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THE DECISION TO HOMEPORIT IN GREECE

REPORT

OF THE

SUBCOMMITTEES ON EUROPE AND
THE NEAR EAST

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

WITH MINORITY AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS



DECEMBER 31, 1972

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FOREWORD


HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., December 31, 1972.

This report has been submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs by Benjamin S. Rosenthal, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe, and Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Near East.

The findings and recommendations in this report are those of a majority of the members of the Subcommittees on Europe and the Near East and do not necessarily reflect the views of the membership of the full Committee on Foreign Affairs.

THOMAS E. MORGAN, *Chairman.*

(III)



LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

Hon. THOMAS E. MORGAN,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: We enclose a report of the Subcommittees on Europe and on the Near East based on our joint hearings on the "Political and Strategic Implications of Homeporting in Greece". During those hearings, we heard the testimony of 10 witnesses, including two from the Department of Defense and three from the Department of State. The hearings were supplemented by a series of correspondence between the subcommittees and Defense and State.

Congress first became aware of the decision by the Department of Defense to homeport in Greece in late January 1972. Our hearings were conducted in March and April 1972, 5 months prior to the arrival of the first Americans in Greece under the homeporting arrangement.

We believe that this report will be useful to Members of Congress and all persons concerned about United States-Greek relations or interested in the issue of homeporting in the Mediterranean.


While the findings and recommendations of this report represent a consensus of the majority of the members of the subcommittees, not all members of the subcommittees endorse all of them, and each is at liberty to agree or disagree with specific statements in the report. Minority and additional views appear at the end of the report.

Your comments and those of any of our colleagues on the full committee would be most welcome.

Respectfully submitted.


BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Europe.

LEE H. HAMILTON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on the Near East.



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This is a detailed map of the Mediterranean region, showing countries, cities, and bodies of water. The map includes labels for countries like France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, and others, as well as major cities like Paris, Rome, Athens, and Cairo. It also shows the Black Sea, Red Sea, and various islands in the Mediterranean. A scale bar and a note about the map's authority are included.


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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The principal conclusion of this joint subcommittee report is that the decision to homeport part of the Sixth U.S. Fleet in Greece at this time is a serious mistake, even though the concept of homeporting may be valid.

This judgment is made after careful consideration of United States security needs in the Mediterranean as well as our long-term interests in, and relations with, the countries of this area. Our reasons for this judgment are given in detail in the following pages; they are based on hearings conducted by the two subcommittees earlier this year and contain some reference to the earlier hearings by the Subcommittee on Europe on "Greece, Spain and the Southern NATO Strategy".

This report traces and analyzes the two-part major decision: (a) to homeport three carrier task forces overseas to meet certain budgetary restraints, solve a difficult personnel retention problem, and maintain a strategic balance throughout the world; and (b) to use Athens as the first carrier task force homeporting site.

CONCLUSIONS

Our specific conclusions are:

(1) Homeporting in Greece today does a serious disservice to American relations with the Greek people, to our ties with our NATO allies and, most importantly, to our own democratic traditions. The subcommittees recognize that the United States has legitimate military and security interests in Greece relating both to our NATO and Middle East responsibilities. These interests must be balanced, however, by appropriate concern for the suspension of democratic government in Greece since 1967. The homeporting decision did not, we believe, properly reflect that concern; instead, our government chose, for reasons of convenience and not strictly military necessity, to increase importantly our military presence in Greece by homeporting approximately 3,100 dependents and 6,600 servicemen in the Athens area. The circumstances of that choice indicate that our government is more concerned about obtaining the minor advantages and conveniences of homeporting in Greece (instead of Italy, for example) than about expressing our opposition to the Greek dictatorship through a policy of minimal and cool relations until democracy is restored in that country. The world looks to the United States to stand up for democratic principles and if we shirk that responsibility, we are negating the most important principle on which this country stands.

By expanding our already extensive military ties to Greece, the United States widens the gap between American policy and that of its European allies who have indicated in both the Council of Europe and in the European Community their strong opposition to business-as-usual with the only dictatorship which has developed within NATO in the 23 years of the alliance.

(2) We consider the danger of pre-eminence of military and strategic considerations over political values a fundamental problem of American foreign policy decisionmaking today. We think this homeporting decision is a good example of this disturbing trend. The subcommittees understand fully that strategic considerations are important in formulating foreign policy goals and programs, but we are convinced that strategic and military interests are ultimately jeopardized by minimizing the political consequences of decisions like homeporting in Greece. In our judgment, Greece is a potentially unreliable defense partner for the United States precisely because it frustrates and represses the democratic basis on which successful foreign (as well as domestic) policies must be based.

(3) The overall performance of the Department of State and Department of Defense further reinforces our concern over this decision. We believe this decision was not carefully weighed or, if carefully weighed, not candidly presented. The misleading and inconsistent testimony and lack of cooperation by the State and Defense Departments in the course of our investigation indicates an unwillingness of the executive branch to acknowledge major decisions and to subject them to public scrutiny and discussion. Misleading testimony, delayed responses, and incomplete information constitute a pattern by the executive branch in dealing with our subcommittees. One consequence was our inability to consider, in appropriate detail and with conclusive results, the availability of alternate homeports in Italy or elsewhere. Another was the inevitable delay and waste of time and effort by both congressional and executive personnel in completing the inquiry.

(4) Homeporting in general has never been adequately presented to either the Congress or to the American public for the major change in overseas military deployment which it actually constitutes. Homeporting, for example, appears to be inconsistent with a literal interpretation of the Nixon doctrine of a lower American profile abroad. The State Department expressed an awareness of this discrepancy,¹ but could offer no full explanation of the implications of worldwide homeporting.

RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) The United States should maintain a minimum level of relations with the present Greek government. Since homeporting does not involve major construction, the Defense Department still can and should seek an alternative to homeporting in Greece. The State Department should be involved in this re-evaluation fully.

(2) Homeporting as a world-wide concept should be examined by the appropriate congressional committees before commitments to homeport in specific areas are made.

(3) A higher priority within the executive branch must be given to the long-term goals of political development abroad, particularly among those countries with which we have extensive treaty, assistance or other ties. The State Department seems to us to be the proper place to lodge this responsibility.

¹ See "Political and Strategic Implications of Homeporting in Greece" joint hearings of the Subcommittees on Europe and on the Near East, House Foreign Affairs Committee, 1972. (U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.), pp. 56, 73, hereafter referred to as "Hearings."

I. THE CONCEPT OF HOMEPORTING AND ITS APPLICATIONS TO THE MEDITERRANEAN

Homeporting means basing a ship in an overseas port from which it performs its missions and to which it returns periodically. Administratively, it means (at least in the case of Greece) that Navy dependents and their household effects are transported to the homeport at government expense but housing must be found on the local economy by the dependents themselves. Under homeporting, major ship overhauls are still performed at U.S. ports to which homeported ships return regularly but at much less frequent intervals than when a ship is based at an American port.

Homeporting differs from establishing a U.S. naval base overseas principally in the degree of dependence on the foreign port—less for homeporting, more for a formal base.

Homeporting has become more attractive to the U.S. Navy in recent years for many reasons: Some of the advantages attributed to homeporting are:

(1) It helps reduce the high costs, in dollars, manpower, and ship deployment of maintaining a worldwide naval presence (Hearings, pp. 29, 108–109).

(2) By limiting reliance on overseas ports to finding local housing for dependents, homeporting limits the degree of dependence. Homeporting, therefore, avoids building large military complexes overseas while preserving many of the advantages (and some disadvantages) of such bases (Hearings, pp. xxi, 56–57).

(3) Homeporting eases the difficult recruitment problem of the Navy where extended separation from families drives many officers and men from the service after one enlistment (Hearings, pp. 15, 110–111).

(4) Keeping a carrier task force on station without homeporting requires maintaining two other carriers in service because of transit, leave time and overhaul requirements. Homeporting helps cut this three-for-one ratio, to about two-for-one. Such a gain would help the carrier task force, the most powerful element in the Navy's fleet, compensate for the planned reduction in the decade of the 1970's in the number of carriers from 16 to 12 because of aging ships and a tight budget for new ship construction (Hearings, pp. 29, 108–109, 117–188).

As long as budgetary pressures and manpower problems were soluble by other means, the Navy preferred not to homeport, because homeporting has potential disadvantages. Some disadvantages cited are:

(1) Homeporting ties the Navy to certain ports where dependents are living even though the dependence is not as great as at established overseas bases where major ship repair and servicing facilities would also be maintained (Hearings, p. xxi).

(2) By homeporting, the Navy can lose its distinctive character of independence from overseas territories which are always subject to

other nations' decisions on continued access. Supplies and replacement personnel eventually funnel through the homeport, making the Navy dependent on a favorable political climate to preserve that access.

This dependence on overseas ports under homeporting limits what Admiral George W. Anderson, former Chief of Naval Operations, called in 1962 the Navy fleet's status as "a self-contained unit, fully able to perform its mission without reliance on fixed bases." He added, in the same interview, that "We have no plans to alter this situation" (Hearings, p. 254).

(3) The concept of the Navy as the "self-contained unit" in Admiral Anderson's day, which diminishes under homeporting, weakens the Navy in its inter-service bargaining power. A policy of a "low profile" overseas, which puts pressure on army and air units to close bases, does not apply to a completely mobile Navy. But when ships are homeported, the Navy becomes as dependent and visible upon the land of foreign countries as do its sister services.

II. HOMEPORTING IN GREECE

We disagree with the political system which prevails in Greece and consider a return to parliamentary rule essential to the long term stability and prosperity of Greece. At the same time, we must preserve our important strategic interests in Greece as a valuable geographic area in the critical Eastern Mediterranean region. Balancing these often conflicting interests has been the major concern of U.S. policy toward Greece since the coup . . .

—*Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (Near East) Rodger P. Davies*¹

A. INTRODUCTION

There has been a deep and extensive commitment to Greece by the United States since shortly after the end of World War II. That relationship is in question today, not by any review of homeporting or of U.S. military assistance to the present Greek Government, but rather by our present policy of assisting a regime which is repugnant to our NATO allies and potentially detrimental to the development of democratic institutions in Greece. By maintaining and increasing close associations with an anti-democratic government, the United States can risk its future influence and presence in Greece if the Greek people react against their military dictatorship.

Homeporting, therefore, is not simply a "very minor" part of the American presence in Greece, as the State Department maintains (Hearings, pp. 47, 57). Rather, it is the second major step (the first being the resumption of embargoed aid in 1970) taken to indicate our intention to deal fully and in a business-as-usual manner with a military dictatorship. Adding nearly 10,000 American servicemen and their dependents under homeporting is evidence of that intention.

B. BACKGROUND

Homeporting cannot be judged in isolation from post-war American policy toward Greece. United States presence in Greece was provided by the latter's entry into NATO (early in 1952) and through a bilateral facilities agreement signed on February 4, 1953. This agreement gave the United States a naval communications station north of Athens, installations and port sites in Crete, Voice of America broadcasting facilities in the north, Military Airlift Command facilities at the Athens airport, and fuel storage facilities in Piraeus (Hearings pp. xi, 10).

American interests in Greece have been primarily strategic, and secondarily, economic and sentimental. Strategically, Greece and Turkey guard the Dardanelles, the Soviet gateway to the Mediterranean, and the important air, land and sea lanes leading to the Middle

¹ "U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad", hearings of the Subcommittee on United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, 1971 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) Vol. 11, p. 1784. (Testimony given June 9, 1970.)

East. Economically, the United States provided nearly three quarters of the post-war foreign investment in Greece.² We also enjoy a positive balance of trade with Greece. The sentimental ties are provided by nearly two million Greek-Americans as well as by the respect engendered in Americans for Greece as a source of Western civilizations.

Heavy American military presence in postwar Greece contributed to the strong U.S. influence on decisions dealing with the Greek economy, the armed forces, and the police apparatus. Other forms of exerting influence involved: the considerable U.S. economic and military aid; showing of the U.S. flag by frequent naval visits in Greek ports; camaraderie among military personnel developed through joint NATO service; the training of nearly 12,000 Greek officers in the U.S. since 1947; and extensive official and private cultural exchange programs.

C. THE SITUATION SINCE 1967

The preponderance of Greek politicians, whether of Left, Center or Conservative orientations, are strongly opposed today to the military regime which seized power on April 21, 1967 (Hearings, p. 147). There is a consensus among them that the United States is supporting the colonels.

The problem facing the United States today is that our interests in Greece seem to be in danger in all foreseeable contingencies. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (Near East), Rodger P. Davies, defined America's dilemma in the statement quoted at the start of this section. Mr. Davies cited there the conflict between the short-term military advantages of our Greek naval and air bases and our long-term need for a stable Greek Government which will come through a democratic restoration. If Greece fails to return to democratic rule, Davies suggests, its stability—and by extension our strategic interests—are in jeopardy. Yet to urge democratization in Greece through pressures against its present government would also threaten those strategic interests, perhaps in a more direct way. Since the April 1967 coup, American policy has been caught between these undesirable alternatives.

For the first 3½ years we embargoed "heavy" arms shipments to Greece, although total military aid during that period was greater than during the comparable pre-coup period. Eventually, the political effect of the embargo was felt in Athens and reflected in concern at the Defense Department in Washington.³

U.S. policy makers let Greece "simmer" from 1968, when the colonels were fully in power, until 1970. A chargé d'affaires ran the U.S. Em-

² See "Greece, Spain and the Southern NATO Strategy", hearing of the Subcommittee on Europe, House Foreign Affairs Committee, 1971 (Washington, D.C.; Government Printing Office), pp. 31-32.

³ *Ibid*, pp. 26, 55, 313.

bassy in Athens for a year following a change in administrations. This interim diplomatic arrangement only postponed the response to the continuing Greek and U.S. military pleas for full resumption of aid. Finally, the nomination of Ambassador Henry J. Tasca (and his arrival in Athens January 1970) signaled the decision to resume aid fully.⁴ The formal announcement by the State Department came eight months later, on September 22, 1970. Resumption of aid, according to the announcement, was based "entirely" on considerations of improving the ability of the Greek forces to carry out their responsibilities in defense of the NATO area, and thus contribute importantly to the cohesion and strength of the southern flank of NATO. The other important consideration (and undoubtedly the major one), according to the announcement, was that "Greece offers strategic advantages (i.e., its geography) to the NATO alliance and to the United States which are of great importance to the security of the West. This importance has been sharply underlined in recent months by events in the Eastern Mediterranean."⁵

These events were, of course, the increasing Soviet naval activity in the Mediterranean, its growing land-based presence in Egypt (which has been dramatically reversed in the last few months) and the continuing danger that another Middle East war would erupt with the United States (but not NATO) committed to Israel's defense.

Within the Mediterranean, therefore, homeporting takes on a special significance. The increased Soviet naval activity since the mid-1960's and Soviet military presence in the Middle East concerned Defense Department planners (Hearings, pp. 10, 117-118). The U.S. Sixth Fleet remains, in their view, the single strongest deterrent to Soviet "adventurism" in the Eastern Mediterranean. To maintain that deterrent in the face of severe budgetary pressures became a high Pentagon priority. Homeporting a key part of the Sixth Fleet, a carrier task force, was deemed the best solution.

The homeporting decision, following as it did the resumption of aid, seems to indicate the resolution by the present Administration of the American dilemma in Greece: as long as the Middle East remains turbulent, the United States will seek to maintain a strong military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean where Greece is an important ally. Our Government will hope for democratic developments, but not at the expense of jeopardizing relations with the present Greek Government.

⁴ *Ibid*, pp. 306-308.

⁵ *Ibid*, p. 548.

III. ROLE OF DEFENSE AND STATE DEPARTMENTS

The Department of Defense selected Greece as a homeport following the decision to apply the concept of homeporting somewhere—a decision peripheral to this discussion.

The Navy's preference for Athens was articulated informally to the Department of State prior to any serious consideration of the adequacy of alternative Mediterranean homeport sites for a carrier task force. Five months passed before the State Department suggested consideration of alternative ports.

We believe this decision included the following elements:

First, during the year 1969 and much of 1970, planners in the Department of Defense considered, for the very important budgetary, strategic and personnel reasons cited above, ways of improving the efficiency of the Navy, its capabilities and its personnel retention rate. The homeporting concept was developed to deal with these problems (Hearings, p. 36).

Second, because of increasing Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean, the Navy in 1970 focused, with a greater sense of urgency, on maintaining its force in the Mediterranean (Hearings, p. 170).

Third, the Department of Defense arrived, by late 1970, at the decision to homeport a Mediterranean carrier task force with strong preference for Athens (Hearings, pp. 171, 193).

Fourth, in January 1971, the State Department told our Athens embassy of the Navy proposal to homeport a carrier task force in Athens. In June, 1971, the State Department amended the proposal by suggesting that alternative sites in Italy be considered also (Hearings, p. 193).

What caused this change in the intervening 4 months? While we have no strong basis for answering this question, we must point out that in this period the State Department became aware of a growing congressional criticism of the United States Government relations with the Greek junta. Such criticism culminated with hearings of the Subcommittee on Europe in July 1971 and with the passage the next month of an amendment to the foreign aid bill for fiscal year 1972 terminating aid to Greece, subject to a presidential waiver on national security grounds.

Fifth, the Navy Department made a cursory survey of several alternative homeport sites in Italy which reinforced their initial preference for Athens (Hearings, pp. 20, 24, 186, 188).

The Defense Department refused to testify on the alternate port surveys so we must rely on brief testimony provided by Admiral Elmo Zumwalt and G. Warren Nutter, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. That testimony and correspondence between the subcommittees and the Department of Defense raised several questions (Hearings, pp. xv-xxiv and 1-37). The Navy Department, for example, consistently stated that its reasons for seeking homeporting facilities were

administrative, involving principally personnel considerations in the Navy Department (Hearings, pp. 6-37). Yet, in their summary of Athens and the Italian sites considered in the 1971 follow-up study, strategic location for Athens was termed "good" while all Italian ports were considered only "marginal" (Hearings, p. 21). Such distinction indicates the conclusion that there were definite political and strategic considerations that, in the eyes of the Defense Department at least, made Athens preferable.

Further, why did the Defense Department prefer Athens for home-porting? Is Athens preferred because it is felt the city can "handle" politically, socially, and economically an increased American presence of some 10,000 people? Does the Department of Defense prefer to deal with the Greek Government as opposed to, say, the Italian Government? Was the location of Athens a key factor? Is Athens preferred because its location will help monitor Soviet naval movements in and out of the Black Sea? Was it chosen because it is close to the Middle East?

The State Department was consulted and briefed *after* the Defense Department determined Athens to be the preferred site (Hearings, pp. 56-57, 61-62, 193 and section V of this report). Its subsequent role was confined largely to defending that Defense Department decision.

Where the Defense Department was far-sighted in planning for the Mediterranean homeport, the State Department did little to counter the initiative; where the Defense Department was decisive in proposing Athens, State was hesitant in insisting on alternative port studies; when Defense parried this insistence by ordering quick surveys of a few Italian ports, the State Department accepted these results, even though the surveys would be difficult to defend as justifications for the Athens choice; finally, when the Defense Department refused to give the subcommittees further information on the alternative ports (probably, we judge, because whatever further information DOD had was as sketchy as that supplied), the State Department was left with the unpleasant task of testifying in open session without any DOD assistance on what DOD surveys showed!

IV. FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF DECISION

A. IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

The subcommittees believe that the decision to homeport a carrier task force in Athens could have political ramifications throughout the Eastern Mediterranean beyond those of our bilateral relations with Greece:

1. Homeporting as a commitment:

How does a homeport facility differ from a "base"? Both the State Department and the Department of Defense insist that this "administrative arrangement" carries no increased commitment to the Greek Government (Hearings, pp. 9, 43, 56-57). Yet homeporting doubles the number of U.S. servicemen and dependents in the country. Even the restricted Greek press is concerned about how this new presence will be absorbed politically and socially within Greece (Hearings, pp. 47-55).

2. Possibility of a Soviet response:

Any homeporting in the Mediterranean raises serious political questions beyond the subject of Greece. Will the Soviet Union, for example, seek similar arrangements for "administrative" reasons in Egypt or Syria? At present, the Soviet Navy does appear to have certain rights in both Syria and Egypt but not homeport facilities. Whether the Navy's arrangement could provoke a similar Soviet move is, in our opinion, a calculation worthy of considerable attention in the carefully balanced Middle East power equation.

3. Effect on United States role in the Middle East:

Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Rodger P. Davies emphasized in his testimony the importance of the Sixth Fleet for protecting interests and preserving peace in the Middle East (Hearings, pp. 40-41; and, for contrast, see pp. 12-13; see also, section V). Recently, President Nixon related aid to Greece and the strengthening of NATO's southern flank to our ability to help preserve the State of Israel (Hearings, p. 260). Yet, the Greek Government, seeking to preserve its own close ties with the Arab countries, has denied twice in recent months that Greece will allow itself to be used in Middle East hostilities (Hearings, p. 258; The Deputy Greek Foreign Minister on July 12, 1972, reiterated this position in response to the presidential statement, cited above). This contradiction raises doubts whether the United States and the Greek Government have discussed frankly any political implications of the course our Navy Department seeks.

B. IN THE REST OF THE WORLD

Homeporting in Greece is part of the global pattern which the Defense Department is preparing for the 1970's and 1980's (Hearings, pp. 19, 29-31, 108-109). Homeporting may well be part of the answer to the problems now confronting the Navy, but our government should not plan a sizable increase of Americans assigned abroad without public disclosure and exhaustive considerations of the implications. Is the Nixon doctrine of a lower American profile overseas consistent with the concept of homeporting? In response to this question raised during the hearings (pp. 56, 73), the State Department indicated that this was one problem considered in the executive branch discussion on the homeporting issue. It was outweighed by the urgent needs of the Navy, Mr. Davies said. Yet, a basic incompatibility remains.

Two more carrier task forces will, apparently, be formed and stationed overseas in the next few years and one will be placed in Japan, probably. There will be, undoubtedly, foreign policy implications no matter where these forces are stationed. It is our concern that these issues be discussed frankly with congressional committees and Congress whose consent for homeporting should be mandatory.

V. IMPLICATIONS FOR CONGRESS OF HOMEPORING DECISION

Our inquiry into this foreign policy decision raised several issues of direct concern to Congress.

Almost all foreign policy decisions today are complex; persuasive arguments can invariably be marshaled for and against a particular course of action. The role of foreign policymakers in the executive branch—in the White House, State Department, or Defense Department—is to weigh alternatives and make decisions.

If Congress is to play a constructive role in the foreign affairs field, it must have some appreciation of the factors involved, the alternatives considered and the weight given to certain variables. To be merely presented a sketchy and inconsistent *post facto* rationalization of a major decision, as the subcommittees were in this case, raises serious implications about the interaction between the executive branch and the legislative branch in this field. Given congressional concern over the American-Greek relations, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Rodger P. Davies' assessment of this administrative arrangement as "minor" in the context of overall Greek-American ties appears unwarranted (Hearings, p. 47). It is just such characterizations of major policy changes which inhibit careful scrutiny.

But Greece is not really the only issue in homeporting. There is also the Defense Department's decision to seek homeporting facilities around the world. Calling these plans "administrative arrangements" tends to minimize discussion of political implications and to curtail detailed congressional consideration of the decision. Congress, and particularly the Committee on Foreign Affairs, must resist these attempts.

The pre-eminence of military and strategic considerations over political issues within the executive branch illustrates, in the subcommittees' viewpoint, a basic error of American foreign policy decisionmaking today. Such domination, in this inquiry of homeporting in the Mediterranean, was facilitated by the Defense Department's persistence in the choice of Athens as a homeporting site and by the State Department's belated acquiescences in the choice.

This joint inquiry also raised important questions concerning the ability of largely investigative congressional subcommittees to carry out their mandate. Two major obstacles confronted the subcommittees, and each has implications far beyond the role of one committee. They were: The lack of cooperation by the executive branch and misleading and contradictory testimony.

Specific examples of lack of cooperation and of contradictory and misleading testimony follow:

A. LACK OF COOPERATION

1. DELAYED RESPONSES TO SUBCOMMITTEE INQUIRIES

The subcommittees wrote both the State and Defense Departments several times requesting information to insure proper preparation by the subcommittees' members before the actual hearings.

Here is a summary of those requests and the responses:

Agency	Date of request	Date of reply	Comments
State.....	Feb. 2.....	Feb. 24.....	Answer received 1 week after date requested.
State (2d letter).....	Feb. 25.....	Mar. 7.....	Answer received on Mar. 8, the date of testimony.
Defense.....	Feb. 2.....	Feb. 19.....	Answer received on Feb. 20, 3 days after date requested.
Defense (2d letter).....	Feb. 28.....	Mar. 21.....	Answer received 2 weeks after DOD testimony and 2 weeks after date requested.

These delays caused more than mere inconveniences. The second inquiries were answered either at the time of, or after, dates of testimony so that they could not be digested for the question and answer sessions.

In one case, at least, the delay frustrated a basic element of the inquiry which was to identify alternate homeport sites. In each letter to the Defense Department, the subcommittees asked "what other ports in the Mediterranean Sea were considered [for homeporting the carrier group] and on which . . . criteria . . . were these other sites disqualified?" (Hearings, pp. xv, xix).

Seven weeks after the initial request, the subcommittees received the information requested. The response came two weeks after the Defense Department witnesses testified, making it impossible for the subcommittees to question on the basis of adequate background information.

What makes this delayed response an even greater affront is the fact that Messrs. Nutter and Zumwalt had before them, when they testified on March 7, at least part of the prepared answers to the subcommittees' letters of February 2 and February 28. Yet they refused to give this information for two additional weeks.

(The subcommittees discovered that some of the answers to their letters had been prepared—but not for them—for the March 7 hearing when a spectator gave the subcommittees, staff a tab sheet of data on alternate homeport sites which had been left inadvertently on the witness table by the Navy witnesses after that hearing.)

2. EXAMPLES OF DEFECTIVE RESPONSES TO SUBCOMMITTEES' INQUIRIES

The preceding section indicates the delays the subcommittees experienced in obtaining information about homeporting in advance of the actual hearings. In addition, the information supplied in response to those requests was often incomplete, badly presented and misleading.

(a) For example, the summary chart, which appears on p. 21 of the hearings and which lists the Italian ports studied as alternates to Athens, fails to express the apparent importance of some of the selection criteria over others although such weighted values were discussed by several Administration witnesses. Admiral Zumwalt's testimony, for example, on page 11, indicates that all alternatives to Athens were "clearly unacceptable" and that Athens was the "only one that really satisfied a substantial number of the criteria." That judgment is explicable only if some criteria were more important than others. (See

also the discussion below p. 19, B(3) on how well Athens satisfied the criteria.) Without such weighting, and by assigning a value of 3 for "good", 2 for "marginal" and 1 for "poor or not at all" the following totals are reached:

Athens -----	16	Augusta Bay-----	10
Livorno -----	13	La Spezia-----	9
Naples -----	12	Gaeta -----	8
Taranto -----	12		

By this analysis, the Italian ports, while less desirable than Athens by the Navy's operational criteria (which ignored political considerations), do not appear as unacceptable as Admiral Zumwalt indicated in the testimony cited above.

Mr. Fessenden, on p. 154, describes "strategic location", which is one of the six criteria, as "not a primary purpose of it [homeporting] but a secondary benefit." Whether other criteria were also of "primary" or only "secondary" or even of lower values was not indicated by the witnesses.

The result is that the summary chart, and the sketchy descriptions of the cities which accompanied it, are nearly useless in discovering (a) what criteria were decisive in the preference of Athens over the Italian ports and, (b) whether, and to what extent, the latter ports should have been considered as real alternatives to Athens.

(b) The estimate of costs for homeporting initially supplied by the Defense Department omitted the cost of educating 1,300 Navy dependent children. The omission amounted to \$1.3 million annually, or about 10 percent of the entire annual cost of homeporting (Hearings pp. xvii, xxii).

(c) In response to the question "How will homeporting in Greece affect our relations with (a) Turkey, (b) Middle East countries, including Israel, and (c) other NATO countries?", the State Department (Hearings, p. viii) replied with a general discussion about the role of the Sixth Fleet without any regard to the specific countries included in the question. This information has never been received by the subcommittees except as fragmentary responses to questioning by subcommittee members. Yet the implication by this non-answer is that there are no complications involving these countries as a result of homeporting in Greece. We do not believe this to be true. The lack of response is, therefore, misleading.

3. REFUSAL OF DEFENSE DEPARTMENT TO TESTIFY ON ALTERNATE SITES

While the Department of Defense testified once, it declined to testify a second time despite the subcommittees' request for additional information (Hearings, pp. 167-169). A second appearance could, perhaps, have been avoided if the material requested (Hearings, p. 20) had been received in full and questions concerning discrepancies and timing of surveys had been answered with greater candor (Hearings, pp. 59-61, 171-172, 178.)

4. REFUSAL OF WITNESSES TO FURNISH ADDITIONAL DATA ON ALTERNATE SITES

Important information requested from the Department of Defense and the Department of State during the hearings or in correspond-

ence, like the Summary of the Housing Surveys (Hearings, pp. 20-24), was denied the subcommittees. In an effort to obtain further information on housing (See below, p. 19, B(3) for adequacy of information supplied), the subcommittees encountered more difficulties. The Department of Defense refused to testify (Hearings, p. 168) and the Department of State said that it could not supply the housing surveys because they were Department of Defense documents (Hearings, p. 189). This lack of cooperation is all the more perplexing because public housing surveys cannot be considered relevant to national security or able to impair our relations with another state and because the State Department argued that these surveys were authorized by it (Hearings, p. 191). If the State Department was the authorizer of documents, as it argued that it was (Hearings, p. 191) surely it has some determination over their distribution and surely it cannot claim that the surveys are exclusively Department of Defense documents. Other information on alternate ports requested from the Defense Department (Hearings, p. 192) and from the State Department (Hearings, pp. 194-195) was never received.

5. EVASIVE TESTIMONY BY STATE AND DEFENSE DEPARTMENT WITNESSES

A consistent pattern of "passing the buck" added another element to the lack of cooperation that pervaded these hearings. The Department of Defense, for example, was reluctant to talk about the political implications of homeporting because it wanted to "stick to the military view" and leave a discussion of the political aspects of the decision to others (Hearings, pp. 15, 18-19). And when Department of State witnesses testified, they emphasized the military reasons for homeporting as being determinative and that the Department of Defense knew more about these issues (Hearings, pp. 60, 61, 65, 74, 178).

A similar pattern is discernible in statements on the possibility of Naples as a homeport site. The Department of Defense argued that housing shortages were the real reason for Naples' deficiency as a site, a topic on which they volunteered little during their testimony before the subcommittees (Hearings, pp. 19, 20). The subcommittees, in turn, were unable to develop adequate information on alternate homeporting sites during the Defense Department's only appearance because they did not even have the survey summaries at that time (Hearings, pp. 20-24 and above p. 13, A(1)).

When the State Department testified, it emphasized port saturation as the major deficiency with Naples, a topic on which the State Department was unable to elaborate (Hearings, pp. 65, 74, 188). For the State Department to emphasize port saturation as the major problem with Naples and to be unable to go beyond that and for the Defense Department to talk about housing shortages without clearcut evidence available during the hearings were detrimental to the subcommittees' inquiry. The same pattern of passing the buck is visible in the discussion of documents relevant to this inquiry. State Department witnesses stressed their agency's role in this decision and their agency's role as authorizer of surveys (Hearings, pp. 60, 189) and yet the State Department could not get those surveys (Hearings, p. 189) for the subcommittees.

B. DISCREPANCIES IN TESTIMONY

Issue	1st State Department testimony	2nd State Department testimony	Classified telegrams	Defense Department position
1. Initial DOD preference for Athens.	No (p. 61).	(1) No, (p. 171); (2) yes (pp. 171, 176).	Yes. ¹	Yes (pp. 171-173).
2. When alternate ports were first considered.	From the beginning (p. 61).	(1) February 1971, prepared by State; (2) June 1971, alternate ports; surveys authorized (p. 171).	4 months after Athens.	
3. Which alternate ports were first considered.	(1) Naples (p. 59); Livorno, La Spezia, Naples (p. 61).	La Spezia, Livorno, (p. 171).	La Spezia, Livorno.	
4. Whether State Department objected to Athens home port plan?	Yes (p. 56).	Denied Athens was in original proposal, (p. 171).	January 1971 telegram says State position not totally developed.	No (p. 12).
5. Was January 1971 survey authorized to include Naples as possible home port?	Yes (p. 59).	Yes (pp. 176-177).	No.	
6. Who analyzed Navy's preference for Athens?	Davies himself.	Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs.		
7. On what basis of knowledge did State analyze Navy's preference for Athens?	Studied conclusions Navy had reached (pp. 65, 75); asked for surveys of alternate ports (p. 59).	'Took hard and critical look... going beyond the factual information' (p. 178).		
8. Home port consistent with Nixon doctrine.	No (p. 73).	No.		Yes (p. 31).

¹ See hearings, p. 193. The telegrams themselves refer to Athens as the Navy preferred homeport.

1. STATE DEPARTMENT ROLE IN HOMEPORTING DECISION

The subcommittees received contradictory and misleading testimony from the Department of State concerning its precise role in this homeporting decision. At various points during the hearings, representatives of the Department of State indicated that they "were given . . . a very full opportunity to study all aspects of this decision . . . it was a decision almost jointly arrived at after months of close collaboration between the Department of Defense and Navy and the Department of State" (Hearings, p. 180) and "it was the decision for the State Department to make as to where the homeporting would be . . ." (Hearings, p. 183). At another point, a State Department witness talks of "our decision" (Hearings, p. 60).

However, other testimony by these same State Department witnesses puts far less emphasis on their role in the decision and far more on a secondary role of the foreign policy agency. "A series of briefings" (Hearings, pp. 62, 63) given to the State Department by the Department of Defense, were continually referred to by State witnesses. "I relied on briefings by the Navy on the basis of the surveys" (Hearings p. 74) or "we were fully briefed on all the problems" (Hearings, p. 186) were typical statements made and were defended by "I don't know what due consideration of the facts is other than undergoing briefing and coming to a conclusion" (Hearings, p. 75). The precise role of the State Department was probably best elucidated by a member of one of the subcommittees who talked of the State Department's "informal guidance" in the decision (Hearings, p. 176). This is, however, far different from stating that there was a State Department decision to determine where homeporting would take place.

These contradictory statements involve two principal issues within the homeporting decision: (a) what ports were examined and when they were examined; and (b) what role the State Department played in these surveys, a summary of which was given to the subcommittees (Hearings, pp. 20-24).

On the first issue, there were clear contradictions in the State Department testimony. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Davies told the subcommittees that "they [the Navy] came to us with the concept of homeporting and a list of possible ports, including Athens . . . That the implication was given that Athens was the only port given to us, that is wrong" (Hearings, p. 61). Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Russell Fessenden, however, informed the subcommittees that . . . "up to this point [February, 1971], we had not been asked about homeporting of a carrier task force in any area except in Athens" (Hearings, p. 172). Other evidence in the hearings (Hearings, pp. 171-172 and 193) further reinforces our judgment that the Department of the Navy had clearly identified Athens as its preferred carrier task force site *before* it examined any other site (See p. 18, B(2)).

While it is amply clear from State Department testimony that it did ask for surveys of alternate port sites because of the possible misinterpretations of homeporting in Athens (Hearings, pp. 59, 62), the role of the State Department in evaluating these surveys is less clear. We were told that in many areas of inquiry in the surveys, such as issues involved in urban support, the State Department gave its "own, independent judgment" (Hearings, p. 178), adding that the

Department "took a critical and hard look at each of these categories [of the surveys], going behind the factual information" (Hearings, p. 178). Persistent questioning on two areas, Naples and Taranto, however, give the precise opposite conclusion, namely that the State Department did not examine the sites thoroughly nor make its own independent judgment on the suitability of these alternative homeporting sites (Hearings, pp. 64, 188).

The minor role of the State Department in this decision and its almost total reliance on the Department of Defense's analyses of the issues can be inferred by testimony. Mr. Fessenden admitted that "... these surveys were conducted by the Defense Department and by the Navy and ... although we work closely with them in analyzing the results, they are basically their materials" (Hearings, p. 189 and see also p. 190). Indeed, it appears that the only initiative of the State Department was to urge a consideration of alternative sites early in 1971 *after* the Department of Defense had asked for homeporting a carrier task force in Athens and a cruiser in Naples. Even then, its role was only that of authorizing the Defense Department to undertake the surveys. A State Department witness stated that "after prolonged study and review . . . in Defense, the [State] Department in June 1971 authorized surveys of Italian places" (Hearings, p. 171). It should be noted that that prolonged review and study was in the Defense Department and not in the State Department. The subcommittees believe it would have been more accurate and less misleading if this point had been made clearer by the witnesses and if State freely admitted its minor role in examining this Defense Department decision. Such an admission would have put this decision in its proper perspective and would have given Congress a greater appreciation of the State Department's apparent increasing difficulty in getting political issues weighed appropriately vis-a-vis military and strategic considerations.

2. ATHENS AS THE PREFERRED SITE

Testimony shows the early and clear preference by the Defense Department for Athens. Yet both Mr. Davies and his counterpart from the European area, Mr. Fessenden, suggested to the subcommittees on several occasions that Greece was not identified initially or specifically as the Defense Department's preferred homeporting site for the carrier force.

For example, on page 61, Congressman Fraser asked about the Navy's apparent proposal for homeporting in Athens which he understood Mr. Davies had wanted broadened into a wider inquiry:

MR. FRASER. What cities were proposed to you at the beginning, *the first time this proposal came to the attention of the Department?* (Emphasis added)

MR. DAVIES. The possibilities were the west coast of Italy, Livorno, La Spezia and Naples.

Similarly, Mr. Fessenden (Hearings, pp. 170-171) said that when the Navy briefed the State Department on the homeporting plan in "mid-January 1971 . . . no firm proposals for homeporting sites had been made *in either the Department of Defense or in the Navy*". (Emphasis added.)

Against these statements, however, we have already seen (See p. 16 (chart)) that on January 21, 1971 a telegram was sent by Secretary of State Rogers to our Embassy in Athens indicating that city as the Navy's preferred site. That telegram was a joint message from the State and Defense Departments.

There is no indication, despite Mr. Davies' contention (quoted above), that cities on the west coast of Italy or anywhere outside of Athens were considered for homeporting a carrier force until over four months after the Navy's mid-January 1971 briefing of State Department officials at which the preference for Athens was explained sufficiently to allow drafting the telegram to our embassy there.

Indeed, Mr. Fessenden, shortly after the above denial, admitted that the Navy staff study already completed did prefer Athens. This admission comes in the following statement by him (Hearings, p. 171) where the sequence of events outlined is again important.

"Pending completion of the initial surveys (Mr. Fessenden said), the Department of State was asked in early February 1971 by the Office of the Secretary of Defense if it would provide informal guidance on the United States Navy's staff study on homeporting which clearly identified Athens as the preferred location for a homeported carrier task group in the Mediterranean." (Emphasis added.)

The "initial surveys" Fessenden cites here are those authorized by the Department of State. (See above, p. 17, B(1).) Those authorization telegrams proposed homeporting the carrier force *only* in Athens with a cruiser suggested for Naples.

Finally, on the preference for Athens, the testimony of Mr. Davies on page 61, cited above in this section, should be re-read and compared with that of Mr. Fessenden. Mr. Davies says that Athens and Naples were surveyed first and subsequently other Italian ports. Later he says that when the Department of State first heard of this homeporting plan, cities on the west coast of Italy were considered. While these answers contradict each other, neither is apparently true. The classified telegrams indicate that Athens alone was first proposed as the preferred carrier site. Four months later Italian cities were also considered (See p. 16, (chart).)

3. NO "VIALE ALTERNATIVE" TO ATHENS AS HOMEPORT

The insistence that there was no "viable alternative" to Athens as a Mediterranean homeport (Hearings, pp. 18, 178) is not sustained by the summary of surveys of alternate ports (Hearings, pp. 20-24) nor by any other information furnished by the State or Defense Department. (See above, p. 13.)

Under two of the six criteria listed in that summary Athens is only "marginal" by the Navy's own admission. If marginal actually means "average" or "passable", then Naples, which is judged "good" in two criteria and "marginal" in three others, is also apparently a viable alternative. The only category in which Naples is "poor or not at all" is in "adequate urban support", a contention not supported by the testimony, inquiries at the Italian Embassy in Washington, or by the State Department. (See below, p. 20, B(4).)

Similarly, Livorno (Leghorn), Italy is, by the summary of the Navy's survey, judged "good" in three of the six criteria while Augusta

Bay/Siracusa is judged "good" in one criterion, "marginal" (i.e., passable) in four and "poor" in only one.

Whether the Italian ports cited are adequate operational alternatives to Athens we cannot judge from this information available to us. We have the State Department's witness contradicting the Navy's judgment about adequate housing in Naples (Hearings, p. 188), about housing in Taranto (Hearings, p. 186), and about the "strategic location" of Athens (Hearings, p. 194).

4. ADEQUACY OF NAPLES AS HOMEPORTING SITE

The Department of State and the Department of Defense gave conflicting testimony on the inadequacy of Naples as a homeport site for a carrier task force, a discrepancy emanating, perhaps, from the fact that the original survey of Naples completed in February 1971 was a survey designed to show Naples' adequacy as a homeport site for a cruiser, not a carrier task force (Hearings, pp. 187, 193). In testimony, the Department of Defense indicated that inadequate housing was the major deficiency with Naples as a carrier task force homeporting site (Hearings, pp. 19, 37) although acknowledging port saturation was also an issue of concern (Hearings, p. 37). The Department of State, on the other hand, emphasized port saturation as the major deficiency with Naples (Hearings, pp. 65, 187-188) while being unable to criticize the housing shortage of Naples (Hearings p. 64) and indicating that the State Department was in a better position to examine critically urban support issues like housing than military related items involved in the port surveys (Hearings, pp. 20-24 for surveys and p. 178 for the State Department's examination of issues involved in urban support).

This housing survey summary for Naples (Hearings, p. 23) reinforces this discrepancy. The survey on which the summary was based was written in February 1971 (Hearings, pp. 24, 193) and it had only the homeporting of a cruiser in mind.

5. WHEN ATHENS WAS CHOSEN AS PREFERRED SITE

The Department of State attempted to convince the subcommittees that Athens was the selection of the State and Defense Departments as a homeport *after* an exhaustive consideration of all possible ports by both agencies working closely together (See above, p. 17, B(1).) A key part of that attempt was the description of the process by which the State Department authorized the Defense Department to study possible homeports in Italy and Greece.

Specifically, Rodger Davies stated (Hearings, pp. 56, 59, 61) that from "early in 1971" the State Department "did ask for a survey of other ports [i.e., other than Athens] . . . and the survey was conducted." Mr. Davies also (Hearings, p. 59) indicated that Athens and Naples were surveyed together in "late January or February 1971" and that later other Italian ports were surveyed as this dialog on page 59 indicates:

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, Naples and Athens were done [surveyed] together my people tell me.

Mr. FRASER. Done together when?

Mr. DAVIES. Late January or February, 1971.

Mr. FRASER. Those two cities alone were looked at?

Mr. DAVIES. Subsequently others were. My recollection is that some seven other ports in Italy were surveyed.

Mr. FRASER. After you requested a survey?

Mr. DAVIES. Yes, sir.

Mr. FRASER. So up until the time you requested a survey the only two cities that were looked at were Naples and Athens, is that right?

Mr. DAVIES. In part, because of the desire to keep appropriate elements of the fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean.

From this exchange the reader would understand that Athens and Naples were considered equally as a carrier task group homeport and that later only ports in Italy were similarly studied.

In fact, according to classified telegrams given to the subcommittees by the State Department and summarized on page 193, the following events transpired during the first half of 1971:

(a) The Defense Department presented the State Department with a plan to homeport a carrier task group in Athens and a cruiser in Naples.

(b) On January 21, 1971, telegrams authorizing the surveys *for the above purposes* were sent to Athens and Rome, respectively, with an explanation that the Navy preferred to homeport the carrier force in Athens for several reasons listed.

(c) In June, over four months later, the State and Defense Departments jointly asked the American Embassy in Rome to cooperate with Navy surveys of Italian ports although Athens remained DOD's preferred site.

(We have discussed elsewhere in this report (p. 8) the possible reasons for the delay of over four months in surveying any city other than Athens-Pireaus. Here we are only concerned with the misleading impression given by Mr. Davies' testimony, cited above, that "early on" in its consideration the State Department asked for surveys of alternate ports. Actually, that request was made much later and at least four months after Athens was identified to the State Department and to the American embassy in Athens as the preferred homeport.)

6. HOUSING SURVEY SUMMARIES

The results of the housing surveys (Hearings, pp. 20-24) given to the subcommittees were both incomplete and uneven (See above p. 13, A(2a) and p. 19, B(3)), leaving misleading conclusions. The surveys were conducted by Navy teams sent out from London (Hearings, p. 20); in practice, however, the main source of information seems to have been local naval personnel. In some cases, such as Palermo (Hearings, p. 24) where no Navy personnel seem to reside, the survey summary is very superficial and apparently based mainly on a drive through town. It is curious that the Department of State, which has seven foreign service officers stationed in Palermo, was not asked to prepare a housing survey, a subject on which it must have some valuable information despite its unsupported contention that Defense Department personnel are better qualified to assess availability of housing (Hearings, p. 193).

The unevenness of these surveys is confirmed by the summaries for Athens and Naples (Hearings, pp. 22-23) which are clearly more informative and more systematic than all the others, confirming that they were prepared separately and prior to the others but for different homeporting purposes.

7. RELATIVE SIZE OF HOMPORTING FORCE

There were misleading indications by both State and Defense Department witnesses that homeporting in Greece would amount to only a "minor" increase in the American presence there (Hearings, pp. 47, 181). In fact, to the 3,100 additional military dependents who will be living in homes in Greece, must be added their 1,200 military sponsors who will be living in Greece about 25% of the year and the 5,400 single officers and men who will similarly increase their inport time in Greece from 10% to 25% of the year (Hearings, pp. xx, 34). The net increase, therefore, in American presence due to homeporting nearly equals the number (3,000 military personnel, 3,500 dependents) of all military personnel and dependents assigned to Greece before homeporting. Homeporting thus nearly doubles the American military presence in the country, an increase which is "minor" neither by percentage nor by absolute numbers. The testimony cited above by both State and Defense Department witnesses tried to obscure the size of this increase.

8. CITATION OF POLL ON ANTI-AMERICANISM IN GREECE

A serious example of misleading information supplied by the Department of State concerned a classified poll on Greek attitudes toward the United States which was conducted in June-July, 1970 by an Athens public opinion research firm on commission from USIS Athens. Mr. Davies (Hearings, p. 67) introduced this poll casually in responding to a question from a Congressman by saying "I ran across in my reading a summary of an opinion poll . . ." He then cited figures from the report indicating that he had prepared detailed notes on the poll for his testimony.

What Mr. Davies did not provide was a warning by the private Athens polling firm about the difficulty of judging responses when those polled might hesitate to express controversial views because of what it termed "the present political climate in Greece."

After Mr. Davies' testimony, subcommittee staff examined the original poll at the State Department and questioned the omission of the original "Note of Caution" summarized above. Consequently the following words were added when the State Department corrected the transcript of Mr. Davies' testimony: (*Italic words added*)

. . . I ran across in my reading a summary of an opinion poll done for us by a private Greek institute in Athens, *with a caveat by the poll takers as to biases that may have been introduced because of the political climate prevailing at the time.*

This qualification, however, was never heard by those present at the hearing nor was it contained in a letter sent 16 days later from Assistant Secretary of State Abshire to the subcommittees' chairmen, (Hearings, pp. xiv-xv) and written presumably in the Near East Bureau.

Some months later when Mr. Abshire was told by a journalist doing a story about the poll (which had been declassified in January 1972 by USIA), he apologized to the subcommittees' chairmen "for the incomplete and inadequate nature of my earlier letter."


He wrote further: "Neither I nor my staff were aware of this Note of Caution until [a journalist's name] called it to my attention in early October." (Letter of October 4, 1972 in the subcommittees' files.)

Apparently the lack of candor experienced by the subcommittees in this investigation extended also to relations between elements of the State Department.

9. EFFECT OF HOMEPORTING IN GREECE ON U.S. RELATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The contention that homeporting in Greece would have little to do with an American role in any Middle East crisis (Hearings, pp. 5, 12, 68) is contrary to other assertions (Hearings, pp. 14, 19, 25, 40) that an American presence in Greece and our assistance to that country are closely associated with the United States' ability to act quickly and expeditiously in the Middle East if a crisis required action.

The designation of "strategic location" as one of the six criteria in the Navy's port surveys (Hearings, pp. 20-24) also indicates that Athens' location 600 miles farther east than the Italian ports surveyed gave the Greek city a "good" rating while the Italian cities were judged only "marginal" in that respect. Being farther east, Athens is, of course, closer to Israel and Egypt, a fact apparently important to the Navy when it selected its six criteria. In the abstract, such a "good" rating for Athens' strategic location might be justified, but in a Middle East crisis situation, Greece's close ties with many Arab States could affect the usefulness of Athens.



MINORITY VIEWS

We wish to disassociate ourselves vigorously from the conclusions presented in the joint subcommittee's report on homeporting in Greece. Obviously there is room for honest differences of opinion regarding the basic concept of homeporting, and also regarding our country's relationship with the present Greek Government. However, the subcommittee's report, in our opinion, does not state a reasonable case. In fact it actually ignores the testimony developed during the hearings, and comes to conclusions which cannot be supported by the evidence. The result is more an airing of a preconceived point of view than a critical and objective examination of issues.

In our opinion the decision to issue such a report—after the adjournment of the 92d Congress, it should be noted, when Members are not available for personal discussion—is a mistake. The uneven quality of the report itself reflects on the capacity of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittees to make a fairminded and balanced presentation of such a sensitive foreign policy issue.

The report describes our Government's decision to homeport in the Athens area as "a serious mistake," constituting "a serious disservice to American relations with the Greek people, our ties to our NATO allies, and to our own democratic traditions." Throughout the report runs an obsessive dislike for the present Greek Government. Indeed, apart from issues relating to the nature of the Greek regime, the report finds little negative to say about the decision to homeport in Athens. When these diversionary issues are set aside, the decision emerges for what it is—an honest attempt by reasonable men to solve, or at least alleviate, some of the budgetary and personnel problems of the Navy.

It is as foolish to exaggerate, the way the majority report does, the significance of homeporting as a concept as it is to cast doubts on the wisdom of the policy. Although the report discusses the practical reasons for homeporting, it also appears on the verge of challenging the concept itself. For example, it suggests that homeporting "appears to be inconsistent with a literal interpretation of the Nixon doctrine of a lower American profile abroad." The meaning of such an assertion is not clear, but this is an untenable contention, in our opinion. So, likewise, we can only wonder why congressional committees should examine homeporting "as a worldwide concept" before further commitments in specific areas are made. Is this a suggestion that the basic concept of overseas homeporting is a mistake?

We question the statement that Greece is a "potentially unreliable defense partner." Although it is of course impossible to predict with certainty future political developments in any country, nothing to support such a prediction was presented in this year's testimony on homeporting, nor during the hearings in 1971 on Greece, Spain, and the southern NATO strategy. Regardless of changes in its government, Greece since 1952 has always been a staunch member of the NATO

alliance and, as such, is worthy of our trust. It is the contention of the majority of the subcommittee that U.S. policy has sacrificed the long-term need for a stable Greek Government upon the altar of short-term military advantage. In an attempt to justify their contention, they distorted the testimony of State Department witnesses. For example, while Deputy Assistant Secretary Davies is quoted correctly with regard to homeporting in Greece, subsequent comment distorts his testimony to further the majority's contention that U.S. policy in Greece has been shortsighted.

At the same time, we do not subscribe to the doctrinaire approach of those who criticize the administration for not seeking more aggressively to shape the political system of Greece. We cannot help but note that it is often these same critics who, when U.S. policy in other parts of the globe (Southeast Asia, for example) is debated, attack our Government for becoming too involved in the internal affairs of other countries. Another inconsistency of some critics is to oppose U.S. contacts with rightwing regimes while favoring broader contacts with leftwing regimes. Our own view is that U.S. Government policy in general should be to work with governments as they are, quietly encouraging them to move in directions we favor, but avoiding any actions which could be construed as patronizing, or as interfering in their internal affairs.

We earnestly hope that the present Greek regime will speedily restore the benefits of a constitutional and parliamentary government to the people of Greece, but this is a problem which the Greek people must determine for themselves. Outside pressure and interference, even—or perhaps especially—by old friends such as the United States, may well complicate the situation, and delay a resumption of parliamentary government in Greece.

We do not agree that the administration failed to cooperate fully with the committee. On the contrary, it is clear that the executive branch furnished the committee with all information requested. Furthermore, we are convinced that the Department of State thoroughly considered all of the relevant political factors before making the final decision in favor of homeporting in Athens. Indeed, testimony showed that it was the State Department's insistence that all homeporting options in the Mediterranean be exhaustively explored which led to a 1-year study of the issue.

In summary, we believe the administration carefully considered all implications of homeporting in Athens, that it cooperated fully with the committee's study of the subject, and that the report reflects a bias against any steps which would imply approval of the Greek regime. For our part, we do not consider approval or disapproval of that regime to be the issue.

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GUS YATRON.

PETER H. B. FRELINGHUYSEN.
J. HERBERT BURKE.
SHERMAN P. LLOYD.
BOB MATHIAS.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS

The joint subcommittee report contains conclusions whose depth and scope are too broad to secure my unqualified support. However, the contention that the political implications of homeporting should be thoroughly explored and weighed in such a decision is well founded, as is the report's suggestion that those implications were inadequately evaluated in the present case. My greatest concern, accordingly, is with the decisionmaking process revealed here, and with the character of the executive branch's response to a significant expression of congressional concern.

The evidence is also conclusive with respect to the allegation that the Departments of Defense and State were less than cooperative with this congressional inquiry. Their cooperation with the Foreign Affairs Committee and its various subcommittees is vital to the effective formulation and support of our Nation's foreign policy, and I hope that the record provided by this report will lead to a more positive and productive relationship on behalf of legitimate public interests.

GUY VANDER JAGT

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