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DETENTE AND THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. AND U.S.S.R. RELATIONS

REPORT

BY

Senator HUGH SCOTT

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

ON THE

DARTMOUTH VIII CONFERENCE

IN

TBILISI, GEORGIA SSR

APRIL 20–27, 1974

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

MAY 3, 1974.

Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: As a Member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, I spent the period of April 20 to April 27 in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in order to participate in the Dartmouth VIII Conference which was held in Tbilisi, capital of the Georgian SSR, and subsequently to meet with General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev in Moscow on April 26. I was accompanied in the Soviet Union by Mr. Robert D. Barton of the Committee staff.

My report on these meetings is attached.

Sincerely,

HUGH SCOTT, *U.S. Senator.*

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DETENTE AND THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF U.S. AND U.S.S.R. RELATIONS

During the recess from April 11 to April 28, 1974, I participated in the Interparliamentary Union meetings held in Bucharest, Romania, and the Dartmouth VIII Conference held in Tbilisi, Georgia SSR, to learn at first hand more about the attitudes of parliamentarians and other leading officials behind the Iron Curtain during this period of increasing detente. As the U.S. delegation to the Interparliamentary Union will submit a separate report on that meeting, I shall limit my comment on those sessions to the simple statement that all members of the American delegation worked collaboratively and effectively in the highly productive sessions of that Conference. Results generally were in accord with views favored by the U.S. delegation, often as the result of lengthy discussions and revisions.

Apart from the work sessions, I had the unique opportunity to talk privately with President Ceausescu of Romania for about two hours. We covered a large range of subjects in a most open and confidential manner. Out of courtesy to the Romanian President, I do not feel I should reveal details discussed privately, but my general impression is that President Ceausescu is as anxious today to promote closer relations between his country and ours as he was on his trip last year to the United States and even more so than during my visit with him in Romania in 1971. Romania is reaching westward, just as is the U.S.S.R., and at this particular time is concerned about its efforts to improve its trade relations with the United States. The President fears that present cordial relations with our country will be adversely affected if the most-favored-nation clause in the Trade Act is rejected or if American credits for new industrial and tourist enterprises are restricted.

I also had interesting and useful discussions along the same lines with Mr. Emil Bodnaras, Romanian Communist Party leader, and with Mr. Corneliu Manescu, President of the Romanian Interparliamentary Group. I also had a chance to visit the U.S.I.S. Exhibit in Bucharest called "Progress and the Environment." One intriguing demonstration there was General Motors' new catalytic converters for automobile exhausts, something I had not as of then seen here in the United States.

Moscow, April 20–21 and April 26

From Bucharest I flew to Moscow where I had ample opportunity to discuss American-Soviet affairs with Ambassador Walter Stoessel. At a reception he gave in my honor, I had a chance to meet many of the outstanding leaders of the Politburo, the Council of the Union of U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet and the Council of Nationalities of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet. In contrast to my earlier visits, I found an eagerness on the part of most Russian leaders to discuss issues openly and frankly in the full spirit of detente.

On my return to Moscow from Tbilisi on April 25, for example, I was met by a delegation of Soviet officials, headed by Mr. Vladimir L. Kudryavtsev, a senior member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Council of Nationalites of the Supreme Soviet. He and the other Soviets continued to display the same warm hospitality and candor which I had experienced while at the Dartmouth Conference itself. The high point of my return visit was a two-hour conference held privately with General Secretary Brezhnev in his office at the Kremlin on April 26. Because of the nature of these confidential discussions, at which, besides the interpreter, only one other Soviet was present, I again feel restrained not to divulge in a public document all that was said, but I consider the conversation to have great significance for the improvement of Soviet-American relations. For the record, I would like to paraphrase some of our talks.

I emphasized that the negotiations already concluded between the General Secretary and President Nixon had created an extraordinarily favorable climate for averting the threat of nuclear war and the diminishment of the arms race. We both agreed that detente, as evidenced by the increasing normalization of mutual relations, had had a deep and positive influence on the process of all international diplomacy of either a bilateral or multilateral nature.

These high-level negotiations serve as a powerful impulse for the development of cooperation between the two countries in such varied spheres as science, technology and economy. For example, we now find ourselves in the process of arranging a joint flight of the Soyuz and Apollo spaceships which will permit the achievement of further collaboration in the field of space science and technology. I first discussed this proposal with Mikhail Suslov in 1971. In the area of economic accord we find greater demand for American technical know-how and management skills as well as a need for United States capital for the expansion of the extractive industries and consumer goods. Mr. Brezhnev remarked that Soviet public opinion is completely unanimous in support of expanding U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade. He mentioned the exceptionally rich natural resources found so bountifully in the Soviet Union which need international cooperation to extract and exploit them. For instance, he claims that the Soviet Union has up to a trillion cubic-meters of oil and gas, some of which could be made available to the United States if arrangements can be made. In this regard, Mr. Brezhnev continued, the United States has no need to fear that increased Soviet-American trade would produce any dislocations of employment; on the contrary such joint ventures would lead to increased employment in those fields dealing with the production of machinery and equipment for extracting, processing and transporting natural resources.

Our discussion naturally led into the chances of the U.S. Trade Bill in the Congress and while I was giving him my views, I pointed out that the issue of human rights and the emigration policies of the Soviet Union seriously hindered its successful passage. Mr. Brezhnev stated most emphatically that in his view no discrimination exists in the Soviet Union today and that all those desirous of leaving will be given permission to do so except those who hold or who have recently held jobs connected with Soviet national security, which he assured me were small in number. He also pointed out that due to the already

large numbers of Jews who have been given exit permits, the number requesting permission to leave is constantly declining. In fact, he said, some 1,500 persons of Jewish origin have permits to leave but have shown no inclination to do so. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is no longer imposing any exit tax on those who leave the U.S.S.R. He regretted that this has become such an issue and expressed the hope that when it has been satisfactorily resolved, which he felt was well underway already, some other symbolic issue would not be raised to take its place. I mentioned the differing point of view on the part of many Americans and discussed also the problems of specific applicants.

Another large topic we turned our attention to was the arms limitation talks now going on in Geneva and Vienna. Here Mr. Brezhnev expressed the belief that both he and President Nixon shared a common desire to reach agreements of mutual benefit. I was mindful of a letter which I had co-signed with Senators Mansfield, Fulbright, Mondale, Aiken and Mathias on April 10th to Secretary Kissinger, and expressed to the General Secretary the sense of that communication found in its penultimate paragraph which reads:

"In sum, you may be confident that the Congress will continue to support your efforts to achieve equitable treaties and agreements limiting and reducing strategic nuclear weapons within the context of a secure strategic capability to protect our national security interests."

Mr. Brezhnev took this message to heart and appeared to agree that this is substantially what the Soviets desire as well.

I left his office with the very strong feeling that he was anticipating the summit talks he and President Nixon will hold in June as an effective measure towards progress in smoothing out difficulties impeding the development of sound political-economic relationships. He emphasized that these meetings have been preceded by lengthy and substantial preparations so that during the summit talks themselves the two world leaders can go directly to the issues confronting them with the least amount of delay and misinterpretation. Both are resolved to make every effort to strengthen the process of detente in order to free the peoples of both countries from the overwhelming burdens of the arms race.

Dartmouth VIII Conference—Tbilisi, April 21–25, 1974

The Eighth Dartmouth Conference might be said to have commenced when the Soviet and American delegates met at the Moscow International Airport on Sunday evening, April 21, 1974. The exchange of greetings and promises of harmonious collaboration were publicly carried to the people of the Soviet Union by their national TV network. Altogether I participated in four TV and press interviews in Moscow and three in Tbilisi and, of course, other participants were also interviewed so that within the Soviet Union itself the proceedings of the Conference were widely publicized.

Early and easy companionship was further advanced by the delegations sharing a chartered Aeroflot plane to the capital of Georgia, one of the fifteen united Republics within the federation. Located

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about one thousand miles south of Moscow, it occupies 27,000 square miles and has a population of slightly over 5,000,000. Georgia SSR has the world's largest manganese mines, as well as rich timber and coal resources.

The Dartmouth Conference received its name from having had the first and seventh of its bilateral talks at the Hanover, New Hampshire campus of that college in 1960 and 1972. The third and fifth sessions were held in Andover, Massachusetts and Rye, New York. Alternately, conferences are held in the Soviet Union; previous even-numbered sessions having been held in the Crimea in 1961, Leningrad in 1964 and Kiev in 1971. Tbilisi was chosen for 1974 because of its having a spacious and convenient conference center outside of the city proper, because of the warmth and hospitality of the Georgian people, and because it allowed the American delegates, many of whom had previously participated in earlier meetings, a chance to become acquainted with a very different part of the U.S.S.R.

The American delegation was headed by Norman Cousins, the editor of *Saturday Review/World*. Co-Chairmen of the three committees on political affairs, economic issues and scientific and technological exchange were: former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Charles Yost; Mr. David Rockefeller, Chairman of the Board of the Chase Manhattan Bank; and Dr. Thomas F. Malone, Director of Holcomb Research Institute of Butler University. The Soviet counterparts were: Conference Co-Chairman Georgi A. (Yuri) Zhukov, Deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and *Pravda* political commentator; political Co-Chairman Georgi A. Arbatov, Director of the Institute of U.S. Studies of the Academy of Sciences; economic Co-Chairman Boris A. Borisov, Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the U.S.S.R., and Scientific and Technological Co-Chairman Academician Evgeni Fedorov of the Academy of Sciences.[1]

The Charles F. Kettering Foundation provides the funds to cover expenses in the United States and of the American participants other than the Congressional delegates and the Council on International Educational Exchange administers the Conferences. Both deserve the gratitude of the American people for their excellent efforts to promote Soviet-American relations.

First Plenary Session

Mr. Zhukov opened the Conference on April 22 by welcoming past and new delegates and reminding them that the sessions to follow offered them "a precious opportunity to hold frank exchanges of views on the most pressing problems facing Soviet-American relations on the urgent problems of the world without being apprehensive that their utterances will be heard beyond this forum and distorted for propaganda purposes." For this reason, I shall not identify speakers nor quote them directly except occasionally when the relevance of their statement or the pithiness of their remarks makes it proper to do so.

Mr. Cousins pointed out that the conspicuous difference between

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[1] See Appendix 1 for a list of participants.

this conference and others preceding it was found in the two position papers prepared by each team. The concentration was less on differences separating the two than on a general acceptance of detente and a determination on both sides to find a resolution of apparent differences and specific implementation of the goals of detente.

SUMMARY OF THE U.S. AND U.S.S.R. POSITION PAPERS

Since the two reports served as a general background for the agenda of the conference, a brief summary of each follows. Both prologues praise the progress made in detente over the past 18 months which they credited largely to summit and other high level negotiations. However, the American report stated: "Before detente can be considered fully successful, the danger of international war must be overcome through a substantial reduction, if not the complete elimination of weapons of mass destruction, and through the creation of a new, effective system of mutual security." The Soviets spoke to this point thus: ". . . diminishing and complete elimination of the threat of nuclear conflict is an international problem of cardinal importance which is still urgent."

The Americans saw the Middle East conflict as evidence that the destruction of civilization was still possible while the Soviets claimed that the negotiations which led to the truce would not have been possible save for detente. The Americans pointed out that extensive public support is fundamental if detente is to be furthered, but warned that Soviet actions in the Middle East and in trade relations have raised serious doubts in the mind of the American public as to whether detente is being earnestly pursued by the Soviet leadership or is being used for narrower national interests. The Soviets, on the other hand, viewed such skeptics and other outright opponents of detente as serious impediments to the solution of pending problems and even as a danger to the results already reached.

POLITICAL ISSUES RAISED IN REPORTS

Both sides agreed that measures already taken towards disarmament have been simultaneously useful and paradoxical. The Americans wrote that unless SALT II accomplishes its arms limitation objectives, a costly and dangerous arms race will accelerate. The Soviets put their hopes in a reliable collective security system and stronger mechanisms for mutual consultation.

The U.S. authors suggested that the two nations negotiate an annual rate of quantitative reduction in the range of five to ten percent per annum for five to ten years. They recognized the difficulty of quantitative reductions in an asymmetrical balance of power while qualitative advances are being sought through each nation's research and development teams. The Soviets underscored this issue by pointing to the U.S. defense budget for FY 1975 which will be increased by nearly 20%, mostly for improved weapon systems (mobile ICBM's, submarines and bombers), and the rebirth of the "counterforce" concept. They proposed that in addition to the arms reduction talks underway in Vienna and Geneva serious consideration be given to their earlier

disarmament proposal made to the United Nations. They have suggested a World Conference on Disarmament which would seek a reduction in all nations' defense budgets, and up to ten percent for those nations who are members of the Security Council. They suggest that savings that would ensue should be used at least in part for aid to developing countries.

The U.S. paper examined other aspects of the arms race, including a comparison of the size of the NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces in Europe and each nation's navies, but these factors were largely ignored in the Soviet's paper, although not in the ensuing discussions. The U.S. recognized that mutual interest decreed that local conflicts must be contained if not altogether eliminated and considered both the U.N. and consultation outside of the United Nations' framework as methods of doing so. The Middle East conflict and the emerging rivalry in the Indian Ocean were used as cases in point as was the U.S. detente with the People's Republic of China. The Soviets passed over their military involvement in Syria, repeated their proposal to make a "zone of peace" in the Indian Ocean, and agreed that Asia would be an important region for international cooperation. Regarding Soviet-PRC relationships, they felt that their normalization would not hinder the development of PRC relations with other nations nor should the improvement of U.S.-PRC relations be used against the U.S.S.R.

ECONOMIC QUESTIONS RAISED IN THE REPORTS

Both papers evinced satisfaction over the progress made in bilateral trade relations. The Soviets credited detente with the increase of trade from $200 million in 1971 to $642 million in 1972, to $1.5 billion in 1973. According to them new trade arrangements dealing with taxes, port facilities, intergovernmental commissions, the exchange of trade representatives and the proposed new Moscow Trade Center have been instrumental in this regard. Furthermore, they wrote, the economic level the U.S.S.R. has achieved makes international participation in commerce more attractive and the United States now views the Soviet as a viable market for its wares. They cited three major obstacles to continued commercial growth: (1) the possible withdrawal of further U.S. government credits; (2) the growth of American protectionism; and (3) the U.S. political campaign opposing greater trade. Given their unfavorable balance of payments resulting from the growth, they view these problem areas seriously, feeling that they hinder their efforts to sell on the U.S. market and thus provide funds with which to pay for their imports. In conclusion, the Soviet paper asked for full equality in trade relations and the removal of those obstacles.

The American position was that other serious problems might prevent trade transactions and investments in the U.S.S.R. First of all, they noted that the large 1973 increase was mainly due to the one-time and special agreement to supply agricultural goods when the U.S.S.R. faced a grain shortage. The Americans want to promote greater non-agricultural exports, especially as agricultural conditions in the Soviet Union now appear normal. Secondly, they acknowledge that the energy situation makes Soviet petroleum look attractive but the surge of protectionism, as exemplified by President Nixon's goal of energy inde-

pendence by 1980, would mean the "U.S. public would not at the moment favor a switch from growing dependence on Middle-Eastern crude to a significant dependence on Soviet gas." Thirdly, they posited that doubts about the world-wide political ambitions of the Soviet Union, as well as restrictions on human liberties, jeopardize mutual economic relations and the growth of general world trade. Misgivings were also expressed about whether detente might not be a ploy for the Soviets to overcome local production bottlenecks by getting U.S. technology cheap, to provide needed consumer goods without cutting into the Soviet's military productivity, and to get U.S. capital to develop key sectors of the Soviet economy. Fourthly, they see the failure of the Soviet to integrate its internal economy into the worldwide market as far as planning and pricing go as another impediment.

Nevertheless, the Americans agreed that significant steps had been made despite differences in ideology, objectives and methods and offered five additional steps which might be undertaken. The first was co-production, in which the U.S. would provide equipment and technical expertise in return for a percentage of the output as compensation. A greater effort to allocate domestic resources for the purpose of satisfying foreign demand and to ensure high quality and competitive goods for the world markets was a second possibility. More public information about Soviet productivity, natural resources and the financial position of the Union was a third. A fourth was the need to minimize excessive bureaucratic interference and delays, and the fifth advocated a greater exchange of economists and businessmen between the two nations.

EXCHANGES OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND PERSONS

Both sides agreed that exchanges have been highly beneficial both towards and as a result of detente. The Soviets gave examples of where international cooperation has been particularly successful and suggested that the parties look into other possible areas. Among these were psychotherapy, medical electronics, new energy resources, climate modification, and management organizational techniques.

The Americans suggested such fields as agriculture, biochemistry, climatology, environmental modeling and greater use of natural resources. They also cited some obstacles to the free exchange of scientists and ideas. For example, more American scientists are visiting the U.S.S.R. than vice versa. Cooperative research must be extended to multinational areas in order to be effective and international institutions dealing with similar problems should be strengthened. Finally, research efforts should be directed towards solving mankind's most urgent problems.

Political Work Sessions

After a full discussion of the two papers and a thorough examination of their areas of agreement and points of difference the conferees broke up into work sessions which took place April 23 and 24. The largest of these dealt with the political issues of detente and particularly disarmament.

Both sides agreed that detente and disarmament concern not just the two superpowers but the world as a whole. The Soviets reviewed

the many lost opportunities to find detente in the past and enumerated the present crises such as energy, food supplies, population explosion, inflation, etc., as requiring a period of peace. "If we live another decade without war we will find out how critical these actually are," said one.

DISARMAMENT AND THE ARMS RACE

One obstacle to achieving more harmony in the SALT II talks, according to an American spokesman, was the mistaken belief that the more visible the arsenal of either side, the less likelihood there was of the other resorting to aggression. The Soviets agreed on the importance of the ongoing arms limitation talks but said the inequalities of the present situation distort the point of view of the negotiators. They felt the U.S. mistakenly sees much greater power resting with the U.S.S.R. than is actually the case. They followed this up by saying that the reduction of arms is far more important than their limitation. If the latter is all that results from SALT II a further disarmament conference will have to be convened almost immediately although its outcome would be still more problematical. They referred to the obvious neglect by the Americans of collateral issues such as the geographic distribution of strategic weapons, new research and development efforts, military plans for a counterforce strategy and the public reaction to the whole issue.

One American conceded that the U.S. forward-based forces, which now comprise only five percent of its total, should be eliminated altogether due as much to their excessive vulnerability as to their provocative nature. Another felt that the Defense Department's proclaimed new strategy amounted to simple advocacy of its FY 1975 budget. Moreover, he claimed Americans debated their military strategy in open sessions whereas no one knows what the U.S.S.R.'s is. The Soviets reacted as might be expected to this, finding the Defense Department's new budget and strategy far from innocent and actually portending a new type of warfare and further arms escalation. One summarized the new research and development efforts of the Americans as follows: "When science invents something new, the Devil immediately grabs it while a hundred angels argue at length on how to make it work for peace." In another context, the Soviets defined their word *razriadka* (detente) as meaning literally the unloading of a gun and thereby a relaxation of tensions or detente. Each meaning of "razriadka" appealed to me as the talks progressed towards description of newer and more destructive weapons. In fact, I could not help but think of Churchill's remark that all excessive weaponry could do would be "to make the rubble bounce." Another delegate defined overkill as "the difference between gravel and sand."

THE MIDDLE EAST

The present imbroglio in the Mid-East was optimistically described by an American, who had just left the area in order to attend the Conference, as providing as much an opportunity as a challenge. In his opinion Israeli attitudes towards the Arab nations, the Palestinians and the Soviets were changing for the better. The Soviets

considered the situation that has prevailed over recent decades of no war/no truce as impossible to tolerate much longer. They felt that detente had allowed Mr. Kissinger to confer with the leaders of both sides and to limit the conflict, yet warned that peace could not be imposed by one side telling the other what to do. Final agreement must take into accord the interests of all. They observed that the U.S. position paper had contained but little reference to the proposed Geneva peace talks on the Middle East and reviewed why they felt those talks significant. The Americans agreed they were most important and had not received greater attention only because disengagement must precede them. Disengagement remains elusive not only because of the Syrian intransigence, but because of a variety of other issues as well. For example, would the Palestinians unite behind a single representative to Geneva? The Soviets felt that the delegate must be chosen from the Palestinian Liberation Organization but would this be tolerated by the Israelis? The fates of Jerusalem and the three religions of the Holy Land contain *casus belli* by themselves and the drawing of new frontiers for Israel and guarantees of their inviolability also charge the diplomatic atmosphere. The U.S.S.R. contends that Syria will never rest content unless it feels its legitimate claims will be recognized in Geneva. An imposed consolidation of present frontiers would amount to only a partial settlement, unlikely to appease them, and would contribute to the inflammatory situation now prevailing.

In conclusion, though both sides expressed some criticism of how the October War was handled by the other, they agreed that disengagement of troops under U.N. supervision followed by the Geneva Conference would benefit both. The key issue at Geneva would be the imposition of the 1967 U.N. Resolution 242 and additional guarantees for all concerned.

Among these would be (1) diplomatic recognition of Israel by the Arabs (and implicity, also, by the U.S.S.R.), (2) promises from Lebanon to restrict guerrilla activities emanating from within its borders, and (3) establishing demilitarized zones along the new frontiers. Underlying all of these suggestions was one made by a Soviet who said our two nations must find means to coexist in that sphere and to promote coexistence. He assured the Americans that the U.S.S.R. has no designs on U.S. (oil) interests in the area.

EUROPE

Military detente is a *sine qua non* for political detente in Europe according to both delegations. A Soviet spokesman mentioned that his nation was intent on reducing the size of both the Warsaw Pact and NATO forces, but it soon became apparent that a fair number of difficulties beset this worthy intention. Much of the session was consequently devoted to means whereby conventional forces and tactical nuclear forces could be limited or reduced. The conferees agreed that their present size reflects attitudes prevalent during the cold war days of a decade or more ago, but worried whether Germany's fears would be quelled if a U.S.-U.S.S.R. bilateral agreement to reduce forces was negotiated. An unanswerable question was whether Germany would feel obligated to rearm unilaterally in that case. Nevertheless, both

sides shared the opinion that at Vienna they should more resolutely press for a mutual reduction of forces in Central Europe.

OTHER POLITICAL ISSUES

Inasmuch as I also participated in the task force on economic issues, I cannot summarize the totality of other political issues discussed by the first work group. I particularly regret having missed some of the discussions on Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean and the United Nations. On the first, the conferees evidently joined in expressing hopes that the Paris Accord on Vietnam would be observed. The Soviets hold that they have observed their part of the bargain not to rearm North Vietnam better than the Americans have done in South Vietnam but nevertheless are convinced both sides equally desire peace. The continuing enigma for both nations is China, whose frigid relationship with the U.S.S.R., they contend, has cooled all attempts towards signing a non-aggression treaty or establishing any other common area of detente. One, of course, hears a different point of view in the People's Republic of China.

The delegates viewed accelerated competition in naval armaments as a threat to peace and detente and stressed the importance of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace as they have proposed in the United Nations. There was a general view that the prohibition of foreign naval bases in that area would be consistent with that purpose.

They also agreed, that the United Nations should be relied upon to a greater extent to resolve bilateral and multinational differences and that they should work harmoniously together and with other permanent Security Council members to improve its peacekeeping machinery.

PUBLIC OPINION

The effect of public opinion on detente was given careful study by both sides although it obviously forms less of a factor on foreign policy in the U.S.S.R. than it does in the United States. Mr. Hedley Donovan, editor-in-chief of *Time* remarked on the number of letters Mr. Yuri Zhukov had received from Soviet viewers after one of his televised interviews on detente, but the main thrust was on how the Americans viewed detente. Mr. Donovan cited recent events having led to some disillusionment on the part of the American people with this new state of affairs. The Mid-East conflict, Solzhenitsyn, and the restrictions on human rights and on the exodus of Jews contributed to U.S. disillusionment. I added several others, such as the grain deal, the energy crisis and the difficulties reported about SALT II, as evidence that detente's modest success is continually being weighed against new problems. I reviewed how the events affected the opinions of Congressmen and how in turn Congressmen's opinions affected the mass media and thereby the public. For detente to work, I said, new evidence of cooperation would be required constantly. To reassure the public, I felt the two countries should find quick solutions to differences in the SALT and MBFR talks, to the competitive stance each is taking to continued cooperation in the Middle East and to mutual and collaborative assistance in the developing countries.

Other delegates made further suggestions, especially about the need to give the public of each other's country more accurate knowledge

about each nation. Soviets and Americans alike deplored the exaggerated publicity given to military leaders' pronouncements and the abyssmal ignorance of their fellow citizens about the international or domestic affairs of the other country which might affect bilateral relations. In this regard, one Soviet spokesman promised that the U.S.S.R. would not interfere in American internal affairs nor would it exploit domestic problems concerning the President as this would be a violation of the principles upon which detente is based. He went on to call for more exchanges of officials, youth, women, students and professors. One American suggested that in both countries televised debates about detente might be a forceful way of telling the public that detente is a process, not a panacea. Delegates to the Dartmouth Conference might themselves be able participants in such TV debates, and should also encourage objective instruction about the other's country in educational institutions at all levels.

Economic Work Session

As was done in the other sessions, the first work session by the economic task force carefully examined each other's position papers. Concurrence was held that better economic relations improved detente and vice versa, but both sides maintained that the relationship must be sustained with continued progress. The Soviets seek greater commercial credits, the development of their industry through the transfer of American technology and management skills, and new legal machinery which will harmonize with the different eco-social systems of each country. However, they warned that no one should fall into the trap of believing economic collaboration will eliminate ideological differences on which the systems are founded.

I was asked to speak on how these differences affect the U.S. Trade Bill now before the Congress. I summarized the prevailing Congressional views. As mentioned earlier, MFN is of much concern to the Soviets who would consider a rejection of the agreement signed by the leaders of each nation as a serious step backward in the normalization or advancement of commercial and financial ties.

Serious as the Jackson Amendment might be for the U.S.S.R., American businessmen are concerned with aspects of the Soviet political-economic monolith with which Americans must deal. As one American described it, the omnipotent state monopolizes commerce (and every other activity) both horizontally and vertically. It operates as planner, owner, investor, producer, buyer, seller, banker, insurer, shipper, and even controls the labor unions. When the U.S.S.R. buys, it does so for 250 million consumers. Its decisions are totally secret; it divulges no more information than absolutely necessary. One prominent Soviet official claimed that the lesson to be learned from the grain sale was not that improprieties existed on either side but that standard techniques used by Americans in such a transaction are unsuited to the demands of the new bargaining situation they now find themselves facing.

Other areas where the monopolistic character of the Soviets would affect U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade relations come in cooperative manufacturing and marketing ventures, and the exchange of technology. Americans feared unfair competition in foreign markets could come about

through the exploitation of U.S. productive facilities built in and for the U.S.S.R. They also mentioned the possibility of "dumping" goods both in the U.S. and abroad to the disadvantage of American producers and laborers alike.

It stands to the credit of this working group that they could discuss these crucial issues without acrimony. Rather, they favored further study of them by such organizations as the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Economic Council and suggested specific possibilities which would alleviate future aggravation. Some problems of a non-political nature included the need for the Soviets to provide better physical facilities for visiting businessmen, more flexible trade and technical arrangements and the expansion of mutual information on export-import and financial possibilities. Soviet leaders have anticipated some of these requirements. Two days before the Conference convened, an agreement had been signed and the design approved for a new Moscow Trade Center to be built collaboratively with American credits, architects and engineers and their Soviet counterparts. This welcome development stands as a symbol of the efforts being made by both nations to increase the two way volume of trade and to foster economic cooperation on a broadly based premise of mutual equality and benefit.

Scientific Work Sessions

The work group discussing technological, scientific and other exchanges met concurrently with the other groups in a separate *dacha* which made it physically impossible for me to attend any of their discussions. However, I did meet with most of their conferees socially and received the impression that they united behind the resolve to enlarge and strengthen the joint research now underway in both countries. I commend the Soviet participants for being willing to admit that due to ideological differences their country has not cooperated as fully as it might have in many international organizations specifically charged with finding solutions to critical problems confronting the world today, such as agricultural production methods in marginal lands, health and population interactions, energy, pollution, et cetera. After admitting this, the Soviets insisted that cooperation was required in order to save money, time and the world!

I shall quote from the final report [2] of the Conference on subjects which this work group considered suitable for intensified cooperation in scientific fields.

"(1) Increasing the productivity of world-wide agriculture, taking into account modern scientific developments which bring within reach the possibility of substantially greater yields of the major food crops. A major effort will be required.

"(2) Requirements for energy taking into account that there are adequate resources for its production though there are some local and regional imbalances.

"(3) The growing impact of human activities on nature which changes the cycles of substances and energy and may change also the global climate through the biosphere.

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[2] See Appendix 2 for complete text of the Joint Communique.

"(4) Methodology with special attention to simulation models for study of aforesaid problems and the total interactions of man and his environment."

Conclusions

1. The American-Soviet summit talks have provided a powerful impetus for the development of collaboration between the two countries, not only in the political field but also in the spheres of science, technology and economics.

2. Both in Moscow and Tbilisi I found solid proof that the U.S.S.R. has accepted detente as a new political doctrine set down by the very highest councils of the State and to be espoused and fostered by all of its elements.

3. Differences of opinion about detente still exist in the U.S.S.R., however, just as they do here. Some Soviets put more hope in it than others; some doubt its potential; others privately oppose it. Since it is supported by General Secretary Brezhnev no one disagrees with it publicly.

4. The continual references made by senior officials about our common responsibility to our children and to all mankind was a significant indication that the Soviets sincerely want peace and are willing to make concessions to maintain it.

5. For the Soviets the June summit talks hold great importance. The visits of Mr. Kissinger and other high level meetings have involved a great deal of intensive preparation for the summit talks. However complicated they may be, we should all remember that essentially they can lead to peace.

6. Soviet leaders, however, are tough and able negotiators. Although not personally involved in working out the final communique of the Dartmouth Conference, I observed that even though it simply expressed concern, concurrence and cooperation in efforts for promoting detente, it took great perseverance, tact and determination on the part of both sides to establish a common point of view.

7. While the final communique therefore is neither original nor surprising, the depth of harmony expressed in it leads to the conclusion that the Dartmouth Conference was entirely worthwhile. Additionally, the fact that the delegates agreed to so much of the other side's position was an indication that cooperation for detente and its success is assured.

8. Although Senator Edward Kennedy spoke briefly and usefully at the Dartmouth Conference while traveling privately to Tbilisi, I was the only American official continuously there to represent the United States Government. (Senator Symington unfortunately had to decline his invitation to attend due to illness). The Soviet delegation, while purportedly attending privately in their role as writers, scientists, and professionals in other fields, was inescapably "official" by the very nature of the Soviet system. For this reason I believe my presence was useful as was Senator Kennedy's. In fact, his attendance was particularly valuable for offering proof positive that in most regards the Congress is not divided along party lines in its approach to foreign affairs and better U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations.

9. The higher the level of the Soviet official, the more openly and frankly he talks with a foreigner. At the other end of the spectrum, debate for the benefit of the man in the street is covered by platitudes or propaganda slogans although in my brief experience never were these polemical or bellicose.

10. High Soviet officials and intellectuals know through a microscopic inspection of readily available American newspapers, magazines and journals of all description much more about us than we can possibly learn about them through their controlled press. On the other hand, the rank and file hanker after American publications having no ready access to them, even if their very possession might become an embarrassment to them.

11. Soviet newspapers, magazines and public utterances aimed at the Soviet people still contain a good deal of anti-Western ideological prose although neither as conspicuous nor as contentious as I have witnessed on earlier visits.

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All in all, the time, the work and the intellectual interchange can only have been helpful to the betterment of U.S.-U.S.S.R. understanding.

The Dartmouth Conference justified its raison d'etre.

APPENDIX 1

DARTMOUTH VIII CONFERENCE

(Tbilisi-Moscow, April 22–26, 1974)

Soviet Participants

1. Arbatov, Georgi Arkadyevich: Corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR; Director, Institute of U.S. Studies, Academy of Sciences of the USSR.
2. Balagurov, Juri Alekseevich: Vice Chairman, Board of the State Bank of the USSR.
3. Blokhin, Nikolai Nikolayevich: Academician, Director of the Institute of Oncology, Academy of Sciences of the USSR
4. Borisov, Boris Andrianovich: Chairman, Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the USSR.
5. Belyaev, Igor Petrovich: Deputy Director, Institute of Africa, Academy of Sciences of the USSR.
6. Bykov, Oleg Nikolayevich: Chief of Section, Institute of World Economics and International Relations, Academy of Sciences of the USSR.
7. Emelyanov, Vasily Semenovich: Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR; Member of the Board, Soviet Peace Fund.
8. Ermolenko, Dmitry Vladimirovich: Professor, Moscow State Institute of International Relations.
9. Fedorov, Evgeni Konstantinovich: Academician, Academy of Sciences of the USSR.
10. Kotov, Mikhail Ivanovich: Executive Secretary, Soviet Peace Committee; Member of the Board, Soviet Peace Fund.
11. Matveev, Vikentii Alexandrovich: *Izvestia* political commentator.
12. Milstein, Mikhail Abramovich: Head of Department, Institute of US Studies, Academy of Sciences of the USSR.
13. Morozov, Grigori Iosifovich: Head of Department, Institute of World Economics and International Relations, Academy of Sciences of the USSR.
14. Mostovets, Nikolai Vladimirovich: Professor, Chief of US Section, International Department of Central Committee CPSU.
15. Noneshvili, Iosif Eliozovich: Secretary, Board of Writers' Union of the Georgian SSR.
16. Pavlichenko, Vladimir Pavlovich: Executive Secretary, Soviet Pugwash committee.

17. Primakov, Evgeni Maksimovich: Professor, Deputy Director, Institute of World Economics and International Relations, Academy of Sciences of the USSR.
18. Rounov, Boris Alexandrovich: Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the USSR.
19. Rybak, Natan Samoylovich: Writer, State Prize Winner.
20. Siradze, Victoria Moyseevna: Chairman, Foreign Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet of GSSR.
21. Trofimenko, Genrich Alexandrovich: Head of Department, Institute of US Studies, Academy of Sciences of the USSR.
22. Vaganov, Boris Sergeevich: Rector, All-Union Academy for Foreign Trade.
23. Vekua, Ilia Nesterovich: Deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; President of the Academy of Sciences of Georgian SSR.
24. Zhukov, Georgi Alexandrovich: Deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; *Pravda* political commentator.
25. Zhurkin, Vitali Vladimirovich: Deputy Director, Institute of US Studies, Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

Advisers

1. A. V. Anikin: Head of Department, Institute of World Economics and International Relations, Academy of Sciences of the USSR.
2. Y. I. Bobrakov: Chief of Section, Institute of US Studies, Academy of Sciences of the USSR.
3. V. I. Gantman: Chief of Section, Institute of World Economics and International Relations, Academy of Sciences of the USSR.
4. A. I. Kashirin: Lecturer, Moscow State Institute of International Relations.
5. Y. A. Kostko: Scientific Secretary, Institute of World Economics and International Relations, Academy of Sciences of the USSR.
6. L. G. Mikhailov: Head, Foreign Department, Soviet Peace Committee.
7. A. N. Stepunin: Head, American Department, Soviet Friendship Societies; Secretary-General, Institute of Soviet-American Relations.
8. A. S. Shuvalov: Chief of Section, Institute of World Economics and International Relations.
9. M. G. Sturua: Journalist.
10. M. I. Zakhmatov: Chief of Section, Institute of US Studies, Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

U.S. Participants

Landrum Bolling, Executive Vice President, Lilly Endowment, Inc.
Norman Cousins, Editor, *Saturday Review/World* Magazine.
Hedley Donovan, Editor in Chief, *Time*.
Paul M. Doty, Director, Programs for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University.
James L. Ferguson, President and Chief Executive Officer, General Foods Corporation.
William Hewitt, Chairman, Deere and Company.
Thomas F. Malone, Director, Holcomb Research Institute, Butler University.
Samuel Pisar, Attorney, Paris, France and Washington, D.C.
David Rockefeller, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, The Chase Manhattan Bank.
Hugh Scott, U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania.
George M. Woodwell, Senior Ecologist, Department of Biology, Brookhaven National Laboratory.
Sterling Wortman, Vice President, The Rockefeller Foundation.
Charles W. Yost, Lecturer, Member United Nations Association of the U.S.A.

U.S. Conference Staff

Administration:

Irving H. Becker, Conference Director, Assistant Executive Director, Council on International Education Exchange.

Richard Kaufman, Vice President, The Chase Manhattan Bank.

James M. Read, Vice President, The Charles F. Kettering Foundation.

Ms. Danielle Shepherd, Bilingual Staff Assistant, Council on International Education Exchange.

Rapporteur: Philip D. Stewart, Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University.

Interpreters:

Group I, George Sherry, Principal Officer for Special Political Affairs, Office of the Secretary General, United Nations.

Group II, George Klebnikov, Chief, Interpretation Services, United Nations.

Group III, Ms. Galina Tunicks, Assistant Professor of Linguistics, University of California, Davis.

Observer: Robert D. Barton, Professional Staff Associate, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate.

APPENDIX 2

JOINT COMMUNIQUE DARTMOUTH VIII CONFERENCE

(Tbilisi, April 22–25, 1974)

From April 22 to 25, 1974, a meeting of American and Soviet public figures was held in Tbilisi, the capital of the republic of Georgia (USSR). The meeting was the eighth in the Dartmouth Conference series that began in Hanover, New Hampshire, USA in 1960 and that has since been held alternately in the United States and Soviet Union. Attending the Tbilisi meeting were deputies to the USSR Supreme Soviet, a member of the United States Senate, scientists, editors, writers, economists, and business leaders, all participating as private citizens.

The conferees met in a positive atmosphere, largely the result of the policies adopted by both countries. These policies seek an improved climate for peace in the world and a substantial enhancement of relations between the two states. The Basic Principles of Relations between the USSR and the USA and the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War signed by General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and President Richard Nixon in May 1972 and June 1973 respectively are regarded by the conferees as significant landmarks in the development of detente.

The participants of the Conference see detente not as a temporary tactic but as an ongoing and indispensable instrument for world peace. Detente is a process through which both countries, as well as other countries of the world, can effectively resolve outstanding issues among themselves.

The Dartmouth conferees emphasize that a detente is not an exclusive arrangement between two countries but an integral part of a worldwide effort designed to promote the possibilities of a durable peace. The conferees regard the United Nations as the proper and essential instrument for bringing about collective world security. They believe that the strengthening of the United Nations should be a primary objective of its members.

The conferees regard continuing meetings at the summit between the two countries as natural and indispensable. They attach the highest importance to the forthcoming summit meeting.

A number of political agreements have recently been concluded between the USA and USSR. The full implementation of all these agreements is essential if Soviet-American relations are to become an enduring factor for world peace.

The work of the Conference was divided into three groups—political, economic and scientific. The specific conclusions of these three groups, approved by the Conference as a whole, are summarized herewith:

POLITICAL QUESTIONS

The conferees recognize the special responsibility of both nations in bringing the arms race to a halt. This applies especially to the sphere of strategic arms.

The nuclear arms race is fundamentally incompatible with detente, and is wasteful of resources required for the satisfaction of human needs. The test ban treaty, non-proliferation treaty, the SALT I and other agreements in this field are valuable interim steps toward ending the nuclear arms race.

The conferees are aware of the complexity and sensitivity of issues involved in current strategic arms negotiations but they consider that existing obstacles can be surmounted. The agreement on basic principles for further limitation of offensive strategic arms, signed in June 1973, points the way to the quantitative and qualitative limitation of arms, a prerequisite to their reduction on the basis of equal security.

An accelerated competition in naval armaments is another aspect of the arms race that poses a danger to detente. The conferees stressed the usefulness of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace as proposed in the UN. The prohibition of foreign naval bases in this area is consistent with this purpose.

The conferees welcome the work of the Geneva Conference on European Security and Cooperation. This is a significant forum called upon to strengthen political detente on the European continent.

Even allowing for the complex nature of the problems under discussion at the Vienna talks, the conferees stressed that reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe are essential for peace on the Continent.

The still unsettled situation in the Middle East continues to be of acute concern to both the Soviet Union and the United States. The conferees express confidence in the possibilities of a peaceful settlement at the Geneva Conference in accordance with Security Council resolution 242 (1967). The conferees consider that disengagement of troops under UN supervision is the first essential step towards such a settlement, and they strongly favor the initiatives by the Soviet Union and the United States to achieve this end.

The participants in the Dartmouth Conference emphasized the central role of the United Nations in maintaining world peace and security. This role requires substantial improvement of the UN's peace-keeping machinery and concerted efforts toward this end, especially by the Security Council's permanent members.

Further development of detente requires the vigorous support of an informed public opinion in both our countries. Broad dissemination of information on the possibilities of detente will make a valuable contribution to public support. The participation of large numbers of citizens in a series of bilateral public colloquia or debates in both countries might be one means of buliding an informed public opinion which should contribute to a lasting detente.

ECONOMIC QUESTIONS

The participants in the meeting have noted that positive changes in the international atmosphere have contributed to an expansion of economic, commercial, scientific and technological relations between the United States and the USSR. This is apparent from the significant recent growth in the volume of trade and in contacts between Soviet organizations and American firms concerned with scientific and technical cooperation. The development of such economic relations is inseparably linked with progress towards political detente.

The participants stressed the need to intensify all efforts aimed at increasing the volume of trade and of broadly based economic cooperation between the USSR and the USA on a long term basis of its mutual advantage and equality. In this regard, the proposed establishment of the international trade center in Moscow was considered a welcome development.

Both sides recognized that Soviet-American trade cannot develop successfully without the extension of most favored nation treatment to the Soviet Union by the United States in accordance with agreements signed by the two governments. They have expressed the hope that the remaining obstacles which stand in the way of the full development of Soviet-American trade can be removed.

The participants have also favored a constructive search for new forms of cooperation in the spheres of production, science, credits and the exchange of technology and economic information. In this connection, a number of specific possibilities were considered and it was suggested that these possibilities be given further study by such organizations as the US-USSR Economic Council.

SCIENTIFIC QUESTIONS

Participants in the session on scientific cooperation and exchange agreed that the nature of research requires continuous, permanent, long-term contacts with versatile and flexible modes of interaction. It is timely that the programs now under way be strengthened and enlarged to provide for joint research between institutes and laboratories, including both senior and younger scientists.

Subjects suitable for intensified cooperation in science included:

(1) Increasing the productivity of world-wide agriculture, taking into account modern scientific developments which bring within reach the possibility of substantially greater yields of the major food crops. A major effort will be required.

(2) Requirements for energy taking into account that there are adequate resources for its production though there are some local and regional imbalances.

(3) The growing impact of human activities on nature which changes the cycles of substances and energy and may change also the global climate through the biosphere.

(4) Methodology with special attention to simulation models for the study of aforesaid problems and the total interactions of man and his environment.

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The conferees noted with great satisfaction that the discussions were held in Tbilisi in the spirit of frankness and mutual understanding. They believe it would be useful to give a more continuous character to the contacts established within the framework of the Dartmouth conferences.

We express our gratitude to our Georgian hosts for their hospitality.

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