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THE WORLD NARCOTICS PROBLEM: THE LATIN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY MISSION
TO LATIN AMERICA AND THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

COMPOSED OF

MORGAN F. MURPHY, Illinois
ROBERT H. STEELE, Connecticut

PURSUANT TO

H. Res. 267

AUTHORIZING THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AF-
FAIRS TO CONDUCT THOROUGH STUDIES AND INVE-
STIGATIONS OF ALL MATTERS COMING WITHIN THE
JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE



MARCH 21, 1973

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FOREWORD

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., March 21, 1973.

This report has been submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs by a special study mission conducted between January 3 and 19, 1973.

The findings in this report are those of the special study mission and do not necessarily reflect the views of the membership of the full Committee on Foreign Affairs.

THOMAS E. MORGAN, *Chairman.*

(III)

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REPORT

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The following is a report of the
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The work was done in the
Department of the Interior,
Bureau of Land Management,
Washington, D. C.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

WASHINGTON, D.C.,
March 21, 1973.

Hon. THOMAS E. MORGAN,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: There is transmitted herewith a report of a special study mission conducted between January 3 and 19, 1973 by the undersigned. We were accompanied by Dr. John J. Brady, Jr., Staff Consultant, Committee on Foreign Affairs. This was the culmination of a worldwide study of the narcotics and dangerous drugs problem as it affects the United States which was started during the first session of the 92d Congress.

The primary purpose of the study mission was to gather information pertaining to the illegal international trafficking in narcotics and to ascertain the steps that certain governments in Latin America are taking to help control the production of and trafficking in heroin and cocaine.

The study mission also examined the degree of narcotics addiction among U.S. forces in West Germany. The results of this portion of the study are included in Part II of this report.

During the course of the study, we met in Washington, D.C. with U.S. Government officials involved in the international aspects of the narcotics control problem, including representatives of the Departments of State and Defense and the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the U.S. Bureau of Customs.

In the field the study team met with U.S. diplomatic, intelligence, and narcotics control personnel, including representatives of the Departments of State and Defense, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and the Bureau of Customs.


Although we did not visit Ecuador or Uruguay, the study team met with narcotics control officials from the U.S. Embassies of those countries while in Argentina and Colombia.

The highlight of the study was a visit with Misael Pastrana Borrero, President of Colombia. As a result of that meeting President Borrero publicly committed his government to take action to deal with the narcotics problem in that country.

We would like to express our thanks and appreciation for the assistance, cooperation and hospitality extended to members of the study mission by officials from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Treasury, and other U.S. Government agencies in the countries visited.

It is hoped that the information contained in this report will be helpful to members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Congress in their deliberations on this subject.

MORGAN F. MURPHY,
ROBERT H. STEELE.



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INTRODUCTION

Heroin, cocaine, and marijuana are produced in Latin America and heroin is smuggled into Latin America from Europe and possibly Southeast Asia for further movement to the illegal market in the United States. There are no precise or accurate statistics available as to the quantity of narcotics that actually enters the United States from South America. According to the best intelligence available to the U.S. Government, however, the Latin American Connection accounted for at least 50 percent of the heroin and 100 percent of the cocaine smuggled into the United States in the past year.

Over the past 20 months the United States Government has pressed a new diplomatic offensive designed to encourage the governments of the world to take action to stop the production and movement of narcotics. In response to the new U.S. effort, the Government of Turkey announced that it would stop growing poppies after 1972. At the same time the governments of Southeast Asia initiated efforts to stop the production of and trafficking in heroin. Meanwhile, antismuggling law enforcement efforts have been expanded throughout the world.

Prior to 1970, most of the heroin entering the United States was thought to come from Europe directly, although significant quantities of European heroin were being transhipped through Latin America as early as the 1950's. As customs inspections were widened at U.S. ports of entry and as several countries in Europe began to cooperate with the United States in mutual efforts to stop the illegal flow of heroin, international heroin traffickers increasingly turned to Latin America as the safest and most promising route for smuggling narcotics into the United States.

Smuggling is endemic throughout Latin America. Contraband goods, cigarettes, whiskey, television sets, radios, precious gems, arms, ammunition and narcotics are easily transported from one country to another. Sometimes such items move across three or more borders before they reach their destination. Governmental steps to deal with the problem have had little effect. Official corruption is widespread and often the very officials who are responsible for the suppression of smuggling are themselves deeply involved. Middle and lower grade officials are known to engage in the manufacture and smuggling of cocaine.

In spite of vigorous U.S. Customs and Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) efforts and recent progress in reducing the availability of heroin on the east coast, narcotics continue to pour into the United States. It is now estimated that there are between 500,000 and 600,000 heroin users in the United States¹ and that they account for a major portion of the crime in major U.S. cities. (For background on the heroin problem in the United States, see Appendix 1, p. 63.) Firm statistics are not available on the number of cocaine users in the United States, although the number is believed to be both substantial and growing.

¹ The increase in the number estimated is due in part to refined techniques of identification and detection. It, therefore, should not be construed that the number of addicts actually doubled during the past year.

The permissive attitude that prevails throughout Latin America toward smuggling and corruption, the existence of weak judicial systems and lax law enforcement have combined to make Latin America the major conduit of illicit drugs that it is today.

Since the lax attitude of the Latin American toward smuggling is traditional and so much a part of the pattern of commerce throughout Latin America, there is little likelihood that smuggling in contraband other than narcotics can be stopped.

Narcotics are a different matter, however. There is a great distinction between a television set and a death-dealing narcotic. United States officials throughout the continent must work to persuade government leaders of the need for positive action to stop the production of and trafficking in heroin and cocaine.

Until a little more than a year ago, the governments in Latin America were not concerned that their countries played a significant role in the drug abuse problem in the United States. Heroin addiction was not widespread in Latin America and there was little interest in taking action to stop the illegal international trafficking in narcotics and other dangerous drugs.

All of the blame for this attitude cannot be placed on the governments of Latin America. U.S. officials were also slow to recognize and attempt to combat the important role Latin America plays in the U.S. drug abuse problem. In fact, until the spring of 1971 the United States did not give adequate priority to the task of obtaining international cooperation on narcotics anywhere in the world.

Since that time, the United States has launched a worldwide program to gain the cooperation of other countries in a mutual endeavor to stop the illegal production of and trafficking in narcotics. Simultaneously an awareness has begun developing among world leaders that what is an American problem today may very well become their problem tomorrow. The use of narcotics and other dangerous drug use undoubtedly is increasing globally. Nevertheless, although there has been some response to the U.S. call for strong international action against drug traffickers, that response has not been as wholehearted or as effective as it should and could be, particularly in Latin America.

The reasons for this situation will be discussed in this report.

PART I—LATIN AMERICA

ANTI-NARCOTICS ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

The U.S. anti-narcotics effort in Latin America has included consultation with the respective governments to encourage them to take vigorous action to eliminate the production of and trafficking in narcotics and other dangerous drugs. As part of that program, United States enforcement and advisory personnel, including representatives from Customs, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) and the Agency for International Development, Public Safety Division, have furnished training assistance to enforcement officials in several countries. A number of other Latin American officials have also received training in the United States. In addition the United States has furnished a limited quantity of material assistance to enforcement agencies throughout the continent and is now in the process of coordinating additional assistance programs with several countries.

In response to U.S. efforts to gain the cooperation of the respective governments all countries have indicated a willingness to cooperate in programs designed to stop illegal trafficking in narcotics. This cooperation has included the creation of intergovernmental coordinating teams in some countries and agreement to permit the assignment of additional BNDD and U.S. Customs personnel in certain key countries.

Every U.S. Embassy has created a narcotics action team to coordinate the drug suppression effort with the host country. The basic elements of these teams are the BNDD, Customs, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Agency for International Development, the United States Information Agency and diplomatic personnel. All missions have narcotics action plans and are in the process of implementing them. While all members of the Embassy team participate in the antinarcotics effort the operating elements are the representatives of BNDD and U.S. Customs. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency is providing intelligence support. Of these, BNDD works more closely with indigenous narcotics enforcement officials in the several countries.

BNDD IN LATIN AMERICA

There are two BNDD Regional Offices in Latin America. Region 18 is headquartered in Buenos Aires and covers all of South America including Panama. Of its 16 agents, five are in the regional headquarters. The remaining 11 are located in Paraguay, Colombia, Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela, Peru, Panama, Ecuador and Chile.

Region 15, which is headquartered in Mexico City, is responsible for Mexico and the several countries of Central America excluding Panama. All of the 15 agents assigned to Region 15 are stationed in

Mexico and function in other countries of the region on a temporary basis.

BNDD holds a regional conference of its Special Agents in Charge in Region 18 every 3 months. The Regional Director encourages the Special Agents to bring their counterparts. Results to date have been encouraging.

Relations between the BNDD agents in Buenos Aires and the U.S. Customs attaché appear to be harmonious and closely coordinated. In Mexico City this does not appear to be the case and there are personality and bureaucratic tensions between BNDD and Customs personnel.

THE HEROIN AND COCAINE SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA

HEROIN PRODUCTION

Little is known about heroin production in Latin America. No opiates (opium, morphine, heroin) are produced legally anywhere in Latin America except in Argentina, where there is some legal cultivation of opium poppies. According to the U.S. Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, Argentina produces no opium, although some poppy straw has been converted to morphine for medicinal purposes.¹

Illegal cultivation of opium poppies occurs along the border area between Colombia and Ecuador. This opium is believed to be refined into heroin in a clandestine laboratory in Guayaquil, Ecuador. The heroin produced, which is tan in color, has appeared in the United States, especially in Miami.

Opium poppies are also grown in Costa Rica. Costa Rican authorities destroyed about 500 plants in July 1970. Since then more than 1,000 additional plants have been destroyed. The opium content of these poppies is not known nor are U.S. narcotics enforcement officials aware of any heroin production in Costa Rica.

That country, however, could become a producer of heroin. It is mountainous and many places suitable for poppy cultivation can be found in the remote areas of the Cordillera Central, which is about 17 miles from the capital city of San José, and elsewhere in the mountains. Costa Rica also has the potential to become a staging area for narcotics being moved to the United States. There appears to be no customs inspection at the airport and it is possible to get off an airplane and walk out of the terminal at San José without interference. Unless action is taken to tighten customs controls the international trafficker can be expected to move into Costa Rica, especially as enforcement efforts elsewhere in Latin America become more effective.

Substantial quantities of brown heroin are produced in Mexico and smuggled into the United States. The situation in Mexico will be discussed later in the report. Otherwise no opiates are known to be produced in Latin America, although the climate and altitudinal conditions for poppy cultivation are ideal in the remote mountain regions throughout the continent.

There is little doubt that if the ban on poppy cultivation in Turkey is effective in eliminating that country as a source of opium the international smuggler will look elsewhere for opium.

At this time there are only three areas producing substantial quantities of opium for the illegal market: the Golden Triangle in Southeast

¹ "World Opium Survey 1972," Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, p. A53.

Asia, the Middle East, and Mexico. As enforcement procedures improve in Europe and Southeast Asia the temptation to begin large poppy cultivation in South America will become great. The traffickers in drugs and other contraband are well ensconced throughout South and Central America. They are engaged in legitimate business enterprises, they have money to finance the growing of poppies and they can buy political protection. There are chemists available to produce heroin and, above all, the United States and Latin America are connected by land.

Under such circumstances smuggling operations would be easier and would require less manpower to move the heroin from the laboratory to the addict in the United States.

For the immediate future, however, Latin American produced cocaine constitutes a greater menace to the United States than does heroin produced in Latin America.

THE COCAINE SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA

Cocaine, the only hard drug natural to the Western Hemisphere, is produced from the leaf of the coca bush. About 90 percent of the world's coca is grown in Latin America. There is very little coca known to be under cultivation anywhere else in the world, except in Java where there are some small plantations. The areas of most intensive cultivation in Latin America are located in the Departments of Cajamarca, San Martin, Huanuco, Ayacucho, Cuzco, and Puno in Peru; and in the Departments of La Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz in Bolivia. Smaller quantities are also grown in Chile, Ecuador and parts of Colombia.

An estimated 90 percent of the Bolivian and Peruvian coca crop is consumed in leaf form. The leaf is mixed with an alkaline substance such as quicklime, ashes, or ground seashells and chewed by the Indians. Coca chewing is reported to give physical strength, reduce hunger and to make life in the mountains more endurable. Today it is estimated that perhaps 25 million tons of coca leaf are used annually in Peru and Bolivia alone. Nevertheless, medical authorities agree that continued use of the coca leaf is both mentally and physically debilitating. Of the estimated 10 percent of the coca production not consumed locally, a large part is exported to the United States and Europe where it is used in the preparation of legal medicines and chemicals and as flavoring for soft drinks. The remainder is converted into cocaine for the illegal international market.

COCAINE

It was not until 1860 that the chief alkaloid in the coca leaf, cocaine, was isolated. By the 1880's it was widely used as an anesthetic in medicine and dentistry. In Europe and the United States its diversion for illegal purposes became common. In parts of Asia it was sometimes used in place of hashish and opium. Illegal cocaine use probably reached its high point relative to that of other drugs in the second decade of the 20th century. Thereafter, the passage of strict laws against cocaine use in most Western countries and the increasing availability of heroin combined to reduce consumption relatively if not absolutely.

Now in the last third of the 20th century the misuse of cocaine is again becoming a serious world problem.

Compared to the refining of good quality heroin, cocaine production is a relatively simple process. It requires no exotic chemicals. The principal chemicals used are kerosene and benzene and both can be recycled and reused. A plentiful water supply is also necessary.

Cocaine refining usually takes place in two stages. In the first stage the leaf is made into a paste which may be either reddish or white in color. The paste is later converted into crystalline or powdered cocaine.

At least 100 kilos of leaves are required to produce 1 kilo of cocaine; hence the conversion process is most often begun near the areas of cultivation in clandestine laboratories which produce mostly paste.

Conversion of the paste into cocaine is more expensive and complicated than is production of the paste and for this reason refining operations are frequently performed in centralized laboratories which are located in Chile, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru and Colombia. Smuggling across borders, therefore, may be in any one of three forms: in leaves, paste, or as white powder or hydrochloride of cocaine crystals. Most of the smuggling between Latin American countries is of paste on its way to further refinement.

Cocaine is the only hard drug at present widely used in Latin America. Not only is it far cheaper in Latin America than heroin, but some Latin Americans consider it a more "manly" drug because it stimulates rather than depresses activity. Nevertheless, Latin American consumption is still relatively small, and most of the cocaine produced is smuggled into the United States, Europe, or Asia.

THE ECONOMICS OF COCAINE

Coca leaf is produced principally by small farmers. The majority of the plots cover only two or three acres. The low value of the unprocessed leaf and the labor intensity of cultivation (because of the care required to remove the leaves without future damage to the bushes) have discouraged plantation agriculture. There are a few large plantations in Peru (mostly for the legal export trade) but these are largely holdovers from an earlier period. Also many subsistence farms, especially in nearby settled areas of the Bolivian Yungas and lowlands, raise coca as a commercial crop in order to obtain cash for taxes.

In many Andean regions, miners and farm workers still receive a part of their pay in coca leaves and the *cocada*—the distance a porter can travel while chewing one quid of coca leaves—is still a common unit of measurement.²

Most coca is grown between elevations of 2,000 and 8,000 feet. The coca bush begins to produce leaf suitable for conversion into cocaine after 2 years and may have a productive life of 30 years or more. There can be as many as four harvests per year and the average is about 5,000 pounds of undried leaf per hectare (2.47 acres). The leaf loses about 75 percent of its weight after it has been dried out. When

² Webster's Dictionary describes quid as "a portion suitable to be chewed; a cud; as a quid of tobacco."

dry the leaf is packed into burlap and banana leaf containers of from 50 to 120 pounds each. While prices will vary, the dry leaf is usually sold for about \$1.10 per kilo in Bolivia and Peru.

PROFITS FROM THE PRODUCTION, PROCESSING AND SALE OF COCAINE

One of the fundamental facts compounding the drug abuse problem in the United States and abroad is the tremendous profit involved. As with heroin, the initial outlay for the basic ingredient of cocaine, in this case coca leaf, is very little. Once the leaf has been converted into cocaine an initial investment of \$110 in Bolivia or Peru will sell for between \$200,000 and \$1 million on the streets of New York City. The return depends upon the number of times that the cocaine has been "cut", its availability in an area, and the quantities purchased.

DEVELOPMENT OF RETAIL PRICE OF COCAINE AND HEROIN AS OF JAN. 31, 1973¹

	<i>U.S. dollar per kilo</i>
Cocaine (1 kilo) :	
Coca leaf—100 kilos (price to farmer)-----	110. 00
Coca paste—1 kilo-----	600. 00
Delivered in Latin America-----	3, 000 to 4, 000
Price to pusher in New York City-----	40, 000 to 50, 000
Street value 1 kilo (cut to 20 percent)-----	200, 000 to 250, 000
Street value 1 kilo (cut to 5 percent)-----	800, 000 to 1, 000, 000
Heroin (1 kilo) :	
Price to farmer for opium (Turkey)-----	50 to 90
Wholesale price for heroin (Marseilles)-----	8, 000 to 10, 000
Price to dealer in New York-----	35,000 to 46,000
Street value when cut to 4 percent-----	875,000 to 1,150,000

¹ There are wide variations in price at all stages of the process.

Because of the tremendous profits that are made from the illegal sale of cocaine and heroin there will always be criminal elements willing to risk apprehension. With this kind of profit it is possible to bribe government authorities and police officials at all levels of government. A way must be found to take the profit out of narcotics smuggling. For only when the risks involved are greater than the potential profits will the availability of heroin, cocaine, and other dangerous drugs be diminished to manageable levels or eliminated entirely.

COCAINE AND HEROIN

The characteristics and dangers of cocaine differ considerably from those of heroin. Heroin is a depressant and is physically addictive. Cocaine on the other hand is a stimulant and is psychologically habit forming. It does not produce (in the usual doses) the drowsiness, slurred speech, and impairment of coordination characteristic of heroin. In small doses, its use results in restlessness, excitement, a real or imagined increase in mental power, increased capacity for work without fatigue, and a general feeling of well-being. In larger doses, it may result in tremors, convulsions, cardiac failure, and death. Like other stimulants, it may cause paranoid or aggressive actions. For example, it is said that the heroin addict commits crime to obtain the drug, but the cocaine user commits crime while under the influence of the drug. As an aphrodisiac, it is used both internally and externally

(applied to the male sex organ). The most common methods of taking cocaine are sniffing—repeated use results in perforation of the nasal membrane—and intravenous injection.

Although the user who stops using cocaine will not suffer the same agony of withdrawal as the heroin addict there is a pronounced depression and an almost irresistible compulsion to seek a new high. The idea that there is a great deal of difference between a physically addictive drug and a psychologically habit forming drug is dangerous. The heroin addict can be "physically cured." It is more difficult, however, to cure him of his psychological addiction.

The demand for cocaine is growing as the worldwide pressure on the heroin traffic increases. Presently the cocaine trade is being handled almost entirely by individuals and organizations indigenous to Latin America. French Corsicans and other Europeans have engaged in cocaine smuggling from time to time, although their primary interest has been and is heroin.

There is a demand for cocaine in Europe, particularly in Italy, and the profits are even greater in that country than in the United States. Consequently a triangular trade has developed. In some cases 1 kilo of cocaine is being traded for 2 kilos of heroin. The heroin is then smuggled to the United States either directly or indirectly through Latin America while the cocaine is routed to Europe.

THE MOVEMENT OF NARCOTICS IN LATIN AMERICA

Practically all of the major cities of Central and South America have served as transshipment points for narcotics destined for the United States.

It is estimated that at least 50 percent of the heroin smuggled into the United States has been transmitted through the area south of the U.S. border in recent years. Most of this heroin, is smuggled into and through Latin America while the remaining 10-15 percent is produced in Mexico.

It is obvious that one of the most critical problems facing the United States is to stop the flow of drugs that are transshipped from Europe through this region.

Once a shipment of heroin reaches Latin America there are a vast variety of routes and techniques that a trafficker may use to move it to the United States. For example, heroin smuggled into Buenos Aires may be shipped by river to Paraguay, where it has been loaded aboard a private aircraft and flown to Brazil. In Brazil it may be shipped directly to the United States by sea or commercial aircraft or be diverted to Colombia or Panama via Santiago, Chile.

The great lengths of the borders, the difficulties of terrain, the large number of border jumpers and illegal aliens living in the border areas, inadequate security forces, modern commercial air and sea links and hundreds of private boats and aircraft, hidden bays and inlets and clandestine airfields enable the narcotics trafficker to choose almost any route or method he desires.

Many islands of the Caribbean also play an important role in the illicit traffic. Some serve as staging areas for drugs moving up from South America, while others serve as transshipment points for drugs coming directly from Europe. Of considerable value to the illegal trafficker are the islands which are European possessions, particularly the French-owned island of Guadeloupe in the West Indies,¹ and Curaçao and Aruba in the Netherland Antilles.

Curaçao and Aruba are served frequently by air and sea from Holland. The ports of Rotterdam and Amsterdam are infamous as entry points for heroin and other drugs into Europe. Some of the opiates smuggled into the Netherlands end up in the veins of U.S. troops in Western Europe. A large quantity ends up in New York or Miami through Curaçao and Aruba.

The international narcotics smuggler could not function without connections in the United States. The Mafia and other criminal elements from the United States travel to Latin America where they arrange to buy narcotics, routing some shipments through Puerto Rico and St. Croix in the U.S. Virgin Islands.

¹ The Guadaloupan registered shrimp boat, *Caprice des Temps*, seized in France in 1972 with 935 pounds of heroin, was bound for Miami via its homeport of Guadeloupe. The crew was from Guadeloupe.

South America: Illicit Traffic in Opiates



Some heroin and cocaine is smuggled by individuals, but the bulk is managed by a number of smuggling organizations whose participants may vary from operation to operation.

Recently, more determined enforcement efforts and more vigorous international cooperation have combined to disrupt some narcotics traffic and there have been a number of seizures of heroin and cocaine.

More importantly a number of arrests have been made.² As a result there is today a shortage of heroin on the streets of New York and other

² A résumé of some significant seizures and arrests made in Latin America in 1972 are described in Appendix 2, p. 65.

East Coast cities; the price is up and the quality is down. U.S. narcotics officials do not, however, believe this situation is permanent. They note that there is no shortage of heroin in the world. The arrest of key individuals has disrupted smuggling patterns, they contend, but traffickers are only waiting for the pressure to ease before looking for new routes and methods to smuggle narcotics into the United States.

While seizures are important because they remove narcotics from the streets and are expensive to the trafficker, there is a greater objective and that is to remove the trafficker from circulation. Mr. John E. Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, told the Senate Internal Security Committee on September 19, 1972 that "seizure figures are often reported by BNDD and others because of their dramatic impact, but the true measure of success is the importance of the violators who are taken out of the traffic through enforcement activity."

A number of important traffickers have been arrested over the past year. In March 1972 Marcel Boucan, captain of a fishing vessel the *Caprice des Temps*, was seized off the coast of France with 935 pounds of pure heroin aboard. The vessel, which was destined for Miami, had made at least two previous trips to the United States.

On August 30, 1972, Argentine authorities seized 101 pounds of heroin and arrested four traffickers. Since then 28 additional traffickers have been arrested. Among them are some of the most significant Corsican, Latin and Italian traffickers known to U.S. officials. They include Francois Chiappi, Michael Russo, and Eduardo Hugo Burns. Chiappi is believed to have set up the heroin route from southern France to the United States in the 1960's.

Other narcotics traffickers are known to be operating in Uruguay, particularly Armando Nicolai and Franco Tosconino, who is wanted for murder of a policeman in Italy. Tosconino is thought to have inherited the operation of Auguste Joseph Ricord who is perhaps the most important smuggler arrested to date. Ricord is a French Corsican who was in prison in Asuncion for 17 months prior to his extradition to the United States. He was tried and convicted on conspiracy charges in New York and sentenced to 20 years in prison. Ricord is said to have engineered the shipment of more than 11,000 pounds of heroin into the United States worth about \$1.2 billion wholesale.

The fact that Ricord was extradited after months of negotiations between the United States and Paraguay is the more significant because Paraguay had previously been a haven for drug traffickers. His extradition is an indication that even the most reluctant Latin American governments can be persuaded to cooperate with the United States on the narcotics issue.

Despite seizures, arrests, and the pressure being exerted in Latin America, U.S. officials believe that continent will continue to be a transshipment point for drugs. The reasons became apparent to the study mission as it reviewed the situation in the several countries visited, particularly in Mexico, Panama and Colombia.

THE NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE

Almost all significant seizures and arrests have been made because there was prior information available to enforcement officials. Given the complexities involved in the production of and trafficking in narcotics and other dangerous drugs successful operations against the international narcotics trafficker will depend upon how much is known about his operations. This is the role of intelligence.

A narcotics enforcement program is only as effective as the information that is available to the enforcement agency. Because of the nature of smuggling and the myriad ways that narcotics can be hidden and transported across national borders, information on the activities of the international smuggler is essential.

There is no secret as to how narcotics and other items of contraband are smuggled across national and international borders. Narcotics enforcement officials know where heroin, cocaine and marijuana originate and that it is moved by land, sea and air from its point of origin to the addict. What enforcement officials do not know is when a shipment will take place or how it will be disguised or where it will be transferred from the smuggler to the receiver in any given country.

In many cases narcotics enforcement officials even know who is involved. What the enforcement officials must be able to do is to put the what, when, where, how and who together in order to make a prosecutable case. In most cases, this can be accomplished only by reliable and timely intelligence.

Unfortunately, several Latin American governments do not realize the value of intelligence operations in the narcotics field and do not make an effort to collect data on the trafficker. Others gather data but do not share it freely or fully with the United States.

As the situation now stands, the imaginative international narcotics smuggler continues to have an excellent chance of getting his shipment of living death to the addict in the United States.

This observation is not intended to denigrate the efforts of U.S. enforcement agencies to cope with the problem. Within the parameter of their capabilities, U.S. enforcement agencies have been relatively successful. Relative success, however, is unsatisfactory. The goal must be the complete elimination of drug abuse from the world. Achievement of that objective requires a maximum effort against the international trafficker by every country in which heroin, cocaine, and other dangerous drugs are produced or smuggled through. As intensive as law enforcement may be, however, parallel programs of drug treatment, rehabilitation, education, and research must also be vigorously pursued here at home if we are to bring the drug abuse epidemic under control.

COUNTRY SITUATION REPORTS

MEXICO

MEXICO AND THE DRUG ABUSE PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES

The heroin, cocaine, and marijuana produced in or smuggled through Mexico make a major contribution to the drug abuse problem in the United States. The brown heroin consumed in the United States is produced in Mexico and approximately 90 percent of the high quality marijuana used in the United States is grown in that country. In the past the vast percentage of the Mexican heroin was used in California and the Southwestern United States. In addition, Mexican heroin frequently appeared in the States of Oklahoma, Colorado, Oregon, and Washington.

During the shortage of white European-type heroin, which commenced in about July of 1972, it was discovered that relatively small quantities of Mexican-type heroin were being sold in a number of cities wherein it had not previously appeared. These cities include Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, Wilmington, Richmond, Miami, Buffalo, New York, and Hartford.

Mexico is consequently of special importance to the United States effort to solve its drug abuse problems since any solution will depend to an important degree upon the firmness with which the Government of Mexico acts to stop the illegal production of and trafficking in narcotics in and through that country.

The President and the Attorney General of Mexico have committed that Government to cooperate with the United States in efforts to stop the illegal production of and trafficking in drugs. And that Government has taken a number of steps to put an end to narcotics trafficking in and through Mexico.

These efforts have had relatively little effect, however, and the smuggling of heroin and marijuana produced in Mexico into the United States continues unabated. Intelligence now becoming available to U.S. authorities indicates that in addition to being a producer of 10-15 percent of the heroin smuggled into the United States, Mexico is also becoming an increasingly important conduit for foreign heroin, amphetamines and barbiturates destined for the United States. As a result, U.S. narcotics enforcement officials are concerned that the situation will get worse over the next several years. Their concerns are justified on several counts.

First, the 2,000 mile border between the United States and Mexico is remote and extensive and it is not possible for either government to patrol every mile.

Second, the Mexican Government has been reluctant to devote sufficient resources to the antinarcotics effort. As a result Mexican narcotics enforcement agencies are undermanned, under equipped, underpaid, undertrained, and in many cases susceptible to bribery.

Third, Federal and State narcotics enforcement officials in Mexico will not commit their forces in certain areas. For example, large quantities of opium are produced in remote parts of the State of Sonora. "The authorities are afraid to go in," said one U.S. official. The area is wild geographically and there are close political ties between the leading traffickers and the local political structure. In addition, the traffickers have their own bodyguards and in many cases are better armed and equipped than are the government forces. There have been shootouts in which both growers and soldiers have been killed.

Fourth, relations between the Mexican Federal and State Governments are political and sometimes fragile. As such Federal officials are slow to intervene in narcotics matters.

Fifth, the "mordida" or payoff system practiced in Mexico makes law enforcement difficult. The mordida system, a part of life throughout Latin America, involves under-the-counter payment for everything from birth certificates to export licenses. It also involves the buying of protection from official scrutiny.

Sixth, high-ranking Mexican military and governmental officials and prominent businessmen are permitted to enter and leave Mexico without being inspected by Mexican Customs. In 1972 a retired officer, Gen. Humberto Mariles, was arrested in Paris with approximately 62 kilos (135 lbs.) of pure heroin in his possession. Narcotics officials believe that the General planned to smuggle the heroin into Mexico for further movement to the United States.

Seventh, Mexican officials do not share narcotics intelligence with United States narcotics enforcement officials as fully as do some other countries in Latin America.

Eighth, some high-ranking police officials are believed to be involved in narcotics activities at both the Federal and the State level.

Ninth, there is no independent internal investigative system within the Mexican governmental structure capable of uncovering those engaged in illegal narcotics activities or other corrupt practices.

At the State level, there have been a number of incidents where police officials have been associated with known narcotics traffickers. Two examples should suffice to demonstrate this aspect of the problem. They are:

- (1) A Federal Judicial Police official was seen drinking with three known traffickers by U.S. officials in Mexicali. One U.S. agent was followed to the latrine by a trafficker who pulled a gun on him and threatened to kill him. The following day the police official apologized to the U.S. official for the incident.

(2) U.S. officials notified Mexican Federal authorities that there was a large quantity of marijuana hidden on a farm which was owned by the brother of Maj. Francisco Luken Aquilar, head of the Sonora State Police. A U.S. official requested Mexican authorities not to use a high ranking Federal Judicial Police official in the State on the case because he was thought to be involved. Nevertheless the suspect Mexican police official was assigned to the case, and when he was advised of the location of the farm, he said that the police could not raid the farm without proof that the marijuana was there. This scene occurred at 8 p.m. According to one informer, the marijuana was removed from the farm at 2 a.m. the following day. It has not been found.

There have been no large seizures of heroin or cocaine and no major traffickers have been arrested. Most of the effort in Sonora has been directed toward the less profitable and harder to disguise marijuana. For example, in 1972 there were almost 100 tons of marijuana seized or destroyed as opposed to only 4 kilos (8.8 lbs.) of heroin and 12 kilos (26.4 lbs.) of cocaine.

While these factors combine to present a bleak picture for the near future, the Government of Mexico has recently taken several steps to deal with the problem more forcefully and in the past month has launched a new drive against drug traffickers in the State of Sonora.

That drive, known as "Operation Cactus," was a 5-week enforcement operation along the Arizona-Mexican border which began early in February. It was carried out by a joint force composed of members from U.S. Customs, BNDD, and State and local police on the U.S. side and a crack team of Mexican Federal Judicial police dispatched from Mexico City. The operation resulted in the seizure of \$19.1 million in illegal narcotics including 24½ tons of marijuana and 9.3 pounds of heroin. Along with the drugs, the Mexican authorities seized several private dwellings used as smuggling warehouses, vehicles, weapons, and several light aircraft. There were over 100 traffickers arrested, including Humberto Aviles, brother of the suspected drug kingpin in Sonora, Pedro Aviles. A warrant has been issued for Pedro Aviles' arrest and he is being hunted by Mexican police.

The study mission is extremely pleased with the level of United States-Mexican cooperation and the degree of Mexican initiative evidenced in the Sonora campaign and is hopeful that the anti-narcotics drive will lead to an all-out campaign against traffickers all along the United States-Mexican border.


OPIUM PRODUCTION IN MEXICO

Opium poppy growing is illegal in Mexico. In spite of this there are thousands of farmers who are willing to grow opium poppies for the cash that the international smugglers are willing to pay.

Most of the hidden opium poppy fields are located in the northwest in the States of Sinaloa (probably the largest producer) Durango,

southern Sonora, Nayarit and southern Chihuahua. Fields are also cultivated in the States of Guerrero, Michoacan, Nuevo Leon, Jalisco, San Luis Potosi, Zacatecas, Coahuila, Colima, Guanajuato and Aguascalientes. (See map below.)

Mexico: Opium Poppy Cultivation



Planting takes place toward the end of the wet season in September or October, and the harvest is completed in May, before the end of the dry season. In some cases the farmers plant separate plots during successive months, so that the harvest correspondingly continues through several months.

HEROIN PRODUCTION IN MEXICO

The raw opium which is extracted from the poppy may be processed into heroin near the place of cultivation or it may be taken to a central laboratory in Guadalajara or Culiacan. Mexican heroin is brown in color and is not usually as pure as the white heroin which is produced in Europe and Southeast Asia. Over the years, Mexican authorities have claimed to have destroyed heroin laboratories in or near Culiacan, Sinaloa, Guadalajara, Tepatilla, Jalisco, Uruapan, Michoacan, Hermosillo, Sonora, Mexicali Baja California and Mexico City, but no concerted effort has been made to eliminate laboratories, most of which are primitive, mobile, and difficult to detect. An unknown number of laboratories are still in operation.

MEXICAN EFFORTS TO CONTROL DRUGS

The Government of Mexico is conducting the anti-drug struggle on two levels. The first deals with the effort to eradicate the cultivation of opium poppies and marijuana by locating and destroying the cultivation plots. The second level consists of measures to stop the smuggling of heroin and cocaine into, in and through Mexico.

The eradication program is the responsibility of the military forces, primarily the Army. Suppression of smuggling activity is the responsibility of the Federal and State Police and the Mexican Customs Service.

POPPY AND MARIJUANA ERADICATION

The Mexican Government has conducted campaigns against the cultivation of opium poppies and marijuana for several years. The normal procedure is to use the aircraft and helicopters that the United States has given to Mexico to conduct aerial reconnaissance. Once a cultivated field has been located Army units are sent in to destroy the crops and to apprehend the growers if possible. In most cases the growers, and traffickers, if any, escape. The farmer usually spots the aircraft and vacates the premises.

On other occasions military units initiate ground sweeps of the areas for which they are responsible. The effectiveness of this type of operation is limited by the vast and remote areas which must be covered, a lack of sufficient manpower to cover the areas thoroughly and a shortage of vehicles which limits the search to the area that can be traversed by foot or cavalry troops.

The Army is deployed throughout Mexico in 35 zones which correspond roughly to the States. The pattern of deployment, while not determined by the Army's narcotics mission, is compatible with the drug efforts. The Mexican Army also performs many civic action type functions. Reliable estimates are that of the 35,000 Army troops, 12,000 are available at any one time for use in the eradication program. The Army does not always cooperate, however. For example, the Chief of Police of a town in the State of Durango reportedly went to the Army Captain in charge of the military operations for the destruction of plantings and complained of the abundance of illicit cultivations in his area. He was told to ignore the situation as it was none of his concern.

In his own efforts to combat the drug situation in his area the chief lost one of his officers and another was gravely wounded.

Further reducing the effectiveness of the military forces in the eradication effort is a lack of a reliable communications system. There is no military telephone system and what radios there are are not designed for operating in the rugged mountain areas. Nevertheless, Mexican military authorities claim that they have been successful against the poppy growers. They base their assessment on three factors. One, the campesino or peasant farmer who has been cultivating poppies for the trafficker has been convinced that the Army is sincere in its intention to end poppy cultivation and is unwilling to risk arrest and confiscation of his land. Two, poppy cultivation is a labor intensive crop and there is difficulty finding help in the remote areas where poppies are usually grown. Third, there is difficulty in finding a suitable

place to grow poppies which will not be found during the search and destroy operations conducted by the military.

Actually, it is not possible to determine the effectiveness of the eradication program. While millions of square meters of poppies have been destroyed over the past 27 years, cultivation continues to take place in the remote mountain areas. And although Mexican and some U.S. officials quote statistics of the number of plants that have been destroyed, they have been unable to determine the extent of opium production in Mexico. The fact that there is no shortage of brown Mexican heroin in the United States would indicate that production is substantial.

If the Government of Mexico is to be successful in its efforts to destroy poppies and marijuana it obviously must modernize the Army. Partly because of historical and political reasons and partly because of other priorities the Mexican Government has been reluctant to devote the funds that would strengthen the military forces.

In addition to the failure of Mexican military forces to successfully control the growing of poppies and marijuana, Mexican law enforcement agencies have been unable to prevent the smuggling of heroin, cocaine or marijuana into and out of Mexico.

SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES IN MEXICO

There are two different aspects to the smuggling of narcotics into the United States from Mexico. The first involves the movement of heroin and marijuana produced in Mexico into the United States while the second involves the onward movement of narcotics to the United States that are smuggled into Mexico either directly from Europe or indirectly through Central and South American countries. (See map below.)

Mexico: Illicit Traffic in Opiates



U.S. narcotics officials are of the opinion that the bulk of the traffic in Mexican-produced heroin and marijuana is handled by several different independent operators while shipment of the European product is controlled by French Corsicans working closely with U.S. based criminal elements. The latter are thought to deal in large shipments at scattered intervals while the Mexican traffickers send in small quantities at frequent intervals.

Narcotics are smuggled into Mexico on commercial aircraft landing at Mexico City and other international airports; by sea going vessels docking at the major seaports, particularly Vera Cruz, where a number of motor vehicles loaded with heroin have been offloaded and driven to the United States, in privately owned aircraft landing at secret landing strips, overland from Central and South America by car, truck, bus, foot and animal caravan. According to U.S. and Mexican officials inspection procedures at the international airport in Mexico City have been tightened and as a result the smugglers have switched to other routes. The nature of the international traffic in narcotics is such that if one route or technique is discovered by the enforcement officials, a new and different avenue can be opened. This is especially true of the movement of heroin and marijuana into the United States from Mexico.

SMUGGLING FROM MEXICO INTO THE UNITED STATES

There is no limit on the ways that narcotics can be smuggled into the United States from Mexico. Entry is by land, sea and air. Narcotics are secreted on commercial aircraft and carried to the United States, particularly to airports in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Detroit, Chicago or New York. Small private aircraft are perhaps even more frequently used. These aircraft are loaded with heroin or marijuana in Mexico.¹ They are then flown across the border below the radar screen and landed at improvised airfields, on dry lake beds or along isolated highways in any one of the border States such as California, Arizona, Texas, Louisiana or Florida, where the contraband is off loaded. In many cases the pilot airdrops the load at a prearranged spot where it is picked up by confederates on the ground.

Another technique employed is for the pilot of an aircraft to rendezvous with fishing or other vessels at sea, either in the Gulf of Mexico or off the coast of California, and drop the narcotics into the water where it is picked up and taken to the United States.

A large quantity of heroin and marijuana is smuggled into the United States by sea. U.S. shrimp boats operating in the Gulf of Mexico are particularly useful for this purpose. They move about freely and are not subject to Customs inspection upon returning to the United States. Even if they were there is always the opportunity to put in at a deserted cove or inlet, unload the drug and then proceed to the home port.

Most of the heroin and marijuana from Mexico, however, is smuggled in overland with much of it entering at the established border

¹ In February 1972, Mexican soldiers seized 1,651 pounds of marijuana being loaded on a light aircraft at a remote landing strip near Ensenada, Mexico. One pilot was killed and the other wounded. Both were Americans. Three Mexicans were also arrested, including the owner of the ranch where the landing strip is located.

crossing points connecting Nuevo Laredo, Mexico and Laredo, Tex., Mexicali, Mexico and Calexico, Calif., Nogales, Mexico and Nogales, Ariz., Juarez City, Mexico, and El Paso, Tex.; Villa Acuna, Mexico and Del Rio, Tex. and Matamoros, Mexico, and Brownsville, Tex., to mention the best known. There are millions of tourists who cross the border monthly and it is not possible to dismantle every vehicle or to inspect every handbag, valise, etc. Without intelligence, Customs loses its most important weapon. As discussed earlier, U.S. officials do not believe that Mexico shares all of its intelligence with the United States.

While a large quantity is brought across at the points listed above, another favorite method is to carry narcotics across on foot at unguarded points along the border. There are many Mexican and U.S. citizens who live on one side of the border and work on the other. Traffickers hire some of these individuals to carry small quantities of heroin or cocaine into the United States. Some narcotics are also carried across the border by the many illegal aliens who enter the United States from Mexico each year. It is impossible to prevent a considerable number of the so-called "wet-backs" from crossing into the United States. For example, between January 1971 and June 1972 there were over 430,000 illegal crossers who were apprehended and returned to Mexico by U.S. authorities.

In the final analysis there is no limit to the ways and means that a determined narcotics smuggler can use to get narcotics into the United States and U.S. Customs operations along the border can only accomplish so much.

THE WORLD OF THE BORDER

According to several U.S. Customs officials responsible for enforcement activities in Texas and Arizona, the United States-Mexican border is a world of its own. There are towns whose entire existence is primarily based upon smuggling of contraband into and out of Mexico. There is a vast amount of corruption along the border in Mexico and even in those cases where the local Mexican officials are honest, they have little control over what happens.

Some officials in the United States are bitter over the situation in Mexico. One senior official told the survey team that although U.S. authorities knew of a marijuana storage and outlet facility with its own landing strip just 30 miles from the border "we cannot get the Mexicans to take any action."

In an effort to improve their capability at the border, U.S. Customs has resorted to the use of electronic sensors with some success. Results of the experiment indicated that sensors will work in a small area. For, regardless of the range of the system, its efficiency depends upon the manpower behind it. To be effective such a system would require hundreds or perhaps thousands of Customs agents stationed all along the border. While this is not practical, U.S. customs officials are nevertheless of the opinion that increased use of sensors, plus the assignment of additional Customs patrol officers, would result in a substantial increase of seizures and arrests along the border.

Unless the Government of Mexico takes prompt and vigorous action all along the border drugs will continue to pour into the United States. Regretfully, until now many Mexican authorities along the border have been unwilling or unable to take action against those engaged in drug activities.

This failure on the part of some Mexican enforcement officials to act has resulted in an alarming increase in drug availability on the U.S. side of the border with a corresponding increase in heroin usage, particularly in Yuma and Tucson, Ariz.

In November 1972 the continued flow of heroin from Mexico and the failure of Mexican officials to do anything about it led the Yuma County Chamber of Commerce to take action to demonstrate their concern to Mexican officials. The Chamber withdrew its support for a Mexican economic and tourist promotion in the United States and declared that they would discourage American manufacturing companies from locating in Mexico.

While officials in Tucson did not go as far as to endorse economic sanctions against Mexico, the Chamber of Commerce did call for a meeting with Mexican officials to discuss the flow of drugs across the border and invited influential government and business leaders in Mexico to a January 11, conference in Nogales, Ariz., to call for their support for more effective drug traffic control in Mexico.¹

It is regrettable that local governments must initiate action on international problems which is the responsibility of the United States Federal Government to handle. It is even more discouraging, given the half-hearted measures of Mexican authorities in the border areas to deal with the problem to realize that, in spite of the dedication of U.S. narcotics enforcement officials, the battle to stop narcotics from entering the United States from Mexico is being lost. If the recent Mexican Government raids in the State of Sonora do not develop into an all out war against drug smugglers along the entire border that battle will continue to be unsuccessful.

UNITED STATES-MEXICAN RELATIONS

Relations between the Governments of Mexico and the United States on narcotics matters are considered satisfactory by many U.S. officials. The Attorneys General of the two countries, their deputies and staff meet periodically to discuss various aspects of the common effort to stop illegal international trafficking in narcotics and other drugs.

On a more regular basis, the U.S. Ambassador meets with high level Mexican officials to discuss mutual problems in the area of narcotics control.

U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and U.S. Customs personnel are stationed in Mexico and meet almost daily with Mexican narcotics enforcement officials. BNDD agents, however, do not have the same latitude in Mexico that they do in some other countries. For example, BNDD is discouraged from establishing close relations with

¹ This meeting was attended by Mr. John E. Ingersoll, Director of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. The Mexicans in Sonora State sent Major Francesco Luken Aguilar.

State Police officials in Mexico and in general the Government of Mexico does not fully exploit the resources of U.S. narcotics agencies.

In spite of these negative aspects, chief officials in the U.S. Embassy are convinced that the Mexican President, the Attorney General and the Mexican authorities are sincere in their desire to end the production of and trafficking in narcotics in and through Mexico. This belief is strengthened by the fact that Mexican leaders are fearful that drug abuse may become a serious problem in Mexico.

By cooperating with the United States in a mutual effort to halt the illegal production of and trafficking in narcotics many Mexican officials believe that Mexico might be the eventual beneficiary if the endeavor is successful.

On the other hand several U.S. narcotics control team officers complained that many Mexican officials are actually dragging their heels and that public expressions by U.S. officials that they are satisfied with what Mexico is doing to halt the flow of drugs is counterproductive. As one official said, "How can we go to the Mexicans and tell them that they must do more to help us after they hear high ranking U.S. officials tell them how great they are doing. The situation in Mexico is not satisfactory and the sooner that the United States recognizes this the sooner we will be able to take the actions necessary to solve this problem.

As can be seen, much more remains to be done. The U.S. Embassy in Mexico must be more forceful in impressing upon Mexican officials that vigorous anti-narcotics action is necessary at all levels of government. This should be done in an understanding way given the intense national pride of the Mexicans, however. In turn, the Government of Mexico must be willing to take the drastic, though perhaps politically difficult measures necessary to stamp out the production and smuggling of narcotics and dangerous drugs. That Government must be made to realize that the words of cooperation spoken by government leaders are not adequately reflected in results to date. For regretfully, there has been no apparent lessening in the quantity of heroin, cocaine and marijuana entering the United States from Mexico.

There is much more that the United States can do unilaterally on its side of the border and in cooperation with the Mexican Government to attack this problem. Success, however, will depend upon the resolve of Federal and State officials in Mexico.

U.S. EMBASSY NARCOTICS ACTION TEAM

The Narcotics Action Team at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico is a divided group. There are frictions and personality conflicts that cannot help but have an adverse effect upon U.S. narcotics control activities in Mexico.

On the other hand State Department personnel appear to be more interested in getting along with their counterparts than in convincing the Mexicans of the need for strong action to conduct anti-narcotics activity in Mexico. The Embassy's lack of forcefulness in pressing the narcotics issue with the Government of Mexico is also due to the reluctance of officials in Washington to offend the Mexican Government.

All in all, the situation is entirely unsatisfactory, and must be corrected.

The blame for this problem, however, should not be placed entirely on the U.S. Embassy in Mexico. Officials in Washington have been aware of the circumstances and have not provided the leadership required to rectify the situation. In this case the bureaucratic tensions present in Mexico are only a reflection of the situation that exists among several components of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control in Washington.

U.S. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN MEXICO

Since Operation Intercept was replaced by Operation Cooperation in 1969 the United States has furnished eight helicopters and three fixed wing aircraft to help Mexican authorities in the effort to eradicate poppy and marijuana plants. This assistance has been valued at \$1,000,000.

In fiscal year 1973 the United States has authorized an additional \$1,300,000 for the purchase of communications equipment, vehicles and additional aircraft for Mexico. Most of this equipment has already been delivered.

All of the Mexican enforcement agencies and the military in particular could use vehicles, spare parts, weapons, and patrol boats for the Navy. With the end of the Vietnam war excess military equipment will be available. U.S. officials should study the feasibility of making excess military equipment available to Mexico for use in the eradication and enforcement programs.

BNDD and Customs are interested in conducting training programs for Mexican Police and Customs officials in Mexico and the United States.

Mexican Customs officials have also requested air-to-ground and ground-to-air communications systems from the United States in addition to 50 vehicles for patrol purposes.

COLOMBIA

INTRODUCTION

In the past the Government of Colombia has not been committed to the struggle to stop the illegal international traffic in narcotics. Many U.S. officials complain that the Government of Colombia has been lax in its efforts to apprehend, try, convict and jail traffickers. As one U.S. official said, "You get lip service support from the government on narcotics matters—but nothing else."

This situation may be changing. In a statement made public on January 13, 1973, one day after having met with the study mission, the President of Colombia agreed that "there was an alarming increase in the traffic of narcotics and dangerous drugs throughout the world" which resulted "in the need to coordinate efforts to fight a battle against this serious menace, especially due to its harmful effects on youth."

The President then energetically affirmed that the Government of Colombia "will commit the necessary economic resources to combat this growing danger that can destroy our society." (The President's statement is reprinted in Appendix 3, page 68.)

At the same time the President designated the Colombian Minister of Justice to coordinate the activities of the Colombian Government in its efforts to deal with the narcotics problem in Colombia.

This statement by the President is long overdue, according to several narcotics officials at the U.S. Embassy. This conclusion was substantiated by the Minister of Justice who told the study mission that until 1972 drug traffic through Colombia was not of "any great concern to the Government." This attitude is changing as a result of efforts by the U.S. Government to impress upon Colombian authorities the dimensions of the drug abuse problem in the United States, the role that Colombia plays as a conduit for narcotics smuggling, and the fact that drug abuse is increasing in Colombia.

Nevertheless, the President's public commitment is an important step and should be commended. Hopefully, it will lead to a pitched battle against international narcotics smugglers in Colombia.

The task will not be easy, however. There are political, historical, geographical, organizational and bureaucratic obstacles that have inhibited effective action. If these problems are not dealt with immediately and effectively there will be little or no improvement despite the Presidential announcement and Colombia will continue to serve as an important transshipment point for narcotics destined for the United States.

NARCOTICS AND COLOMBIA

Colombia plays a vital role in the international narcotics smuggling picture. Coca leaf is grown in parts of Colombia and refined into cocaine in clandestine laboratories, particularly in the Bogotá area. More importantly, Colombia also serves as a transshipment point for

heroin and cocaine to the United States. In addition, there are unconfirmed reports that small plots of poppies are under cultivation in isolated areas along the Colombian-Ecuador borders. According to these reports, the opium is refined into heroin in secret laboratories located in both countries. While there is no hard evidence to support such reports there is absolutely no doubt that narcotic drugs are being smuggled through Colombia to the United States. According to several Colombia governmental officials the volume of narcotics passing through Colombia has increased over the past year. While U.S. narcotics enforcement officials are not able to state precisely the quantity of cocaine and heroin entering the United States from Colombia, they unanimously agree that the amount is considerable.

There are several factors which make Colombia a desirable trans-shipment point:

First, the geographic location of Colombia is ideal for smuggling operations. Most of the commercial air traffic from Latin America passes through Colombia en route to the United States. Colombia has over 1,812 miles of coastline with only 228 miles of paved road along the coast. There are a number of isolated bays between Venezuela and Santa Marta in eastern Colombia and the region around the Panamanian isthmus which are used by smugglers. Large shipments of cocaine are known to have passed through the ports of Cartagena and Barranquilla in the Caribbean. European heroin is smuggled in directly by air and sea and indirectly from elsewhere in Latin America.

Second, smuggling has been accepted and tolerated in Colombia for generations and there are established smuggling channels which are also used by narcotics traffickers. Routes used to smuggle cigarettes, whiskey, radios, other items of electronic equipment and a wide variety of consumer goods into Colombia also are used to move narcotics back toward the United States.

Third, there are an unknown number of clandestine airfields along the Colombian coast and in the mountains which are used by those engaged in smuggling operations. Smugglers aboard aircraft operating out of the United States enter Colombia, conduct their business and return to the United States with narcotics. During the latter part of 1972 Colombian authorities seized three airplanes with U.S. registry, confiscated \$53,000 from one of the aircraft and arrested three U.S. citizens. The prisoners have since been released by a provincial judge.

Fourth, the judicial system in Colombia is bureaucratically entrenched and inefficient. The judges are underpaid and in many cases susceptible to bribery. According to the Director of the Department of Administrative Security, the government agency responsible for narcotics control, "it is only logical that a man who deals with millions can buy a judge who only makes 5,000 pesos (\$250) per month."

Corruption of certain customs and police officials and of some Colombian judges makes an efficient fight against drug traffickers impossible. One Colombian expert at an International Law Enforcement Seminar on Narcotics in Bogotá during the period November 15-17, 1972, stated that "all traffickers arrested in Colombia are released by corrupt judges." While this statement is probably an exaggeration the fact that a Colombian expert on narcotics enforcement matters would make it at all demonstrates the need for a change of attitudes in

Colombia. Another ranking narcotics enforcement official speaking of the huge profits that can be made trafficking in narcotics said, "With the profit you can spread money around and buy people, including government officials. This is the source of corruption. With money you can open any door."

Fifth, there has been a lack of coordination between the Colombian narcotics enforcement agencies which inhibits effective narcotics enforcement activity. The structure is such that only the narcotics traffickers benefit.

Sixth, the Penal Code in Colombia does not have sufficient sanctions against drug traffickers, which was not a serious problem in 1938, when the law was last codified. Since the study team was in Colombia, that Government has submitted a draft law to the Colombian Congress that would increase penalties for narcotics offenses. (Provisions of proposed legislation are in Appendix 4, p. 69.) Under present circumstances, however, the traffickers are aware of the lenient law and take advantage of it.

Seventh, many thousands of Colombian citizens visit the United States annually. A number carry heroin and cocaine into the United States. These individuals use every conceivable type of container imaginable, from hollow shoes to bowling balls. Over one three-day period in February 1973 U.S. Customs officials arrested three passengers who had arrived at John F. Kennedy International Airport aboard an Avianca Airlines flight from Bogotá. One had cocaine in a hollow shoe, one was carrying a bowling ball which had been hollowed out and another, a woman, had three pounds of cocaine hidden in her girdle.

Because of these ideal conditions, lax law enforcement in Colombia and increasingly effective narcotics suppression efforts elsewhere in Latin America, Colombia has become a haven for international financiers, traffickers and smugglers. French Corsicans from Marseilles and Mafiosa from Miami and New York and a number of Cuban expatriates living in Colombia are believed to be operating in Colombia, particularly in Bogotá, Cali, Cartagena, and Barranquilla. According to several U.S. officials in Colombia there has been no action taken against these individuals by the Department of Administrative Security.

There are four groups involved in drug traffic in Colombia. They are:

(a) The financiers who finance the operations and exert political influence to protect shipments.

(b) International agents who negotiate transactions and coordinate international traffic. These agents never come in contact with the cocaine or heroin.

(c) The activists or carriers who transport the narcotics for a substantial fee. These individuals are familiar with the modus operandi of the financiers and international agents and are willing to take their chances with the law.

(d) Those who are used to smuggle narcotics unknowingly.

If the Colombian Government is to be successful in its announced desire to control narcotics smuggling, it will be necessary to identify, locate, apprehend, try and convict traffickers with more vigor than

in the past. Unless there is a marked improvement in the entire Colombian narcotics enforcement apparatus, this is unlikely.

COLOMBIAN NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT

Three groups in Colombia are involved in narcotics control enforcement—the National Police, Customs, and the Department of Administrative Security (DAS). Under Governmental Decree 1717 of July 18, 1960, DAS is the Colombian law enforcement agency designated to control drug trafficking.

Department of Administrative Security (DAS)

DAS is the official Colombian Intelligence and Security service and has legal responsibility for illicit drug control in Colombia. It has a force of almost 4,000, of which 2,700 are detective agents and the remainder are technical and administrative personnel. In reality DAS is subject to the pressures of political patronage. This affects their efficiency in dealing with narcotics matters throughout Colombia.

DAS is under the direct legal authority of the President. Day-to-day operations are controlled by its director, Gen. Jorge Ordonez Valderrama, who has the equivalent rank of Minister.

There is evidence that at least one high ranking official of DAS is implicated in the illegal trafficking in narcotics. There could be others. One thing is obvious. DAS has been reluctant to take vigorous action to suppress narcotics trafficking in Colombia. For example, there have been reliable reports that DAS is resisting the efforts of the Minister of Justice to implement the directive of the President to coordinate the narcotics suppression effort in Colombia.

The National Police

Although DAS has legal responsibility for narcotics control, the National Police have been assuming an increasing role. In March 1972 the President of Colombia agreed to permit the police to pursue narcotics cases on a national level. This responsibility was given to the National Police.

Since then the National Police have been engaged in a two-pronged program aimed at (1) improving their interdiction campaign, and (2) making Colombians aware of the nature of the drug problem. At least 500 members of the National Police force have received training in anti-narcotics enforcement techniques.

U.S. officials are enthusiastic about the potential for effective narcotics enforcement being developed by the National Police. These same officials are also impressed with the dedication and professionalism of the police force.

To insure continued improvement the National Police need material assistance from the United States. U.S. Agency for International Development and the National Police are now in the process of preparing a program agreement which will involve between \$600,000 and \$800,000 for equipment and training.

The Director General of the National Police is also attempting to develop close liaison with DAS and Customs.

Directorate of Customs

The Customs service in Colombia is made up of approximately 100 officers, 255 non-commissioned officers and 1,500 guards. Customs per-

sonnel are career employees. Nevertheless, officers from other governmental agencies are occasionally appointed to important Customs positions, although they may not have any Customs experience.

According to the Director General, Colombian Customs does not have the capability to conduct effective operations throughout Colombia.

Colombian Customs also has its share of corrupt individuals. One of the highest ranking Customs agents is reportedly involved in smuggling activities, including narcotics.

The anti-narcotics activities of the National Police, DAS and Customs overlap. This leads to friction and bureaucratic jealousy, especially between Customs and DAS. A prime example of friction between DAS and Customs erupted publicly with the seizure of 82 kilos of cocaine by DAS in Cartagena in November 1972.

The cocaine was hidden in a camper-truck which had been loaded on an Italian ship, the *Verdi*, in Santiago, Chile. This information was reported to U.S. BNDD officials. The vessel passed through the Panama Canal, during which time a search by U.S. Customs failed to discover the cocaine. After the vessel had traversed the Canal it proceeded to Cartagena, Colombia, where Colombian Customs dismantled the vehicle. They did not find the cocaine and cleared the camper for further shipment to Guatemala. At this point, DAS at U.S. BNDD insistence sent an agent from Bogotá with a drill. The cocaine, which has been valued at \$23 million, was discovered under a false floor.

Colombian Customs objected to what it considered DAS interference, claiming that the cocaine should be turned over to Customs representatives.

After some delay the cocaine was turned over to the Ministry of Health. *El Patria*, one of the leading newspapers in Bogotá, criticized the activities of the Colombian enforcement agencies involved in this seizure and spoke of corruption in Colombia. In an editorial of November 23, 1972, *El Patria* said:

It is curious that when the shipment was discovered in Cartagena, three different authorities claimed to have priority over the case and tried to hold the forfeiture, as they say, for investigation: the port authorities, the secret police and the customs service. All three fought each other, there were all kind of arguments and they almost got into physical combat to obtain the fabulous, venomous powder. One billion pesos cannot be written off. With that money one can be rich everywhere in the world and it is also enough to pay contacts in the ports, to pay judges and to make punishment slow.

At last, after many uncertainties, attempts to influence the higher levels in government, telephone calls, struggle, it was decided that the cocaine be given to the Ministry of Public Health for therapeutical use, under costly protection, as if it were coined gold. But the links, the officials interested in not losing their commissions, are still waiting, hoping for the damned powder.

We know that Government is interested in eradicating this destructive traffic from our country, but we also know of powerful influences at work so that Colombia may continue

being a link in the chain of drug traffickers running from Chile to the United States, and it is necessary to act firmly, expurgating the personnel more in contact with drugs in the ports and beheading those high officials in public administration who have so many contacts with the international drug market.

As noted in the preceding extract, the cocaine was turned over to the Ministry of Public Health for therapeutical use. There is no requirement in Colombia providing for the destruction of seized narcotics and, as a result, much of it is sold or released by some corrupt officials. It is hoped that the Colombian Government will soon adopt procedures which will insure that narcotics, once seized by legal authorities, are not permitted to reenter the international smuggling network.

In addition to all of its other problems, Colombia also needs technical and material assistance from the United States.

U.S. ASSISTANCE TO COLOMBIA

The United States has given "token" assistance to Colombia for narcotics control purposes. This assistance consisted of six vehicles which were excess to AID requirements in Colombia and some handcuffs—a total value of about \$45,000.

The Government of Colombia needs and wants more equipment from the United States. Both the President and the Minister of Justice also indicated that they would like to have the U.S. furnish training for the Police and Customs, as well as for the special staff of the Minister of Justice. In addition, other Colombian governmental leaders told the study team that Colombia needs boats, communications equipment, mobile laboratories and individual items of police equipment.

The attitude of the U.S. country team is not to give any equipment to Colombia until they reorganize their narcotics suppression units and decide on a unified basis what kind of assistance they need. As of the preparation of this report, other than some training to be paid for by U.S. Customs, BNDD, and AID Public Safety, Colombia was not programed to receive the equipment suggested by the Colombian Government in fiscal year 1973.

Colombian Government funds for narcotics enforcement programs are limited. Several officials observed that although drug abuse was a world problem and an incipient one for Colombia that country had so many other pressing economic and domestic priorities that it was unlikely that funds could be spared for narcotics suppression programs.

United States officials should review the assistance programs for Colombia. That country plays a very significant role in the smuggling of cocaine and heroin to the United States and without the assistance of that Government, progress toward solution of the problem will be seriously impeded. The President of Colombia committed his Government to the narcotics fight during the visit of the study mission. Colombia needs the tools to get the endeavor underway. The least that the United States can do is to honor its earlier commitment to give that country the equipment and training needed.

PANAMA

INTRODUCTION

Panama is also a conduit for narcotics entering the United States. It has long been a staging area for contraband American cigarettes and other goods bound for Latin America. In recent years international narcotics traffickers have used the established contraband structure of Panama to smuggle narcotics into the United States. More than 15,000 ships pass through the Panama Canal annually. This combined with the continual arrival and departure of aircraft from the international airports and at the 84 airfields scattered throughout the country makes the control of smuggling to and from Panama a difficult task.

PANAMANIAN-U.S. COOPERATION

The Panamanian Government has publicly stated both its determination to stamp out narcotics traffic and its willingness to cooperate with the United States in this endeavor. The Foreign Minister and other Panamanian officials gave the study mission strong new verbal assurances of this policy during discussions in Panama City.

The Panamanian Government has created a narcotics unit in the National Guard and has provided Police and Customs officers for participation in narcotics control training programs conducted by U.S. enforcement agencies. In January 1973 the U.S. Bureau of Customs started a 2-week training course in Panama City for 33 Panamanian enforcement officers, including Customs inspectors, detectives and National Guardsmen. Customs is being assisted by two agents from BNDD who taught courses in narcotics identification. Officers of the Agency for International Development Mission's Public Safety Division provided administrative support. The course was repeated in February for an additional 33 Panamanian officials.

There are 2 BNDD agents presently stationed in Panama and one Customs agent. Many Panamanians and several U.S. diplomatic officials point to the fact that BNDD agents are permitted to operate in Panama as an important illustration of Panama's desire to cooperate.

These officials point out that although 3 BNDD agents were declared person non grata by the Panamanian Foreign Minister in March 1972 and given 12 hours to leave the country the Panamanian Government agreed to admit 2 other BNDD agents within one week after the expulsion. At the present time working relations between BNDD agents and Panamanian enforcement agencies are said to be good, as are relations between the U.S. Customs agent and Panamanian officials.

In spite of these signs of cooperation U.S. officials in and out of Panama do not believe that the Government of Panama is fully com-

mitted to the struggle to stop narcotics from passing through Panama to the United States. It is their view that government officials in Panama are long on words but short on deeds and that actions taken, such as the arrests and deportations of six American citizens wanted by U.S. authorities for narcotics activities, are designed to give the appearance of cooperation and should not be taken as an indication of resoluteness on the part of the Panamanian Government.

Another indication that the Panamanian Government is less than fully committed stems from the fact that there is evidence that some Government officials, including the brother of the President of Panama, are implicated in narcotics trafficking.

There have also been unsubstantiated reports that the Foreign Minister Juan Tack is implicated.

Allegations against Tack are based partly upon two incidents. One, individuals with Panamanian diplomatic passports signed by the Foreign Minister have been arrested in the United States for possession of narcotics, and two, Tack vehemently protested when United States authorities arrested Joaquim Him Gonzalez, a narcotics smuggler, in the Canal Zone and sent him to Dallas, Tex., for trial.

According to Tack these allegations are unfounded. He argues that it is customary for the Foreign Minister to sign diplomatic passports and that he did so not knowing that the individual would engage in narcotics smuggling. He further contends that his protest to the United States Government over the arrest of Him Gonzalez was because the circumstances of his arrest violated the principle of Panamanian jurisdiction in the Canal Zone.

U.S. officials do not believe that Tack has been involved in narcotics activities.

Further complicating relations between the United States and Panama on narcotics matters are the tensions that have arisen between the two countries over the Panama Canal. There are those who argue that the Government of Panama considers both issues within the overall framework of Panamanian-United States relations and that future cooperation on drugs will depend upon the outcome of ongoing negotiations concerning the future of the Canal Zone. Top Panamanian officials denied that there is any connection between the two issues.

Panamanian officials are critical of the United States anti-narcotics effort in Panama, indicating that there is some confusion among Panamanian authorities as to who is coordinating activities and programs. As one high ranking official said, "The United States does not operate in a centralized way. Every U.S. agency wants to be the hero of the movie. They need one coordinator, one man and that is what is needed."

Panamanian authorities are also very critical of the anti-narcotics enforcement in the U.S.-controlled Canal Zone. While this attitude undoubtedly has its origins in the Panamanian desire for jurisdiction over the Canal Zone, there is considerable justification for their criticism of the enforcement effort in the Canal Zone.

THE SITUATION IN THE PANAMA CANAL ZONE

A substantial quantity of narcotics is believed to enter Panama through the Panama Canal Zone.

According to U.S. officials in Panama the anti-narcotics effort in the Canal Zone is weak. One official said, "The Zonal Government is not equipped to deal with the problem."

Approximately 40 ships transit the Canal daily. While waiting to pass through the Canal, ships anchor in the harbor. The ships are not checked and it is possible that narcotics are thrown overboard either before entering the Canal or during transit. The Canal is unfenced and the two meandering lakes are difficult to patrol.

There are 56 U.S. Customs inspectors in the Canal Zone. Only six, however, are narcotics specialists. Three of them are located in Balboa and three in Cristobal. According to the Governor General of the Canal Zone, a physical inspection of all ships and passengers entering or transiting the Canal Zone is a physical impossibility.

Customs inspections of ships transiting the Canal are not as thorough or as effective as they should be. For example, the Italian ship, the *Verdi*, passed through the Canal in November 1972 carrying a large quantity of cocaine (82 kilos) that was later seized by Colombian authorities in Cartagena. U.S. officials in the Canal Zone, who had been alerted to the fact that the *Verdi* was carrying cocaine, were unable to locate the contraband.

Narcotics are also moved into Panama from the Canal Zone. One U.S. official estimated that "up to 50 percent of the narcotics entering Panama come through the Canal Zone." There are a number of ways in which this can happen. For example, ship cargo destined for Panama is offloaded in the Canal Zone. (Panama has only one suitable deep water port and that is used almost exclusively for oil.) This cargo is not checked by U.S. Customs in the Zone nor do Panamanian officials conduct a 100 percent check when the shipment is being moved to the consignee.

Another possible entrance of narcotics is through U.S. military bases in the Canal Zone.

Naval vessels from several Latin American countries, including Chile, Ecuador and Peru call at the Rodman Naval Base from time to time. These vessels are not subject to U.S. Customs inspections and the crews have Post Exchange privilege while in port. This affords an excellent opportunity for individuals or organizations to smuggle cocaine and heroin into Panama. Items purchased in the PX's are cameras, radios, watches and other articles which are either scarce or prohibitively expensive in South America. U.S. officials believe that there are cases where these items are in turn traded for cocaine or heroin which is then taken to either the Canal Zone or Panama, sold for dollars which are in turn used to purchase additional radios, watches, etc. and the cycle starts again.

Nor are inspections at Howard Air Force Base complete or satisfactory. U.S. aircraft from bases all over the world land at Howard frequently.

U.S. military authorities are now in the process of tightening inspection procedures at the military bases. Additional personnel will

be trained in Customs procedures and it is hoped that U.S. Customs personnel will assume the responsibility for operations at the respective bases.

At the present time, however, inspections of vessels and aircraft are sporadic and incomplete.

The Governor General and other Canal Zone officials are taking action to rectify this situation. Several Canal Zone Customs and police officials have been sent to the United States for training and in July 1972, U.S. Customs conducted a training course in the Zone which was attended by over 90 officials from Customs, Police and Military units. Furthermore, the Governor General has organized an Inter Agency Team to coordinate anti-narcotics activities.

In addition a survey has been made to determine future requirements and a BNDD agent has been assigned to the Canal Zone on temporary duty to evaluate the feasibility of assigning an agent to the Canal Zone on a permanent basis.

There is a shortage of funds, however, and funds for augmentation of the narcotics effort must be taken from other programs. The Governor General has been operating under hiring ceilings imposed by the Executive Branch and as a result Customs is short eight men. When asked why the military could not be used for Customs purposes the Governor General replied that the military were not experienced in Customs or arrest procedures. This obstacle can be overcome, however, and officials should consider using military personnel in the anti-narcotics effort, particularly at Rodman Naval and Howard Air Force Bases until experienced Custom personnel can be assigned.

The situation in the Canal Zone is inexcusable. Canal Zone officials must implement full Customs inspections at U.S. military bases and at the ports. The objective is to stop narcotics from moving from one country to another and every likely point of transshipment must be closed. The United States must take positive action to insure that its own house remains in order by insuring that every effort is made to intercept shipments of illicit drugs entering the Canal Zone.

This applies to the Embassy in Panama as well as the U.S. authorities in the Canal Zone.

U.S. NARCOTICS CONTROL TEAM

The effectiveness of the U.S. Embassy Narcotics Control Team is reduced by weak leadership, bickering, and bureaucratic jealousies. It should be pointed out, however, that BNDD and Customs officials in Panama work well together.

According to one official, the Embassy Narcotics Committee "meets only when VIP's come in. Members cannot speak freely." Another official contradicted this and said that the Committee "meets at least once per month" and has for the past six months.

The important thing is not that the Committee meet but that it be coordinated and cohesive. This is obviously not the case. As a result, the U.S. anti-narcotics effort in Panama has moved too slowly and has achieved unsatisfactory results.

While progress in Mexico, Colombia and Panama has been disappointing, the anti-narcotics effort in Argentina and Peru appears to have made important headway.

ARGENTINA

INTRODUCTION

Argentina is a transshipment point for hard narcotics destined for the United States. Heroin from Europe and cocaine from throughout Latin America is smuggled into Argentina and then to the United States either directly or through other countries. While the normal traffic pattern from Argentina is through other Latin American countries, particularly Colombia, Panama, or Mexico, it is also possible that some cocaine passes through Argentina to any one of several European countries before being shipped to the United States.

Originally, Argentine Governmental authorities were reluctant to admit that that country played a significant role in the smuggling of narcotics into the United States.

Argentine authorities became aware of the role that Argentina plays in the smuggling of drugs when 46 kilos of heroin which had been shipped from France aboard an Aerolineas Argentina aircraft was seized on August 20, 1972, in Buenos Aires. The heroin was concealed either in panels behind the food storage area or in the wings of the aircraft. The operation was such that it had to involve collusion between airline employees in France and Buenos Aires and employees of the food handling company in Buenos Aires.

As a result of this seizure more than 30 persons were arrested, the majority of whom had been listed in BNDD files for years, including Francois Chiappi who had been engaged in international smuggling of narcotics since at least early in the 1960s.

In response to U.S. initiatives and a growing awareness that drug abuse could become a serious problem in Argentina that country is co-operating with the United States in narcotics suppression efforts and is playing a leading role throughout Latin American in an endeavor to put an end to narcotics smuggling.

WHAT ARGENTINA IS DOING

Argentina has been active in helping the United States develop international cooperation to stop the illegal flow of narcotics into the United States.

In January 1972 Argentina created a cabinet Commission on Narcotics. The Commission is designed to operate under the Ministry of Social Welfare and will deal with problems of prevention, education, rehabilitation and law enforcement.

Although few drug seizures had been made in Argentina, it is thought by reliable authorities that actions taken to date by that government have caused international traffickers to move most of their operations elsewhere. These same authorities believe that, as a result, there could be stockpiles of heroin in Argentina because of the disruption of routes and the arrest of a number of traffickers.

There is no evidence that high ranking Argentine officials are involved in narcotics trafficking although the former head of the Narcotics Section of the Federal Police was relieved in the spring of 1972 because of such involvement. The information which served as the basis for his relief was provided by the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.

Argentine authorities are of the opinion that the situation is now under control although they are aware that cocaine and coca leaf are being smuggled into northern Argentina from Bolivia and Chile. Argentina is a large country with extensive land and sea borders which are impossible to patrol thoroughly.

Given the dimensions of the problem, Argentine authorities feel that an extensive, responsive intelligence system is vital if they are to inhibit the flow of narcotics into and through Argentina. In addition to improving their own intelligence capability, the Argentines have suggested that all Latin American countries establish a separate organization for the sole purpose of exchanging intelligence on narcotics matters.

At the present time Argentine narcotics enforcement efforts are hampered because there is no law which would allow the Federal Police to function nationwide. The absence of such a law has impeded law enforcement generally and is not restricted to narcotics.¹

ARGENTINE CUSTOMS

Heretofore, Argentine Customs has not been overly concerned with narcotics. In the past narcotics was just another contraband item and there was no specific effort made against the narcotics smuggler. This situation is now changing and Argentine Customs, with the assistance of U.S. customs authorities, is in the process of training an investigative body to develop the kind of information that will enable Argentine Customs to improve their enforcement effort.

In addition, Customs enforcement efforts have been intensified, especially along the border with Chile. Aircraft are being used to patrol the border areas and all buses entering the country are being searched.

As has been discussed, there are substantial quantities of TVs, refrigerators, cigarettes, other items of electronic equipment, and other contraband being smuggled into and through Argentina. Unknown quantities of opium and probably heroin are also believed to have been smuggled in by ethnic Chinese crews on foreign vessels. There is a requirement to place restrictions on the activities of such crews and Argentine officials are working on this aspect of the problem.

In the final analysis Argentine enforcement officials believe that, since the problem of narcotics is international in scope, there must be international cooperation to stop it.

ARGENTINE-UNITED STATES COOPERATION

In 1970 the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs established an office in Buenos Aires. This unit works closely with local law

¹ The Argentine Government has a regulation pending which will enable the Federal Police to operate against narcotics traffickers on a national level. It could be promulgated before Spring. Pending enactment of this legislation the Federal Police encouraged Provincial Police to send officers to Buenos Aires for specialized narcotics enforcement training.

enforcement agencies and has furnished training to Federal Police and Customs authorities.


On September 15, 1972, Argentina and the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding aimed at the control of illegal international trafficking in narcotics and other dangerous drugs. Under the terms of that Agreement the two countries established a Binational Commission to coordinate activities in the area of narcotics suppression. (The Memorandum is reprinted in Appendix 5, p. 70.)

The Co-Presidents are the Minister of Social Welfare and the U.S. Ambassador to Argentina. There are three working groups within the Commission. The working groups are:

1. Coordination and Policy.
2. Security, Intelligence and Review.
3. Education assistance and Rehabilitation.

There are also U.S. and Argentine co-presidents of each of the working groups.

The objective of the Commission is to set up an autonomous Intelligence Task Force which will deal with the international aspects of the narcotics problem. The proposed organization of the Task Force is as follows:



A. *Mission*.—To investigate, penetrate, and destroy major trafficking systems. (Taskforce would bring all assets of the government to bear on traffickers in an effort to avoid inter-agency rivalry and duplication.)

B. *Organization*.—

1. *Advisory Council*.—Composed of either the Chief or Deputy Chief of all agencies involved in narcotic enforcement to act in an advisory capacity to Executive Director.

2. *Executive Director*.—High ranking officer who has not been affiliated with any of the agencies involved in drug enforcement to date. To be appointed by the President and given high level support, possibly reporting directly to the President and have authority to levy manpower and intelligence requirements on all agencies as needed. Will need considerable background in intelligence and investigation.

3. *Operations Section*.—A full-time team of 10–12 officers taken from all agencies. All should have considerable background in narcotics investigations and enforcement. (Section would be augmented on a temporary basis as needed for peak periods of activity such as enforcement actions.)

4. *Technical Services Section*.—A small number of officers experienced in technical penetrations, and other forms of surveillance, etc.

5. *Research and Analysis Section*.—A small number of experienced intelligence analysts who would review, analyze and collate all intelligence gathered by the taskforce. Would have access to all pertinent files and intelligence located within the various participating agencies.

6. *Central Files Section*.—Develop and maintain a central repository of all source information on major systems as a service of common concern.

Argentine authorities are also cooperating with the United States in the diplomatic area. On January 21, 1972 the two Governments signed a new Extradition Treaty which for the first time permits extradition for narcotics offenses.

One offender, indicted with 11 others in New York, is Yolanda Sarmiento. She was arrested in Argentina in January 1973 and released conditionally before U.S. authorities could request extradition. She has since disappeared and is a fugitive. According to reliable authorities Yolanda Sarmiento will be extradited to the United States upon capture. (Indictment is reprinted in Appendix 6, p. 70.)

The United States has also agreed to furnish equipment needed by Argentina to prosecute their narcotics control enforcement program. The equipment which is intended for the use of the Federal Police, the Gendarmerie, and Customs includes closed circuit television to be installed at the international airports in Argentina, automobile inspection devices and surveillance equipment. The Gendarmerie and Customs will receive most of the equipment. While neither is completely effective as yet, it is anticipated that the equipment, if it ever arrives, will help improve their capability.

The study mission was disturbed to learn that material assistance had been offered to the Argentine Government almost nine months ago. U.S. officials in Washington had not yet approved the request, at least while the team was in Buenos Aires. This causes many officials at the U.S. Embassy and in the Argentine Government to question the seriousness of the U.S. commitment to devote the necessary resources to the elimination of international smuggling of narcotics. Unfortunately, this situation is not peculiar to Argentina.

PERU

The narcotics problem in Peru principally involves the illegal production and exportation of cocaine. Coca leaf is grown in the Andes in Peru. Most of the crop is chewed by the Indians. The remainder, about 10 percent of the total crop, is refined into coca paste or cocaine in clandestine laboratories near the coca fields and then exported to the international market.

According to U.S. officials in Peru that government is willing, and does cooperate with the United States on drug control matters. The Foreign Minister has pledged the cooperation of Peru in the international effort to stop the illegal trafficking in narcotics and has requested material and training assistance from the United States. A proposed program for Peru included \$12,000 local costs to support the narcotics enforcement unit, \$10,000 for United States Information Agency and \$6,000 for lender grants—a total of \$28,000. The Latin American Regional Committee of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control has not yet acted on this request and wants to know why Peru cannot finance the local costs itself.

In addition, Peru has requested communications equipment and other material assistance from the United States. According to U.S. Embassy officials, it will require between \$2 and \$3 million in assistance if Peru is to improve its anti-narcotics enforcement capability.

Peru exports coca leaf to the United States and Europe legally. The foreign currency earnings are not substantial. For example in 1972, 522,000 pounds were exported for \$623,600. The largest U.S. importer is the Stephen Chemical Company in Chicago.

Peruvian efforts to control the seepage of coca leaf from the legal to the illegal market are managed by the *Impresa de la Coca*, which is a government company. The company, which employs about 80 people, is charged with the responsibility to regulate and monitor coca production.

The purpose of the company is to produce tax revenues from the legitimate production of coca.

U.S. officials are of the opinion that the *Impresa de la Coca* can become an effective instrument in holding down coca production in Peru. It is in being and it is working albeit not very effectively at the present time. Many U.S. officials in Peru stressed the point that the United States should offer assistance to modernize the operations of the *Impresa de la Coca*.

There are four agencies in Peru responsible for narcotics law enforcement. They are the Civil Guard, the Republican Guard, Customs and the Peruvian Investigative Police (PIP). PIP is a detective force with national jurisdiction with a special narcotics squad of 60 men based in Lima. Their operations are not restricted to Lima, however.

The Director General of PIP told the study team that the anti-drug effort in Peru exceeds their budget capabilities and, as a result, they need outside assistance. PIP needs motor boats, communications equipment and vehicles. He observed that the traffickers are better equipped than the police.

Peruvian authorities have also discussed the possibilities of substituting other crops for the coca leaf, and the United Nations has a team in Peru studying the feasibility of alternate crops. Eradication of the coca leaf is unlikely in the foreseeable future, however. The plight of the Indians and their dependence upon chewing the leaf presents political, physical and economic problems that will not be solved quickly.

OTHER COUNTRIES IN LATIN AMERICA

In addition to the countries already discussed a number of other countries in Latin America play a significant role in the U.S. drug abuse problem. Unfortunately, the study mission was not able to visit all of them. In order to better understand the regional dimensions of the problem the study mission met with U.S. officials from Ecuador and Uruguay while in Latin America. In addition consultations were held in the United States with appropriate officials to discuss the situation in Bolivia and Chile. A brief review of the situation in those four countries follows.

Ecuador

Ecuador also plays a significant role in the U.S. drug problem. Opium poppies are being grown in the mountainous areas of the Sierra ¹ and there are heroin laboratories believed to be located in the mountains along the border with Colombia and in Guayaquil. It is also known that shipments of heroin and cocaine pass through Guayaquil on their way to the United States. Cocaine is also produced in the area of Guayaquil.

Smuggling of cocaine and heroin from Ecuador follows many routes but the operations are probably managed by groups in the Guayaquil and other coastal areas of Ecuador. There is also an unsubstantiated report of a link between the traffickers in Ecuador and criminal elements in Las Vegas, Nev. In addition, U.S. officials believe that some Ecuadorean citizens residing in the United States receive narcotics, principally cocaine, from relatives and friends in Ecuador.

The narcotics enforcement effort in Ecuador is not effective. The government is weak and unable to enforce the narcotics laws. There have been numerous reports that high ranking government officials are involved in trafficking activities but there is no hard evidence according to U.S. officials in Ecuador.

There are 8,000 police officials in Ecuador. They do not have sufficient equipment and have only 250 vehicles. Recently the Government created a special 30-man unit to execute anti-narcotics programs. The unit does not have sufficient space and is critically short of equipment and vehicles. According to U.S. officials in Ecuador if the United States does not furnish assistance immediately the 30 men will be assigned to other units and the anti-narcotic effort will collapse.

The most pressing need is for vehicles. Recently, Ecuadorean and U.S. authorities conducted a raid on a cocaine laboratory in a remote mountain area over 300 miles from Quito. The raid succeeded and several people, including the chemist, were arrested. To get those apprehended back to Quito the authorities were forced to commandeer a civilian automobile.

The prospects for effective action in Ecuador are not good. Eventual success will depend upon the effectiveness of Ecuadorean enforce-

¹ The Andean highlands that run roughly north-south through Ecuador.

ment agencies and they do not have the capability, training or equipment to do the job. One U.S. official said, "If the United States wants an effective anti-narcotics program in Ecuador it will have to buy it."

The United States has approved \$263,000 for equipment and \$15,000 to defray the temporary duty expenses for U.S. Customs advisers and some training. To be effective, however, the equipment must be delivered to the authorities in Ecuador without delay.

U.S. officials in Ecuador are unhappy with the U.S. administration of the U.S. narcotics assistance program. Requests for equipment are not acted upon promptly and there is a feeling of frustration. One official complained that "we have not been told how the Cabinet Committee works or who controls the money."

There is an AID Public Safety Adviser, a U.S. Customs agent, and a BNDD agent stationed in Ecuador. Relations between U.S. and Ecuadorean narcotics enforcement agencies is good in spite of the strain in overall U.S.-Ecuadorean relations stemming from the dispute over the seizure of American-owned vessels fishing for tuna within 200 miles of the Ecuadorean coast.¹

Uruguay

The precise role that Uruguay plays in the world narcotics problem has not been completely verified. There are no narcotics known to be produced in Uruguay. Some shipments of heroin from Europe are known to have passed through Uruguay although it is thought that international narcotics traffickers do not use that country as a general rule. For example, one U.S. shipment arranged by Auguste Ricord is known to have entered through Montevideo and subsequently been driven out of Uruguay by motor vehicle for further movement to the United States.

There is little doubt that Uruguay has the potential to become a conduit for narcotics moving to the United States. Smuggling has been common in that country for years and the channels are well established and well used. The pay of government officials is low and they are susceptible to bribery. U.S. officials, however, do not believe that Uruguay will be used as a transshipment point by the international traffickers. There are indications that the traffickers use Uruguay as an "office" where shipments are arranged and financed. In the opinion of these officials it would be counterproductive to move narcotics through Uruguay. As one high ranking U.S. official said: "They have been able to operate safely in their financing operations. There is no need to involve Uruguay. They can ship through other countries."

The Government of Uruguay has pledged its cooperation in the effort to deal with the narcotics problem. As a part of that endeavor the Uruguayan Government has set up a Commission of high ranking officials to prosecute anti-narcotics programs. To be effective that Commission must deal with the problem in a vigorous and forceful way.

In addition, the Government is in the process of arranging a special narcotics organization and is selecting qualified police officers to serve in the units. There is also legislation in process which would modernize Uruguayan laws.

¹ Ecuador claims territorial waters out to 200 miles. The U.S. recognizes a 3-mile territorial waters limit and an additional 9 miles for fishing rights.

The United States does not have a full time Customs or BNDD agent stationed in Uruguay. An agent from the BNDD regional office in Buenos Aires spends a major part of his time there and the U.S. Embassy has requested that he be assigned permanently.

Uruguay has also initialed a new extradition treaty with the United States which specifically provides for the extradition of narcotics traffickers. Recently Uruguay was prepared to arrest and extradite Armando Nicolai who was engaged in narcotics activity in Uruguay. The arrest never was made. When news reached Uruguay that Nicolai had been indicted in New York on drug charges he immediately disappeared and has been in hiding since.

U.S. officials in Uruguay were understandably disappointed and irritated. The publicity concerning the indictment of Nicolai was unfortunate because it not only resulted in the escape of a known drug trafficker but it caught the Government of Uruguay off guard. If there had been coordination between the Federal Attorney's office in the Southern District of New York with BNDD or the Department of State prior to releasing news of the indictment, Nicolai would not have been forewarned and would now probably be in prison.

The situation in Uruguay is clouded by the Tupomaro guerrilla movement. Although there does not seem to be any connection between the terrorists and the drug traffickers, the rebels are intent upon destroying the institutions of the Uruguayan Government. The military has just recently taken over control of the government. Hopefully, the Government's commitment to deal with international narcotics trafficking will not be a casualty of the upheaval.

While this could have an adverse effect on the anti-narcotics struggle, U.S. officials are optimistic that the cooperation that has started in Uruguay will continue.

Bolivia

The narcotics problem in Bolivia from the U.S. point of view is the transformation of coca into cocaine and its subsequent exportation. There are no reliable figures on the amount of illegal cocaine that is produced in or smuggled out of Bolivia. According to some estimates the amount may be several thousand pounds a year, most of which ends up in the United States.

Coca cultivation in Bolivia is an important source of revenue for thousands of small family farmers engaged in its production. It is not illegal to produce, sell, transport or chew the coca leaf. Coca leaf chewing is also deeply ingrained in Indian life and any attempt to eliminate the supply could lead to serious social disruptions.

The Bolivian Government has reorganized and expanded its narcotics police brigade. Bolivian police officers have received training in narcotics detection and enforcement from Agency for International Development Public Safety advisors.

The United States has furnished some vehicles and communications equipment to Bolivia. The Bolivians have requested additional assistance from the United States. Of a total request of \$307,400 for equip-

ment, training and local costs the U.S. Cabinet Committee's Regional Committee for Latin America has approved a program totaling \$147,000 for Bolivia.

Chile

Chile is an important producer of cocaine. Recently Chile has also become an important transfer point for heroin shipments from Europe to the United States and a major staging point for smuggling it into the United States. U.S. officials believe there are as many as a dozen different cocaine smuggling organizations operating in the country. BNDD believes that one ring operating out of Santiago with contacts in New York, Miami, Marseilles, Amsterdam, Buenos Aires and elsewhere is engaged in a smuggling operation which moves between 300 and 500 kilos of heroin and cocaine into the United States each month in return for cigarettes, weapons, radios, television sets, and other electronic items which have been sent from the United States and Panama.

Political relations between Chile and the United States are strained as a result of the expropriation of U.S.-owned properties and other actions taken by the Allende government.

Nevertheless, Chile has agreed to cooperate in the effort to stop the production of and trafficking in cocaine and heroin. The principal drug effort is the responsibility of the Chilean police.

Chilean authorities do work closely with the BNDD agent stationed in Chile. The Latin American Regional Committee of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control has approved a request for equipment and training for Chilean enforcement officials and agencies of \$76,000 subject to additional information to be submitted to U.S. officials in Chile on requirements. There have been no requests received from the Government of Chile.

CONCLUSIONS

1. According to the best intelligence available to the U.S. Government, the Latin American Connection accounts for at least 50 percent of the heroin and 100 percent of the cocaine currently being smuggled into the United States.

2. The majority of the heroin is of European origin and is smuggled through Latin America on the way to the United States. All of the cocaine and approximately 15 percent of the heroin is produced in Latin America. In addition, there is evidence that small amounts of Asian heroin are beginning to be funneled into the United States through Latin America.

3. Significant progress has been made in the last year in reducing the smuggling of European heroin through Latin America, and this progress is believed to have contributed importantly to the heroin shortage which has existed in most U.S. east coast cities since the summer of 1972.

4. Progress against drug trafficking has varied widely from country to country in Latin America, however, and the traffickers have shown considerable flexibility in shifting their operations to those Latin countries where law enforcement remains weakest. As a result, drug trafficking through certain countries, such as Colombia and Mexico, is believed to have increased in the past year.

5. Cocaine traffic from Latin America has increased sharply as worldwide pressure on heroin smuggling has been expanded.

6. The key trouble spots in attempting to halt the flow of illicit drugs into the United States from Latin America are currently Mexico, Panama and Colombia. Although government leaders in all three countries have publicly announced support for the fight against drug trafficking, corruption and inertia—particularly at middle and lower levels—have combined to thwart or reduce effective action.

7. Corruption is endemic to all the countries of Latin America. Profits earned from trafficking in drugs are so great that low-paid police and government officials can often be bribed to look the other way.

8. Smuggling and contraband—be it cigarettes, whiskey, weapons, cameras, or watches—are historically commonplace in Latin America. For that reason it is difficult to arouse the populace and officials against such trafficking when it involves drugs.

9. Vastly improved intelligence on producers, traffickers, financiers and smugglers, is essential if enforcement efforts are to improve further. The U.S. anti-drug effort in Latin America has been severely handicapped in the past by a lack of intelligence, and although there has been some improvement in our ability to collect narcotics intelligence there in the last 6 months, our collection capability in Latin America remains inadequate. The Latin American governments' intelligence collection efforts are poorly managed and executed and there is little exchange of narcotics intelligence among the Latin American countries.

10. Efforts to eliminate the production of and trafficking in illicit drugs in Latin America requires regional programs, regional cooperation, and a complete and honest exchange of information among nations on the lawbreakers involved. To date, there has been no effective action against drugs taken by the several governments on a regional basis.

11. If the enforcement effort in Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America increases there will be some success in disrupting routes which will cause changes in the modus operandi of the international smuggler. When, and if, this occurs the trafficker can be expected to look for alternate routes. The most likely would be Canada because, like Mexico, most of its continuous land border with the United States is remote, barren and difficult to patrol. United States narcotics enforcement and diplomatic officials must take immediate steps to be prepared to deal with this contingency before the trafficker transfers a significant part of his operations to Canada.

12. Coordination between the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control and several U.S. Diplomatic Missions in Latin America has been insufficient. Countries have requested financial and material aid from the United States to help in the struggle against narcotics and have been assured of assistance by U.S. Embassy officials, only to have approval stall in Washington because of a failure to act by component agencies of the Cabinet Committee.

13. Although Congress authorized the use of foreign aid funds for assistance to narcotics control in February 1972, only small amounts have yet been obligated by the Agency for International Development for limited training and small quantities of equipment. As a result the development of an effective anti-narcotic effort in Latin America has been impeded.

14. Bureaucratic and personality differences among groups and individuals represented on U.S. Embassy Narcotic Control Teams in some Latin American countries have weakened American efforts to fight the drug traffic in that region. Host government officials, to whom such frictions often are apparent, are confused about where coordination and direction of U.S. programs is centered and undoubtedly have been able to take advantage of our disarray to avoid or resist taking some of the actions we have urged upon them.

15. Communication is poor between the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics and several U.S. Narcotic Control Teams in Latin America. The study team was particularly frustrated by the apparent lack of priority being given to the U.S. anti-narcotics program by the Agency for International Development, as evidenced by that Agency's lethargic and bureaucratic approach to meeting requests for law enforcement assistance.

16. Use of the coca leaf has been accepted and tolerated in many Latin American countries for centuries. Crop substitution programs, therefore, are not likely to be successful until the economic conditions of indigenous Indian groups which grow and use coca are improved substantially.

17. Failure of the United States to take harsher and more effective action against drug trafficking in the United States has weakened our position in attempting to persuade foreign governments to take stronger action in their own countries. Foreign government officials frequently pointed to the theft of substantial quantities of heroin from the New York Police Department, the failure of the United States to ratify the International Convention on Psychotropic Substances, and lenient sentencing of drug dealers in the United States as indications that the United States itself is not prosecuting the war against drugs as vigorously at home as it could.

18. As a result of the many problems outlined above, future progress in reducing the flow of illicit drugs into the United States from Latin America will be a difficult long-term task requiring a substantial increase in the level of priority being given to the problem by both the United States and the nations of Latin America.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the President reorganize the U.S. anti-narcotics effort at home and abroad in order to end overlapping responsibilities, eliminate bureaucratic friction, and increase the efficiency of the Federal Government's war against illicit drugs.

2. That a new Office of Drug Abuse Investigation and Enforcement be established in the Department of Justice to direct the anti-drug effort both at home and abroad. This new Office would in turn operate through and direct the operations of two separate bureaus, one of which would be charged with domestic narcotics control and the other with international narcotics control.

The domestic bureau would be organized around the current Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and would be called the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. The international bureau would be staffed by agents from the U.S. Bureau of Customs and the BNDD and would be known as the International Narcotics Bureau.

In making this proposal, the study team is concerned about recent proposals to roll the entire anti-drug enforcement and intelligence effort into the FBI. The study team believes their implementation would set back the entire anti-drug effort, and particularly the United States international drug control program, by several years.

Specifically, such a plan would (1) dilute the drug effort by placing it in an agency with many other responsibilities and priorities and (2) jeopardize the increasing cooperation now being received from foreign governments on the drug problem, since foreign governments could be expected to suspect foreign-based FBI agents of having other interests in addition to drugs and to be reluctant to allow the FBI as much freedom of operation in their countries as they now allow the BNDD, which is concerned only with drugs.

The thrust of U.S. policy has been to encourage the establishment of a central, identifiable narcotic enforcement authority in foreign countries. This policy has been increasingly effective in gaining international action against drug trafficking, and for the U.S. now to merge its own narcotic enforcement effort into a general investigative organization would clearly contradict that policy.

The study team's proposal has the additional merit of retaining the services of hundreds of highly trained, experienced and motivated BNDD and Customs agents who could be wasted by giving the drug responsibility to the FBI.

3. That, in view of the proposed reorganization, the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control and the Office of

National Narcotics Intelligence, be abolished and their functions assumed by the new Office of Drug Abuse Investigation and Enforcement and its components.

4. Under the direction of the President, the Secretary of State should be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of programs formulated by the International Narcotics Bureau in the international narcotics control field.

5. As is the case with other U.S. personnel assigned abroad, international narcotics personnel should be under the supervision of the Chief of the U.S. Diplomatic Mission in each country.

6. That the United States be more responsive to requests for equipment and funds from foreign countries. Foreign assistance programs for narcotics control purposes are unique. In fact the U.S. is asking other countries to join in a mutual attack upon illegal international trafficking in narcotics. If assistance provided by the United States is effectively utilized it will lessen the quantity of narcotics and other dangerous drugs entering the United States.

7. That the President strengthen the anti-narcotics enforcement capability of the Canal Zone Government by providing additional funds and personnel authorizations.

8. That the Canal Zone Government initiate adequate customs type inspection procedures throughout the Zone and particularly at the U.S. military installations in the Canal Zone.

9. That the Canal Zone Government undertake a cooperative effort with the Government of Panama to insure that all cargo leaving the Canal Zone for Panama is inspected in accordance with tested inspection procedures.

10. That the President instruct the Chiefs of U.S. Diplomatic Missions to inform government officials at the highest level, that drugs continue to pour into the United States and that a failure to take more effective suppression measures will prejudice U.S. relations with those countries, including U.S. aid programs.

11. That the President invoke the provisions of section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and terminate foreign assistance.

12. That the Congress authorize and appropriate international narcotics control assistance funds on a line item basis to facilitate congressional oversight of the assistance program.

13. That the Congress require periodic reports from the executive branch showing the amount of assistance furnished to each country, including the type, quality, and value of equipment furnished. This report should also contain data giving amounts spent by all agencies of the Federal Government on international narcotics control programs, including personnel salaries, allowances, and U.S. overhead costs.

14. That military equipment becoming excess to the requirements of the U.S. military be made available to anti-narcotics enforcement agencies in foreign countries.

15. That the number of Customs patrol officers, who patrol U.S. borders, international airports and seaports, be at least doubled. The current force of 916 men is clearly inadequate.

16. That the U.S. Government take measures to assist local authorities in the U.S.-Mexican border area to deal with the heavy influx of illicit drugs from Mexico. Local governments should not be put in the position of dealing with foreign officials on a matter which is the responsibility of the Federal Government.

17. That the United States move promptly to ratify the International Convention on Psychotropic Substances, which has as its purpose the international control of hallucinogens, amphetamines, barbiturates, and tranquilizers.

18. That Congress legislate stiff mandatory prison terms for convicted drug dealers, as well as for any public official, including political officeholders, judges or police, convicted of protecting the drug trade.

PART II—EUROPE

THE SITUATION AMONG U.S. FORCES IN WEST GERMANY

INTRODUCTION

In the past 6 months, urinalysis testing has shown an increased rate of drug abuse, and particularly of opiate use, among U.S. servicemen in West Germany. Drug abuse is not limited to one category of drugs and, in addition to opiates, U.S. soldiers are using amphetamines, barbiturates, cocaine, and hashish. This increase is due to a number of factors:

First, the Army has instituted a new random testing system for urinalysis which catches the user by surprise. This system, which was instituted in the late summer of 1972, did not become effective until late September or early October.

Second, the military command has stopped testing everyone and is now only testing soldiers 28 years old or under. This raises the incidence of those being tested since experience has shown that drug users are concentrated almost entirely among servicemen under the age of 28 and that drug abuse is rare among military personnel over the age of 28. According to one military official, "Under 28 it's drugs and over 28 it's alcoholism." Actually the majority of drug users are under the age of 24.

Another reason cited for the increase in the number of drug users detected is that young medical officers have gained more experience with drug users and the effectiveness of the laboratory system has been strengthened.

Finally, drugs, including opiates, are readily available in Europe and the U.S. soldier has little difficulty in obtaining them.

DRUG ABUSE AMONG U.S. ARMY FORCES

Drug users among U.S. Army Forces in Europe (USAREUR) increased from 1.3 percent of those tested in December 1971 to between 4.2 and 6.3 percent in November 1972.

There are approximately 185,000 Army troops in USAREUR at any one time. Approximately 28 percent of this total are over 28 years of age and not required to undergo urinalysis testing. This eliminates approximately 51,800 troops from the testing process. This leaves 133,200 subject to urinalysis. Using these figures the number of drug users detected among U.S. forces increased from about 1,732 (1.3 percent) in December 1971 to a high of 8,392 (6.3 percent) in November 1972. Of those, approximately 40 percent were using opiates such as heroin. The remainder were using amphetamines, barbiturates, and hashish.

There are four different types of tests used to detect drug usage.

They are random samplings, testing ordered by a unit commander when a soldier is suspect, referrals by counselors and testing required as part of the processing for European discharge or reenlistment.

According to military officials the testing procedures and improved techniques being implemented by military police and unit commanders, which have already resulted in a statistical increase in the number of drug users detected are expected to improve further over the next several months. Military officials consequently believe that a peaking or downturn in the index line of newly identified drug abusers would indicate a major turning point in their battle to control the drug problem.

While improved detection techniques are responsible for some of the increase in the number of known drug users, there is little doubt that the number of drug users has also become larger.

According to one brigade commander in the 8th Infantry Division about 60-65 percent of the lower five grades in some units have used hashish from time to time and between 40 and 50 percent have used it at least once per week.

Stopping the use of drugs is like trying to pick up a piece of mercury. Once a commander solves one problem another erupts. During 1972 increased quantities of heroin began to appear. Another Brigade Commander estimated that up to 10 percent of the lower four grades in his unit have used heroin.

According to this Commander a well organized ring is pushing heroin in Central Germany with Frankfurt Am Main being the key pickup point. Pushers can also be located at the Water Tower in Mannheim and the Cathedral in Heidelberg.

The Division Commander believes that strong unit action and frequent field training exercises and other activities, which keep the troops occupied, have helped contain the number of drug users although he is by no means complacent.

There is little drug abuse among U.S. Air Force Personnel in Europe. Reasons given are that Air Force personnel in Europe are older than the average Army enlisted man, are enlistees as opposed to draftees and, for the most part have a higher educational level.

There is no doubt that military officials at all levels of command are now acutely conscious of the threat of drug abuse among the Armed Forces and are taking positive action to deal with the problem before it becomes an epidemic as it did in Vietnam during the 1970-71 period.

THE U.S. ARMY DRUG CONTROL PROGRAM

The U.S. Army in Europe has launched a Command-wide drug suppression program. This program, which is based upon the concept of "Concerned Leadership" is aimed at preventing the use of drugs and, if this fails, to detect and treat the users. The components of the program are education in the evils of drug abuse, understanding of the soldier and the pressures of military life in a foreign country, firm disciplinary action against pushers and repeated offenders, exemptions from disciplinary action for those who seek and accept treatment,

treatment in a Community Drug and Alcohol Assistance Center and finally, if hospitalization and resident rehabilitation programs are unsuccessful, separation from the military service, usually under honorable conditions. Two weeks prior to separation the individual is referred to the Veterans Administration for further treatment. Once he has been separated, however, he can leave the Veterans Administration Hospital on his own volition regardless of whether he is cured or not.

THE FULL COURT PRESS

One technique applied to identify drug users is what the Commander in Chief, U.S. Forces Europe calls "the full court press." The operation of the full court press is simple. At an unannounced time a unit commander will order all of his troops into the gymnasium or some other suitable location. Once inside the only way out is to give a specimen of urine. At the same time a physical inspection for drugs is conducted in the barracks. Individuals absent during the exercise are required to undergo the test upon their return to the unit. According to the Commanding General of the 8th U.S. Infantry Division the full court press has been a very effective tool in "driving drugs out of the barracks."

PROBLEM AREAS

In spite of the programs discussed above there are problem areas. The requirement to show probable cause before a unit commander or other official can inspect the belongings of a soldier has inhibited enforcement activity.

U.S. military officials are also plagued by ex-servicemen who have either been discharged in Europe or who return from the United States after being separated. While U.S. military forces will not separate a soldier who has a drug related record in Europe there is no way to prevent his return to Europe after separation and many return immediately. West German officials have asked the U.S. Government to give them the names of these individuals. U.S. authorities however are prevented from doing so because if the individual has not been convicted of a narcotics offense such information would violate the civil rights of the ex-soldier. Many are addicts and return to Europe because of the availability of drugs. Others are traffickers who want the profits that result from selling narcotics and other dangerous drugs to U.S. servicemen. According to U.S. officials the remnant of the William Henry Jackson group, which operated out of the Five Star Bar in Bangkok, Thailand, has returned to Germany and is engaged in narcotics activity.¹

Federal Republic of Germany officials are finding that American ex-servicemen pose a serious problem. It is difficult to get evidence sufficient to obtain their conviction and it is almost impossible to get them to leave Germany of their own volition.

¹ Jackson was an ex-serviceman who moved from Europe to Bangkok during the Vietnam War. He was engaged in smuggling heroin into the United States. Jackson was arrested in Denver, Colorado in 1972, tried on narcotics charges and sentenced to two 15-year terms in prison. "World Heroin Report," p. 20, Committee on Foreign Affairs committee print, May 27, 1971, submitted by Congressmen Morgan F. Murphy and Robert H. Steele.

Efforts by military authorities to deal with the drug abuse problem also require the cooperation of the Federal Republic of Germany and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies.

THE DRUG SITUATION IN WEST GERMANY

INTRODUCTION

Narcotics and other dangerous drugs are smuggled into West Germany from several countries in Europe and the Middle East for the use of both German citizens and U.S. military forces stationed in Germany. That country also serves as a major transit and storage point for morphine base moving from Turkey and other points in the Middle East to heroin processing laboratories in France.

West Germany is neither a known producer nor a processor of opiates, although there have been unsubstantiated rumors that there are heroin laboratories in the Hamburg and Munich areas.

The Federal Republic of Germany has a growing drug problem. Hashish, opiates, LSD, barbiturates, and amphetamines are already being used. And while heroin and cocaine are not yet a widespread problem, their usage is increasing.

West German officials are aware of the extent of drug abuse among U.S. Forces and the need for the German Government to take action to inhibit the flow of heroin, morphine and other drugs into and through that country.

DRUG CONTROL EFFORTS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC

On November 12, 1970 the West German Government adopted a comprehensive "Action Program Against Drug Abuse." Since then definitive legislation has been proposed and administrative measures have been taken in both the national and international spheres.

Domestically this included an educational campaign on the effects of drug abuse, increased assistance for addicts and users in Germany, and a strengthening of narcotics enforcement agencies in the local and State (*Land*) governments were also taken to improve the capability of Federal Crime Office (Bundeskriminalamt) to serve as an information and coordination center for narcotics matters.

The basic problem affecting enforcement activity in West Germany stems from the federal structure of the Republic. This structure grants primary police power to the States and not to the Federal Government. The States guard their constitutional prerogative zealously. The Federal Government is now considering legislation which will give Federal authorities more power to deal with narcotics smuggling and drug abuse. Such legislation would appear to be essential if the West German Government is to deal effectively with the narcotics problem.

A second factor inhibiting the developing of a truly effective narcotics control program in West Germany is the division of responsibility for narcotics control among several ministries (Health, Interior, Finance, Justice) and others). This requires more coordination than is sometimes possible. Also affecting the overall capability of the anti-

drug effort is the fact that Federal and State bureaucracies are understaffed.

A labor shortage in West Germany has attracted workers from all over Europe. One of the largest groups, and from the standpoint of the smuggling of opiates into West Germany, most troublesome are the 500,000 Turks residing in West Germany.

SMUGGLING ROUTES TO WEST GERMANY FROM THE MIDDLE EAST

Morphine base is smuggled into West Germany from Turkey, with the bulk going on to heroin laboratories in France and a much smaller proportion remaining in West Germany for use by U.S. forces, German citizens, members of the foreign working population, and itinerant students and tourists. Some enters by air and some by sea into the ports of Bremerhaven and Hamburg. The majority, however, is smuggled overland.

Although Turkey has agreed to stop growing poppies, most authorities believe that there are sufficient quantities of opium gum and morphine base stockpiled in that country to last for at least 2 years and probably longer.

So the smuggling will continue. Overland one can drive from Istanbul to West Germany following several routes through Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Austria.

Much of the morphine base is smuggled by the large number of Turkish workers, their relatives and friends who travel back and forth regularly, either in private passenger automobiles, by air and by rail.

It is probable, however, that a larger quantity is smuggled into the Munich area hidden in Transports' Internationale Routiere (TIR) trucks. TIR cargo storage areas are sealed at the point of origin and pass over border check points freely. By international agreement the vehicles are not opened until the consignment reaches its destination. Many officials believe that there is no way to preclude smuggling of opiates or hashish until some agreement is reached which will permit Customs officials at border crossing points to open up the vans and inspect the cargo.

Some narcotics are also smuggled in aboard aircraft and on railcars.

The West Germans are aware of this aspect of the problem and have strengthened inspection procedures at the ports of entry, particularly along the Austrian-German border. In addition, German officials have met with officials from the United States, the United Kingdom, France and some East European countries and agreed to exchange intelligence with them. The Germans also have bilateral intelligence exchange programs with Turkey, Greece and Iran and have assigned a narcotics officer to their consulate in Istanbul.

GERMAN-AMERICAN COOPERATION

Chancellor Willy Brandt has taken a personal interest in joining with the United States in a mutual cooperative effort.

The West German Government is aware of the role that Germany plays in the international narcotics picture and the need for international cooperation to stop illegal trafficking. Furthermore, officials at every level of Government recognize the concern of U.S. military authorities over the widespread availability of drugs in West Germany.

Federal Republic officials and United States Military authorities in West Germany are representatives on a Joint Narcotics Task Force which has been created to discuss mutual problems resulting from the presence of almost 225,000 U.S. military personnel on German soils.

To improve their capabilities, German narcotics enforcement personnel have visited the United States to review U.S. narcotics suppression programs and procedures. Perhaps, the most significant step taken by the two governments is an agreement to establish an Intelligence Task Force in Southern Germany to France which, if successful, will enable Federal authorities to begin interdicting the flow of morphine base through Southern Germany from the Middle East. For the bulk of the heroin used in the United States is still produced in the clandestine heroin laboratories that are located in Southern France.

THE U.N. FUND FOR DRUG ABUSE CONTROL AND WEST GERMAN PARTICIPATION

The United Nations established the Fund for Drug Abuse Control on April 1, 1971. At the outset, the Secretary General indicated that member nations were expected to voluntarily contribute \$5 million annually for the first few years and about \$20 million thereafter.

The objective of the Fund is to furnish assistance to governments, international organizations, and specialized agencies in their efforts to:

(1) Limit the supply of drugs to legitimate requirements by putting an end to their illegal or uncontrolled production, processing and manufacture, making use of crop substitution or other methods, as appropriate;

(2) Improve the administrative and technical capabilities of existing bodies concerned with the elimination of the illicit traffic in drugs;

(3) Develop measures to prevent drug abuse through programs of education and special campaigns, including the use of mass media; and

(4) Provide facilities and develop methods for treatment, rehabilitation, and social reintegration of drug dependent persons.

The Fund intends to support the expansion of research and information facilities of United Nations drug control bodies; the planning and implementation of programs of technical assistance in a pilot project for crop substitution purposes; the establishment and improvement of additional drug control administration and enforcement machinery, the training of personnel and the setting up or expanding of research and training centers which could serve national or regional needs; the enlargement of the capabilities and the extension of the operation of United Nations drug control bodies; the promotion of facilities for the treatment, rehabilitation and social reintegration of drug addicts; and the development of educational material and programs suitable for use on high-risk populations.

The Federal Republic has contributed 1 million marks (approximately \$310,000) to the Fund. This is a small amount considering the role that Germany plays as a conduit for opiates being smuggled from the Middle East, its own emerging drug problem, and the fact that that country is one of the most prosperous in Europe and can afford to contribute much more.

When questioned about the small amount contributed to date West German officials indicated that they were waiting to see if the U.N. were successful in its control programs before making another pledge. If every country maintained this attitude, and most appear to be doing so, the UN narcotics control program will be ineffective.

As of mid-March 1973 total contributions and pledges to the U.N. Fund totaled \$5,881,519. Of this the United States had contributed \$4 million or roughly 68 percent.

U.S. officials in West Germany have not discussed the meager contribution made by that country with officials of that Government because, as they told the study team, "we have not received any instructions from Washington." This situation must change and the United States must exert every effort to convince the West German Government to increase its contribution to the U.N. Fund. If those who can afford to contribute do not, how can one expect the poorer nations to do so?

THE ROLE OF THE NETHERLANDS

U.S. officials in Germany are convinced that much of the heroin being used by American servicemen in Germany originates in Southeast Asia. It should be pointed out that BNDD officials in Washington state that it is not possible to determine the origin of white heroin with certainty. U.S. officials in West Germany, however, were adamant that the heroin coming from Holland originated in Southeast Asia.

According to these officials some heroin is flown first to London on commercial aircraft and subsequently moved to the Netherlands either by sea or by air. Most however, is believed to be smuggled aboard ocean-going vessels through the Dutch ports of Amsterdam and Rot-

terdam for sale or transfer to a pusher or user in Holland or for transshipment to other points in Europe and to the islands of Curaçao and Aruba in the Dutch Antilles.

According to West German and U.S. officials customs inspections are lax throughout the Netherlands and there is a permissive attitude by the Dutch Government and much of the citizenry toward drug usage. Ships, aircraft and their crews enter and leave Holland freely as do American servicemen based in West Germany.

While most heroin used by U.S. servicemen is smuggled into West Germany by a pusher or a trafficker a substantial quantity of heroin and other drugs is obtained in Holland by U.S. servicemen who travel to the Netherlands with the specific purpose of purchasing drugs for their own use.

To reduce the flow of drugs from Holland the U.S. Army commander in West Germany has directed U.S. Military Police to establish Customs checkpoints to inspect G.I.'s crossing into Germany from Holland. In addition the U.S. Commander has met with Dutch and West German officials in an effort to persuade them of the seriousness of the drug abuse problem and the need for their wholehearted cooperation. There is evidence that some Dutch officials, particularly the police, are concerned with the growing use of drugs in Holland. According to United States and West German sources Dutch police officials regret that the Netherlands serves as a conduit for drug smuggling to the U.S. servicemen and are determined to correct the problem but cannot take the steps required without the wholehearted cooperation of the Dutch Government.

It is unfortunate that a crisis had to erupt before the need for action became apparent however. The permissive situation in Holland has existed for some time. Until U.S. military officials became aware that drugs being used by their troops was coming from Holland and began to protest, however, little thought was given to the problem by most Dutch authorities. Now that it is known that Holland is a conduit for narcotics perhaps the Dutch Government will take action to deal with the illegal trafficking in narcotics and other dangerous drugs, both into and out of the Netherlands.

CONCLUSIONS

1. Urinalysis testing has shown an increased rate of drug abuse among U.S. servicemen in Europe over the past 6 months.
2. The increase in the number of known drug users is due in part to improved techniques of identification, detection and urinalysis. At the present time it is estimated that between 4.2 and 6.3 percent of the U.S. Army Forces in Europe are drug users. About 40 percent are using opiates, including heroin.
3. U.S. military commanders in West Germany are aware of the drug abuse problem and are taking increasing measures to deal with it.
4. U.S. military authorities in West Germany believe that the number of drug users will increase over the next several months in spite of disciplinary, administrative, educational and medical countermeasures.
5. The requirement to show probable cause before searching for narcotics or other drugs inhibits unit commanders in their efforts to identify drug users.
6. Much of the heroin being used by U.S. military forces in West Germany is being smuggled into Europe through the Dutch seaport cities of Rotterdam and Amsterdam. Many U.S. soldiers travel from their bases in Germany to the Netherlands and purchase heroin for their own use. If the anti-narcotics effort is to be successful, the Dutch Government must adopt more stringent measures to stop international narcotics traffickers from using that country as a conduit.
7. Although it is not possible to chemically determine the origin of the heroin sold to U.S. forces, U.S. officials in Europe believe most of the heroin reaching U.S. forces via the Netherlands is of Southeast Asian origin and that it is smuggled into Holland primarily by ethnic Chinese seamen.
8. Heroin is also smuggled from the Netherlands to the Caribbean islands of Curacao and Aruba for further movement to the United States.
9. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is aware of the dimensions of the drug abuse problem among U.S. military forces and is cooperating with U.S. officials to cope with the problem.

10. Some U.S. ex-servicemen are involved in pushing drugs near U.S. military bases in West Germany. These ex-servicemen constitute an important link in the drug traffic and are a source of irritation between United States and West German officials, since there are legal restrictions on the ability of U.S. authorities to alert the West Germans to the appearance in West Germany of an ex-serviceman with a drug-related military record unless he has a prior drug conviction and since there are no U.S. funds available to return ex-servicemen who are drug users or pushers to the United States.

11. Transport Internationale Routière vehicles, which are sealed at the point of origin, are allowed to pass through border checkpoints freely and are not inspected until the consignment reaches its destination, are believed to play a major role in smuggling narcotics into Germany from Turkey.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the President inform the Government of the Netherlands that narcotics and dangerous drugs passing through that country are being used by U.S. military forces in West Germany and that the United States expects the Dutch Government to take effective measures to stop illegal trafficking in drugs.
2. That the United States Government propose an international conference to develop ways of dealing with the drug smuggling problem posed by the sealed trucks and vans of the Transport Internationale Routière.
3. That the United States Government propose the establishment of an East-West European task force to develop an integrated European anti-narcotics enforcement program.
4. That the U.S. Government undertake a thorough review of how to deal with U.S. ex-servicemen who are suspected of selling drugs to U.S. military personnel stationed abroad.
5. That the Department of Defense review the rules of evidence as they apply to narcotics searches and seizures and, if necessary, seek legislative authority to make such searches and seizures more effective.
6. That the Department of Defense authorize additional medical, enforcement and educational personnel for work in anti-narcotics programs.
7. That high-ranking U.S. military officials put new emphasis on the importance of anti-narcotics programs and the need for vigilance on the part of all Department of Defense personnel.
8. That the "full court press" testing technique be mandatory throughout the military services.
9. That the Secretary of State instruct the U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany to urge that Government to increase its contribution to the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control and instruct U.S. Ambassadors throughout Europe to urge greater European participation in this important project.

APPENDIX

SCOPE OF THE HEROIN PROBLEM

Precise statistics on heroin use are difficult to collect, and, partly because of the continuing refinement in identification and detection techniques, estimates of the number of heroin addicts in the United States have jumped all over the lot in recent years.

At present, the best estimate appears to be that there are roughly 550,000 heroin users in the United States. Most knowledgeable observers feel that heroin use has begun to level off in the last 2 years for a variety of reasons, including increased treatment and rehabilitation programs, increased awareness of the dangers of heroin, the heroin scarcity in east coast cities over the past eight months, and the growing trend to barbiturates and other synthetic drugs, which can produce effects similar to heroin, but are far less expensive.

Whether a leveling off is taking place or not, however, it is clear that heroin addiction continues to be an enormous health and social problem in the United States.

HEROIN ADDICTION AND CRIME

Reliable estimates indicate that the average heroin addict spends at least \$30 per day on heroin. Some spend as much as \$100 or more per day. It is well known that a large percentage of the money spent on heroin in the United States is obtained through crime.

In attempting to estimate the monetary cost in crime of heroin use in the United States, it is necessary to recognize that not all of the estimated 550,000 users shoot heroin every day. Tens of thousands of addicts are currently in treatment and rehabilitation programs, while others may not be able to find heroin or the money to buy heroin every day. Moreover, not all the money addicts use to pay for heroin is necessarily stolen or obtained by committing other crimes.

Nevertheless, the value of cash and goods estimated to be stolen by heroin users to support their habits is staggering. One reason for this is that an addict has to steal goods worth at least four or five times the cost of his habit in order to raise the cash necessary to pay for the habit.

Consequently, if just one-half of the estimated 550,000 heroin users in the United States spent \$30 per day on heroin for 300 days a year, they would spend approximately \$2.5 billion per year. And if they paid just one half of that bill with money raised from stolen goods, they would have to steal at least \$5 billion in goods per year.

It is because of this kind of arithmetic that law enforcement officers have estimated that one-half of the urban crime in America is directly linked to drug abuse.

HEROIN CONSUMED IN THE UNITED STATES¹

It is estimated that the heroin addict population in the United States requires from 10 to 12 tons of heroin per year. Since it requires 10 tons of opium to produce 1 ton of heroin, it would only take between 100 and 120 tons of opium to satisfy these needs.

THE WORLD OPIUM SUPPLY¹

There are two separate markets for opium—the licit and the illicit. According to "The World Opium Survey 1972," published by the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, the licit market used 1,500 tons of the world's opium production in 1971 while the illicit market consumed an additional 1,000 tons.

¹ Extracted from "The U.S. Heroin Problem and Southeast Asia." The Committee on Foreign Affairs, January 11, 1973.

Most of the world's licit opium is used to manufacture medicinal opiates and is grown in India, Iran, U.S.S.R., and Turkey. In 1971, India and Turkey, the two countries probably accounted for close to 99 percent of total world opium exports. Now that Turkey has decided to discontinue cultivation of the opium poppy, India, and possibly Iran, will become the source of practically all of the legal opium used in the non-Communist world.

WORLD LICIT PRODUCTION OF OPIUM, BY COUNTRY ¹

[In metric tons]

Crop year ²	Total ³	India	Turkey	U.S.S.R.	Iran	Other ⁴
1950	739	179	147	86	307	21
1951	832	410	284	94	21	23
1952	849	272	370	104	83	19
1953	1,007	489	255	92	145	26
1954	609	341	56	103	92	18
1955	660	281	176	109	61	33
1956	643	270	220	105		48
1957	589	377	40	147		24
1958	775	511	144	93		27
1959	909	593	149	132		35
1960	1,253	711	323	169		50
1961	1,037	709	157	120		51
1962	1,203	755	284	148		15
1963	993	538	263	172		20
1964	787	501	73	188		25
1965	754	486	77	177		14
1966	671	339	126	201		5
1967	662	368	104	181		8
1968	815	585	111	116		3
1969	1,219	868	117	217	8	9
1970	1,157	794	51	227	78	7
1971	1,449 ⁺	943	150	200	156	(⁵)

¹ Data for 1950-69 are from International Narcotics Control Board reports, data for 1970-71 are estimated. Data for India, Turkey, and Iran refer to opium containing 10 percent moisture. The U.S.S.R. and most other countries have not provided information to the United Nations on the moisture content of their opium.

² Ending July 30 of the stated year.

³ Because of rounding, components may not add to the totals shown.

⁴ Including Yugoslavia (40 tons in 1960, reduced to 1 ton in 1970), Japan (4 tons or less annually), Pakistan (12 tons annually), Bulgaria (7 tons in 1952, reduced to little or none in recent years). Data on licit production in China and North Vietnam are not available.

⁵ Not available.

Because of the very nature of the terminology—illicit production—precise estimates of the amount of opium produced illegally are not available. As a result of improved intelligence collection and more vigorous efforts on the part of governments involved, however, it is possible to approximate the amount of opium produced in 1971 for the illicit opium market.

As can be seen in the following table—of the estimated 990 to 1,210 tons of the world's illegal opium, 700 tons or more than one-half of the total, is believed to be produced in Burma, Laos, and Thailand.

Estimated Illicit Opium Output, by Major Producers, 1971

	Metric tons
India	100
Afghanistan	100
Turkey	35-80
Pakistan	20-160
Burma, Thailand, and Laos	700
Mexico	10-20
Other ¹	20-50
Total	² 990-1, 210

¹ Mainly Eastern Europe.

² Additional amounts probably are produced in Latin America, North Africa, and the Far East.

APPENDIX 2

RÉSUMÉ OF SIGNIFICANT NARCOTICS SEIZURES AND ARRESTS

1. In early March 1972, French Customs effected the largest heroin seizure ever recorded. BNDD Agents were present during the seizure of 935 pounds of pure heroin found on board the Caprice Des Temps, a fishing vessel captained by Marcel BOUCAN. French authorities arrested six persons in connection with this seizure, including BOUCAN. The vessel was bound for its home port at Guadeloupe for refueling. From Guadeloupe it was to continue to Miami where the heroin was to be unloaded.

2. On July 8, 1972, BNDD Agents of the Monterrey District Office assisted agents of the Mexican Federal Judicial Police in an investigation which resulted in the seizure of approximately 7.5 pounds of cocaine and 3.5 pounds of brown heroin. Two Mexican nationals were arrested during the course of the investigation. Intelligence was developed which indicates that Cali, Colombia may have been this group's source of cocaine. The investigation also developed leads on possible U.S. recipients.

3. On July 19, 1972, Argentine Federal Police arrested three Argentine nationals for passing forged checks. During a search of their residence information was obtained which indicated their possible involvement in narcotics trafficking. An investigation was initiated resulting in the seizure of approximately 20 pounds of cocaine secreted inside picture frames which had been shipped to Buenos Aires from Chile. The three Argentines advised that the cocaine had been purchased from an unidentified source in Chile. It was to be shipped to Bogota, Colombia with the eventual destination being New York City. Information regarding the recipients has been provided to the responsible regions.

4. As a result of information supplied by the Mexico City Regional Office, Mexican authorities on July 30, 1972, searched a Canadian Pacific flight from Bogota to Acapulco. That search resulted in the seizure of approximately 28 pounds of cocaine which had been concealed in a small trunk. Two Colombian nationals were arrested when they attempted to claim the trunk. This is the largest cocaine seizure ever made in Acapulco.

The defendants reported that they were offered \$2,000 to transport the cocaine from Bogota to Acapulco. Investigation disclosed that the cocaine had reached Bogota from Peru. The Lima District Office advised the Peruvian Investigational Police (PIP) of the events in Mexico and an investigation was initiated in Lima which lead to the arrest of five additional traffickers in Peru.

Approximately 50 pounds of cocaine and almost \$35,000 in U.S. currency was seized in Peru. The Chilean source was also identified.

5. On August 9, 1972, A BNDD Agent on TDY in La Paz, Bolivia and a Bolivian Narcotic Bureau Officer located an operating cocaine laboratory in Cochabamba, Bolivia.

The laboratory operator was placed under arrest. They seized approximately 41.5 pounds of cocaine which was either finished crystal or in the final stages of the conversion process, various chemicals and equipment necessary for the production of cocaine crystal, and a machine gun, a rifle, and a pistol. The entire contents of the laboratory was transported to La Paz for security reasons. A BNDD forensic chemist traveled to La Paz to examine the laboratory and interview the operator. It is anticipated that this examination will increase the Bureau's understanding of the methods by which cocaine is produced. This, in turn, should assist in the development of additional methods for the detection of clandestine laboratories.

6. On August 30, 1972, a joint BNDD-Venezuelan Federal Police investigation resulted in the seizure of approximately 36 pounds of heroin in Caracas, Venezuela. This case brought together three separate investigations which had been

initiated by BNDD Offices in Miami, Buenos Aires and the New York Joint Task Force respectively. The following persons have thus far been detained by Venezuelan authorities:

French national Joseph Sereni, U.S. national Marcello Cabot, Cuban national Joaquin Ludolfo Pelaez Garu, Venezuelan nationals Miguel Enrique Fuentes Silverio, Pedro Diaz Salazar, Rosa Amelia Dominguez Lara, Carmen Josefina Chavez Chirinos, Pedro Francisco Ferrer Chavez, Rolando Pita, Luis Hernandez, and Rolando Gonzalez Nunez.

7. On September 19, 1972, Mexican authorities in Guadalajara seized approximately 15.5 pounds of heroin and 198 pounds of white powder which was initially thought to be heroin but was later determined to be a non-narcotic substance.

Eleven defendants were arrested. Follow-up investigation is currently being developed through a joint MFJP-BNDD effort.

8. On October 4, 1972. Brazilian police, acting on information supplied by Argentine police and BNDD, seized approximately 132 pounds of heroin in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The heroin was secreted in bundles of sheep skins which were being shipped from Argentina to New York aboard the Moore-McCormick liner, "Mormacaltair".

This seizure was the result of a joint Argentine Federal Police-BNDD investigation which had been underway for several months. As a result of this investigation Moises Miguel Sanchez, and six other defendants have been arrested in Argentina. A notorious trafficker in France has been identified as the source of supply.

9. On October 3, 1972, BNDD Agents of the Buenos Aires Regional Office furnished information to Argentine authorities which led to the seizure of approximately 7.5 pounds of cocaine in Buenos Aires. Three Argentines were arrested by Argentine authorities. One of those arrested is an attorney and the secretary of an Argentine Federal Judge. Subsequent investigation disclosed that the source of supply is in Chile. Information was also developed indicating that approximately 13 pounds of cocaine was in the possession of a trafficker in Madrid, Spain. This information was forwarded to Spanish authorities for appropriate follow-up.

10. On October 5, 1972, as a result of information developed by BNDD and Chilean authorities, four subjects were arrested by Peruvian Investigation Police Officers in Lima, Peru in possession of approximately 55 pounds of cocaine. The Chilean officials rate one of those arrested as one of the largest cocaine laboratory operators in Chile.

11. On October 25, 1972, a Chilean national was arrested by Chilean Police. He is a close associate of a major trafficker and laboratory operator arrested October 5, 1972 in Peru in a cooperative investigation between BNDD and Peruvian and Chilean authorities. As a result of this arrest a cocaine laboratory was located.

The laboratory was located in a five room house in a remote area near the town of Mirasol, Chile. The entire house was devoted to cocaine production and contained a large amount of equipment including a large gasoline operated electric generator, heat lamps, shaker tables, vats, and drying tables. There was also sufficient ether and sulphuric acid to produce an estimated 300-400 pounds of cocaine. A small amount of cocaine paste was also seized. The laboratory had been in operation for more than three years and the average monthly production was 66 to 88 pounds with occasional months when 110 pounds of cocaine was produced. Because of the remote location of the laboratory it could only be operated during the dry season from September through April.

Also arrested were the defendants wife, who assisted in producing the cocaine and the individual who sold the cocaine. The latter was in possession of approximately one pound of cocaine when he was arrested.

12. On October 26, 1972, a Chilean national was arrested by Chilean Police Officers. After interrogation he led Chilean Police Officers and a BNDD Agent to a cocaine laboratory which he admitted operating in a Santiago suburb. Approximately 7 pounds of cocaine paste was seized. The defendant stated that he could manufacture approximately 10 pounds of cocaine per week.

13. On November 6, 1972, Chilean authorities searched a merchant vessel at Valparaiso, Chile. They discovered approximately 60.5 pounds of cocaine secreted in wine crates which were on board the vessel. One crew member was arrested. BNDD is assisting in a follow-up investigation.

On November 13, 1972 authorities in Cartagena, Colombia, discovered 180 pounds of cocaine secreted in a pick-up truck with a camper. The camper had been shipped from Antofagasta, Chile and was to be shipped to Guatemala. The ultimate destination of the drugs was the United States. The search was performed as a result of a request to Colombian authorities by the BNDD District Office in Bogota. An investigation involving BNDD representatives in Chile, Panama and Colombia, developed the information that the drugs were hidden on the camper. An initial search failed to disclose the drugs and the owner of the camper was permitted to leave the area. At BNDD's insistence additional searches were made and the drugs were discovered through the use of a metal drill, used to punch holes in the body of the camper.

APPENDIX 3

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENCY OF THE REPUBLIC OF COLOMBIA

BOGOTA, COLOMBIA, *January 13, 1973.*

The Embassy of the United States asked the President of the Republic to receive a commission of the American Congress now visiting Colombia in the course of a trip that includes Argentina, Peru, Panama and Mexico. The purpose of this mission is to obtain information related to the production and traffic of narcotics and to evaluate the effectiveness of measures adopted by the United States to stimulate cooperation with other governments.

Yesterday, the President of the Republic presided over a meeting attended by the Minister of Justice, Dr. Miguel Escobar Mendez, the Chargé d' Affaires of the United States, Mr. Robert E. White, and the two American congressmen, Robert Steele and Morgan F. Murphy.

The spokesmen for the American Congress expressed to the President that the United States government views the alarming increase in the traffic of narcotics and dangerous drugs throughout the world as a major concern at this time, resulting in the need to coordinate efforts to fight a battle against this serious menace, especially due to its harmful effects on youth.

The spokesmen for the United States also expressed the willingness of the government and Congress of that nation to cooperate in a decisive way in the actions to be taken in this field.

The President stated his total agreement with these concerns and energetically affirmed that the Government of Colombia will commit the necessary economic resources to combat this growing danger that can destroy our society.

The President also expressed his satisfaction with the statements made by the American Congressmen, because he believes that in matters such as this international cooperation can be most effective, especially through technical assistance to train the personnel needed to combat these crimes. Therefore, the President designated the Minister of Justice as Coordinator of the unwavering effort the Government is undertaking, calling on the entire society for a great outpouring of solidarity and cooperation in what the Government considers to be one of the most important tasks to be undertaken, for it is surely in this area where grave problems that affect vast sectors of the populace originate.

APPENDIX 4

MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE NEW DRUG LEGISLATION PRESENTED TO COLOMBIAN CONGRESS

On February 8 the Minister of Justice submitted two bills to the Colombian Congress for action during the Special Session now in process. One of these provides severe penalties for cultivation, trafficking and possession of narcotics, and the second provides for the adoption as law of emergency decree 1988 of 1971 which provides increased penalties for kidnapping, extortion and homicide.

The drug bill contains the following: Principal provisions: A) Penalties of from 2 to 8 years and a fine of from 1,000 to 100,000 pesos (1 peso equals approximately 4.3 cents) for cultivation or maintaining any plant from which marijuana, cocaine, morphine, heroin or any other drug which can produce a physical or psychic dependence, can be extracted. B) Imprisonment of from 3 to 12 years and a fine of from 5,000 to 500,000 pesos for anyone who imports, exports, possesses, manufactures, or sells any of the above mentioned drugs. In the case of possession of an amount of drugs for personal use, the penalties are imprisonment from one month to two years and a fine of 200,000 pesos. C) Anyone providing premises for drug use is subject to imprisonment of from 2 to 8 years, and in the case that this is for profit, the prison term is increased by 50 percent and a fine of from 5,000 to 500,000 pesos is added. D) Anyone encouraging drug use is subject to imprisonment of from 2 to 8 years. E) Doctors, dentists and other medical professionals who prescribe drugs for non-therapeutic reasons or in quantities in excess of that needed are subject to from 2 to 8 years of imprisonment and suspension of the exercise of their profession for from 2 to 8 years. F) All drugs or plants discovered will be destroyed. G) Finally, extraordinary powers are granted to the President to issue regulations in connection with drug matters, to make appropriations and to create an administrative organization responsible for carrying out the law.

The proposed criminal penalties bill would substitute legislation for decree 1988 of 1971 which was promulgated by the President under the reigning state of emergency. The bill would continue penalties for kidnapping, extortion, homicide and related crimes. The main purpose in substituting a law of the republic for an emergency decree is to insure continuity of the provisions of the latter after the state of emergency ends.

APPENDIX 5

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND THE UNITED STATES

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Argentina, as parties to the Single Convention of 1961 on Narcotic Drugs and as signatories of the Amending Protocol of 1972; in conformity with existing international agreements on the control of dangerous drugs and the unlawful traffic of the same, agreement has been reached as follows:

One. To reaffirm their decision to cooperate with each other, and with other nations as well, in every possible way in the elimination of the unlawful use and the illicit traffic in and smuggling of narcotics and other dangerous drugs by means of the prevention, prohibition and suppression of same, providing for the swift apprehension and extradition, where appropriate, of persons so involved.

Two. To cooperate as signatories of the present Memorandum in all the related aspects of prevention, suppression, education, assistance and rehabilitation in regard to the illicit and improper use or the abuse of drugs.

Three. In order to carry out the terms of the two preceding paragraphs both parties shall establish an Argentina-United States Commission composed of an equal number of members representing each of the respective Governments. The Commission shall establish sub-committees or working groups as necessary in order to carry on the work of the Commission.

Four. The Commission shall be located in the city of Buenos Aires, Republic of Argentina, and shall meet monthly, or as often as shall be mutually agreed.

Five. The cooperation referred to in paragraphs One and Two above shall consist of:

The exchange of all pertinent information on the subject;

The preparation and implementation of specific programs under Argentine leadership in accordance with the common objectives established in paragraphs One and Two above;

The giving of support to the activities of the international organizations of the United Nations on this program and the participation in other multi-lateral programs for combating the unlawful use of and illicit traffic in and smuggling of narcotics and dangerous drugs;

Specific programs of cooperation may involve: training, advice, special equipment, and other mutually agreed support.

Six. In carrying out the terms of this memorandum, both parties shall provide all the necessary personnel and support needed to achieve successfully the objectives set forth in paragraphs One and Two and any agreed programs developed in accordance with paragraph Five of this Memorandum, subject to the availability of resources of both Governments. However, should any particular program approved by the Argentine-United States Commission within the framework of this Memorandum be initiated, both parties pledge to endeavor to carry it out subject to the availability of resources previously assigned for the execution of same.

Seven. The signatories of the present Memorandum agree that the further definition and implementation of the cooperation referred to herein shall be decided by the Argentine-United States Commission and its sub-committees or working groups established in accordance with paragraph Three above. These decisions shall be carried out exclusively by the competent authorities of the signatory state in whose territory they apply.

Eight. This Memorandum shall come into force as of the date of its signing.

DONE in the city of Buenos Aires, Capital of the Argentine Republic, on the fifteenth day of the month of September of the year 1972, in two originals in the English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authentic.
For the United States of America :

JOHN DAVIS LODGE, *Ambassador.*

For the Republic of Argentina :

EDUARDO F. McLOUGHLIN,
Minister of Foreign Relations and Worship.

APPENDIX 6

INDICTMENT OF ANDRE GAETAN CONDEMINE (YOLANDO SARMIENTO INCLUDED) AND OTHERS

No. 72 CR1260

United States District Court, Eastern District of
New York, -----

DIVISION

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ANDRE GAETAN CONDEMINE, AKA "RAYMOND", ET AL., DEFENDANTS

Indictment—21 U.S.C., §§ 173, 174, 846, 963, 952(a), 960(a)(1), 18 U.S.C., § 2

A true bill,

Filed in open court this ----- day of -----,
A.D. 19-----.

_____,
Foreman.

_____,
Clerk.

Bail, \$-----.

THOMAS P. PUCCIO,
AUSA, Chief, Narcotics Section.

[Warrant for Arrest of Defendant (Rev. 7-52)—Cr. Form No. 12]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

ANDRE GAETAN CONDEMINE, A/K/A "RAYMOND", ET AL., DEFENDANTS

[No. 72 CR-1260]

To ¹ Any special agent of the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and/or to any special agent of the Bureau of Customs, and/or to any United States marshal or his deputies:

You are hereby commanded to arrest Yolanda Sarmiento and bring her forthwith before the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York in the city of Brooklyn to answer to an indictment charging her with prior to May 1, 1971, importing and bringing into the United States heroin and cocaine, narcotic drugs; on and after May 1, 1971, importing heroin and

¹ Insert designation of officer to whom the warrant is issued, e.g., "any United States Marshal or any other authorized officer"; or "United States Marshal for ----- District of -----"; or "any United States Marshal"; or "any Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation"; or "any United States Marshal or any Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation"; or "any agent of the Alcohol Tax Unit."

cocaine, Schedule I and Schedule II narcotic drug controlled substances, into the United States from Argentina; and conspiracy in violation of Title 21, U.S.C., §§ 173, 174, 846, 963, 952(a), 960(a)(1); Title 18, U.S.C., § 2.

Dated at Brooklyn, New York, on November 30, 1972.

Bail fixed at \$-----.

LEWIS ORGEL,
Clerk.

By MARC MILLER,
Deputy Clerk.

District of -----

Received the within warrant the ----- day of -----, 19--
and executed same.

I hereby certify that I am unable to find the within named defendant:
Yolanda Sarmiento, within the Eastern District of New York.

Dated: Brooklyn, N.Y. December 5, 1972.

BENJAMIN F. BUTLER,
United States Marshal, E.D.N.Y.
By Frank Chlero, Deputy Chief.

United States District Court, Eastern District of New York

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Against

ANDRE GAETAN CONDEMINÉ, a/k/a "Raymond"; JOANNES MUNOZ, a/k/a "Mimi";
LOUIS RIVIERE, a/k/a "Petit Louis"; JOZEF VIENNE; YOLANDA SARMIENTO;
JORGE VARELA FERNANDEZ, JUAN CARLOS FRANCO, a/k/a "Miguel"; ROBERTO
CRISTOBAL; ALFEDO AVILES; ELSA YASBIC, a/k/a "La Turca"; JOHN DOE,
a/k/a "Guigui"; and JOHN DOE, a/k/a "Garcia", DEFENDANTS

The Grand Jury charges:

COUNT ONE

From on or about the 1st day of August 1970, and continuously thereafter up to and including the date of the filing of this indictment, within the Eastern District of New York, and elsewhere, the defendants Andre Gaetan Condemine, a/k/a "Raymond", Joannes Munoz, a/k/a "Mimi", Louis Riviere, a/k/a "Petit Louis", Jozef Vienne, Yolanda Sarmiento, Jorge Varela Fernandez, Juan Carlos Franco, a/k/a "Miguel", Roberto Cristobal, Alfredo Aviles, Elsa Yasbic, a/k/a "La Turca", John Doe, a/k/a "Guigui", and John Doe, a/k/a "Garcia", together with Alfredo Mazza, Rodolfo Alberto Ruiz, Eduardo Arrovo, Racnid Gharbi, Pedro Caballero Linares and Carlos Mazza, named herein as co-conspirators but not as defendant and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, unlawfully, willfully and knowingly did combine, conspire, confederate and agree together and with each other to violate prior to May 1, 1971 Sections 173 and 174 of Title 21, United States Code, and on and after May 1, 1971 to violate Sections 812, 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 952(a), 960(a)(1) and 960(b)(1) of Title 21, United States Code.

1. It was part of said conspiracy that prior to May 1, 1971 the defendants fraudulently and knowingly would import and bring into the United States large amounts of heroin and cocaine, narcotic drugs, contrary to law.

2. It was further a part of said conspiracy that prior to May 1, 1971 the defendants unlawfully, willfully and knowingly would receive, conceal, buy, sell and facilitate the transportation, concealment and sale of large amounts of heroin and cocaine, narcotic drugs, after the narcotic drugs had been imported and brought into the United States, knowing the same to have been imported and brought into the United States contrary to law.

3. It was further a part of said conspiracy that on and after May 1, 1971, the defendants knowingly and intentionally would import large amounts of heroin and cocaine, Schedule I and Schedule II narcotic drug controlled substances, into the United States from places outside thereof.

4. It was further a part of said conspiracy that on and after May 1, 1971, the defendants knowingly and intentionally would distribute and possess with intent to distribute large amounts of heroin and cocaine, Schedule I and Schedule II narcotic drug controlled substances.

5. It was further a part of said conspiracy that the defendants would conceal the existence of the conspiracy and would take steps designed to prevent disclosure of their activities.

In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effect the objects thereof, the following overt acts, among others, were committed within the Eastern District of New York and elsewhere:

OVERT ACTS

1. In or about August 1970, in Buenos Aires, Argentina, co-conspirator Alfredo Mazza met with the defendants Yolanda Sarmiento and Juan Carlos Franco, a/k/a "Miguel".

2. In or about August 1970, in Buenos Aires, Argentina, co-conspirator Alfredo Mazza met with the defendants Juan Carlos Franco, a/k/a "Miguel" and Elsa Yasbic, a/k/a "La Turca".

3. In or about September 1970, in New York, New York the defendant Elsa Yasbic, a/k/a "La Turca" introduced the defendant Juan Carlos Franco, a/k/a "Miguel" and co-conspirator Alfredo Mazza to the defendant Alfredo Aviles.

4. In or about April 1971, in Buenos Aires, Argentina, the defendant Jorge Varela Fernandez delivered approximately ten (10) kilograms of heroin to co-conspirator Alfredo Mazza.

5. In or about April 1971, in New York, New York, the defendant Roberto Cristobal delivered approximately ten (10) kilograms of heroin and three (3) kilograms of cocaine to the defendant Alfredo Aviles.

6. In or about April 1971, in Brussels, Belgium, co-conspirator Alfredo Mazza met with the defendants Andre Gaetan Condemine, a/k/a "Raymond" and Joannes Munoz, a/k/a "Mimi".

7. On or about July 1, 1971, the defendant Jozef Vienne entered the United States aboard the S.S. France.

8. In or about July 1971, in New York, New York, the defendants Joannes Munoz, a/k/a "Mimi" and John Doe, a/k/a "Guigu" and another person removed approximately seventy two (72) kilograms of heroin from a Volvo automobile.

9. In or about August 1971, in Buenos Aires, Argentine the defendant John Doe, a/k/a "Garcia" met with the defendants Joannes Munoz, a/k/a "Mimi" and John Doe, a/k/a "Guigui".

10. In or about October 1971, in Lille, France, co-conspirator Alfredo Mazza met with the defendants Andre Gaetan Condemine, a/k/a "Raymond", Joannes Munoz, a/k/a "Mimi" and Louis Riviere, a/k/a "Petit Louis".

11. On or about July 24, 1972, co-conspirator Rachid Gharbi arrived at John F. Kennedy International Airport in Queens, New York.

12. On or about September 20, 1972, the defendants and co-conspirators shipped approximately sixty (60) kilograms of heroin aboard the Mormacaltair, a vessel sailing from Buenos Aires, Argentina to New York, New York.

13. On or about October 2, 1972, co-conspirator Rachid Gharbi travelled from New York to Brussels, Belgium. (Title 21 United States Code, Sections 173, 174, 846 and 963.)

COUNT TWO

On or about the 26th day of October 1970, at John F. Kennedy International Airport, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendants Yolanda Sarmiento and Juan Carlos Franco a/k/a "Miguel" fraudulently and knowingly did import and bring into the United States approximately six (6) kilograms of heroin, a narcotic drug, contrary to law. (Title 21 United States Code, Sections 173 and 174; Title 18 United States Code, Section 2.)

COUNT THREE

On or about the 1st day of December 1970, at John F. Kennedy International Airport, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendants Yolanda Sarmiento and Juan Carlos Franco a/k/a "Miguel" fraudulently and knowingly did import and bring into the United States approximately eight (8) kilograms of heroin, a narcotic drug, contrary to law. (Title 21 United States Code, Sections 173 and 174; Title 18 United States Code, Section 2.)

COUNT FOUR

On or about the 12th day of April 1971, at John F. Kennedy International Airport, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendants Andre Gaetan Condemine, a/k/a "Raymond", Joannes Munoz, a/k/a "Mimi", Louis Riviere, a/k/a "Petit Louis", Yolanda Sarmiento, Jorge Varela Fernandez and John Joe, a/k/a "Guigui" fraudulently and knowingly did import and bring into the United States approximately ten (10) kilograms of heroin, a narcotic drug, contrary to law. (Title 21 United States Code, Sections 173 and 174; Title 18 United States Code, Section 2.)

COUNT FIVE

On or about the 12th day of April 1971, at John F. Kennedy International Airport, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendant Yolanda Sarmiento fraudulently and knowingly did import and bring into the United States approximately three (3) kilograms of cocaine, a narcotic drug, contrary to law. (Title 21 United States Code, Sections 173 and 174; Title 18 United States Code, Section 2.)

COUNT SIX

On or about the 30th day of September 1971, at John F. Kennedy International Airport, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendants Andre Gaetan Condemine, a/k/a "Raymond", Joannes Munoz, a/k/a "Mimi", Louis Riviere, a/k/a "Petit Louis", Yolanda Sarmiento and John Doe, a/k/a "Guigui" knowingly and intentionally did import approximately eighteen (18) kilograms of heroin, a Schedule I narcotic drug controlled substance, into the United States from Argentina. (Title 21 United States Code, Sections 960(a)(1) and 952(a); Title 18 United States Code, Section 2.)

COUNT SEVEN

On or about the 30th day of September 1971, at John F. Kennedy International Airport, within the Eastern District of New York, the defendant Yolanda Sarmiento knowingly and intentionally did import approximately nine (9) kilograms of cocaine, a Schedule II narcotic drug controlled substance, into the United States from Argentina. (Title 21 United States Code, Sections 960(a)(1) and 952(a); Title 18 United States Code, Section 2.)

A true bill.

LOUIS CONSOLI,

Foreman.

ROBERT A. MORSE,

*United States Attorney,
Eastern District of New York.*

APPENDIX 7

SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS, INTERVIEWS AND DISCUSSIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C.

DECEMBER 27, 1972

Lawrence J. Strickler, BNDD Area Officer for Latin America
Robert W. Goe, Staff Officer, Chief of Strategic Intelligence Staff, BNDD

JANUARY 2, 1973

Walter C. Minnick, White House Staff Assistant, Domestic Council
Geoffrey C. Shepard, White House Staff Assistant, Domestic Council
Walter Weiss, Office of Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Narcotics Matters
Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Drug and Alcohol Abuse)
Col. Hubert E. Nolde, Director, Treatment and Rehabilitation (Drug and Alcohol Abuse)

FEBRUARY 2, 1973

Miss Mary E. Wampler, Special Assistant to the Administrator for Narcotics Matters, Agency for International Development

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

JANUARY 4-6, 1973

Frankfurt am Main

Robert H. Harlan, Principal Officer, U.S. Consulate
Jack A. Sulser, International Relations Officer
Richard Jarrett, Agent in Charge, BNDD
Dr. Jurgen Jeschke, Director of Operations, Federal Criminal Police Headquarters, Wiesbaden
Lt. Col. Julius Parker, Commander, 165th MI Battalion
Maj. Paul J. Kratz, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel, U.S. Army Europe, Escort Officer
Daroslav S. Vlahovich, Consular Officer
Brig. Gen. Richard J. Eaton, Chief of Staff, Fifth U.S. Army Corps and Staff

Bonn

Martin J. Hillenbrand, U.S. Ambassador, Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany
David A. Macuk, Assistant to the Ambassador for Narcotics Matters
Robert E. Waltz, Narcotics Attache, U.S. Embassy
James O. Holmes, Customs Attache, U.S. Embassy
Col. Thomas J. Heller, USAREUR Liaison Officer
Dr. Walter, Ministerialdirigent (Deputy Assistant Secretary), Chief, Drug and Narcotics Division, Ministry Youth, Family, and Health
Mr. Kalisch, Ministerialrat (Head of office), Environmental Policy Division, Chancellor's Office
Hans Hutter, Ministerialdirektor (Assistant Secretary), Chief, Customs Division, Ministry of Finance
Gerhart R. Baum, Staatssekretaer (Under Secretary), Ministry of Interior

Heidelberg—U.S. Army Europe

General Michael S. Davison, Commander in Chief, U.S. Army Europe and staff
 Major General Hayword, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
 Colonel Cohn, Office of the Provost Marshal

Weisbaden—U.S. Air Force Europe

Gen. David C. Jones, Commander in Chief
 Lt. Gen. Jaime M. Philpott, Vice Commander in Chief
 Col. Dwaine J. Weatherwax, Chief of Staff
 Col. George F. Harrington, Deputy Chief of Staff, Personnel
 Col. Leon G. Mark, Director of Social Action
 Col. William E. Shannon, Judge Advocate
 Col. Benjamin R. Baker, Deputy Command Surgeon
 Col. Ray B. Coffman, Drug and Alcohol, Abuse Task Force
 Col. Frederick R. Geier, Assistant Deputy Commander for Investigation Operations, OSI
 Lt. Col. Paul J. Patrick, Chief Law Enforcement Division, Directorate of Security Police
 Capt. Stephen F. Ramsey, Social Action Staff Officer, Member of Drug/Alcohol Abuse Task Force
 Brig. Gen. Edwin W. Robertson, USAF Europe Inspector General
 Thomas Adam, Agent, Office of Special Investigations

Mainz—8th U.S. Infantry Division

JANUARY 6, 1973

Maj. Gen. F. E. Davison, Commanding General 8th Infantry Division
 Col. L. P. Riddlehoover, Commander 1st Brigade
 Col. A. E. Carpenter, Commander 2nd Brigade
 Col. G. G. Thomas, Commander DISCOM
 Lt. Col. J. Mason, Executive Officer 3rd Brigade
 Lt. Col. D. C. Albertson, Executive Officer 1st Brigade
 Lt. Col. A. P. Chambers, Commander 1/509th Infantry Battalion
 Lt. Col. H. L. Olson, Commander 2/509th Infantry Battalion
 Lt. Col. D. K. Brudvig, Commander 4/69th Armored Battalion
 Lt. Col. R. S. Hawley, 8th Infantry Division Staff Judge Advocate
 Lt. Col. B. J. Allen, 8th Infantry Division Provost Marshal
 Maj. D. W. Meade, Division Alcohol/Drug Abuse Control Officer (ADCO)
 Capt. P. S. Hodges, ADCO Team Leader
 Capt. G. R. Blackmore, ADCO Medical Officer
 Lt. Col. M. Townsend, Deputy Commander, Baumholder
 Lt. Col. M. B. Carson, Commander 12th Engineer Battalion
 Capt. R. L. Miller, Commander Co A 2/509th Infantry
 Capt. C. C. Graham, Commander Co C 1/509th Infantry
 Capt. C. E. Penrose, Commander Co A 4/69th Armored
 Capt. W. W. Mendel, Commander HHC 15th Brigade
 Mr. J. M. Smith, Chief, Criminal Investigation Division, MAINZ
 Sergeant Major James Hardin, HQ USAREUR
 An infantry platoon from the 1st Brigade

BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA

JANUARY 7-10, 1973

Hon. John D. Lodge, U.S. Ambassador
 Hon. Robert C. Hill, former U.S. Ambassador to Spain
 Max V. Krebs, Deputy Chief of Mission
 William B. Sowash, Political Counselor
 Lawrence B. Elsbernd, Economic Counselor
 Myron B. Kratzer, Scientific Attaché
 Capt. Emiddio Massa, Naval Attaché
 Eugene J. Friedman, Counselor for Public Affairs
 Brig. Gen. John Waggener, MILGRP Commander

John L. Wächter, Legal Attaché
 Vytautas A. Dambrava, Deputy Public Affairs Officer
 Daniel J. Addario, BNDD Regional Director
 Kenneth Y. Millian, 1st Secretary & Counsel
 Thomas H. White, 2nd Secretary
 Edward Betzig, Regional Development Officer
 Louis Bachrach, Customs
 Major Herbert C. Huser, Asst. Army Attaché
 John T. Doherty, Labor Attaché
 Edward A. Heath, BNDD Agent in Panama
 Brig. Gen Alberto S. Cáceres, Chief of Federal Police
 Cap. de Nav. (R.E.) Mario Durrieu, Superintendent of National Customs Administration
 Dr. Roberto Durrieu (h), Adviser to Under Secretary for Legislative Affairs, Ministry of Justice
 Prof. Dr. Francisco P. Laplaza, Director of Institute of Law & Criminology, Univ. of Buenos Aires
 Com. General Juan Carlos Rojas, Chief of Criminal Investigation—Police Department
 Cnel. (R.E.) Saúl García Tuñón, General Director of Human Potential—Ministry of Defense
 Dr. Alberto Calabrese, Professor of Medicine—University of Buenos Aires
 Com. Mayor Roberto E. Sala, Director General of Anti-Crime Brigade, Police Department
 Com. Inspector Enio Rivelini, Chief, Department of Public Safety, Federal Police
 Sr. Osvaldo J. Masucci, Secretary of GOA Delegation—CONATON
 Ambassador Fernando J. Taurel, Chief, North American Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Capt. Jorge E. Luparo, Chief Control Division, National Customs Administration
 Frank V. Ortiz, Jr., Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy, Montevideo, Uruguay; Narcotics Coordinator
 John S. Morgan, Narcotics Action Officer, U.S. Embassy, Montevideo

LIMA, PERU

JANUARY 10-11, 1973

Hon. Taylor G. Belcher, U.S. Ambassador, Lima
 Edward W. Clark, Deputy Chief of Mission
 Ray González, Embassy Narcotics Coordinator and Chief of Political Section
 Louis V. Perez, AID Director
 Colonel Joseph L. Schmalzel, Army Attaché
 Richard S. Welch, Special Assistant
 Willard B. Devlin, Chief of Consular Section
 Lawrence Katz, BNDD
 James Settle, USIS
 Ing. Alejandro Castaneda Pastor, General Administrator, National Coca Company
 Inspector General PIP, Julio Esquivel Trigoso, Director General of Peruvian Investigations Police and staff

BOGOTA, COLOMBIA

JANUARY 11-14, 1973

Robert E. White, Charge d'Affaires
 Vernon D. McAninch, Consul General
 Charles C. Loveridge, Assist. Information Service Officer
 Nester D. Sanchez, Political Officer
 William C. Frietze, Admin. Assist. Officer
 Robert L. Chatten, Public Affairs Officer
 John P. Reddington, Administrative Officer
 Donald L. Ackerman, Public Safety Advisor
 William W. Winn, Public Safety Advisor
 Octovio Gonzalez, BNDD
 Paul Gerhart, Customs

Robert H. Riefe, Political Officer
 John Robinson, Deputy Director, AID
 T. Elkin Taylor, Desk Officer for Colombia
 Thomas F. Killoran, Chief of Political Section
 Col. William H. Vail, Office of Defense Attaché
 Maxwell Chaplin, Deputy Chief of U.S. Mission, Quito, Ecuador
 Paul V. Harwood, Political Officer, U.S. Embassy, Quito, Ecuador
 Richard Heath, BNDD, Quito, Ecuador
 Misael Pastrano Borrero, President of Colombia
 Sr. Miguel Escobar Mendez, Minister of Justice
 Gen. Jorge Ordóñez Valderrama, Director General of Security and Intelligence
 Sr. Jorge Alba, Attorney General

PANAMA

JANUARY 14-16, 1973

Hon. Robert M. Sayre, Ambassador to Panama
 Herbert B. Thompson, Deputy Chief of Mission
 Maj. Gen. David S. Parker, Governor General, U.S. Canal Zone
 Melvin C. Niswander, Public Affairs Officer
 Adolph B. Saenz, Chief, Public Safety Officer
 J. Phillip McLean, Political Section, U.S. Embassy
 Thomas A. Austin III, Commander, U.S. Military Group, Panama
 Stephen D. Vermillion, Jr., Special Assistant's Office
 Joseph Y. Kiyonaga, Special Assistant to the Ambassador
 George O. Huey, Consul-Chief, Consular Section
 George Rublee, Deputy Director USAID/Panama
 M. Gordon Daniels, Chief, Economic Section
 Robert A. Wainio, Chief Customs Director, Canal Zone
 B. I. Everson, Director, Civil Affairs, Bureau, Canal Zone G.
 Lt. C. Joseph R. Koehler, J-1 Headquarters, USSouth COM
 L. Cmdr. J. H. Welborn, J-4 Headquarters, USSOUTHCOM
 Guy A. Wiggins, Special Assistant to the Ambassador on Narcotics Matters
 Edward A. Heath, BNDD, U.S. Embassy
 Leland L. Riggs, Bureau of Customs, U.S. Embassy
 Lic. Juan Antonio Tack, Minister of Foreign Relations
 Lic. Miguel A. Sanchiz, Minister of Finance and Treasury
 Lt. Col. Manuel A. Noriega, Chief G-2
 Dario Arosemena, Chief, National Department of Investigations (DENI)
 Jorge Carrasco, Editor, *The Panama American*
 Gen. Luis Grenada Mejia, Director General of Customs
 Dr. Louis Alberto Blanco, Member, House of Representatives and Special Advisor to the President on Narcotics Matters
 Brig. General Nicolas Rioste-Mesa, Sub-Director of the National Police
 Dr. Herman Naverretti, Customs Judicial Police

MEXICO

JANUARY 16-18, 1973

Hon. Robert H. McBride, U.S. Ambassador to Mexico
 Robert W. Dean, Deputy Chief of Mission
 H. Freeman Matthews, Political Counselor
 Ralph Barker, BNDD, Deputy Director
 Brig. Gen. James Munson, Defense Attache
 David Zweifel, Narcotics Action Team
 Antonio Celaya, BNDD Agent
 Stewart Adams, Customs Attache
 George Fill, Political Officer
 Bruce Van Matre, Customs
 Horace Cavitt, Customs
 Shawn McArdle, Political Officer
 Roderick G. Marshal, Political Officer
 Charles J. Beechie, Immigration Attache
 Robert T. Nischwitz, Legal Attache

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 MANHATTAN

Sr. Pedro OJEBÁ Paullada, Attorney General, Mexico
Dr. Enrique CARDENAS Gonzalez, Under Secretary of Finance
Sr. Oscar REYES Retana, Director General of Customs
Sr. Carlos OROZCO Sosa, Customs
Sr. Miguel ANGEL Reyes, Assistant Director, Customs

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS

JANUARY 18, 1973

William F. Hughes, Special Agent in Charge U.S. Customs (Dist. 8)
William M. Kline, Assistant Special Customs Agent in Charge (Enforcement)
Bill J. Cochran, Senior Resident Customs Agent, Laredo
Leonard H. Williams, Special Agent, Laredo
Walter Seawell, District Director of Customs, Laredo
A. P. Sanders, Supervisory Customs Inspector, Laredo
Jack Givens, former Supervisory Customs Agent, Houston
H. H. Washington, Senior Resident Customs Agent, U.S. Customs, San Luis
Arizona

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