homes in safety ;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to submit at the earliest possible opportunity a full report on the situation of the refugees and other persons referred to in paragraph 4 of this resolution and decides to keep that situation under constant review ;

6. Further requests the Secretary-General to continue to provide emergency United Nations humanitarian assistance to all parts of the population of the island in need of such assistance ;

7. Calls upon all parties, as a demonstration of good faith, to take, both individually and in co-operation with each other, all steps which may promote comprehensive and successful negotiations ;

8. Reiterates its call to all parties to co-operate fully with UNIFCYP in carrying out its task ;

9. Expresses the conviction that the speedy implementation of the provisions of this resolution will assist the achievement of a satisfactory settlement in Cyprus.

APPENDIX VI

REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON DEVELOPMENTS IN CYPRUS AND THE FIRST ASSESSMENT OF THE U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON DEVELOPMENTS IN CYPRUS

Since I reported to the Council on 20 July on developments in Cyprus, I have continued to receive regular reports from my Special Representative in Cyprus and from the Force Commander of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) on developments in the Island. The following information is based on three reports describing the situation at 0500, 0900 and 1100 hours local time on 21 July.

2. The fighting on the Island, which had died down during the night, grew in intensity during the morning of 21 July and was accompanied by air attacks by high-performance Turkish aircraft. There were reports of atrocities in scattered locations throughout the Island. Steps were being taken to evacuate foreign civilians to the British Sovereign Base areas. According to a later report, UNFICYP assisted the United Kingdom and United States authorities in the implementation of the scheme, which applied to all foreign nationals. More than 4,000 persons, including the persons trapped in the Ledra Palace Hotel, were collected, with no casualties reported, from various localities in Nicosia between 1200 and 1600 for dispatch to the British Sovereign Base area of Dhekelia.

3. In the Nicosia district, a truce arranged along the Green Line went into effect at 0630 hours local time, but at 1100 hours it was reported that fighting had broken out again along the Green Line. The United Nations has retained control of the Ledra Palace Hotel area, where 386 civilians remained. Despite this, the hotel came under heavy fire from mortars. The Canadian contingent is withdrawing its personnel to Camp Cronberg. A further Canadian soldier was reported wounded, bringing the total to seven.

4. There have been heavy air attacks by Turkish planes with bombs and rockets against the International Airport area. At 1010 hours local time, rounds were falling in the vicinity of UNFICYP headquarters and camp and 60 Turkish helicopters were overflying the airport area.

5. In the Kyrenia district, heavy fighting which occurred during the evening of 20/21 July for control of Kyrenia pass was reported to have died down by the next morning. On 21 July, National Guard troops were reported retreating towards Bellapais in United Nations landrovers with United Nations flags, said to have been captured from a Finnish patrol. The 12 members of the patrol are believed to be in National Guard hands. The National Guard garrison at Bellapais was attacked by aircraft and napalm was reported to have been used. Kyrenia was said to be quiet and believed to be in National Guard hands. During early firing, artillery fire from National Guard hit the United Nations Tjiklos Camp and two United Nations soldiers were wounded. At last reports, the camp and three OPs were still manned.

6. In the Famagusta district, there were reports of sporadic small-arms fire throughout the district and of National Guard artillery fire on the old city and of Turkish aircraft bombing Famagusta, with the use of napalm reported. One United Nations OP was withdrawn.

7. In the Larnaca district the Danish civilian police and outlying UNFICYP posts were withdrawn. Negotiations for a cease-fire broke down at 0335. Heavy fighting began with artillery and mortar fire by the National Guard. UNFICYP tried to reinstate the cease-fire but the National Guard resumed the attack at 0900. In the ensuing heavy fire, National Guard fired mortar bombs in the direction of United Nations Camp Leopold and Turkish Cypriots fired mortars from vicinity of the Camp. At 1030, Turkish Cypriots in Larnaca were reported to have begun surrendering.

8. In the Limassol district, 1100 Turkish Cypriots were reported to be in National Guard hands at 2250 on 20 July. They were to be allowed to return to the Turkish quarter after surrendering their arms. One UNFICYP soldier of the British contingent was accidentally killed while unloading a surrendered Turkish weapon. All British personnel in Limassol were concentrated in the Polemidhia Camp.

9. In the Paphos district, a large number of refugees are being held at St. Patrick's Camp. In Paphos town a cease-fire was reported to be in existence at 0900; and at 1100, all resistance by Turkish Cypriots there appeared to have stopped. UNFICYP was continuing to man three OPs in the district. The National Guard was reported to have attacked Mandria village with mortar fire; fighting continued at 0900.

10. In the Lefka district, the Limnitis enclave was surrounded by the National Guard. Firing with mortars and heavy machine guns was reported at Lefka town at 0445, followed at 0845 by an attack with high-level bombing, rockets and shelling. Sporadic fighting was also reported in Xeros. UNFICYP OPs were being maintained in two outlying locations.

11. UNFICYP received a protest from National Guard headquarters that the Turks were bombing indiscriminately civilian targets including the hospital in Famagusta. They said that if it was not stopped immediately there would be very strong retaliation, which could lead to a lot of bloodshed. According to UNFICYP information the hospital had been bombed but it appears to have been evacuated on 21 July.

12. UNFICYP later reported that they had obtained the agreement of the Turkish Ambassador that if anti-tank guns, artillery and mortars were removed from Nicosia city, the city would not be attacked by the Turkish Air Force. The Commander of the National Guard also agreed and UNFICYP was hopeful that both sides would comply.

13. On the morning of Sunday, 21 July, I issued the following statement:

"The Secretary-General welcomes the decision concerning the Cyprus question taken unanimously by the Security Council on 20 July. He expresses the hope that the authorities concerned will implement this important decision with the least possible delay.

"However, as long as the Council's demand for a cease-fire is not complied with and fighting continues, the situation remains extremely serious.

"The Secretary-General is appealing to all concerned to bring the fighting to an immediate end and to begin forthwith negotiations for a peaceful settlement in line with the resolution of the Security Council.

"The United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus has been doing all it can, especially in the humanitarian field, and will continue to do its utmost to limit the fighting and to protect the civilian population."

In this connexion, I have addressed appeals to the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey.

14. In view of reports reaching me from Cyprus, I have made the following appeal:

"Reports reaching me from Cyprus indicate that the fighting is extremely violent and bitter and that the civilian population in many parts of the Island is living in grave danger, fear and great suffering.

"I appeal most urgently to all the parties involved in the fighting, pending the achievement of a cease-fire, to exercise extreme restraint, and to respect the accepted international rules for the treatment of civilian populations in time of war. I urge them to take every possible measure to avoid actions which may cause further suffering to the civilian population and which can only further embitter the already tragic situations."

I have asked my representatives in Cyprus to make all possible efforts to communicate this appeal to all of the parties concerned.

INTERIM REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 355 (1974)

A. INTRODUCTION

1. At the 1788th meeting of the Security Council on 31 July 1974, I drew the attention of the members of the Council to the communication I had received on the previous day from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs of the United Kingdom, on behalf of the three Foreign Ministers who

had been negotiating in Geneva, transmitting the text of the Declaration and statement which had been agreed to by the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom (S/11398). I expressed the hope that the agreement reached in Geneva on the cease-fire would be a first step to the full implementation of Security Council resolution 353 (1974). I also referred to the functions which the Declaration envisaged for UNFICYP.

2. On 1 August 1974, the Security Council adopted resolution 355 (1974) in which, taking note of the Secretary-General's statement made at the 1788th meeting, it requested the Secretary-General "to take appropriate action in the light of his statement and to present a full report to the Council, taking into account that the cease-fire will be the first step in the full implementation of Security Council resolution 353 (1974)".

3. This interim report gives an account of the action taken as of 9 August 1974 in pursuance of resolution 355 (1974). A full report will be presented to the Council in due course.

4. Immediately after the adoption of resolution 355 (1974), I instructed my Special Representative in Cyprus and the Commander of UNFICYP to proceed, in co-operation with the parties, with the full implementation of the role of UNFICYP as provided for in Security Council resolution 355 (1974).

5. The Special Representative and the Force Commander have since been in close touch with the parties and have indicated to them that UNFICYP stands ready to carry out all the functions devolving upon it under resolution 355 (1974) of the Security Council. In particular, UNFICYP has repeatedly appealed to the parties to observe the cease-fire called for by the Security Council in its resolutions 353 (1974) and 354 (1974).

B. OBSERVANCE OF THE CEASE-FIRE CALLED FOR BY SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 353 (1974) AND 354 (1974)

6. Since the outbreak of hostilities in Cyprus and especially since the adoption of Security Council resolution 353, in accordance with my instructions, UNFICYP has made every effort to secure an effective cease-fire. In addition, UNFICYP has carried out continuous observation and reporting on the status of the observance of the cease-fire. This has provided the basis for my regular reports to the Security Council on developments in Cyprus (S/11353/Add. . . . series).

7. In general, the fighting diminished substantially and ceased in some areas after the agreement announced on 22 July that Greece and Turkey had agreed on a cease-fire to be implemented at 1600 hours. Since that time, although the cease-fire by and large has been observed by the parties throughout most of the island, intermittent fighting and some forward movement has continued in the area west of Kyrenia, along the coast and on the southern slopes of the Kyrenia mountains. There has also been some movement on the eastern side of the main Turkish enclave, especially in the Bellapais area. Exchanges of fire and minor movements also occurred in the western and eastern outskirts of Nicosia. In the Famagusta harbour area, UNFICYP has had to interpose itself between the Turkish Cypriots and the National Guard.

C. ACTION TAKEN PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 355 (1974)

8. The military representatives of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, together with a representative of UNFICYP, began meeting in Nicosia on 2 August 1974. The communiqués issued by the military representatives have been reproduced in the Secretary-General's further reports on developments in Cyprus (S/11353, Add.13, para. 4; Add.15, para. 5; Add.16, para. 6; Add.17, para. 6; Add. 18, para. 7). On 9 August the military representatives signed the agreement on the demarcation line, which has been submitted to the Foreign Ministers meeting at Geneva.

9. The military representatives have not as yet determined the size of the security zone to be established at the limit of the areas occupied by the Turkish armed forces on 30 July 1974 at 2200 hours Geneva time. Accordingly, the action of UNFICYP in relation to paragraph 3 (a) of the Geneva Declaration has been limited thus far to the participation of a representative of UNFICYP in the deliberations of the military representatives.

10. Concerning the provision of paragraph 3 (b) of the Geneva Declaration which provides for the immediate evacuation of "all the Turkish enclaves occupied by Greek or Greek Cypriot forces", the Special Representative and the Force Commander have reported that on 2 August 1974 Vice-President Denktash ad-

addressed a letter to Acting President Clerides requesting that this evacuation should be carried out. It does not appear that Mr. Clerides has replied to that letter, but it is understood that the question of the implementation of paragraph 3 (b) will be discussed at the negotiations which were resumed in Geneva on 8 August. My Special Representative and the Force Commander have discussed this matter with the authorities on both sides of Nicosia. UNFICYP stands ready to assume its function of protecting the Turkish enclaves as soon as the essential preliminary step, namely, evacuation of the "Greek or Greek Cypriot forces", has been carried out.

11. Pending the evacuation of Greek or Greek Cypriot forces, UNFICYP protective functions in respect of Turkish enclaves have continued. UNFICYP is regularly patrolling all the villages and areas occupied by the National Guard, as reported in my regular reports. Generally, UNFICYP assists the population by ascertaining needs, providing convoys for relief supplies, escorting persons to buy supplies and where possible providing water and medicaments. The able-bodied males from many of these villages have either been removed to prisoner-of-war camps or have been disarmed and released. Those under detention have had their names listed and are regularly visited by UNFICYP and the ICRC to ensure that their treatment is satisfactory.

12. The protective and humanitarian functions described above are also carried out in the "other Turkish enclaves" referred to in paragraph 3(b) of the Geneva Declaration, as well as in mixed villages. Some of the enclaves are surrounded by the National Guard; others have not been affected by the hostilities. Some of the mixed villages have come under National Guard control; others are untouched. UNFICYP visits all these villages regularly and has provided relief convoys in the same way as for the villages referred to in paragraph 11. I shall report further on measures taken regarding UNFICYP security zones and the assumption of security and police functions in mixed villages by UNFICYP in my next report.

D. EXCHANGE OR RELEASE OF DETAINED MILITARY PERSONNEL AND CIVILIANS

13. The International Committee of the Red Cross has informed me that on 3 August 1974 it received a note from the Turkish Government on the subject of the release of civilians and exchange of prisoners-of-war. The note reads as follows:

"1. With a view to implement without delay Article 3, paragraph d of the Geneva Declaration, the Turkish Government is prepared to release regardless of numerical reciprocity Greek Cypriot and Greek civilians who happen to be in the Turkish regions in Cyprus if the interested parties are willing to do the same. The Turkish Government deems it necessary that the parties concerned should also make declaration to the effect that they are ready to release civilians and the International Committee of the Red Cross undertake to carry out its obligations towards both parties concerning these declarations. As can be seen from the above, the Turkish Government attaches priority to the release of civilians.

"2. In conformity with the Geneva Declaration and the Geneva conventions of 1949, after the release of civilians the Turkish Government will be ready with the least possible delay to undertake the exchange of the prisoners-of-war. In order to determine the plan for the exchange, a list of prisoners-of-war in Turkish hands will be duly notified."

A similar communication was passed to UNFICYP on 4 August by the Turkish Embassy. At the Embassy's request, that communication was transmitted to the Greek Cypriot authorities (S/11353/Add.15, para. 11).

14. The ICRC addressed the following reply to the Government of Turkey on 5 August:

"The ICRC has received the text of a declaration, concerning the release and exchange of military and civilian detainees in Cyprus and Turkey, from the Turkish Government. According to information given to the ICRC, the same communication has been addressed to the Governments of Cyprus and Greece.

"The ICRC repeats that it is prepared to assume the tasks envisaged in the Geneva Tripartite Declaration of 30 July regarding the exchange and release of civilian and military detainees. The ICRC proposes the following measures:

"(a) Exchange of data regarding the numbers of, and names of, detained persons:

"(b) The drawing up of a concerted exchange and release plan by the three Governments, or their representatives on the spot, in co-operation with the ICRC;

“(c) In the waiting period before the exchange and release, the ICRC will visit the detainees, and will be given the opportunity to assist them ;

“(d) As regards civilian detainees, the establishment of a procedure whereby they may freely choose the place or zone where they wish to be released ;

“(e) No detainee should be obliged to return to his habitual place of residence, nor, on the other hand, to leave such habitual place of residence, against his will.

“The ICRC is prepared to co-operate on the humanitarian level to the various exchange and release operations. Should circumstances so require, the ICRC could take part in any transport operations necessary.

“The ICRC calls to mind that the repatriation of prisoners envisaged by the Third Geneva Convention, and the release of civilians envisaged in the Fourth Geneva Convention, are two different operations envisaged in two distinct conventions. Consequently, neither of these operations depends on the accomplishment of the other : the two operations should be carried out simultaneously.”

15. On 7 August, Acting President Clerides sent the following communication to representatives of the ICRC in Cyprus :

“In conformity with the provisions of the Geneva cease-fire Agreement, article 3(d) :

“1. The Government of Cyprus is prepared to liberate immediately all Turkish civilian detainees in its hands, without regard to number, provided that the other side is prepared to do the same.

“2. The operation should be carried out under the supervision of the International Committee of the Red Cross. This should be done on the basis of detailed nominative lists which should be handed over to the International Committee of the Red Cross forthwith by both sides.

“3. It should be made absolutely clear that all civilian detainees thus liberated shall return with their families to their homes and be given all facilities to do so immediately. Permanent security of life and property should be assured to Greek Cypriots living in Turkish controlled areas to the satisfaction of the Government of Cyprus, as is assured for Turkish Cypriots living outside Turkish controlled areas.

“4. With regard to the prisoners-of-war, the Government of Cyprus is prepared to exchange these under the supervision of the International Committee of the Red Cross according to arrangements to be made after detailed lists shall have been handed over by both sides. The Government of Cyprus is ready to hand over forthwith the lists of prisoners-of-war.”

E. METHOD OF OPERATION OF UNFICYP

16. UNFICYP's current operations are based on a framework of static posts, which have been established wherever possible at specially sensitive places, supplemented by frequent mobile patrols, both military and UNCIVPOL, to all parts of districts lying outside the Turkish controlled area. The main purposes of this activity are to generate a feeling of confidence and to obtain information concerning the local situation, not least in order to ascertain those areas where humanitarian and relief measures are required. A special problem exists in Nicosia city, where a close military confrontation exists and UNFICYP is endeavouring to interpose itself to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, in particular, to prevent shooting incidents, of which there continue to be many, from spreading throughout the city. This has required the establishment of a large number of United Nations posts along the area of confrontation and very active patrolling between them.

17. Within the Turkish controlled area, UNFICYP activities are centred on humanitarian and relief measures in Kyrenia and certain surrounding villages, especially Bellapais. These activities include the delivery of food to a considerable number of small isolated groups.

18. In all areas outside the Turkish controlled area UNFICYP is making special efforts to prevent looting and harassment of civilians, especially in the major towns, although UNFICYP resources do not permit complete surveillance over all the areas concerned.

19. A special humanitarian economics branch was set up at UNFICYP Headquarters on 22 July 1974 to deal specifically with problems of this nature. That branch, which is staffed by both military personnel and UNCIVPOL members, has been most active in organizing and co-ordinating a wide range of humanitarian and relief measures for both communities. The branch operates in close

co-operation with the ICRC representatives in Cyprus. At the present time all food relief convoys to all parts of the island are organized by this branch, which also engages in many other humanitarian tasks such as arranging the evacuation to hospital of urgent medical cases, both by United Nations helicopter and by road ambulance.

F. UNFICYP STRENGTH

20. At the 1782d meeting of the Security Council, I explained that the present strength of UNFICYP was obviously not sufficient for it to ensure effectively the maintenance of the cease-fire. I therefore stated my intention, in compliance with Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and as a first step, to ask the contributing countries urgently to reinforce their contingents which have been serving with UNFICYP.

21. In response to my request, the following pledges of military personnel to strengthen UNFICYP were received by me from the contributing countries:

Austria, 60; Canada, 460; Denmark, 200; Finland, 400; Sweden, 350; and United Kingdom, 611.

22. The table below indicates the projected military strength of UNFICYP by 14 August 1974 when the pledged reinforcements will have arrived in the island:

Austria	300
Canada	950
Denmark	432
Finland	626
Ireland	4
Sweden	575
United Kingdom	1,391
Subtotal	4,278
Hospital unit (Austria)	14
Total	4,292

23. The Force Commander has assessed the desirable strength of UNFICYP in the light of UNFICYP's present and future tasks. As a result of his assessment the Force Commander has informed me that the reinforced strength of UNFICYP as described above is sufficient in terms of military personnel. However, he has recommended that the civilian police element of UNFICYP (UNCIVPOL) should be increased from 153 to 200. Accordingly, I have requested the Governments providing civilian police to UNFICYP to increase their police contingents in order to reach this figure.

G. OBSERVATIONS

24. In the days since the adoption of resolution 355 (1974) some progress has been achieved towards bringing peace to Cyprus. However, despite the efforts of the United Nations, of interested Governments and of the parties directly concerned, the cease-fire is not yet secure in all parts of the island; there have been forward movements of troops in some areas, and enclaves continue under occupation in other areas.

25. As indicated elsewhere in this report, UNFICYP has stood ready, since the adoption of resolution 355, to carry out the functions devolving upon it under that resolution, and it has repeatedly urged the parties to take the necessary actions to that end, beginning with the full observance of the cease-fire. Nevertheless, the full implementation of Security Council resolutions 353 (1974) and 355 (1974) is still in its first stages.

26. In effectively carrying out its task of assisting the parties in implementing the resolutions of the Security Council, UNFICYP needs their full co-operation, as called for in paragraph 6 of resolution 353. There has been a measure of co-operation in recent days, but a greater degree of co-operation is required if further progress is to be made in implementing resolutions 353 and 355, and if UNFICYP's efforts are to achieve their maximum effect. This particularly applies to the consolidation of the cease-fire, the establishment of UNFICYP supervised security zones and the evacuation of occupied Turkish enclaves. I have had the opportunity to discuss these problems in Geneva with all of the parties concerned.

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 361 (1974)

1. This report is submitted in pursuance of paragraph 5 of resolution 361 (1974), which the Security Council adopted on 30 August 1974. In that resolution, the Council expressed its grave concern at the plight of the refugees and other persons displaced as a result of the situation in Cyprus, requested the Secretary-General to continue to provide emergency United Nations humanitarian assistance to all parts of the population in need of such assistance and to report to the Council at the earliest possible opportunity.

2. On 20 August 1974, I announced the appointment of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as co-ordinator of United Nations humanitarian assistance for Cyprus. The High Commissioner visited the island from 22 to 27 August 1974 to study the problem at first hand.

3. In the light of the Security Council resolution, I requested the High Commissioner to submit to me a report on humanitarian problems in Cyprus with special reference to the plight of the refugees. The High Commissioner prepared his report in close co-operation with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus and the Commander of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force. The text of that report is attached.

4. The High Commissioner has informed me that, in order to meet the immediate needs, he has been in touch with the representatives of potential donor Governments. However, the problems left in the wake of the recent hostilities in Cyprus are of such magnitude that substantial resources will be required if the Secretary-General, and the High Commissioner in his capacity as co-ordinator for humanitarian assistance, are to be in a position to continue to provide emergency assistance as requested by the Security Council in paragraph 6 of its resolution 361 (1974). I therefore intend to make, before the end of this week, an appeal to Governments, non-governmental organizations and individuals to support the United Nations effort to assist the afflicted population of Cyprus, to provide relief and to endeavour to find a peaceful solution to the problem of refugees.

ANNEX: REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES TO
THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE IN CYPRUS

INTRODUCTION

1. On August 20, 1974 the Secretary-General appointed me co-ordinator of United Nations humanitarian assistance in Cyprus. Preceded by two UNHCR officials, I arrived in the island on 22 August 1974 and remained there until 27 August.

2. During my stay in the island I had several occasions to meet with Acting President Clerides and with Vice-President Denktash. I also attended on 26 August the joint meeting on humanitarian questions presided over by the Secretary-General with the Acting President and the Vice-President. In addition, I had consultations with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Cyprus and the Commander of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus and met with senior members of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent, the chief delegate of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) as well as with representatives of potential donor Governments.

3. Thanks to the co-operation received from the authorities and the logistic support provided by UNFICYP, I visited by car and helicopter the British Sovereign Base Areas of Dhekelia and Episkopi where there are considerable numbers of displaced persons. I also toured the areas of Kyrenia, Kythrea, Larnaca, Limassol, the Troodos Mountains and Paphos and stopped to see some villages on the way. In the course of these visits, I had occasion to gather first-hand impressions of human sufferings and the extent of disruption.

THE PROBLEM

4. A large number of Greek Cypriot displaced persons, estimated to be 163,800, have fled their homes in the northern part of the island and are now in the south. There are also an estimated 34,000 Turkish Cypriots in the south. Of these numbers, some 50,000 Greek Cypriots and some 7,800 Turkish Cypriots are in the British Sovereign Base Areas. In the south there is, therefore, a total of some

197,800 persons in need. In the north there are an estimated 20,000 Greek Cypriots who did not or could not leave and a further 7,800 Turkish Cypriots who are homeless, making a total of 27,800 persons in need in the north and a total of 225,600 in the whole island. These figures were given locally to UNHCR by the Red Cross and the Red Crescent. It should be noted that not all 225,600 are displaced, as most of the Greek Cypriots in the north are still in their own homes, but deprived of their livelihood. The great majority of these are or shortly will be in need of assistance.

5. Related to the present situation are also other problems such as the care of large numbers of livestock left behind on Greek Cypriot farms in the north and the maintenance of the irrigation of the citrus plantations.

ASSISTANCE ALREADY PROVIDED

6. The immediate assistance is already being provided from several sources, both bilateral and multi-lateral. Since the second half of July, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has played a vital role not only in its traditional context of the Geneva Red Cross conventions but also in the provision of relief. Indeed, the ICRC has some 40 delegates on the island distributing relief assistance in close co-operation and in many instances with the logistical support of UNFICYP.

7. Since the beginning of the hostilities in Cyprus in July 1974, UNFICYP has made all possible efforts to assist the afflicted population. UNFICYP activities in support of the humanitarian relief programme have included information gathering on conditions in towns and villages, providing supply convoys, giving medical assistance and escorts for medical and casualty evacuations, escorting work parties to repair power lines, transformers, generators and other essential services, assisting in tracing missing persons and protection, where necessary, of Turkish Cypriot villages.

8. Supplies for Turkish Cypriots come through the Red Crescent and for Greek Cypriots either through the Cyprus Government Welfare Department or the Red Cross. Four UNFICYP trucks are allocated permanently to move food and supplies to areas in need. Vehicles are allotted on a daily basis in response to requests from the agencies involved, and the supplies are delivered to their destination under UNFICYP escort. To date, 121 loads have been delivered, 92 to Turkish Cypriots and 29 to Greek Cypriots.

9. UNFICYP provides medical assistance to the sick and infirm in isolated villages and co-operates in the evacuation of seriously ill patients by providing escorts by road, and if required, by helicopter.

10. Specific instances of successful UNFICYP intervention as regards public facilities include Pyroi, where the badly damaged transformer has now been repaired, and the power line from Nicosia to Kyrenia, which was broken at Kaimakli, and where work is proceeding under UNFICYP protection. A joint meeting of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot technicians is being arranged under UNFICYP auspices to consider the repair of the electricity supply to Lefkoniko.

11. The UNFICYP Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) too is actively engaged in the humanitarian relief efforts. In addition to the tracing service established by the ICRC in line with its traditional work, a special UNFICYP missing persons bureau has been set up since 15 July 1974. About 2,180 persons have been reported missing, of whom 580 were located. It must be mentioned, however, that UNCIVPOL investigations in this regard and other related matters are hampered in the north owing to restrictions of movement. UNCIVPOL co-operation with the ICRC is excellent and it is supporting the Red Cross efforts by visiting prisons and refugee camps.

CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE ACTION

12. The economic and social disruption caused by the recent upheavals in Cyprus constitutes a serious obstacle to the efforts of local authorities to bring life back to normal. More than one third of the total population has been affected by the events. The condition of nearly a quarter of a million persons requiring humanitarian assistance has been mentioned in the above paragraphs. These groups include not only those homeless and uprooted who have had to leave one zone of control for another, but also sizable groups of Greek Cypriots in the Turkish zone and Turkish Cypriots in the Greek zone. They are mostly concen-

trated in identified areas where all protective measures possible under the circumstances are being taken. However, they are deprived of their livelihood and, in terms of assistance required, their situation is comparable to that of displaced persons.

13. Pending an amelioration of the over-all situation leading to some measure of socio-economic stability and enabling populations in rural and urban areas to pursue their normal means of livelihood, considerable efforts would be required of the international community to provide adequate humanitarian assistance in Cyprus. The assessment of requirements made on the spot calls for (i) immediate assistance required in coming days and weeks to save human lives and alleviate hardship; (ii) short-term assistance required over a period of several months, depending on the evolution of the over-all situation.

14. During the first phase, the United Nations efforts are to be concentrated on supplementing the humanitarian work already being carried out, on providing such basic assistance as medicaments, food, blankets, shelter, etc., and on preventing duplication of relief to the extent possible, both through bilateral and multilateral channels. The need for such assistance is immediate and, given adequate means, may be completed in the next few weeks.

15. Concurrently, efforts have to be made to provide assistance required over a longer period. The necessary planning for timely provision of required material assistance is being carried out. It is felt, in this respect, that the full extent of disruption will be more acutely felt by the population of Cyprus in general as the existing meagre stocks run out.

16. The co-ordinator is represented in both zones. A satisfactory mechanism of consultation and co-ordination has been established both at UNHCR headquarters level in Geneva and at the local level in Nicosia. In my capacity as United Nations co-ordinator of humanitarian assistance to Cyprus I have already approached Governments for contributions in cash and kind amounting to \$US 9 million, in order to meet the immediate requirements. At the same time, needs for the short-term phase are being identified and costed and it is expected that the United Nations Secretary-General will be in a position during this week to appeal to Governments for their support.

17. It is clear that the situation of displaced persons and other elements of the Cypriot population should not be allowed to deteriorate into a more or less permanent burden. The support of the international community over the coming months would be critical in determining the future of these people. It is hoped that, as in the case of similar situations in the past, the international community will rise to this humanitarian challenge and respond generously to the Secretary-General's appeal.

OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES—PRESS RELEASE REF/1178,
SEPTEMBER 9, 1974

DETAILS OF \$22 MILLION PROGRAMME FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO CYPRUS
ANNOUNCED

Emergency accommodation is the main item in the \$22 million programme of humanitarian assistance to Cyprus being co-ordinated by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. According to the first official breakdown made public today following the appeal of the Secretary-General on September 6, the \$8.9 million Emergency Accommodation item includes principally tents, beds and blankets, while \$8.1 million is earmarked for various types of food including cereals, edible oil, condensed milk, sugar, canned meat, canned fish and pulses.

The other major components in the plan are \$2.5 million for transportation including overseas air and sea freight and inland transportation and \$850,000 for domestic and community equipment such as stoves, domestic utensils, mobile kitchens and related equipment. An amount of \$1.65 million is foreseen as a contingency reserve and programme support.

The High Commissioner, Sadruddin Aga Khan, has pointed out that on the basis of some 226,000 persons, either displaced or isolated, who are estimated to be in need of international assistance on the island, the required \$22 million represents an aid amounting to only 80 cents per person per day until the end of the year.

The UN plan is designed to supplement humanitarian work already being done both bilaterally and multilaterally, mainly under the aegis of the International

Committee of the Red Cross. The ICRC's role in providing relief will phase out in due course as the UN humanitarian action takes over. Details of the UN programme are being dispatched to governments today as a follow-up on the Secretary-General's appeal.

The High Commissioner has stated that in order to allow flexibility in planning, cash contributions are preferred. Sources of principal supplies have been found for the most urgently needed items and shipment by air transport will begin as soon as funds are pledged.

UNHCR has already set up an office in Cyprus. A mechanism of co-ordination has been established in Geneva and Nicosia in order to avoid duplication and maximize the effort of multilateral and bilateral humanitarian efforts. Meetings of representatives of the UN bodies involved, including UNFICYP, UNICEF, WFP and WHO are being held regularly to ensure effective co-operation within the UN system. Similar co-ordination is being arranged with nongovernmental organizations.

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CONTRIBUTIONS FOR HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO CYPRUS REACHES \$7 MILLION

[The following is reproduced as received from the UNHCR, Geneva]

The level of aid channelled through the United Nations system for the programme of humanitarian assistance in Cyprus, being co-ordinated by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), has now reached \$7 million, thanks to seven new contributions.

The seven, not previously announced, are: Canada (\$51,020), France (\$416,667), Federal Republic of Germany (\$188,758), Mauritius (\$17,544), Monaco (\$1,042), Norway (\$90,580) and the Philippines (\$2,300).

They bring to 17 the number of Governments which have contributed cash or kind in response to the appeal of the Secretary-General and the High Commissioner on 6 September. The largest contributor through the United Nations system remains the United States with \$3 million thus far.

RELIEF SUPPLIES POUR IN

Meanwhile, more than half of the 204,000 blankets ordered by the UNHCR, through the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), have been delivered and distributed. UNHCR-chartered planes are moving the blankets from Europe as fast as they are procured. And all but 10,000 of the 40,000 camp beds ordered by the UNHCR will be in Cyprus by 17 October. In addition, the UNHCR has arranged to buy 25,000 from local manufacturers.

Another of the main priorities—tents—is well on the way to being met. The last installment of the 2,500 tents bought with UNHCR funds will leave the United Kingdom by ship on 15 October, with arrival scheduled for 1 November. At that point, almost 15,000 family tents—many made available from bilateral sources—will have been provided to shelter over 70,000 displaced or uprooted persons as the period of cold weather approaches. Family cooking equipment and domestic utensils are being purchased in large quantities through the UNICEF and are being delivered by air.

The three large donations in food commodities made available by Belgium, Denmark and the European Economic Community (EEC), respectively, will begin to move to Cyprus by sea on 25 October. The UNHCR has made available \$200,000 to cover the transportation costs involved. The World Food Programme (WFP) is providing technical expertise in arranging the shipment.

The most pressing needs in the medical field at present are ambulances, supplies for environmental sanitation, pharmaceuticals and hospital equipment. With a view to meeting these requirements, the UNHCR has made an initial allocation of \$400,000 to the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNICEF.

APPENDIX VII

DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE FOUNDING OF CYPRUS, INCLUDING THE TREATY OF GUARANTEE, 1959

[From Documents on International Affairs, 1959, edited by Gillian King, Oxford
University Press, London, 1963]

1. DOCUMENTS REGARDING CYPRUS SIGNED AND INITIALLED AT LANCASTER HOUSE, LONDON, FEBRUARY 19, 1959¹

(A) BASIC STRUCTURE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS

1. The State of Cyprus shall be a Republic with a presidential régime, the President being Greek and the Vice-President Turkish elected by universal suffrage by the Greek and Turkish communities of the Island respectively.

2. The official languages of the Republic of Cyprus shall be Greek and Turkish. Legislative and administrative instruments and documents shall be drawn up and promulgated in the two official languages.

3. The Republic of Cyprus shall have its own flag of neutral design and colour, chosen jointly by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic.

Authorities and communities shall have the right to fly the Greek and Turkish flags on holidays at the same time as the flag of Cyprus.

The Greek and Turkish communities shall have the right to celebrate Greek and Turkish national holidays.

4. The President and the Vice-President shall be elected for a period of five years.

In the event of absence, impediment or vacancy of their posts, the President and the Vice-President shall be replaced by the President and the Vice-President of the House of Representatives respectively.

In the event of a vacancy in either post, the election of new incumbents shall take place within a period of not more than 45 days.

The President and the Vice-President shall be invested by the House of Representatives, before which they shall take an oath of loyalty and respect for the Constitution. For this purpose, the House of Representatives shall meet within 24 hours after its constitution.

5. Executive authority shall be vested in the President and the Vice-President. For this purpose they shall have a Council of Ministers composed of seven Greek Ministers and three Turkish Ministers. The Ministers shall be designated respectively by the President and the Vice-President who shall appoint them by an instrument signed by them both.

The Ministers may be chosen from outside the House of Representatives.

Decisions of the Council of Ministers shall be taken by an absolute majority.

Decisions so taken shall be promulgated immediately by the President and the Vice-President by publication in the official gazette.

However, the President and the Vice-President shall have the right of final veto and the right to return the decisions of the Council of Ministers under the same conditions as those laid down for laws and decisions of the House of Representatives.

¹ The agreement on Cyprus was approved by the Greek Parliament on 28 February, by 170 votes to 118, by the Turkish Parliament on 4 March, by 347 votes to 138 with 2 abstentions, and by the House of Commons on 19 March, with no division, after an opposition amendment criticizing the Government's policy since 1954, had been defeated by 299 votes to 246. On 10 November 1959 agreement was reached on the question of executive authority in the new constitution. On 13 December Archbishop Makarios was elected first President of the future republic of Cyprus, he received 70 per cent of the votes. The state of emergency on the island ended on 4 December 1959.

6. Legislative authority shall be vested in a House of Representatives elected for a period of five years by universal suffrage of each community separately in the proportion of 70 per cent for the Greek community and 30 per cent for the Turkish community, this proportion being fixed independently of statistical data. (*N.B.*—The number of Representatives shall be fixed by mutual agreement between the communities.)

The House of Representatives shall exercise authority in all matters other than those expressly reserved to the Communal Chambers. In the event of a conflict of authority, such conflict shall be decided by the Supreme Constitutional Court which shall be composed of one Greek, one Turk and one neutral, appointed jointly by the President and the Vice-President. The neutral judge shall be president of the Court.

7. Laws and decisions of the House of Representatives shall be adopted by a simple majority of the members present. They shall be promulgated within 15 days if neither the President nor the Vice-President returns them for reconsideration as provided in Point 9 below.

The Constitutional Law, with the exception of its basic articles, may be modified by a majority comprising two-thirds of the Greek members and two-thirds of the Turkish members of the House of Representatives.

Any modification of the electoral law and the adoption of any law relating to the municipalities and of any law imposing duties or taxes shall require a simple majority of the Greek and Turkish members of the House of Representatives taking part in the vote and considered separately.

On the adoption of the budget, the President and the Vice-President may exercise their right to return it to the House of Representatives, if in their judgment any question of discrimination arises. If the House maintains its decisions, the President and the Vice-President shall have the right of appeal to the Supreme Constitutional Court.

8. The President and the Vice-President, separately and conjointly, shall have the right of final veto on any law or decision concerning foreign affairs, except the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in international organisations and pacts of alliance in which Greece and Turkey both participate, or concerning defence and security as defined in Annex I.

9. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall have, separately and conjointly, the right to return all laws and decisions, which may be returned to the House of Representatives within a period of not more than 15 days for reconsideration.

The House of Representatives shall pronounce within 15 days on any matter so returned. If the House of Representatives maintains its decisions, the President and the Vice-President shall promulgate the law or decision in question within the time-limits fixed for the promulgation of laws and decisions.

Laws and decisions, which are considered by the President or the Vice-President to discriminate against either of the two communities, shall be submitted to the Supreme Constitutional Court which may annul or confirm the law or decision, or return it to the House of Representatives for reconsideration, in whole or in part. The law or decision shall not become effective until the Supreme Constitutional Court or, where it has been returned, the House of Representatives has taken a decision on it.

10. Each community shall have its Communal Chamber composed of a number of representatives which it shall itself determine.

The Communal Chambers shall have the right to impose taxes and levies on members of their community to provide for their needs and for the needs of bodies and institutions under their supervision.

The Communal Chambers shall exercise authority in all religious, educational, cultural and teaching questions and questions of personal status. They shall exercise authority in questions where the interests and institutions are of a purely communal nature, such as sporting and charitable foundations, bodies and associations, producers' and consumers' co-operatives and credit establishments, created for the purpose of promoting the welfare of one of the communities. (*N.B.*—It is understood that the provisions of the present paragraph cannot be interpreted in such a way as to prevent the creation of mixed and communal institutions where the inhabitants desire them.)

These producers' and consumers' co-operatives and credit establishments, which shall be administered under the laws of the Republic, shall be subject

to the supervision of the Communal Chambers. The Communal Chambers shall also exercise authority in matters initiated by municipalities which are composed of one community only. These municipalities, to which the laws of the Republic shall apply, shall be supervised in their functions by the Communal Chambers.

Where the central administration is obliged to take over the supervision of the institutions, establishments, or municipalities mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs by virtue of legislation in force, this supervision shall be exercised by officials belonging to the same community as the institution, establishment or municipality in question.

11. The Civil Service shall be composed as to 70 per cent. of Greeks and as to 30 per cent. of Turks.

It is understood that this quantitative division will be applied as far as practicable in all grades of the Civil Service.

In regions or localities where one of the two communities is in a majority approaching 100 per cent., the organs of the local administration responsible to the central administration shall be composed solely of officials belonging to that community.

12. The deputies of the Attorney-General of the Republic, the Inspector-General, the Treasurer and the Governor of the Issuing Bank may not belong to the same community as their principals. The holders of these posts shall be appointed by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic acting in agreement.

13. The heads and deputy heads of the Armed Forces, the Gendarmerie and the Police shall be appointed by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic acting in agreement. One of these heads shall be Turkish and where the head belongs to one of the communities, the deputy head shall belong to the other.

14. Compulsory military service may only be instituted with the agreement of the President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus.

Cyprus shall have an army of 2,000 men, of whom 60 per cent. shall be Greek and 40 per cent. Turkish.

The security forces (gendarmerie and police) shall have a complement of 2,000 men, which may be reduced or increased with the agreement of both the President and the Vice-President. The security forces shall be composed as to 70 per cent. of Greeks and as to 30 per cent. of Turks. However, for an initial period this percentage may be raised to a maximum of 40 per cent. of Turks (and consequently reduced to 60 per cent. of Greeks) in order not to discharge those Turks now serving in the police, apart from the auxiliary police.

15. Forces, which are stationed in parts of the territory of the Republic inhabited, in a proportion approaching 100 per cent., by members of a single community, shall belong to that community.

16. A High Court of Justice shall be established, which shall consist of two Greeks, one Turk and one neutral, nominated jointly by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic.

The President of the Court shall be the neutral judge, who shall have two votes.

This Court shall constitute the highest organ of the judicature (appointments, promotions of judges, &c.).

17. Civil disputes, where the plaintiff and the defendant belong to the same community, shall be tried by a tribunal composed of judges belonging to that community. If the plaintiff and defendant belong to different communities, the composition of the tribunal shall be mixed and shall be determined by the High Court of Justice.

Tribunals dealing with civil disputes relating to questions of personal status and to religious matters, which are reserved to the competence of the Communal Chambers under Point 10, shall be composed solely of judges belonging to the community concerned. The composition and status of these tribunals shall be determined according to the law drawn up by the Communal Chamber and they shall apply the law drawn up by the Communal Chamber.

In criminal cases, the tribunal shall consist of judges belonging to the same community as the accused. If the injured party belongs to another community, the composition of the tribunal shall be mixed and shall be determined by the High Court of Justice.

18. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic shall each have the right to exercise the prerogative of mercy to persons from their respective communities who are condemned to death. In cases where the plaintiffs and

the convicted persons are members of different communities the prerogative of mercy shall be exercised by agreement between the President and the Vice-President. In the event of disagreement the vote for clemency shall prevail. When mercy is accorded the death penalty shall be commuted to life imprisonment.

19. In the event of agricultural reform, lands shall be redistributed only to persons who are members of the same community as the expropriated owners.

Expropriations by the State or the Municipalities shall only be carried out on payment of a just and equitable indemnity fixed, in disputed cases, by the tribunals. An appeal to the tribunals shall have the effect of suspending action.

Expropriated property shall only be used for the purpose for which the expropriation was made. Otherwise the property shall be restored to the owners.

20. Separate municipalities shall be created in the five largest towns of Cyprus by the Turkish inhabitants of these towns. However:—

(a) In each of the towns a co-ordinating body shall be set up which shall supervise work which needs to be carried out jointly and shall concern itself with matters which require a degree of co-operation. These bodies shall each be composed of two members chosen by the Greek municipalities, two members chosen by the Turkish municipalities and a President chosen by agreement between the two municipalities.

(b) The President and the Vice-President shall examine within four years the question whether or not this separation of municipalities in the five largest towns shall continue.

With regard to other localities, special arrangements shall be made for the constitution of municipal bodies, following, as far as possible, the rule of proportional representation for the two communities.

21. A treaty guaranteeing the independence, territorial integrity and constitution of the new State of Cyprus shall be concluded between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey. A Treaty of military alliance shall also be concluded between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey.

These two instruments shall have constitutional force. (This last paragraph shall be inserted in the Constitution as a basic article.)

22. It shall be recognised that the total or partial union of Cyprus with any other State, or a separatist independence for Cyprus (*i.e.*, the partition of Cyprus into two independent States), shall be excluded.

23. The Republic of Cyprus shall accord most-favoured-nation treatment to Great Britain, Greece and Turkey for all agreements whatever their nature.

This provision shall not apply to the Treaties between the Republic of Cyprus and the United Kingdom concerning the bases and military facilities accorded to the United Kingdom.

24. The Greek and Turkish Governments shall have the right to subsidise institutions for education, culture, athletics and charity belonging to their respective communities.

Equally, where either community considers that it has not the necessary number of schoolmasters, professors or priests for the working of its institutions, the Greek and Turkish Governments may provide them to the extent strictly necessary to meet their needs.

25. One of the following Ministries—the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of Finance—shall be entrusted to a Turk. If the President and the Vice-President agree they may replace this system by a system of rotation.

26. The new State which is to come into being with the signature of the Treaties shall be established as quickly as possible and within a period of not more than three months from the signature of the Treaties.

27. All the above Points shall be considered to be basic articles of the Constitution of Cyprus.

E. A.-T.

F. R. Z.

S. L.

† A. M.

F. K.

ANNEX I

A

The defence questions subject to veto under Point 8 of the Basic Structure are as follows:—

- (a) Composition and size of the armed forces and credits for them.
- (b) Appointments and promotions.

- (c) Imports of warlike stores and of all kinds of explosives.
- (d) Granting of bases and other facilities to allied countries.

The Security questions subject to veto are as follows :

- (a) Appointments and promotions.
- (b) Allocation and stationing of forces.
- (c) Emergency measures and martial law.
- (d) Police laws.

(It is provided that the right of veto shall cover all emergency measures or decisions, but not those which concern the normal functioning of the police and gendarmerie.)

(b) *Treaty of Guarantee between the Republic of Cyprus and Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey*

The Republic of Cyprus of the one part, and Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey of the other part :—

I. Considering that the recognition and maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the basic articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest ;

II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure that the provisions of the aforesaid Constitution shall be respected ;

Have agreed as follows :

ARTICLE 1

The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution.

It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. With this intent it prohibits all activity tending to promote directly or indirectly either union or partition of the Island.

ARTICLE 2

Greece the United Kingdom and Turkey, taking note of the undertakings by the Republic of Cyprus embodied in Article 1, recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the provisions of the basic articles of its Constitution.

They likewise undertake to prohibit, as far as lies within their power, all activity having the object of promoting directly or indirectly either the union of the Republic of Cyprus with any other State, or the partition of the Island.

ARTICLE 3

In the event of any breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, the United Kingdom, and Turkey undertake to consult together, with a view to making representations, or taking the necessary steps to ensure observance of those provisions.

In so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 4

The present Treaty shall enter into force on signature.

The High Contracting Parties undertake to register the present Treaty at the earliest possible date with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the Chapter.

E. A.-T.

F. R. Z.

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(c) *Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey*

1. The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey shall co-operate for their common defence and undertake by this Treaty to consult together on the problems raised by this defence.

2. The High Contracting Parties undertake to resist any attack or aggression, direct or indirect, directed against the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

3. In the spirit of this alliance and in order to fulfill the above purpose a tripartite Headquarters shall be established on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.

4. Greece shall take part in the Headquarters mentioned in the preceding article with a contingent of 950 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers and Turkey with a contingent of 650 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers. The President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, acting in agreement, may ask the Greek and Turkish Governments to increase or reduce the Greek and Turkish contingents.

5. The Greek and Turkish officers mentioned above shall be responsible for the training of the Army of the Republic of Cyprus.

6. The command of the tripartite Headquarters shall be assumed in rotation and for a period of one year each by a Cypriot, Greek and Turkish General Officer, who shall be nominated by the Governments of Greece and Turkey and by the President and the Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus.

E. A.-T.

F. R. Z.

S. L.

†A. M.

F. K.

(d) *Declaration by the Government of the United Kingdom, 11 February 1959*

DECLARATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, having examined the documents concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, comprising the Basic Structure for the Republic of Cyprus, the Treaty of Guarantee and the Treaty of Alliance, drawn up and approved by the Heads of the Governments of Greece and Turkey in Zürich on February 11, 1959, and taking into account the consultations in London, from February 11 to 16, 1959, between the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom

Declare:

A. That, subject to the acceptance of their requirements as set out in Section B below, they accept the documents approved by the Heads of the Governments of Greece and Turkey as the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus.

B. That, with the exception of two areas at

(a) Akrotiri—Episkopi—Parmali, and

(b) Dhekelia—Pergamos—Ayios Nikolaos—Xylophagou, which will be retained under full British sovereignty, they are willing to transfer sovereignty over the Island of Cyprus to the Republic of Cyprus subject to the following conditions:—

(1) that such rights are secured to the United Kingdom Government as are necessary to enable the two areas as aforesaid to be used effectively as military bases, including among others those rights indicated in the Annex attached, and that satisfactory guarantees are given by Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus for the integrity of the areas retained under British sovereignty and the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights referred to above;

(2) that provision shall be made by agreement for:—

(i) the protection of the fundamental human rights of the various communities in Cyprus;

(ii) the protection of the interests of the members of the public services in Cyprus;

(iii) determining the nationality of persons affected by the settlement;

(iv) the assumption by the Republic of Cyprus of the appropriate obligations of the present Government of Cyprus, including the settlement of claims.

C. That the Government of the United Kingdom welcome the draft Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of Cyprus, the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey and will co-operate with the Parties thereto in the common defence of Cyprus.

D. That the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus shall come into force and the formal signature of the necessary instruments by the parties concerned shall take place at the earliest practicable date and on that date sovereignty will be transferred to the Republic of Cyprus.

SELWYN LLOYD.
ALAN LENNOX-BOYD.

E. A.-T.
†A. M.

F. K.

F. R. Z.

ANNEX

The following rights will be necessary in connexion with the areas to be retained under British sovereignty:—

(a) to continue to use, without restriction or interference, the existing small sites containing military and other installations and to exercise complete control within these sites, including the right to guard and defend them and to exclude from them all persons not authorised by the United Kingdom Government;

(b) to use roads, ports and other facilities freely for the movement of personnel and stores of all kinds to and from and between the above-mentioned areas and sites;

(c) to continue to have the use of specified port facilities at Famagusta;

(d) to use public services (such as water, telephone, telegraph, electric power, &c.);

(e) to use from time to time certain localities, which would be specified, for troop training;

(f) to use the airfield at Nicosia, together with any necessary buildings and facilities on or connected with the airfield to whatever extent is considered necessary by the British authorities for the operation of British military aircraft in peace and war, including the exercise of any necessary operational control of air traffic;

(g) to overfly the territory of the Republic of Cyprus without restriction;

(h) to exercise jurisdiction over British forces to an extent comparable with that provided in Article VII of the Agreement regarding the Status of Forces of Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, in respect of certain offenses committed within the territory of the Republic of Cyprus;

(i) to employ freely in the areas and sites labour from other parts of Cyprus;

(j) to obtain, after consultation with the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, the use of such additional small sites and such additional rights as the United Kingdom may, from time to time, consider technically necessary for the efficient use of its base areas and installations in Cyprus.

(e) *Additional article to be inserted in the Treaty of Guarantee*

The Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus undertake to respect the integrity of the areas to be retained under the sovereignty of the United Kingdom upon the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to the United Kingdom by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the declaration by the Government of the United Kingdom.

S. L.

E. A. T.

F. R. Z.

†A. M.

F. K.

The first part of the report is devoted to a general survey of the situation in the country, and to a description of the progress made during the year.

The second part of the report is devoted to a detailed account of the work done in each of the various departments of the service.

The third part of the report is devoted to a summary of the results of the work done during the year, and to a statement of the views of the Committee on the progress made.

The fourth part of the report is devoted to a statement of the views of the Committee on the progress made during the year, and to a summary of the results of the work done.

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The sixteenth part of the report is devoted to a statement of the views of the Committee on the progress made during the year, and to a summary of the results of the work done.

The seventeenth part of the report is devoted to a statement of the views of the Committee on the progress made during the year, and to a summary of the results of the work done.

The eighteenth part of the report is devoted to a statement of the views of the Committee on the progress made during the year, and to a summary of the results of the work done.

APPENDIX VIII

MEMORANDUM PREPARED FOR THE STUDY MISSION BY THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS, ON CONDITIONS IN CYPRUS

MEMORANDUM

INTRODUCTION :

As it is known on the 20th of July forty thousand Turkish forces assisted by Turkish air and naval forces, in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and all principles governing international relations, invaded the small Island State of Cyprus.

The Turkish air-force systematically bombed inhabited areas, including hospitals and hotels, thus killing civilians and forcing thousands of others to flee away to safer areas.

The Turkish army on invading Cyprus started occupying Greek-inhabited areas and systematically looted and plundered the properties of the inhabitants, arrested men, molested women, children and elderly people and indulged in repeated rapes, arsons, cold-blooded murders of hundreds of civilians and finally forced expulsion of the inhabitants from their homes.

According to foreign press reports, Turkey, in an effort to artificially change the population ratio, which in this century has always been 82% Greeks, 18% Turks, started to transport to the Island Turks from Turkey.

Thus Turkey is trying to change the Greek character of the Island, which was preserved for some 4,000 years, as evidenced by History, the people and the many monuments which are now being systematically destroyed by the Turkish Forces.

EFFECTS OF THE TURKISH INVASION ON THE COUNTRY AND ITS ECONOMY

It is very difficult at this juncture to quantify all damage and future repercussions on the Cyprus economy as a result of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. It is even more difficult to estimate accurately the damage incurred in the areas controlled by the Turkish invading forces in terms of residential buildings, hotels, factories, etc., bombed or of other properties already lost. What follows is a first attempt to estimate the economic consequences of the invasion on the economy.

Since the invasion, the whole economy has been disrupted. It is estimated that the country is foregoing about 2 million pounds worth of production every day. So far, more than 60 million pounds of production has been lost because of the standstill in economic activity. Virtually the whole of the labour force is unemployed or seriously underemployed, compared with the state of full employment which existed before the invasion.

About 200,000 persons, representing about 40 per cent of the Greek population of the Island, have been displaced from their homes and peaceful occupations to refugee camps, living under lamentable conditions, underfed and facing the serious problem of survival, owing to malnutrition and hygienic hazards.

It is estimated that about 40,000 households have been broken up and forcibly expelled, leaving behind all their properties. The household movable properties alone are estimated to be of the order of 50-100 million pounds. Out of these properties, even those which may not be further looted, will be destroyed by time. In addition, goods left in warehouses, fields, factories and shops in the Turkish controlled areas amount to many millions of pounds. Another serious damage which cannot be expressed in pecuniary terms is the destruction by bombings of an area of 100 square miles of pine-wood forests, which represents about one fifth of the main state forests. Tourist activities, which was expected to fetch more than 30 million pounds of foreign exchange earnings this year, suf-

ferred the worst blow of all sectors and the negative consequences are expected to last for a number of years.

Hundreds of thousands of animals are dying because of lack of food and veterinary care or are slaughtered to feed the invading army. Citrus orchards worth millions of pounds and other plantations fetching more than 10 million pounds of income every year are in danger of irreparable destruction because of not being watered.

An off-hand estimate places the damage at 350 million pounds, a sum which most probably will prove to be inferior to the real financial damage. This same amount should also be considered not as an absolute figure but within the context of the Cypriot economy and in comparison with its potentialities.

In order to underline the importance of the disaster that this figure represents for a small country like Cyprus, it should be remarked that the amount of 350 million pounds corresponds to 11 years of expenditure in the Cyprus general budget (1970: 32 million pounds) which for the United States, for example, would be 2.1 trillion dollars.

The above-estimated figure does not include other damage that will unavoidably result in the future from the Turkish invasion, such as:

(a) Livestock belonging to Greek-Cypriots and left in occupied areas without water or food die in masses every day. Turkish military authorities do not permit the Greek-Cypriots to approach their livestock, with the pretext that they will be taken care of by the Turkish authorities;

(b) In the orange plantations of the Morphou region, the trees are not being watered and in the midsummer if this situation lasts for a few more days, the entire system of plantations, which has been created after many years of work and with considerable expenditure, will be completely lost;

(c) The Turkish occupation has already covered 40 per cent of the Cypriot territory which, however, corresponds to 70 per cent of the agricultural production and to the same percentage of the whole economic life of the country, for the following reasons:

Turkish forces control the most fertile areas of Messaoria and Morphou, the lemon plantations of Lapithos and Karavas, the olive plantations of the Kythrea, Kyrenia and Solea, the orange plantations of Morphou and Famagusta, the water resources of Lapithos and Kythrea, the tourist installations of Kyrenia and Famagusta, a great part of various industrial areas of Nicosia, etc.

The territory controlled by Turkish forces at present is about 40 percent of the total area of the Island. In this area the inhabitants were 82 percent Greeks and 18 percent Turks. The area comprised almost all the Messaoria plains, east and west, the Kyrenia District and the Karpass Peninsula. It is the almost exclusive cereal, carob-producing and the main citrus, vegetable, meat-, milk and egg-producing area of Cyprus. It contains two-thirds of the tourist activities, 55-60 percent of the industrial activity, 65 percent of the cultivated land, 60 percent of the underground water resources, 60 percent of the mining and quarrying activities (almost 100 percent of the quarrying activities), the main port of Cyprus at Famagusta, through which 83 percent of the general cargo was handled, and the main specialized port of Karavostassi, through which 85 percent of the minerals were handled. In other words, the economic significance of this area is much more important than its size. It is estimated that about 70 percent of total gross production from all sources emanates from this area, not to mention the immense wealth of physical assets, resources and structures situated there in the form of hotels and hotel apartments, houses, factories, orchards, arable and irrigated fertile land, mineral and quarrying resources, water resources and high valued tourist land.

From the above figures, it can be concluded that in 1974 the gross national product of the whole Island will be significantly reduced to perhaps half of its average size, whereas investment and other physical wealth has been badly damaged with negative consequences for years to come.

The Turkish Cypriots, despite their share of 18 percent in total population, were contributing less than 10 percent to the gross domestic product. The land registered in the names of Turkish people and organizations represents only 12.8 percent of the total area of Cyprus compared to 58.8 percent registered in the names of the Greeks and 1.4 percent in others. Even if the remaining 27 per-

cent of forest, state and communal land is distributed between the Greeks and the Turks in accordance with the population proportions, the Turks are entitled to only 17.9 percent of the total area of Cyprus.

The refugee problem

(a) The whole of Cyprus has been turned into a vast refugee camp. Forty percent of the Greek population of the island have been turned into refugees and what is worse as a result of the most relentless and organised persecution. Consequently, they moved in panic and at the beginning without of course any preplanned aim. If this is coupled with the fact that the displaced persons abandoned their homes without being able to take anything with them, and that 70% of the general stores of food, livestock and agricultural and industrial products remained in the cut-off areas and, are therefore, inaccessible, one can easily assess the magnitude of the enormous problem of sheltering and maintaining these unfortunate people, who are not being allowed to return to their homes.

(b) A number of refugees at first sought shelter where they thought they would be safe. Subsequently some moved to towns and villages where they had relatives or friends or to the British base areas, while the majority were forced to remain in forests and hills. The total number, estimated at 191,259 (about 40,000 families) is believed to be distributed as follows :

Town	Urgently needing accommodation	Temporary accommodations	Accommodation with relatives	Total
Nicosia.....	5,162	2,858	24,559	32,579
Larnaca.....	57,900	3,800	28,100	89,800
Limassol.....	18,300	4,767	21,389	43,456
Kakopetria-Pedoulas area.....	750	2,760	18,095	21,605
Paphos.....		373	3,446	3,819
Total.....	82,112	14,558	94,589	191,259

Of these people, only 27,496 could be regarded as being able to maintain themselves. The remaining 163,763 are in need of constant care and assistance. Their subsistence alone requires an expenditure which at the most conservative estimate amounts to 400 mils per day per person.

(c) As regards clothing and elementary domestic and other equipment, it is estimated that about 12 million pounds will be needed.

(d) Concerning immediate requirements (the constant supply of foodstuffs of all kinds is of primary importance) there is an urgent need to secure :

30,000 tents and another 100 large ones capable of being used as common spaces.

630,000 blankets.

150,000 campbeds and other bedding.

33,000 heating sets.

320 mobile kitchens.

a sufficient number of mobile bakeries to cater for about 100,000 persons.

other elementary installations particularly in open-air camps such as sanitary and electric installations, water supply, telephone communications, transportation etc.

CONCLUSIONS

There is no doubt whatsoever that the aim of the Turkish Government is simply to destroy the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus by military force in order to promote Turkey's expansion. For the success of this aim they have used means and methods not only in absolute disregard of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of fundamental human rights but such that remind the most dark pages of human history. Turkey's purpose went far beyond the scourge of war. It is an attempt to use force to deface the Island and break up its economic and cultural continuity and its development. By intensive napalm bombing of defenseless villages Turkey aimed at spreading death and destruction. For the first time since World War II the invaders were pursuing their determined policy of expelling Cypriots from their ancestral homes. They had entered Cyprus with the set purpose of conducting a policy of expulsion by blood and iron and of geographic and demographic dismemberment.

It should be noted that the orgy of destruction by Turkey had begun at the very time the Prime Minister of Turkey was broadcasting to the World that "our mission is peaceful". It should also be noted that Turkey acted under the guise of a guarantor of the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus.

What can be done now?

(1) First and foremost there must be implementation of the Agreements reached recently in Geneva between the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey. At the same time there must be implementation of the Security Council Resolutions. Both the Geneva Agreements and the Security Council Resolutions provide for the withdrawal of the Turkish invading force from Cyprus.

(2) Secondly, there should be return of the 200,000 Greek Cypriot refugees, to their homes, who have been expelled from their houses by the invading forces for the reasons that have already been explained.

(3) Thirdly, there should be exchange of prisoners of war and hostages.

With all these vital and fundamental problems remaining unresolved any negotiations for the future of the Island will be carried out under pressure and blackmail, as it happened at Geneva. Cyprus expects from the whole international community and especially from the countries that have the power to do so to exert their influence in the right direction in order to secure for Cyprus its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and for the consolidation of peace not only in Cyprus itself but in the whole region.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Nicosia, 4th September, 1974.