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THE NARCOTICS SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1973

REPORT OF A SPECIAL STUDY MISSION TO SOUTHEAST ASIA, AUGUST 6–28, 1973

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FOREWORD

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., March 26, 1974.

This report has been submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs by Hon. Lester L. Wolff who conducted a special study mission between August 6 and 28, 1973.

The findings in this report are those of Hon. Lester Wolff and do not necessarily reflect the views of the membership of the full Committee on Foreign Affairs.

THOMAS E. MORGAN, *Chairman.*

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

MARCH 26, 1974.

HON. THOMAS E. MORGAN,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: There is transmitted herewith a report of a special study mission which was conducted by the special ad hoc subcommittee on international narcotics during the period August 6–28, 1973.

The purpose of the study was to conduct a followup investigation of the narcotics situation in Southeast Asia. The members of the study team were particularly interested in determining the effectiveness of international narcotics control programs and the degree of cooperation that the United States is receiving from the various governments in Southeast Asia.

During the course of the investigation, the study mission met in Washington with U.S. Government officials involved in the international aspects of the narcotics control program, including representatives of the Department of State, the Department of Justice, including the Drug Enforcement Administration and the Office of Management and Budget.

In the field we met with U.S. diplomatic, intelligence, and narcotics control officials; with foreign governmental leaders, foreign law enforcement, and other government officials responsible for narcotics control in the Philippines, Thailand, Laos, Hong Kong, the Republic of China, Korea and Japan; with representatives of the United Nations Special Drug Abuse Fund; and with private citizens. In addition, the study team met with U.S. Department of Defense officials in an effort to determine the dimensions of drug abuse among U.S. military personnel throughout the Pacific Command.

The study team consisted of Congresswoman Bella S. Abzug and Congressmen Charles B. Rangel, Fortney H. Stark, and Morgan F. Murphy, who participated in the study mission during the period August 12 to 20, and whose advice, assistance, and knowledge of the international drug problem made an invaluable contribution to the success of the study mission. Congressman Joseph P. Addabbo also participated in that part of the study relating to the drug situation among U.S. military forces in the Pacific Command area.

The study team would also like to express its thanks and appreciation for the assistance, cooperation, and hospitality extended to it by officials from the Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and other U.S. Government officials in the countries visited.

It is hoped that this report will be helpful to the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Congress in their deliberations on efforts to solve the drug abuse problem in the United States.

LESTER L. WOLFF,
Chairman, Special Study Mission.

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
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Saigon
GULF OF THAILAND
ANDAMAN ISLANDS (India)
Andaman Sea
NICOBAR ISLANDS (India)
Opium Growing Areas
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PART I

INTRODUCTION

Prior to 1970 most of the illicit heroin entering the United States was thought to have originated in the poppy fields of Turkey. Heroin was produced in clandestine laboratories in the Marseilles area of France and smuggled into the United States directly. Occasionally, significant quantities of European heroin were transshipped through Latin America.

In 1972 poppy cultivation in Turkey was declared illegal and stopped. This, coupled with more effective customs' inspections and other enforcement procedures in the United States, increased cooperation from European countries and several seizures of large quantities of heroin both in the United States and abroad have created a shortage of heroin on the east coast of the United States.

While this situation may be only temporary, the likelihood is that the international trafficker is in the process of looking for another source of heroin. The most likely area, and the one that offers the quickest availability, is Southeast Asia.

It is estimated that there are approximately 1,500 tons of illicit opium produced in the world each year. Of this amount over 700 tons are produced in Burma, Laos, and Thailand; if the entire quantity were to be converted into heroin, it would produce approximately 70 tons which is about six or seven times the 10–12 tons required each year to satisfy the heroin-user population in the United States.

Until 1971 the governments in Southeast Asia were not concerned that their countries played a role in the illegal production of and trafficking in opiates. The use of opiates had been accepted and tolerated for centuries and there was little interest in taking action to stop the production of and trafficking in opiates, since it was conventional wisdom that if a narcotics problem existed it was the user states not the producer who was responsible for control.

During the past 2 years the Governments of Laos and Thailand, with the advice and assistance of the United States, have taken steps to curtail the growing of poppies and have created special police organizations to improve enforcement efforts. And, unlike a year ago, the Government of Burma has also taken some measures to deal with the groups that have been actively engaged in the production of and trafficking in narcotics in northeastern Burma. Furthermore, Burmese officials have now expressed an interest in some type of cooperation with the United States in an effort to suppress Burmese narcotics traffic and have indicated a willingness to accept narcotics suppression assistance from the United States.

Despite this, heroin continues to be abused by the youth of the United States and there are strong indications that Southeast Asia has become a primary source for the white heroin entering the United States.

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There are no precise or accurate statistics available anywhere as to the source or quantity of narcotics that enters the United States from various parts of the world. The lack of hard information is one of the most bothersome problems we face. Based upon the best intelligence available, however, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency estimates that the bulk of the heroin that enters the United States still comes from stockpiles in Europe, about 20–25 percent from Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America, and about 10–15 percent from Southeast Asia.

There are those who believe that much more heroin enters the United States from Southeast Asia each year than the 10–15 percent estimated by U.S. authorities. While the amount of Southeast Asian heroin entering the United States each year cannot be determined with any accuracy or certainty, there is no doubt that area produces enough opium each year to more than satisfy the local addict population and the ready availability is a lucrative source for the trafficker who seeks to supply the growing market in the United States. Every effort must be made to stop the production of and trafficking in narcotics, particularly in Burma, Laos, Thailand, and Hong Kong, for it is here where, according to enforcement officials, the greatest headway can be made in the war against narcotics abuse.

As a result of information made available by several studies of the narcotics situation in Southeast Asia which have been conducted at the direction of the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the study team was able to concentrate its effort upon the current situation, and upon the situation as it has developed since the summer of 1972.

There is a great deal about which we can be encouraged, particularly the recent activities of some of the governments in the countries visited. Enforcement of antinarcotics legislation has been stepped up. A number of large-scale drug traffickers have been arrested and large quantities of opiates seized.

Of even greater import is the fact that the respective governments are beginning to realize that the illegal production and trafficking in opiates is a regional problem and that solution of that problem will depend to a great extent upon close cooperation between each other, as with the United States.

The study team was also pleased for the most part with the U.S. antinarcotics effort although there is some concern that political considerations may be allowed to overshadow narcotics control activities. This should be avoided wherever practicable. The war against narcotics cannot be won if the effort is lessened anywhere.

To determine the current situation, the study mission spent most of its time in Southeast Asia concentrating on the following areas:

1. The effectiveness of the antinarcotics effort in the respective countries and the degree of cooperation between those governments and the United States.
2. The status of crop substitution programs in the Golden Triangle.
3. The effectiveness of the U.S. antinarcotics control organization in dealing with the narcotic production problem in Southeast Asia.
4. The steps that are being taken to monitor and/or control the export of acetic anhydride.

5. The drug abuse situation among U.S. military forces in the Pacific.

This report deals with these and releated questions.

OPIUM PRODUCTION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Approximately one-half (680 to 770 tons) of the world's illicit opium (up to 1,500 tons) is produced in Burma, Laos, and Northern Thailand, as follows: Burma, 400 to 450 tons; Thailand, 150 to 200 tons; and Laos, 30 to 120 tons. This region is also known as the "Golden Triangle."

The opium poppy is cultivated by various tribal groups in the highlands of the Shan States and Kachin State of northern Burma, in northwest Thailand near the borders of Burma and Laos and in northwest and northeast Laos. (See map.)

Efforts to control the production of opium have not been successful. For many of the tribes, opium represents their only cash crop. In many cases the cash that opium earns, or the opium itself, is used to purchase or barter for, the arms and ammunition and supplies needed to support the many insurgent groups that operate throughout the area, particularly in northern Thailand and Burma.

Further complicating the problem is the fact that it has been impossible for the Governments of Burma, Laos, and Thailand to assert effective political or administrative control in the Golden Triangle. The remote mountain areas provide ideal hiding places for the many insurgent groups who are the backbone of the arms smuggling and drug trafficking operations in this part of Southeast Asia.

Both the Thai and Burmese Governments have increased their campaigns against the insurgents and have cooperated with each other in one operation which led to the capture of Lo Hsing Han, the reported "opium king" of Southeast Asia.

THAI-BURMESE COOPERATION

Until recently relations between Thailand and Burma were strained. The Thais were fearful that the area east of the Salween River in Burma would be used to furnish Chinese Communist assistance to the Communist insurgents operating against the government in northern Thailand and for this reason permitted U Nu, former Prime Minister of Burma, to operate in northern Thailand and to direct the activities of his antigovernment forces operating in Burma from that location.

U Nu's presence in Thailand was a source of friction between the two countries because it is believed he was actively engaged in activities aimed at the overthrow of the Burmese Government.

On July 27, 1973, encouraged by the Thai Government, U Nu departed Thailand and is now in the United States. His departure removed a bone of contention and improvement in relations between the two governments was given a needed boost.

The Thai-Burma Border Commission which was created several years ago to coordinate the border activities of the two governments, but which had been inactive recently, has resumed its meetings and Ne Win, Burmese head of state visited Thailand in September 1973 with

an agenda that is reported to have placed drugs as one of the chief topics of conversation.

Perhaps the most significant result of increasing Thai-Burmese cooperation was the combined operation in July which led to the capture of Lo Hsing Han and many of his Khakweyei (KKY) followers.

Prior to his capture, Lo, who was one of the leading narcotics producers and traffickers in eastern Burma, was attempting to put together a coalition of insurgent groups, including the Shan State Army, for operations against the Burmese Government.[1] This attempt to put together such a coalition was in response to a Burmese Government proposal to the insurgent groups that they join the Home Militia, stop actions against the Burmese Government and get out of the arms smuggling and drug trafficking business. When the insurgent groups responded by calling a meeting of Mong Mah, Shan State, the Burmese Government ordered the army to move against Lo Hsing Han[2] (who defected to the insurgents) and the other groups who were participating in the proceedings.

Lo, who was forced to evacuate the area, retreated into Thailand, where Thai forces, who had been alerted to the activities of the Burmese Army, captured him on July 17, 1973. Since the overthrow of the military regime in Thailand there have been rumors that the former Deputy Prime Minister Field Marshall Praphat Charusathira might have been involved in illegal drug activities.

Less than 3 weeks later the Thai Government extradited Lo to Burma where he is being held on charges of armed rebellion, arms smuggling, and drug trafficking.

AN EXTRAORDINARY PROPOSAL

On August 16, while the study mission was in Bangkok, the chairman received an extraordinary proposal from an individual who claimed to represent various Burmese insurgent leaders, including Lo Hsing Han and his KKY and representatives of the Shan State Army. The gist of the offer was that the Burmese insurgents would deliver over 400 tons of opium (almost 1 year's total production) to the United States in return for an undisclosed sum of U.S. dollars (reportedly $12 million) and support for the Shan State in its effort to revive what it claims to be the Burmese constitutional mandate of autonomy from the Government of Burma.

According to the emissary this proposal had been presented to the agent-in-charge of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Southeast Asia Regional Office, several weeks earlier, without any response.

The chairman of the study mission, in an effort to determine the facts, attempted to meet with the agent-in-charge to no avail. Instead, a meeting was arranged with the DEA Deputy Director, the Deputy

---

[1] Lo's method of operation, according to narcotics agents, was to purchase opium from hill-tribe farmers and transport it to his own refineries by packhorse and mule caravan. From Tachilek, the refined heroin was reportedly smuggled through Thailand to the coast and taken from there by Thai trawlers to South Vietnam and Hong Kong.

[2] Lo Hsing Han operated as an opportunist and from time to time supported the Government of Burma in its operations against the Communist groups in eastern Burma. When the Burmese Government decided to crack down on the insurgents and drug traffickers, Lo was put in a position of either backing the Government or joining the insurgents. He joined the latter.

Chief of Mission, and other U.S. Embassy officials where the details of the Burmese insurgent offer was discussed.

According to U.S. officials, several similar offers which had been made in the past had been rejected for political and diplomatic reasons. Nevertheless they agreed to bring the latest offer to the attention of the authorities in Washington.

Of concern to the study team was the fact that such an offer had been previously made and had not been brought to the attention of the Chief of Mission or to DEA and State Department officials in the United States. Of even greater consternation was the fact that the regional DEA director, to whom the proposal had been made, refused to discuss the matter with the chairman of the study mission. Regardless of other considerations, this failure to consult with the Congress on a matter of such importance can only lead one to the conclusion that there is something to hide. If the Congress is to continue to authorize and appropriate funds for narcotics control programs information essential to a full understanding of the problem must be made available. Failure to discuss or refusal to provide information can only lead to doubt and suspicion between the executive and the legislative branches of the Government. The war against narcotics is too vital to the security of the United States to allow that to happen.

THE SITUATION IN BURMA

There can be no solution to the narcotics problems in Southeast Asia as long as the Burmese part of the Golden Triangle is operational. An estimated 400 metric tons, or more than one-half of the entire illicit opium output in the Golden Triangle is produced within Burma.

Until early 1973 the Burmese Government more or less tolerated the drug smuggling activities of the insurgents operating in Eastern Burma. Government forces were poorly equipped and the insurgents controlled more than 30 percent of the country. What military capability the Burmese possessed was saved for operations against the Communists and other insurgent forces who aimed to overthrow the Government. Consequently, the Burmese Government was willing to permit Lo Hsing Han and others to engage in drug activities as long as those operations did not weaken the central government.

Inherent in the Burmese opium trade is the illicit traffic in armaments in Southeast Asia. In many cases the insurgents are better armed than government forces and those dealing in drugs and arms are not overly concerned with whom they were dealing.

The influx of modern arms which, if allowed to continue, would have tipped the balance in favor of the insurgents; an alarming increase in the use of heroin among the middle- and upper-class youth of Burma; and adverse world publicity stemming from the refusal of the government to cooperate in the international effort to control the production in and trafficking of opiates probably combined to convince governmental leaders that there was no other alternative they could embrace except a strong campaign against the drug traffickers.

Several refineries have been destroyed and large quantities of drugs seized. Above all, major traffickers such as Lo Hsing Han and Hsu Chia-Chu, another drug king, and many of their followers have been

captured. This has disrupted drug-related operations in Burma, caused disarray among the groups and has created a leadership vacuum. The general effects have been little movement of narcotics, high prices and a shift toward dealing in precious stones, jade and other "black marketable" items.

Of equal significance is the growing willingness of the Government of Burma to drop its facade of a nonalined nation as an excuse for failure to cooperate and finally join with other countries, including the United Nations, and the United States in the war on drugs.

The Government of Burma has again agreed to discuss the possibility of receiving narcotics control assistance from the United States and the United States in turn has indicated that it would be responsive to a request for assistance, particularly for helicopters for narcotics suppression activities in remote areas. Such assistance should prove to be very valuable.

The Government is severely hindered in its narcotics suppression operations by its lack of helicopters and other related equipment. For example, when the Burma drug force was sent to attack Lo Hsing Han and other insurgent leaders at Mong Mah it found the Salween River to be impassible due to heavy rains. It took 1 week to cross the swollen river, and when the attack finally took place, the Burmese forces found the site had been hastily evacuated. This evacuation apparently occurred while the Burmese Army was attempting to ford the Salween. This delay gave Lo sufficient time to abandon the area (taking his stocks of morphine and opium with him).

Apparently some time prior to his capture Lo cached his stocks. The cache which may have been recovered by his cohorts has not been discovered by the authorities.

Had the Government of Burma been adequately equipped with helicopters to facilitate their crossing of the Salween River, Lo, himself, his forces and potential allies, and his stocks of opiates would probably have been captured or destroyed.

Of some concern to the study mission is the possibility that any equipment provided by the United States would be used against the insurgents rather than against the narcotics traffickers. It is recognized that the interrelationship between the insurgents and drug traffickers is such that activities against one would include activities against the other. Nevertheless, if the United States does decide to furnish helicopters and other equipment for antinarcotics activities, it should insist that the Burmese Government agree not to use such equipment against insurgents unless they are also engaged in the production of or trafficking in narcotics.

COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY SURVEY

THAILAND

Thailand is the pivotal country in the antinarcotics effort in Southeast Asia because it is both a producer of opium and a conduit for narcotics moving out of Burma and Laos to Hong Kong and eventually to the United States. It is estimated that between 130 and 200 tons of opium are produced by the hill tribes who inhabit the mountainous regions of northern Thailand while unknown quantities of opiates are smuggled into and through Thailand.

The Thai Government has begun to take some meaningful action to stamp out the opium trade. Much more remains to be accomplished. however.

THAI GOVERNMENT ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS

Thailand outlawed the growing of poppies in 1959 and in 1963 organized the Central Bureau of Narcotics under the Director General of the Police Department to enforce the law. Results were disappointing in spite of the fact that manufacturers and traffickers in narcotics were subject to the death penalty and have been since 1961. By late 1970 and early 1971 when the use of heroin by U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam reached epidemic proportions it became evident that Bangkok was the funnel through which passed most of the opiates entering the international market.

In the summer of 1971 the Government of Thailand and the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok conducted a joint study of existing Thai enforcement capabilities with the objective of improving operational effectiveness against the narcotics trafficker.

Meanwhile, in a memorandum of understanding, which was signed on September 28, 1971, the two governments agreed to cooperate in programs designed to meet all facets of the narcotics problem—enforcement, crop substitution, education and rehabilitation and training with priority being given to the enforcement effort.

Subsequently, the Thai Government organized with the backing and financial support of the United States a Special Narcotics Organization (SNO) to operate in northern Thailand.

In the beginning, SNO was beset with political, organizational, bureaucratic, personnel, and equipment problems, but these now seem to have been overcome and SNO in the process of being expanded.

In August 1972, there were 37 officers and men positioned in Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, Fong, Lampong, and Mai Sai. Now, there are 59 officers and men and there are plans to open SNO offices in Tak, Prae, and Bon Phae. This increase in manpower and the opening of three additional offices should make SNO—if it can remain free from political interference—a more effective antinarcotics organization than it has been heretofore.

The improvement in SNO's capability can be appreciated when the seizures made during a 9-month period in 1972 are compared with the seizures made during the first 7 months of 1973. Seizures in 1972 totaled 9,384 pounds or slightly over 4.1 tons while seizures in 1973 totaled 12,665 pounds or approximately 6.1 tons.

SEIZURES OF OPIATES, 1972–73

[In kilograms]

	1972	1973
Raw opium	4,148	11,966.0
Morphine	212	510.0
No. 4 heroin	7	38.5
No. 2 heroin		16.5
Smoking opium	353	124.0
Total	4,720	12,655.0

Note: 1 kilogram equals 2.2 pounds.

While SNO has had some successes, narcotics continue to be smuggled into and through Thailand. There is a growing domestic drug abuse problem, particularly among the youth of the country and governmental officials are deeply concerned.

Owing to the increasing abuse of drugs, the Thai National Police Department created a National Narcotic Suppression Center (PNSC) to improve the efficiency of the antinarcotics effort throughout Thailand on March 19, 1973.

Composed of representatives from 11 different police organizations and divisions, the primary purpose of the PNSC is to supervise, direct, and coordinate the narcotics suppression operations of the police departments throughout Thailand.

It is anticipated that this move will result in a more effective and a more efficient antinarcotics effort in Thailand, particularly if the United States continues to render administrative, training, material and technical and financial support as required.

THE ROLE OF THE CHINESE IRREGULAR FORCES

Much opium enters Thailand by mule caravans escorted by remnants of the 3d and 5th Kuo-min-tang armies which were driven out of China in 1949. Now referred to as Chinese Irregular Forces, these forces under the command of Generals Li and Tuan have operated in southern Burma and northern Thailand for better than 21 years.

In 1972 in its effort to control narcotics traffic, the Thai Government entered into an agreement with the CIF leaders. In return for land to settle on, and eventual Thai citizenship, the CIF agreed to turn over all of their opium stocks.

The United States covertly agreed to help finance the project by turning over 20.8 million baht (almost $1 million) to the Thais who in turn contributed 17 million baht (about $850,000) in Thai Government funds. Subsequently, 26 tons of opium were turned over to the Thai Government.[1]

[1] As things turned out, a 27th ton was refused because there were no funds nor authority to pay for the extra opium; what happened to the 27th ton remains a mystery. And some serious questions remain over the real composition of the 26 tons of purported opium.

A report submitted to the Foreign Affairs Committee on January 11, 1973, in commenting on this agreement with Li and Tuan said that—

> The success of the agreement depends upon whether the Chinese will abide by their part of the bargain and stay out of the opium business. At this point, it is debatable whether the project can succeed. Many CIF officers and men question the wisdom of entering into such an agreement and a large number have refused to accept the conditions of resettlement. According to reliable sources, both Li and Tuan claim that they no longer control those who refused resettlement and that these elements may remain in the opium trade in spite of Li and Tuan.
>
> The possibility that Li and Tuan will continue their activities in the opium trade has occurred to Thai authorities and both the United States and Thai narcotics control communities have the CIF under close surveillance to insure that they abide by the agreement. If the CIF continues to deal in opium the agreement will be null and void and resettlement will be discontinued.

Unfortunately, the promise of land and eventual Thai citizenship have not been sufficient inducement. According to the evidence made available to the study mission in Thailand, both Generals, Li and Tuan, are still involved in opium trafficking in the Golden Triangle.

The current attitude of the Thai Government is that Generals Li and Tuan play only small roles in this traffic and that both have been unable to exercise control over their subordinates and followers.

The tendency to downgrade the role that the CIF plays in narcotics smuggling in Thailand may be motivated by the Thai Government fear of the insurgents that are operating in Thailand. For example, some CIF groups have been given arms and ammunition by the Government of Thailand as a part of the resettlement. According to reliable sources in Bangkok, these groups have been relatively effective against the insurgents. As a result, Thai Government officials are reluctant to take action against Li and Tuan which would weaken the intensification of the Thai effort against the insurgents.

The insurgency in Thailand has also inhibited the Thai crop substitution effort.

Most Thai officials with whom the study mission met are of the opinion that the hill tribe people are a prime target of the Communists. As a result there is a reluctance to force the former to stop growing poppies until such time as a suitable alternate crop has been developed. While this attitude is understandable from the point of view of the Thai Government, it points up the fact that United States diplomatic representatives in Thailand must be more aggressive in their efforts to convince the Thai Government that it cannot solve the narcotics problem unless it is willing to conduct the struggle at every level and on every front.

A way must be found to reduce the availability of heroin. The most effective way to accomplish this is to combine enforcement with a realistic crop substitution program. Evidence suggests that U.S. officials have been slow to realize this, particularly in Thailand, and as a result more emphasis has heretofore been placed upon the enforcement effort than upon crop substitution programs. This situation must be reversed and the search for suitable alternate crops conducted parallel to the enforcement effort.

Even the most efficient enforcement programs in the United States will not keep heroin off the streets of the United States, however. As long as the opium poppy is grown abroad, heroin will be produced.

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EFFORTS TO DEVELOP ALTERNATE CROPS IN THAILAND

Opium cultivation has been illegal in Thailand since 1959. Enforcement of this ban has not been successful and the hill tribes in the mountains of northern Thailand still produce an estimated 130 to 200 tons of opium per year.

In an effort to curtail opium production, the Thai Government has been engaged in several experiments to induce the farmers to substitute other crops such as tea, silkworm, fruit, cabbage, beans or livestock for the opium poppy.

Poppy, however, is grown as a source of cash income. Only a small portion of the opium harvested is consumed by the people themselves, although the amount varies according to family size.

In 1967, and again in 1970, at the request of the Government of Thailand, a United Nations survey team conducted a study of the socioeconomy of the hill tribes of northern Thailand with special reference to the possibility of substituting any suitable crops and occupations for the growing of poppy and the production of opium. As a result of the studies, the U.N. concluded that the prospects for the immediate development of a profitable alternative to the poppy were not encouraging and that a great deal more research and experimentation was required.

Nevertheless, it was recognized that if the hill tribes were forced to stop poppy cultivation, it was essential that a substitute crop be developed.

Consequently, on December 7, 1971, representatives of the Royal Thai Government, the United Nations and the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control (UNFDAC) signed an agreement designed to assist the Thai Government in progressively replacing opium poppy cultivation in northern Thailand by other crops and other economic activities. (For this project, the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control has budgeted an inadequate sum of $2 million to be expended over a 5-year period.) To accomplish this objective a work plan was developed which provided for the selection of five key villages and 25 satellite villages in which initial efforts would be concentrated.

According to the United Nations Special Fund for Drug Abuse Control representatives in Thailand—

> There is very little known at present about the type of crop that will grow well in the mountains of northern Thailand. Until now there has been very little experimentation and there is not much to learn from other parts of the world as the conditions in the project area appear to be quite unique. Experimentation with "annual" crops will be required to be conducted over a period of about 3 years before we can allow for extensive planning by the hill tribes.

The 1973 opium crop was very poor due to unsatisfactory weather conditions. Surveys in the five pilot villages have shown that the price being paid for opium has dropped from between $70 and $90 per rai (2.6 rai=1 acre) to about $35 per rai. Although the price paid to the farmer has dropped, the illicit traffickers continue to realize tremendous profits on the international market.

This, combined with other factors, should be an inducement to the farmer to accept other crops. Poppies are not easy to grow. They are extremely hard on the soil and successive plantings result in lower yields. After a period of 10 or 15 years, the farmer finds it necessary to

move to another area and the "slash and burn" cycle begins once more. Many of the farmers are beginning to realize that the replacement crops now under experimentation will not only permit greater earnings than those realized from opium, but will also enable them to establish permanent dwelling sites.

Once a suitable alternate crop has been developed, the farmer must be able to dispose of his product at a profit. There must be a market for the product and the farmer must be able to get that product to the market. Roads must be built and Thailand's already developed lowland marketing structure must be extended to the hill tribe region. This will require marketing infrastructure development and investment on the part of the Government and Thai merchants. There is already interest from the merchants. From the Government the most necessary assistance would be to establish storage and food processing facilities. This assistance could perhaps be in the form of low-interest loans to interested entrepreneurs. It is still too early to know more precisely where the private sector will need assistance. Market planning however, must begin now. The U.N./Thai project has already undertaken some basic market research but much more extensive research—although this is outside the scope of the U.N./Thai project—will be necessary to allow for adequate infrastructure development and investment planning.

Above all there must be a rational approach to the problem if the mistakes of the past are to be avoided in the future. In some instances where substitute crops have been cultivated, the farmers have had difficulty in transporting and selling the new product. For example, in 1971 some of the hill tribes planted kidney beans. When the beans were ready to be sold, there was no market and the farmers were unable to sell the beans. As a last resort, the United Nations Special Fund for Drug Abuse Control purchased the entire yield, 42.6 tons, for approximately $8,713.55.[2] This is an insignificant sum when one considers that between 1,000 and 1,500 rai were taken out of opium production as a result of the kidney bean project.

It is anticipated that 30 tons of beans will be planted this year with an expected yield of 300 tons to be harvested in February 1974. Representatives of the UNFDAC figure that the total cost of the purchase program will be $100,000, including purchase of the entire crop.

Although the crop substitution program is in the initial stages, the bean situation in Thailand demonstrates one of the most difficult problems facing the U.N. and the Thai Government. The United States, however, cannot be a disinterested bystander since our exposure as a heroin market is so great.

THE UNITED STATES AND CROP SUBSTITUTION PROGRAMS

It was pointed out above that the United States placed more emphasis upon stricter enforcement methods and techniques in Thailand than upon the search for substitute crops. While this decision is understandable, it was nevertheless regrettable. Solution of the narcotics abuse problem must involve an attack upon the poppy fields as well as

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[2] Price was actually 4½ bahts (about 22½ cents) per kilogram. There are 2.2 pounds per kilogram.

against the trafficker. The development of suitable alternate crops and the establishment of a market mechanism takes time and the dimensions of the heroin problem in the United States are such that it was essential to move in the direction that promised the quickest results. Ideally, the best course of action would have been to develop the enforcement and crop substitution programs simultaneously.

According to representatives of the UNFDAC it was originally thought that there would be 5 years before suppression programs would be effective and that there was sufficient time to develop alternate crops. Consequently, there was no sense of urgency surrounding agricultural programs on the part of U.S. narcotics control officials, particularly in the United States.

From the beginning the United Nations had insisted that an integral part of its program was an aerial survey of the poppy growing areas to determine where poppies were being grown. This would have enabled the experts to concentrate their own crops substitution efforts. The aerial survey which was to have been conducted during the dry season in late 1971 and early 1973 was not made, primarily because of a lack of enthusiasm for the project in Washington. Finally, when the funds for the project were approved in Washington, the Thai Government withdrew from the discussions and refused to permit the United States to conduct the survey on the grounds of security.

When Field Marshal Praphat Charusathira, former Deputy Prime Minister, was asked during the study mission visit about the survey, he offered a lame excuse that the Thai Government was in the process of conducting a detailed survey of the entire area, but even if this was a real objection, to restrict it solely to the poppy fields would be wasteful of money which could be put to better use elsewhere. However during the discussions it was learned there was political reasoning behind the refusal. When first asked, the Thai request for assistance was turned down. The Thais considered this to be a slap in the face which prompted them to refuse the second United States proposal.

This is an unfortunate situation. While the current survey will eventually provide the information required regarding poppy cultivation, the United Nations needs the data now. There is a new government in Thailand today and the United States should renew its efforts to get the approval of the Thai Government to conduct such a survey.

The United States should also give consideration to increasing the resources being devoted to crop substitution programs in Thailand. The agreement reached with the United Nations in 1971 was that the United States concentrate upon enforcement while the U.N. would focus on substitution programs.

U.N. funds are scarce, however. The contributions of member countries to the Drug Abuse Fund has been disappointing and of the approximately $10.1 million pledged or paid in as of October 31, 1973, the United States has contributed $8 million. It is obvious that the U.N. Drug Abuse Fund is in fact a U.S. fund. The United States should, therefore, insist that the U.N. provide additional resources to the crop substitution effort in Thailand. Failing this, the United States must follow through on its discussions with the Thai Government and work out a realistic bilateral program with the Thais.

It was brought to the attention of the study mission that the United States was not able to assist in the development of alternate crops if these crops were surplus in the United States.

Upon return to the United States, contact was made with the Department of Agriculture and with the Agency for International Development in an effort to determine the accuracy of this statement.

It was learned as a matter of policy, the United States has generally refrained from supporting programs designed to increase the yield of crops which the United States exports, particularly cotton, peanuts, and tobacco. The United States sells tobacco to Thailand and as a result, the U.S. Department of Agriculture representative in Chiang Mai has not participated in the effort to experiment with tobacco in northern Thailand.

It is the understanding of the study mission that the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok has been given authority to enter negotiations with the Thai Government to determine how the United States can give further assistance to crop substitution programs in northern Thailand.

Hopefully, the talks will lead to a firm U.S. commitment to support such programs with the same enthusiasm that has heretofore been given to making the enforcement effort more effective.

U.S. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION IN THAILAND

The contemplated expansion of SNO and the large number of Thai agencies involved in narcotics suppression activities has created personnel problems for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration in Thailand. There are not enough agents to coordinate or to give counsel to all of the Thai agencies required. Few of the agents speak Thai. In fact, this is a general shortcoming throughout the Pacific area. Only a handful of agents speak the local languages, which is a great problem in law enforcement abroad.

The Southeast Asia regional office is located in Bangkok and there are 22 agents stationed in Thailand, Laos, South Vietnam, Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong—

South Vietnam	3
Hong Kong	3
Laos	2
Thailand	11
Bangkok	(8)
Chiang Mai	(3)
Singapore	2
Malaysia	1

The regional director told the study team that he needed a minimum of 12 additional agents for Thailand alone to hold established programs together and to have enough agents to work nationwide with the Thai enforcement agencies. Five of them would be stationed in Bangkok, five in Chiang Mai, and two in Songkhla near the Malaysia border.[3]

In addition, he said that more agents should be authorized for Malaysia.

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[3] The study mission has been advised that the Cabinet Committee on Drug Control has authorized an additional 20 DEA agents for Thailand.

Relations between the U.S. agencies responsible for antinarcotics activities in Thailand appear to be harmonious. There are many complaints, however, that the Agency for International Development has been exceedingly slow to react to requests for narcotics assistance from the host countries. This situation must be corrected in the United States.

If the United States is to wage a successful struggle against drug abuse, it needs the cooperation of the governments throughout the world, particularly in Southeast Asia. To get this cooperation, however, the United States must convince those governments that it considers the war against heroin to be of the highest national priority and that the United States will use every weapon in its arsenal to stop the illegal production of, and trafficking in narcotics.

An essential element in this process is a willingness to furnish the necessary assistance, without delays brought about by bureaucratic procedures and disagreements as to the need for particular kinds of assistance among individuals in the United States.

LAOS

Prior to the cease-fire agreement the Royal Laotian Government appeared to be making an effort to control the production of and trafficking in opiates although there was and are indications that several members of the Laotian National Assembly, and other military and government leaders may be involved in narcotics smuggling. Therefore, the situation in Laos may not be as satisfactory as some U.S. officials believe. Nevertheless, the Laotian Government has the frame within which to build an effective antinarcotics effort, providing the will is there.

On January 2, 1971 the Government established the Groupe Speciale d'Investigation to direct and coordinate implementation of the narcotics laws and placed one of its most reliable officers in charge, the Laos Chief of Intelligence, Maj. Gen. Khamhou Boussanath, who reports directly to the Prime Minister.

Gen. Khamhou is a hard-working, dedicated officer who has encountered some difficulty in bringing suspected narcotics offenders to trial. On June 6, 1972, for example, a deputy in the national assembly, Moua Xu was arrested with 9½ kilos (approximately 21 pounds of heroin) and 26 kilos (57 pounds) of opium. According to Laotian law deputies in the national assembly are immune from prosecution as long as the assembly is in session. Therefore, Moua Xu was not scheduled for trial at least until after the assembly ended in November 1972.

Moua Xu who is free today has not been brought to trial. Instead the Assembly has censured Gen. Khamhou for his actions in arresting a deputy of the national assembly.

When questioned about this situation, officials at the U.S. Embassy were unable to explain why Moua Xu had not been brought to trial. Unfortunately, the general opinion was that he never would be tried.

This is inexcusable. If the antinarcotics effort is to be successful those engaged in narcotics activities must be apprehended and brought to trial immediately. There cannot be a double standard in the enforcement of the law, one for the people and one for the privileged few. As long as Moua Xu remains free, others will be encouraged to engage in drug smuggling activities. Officials at the U.S. mission in Laos should make it clear to the Laotian Government that failure to try Moua Xu is regarded as a serious matter by the United States and a setback in the struggle against the drug traffickers. Every effort should be made to encourage the Government of Laos to bring Moua Xu to trial as an example to other would-be offenders that there is no escape from real justice.

In addition to the establishment of the Groupe Speciale d'Investigation, the national assembly enacted a comprehensive antinarcotics law banning all opium transactions in Laos. (This law became effective on November 15, 1972.)

The Government also placed a prohibition on the importation of acetic anhydride (an essential ingredient in the production of heroin), a step which has undoubtedly made it more difficult to produce heroin in Laos.

OPIUM PRODUCTION IN LAOS

Little is known about current opium production in Laos. The Department of State estimates that production may be about 30 tons per year, a substantial reduction from the 100–150 tons thought to have been produced annually before hostilities began in the early 1960's. Narcotics officials believe that most of the opium is consumed by the hill tribes who grow it. These estimates must be accepted with caution. There is little known about the quantity of opium that is produced in the Communist held territory or what happens to it. Production could be considerable and the Pathet Lao and its allies could be using opium to purchase arms, ammunition, and other necessities for war.

Now that a cease-fire has been reached, every effort must be made to gain the cooperation of the Pathet Lao and to encourage them to enforce the antinarcotics laws. The war against drugs is not an ideological struggle; it is humanitarian in nature and must not be restrained by political or other considerations.

HEROIN PRODUCTION IN LAOS

Heroin has been produced in Laos in the past. On August 2, 1971 a laboratory was seized at Houei Phee Lork just north of Ban Houei Sai along the Mekong in the heart of the Golden Triangle. In addition, an opium producing laboratory was found abandoned at Bon Houei Tap which was reportedly owned by former Chief of the Imperial General Staff and currently a deputy to the National Assembly, Gen Ouan Rathikoun, representing Luang Prabang Province.

There have also been unsubstantiated rumors that heroin laboratories are located in Luang Prabang, Pakse, Vientiane, and Long Cheng.

Laotian and United States authorities did not believe that heroin was being produced in Laos at the time the study mission was in Vientienne.

This assessment was by no means unanimous. Many U.S. officials were of the opinion that the heroin producers and traffickers whose operations in Burma and northern Thailand had been somewhat disrupted were moving into Laos north of Ban Houei Sai. There is little or no government presence in that area and the rugged jungle terrain makes effective antinarcotics operations extremely difficult if not impossible.

The Laotian Government has a number of outposts along the Mekong River from which surveillance operations are conducted by river, overland, and by air. To assist, the United States has seven Customs agents working with the Laotians. Unfortunately, a decision was made in October to reduce this number to four by February 1974. This, despite a vigorous effort by the U.S. Customs agents in Laos to prevent the reduction in personnel.

This decision should be reviewed. The situation in Laos is such that the United States must demonstrate its willingness to cooperate not by weakening its efforts but by expanding them.

There is sufficient evidence to suggest that the antinarcotics effort is less than wholehearted. The failure to deal with Moua Xu and the fact that several members of the National Assembly, and other governmental leaders, who may be involved in the illegal production of, and trafficking in opiates, seem to be untouchable, particularly Gen. Ouan Rathikoun, tends to support the claim that the Government of Laos lacks the skill, or strength, to deal with the narcotics problem.

The United States continues to support the Royal Laotian Government against the Pathet Laos and its allies. American lives have been lost in the struggle to insure the survival of the Royal Laotian Government. As a result the United States has a right to expect that government to prosecute the fight against narcotics with every weapon that it takes, including the apprehension and imprisonment of those engaged in illegal narcotics activities regardless of their station in life, or position in government.

At the same time the United States must be willing to support those elements in Laos that are working to combat illegal trafficking in drugs. For example, General Khamhou has made many enemies in high places because of his antinarcotics activity and any weakening of the U.S. antinarcotics effort in Laos could jeopardize his position and possibly his life.

The situation in Laos is murkey because of the uncertainties created as a result of the cease-fire. Now is not the time to let up—now is the time for the United States to exert diplomatic, economic, and moral pressures on the Royal Government of Laos to insure an all-out struggle against the narcotics traffic. Halfhearted enforcement is not adequate and partial success is not satisfactory.

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PHILIPPINES

At present there are about 10,000 heroin addicts in the Philippines, although it is estimated that as many as 150,000 to 200,000 are using some kind of drug. In addition to heroin, the principal drugs of choice are morphine, demeral, mandrax, seconal and other barbiturates, amphetamines, tranquilizers, and LSD.

Philippine authorities are also greatly concerned with the increasing use of marihuana and hashish which they regard as great a menace as opiates, amphetamines, and barbiturates.

Originally, addiction was almost totally confined to the Chinese population in the Philippines. Presently, however, the number of Chinese addicts appears to have decreased with a corresponding alarming increase in the number of Filipino addicts. A large percentage of these are between the ages of 15 and 22. Over 60 percent have criminal records and most drop out of school between the 3d and 11th grades.

SOURCE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS

The Government of the Philippines has organized well for the struggle against narcotics, although there are some law enforcement problems.

The geographical features of the Philippines consisting of more than 7,000 islands together with its long irregular coastline provide hidden avenues of approach that the narcotics trafficker can use to his advantage.

Access to the islands is also facilitated by the numerous airports and seaports which are located in all parts of the country.

According to the evidence, arrests and seizure reports, opium and morphine base are smuggled into the Philippines from Southeast Asia. An unknown quantity of hallucinogenics enters from the United States, especially LSD.

Smuggling is endemic in the Philippines and narcotics are generally smuggled along established avenues of approach. Organized criminal elements are known to use international air carriers, ocean-going vessels, couriers and the postal system throughout the Philippines. An unknown quantity enters through Mindanao from Sabah, Indonesia, where neither government exercises effective control.

HEROIN PRODUCTION IN THE PHILIPPINES

There is no evidence that opium poppies are cultivated in the Philippines although heroin has been processed from opium and morphine which has been smuggled into the islands.

In January 1973 a heroin laboratory was seized, the Chinese chemist and owner, Lin Hsing Sok, arrested, and approximately 22 kilos (47.25 lbs.) of No. 4 heroin confiscated. Lin Hsing Sok was preparing heroin for shipment to the United States when captured and sentenced

to death. Before Lin Hsing Sok was executed for his narcotics activities, he admitted to a reliable source that he had trained at least 20 other chemists.

U.S. narcotics officials do not consider the Philippines to be a major source of, or transshipment point for, heroin destined for the United States at the present time although there may be several herion laboratories operating in the Manila area and on Luzon.

There is no complacency however. There is little doubt that the Philippines has the potential to become a serious problem area for the United States. Air and sea traffic is increasing, an incipient insurgency, particularly in Mindanao, inhibits antismuggling activity, and the possibility that there may be a number of laboratories producing heroin combine to create a feeling that it may be only a matter of time before the international narcotics trafficker decides to use the Philippines to supply the heroin addict in the United States.

Fortunately, the U.S. Embassy narcotics control team in Manila is aware of this problem and is working closely with the Philippine Government to make narcotics suppression even more effective.

THE ENFORCEMENT EFFORT

On March 30, 1972 the Philippine Government strengthened the legislation dealing with narcotics to meet the increase in drug abuse. Known as the Dangerous Drug Act, the law provides stiff penalties including the death sentence for the production, possession, manufacture and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs. Moreover, it provides for speedy prosecution of the accused.

The statute also provides for the establishment of a Dangerous Drug Board to act as coordinating agent of the Government in the effort to effectively control narcotic and dangerous drug abuse. The Board consists of:

a. Department of Justice through the National Bureau of Investigation.

b. Department of National Defense through:

(1) Philippine Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU);

(2) Philippine Coast Guard.

c. Department of Finance through:

(1) Bureau of Customs;

(2) Bureau of Internal Revenue;

(3) Anti-Smuggling Action Center (ASAC).

d. Police commission through the local police forces.

e. Department of Health through the Food and Drug Administration.

By law, the overall coordinator for all narcotic programs, educational rehabilitation and enforcement conducted by all military and civilian agencies is the Dangerous Drugs Board, composed of the six secretaries from Malacanang, chaired by the Secretary of Health. Interagency coordination on enforcement matters is in the embryonic stage but is developing.

There is no combined coordinated narcotic intelligence network. However, a master narcotic intelligence plan has been introduced by the National Bureau of Investigation. The Dangerous Drugs Board

and CANU are in the process of studying this proposal for adoption for use in the Philippines.

NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND ANTI-SMUGGLING ACTION CENTER

There are two national agencies actively engaged in narcotic law enforcement. They are the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and the Anti-Smuggling Action Center (ASAC). The NBI now has five agents assigned full time to narcotics duties. They also have 10 in the U.S. Public Safety training program and 10 more planned for a total of 25. While much of the work of NBI is done in the Manila area, it also operates throughout the country and independently or in conjunction with local police units.

The Anti-Smuggling Action Center is a national agency created to target organizations or individuals who are bringing taxable goods into and out of the Philippines without paying the tax and duty. Its investigations include illegal logging, hot cars, gun running, and narcotics. At present 15 five-man teams are devoting 25 percent of their time to the narcotics problem.

These two units report to the Secretaries of Justice and Finance respectively on narcotics cases. In addition there are over 1,500 independent municipal and police departments throughout the Republic (to augment the NBI and ASAC). The Public Safety Division training program has since late 1971 concentrated on 24 selected departments. Each have one or more five-man narcotic enforcement teams trained and equipped under the aegis of the mission narcotic effort. A third antinarcotics enforcement agency is the Philippine Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit.

THE PHILIPPINE CONSTABULARY

The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration's direct counterpart agency in their operational functions is the Philippine Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU). CANU's actual strength is 138 enlisted men and 29 officers. The commander of CANU reports to the secretary of national defense through the chief of constabulary and is not subordinate to any police agency. The constabulary is considered as the national police force. Also, it is one of the four branches of the armed forces.

The government plans to expand the constabulary from 5 to 20 narcotic field teams, deploying 4 teams in Mindanao, 4 in the Visayas and 12 in Luzon. Each team will consist of two officers and three enlisted men. Future plans call for the training of all constabulary personnel in drug identification and the training of all CANU members and selected police officers from throughout the Republic in narcotic enforcement investigations. The Government also intends to continue participating in the overseas narcotic training programs offered to them by the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Colombo Plan, World Health Organization, United Nations Development Programme, and other agencies.

When CANU was created, it was short of equipment, weapons, vehicles and communications. While this situation has changed, there is

still a shortage of radios in particular. The CANU commander requested assistance from the United States in early 1973. At the time the study team was in the Philippines in August the equipment had not been delivered. This fact was commented on by several U.S. antinarcotics officials who complained that delays in furnishing equipment could result in a weakened antinarcotics program in the Philippines.

Unfortunately, the failure of the United States to deliver narcotics control assistance when requested is not peculiar to the Philippines. A similar situation exists in Latin America and elsewhere in Southeast Asia.

Experience suggests that this shortcoming is a result of procrastination and bureaucratic delay in Washington. It is inexcusable. The United States has asked these countries to cooperate in a worldwide attack on narcotics and failure to provide equipment or to delay decisions minimizes the U.S. commitment in the eyes of governmental leaders in precisely those countries where the United States needs the greatest amount of cooperation.

A way must be found to insure that narcotics assistance is made available as needed.

U.S. AID PROGRAM

U.S. programs in the Philippines are designed to assist selected narcotics law enforcement agencies to control the production, sale, and use of narcotics and dangerous drugs by providing training and equipment. The U.S. aid programs for 1972 and 1973 are compared with the estimated fiscal year 1974 programs in the following table:

	1972	1973	1974
Technicians	0	$29,000	$35,000
Participants	$60,000	0	53,000
Commodities	170,000	208,000	180,000
Contract		12,000	12,000
Other		1,000	25,000
Total	230,000	250,000	305,000

The funding levels in fiscal year 1972 helped to equip 16 five-man narcotics control teams. The equipment consisted of (per team) one vehicle, communications equipment, five revolvers, one typewriter (per city), one camera (per city), five handcuffs, one binocular, two narcotic field test kits and reference books. In fiscal year 1973 the same commodity package was provided for an additional 31 teams, making a total of 47 five-man teams for 24 cities and the National Bureau of Investigation.

In addition, the United States plans to furnish equipment for two narcotics identification laboratories which the National Bureau of Investigation is establishing in Cebu and Zaboanga.

The United States has approximately 15,000 servicemen stationed in the Philippines. The drug situation among those forces will be discussed in a separate part of the report dealing with U.S. Military Forces.

REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Heretofore the Republic of China (GRC) has not figured prominently in international narcotics trafficking either as a market or as a transshipment point. This situation has resulted from a combination of strong antinarcotics legislation, an effective enforcement effort, and stringent antidrug laws which allow the death penalty to be imposed for the sale, manufacturing, or transportation of narcotics.

There is a possibility, however, that the international trafficker may attempt to convert Taiwan into a transshipment point from elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Enforcement throughout Southeast Asia has disrupted traditional smuggling patterns, and the international trafficker is undoubtedly looking for new smuggling routes. Taiwan could be a possible alternate.

The most serious problem currently facing the Government of the Republic of China is a shortage of trained officers capable of conducting effective narcotics search and seizure operations.

Because of the possibility that the international trafficker may attempt to use Taiwan as a conduit for smuggling opiates, it is important that this shortcoming be corrected. In an effort to help, the U.S. Diplomatic Mission in Taipei requested basic narcotics training for some GRC officials. The request was turned down because Taiwan was a low-priority area. Furthermore, the U.S. mission was told that the possibility of obtaining such training in the future was doubtful.

Although the study team agrees that Taiwan does not today play as great a role in the illegal trafficking in narcotics as Thailand, Laos, or Hong Kong, it is our judgment that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure and that the time to train Chinese officials is before a real problem develops, not after. The decision not to obligate funds needed to bring Chinese officers up to the desired level of professionalism should be reconsidered.

UNITED STATES-GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA COOPERATION

Cooperation between the United States and the GRC on narcotics suppression could not be better. There have been a number of arrests and seizures made as a result of that cooperation.

The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration does not have a permanent agent stationed in Taiwan. Tiawan is currently being covered by one agent from Manila on a temporary duty basis. This is an unsatisfactory arrangement and should be corrected. The effects that this could engender and the expertise that the DEA would make available to the GRC make it imperative that the United States take steps to open a DEA office in Taiwan.

There is one significant disagreement between the United States and the Republic of China in the narcotics area and that is over the role

that People's Republic of China plays in the illegal production of and trafficking in opiates, particularly heroin.

THE ROLE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

There is no reliable evidence that we have been able to uncover that the People's Republic of China (PRC) has engaged in or sanctioned export of opium or its derivatives, or of PRC involvement in the opium trade in Southeast Asia. The PRC has officially prohibited the production, consumption, and distribution of opiates.

The PRC adopted stringent control over opium production and use in February 1950. The law enacted at that time banned private importation, processing, and sale of opium and other narcotics. Government-controlled production continues, and small quantities of raw opium and poppy husks are legally exported from time to time. The tight political control exercised by the PRC Government over its citizens has probably made enforcement of such laws effective in most areas of the country.

Through control over opium production and trade in southern border areas of the PRC, particularly Yunnan Province, have been made difficult, there is no confirmed evidence that the PRC is illicitly exporting opium or its derivatives across its borders, despite occasional reports of cross-border movements of opiates between PRC and Southeast Asia.

Nevertheless, there are persistent rumors and allegations that the PRC is deeply involved in illegal international narcotics trafficking. These charges emanate from several sources, including the Government of the Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and from refugees from the mainland.

Since the late 1950's, the GRC has insisted that the Chinese Communists were deeply involved in illegal international narcotics trafficking.

Supporting this position have been statements by a number of refugees who have fled the PRC. One such individual, Miss Yuan Moun-Ru, a political refugee from mainland China, who told the Subcommitee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 17, 1972, that she saw the Chinese Communists Liberation Army growing opium. She further stated that, "It is illegal to sell opium or other narcotics in Communist China, although a blackmarket in opium exists. The Government controls all the opium for exports, especially for the United States."

Another was Mr. Wu Shu-jen who escaped from the PRC in 1971. On July 10, 1973, Wu testified before the House of Representatives Committee on Internal Security, Subcommittee on the Theory and Practice of Communism, that poppies were grown on collective farms and that he had been told that heroin was produced in a laboratory in Canton for export.

U.S. narcotics officials cannot verify these reports. The official U.S. Government position has been outlined by the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control in the World Opium Survey, 1972. In that document, the Cabinet Committee stated:

> There is no reliable evidence that China has either engaged in or sanctioned the illicit export of opium and its derivatives nor are there any indications of

government participation in the opium trade of Southeast Asia and adjacent markets. British authorities in Hong Kong believe that most of the opium and related narcotics seized in Hong Kong in recent years comes into the colony by sea from Southeast Asia.

This was also the conclusion of U.S. officials in Southeast Asia in August 1973.

Nor have British authorities in Hong Kong been able to obtain evidence that any of the opium or its derivatives entering Hong Kong originates in the People's Republic of China.

However, as long as the PRC adopts the aloof attitude they have in the past, and refuses to cooperate with the United States and the United Nations in the combined effort to stop the illegal traffic in narcotics, there will be continuing suspicion that the PRC is involved.

The Government of the People's Republic of China could remove great doubt and reduce the suspicion that it is engaged in illegal international narcotics by becoming a signatory of the Single Convention in Narcotics, by making full and complete reports to the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) relative to the production and disposition of opium in China, and by contributing to the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control. Solution to the narcotics problem requires positive action not pious platitudes about being against drug abuse.

In particular, the PRC should initiate vigorous measures to prevent trawlers from unloading opium in Chinese-controlled waters.

It should be pointed out that the finger of suspicion has also been pointed at the Republic of China by the Government of Burma, who accused the GRC of sending over 1,400 agents of the Intelligence Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense (IBMND) into eastern Burma. According to a spokeman for the Burmese Government, the IBMND agents gave money and arms to Khakweyei groups in the Shan State and engineered a triple alliance between Lo Hsing Han, remmants of the 3d KMT Army, and the Hkun Hsa Khakweyei group who together planned and carried out the kidnapping of two Russian doctors.

The Burmese also charged that some IBMND agents are in contact with other Chinese, many of whom are unscrupulous drug traders, smugglers, black marketeers, and vice kings.

A spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense, General Li Chang Hao, vigorously denied the allegations that Chinese intelligence agents are working in Burma.

The study team was unable to determine the authenticity of these allegations, or the fate of the two Russian doctors.

JAPAN

The Japanese have an effective narcotics and dangerous drug suppression program. The laws are strict and enforcement vigorous.

Recently, the abuse of hallucinogenic drugs such as cannabis and LSD and organic solvents such as thinner and glues have been increasing among the younger generation, as has the use of sleeping pills, tranquilizers, and stimulants.

Japan does not produce opium or its derivatives, except for a small, controlled quantity for experimental purposes. However, Japan does play a role in the international narcotics picture. As a major world producer of chemicals it is a source of chemicals required to produce heroin in Golden Triangle refineries, particularly acetic anhydride. As a major crossroads in the Far East, its seaports and airports provide a potential conduit through which drugs can be routed to the United States.

ACETIC ANHYDRIDE

Acetylation is the key process in converting morphine base to heroin and can be accomplished by using either acetyl chloride or acetic anhydride. Acetyl chloride is flammable, irritating to the eyes, reacts violently with water or alcohol, and requires careful handling in laboratory processes. Although acetic anhydride is corrosive and requires care in handling, it is less hazardous to the user than acetyl chloride and hence is the preferred chemical used in illicit processing.

Enormous quantities of acetic anhydride are produced annually in the world's industrial countries. U.S. output alone was on the order of 750,000 tons in 1973, with comparable amounts being produced in Western Europe and Japan.

Acetic anhydride is relatively inexpensive. Recent prices range from 21 cents per kilogram in the United States, to 26 cents in France, to 39 cents in Japan. Between 80 and 90 percent of the world output is used to manufacture synthetic fibers, with the remainder going to pharmaceutical compounds, primarily for the manufacture of aspirin. It is also used to produce plastics, perfumes, flavoring materials, and dyestuffs. As a general rule, the production of 1 kilogram of heroin requires 1 kilogram of acetic anhydride. Given the chemical's abundance and cheapness, both the quantity and value of acetic anhydride used in illicit narcotic production is miniscule. These factors make government monitoring and control of acetic anhydride production and distribution difficult in industrialized countries.

In a report on the acetic anhydride situation in Japan a staff survey team reported to the Foreign Affairs Committee that given Japan's role as a primary producer of acetic anhydride for Southeast Asia's heroin laboratories, the U.S. Government should request the Government of Japan to adopt procedures to identify producers, exporters, and purchasers of this vital chemical.

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This question was of primary interest to the Study Mission during our visit to Japan.

ACETIC ANHYDRIDE—THE CURRENT SITUATION

The Japanese Government does not exercise control over the export of acetic anhydride, primarily because the Japanese Government does not consider acetic anhydride to be a precursor of heroin or to be a controlled substance. In the opinion of Japanese officials it is easier to monitor and to control the importation of acetic anhydride than it is to control and monitor its exportation.

According to the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, in Tokyo, there are only four companies producing acetic anhydride in Japan, as follows: Chisso Corp.; Teijin, Ltd.; Daicel, Ltd.; and Nippon Synthetic Chemical Industry Co., Ltd.

In 1972, these four companies produced 103,721 tons of acetic anhydride. Approximately 90 percent of the total production was consumed by the producing companies while about 8.6 percent was sold to wholesalers in Japan. A small amount of acetic anhydride, 159.2 tons (about 1.4 percent) was exported to the following four countries:

Country	Tons	Imported
Korea	107	
Taiwan	45	
New Zealand	6	
Hong Kong	1.2	
Total	159.2	

In comparison, the United States exported approximately 280 tons of acetic anhydride in 1972 out of a total production of 750,000 tons. This represents approximately 65 percent of total world production of 1,105,000 tons.

Like Japan, the United States does not control the production or exportation of acetic anhydride although export data is available from the Department of Commerce.

The fact that the United States does not control the export of acetic anhydride put U.S. diplomatic and narcotics officials in Tokyo at a disadvantage when they discussed the need to monitor the production and exportation of the chemical.

The Japanese simply asked "why would the Japanese do anything to control acetic anhydride if the United States doesn't."

In spite of this attitude, the study team was instrumental in getting pertinent information relative to the production and exportation of acetic anhydride in and from Japan. Of even greater significance the study team was advised by representatives from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry and that in the future this data would be made available to the U.S. mission in Tokyo on a regular basis.

The study team recognizes that it would be almost impossible to control the export of acetic anhydride and that only a minute quantity is required to produce heroin. For example, it takes approximately 1 ton of acetic anhydride to produce 1 ton of heroin. Thus only 10 to 12

tons of acetic anhydride would be required to produce the estimated 10 to 12 tons of heroin consumed in the United States annually, that is, less than .001 of a percentage of total world production.

Nevertheless, a concentrated effort should be made to compile export data with respect to shipments of acetic anhydride including the destination and recipients, whether such shipments are made to manufacturers or wholesalers, and insofar as possible, what disposition is made by importers and users of acetic anhydride. Parallel with these measures, the United States should initiate diplomatic steps to induce all producers of acetic anhydride to adopt procedures to compile the same data with respect to the disposition, use, and export of the chemical. The International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) adopted a resolution calling for international cooperation in monitoring the exportation of acetic anhydride at the 42nd General Assembly in Vienna in October 1973. (See appendix 1.)

Success in this endeavor, however, will also require the cooperation of trade, industry, and commercial agencies in every country that produces-acetic anhydride and a coordinated intelligence effort to identify the importers of acetic anhydride.

In order to determine the willingness of the producers in such a program, the study team has written to the major producers of acetic anhydride in the United States requesting their views. Unfortunately, the answers have not been satisfactory.

HONG KONG

The British Crown Colony of Hong Kong occupies a critical position in the world narcotic problems. It serves as a conduit, processing point, and market for opiates originating in the Golden Triangle. In addition Hong Kong is a primary source of the chemists who process raw opium into morphine base, and heroin, in clandestine laboratories in the Golden Triangle and in Hong Kong.

The well organized criminal groups that exist in the Ch'ao Chu community provide the organization and financing required in the production of, and trafficking in narcotics throughout Southeast Asia.

The enforcement of antinarcotics legislation in Hong Kong is extremely difficult. Hong Kong, which is widely used as an international free port, provides the trafficker with an excellent transshipment point for heroin and other drugs to their ultimate destination.

Over 20 million tons of cargo either originates in, enters or passes through Hong Kong each year. There are more than 7,000 oceangoing vessels entering the Hong Kong area annually and over 30,000 smaller boats, including junks, operate in the adjacent waters or in the waters off the Chinese mainland. Compounding the enforcement problem is the fact that over 1 million airline passengers move through Hong Kong annually. Customs inspections, which are difficult under the best of circumstances, cover a relatively small number of travelers and transients and cargo. There is little doubt that an unknown quantity of heroin passes through the Hong Kong Airport, destined for the United States.

Because of the great volume of ocean and air freight and traffic freight through Hong Kong, British and U.S. officials in Hong Kong told the study mission that it is impossible to determine if narcotics in any large amounts are being transshipped through Hong Kong to the United States. According to a high ranking U.S. Consulate official, an extensive investigation by U.S. and Hong Kong narcotics enforcement officials failed to uncover any evidence to indicate that Hong Kong "is a major center of drug trafficking to the United States."

In the opinion of the study mission the inability to determine the quantity being smuggled to the United States is an intelligence gap which is inexcusable and one that must be filled quickly.

This lack of intelligence points out the need to establish a narcotics intelligence organization in Hong Kong which will be able to utilize the resources of all intelligence collection elements in the Hong Kong Government.

Such an organization would enable Hong Kong authorities to deal more effectively with the narcotics addicts' problem in Hong Kong and would make a valuable contribution to the worldwide struggle against drug abuse.

Intelligence on the activities of the narcotics trafficker is essential if the struggle against him is to be successful. That intelligence must

also be shared with other antinarcotics enforcement agencies throughout the world. A gap such as exists in Hong Kong weakens the entire suppression effort.

SYNDICATES' CONTROL OF DRUGS IN HONG KONG

The arrival of and wholesale distribution of drugs in Hong Kong are controlled primarily by five large syndicates with the leadership protected by family loyalty and an organizational structure that enables them to share in the profits without getting involved in the operation. Heroin refineries, which are not always directly controlled by the syndicates, are small and spread throughout the densely populated area, usually on the upper floor where the odor cannot be detected without scientific equipment which is not yet available.

To deal with the syndicates Hong Kong authorities should organize undercover operations to penetrate and destroy these organizations.

It is believed that the smuggling of narcotics from Hong Kong is conducted by individuals and organizations independent of these syndicates, but nobody is quite certain. For example, some U.S. and Canadian traffickers and some servicemen have been arrested after buying No. 4 heroin from different local sources. It is also likely that an unknown number of the approximately 1 million air travelers using the Hong Kong airport also carry narcotics through en route to the United States.

THE HONG KONG DRUG ANTINARCOTICS EFFORT

The use of opiates has been illegal in Hong Kong for over 30 years. Nevertheless, Hong Kong has one of the largest opium addict populations in the world. Estimates range from 80,000 to 100,000 and even as high as 150,000. Most are users of opium although a substantial number use No. 3 smoking heroin. According to Hong Kong authorities, very few addicts inject No. 4 heroin although it is possible that many either smoke or sniff No. 4 heroin.

This large market is supplied from Southeast Asia, particularly from Thailand. While some morphine and heroin is smuggled by air the bulk enters in the form of opium and morphine aboard trawlers from Thailand. It is processed into the drug of choice for the user in the many clandestine laboratories that are located in Hong Kong and its environs.

As recently as 1971 there was little focus on international narcotics trafficking by the Hong Kong Government. Hong Kong was more concerned with its own drug abuse problems, and was of the opinion that it was capable of solving its drug abuse problem without outside assistance.

By mid-1972 it had become apparent that Hong Kong played a significant role in the illegal international traffic in narcotics. Even more obvious was the fact that Hong Kong authorities could not solve their own narcotics problem through local police measures alone and that there was a need for cooperation with other governments.

To cope with this multipronged problem the Hong Kong Government created the post of Commissioner of Narcotics in mid-1972 and

named Mr. N. G. Rolph (then Deputy Commissioner of Police) to fill the post.

To push the fight against narcotics Hong Kong authorities have increased the size of the Narcotics Bureau from 100 to 200. On the international level, Hong Kong officials are in the process of creating a mechanism for closer cooperation with the governments of Southeast Asia and in June convened an international meeting (United States, United Kingdom, Hong Kong) to discuss various aspects of the narcotics problem in Southeast Asia.

Two of the more important topics discussed related to:

(1) Determining what measures should be undertaken to control the trawler traffic; and

(2) How best to obtain the cooperation of the People's Republic of China in curbing illicit traffic in opium in Chinese coastal waters.

Thai trawlers have been a constant problem for Hong Kong authorities. The vessels usually transfer their deadly cargo in international waters off the Chinese mainland where it is picked up by junk and other small vessels and carried into Hong Kong for distribution.[1]

Recently the trawler traffic appears to have been interrupted.[2]

While there is no official explanation as to the reason for this stoppage, many authorities believe that stepped-up enforcement efforts in Thailand and the recent capture of two trawlers by the South Vietnamese has caused the traffickers to reassess the situation. The result of this has had a definite impact in Hong Kong.

On August 1, 1973, British enforcement officials said that no opium had entered Hong Kong for 7 weeks and the opium stocks had been depleted. Morphine base was in short supply and the price had increased to over $1,000 per pound, an increase of about 214 percent. Hong Kong authorities also said that there was a shortage of opium and heroin and that the cost of opium was up 35 percent; No. 3 heroin 65 percent and No. 4 heroin had increased in price by 100 percent. Furthermore, the heroin content was down and the opium diluted.

Most officials, United States and British, are of the opinion that this situation is only temporary. The profits are too great and it is expected that the international trafficker will either reorganize in Thailand or move his operations to other areas of Southeast Asia.

Every effort should be made to prevent the trawler traffic from resuming. The United States should encourage the Thai Government to prohibit Thai registered trawlers from passing above the 10th parallel unless specifically authorized by the Thai Government. Any unauthorized vessel above that line would be subject to interception.

The United States should also propose a conference of Southeast Asian nationals to mark out an international agreement with the Thai Government permitting the governments of the area to stop, search, and seize if necessary unauthorized Thai trawlers in waters above the 10th parallel.

Air surveillance of the waters surrounding Hong Kong should also be continued and if possible the number of flights increased.

Above all, the People's Republic of China must be made aware that it has a responsibility to the nations of the world to cooperate in

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[1] There are unsubstantiated reports that some of the trawlers drop their cargo in People's Republic of China waters near the Lema Islands.

[2] According to U.S. narcotics control officials the last Thai registered trawler departed for Hong Kong on June 4, 1973.

efforts to help end the production of and trafficking in narcotics and other dangerous drugs.

UNITED STATES-HONG KONG COOPERATION

According to U.S. officials in Hong Kong there is an increasingly close working relationship between U.S. officers, particularly DEA agents and Hong Kong officials. "During the past 2 years we have never been refused assistance, investigations information, and cooperation which we have requested from the Hong Kong Narcotics Bureau, the customs service, and other authorities in Hong Kong," said one U.S. official.

The authorities in Hong Kong have also been cooperative in helping U.S. military officials put an end to the number of deaths resulting from an overdose of drugs.

There were six such deaths among U.S. military personnel in 1972 and one in early 1973 and it was evident that the situation was getting out of hand.

A coordinated program was adopted which involved the use of U.S. naval personnel under charges of narcotics offenses as informants and intensified briefings on the evils of drugs on board U.S. naval vessels before personnel were permitted to go on leave. Hong Kong authorities cooperated by taking steps to break up the distribution process by arresting the bar girls and pimps who were pushing the drugs and by concentrating the enforcement effort in the Ch'ao Chu area where drugs were being pushed.

The study team agrees that cooperation on the part of Hong Kong authorities has gotten better. We believe, however, that cooperation could be improved. For example, Hong Kong authorities permit U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents to act only in an informational and advisory capacity. This is a waste of a valuable resource and demonstrates at least a lack of a spirit of full cooperation. There is no reason why Hong Kong authorities should not be willing to utilize the services of U.S. agents. Undercover operations as developed by U.S. enforcement agencies would be of great benefit to the overall antinarcotics efforts and could be of tremendous value to the Hong Kong enforcement agencies.

While in Hong Kong, the study team was subjected to adverse publicity which was the result of a misinterpretation of a statement made at an unscheduled press conference which was arranged without the prior knowledge of the study mission. In reply to a series of hypothetical questions concerning the "determination to go all out" to stop the flow of drugs into the United States, the chairman suggested that the United States should use every weapon including the invoking of trade sanctions. Trade is essential to Hong Kong, and this implication led to unfavorable newspaper publicity and a number of critical editorials.

In an effort to put things in perspective, the chairman issued the following statement upon departure from Hong Kong:

> The United States, in dealing with the problem of the manufacture and smuggling of narcotics, has no desire to impose itself on the autonomy of Hong Kong or any other government.

The problem we find is not a lack of cooperation from the Hong Kong Government. Rather it is a question of interpretation as to what cooperation infers. We find there is no solid evidence available as to the amount of drugs transiting Hong Kong that are going to the United States. This is partly because of the nature of Hong Kong as an entrepot port and inability to exercise sufficient surveillance to control the drug traffic. Hong Kong is a free port with a great volume of travelers and freight passing through. It is an area of great potentiality to the drug trafficker who can utilize the air traffic and ship traffic stopping over in Hong Kong.

During my stay here, I have had ample opportunity to talk with both Hong Kong and American officials about the problem of trafficking in drugs. I leave here optimistic that our friendly discussions have paved the way for continuing and increased cooperation that will operate to our mutual advantage, and through our coordinated efforts, we can greatly reduce this scourge.

The United States could also improve the capability of its antinarcotics organization in Hong Kong. There are not enough Drug Enforcement Administration agents to do the job, and those that are assigned are required to go on temporary duty to other parts of Southeast Asia from time to time, thus weakening the effort in Hong Kong. Furthermore, there are four agents authorized for Hong Kong, with only three assigned. The fourth slot has been vacant for over 1 year because "DEA is looking for a Chinese linguist and can't find one." Four agents are not enough to do the job, and the fact that only three are assigned is difficult to explain or to understand.

The United States must realize that it is asking Hong Kong officials to intensify the battle against narcotics and that it must demonstrate a willingness to devote the necessary resources to that struggle. It does no good to speak of the need for more agents in Hong Kong when the United States has not even filled the slots already authorized.

The study team is also of the opinion that the attitude of Hong Kong officials is too complacent given the magnitude of the narcotics problem in Hong Kong as well as in the United States.

In keeping with the "threat or promise" made to gain further cooperation from areas where it was not forthcoming, the chairman of the mission offered an amendment to the Trade Bill of 1973 "cutting off trade with those nations, who in the judgment of the President, fail to fully cooperate with U.S. drug enforcement efforts." This amendment passed in committee and has passed both Houses of the Congress.

THE U.S. ANTINARCOTICS EFFORT

Every U.S. diplomatic mission in the countries visited has established narcotics control teams. While membership consists of all U.S. Government agencies which can make a contribution to the antinarcotics effort, the heart of the operation is the enforcement and intelligence collection agencies.

Relations within the respective control teams is harmonious and cooperative. Occasionally a complaint is raised that one or another group is withholding information from another but the study team was unable to uncover any hard evidence to support such complaints.

The one common complaint was that the U.S. Agency for International Development is not as responsive to requests for assistance as the situation warrants. Narcotics enforcement procedures must be current, constant, and vigorous. Delay enables the trafficker to change his

methods and procedures, as well as traffic patterns. When the U.S. missions in the various countries indicate that equipment will be made available, the bureaucracy in Washington cannot be permitted to engage in long delaying feasibility studies. Assistance promised must be equipment delivered, if the United States is to convince other nations that it is seriously engaged in an all-out war against narcotics.[3]

Another problem area is the unequal status of the Drug Enforcement Administration agent vis-a-vis his Department of State counterpart. He is not entitled to rest and rehabilitation leave or to emergency return to the United States. Nor is he on the diplomatic list.

Promotions are slow and infrequent. The DEA agent becomes more effective as time passes. It takes him at least 1 year to develop the contacts necessary to do his job. If he leaves at the end of 2 years when his tour has ended (because he is dissatisfied) the antinarcotics effort suffers a severe setback. Personnel procedures must be adopted by the Drug Enforcement Administration to induce the agent to extend his overseas tour so that he will remain on station for an extended period.

Steps must also be taken to increase the number of DEA agents throughout Southeast Asia. In particular, the standard operating procedure should be to assign two agents to each post. No law enforcement official should be required to work alone on a daily basis. He should have a support agent so that each could supplement and protect the other.

Perhaps the most serious shortcoming, however, is that too many Drug Enforcement Administration agents do not speak the language of the country in which they are stationed. This is a problem that only the Drug Enforcement Administration can solve. U.S. citizens with a language capability, who have some ethnic ties to an area, must be recruited. To send an American without a language capability to Southeast Asia to gather information on narcotics traffickers is not fair to the agent nor is it likely to provide usable intelligence.

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[3] On November 16, 1973, the President delegated authority for the management of international narcotics control funds authorized and pursuant to Section 482 of the Foreign Assistance Act to the Secretary of State's Senior Advisory for International Narcotics Matters. (See appendix 2.)

CONCLUSIONS

1. As a result of increased Burmese-Thai cooperation and more vigorous enforcement in both countries, drug trafficking in the Golden Triangle has been disrupted.

2. There was a reluctance on the part of some individuals to discuss certain aspects of the international narcotics problems with the study team. Failure to discuss or refusal to provide information to congressional inquiries can only lead to doubt and distrust between the executive and legislative branches. The war against narcotics is too vital to the security of the United States to allow this to happen.

3. The Government of Burma has started to take action against drug trafficking in Burma due partly to an alarming increase in drug abuse among Burmese youth. So far this action has helped to disrupt the production of, and trafficking in narcotics in the Golden Triangle.

4. The Government of Burma has indicated a willingness to accept narcotics assistance from the United States. While such assistance would be helpful in the fight against the narcotics producer and trafficker, the United States should get an agreement from the Burmese that such assistance will be used only in the struggle against those involved in the production of and trafficking in narcotics.

5. The governments in the countries visited now seem to appreciate the dimensions of heroin abuse in the United States and have taken action to inhibit the illegal production of trafficking in opiates with varying degrees of success.

6. The United States has been slow to realize that the enforcement effort, while important, must be coordinated with a well conceived, well executed crop substitution program.

7. There is a need to develop a marketing mechanism simultaneously with the crop substitution program. It does no good to develop alternate crops if the farmer is unable to get the product to the market.

8. Success of the crop substitution program in Thailand is dependent upon a reliable aerial survey of the opium poppy growing regions.

9. The narcotics enforcement effort in Laos is not as effective as it must be because of a laxity toward known offenders and a reluctance to apply the law equally.

10. As a result of the relative success of the enforcement effort in Burma and Thailand there is a distinct possibility that the narcotics trafficker will move his operations into Laos.

11. Although neither the Philippines, Republic of China, nor Korea play a significant role in the illegal production of and international trafficking in narcotics, the potential is there and every step must be taken to insure that the international trafficker is not able to transfer his operations into those countries.

12. There is no evidence that the People's Republic of China is involved in the illegal production of and trafficking in narcotics. However, as long as the PRC refuses to cooperate with the United States and the United Nations in the combined effort to stop the illegal traffic in narcotics, there will be a suspicion that the PRC is involved, rightly or wrongly.

13. The Japanese Government does monitor the production of and exportation of acetic anhydride although there are no controls. The United States does not exercise any control over the production or exportation of acetic anhydride.

14. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration effort throughout the Pacific area is short of personnel, particularly those with an oriental language capability.

15. The authorities in Hong Kong do not give the impression that they recognize the important role Hong Kong plays in the illegal production of and international trafficking in heroin.

16. Although U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents are integrated into the country team in the various Embassies they are nevertheless treated as second-class citizens when it comes to being on the diplomatic list. Furthermore, the DEA does not provide funds for emergency home leave and rest and rehabilitation leave.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

1. The executive branch initiate procedures which will insure that information relating to the struggle against the production of and trafficking in narcotics is made available to the Congress.

2. The United States does not provide aircraft and other narcotics control assistance to Burma unless that Government agrees to use such assistance solely for antinarcotics activity.

3. The United States intensify its effort to convince the Government of Thailand that an aerial survey of the poppy growing regions is essential if a viable crop substitution program is to be successful.

4. The United States provide whatever assistance is needed to help the Government of Thailand, and the United Nations, in the combined effort to develop suitable alternate crops for the opium poppy.

5. The United States secure the consent of the Government of Thailand to increase the number of Drug Enforcement Administration agents in that country by a minimum of twelve. Efforts should also be made to increase the number of agents throughout Southeast Asia, particularly in Singapore and Malaysia.

6. The United States apply whatever pressure is required to encourage the Government of Laos to prosecute those individuals, who are known to be involved in illegal drug activities, particularly Moua Xu.

7. The United States use whatever leverage it has to encourage the Government of Laos to step up its antinarcotics program, particularly in the Golden Triangle to preclude drug traffickers moving to Laos from Burma.

8. The United States reconsider the decision to reduce the number of U.S. Customs agents in Laos from seven to four.

9. The United States provide the assistance and training needed to insure that the Philippines, Korea, and Taiwan do not become major heroin transshipment points to the United States.

10. The President take action to insure that narcotics control assistance promised by the United States is provided and shipped as rapidly as possible.

11. The President take whatever steps are required to encourage the Peoples' Republic of China to cooperate in the international struggle against narcotics.

12. The President initiate procedures designed to monitor the production of and exportation of acetic anhydride by calling an international conference of producing countries to work out the details.

13. The United States stress to the Government of Hong Kong that it contributes significantly to the U.S. drug abuse problems and that failure to cooperate in every way could prejudice relations with the United States.

14. The Drug Enforcement Administration take immediate steps to fill all authorized positions in Hong Kong. Efforts should also be made to obtain the approval of the Hong Kong Government to allow U.S. agents to be operational.

15. The Drug Enforcement Administration change its administrative procedures and permit the use of funds to defray emergency leave expenses for DEA agents and to authorize rest and recuperation leave for DEA agents serving in hardship posts.

16. The Drug Enforcement Administration initiate training and recruiting programs to insure that agents serving abroad are able to speak the language of the country in which they are serving.

PART II

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE PACIFIC

Although drug abuse does not appear to be a serious problem in the Pacific area, there is no doubt that the situation is tense. Drugs of all kinds are readily available at low prices and U.S. military officials must exercise constant vigilance if the Vietnam experience is to be avoided.

As of June 1, 1973, there were approximately 199,000 U.S. servicemen stationed in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia as follows:

Southeast Asia:	
Thailand	42,000
Afloat	11,000
Total	53,000
Western Pacific:	
Japan	19,000
Ryukus Islands	38,000
Philippines	16,000
South Korea	42,000
Taiwan	9,000
Afloat	22,000
Total	146,000
Overall total	199,000

As a result of the escalating use of drugs in the United States and abroad, the President in June 1971, directed that urgent and immediate attention be given to development of a national counteroffensive against drug abuse. In turn the Secretary of Defense, in June 1971, directed the Secretaries of the Military Departments to give urgent priority attention to developing plans designed to meet the problem of drug use, particularly heroin use among members of the Armed Forces in Vietnam. The objectives of the program were threefold:

(1) To prevent drug abuse and drug use;

(2) To attempt to restore to effective and reliable functioning all individuals with problems stemming from drugs; and

(3) To administratively separate from the military service those individuals who cannot be effectively restored to military duty within a reasonable period.

Basically, the Defensewide program can be broken down into five main categories: (1) Education; (2) identification; (3) evaluation; (4) treatment, and (5) rehabilitation.

Responsibility for implementation of the program rests with the local commanders who appear to be aware of the fact that the production and flow of narcotics and dangerous drugs is a threat to the military readiness of U.S. Forces throughout the Pacific area.

There are serious problems which must be overcome however. With the end of U.S. military activities in Southeast Asia the likelihood of boredom becomes a reality. Soldiers with nothing to do are ingenious when it comes to finding unsupervised activities to occupy their time. Commanders at all levels must adopt programs which will keep their troops occupied. Intensive training programs must be coordinated with interesting off-duty recreational, educational, and athletic activities which will attract the servicemen.

Leave policies should be liberal. Before a soldier goes on leave, however, the normal command drug education program should be augmented by a comprehensive period of instruction on the dangers of drug abuse.

Particular emphasis must be placed on the Philippines, Thailand, and Okinawa. Hong Kong is a unique problem area. It is a leave center and servicemen visit that colony from all over the theater. Drugs are easy to obtain either in Hong Kong or in Kowloon and there is a temptation to attempt to smuggle drugs from the colony aboard ships back to their units.

United States and Hong Kong authorities are cooperating in an effort to discourage the use or purchase of drugs by U.S. servicemen with some success, particularly since the beginning of 1973.

The drug situation in countries visited is outlined on the following pages.

Philippines

There are approximately 15,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in the Philippines. Of this about 8,800 are Air Force, about 5,000 are Navy and the remainder Army.

Prior to the imposition of martial law in September 1972, drugs of high quality and cheap prices were readily available. Subsequently, prices of heroin have gone up and the purity has been reduced from about 50 percent to 5 percent, when it can be found.

Drug abuse does not seem to be widespread among U.S. military forces. Authorities attribute this to the fact that most servicemen in the Philippines are volunteer; they are older and more settled than the draftees. Another reason cited is the vigorous identification and customs programs conducted by U.S. military authorities, particularly in Olongapoa, where the Subic Bay Naval Base is located.

Pill cases

In addition to the random urinalysis testing system the Navy conducts a random body search of personnel returning from liberty. Actually, about 1 out of every 40 is searched, but the fact that the search is random keeps most servicemen honest.

In those cases where narcotics are discovered the individual is referred for investigation. These are called "pill cases."

This program has been successful. In the 3 months prior to September 1972, the number of "pill cases" averaged about 87 per month, and of those tested 90 percent tested positive for narcotics, with about 30 percent being heroin. In January and February 1973, the number of pill cases averaged one per day and tested about 65 percent positive with three cases being heroin. In June and July there were a total of 35 cases, with 24 percent testing positive, none being heroin.

In addition to preventing the use of narcotics, U.S. programs are

also designed to discourage the smuggling of narcotics by U.S. military personnel within the theater on to the United States.

The customs program

The U.S. military customs program resulted in the recovery of large amounts of U.S. Government property but only small amounts of narcotics and other dangerous drugs.

The procedures followed by U.S. military customs inspection at Subic Bay involves the onsight inspection and examination of all household goods, personal property, all privately owned vehicles being processed, handcarried and hold baggage of personnel departing the Philippines by the Culic Point Air Terminal.

At Clark Air Force Base the military customs program has resulted in the seizure of significant amounts of drugs and narcotics. In order to maintain program integrity, random inspections are also conducted in the United States in addition to the full checkage in the Philippines.

While the study team was in the Philippines, there was a U.S. Customs Service adviser assigned on a 90 to 120 day period covering Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines and Taiwan and Guam. We were told that there were plans to have a U.S. Customs adviser assigned permanently to the Philippines.

Thailand

There are approximately 38,000 U.S. military personnel stationed in Thailand. Most are assigned to Air Force units.

Drugs of all kinds are available and the spectre of a heroin epidemic such as raged in Vietnam during the 1970–71 period haunts military commanders.

A 45-milligram vial of 98 percent pure heroin can be purchased for as little as $2.50, while a vial containing almost 1 gram can be purchased for about $10.

The U.S. Armed Forces are actively engaged in attempting to both reduce the use of drugs by servicemen in Thailand, and to stem the flow of drugs out of Thailand to other U.S. servicemen in the Pacific area and to the United States via military transportation systems.

Efforts to stop narcotics smuggling out of Thailand

The U.S. Air Force transportation system provides an attractive vehicle for the narcotics smuggler. Operational aircraft, air freight systems, Army Postal Office and passenger operations are all accessible to military personnel.

The enforcement effort which is designed to deny the use of these systems to the drug trafficker consists of two basic programs: Identification and apprehension of military drug traffickers and an effective military customs program which seeks to inspect or examine all personnel departing Thailand together with accompanied baggage; all household goods, including unaccompanied baggage; all mail; all Department of Defense controlled aircraft, ships and watercraft, to include their crews, and all privately owned vehicles being shipped from Thailand.

There are a total of 185 trained military customs inspectors located at 13 different locations in Thailand, and 52 marihuana detection dogs. There are no heroin dogs although there was one being trained while the study team was in Thailand.

The customs programs appear to be relatively successful. For example, during the last quarter of fiscal year 1973 a total of only 94 customs violations were detected as a result of customs inspections of 54,700 passengers, customs examinations of 5,814 passengers and customs inspections of 13,859 household goods/hold baggage shipments.

There is room for improvement, however. Drugs are being smuggled from Thailand to the U.S. military installations throughout the Pacific area, including marihuana which has been laced with opium. Some is body carried, some is mailed, while the bulk is hidden aboard aircraft.

The primary emphasis of the military antinarcotics effort is being placed upon apprehending the traffickers in preference to the documentation of offenses by users.

The drug abuse problem in Thailand

According to military sources, identification and detection techniques employed in Thailand are similar to those followed elsewhere in the military services. The most effective technique is the random urinalysis test, which is designed to test every man in a unit.

Initially there were many ways of beating the system. Some drug users failed to give a specimen, others got their friends to take the test, while others simply failed to show up for the tests.

According to the authorities, the scope of the testing process has been widened and the number of those failing to take the test is diminishing. This statement is particularly true of Undorn Air Base. For example, in February of 1973, almost 8 percent of those selected for urinalysis failed to take the test. By July of 1973 the number of no-shows had been reduced to zero.

Usable statistics on the extent of drug abuse among U.S. military forces in Thailand are not available. According to military authorities, a total of 379 drug cases involving 557 suspects were investigated by U.S. agencies in fiscal year 1973. Of those suspects, 18.5 percent (103 individuals) involved heroin and 0.3 percent (17 individuals) involved dangerous drugs. The remaining 78.5 involved the use of marihuana, which like opium is grown in Thailand. The proximity of the two crops has resulted in a new headache for the military commander—opiated marihuana.

Opiated marihuana is addictive and U.S. authorities are concerned over its appearance. In an effort to educate the servicemen and to discourage the use of opiated marihuana, U.S. military authorities have distributed instructions on how to test marihuana for opiates. Because of the danger that opiated marihuana may be introduced to the United States, those detection instructions are as follows:

TESTING MARIHUANA FOR OPIATES

OR

IS MY JOINT LACED?

You may have seen the warnings we've put out about all the laced grass that's been showing up locally. It can be a real bummer getting into Smack unintentionally. Marihuana usage is illegal in the Air Force and under Thai law, however, many people take a chance on a bust and toke up anyway. In order to keep the number of Smack freaks down we're putting out these instructions on testing for opiates.

It is relatively simple to determine if grass has been laced. Each individual normally has all the laboratory equipment necessary to test grass for most

drugs—his eyes, hands and tongue. Using these three anyone can probably determine if the grass he has is laced.

Marihuana has a bland, vegetable-like taste, much like dry leaves (who eats dry leaves?) when it is clean (uncut). Colorwise, it is normally various shades of green, or a light golden-colored brown. This is also dependent upon how old the grass is. The grass may stick together, but will not be extremely sticky (like wet glue) if it is clean.

To test for opium cured grass, first check color; if the grass has been treated with opium it should be very dark, almost black in color, or splotched with black or dark spots. The grass will be very sticky to the touch and have a very bitter aspirin-like taste. (All opiates taste very bitter.)

If the grass is in the bulk or brick form, and has been laced with redrock or white heroin, there will be either small chunks of redrock on or in it, a reddish powder on the grass, or a white powder on it. Heroin tastes extremely bitter, and greatly changes the taste of the grass. It also, needless to say, will be very apparent that it has been cut just from the drug's effects.

There are also a fairly large number of the prerolled packs of joints that have been opium cured or heroin laced. With a preroll, take one joint (you can afford it), cut it open, and dump out the contents. Look at the inside of the cigarette paper to see if there appears to be any reddish or white powder on it. If this proves negative, lick on the tip of your fingers and run it across the cigarette paper, check your finger for either a white or reddish powder and then taste it. If there is any redrock or white heroin on the grass, taste will tell, and lastly so will using the drug. There is a very distant difference between the effects of marihuana as opposed to the effects of opium or heroin. Marihuana is a mild hallucinogen; opium and heroin are strong depressants. The difference is easily distinguishable.

The grass here is far stronger than most grass found in the States and can sometimes act as a depressant. Because of this, it may be difficult for an inexperienced user to tell the difference between the "clean" grass locally available or the laced grass. While opium and heroin are stronger than grass and would increase the hassles one might not expect to face from marihuana (physical addiction and detection through urinalysis to name a few.)

It's your head.

Unfortunately, the resourceful U.S. servicemen are smuggling opiated marihuana to U.S. military forces throughout the Pacific area.

Korea

The use of heroin and other dangerous drugs by U.S. servicemen in Korea is under control at the present time. Military commanders, however, are aware that drugs are available and have developed programs designed to detect and identify individuals who may be using or trafficking in drugs. Parallel education programs are also conducted to discourage the use of drugs by U.S. military personnel.

There are four categories of drugs available in Korea: Marihuana including hashish, dangerous drugs which include amphetamines and barbiturates, hallocinogenic and opiates, including heroin or any of its derivatives.

The opium poppy grows in Korea and several fields have been located and destroyed by the Republic of Korea and U.S. investigative agencies. These fields are normally located in rugged, almost inaccessible terrain. There are persistent, but unsubstantiated reports that there is at least one heroin laboratory in Korea although no processing facilities have been located and no confiscated heroin has been traced to a Korean source.

There are also numerous reports that heroin is being smuggled into Korea by American merchant seamen, Japanese tourists and others. Because of the small amounts of heroin being found within Korea, U.S. antinarcotics authorities place little credence on these rumors.

Approximately 3 pounds of raw opium which had been smuggled into Korea aboard a Military Airlift Command (MAC) flight from Thailand was confiscated from a soldier addict. There have been no indications of the shipment of heroin into Korea nor have there been any indications of the transshipment of heroin from Korea to other countries.

Amphetamines, barbiturates, and other dangerous drugs can be legally manufactured and imported into Korea and distributed to pharmacy customers. U.S. military forces have on occasion gotten Korean friends to purchase these drugs for them. This situation may change as a result of a new law which provides for a comprehensive regulatory scheme for licensing legitimate businessmen, pharmacists, physicians and researchers handling drugs. Reports must be filed with the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare and stringent controls on drugs must be kept by the licensees.

Small amounts of lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) have been confiscated in Korea. U.S. authorities have no reliable information, or even rumors, as to the source of LSD although two U.S. soldiers were apprehended for possession of 1,345 LSD tablets 2 days before the study team arrived in Korea.

The following table shows the number of drug-related investigations conducted by U.S. Army authorities in Korea during the first 7 months (January 1–July 31) of 1973.

Type	*Cases*
Marihuana	665
Dangerous drugs, including amphetamines and barbiturates	42
Hallucinogenic (LSD)	4
Opiate (opium and heroin)	1

U.S. Army efforts to suppress drug use and trafficking

Of the approximately 42,000 U.S. military forces stationed in Korea, over 34,000 are Army, about 7,700 are Air Force and less than 300 are Navy.

Because the Army is the predominant service in Korea the study team concentrated its interest on the drug problem as it relates to U.S. Army Forces in Korea. We were pleased to learn that all elements of the U.S. country team are committed to the struggle to eliminate the use of narcotics and other dangerous drugs.

The U.S. Ambassador in Korea is a dynamic, capable individual who not only understands the nature of the drug problem but is willing to devote every resource to the struggle.

As a result of the country team organization and management, techniques that have been developed to provide direction for drug related activities in Korea are excellent.

Taiwan

There are approximately 9,000 U.S. servicemen stationed on Taiwan.

While narcotics and other dangerous drugs are smuggled in from time to time, principally by U.S. servicemen from other areas of the Pacific, the use of opiates and other dangerous drugs is sporadic and limited to a small community of American servicemen.

One of the basic reasons for the lack of a serious narcotics problem on Taiwan is a strict enforcement program on the part of both the

local and national police and U.S. agencies. For example, at CCK Air Base, where the bulk of U.S. air traffic is flown to and from Southeast Asia, a 100-percent inspection of all aircraft is conducted by U.S. personnel.

The picture is not as bright, however, when it comes to amphetamines, barbiturates and other chemically developed pills produced legitimately for medicinal use.

Only small quantities of these drugs are locally produced. The capability for increased production is there although at present it is apparently more economical to import large quantities of these drugs from Germany, the United States and Japan. Imported drugs and locally produced drugs are easily obtainable at any drug or department store for prices as low as 10 cents per capsule.

Technically, Chinese law requires a prescription for purchase. It is only illegal, however, to sell without a prescription, not to consume or to possess, and the enforcement is lax. According to U.S. officials, Chinese police will fine or close down drugstores which are known to be dispensing cheap pills to U.S. military personnel but, on the whole, this particular problem is treated as an American problem and is not taken seriously by Chinese authorities.

To combat this potentially serious problem, U.S. diplomatic and military authorities have been attempting to educate officials of the Republic of China as to the danger involved and the necessity for increased emphasis on stricter enforcement of present restricted drug laws and the need for the enactment of new legislation.

U.S. military officials on Taiwan have instituted a comprehensive antinarcotics and dangerous drug program consistent with Department of Defense directives. That program involves education, identification, evaluation, treatment, and rehabilitation.

In implementing the program, military authorities on Taiwan believe that the strongest deterrent against drug abuse is the urinalysis random testing system.

In Taiwan, as elsewhere, all military personnel under the age of 29 are tested randomly three times per year. With a target population of approximately 4,000 individuals and a test intensity of three tests per year, this amounts to approximately 12,000 urinalysis tests per year. Results of those tests since January 1973 have been encouraging to U.S. authorities. In January, 1.2 percent of those tested were confirmed positive as drug users. By October 1973, the number of confirmed positive was 3/10 of 1 percent of the 300 servicemen tested.

Once the authorities on Taiwan know who the drug abuser is, there are rehabilitation programs designed to restore him to duty.

In summary, U.S. military leaders on Taiwan believe that there is a minor, controlled, though not eradicated, problem with drug abuse. The study team agrees with this assessment.

Japan

There are 19,000 U.S. servicemen stationed in Japan and an additional 38,000 on Okinawa. By far the most serious drug problem is on Okinawa. Unfortunately, there have been cases where some soldiers suspected of drug abuse have been absent without leave and have committed crimes against Japanese citizens. This has led to strained

relations between the U.S. military community and Okinawan authorities.

Actually, the situation on Okinawa is far from satisfactory. Japanese customs inspections are not thorough and U.S. inspections are not complete.

According to U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration agents, some military authorities object to a 100-percent search of U.S. personnel entering Okinawa aboard Defense Department transportation on the grounds that such a program would cause the smuggler to hide the "stuff" aboard the airframe.

As a result, an unknown quantity of 75 to 80 percent pure heroin is carried into Okinawa principally from Thailand. U.S. authorities told the study team that most of the heroin is carried aboard aircraft from Utapao Air Base south of Bangkok. The evidence available suggests that little or no heroin is being smuggled from Okinawa to the United States.

In spite of the difficulties on Okinawa, Japanese and U.S. officials are of the opinion that the major heroin traffickers have been arrested and their organization destroyed.

The saga began on December 14, 1972, when two former Special Forces soldiers were arrested in Koza, about 14 miles north of Naha. One, a former master sergeant, was arrested entering a bar with seven $100 bags of heroin in his possession. The second was arrested after a tin can full of narcotics was found buried in a field in Koza. A neighbor had seen him burying the can and notified the authorities.

Their arrest culminated a 5-month-long operation conducted jointly by the then Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), Japanese Health and Welfare Ministry, U.S. Air Forces Special Investigations, and the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division.

Then, on June 2 and 3, three more Americans were arrested and heroin, valued at $6.9 million, was confiscated. This group, whose leadership comprised a former U.S. Army medical officer then employed at the Camp Kue U.S. Army Hospital as a doctor; a retired Special Forces master sergeant, and the manager of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) Club in Naha, and smuggled heroin worth $61.9 million (including the $6.9 million which was confiscated at the time of their arrests) into Okinawa during a 10-month period beginning in May 1972. These arrests were made possible because another ex-serviceman who was involved turned informer, and close cooperation between U.S. and Japanese officials.

According to a Japanese spokesman, the ring obtained the heroin in South Vietnam and shipped it to Okinawa in boxes marked "medical equipment." The drug was packed in plastic tubing concealed beneath paper packing in the crates. Marks indicating that the crates had been cleared by U.S. military customs officials were visible on the boxes.

The study team has been assured that U.S. customs procedures on Okinawa have been tightened considerably over the past year. Hopefully, this will go a long way toward eliminating narcotics smuggling into Okinawa. Meanwhile, U.S. diplomatic officials in

Tokyo must continue their efforts to encourage the Japanese to expand their customs inspections procedures on Okinawa.

Otherwise, those involved in drug trafficking will still be able to smuggle drugs into Okinawa for consumption by U.S. personnel.

In addition to the major trafficking operations which have been stopped, drugs are also smuggled into Okinawa by individual soldiers on a small scale.

One method is to load the drug on a U.S. aircraft in Thailand and just as the aircraft is landing on Okinawa to open the door and eject the container to a confederate waiting on the ground.

Another successful method has been to utilize the services of Thai massage girls who were given passports and visas for Okinawa by airmen stationed at Utapao Air Base.

One factor inhibiting completely effective antinarcotics enforcement is the fact that each service conducts separate operations. In fact, only the U.S. Marine Corps has assigned an antinarcotics noncommissioned officer to full-time duty with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration office on Okinawa.

To counter this shortcoming the DEA and the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo have recommended that a task force be established on Okinawa to work only on narcotics matters with authority to operate across service lines and with Japanese officials.

The study mission endorses this recommendation fully. U.S. authorities on Okinawa must take steps to close off every possible source of drugs before drug abuse becomes an epidemic and before the drug trafficker attempts to use that island as a transshipment point for smuggling narcotics to the United States.

CONCLUSIONS

1. There is not now a serious drug abuse problem among U.S. military personnel in the Pacific area. Constant vigilance on the part of military commanders is required, however, if the Vietnam experence is not to be repeated.

2. Potentially, the most critical areas where special efforts must be exerted to prevent widespread drug abuse among U.S. military personnel is in Thailand and Okinawa. There are comparatively large contingents of forces stationed in those two areas and drugs of all kinds are readily available at cheap prices.

3. With the end of U.S. involvement in hostilities in Southeast Asia, realistic training, educational, recreational, and athletic programs must be developed so as to relieve boredom and frustrations which contribute greatly to the kind of situation in which widespread drug abuse can develop.

4. U.S. military authorities in Okinawa must learn to work together. Separate enforcement weakens the overall effort and only abets the drug trafficker.

5. Each service on Okinawa should assign an antinarcotics agent to the Drug Enforcement Administration office on a full-time basis.

6. U.S. Air Force officials must be especially vigilant so as to prevent widespread drug smuggling aboard military aircraft.

7. Opiated marihuana is becoming available, and educational programs should stress the fact that this is a narcotic which is addictive.

8. While drug abuse among U.S. personnel stationed in the Republic of China and in Korea is minimal, every precaution must be taken to prevent these countries from becoming transshipment points for narcotics and other dangerous drugs. Traffic patterns have been disrupted in other points of the Pacific, and the international drug smuggler may be tempted to transfer operations to those two countries where there is a potential market of approximately 51,000 U.S. servicemen.

9. There are about 33,000 U.S. Navy personnel serving afloat in the Pacific area, most of whom visit Hong Kong at least once per year. Therefore, U.S. naval officials must continue to coordinate educational programs aboard ship with forceful diplomatic efforts to get and maintain the cooperation of the Hong Kong Government.

RECOMMENDATIONS

It is recommended that:

1. U.S. military authorities take effective measures to relieve boredom which was a major contributor to the widespread use of heroin in South Vietnam by developing coordinated training, recreation and leave programs.

2. U.S. military and civilian authorities create a Narcotics Task Force on Okinawa to coordinate the antinarcotics effort. The Commander in Chief Pacific Command should initiate this action by directing military commanders to assign permanent investigators from each of the services to the Office of the Special Agent in Charge, Drug Enforcement Administration.

3. The search of military aircraft be improved and expanded to include a complete and thorough physical check of all military aircraft operating within the Pacific Command, particularly those flights that originate in Thailand and South Vietnam.

4. U.S. diplomatic officials in Japan intensify their efforts to encourage the Japanese Government to expand and improve customs search and inspection procedures in Okinawa.

5. U.S. military commanders throughout the Pacific Command incorporate into their narcotics training programs detailed instructions on the fact that opiated marihuana is addictive. Such instruction should also include how to detect and identify this drug.

APPENDIX 1

International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) Resolution Relating to the Control of Trade in Acetic Anhydride

Noting that heroin is the most dangerous drug trafficked and abused internationally;

Recognising that acetic anhydride is the one substance essential to the illicit transformation of morphine base to heroin;

The I.C.P.O.-Interpol General Assembly, meeting in Vienna from 2nd to 9th October 1973 at its 42nd session:

Recommends that in countries where the illicit manufacture of heroin exists and there is little or no industrial need for acetic anhydride, the importation and internal distribution of that chemical be placed under strict control;

Recommends further that in countries where illicit heroin manufacture exists but the heavy industrial utilisation of acetic anhydride renders its control impractical, the narcotic control authorities develop the co-operation of the legal distributors of this substance to trace suspicious sales as a means to discover clandestine laboratories;

Recommends further that countries which manufacture and export acetic anhydride take every practical measure to prevent its export for illicit heroin manufacture and co-operate with the authorities of countries where heroin is illicitly produced in their efforts to monitor the trade in acetic anhydride for the purpose of detecting illicit heroin laboratories.

Adopted unanimously

APPENDIX 2

Delegation of Authority No. 104–9

Department of State, Office of the Secretary

[Public Notice 408; Delegation of Authority 104–9]

SENIOR ADVISER FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS

Delegation of Authority

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (75 Stat. 424) (hereinafter referred to as the Act), Executive Order 10973 of November 3, 1961, entitled "Administration of Foreign Assistance and Related Functions" (hereinafter referred to as the Executive Order), and section 4 of the Act of May 26, 1949, as amended (63 Stat. 111; 22 U.S.C. 2658) State Department Delegation of Authority No. 104 of November 3, 1961 (26 FR 10608), as heretofore amended, is hereby further amended as follows:

1. Section 3(a) is amended as follows:

a. There are hereby allocated to the Administrator the funds allocated to the Secretary of State by subsection (a) of section 501 of the Executive Order, except such funds as are appropriated for purposes of section 481 of the Act.

2. Section 6 is amended by adding the following paragraph:

(b)(5). To the Senior Adviser for International Narcotics Matters:

(A) those functions conferred upon the President by section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended together with all those authorities contained in the Foreign Assistance Act, to the extent necessary or appropriate to accomplish the purposes of Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act.

(B) the functions of negotiating, concluding and terminating international agreements relating to international narcotics programs subject to the concurrences required by the State Department Circular 175 procedure.

Dated: November 16, 1973.

[SEAL]

KENNETH RUSH,
Acting Secretary.

[FR Doc. 73–26227 Filed 12–10–73; 8:45 am]

(This Delegation of Authority was published in the Federal Register as Public Notice No. 408, F.R. 34130, Dec. 11, 1973.)

APPENDIX 3

JOURNAL

August 6

Departed Andrews Air Force Base aboard U.S. Military aircraft 9:30 a.m. Arrived Hickam Air Force Base, Honolulu 1:35 p.m. Congressmen Lester L. Wolff, Charles B. Rangel and Congresswoman Bella Abzug.

August 7

Meeting with U.S. Pacific Command Drug Abuse Control Team on the narcotics situation among U.S. forces in the Pacific.

Mr. John E. Kelly, Deputy Political Adviser, U.S. Pacific Command.
Col. E. B. Covington, U.S. Army, U.S. Pacific Command, Project Officer.
Lt. Col. H. J. Hartke, U.S. Army Pacific Drug and Alcohol Abuse Officer.
Lt. Col. A. F. Fisher, U.S. Army Pacific Drug and Alcohol Information Center.
Lt. Col. A. M. Harris.
Lt. Col. T. F. Aschenfeld.
Lt. Col. A. A. Ackerman.
Capt. A. E. Clemente, U.S. Navy.
Cdr. G. D. Ellis.
Maj. J. R. Johnson.

August 8

Departed Hickam Air Force Base via U.S. Air Force aircraft 9:00 a.m. Arrived Anderson Air Force Base, Guam 12:30 p.m. August 9, 1973 (crossed international dateline).

Meeting re narcotics situation in Guam.

A. P. Crisostomo, Government of Guam Customs.
G. Baxter Jones, Lt. Cdr., CincPac Rep Guam/TTPI Military Customs Coord.
Paul W. Broderick, USN, Drug and Alcohol Education, U.S. Navy, Marianas.
Lt. (jg.) Robert A. Woo, U.S. Navy, Marianas, Director/Staff Prog Programs, officer.
Lt. Col. D. L. Thenhaus, USAF, Hq8AF, Director Security Police, Anderson ABF.
Lt. Col. P. E. Jones USAF, Office of Investigative Services.
Guy W. Cline, Organized Crime Unit Guam, Police Department.
Cdr. J. E. Beamon, USN, Director, Human Resources Development Unit.
Capt. Ben G. Munoz, Chief of Detectives, Guam Police, Agana, Guam.
Mr. A. W. Perrin, Supervising Agent, Naval Investigative Services Officer, Marianas.
Lt. Larry N. Bonhill, Executive Officer, Naval Investigative Services Office.

August 10

Departed Anderson Air Force Base, Guam, aboard U.S. military aircraft 9:30 a.m. Arrived Manila International Airport, Philippines 11:45 a.m.

Meeting with President of the Philippines Fernando Marcos (Congressman Wolff only).

Meeting with U.S. Embassy Narcotics Control Committee.

Mr. William C. Hamilton, Deputy Chief of Mission.
Mr. Michael G. Picini, Acting Regional Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration.
Mr. Robert L. Rainsberger, Acting Deputy Regional Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration.

Lt. Col. Roger Cook, Office of Special Investigations, Clark Air Base.
Lt. Cdr. Joseph Pelton, NISO, Subic Bay Naval Base.
Mr. James L. McMahon, Chief, Public Safety Division, USAID.
Mr. Robert D. Long, Public Safety Adviser for Narcotics, USAID.
Mr. Joe M. Little, Regional Security Officer.
Mr. Robert F. Slutz, Jr., Liaison Officer, Drug Enforcement Administration.

Meeting re drug abuse and treatment problems in the Philippines:
Secretary of Health Clemente S. Gatmaitan.

August 11

Meeting re U.S. antinarcotics activities and cooperation with Philippines antinarcotics officials:
Mr. Robert L. Rainsberger.

Meeting re U.S. Public Safety narcotics activities:
Mr. Robert D. Long.

Lunch at the Presidential Palace hosted by President and Mrs. Marcos (Congressmen Wolff and Rangel only).

August 12

Meeting at the National Bureau of Investigations re narcotics problems in the Philippines:
Dr. Manuel Sanchez, Officer in Charge, National Bureau of Investigations Treatment Center.
Mr. Eligo Songco, Executive Office, Narcotics Bureau.
Mr. Julian Atienza, National Bureau of Investigation Regional Division South.
Miss Judy Pacificador, Research—Narcotics.
Mr. George Mella, Executive Office, Narcotics Bureau.
Mr. Abelardo Tolentino, Deputy Director—Administrative Branch, National Bureau of Investigation.
Mr. Lorenzo Sunico, Deputy Director, Technical Services Branch.
Mr. Antonio Mecaro, Office of the Director—National Bureau of Narcotics.
Mrs. Rosa Manalod, Chemist—National Bureau of Narcotics.

Departed Manila International Airport via Pakistan International Airlines 4 p.m. Arrived Bangkok, Thailand 6:30 p.m. Congressmen Morgan J. Murphy and Fortney H. Stark joined the Study Mission.

August 13

Meeting with Ambassador Unger regarding general narcotics, political and economic situation in Thailand.

Meeting with U.S. Embassy Narcotics Control Team:
Mr. Edward E. Masters, Deputy Chief of Mission.
Mr. Fred T. Dick, Regional Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration.
Mr. Tom Barnes, Political Counselor.
Mr. Tom Finn, Public Safety, U.S. AID.
Mr. John Reagan, Special Assistant, Embassy.
Mr. Edward Holland, USIS Press Officer.
Mr. Paul Samaduroff, Drug Enforcement Administration.
Mr. Jonathan L. Sperling, U.S. AID Program Officer.
Mr. Bill Kushlis, Political Officer, Control Officer.
Mr. Carl Fritz, U.S. AID.
Col. Charles G. Ray, Military Assistance Command, Thailand.
Lt. Col. R. A. Burke J–1, Military Assistance Command, Thailand.
Lt. Col. W. H. Russell, Jr., Dep PM, Military Assistance Command, Thailand.
Lt. Col. Bryan S. Spencer, Stall Judge Advocate, Military Assistance Command, Thailand.
Mr. David E. Reuther, Political Officer.

Meeting regarding United Nations Drug Abuse Control Fund Projects in Thailand:
Mr. Chit Posayanond, Project Leader.

August 14

Departed Bangkok International Airport via military aircraft at 8 a.m. Arrived Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base 9:30 a.m.
Meeting with U.S. Air Force Narcotics Control Team Udorn (Congressman Wolff visited U.S. Embassy in Cambodia during this period and rejoined the group in Vientienne, Laos at 1 p.m.):
Brig. Gen. James R. Hildreth, Commander, 13th Air Force Advon (Advance Echelon), Udorn.
Col. Robert W. Clement, Commander, 432nd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Udorn.
Col. Kenneth E. Harrison, Commander, 432nd Combat Support Group (Base Commander), Udorn.
Lt. Col. John Merritt, Social Actions Officer, 56th Special Operations Wing, Nakhon Phanom.
Maj. Richard E. O'Grady, Executive Officer, 13th Advon, Udorn.
Maj. Garry Allison, Commander, 56th Security Police Squadron, Nakhon Phanom.
Maj. David Hetzel, Commander, 432nd Security Police Squadron, Udorn.
Capt. Jack R. Miller, Drug and Alcohol Abuse Control Officer.
Mr. Robert E. Cunniff, Commander, Office of Special Investigations.
Departed Udorn via U.S. military aircraft at 12 noon. Arrived Vientienne, Laos, 12:30 p.m.:
Briefing by Chargé John G. Dean.
Meeting with country Narcotics Control Action Team:
Mr. Robert Myers (DCM Rep), Chairman (State).
Mr. Charles A. Mann AID Mission Director.
Mr. Anthony J. Morelli (DEA), Narcotics Attaché.
Mr. William LeClar, U.S. Bureau of Customs.
Maj. W. McBee, Public Safety Division.
Dr. Charles Weldon, M.D., Public Health Division.
Mr. Charles Saunders, Agriculture Division.
Mr. Harry M. Allison, U.S. Customs Adviser.
Mr. Robert Dakan, Program Coordinator.
Meeting regarding narcotics controls programs in Laos and cooperation with the United States:
Brig. Gen. Khamhou Boussarath, Director General, Groupé Specialé d'Investigation.

August 15

Departed Vientienne, Laos via U.S. military aircraft 9:30 a.m. Arrived Chiang Rai, Thailand 10:30 a.m.
Congresswoman Abzug departed Vientienne aboard U.S. military aircraft 3 a.m. Arrived Utapao Air Base, Thailand, at 8 a.m.
Flyover of the Mai Sai, Thailand-Tachilek, Burma area of the Golden Triangle via Thai Police helicopter.
Landed in Mai Sai and inspected the Thai-Burma border area.
Returned to Chiang Rai via Thai Police helicopter.
Meeting regarding narcotics law enforcement problems in Northern Thailand:
Col. Chavalit, Thai National Police Department.
Col. Prasat, Thai National Police Department.
Col. Cuson, Commander, Special Narcotics Organization (SNO).
Mr. James Montgomery, U.S. Consul, Chiang Mai.
Departed Chiang Rai via military aircraft 12:30 p.m. Arrived Chiang Mai, Thailand 1:30 p.m.
Meeting regarding U.S. anti-narcotics activities in Northern Thailand:
Mr. James Montgomery, U.S. Consul, Chiang Mai.
Mr. Vern Parker, Drug Enforcement Administration, Agent, Chiang Mai.
Meeting regarding U.N. crop substitution programs in Northern Thailand:
Mr. Sam Williams, United Nations.
Mr. Nusit Chindorsi, United Nations.
Mr. W. E. Manis, U.S. Department of Agriculture.

Meeting regarding other narcotics assistance programs in Thailand:
Mr. Garry Oughton, Technical Adviser, Tribal Research Center, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.
Departed Chiang Mai via Thai Airlines 5:30 p.m. Arrived Bangkok 7:10 p.m.

August 16

Meeting regarding Thai-U.S. narcotics control cooperation:
Field Marshal Praphat Charusathira, Deputy Prime Minister.
Dr. Malai Huvanandana, Deputy Minister of Interior.
Lt. Gen. Prachuab Suntrankun, Deputy Director General of Police.
Maj. Gen. Pow Sarasin, Secretary General, Central Narcotics Bureau.
Police Colonel Chavalit Yodmanee, Deputy Chief, Foreign Assistance Program, Thai National Police Department.
Closing conference with U.S. Ambassador Leonard Unger.
Briefing on Joint Casualty Resolution Center (Congressman Rangel only.)

August 17

Meeting regarding Shan State Army proposal to sell opium:
Mr. Edward Masters.
Mr. John Doyle, Deputy Regional Director, Drug Enforcement Administration.
Departed Bangkok via Japan Airlines 10:55 a.m. Arrived Hong Kong 5:30 p.m.
Congressman Morgan F. Murphy remained in Thailand on narcotics matters and rejoined the study mission in Hong Kong on August 19, 1973.
Congresswoman Abzug went to Saigon, South Vietnam to look into the problem of political prisoners in South Vietnam. Rejoined the group in Hong Kong on August 19, 1973.
Press conference Kaitak Airport Lounge, Hong Kong.

August 18

Meeting regarding narcotics problem in Hong Kong and U.S. Hong Kong cooperation:
Mr. N. G. Rolph, Commissioner of Narcotics.
Meeting with U.S. Consulate Drug Abuse and Narcotics Coordinating Committee:
Mr. David Dean, Acting Principal Officer.
Stanley Wagner, Commission on Foreign Policy.
Richard C. P. McClem, Commission on Foreign Policy.
Wever Gim, Political Officer.
Ivan Izenberg, Public Affairs Officer, U.S. Information Service.
Lt. Col. J. J. Keenan, USMC, Defense Liaison Officer.
Robert H. Leeper, Information Officer, USIS.
J. D. Blevins, Chief, Consular Section.
Richard Hart, Narcotics Action Officer.
Keith S. Shostrom, Drug Enforcement Administration.
Meeting regarding specific problems related to Hong Kong, Drug Enforcement Administration:
Mr. Keith S. Shostrom.
Mr. David Dean.

August 19

Press Conference by Congressman Wolff:
Mr. Robert L. Green, NBC News.
Mr. Keith Kay, CBS News.
Mr. Don Webster, CBS News.
Mr. John Stephen, Hong Kong Star.
Congresswoman Abzug separated from the group and returned to the United States aboard U.S. military aircraft.

August 20

Departed Hong Kong via Cathay Pacific Airlines 3 p.m. Arrived Taipei, Taiwan 5:55 p.m. Congressman Morgan F. Murphy remained in Hong Kong and returned separately to the United States.

August 21

Meeting regarding general political, economic and narcotics situation in the Republic of China:
Mr. William H. Gleysteen, Jr., Chargé d'Affaires.
Mr. Harvey J. Feldman, Political Officer.
Mr. Sterneman, Drug Enforcement Administration, Philippines on TDY in Taiwan.
Meeting regarding narcotics situation among U.S. military forces:
Capt. Edsel Carson, Alcohol and Drug Abuse Officer, Taiwan Defense Command.
Maj. Innes, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Taiwan Defense Command.
Congressman Wolff along with premier Chiang Chin-kuo regarding political matters in the Republic of China.
Meeting regarding narcotics policies in Taiwan:
Chow Shu-Kai, Foreign Ministry.

August 23

Departed Taipei via Cathay Pacific Airlines 10:30 a.m. arrived Seoul, South Korea 1:40 p.m.
Joint Military/Embassy meeting regarding U.S. narcotics control activities in Korea:
Hon. Philip Habib, U.S. Ambassador, Republic of Korea.
Gen. Richard Stilwell, Commander, United Nations Command, Korea.
Mr. Larry Delaney, Chief Tokyo Office, Drug Enforcement Administration.
Mr. Paul Cleveland, Political Officer.
Members, U.S. Forces Drug Abuse and Alcohol Control Team, Korea:

Lt. Col. Granger.	Col. Essex.
Lt. Col. Peters.	Col. Zeifiler.
Lt. Col. Hack.	

August 24

Congressman Wolff met with President Park alone.
Congressman Wolff addressed the Korea American Association regarding U.S.-Korean relations, Host Lee Won-son, President Korean American Association
Congressman Wolff met with Yu Chae-Hung, Minister of Defense.
Meeting regarding drug trafficking in Korea, new Korea drug laws, cooperation with U.S. officials enforcement problems and activities of customs officials:
Hon. Yi Kyong Ho, Minister of Health and Social Affairs.
Mr. Kong Chong Kwan, Vice Minister of Health and Social Affairs.
Sin Yang Sik, Director Pharmaceutical Administration.
Yi Chang Ki, Chief, Narcotics Division, Ministry of Health.
Choe Sok Won, Director of National Police.
Yi Taek Kyu, Director of Customs Administration, Ministry of Finance.

August 25

Congressman Rangel visited 2nd U.S. Infantry Division and the 314th Air Division.
Congressman Wolff held a press conference.
Congressman Stark separated from the group and returned to the United States independently.

August 26

Department Seoul, Korea via Northwest Airlines 2:30 Arrived Tokyo, Japan 4:30 p. m.

August 27

Meeting regarding U.S. narcotics control activities in Japan and U.S. Japanese cooperation:
Mr. Thomas P. Shoesmith, Deputy Chief of Mission.
Mr. Thomas E. Cummings, Consul, Narcotics Control Officer.
Mr. Larry J. Delaney, Special Agent in Charge Drug Enforcement Agency, Tokyo.

Meeting regarding Drug Enforcement Administration program in Tokyo:
Mr. Larry J. Delaney, DEA.
Meeting regarding narcotics situation among U.S. military forces on Okinawa:
Mr. Charles D. Casey, Special Agent in Charge, Drug Enforcement Administration, Chairman.
Meeting regarding U.S. Narcotics Action Control Team activities in Japan combined with examination of the drug situation among U.S. military forces:
Thomas P. Shoesmith, Deputy Chief of Mission.
H. L. Child, Legal Attaché.
C. P. Kleebauer, Provost Marshal Liaison Division.
Thomas E. Cummings, Consul, Narcotics Control Officer.
Richard W. Petree, Political Counselor.
William C. Kauffman, CHR, U.S. Navy, U.S. Forces, Japan.
William J. Holda, Embassy Security Officer.
Daisy L. Clawson, Embassy Nurse.
John Sylvester, Sr., Counsul General, Naha-Okinawa.
Charles D. Casey, Drug Enforcement Administration: Okinawa.
Larry J. Delaney, Drug Enforcement Administration, Toyko.
Meeting regarding narcotics control in Japan:
Dr. Nobuo Motohashi, Director Narcotics Division Pharmaceutical and Supply Bureau, Ministry of Health and Welfare.
Meeting regarding export control of acetic anhydride:
Mr. Kiyoshi Takahashi, Director, Basic Chemical Division, Basic Industry Bureau, Ministry of International Trade & Industry (MITI).
Meeting regarding Japan's participation in the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control:
Mr. Fumihiko Suzuki, Director General, United Nations Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

August 28

Congressman Wolff returned to New York City; Congressman Rangel returned to Washington, D.C.

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