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I. WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE

II. EUROPEAN SECURITY SITUATION

REPORT

OF THE

SPECIAL MISSION TO EUROPE
NOVEMBER 6–17, 1974

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

Hon. THOMAS E. MORGAN,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Transmitted herewith is a report of a special mission of the Committee on Foreign Affairs which visited Europe November 6–17, 1974.

The principal purposes of the mission were to attend the World Food Conference in Rome, and to examine various aspects of the European security situation, particularly the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations in Vienna.

It is our hope that this report will be helpful to the Committee and to the Congress in their consideration of matters related to our mission.

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments.
DANTE B. FASCELL,
PAUL FINDLEY,
LARRY WINN, JR.,

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INTRODUCTION

The special mission of the Committee on Foreign Affairs making the following report was headed by the Honorable Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, and included the Honorable Dante B. Fascell, the Honorable Paul Findley and the Honorable Larry Winn, Jr.

Leaving Washington November 6, the mission inspected the U.S.-operated naval base at Rota, Spain, on November 7. Proceeding on to Rome, the group remained in Italy from November 7 to November 13. On November 13 it flew to Vienna, from where it returned to Washington November 17.

One of the principal purposes of the mission was to attend the World Food Conference in Rome. Other purposes included first-hand examination of the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations in Vienna and a review of certain issues relating to NATO and European security.

The mission received substantial information and assistance throughout its European trip from American officials, from host country authorities, from members of the international community and others. We wish to express our appreciation for the cooperation so courteously extended to us at each point in our journey.

I. THE WORLD FOOD CONFERENCE

A major purpose of the special mission was to attend the World Food Conference, which was held in Rome November 5–16. Congressman Zablocki and Congressman Pierre S. du Pont of Delaware held official appointments as congressional advisers to the U.S. Delegation to the Conference. Congressmen Fascell, Findley and Winn served as observers for the Foreign Affairs Committee. While the special mission was in Rome, all members attended plenary sessions of the Conference and various meetings of Conference committees and participated in informal discussions. The mission also attended a special Papal audience for delegates to the Conference at which His Holiness Pope Paul VI delivered a major address concerning the world food situation and a special briefing for the U.S. Delegation on the UN/FAO World Food Program. As congressional advisers, Congressmen Zablocki and du Pont additionally took part in private meetings of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference which was headed by Secretary of Agriculture Earl L. Butz. Following the special mission's return to Washington, the committee was briefed at a November 26 hearing by Ambassador Edwin M. Martin, Vice Chairman and Coordinator of the U.S. Delegation.

Conference Resolutions

Some 130 nations were represented at the Rome Conference, which was marked by speechmaking and resolutions. Among a wide range of actions, the Conference:

Agreed on the need for both developing and developed countries to increase food production; recognized the necessity for increased agricultural priorities and incentives in many developing countries; approved establishment of a voluntary fund to increase aid to developing countries in expanding food production; recommended commitment by donor countries to food aid of at least 10 million tons of grain a year, in commodities or funds to buy them; endorsed the Food and Agriculture Organization undertaking for international cooperation in setting up a network of nationally held grain reserves; decided on establishment of a global information and early warning system on food and agriculture; stressed the need for eliminating trade barriers.

To provide coordination for various international activities in the agriculture assistance field, the Conference called for creation of a World Food Council. The Council membership of about 36 nations is to be elected by the U.N. General Assembly.

The Outcome

Whether the Conference was a "success" will depend on what is done to follow through. The major action recommendations adopted at Rome require further negotiations to take specific effect.

At the least, however, it can be said that the worldwide ministerial-level gathering focused international concern on the hunger suffered by hundreds of millions of people in poor lands and the prospect of worse to come if vigorous campaigns are not waged to overcome food shortages. All men of good will can subscribe to the "resolve" undertaken by the Conference—

"That all governments should accept the removal of the scourge of hunger and malnutrition, which at present afflicts many millions of human beings, as the objective of the international community as a whole, and accept the goal that within a decade no child will go to bed hungry, that no family will fear for its next day's bread, and that no human being's future and capacities will be stunted by malnutrition."

Immediate Needs

An ever-present concern at the Conference was what to do, immediately, about the starvation now threatening many men, women and children in certain critically food-short areas, mainly in South Asia. While the purpose of the Conference was to advance longer range solutions for the food crisis, no delegate could ignore the current emergency facing large numbers of fellow human beings. With the United States traditionally the world's largest supplier of food assistance, pressures developed on the U.S. Delegation to promise at Rome a sizable increase in current U.S. commodity aid shipments. A proposal for such an increase, supported by several Senators advising the Delegation, was sent by Secretary Butz to Washington and was rejected. The administration position is that large-scale U.S. food aid already is in process and that decisions on the future volume of this assistance should be made only on a quarter-by-quarter basis, because of inflationary pressures and tightness of supply. However the possibility was left open for increased U.S. shipments, above previously planned amounts, later in this fiscal year. While not formally before the Conference, the questions of immediate food availabilities and the financing of increased shipments to meet the current emergency were discussed among the interested parties at Rome and consideration has continued since.

The special mission believes that the United States should do what it can to provide increased food aid as needed to meet specific short-term emergencies. We must act to combat hunger now, as well as in the future. It would make mockery of the campaign to help the hungry if, before longer range programs can improve their lot, people die for want of immediate aid that might be available from proper distribution of existing supplies. The United States must not play politics with human suffering and starvation. The mission believes that the appropriate U.S. Government agencies should vigorously explore means of supplying increased humanitarian emergency food assistance in a manner which avoids any increased domestic inflation. It also recommends increased efforts to enlist other donors in such aid.

Shortcomings in the U.S. Food Aid System

The argument over the proposed U.S. emergency food aid increase which took place within the American Delegation at Rome marked another round in a continuing dispute over U.S. concessional food

shipment programs. The dispute has intensified with the disappearance of America's once-large farm surpluses, the spread of hunger in poor lands, soaring inflation at home, balance-of-payments needs and campaigns to hold down government spending.

Major issues are (1) at what levels U.S. food aid shipments should continue, and (2) how much of this food should be allocated on the basis of humanitarian need and how much on the basis of U.S. political and security interests abroad.

U.S. food shipments sold for dollars or local currencies on concessional credit terms, or donated for purposes such as disaster and famine relief, are made under Public Law 480. The Secretary of Agriculture determines what amounts are available under Public Law 480 after taking into account domestic requirements, carryover needs, and anticipated commercial exports.

Domestic U.S. grain consumption is estimated at about 151 million tons during the current 1974–75 marketing year and commercial exports at some 61 million tons. On grounds of tightness of supplies, the administration is making its Public Law 480 determinations this year only on a quarter-by-quarter basis. The level of Public Law 480 assistance in the first half of fiscal 1975 has run about 2½ million tons.

While small in terms of America's overall production, the Public Law 480 commodities available are a precious ingredient for foreign affairs uses. Food has become as valuable as cash. As a foreign policy instrument, Public Law 480 shipments in many cases offer an option for implementing U.S. interests at least as valuable as an equivalent outlay of money.

The situation in the new age of shortages stands in contrast to the years of bulging U.S. farm surpluses. In that earlier era, holding accumulated stocks under domestic agricultural support programs was a burden to the taxpayer. Public Law 480 offered a means of unloading these surpluses, in a manner helpful to American interests in many parts of the world. Some $25 billion worth of U.S. food has been shipped abroad under Public Law 480 since it became law two decades ago. Millions of people have been saved from death by starvation, and many worthwhile causes and U.S. interests have been served. It has been a program of which the American people can be proud.

However, it is manifest now that Public Law 480 as a law has become obsolete. It was conceived in a context of U.S. food abundance. Its policy declaration states at the outset a U.S. objective "to expand international trade; to develop and expand export markets for United States agricultural commodities" and names humanitarian and other foreign policy objectives thereafter. In today's world food shortage context, the foremost value of Public Law 480 shipments to the United States lies not in disposal of surpluses but in furtherance of foreign policy objectives. Under the heading of "foreign policy", we include both humanitarian objectives and economic and social development programs as well as "political" uses related to other U.S. interests and trade and export promotion.

Furthermore, as shown by continuing expressions of dissatisfaction by various Members of Congress with the administration's determinations on levels and allocations of food aid, the Public Law 480 program has been operating without sufficient responsiveness to congressional desires. The Public Law 480 system, which involves multiyear author-

izations and multibillion-dollar accumulation of funding authority, lends itself to executive branch manipulation of food aid shipments and is difficult for Congress to regulate. We believe the Congress should have greater control and supervision over the program.

With jurisdiction over the overseas aspects of Public Law 480 allotted to the Foreign Affairs Committee in the new Congress starting in January, we think the time has come for the committee to undertake a fundamental, broad review of this legislation and program. Full recognition should be given to the importance of food shipments as foreign policy instrument. Congressional control must be firmly established. Additionally, with shortages rather than surpluses a matter of increased concern, the role of export controls in carrying out U.S. interests must be carefully weighed particularly because some commodity exports are likely targets of export restrictions.

Key Answer to the Global Food Crisis: Increased Production, Better Distribution

While we have spoken of direct U.S. food aid to those in need, we at the same time must stress that such emergency shipments are not the basic solution to the world's food needs. Global production of grains currently totals about 1.2 billion tons a year. All food in international trade and aid taken together accounts for only 10 percent of total global consumption. U.S. food aid shipments currently at a 4-million-ton annual rate clearly cannot be expanded to fill the additional consumption of some 24 million tons a year required by world population increases of 75 million people annually.

Our attendance at the World Food Conference has served to reemphasize the importance we attach to the foreign assistance authorization for fiscal 1975, and to House Resolution 1399, the food policy resolution passed by the House December 9. The authorizing legislation for fiscal 1975 provides for a significant increase in U.S. food production assistance to poor countries.

The committee for some time has recognized the necessity for raising farm production in developing lands. Both testimony received by the committee and material available at the Rome Conference indicate the wide range of opportunities to accomplish this, with self-help a primary ingredient. More area can be put under cultivation. Incentives for farmers can be increased and disincentives removed. Land reform, rural credit, improved marketing facilities and other inducements are needed. Research should be expanded and its applications more widely applied. Losses from disease, pests and maldistribution must be cut. Fertilizer production must rise.

The committee has been particularly impressed with the potential of small farmers in developing countries. We have received testimony indicating that perhaps a billion people, or more than half of the population of noncommunist development countries, depend on relatively tiny plots for their livelihood. In many countries the per acre yields are far too low and rural underemployment is high. Given the means and incentives, we believe these farmers could significantly increase the agricultural production of their countries and at the same time join in economic and social progress of their nations generally. In some developing countries, the development of small farm, labor-intensive agriculture already has taken place with remarkable results.

Conclusion and Recommendations

In conclusion, the special mission believes that the nations of the world must move ahead promptly and urgently to meet the challenge of the food crisis. We believe that the people of the United States, for their part, are willing to respond to a call from our leadership for effective steps. We are still a land of affluence, compared with the great majority of countries on this earth. We are convinced that Americans are prepared to accept Presidential proposals that might involve some sacrifice in our lifestyle, provided this will help in combatting food shortages and other nations show equal determination to eliminate food deficits.

To summarize our recommendations, we urge that:

(1) Set-asides for meeting the most urgent hunger needs—through sales on concessional terms and disaster aid shipments—be increased to the extent possible without causing short supplies and resulting inflation in the United States.

(2) Vigorous efforts be made to enlist all food exporters and those who can contribute financially—such as oil producing nations—in the immediate and longer term campaigns to combat hunger and wipe out world food shortages.

(3) Full support be given to follow-through actions to make World Food Conference recommendations effective.

(4) Joint efforts be made to increase agricultural production, especially in the populous, low-income countries, along the lines discussed.

(5) The Foreign Affairs Committee undertake a basic review of the overseas aspects of Public Law 480 legislation and operations to ascertain what changes may be needed to update the U.S. food aid system and improve congressional control.

II. EUROPEAN SECURITY SITUATION

Italy

Shortly after its arrival in Rome November 7, the special mission received a briefing on the political and economic situation in Italy from senior officers of the American Embassy. Members of the mission subsequently had opportunities to confer with Italian politicians and were able to observe some aspects of the Italian economy prior to their departure November 13.

At the time of our visit, Italy was amidst its longest governmental crisis of postwar years, having been without a government since October 3. Observers seemed agreed that a new election would not alter significantly the percentages awarded by the electorate to the various parties. Negotiations were underway for a new coalition government.

Meanwhile it was apparent that Italy's economy, which is heavily affected by international economic developments, was suffering markedly from ills common to many industrialized nations today. Her inflation was running at an annual rate of some 25 percent, the highest among major western countries. Her economic growth rate has slowed and rising unemployment is in prospect. About one third of her national budget is currently supported by deficit financing. Her external balance-of-payments deficit has been estimated for 1974 at some $7 billion, because of the soaring cost of the oil which she must import.

During 1974, Italy took very strong measures to fight inflation by increasing taxes $4 billion and other steps. These measures helped—but strong actions will have to be continued and expanded to cope with the long-term problem of European recession and the drastic imbalance in Italy's external accounts.

Subsequent to our return to Washington, we received word of formation of a new Italian government under Premier Aldo Moro. We extend our best wishes to the new leadership and hope that it will move strongly to rescue Italy's economy.

Italy is a good friend of the United States and a staunch NATO ally. The larger problems which she faces are symptomatic of a profound economic dislocation which is affecting virtually all of the noncommunist world—and are not of her own making.

The rise in oil prices, inflation, unemployment, and the weakening of financial structures affect many Wesern European countries. These problems can be resolved only through active international cooperation in keeping the channels of international trade open—dealing together with the problem of price inflation in oil and other basic resources—and strengthening international machinery for coping with the new, massive transfers of purchasing power from the industrialized to the oil exporting countries. The poorest, developing countries must be aided to survive the devastating effect of the basic economic realinement.

Without such international cooperation, the likelihood of a creeping, worldwide depression increases each month. This, in turn, is bound to have very serious consequences for the structure of security and relative stability which the United States, working with its allies, has been able to produce during the post-World War II period.

The special mission is very much concerned about the fact that so much hangs in the balance in the coming months. The progress which has been achieved over the past quarter century—in broadening the industrial base of the Atlantic Community, in raising the standard of living, in assisting the developing countries in the difficult and painful transition to modernity—and even in beginning the dialogue aimed at the limitation of both nuclear and conventional weapons—can be undone in a short time under the pressure of economic necessity. This undoing would serve no one. And it is likely to hurt us as much, if not more, than some of our allies.

We recommend, therefore, that more effort be expended by the U.S. Government to develop a coordinated approach to the solution of these economic problems, through closer integration of our vital domestic interests with those of our allies abroad. We strongly urge the Foreign Affairs Committee to undertake studies designed to find new initiatives toward this end.

U.S. Naval Base at Rota, Spain

The special mission had opportunities to examine several aspects of the European security situation. Its first opportunity was at Rota, Spain, on November 7, where it received a briefing and inspected the facilities of this major base operated by the U.S. Navy.

The 6,000-acre base at Rota, in southwestern Spain along the Atlantic coast, performs important services for U.S. forces in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Atlantic and elsewhere. Construction of various U.S. facilities on the base was initiated in the early 1950's, and U.S. operations have continued there continuously since under the United States-Spanish bases agreements.

Helping to transform this flat, arid coastal area into a busy port and major supply center for the U.S. Sixth Fleet have been a 1½-mile artificial harbor entrance, dredging to permit berthing by larger vessels and two 1,000-foot piers. The base serves as one of the world's largest fuel depots and as originating point for a 485-mile pipeline feeding fuel to U.S. air bases in the interior of Spain. It stores and dispatches ammunition and weapons. It services ships from the Atlantic and Mediterranean fleets, ranging from aircraft carriers to submarines and merchant vessels. It handles all Military Air Lift Command (MAAC) service in support of the Sixth Fleet—more than 80,000 passengers and 20,000 tons of cargo last year. It homeports a fleet air reconnaissance squadron, and a detachment of a fleet tactical support squadron. It serves as a Polaris submarine replenishment site. It houses one of the Navy's five weather central stations, with its forecasters responsible for an area ranging from the Mediterranean, Red and Black Seas, to 1,500 miles south of Capetown and east to Pakistan. In the communications field, it includes an integral link in the worldwide Defense Communications System.

Altogether, the Rota complex includes 27 commands with a total of some 11,000 military personnel and dependents. From its observation of living facilities as well as military servicing areas, the mission is of the opinion that some deficiencies particularly in housing could be remedied with increased appropriations during the next year or two.

The larger question concerning Rota is political, especially in view of various unsettled and unpredictable situations prevailing in the Mediterranean area. The Spaniards hold overall command at Rota, which homeports some Spanish naval units, and relations with Spanish officials have been good.

Negotiations now are underway for renewal of the United States-Spanish agreement. To avoid complicating these negotiations, the mission will not express its views concerning Rota's future publicly at this time but will communicate them to U.S. negotiators.

AFSOUTH and the Sixth Fleet

On November 11, the special mission went from Rome to Naples to receive a briefing on AFSOUTH and the Sixth Fleet. AFSOUTH—Allied Forces, Southern Europe—is one of NATO's three major subordinate commands under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. Its headquarters at Naples is staffed by military personnel from five NATO countries—the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, Greece and Turkey. In the temporary absence of Admiral Means Johnson, Jr., USN, Commander-in-Chief of AFSOUTH, the mission was briefed by Lieutenant General John Norton, USA, AFSOUTH Chief of Staff.

AFSOUTH's mission is to deter aggression, defend NATO's southern region and preserve the integrity of NATO territory. As seen from the Naples headquarters, the Mediterranean area which falls within AFSOUTH's responsibility presents three significant strategic characteristics: Its size—1½ million square miles, including a 2,500-mile span between Gibraltar and the Turkish-Russian borders and 900 miles from the Austrian frontier to the North African coast; its isolation, in that it is separated from the rest of NATO's European command by two neutral states—Switzerland and Austria; and its dispersion, with the three NATO members of the southern region—Italy, Greece and Turkey—forming peninsulas separated from one another by the Mediterranean Sea.

With these factors making AFSOUTH essentially an independent theatre of operations, military considerations are further importantly affected by political factors. Control of the Mediterranean Sea is critical to defense of the region, and the positions taken by France and Spain would be vital in connection with the western part of the Mediterranean including the Gibraltar Strait. Fortunately it is virtually a closed sea as long as we maintain control of the entrances at Gibraltar and the Bosporus. The attitudes of other neighboring states must be taken into account, including those of the Middle East and North Africa and of Malta, Cyprus, Yugoslavia, and Albania.

In AFSOUTH's view, the central European region has been marked by an extended period of relative stalemate between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces. This has been accompanied by an increased Soviet bloc threat to NATO's flanks, with the communists seeking to exploit areas and situations of relative instability by a combination of political

and military pressures. The volatile situation in the eastern Mediterranean areas has been underlined by the October 1973 war and continued instability in the Middle East and North Africa, plus the Cyprus crisis.

NATO intelligence estimates indicate a Warsaw Pact land force numerical superiority in the southern region, an air balance in favor of the Pact, a more comprehensive Pact air defense missile system and a Soviet naval force in the Mediterranean normally about 50 ships including 25 combat vessels. The Soviet naval force can be built up easily by drawing vessels from the large Soviet Black Sea fleet. However, NATO naval forces maintain numerical superiority in the Mediterranean, including a powerful carrier-based tactical air force. The Soviet surface naval threat is thus regarded by AFSOUTH as manageable, with the main threat being posed by Soviet submarines.

In peacetime, the forces assigned or earmarked to NATO in the southern region amount to more than half a million men and three times that number in war. The majority of these forces are provided by the three Mediterranean countries of the region. The U.S. Sixth Fleet has a normal complement of some 29,000 Navy personnel and a strong force including two aircraft carriers. AFSOUTH believes it is making steady progress in programs to strengthen its defenses. However, the increasing relative strength of the Soviet Warsaw Pact Group gives it serious concern because a significant imbalance can introduce instability to the region by inviting rash actions and less restraint in response to local incidents.

The mission was told that if the United States should unilaterally reduce its forces in Europe, other NATO members would probably cut back their forces also. As for rumors of possible reduction in Sixth Fleet strength and deployment of some of its units to the Indian Ocean, we were advised that there is little leeway for a Sixth Fleet cutback impairing flexibility needed to deal with spot situations that might arise including requirements for evacuation of U.S. personnel or other localized operations.

Homeporting for the Sixth Fleet remains a troublesome problem. The proposed stationing of a carrier at Athens has been postponed indefinitely and a solution is not yet in sight.

In addition to the Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus, the mission was told of continuing concern over the potential for a flare-up between the two NATO allies over the Aegean shelf issue. Both countries claim rights to explore for oil in large areas of the Aegean, in which Greece has hundreds of islands including some just off the Turkish coast.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)

Along with the SALT talks, the negotiations for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions rank among the most important of disarmament discussions now underway in this era of détente. While SALT deals with the long-distance nuclear weaponry face-off between the United States and the Soviet Union, MBFR concerns the close-range confrontation of men and arms between opposing sides in the strategic heartland, central Europe.

To gain firsthand insight into the MBFR negotiations, the mission flew to Vienna November 13. During our 4-day stay there we were briefed by the Honorable Stanley R. Resor, the chief of the U.S.

negotiating team at the MBFR conference. We conferred with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency representative on the U.S. delegation. We attended a plenary MBFR session. We met informally with allied and separately with Soviet representatives to the negotiations. Finally, we participated in a private roundtable discussion with Ambassador Resor and his aides which was attended by MBFR representatives from the United Kingdom and West Germany.

The MBFR negotiations have been underway in Vienna since October 30, 1973. There are 19 participating nations, 12 on the NATO side and 7 with the Warsaw Pact. All have military interests in central Europe.

Both sides submitted force reduction proposals soon after the negotiations began. The proposals reflected differing approaches which have yet to be resolved.

From NATO's standpoint, an outstanding characteristic of the military situation in central Europe is what the Western negotiators term the "disparities" between the two sides. The disparities include manpower, character of forces and geographic advantage. NATO estimates that its troop strength in the central European region totals 777,000 (of which 193,000 are United States), compared with 925,000 (of which 460,000 are Soviet) for the Pact, a disparity of 148,000. In the important category of tank strength, the NATO tank number stands at 6,000 compared with 15,500 for the Pact, a disparity of 9,500. Geographically, the Pact is favored by a distance of little more than 400 miles in terms of reinforcements from Soviet territory, while U.S. forces are pulled back more than 3,000 miles when they are brought home.

The NATO force reduction proposal takes into account these disparities by calling for reductions looking toward approximate parity between the two sides in the form of a common ceiling on ground force manpower. In its first phase, the NATO plan would involve withdrawal of a roughly equal percentage of United States and Soviet ground forces from the central region. The numerical result of the percentage cut and ceiling proposals would be a larger reduction in absolute numbers of Pact forces than of NATO. In NATO's view such a move toward parity, combined with other measures, would be in accord with the objective of an agreement providing for undiminished security by both sides.

The Warsaw Pact proposals envisions reductions on both sides, but would maintain the existing correlation of forces at a lower level. Given the Pact's present advantages in ground forces and tanks, the effect of the Pact's proposals in NATO's view would be to actually increase the existing margin in favor of the Pact. The Pact also proposes to include air forces and nuclear weapons in the reductions. The NATO allies to date have opposed including air and nuclear forces in negotiations at this stage, which would add greatly to the complexity of an already complicated problem.

While the mission was at Vienna, the allies rejected a Pact proposal calling for reduction of 20,000 men on each side during 1975 beginning with Soviet and American troops. NATO representatives portrayed the Pact offer as essentially similar in concept to the Communists earlier proposals.

We were impressed at Vienna with the unity shown by allied negotiators in behalf of the NATO position. The danger from the "disparities" was, in some cases, even more strongly expressed to us by allied representatives than by the Americans.

We also were left in no doubt concerning allied desires that the United States maintain its strength in Europe until such time as reductions could be negotiated with the Soviets. This was in response to statements from us concerning the possibility of renewed moves in Congress for a unilateral pullback of U.S. forces from Europe.

Whether MBFR negotiations will result in an agreement remains to be seen. After more than a year of talks, there still are major differences between the two sides. On the other hand, quick accord was not predicted on these complex issues and we were told that negotiators on both sides are proceeding seriously.

One potential does appear clear to us: If the United States engages in unilateral troop withdrawal from Europe, the MBFR negotiations will collapse.

Beyond this, as a result of our visit to the Mediterranean area as well as to Vienna, we gained an increased awareness of the chain of interdependence between security levels in different parts of the world. Part of the allied calculations at MBFR involved certain assumptions concerning Europe's southern region. At AFSOUTH's Naples headquarters, in turn, there was responsiveness to developments in the Middle East. Danger at one point in the map raised apprehensions of increased threat in another.

We think this interface of security interests must be kept in mind by the Congress in its decisions concerning U.S. security assistance generally. For a global power like the United States, excessive reduction of military aid to one country or area can lead to dangerous instability in another.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

On November 15 the special mission conferred with senior officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is headquartered in Vienna. In the temporary absence of IAEA Director General Sigvard Eklund, the mission was briefed by John Hall (USA), Deputy Director General for Administration, assisted by Yuri Chernilin (USSR), Deputy Director General for Technical Operations, D. A. V. Fisher (South Africa), Director for External Relations and Georges Delcoigne (Belgium), Director for Public Affairs. Accompanying the mission was Allan Lavowitz, of the U.S. mission to the IAEA.

The IAEA, now in its 18th year, is a United Nations-related international organization with a separate statute. More than 100 nations are members. Its statutory objectives are to promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy throughout the world and to insure that none of the assistance provided by it or under its supervision is used for any military purpose. It has a staff of about 1,100.

While the IAEA is engaged in many programs, we were particularly interested in its activities in relation to safeguarding against the diversion of nuclear materials to military uses. We believe airtight safeguards are increasingly vital as nations of the world turn to nuclear power for energy, nuclear fuel supplies increase, and atomic technological know-how spreads. The Foreign Affairs Committee has

in process an inquiry into the general subject of the transfer of nuclear technology. Also, following the administration's proposal for U.S. cooperative nuclear agreements with Egypt and Israel, a resolution of inquiry concerning this subject (H. Res. 1189) was referred to the committee. Chairman Morgan has requested the General Accounting Office to undertake an in-depth study of such agreements, which includes a study of IAEA's role. In the meantime the committee approved additional funds for IAEA in the fiscal year 1975 foreign assistance authorization bill to help IAEA strengthen its safeguards activities.

In 1961 IAEA adopted a safeguards system applicable to small research reactors. Subsequently revisions and extensions have expanded the system to cover virtually all types of nuclear plants. The system as it developed over the years was based on strict accounting of material entering or leaving a nuclear facility.

Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force in March 1970, the IAEA was assigned responsibility for applying safeguards concerning all nuclear materials in all the peaceful nuclear activities of all the non-nuclear-weapon nations which ratified the treaty. Under the new safeguarding system developed under its NPT mandate, IAEA checks the entirety of a nation's peaceful nuclear activities instead of dealing only with isolated individual plants. The NPT system is supposed to interlock with a safeguards system established by each country for control over its nuclear materials.

The mission was told that some 80 non-nuclear-weapon states have signed and ratified the NPT. The five Common Market Euratom nations have signed but not yet ratified. They have agreed to ratify together, but Italy has not made a decision on whether to ratify. Others which are yet to complete NPT adherence include Japan, India, Israel, Egypt, Spain, South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil. IAEA is now negotiating with the United States and the United Kingdom for inspection of a number of plants in those nations, which are not subject to NPT inspection because they already are nuclear powers, with the aim of demonstrating to doubters that the inspection system does not compromise commercial atomic energy secrets.

Some IAEA officials were of the opinion that as of now, nuclear security is rather good worldwide, although there are a number of countries which could be developing atomic explosives in the future if they are not persuaded to join the NPT. They also pointed out that effective safeguards are far more economical now than had been anticipated a decade ago, because of technological improvements in inspecting.

One problem arises from the fact that in nations not covered by the NPT, some nuclear facilities may be subject to IAEA safeguards while others may be under bilateral safeguards or none at all. Another aspect is that IAEA safeguards do not include physical protection of nuclear plants, although IAEA has given advice to governments on how best to maintain physical security.

We were told that top IAEA officials are of the opinion that under NPT, no country should be given nuclear assistance unless it is a party to the treaty. This is not now the view of the United States. In the mission's judgment, it would be helpful if nuclear powers follow the same policy as the IAEA on this matter.

East-West Trade Center

The mission visited the East-West Trade Center in Vienna on November 14 and met with S. Douglas Martin, Director of the Center, and his assistants. The Center was established about 1½ years ago, subsequent to President Nixon's trip to Moscow, to help increase trade between the United States and the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe.

Vienna was chosen as a site for the Center because of the city's prime location for commerce flowing between Communist East Europe and the West. We were told that about 100 firms engaged in East-West trade are in Vienna. Flight time to most East European capitals is 90 minutes or less. All East European governments have trading offices in the city.

The Center operates as a trade promotion arm of the American Embassy under a modest budget and with a staff of three Americans and a half dozen Austrians. Its primary activity is to advise and assist American businessmen, especially those who are newcomers in seeking East European markets. It publishes an information bulletin. It offers a reference library, exhibition and meeting space and communications and reproduction facilities. It also serves as a base for U.S. Commerce Department operations in East Europe and the Soviet Union.

East-West Trade Center officials told us they have been able to mount a successful operation in the relatively short time since the Center's establishment. More than 1,500 U.S. businessmen have used its facilities so far. Lectures and seminars at the Center have drawn more than 750 participants. Some 18 trade missions with representatives from more than 100 American companies have been briefed at the Center. Showings of U.S. products have attracted more than 1,000 visitors.

A major function of the Center has been market research on prospects for sales of various U.S. goods to East Europe. We were informed that, in addition, the East Europeans—particularly the Bulgarians—have sought the Center's aid in finding U.S. markets.

Austrian Transit Facility

On November 14 the mission visited the Austrian Transit Facility, a compound in Vienna's outskirts which is owned by the Austrian Red Cross. Through this inconspicuous facility pass thousands of Jews emigrating from the Soviet Union to a new life in the non-Communist world.

The emigres arrive at Vienna daily, mostly by morning and evening train, are transported to the transit camp, are fed, given medical examinations, interviewed and rested until their outbound transportation is available, and then are sent on their way. Most go to the airport for flights to Israel.

We were told that the emigrants generally arrive in good health, even though some may have been journeying for 3 to 4 weeks from some distant point in the Soviet Union. The average length of their stay at the facility was given as 36 hours. On the day of our visit, 110 emigrants were there.

We were briefed by a representative of the Austrian Red Cross and shown the accommodations. The compound is in a quiet residential area

and we were advised of special security precautions protecting the emigrants during their brief Austrian stopover. Entrance to the compound is tightly guarded.

We were impressed with the accommodations provided for medical examination, feeding, bathing, repacking and rest for the travelers. The barrackslike layout was clean and quiet. First aid facilities were at hand. The kitchen appeared capable of serving up warm meals to large numbers on short notice. There is a place of worship.

We have information from U.S. officials indicating that in 1973 approximately 30,600 refugees went to Israel via Vienna and 1,700 went to other countries, with 1,500 proceeding to the United States.

In the first 10 months of this year the flow has been much smaller. The figures given for January–October were 14,800 to Israel through Vienna, plus 3,800 to other countries of whom 3,300 went to the United States.

The U.S. officials stated that in their opinion, the cutback in Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union so far in 1974 reflects deliberate Soviet policy. They suggested that the Kremlin has been awaiting the passage of the trade bill in Congress which would allow most-favored-nation U.S. trade treatment toward the Soviet Union. The officials predicted a sharp rise in the outflow of Jews from Russia following enactment of the measure, which was passed by Congress in December, although they said no specific figure has been agreed to by the Soviets.

In October, which was described as a typical month for 1974, the number of Soviet Jews who emigrated to Israel via Vienna was listed at around 1,440. Of this total, more than 500 were under age 22 and about 200 were over age 62. The other half were in the 22–62 age range.

In terms of occupations, the largest number—380—were skilled workers and the second largest category—175—consisted of professionals ranging from engineers to teachers and doctors.

Nearly 500 of the total came from the Ukraine. Other areas of the Soviet Union heavily represented in the group included Moldavia and the Central Asian Republics.

Austria faces a real problem in connection with handling the flow of Jewish refugees from the Soviet Union. She cannot carry the burden alone. The United States, by pressing for increased freedom for Soviet Jews to emigrate, has a responsibility to help in the processing. We hope that some other nations of Europe, cooperating through the International Committee on Emigration and Migration, will contribute.

International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA)

An interesting and stimulating experience for the mission was a visit November 16 to Schloss Laxenbourg, a former Hapsburg estate which is now the site of one of the most modern international scientific "think tanks"—the Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.

The IIASA was set up in 1972 as the result of the interest of prestigious scientific organizations in a dozen countries, East and West, in applying cross-discipline research to complex problems confronting advanced societies today. U.S. participation in the Institute is managed by the National Academy of Sciences. For the first time,

the Institute brought Soviet scientists together with top scientists from the United States and other Western nations in an institutional framework for collaborative research projects dealing with a wide range of modern social, economic and technical questions.

The need for multidisciplinary approaches is obvious to those of us living in industrialized societies which are increasingly affected by such problems as crowding, materials shortages, pollution and inflation. It also is apparent that similar problems affect many different nations, and that conditions within some nations can have an effect on conditions within others.

IIASA officials told us of the different scientific specializations being used in their projects. Their definition of "applied systems analysis" spans such fields as operations research and management science, cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis, planning, programing and budgeting, decision analysis, cybernetics, information theory, management information and control systems, computer service, dynamic modeling and organization theory. In their view, none of these fields can realize their potential in isolation from the others.

IIASA also believes that as an Institute, it must restrict itself to two classes of problems—those which are global, in which the effects and the reins of policy involve many nations; and those which are universal, where activities may be separately controlled by single nations but where the problems each nation faces are common.

Thus the scientists at the Institute are focusing on projects in fields such as management of urban systems, ecology and environment, energy, water resources and scientific services.

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