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# U.S. FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970's

## A Comparative Analysis of the President's 1972 Foreign Policy Report to Congress

PREPARED FOR THE  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS  
BY THE  
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## FOREWORD

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,  
*Washington, D.C., July 17, 1972.*

Ever since the President in 1970 initiated the practice of sending Congress an annual foreign policy message, the Committee on Foreign Affairs has considered the review and evaluation of that message as an important responsibility.

In 1970, the committee held extensive hearings on the President's message. Last year, we asked the Foreign Affairs Division of the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, to prepare a comparison of the two messages. That was issued on July 26, 1971, under the title "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A Comparison of the President's 1970 and 1971 Foreign Policy Reports to Congress."

That document proved to be useful in the work of the committee and the Congress, and was in considerable demand because of its interest to students of U.S. foreign policy. For that reason, I requested the Congressional Research Service to prepare a review of the President's 1972 foreign policy message.

It has complied by producing the following study, which is considerably more comprehensive than its predecessor. Not only does this document contrast the 1972 message with those for 1970 and 1971, it also compares it to the Secretary of State's 1972 report on foreign policy and the 1972 "posture statement" of the Secretary of Defense. In addition, new emphasis has been given to congressional activity in each of the areas covered in the President's report. As a result of this expansion, the comparison should prove to be of even greater value to the committee, to the Congress, and to the public.

The selection of material included, however, does not necessarily reflect the views or judgment of the committee.

THOMAS E. MORGAN, *Chairman.*







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 continuous and differentiable. The third part  
 is devoted to a study of the properties of the  
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 bounded and has a maximum and minimum.

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## PREFACE

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The difficulties inherent in attempting to present United States foreign policy in a neat package have been illustrated with the President's Report to the Congress, "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, the Emerging Structure of Peace". When the report was submitted on February 9, 1972, the President's trip to China was less than two weeks away and events seemed to be progressing as generally anticipated. Scarcely a month had gone by, however, when the unexpected force of the North Vietnamese offensive reminded the United States that nations do not always behave according to plan and world events cannot always be made to fit into a predefined framework.

Nevertheless, the usefulness of an annual report to Congress on foreign policy by the President has become increasingly apparent in the three years in which President Nixon has submitted such a report. Each of the President's reports, as issued in 1970 and 1971 as well as 1972, brings together in a single document an official Executive statement of U.S. policy that year on the main geographical and functional areas involved in U.S. foreign policy. Just the preparation of such a document would seem to be a beneficial activity requiring officials in the executive branch to think through objectives, evaluate the previous year's accomplishments, and consider the problems usually dealt with separately in relation to each other. The labor involved does more than simply clarify objectives and methods for the officials in charge of carrying out foreign policy, however. It also results in a convenient reference work which makes it easier for Members of Congress or anyone concerned with foreign policy to find out what the stated Administration policy is.

The same utility may be found in the Secretary of State's report on U.S. foreign policy which has been issued for the past two years, "United States Foreign Policy, 1969-1970," dated March 26, 1971, and "United States Foreign Policy, 1971," dated March 8, 1972. The Secretary of State describes his report as supplementary to that of the President, with the President's report focusing on the "conceptual bases" for American policy and the philosophy behind it, and the Secretary's report providing a more detailed record of how that foreign policy was implemented in the previous year.

Prior to these annual reports by President Nixon and Secretary of State Rogers, the closest thing to an official and comprehensive statement setting forth American objectives and plans in the various areas of the world was the annual posture statement of the Secretary of Defense. This year it was presented by Secretary of Defense Laird on February 17, 1972, under the title, "National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird's Annual Defense Department Report, Fiscal Year 1973."



Thus there are now three comprehensive reports being submitted to Congress annually on U.S. foreign policy. Since the subject is vast, and each report is different in scope and perspective, three separate reports seem warranted.

It should be recognized that all of these reports justify the position and propound the foreign policy views of the executive branch. Because of the separation of powers and the duties given to Congress under the Constitution, foreign policy in the United States is not made solely by the executive branch but is a responsibility shared by the President and Congress. Some of the policy described in the reports is official U.S. policy, made under laws enacted jointly by Congress and the President or treaties ratified by and with the consent of the Senate or, in some cases such as communicating with other countries, clearly within the powers of the executive branch. Some of the report, however, states the views of the executive branch alone on controversial policies which fall within the powers shared between the President and Congress which might not receive necessary legislative support.

Despite these limitations, the usefulness of the reports suggests that consideration might be given to insuring the continuation of such reports beyond the incumbent administration. At the present time the President's report on foreign policy is not required by legislation but is submitted voluntarily. This is also true of the report of the Secretary of State.

Since these reports have been submitted to Congress, and since Congress shares the responsibility for making foreign policy, the legislative branch has a responsibility to examine the reports carefully. A considerable amount of congressional scrutiny is assured as Members and committees consider programs requiring legislation. The report of the Secretary of Defense for several years has served as the basic statement of the rationale for the amount requested to be authorized for the Department of Defense and its programs. Since the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 added a requirement for authorizing legislation for any appropriation for the Department of State, from this year on the report of the Secretary of State may serve much the same purpose. In his letter of transmittal to the Chairmen of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees Secretary Rogers said, "This annual report will be an important part of the Department of State's response to the new legislative requirement for authorization of the Department's budget by your Committees."

Close congressional review of the reports can also serve the purpose of improving the communication between the executive and legislative branches. The President has set forth a statement of what he believes should be the objectives of the United States in its international relations and the foreign policies which should be pursued. Careful study of this statement and responses from Congress could establish a new dialogue between the two branches, identifying areas of full agreement, areas needing further consultation, and issues on which there is a basic disagreement.

The purpose of this study is to examine this year's report of the President as a whole, and, to a lesser extent, also the reports of the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. It is called a comparative analysis because an attempt has been made to do three things:



(1) To summarize the President's foreign policy as stated in the 1972 report and compare it with his foreign policy reports of 1970 and 1971 with a view to identifying noteworthy changes;

(2) To compare the President's report with those of the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense; and


(3) To identify instances in the report in which the President has mentioned Congress and compare these against the actions in the relevant foreign policy areas which have been taken by Congress.

Some concluding observations on each of these areas are found in the last section.

Each section of the study has been written by an analyst of the Foreign Affairs Division who specializes in that subject. The project was coordinated by Ellen C. Collier, Specialist in U.S. Foreign Policy, and Susan D. White, Foreign Affairs Analyst.

A similar report was prepared by the Foreign Affairs Division last year, entitled "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: A Comparison of the President's 1970 and 1971 Foreign Policy Reports to Congress," House Foreign Affairs Committee print, July 26, 1971.







## Part I. THE WATERSHED YEAR—AN OVERVIEW <sup>1</sup>

### A. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON

The President calls 1971 "the watershed year," stating, "The foundation laid and the cumulative effect of the actions taken earlier enabled us to achieve, during the past year, changes in our foreign policy of historic scope and significance." This introduction to the 1972 report summarizes the events of the year and the changes which took place in foreign policy. In the introduction to his 1970 report the President outlined the Nixon Doctrine as well as other policies he intended to pursue; he elaborated on them in 1971. In 1972 the President discusses many of the events of the past year as the fruition of his policies.

In all three reports the President stresses that the postwar period in international relations is over and that the changed circumstances require new policies. The changed circumstances, which were also discussed in the earlier two reports, include the recovery of Western Europe and Japan, the increasing self-reliance of the emerging nations, the breakdown in Communist bloc unity, the replacement of U.S. strategic superiority by strategic balance, and the growing conviction of the American people that "the time had come for other nations to share a greater portion of the burden of world leadership."

The President states that coincident with this changed context of international politics has been the development of a new foreign policy philosophy. This new philosophy was discussed in the earlier reports, especially that of 1971, and can be briefly summarized as follows: The bipolar world has ceased to exist and consequently any structure of peace requires the participation of many nations; a leading U.S. role in the world continues to be indispensable; friendships may be expressed in new and different ways, and enmities are not immutable; many problems transcend geographic and ideological borders; the United States must be willing to work with all countries for a peaceful world.

### THE BREAKTHROUGH—ACTIONS TAKEN

Whereas the introductions of the two earlier reports outlined the policy implications of the Nixon Doctrine, the 1972 report speaks of "breakthroughs" in describing the steps taken to apply the philosophy summarized immediately above. The President states, "It is beyond dispute that we have made signal progress. Taken together, the initiatives of 1971 constitute a profound change in America's world role." The first of these initiatives, which the President lists under the heading "Breakthrough With Our Adversaries," is the new approach to the People's Republic of China and the President's trip to Peking. Second is a series of agreements with the Soviet Union

<sup>1</sup> This section of the analysis was written by Allan S. Nanes, Specialist in International Development,



which "get at the cause of the tension between our two countries." The President expresses the hope that his Moscow mission scheduled for May 1972 will stimulate progress in arms limitation and economic cooperation.

The President also refers to a "Breakthrough With Our Allies." He states that the alliances "are no longer addressed primarily to the containment of the Soviet Union and China behind an American shield," but now look to working with those powers toward a stable world peace. This task, the President states, requires the continuing strength of the non-Communist world. The President cites two areas in which steps were taken in 1971 toward keeping these alliances "flexible enough to permit members to pursue autonomous policies within a common framework of strategic goals." One of these areas was economic, consisting of those measures which led to the general realignment of currencies concluded in December 1971. Of those measures the President states, "Most important of all, we have acted together to meet our economic problems in a way which strengthens our unity and guarantees our continued cooperation. We have, therefore, put behind us the imminent danger that conflicting economic interests would lead to the unraveling of free world cohesion."

The other area in which the President says that steps were taken to ensure flexible U.S. alliances was political and consisted essentially of U.S. support for various autonomous initiatives by its allies. Among the more notable of these were the British decision to press again for membership in the Common Market and the policy of Chancellor Brandt in seeking to normalize relations between West Germany and Eastern Europe. In the 1971 report a certain ambivalence on the part of the U.S. allies toward exercising greater autonomy was noted, but this year's report speaks of the U.S. role as "accepting and encouraging initiative and leadership from our allies."

Other actions cited as having helped maintain U.S. alliances in good repair are the agreement with Prime Minister Sato of Japan to expedite the return of Okinawa, the recognition of France's special concerns with exchange rate adjustment, and the policy that U.S. troops in Europe could be justified only by a common strategy and a consensus on a more equitable sharing of burdens.

Except for scattered references such as this one to military strength in Europe, there is not much discussion of military strength or policy in the 1972 introduction, although there is a chapter in the report on this subject. This is in contrast to the introduction to the 1970 report, which contained a separate section on military strength. The 1971 introduction asserted that growing Soviet power had altered the military equation, and in that report defense policies were also discussed in Part I on the Nixon Doctrine as well as in a separate section.

Continuing the discussion on his new policy initiatives, the President says that these changes in foreign policy had led to concern "that our interests in some areas were being sacrificed to the need for progress in others." He indicates that this concern was temporary and that by the end of the year "it was clear that our initiatives toward both our friends and our adversaries were in basic harmony. Progress in each contributed to progress in the other."

The President asserts that the United States "has neither the prescriptions nor the resources for the solution of problems in which



ours is not the prime national interest." This is consonant with the Nixon Doctrine as described in the two preceding reports. The President states that in practice this has meant the encouragement of Latin American initiatives and leadership, the creation of a greater self-defense capability in Asia with the resulting reduction in the U.S. military presence there from almost 800,000 men to less than 300,000, and deliberate restraint concerning involvement in the problems of Africa.

#### NEW DIMENSIONS OF DIPLOMACY

The President lists other international issues in which the United States has been involved including efforts to conclude an agreement in 1973 on the Law of the Sea, narcotics control, help in limiting population growth, protection of the environment, outer space exploration, and combating air piracy. These are issues which, the President said in 1971, transcend geographic and ideological borders and call for "a new dimension of international cooperation." They are referred to in the 1972 report as constituting "The New Dimension of Diplomacy."

With respect to Vietnam, the President states in his 1972 introduction that the U.S. ground combat role has effectively ended, that air sorties, budget costs, and draft calls have all declined sharply, and that U.S. forces in Vietnam are to number only 69,000 as of May 1, 1972. Referring to his disclosure in January of the secret negotiations with North Vietnam and his public proposals for a peaceful settlement, the President asserts that "earnest efforts to end the war for all participants through negotiations have foundered on Communist obstinacy." Hence the U.S. has had "no choice but to move toward ending the war for America through Vietnamization of the conflict." This note of exasperation with the North Vietnamese negotiations is not found in the introductions of the preceding reports.

Another feature of the 1972 introduction which can be contrasted to the earlier messages is the President's listing of "several sharp disappointments" during 1971. The failure to end the Vietnam war is listed as the greatest of these, followed by the failure to prevent the India-Pakistan War (referred to as the war in South Asia) and the lack of progress toward effectuating a Middle Eastern peace. In Latin America "the thrust for change . . . and our response to it have yet to shape themselves into a pattern permitting us to make as full a contribution as we wish and our hemisphere friends expect." Finally the President expresses disappointment that "shrinking aid appropriations" might prevent extending sufficient assistance to Africa and that the United States was unable to keep the Republic of China in the United Nations.

#### UNFINISHED BUSINESS

"The Watershed Year" closes with a tabulation of tasks yet to be accomplished before the United States can complete its transition to its new world role. In his 1971 report, the President also ended his introduction with a discussion of the "transition" but in much more general terms. In 1972 the President lists the issues that he says require more progress including accommodation with the Soviet Union,



continued development of a better relationship with the People's Republic of China, control of the arms race, development of a more constructive approach to economic aid to the poorer nations, reform of trade and the monetary system, continuation of the building of an international system, and the development of a realistic approach to the crisis in the United Nations. As he did in 1971, the President concludes his introduction by voicing confidence in the soundness of his approach to foreign policy.

## B. THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The introductory section of the Secretary of State's report is similar to the President's. There is one difference in emphasis that is found throughout the two reports, namely, that the President focuses on the conceptual bases for a change in America's role while the Secretary of State treats the diplomatic record in greater detail. In his introductory section the Secretary of State mentions U.S. support for a mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Central Europe, a point not covered in the President's introduction. He also has more to say on the specifics of issues such as development assistance and narcotics control. The Secretary of State, who relates the developments in 1971 to the prospects for 1972, makes several optimistic predictions, such as "1972 will be a year of substantial developments in bilateral cooperation." The President in his report does not make such specific predictions although its tone is optimistic.

The introduction to the report of the Secretary of Defense begins by asserting that defense policy, which it calls the "National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence," complements and supports the President's strategy for peace. The Secretary of Defense avers that the purpose of national security strategy is, through strength and partnership, to provide for the security of the United States and its allies and friends. It seeks to deter war but to insure adequate capabilities to protect the nation and its interests should deterrence fail.

The introduction to the Secretary of Defense's report also argues the success of Vietnamization and says that the Department of Defense is now planning beyond Vietnam. The report states that the United States will not abandon U.S. prisoners of war, a matter which the President does not mention in his introduction, and that the U.S. will protect its forces withdrawing from Vietnam. Much of the remainder of the introduction is devoted to weapons and force levels and planning.

## C. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

In the introduction to his 1972 report the President only mentions Congress twice. He states that he is prepared to work with Congress toward the end of finding the most effective way to help the poorer nations. In concluding the introduction he also refers to Congress saying, "It is my hope that this report will help engender that support among the people of the nation and the Congress that represents them."

The introduction to the Secretary of State's report mentions specific congressional appropriations in some aspects of foreign assistance and urges Congress to fund bilateral and multilateral development assist-



ance at the level of \$2.7 billion requested by the President for fiscal 1973.

The Secretary of Defense, in discussing changes which have occurred in the decision-making process in defense, states in the introduction:

There is also a changed relationship between the Department of Defense and the Congress. We recognize the partnership that must exist with Congress, which as a coequal branch of government shares equally the Constitutional responsibility for insuring the safety and security of our country.

He notes that Congress must vote the necessary funds for the force structure and planning to be adequate and effective. In a final subsection of his introduction, he remarks that he intends to increase consultation and cooperation with the congressional committees to which his Department is responsible.







## Part II. AREAS OF MAJOR CHANGE

In Part II, "Areas of Major Change," the President discusses in separate sections the Soviet Union, China, Europe and the "Atlantic Alliance," Japan, and international economic policy. Although he does not introduce this part with any general statements as to why he has grouped these areas in this way, the President does speak generally of each in the introduction to his report in a section titled "The Breakthrough." These areas of major change or breakthroughs, in the President's view, result from initiatives to alter America's role in the world and build the basis for a "more balanced alliance with our friends—a more creative connection with our adversaries." The breakthroughs are the end of twenty-five years of hostility with China, the achievement of agreements with the Soviet Union which have given momentum for building a constructive relationship, realization of the need for a more mature political partnership with Western Europe and Japan, and a relieving, by a general realignment of currencies, of the economic problems which put severe strains on free world cohesion.



## THE SOVIET UNION<sup>1</sup>

### A. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON

As the first section of Part I, the discussion of the Soviet Union occupies a more prominent position in the President's foreign policy report of 1972 than it did in the previous reports. It is also considerably longer. This is perhaps a reflection of the hope the President expresses throughout this section that, as a result of the agreements made in 1971 and other developments, there can be a substantial change in the nature of U.S.-Soviet relations.

The themes developed in this section proceed from those expressed in the two previous reports. In his 1970 report the President pointed out the widespread decline in the appeal of ideology and the foreign policy dilemmas posed to the Soviet Union in the spread of communism to states which would not endure permanent submission to its authority. He defined as a central factor in the U.S.-Soviet relationship an ability to transcend the past and work together to build a lasting peace. In his 1971 report the President spoke at greater length and described four common U.S.-Soviet interests on which a more constructive relationship could be built: the avoidance of a nuclear exchange, the reduction of the burden of armaments, increased trade, and the need for creative economic and social change. The President described U.S.-Soviet relations during 1970 as mixed, mentioning both positive progress, on the one hand, in disarmament talks, negotiations on Berlin, and cooperation in outer space, and, on the other hand, negative aspects of Soviet actions the previous year in the Middle East, Berlin, and Cuba.

In his 1972 report the President again stresses that hope for world peace and stability rests on a mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. As he did in the past, he speaks of the differences between the two countries and emphasizes that these differences do not spring from superficial or transitory causes but are rooted in history, national personalities, and basic orientation. As specific factors contributing to the differences between the Soviet Union and the United States the President mentions: (1) ideological antagonism, (2) military and political competition, (3) commitments as leaders of regional groupings, (4) nuclear rivalry, (5) global interests potentially in conflict, and (6) consciousness in the American and Soviet populations of a long period of hostile feelings.

The President acknowledges that these are "deep concerns" dividing the two countries and states that his approach has been to concentrate on the substantive issues and problems rather than on the "climate" of the relationship. The President says that he has been reinforced in this approach by recognition of the "ambiguous tendencies" in Soviet policy, that is, that the same factors that might lead to a greater hostility with the Soviet Union might also lead to

<sup>1</sup> This section of the analysis was written by Edward T. Lampson, Analyst in European Affairs.



an easing of tensions. The President states, "The task of American policy was to recognize the persistence of this ambiguity and to take action to strengthen the more positive tendencies." For example, nuclear equality with the United States might either increase the urge for predominance or provide opportunities for balanced arms limitations. Similarly, industrial progress might either facilitate a major arms buildup or stimulate international trade. The President sees possibilities for improved relations if the Soviet Union chooses the beneficent alternatives he outlines. He also asserts the hope that the expansion of the Soviet presence into the Middle East, South Asia, and elsewhere might result in a new Soviet interest in regional stability and suggests that the United States and the U.S.S.R. "could work on parallel courses" in these areas.

As in the President's 1971 and 1970 reports, the theme that the U.S.-Soviet relationship is moving from one of confrontation to one of negotiation is repeated. The President emphasizes that progress can be made only on the basis of concrete agreements about specific questions of mutual interest and refers to the four issues he had chosen in 1969 to test the possibility of improving U.S.-Soviet relations: Berlin, strategic arms limitations, the Middle East, and Vietnam. Berlin and arms limitations, two areas the President also mentioned in his 1971 report as making some progress, produced more encouraging results in 1971, the President reports. The President states that in the case of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) a deadlock was broken in 1971 by giving first priority in negotiation to defensive systems and by agreeing that the final conclusion of an agreement on that subject would take place simultaneously with an agreement on limitation of offensive weapons. The deadlock on Berlin was also broken, the President reports, by laying aside legal and political issues on which neither side was willing to modify its position and concentrating on seeking an accord on, and a clarification of, West Germany's ties to West Berlin. An agreement dealing with these limited problems was finally signed by the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, and the United States on September 3, 1971. It guaranteed that access to the western sectors of Berlin from West Germany would be unimpeded and that the West Berliners would be able to travel to East Berlin and to East Germany on the same basis as any other persons.

Other agreements reached with the Soviet Union in 1971 are also mentioned briefly by the President including a draft treaty banning the development, production, or possession of biological and toxin weapons, an agreement on the use of satellites for direct communications, and an agreement on the exchange of certain information to reduce the risk of an accidental nuclear war. In discussing the progress made in normalizing economic relations between the two countries, the President refers to the contribution made by the visit of the Secretary of Commerce to the Soviet Union in November.

This summary of concrete achievements concludes with a recapitulation of a series of other agreements with the Soviet Union and the conclusion by the President that a meeting between himself and the Soviet leaders is justified. There is a reasonable chance, he asserts, of sufficient concrete progress in the resolution of outstanding problems to ensure that a summit meeting will "not be an empty and self-deluding exercise in atmospherics." He calls attention to his October



1971 announcement that such a meeting has been scheduled in Moscow for the latter part of May 1972 and states that his major objectives will include: (1) an accord on an initial strategic arms limitation agreement, or on issues to be addressed in the second stage of the SALT negotiations, (2) a discussion of why no progress has been made in reaching a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, (3) a discussion of the problem of European security in all its aspects, with the reservation that no agreement will be made in this area without U.S. allies, and (4) an exploration of other regional problems and substantive fields to ascertain where additional agreements or cooperation might be possible.

In concluding his discussion of United States-Soviet relations, the President returns to a theme repeated in his other foreign policy reports to the Congress, the depth and durability of the differences which divide the two countries. While he warns against expecting too much from a summit meeting and points out that neither country will give up the pursuit of its own interests, he stresses the need for restraint and for a recognition of the dangers of pursuing narrow advantages, affirming that both countries will benefit from a new relationship. In conclusion, he renews the commitment given in his inaugural address that he would continue to seek a transformation of that relationship, which, if achieved, he would consider "one of the most significant achievements of our time."

In this section the President does not comment on the implications of his trip to China for U.S.-Soviet relations nor suggest that this subject would be on the agenda of the summit meeting, although in the section on China the President does say that American policy in regard to China is not aimed at the Soviet Union. The President also does not mention that the Soviet government has made the entry into force of the Berlin Agreement dependent upon the ratification by the German legislature of the German-Soviet Treaty, signed on August 12, 1970. (The treaty was subsequently ratified in May 1972.) He does not speak on the Soviet buildup in the section on the Soviet Union as he did in his 1971 report, but in the section entitled "The Imperative of Security" he states that there has been a continuing Soviet buildup in nearly every major category of military power and that the U.S.S.R. "is continuing to create strategic capabilities beyond a level which by any reasonable standard already seems sufficient."

#### B. THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The reports of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense follow the same themes of the President's report, but they emphasize different aspects of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. The Secretary of State, after mentioning the modernization and strengthening of Soviet military forces, the expansion of Soviet sea power, and the sharp conflict between the policies of the United States and the Soviet Union in the Middle East and South Asia, discusses in considerable detail the "breakthroughs" which occurred in 1971 including the subjects of Berlin, arms control, U.S.-Soviet naval talks, trade developments, maritime relations, and outer space.



What is particularly notable about the Secretary of State's treatment of the Soviet Union is found in the introduction to his report. He states that although the Soviet Union did not exercise restraint or promote peace in South Asia, Indochina, or the Middle East, "1972 will be a year of substantial developments in bilateral cooperation." The President, although suggesting the possibility of progress in Soviet relations, does not make such a direct prediction as this.

The Secretary of Defense's report to the Congress dwells at length upon the Soviet military buildup and the challenge this presents to the United States, a subject which the President does not treat in the Soviet Union section but mentions in another section entitled "The Imperative of Security."

### C. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

There is no mention of Congress in the Soviet section of the President's report. Congressional interest in policy toward the Soviet Union remained high, however, and was reflected in action on other issues. For example, in the course of the congressional authorizations for defense procurement, Congress reviewed the strategic balance between the Soviet Union and the United States. Congress also took special interest during 1971 in the treatment of Jews in the Soviet Union and numerous bills and resolutions on the subject were introduced. One of these, H. Con. Res. 471, urging the President to take up the cause of Soviet Jews with the Soviet government, was passed by the House on April 17, 1972. There is no mention in the President's report regarding action taken in response to these resolutions, but the report of the Secretary of State contains a section on the problem and on the related problem of actions of violence against Soviet personnel in the United States. The Secretary of State notes the adverse effect this has had on U.S.-Soviet relations, welcomes the willingness of the Soviet Union to permit some thousands of Soviet Jews to emigrate, and calls for prompt congressional action on proposed legislation to make destruction of foreign government offices or official residences a Federal offense.



## CHINA<sup>1</sup>

### A. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON

The major movement in 1971 in U.S. relations with China is greatly emphasized in the President's 1972 report. The President describes his projected trip, which took place February 21-28, 1972, as an historic event and a giant step toward the creation of a stable structure of world peace. The 1972 report stresses that the progress in U.S.-Chinese relations resulted from difficult and meticulous preparations that had begun shortly after the Nixon Administration took office. Although the President, as he did in his previous reports, cautions that both sides still remain separated by profound differences in principle and that immediate concrete achievements may be limited, the thrust of his report on China is optimistic.

The 1972 report summarizes in some detail the moves made by the Administration in 1969, 1970, and 1971 in its efforts to establish a new channel of communication with Peking and to convince the Chinese that the United States desired to "set a new direction in our relations." The short discussion of China policy in the 1970 report, about one-fifth that of the 1972 report, briefly summarized its historical background and pointed out that the United States would take steps to improve relations, but it clearly stated the intention of the United States to maintain its treaty commitments to the Republic of China. The 1971 report, which referred to the "People's Republic of China," stressed that a number of measures had been taken to convince Peking that the United States was ready for a serious dialogue and that additional steps would be taken in 1971. The President pointed out that while U.S. treaty commitments would be maintained and the United States would oppose attempts to unseat the Republic of China as a member of the United Nations, the close relationship with Taiwan should not be an obstacle to movement toward more normal relations between Washington and Peking. In his 1972 report, the President expresses regret at the General Assembly's decision to deprive the Republic of China of its U.N. seat but also welcomes the admission of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The President in all three reports declares that the United States does not intend to exploit the Sino-Soviet dispute. In the 1970 report he stated that the principles which would govern U.S. policies toward China would be similar to those underlying policies toward the U.S.S.R. He went on to say that the United States would not join "any condominium or hostile coalition of the great powers against either of the large Communist countries." In the 1971 report, he noted that the U.S. would not permit either China or the Soviet Union to dictate American policies and conduct toward the other. In the 1972 report, the President again states that U.S.-China policy is not aimed against Moscow and points out that progress in negotiations with the

<sup>1</sup> This section of the analysis was written by M. T. Haggard, Specialist in Asian Affairs.



U.S.S.R. continued after the July 15 announcement that he would visit China. The President repeats that the United States will not attempt to exploit Sino-Soviet tensions, adding that the U.S. did not create the differences between the two Communist powers, that the U.S. has little interest in the dispute over the proper interpretation of Communist philosophy, and that Sino-Soviet border problems are not susceptible to U.S. manipulation.

The President, in a detailed section on international implications, moves to answer questions raised about the impact of the China initiative on U.S. relations with its allies in Asia as well as with the U.S.S.R. He first explains why the early negotiations with China and the July visit by Henry Kissinger, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, were kept secret, stating that advance public disclosure would have inflated expectations and placed pressure on both sides that might have frozen discussions before they began. The President notes that the price paid for secrecy was unavoidable, but that the problems that it caused with allies "should prove transitory." He says that after July the United States gave careful assurances to its allies that "we would not negotiate" to the detriment of their interests. The discussions in Peking, he adds, would focus primarily on bilateral questions.

The President denies that U.S. moves toward China reflect any shift in priorities from Tokyo to Peking, and notes that there is no intention of exchanging strong ties with a "crucial ally" for a closer relationship with Peking. He adds that he could see no conflict in the aim of preserving a close relationship with Japan and at the same time attempting to broaden communications with China. The President's approach indicates that the Administration expected that future developments in U.S.-China relations could make the problem even more acute, calling for "wisdom and restraint" and effort by all three states to "avoid temptations" to exacerbate relations between the other two.

The President in the 1972 message clearly points out the evolving U.S. position toward Taiwan. He states that while the United States will maintain its defense commitments and its diplomatic ties to the Republic of China, the ultimate relationship between Taiwan and the mainland is not a matter for the U.S. to decide. If the two parties themselves could work out a peaceful settlement, he adds, they would do much to reduce tension in the Far East. (Shortly after the President's report, the joint communique issued at the end of the President's trip to China made no reference to the U.S. defense commitment nor was the title Republic of China used).

In recounting the moves made since 1969 to develop communications with China, the President says that within two weeks of his inauguration, he ordered that efforts be undertaken to communicate "our new attitude" through private channels and to set up a new channel of contact. The two sides, he says, began clarifying their intentions through mutually friendly countries, and after a period of exploration settled upon a reliable means of communication, on which the President does not elaborate, between Washington and Peking.

Drawing upon a National Security Council study he had ordered prepared on policy toward China, the President further recounts, he and his staff drew up a program to be followed and then began to



implement a phased sequence of unilateral measures to indicate the direction in which the Administration was prepared to move. These included several steps to relax trade and travel restrictions. Because of the difficulties in communication, the steps taken required no Chinese action in return and could be ignored or quietly accepted. By the fall of 1970, the President notes, the Chinese had begun to respond through private and reliable diplomatic channels. A series of steps taken in the spring of 1971 set the stage for Dr. Kissinger's secret visit to Peking. Discussions were held with Premier Chou En-lai from July 9 to July 11 which resulted in the agreement that the President would visit China before May 1972. During Dr. Kissinger's second trip to Peking (October 20-26) the exact dates on the itinerary and agenda were worked out.

#### B. THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Secretary of State's foreign policy report contains a much shorter section on the People's Republic of China, but unlike the President's report it also contains a separate section on the Republic of China that is almost as long as that on the P.R.C. The Secretary of State's report on the People's Republic of China concentrates on 1971. It does not mention the second Kissinger trip in its summary of the negotiations leading up to the President's trip. The Secretary of State specifically refers to the 1954 Mutual Defense treaty with the Republic of China and notes that Taiwan in 1971 was given assurances several times that the United States "stands by this commitment." The Republic of China section includes some detail on Taiwan's trade.

The Secretary of State refers to the People's Republic of China in his introduction and makes some optimistic statements on future United States-Chinese relations. As his report came out after the President's trip to China, he was able to refer to its achievements while the President's report, written before the trip, could only discuss its possibilities. The Secretary of State's conclusions on the China trip are "... that the President's visit will reduce tensions in the world and make for greater mutual understanding between the People's Republic of China and the United States. It will serve the common interests of our friends and allies in the Pacific. It will improve the prospects for peace in this generation. And, I firmly believe it will serve the best interests of mankind."

Reference to China in the Secretary of Defense's 1972 report deals almost entirely with Peking's military posture and missile development. The Secretary of Defense points out that lack of information on the present status of ICBM (Intercontinental Ballistic Missile) development makes it difficult to assess the level of the strategic nuclear threat that China could pose in the 1970's. He says that current estimates indicate that China could not deploy before 1975 an ICBM capable of striking the continental U.S., although some 10-20 missiles might be deployed by mid-1976. The Chinese have no intercontinental heavy bomber force and do not appear to be developing one, the Defense Secretary states, and neither nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines nor their associated missiles are likely to be available until the last half of the decade. He adds that China at present



has deployed a few MRBMs (Medium Range Ballistic Missiles) and IRBMs (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles), able to reach most cities and other area-type targets in South and East Asia and a substantial part of the U.S.S.R.

The Chinese army of some 2.5 million men is essentially the same as it was last year, he reports, but is continually being modernized and upgraded. The P.R.C. has provided over \$300 million in military aid to the non-Communist third world, largely to Pakistan and Tanzania, with most of this supplied after the Cultural Revolution. The report says that the P.R.C. military aid program is expected to grow.

### C. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

The President does not refer to any congressional action or role in the section on China in his foreign policy report, nor do the Secretaries of State and Defense.

There was action and interest on the subject of China in Congress, however. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July 1971 voted to repeal the 1955 Formosa Resolution which had authorized the President to use U.S. armed forces to protect Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack. The repeal of the Formosa Resolution was adopted by the committee as an amendment to H.R. 9910, the Foreign Assistance bill of 1971. An amendment on the Senate floor to strike out repeal of the Formosa Resolution was agreed to, 43-40.

In other actions indicating congressional interest, hearings were held by both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee relating to U.S.-China relations. The Senate on August 2 passed S. Con. Res. 38 commending the President for initiating his "Journey for Peace." On October 13, 1971, a petition signed by 336 members of the House of Representatives opposing the expulsion of the Republic of China from the U.N. was presented to the President.



## EUROPE AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE<sup>1</sup>

### A. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON

In the section devoted to "Europe and the Atlantic Alliance," the President defines U.S. goals in Europe as "the flourishing of the Atlantic world, the security of the Alliance and the relaxation of East-West tension." The President lists the following developments during 1971 which he says have brought the United States closer to these goals:

- The enlargement of the European community with the projected entry of Britain, Denmark, Norway, and Ireland;

- The groundwork laid in December toward new international monetary arrangements;

- The Berlin agreement of September 1971;

- Increased prospect for discussions with the East on other unresolved issues of security and cooperation in all of Europe;

- The emergence of a more mature political relationship between the United States and its European allies, as reflected in the series of summit meetings held with several of them during the latter part of 1971.

U.S. goals in Europe, as presented by the President in his 1972 report, do not differ fundamentally from those found in his two previous reports. What differences are found in the policies or explanation of them reflect developments of the past year in Europe, and sometimes perhaps a slight shift in attitude on the part of the President in his interpretation of these developments. On the whole, however, the President's views and policies toward Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty have remained constant.

### EUROPEAN UNITY AND ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP

The President reiterates his endorsement of the projected enlargement of the European Community as a positive step toward European unity but he adds that the United States does not regard economic unification as an end in itself: "We continue to feel that political and defense cooperation within Europe will be the fulfillment of European unity." In assessing the implications of an enlarged and strengthened Europe for the Alliance, the President reaches conclusions similar to those expressed in last year's report: "An emerging European identity . . . will mark a striking change in political as well as economic relations across the Atlantic. . . . This change means the end of the era of automatic unity." But more than in his 1971 report, in which he dwelt on the possible adverse effects of a strong, united Europe upon the cohesion of the Alliance, the President in his 1972 report writes about the prospect of an independent Europe with equanimity. He asserts that in the political and military spheres close

<sup>1</sup> This section of the analysis was written by Pauline A. Mian, Analyst in Western European Affairs.



cooperation will continue because "European and American interests in defense and East-West diplomacy are fundamentally parallel." Moreover, the President states, "Two strong powers in the West would add flexibility to Western diplomacy, and could increasingly share the responsibilities of decision."

The President, however, does not ignore the potentially disruptive effect an enlarged Community could have on economic relations within the Alliance, where interests might not run parallel, but are indeed, in certain cases, "conflicting." He asks both sides not to lose sight of "our fundamental shared interest in freer and expanded trade across the Atlantic." He states that a "major collective effort" will be required to resolve divergent economic interests and that "determined statesmanship and hard political decisions" will be necessary. He makes a strong appeal for action in this area and calls for a reduction of the Community's external trade barriers. The President cites as an example of "how cooperation can work" his action in the wake of last summer's international monetary crisis along with the series of summit meetings held in the fall with a number of U.S. allies which, in his view, "laid the political basis for a broad cooperative solution" to international monetary reform.

#### ALLIANCE DEFENSE

The President reasserts his conviction in the necessity of a strong allied defense, although his definition of NATO's role takes on a new dimension in his 1972 report. In the introduction to this year's report he states, "Our alliances are no longer addressed primarily to the containment of the Soviet Union and China behind an American shield. They are, instead, addressed to the creation with those powers of a stable world peace." The President stresses the importance of a strong defense posture as an essential condition for detente.

The President reiterates his endorsement of the conclusions reached in a review of NATO strategies and deployments, conducted in 1970, which reaffirmed the need for a strategy of flexible response "resting on the deployment of appropriate forward defenses." Although it was estimated that "a major war in Europe was unlikely . . . it was evident that Europe was still prone to crises as long as East-West political issues were unresolved, and that the confrontation of opposing forces raised a risk of conflict unless NATO's forces were clearly sufficient to deter and defend."

#### EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN EUROPE

The President holds that detente between Eastern and Western Europe will only come about through negotiation on concrete problems. He lists as the main issues: Berlin, SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions), and the possibility for a European security conference.

While the President briefly discusses the history and contents of the Berlin agreement of September 1971, describing it as a "milestone achievement," he does not mention that its implementation was made contingent on the ratification by the German Bundestag of the two treaties with the Soviet Union and Poland on the renun-



ciation of force. He does indicate, however, that it will not come into force until the signing of the final Four Power protocol.

In regard to the prospect that the agreement on Berlin will open up the possibility for further consultations on the proposed Conference on European Security and Cooperation, the President endorses the convening of such a conference if it "is carefully prepared and will address substantive issues." He says that it can be a productive conference if it is not used as "merely a forum for speeches and friendly atmosphere."

The question of mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Europe is discussed by the President at greater length in his chapter on arms control, but he does mention in this section that the criterion for these negotiations must be "undiminished security."

#### RELATIONS WITH EASTERN EUROPE

The President briefly reviews the progress in U.S. relations with Yugoslavia, Rumania, Poland, and Hungary during 1971, stating that U.S. relations with Eastern Europe are guided by the conviction that "a firm peace and true security are indivisible and can be attained only in Europe as a whole, and not only in one or another part of it." He calls for improved relations with the nations of Eastern Europe and asserts the principle that they can be our friend without being anyone else's enemy. Acknowledging that the Soviet Union "has a right to its own security," he states that "every nation in Europe has the sovereign right to conduct independent policies." The President also says that there are ample opportunities for closer economic, technical and cultural relations between the United States and East European countries.

The President concludes his chapter on Europe by outlining the following "issues for the future":

- Facing economic issues between an enlarged European Community and the United States;

- Reform of the international monetary system;

- Further efforts in attacking the environmental and social problems of the modern world;

- Making force improvements and equitable sharing arrangements within NATO;

- Building a broader structure for reconciliation and peace in all of Europe.

#### B. THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Secretary of State's report on U.S. foreign policy differs from the President's in that it is more descriptive of developments which have taken place in 1971 and less interpretive. The Secretary of State generally limits himself to reviewing U.S. policies and objectives and refrains from attempting to justify the rationale behind them or fit them into an overall framework. The format of his report is lengthier than the President's, enabling him to review, after surveying European developments as a whole, relations with European countries on an individual basis, something which the President does not do.



The tone, and in some places the emphasis, may be different, but the content of the Secretary's report on Europe is essentially the same as the President's. However, a difference in emphasis can be seen as the President cites the "agreement in December on a realignment of exchange rates" in his introductory list of major achievements of policy in Europe in 1971, while the Secretary of State omits this from a similar list. The Secretary's report does discuss the December agreement as a culmination of four months' negotiations and as comprising "measures to settle the most pressing short-term issues."

The Secretary of State gives more policy statements concerning Europe in the introduction to his report than in its body. He refers to the Berlin agreement as "the touchstone for . . . progress" and says that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, if devoted to issues of substance, "could stimulate increased East-West trade, greater cooperation in science and technology, freer movement of people, increased availability of information, and common efforts to protect the environment." The President in his report also discusses the Conference, but more in terms of its intent and how it generally should be approached, while the Secretary of State looks more at its possible results.

The chapter of the Secretary of Defense's report dealing with total force planning in Europe consists of a fairly detailed review of steps taken by the United States and its NATO allies to implement the 1970 NATO Study on Alliance Defense Problems in the 1970's, which called for "improvements in NATO's conventional deterrent, as well as the maintenance of a sufficient modern tactical and strategic nuclear deterrent." In his section on Force Planning and Security Assistance, the Secretary of Defense justifies assistance to Greece, Turkey, and Portugal on the grounds that "their importance to U.S. and NATO security interests have increased significantly in recent years as a result of the Soviet military buildup in the Mediterranean and the volatile situation in the Middle East."

### C. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

In calling attention to the initiatives taken by European members of NATO over the past year to improve their defense posture, the President addresses himself specifically to the question of U.S. forces in Europe which has been of major concern to Congress. He reasserts his determination "to maintain and improve our forces in Europe and not reduce them except through reciprocal reductions negotiated with the Warsaw Pact." He states that it is proper that Congress examine whether troop deployments have a rational basis that justifies their cost but that force levels, being essential for an agreed strategy, should not be undermined for budgetary reasons. He lists as his objections to unilateral cuts that they would impair the possibility for negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR), weaken Allied cohesion, and upset the present military balance "which underpins the overall stability on the Continent which makes detente feasible."

The President acknowledges that the stationing of U.S. troops in Europe has had an adverse effect on the balance of payments, and although he notes that steps have been taken to correct this, he expresses the hope in his 1972 report that arrangements can be



achieved "whereby the United States could maintain its forces in Europe with balance of payments consequences no different from those of maintaining the same forces in the United States."

Attempts were made in Congress in 1971 to reduce U.S. troop levels in Europe. Amendments to this effect were introduced and voted on in the Senate. In May, by a vote of 16 to 36, the Senate defeated an amendment to H.R. 6531 (the Military Selective Service Act) which stated that "no funds appropriated by the Congress may be used after December 31, 1971, for the purpose of supporting or maintaining in Europe any military personnel in excess of 150,000." Other compromise proposals were also rejected by the Senate.

Another amendment—to H.R. 11731, the Defense Appropriations bill—which would have compelled the withdrawal of 60,000 United States troops from Europe (by June 15, 1972), was approved by the Senate Appropriations Committee on November 18, but deleted on the Senate floor on November 23, 1971, by a vote of 54 to 39.

The President does not refer to another NATO-related issue which has been of concern to Congress, that of U.S. military aid and commitments to NATO countries which do not have a democratic form of government.

The providing of military assistance to Greece by the United States was challenged by Congress during the past year. On July 15, the House Foreign Affairs Committee voted 17 to 12 to cut off military assistance to Greece unless the President reported in writing to Congress that "overriding requirements" of U.S. national security justified the assistance. In such an event, the amount expended was not to exceed that of FY 1971. On December 17 the Senate, by a vote of 33 to 21, agreed to a conference report on the authorization for the foreign aid program which included these provisions. They were enacted in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 (P.L. 92-226), signed February 7, 1972. (On February 17, 1972, the restriction was waived by the President.)

In another instance, Senator Clifford Case introduced S. Res. 214 on December 16, 1971, asking that "any agreement with Portugal or Bahrain for military bases or foreign assistance should be submitted as a treaty to the Senate for advice and consent." The resolution was passed by the Senate on March 3, 1972, by a 50-to-6 vote.

President Nixon's concern over economic issues within the Alliance was also shared in Congress during 1971 when a large number of hearings were held relating to U.S. economic posture and policies and their effect on Europe. For example, the House Foreign Affairs Committee held several sets of hearings on international economic relations during 1971, including those on the implications for U.S. foreign economic policy of British entry into the Common Market and the international implications of the new economic policy.



## JAPAN<sup>1</sup>

### A. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON

In his 1972 foreign policy report, the President appears to place more emphasis than he did in previous reports on the importance of the United States relationship with Japan and the need to continue adjusting that relationship to the changing situation in Asia. He states that Japan is the most important U.S. ally in Asia, America's largest overseas trading partner, and the world's third greatest industrial power. He reports that the past relationship between the United States and Japan has been very successful in that it has contributed to Asian security and stability, promoted Asian economic development, and served to strengthen Asian political freedoms.

The President notes that the past year has altered the U.S.-Japanese relationship. As Japan has achieved remarkable postwar development, these changes in the United States-Japanese relationship were unavoidable, in his opinion, and, in the long run, desirable. However, the President says, in some cases, changes were made too slowly and strains developed. The issues contributing to these differences were: Okinawa's reversion, the economic growth of Japan and the growing imbalance in United States-Japanese trade, the imbalance of United States-Japanese contributions to Asian development, the United States-Japanese defense relationship, and relations with China.

Because of Japan's growing economic and political strength, the President asserts the United States-Japanese relationship can only be sustained on a basis of equality and reciprocity. This requirement for a more mutually beneficial partnership, which had been described as part of the Nixon Doctrine as applied to Japan in the 1971 report, is stated with more detail in the 1972 report.

The President states that in moving to achieve greater equality and reciprocity, "We began with Okinawa." Achieving the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese control in 1972 was a goal the President set in the 1970 and 1971 reports. This year's message reports the signing of the reversion treaty in 1971 and the President's agreement in early 1972 to Prime Minister Sato's request to speed up final reversion.

Japanese restrictions on foreign trade and investments were mentioned as an issue of concern in the 1970 report and again, more strongly, in the 1971 report. In both cases however, optimism was expressed in regard to Japan's plan to liberalize its controls. The 1972 report describes the slower-than-hoped-for progress in this area in the first half of 1971, the serious problems of the American international economic position, and the "harsh" measures applied on August 15, 1971. Although there was an economic shock to the U.S.-Japanese relationship, the President states, the unilateral measures of August 15 were required and could not have been delayed longer. He asserts that since then substantial progress has been made in reducing trade

<sup>1</sup> This section of the analysis was written by Robert D. Shuey, Analyst in Asian Affairs:



barriers, in controlling the sale of Japanese synthetic textiles in America, and in realigning currency values.

The proper level of Japanese and American contributions to Asian development is another issue which the President has raised in each of his reports, indicating a hope that Japan would increase its share. The 1972 report, while welcoming Japan's growing contribution to Asian development, expresses the hope for greater Japanese use of grants and concessional loans rather than commercial credits. The 1970 report made the point that Japan was exploring ways it could help bring about stability and reconstruction in postwar Southeast Asia. While the 1971 and 1972 reports do not refer specifically to a Japanese role in the reconstruction of postwar Southeast Asia, they do refer to Japan's stake in Asian stability.

The 1972 report states that Japan has long had the industrial and technological strength to assume responsibility for its own conventional defense and notes with approval that Japan plans to strengthen its conventional defense capabilities over the next several years. The President reports that the trend in Japan toward a stronger defense has been accompanied by a reduction of U.S. forces in Japan and on Okinawa. He does not discuss the possibility of future nuclear armament by Japan. The 1970 report pointed out that in 1969 Prime Minister Sato affirmed that it was in Japan's interest for the United States to carry out fully its defensive commitments in East Asia. However, it did not specifically mention Japan's security role. The 1971 report referred to Japanese plans to provide substantially all their conventional defense requirements.

The 1972 report states that as the People's Republic of China moves to increase international contacts, the United States and Japan must face the problem of "harmonizing our changing national perspectives" toward China. The President says he knew that the major American initiatives taken to improve relations with China would have a significant impact on Japan, but that the United States has made extensive efforts to assure Japan that the reduction of Asian tensions, which these initiatives sought, is in basic harmony with U.S.-Japanese friendship. He states America will not sacrifice that friendship for better communication with a longstanding adversary and adds that the United States does not intend to seek bilateral arrangements that would adversely affect the interests of its allies.

In discussing American and Japanese relations with China, the President declares that both nations "shared a fundamental interest in improved relations with China," and that "there is no cause for either Japan or the United States to feel a lack of trust concerning our parallel policies toward China." The President also refers to "the necessity and right of a reinvigorated Europe and Japan to pursue their own political initiatives, just as we wish to pursue ours," and states that "we expect and welcome a greater diversity of policy."

#### B. THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The message to Congress by Secretary of State Rogers is similar to the President's report but supplies additional detail. The Secretary notes that after the reversion of Okinawa, the United States will be required to consult with the Government of Japan prior to using



bases there for military combat operations and prior to making major redeployments there. On the subject of trade controls, he refers to some Japanese import quotas as being in violation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The Secretary also mentions an important shift taking place in Japanese resource allocation from investment in production facilities to a greater emphasis on modernization of social infrastructure. He suggests that this could have important effects, such as a slowing of the growth of its giant export business. Finally, Secretary Rogers speaks of scientific cooperation between the United States and Japan in such projects as a space station and deep space exploration.

In the introduction to his report, the Secretary of State lists the four areas in which ". . . we will strengthen our ties with our major ally in the region—Japan." 1972, according to the Secretary of State, will be a year for consolidating political and economic relations, restoring Okinawa to Japanese administration, seeking, by both the United States and the Japanese, a better relationship with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union, and emphasizing bilateral trade. While the President touches on these same areas in his section on Japan, he does not make the same optimistic predictions about 1972 as does the Secretary of State.

Secretary of Defense Laird, in his report to Congress, notes that the United States is encouraging Japan to modernize its armed forces and is providing technical assistance to help Japan assess its needs.

### C. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

The President does not make any mention of Congress in the section on Japan. He does not describe in his report the actions of the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee which led to an offer for voluntarily self-imposed quotas by the Japanese textile industry of exports to the United States. The President referred to this when he rejected the Japanese offer as insufficient on March 11, 1971.

The report of the Secretary of State, but not that of the President, mentions Senate approval of the Okinawa reversion treaty by a vote of 84 to 6 on November 10, 1971. The Japanese Diet approved the treaty and completed the necessary implementing legislation on December 30, 1971.



## INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY<sup>1</sup>

### A. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON

This section of the report reexamines the policies and institutions mentioned in the 1970 and 1971 reports, including Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Agency for International Development (AID), and the Council for International Economic Policy. It also deals with the background to the events of August 15, 1971, the policies proposed, and the justifications for these policies.

In order to indicate the long-term factors leading to the economic measures of August 15, the format this year differs considerably from that of the two previous reports. The 1972 report commences with a broad-scale historical overview of the international economic situation in the period immediately following the Second World War and discusses the creation of the multilateral trade and financial institutions which since that time have provided the framework for international economic relations. The dominance of the United States in that period is noted as is the subsequent growth in the volume of commerce and the industrial capacities of the European Economic Community, Japan, and Canada. The introductory overview concludes by stating that the President's policies in 1971 were intended to reflect the changed status of the United States in the international economic sphere.

### INTERNATIONAL MONETARY POLICY

This section begins by reviewing the Bretton Woods system and the U.S. role in the founding of the IMF. The President notes the beneficial effects at first of U.S. balance of payments deficits in providing international liquidity. He describes the relative decline of the U.S. trade position, noting that throughout the 1960's there existed an imbalance between U.S. liquid assets and liabilities and that doubts about the strength of the dollar arose as large dollar balances piled up overseas. Exacerbating the decline was the fact that the pressures on surplus and deficit countries were not reciprocal. Surplus countries were able to continue to run up large balances with little pressure to revalue while deficit countries had to take deflationary steps or institute controls. And, because the dollar was reserve currency, it was more difficult for the United States to change its exchange rate.

This discussion appears to reflect a point of view that is different from that of last year. In the 1971 report the President stated, "The continued improvement in international monetary cooperation in the past few years made 1970 a year of relative tranquility in the monetary system in contrast to the recurrent monetary crisis which punctuated the 1960's." This year's report, however, details the decline of the dol-

<sup>1</sup> This section of the comparison was written by Theodor W. Galdi, Analyst in International Relations.



lar in world markets since 1945 and narrates a series of European revaluations and devaluations from 1967 to 1971 as evidence of world monetary instability. Against this background, in 1971 the situation for the dollar worsened. Rising inflation in the United States, an outflow of short-term capital accompanied by a deficit in the balance of trade, and overvaluation all caused dollars to flow abroad in record amounts.

#### THE AUGUST 1971 MEASURES

The President states that by August of 1971 the situation was no longer sustainable, especially because of a sharp deterioration in the balance of trade. "It was clear that the dollar was overvalued, while the currencies of certain of our trading partners were manifestly undervalued." Since he determined that strong measures were necessary to emphasize the seriousness of the problem, the President, on August 15, suspended the convertibility of the dollar into gold, established a temporary surcharge of 10 percent on imports, and imposed wage-price controls on the economy. His stated objectives were to create the conditions for a realignment of exchange rates, to stimulate progress in the areas of trade liberalization and burden sharing, and to check domestic inflation. However, the President notes, the August 15 measures were not viewed as a lasting solution as that would depend upon improvement in the competitiveness of the domestic economy as well as a major cooperative international effort to help improve the U.S. balance of payments position.

At the Group of Ten meeting on December 18, 1971, in Washington, agreement was reached on a number of the most pressing issues including devaluation of the dollar in exchange for revaluations of other currencies and the removal of the 10 percent import surcharge. The President points out that the agreement marked the first time in history that nations had negotiated a multilateral realignment of exchange rates and, unlike the postwar Bretton Woods Agreement, it was fashioned by relatively coequal economic powers. Although cautioning that an immediate turnaround should not be expected, the President states that the results of the agreement should help improve the U.S. balance of payments position.

The realignment of exchange rates, however, must be only the first step toward more fundamental reform of the international monetary system because a system is needed, the President asserts, with greater adaptability and resilience, one that will bring pressure for adjustment to bear as heavily upon surplus countries as upon those in deficit. In 1972 he expects progress toward the development of arrangements with other nations which will provide a more durable framework for further expansion of trade and investment.

The reference at this point to the creation of SDRs in 1969 is considerably less sweeping than that which appeared last year. At that time he said, "We look forward to the day when this product of remarkable international cooperation will become the primary reserve assets in the international monetary system." This year, he expresses the hope that experience with SDRs will help nations to find ways to diminish the role of gold and to avoid the excessive reliance on reserve currencies characteristic of the present system.



## INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY

Following a brief review of the evolution of postwar international trade policy and of the leading role of the U.S. in the formulation and execution of that policy, the report notes that the European Economic Community (EEC) and Japan are now independent centers of economic power and strong competitors with the United States in international trade. The President calls attention to the establishment or reemergence of trade barriers and discriminatory trading arrangements which have placed U.S. products at a competitive disadvantage. In addition to these external factors, he notes, U.S. productivity has increased more slowly, and its price levels more rapidly, in the recent past than in the case of competitors. In 1971, the President points out, for the first time since 1893 the United States experienced a trade deficit.

In order to deal with the effects of these changes, the President states he established seven objectives for his trade policy in 1971: (1) curb inflation domestically, (2) realign exchange rates, (3) seek removal of specific barriers to U.S. exports, (4) set the stage for further international negotiations to remove trade barriers, (5) strengthen the export competitiveness of American industry, (6) facilitate the adjustment of domestic industries to rapid import increases, and (7) increase opportunities for trade with the Communist countries. Some of these same objectives were stated in similar language in the President's 1971 report.

The President states that the measures of August 15 were a significant success in dealing with the root causes of the trade deficit. First, the realignment of exchange rates in December corrected most of the problems arising from the overvaluation of the dollar. Second, the wage-price freeze directly attacked the domestic roots of inflation. Finally, progress was made in the removal of certain restrictions against American exports.

The President observes that in recent years major irritants in relations of the United States with other countries have been the establishment of discriminatory policies such as the preferential trading arrangements made by the European Economic Community, European discrimination against Japanese goods, the agricultural policy of the EEC, and Japanese barriers to direct investment. The President credits the Secretary of State with taking the lead at the Ministerial meeting of the OECD in June 1971 to establish a group of experts to deal with world trade problems and try to overcome these barriers. The President advocates a concerted effort to undertake a series of international negotiations for the reduction of trade barriers and in support of this he cites the recommendations of the President's Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy which were submitted in July 1971.

As he did in the 1971 report, the President notes the establishment of the Council on International Economic Policy to develop long-range programs to improve U.S. competitiveness overseas and to strengthen U.S. export performance. He says that he supports the conclusions reached by Peter Peterson, then Presidential Special Assistant for International Economic Policy and now Secretary of Commerce, that the United States should assume a firm posture in future negotiations to



assure U.S. products equal access to world markets, and avoid erecting new barriers to imports.

As in the 1970 and 1971 reports, the President reviews his accomplishments in the field of trade policy during the preceding year. Among these, he notes the conclusion of voluntary agreements with Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, and the Republic of China to limit exports to the United States of woolen and synthetic textiles, invocation of the Long-Term Arrangement on Cotton Textiles, and improvements in the Voluntary Steel Arrangement to limit exports of steel products from Japan and Europe to the United States.

Among the measures taken to increase opportunities for trade with Communist countries, the President notes his support of Rumania's accession to GATT and the application of Most Favored Nation Treatment for that country, the relaxation of currency restrictions and some trade controls in regard to the People's Republic of China, and the trip to the Soviet Union and Poland by the Secretary of Commerce. The significant expansion of this section compared with the 1971 report is perhaps an indication of the changes that have taken place in the past year regarding trade with Communist countries.

#### FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

The President describes 1971 as "a year of crisis for foreign assistance." After reviewing the early history of the foreign assistance program and the dominant role played by the United States in the field of development assistance, he points out that the situation today is quite different. Other nations have become economically strong and have assumed greater responsibility for providing assistance to less developed countries. Multilateral institutions now provide a structure for improved planning and execution and for a broader sharing of the responsibility for development. Because of these changes, the President reiterates, a new approach is required. Elements of the new approach are: (1) a focusing of bilateral assistance to countries in which the U.S. has a special interest, (2) a less direct role in the planning phases of development, and (3) the coordination of U.S. bilateral aid with that of other countries.

The President repeats his support for the conclusions of the Peterson Commission, which appeared in the 1971 report, and the division of the foreign assistance program into the categories of security assistance, humanitarian assistance, and development assistance with each division having its own administrative and policy structure.

In the meantime, the President lists major changes which have already been effected: (1) the Agency for International Development (AID) has separated the administration of its security assistance programs from that of its development assistance programs, (2) AID technical assistance programs are now being concentrated on major development priorities, mainly food production, education, health, and population, (3) AID has launched a systematic effort to engage American private organizations more effectively in the application of technical and scientific capabilities to help the developing countries, (4) Since 1969 AID has reduced its staff by 30 percent, and (5) the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) was created in January 1971 to stimulate investment in less developed countries by U.S. firms.



The President discusses the new expropriation policy announced in January 1972, stating, "Henceforth should an American firm be expropriated without reasonable steps to provide prompt, adequate and effective compensation, there is a presumption that the expropriating country would receive no new bilateral economic benefits until such steps have been taken unless major factors affecting our interests require us to do otherwise." In addition, the President notes U.S. support for loans to the expropriating country by multilateral institutions would be withdrawn. The President urges greater use of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes and indicates his support for the establishment of the International Investment Insurance Agency.

The President discusses multilateral assistance in a manner similar to that in the 1971 message. He reiterates his support for multilateral development institutions and the various consortia and consultative groups, including the United Nations agencies and programs.

The President is less optimistic than in 1971, when he expressed hope that the downward trend in bilateral foreign assistance had been reversed. The year 1972, the President says, "could prove to be decisive for foreign assistance." He states that,

This nation has the resources and the know-how to make a vital contribution to the efforts of the developing nations to improve the quality of life of their people . . . we must do our part to ensure that all nations share in the world's prosperity.

#### ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE

Stating that 1971 saw the stage set for fundamental and long-term reforms in the international economic system, the President sets out his goals for 1972: (1) begin discussions with other nations to reform the international monetary system, (2) work in cooperation with trading partners to set the stage for major international negotiations for the reduction of trade barriers, (3) continue efforts to hold down domestic inflation, increase productivity, and strengthen adjustment assistance efforts, (4) work toward an improved foreign assistance program which will merit increased domestic support, (5) develop effective mechanisms for analyzing and dealing with long-term issues such as the role of multinational corporations, foreign investment policy, and the effects of environmental control on international trade and investment patterns.

#### B. THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The section of the Secretary of State's report on economic affairs, while considerably more detailed, does not differ substantially in tone or emphasis from the President's report. In most instances the additional background and facts help to elaborate on the issues presented by the President. However, the appraisal of the Secretary of State concerning the length of time needed to achieve a favorable balance of payments does not appear to be as optimistic as that of the President. The Secretary notes, "The experience of other countries, notably Great Britain, suggests that two or three years must elapse



before the full impact of the exchange rate changes are felt. Indeed, until standing orders are worked off, and trading habits change, the effect might be negative."

The Secretary of State includes several topics having both immediate and long-term consequences on the U.S. economic position that are not mentioned in the President's report. The most important of these concern international petroleum developments and economic issues involved in efforts to share the burden of the cost of U.S. forces in Europe.

In the introduction to his report, the Secretary of State opens his discussion of international economic policy with the statement, "As we negotiate a transformation of the postwar international economic system, we will endeavor to preserve the economic openness which made that system so successful for so long." While the President only sets out the goals to be achieved in 1972, the Secretary of State makes predictions: "1972 will be a year of international negotiations to improve the condition of our trade, to reform the monetary system, and to set the stage for comprehensive multilateral negotiations, to expand and liberalize international trade."

The Secretary of Defense has a section in his report entitled "Defense and the Economy" but in this he discusses problems related to the domestic rather than the international economy. He also has a section on security assistance, an aspect of the foreign aid program covered by the President in a separate section, in which he endorses the concept of authorizing and funding security assistance separately from foreign economic assistance.

### C. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

The President mentions Congress several times in the section on international economic policy. In the field of trade policy, he notes that he proposed and Congress passed legislation permitting the establishment of the Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC). In addition he supported legislation expanding the facilities of the Export-Import Bank which was signed into law in August 1971, Public Law 92-126.

After reporting that the system of generalized tariff preference for imports from less developed countries has been put into effect by the EEC, Japan, and the United Kingdom, the President, as he did in last year's message, states that he expects to propose legislation to Congress to fulfill the U.S. commitment to institute such preferences.

Most of the President's references to Congress in this section are to congressional action on foreign assistance. In discussing a proposed new approach to foreign assistance, he points out that he submitted two bills to Congress on April 21, 1971, to separate international security assistance from international development and humanitarian assistance. He states his hope that in 1972 Congress will give closer consideration to his proposals for two new development institutions, one to provide capital development loans and the other to provide technical assistance. He repeats his support for congressional authorization of \$320 million per annum over the next three years for the International Development Association (IDA) and continues to urge the fulfillment of the U.S. commitment to the Inter-American Devel-



opment Bank and the Asian Development Bank. (Authorizations for funds for the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the International Development Fund were enacted in March 1972, Public Law 92-245, Public Law 92-246, and Public Law 92-242.)

Referring to the treatment of the Foreign Assistance Act by Congress, the President states,

I was distressed by the congressional action on foreign assistance during the latter part of last year. The 10 percent reduction in foreign aid which I ordered in August was effected as a budgetary measure when Americans were asked to sacrifice. It did not signal a renunciation of the commitment of this Administration to assist the developing countries. It did not justify the action taken by the Senate in November which almost abolished our entire aid program. This action, subsequent congressional treatment of the aid program, and the large cuts in the aid levels I requested are of serious concern to those of us who realize the importance of this program and to friendly nations who look to us for assistance.

He states that the Administration will work cooperatively with Congress to insure that the United States continues to provide meaningful amounts of development assistance and continues actively to participate in the international development process.

On this same subject the Secretary of State, in his report, notes the "inadequate" attention received by the President's recommendations for aid reform. He indicates that they contained many proposals aimed at solving the very problems that brought about the temporary defeat of the aid authorization in the Senate.

The legislative consideration of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 (Public Law 92-226) was long and involved, and it was not signed until February 7, 1972. The appropriation act (Public Law 92-242) was signed on March 8, 1972, and provided a total of \$3,189,437,000.

In addition to the hearings on foreign assistance legislation, several hearings were held on international aspects of the President's New Economic Policy and other international economic problems by a number of congressional committees.



### Part III. AREAS OF CONTINUING TRANSITION

In Part III, "Areas of Continuing Transition," the President discusses East Asia, Latin America, and Africa. These same areas are covered in the President's introduction to his report under the heading "Other Areas of Progress," areas which are not "breakthrough" areas but in which "important, if quieter, progress was made in 1971 toward shaping the new American role." There the President states, "In our relations with all countries we proceeded to give effect to our new policy of insisting that the United States has neither the prescriptions nor the resources for the solution of problems in which ours is not the prime national interest." The President says that although the United States will provide supplementary help, it is for others actually to formulate the policies and solutions.



## EAST ASIA<sup>1</sup>

### A. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON

The 1972 section on "East Asia" in the President's foreign policy message covers basically the same geographic area as did the 1971 report, although in 1971 the section was titled "East Asia and the Pacific." In this section the President stresses the need for a new form of American participation in Asia, noting that U.S. allies in Asia are acting with a new self-assurance, both individually and collectively, and that the four major powers concerned with Asia are "certain" to play a role in shaping a new structure of regional stability. The President emphasizes the evolving U.S. approach to Asia, citing (1) the initiative toward China as a move to ease tensions while maintaining existing commitments, and (2) the diminishing U.S. role in Vietnam, which he says had reduced domestic strains in the United States and which otherwise could have weakened the basis for future American participation in Asia. Bringing an end to U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war, he adds, emphasizes the need for local forces to be self-reliant and bear the combat burden, but with substantial U.S. military and economic assistance.

While the section on East Asia is shorter than in the 1971 report, the heavy stress on the area is shown by the detailed attention that is given in other sections of the report to specific subregions, including Indochina, China, and Japan. Moreover, in his discussions on geographic areas, the President devotes more space to Asia than to all the other areas combined.

The President's section on East Asia makes only two brief references to the role that the four involved powers—the United States, the U.S.S.R., Japan, and China—will play in Asia's future. Beyond that, he makes no direct reference in the section to the Soviet Union.

The President summarizes, as he did in the 1970 and 1971 reports, the policy he enunciated at Guam in 1969 as it relates to future U.S. security policy in Asia. The President refers to this as the Nixon Doctrine only toward the end of the East Asia section. The main components of this policy, he reiterates, are maintenance of existing treaty commitments, providing a "shield" if an ally or a nation "vital to our security" is threatened by a nuclear power, and providing military and economic assistance to a threatened nation while it provides the manpower for its own defense.

The President notes that while U.S. forces in Asia have been reduced by 460,000 men, sufficient forces will be maintained in Asia to meet U.S. commitments. The transition to self-reliance in Asia, he adds, will require substantial and, in some cases, increased U.S. security and economic assistance. The President asserts that U.S. deployments can thus be reduced without jeopardizing national interests or strategic objectives.

<sup>1</sup> This section of the analysis was written by M. T. Haggard, Specialist in Asian Affairs.



The report states that U.S. bilateral security treaties with Japan, the Republic of China, the Philippines, and the Republic of Korea remain the "touchstones" of regional stability, and that the multi-lateral security pacts with Australia and New Zealand (ANZUS) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) have made a "valuable contribution to peace". The Five Power arrangement for cooperation among Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom in the defense of Malaysia and Singapore facilitates "continuing stability" in that area and is described as a symbol of "feasibility" of a broad regional approach.

The President cites, as an example of a country that has demonstrated the ability to share the defense burden, the increased strength and competence of South Korean forces, the reduction of U.S. troop strength in Korea, and the United States-South Korean program to modernize Republic of Korea forces. He adds that common U.S.-Thai objectives are an important factor in the Nixon Doctrine's success in Southeast Asia and that the United States has reaffirmed its intention to continue aid to Thailand and maintain the U.S. security agreement.

In citing the advances made by Asian states toward regional stability, the President, while referring to problems which hamper economic growth, cites the record of rapid economic development in such countries as the Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Indonesia, he says, has achieved stability, controlled inflation, and adopted enlightened economic policies which increased domestic support for the government. In that country growth continues in the level of exports, investment, and rice production.

The President cites the periodic consultations of the members of the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). He notes the ASEAN interest in eventual neutralization of the area, adding that "much remains to be done" before such an objective can be realized.

#### B. THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Secretary of State's report on East Asia and the Pacific contains a great deal more detail than does the President's report and includes separate sections on Thailand, Burma, Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, and the South Pacific, with Micronesia discussed in the section on the United Nations, thus covering the Pacific more thoroughly. The Secretary of State's report also has a detailed breakdown of information on troop withdrawals in Asia in 1971 and discusses developments in the U.N. Economic Commission on Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) and the Mekong Committee.

The references to East Asia in the Secretary of Defense's annual report relate largely to military personnel and hardware. In the section on total force planning in Asia, however, a quotation is included from the President's 1971 report on general U.S. security policy in the area. The President referred to U.S. policy over the next decade in Asia as having to deal simultaneously with three phases of Asian development. In some countries there would be an absolute



need for the U.S. to play a central role in helping them meet their security and economic requirements, the President said, while in others "we will complete the process of adjusting our relationship to the concepts of the Nixon Doctrine." And with all, the United States will be striving to establish a new and stable structure reflecting the interests of the smaller Asian states, of Japan, and of China and the Soviet Union. The Secretary of Defense goes on to state that the U.S. is a Pacific power and must recognize and accept its responsibilities in the area. He adds that the U.S. maintains balanced ground, air and naval forces in the Asian theater, but continues to emphasize the strengthening of the military capabilities of its allies.

### C. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

In his discussion of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia and the provision of security assistance to support the transition to self-reliance in Asia, the President adds that "I am convinced that the Congress and the American people will continue to prefer this course over a retreat from Asian problems—and from our responsibility to help provide Asians with the vital resources needed to meet them." The only other reference to Congress in the section covering East Asia relates to the Asian Development Bank. The President says he attaches great importance to continued U.S. financial support for Asian development "including Congressional approval of soft loan funds" for the Asian Development Bank. The authorization for a U.S. contribution of \$100 million to the Bank, to be made in two annual installments, was passed by Congress and approved March 10, 1972, Public Law 92-245.



## LATIN AMERICA<sup>1</sup>

### A. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON

The President's discussion of policy toward Latin America in 1972 is similar to that in his two previous messages. The 1972 message, however, is not limited to 1971 developments but approaches policy in terms of the three-year experience of the Administration. Points of departure from the 1971 and 1970 reports are the President's references to specific developments during the year such as problems in relations with Chile and Ecuador.

The theme that the special relationship of the United States with Latin America has to be readjusted to meet the realities of the 1970's runs throughout the three statements. The reports assert that Latin America's demands for political, economic, and social change have created tensions in the hemisphere that require an adjustment of U.S. policy. They state that the new relationship recognizes that Latin America desires to be and should be less dependent on the United States while the United States retains certain responsibilities in fulfilling its role in the "partnership."

In his 1972 report the President identifies four continuing policy themes: (1) a sharing of ideas, (2) a mature U.S. response to political diversity and nationalism, (3) a practical contribution to development, and (4) a humanitarian concern for the quality of life in the Western Hemisphere. With regard to the sharing of ideas, the President states that the new practice of Latin American consultation and coordination on political and economic issues, as expressed in the Consensus of Vina del Mar in 1969 and in various meetings of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA-ECOSOC) and the Special Coordinating Commission for Latin America (CECLA), can be a constructive force for cohesion in the hemisphere and contribute to the formulation of U.S. policy. The 1971 report was more specific on this point, detailing measures taken, such as financial support for the strengthening of multilateral institutions, including the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB).

In the section dealing with diversity and nationalism, the President refers directly to the fisheries and territorial waters dispute with Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil as well as to Chile's expropriation policies. Like the 1971 message, the 1972 statement repeats assurances that U.S. policy is to deal with governments as they are. Citing Chile as the prime example, the President says, "... our relations will hinge not on their ideology but on their conduct toward the outside world. . . . We are prepared to have the kind of relationship with the Chilean Government that it is prepared to have with us." The President, however, expresses concern over Chilean expropriation policies and warns that

<sup>1</sup> This section of the comparison was written by Barry Sklar, Analyst in Latin American Affairs.



the "United States and other public and private sources of development investment will take account of whether or not the Chilean Government meets its international obligations."

The President pays more attention to Cuba in the 1972 report than he did previously. While recognizing that Cuba has moderated its tactics, the President stresses that Cuba continues to furnish assistance to revolutionary groups and continues to host a permanent Soviet military presence. Indirectly, the President acknowledges the move on the part of some Latin American nations to lift OAS diplomatic sanctions on Cuba but says that the United States will not support such a move unless a real change in Cuba's policy is noted.

The 1972 report, in contrast to the previous messages, mentions U.S. military assistance, although in a rather oblique manner. In the context of discussing confrontation and extremism the President says that "... the United States continues to assist the efforts of its partners to combat subversive violence, both with material and training support for security programs. . . ."

The President addresses himself to the trade issue in his discussion of the United States program of action for development. He stresses that the United States is working for a generalized tariff system by which industrial countries give preferential treatment to all developing nations. Similar statements were made in the 1970 and 1971 reports which also emphasized that the problem was one of worldwide concern.

Rather than list what "action for development" the United States has undertaken during 1971, the 1972 report lists the action taken in the past three years, thus repeating some of those which appear in the previous statements. For example, the President mentions that the United States has maintained the annual level of development assistance reached in the first 10 years of the Alliance for Progress. One new measure taken in 1971 was the exemption of Latin America from the ten percent cut in bilateral foreign aid which was imposed temporarily on a worldwide basis on August 15.

In a section on the quality of life in the hemisphere, the President in essence repeats several items which he discussed in the 1971 report: the creation of the Inter-American Social Development Institute (subsequently renamed the Inter-American Foundation), earthquake relief in Peru during 1970, and overall people-to-people efforts.

The President concludes his report by stating the objectives of U.S. policy toward Latin America in terms of the principles previously discussed: that the United States and Latin America share initiative and responsibility in collective enterprises, that differences must be discussed and solutions negotiated, that the United States should make an effective contribution to economic development in Latin America, and that the people of the United States have a humanitarian concern for the betterment of life in Latin America.

Although the 1972 report closely resembles its predecessor, there are some points of departure. One example is that the 1971 report was more specific in stating U.S. objectives in the problem areas of trade, economic assistance, and political and economic change. In addition, the support the President voiced for the establishment of the position of Under Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs in the two previous reports is omitted in the 1972 report. Furthermore, the President neglects to mention some of the major developments in



U.S.-Latin American relations during 1971. For example, although the President says that the United States is committed to secure better trade terms for Latin America, no mention is made of the Latin American reaction to the imposition of the ten-percent surcharge on imports or the effect the surcharge had on U.S.-Latin American relations. In his 1970 report the President said that Latin American countries would be consulted in advance on all decisions relating to trade and development matters.

#### B. THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The section of the Secretary of State's report on U.S. foreign policy devoted to the Americas discusses policies in greater detail than does the President's report. After an overall review of U.S.-Latin American relations during 1971, the Secretary of State singles out for discussion the issues of trade relations, foreign investment, economic and social development, military sales and assistance, territorial seas and fisheries, narcotics control, and the Inter-American system. The report concludes with a country-by-country survey, with Chile receiving the most attention.

The Secretary of State discusses some of the shortcomings of United States policy and Latin American reaction. He states that although the United States has not swerved from its basic purpose of helping the Americas help themselves, "... we were not able to pursue this goal as effectively as we had hoped." The Secretary's report, in contrast to that of the President, mentions that there was much Latin American disenchantment over some United States policies such as the ten-percent surcharge.

In his introduction the Secretary of State makes some statements about his own intentions with regard to Latin America, stating, "I plan during 1972 to give particular personal attention to our ties in the hemisphere." He also notes here that he will again represent the U.S. at the OAS General Assembly, where during consultations he will convey impressions of the President's trip to China and consult on the forthcoming trip to the Soviet Union. He states that these consultations represent his belief that the Western Hemisphere is "... destined to have a growing impact on the events as the century unfolds."

There is relatively little on Latin America in the Secretary of Defense's Annual Defense Department Report, and the statements on Latin America parallel the President's with regard to the justification of U.S. military assistance to the area. In a statement very similar to the President's, the Secretary of Defense says that U.S. security assistance in Latin America has the purpose of preserving "the environment within which social and economic progress can occur." The Secretary of Defense also says that the United States assists "friendly countries to combat insurgency and help defeat externally inspired subversion and maintain the kind of military balance which will deter external attack."

In the context of programs to help avert war, "among our hemisphere neighbors and elsewhere," the Defense Secretary touches on the issue of military sales. He indicates the need for countries to purchase modern military equipment and refers to the activity of foreign



suppliers in this area. He says that the United States will continue to review carefully requests for such equipment.

### C. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

The President in his report does not refer extensively to the relationship of Congress to U.S.-Latin American policy. In discussing the points against "launching ambitious crusades" which promise a transformation of the continent he says, "Pious exhortation for a massive U.S. effort would serve no purpose when the U.S. Congress was barely willing to preserve, let alone increase, our foreign assistance program." Brief references to Congress are also made in conjunction with the statement that legislation for generalized tariff preferences would be submitted to Congress and that the President has urged Congress to move quickly and favorably on new appropriations for economic assistance. One thing the President does not mention with respect to Congress is that in 1971 he exercised his option to lift the \$75 million annual ceiling on military sales to Latin America imposed by Congress. The President sought to raise the ceiling to \$150 million annually beginning in fiscal year 1972; the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 (Public Law 92-226, approved February 7, 1972) raised the ceiling to \$100 million. (The new ceiling was waived on May 3, 1972).

The Secretary of State also mentions Congress in his report. He notes, for example, that Congress had authorized but not yet appropriated the full amount requested for the replenishment of the Inter-American Development Bank and had authorized \$100 million for the first installment of the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank, but appropriated only \$50 million. Subsequently Congress also authorized second and third installments for the Fund for Special Operations of \$450 million each (Public Law 92-246).

The President mentions several treaties relating to Latin America which received Senate approval: a treaty between the United States and Nicaragua abrogating the Bryan-Chamarro Treaty (thus relinquishing U.S. canal-construction rights in Nicaragua), and the United States-Mexican treaty relating to the return of archaeological treasures. Not mentioned in the section on Latin America but referred to in that on arms control was the ratification of Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. Otherwise the main legislative action related to the foreign assistance program. A House-initiated amendment was added to the foreign assistance appropriations bill which prohibited funds for Ecuador but permitted the President to waive the amendment if he deemed it to be in the interest of national security. The amendment was a response to the seizure by Ecuador of over 50 commercial fishing vessels during 1971. It was waived the day the bill was signed by the President, March 8, 1972.

The ship seizures by Ecuador and Peru also prompted various measures such as the amendment to H.R. 7117, the Fisherman's Protective Act of 1967, which called for expeditious reimbursement of U.S. vessel owners for charges paid by them for release of vessels and crews illegally seized by foreign countries. This was passed by the House on August 2, 1971, and referred to the Senate.



The Panama Canal, mentioned by the President as the subject of new negotiations with Panama, continued as a focal point of congressional interest. The report of the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commission in December 1970 recommending that the United States negotiate a new equitable treaty with Panama was responsible for over 100 resolutions in the House demanding that the United States maintain and protect its sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone. Hearings were held by subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee.

Several resolutions were introduced dealing with Cuba. Some called for a more stringent policy toward Cuba, such as placing before the United Nations charges of the denial of human rights by the Cuban Government. Others called for the repeal of the Cuba Resolution, which has formed the basis of U.S. policy toward Cuba since the 1962 missile crisis, or for a review of U.S. policy, looking toward the possibility of normalizing relations with Cuba.



## AFRICA<sup>1</sup>

### A. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON

The thrust of the President's 1972 foreign policy message on Africa is similar to that of the 1970 and 1971 reports. The President stresses in all three messages that although a policy of political restraint in Africa will best serve both U.S. and African interests, the United States will cooperate in providing assistance for African development. Both in 1971 and 1972, however, the President states that Africa's destiny is in the hands of its own people and that development in Africa in the 1970's will be largely on the basis of African effort.

Some of the themes that are found in all three reports are the African need for development and the limited role the United States can play in that development, the African desire to solve the racial problem in southern Africa, and the necessity of maintaining an attitude of noninterference by outside powers in African affairs. The historical ties between the United States and Africa and the need for an honest dialogue between the United States and the leaders of Africa are also factors mentioned in all three reports.

In the 1972 report, the President says that the United States interest in African trade and investment opportunities matches the need for American goods and technology in Africa. The President asserts that during 1971 the United States increased its development assistance to Africa, American private investment in Africa grew, the U.S. sugar market was opened to more African countries, and many African products were exempted from the temporary import surcharge. He says that the United States will make every effort to encourage private investment in Africa, but Africans must create a hospitable climate. Similarly, he says that assistance from others can supplement but not replace the application of major resources for the African countries themselves.

The President states that the United States is not indifferent to the racial policies of the southern African states and has maintained the arms embargo against the minority regimes, but he repeats the American policy statements of the past that the United States will not support violence to bring about changes in southern African racial policies. He says that the U.S. has done more than any other power to encourage self-determination and more political and economic opportunity for all Africans.

The President says that although the United States will not attempt to define Africa's goals or recommend internal political arrangements to Africans, it will support African commitments to values shared with the United States.

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<sup>1</sup> This section of the analysis as written by Clyde R. Mark, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs.



## B. THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Secretary of State's reports for 1971 and 1972 generally cover the same African problems—development, racial policies, and the maintenance of independence—and the same United States interests and policies—non-intervention, cooperation, and mutual understanding—as do the Presidential reports, except that the Secretary of State surveys American-African relations in more detail, discussing each country individually.

The Secretary of State mentions Africa in the introduction to his 1972 report with regard to foreign assistance to developing countries. He states that U.S. economic relations with Africa are far behind those with the developing countries of Asia and the Americas, even though the U.S. has made progress in this area in the last year. He says: “. . . I intend to convene this year, in cooperation with other government agencies, a conference of American agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial enterprises and individuals to consider opportunities for export and import trade with Africa and investment opportunities there.”

In the report of the Secretary of Defense there is very little discussion of Africa. However, the Secretary does mention Soviet military aid to states in the Horn of Africa and the assistance given to Tanzania by the People's Republic of China.

## C. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

The President's 1972 message makes two references to Congress or congressional functions which specifically relate to Africa. One states that the Administration would submit to the Congress legislation to implement a system of generalized preferences for the exports of developing areas, including Africa.

The other, in the introduction, expresses “a sharp disappointment, both to us and to our African friends, that our shrinking aid appropriations may prevent us from matching our expressions of good will with the material assistance which African countries want and need.”

The Secretary of State discusses two congressional actions affecting Africa: the Sugar Act Amendment of 1971, in which the African quotas were doubled, and the amendment to the 1971 Military Procurement Authorization Act which had the effect of allowing the import of Rhodesian chrome as long as chrome imports from Communist countries were not prohibited. The Secretary of State says the Administration was opposed to the latter amendment, noting that the United States had supported the Security Council resolutions of 1966 and 1968 which imposed sanctions against Rhodesia involving an embargo on imports from southern Rhodesia including chrome.

The Secretary of State reports that in response to the Administration's efforts, Representative Charles C. Diggs, Jr., Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, and other members of the subcommittee were given visas by the South African Government to enter South Africa on one occasion although a second request was refused. Neither the President nor the Secretary of State mentions that Representative Diggs resigned as one of the two congressional members of the United States delegation to the 26th session of the U.N. General Assembly on December 17, 1971, in protest over U.S. policy toward black Africa.



The first of these is the fact that the Chinese have been able to maintain a high level of production and export of goods, despite the fact that they have been subjected to a long and hard struggle against foreign imperialism and domestic reaction. This is a remarkable achievement, and it is a testament to the strength and resilience of the Chinese people. It is also a testament to the success of the Chinese revolution, which has enabled them to overcome these difficulties and to build a new and better China.

THE ROLE OF CHINA

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## Part IV. AREAS OF TURBULENCE AND CHALLENGE

Part IV, "Areas of Turbulence and Challenge," covers Indochina, the Middle East, and South Asia. The President discusses these areas more generally in his introduction when he lists the "sharp disappointments" of 1971. In Indochina the major disappointment was the failure to achieve a negotiated settlement of the war. In South Asia the disappointment was the unsuccessful effort to prevent the India-Pakistan War. In the Middle East, although the cease-fire was maintained, no negotiations between the parties were effectuated. Although other "sharp disappointments" were noted, these are the only geographic areas which the President does not include under either the "breakthrough" heading or the less dramatic "Other Areas of Progress."



## INDOCHINA<sup>1</sup>

### A. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON

In each of his three foreign policy reports, President Nixon states as his overall goal in Indochina a "just peace" based on the right of the South Vietnamese people to determine their own future. As the focus of the hostilities shifted more and more to Laos and Cambodia, the President placed more emphasis on preserving the neutrality and independence of these two countries in line with his policy of providing military assistance to them. The President has consistently argued that abandoning the objective of a just peace for the states of Indochina would exacerbate domestic divisions in the United States, weaken the trust of allied and friendly countries in the United States, and risk new wars in the future. He stated in the 1971 message, and amplifies on it in 1972, that a precipitate American withdrawal from Vietnam would prevent the United States from building a more stable structure of international state relationships in Asia and the world, because the United States would then have no credibility with either friends or foes. The President, in short, appears increasingly to be linking his Vietnam policy with his foreign policy in other areas in the context of an overall objective of stability and peace in the world.

The 1972 report contrasts with the 1971 report with regard to overall goals in that the 1972 message speaks of an end to "American involvement" in the war as a major and achievable objective; the 1972 report takes an increasingly pessimistic view of the chances of totally ending the conflict through negotiations and makes an optimistic assessment of Vietnamization. The President appears to have broadened the objectives of Vietnamization while placing less emphasis on the goal of ending the war entirely. In the 1971 message, for example, he cautioned that Vietnamization "cannot satisfy" the demand "for an immediate end to our involvement" and only "fulfills our objective of reducing American involvement." In the 1972 report, he places an end to American involvement on the same plane as an end to the war and declares it an achievable goal. Citing his speech of April 7, 1971, the President defines his goal as "a total American withdrawal from Vietnam" which could be attained through Vietnamization "if necessary."

### PROGRESS IN VIETNAMIZATION

The three reports show a distinct trend from caution to optimism over the chances for the success of the Vietnamization program. The President asserted in the 1970 report: "Vietnamization is not a substitute for negotiations, but a spur to negotiations." He described a "major problem" as "whether the Vietnamization program will succeed," and said there were many unanswered questions such as enemy capabilities, the actual improvement in the South Vietnamese armed forces, and the durability of pacification.

<sup>1</sup> This section of the analysis was prepared by Larry A. Niksch, Analyst in Asian Affairs.



A more optimistic assessment came in the 1971 report. The President stated that the "South Vietnamese have made great progress in assuming the burdens of the war." As evidence, he pointed to the enemy's inability to mount sustained operations in South Vietnam, most notably in the "particularly quiescent" areas of Military Region IV (the Mekong Delta) and Military Region III (the Saigon area). Still, the President cautioned that the Communists posed a "considerable threat" in northern South Vietnam and that substantial problems remained, including South Vietnamese military leadership at all levels, the low support capabilities of the South Vietnamese armed forces, and the existence of the Vietcong political infrastructure.

In describing Vietnamization in his 1972 report as a means of "ending American involvement in the war," President Nixon lists eight major accomplishments of the program covering such areas as the withdrawal of American troops, reduction of U.S. casualties, lower draft calls, the assumption of complete ground combat responsibility by South Vietnam, and the lowering of war costs. He takes particular note that "our ground combat role has effectively ended."

The President is less cautious in the 1972 message in describing the effects of the Vietnamization program. While predicting "major tests" in the coming months, he warns of only "some isolated setbacks" for the South Vietnamese, adding:

But these should not distort the overall picture of growing self-sufficiency and security. We and the South Vietnamese are both confident of their ability to handle the North Vietnamese challenge.

In both the 1971 and 1972 reports, the President attributes much of the success of Vietnamization to the allied operations in eastern Cambodia in 1970 and the South Vietnamese incursion into southern Laos in February-March 1971. The Cambodian operation, President Nixon says, contributed substantially to the very favorable security situation in the southern half of South Vietnam by destroying the North Vietnamese sanctuaries along the border. In addition, the South Vietnamese army's performance showed a "marked improvement" during the operation.

President Nixon in the 1972 report indicates the South Vietnamese incursion into Laos to be a success, but implies that the benefits were more limited than those resulting from the Cambodian operation of 1970.

The President omits reference to the stubborn North Vietnamese resistance in Laos and the South Vietnamese withdrawal at the end of March 1971. However, he reports that pacification security declined in five of South Vietnam's seven northernmost provinces in 1971; he also cites reports that the North Vietnamese might be preparing a major offensive in northern South Vietnam in 1972.

#### THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE

The President discusses pacification in all three reports; in each he describes it as an integral part of Vietnamization. The trend in the reports is toward optimism but somewhat more guarded optimism than in his overall assessment of Vietnamization. From emphasis in the 1970 report on the development of more solid criteria with which



to measure pacification, the President went on in his 1971 message to cite "a boost to pacification efforts in the southern half of the Republic of Vietnam" partly as a result of the 1970 allied operation in Cambodia. Applying "tough and realistic" criteria, he noted that the percentage of rural population under firm government control rose from 40 percent in mid-1969 to 65 percent "recently." In total, about 80 percent of South Vietnam's population (including six million urban dwellers) were under secure government control. Pacification, he stated "has made steady progress throughout these two years."

Some caution was also evident in the 1971 report as President Nixon noted the difficulty in measuring the rural population's attitude toward the Saigon government and admitted that pacification gains had been slower in northern South Vietnam. He attributed this difficulty to the nearness of Communist sanctuaries in Laos and the deeply embedded Vietcong infrastructure. Rooting out this infrastructure he described as one of the "substantial problems" still facing the allies in Vietnam.

That caution appears to have given way to optimism in 1972. The President declares in this year's report:

During the past year, the South Vietnamese faced a crucial challenge: to keep up the momentum of pacification, while simultaneously taking over an increasing share of combat responsibilities as U.S. and other allied forces rapidly withdrew. In most areas, this challenge was met successfully.

Statistics at the close of 1971 showed approximately 73 percent of South Vietnam's rural population and over 80 percent of the total population under government control. The President mentions the Government's new land reform program and the arming of the citizen's militia (People's Self-Defense Forces) as positive accomplishments. He does not refer to the problem of the Vietcong infrastructure as he had done in 1971 (reports in late 1971 suggested that the "Phoenix" program designed to destroy the Vietcong infrastructure had largely failed and that the infrastructure, although weakened, still existed<sup>2</sup>).

In perhaps his most optimistic remark concerning pacification, the President describes the program as "the actions of a government that is increasingly sure of the allegiance [of the people] and taking the steps to deserve that allegiance."

#### NEGOTIATIONS

While the President displays an increasing confidence from 1970 to 1972 with respect to Vietnamization and pacification, his assessment of the Paris peace talks grows more pessimistic in each report. In 1970 the President said that the Communist refusal to agree to a formula that would assure South Vietnam's self-determination "does not necessarily mean that such a decision cannot come at any point."

In the 1971 message, this note of optimism had turned into the following expression of pessimism:

For negotiations were not entirely in our hands. North Vietnamese history and doctrine did not make for encouraging prospects. Their calculus of the situation in South Vietnam, and more particularly in the United States, probably made them believe that time was on their side.

<sup>2</sup> See Washington Post, August 1 and December 14, 1971. New York Times, October 26, 1971.



The President also noted that as U.S. forces withdrew from Vietnam, the United States would have less influence on the negotiations.

President Nixon implies in his 1972 report that he has given up much of his earlier hope for a negotiated settlement. The North Vietnamese, he asserts, "view negotiations as an alternative route to victory, not a compromise with opponents." Despite generous American offers and the momentum of Vietnamization, "Hanoi chooses to fight on instead of seeking a negotiated settlement."

Several themes appear throughout the President's reports and reflect the negotiating deadlock. A negotiated settlement, the President says, is the best way of quickly ending the war, and the United States seeks a settlement which will allow the South Vietnamese to determine their own future without outside interference, that is self-determination based on free elections. The Communists, according to the President, demand that the United States withdraw all its forces from South Vietnam and replace the South Vietnamese government with a coalition government that will guarantee a Communist takeover, and also insist that U.S. acceptance of their demands is a precondition to negotiations.

The President in his 1972 message details the secret talks that went on in 1971 between North Vietnamese representatives and Presidential adviser Dr. Henry Kissinger. He points out that in May 1971 the United States proposed a simple military settlement based on a total U.S. troop withdrawal from Vietnam, an exchange of prisoners of war, and an Indochina cease-fire. North Vietnam, according to the President, rejected the proposal on the grounds that a settlement had to resolve the political issue as well as the military question. North Vietnam on June 26 presented a secret nine-point plan to the United States, which included the removal of the South Vietnamese government and its replacement by a coalition regime. The United States responded by dealing with the political as well as the military issues and attempting to work out a new formula acceptable to Hanoi. No progress was made, and the secret talks broke up in November 1971.

On January 25, 1972, the President publicly offered an eight-point proposal containing as its main elements: (1) a complete withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces from South Vietnam within six months provided final agreement was reached on the other aspects of an overall settlement, (2) an exchange of prisoners throughout Indochina and (3) a new presidential election in South Vietnam coupled with an offer by President Thieu to resign one month before the election.

The President emphasizes that his peace plan is "new, comprehensive and flexible." He notes, in particular, that the United States is still willing to negotiate a strictly military agreement under which the United States would withdraw its troops within six months in exchange for an Indochina cease-fire and the release of all prisoners. The problem, according to the President, is Hanoi's continued insistence that the United States replace the South Vietnamese government. He emphatically declares that he would never agree to this:

In our view, there is only one fundamental issue left—will we collude with our enemies to overturn our friends? Will we impose a future on the Vietnamese people that the other side



has been unable to gain militarily or politically? This we shall never do.

It is difficult to assess the President's description of the secret talks of 1971 because of lack of public information beyond that provided by the President. North Vietnam has challenged two parts of the President's account but has acknowledged and made public the secret nine-point plan. Hanoi charged and the Administration subsequently confirmed that the secret negotiations ended in November when the United States refused to meet Xuan Thuy and insisted that the Communists continue to present a higher ranking official with more authority. Xuan Thuy stated on CBS's "Face the Nation" on February 6, 1972, that until the South Vietnamese presidential election of October 3, 1971:

. . . it was our earnest desire to see Mr. Nixon rapidly settle the Vietnam problem peacefully, that is to say—to withdraw U.S. forces and to change the Nguyen Van Thieu administration through the election of October the third, 1971.

#### PRISONERS OF WAR

The dilemma of the prisoner question can be seen in each of the three reports. In 1970 President Nixon pointed up North Vietnam's refusal to abide by the Geneva Convention and argued that prisoners of war should not be a political or military issue. In the 1971 message he spoke of the "intensive efforts" made by the United States to improve the treatment of American prisoners of war and secure their release. He cited the "courageous raid at Son Tay" as one element of this effort as well as his peace proposal of October 7, 1970, calling for the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war. The President praises the initiatives by South Vietnam in the 1972 report. All were rejected by Hanoi except for Saigon's offer of April 29, 1971, to release 570 sick and wounded prisoners. North Vietnam accepted, but the plan failed when South Vietnam could find only 13 North Vietnamese prisoners who were willing to be repatriated.

The President does not discuss this episode but only mentions the original offer. He promises in the 1972 report "to use every means to press for proper treatment and prompt release of all Americans held in captivity" and that "Americans in significant numbers will remain in South Vietnam until we secure the release of our imprisoned men."

#### "POLITICAL" AND "ECONOMIC" DEVELOPMENTS

The one-man presidential election in South Vietnam in October 1971 represented a setback to the President's earlier optimistic evaluation of South Vietnam's political development. Asserting in the 1971 report that "ultimately the fate of Vietnam will turn on political factors," the President outlined "a steady political evolution in South Vietnam" and "a growing commitment to the political institutions established by the 1967 Constitution." Prominent developments in 1970 included numerous local elections and elections for half the seats of the upper house of the National Assembly. (Most observers did consider these elections to be relatively free, especially the upper house election.)



The President warned in the 1971 report that the presidential and lower house elections "will show the extent of political development in South Vietnam" and "will further test the fabric of the constitutional system." He displays in the 1972 message his disappointment in the 1971 presidential election. Referring to his earlier words concerning the importance of the election, he states:

The results this past year have been mixed. There are areas in which political freedom and development still need to be advanced in South Vietnam. And the cohesiveness of the non-communist political forces remains to be tested.

Still, he appears to try to present a positive picture, citing again the successful local elections since 1967 and the "basic political stability in South Vietnam." He contends that the United States had stressed the view that the presidential election should be contested but had avoided direct intervention to force that result in order to "avoid the practices which helped produce our involvement in the first place" (apparently a reference to the U.S. role in the overthrow of President Diem in 1963). He attributes the lack of a real contest to the absence of strong political parties in South Vietnam, which made the election dependent "upon the personal motives and calculations of individuals." This was as close as the President came to mentioning President Thieu's role in limiting the chances of a genuine contest.

The President indicates that he was encouraged by South Vietnam's economy and praised the fiscal and monetary reforms of the autumn of 1970 which had "dramatically arrested" an inflation rate of 50 percent per annum. In his 1972 message, the President states that prices had risen less than 15 percent during all of 1971. In this message he places more emphasis on the increasingly favorable prospects for the beginning of developmental programs in South Vietnam. He notes the reforms announced by President Thieu in November 1971 designed to encourage savings and investment, exports, tax collections, and industries, and emphasizes the importance of U.S. financial assistance for these programs now and in the future.

#### LAOS AND CAMBODIA

The President made only a passing reference to Laos' neutrality and did not specifically mention Cambodia in the 1970 report. In the 1971 and 1972 reports he outlines U.S. policy with regard to aid to Laos and Cambodia in their struggle with North Vietnam. In terms of the U.S. role in Cambodia in 1971 he stated the chief elements to be: (1) No American ground combat troops or advisers in Cambodia; (2) air missions against enemy troops and supplies that pose a "potential threat" to South Vietnam; (3) military assistance to Cambodia. For Laos, he described the U.S. role as: (1) No American ground combat forces; (2) minimum American presence; (3) military assistance to Laos; (4) reconnaissance flights and air operations to interdict the Ho Chi Minh trail; and (5) logistic and air support for Lao forces. In short, U.S. air power and military assistance were the principal American ingredients in the war in Laos and Cambodia. The President stated in the 1971 message that the United States expected Laos and Cambodia "to shoulder the primary combat responsibilities for their



own defense." Cambodia, he said, was a "concrete illustration of Nixon Doctrine principles" in that it assumed the primary responsibility for its defense, received help from "regional friends," and received U.S. military and economic assistance.

The 1972 report contains a measured shift in rationale for U.S. aid to Laos and Cambodia. In the 1971 study the President's "immediate concern" was North Vietnam's use of the two countries to attack South Vietnam; the preservation of their neutrality and independence was an important consideration but less so. In the 1972 message President Nixon places the independence and neutrality of Cambodia and Laos on a level of equal importance to the goal of protecting South Vietnam:

Our constant objectives in both countries have been to ensure the momentum of Vietnamization and our withdrawals, to protect American and allied lives, and to help maintain the precarious balance within these two countries as they fight to restore their independence and neutrality.

The President also appears more convinced that North Vietnam's intention is to take over Laos and Cambodia. Whereas in the 1971 report the President stated that North Vietnam intended "perhaps to take over Laos and Cambodia themselves," in the 1972 message North Vietnam's policy has "also the intention of taking Laos and Cambodia themselves."

The President tends to justify continued American aid to Laos and Cambodia by painting a somewhat more pessimistic picture of their prospects in the 1972 report. In contrast to the 1971 message in which he praised Laos' "determination to preserve its independence" and asserted "the Cambodians also have the essential ingredients for success," the 1972 report states that "these two countries are clearly no match for a much larger North Vietnam, and they must have external assistance to survive." This shift in attitude probably reflects to some degree the military reverses suffered by Cambodian and Lao forces in the fall and winter of 1971 and Cambodia's internal political problems.

#### B. THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Secretary of State's report, like that of the President, is pessimistic on the Vietnam negotiations and optimistic on Vietnamization (although more vague on its goals). One notable statement suggests that the role of U.S. air power in Indochina is open-ended, with no termination date:

South Vietnam will continue to require outside military assistance in the form of training and supplies, as well as supplementary air support, as long as North Vietnam maintains its aggression.

While the Secretary of State discusses Indochina in his introduction, his tone and emphasis do not really vary from the comprehensive treatment of that area. He states that he is unable to make a prediction of peace for Indochina "... because it is North Vietnam's decision whether 1972 will be a year of negotiated peace or another year of warfare for the peoples of Indochina."



The Secretary of Defense emphasizes both the success of the Vietnamization program and the continued North Vietnamese military threat in Indochina, based largely on Soviet military aid. The Soviet Union, he says, has provided 70 percent of the total military aid received by North Vietnam. Vietnamization, according to the Secretary, has completed Phase I—turning over ground combat responsibility to the South Vietnamese. Phase II, turning over support and logistics, is ahead of schedule, and Phase III, transforming the American presence to a “military advisory mission,” has begun. The Secretary states that Phase III will ultimately lead to “further reductions as South Vietnam becomes capable of handling the threat with no U.S. military presence required.”

### C. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

The President's references to Congress in the 1972 report contain both praise and criticism. He speaks favorably of congressional concern over the prisoner of war question. He states in the 1972 report that “some Americans” who criticized his policy in the Paris talks had fallen victim to North Vietnamese propaganda. He also warns against new and tougher congressional restrictions on U.S. aid to Laos and Cambodia and describes congressional cuts in foreign aid funds as an “unwise” move which hampered U.S. assistance to South Vietnam's new development programs.

Congress in 1971 passed two amendments relating to U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. One amendment as originally approved by the Senate in June declared it to be “the policy of the United States” to remove all U.S. military forces from Indochina “not later than nine months” after the date of enactment, subject to the release of American prisoners of war. As modified and incorporated into the Military Selective Service Act (Public Law 92-129) in September, the amendment declared it to be “the sense of Congress” that a total troop withdrawal be carried out “at a date certain” subject to the release of American prisoners. The second amendment, which in its original form as passed by the Senate set a six-month deadline, was also softened before its passage as part of the Military Procurement Authorization (Public Law 92-156). The final version passed in November declared it to be “the policy of the United States” that a total troop withdrawal be carried out “at a date certain” subject to the release of American prisoners. President Nixon, in signing the authorization act, stated that he was not bound by the policy statement language of the amendment.

Other attempts made in the House and Senate in 1971 to legislate a firm deadline for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Indochina were defeated. All such efforts were strongly opposed by the Administration.



## MIDDLE EAST<sup>1</sup>

### A. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON

The President's 1972 report outlines three primary requirements for reduction of tension in the Middle East: an Arab-Israeli settlement, a reduction of local and regional rivalries, and a stabilization of great-power competition. These are basically the same three problem areas outlined in the 1971 and 1970 reports. The three reports differ in that developments in the Middle East in 1970 and 1971 altered the President's immediate goals for 1971 and 1972. In the 1970 report, the President stressed the need for a cease-fire; the American initiative culminated in a cease-fire on August 8, 1970. In the 1971 report, the President focused on the need for an active U.S. role in the negotiating process and during the year the United States initiated the discussions for an interim agreement to reopen the Suez Canal. The goal the President sets out in the 1972 report appears to be to encourage the Arabs and the Israelis to begin serious negotiations while the cease-fire is maintained.

The President's 1972 report says the search for a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli problem has gone through two phases: the multilateral negotiations of 1969 which failed because the Soviet Union apparently lost interest; and the U.S. proposal of 1970 for a cease-fire and resumption of talks which failed because of the Soviet-Egyptian violations of the cease-fire and the collapse of domestic order in Jordan. The President expresses the hope that the United States initiative to open negotiations for an interim agreement will produce conditions that will facilitate a basic settlement. The proposed interim agreement, the President states, calls for a reopening of the Suez Canal and a partial withdrawal of Israeli troops, but the negotiations have not yet produced results because of differences over six points: (1) the relationship between an interim settlement and an overall settlement, (2) the duration of the cease-fire, (3) the extent of withdrawal from the Suez Canal, (4) the nature of the supervisory arrangements, (5) the nature of an Egyptian presence east of the Canal, and (6) the Israeli use of the Canal.

In his 1972 report, the President says that the patterns of order necessary for a new era of stability in the Middle East have been delayed because of tensions including the Arab-Israeli dispute, instability in the Persian Gulf, the Cyprus problem, Islamic world rivalries, inter-Arab tensions caused by the Palestinian struggle for a homeland, externally supported subversion of stable and moderate governments, and competition among the great powers. In his 1971 report the President put more emphasis on inter-Arab rivalries and nationalism as factors contributing to instability in the Middle East.

<sup>1</sup> This section of the analysis was written by Clyde R. Mark, Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs.



The President stresses in his 1972 report that the great powers must reach an understanding on the limits of acceptable behavior and the need for balance so that they will not exploit developing relationships, obstruct peace, or seek unilateral advantage. The President says that the Soviet Union has encouraged the continuation of the arms race by sending new arms to Egypt and by taking advantage of Egyptian dependence on Soviet military supply to gain air and sea bases in Egypt. He reiterates that the United States would not allow the military balance between Israel and the Arabs to be upset. The reports of 1970 and 1971 also discussed the Soviet involvement in the Middle East.

The "Issues for the Future" listed by the President in his 1972 report are an Israeli-Arab settlement, maintenance of the cease-fire in order to preserve the climate for negotiation, and stabilizing the military balance by ending the arms race. The search for peace, the President says, will be continued through the negotiations of United Nations Special Representative Gunnar Jarring. The United States will continue its efforts to help the parties achieve an interim agreement as long as they wish, the President states. The President reaffirms that the United States seeks "a new era" of constructive and mutually beneficial relations with all the states in the area.

#### B. THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

In comparison with the President's general discussion, the report of the Secretary of State is a more detailed catalogue of American diplomatic relations with the Middle East. The Secretary describes some of the events in each country and the general status of U.S. activities and relations in those countries. The Secretary of State enumerates the American interests in the Middle East: (1) peace, (2) regional independence free of outside dominance, (3) stability of NATO's southeast flank, and (4) United States-Middle Eastern trade and economic relations. The Secretary asserts that U.S. policies in the Middle East are: (1) to help create peace, (2) to help develop friendly relations, (3) to provide assistance within the U.S. capacity to do so, and (4) to be mindful of the new relations created by increased communications and transportation needs through the area.

In his introduction, the Secretary of State discusses the Middle East solely in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the role of the U.N. in that conflict. He states ". . . we will seek again to move beyond the cease-fire toward a settlement negotiated between the parties on the basis of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242." Paralleling the President's statement, he says that although the United States will play an intermediary role, ". . . we seek no special position."

The Secretary of Defense, in his report, asserts that there is a danger that an Arab-Israeli war could involve the Soviet Union and the United States. He goes on to say that the Middle East balance of military power has a vital bearing on U.S. security interests, and that U.S. aid programs are designed to preserve the balance. The Secretary of Defense also notes the large Soviet aid programs in Syria, Iraq, and Egypt.



## C. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

The President does not mention the role of Congress in the formation or implementation of foreign policy toward the Middle East. The Secretary of State, however, does acknowledge that the Congress appropriated \$500 million in FY 1971 in military credits for Israel (P.L. 91-665, signed on January 8, 1971, which also provided \$30 million military assistance for Jordan and \$5 million military assistance for Lebanon). The Foreign Assistance Appropriations Act for FY 1972 (P.L. 92-242, signed on March 8, 1972), provided \$300 million in military credit assistance and \$50 million in security supporting assistance for Israel.



## SOUTH ASIA<sup>1</sup>

### A. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON

The President's 1972 report can be sharply contrasted to his 1970 and 1971 reports in terms of the space he devotes to South Asia. He discussed the region in one page in the 1970 message and in 2½ pages in the 1971 report. The latter constituted the shortest section for any of the seven geographical areas discussed by the President.

The President devotes 14 pages to South Asia in the 1972 report. The major portion, however, is a description and defense of U.S. policy before and during the November-December 1971 war between India and Pakistan.

The President's messages for all three years give the impression that South Asia is an area of lower overall priority to the United States in comparison with other geographical regions—such as East Asia and Europe—and has importance primarily in how events in the region affect relations among the great powers. The President implied this in the 1971 report by emphasizing the desire of the United States to maintain a limited role in the region and “bring our activity into a stable balance with that of the other major powers with interests in the area.” In addition, the trend toward a more limited role was shown when the President offered no increase in economic assistance to the region despite his description of “the world's most cruel imbalance between human needs and available resources,” especially in India where “the mere size of its population and the need for large infusions of external resources, make extremely difficult the task of organizing the society to meet its needs.” In addition, he stated that the United States would “do nothing to harm legitimate Soviet and Chinese interests in the area” and had “no desire to try to press upon them [India and Pakistan] a closer relationship than their own interests lead them to desire.”

In short, the President laid out a future U.S. role in South Asia that included continuing but not increasing levels of economic assistance (possibly even decreasing assistance) and acceptance of special political roles played by the Soviet Union and China in India and Pakistan. The United States, the President said in effect, would do nothing to counter directly Soviet and Chinese influence by trying to match their military aid programs in India and Pakistan, which constitute the key to Moscow's and Peking's positions in the Indian subcontinent. In the 1972 report, while the President expresses “strong interest in Indian democracy and progress,” he also notes that at the time of the November war, “India and the Soviet Union already had a political tie of a kind that the United States would not attempt to match.” Once again the President, in effect, rules out trying to match Soviet influence in India in terms of economic assistance or arms shipments. (The President says that from 1966 to 1971 the Soviet Union furnished India with

<sup>1</sup> This section of the analysis was written by Larry A. Niksch, Analyst in Asian Affairs.



\$730 million of arms while China supplied Pakistan with arms valued at \$133 million. Over the same period U.S. military deliveries to both India and Pakistan amounted to \$70 million.) He does, however, caution India against colluding with the Soviet Union against the interests of the United States and other powers. The President states that the United States is prepared to discuss with India the political and economic relationships between them and that "we are prepared to respond constructively" if India "has an interest in maintaining balanced relationships with all major powers."

The President notes that the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation signed in August 1971 was two years in preparation. (This would mean negotiations on it began at about the same time that Chairman Brezhnev in June 1969 first proposed an Asian collective security system directed mainly against China.) Since the President stated in the 1971 report that the United States would not collude with either China or the Soviet Union against the other, he may fear that a Soviet-sponsored collective security system with India as a major link would continue to keep Asia divided into opposing blocs and thus run contrary to the type of balanced relationships among the great powers and the countries of Asia that he seeks. He does not, however, set forth in the report any specific criteria for judging whether India's involvement with the U.S.S.R. prevents it from maintaining "balanced relationships" with the other powers. The President lists another factor to be used in determining future U.S. relations with India:

Of interest to us also will be the posture that South Asia's most powerful country now adopts toward its neighbors on the subcontinent.

The President describes Pakistan as a "close friend" in the 1972 report and states that the United States stands ready to help it rebuild after its dismemberment and defeat. He also declares: "Our concern for the well-being and security of the people of Pakistan does not end with the end of a crisis." This concern for Pakistan's "security" could indicate an interest in resuming some kind of military assistance to Pakistan or it could be primarily a warning to India.

The President promises a continuation of humanitarian relief to the new state of Bangladesh (which the President, writing before recognition, refers to as East Bengal), but declares the United States expects other nations to bear a proportionate share of that responsibility. He makes no commitment on future development assistance and says nothing with regard to diplomatic recognition. (The United States officially recognized Bangladesh on April 4, 1972.) In short, he indicates a cautious U.S. approach toward Bangladesh, weighing not only U.S. interests in the country but also broader foreign policy considerations.

In discussing U.S. diplomacy before and during the November-December war between India and Pakistan, the President explains that the United States was the only great power in a position to help bring about a political solution satisfactory to all parties (given the polarization of Soviet and Chinese interests in India and Pakistan, respectively) despite the "objective limits" on its influence. He



describes U.S. goals during the crisis as being to: (1) restrain India from resorting to war; (2) persuade Pakistan to "bring an end to the civil strife and restore peaceful conditions in East Pakistan" (the language used in the President's letter of May 28, 1971, to President Yahya Khan) and work toward a political accommodation based on "some form of autonomy for East Pakistan"; and (3) provide humanitarian aid to ease the refugee burden on India and alleviate suffering in East Pakistan.

The President defends the "quiet diplomacy" approach of the United States as best suited to achieve American objectives. To have condemned Pakistan publicly, he argues, would have alienated it and ended any possibility of persuading it to change its policies in East Pakistan.

The President lists a number of steps which Pakistan agreed to and which he regarded as positive. These included an assurance that Bengali leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman would not be executed, allowing a United Nations relief presence in East Pakistan, amnesty for refugees, the replacement of the military governor of East Pakistan by a civilian, a pledge to restore civilian government in December, and finally an offer in early November to negotiate with some members of the rebel Awami League.

The President is critical of India's role in the November–December war, stating that the "disintegration by force" of a U.N. member was "intolerable." The President cites as evidence: India's support of the East Pakistani guerrillas, its rejection of a mutual troop withdrawal from the East Pakistan border, its refusal to accept U.N. observers, and its attack on East Pakistan in November. He also levels an implied criticism of the timing of the November Indian move into East Pakistan in stating that the United States felt that a return to civilian rule in Pakistan in December "could have increased the chances for a political settlement and the release of Sheikh Mujib."

The President also asserts that during the week of December 6 "we received convincing evidence that India was seriously contemplating the seizure of Pakistan-held portions of Kashmir and the destruction of Pakistan's military forces in the West." India offered no assurances to the contrary, according to the President. He does not, however, describe the evidence received by the United States.

The Pakistan crisis and the war had global implications which necessitated a U.S. stand in opposition to India's actions, the President asserts. The resort to military solutions, if accepted, would undermine international efforts to promote or guarantee regional peace. Ethnic conflicts and separatist movements in other areas of the world would be encouraged—"a formula for anarchy." In addition, the Soviet Union had used the conflict to promote its own political and military influence in the area, the President asserts, and if the war had continued without strong U.S. pressure to check India, the U.S.S.R. would have been encouraged to reject efforts at detente and pursue its strategic expansion. Finally, the President states, the United States had considered the effect of the South Asian crisis on China's future attitude.



## B. THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Secretary of State's discussion of South Asia is notable for its criticism of India. The Secretary is more blunt than the President in blaming India for the November–December war: "It was our view that India bore heavy responsibilities for this outbreak of hostilities." Moreover, he critically evaluates India's motives, attributing India's use of military force to the "pursuit of political goals," the implication being that these goals were as important to India if not more so than humanitarian motives and the refugee burden.

The remainder of the South Asian sections of the Secretary of State's report varies little from that of the President. The Secretary does note that the question of future U.S. military assistance or sales to Pakistan "remains under continuing review." In addition, in the introduction to his report, the Secretary of State does differ in approach somewhat from the President with regard to Bangladesh. The Secretary acknowledges the fact that a number of nations have recognized Bangladesh (which unlike the President he refers to as Bangladesh) and asserts, "We too have the matter under active consideration." As mentioned previously, the President does not refer to this possibility.

The Secretary of Defense makes only one reference to South Asia, but it lends itself to the interpretation that the President in his 1972 report is particularly concerned over the Soviet Union's role in the area and how that might affect U.S. efforts to achieve a balanced system of great power relationships in Asia:

Furthermore, as the performance of the PRC and the U.S.S.R. in the India-Pakistani hostilities of December 1971 indicated, we continue to be faced with the prospect that the Communist powers will use military assistance as a means to play out their own rivalries, without regard for the effect on regional balances.

## C. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

The President does not refer to Congress in connection with South Asia in the 1972 report. In both the House and Senate voices were raised in criticism and defense of the Administration's policy toward the India-Pakistan crisis. The bulk of the criticism was directed at the Administration's refusal to publicly condemn the Pakistan Army's policies in East Pakistan and its subsequent action in blaming India for starting the war. The House and Senate voted in August and October respectively to suspend all economic and military assistance to Pakistan until the President could certify that Pakistan was allowing the East Pakistani refugees to return home. This measure was included in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 (P.L. 92-226), signed February 7, 1972. The President made the certification necessary to permit assistance on February 16, 1972.



## Part V. THE IMPERATIVE OF SECURITY

The President discusses four issues in Part V, "The Imperative of Security": strategic policy and forces, general purpose forces, security assistance, and arms control. In contrast to the preceding parts, the President includes some introductory statements titled "Assuring National Security," in which he explains what he means by "The Imperative of Security." "America's strength is essential if we are to move from an era of confrontation toward an era of negotiation," he asserts. Since the United States is the world's strongest power, it has the responsibility of trying to improve world stability; a weak America, the President indicates, would work contrary to a lasting peace.

The President goes on to say that not only are the imperatives of security great but security issues themselves have become very complex. The Vietnam war, the cost of weapons, the strategic balance with the Soviet Union, and many other factors all serve, the President says, to make more difficult the formation of the long-range decisions in this area necessary for future security.

Although the chapter headings within Part V are the same as those used by the President in his 1971 report, there were not separate sections for arms control and security assistance in his 1970 report.



## STRATEGIC POLICY AND FORCES <sup>1</sup>

### A. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON

This section of the report is much like last year's in that it reflects the President's concern about the continuing Soviet buildup of strategic forces and his determination to maintain U.S. security either through an agreement with the U.S.S.R. limiting the arms race or through new programs to improve the strategic forces of this country, or both. Thus he reports "... we are moving toward an agreement which should stabilize the strategic balance and foreclose future rounds of arms competition." At the same time, however, he announces major expenditures on new weapons systems and warns: "If ... the Soviet Union continues to build up its strategic forces, I will continue to take actions necessary to protect the national security."

After reviewing various strategic concepts during the first year of his Administration, the President decided on a doctrine of "strategic sufficiency" designed to take into account political factors and a broader set of military factors than the doctrine of "assured destruction," which had gained acceptance during the previous administration. Although the President's 1970 report contained a brief and general discussion of the meaning of sufficiency, a much more detailed and specific definition appeared in last year's report, some of which is repeated in the 1972 report:

In its narrow military sense, it means enough force to inflict a level of damage on a potential aggressor sufficient to deter him from attacking . . .

In its broader political sense, sufficiency means the maintenance of forces adequate to prevent us and our allies from being coerced. Thus the relationship between our strategic forces and those of the Soviet Union must be such that our ability and resolve to protect our vital security interests will not be underestimated.

Thus, the primary role of U.S. nuclear forces under the doctrine of sufficiency is to deter a nuclear attack on the United States and its allies through the maintenance of an adequate second-strike capability. The report says, "Our forces must be maintained at a level sufficient to make it clear that even an all-out surprise attack on the United States by the U.S.S.R. would not cripple our capability to retaliate." However, in each message the President suggests that in the event of a nuclear attack he does not want to be left with the single option of ordering the mass destruction of enemy cities in the face of the certainty that it would be followed by the destruction of American cities. He elaborates upon this point in the 1972 report:

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<sup>1</sup> This section of the analysis was written by Charles Murphy, Analyst in National Defense, and Hugh W. Wolff, Specialist in National Defense.



Our forces must also be capable of flexible application. A simple "assured destruction" doctrine does not meet our present requirements for a flexible range of strategic options. No President should be left with only one strategic course of action, particularly that of ordering the mass destruction of enemy civilians and facilities. Given the range of possible political-military situations which could conceivably confront us, our strategic policy should not be based solely on a capability of inflicting urban and industrial damage presumed to be beyond the level an adversary would accept. We must be able to respond at levels appropriate to the situation.

In the 1971 report, the President said, "This means having the plans and command and control capabilities necessary to enable us to select and carry out the appropriate response without necessarily having to resort to mass destruction." In 1972 he says, "this problem will be the subject of continuing study," leaving the question of an alternative strategy still largely unanswered.

#### THE STRATEGIC BALANCE—1972

As he did in his two previous reports, the President discusses the continuing Soviet buildup of strategic forces. He points out: "Last year there were uncertainties in our appraisal of Soviet strategic forces. Some of these uncertainties have now been removed, unfortunately not in a reassuring way." Hopes that the Soviets had slowed or ceased deployment of land-based strategic missiles had proven false. "The pause in construction of ICBM silos was apparently related to the introduction of major improvements or the deployment of a totally new missile system," and "nearly 100 new ICBM silos are being constructed." After citing other indications of the Soviet strategic buildup, including the fact that the U.S.S.R. "now has operational or under construction more modern ballistic missile submarines than does the United States," he concludes: "In short, in virtually every category of strategic offensive and defensive weapons the Soviet Union has continued to improve its capability." Such "developments raise serious questions concerning Soviet objectives." The possibility of a future Soviet capability to carry out a disarming first strike against U.S. land-based retaliatory forces is raised as it was in the earlier reports:

The Soviet Union is continuing to create strategic capabilities beyond a level which by any reasonable standard already seems sufficient. It is therefore inevitable that we ask whether the Soviet Union seeks the numbers and types of forces needed to attack and destroy vital elements of our strategic forces.

The President says that "While it seems unlikely that the Soviet Union would actually plan to use these forces in an all-out manner, their existence is a disturbing reality which has compelled me to request the funding of additional offsetting measures." At the same time, the President states that our forces meet the test of sufficiency, emphasizing as he did last year that the "capabilities of both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. have reached a point where our programs need not be driven by fear of minor quantitative imbalances."



The following table in this year's report shows the relative growth of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces since mid-1965:

OPERATIONAL U.S. AND U.S.S.R. MISSILE LAUNCHERS

|               | Mid-1965 | End 1969 | End 1970 | End 1971 |
|---------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| ICBM's:       |          |          |          |          |
| U.S.-----     | 934      | 1,054    | 1,054    | 1,054    |
| U.S.S.R.----- | 224      | 1,190    | 1,440    | 1,520    |
| SLBM's:       |          |          |          |          |
| U.S.-----     | 464      | 656      | 656      | 656      |
| U.S.S.R.----- | 107      | 240      | 350      | 500      |

What this table does not show is the addition over the past several years of multiple warheads to a sizeable portion of the U.S. strategic missile force, both land- and sea-based. The President makes the point that the United States has "... acted with great restraint. The number of missile launchers in the U.S. strategic force has not changed for five years." Although the addition of multiple independently-targetable warheads (MIRVs) is mentioned in the text, it is with the qualifying comment that "... we have not provided our missiles with the combined numbers, accuracy and warhead yield necessary to threaten Soviet forces with a disarming strike." Thus, the President apparently chooses not to say that as a result of ongoing MIRV deployments the United States has attained a sizeable lead in the number of deliverable warheads. Both Secretary Rogers and Secretary Laird do make this point in their reports.

#### THE FORCES FOR SUFFICIENCY

Describing briefly the steps taken "to preserve the sufficiency of our forces" and "to strengthen our defensive position," the President lists seven areas of improvement, including development of a new manned bomber, the B-1, and plans for a new long-range submarine-launched missile system (ULMS) which will "... allow our submarines to operate in a larger ocean area where they will be even less vulnerable to enemy anti-submarine forces." The latter system, for which \$942 million is being requested for fiscal year 1973 according to the Secretary of Defense's report, represents a major new program this year, the cost of which with missiles has been estimated at roughly \$1 billion per boat.<sup>2</sup>

#### BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE

While the President contends in each of the three reports that continuing uncertainties vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. and China confirm the wisdom of the decision to begin Safeguard deployment, he stresses in the second and third reports that the United States is exercising sufficient restraint to enhance the prospects for an agreement on SALT. Thus, whereas the 1970 report underscored the need for the full 12-site Safeguard system, last year's report conceded that "some limits

<sup>2</sup> The request of \$942 million for ULMS in fiscal year 1973 has been subsequently revised upward and now totals \$977 million, including \$35 million originally proposed as supplemental fiscal year 1972 funding. This figure was obtained by telephone from the Directorate for Defense Information, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. The estimated unit cost of \$1 billion for ULMS is based on information contained in DMS Market Intelligence Reports (Missiles/Spacecraft), June 1971, p. 2.



on ABM systems are essential to any SALT agreement," reflecting not only the decision of Congress to confine ABM deployments to those sites protecting Minuteman ICBMs but also the President's desire to maintain flexibility because of the continuing negotiations with the U.S.S.R. In the 1972 statement, he is even more direct.

We may soon complete a SALT agreement with the U.S.S.R. which will limit ABM deployments. From the beginning of SALT negotiations it has been implicit that we would be willing to forego extensive ABM protection in return for the greater stability offered by an equitable limit on both offensive and defensive strategic forces. . . . Our future actions will continue to reflect progress made in SALT.

Thus, it appears that the President has abandoned plans for the deployment of a nationwide area defense system against the Chinese ICBM threat such as he originally proposed.

#### B. THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

In discussing the strategic balance both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense echo the President's concern about increasing Soviet missile forces. The report by Secretary Rogers, which devotes only a few pages to the security aspects of foreign policy, says: "The uncertainties created by the Soviet force buildup occur at a time of serious negotiations between the Soviets and ourselves to limit strategic arms and to avoid another round of arms competition. Until these negotiations are successfully concluded, the United States is pursuing a dual approach in our strategic programs." We are "seriously pursuing the SALT and other negotiations," but we are also taking steps to improve elements of our strategic forces "in view of the continuing Soviet force expansion and modernization." As mentioned earlier, Secretary Rogers also points out (in discussing arms control and disarmament) that although "the Soviets have a lead in numbers of missile launchers, our advances in MIRV technology have given us a lead in numbers of warheads."

The assessment by the Secretary of Defense of the threat and his discussion of planned U.S. programs for FY 1973 are more comprehensive and detailed than those in the President's report. Whereas the President's message contains a condensed appraisal of the Soviet strategic buildup, including a list of several specific weapons programs, the Secretary of Defense provides a detailed analysis of both the Soviet and Chinese nuclear weapons programs, lists more than fifteen strategic weapons programs on the U.S. side, and discusses in detail the rationale, capabilities, and proposed funding for these programs. Notably absent this year, as in the past, is extensive comment on the concept of "strategic sufficiency" or on the question of a possible alternative to the McNamara doctrine of "assured destruction." The Defense report differs from that of the President in one other respect. Comparing U.S. and Soviet strategic forces, Secretary Laird reports not only the number of missile launchers in each country but also the number of warheads. In the latter category, described as "total



offensive force loadings," the United States has a substantial lead because it is ahead in the development and deployment of multiple warheads. Thus in mid-1972, according to a tabulation in the Defense report, the United States will have 5,700 weapons as compared to an estimated 2,500 for the U.S.S.R.

### C. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

In his concluding remarks on the current status of the U.S.-Soviet strategic balance, the President warns:

We are approaching a crucial turning point in our strategic arms programs. If the Soviet Union continues to expand strategic forces, compensating U.S. programs will be mandatory. The preferable alternative would be a combination of mutual restraint and an agreement in SALT. But under no circumstances will I permit the further erosion of the strategic balance with the U.S.S.R. I am confident that the Congress shares these sentiments.

On December 15, 1971, Congress cleared for the President's signature the \$70.5 billion Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1972 (Public Law 92-204). It was the second largest defense appropriations measure to be adopted by Congress in U.S. history—surpassed in dollar value only by the fiscal year 1969 measure that totaled \$71.8 billion. Major strategic weapons programs, such as Minuteman III (MIRV), Poseidon (MIRV), Safeguard, the B-1 strategic bomber, and the Undersea Long Range Missile System (ULMS) were, for the most part, left intact. However, major cuts were made in other areas such as intelligence, civilian personnel, and the Main Battle Tank program, which was terminated by the bill.

Congressional action on the fiscal year 1972 Safeguard request approved the continued deployment at Grand Forks and Malmstrom Air Force Base but withdrew authorization for construction at the Whiteman site, thereby limiting deployment authorization to the former two sites. Under this legislation (Public Law 92-156), activity at Whiteman and at Warren Air Force Base was limited to advance preparation only, and the request to initiate predeployment activities in the area of Washington, D.C., was denied.



## GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES<sup>1</sup>

### A. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON

The President stresses the point that Soviet nuclear parity and the Chinese strategic buildup have rendered nuclear confrontations less likely but increased the possibility of short-of-general-war conflict situations, enhancing the importance of general purpose forces. The message concludes that because of the "one-and-one-half-war" strategy announced in the President's 1970 report, and the capability of rapid reinforcement of forces of both the U.S.S.R. and People's Republic of China, U.S. capabilities rest on the strength of U.S. allies, strong U.S. forces overseas, and the availability of credible reinforcements.

Although the 1972 message leaves the 1971 strategic assumptions intact the President elaborates on the nature of an adequate response. He points out that the conditions which in 1969 had rendered the "two-and-one-half-war" concept unlikely, the risks of nuclear war and the improbability of Sino-Soviet cooperation, today render that concept even more remote. The message warns, however, that:

If, in these circumstances, allied general purpose forces are weak, aggression by conventional means or attempts at political coercion might seem more inviting.

The President cites U.S. involvement in crises in the Middle East and Asia, as well as in the Jordanian crisis in 1970, to illustrate the importance of the capability for rapid deployment of forces to stabilize a local situation involving great-power interests. He also draws attention to the emerging Soviet capability to apply military leverage in remote areas, mentioning Soviet treaties with Egypt and India, the alleged use of Soviet pilots in combat against Israel, and the growing Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and even the Caribbean.

The President gives explicit recognition to the proposition that not all conflicts or potential challenges to U.S. interests necessarily involve the U.S.S.R. or other major powers directly. He predicts that in time efforts under the Nixon Doctrine to strengthen allied national and regional defense forces will diminish the need for American military forces in situations not involving other nuclear powers.

The 1971 report summarized strategic goals in Europe and Asia in general terms, as in pledging that the United States and its NATO allies will improve the quality of their forces. The 1972 report, however, spells out in some detail a number of conclusions based on an analysis of possible worldwide threats. In Europe, emphasis is given to continuation of the qualitative improvement of NATO defenses, especially the growing European effort to bear a larger portion of the burden. The President pledges, however, that the United States will

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<sup>1</sup> This section of the analysis was written by James R. Price, Analyst in National Defense:



"continue to maintain forces in Europe that provide a credible capability to defend our interests." In presenting some "preliminary conclusions" the President states that the United States intends to maintain the U.S. nuclear shield to protect its allies, and considers both strong American forward deployments and economic and military aid programs necessary. He further notes that U.S. deployments can be adjusted downward as allied military capabilities improve, and that problems of subversion and guerrilla warfare will be dealt with primarily by indigenous forces, but with appropriate U.S. military and economic aid as required.

The President is quite explicit about the force structure required to support general purpose forces. Cast in the mold of "planning for forces to meet post-Vietnam requirements," the President states that the Administration has examined alternative force structures in terms of capability and costs, including tactical nuclear weapons factors for both Europe and Asia. The President announces the following conclusions about the needed composition of U.S. forces:

Thirteen U.S. Army divisions composed of  $7\frac{2}{3}$  armored mechanized divisions and  $5\frac{1}{3}$  infantry, airborne, and airmobile divisions;

Sixteen aircraft carriers;

The existing three Marine Corps divisions and three airwings, maintained at a "high state of readiness";

"About" 22 Air Force Wings, also maintained at a "high state of readiness." (Secretary Laird's posture statement indicates that the exact figure will be 72 active fighter/attack squadrons—a figure, according to the Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, equivalent to 21 full-strength Air Force Wings).

The 1972 report strongly emphasizes the need for modernization of land, sea, and air forces—modernization which the President says has been deferred because of the priorities of the Vietnam war. However, he notes, significant steps have been taken to streamline the overall defense command organization to meet changing strategic situations.

In contrast to the minimal discussion of management problems in the 1971 report, the 1972 report elaborates on the need for optimum efficiency in managing available resources. The President notes that this is especially true in areas of manpower and weapons development—areas reflecting constantly increasing costs. The President reports that the Secretary of Defense is taking "imaginative and forceful management initiatives" to solve these problems.

In the 1971 report, the President expressed the hope that the Selective Service System could be reformed and that, ultimately, draft calls could be reduced to zero. In the 1972 report, the President announces a plan to eliminate draft calls entirely by July 1973. The report closes with a statement on the importance of bolstering respect for the military profession in American society.

## B. THE REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The Secretary of State's report on foreign policy touches upon the relationship between diplomatic and military manifestations of U.S. policy in both Europe and Asia.



In Asia, for example, the Secretary notes that the U.S. role vis-a-vis the security of its allies is one of "shifting from bearing the major responsibility for that security to furnishing them the necessary military and economic support to assure peace." The Secretary summarizes how this changing role has permitted reduced U.S. force levels in Korea as well as Vietnam and the turnover of responsibility for the defense of Okinawa to the Japanese.

In Europe, Secretary Rogers calls attention to the fact that U.S. allies provide "almost 90 percent of NATO's ground forces, 80 percent of its seapower, and 75 percent of its aircraft." The Alliance is concentrating on improving conventional combat readiness with emphasis on construction of aircraft shelters, modernization of tank and anti-tank forces, new air defense weapons, modern communications, modernization of tactical aircraft and naval vessels, and expansion of munitions stocks. The Secretary of State also announces commitments of NATO allies to force-improvement programs beyond the five-year, \$1 billion European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP), but reports that the U.S. in return has agreed to retain the present level of 320,000 U.S. troops in Europe and to modernize these forces.

The Secretary of Defense's Annual Report provides the details of strategic rationale, force structure, weaponry, and management procedures upon which the President's report is based. The Defense Report stresses the importance of the ready reserve, with emphasis upon modernization and training. The modernization theme is, in fact, a prime characteristic of the entire Department of Defense analysis of the role and mission of conventional forces. The Secretary of Defense acknowledges deficiencies in some aspects of command and control, and in the section on organization and management he describes the solution of these problems in connection with the creation of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Telecommunications. He also points out that Congress was asked last year to establish a second Deputy Secretary of Defense—a position which he considers "crucial to effective and continuing management of the largest government Department in the world." Coordination and control of the Defense intelligence community is thoroughly discussed in the context of the recent establishment of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

### C. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

Although the President does not refer to Congress in this section of his report, the 92d Congress considered and in some cases enacted a number of measures during its first session which were directly related to the force levels, manpower procurement procedures, and operational authority of General Purpose Forces. Of major importance was passage of a new Selective Service Act which renewed the President's authority to induct citizens into the Armed Forces, but which limited the number of inductees to 130,000 in fiscal year 1972 and 140,000 in fiscal year 1973. The Act also provided that total manpower ceilings for each of the Armed Services must be authorized by the Congress annually. The move toward an all-volunteer force was given impetus by a title in the Selective Service Act raising military pay and fringe benefits.



## SECURITY ASSISTANCE <sup>1</sup>

### A. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON

The "Security Assistance" section in the President's 1972 report is essentially the same as that in the 1971 report. There was no comparable section in the 1970 report, and the only references to military assistance were a few comments about helping partners to develop their strength. The Nixon Doctrine, as it was outlined in the 1970 report, called for furnishing military assistance when requested and as appropriate to nations facing a non-nuclear attack. What this means precisely was not spelled out. The 1971 report, however, clearly stated, "The Nixon Doctrine requires a strong program of security assistance."

The President begins in the 1972 report by stating that security assistance has been a cornerstone of United States foreign policy since the early days of World War II. Its purpose, he says, is to provide the military equipment, supplies, and training that our allies cannot afford. He integrates this view with the Nixon Doctrine by stating that the United States will fulfill its commitments while looking to its friends and allies to play a greater role in providing for their own defense. He cautions, however, that the primary requirement for effective local defense is the willingness of the threatened country to marshal its own resources; without this will, U.S. material assistance would be useless. Given this will, the President says, security assistance can make the critical difference, especially in those areas of the world where the United States is reducing its military presence.

The President indicates that the U.S. security assistance program can help overcome the dilemma faced by friends who have insufficient resources for both economic development and for defense, he says, can help these countries assume the costs of both dependable defense and steady development; the purpose of security assistance is to ease and to speed the transition to greater self-reliance on the part of the recipient countries. This is basically the same goal the President set for the security assistance program in 1971. In the current report, the President says that some countries have achieved or are nearing self-reliance. He does not, however, mention which countries these are.

The President says, as he did in 1971, that this transition must be a cooperative effort, and that, if the United States is to ask others to assume an increasing share of their own defense, it must be willing to share the skills, equipment, and technology which will allow them to bear that burden.

In this report, as in last year's, security assistance is discussed separately from foreign economic assistance, which is included in the chapter "International Economic Policy." The latter does note the administrative separation of economic security assistance from

<sup>1</sup> This section of the analysis was written by Theodor W. Galdi, Analyst in International Relations.



development assistance in the Agency for International Development last year and discusses proposed reforms of development assistance. However, none of the recommendations of the President's Task Force on International Development, known as the Peterson Commission, appears in the Security Assistance section for either 1971 or 1972, although a major portion of the Peterson Commission Report was devoted to an examination of the military assistance program and to making extensive administrative and policy recommendations.

#### B. THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

While the report of the Secretary of State does remedy, to some extent, the lack of concrete recommendations for security assistance in the President's report, it too seems not to spell out the outstanding issues or the solutions proposed. Beyond elaborating upon some of the objectives and accomplishments mentioned in the President's report, the Secretary of State's report is basically the same.

The report by the Secretary of Defense reiterates the policy goals stated in the President's report. It goes on to list the four main elements of the Security Assistance Program as presently constituted: (1) *The Military Assistance Program (MAP)* consists of grants of military weapons and equipment as well as military training; (2) *Foreign Military Sales* consists of either (a) government-to-government credit sales or commercial sales of defense material financed by the U.S. Government or with U.S. Government-guaranteed credit, or (b) cash sales involving purchases by other governments directly from the U.S. Government or from U.S. suppliers; (3) *Security Supporting Assistance* is economic aid intended to offset in part the impact on the civilian economy of the recipient country of exceptional defense costs; and (4) *Non-Funded Security Assistance* deals with grant transfers of military equipment and supplies declared excess to U.S. force requirements.

The remainder of the report concentrates on the changes that were made in the Department of Defense in the last year to make the planning and administration of security assistance more effective. Among the most important changes were that: (1) security assistance was treated as an integrated whole in planning the 1973 budget, although there was a separation in the administration of economic supporting assistance and other military assistance administration; (2) military assistance and military credit sales planning were placed in the Department of Defense Planning, Programming and Budgeting System and (3) a Defense Security Assistance Agency and a Defense Security Assistance Council were created. The former is to act as the central organization in the Department of Defense for directing the execution and administration of security assistance programs. The latter is to advise the Secretary of Defense on security assistance matters and to provide coordination throughout the Department for this type of assistance. The membership of the Council is designed to assure that security assistance programs meet the requirements of the recipients and at the same time are consistent with overall Department of Defense plans and capabilities.



The Secretary of Defense reviews briefly the major security assistance programs, noting that in some cases (South Vietnam, Laos, and Thailand) this assistance has been provided through the Defense budget rather than under the Foreign Assistance program. The report points out that the recipient countries will continue to rely upon United States military assistance in the near future. The Secretary also gives the status of military assistance in European countries, indicating that only Turkey, Greece, and Portugal continue to require grant and credit assistance. He asserts that it is in the U.S. national interest to help these countries to make a more effective contribution to NATO defense by aiding them in acquiring more modern equipment and improved training.

### C. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

In his 1971 report President Nixon said that he would present to Congress a proposal for a new International Security Assistance Program which would clearly separate security assistance from other forms of assistance and pull all types of security assistance together into one program. In the 1972 report he does not mention Congress in his section on security assistance beyond an introductory quotation from his message to Congress presenting the security assistance program. However, in his discussion of foreign assistance in the International Economic Policy section, he notes that he proposed two foreign assistance bills, one recommending a separate program for International Security Assistance, including establishing a Coordinator of Security Assistance in the Department of State.

The House did not act upon these bills, which involved a substantial reorganization, because of the lateness in the fiscal year. A single bill was passed containing military and economic assistance. This bill (H.R. 9910) was defeated in the Senate on October 29. One of the two bills passed by the Senate in place of H.R. 9910 was a separate authorization for military assistance. However, in conference, military and economic assistance were recombined. Also in conference, the Senate version which authorized both military and economic assistance for one year was replaced by a compromise bill which authorized economic assistance for two years and military assistance for one year. The authorization, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 (Public Law 92-226), was signed on February 7, 1972. The Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act for fiscal year 1972 (Public Law 92-242) was signed on March 8, 1972.



## ARMS CONTROL <sup>1</sup>

### A. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON

Although the President's 1971 report included a discussion of some of the substantive issues that emerged during the initial exchanges at the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) and general information on the course of these negotiations, it and the 1970 report focused, for the most part, on the planning undertaken by the United States in preparation for the SALT talks. The 1972 report, by comparison, provides a detailed official assessment to date on the status and direction of SALT as well as on the scope of possible agreements that might emerge. Moreover, the view that a "breakthrough" had been achieved in May 1971 makes the general tone of this year's report more optimistic than last year's.

#### STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS (SALT)

The President reviews the course of negotiations with the U.S.S.R. and points out that by late 1970 these key differences had emerged:

(1) We disagreed on the kinds of weapons systems that would be limited in an agreement. The United States preferred to cover all major strategic systems—land and sea-based ballistic missiles, heavy bombers, and anti-ballistic missiles; the U.S.S.R. defined strategic to include certain U.S. air and naval deployments abroad, while excluding various systems of their own, including medium-range missiles.

(2) We had not been able to agree on an equitable basis for limiting individual offensive systems that differed in numbers or capabilities.

(3) The scope of an initial agreement was undetermined. The U.S.S.R. proposed that it limit defensive forces alone; the United States felt it must encompass both offensive and defensive forces.

The list of specific differences included in the 1971 report varied from the above summation in one important way. Verification was identified as a specific problem last year while this year it is not.

In both the 1971 and 1972 reports the President notes that a fundamental principle of the U.S. position is that an agreement must include limitations on both offensive and defensive weapons. "To limit only one side of the offense-defense equation," he said in the 1971 report, "could rechannel the arms competition rather than effectively curtail it." This year President Nixon lists two additional principles:

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<sup>1</sup> This section of the analysis was written by Charles Murphy, Analyst in National Defense.



(1) If satisfactory formulas for limiting all major weapon systems could not be devised, the parties should concentrate on those of primary importance in the strategic balance.

(2) If technical solutions for limiting systems that already differed in numbers and capabilities could not be found, an interim step might be "a freeze at current levels on deployments of the most de-stabilizing offensive weapons."

These new principles suggest that the President would now be willing to accept something less than the comprehensive agreement that the 1971 report indicated was originally sought. At that time the President said, "The United States suggested possible approaches involving both numerical and qualitative limitations on strategic offensive and defensive systems, including MIRV's," and "We shall strive for an initial agreement which is as broad and comprehensive as possible".

In the 1972 report, the President says that because of the key differences and the continuing buildup of Soviet strategic systems, he found it necessary to intervene personally with the Soviet leaders: "Recognizing that only by establishing a political commitment at the highest level could we make significant progress on the range of technical issues that still confronted the negotiators, I attempted to create a new negotiating framework in which both sides could proceed." This overture, he states, ultimately produced the "breakthrough" announced on May 20, 1971, in which both sides "agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of antiballistic missile systems (ABMs)" since greater progress had been made in this area. Additionally, the United States and the U.S.S.R. announced that they would "agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons."

According to the President, ". . . this new understanding involved elements that bridged the concerns of both sides. . . . The impasse over the composition of strategic offensive weapons was resolved by concentrating on an initial agreement for those offensive systems having the major impact on the strategic balance." The "essential linkage between agreements to limit offensive and defensive systems would be preserved," with the two agreements to be concluded simultaneously.

The understanding in May, according to the President, revitalized the negotiations and was followed by progress in related areas. On September 30, 1971, the United States and the Soviet Union signed two agreements, worked out in parallel with the main talks at SALT, aimed at reducing the risk of an unintentional nuclear war. One agreement dealt with measures that both countries would adopt to reduce the risk of nuclear war resulting from an accident or unauthorized acts. The other agreement provided that the U.S.-U.S.S.R. direct communications link (Hot Line) would employ communications satellites to enhance its security.

President Nixon reports that the "exact scope of the agreements derived from the commitment of May 20th is still under negotiation," and that he feels "obligated to protect the confidentiality of these talks". Nevertheless, "a consensus is developing on certain essential elements which provide a basis for further movement toward an agree-



ment that accommodates concerns expressed by each side." He lists the following elements:

Comprehensive limitations should be placed on ABM systems. . . . However, reaching agreement has been complicated because the existing Soviet system is designed to protect Moscow in contrast with our initial ABM deployments which defend ICBMs located in less populous areas.

. . . . An ABM agreement . . . should be a long term commitment formalized in a treaty.

There should be an interim solution to the question of offensive controls. Certain offensive weapons should be frozen to prevent widening of numerical differentials to a point which would necessitate additional American countermeasures . . . and further offensive limitations would be considered in a second phase of negotiations. Because it is only an interim measure, it is more appropriately concluded in a formal agreement of a different type.

An essential linkage between the substance and duration of the documents dealing with offensive and defensive aspects must be preserved.

In his concluding remarks on SALT, the President makes the following statements:

We must weigh the advantages of prolonging the current stage of negotiations in order to reach agreements on every offensive system against the consequences of allowing the current Soviet buildup to continue, perhaps for a considerable period. Considering the overall balance of offensive systems, including our programs of multiple warhead deployment, there will be no disadvantage for the U.S. in an interim freeze of certain systems. Moreover, Soviet willingness to limit the size of its offensive forces would reflect a desire for longer term solutions rather than unilateral efforts to achieve marginal advantages.

At the same time, however, he warns that "if negotiations are protracted while the Soviets continue offensive missile deployments and development of new systems, the U.S. has no choice but to proceed with major new strategic programs." The President refers to the SALT negotiations as offering "a constructive alternative to unlimited competition." He says that he is "confident that agreements limiting strategic arms are feasible and in the interests of both nations."

#### MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS (MBFR)

The President states that the possibility of mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Central Europe was first raised by NATO in 1968, but that thus far no specific reply has been elicited from the Soviet Union or the other Warsaw Pact countries. Nevertheless, he adds, the Administration is conducting an ongoing analysis of the issues in concert with the NATO allies in order to be in the best possible position should negotiations develop.

Following a detailed evaluation of the existing balance of military forces in Central Europe, the President reports that "certain tentative



findings have emerged at this stage of preparations" for MBFR as follows:

Small reductions, on the order of ten percent or less, cannot be confidently verified to assure that reductions have actually taken place, especially those forces demobilized within national territories.

Larger reductions can be verified, provided they are made under certain conditions and accompanied by measures to ensure continuing compliance.

The USSR can mobilize and reinforce its forces in Central Europe much more rapidly than NATO. Therefore, an agreement to reduce forces simply on an equal percentage basis is inherently unfavorable to NATO, and the larger the percentage, the greater the inequity.

The United States and its allies concluded last year, the President reports, that preparations had advanced to the point where it would be advantageous to discuss preliminary principles with the USSR. Former Secretary General of NATO Manlio G. Brosio was appointed to hold exploratory talks on MBFR, but the Soviet Government has not yet responded to this initiative. The report states "... the extensive studies completed have laid a promising foundation for constructive discussions once the interest of NATO nations is reciprocated by members of the Warsaw Pact."

Despite a rather optimistic tone throughout this section it ends on a cautious note. While President Nixon states "We are committed to progress in arms control," he also asserts, "I will not allow negotiations to become a subterfuge by which potential adversaries obtain military advantages. . . . We will maintain those forces essential to deal with the challenges of the 1970's, and we will develop a solid foundation for strength over the long term to ensure against potential dangers in the future."

#### B. THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The President's report goes into considerable detail on both SALT and MBFR but gives only a few highlights concerning other developments in arms control. It is supplemented by Secretary Rogers' report, which has more to say about the negotiations of the Geneva Conference of the U.N. Committee on Disarmament (CCD).

Secretary Rogers reports briefly on developments relating to a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing and on a U.S. proposal to consider conventional arms control, neither of which is mentioned in the President's report.

Secretary Laird's report contains only a few general references to SALT and a discussion of MBFR considerably shorter and more general than that in the President's report.



## C. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS


The President's references to Congress in this section all relate to the constitutional requirement that treaties be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent prior to ratification. The President notes that the United States on May 12, 1971, following a unanimous vote in the Senate, ratified Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) under which the United States agreed to respect the Latin American nuclear-free zone. In addition, he points out, a treaty banning weapons of mass destruction from the seabed was signed in Washington on February 11, 1971, and subsequently submitted to the Senate on July 21, 1971. (The Senate approved the Treaty on February 15, 1972.)

In addition, the President reports, following unilateral renunciation by the United States of all biological methods of warfare in November 1969, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) negotiated a convention banning the development, production, and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons and requiring destruction of existing stocks. Completed in September 1971, it is described by the President as a "unique milestone." "Following its signature," the President states, "I intend to submit this treaty to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent to ratification this year." The treaty was signed on April 10, 1972.

The Secretary of State also mentions the Senate in connection with the Geneva Protocol of 1925 which bans the use of chemical and biological weapons. He points out that following the President's renunciation on November 25, 1969, of biological warfare and first use of lethal and incapacitating chemicals the Administration, on August 19, 1970, submitted the Protocol to the Senate. However, after a series of hearings held in early 1971, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee "asked that the question of interpretation of the Protocol be reexamined." The Secretary's report does not indicate the current status of this review.

Relating to strategic policies and programs and negotiating strategy at SALT, Congress funded strategic weapons programs, such as Minuteman III (MIRV), Poseidon (MIRV), the proposed B-1 strategic bomber, and the proposed Undersea Long Range Missile System (ULMS), at close to requested levels for fiscal year 1972. Efforts by individual Congressmen to curb the testing of MIRVs and the deployment of both offensive and defensive strategic weapons systems during the SALT negotiations did not succeed during 1971. Several resolutions and a bill to suspend nuclear weapons deployments during the talks were introduced but not reported out of committee during the 1st Session of the 92d Congress. Similar amendments to the fiscal year 1972 military procurement authorization bill were defeated.







## Part VI. THE IMPERATIVE OF GLOBAL COOPERATION

"The Imperative of Global Cooperation" contains sections on the United Nations and on the "New Dimensions of Diplomacy." While there is no explanation as to why these two subjects are linked together, an examination of the first two reports illustrates how the President's approach to these areas has probably progressed. In the 1970 report the President had a section on the United Nations which talked about its role primarily in terms of how it promoted international cooperation in particular areas. The 1971 report included a section on the United Nations and a separate one entitled "Global Challenges" which was an expansion of the tasks he had outlined the previous year as being within the competence of the United Nations. This year's message devotes an equal number of pages to both sections which gives relatively greater attention to the United Nations itself than in the two earlier years. While the President links the subjects together in this part of the report they are treated differently in the introduction. The United Nations is discussed under the "areas of disappointment" and unfinished business, while the subject of the new dimensions of diplomacy is discussed as an area of "important, if quieter, progress."

As a whole, this part discusses the issues of achieving cooperation between nations and people in political and non-political areas. The section on the United Nations deals to a great extent with issues involving political cooperation. The fact that the section on the United Nations centers on discussion of the problems it is facing illustrates the greater difficulty of achieving cooperation in the political field. The issues discussed in "New Dimensions of Diplomacy," however, are generally the non-political problems imposed by the rise of science and technology. Issues such as the environment, drugs, and population are being accepted for discussion on a universal basis. The President states that since these problems are world challenges, a global response is required and so far the response to this global challenge, he says, has been "vigorous."



## THE UNITED NATIONS<sup>1</sup>

### A. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON

In the 1972 report President Nixon devotes more attention to the United Nations than he did in either of his two previous messages. The President's approach to the United Nations appears to be more emphatic and positive than in previous years. His opening remarks reflect this:

We believe the United Nations is now entering a crucial period. A pervasive skepticism concerning the UN is widespread. . . . Our obligation to the future requires that we face that fact squarely. We believe that the time has come for a large dose of realism and candor in United States policy toward the United Nations.

In addition, the President states as a comprehensive policy objective to "conduct our UN activities . . . [so] as to preserve and enhance the potential of the world organization to grow . . . toward understanding, tolerance and the sublimation of national conflicts of interest."

### MAJOR PROBLEMS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The President focuses on four major problems now confronting the United Nations. Noting that "preserving the world peace" is "the UN's fundamental purpose," the President points out the inability of the Security Council to prevent or "even to moderate" the India-Pakistan conflict in 1971. He identifies four primary methods by which the United Nations can attempt to keep the peace: "recommendations or mandatory decisions of the Security Council," "resolutions embodying the will of the General Assembly," "peacekeeping missions sent into conflict-ridden areas," and "voluntary resort by states in dispute to resolution . . . by an ad hoc authority or by the International Court of Justice." The President states that "the UN has, in the past, been able to make major contributions" in the dispatch of peacekeeping missions. He sets forth, as in his 1971 message, the basic disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union with reference to the negotiations over the establishment of standby peacekeeping apparatus. "Our earnest efforts to resolve this problem have, thus far, been fruitless," he notes, and adds that at this stage it is too soon to know what effect the People's Republic of China will have on the negotiations.

With reference to the use of the International Court of Justice, which had not been mentioned in the 1970 or 1971 messages, the President declares:

In the coming year, the United States will be alert for disputes to which we are a party which might be resolved

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<sup>1</sup> This section of the analysis was written by Marjorie Ann Browne, Analyst in International Organization.



through the use of the International Court. . . . It may . . . be possible, by example, to strengthen this potentially important aspect of the UN system's dispute-settlement machinery.

The second major problem affecting the United Nations is, according to the President, "an excessive resort to the politics of confrontation by members who placed group solidarity above the need for a realistic consensus." This problem was highlighted by the President in his 1971 message when he noted that "UN members contribute best to the maintenance of peace when they examine issues on their merits instead of voting as blocs along geographical or ideological lines." The President, in 1972, declares that the United States would "work . . . for a spirit of accommodation and an atmosphere of civility, which even among enemies encourages reconciliation." He refers specifically to the position taken by the United States in the fall of 1971 on the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations.

A third major problem confronting the United Nations, the President declares, is its financial crisis. After setting forth the basic causes and current status of the crisis, the President welcomes the actions of the Secretary-General to reduce expenditures although he cautions that stopgap measures are not sufficient. He notes that the "United States is prepared to play a constructive role in the search for . . . a solution" to the financial crisis. He warns, nevertheless, that the United States will not "take the initial or major responsibility for making up a deficit created by the policies of other countries." The message does not refer to the establishment in December 1971 by the U.N. General Assembly of a 15-member Special Committee on the Financial Situation or to the role of the United States on this Committee.

Another aspect of U.N. financing which is given attention by the President as the fourth major problem confronting the United Nations is the need for a wider sharing of its costs. The President notes that the Lodge Commission, appointed by him to study U.S. participation in the United Nations, "concluded that the United States should seek to reduce its contribution to not more than 25 percent of the assessed budget of the United Nations, using this saving to increase our voluntary contributions to other UN programs." He declares that it is the policy of his "Administration to negotiate with other UN member states an arrangement by which the U.S. contribution to the assessed budget of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies will be brought down to the level of 25 percent." While recognizing that "capacity to pay is a valid general guide to assessments," the President observes that ". . . it is not the only guide. Prudence and political realism dictate that no one country should be assessed a disproportionate share of the expenses of an organization approaching universality in which each member, large or small, has but one vote."

#### FUNDING OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND OTHER ISSUES

In a very brief section of the report the President looks at the funding of the technical assistance provided by the specialized agencies and concludes "that the assessed contribution of the U.N. specialized agencies should relate to the administration of the organizations them-



selves and to activities of common benefit." He continues, "Assistance which benefits only some countries . . . should properly be funded through voluntary national contributions, thus permitting each country to determine for itself the amount of its own national resources which should be applied to these purposes."

As in 1971, the President's 1972 message points to the new dimension in diplomacy, noting that the United Nations enhances its effectiveness by successfully fostering international cooperation in the special set of "problems which by their very nature involve all the nations of the world, and can be satisfactorily met only in a context of the broadest international cooperation and agreements."

The President's concluding section defines the "essential task of the UN" as whether "man [can] create institutions to save him from the dark forces of his own nature and from the overwhelming consequences of his technological successes." The President states that he believes that man can, but only with a "healthy and increasingly vigorous United Nations."

There are a few noteworthy omissions in the President's report. In 1971 the President indicated that the Administration would seriously study the report of the Lodge Commission. There is only one reference to implementation of the Commission's recommendations and no general discussion of how the President views the report, which was issued after his 1971 message was sent to Congress. In addition, the President does not mention the increase in U.N. membership by five nations, all of whom might have been candidates for the associate membership status proposed by the United States and still under consideration in the Security Council. Similarly, the President's 1972 message does not refer to the U.N. General Assembly action offering an amendment to Article 61 of the U.N. Charter to increase membership on the Economic and Social Council from 27 to 54 nations. This amendment, to be given effect, must be ratified by two-thirds of the U.N. members, including all of the permanent members of the Security Council. To date, the President has not transmitted this amendment to the Senate for approval.

#### B. THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The section entitled "International Organizations and Law" in the Secretary of State's report provides a historical sketch of U.N. activities in 1971. In general, the Secretary's report discusses the same subjects referred to in the President's message although not in an identical format and arrangement. Moreover, the Secretary's report covers in detail some subjects not mentioned by the President—human rights in armed conflicts, African issues before the United Nations, the U.S. administration of Micronesia as a U.N. Trust Territory, reform of the Economic and Social Council, actions toward reform of General Assembly procedures, and Security Council consideration of U.S. proposals for associate status. The Secretary's report also outlines in a brief descriptive paragraph the general character of the Lodge Commission report which was submitted to the President in April 1971.

In the introduction to his report, the Secretary of State says that 1972 "will be a year in which we support a new Secretary General in his efforts to restore strength to the United Nations" and asserts that the



United States must continue to support the United Nations, despite its problems, and seek ways to make it more effective.

The report of the Secretary of Defense does not include a section on the United Nations.

### C. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

In his 1972 message, the President examines what he entitles "the decline in congressional support for the UN." The President lists four actions by the Congress in 1971 which he says "require mention in this report:" the House "refused to provide a voluntary contribution to the United Nations Development Program [UNDP]"; "Congress refused to pay the assessed contribution to the International Labor Organization [ILO]"; "the Congress failed to appropriate funds for the U.S. contribution to the expansion of UN Headquarters facilities in New York;" and "the Congress exempted strategic and critical materials, notably chrome, from the U.S. implementation of mandatory UN sanctions on imports from Rhodesia." In explaining these actions the President notes that "it would be a mistake to conclude that these actions were motivated by Congressional hostility to the United Nations." While mentioning that they occurred for a variety of reasons, the President says they could not "have taken place if the UN, as an entity, enjoyed stronger support in the Congress and among the American people."

Congressional action on the UNDP funds was not yet complete at the time the President's message was written. Later action restored a large percent of the appropriation which was cut at one stage. In his 1971 message the President referred to ways in which the United Nations was beginning to remedy inadequacies in UNDP. In his 1972 message the President notes that "progress continued in making the UNDP's machinery more efficient" and also that contributions to UNDP were significantly increased. In addition, the President reminds readers that Paul Hoffman, retiring as Administrator of UNDP, is being succeeded by another American, Rudolph Peterson.

In regard to the International Labor Organization, the President, in his 1972 message, notes that the United States is "on the verge of losing its vote under the ILO rules." He agrees that there were "cogent reasons behind the Congressional dissatisfaction with the ILO" but says that in the past two years "the ILO has responded to our efforts to revitalize its tripartite structure and procedures." He warns that "This Administration will . . . have no choice but to give notice of withdrawal from the ILO unless the Congress sees fit to provide our assessed contributions to that organization."

This section is quite frank in its treatment of congressional action. However, there is no statement elaborating further on the implications of congressional action in exempting chrome from the U.S. implementation of the mandatory sanctions on imports from Rhodesia signed into the law by the President in the Military Procurement Authorization (Public Law 92-156). Nor is there an indication of the President's intentions relative to U.S. contributions to the U.N. Headquarters expansion.

In addition to the four major congressional actions pointed out by the President as affecting U.S. participation in the United Nations,



it might also be considered significant that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported favorably on the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide on May 4, 1971. Moreover, numerous bills were introduced in the House to limit in some way U.S. contributions to the United Nations. The Senate added and the House concurred in adding to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 (Public Law 92-226) a section which urged the President to undertake negotiations necessary to reduce the U.S. annual assessment to the U.N. regular budget to no more than 25 percent, as was proposed in the Lodge Commission report.



## NEW DIMENSIONS OF DIPLOMACY<sup>1</sup>

### A. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON

This section of the President's message corresponds to the section in the 1971 message called "Global Challenges." This year the President continues the theme in last year's report, observing that man has "no choice but to cope with the new problems of technological civilization." He notes that this is "one of the great challenges of our time." He adds that he is happy with the response of the international community to his earlier calls to focus "attention and energy" on these "new tasks for diplomacy."

The subject areas the President talks about in his 1972 message are the oceans, control of drug abuse, aircraft hijacking and sabotage, population growth, protection of the environment, outer space, and disaster relief. In his 1971 message the President discussed all of these issues and, in addition, the kidnapping of diplomats, nuclear energy cooperation, and other ways of encouraging international cooperation in science and technology. The President's 1970 report referred to some of these problem areas and also that of encouraging international voluntary service.

#### THE OCEANS

The President reviews the development of U.S. policy since he took office. He lists four general principles underlying U.S. oceans policy: "multilateral agreement is essential," "freedom of navigation and overflight must be protected," "an equitable system must be established for regulating the exploitation of the resources of the ocean and seabeds beyond national jurisdiction," and "it is not possible for any nation, acting unilaterally, to ensure adequate protection of the marine environment."

The President points out that the U.S. Government has offered four proposals in this area. One on seabeds was presented in 1970 in the form of a draft U.N. convention and discussed at length in his 1971 message. During 1971 the United States put forward three additional draft articles—one each on the breadth of the territorial sea, transit through straits, and living resources, i.e., fisheries management and conservation. The President states that "the U.S. is deeply engaged in an international effort to write a new law of the sea. . . . The time has arrived for monumental decisions . . . , and the U.S. has acted forthrightly to meet the challenge."

#### CONTROL OF DRUG ABUSE

The President reviews his activities in 1971 toward intensification of the international attack on all aspects of the control of narcotics and other dangerous drugs. He includes the redirection of energies

<sup>1</sup> This section of the analysis was written by Marjorie Ann Browne, Analyst in International Organization.



within the executive branch by the establishment of a Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control as well as international cooperation on bilateral, regional and multinational levels. The President notes that the United States is encouraging more countries to contribute to the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control and indicates that "we will seek additional U.S. contributions from the Congress when required." He further observes that U.S. proposals for amendments have been followed by the convening in March 1972 of an international conference to strengthen the 1971 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. According to the President, while the chief sources of narcotics are foreign, the United States is a source of psychotropic drugs and therefore U.S. efforts to control psychotropic substances must be equally vigorous.

#### AIRCRAFT HIJACKING AND SABOTAGE

The President's 1972 message urges widespread ratification of two international conventions already concluded on this subject. In addition, he calls for an "international agreement to suspend air services to countries which refuse to cooperate in the release of hijacked aircraft and in the punishment of hijackers."

#### POPULATION GROWTH

The President observes that the "worldwide population growth rate is still explosive"; thus a "problem of the greatest urgency" still exists. The United States is attacking this question on both the bilateral and the multilateral levels.

#### PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT

The President cites three agreements on which the United States is seeking progress at the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment to be held in Stockholm in June 1972: a draft convention on ocean dumping, submitted by the United States; a World Heritage Trust Convention; and an international agreement to protect endangered species. At the same time the United States is participating in the activities of NATO's Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society and in the Environmental Committee of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development. The United States is also negotiating actively on a new convention to ban all intentional oil discharges from vessels and is engaged in bilateral discussions with several countries on the solution of basic environmental problems.

#### OUTER SPACE

The President points out that "the U.S. is committed to work with others in space for the benefit of all mankind." He observes that the United States is prepared to assist the members of the European Space Conference and other nations in launching satellites for peaceful purposes. He notes areas of agreement with the Soviet Union within the past year on cooperation in space tasks. In addition, he refers to two significant multilateral agreements which were concluded in 1971: the Outer Space Liability Convention, approved by the U.N. General



Assembly; and the definitive charter for the operation of the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (INTELSAT).

#### DISASTER RELIEF

In his 1971 message the President urged the United Nations to take the "organizational steps necessary to insure that the world's response to disaster victims is characterized . . . by high efficiency as well as great generosity." His 1972 message applauds the creation by the General Assembly in 1971 of a U.N. "coordinator for disaster relief."

#### B. THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The problem areas discussed by the President are treated in more detail in the report of the Secretary of State in the section "International Organizations and Law" and, to some extent, in the section "Social and Scientific Dimensions." Some pertinent additional subjects are also itemized and described in the Secretary's report, including youth, atomic energy, and atmospheric sciences.

The report of the Secretary of Defense does not include a corresponding section, although he does discuss drug abuse as a problem in the armed forces.

#### C. ROLE OF CONGRESS

The President twice refers to actions—either past or future—in the Congress: he indicates he will request additional money from Congress for U.S. contributions to the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control and he says that he has already sent to the Senate for "early advice and consent to ratification" the Vienna Convention on Psychotropic Substances.

During 1971 Congress acted in several of the problems areas discussed by the President in his 1972 message. The Senate approved for ratification two oil pollution agreements adopted by the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization in 1969, and also the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft adopted at the Hague in December 1970. In addition, Congress enacted amendments to the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Act of 1950 (P.L. 92-87, August 11, 1971), passed a bill providing for the International Protection of Patents, Trademarks and Intellectual Property (P.L. 92-132, October 5, 1971), and included Section 481 on International Narcotics Control in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1971, which authorized the President to furnish assistance to international organizations for the control of the production of, processing of, and traffic in, narcotic and psychotropic drugs.



## Part VII. THE POLICYMAKING PROCESS: THE NSC SYSTEM<sup>1</sup>

### A. SUMMARY AND COMPARISON

In each of his foreign policy reports the President devotes a brief section to a description of the National Security Council (NSC) system, explaining in some detail why it has been restored and strengthened as the principal mechanism for the consideration of foreign policy issues. In the 1970 report this section was highlighted. As Part I of the report it had a position of priority and great emphasis was given to describing the various measures taken to improve the decisionmaking process.

In the current report, as in last year's, the section on the NSC has been put at the end of the report, followed by a brief conclusion. The content is much the same as in the earlier reports: (1) a brief review of the situation that had confronted the new Nixon Administration and the need for a more systematic approach to policy review and decisionmaking; (2) a description of the NSC and the underlying committee structure; and (3) a few examples of problems considered by the NSC, including the number of times the NSC and certain subgroups met last year on such issues as SALT and the Jordanian crisis.

The principal change in the NSC structure during 1971 was the establishment of the NSC Intelligence Committee as one of the senior bodies reporting to the Council. Its function is to advise the President "on the quality, scope and timeliness of the intelligence input to Presidential decisions, and on the steps to improve it." Nothing is said about the membership of the Committee or the circumstances leading to its establishment.

Apparently replying to implications that Dr. Henry Kissinger, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, has largely superseded the Secretary of State in the field of foreign policy, the President this year endeavors to spell out the roles of both men:

I rely heavily on the advice and judgment of the Secretary of State, my senior foreign policy adviser, but clearly there must be a means by which I can secure the views of all agencies concerned with national security affairs and foreign policy. There can be no question of the right and obligation of each agency to present its views. The NSC system exists to assure and protect that right. There is no more cogent demonstration of this than the fact that for the first time, through the Defense Program Review Committee, the broad foreign policy judgment of the Department of State is actively sought in the planning of the defense budget.

In closing the President adds that his advisers have been able, through the NSC system, to express their views with a candor "which . . . has been a hallmark of the system and essential to its success." He says that while the Administration will be judged by the

<sup>1</sup> This section of the analysis was written by Hugh W. Wolff, Specialist in National Defense.



substance of its policies rather than by the instruments used, the NSC system is "an effective vehicle for the creative and orderly formulation and execution of our foreign policy."

#### B. THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Secretary Rogers' report does not comment directly on the NSC system. It does, however, describe in some detail measures being taken to implement the Department's management reform program, which includes a newly established system for policy analysis and review. Known as the Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation (PARA) system, it is an effort to relate the allocation of available resources more directly to U.S. interests and objectives. Actions taken under the PARA system include a series of policy reviews in specific geographic and functional areas which "have permitted the leadership . . . to consider issues which might not normally have been brought to its attention." The position papers developed in the State Department under PARA are introduced into the NSC system when they are reviewed by interdepartmental groups which are a part of that system. The Secretary's report makes clear that although the PARA process may change as it evolves further "the central objectives have been established and will continue to govern."

Improving the decisionmaking process is also a matter of concern to the Secretary of Defense. In his 1972 report, as in his earlier reports, Secretary Laird gives considerable prominence to the philosophy on which U.S. defense policy is based and the processes used in defense planning. This year he introduces the concept of "Net Assessment" as a new planning tool, announcing also the establishment of a new position within his own office, Director of Net Assessments. "Net Assessment is a comparative analysis of those factors, military, technological, political and economic, which impede or have a potential to impede our national security objectives with those factors available or potentially available to enhance the accomplishment of those objectives." In making a Net Assessment in a particular problem area, "we weigh the capabilities of potential enemies against our capabilities and those of our allies . . . [giving] consideration not only to the strengths of potential adversaries, but also to the deficiencies in their capabilities and the various constraints with which they must cope." Examples cited in the report as demanding examination are Soviet forces and China's "increasing military capability across a broad spectrum."

#### C. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

Some concern was expressed in Congress during 1971 over the powers vested in Dr. Kissinger and the NSC. Apart from the many bills addressed to the question of executive powers to commit U.S. troops to war, several bills were introduced to improve congressional machinery for dealing with national security policy and insuring a greater congressional role.

Concern was also expressed in Congress over the establishment of the Intelligence Committee as part of the NSC system. The point was made in the Senate that this was done by the President without



any consultation with the Congress and that it seemed to represent the transfer of authority over intelligence analysis from the career professionals in CIA to "a combination of military professionals and the White House staff."



## Part VIII. CONCLUSIONS OF THE REPORTS <sup>1</sup>

The President concludes by restating his goal of achieving a generation of peace. He asserts that this is a more credible goal now than it was at the beginning of 1971. The President says that this in itself is important because it holds out hope for something more than crisis management and staving off conflagration as the prime goal of foreign policy.

By a "generation of peace" the President says that he means the seeking of a structure of global relationships, in which all nations have a stake, which will remove the fear that every conflict has the potential for doomsday. He implies that with fear removed, habits of moderation and compromise can grow and people and nations can progress.

The President maintains that for too long the United States merely reacted to events because "we had no positive conception of where we wanted to go." But durable peace, the President states, is a set of conditions and requires conscious effort to create those conditions. The President implies that the United States is purposefully striving to create those conditions today.

Our dramatic departures of the past year—the fruits of our planning and policies over three years—reflect the historical conditions we see today and the historic possibilities we see for tomorrow. They were momentous steps, accelerating the very process of change which they addressed. The world—and we ourselves—are still in the process of adjusting to the developments we have set in train. But we know where we are going. We are moving with history, and moving history ourselves.

The same general tone pervaded the concluding sections of earlier reports. However, there were differences of emphasis. The 1970 report, like the 1972 one, discussed the meaning and requirements of peace but in a more philosophical tone. The 1971 report linked partnership at home with partnership abroad. This domestic partnership, the President indicated in 1971, must include the advice and support of Congress. The President does not refer to Congress in the conclusion of his 1972 report.

Neither the Secretary of State nor the Secretary of Defense includes formal conclusions in their annual reports. The President's annual foreign policy report is the only one of the three that provides any deliberate concluding judgments and prescriptions relating to foreign policy in 1971.

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<sup>1</sup> This section of the analysis was written by Allan S. Nanes, Specialist in International Development.



# THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC

OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AS REVISED AND AMENDED

TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC

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## CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

### A. THE PRESIDENT'S REPORTS

Most of the major changes in U.S. foreign policy which reveal themselves in a comparison of the President's 1970, 1971, and 1972 reports to Congress have been pointed out and explained by the President. In fact, a changing foreign policy is the underlying theme of his reports. The President calls 1971 the "watershed year" because in his view foreign policy changes of such historic scope and significance took place.

He holds that during 1971 there were breakthroughs in policy toward two adversaries, China and the Soviet Union, and toward U.S. allies—Western Europe and Japan—especially in the international economic field. Latin America, Asia, and Africa are described as other areas of important but quieter progress and as areas of continuing transition. Progress and initiatives are also claimed in the "new dimension of diplomacy," legal, social, scientific, and economic problems of worldwide concern such as ocean resources, international control of narcotics, population control, and space exploration. Vietnam, where efforts to end the war by negotiated settlement failed, South Asia, where war between India and Pakistan was not prevented, and the Middle East, where negotiations between the parties were not obtained, are listed as "sharp disappointments" and "areas of turbulence and challenge." The failure to keep the Republic of China in the United Nations is also listed as one of the year's disappointments.

The three reports portray the progressive development of foreign policy under one President during an era of transition in that policy. The subtitle for the 1970 President's report, "A New Strategy for Peace," reflected the formative stage of the Nixon Doctrine, an attempt to define the new policy then shaping up which had been spelled out for the first time at Guam in 1969. The subtitle for 1971, "Building for Peace," suggested the strategy was being applied. The subtitle for 1972, "The Emerging Structure of Peace," suggests the belief that the strategy has begun to bear fruit.

There is much less talk about the "Nixon Doctrine" this year. Whereas much of the 1970 report was grouped under the heading "Partnership and the Nixon Doctrine" and the 1971 report had an entire part devoted to describing the Nixon Doctrine, there is only occasional use of the term "Nixon Doctrine" throughout the 1972 report. It is not used at all in the introduction or as a title. Nevertheless, the policy implied by the name is still there. For example, under the chapters on "East Asia" and "Security Assistance" the 1969 speech at Guam is recalled and there is reference to the Nixon Doctrine as requiring fuller participation by other nations in providing for their own defense. Similarly in the introduction President Nixon states:



In our relations with all countries we proceeded to give effect to our new policy of insisting that the United States has neither the prescriptions nor the resources for the solution of problems in which ours is not the prime national interest. It is coming to be widely understood that we are in earnest when we say that it is for others to formulate solutions to these problems, and that our contribution should be viewed as a supplement to the application of major resources from those primarily at interest.

There are viewpoints in the President's report which are debatable. Some might contend the watershed in U.S. foreign policy was reached much earlier than 1971, perhaps when disillusionment with the Vietnam war became prominent. Others might wonder if there had been a watershed, a real change in the direction of American foreign policy, since many important elements of foreign policy remain the same. Similarly, while many might agree that the term "breakthrough" was accurate for the change which took place in U.S. China policy, whether there were "breakthroughs" in relation to Western Europe, Japan, or international economic policy might be questioned. Finally, although most would probably agree that a profound change in foreign policy is underway, some would emphasize more that many of the changes and achievements have roots dating back before 1969.

Perhaps the single most concise statement portraying both the change and the continuity in U.S. foreign policy is that of the President in the introduction:

Our alliances are no longer addressed primarily to the containment of the Soviet Union and China behind an American shield. They are, instead, addressed to the creation with those powers of a stable world peace. That task absolutely requires the maintenance of the allied strength of the non-Communist world.

The basic goal of United States foreign policy, a stable world peace, is not new, but there is new hope that the Soviet Union and China and the Western allies will work together to achieve it. Meanwhile, the President contends, military strength remains an imperative. Thus, it is a time of transition in American foreign policy, resulting in an appearance of "ambiguous tendencies" in U.S. policy similar to what the President calls "ambiguous tendencies" in Soviet policy.

#### B. THE REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The annual reports by the Secretaries of State and Defense both serve in different ways to complement the President's third annual foreign policy message. The three reports are quite different in format and purpose, but together they give a complete picture of the Administration's view of foreign policy. While the President sketches the outline and presents the philosophy of foreign policy in 1971, the Secretary of State documents diplomatic activity, and the Secretary of Defense details the practical aspects of the military defense of these policies. Because of their obvious differences in approach it is not always easy to compare the three reports in a uniform manner. How-



ever, looking at the three reports as one comprehensive executive statement of U.S. foreign policy is a worthwhile exercise and probably necessary for a fair assessment.

The Secretary of State includes a letter of transmittal to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee with his statement of U.S. foreign policy, which states that the report he is submitting is to serve the purpose of providing a complete record of how U.S. foreign policy was conducted in 1971. "Within the framework set by the President it describes in greater detail our relations with individual countries and our diplomacy on a wide range of economic, technical, legal and other issues." The obvious difference when looking at the President's and the Secretary's reports together is that the President's report is more a statement of policy while the other appears to be more a record of activity. While it is true that Secretary Rogers' report is for the most part "Within the framework set by the President," there are some differences in emphasis and sometimes in tone. There are two examples of this: The Secretary of State appears to be somewhat more critical of India in his discussion of the India-Pakistan war than is the President; secondly, he devotes a separate section to the Republic of China while the President includes only a section on the People's Republic of China. Specifically regarding the People's Republic of China, there is an understandable difference between the two reports. The President's report was written on the eve of his trip to China, allowing him only to refer to its possibilities, while the Secretary, writing a month later, could and did discuss its achievements.

While there are deviations such as these from the "framework" set by the President within the body of the Secretary of State's report, it is in his introduction where Secretary Rogers substantially departs from his general "report" approach. This introduction, written in the first person, can be sharply contrasted to the rest of his report in that Secretary Rogers makes specific predictions, sets out goals, both personal and diplomatic, and is generally more subjective. While in discussions of international economics the President sets out some goals to be achieved, Secretary Rogers makes specific predictions. In discussions of South Asia, President Nixon avoids any mention of the recognition of Bangladesh, while Secretary Rogers states that recognition is being actively considered. Both the President's report and the Secretary of State's introduction are alike in being optimistic in tone, even though the President does not go as far as the Secretary of State in predicting what will happen in 1972.

With the exception of his introduction and a few instances within the body of the report, the Secretary of State follows through with his goal of presenting a "record" of foreign policy and not a statement of it. He includes discussions on specific issues that are not touched on by the President such as the Peace Corps, youth, and information and cultural exchange. This approach is further carried out by the inclusion of an annex containing foreign policy speeches, statements, messages to Congress, treaties, and agreements.

Secretary Laird's annual report is also further documentation of those policies set forth by President Nixon. The Secretary of Defense states in a summary at the beginning of his report, "This 1972 Defense Report is about peace: how to achieve it and how to maintain it".



This summary of Secretary Laird's, like the introduction of Secretary Rogers, takes the opportunity to make direct statements that are, in the overall, absent from the body of the report. He discusses the policy of Vietnamization, explaining what the situation was in Vietnam when the Administration took office, and states, ". . . U.S. involvement in the war is coming to an end." He goes on to say, "We are now planning for the period *beyond Vietnam* and devoting even greater attention to America's long range security needs—adequate peacetime Nixon Doctrine forces, and the urgent need to assure technological superiority."

For the most part the body of the Defense Department report is involved with this concept of "beyond Vietnam," that is, the security needs of allies and U.S. national security requirements. The Secretary of Defense provides the details of strategic rationale, forces, weapons, and management issues that the President and the Secretary of State do not discuss.

The President states in his letter of transmittal of his report to Congress that his report is a "broad framework" and the other documents from the Secretaries of State and Defense would fill out that framework. Taken together the three reports can provide a complete picture, from the point of view of the Administration, of the philosophical, diplomatic, and defense aspects of United States foreign policy during 1971.

### C. THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

The outlining of the major actions taken by Congress on each subject in this analysis has attempted to fill in to some extent the incomplete picture of the congressional role in foreign policy which might be seen from the President's report. Even the discussion of congressional action added in this study does not fully portray the input of Congress into the making of U.S. foreign policy. In most cases the sections on the role of Congress describe only those measures in Congress which received a vote. They do not usually discuss the proposals and speeches which were made by individual Members of Congress, the studies and hearings which were undertaken by various congressional committees, the bills, resolutions, and amendments which were introduced and considered, or the other ways in which Congress helps shape foreign policy. Nevertheless the legislation which was passed and the treaties which were approved make it clear that the Congress as well as the President makes foreign policy.

Each of the foreign policy reports to Congress submitted by the President during the past three years is an implicit recognition by the President of the need for congressional support. In the 1970 report he mentioned only the need for congressional understanding of his Administration's "stewardship of foreign relations." The 1971 report contained an explicit acknowledgement that Congress as well as the Executive has a constitutional role in the making of foreign policy.

That report stated:

Our new course of partnership in the world can only be steered with the sustained understanding of the American people. . . .

This partnership at home must include the advice and support of the Congress. Charged with constitutional



responsibilities in foreign policy, the Congress can give perspective to the national debate and serve as a bridge between the Executive and the people.

Instead of further developing his concept of the role of Congress in the foreign policy process, however, the President in his 1972 report mentions Congress primarily in terms of its providing support for the Administration's policies and representing the public whose support is also required. Speaking of the need for a "solid consensus of American public understanding and support" for the job of redefining the United States role in the world, the President says:

It is my hope that this Report will help engender that support among the people of the nation and the Congress which represents them.

This year greater recognition of the role of Congress is given by the Secretary of Defense who writes in the same vein as the President did last year. He states:

We recognize the partnership that must exist with Congress, which as a coequal branch of government shares equally the Constitutional responsibility for insuring the safety and security of our country.

The Secretary of Defense acknowledges having had assistance from Congress in bringing about changes he believes are beneficial and declares an intention "to increase further our consultation and cooperation with the Committees to whom we are responsible."

On some occasions scattered throughout the President's report he mentions Congress but nevertheless gives no indication of perceiving Congress as an equal partner in the foreign policy-making process. There are a few references to foreign policy legislation which was passed, such as that permitting the establishment of the Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) or expanding the Export-Import Bank facilities, but not to other important legislation such as the authorizations and appropriations for both the strategic and general purpose forces or the extension of the Selective Service Act. Similarly, Senate approval of a treaty is occasionally mentioned, as in the case of the protocol respecting the nuclear free zone established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. On many occasions, however, there is no mention of the Senate role when an action was taken by treaty and could not have been completed without Senate approval, as in the case of the Okinawa reversion treaty. Sometimes it is not even mentioned that an action was taken by treaty, as in the abrogation of the Bryan-Chamorro treaty, thus relinquishing canal-construction rights in Nicaragua, and an agreement with Mexico on boundary matters. Congress is not referred to at all in some of the major chapters dealing with subjects on which there has been a great deal of concern and interest by Members of Congress, including the Soviet Union, China, and the Middle East.

At least twice the President mentions his confidence that Congress would support his policies. In one case he expresses conviction that Congress and the American people would prefer the provision of substantial or even increased security and economic assistance to support



the transition to self-reliance in Asia over a retreat from Asian problems. In another he expresses confidence that Congress shares the sentiment that while mutual restraint and an agreement in SALT would be a preferable alternative, under no circumstances should he permit "the further erosion of the strategic balance with the U.S.S.R."

The President ignores in his report several actions taken by Congress such as the amendment to the Military Procurement Authorization Act declaring it to be the policy of the United States that a total troop withdrawal from Indochina be carried out "at a date certain" subject to the release of American prisoners. He does not mention some of the subjects which have been of special concern to Congress such as the provision of military assistance to countries having military dictatorships.

Although on more than one occasion the President mentions legislation he intends to propose to the Congress, only in one area does the President speak of working cooperatively with Congress, and that is the provision of economic assistance. In this area he seems fully convinced of the need for congressional support, expressing his distress at the congressional action on foreign assistance (which had not yet been completed at the time he wrote the report). This is in contrast to his 1971 report in which, after having expressed the belief that the United States was well on the way toward accomplishing one of his basic objectives, to reverse the downward trend in U.S. foreign assistance, the President scarcely mentioned Congress as playing a part in the rising appropriations in the three prior years.

The other section in which the President makes more than a passing reference to Congress is the one on the United Nations, in which he has a section entitled "The Decline in Congressional Support for the UN". The question might be raised as to whether in this instance a disproportionate share of responsibility for problems concerning the United Nations has been attributed to Congress.

In reading the President's reports of the past three years, the impression is gained that the President has methodically dealt with the major problems one at a time. In some of those areas to which he has given his full attention, a new or at least better organized conceptual framework has frequently evolved. These might include the Soviet Union and China, where he prepared carefully for the summit meetings. In others much remains to be done, as in the relationship of domestic economic problems with international ones. Still other subjects appear to have not yet received the President's full personal attention, and in these areas, perhaps including Latin America, Africa, and security assistance, the report remains much the same this year as in the previous years. The relationship between the President and Congress also seems to fit into this category. There is a recognition of the need for greater congressional support and an acknowledgement that Congress has a constitutional role in making foreign policy. Nevertheless, the reports do not indicate that the President has yet seriously addressed the partnership between the President and Congress which the making of foreign policy under the Constitution requires.