GOVERNMENT
Storage
Y 4
.C 73/6
Or 3/4-24

DOCUMENTS
JAN 6 1975
THE LIBRARY
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY

SELECT COMMITTEE ON COMMITTEES

WORKING PAPERS
ON
HOUSE COMMITTEE ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION

TEN SUGGESTIONS FOR CONGRESSIONAL REFORM

MURRAY L. WEIDENBAUM
Washington University

NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

JUNE 1973

KSU LIBRARIES
A11900 953798

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
96-324 WASHINGTON : 1973

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO

Y 4.
C 73/8
97-3/4

SELECT COMMITTEE ON COMMITTEES

RICHARD BOLLING, Missouri, *Chairman*
DAVE MARTIN, Nebraska, *Vice Chairman*

ROBERT G. STEPHENS, JR., Georgia
JOHN C. CULVER, Iowa
LLOYD MEEDS, Washington
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

PETER H. B. FRELINGHUYSEN, New Jersey
CHARLES E. WIGGINS, California
WILLIAM A. STEIGER, Wisconsin
C. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida

CHARLES S. SHELDON II, *Chief of Staff*
GERALD J. GRADY, *Professional Staff Member*
LINDA H. KAMM, *Counsel*
WALTER J. OLESZEK, *Professional Staff Member*
TERENCE T. FINN, *Professional Staff Member*
MARY E. ZALAR, *Chief Clerk*
SHIRLEY A. KALICH, *Secretary*
CARMEN T. BAGHERZADEH, *Secretary*
MELVIN M. MILLER, *Deputy Chief of Staff*
SPENCER M. BERESFORD, *Counsel*
ROGER H. DAVIDSON, *Professional Staff Member*
ROBERT C. KETCHAM, *Professional Staff Member*
DENNIS J. TAYLOR, *Associate Counsel*
LINDA G. STEPHENSON, *Assistant Clerk*
ROSE M. SANKO, *Secretary*
C. CARLEDA BROUGHTON, *Secretary*
JOAN BANNON BACHULA, *Research Assistant*

TEN SUGGESTIONS FOR CONGRESSIONAL REFORM

(By Murray L. Weidenbaum,[1] Washington University)

To deal with the underlying budget problem facing the federal government, I would like to offer a 10-point program for changing the situation. I urge avoiding a search for villains. The budget situation facing us is the result of many actions taken over a number of years, by many Presidents and many Congresses. The public good would be better served by turning our attention to solving the substantive problems, rather than trying to pin the tail on the donkey—or the elephant.

The crucial problem is not that the President has imposed his priorities on the budget. Rather, it is that Congress lacks an effective mechanism for asserting its own priorities. There is now a log jam in the process of determining government policy in the United States. On budget and many other domestic policies, the President and the Congress are close to an impasse. In the long run, this deadlock will be broken. One possibility is that a plethora of congressional investigations of executive branch activities will weaken the President's position in relation to the Congress. That might be attractive on political or other grounds, but it would do little to improve governmental decision-making on financial matters.

A more positive approach—what I like to call the high road—is to strengthen the operations of the Congress so that it can take forceful stands and follow through on them. When we examine the congressional budget process over the years, we find that the present procedures have not always been with us; change is possible and does occur. The Congress repeatedly has revised the manner in which it organizes for and takes action on budgetary matters. In a sense, there has been an ebb and flow from centralized to fragmentized decision making and back again. We may have reached a point where the tide of Congressional power is about to flow once again.

STRENGTHENING THE CONGRESS

I have no single or simple panacea to offer. Rather, I would like to present a package of ten changes which in total would help to modernize the congressional budget process and thus increase the possibility of more effective legislative action on financial matters. Most of these proposals are taken from the recent study, *Matching Needs and Resources*, published by the American Enterprise Institute for Public

---

[1] Murray Weidenbaum has held key federal posts in the field of economic and budgetary policy. Prior to his service as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Economic Policy (1969–72) he worked in the Bureau of the Budget (1949–57). Today he is teaching economics at Washington University in St. Louis and recently served as senior author for a study, *Matching Needs and Resources,* published by the American Enterprise Institute (1973).

Policy Research.[2] Many contributed to the research, but I should like to cite Professor Philip N. Marcus as having made the major contribution to this portion of the study. As the senior author, I of course take full personal responsibility for the results.

These are the ten proposals to strengthen the way in which Congress makes its decisions on the budget:

1. *Streamline the budget.*—It is unreasonable to expect the Congress to make rational choices among the many hundreds of programs, bureaus, agencies, and activities which it must review each year during the budget process. The basic nature of federal undertakings must be streamlined. Revenue sharing, both general and special, points the way to achieving national objectives with less federal overhead. The federal government is not suited for the role of "doer" or administrative manager of the entire vast array of undertakings that it finances in our society. Its great advantage is, rather, its ability to serve as a policy formulator and financier over the public sector of the American economy. The federal government also can use the tax system to provide assistance to private, voluntary segments of our society whose activities promote the national interest without taking on the responsibility for running them.

One shortcoming is overriding—the lack of any mechanism for relating the numerous actions on specific pieces of legislation to the central issues of budget policy and national priorities. The use of a government-wide Planning Budget would help to shift the focus of attention from the bits and pieces to the major choices involved in enacting the budget. Such a reworking of the budget submissions would permit decision-makers to compare alternative programs of different agencies which contribute to achieving a given national goal. In the absence of an automatic market mechanism, such an approach would introduce a healthy degree of competition among government spending programs. Appendix A shows how the government-wide Planning Budget can be developed from existing budget materials.

2. *Reorganize the appropriations committees.*—It would be a great advantage if the subcommittee structure of the appropriations committees were reorganized to conform more closely to program lines. The possibility of an effective, coordinated review by Congress now is undermined by a subcommittee structure patterned after antiquated department and agency lines. But far more basic is the need to strengthen the role of the House Appropriations Committee vis-a-vis its individual subcommittees. The parent committee now resembles a loose confederation of autonomous components. If the overall power of the committee is strengthened, it will be even more important to make the subcommittees more responsive to the will and broader outlook of the full committee and thus of the Congress itself.

3. *Revise the congressional calendar.*—The Congress, cannot, and should not be expected to, complete work on the whole gamut of budget issues in the short period from February to June. It is not surprising that many appropriations bills are not passed until well after

---

[2] Murray L. Weidenbaum, Dan Larkins, and Philip N. Marcus, *Matching Needs and Resources: Reforming the Federal Budget,* Washington, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973, 114 pp.

the new fiscal year begins. The basic solution, of course, is to require that either the budget be submitted earlier or the fiscal year started later.

Meanwhile, the Congress should alter its own budget calendar. Before the budget is submitted, the committees should turn their attention to the basic economic, fiscal, and program policies that underlie the item-by-item decisions that are to come. There is a parallel in the executive branch: Office of Management and Budget examiners often use lulls in the budget preparation process for detailed examination and evaluation of specific programs that cannot be performed in the rush of the budget season.

4. *Enhance the role of the Economic Report.*—The President's Economic Report is now submerged by the budget message and does not serve the central purposes for which it was intended. If the Report were submitted in the Fall instead of January, then the Congress—prior to receiving the budget—would have a vehicle for exploring some of the basic issues it inevitably will have to address in the next session. Rather than being an after-the-fact rationalization of budget recommendations and decisions, the Economic Report would serve as a means of setting out some common intellectual ground for the program debates to follow. The Joint Economic Committee would play a far more direct role in the determination of budget priorities.

5. *Limit annual authorizations.*—Many programs each year go through a double-barrelled process requiring, first, an authorization stating an amount to be appropriated and, second, the actual appropriation of funds. The advantages of periodic authorizations—that is, better information and wider participation—offset the delays and duplication that are its side-effects. But modification of present practices is badly needed.

The use of these authorizations should be substantially limited. Authorizations should be enacted before hearings on the actual budget begin. The authorizations should set forth basic policy, and not prescribe dollar floors or ceilings for specific programs. Setting the precise financial magnitudes of government programs should be the province of the appropriations committees. Moreover, the authorizations should be enacted for a period of several years, so that they provide a broader framework than the annual appropriations hearings, rather than merely duplicating them in another arena.

6. *Control spending by a special bill for appropriation increases.*—In addition to a single spending ceiling to correct the fragmentation of budget authority, the Congress should try a new approach: a special appropriations bill for annual changes in total budget authority. Each appropriation subcommittee should be limited to the total amount appropriated in the previous year for the activities under its jurisdiction, adjusted by a standard inflation factor. All changes in total spending beyond that should be contained in a special appropriations bill sponsored by the chairmen of the full appropriations committees.

Reallocations of funding among individual programs should be made freely by each subcommittee within the limits of the amounts established for it. But increases in total new budget authority from the previous year's level should be combined into one special bill. A new single bill thus would help to coordinate the use of numerous appropriations bills with an overall spending ceiling.

7. *Reduce backdoor financing.*—At the present time, many federal programs escape the annual appropriations process entirely. A variety of transparent subterfuges is used, varying from trust funds to permanent appropriations.

One particularly undesirable practice is providing financing for the program in the same bill that authorizes it. This frequently has been done in such areas as housing and agriculture via the "authorization to spend public debt receipts." These authorizations require the Treasury to make disbursements in the same fashion as appropriations. The key difference, of course, is that the authority is not contained in an appropriations bill. The purpose of backdoor financing is obvious: the programs involved do not have to be justified to the appropriations committees but only to what often are the more sympathetic subject matter committees.

Backdoor financing makes it difficult for Congress to determine spending priorities. Direct appropriations should be substituted for these special pipelines to the Treasury.

8. *Eliminate the legislated "fiscal sacred cows."*—Too many of the items that Congress does nominally include in appropriation bills cannot be effectively controlled because of the restrictive requirements of basic statutes—the highway program is a case in point. These "sacred cows" should be put to pasture by eliminating the legislated barriers to effective Congressional (and Presidential) control through the budget process. Otherwise, much of the annual budget review will continue to be a time-consuming but ineffective ritual, a futile game of "spin the budget."

9. *Use a "budget scorecard."*—The Congress should use a "budget scorecard" to show the cumulative effects of individual budget decisions on the overall budget. This mechanism would enable each congressional committee reviewing an item to treat it as the marginal case. The scorecard would provide an up-to-date recording of the impact of congressional action on the overall fiscal picture—thus a congresman would be getting the kind of current information given to every football and baseball fan. In the case of the budget, neither the fans nor the players knows who is winning or literally who's on first.

Appendix B illustrates a hypothetical budget scorecard, drawn up on the assumption that revisions from the original presidential estimates are supplied by a congressional staff. The scorecard could be used to tally actions on a variety of expenditure authorizations, appropriations bills, and revenue measures. It would record the ebbs and flows in the status of the budget. If Congress was enacting higher levels of spending and thus larger deficits (or the reverse) than the President had proposed, this would be revealed during and not after the end of the budget process.

10. *Set up an Office of Program Analysis and Evaluation.*—Established in the General Accounting Office (GAO) with a nonpartisan staff, such a unit could provide objective analytical studies of program costs, benefits, and alternatives, both for existing and proposed undertakings.

The essential ingredient in any proposal for controlling expenditures is critical evaluation of federal programs and agency expenditure requests. Evaluative research is now a virtual monopoly of the executive branch, to the extent that it is used at all. If Congress is ever to oversee executive administration effectively, then it needs professional assistance beyond that provided by existing committee staffs. As imperfect as evaluation techniques are, at the least they would be a useful supplement to existing rules-of-thumb and other subjective approaches. Critical analyses of agency budget justifications by the GAO should be made available to congressional committees prior to the budget hearings.

* * * * * * *

I do believe that these changes will strengthen the hand of the Congress, but they are not a sure cure. There is a more basic and overriding need. The fundamental requirement for enhancing the congressional power of the purse is for its members to demonstrate that they possess the ability to make choices among alternatives each of which seems attractive in its own right.

Identifying areas of greater priority to which more spending should be devoted is a relatively simple or at least pleasant matter. It is the other side of the coin that is at the heart of reordering priorities—the distasteful task of selecting those areas of lower priority to which lesser proportions of our resources should be devoted. But, after all, making difficult decisions is the basic function of any management, public or private.

Appendix A: A Government Wide Planning Budget

The proposal for a Planning Budget attempts to deal with the most fundamental shortcoming in government budgeting—the failure to treat the budget process as a series of choices among alternatives.

"Would an added dollar be more wisely spent for education or for highways?" "For job training or for income maintenance?" These fundamental questions are not even raised in the budget process at the present time, much less are any answers sought. The current emphasis rather is on deciding whether to increase or decrease the funds to be allotted to the specific projects within each of these categories. Furthermore, the choices are usually restricted to those which can be made within each of the many agencies involved in education or income maintenance or any other specific functional areas.

What is needed is a Planning Budget for the entire Federal Government. This would permit if not require decision-makers to compare alternative programs of different agencies which may contribute to achieving a given basic national goal. Hence, I would base such a budget on the fundamental objectives for which the various government programs are carried on. Merely for purposes of illustration, I have identified four such basic end purposes.

In a world of continuing international tensions, the initial purpose that comes to mind is the protection of the nation against external aggression. A variety of federal programs exists to maintain the

national security, ranging from our own military establishment, to bolstering the armed forces of other nations, and to negotiating arms control agreements.

A second basic national purpose, one also going back to the Constitution, is the promotion of the public welfare. Here we find the federal government operating in the fields of social security, unemployment compensation, veterans pensions, and many other such income-maintenance activities.

A third major purpose of government programs is the necessary investments in the further development of the American economy. This area covers the various programs to develop our natural resources and transportation facilities, as well as support of education, health, research and development, and other efforts to increase economic growth. Finally, there is the day-to-day operation of the government, such as the functioning of the Congress and the courts, and the collection of revenue.

Let us reconstruct the federal budget in this framework and thus see for ourselves what the implicit priorities really are. The key term of course is implicit. When we examine the budget and appropriation hearings over the years, we find little if any systematic attempt to appraise the wisdom or desirability of these overall choices in the allocation of government resources. Some of the results of such a reconstruction of the budget are obvious. Public welfare, rather than national security, receives by far the largest share of the budget. At the present time the respective portions are two-fifths versus one-third. To be sure, the precise numbers have been influenced by the end of the Vietnam War. Yet, when we attempt to develop the data for a decade earlier, we find the same emphasis in the budget on welfare rather than warfare.[3]

What may be more surprising, and maybe also disconcerting to some, is the overwhelming dominance of civilian spending by income-maintenance expenditures over investment outlays. A puny portion, about 13 percent of the total budget, is comprised of the various investment and economic development efforts. That is, the bulk of civilian spending is devoted, not to increasing the size of the nation's income pie, but to rearranging the slices. This may come as a pleasant surprise to those who want to use the government to redistribute income in our society. The fact of the matter is that a good deal of such activity is currently being performed. Some may even contend that it already is excessive.

It is mere conjecture of course to wonder to what extent the allocation of government funds would have been different if the individual appropriation requests had been developed and reviewed in the overall context of priority decisions such as presented here. We can gain some added insight to the possibile program choices that can and might be made in this budgetary framework by making a deeper analysis of the content of each of the four categories (see Table 1).

---

[3] See Murray L. Weidenbaum, *Federal Budgeting: The Choice of Government Programs,* Washington, American Enterprise Institute, 1964, pp. 59–69. See also Murray L. Weidenbaum and Dan Larkins, *The Federal Budget for 1973,* Washington, American Enterprise Institute, 1972, pp. 39–48.

Table 1.—Hypothetical Government-Wide Program Budget
Fiscal year 1973. [In billions of dollars]

Category	*Amount*
National Security:	
U.S. Miiltary forces	82.4
Foreign economic aid	4.4
Scientific competition	3.4
Foreign military aid	1.7
Psychological competition	0.3
Total	92.2
Public Welfare:	
Social insurance and retirement	60.8
Health services	20.1
Veterans' benefits	12.4
Public assistance	11.0
Aid to farmers and rural development	5.7
Housing and community facilities	3.7
Anti-poverty programs	2.7
Specialized welfare activities	2.5
Total	118.9
Economic Development:	
Transportation facilities	10.4
Education and research	8.0
Natural resources and regional development	6.3
Manpower development	4.4
Health research and development	3.6
Business aids and subsidies	1.3
Total	34.0
General Government:	
Interest on debt	21.2
General aid to States and localities	5.3
Government operations	3.7
Judicial and law enforcement	2.1
Foreign relations	.5
Intragovernmental transactions	—7.1
Total	25.7
Grand total	270.8

As would be expected, the great bulk of the national security budget is devoted to the U.S. military forces. However, a little over one-tenth of the total is comprised of programs that promote the national security through other means, such as foreign aid. This approach lends itself to raising and answering questions such as the following: "Would national security be improved by shifting some of the $6 billion of foreign aid to our own military establishment?" "Conversely, would the national security be strengthened by moving a proportionately small share of the direct military budget, say $200 million, to the U.S. Information Agency or to the arms control effort and thereby obtaining disproportionately large increases in these programs?"

This kind of detail also permits cross-comparisons of government programs which are not now made. For example, the $4.4 billion of foreign economic aid far exceeds the $2.7 billion devoted to the formal domestic anti-poverty efforts. Would some trade-off between the public welfare and the national security areas result in a net advantage to the nation? This type of analysis is an attempt to raise quantitatively

the fundamental question, "Would an extra dollar (a billion in the case of the federal government) be more wisely spent for program A or for program B?" The very existence of this type of information would lead to attempts to answer questions such as these. But, even more fundamentally, it would widen the horizon of budget reviewers, both in the Executive Branch and in the Congress.

A brief examination of the composition of the Economic Development category is revealing. Transportation facilities—mainly highways—account for the largest single share. When combined with natural resource development and business subsidies, these investments in our physical resources dominate the Economic Development category. Education, manpower training, and other investments in human resources receive a lesser priority. A government-wide program budget could focus attention on questions such as, "Would a shift of funds from physical to human resources be advisable?" "From highways to job training?" Raising these questions need not be taken as expressions of value judgments—although I do wonder why highways have become our chosen instrument to foster economic growth and development. The point of course is to develop new patterns for government decision-making so as to identify the areas of government spending that could yield greater returns to the nation and its taxpayers—as well as those areas that yield smaller returns on our national investment and which could be cut back.

If this analysis were incorporated into the annual budget document, it could result in growing Congressional and public concern and awareness of the problems of choosing among alternative uses of government funds. In the absence of an automatic market mechanism, such an approach might introduce a healthy degree of competition among government spending programs.

If the Executive Branch does not take the initiative, then a Congressional staff could rework the existing budget submissions within this framework for use by the entire Appropriation Committee in each House prior to its detailed examination of individual appropriation requests. This would be a possible method of restoring Congressional leadership on budget matters. It would enable the Appropriations Committees to set general guidelines and ground rules for the detailed budgetary review by their subcommittees. It would also permit some improvement over the current situation, in which overall government policy often seems to be the accidental by-product of unrelated budget decisions on the various department requests—rather than the guiding hand behind those decisions.

The underlying theme of this program approach to government budgeting is the need to array the alternatives so that deliberate choices can be made among them. This does not require sophisticated methodology. It has its counterparts in the private sector. Many families rush out and spend the Christmas bonus on a new car. A more prudent family may carefully, although subjectively, consider the relative benefits of a new car, a long summer vacation, or remodeling the basement. Similarly, a well-managed company would not impulsively decide to devote an increase in earnings to raising the dividend rate. Rather, it would carefully consider the alternative uses of the funds—embarking on a new research program, rebuilding an obsolescent manufacturing plant, or developing a new overseas operation.

Appendix B: A Congressional Budget Scorecard

With reference to the need to relate the myriad of individual program decisions to the overall budget totals, there is a desirable reform that could be instituted fairly quickly. The Congress should utilize the device of a "Budgetary Scorecard" which would show currently the effect of individual budget decisions on the overall state of federal finances.

This approach differs from most of the other suggestions for budgetary reforms in that it would not alter the existing organizational structure of the Congress or the way in which actions are taken on individual bills. Rather, the scorecard would be an analytical mechanism which could be used by the existing committees of the Congress as they pursue existing appropriation procedures, as well as by individual members as they participate in debates on the floor of the Congress.

In its essence, this mechanism would enable each Congressional committee reviewing a given item to treat it as the marginal case. But it would merely be an informational aid to the members, rather than any dictum from on high. Table 2 contains such an illustrative budgetary scorecard. In filling out the hypothetical scorecard, it is assumed that some congressional committee or staff—a point to which we will return—has supplied the revisions from the original Presidential estimates and that the estimated deficit for the budget year (1974) has been increased through more liberal congressional action on previous items. The scorecard of course would work just as well if the case were the reverse.

Hopefully, the type of information in Table 2 would show the congressional committee acting on the proposed appropriation for the procurement of aircraft that (1) Revenues are estimated to come in more slowly than projected in the Budget, (2) Congressional action to date has increased the prospective deficits by a more liberal attitude on expenditures, and (3) the specific item under consideration, if enacted at the currently recommended level, would raise the budget deficit for 1974 further still. Moreover, (4) the surplus that the Administration has targeted for the following year is not likely to be achieved.

TABLE 2.—ILLUSTRATIVE BUDGETARY SCORECARD

	1973 (current year)		1974 (budget year)		1975 (following year)	
	Presidential submission	Current estimate	Presidential submission	Current estimate	Presidential submission	Current estimate
Unified budget totals (billions of dollars):						
Receipts	225	228	256	254	290	282
Outlays	250	255	269	272	288	294
Surplus (+) Deficit (−)	−25	−27	−13	−18	+2	−12
Item Under consideration (millions of dollars):						
Appropriation for Air Force procurement of missiles						
Amount being considered:						
Expenditures	1,452	1,552	1,582	1,682	1,680	1,780
Appropriations	1,670	1,670	1,573	1,773	1,770	1,880

Note: Increased deficit will require higher taxes or larger public debt.

It is problematical whether the presentation of such data would, in fact, have any influence upon the deliberations of individual committees or the votes of individual members of the Congress. It would, nevertheless, provide a simple technique and substantiating figures for specific members of these and other committees who desired some analytical support for their positions. At least, the scorecard would be a means of appraising the effects of each individual fiscal action on the total budget outcome.

The scorecard could be used in conjunction with actions on a variety of expenditure authorization, appropriation, and revenue bills. Hence, it would maintain constantly for the attention of the Congress a recording of the ebb and flow of the current status of the budget picture for the ensuing fiscal year. The trend of congressional actions toward a higher level of spending (and a resultant larger deficit) would be revealed during rather than after the completion of the decision-making process.

The scorecard approach, by itself, would be politically neutral. It could be used extensively at the present time by those concerned with minimizing the federal deficit and thus dampening down inflationary pressures. It also could be used by advocates of a larger public sector to show that increases in spending should be made at a more rapid rate. This particularly could be the case in a recessionary period where greater amounts of fiscal stimulus were desired.

Use of the scorecard idea would require the services of staff personnel of congressional committees and/or administrative agencies to do the bookkeeping and to develop estimates of effects on expenditure of revenue figures of individual actions changing proposed new appropriations or affecting anticipated revenues. The term appropriations is here used in its broadest sense, meaning actions which permit government agencies to obligate the government to make expenditures. Technically, contract authorizations and authorizations to expend from public debt receipts are also included. This type of information readily lends itself to being programmed on even the most modest computer system, for ready retrieval and updating.

The current reporting of budgetary action should not be limited to pending action by the appropriations and tax-writing committees. It should also be utilized by the substantive committees considering basic program legislation—agriculture, commerce, education, etc. Thus, the birthstage of government spending programs, now often relatively immune from budgetary considerations, would be exposed to the type of financial concerns shared mainly by the appropriations and revenue committees.

The scorecard could be maintained by the staffs, possibly augmented, of the appropriations committees of each chamber. Alternatively, the task could be assigned to a new Joint Committee on the Budget, should the Congress decide to establish one. Another possibility would be to build on the far more aggregated Scorekeeping Report issued from time to time by the Joint Committee on Reduction of Federal Expenditures.[4] Presumably, the revenue estimates would continue, as at pres-

---

[4] See U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Reduction of Federal Expenditures, *1973 Budget Scorekeeping Report,* Staff Report No. 9, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1972.

ent, to be prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, but their use would extend beyond the tax-writing committees. Indeed the fine group of career personnel that comprises the Joint Committee should serve as a prototype for the expenditure work that is envisioned in this proposal.

Alternatively or in addition, the capabilities of the General Accounting Office might be more fully developed and drawn upon. This is a congressional rather than executive agency, which has increased the scope and calibre of its analytical work very significantly during the last several years.

Whatever staff is assigned the task would need to keep abreast of the actions of the various substantive committees which provide financial authorization for future federal spending. Also, the working relationships would have to be developed so that the scorecards, when properly prepared and made available, would actually be utilized by the individual members of the Congress and in the deliberations of the various committees.

○