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DEFICIENCIES IN THE MANAGEMENT AND
DELIVERY OF U.N. TECHNICAL AND
PRE-INVESTMENT ASSISTANCE

REPORT
OF A
STAFF SURVEY TEAM
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-SECOND CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION



MARCH 25, 1971

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FOREWORD

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, D.C., March 25, 1970.

This report has been prepared for the committee by a staff survey team comprised of Messrs. Marian A. Czarnecki and Harry C. Cromer, staff consultants to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The findings contained in this report are those of the staff survey team, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

THOMAS E. MORGAN, *Chairman.*

(III)

FOREWORD

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, D. C., March 22, 1970

This report has been prepared for the committee by a staff survey team composed of Messrs. Martin A. Charnick and Harry C. Thomas, staff consultants to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The findings contained in this report are those of the staff survey team and do not necessarily reflect the views of the members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

THOMAS H. WILSON, Chairman

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DEFICIENCIES IN THE MANAGEMENT AND DELIVERY OF U.N. TECHNICAL AND PRE-INVESTMENT ASSISTANCE

I. INTRODUCTION

On October 20, 1970, responding to a suggestion of the Honorable Cornelius E. Gallagher, chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, the Honorable Thomas E. Morgan, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, directed that a staff study be made of the capacity of the United Nations system to deliver a significantly larger volume of development assistance over the next two to three years.

One of the key issues to be resolved was whether changes being contemplated or put into effect in the UN system provide adequate assurance that the system will be able to use increased resources effectively, and, if so, when.

Because of time limitations, the staff review focused on the United Nations, its component parts, and the Specialized Agencies which are primarily involved in the provision of technical and pre-investment assistance.

Between October 26 and November 14, 1970, two members of the committee staff—Messrs. Marian A. Czarnecki and Harry C. Cromer—visited the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, the headquarters of the UN Development Program, the UN Industrial Development Organization, and four Specialized Agencies. They augmented their field investigations with further discussions at the United Nations, the UNDP and the USUN in New York during the week of February 1, 1971.

The staff survey team's itinerary and a list of nearly 80 meetings and interviews are appended to the report. In all instances, Messrs. Czarnecki and Cromer were accorded excellent cooperation in their undertaking by the officials of the UN system and of the executive branch of the U.S. Government.

The narrative which follows is divided into three parts:

The first contains a summary of the staff survey team's findings;

The second, a discussion of those findings; and

The third, the staff survey team's observations on a number of suggestions for improving and strengthening both the UN development system and the United States' participation therein.

II. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The record of the United Nations' involvement in the worldwide effort in support of economic and social development has been quite remarkable.

Although neither the United Nations nor most of the institutions affiliated with it had been designed to perform that function, all of them are doing it today and on a scale which was not envisioned even a few years ago.

The extent of the United Nations system's involvement in development is suggested by the growth of its member organizations' budgets. During the past decade, those budgets have increased from \$660 million to \$2.5 billion annually.

There is every indication that these large-scale multilateral inputs have made a significant contribution to the advancement of national and regional development undertakings in many parts of the world.

The United Nations development system is not, however, without its shortcomings. Moreover, partly because of the deficiencies in its original design when viewed as an instrument for the promotion of development; partly because of its rapid growth; and partly because of its failure to adapt more swiftly to the requirements of its new mission, the system is presently operating at or possibly beyond the limits of its capacity.

As mentioned in the introduction, this report focuses on only one part of the United Nations development system: namely, the part which is engaged in the provision of technical assistance and pre-investment aid.

Furthermore, because the staff survey team's assignment was to ascertain the capacity of the affected organizations to handle efficiently a larger volume of *development aid*, the survey did not attempt either to review their regular programs (research, development of standards, drafting of international regulations, etc.) or to gage the overall impact of their activities. As a result, this report may tend to be more negative than would be warranted by an appraisal of the broad range of factors which enter into U.S. participation in that system.

In the opinion of some officials interviewed by the survey team, the political import of the activities discussed in this report is much greater than their economic or financial consequences. In their view, the UN system represents the first stage of an international institutional network which may keep the world from exploding. The officials involved have suggested, therefore, that United States contributions to that system be judged not only as an investment in development but, more importantly, as inexpensive insurance against a potential world disaster.

Although the staff survey team is well aware that political and other factors must be weighed in any comprehensive evaluation of the benefits that accrue to the United States from its membership in the United

Nations system, such an assessment falls beyond the staff survey team's assignment. Our immediate task was simply to appraise the readiness of the UN system to assume larger responsibilities for the delivery of pre-capital investment aid.

With this in mind, the staff survey team's major findings are as follows:

1. *The United Nations does not now have an operative, integrated system for the programming, funding, delivery and evaluation of development assistance.*

2. *The United Nations, the UN Development Program, and the Specialized Agencies involved in the provision of technical and pre-investment assistance are poorly organized and at times indifferently administered. As a result, their overall performance is uneven and their capacity to take on additional work is, at present, questionable.*

3. *The developing countries are partly responsible for the delays and other shortcomings in the delivery of technical and pre-investment assistance by the machinery of the United Nations. Their capacity to absorb development aid, particularly under conditions which presently govern the furnishing of such help, is fairly circumscribed.*

4. *The developed countries, by failing to pay adequate attention to the UN's development-oriented activities, have contributed to the deficiencies of the UN development system and of its present method of operation.*

5. *For a number of years, serious efforts have been exerted within the United Nations system to improve its organization and management. To date, those internal initiatives have produced only limited results.*

6. *In the field of UN development assistance, the major impetus for reform has come from Sir Robert Jackson's report on "The Capacity of the United Nations System," published in the fall of 1969. Prepared at the request of the Administrator of the UN Development Program, Mr. Paul Hoffman, the Jackson Report has recommended a far-reaching redesign of that system.*

7. *The acceptance by the Administrator and the Governing Council of UNDP of some of the reforms urged by Sir Robert Jackson is most encouraging. It appears doubtful, however, that the changes accepted thus far will significantly improve the performance of the UN system and its capacity to deliver additional development resources.*

8. *Some of the reforms being put into effect by the UN Development Program may complicate and increasingly politicize the United Nations' task of furnishing development assistance.*

9. *The larger part of the recommendations contained in the Jackson Report has not been accepted to date by the Governing Council of the UNDP. It remains to be seen whether some of those proposals will ever be implemented.*

10. *Except for its recommendations regarding outside contracting, the Jackson Report does not explore in detail the delivery of UN development aid where most of the system's problems and limitations appear to be concentrated.*

11. *United States participation in the international organizations visited by the staff survey team is fragmented, unresponsive to any clearly-defined set of national goals, and poorly coordinated.*

12. *United States representation in the UN development system is inadequate to provide the U.S. Government, on a continuing basis, with information sufficient to allow sound judgments to be formed about the programs, performance and problems of such organizations.*

13. *The United States is not adequately represented on the professional and technical staffs of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies. At times, this underrepresentation extends to the policy-making positions in such Agencies.*

III. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

1. The United Nations does not now have an operative, integrated system for the programming, funding, delivery and evaluation of development assistance.

At present, the United Nations system provides the developing countries with more than \$2.5 billion annually in technical assistance, pre-investment aid, and capital investment.

This volume of financial resources, supported by extensive research and the regular programs of the Specialized Agencies, is channeled through two major groups of United Nations-related organizations and programs.

On the one hand, technical assistance and pre-investment aid are provided by the United Nations and its component parts, including the UN Development Program, the UN Children's Fund, and the UN Industrial Development Organization, and by about a dozen Specialized Agencies.

On the other hand, the bulk of capital investment resources comes from the Bretton Woods organizations—the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the International Development Agency and the International Monetary Fund—and from the regional banks.

Although this study is directed primarily to the first group, we would like to begin with four brief observations about the UN system as a whole:

First, in the allocation of resources between the two major parts of the UN development system, the lion's share—better than four-fifths of the total—goes to the financial institutions;¹

Second, there is little evidence of effective coordination between the major parts of the UN system. The United Nations itself does not exercise coordinating powers. According to one of its high-ranking officials, the best that the UN can do in this respect is to develop, from time to time, some "coordinating methods" or "unifying concepts" such as the Second Development Decade;

Third, the quality of management and performance differ substantially between the various parts of the UN system; and

Fourth, the most serious shortcomings of the system appear to be centered in its delivery capability.

Each of these points will be developed more fully in the body of the report.

2. The United Nations, the UN Development Program, and the Specialized Agencies involved in the provision of technical and pre-investment assistance are poorly organized and at times indifferently

¹ In the opinion of some officials interviewed by the staff survey team, this emphasis on a "banking" approach to development is excessive and "may lead to a dead-end." Others, however, felt that any substantial increase in multilateral development assistance should be channeled through international financial institutions.

administered. As a result, their overall performance is uneven, and their capacity to take on additional work is, at present, questionable.

This part of the United Nations development system is immensely complicated.² It is theoretically managed by some two dozen separate governing bodies and includes several networks of regional and sub-regional offices, as well as a multitude of field facilities and operations in some 110 countries and territories.

The organizations which make up this machinery are as diverse as they are numerous. This is particularly the case with the Specialized Agencies which deliver the bulk of UN technical and pre-investment assistance and which range from the Food and Agriculture Organization to the World Meteorological Organization.³

Each of those Agencies has its own reason for being, its own constitutional mandate, and its own programs based on that mandate. The latter extend to such diverse fields as atomic energy, cultural affairs, labor, health and telecommunications.

Each of the Specialized Agencies also has its own resources based on formal assessments imposed annually on its member governments, its own constituency, and its own political base. In the opinion of one high-ranking official of the UN system, some of their Directors General are like the dukes of 14th century France: more powerful than the King—or, in the relevant framework, the Secretary General of the United Nations.

In addition to the Specialized Agencies, the UN machinery involved in the provision of technical and pre-investment aid includes the UN Development Program; the Department of Social and Economic Affairs of the United Nations; the regional UN Economic Commissions; the UN Children's Fund; the UN Conference on Trade and Development; the UN Industrial Development Organization; and the new World Population Fund.

These different entities have experienced rapid albeit uneven growth. During the decade of the 1960's, for example, FAO's annual expenditures rose from about \$20 million to \$122 million; ILO's, from \$13 million to \$55 million; UNESCO's, from \$19 million to \$68 million; and UPU's, from \$0.6 million to \$3.4 million.

The resources provided by the UN Development Program have been an important factor in the rapid expansion of this part of the UN system. The annual flow of those resources rose from \$31 million in 1959 to well over \$200 million 10 years later. In addition, funds have been channeled to some of the executing agencies by the World Bank and by individual countries interested in having their own trust fund arrangements. Several of the agencies visited by the survey team engage in cooperative undertakings with the World Bank and are reimbursed by that institution for 75 percent of the cost of those pre-investment activities. Some also administer special national development funds. In the 1970-71 biennium, for example, FAO expects

² "Probably the most complex organization in the world," according to Sir Robert Jackson, author of the impressive report on "The Capacity of the United Nations System."

³ The Specialized Agencies are: Food and Agriculture Organization; International Atomic Energy Agency; International Civil Aviation Organization; International Labor Organization; Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; International Telecommunication Union; U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; Universal Postal Union; World Food Program; World Health Organization; and World Meteorological Organization.

to receive \$8 million from the Freedom from Hunger Campaign and about \$23 million from various trust funds funded primarily by the Scandinavian countries.

Unfortunately, program growth in this sector of UN activities has not been accompanied by a commensurate improvement in the various agencies' ability to deliver development assistance.

The basic weakness of these organizations, particularly the Specialized Agencies, is that they were not designed as, nor have they since become, *action agencies*: namely, delivery systems for multilateral foreign aid and generators of development projects.

For the most part, these agencies were created to conduct specialized research, to develop standards and regulations, and to assist in harmonizing national laws and policies in different fields of activity.

The ILO, for example, was established primarily to develop improved work standards. The largest part of its work during the past half a century is reflected in the more than 100 conventions and again as many formal recommendations which were developed by the ILO staff, approved by the International Labor Conference, ratified by the member countries, and today make up the body of world labor standards.

Similarly, FAO's original task was to raise the levels of nutrition and standards of living; ICAO's, to develop principles and techniques of international air navigation with particular emphasis on safety rules and orderly growth of international civil aviation; UPU's, to improve the various postal services and promote international collaboration in that field; ITU's, to maintain and extend international cooperation for the improvement and rational use of telecommunication; and so on.

Today, however, more than one-half of the annual disbursements of these agencies is related not to their traditional, charter-ordained tasks but rather to the carrying out of technical assistance and pre-investment projects.

In the 1970-71 biennium, for example, FAO's regular program, financed by assessments on its member countries, will amount to approximately \$70 million. During the same period, FAO's development-oriented activities funded by UNDP and other outside sources will cost nearly \$190 million.

Nevertheless, neither the FAO nor the other Specialized Agencies are geared for the job of delivering this larger volume of development aid. Their organizational structures, personnel, planning, programming and other major management functions are not adapted to this increasingly important part of their work. As a result, their managements and performance have become objects of severe criticism.

One high official of an executing agency told us that the only reason his organization was considered to be fairly well run was because the others were "plain lousy."

A closer look at the factors responsible for this situation follows:

Personnel Policies.—Personnel policies peculiar to this group of UN-related organizations vary but have certain characteristics in common. The principle of geographical representation, for example, which assures each member country representation on the organization's staff, is widely observed. This limits the man-

agement's authority to pick people best qualified for given jobs—and to fire members of the staff whose performance is submarginal. The percentage of professional employees who are “untouchable” (they are generally in the “indefinite term appointment” category) ranges from about 20 percent at WHO and IAEA to 45 percent at UNESCO and 75 percent at the United Nations itself.⁴ Nationality distribution of staff in the UN and in the Specialized Agencies appears in Appendix III.

Lack of a comprehensive career service which would combine job security with freedom of movement within the system, merit promotions and some type of selection-out authority, deprives the United Nations “family” of the services of many younger, more able administrators and experts. Noncompetitive salary levels for some groups of professionals; obsolete recruitment practices which find various agencies, even divisions within agencies, competing with each other for scarce manpower resources; and the reported decline in the level of proficiency in the field among the more recent generation of experts, particularly those who are affiliated with academic institutions or come from the developing countries, compound the problems and limit these organizations' capacity for orderly and efficient expansion.

Planning and Programming.—In our discussions in New York and at the headquarters of the various Specialized Agencies, we found no indication of an overall plan or decision regarding the rate at which funds made available for technical and pre-investment aid should grow. Moreover, none of the organizations visited by the staff survey team had in operation a medium- or long-range planning and programming system integrated with budgeting. The bulk of program formulation in the technical assistance and pre-investment aid areas seems to take place in the field between government officials, usually at the ministry level, and country representatives of the executing agencies. The survey team was told that the selection of projects to be submitted to UNDP for financing is quite frequently the function of the personal preferences of the individuals involved rather than of development plans devised by either the receiving country, the UNDP, or some higher organ in the UN system.

Similarly, forward planning by the executing agencies is at present generally limited to their regular programs and to UNDP-financed projects underway. A review of the budget documents and discussions with budget and planning officers of several such agencies suggest that the delivery capability of those agencies, particularly in terms of personnel having specific skills and being available to take assignments in developing countries, is not planned in relation to the *anticipated* volume of UNDP work. Part of the reason given for this is that definitive planning guides, including information on basic priorities and funds availabilities, are not obtainable under present arrangements from UNDP. The

⁴ According to a senior official at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, the United States “has fought for years” in support of “indefinite term” appointments as a step toward a career international civil service. For reasons outlined in the next paragraph, it seems to us that those efforts have fallen short of their mark. Security of tenure without some type of selection-out authority and merit promotions tends to turn “indefinite term” jobs into sinecures.

switch to country programming, recommended in the Jackson report and endorsed recently by the appropriate UN organs (which will be discussed later in this report), is expected to improve that situation.

For the present, however, the lack of forward planning and programming has resulted in extra costs, delays, inadequate performance and limited ability to take on additional assignments—especially in the case of those executing agencies whose technical assistance operations are already financed in most part by UNDP.⁵

Performance Evaluation.—The survey team also found it significant that none of the agencies visited had in operation an effective evaluation system for operational control and assessment of results. Reforms in process of being implemented by UNDP and by some of the executing agencies, such as FAO and WHO, promise to correct this situation. For the present, however, the managements of those organizations are not furnished with information necessary to judge the progress of their field operations, their conformity to original project design, or their effectiveness in attaining project objectives. Neither are the donor governments.

Moreover, independent, outside evaluation and review of the managerial capability and effectiveness of the various agencies and units within the UN development systems is almost totally lacking. Internally, the U.N. Secretariat has the Administrative Management Service which conducts surveys and reports to the Under Secretary General for Administration. The UN General Assembly has the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions which is beginning to extend its activities to include an examination of the budgets of the Specialized Agencies. Simultaneously, the Joint Inspection Unit, established in 1967, is performing some useful functions in reviewing field operations. To date, however, because of lack of funds and the essentially limited approach used by these bodies, the UN system as a whole has not come under impartial and meaningful surveillance.

An interesting footnote to our observations about the new evaluation procedures being introduced within the UN system comes in the form of a confidential report prepared within one of the executing agencies. The unusually frank report details the impressions of an initial evaluation team which reviewed a significant segment of the field (technical assistance) projects being executed by the agency involved. The report's criticism of the agency's delivery capability includes charges to the effect that—

- (a) objectives of field projects are not clearly defined;
- (b) projects are poorly designed and deficiencies, once observed, are not promptly corrected;
- (c) there is no harmony between the design of projects and their stated objectives—or between the design and the inputs;
- (d) excessive delays in preparing and clearing Plans of Operations are the rule—rather than the exception;

⁵ The Economic and Social Affairs Department of the United Nations, as well as FAO, ILO, UNESCO and UNIDO are in this category.

(e) host-country agencies are not involved in the programming of projects;

(f) projects are not properly time-sequenced: entire operations have to come to a halt waiting for one small part of the input;

(g) recruitment of experts is not related to the time execution of projects;

(h) host governments are not fully informed about the progress—and problems—of project implementation;

(i) projects are poorly backstopped by the headquarters (UN backstopping of its projects was characterized as “ghastly” by one experienced observer);

(j) there are too few legitimate inspections of ongoing projects—and too many visits by people who have no business sticking their noses into project operations; and

(k) project managers and outside experts frequently over-emphasize technical aspects of projects at the expense of wider aims: e.g., policy inputs, complementary assistance and appropriate followup actions.

Coordination and Integration.—The UN development system does not lack for instruments of coordination. Present at virtually every level of operations, they include the General Assembly; the Economic and Social Council; the Advisory Committee on Coordination; the Inter-Agency Consultative Board; the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions; and a number of less prominent committees and ad hoc groups. The problem is that, by and large, all of these entities are ineffective in performing analytical and program/policy coordinating functions.

The reasons for this, we were told, are many. At the highest level, neither of the two legislative bodies—the General Assembly or the Economic and Social Council—is suited by its composition for coordinating policies and operations. Moreover, neither of them controls the disbursement of funds for development or has an adequate technical supporting staff. As a result, both of them appear to spend a good part of their time discussing broad issues without coming to grips with specific, frequently pressing, problems—and without being able to enforce decisions on U.N. agencies. The other instruments of coordination suffer from similar deficiencies.

The position of the Economic and Social Council is particularly perplexing. Ostensibly, the Council is *the* instrument for directing and coordinating the UN system's manifold economic activities. In fact, it does little more than debate, take notice of and pass on voluminous (and frequently unenlightening) reports of economic programs and studies conducted by other UN bodies. In most instances, the Council is ignored both by the developed and by the developing countries, though for different reasons. The former seem to prefer to develop policy in a piecemeal fashion at the level of individual funding or operating organizations—i.e., the World Bank, UNDP, and so on. The latter consider themselves underrepresented on the Council and seek to arrive at common positions in such organizations as UNIDO and UNCTAD. As a consequence, the Council seems to operate in a partial vacuum.

The measure of its relative unimportance is reflected in the fact that in the 25 years of its existence, it has met only twice at the ministerial level.⁶

The status of systemwide integration is equally disappointing. From what we have seen abroad, unified services, facilities and basic management functions are still uncommon. Some promising exceptions include the pooling of general services by the IAEA and UNIDO in Vienna and progress toward the development of a UN Computer Center for international organizations headquartered in Geneva. In most instances, however, each agency goes its own way even when sharing could promote economy and improve the participating organizations' capacity to deliver development assistance. The lack of a coordinated or joint system for the recruitment of experts is a case in point.

As a result of the above-discussed factors, the performance of the UN system in delivering technical and pre-investment aid to the developing countries has been less than adequate, and the system's capacity for handling a significantly larger volume of resources for development is at present severely limited.

By various estimates, as few as 40 percent and as many as 95 percent of UNDP-financed pre-investment projects are running behind schedule, some rather seriously. The full extent of these delays is often covered up by the handy device of reprogramming sluggish projects.

Some examples, however, may help to illustrate the problem:

As of September 30, 1970, out of 124 operational projects administered by one Specialized Agency, 87 percent were running behind schedule in terms of disbursements. One 2-year-old hydrological research project in Argentina was 83 percent behind schedule. Some of the others were initiated as far back as 1960 and 1961 but had been reprogrammed when they began to slip noticeably. We were told that this practice, known as "advancing projects to Phase II or III", is quite common with respect to difficult and problem projects. By moving them to a new phase, the executing agency (with the approval of UNDP) establishes a new base for judging their progress—a base which in effect hides the original slippage.

Unfortunately, information available in the offices of U.S. representatives to some of the agencies visited by the survey team did not allow us to ascertain the full extent of those agencies' reprogramming activities.⁷ Nevertheless, a review of UNDP's Special Fund program which accounts for the largest part of technical and pre-investment assistance furnished by the UN system, reveals that—

(a) The timespan between the approval of a project by the Governing Council of UNDP and the filing of an acceptable Plan of Operations by the executing agency has lengthened and presently exceeds 12 months in 80 percent of the cases;

⁶ An attempt is being made to entrust the Council with the function of monitoring the Second Development Decade. This could increase the Council's stature, influence and authority as a policymaking and coordinating mechanism.

⁷ The survey team found, however, that additional information was promptly and willingly made available by international organizations whenever the U.S. representatives, responding to the staff survey team's requests, asked for it and identified it with some degree of precision. In most cases, however, such information was developed for internal use only.

(b) The time which elapses between the issuance of an Authorization to Commence Execution and the completion of a project also has been growing longer and in the majority of cases exceeds the original schedule; and

(c) Executing agencies with a large volume of UNDP-financed work, notably the United Nations, FAO, ILO, and UNESCO, seem to be experiencing more difficulties completing projects on time than do some of the Specialized Agencies which handle a smaller amount of development aid in relation to their regular programs.

3. The developing countries are partly responsible for the delays and other shortcomings in the delivery of technical and pre-investment assistance by the machinery of the United Nations. Their capacity to absorb development aid, particularly under conditions which presently govern the furnishing of such help, is fairly circumscribed.

Many of the developing countries, anxious to participate in the distribution of UNDP resources, have pressed, at times excessively, for prompt approval of their projects. In some cases, improperly prepared and poorly designed projects have been submitted to and approved by the UNDP Governing Council. This has caused subsequent delays when the projects had to be redesigned and has resulted in a number of unfortunate undertakings.

The failure of the receiving governments to produce counterpart resources has also contributed to problems encountered by the executing agencies in their attempts to stick to approved work schedules. Such failures have been attributed to a number of causes including faulty in-country planning, overcommitment of limited local resources, political instability, lack of properly trained personnel to take over UNDP-financed projects, unexpected changes in the host government's priorities, and wars.

The consequences of such developments can be seen in the following cases:

(a) *Vocational Training Center in Iran.*—A project for the establishment of a vocational Instructor and Foreman Training Center in Iran continued to be operative from January 1962 to June 1967. The main objectives of the project were to train qualified instructors for the network of training centers and Apprenticeship Sections of the Industrial Establishment; to provide trained supervisory personnel for industrial undertakings; and to coordinate all efforts in regard to vocational training of instructors, supervisory personnel and workers. The project terminated without any instructors having been trained. An expenditure of \$741,538 was incurred during the 5½ years that the project remained operative.

(b) *Technological Research Institute in Bolivia.*—This project was approved in January 1963 and canceled 2 years later because the local Government was unable to contribute counterpart funds and changed its attitude toward it. Expenditures on the project amounted to \$34,890.

(c) *Survey of Rock Salt Deposits in Brazil.*—The project to carry out a survey of possible rock salt deposits in private lands in Brazil was approved in January 1962 and cancelled five years later after ex-

penditures of \$93,877 had been incurred. The project was terminated at the request of the Brazilian Government because of legal complications relating to the rights of private landowners to under-surface resources. The existence of the legal problem was known to the Administrator of UNDP at the time when the project was approved.

We were also told that an ITU-executed advanced training institute in Liberia and an ILO vocational training center in Turin, Italy, once completed, found themselves without the expected volume of qualified entrants.

A senior UN official estimated that the principal barrier to a rapid increase in development aid disbursements derives from the lack of adequate plans for the absorption of such aid by the developing countries. He suggested that it may take some of the smaller developing countries as long as 5 years "to rev up to receive two Special Fund projects a year".

The survey team was also advised that growing resistance to foreign experts may inhibit the pace of UN-financed development in some of the developing countries.

According to that source, officials of a number of the developing nations (for example, India) would prefer to have their own nationals design, staff and manage in-country development undertakings. At present, however, UN policies prohibit the furnishing of funds for budget support to be used for the hiring of local experts for UNDP-financed projects. Unless those policies are reconsidered, the flow of pre-investment assistance may encounter some additional obstacles from this direction.

4. The developed countries, by failing to pay adequate attention to the UN's development-oriented activities, have contributed to the deficiencies of the UN development system and of its present method of operation.

The developed countries provide the United Nations with the bulk of development financing but appear to have little interest in assuring that those resources are utilized in an efficient and effective manner. Most of them have only skeleton representation at UNDP and at the executing agencies. In the opinion of the survey team, that representation (including missions fielded by the United States) is generally inadequate to monitor the performance of those agencies—and too weak politically to see to it that outside experts are hired to exercise oversight and evaluation functions.⁸

The donor countries frequently compound their lack of attention by espousing conflicting, even contradictory, positions in different United Nations organs and Specialized Agencies. The history of the UN General Assembly's treatment of UNIDO is a case in point. While many of the developed countries have not looked upon UNIDO with great favor, or rushed to offer voluntary contributions at its pledging conferences, neither have they opposed in the UN General Assembly

⁸ Of the 112 people staffing the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, only four officers and five secretaries are assigned to deal directly with economic development issues considered by ECOSOC, UNDP, UNGA and other UN organs. The permanent, on-the-spot U.S. Missions to other international organizations have miniscule staffs; The Mission to FAO has two officers; to UNIDO, two; to IAEA, four; to UNESCO, five; and the U.S. Mission to the European Office of the UN normally assigns one officer to cover a single agency located in Geneva—i.e., WHO, ILO, ITU, and so on.

the various resolutions which continue to entrust development aid responsibilities to that organization.

The survey team also found that the donor countries seldom if ever hold anyone in the UN system accountable either for excessive deviations from approved programs or for inadequate performance. A study conducted recently showed that in the case of one major Specialized Agency, 60 percent of its projects were either reprogrammed or not implemented in a manner envisaged in the regular program approved by that Agency's governing body. Yet apparently no member country bothered to question the Director General about this astonishing deviation from the approved program.

There exists an informal network of 11 so-called "Geneva Groups" composed of the representatives of ten major donor countries and two observers.⁹ Co-chaired by the United States and Great Britain, these groups concern themselves with administrative and budgetary policies of the Specialized Agencies and other major units of the UN system. They meet annually at the Assistant Secretary level and monthly or even more frequently at the ministerial or staff levels. Working by consensus, they attempt to develop common positions to be advanced in the relevant international organizations by their respective governments.

Thus far, the Geneva Group exercises do not seem to have been taken very seriously (except by lower-ranking staff members) or to have produced any impressive results. One reason for this is that consensus achieved within the Group are often difficult to carry out. At times, they have been ignored by the participating countries; at other times, they have been overruled in the governing organs of the Specialized Agencies by the numerically-superior representatives of the developing countries.

Nevertheless, the Geneva Group approach seems to serve a useful function both as an introduction to better coordination among the principal donor countries and as a channel for communicating US positions on various issues relating to this country's participation in the UN system.

Should the major donor countries ever undertake to monitor more closely the programs of the Specialized Agencies, the existence of the mechanism consisting of the Geneva Groups could prove most helpful especially if its staff resources are properly augmented.

5. For a number of years, serious efforts have been exerted within the United Nations system to improve its organization and management. To date, those internal initiatives have produced only limited results.

A series of advisory, coordinating and problem-oriented groups of experts and committees have been striving with varying degrees of success to promote reform in the United Nations and its affiliated organizations and programs. These have included the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts; the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination; the

⁹ The membership of the Geneva Groups comprises: United States, United Kingdom, Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Australia and Sweden; and two observers—Switzerland and the Netherlands. There are five such "Groups" in Geneva; two in Vienna; one in Rome; one in Paris; one in Montreal; and one in Bern. Meetings of the Geneva Groups in Vienna are attended by one additional observer: Austria.

Joint Inspection Unit; the Committee for Programs and Co-ordination of the ECOSOC; the General Assembly's Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions; the Inter-agency Consultative Board; the International Civil Service Advisory Board; the Coordinating Committee on Administrative Questions; and several others.

Working with the Secretary General of the United Nations and with the Directors General and staffs of the Specialized Agencies, these groups have aimed at three major objectives:

(a) improved management of the United Nations and its various subsidiary and affiliated organs;

(b) standardization of personnel, accounting, budgeting and programming systems used by the member organizations of the UN "family"; and

(c) improved system-wide coordination.

To date, these undertakings seem to have produced a modest degree of change within the UN system. Their most significant achievements include agreement in principle on the desirability of a progressive standardization of personnel, financial and management policies of the Specialized Agencies; some progress in implementing that agreement; and introduction by several agencies of modern management tools including long-range planning, program budgeting, network analysis of field projects, and the beginnings of effective management information systems.

In most instances, internal management reforms being introduced in the Specialized Agencies will not become fully operative until 1972 or later; standardization goals seem to belong to an even more distant future.

6. In the field of UN development assistance, the major impetus for reform has come from Sir Robert Jackson's report on "The Capacity of the United Nations System", published in the fall of 1969. Prepared at the request of the Administrator of the UN Development Program, Mr. Paul Hoffman, the Jackson Report has recommended a far-reaching redesign of that system.

The Jackson Report proposes to place the UN Development Program at the hub of the United Nations development system; endow its Administrator with increased powers and make him co-equal with the President of the World Bank and the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund; create new instruments for coordinating the policies of the different parts of the UN system; make the country program the primary instrument for relating UN development efforts to the needs of individual developing countries and for allocating the tasks to be performed by UN agencies; improve the management of UNDP and establish a career service for the re-organized agency's permanent staff; and accomplish other changes.

During the past summer, the Administrator and the Governing Council of the UN Development Program have agreed to accept many of the recommendations of the Jackson Report. Plans for effectuating their "consensus" center on—

(a) introduction of "country programming" to facilitate longer range planning and to link UN activities more closely to

the development plan or national objectives of each developing country;

(b) transfer of a larger measure of decision-making to the field by increasing the staffs and the authority of the UNDP Resident Representatives and directing them to act as heads of country teams in coordinating the inputs of the various components of the UN system;

(c) reorganization of the headquarters of UNDP into four regional bureaus, each with its own program authority; consolidation of administrative, financial, personnel and certain other "housekeeping" operations; and elevation of evaluation, policy formulation and information functions to the office of the Administrator;

(d) change from full-funding of projects to annual programs based on anticipated expenditures; and

(e) vesting of full accountability for the program in the Administrator.

These reforms, estimated to embody about one-third of the recommendations of the Jackson Report, have been endorsed by the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. They are expected to go into effect by the summer of 1971.

7. The acceptance by the Administrator and the Governing Council of UNDP of some of the reforms urged by Sir Robert Jackson is most encouraging. It appears doubtful, however, that the changes accepted thus far will significantly improve the performance of the UN system and its capacity to deliver additional development resources.

The reforms summarized in the preceding section will undoubtedly make it possible for the UN Development Program to distribute more quickly and perhaps more efficiently a much larger volume of development assistance. The recommendations of the Jackson Report are predicated on the assumption that UNDP resources will double within the next 5 years. This would entail UNDP annual project approvals of about \$500 million by 1975, with another \$500 million being contributed in local currencies and other local resources by the developing countries. Improved planning and program formulation, decentralization, delegation of increased authority to the field, and adoption of certain modern management techniques should enable the UNDP to handle such volume of aid by 1975 and to do a better job of evaluation and reporting than it is doing right now.

There are, however, two basic points to be borne in mind in appraising the potential impact of the reforms discussed above.

First, that the cost of reform may prove considerably out of line with the benefits which it may produce; and

Second, that even under the best of circumstances, the changes adopted thus far are likely to have modest effect on the capacity of the UN system *to deliver*—not just to manage—a significantly larger volume of technical and pre-investment aid.

The administrative budget of UNDP is being increased by 20 per cent in 1971 and is expected to more than double by 1976. These in-

creases will come on top of an 80 percent rise in that same budget during the past 4 years. Such rapid escalation in the UNDP's overhead may prove justified if the volume of resources handled by the program moves up correspondingly. The latter possibility appears somewhat remote.

As mentioned above, Sir Robert Jackson predicated his proposals on the expectation that UNDP resources will increase at the rate of 15 percent per year in the foreseeable future. At its last meeting, however, the Governing Council of UNDP adopted a more conservative position by projecting program growth of 9.6 percent annually. The latter rate, after adjustments for in-built salary increases and prevailing inflationary trends, will allow only a small increase in the program—much smaller, in fact, than hoped for by Messrs. Hoffman and Jackson.

Furthermore, the UNDP is only partially responsible for the long pipeline and various shortcomings in the delivery of UN technical and pre-investment assistance. The responsibility here rests primarily with the UN's Department of Economic and Social Affairs and the three Specialized Agencies which together execute 80 percent of UNDP-financed work¹⁰—as well as with the aid-receiving countries. Improvements in UNDP's management capability will have limited impact on the ability of the executing agencies to deliver more aid—and the ability of the recipient countries to absorb it effectively. Consequently, unless these improvements are accompanied by systemwide reforms and better performance by the developing countries, they are not likely to do much to cure the basic problems discussed earlier in this report.

8. Some of the reforms being put into effect by the UN Development Program may complicate and increasingly politicize the United Nations' task of furnishing development assistance.

Three of the proposed changes, in particular, warrant comment. They are, respectively, the establishment of regional bureaus in the headquarters of UNDP; delegation to the Resident Representative¹¹ of authority to approve projects involving up to \$100,000 of UN funds; and publication by UNDP of "country indicative planning figures."

With respect to the four geographical bureaus which will become operative on May 3, it is anticipated that each of them will be headed, and to some extent staffed, by nationals of the region involved. This and the delegation of significant program authority to the bureaus may tend to turn each of them into a lobby for its own region. Responsible officials, including one who has been involved in development work for 25 years, expressed the fear that the allocation of resources between the four regions, and within the regions themselves, may come to be governed less by any development priorities or the performance of individual developing countries than by the personality and political ambitions of the regional bureau heads.

¹⁰ As of September 30, 1970, the UN, ILO, FAO, and UNESCO received \$954 million of the \$1.2 billion in UNDP-funded projects.

¹¹ To be known as the "Resident Director."

From the standpoint of program coordination and relations with the executing agencies, the question also arises whether the reorganized UNDP will act as a single agency or as four separate ones. One senior international servant felt that the latter was more likely and could lead to lower performance standards. He also feared that the new policy of placing representatives of the developing countries in key operational positions may tend "to perpetuate the struggle between the donors and the receivers of UN development aid." His apprehensions seem to merit careful consideration.

The second proposed change involves delegation of authority to the Resident Representative to approve projects under \$100,000. Some officials told us that this innovation may also increase the political factor in UNDP decisionmaking. They pointed out that since the Resident Representative has to be acceptable to the host government and maintain good working relations with its officials, he will be under considerable pressure not to deny UNDP financing for projects favored by influential members of that government. In the words of one observer, the Resident Representative will have to be "a giant of a man" to successfully resist pressures from both local governments and the Specialized Agencies.

We raised this issue with Mr. Paul Hoffman who was aware of the concerns on this score but asserted that the Resident Representative will have an "out": he will be able, whenever a given project involves policy considerations, to refer it to New York for a decision.

Based on U.S. experience, the survey team is inclined to question whether the Resident Representative will be able to use this "out" more than once and still retain his effectiveness as the leader of the UN team in the country of his assignment. The U.S. Government has found that the delegation of substantial financial authority to the field has been generally attended by problems. For this reason, contingency funds available to U.S. Ambassadors for direct disbursement are limited to \$25,000 per country.¹²

The publication by UNDP of "country indicative planning figures" may also cause some difficulties. These figures involve a projection of each country's share of UNDP resources over a period of 3 to 5 years into the future. This projection will be based on the individual country's share of past UNDP allocations rather than on need or performance. While intended to serve for planning purposes only, the figure, in the opinion of a senior UNDP official, may readily come to be considered as a UNDP commitment by the aid-receiving country. Instead of helping to promote more efficient utilization of UNDP resources, this device could have the opposite effect by curtailing UNDP's flexibility to transfer funds to the more efficient performers.

There is a possibility, however, that for some time to come, "country indicative planning figures" may prove a disappointment to some UN members. UNDP's impending abandonment of the policy of full-funding projects upon their approval will create both a temporary

¹² It is interesting to note in this connection that the official U.S. position in 1970 favored giving the Resident Representative the authority to approve projects costing up to \$200,000. Apparently the executive branch has more faith in the ability of UNDP Resident Representatives than in U.S. Ambassadors and AID Mission Directors.

increase in available resources and a funding requirement against future country allocations. In some cases, this requirement to pay for previously approved but unfunded projects may absorb a significant part of a given country's "indicative planning figure."

9. The larger part of the recommendations contained in the Jackson Report has not been accepted to date by the Governing Council of UNDP. It remains to be seen whether some of those proposals will ever be implemented.

According to some estimates, less than one-third of the reforms suggested in the Jackson Report have been approved by the Administrator and the Governing Council of UNDP. As shown above, most of those changes will tend to improve planning and programming of UNDP resources, expedite UNDP decisions on smaller projects, *possibly* strengthen evaluation and integrate it with planning. Few of them, however, will affect the interaction of the different units of the United Nations development system at the policy level, improve the system's performance or augment its capacity at the Specialized Agency level to furnish technical and pre-investment assistance.

Administrator Hoffman's recently established Advisory Panel on Program Policy,¹³ for example, bears scant resemblance to the Policy Coordination Committee proposed by Jackson. In the first place, the relationship of the Panel to UNDP's own Planning Division is not clear. Second, the Panel does not include the managing officials of the executing agencies who control project implementation, or has any authority over their planning units. And, finally, neither does it include the representatives of the international financial institutions. It would seem to us that the planning of pre-investment activities is a vital part of the total capital investment process and should be tied to it. Administrator Hoffman's Advisory Panel does not provide this much needed link.

Similarly, at the field level, the proposed new role of the Resident Representative falls short of Jackson's recommendations. Jackson wanted the Resident Representative to be the in-country coordinator of all UN-sponsored development activities. In addition, he wanted him to have the necessary staff to provide initial technical assistance and to fulfill a "special responsibility" for the operational control of all UNDP-financed projects. Changes approved by the Governing Council give the Resident Representative a new title (Resident "Director"), the authority to approve small UNDP-financed projects, a modest increase in staff,¹⁴ and the mandate to act as "the leader" of the UN team in his country. While some U.S. officials feel that these changes constitute a major step forward, it remains to be seen how these positions largely "cosmetic" changes will aid the Resident Directors in discharging their assignments.

¹³ The membership of the Advisory Panel, headed by David Morse, former Director-General of ILO, is appended at the end of this report.

¹⁴ Out of the 75 professional and 50 general services new positions approved by the UNDP Governing Council, 48 professional and 10 general services posts are to be assigned to the field and 27 professional and 40 general services positions to the headquarters in New York. There are some 95 Resident Representatives in the field at present.

Another major element in Jackson's formula for improving the performance of the UN system was his proposal that the UNDP reach beyond the Specialized Agencies in contracting for the execution of technical and pre-investment assistance projects—and require those Agencies which are currently overworked to subcontract as a condition of receiving any additional UNDP allocations. Jackson envisioned this as a temporary solution which would afford the Specialized Agencies “a breathing spell” and enable them to proceed in an orderly manner in expanding their capacity. In the process, however, the resort to outside contractors could have broken the Specialized Agencies' monopoly of UNDP-financed work and forced them to improve performance and expand capacity or lose out to other, more competent bidders. From all indications, this reform is being side-stepped for the present.

Finally, Jackson's recommendations regarding a unified, multi-purpose, computerized informational system for the UN development “family”; adequate world-wide communications; career service for UNDP's permanent staff; integration of UNICEF and UNDP; improved external evaluation; relieving UN departments of their operational functions; and other reforms, also await future disposition.

10. Except for its recommendations regarding outside contracting, the Jackson Report does not explain in detail the delivery of UN development aid where most of the system's problems and limitations appear to be concentrated.

In the final analysis, the performance of the UN development system depends on what happens in the field: on who delivers the aid, how the delivery is effected, and what use is made of it by the receiving country.

The “delivery” function of the segment of the UN system discussed in this report is performed in most part by the Specialized Agencies. And as we pointed out previously, those Agencies were not designed to serve that function and have not adapted to it. Regrettably, the Jackson Report does not explore this problem with the care that it merits.

It is our conviction that the internal systems of the Specialized Agencies need to be analyzed in detail and rationalized in terms of their major present-day functions. Until this is done, and the necessary steps are taken to forge the diverse parts of the UN “family” into an effective development aid delivery system, the authorization of substantially larger U.S. contributions to the UN Development Program does not appear to be warranted.

11. United States participation in the international organizations visited by the staff survey team is fragmented, unresponsive to any clearly defined set of national goals, and poorly coordinated.

Although the United States is the principal contributor to that part of the UN system which is the subject of this report, United States participation in the organizations involved does not appear to be responsive to any coherent central direction or control.

Theoretically, the Bureau of International Organizations Affairs in the Department of State serves as the management center for the

formulation and implementation of policy which is supposed to govern U.S. participation in the UN system. In practice, that policy seems to consist of a patchwork of sectoral objectives pursued fairly independently of the Bureau by other Departments and Agencies of the U.S. Government.

The survey team was advised that such U.S. Departments as Agriculture, Labor, and HEW frequently deal directly with their corresponding Specialized Agencies (in this instance, FAO, ILO, WHO, and UNESCO) without bothering to inform either the Bureau or the State Department liaison officers at such Agencies of the purpose, timing or outcome of their particular representations.

On occasion, they have been reported to have made recommendations to the Specialized Agencies which were at variance with policies ostensibly pursued by the U.S. Government.

Many such conflicts involve budgetary and administrative questions. United States sectoral delegations to the annual or biennial meetings of the governing bodies of the Specialized Agencies are reputed to encourage more spending on such Agencies' programs than does the U.S. State Department.

According to a number of U.S. officials interviewed by the survey team, the primary reasons for the State Department's failure to provide and enforce an integrated policy at the UN level include—

lack of interest in this area of U.S. foreign policy operations at the highest levels of the U.S. Government;

assignment of responsibility for the development and coordination of U.S. policy to relatively low-ranking officials in the Department of State;¹⁵

failure of the executive branch and the Congress to provide adequate staff for the Bureau of International Organizations Affairs in the Department of State;¹⁶ and

accumulation of power and vested interests in this part of U.S. foreign policy by the various sectoral groups—i.e., Agriculture, Labor, U.S. educational community—and the corresponding committees of the U.S. Congress.

12. United States representation in the UN development system is inadequate to provide the U.S. Government, on a continuing basis, with information sufficient to allow sound judgments to be formed about the programs, performance and problems of such organizations.

In all cases reviewed by the survey team, the United States representation did not include staffs sufficient to analyze and monitor the activities of the agencies concerned; travel funds to allow reasonable inspection of field operations; or adequate backup in the Department of State in Washington.

At the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York, questions relating to economic matters and UN development activities were

¹⁵ Neither the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Affairs nor his Director of the Office of International Economic and Social Affairs can really dictate to the heads of the U.S. delegations to the Specialized Agencies—the Under Secretaries of Agriculture, Labor, etc.

¹⁶ Although the Bureau of International Organizations Affairs is responsible for overseeing the expenditure of more U.S. funds than the other 18 Bureaus and Offices of the State Department combined, it has one of the smallest staffs in the Department. In 1970, the Bureau had 155 positions—in comparison with 236 20 years ago. In spite of the repeated urgings by Members and subcommittees of the Foreign Affairs Committee that the Bureau be properly staffed, no additional positions were allotted to it for fiscal year 1972.

handled by Ambassador Olds, one State Department officer and two AID officials.¹⁷ Between them, the four were expected to represent and advance U.S. national interests at the meetings of the Governing Council of UNDP, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, the Second (Economic) Committee and the Plenary of the United Nations General Assembly; to appraise the performance of these UN organs; and to advise the Department of State in Washington with respect to a broad range of issues relating to the operations of the UN development system.

During the conference season, the four officers could barely cover the meetings of the organizations to which they were assigned. They had no time for the kind of evaluation and analysis which should underlie U.S. decisions relating to UN development aid operations involving hundreds of millions of dollars in U.S. contributions.

As we pointed out earlier in this report, the situations in Paris, Geneva, Vienna and Rome are not much different. The State Department officer who represents the United States on a day-to-day basis in the FAO, for example, is a member of many standing and *ad hoc* committees including the Group on Hard Fibers; the Committee on Construction and Legal Matters; the Committee on Forestry and Fisheries; and the Indian Ocean Fisheries Group. In addition to attending meetings of those bodies, he has to handle arrangements for official visitors from Washington, process all personnel clearances for Americans taking jobs with the FAO, do advance work on policy matters, co-chair the Rome "Geneva Group", attend sessions of the key organs of FAO and tend to other matters. He has one assistant and an AID colleague who is generally absorbed with his own responsibilities.

It is our impression that because of those conditions, policymaking officials of the U.S. Government are not fully and currently informed about the operations of UN-affiliated agencies, nor about the options available to the United States in carrying out our national objectives in those organizations.

13. The United States is not adequately represented on the professional and technical staffs of the United Nations and its Specialized Agencies. At times, this underrepresentation extends to the policymaking positions in such Agencies.

The noncompetitive level of salaries offered by most international organizations (the World Bank Group may be an exception)¹⁸ has been cited repeatedly by officials of the Specialized Agencies as the chief reason for the relatively low number of Americans serving in technical and professional capacities in such organizations.

(The Department of State alleges that this is not the case. In commenting on the FAO, the Department advised us that there is no difficulty in securing well-qualified Federal employees for service in Rome. The Department also claims that there is no problem finding Federal employees willing to take assignments in the field service of FAO because such employees now are entitled to receive an equalization allowance; i.e., the difference be-

¹⁷ Out of a total contingent of 112 assigned to the U.S. Mission.

¹⁸ The World Bank Group does not advertise its pay scales and is reported to have "pirated" nearly 1,000 development specialists during the past 2 years—some from the UN system, some from various national development programs and some from the market.

tween the U.S. and UN pay and allowances which is paid to transferred Federal employees upon their reemployment in the Federal service.

(The Department admits that non-Federal employees do constitute a recruitment problem because without the equalization allowance, compensation offered by international organizations is inadequate compared with private industry or AID. Experts and specialists in the private sector expect to be paid better for foreign assignments and to receive benefits such as housing and post differentials which the UN does not now provide.

(Tables showing U.S. representation in the staffs of the U.N. Secretariat, the Specialized Agencies and other international organizations appear in Appendix IV.)

(A comparison of the pay and basic allowances of several classes of approximately comparable U.S. and UN officers serving in Rome is included in Appendix V. The Department of State did not include such items as leave, travel, transport of effects and other fringe items on the basis that they are at approximately the same level in both the U.S. and UN systems.)

Other factors include the exceedingly long recruitment processes characteristic of the Specialized Agencies and other parts of the UN system (frequently it takes a U.S. citizen 12 to 18 months to secure a job with one of those organizations—including the 3 to 6 months required to obtain a security clearance)¹⁹; American applicants' lack of foreign language skills; inaccessibility of personal interview facilities in the United States in comparison with those available to the Europeans in Geneva; the apparent refusal of the State Department and Congress to properly staff the international organizations recruitment office in Washington; and the unwillingness of Americans to accept assignments in many underdeveloped countries.

The survey team was also impressed by the apparent failure of the U.S. Government to prepare the ground for the appointment of qualified Americans to higher grade policy positions—even to succeed other Americans. Several Americans occupying policy positions in the field complained to us about the lack of attention paid in Washington, both in the Department of State and in the White House, to the achievement of adequate U.S. representation in international organizations. They felt that without such representation, there is little chance for the United States to influence the quality of their operations and the directions which they take.

¹⁹ It seems preposterous that the U.S. Government should require employees who have valid security clearances to have to wait 3 to 6 months to be cleared again in order to take jobs with international organizations. The survey team was told, for example, about the case of a mid-level Federal employee who had "Top Secret" security clearance but who nevertheless had to wait several months for a new check before he could be seconded to an international organization.

IV. ADDITIONAL ISSUES AND PROBLEM AREAS

As indicated at the outset, because of time limitations this particular study was confined to the development activities of only one segment of the United Nations system. While producing some indications regarding the capacity of that segment to take on additional tasks, the study raised many questions that need to be answered before the committee makes a final judgment about future participation of the United Nations system in the distribution of U.S. foreign aid resources. The major unanswered questions are summarized below:

1. CAPITAL INVESTMENT ORGANIZATIONS

The financial institutions affiliated with the United Nations (the World Bank group and the regional banks) provide the bulk of development resources distributed by the UN system. During recent years, as their resources have multiplied, these organizations have injected themselves increasingly into the area of technical assistance and pre-investment activities formerly occupied almost exclusively by the United Nations, its component parts (UNDP, UNIDO, etc.) and the Specialized Agencies. In some instances, the World Bank and its related institutions are presently competing with UNDP for the services of the Specialized Agencies—and outbidding the latter.²⁰ The full implications of these new relationships need to be reviewed with particular attention to the coordination of capital investment flows with pre-investment activities, and the determination of some rational distribution of functions between the different components of the UN development system with due attention to reliability of performance.

Another problem which was brought to our attention and may warrant consideration by the committee relates to the World Bank's gradual advancement to the position of the No. 1 creditor in the developing world. In some of the developing countries, the Bank is apparently acquiring the image of a "Scrooge." We were told that as the poorer countries' indebtedness to the Bank rises, the Bank at times finds it necessary to become overtly involved in the financial and economic affairs of its "clients" (as it is presently doing in Indonesia). This, in turn, affects the Bank's political viability. The charge that the Bank is dominated by the United States and serves as the new instrument of "American capitalist imperialism" appears to be gaining currency in some parts of the world and may one day adversely affect United States' interests in those areas.

This would be particularly unfortunate at a time when the United States, in an effort to achieve a "lower profile" abroad, is dismantling its own bilateral aid mechanism. Some thought should be given, therefore, to problems that may arise as a consequence of the Bank's "credi-

²⁰ The World Bank normally pay 75 percent of the administrative costs of joint projects undertaken with the Specialized Agencies; UNDP, in contrast pays those Agencies only 11 percent overhead for the execution of its pre-investment projects.

tor image"—and ways of coping with them, possibly by putting more emphasis on various intermediary regional and specialized institutions, and multi-national consortia, in the distribution of development resources.

Needless to say, it is easier and more pleasant to receive and spend money than to save and pay it back. Lenders have always been unpopular. It remains to be seen whether the UN machinery for promoting development will be able to cope with the problems of collecting what is due from reluctant creditors.

2. REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, ECONOMIC COMMISSIONS AND MULTILATERAL CONSORTIA ARRANGEMENTS

The regional pattern of existing multilateral organizations is not only exceedingly complex but also confused.²¹ Even the most devoted students of international organizations found it difficult to rationalize to the survey team the purposes of and the relationships between the UN Economic Commissions, the regional networks of the Specialized Agencies, the proposed regional structure of the UN Development Program, the regional banks and specialized financial institutions, and the various multilateral consortia arrangements. Although the United States contributes to most of these institutions and less formal development-financing arrangements, we found no central point at which the development activities being carried out through these organizations were being monitored, correlated or evaluated. We also find it difficult to believe that this multiplicity of regional structures and administrative overheads is either necessary or helpful to the achievement of development objectives in given regions. In our view, the existing arrangements present unparalleled opportunities for duplication and waste and ought to be reviewed with some care.

3. THE UN'S TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AND PRE-INVESTMENT SYSTEM

In arriving at the findings outlined in the preceding sections of this report, the staff survey team was unable to evaluate a number of specific suggestions for improving and strengthening the UN's machinery for the provision of technical and pre-investment assistance to the developing countries. Many of those suggestions appear to be relevant to that task and deserving of the most careful consideration by the committee. The latter include the following:

a. UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)

UNIDO acts like a Specialized Agency in all respects but two: its financial resources come from the regular budget of the United Nations and its personnel and management are tied to the UN headquarters in New York City. The resulting administrative setup has the appearance of a Rube Goldberg contraption. In order to remedy that situation and ascertain whether UNIDO can stand on its own feet, it has been proposed that this UN component be severed from its parent body and established as an independent Specialized Agency.

²¹ Sir Robert Jackson, for one, shares this opinion.

Similar change in status has been advocated in some quarters for the UN Conference on Trade and Development whose burgeoning bureaucracy in Geneva is a reflection of the developing countries' desire to play a more direct and influential role in managing the UN system's effort in support of development.

In the opinion of some observers, the above-suggested change could further limit the developed countries' voice in the affairs of those two UN components and result in excessive assessments being imposed upon them by the vote of the 77 *developing* countries. It seems to us that this can be prevented if UNCTAD and UNIDO are converted into independent *voluntary* agencies whose operations and programs will be financed not by legally binding assessments but by voluntary contributions. Such a change could help to remedy the existing situation which, at least from the budgetary and administrative standpoints, is rather unsatisfactory.

b. UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs

This Department acts as one of the major executing agencies for the UN Development Program. The exercise of those functions does not appear consistent with the Department's constitutional position within the United Nations Organization, or with the professional talents of many of its experts. In any event, the backup provided by the Department for its field operations, some of which are seriously lagging, has been characterized as "ghastly". It has been suggested, therefore, that the operational functions of the Department be detached and divided to the extent possible among the existing Specialized Agencies and programs. This suggestion appears to merit a careful review.

c. UNDP: Need for Greater Delegation of Authority

The ongoing reorganization of UNDP will delegate to the Resident Representative the power to approve projects involving up to \$100,000 in UNDP financing. It will, however, retain the existing three to four layers of review authorities for all UNDP projects (the project director and the Resident Representative in the field; where appropriate, the regional office of the executing agency; the central headquarters of the executing agency; and the headquarters of UNDP). In many instances, all of these layers become involved in decisionmaking on minor issues including small project changes, selection of technical personnel, minor alterations in project scope, reprogramming of funds for fellowships where qualified persons are not available, and the like. To expedite decisions, improve project preparation and reduce the administrative overhead, it has been suggested that the authority to make these types of decisions be left with the executing agencies and that such agencies be allowed to draw upon UNDP resources—within specified, modest limits—for small projects and pre-project activities, including project preparation. It was also proposed that the UNDP abandon its present practice of reviewing the technical aspects of all proposed projects, leave that job to the executing agency which has the relevant technical capability, and concentrate instead on improved comprehensive mid-term and final project evaluations. Both of these suggestions appear to warrant further study.

d. UNDP: Reimbursement for Overhead

Under its present policies UNDP reimburses the executing agencies for the administrative overhead involved in the carrying out of UNDP-financed projects—11 percent for Special Fund pre-investment projects; 14 percent for technical assistance undertakings; and 7 percent for projects in which the execution of the work is subcontracted by the Specialized Agency. Officials of the Specialized Agencies claim that at these rates, they are being reimbursed for only one-half of the overhead. This imposes a drain on their regular budgets and represents a definite limit on the amount of UNDP-financed work that they are able to undertake. It also creates internal pressures for rapid increases in the *regular budgets* of the Specialized Agencies and other parts of the UN system.

These views have struck a responsive chord in the Governing Council of UNDP. At a recent meeting, the Council has directed that new methods be developed for calculating appropriate reimbursements to the executing agencies. Studies of such new methods, supervised by Mr. Bertrand of the Joint Inspection Unit, are currently in progress. While some persons, including one experienced U.S. official, maintain that any move to increase overhead allowances will prompt the executing agencies to raise the cost of administering pre-investment aid, it seems to us that UNDP ought to be paying the full cost of the program which it funds.

e. External Evaluation

One of the shortcomings of the UN development system which should be of special concern to the major donor countries is the lack of an adequate external review and evaluation of its operations. As pointed out in the body of this report, during the past 3 years the Joint Inspection Unit has reviewed the field operations of a number of UN-related organizations. With independent funding and increased staff, the Joint Inspection Unit could acquire permanent and adequate capability to perform external review functions, particularly for those parts of the UN system which are involved in the provision of technical and pre-investment assistance.

f. United States Participation

The staff survey team was particularly impressed by the inadequacies of the organizational arrangements and personnel resources concerned with United States participation in this group of UN-related agencies and programs. If anything, it seemed to us that the observations on this subject outlined in two recent reports filed by the Committee on Foreign Affairs (*To Save Succeeding Generations . . .*, Report on the 24th UN General Assembly by Representatives Dante B. Fascell and J. Irving Whalley; and *United Nations at the Crossroads*, Report on the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations, by Representative Cornelius E. Gallagher, chairman, and the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements) tended to understate the case for the reorganization and strengthening of United States representation in those international organizations. It is the staff survey team's view that the need for such changes is urgent; and that U.S. contributions to the UN system should

not be increased significantly until evidence becomes available that the executive branch has adopted arrangements which will provide the Congress with much better assurances that the funds so authorized will be spent efficiently and in accordance with plans and priorities designed to advance both the national interests of this country and the objectives of development.

APPENDIX I

SCHEDULE OF MEETINGS, INTERVIEWS, AND DISCUSSIONS

NEW YORK—OCT. 26, 27, 28, 1970

U.S. Mission to the United Nations

Ambassador Charles W. Yost, U.S. Permanent Representative
Ambassador Glenn A. Olds, U.S. Representative to ECOSOC
Mr. Robert W. Kitchen, Jr., Adviser on Economic and Social Affairs
Mr. John W. Koehring, Adviser on ECOSOC affairs
Mr. Theodore P. Schottke, Senior Adviser for Administrative Affairs

U.N. Development Program (UNDP)

Mr. Paul G. Hoffman, Administrator, UNDP
Mr. Myer Cohen, Assistant Administrator, UNDP—Director, Bureau of Operations and Programming
Mr. David Morse, Chairman, Advisory Panel on Program Policy and Special Consultant to the Administrator
Mr. Jean Jacques Graisee, Research and Liaison Officer
Mr. John Keppel, Chief, Operations Staff, UN Fund for Population Activities
Mr. Charles Perry, Liaison Officer, Washington office, UNDP
Mr. Morris Huberman, Chief Agriculture Production Program
Mr. James Berna, Project Officer (Human Resources)
Miss Norma Globerman, Project Officer (Natural Resources)
Mr. Louis Shapiro, Chief, Reports and Statistics Division
Mr. John Olver, Director, Financial Management and Administrative Policy

ROME—OCT. 29—NOV. 2, 1970

U.S. Mission to FAO

Mr. Paul J. Byrnes, Counselor for FAO Affairs
Mr. Harry L. Coburn, Second Secretary for FAO Affairs
Mr. Walter K. Davis, AID Coordinator, FAO
Mr. Henry C. Boudreau, Counsellor for Administrator, U.S. Embassy

Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO)

Mr. O. V. Wells, Deputy Director-General
Mr. Clifford F. Pennison, Assistant, DG/Administration and Finance
Mr. Harry B. Wirin, Comptroller
Mr. James J. Cohen de Govia, Director, Management Services Division
Messrs. A. Peters, D. Waterman and C. Faulkner, Staff, Management Services Division
Mr. E. M. West, Director, Program Formulation and Budget Division
Mr. Ross Pope, Program Formulation and Budget Division
Mr. Merrill Blevins, Assistant to Assistant Director General for Administration and Finance
Mr. K. L. Bachman, Director, Economic Analysis Division
Mr. P. Terver, Assistant Director General—Development Department

GENEVA—NOV. 3-6, 1970

U.S. Mission to the European Office of the United Nations

Ambassador Idar Rimestad, U.S. Representative
Minister Jules Bassin, Deputy U.S. Representative
Mr. Edward J. Gaumond, Counselor for Administration
Mr. Ralph W. Eye, Adviser (Geneva Group)
Dr. Benjamin Blood, International Health Attache (WHO)
Mr. Ralph C. Schrader, Labor/Political Officer (ILO)
Mr. W. E. Denny, Transportation/Communications Officer (ITU)

World Health Organization (WHO)

Mr. Milton P. Siegel, Assistant Director General/Administration
 Mr. Paul Bierstein, Pre-investment Studies, Water Resources
 Dr. M. R. Sacks, Director, Division of Coordination & Evaluation

International Labor Organization

Mr. Hubertus Zoetewij, Chief, Research & Planning Department

VIENNA—NOV. 7-11, 1970

U.S. Missions to UNIDO and IAEA

Minister William J. Stibravy, U.S. Representative to UNIDO
 Mr. Edward J. Chesky, Adviser, U.S. Mission to UNIDO
 Minister Dwight Porter, Deputy U.S. Representative to IAEA-designate
 Mr. Edward Noziglia, Adviser, U.S. Mission IAEA
 Mr. Jack Vanderryn, Adviser, U.S. Mission IAEA
 Mr. Rallie H. White, Jr., Deputy Chief Mission/U.S. Embassy

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Mr. John Hall, Deputy Director General for Administration
 Mr. D. A. V. Fischer, Director, Division of External Liaison and Protocol
 Mr. Max Fried, Chief, Joint FAO/IAEA Program
 Dr. O. L. Goswami, Director, Division of Technical Assistance and Publications

U.N. Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO)

Mr. John Birckhead, Director, Division of Administration
 Mr. Samuel Feiffer, Chief HQ Planning & Administrative Management
 Mr. Jose F. R. Barbosa, Chief, Financial Services
 Mr. Alexandre Bernstein, Chief, Conference Services
 Mr. Heinrich Pichler, Chief, Technical Programs Management Section
 Mr. Patrick W. Beirne, General Services Officer
 Mr. Geoffrey Holmes, Chief, Personnel Services
 Mr. A. E. Saenger, Program Planning
 Mr. G. Gouri, Chief, Coordination and External Relations Section
 Dr. Joseph Stepanek, Director, Industrial Services & Institutions Division

PARIS—NOV. 12-14, 1970

U.S. Mission to UNESCO

Ambassador Louise Gore, U.S. Representative to Executive Board, UNESCO
 Mr. Pierre Graham, U.S. Representative to UNESCO
 Mr. Rupert Prohme, Deputy U.S. Representative to UNESCO
 Mr. Dave Nickerson, Adviser, U.S. Mission

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

Dr. Malcolm S. Adiseshiah, Deputy Director General
 Mr. Murray Chase, Director, Office of Management and Data Processing
 Dr. S. Spaulding, Director, Department of School & Higher Education

NEW YORK—FEB. 3-6, 1971

U.S. Mission to the United Nations

Ambassador Glenn A. Olds, U.S. Representative to ECOSOC
 Mr. Robert W. Kitchen, Jr., Special Adviser on Economic Development Programs
 Mr. Albert F. Bender, Counselor for Legal and International Organization Affairs
 Mr. John W. Koehring, Adviser for Economic and Social Affairs

United Nations

Mr. C. V. Narasimhan, Under Secretary General, Chef de Cabinet; Deputy Director of UNDP
 Mr. Phillippe de Seynes, Under Secretary General for ECOSOC

U.N. Development Program (UNDP)

Mr. Myer Cohen, Assistant Administrator of UNDP; Director of Bureau of Operations and Programming
 Mr. John Olver, Director for Division of Financial Management and Administrative Policies
 Mr. Jean Jacques Graisse, Research and Liaison Officer
 Mr. Charles L. Perry, Washington Officer for UNDP

APPENDIX II

UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, ADVISORY PANEL ON PROGRAM POLICY

LIST OF MEMBERS

Lord Caradon, former Ambassador from the United Kingdom to the UN
Edwin Martin, Chairman, Development Assistance Committee (DAC)
Ernst Michanek, Director General of the Swedish International Development
Authority
Saburo Okita, President of the Japanese Economic Research Center
Raul Prebisch, Director General of the Latin American Institute for Economic
and Social Planning
Maurice Strong, President of the Canadian International Development Agency
S. A. Skachkov, Chairman, State Committee for External Economic Relations of
the USSR Council of Ministers
Mohamed Diawara, Minister of Planning, Ivory Coast
Sir Arthur Lewis, President of the Caribbean Development Bank
I. T. Patel, Finance Secretary, Government of India, Ministry of Finance

EX OFFICIO MEMBERS

Philippe de Seynes, Under Secretary General of the United Nations for Economic
and Social Affairs
Robert Gardiner, Executive Secretary for the Economic Commission for Africa
Carlos Quintana, Economic Commission for Latin America
J. Stanovnik, Economic Commission for Europe
U. Nyun, Executive Secretary for the Economic Commission for Asia and the
Far East
Jean Pierre Martin, Director of the UN Economic and Social Office in Beirut

APPENDIX III NATIONALITY DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE STAFFS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION AND OF SELECTED SPECIALIZED AGENCIES

UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT—STAFF IN POSTS SUBJECT TO GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION (AS OF DEC. 31, 1970)

[By nationality and level]

Nationality	Number of staff, Aug. 31, 1970					Number of staff, P-1 Dec. 31, 1970					Desirable range
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	P-1		
I. AFRICA											
Algeria	6			1			2	2	1	6	3-7
Botswana											2-7
Burundi	1								1	1	2-7
Cameroon	5				1	1	1	1	1	5	2-7
Central African Republic											2-7
Chad											2-7
Congo, Democratic Republic of the	9						1		2	8	2-7
Dahomey	10			1		1	5	5	4	11	2-7
Equatorial Guinea											2-7
Ethiopia	16					5	6	3	1	15	2-7
Gabon											2-7
Gambia	4							1	3	4	2-7
Ghana	15	1		2	2	4	2	3		14	2-7
Guinea	5		1				1		3	5	2-7
Ivory Coast							1			1	2-7
Kenya	4					1	2			3	2-7
Lesotho	2								2	2	2-7
Liberia	4				1		1	1		5	2-7
Libya	2										2-7
Madagascar	4		1				1	2		4	2-7
Malawi	1						1			1	2-7
Mali	4			1	1		1		1	4	2-7

UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT—STAFF IN POSTS SUBJECT TO GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION (AS OF DEC. 31, 1970)—Continued

[By nationality and level]

Nationality	Number of staff, Aug. 31, 1970	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	P-1	Number of staff, Dec. 31, 1970	Desirable range
III. EUROPE (EASTERN)												
Albania	8						3	4	2		9	2-7
Bulgaria	8						2	5	1		8	4-8
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic	31	1			4	7	8	6	2		28	11-13
Czechoslovakia	15				1	3	7	4			15	18-18
Hungary	29			1	3	7	16	2			29	10-12
Poland	11						5	4	3		12	25-27
Romania	14				1	1	4	6	2		14	8-11
Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic	124	1		12	9	12	50	36	7		127	31-36
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	24		1	2	2	4	10	1	4		24	188-272
Yugoslavia												8-11
Population reserve												4-4
Subtotal	264	2	1	15	20	34	105	68	21		266	400-328
IV. EUROPE (WESTERN)												
Austria	22				1	2	8	6	5		22	12-13
Belgium	24			1	2	7	2	1	9	1	23	20-21
Denmark	13				1	3	3	4	2	1	14	13-14
Finland	15					2	3	3	5	2	16	10-12
France	128	1		9	14	26	28	24	22	8	132	83-116
Greece	11	1			1	2	3	3	1		11	7-10
Iceland	7					1			4		5	2-7
Ireland	7					1	2	1	2		6	4-8
Italy	31	1			1	3	7	6	2	5	31	52-69
Luxembourg	5					1	2	2	8		5	2-7
Malta	3										3	2-7
Netherlands	30			1	2	10	8	2	4	2	29	22-24
Norway	17			1	1	6	4	3	2		17	9-12
Portugal	5							1	4		5	4-8
Spain	21					2	9	6	2	1	20	20-21
Sweden	20				2	5	4	3	5	1	20	22-25
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	134	1	1	6	14	26	36	20	20	6	130	82-114
Population reserve												6-6
Subtotal	493	4	1	19	39	97	119	86	97	27	489	461-405

V. LATIN AMERICA

Argentina	26	1	5	5	6	7	1	1	1	25	17-18
Bolivia	9		2	3	1	1	1	1	1	9	2-7
Brazil	24		2	2	6	8	4	4	2	24	17-17
Chile	21			4	3	6	5	5	5	23	5-9
Colombia	15	1		2	7	2	1	1	1	15	5-8
Costa Rica	5			2	1	2	2	2	1	5	2-7
Cuba	5			1	2	1	1	1	1	5	4-8
Dominican Republic	4									3	2-7
Ecuador	11			2	5	2	2	2	1	11	2-7
El Salvador	5	1			1	2	2	2	1	5	2-7
Guatemala	4					2	2	2	1	4	2-7
Haiti	13	1			1	8	2	2	2	13	2-7
Honduras	2					1	1	1	2	2	2-7
Mexico	20	1	1		1	4	9	1	2	20	18-18
Nicaragua	5				1	1	1	1	1	4	2-7
Panama	2					1	1	1	1	3	2-7
Paraguay	5					3	2	2		5	2-7
Peru	8		1		1	4	2	4		8	2-7
Uruguay	8					1	3	4		8	9-11
Venezuela	5	1				3				5	22-22
Population reserve											
Subtotal	197	2	1	3	11	31	42	60	34	13	197

VI. MIDDLE EAST

Afghanistan	4				1	1		1	1	3	2-7
Cyprus	5							4	4	5	2-7
Iran	15					3	3	3	1	14	5-9
Iraq	10		1			1		3		9	2-7
Israel	7			1	3	1	5	2	1	10	5-9
Jordan	9										2-7
Kuwait						2	1	5	4	15	3-7
Lebanon	15				1		1	1		2	2-7
Saudi Arabia	2									2	2-7
Southern Yemen	2						4	1		12	2-7
Syrian Arab Republic	13		1			5	5	7		17	8-11
Turkey	17				2	2		3		3	2-7
Yemen	3										10-10
Population reserve											
Subtotal	102		1	2	8	16	23	30	11	8	99

Subtotal

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UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT—STAFF IN POSTS SUBJECT TO GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION (AS OF DEC. 31, 1970)—Continued

[By nationality and level]

Nationality	Number of staff, Aug. 31, 1970	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	P-1 Dec. 31, 1970	Number of staff, Dec. 31, 1970	Desirable range
VII. NORTH AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN												
Barbados	2						1		1	1	3	2-7
Canada	56			1	3	12	12	10	18	1	57	45-60
Guyana	3								2	1	3	2-7
Jamaica	13					3	2	5		2	12	2-7
Trinidad and Tobago	7					1	1	3	3		9	2-7
United States of America	414	1	1	11	35	57	84	115	95	12	411	411-605
Population reserve												0-0
Subtotal	495	1	1	13	38	73	100	133	119	17	495	673-484
VIII. NON-MEMBER STATES												
Federal Republic of Germany	13				2	1	3	4	2	1	13	
Republic of Korea	5					1		4			5	
Republic of Vietnam	4						1	2	1		4	
Switzerland	22			1	3	3	2	2	9	4	24	
Stateless	4					1	2	1			4	
Subtotal	48			1	5	6	8	13	12	5	50	
IX. Total	2,170	12	11	62	160	348	522	523	406	119	2,163	

UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION—NATIONALITY DISTRIBUTION
OF STAFF¹ (AS OF DEC. 31, 1968)

Country	Number	Percent	Country	Number	Percent
Afghanistan.....	1	0.21	Laos.....	1	0.21
Algeria.....	3	.63	Lebanon.....	2	.41
Argentina.....	4	.84	Liberia.....	1	.21
Australia.....	7	1.46	Luxembourg.....	1	.21
Austria.....	6	1.25	Malagasy Republic.....	1	.21
Belgium.....	9	1.88	Malaysia.....	1	.21
Bolivia.....	2	.41	Mali.....	2	.41
Brazil.....	3	.63	Mexico.....	2	.41
Bulgaria.....	2	.41	Monaco.....	2	.41
Burma.....	1	.21	Morocco.....	2	.41
Byelorussia S.S.R.....	2	.41	Nepal.....	1	.21
Cambodia.....	1	.21	Netherlands.....	4	.84
Cameroon.....	2	.41	New Zealand.....	4	.84
Canada.....	14	2.92	Niger.....	1	.21
Central African Republic.....	1	.21	Nigeria.....	3	.63
Ceylon.....	2	.41	Norway.....	3	.63
Chad.....	1	.21	Pakistan.....	3	.63
Chile.....	2	.41	Panama.....	3	.63
China.....	3	.63	Peru.....	1	.21
Congo (Brazzaville).....	1	.21	Philippines.....	2	.41
Congo (Kinshasa).....	1	.21	Poland.....	5	1.04
Cuba.....	1	.21	Romania.....	2	.41
Cyprus.....	1	.21	Saudi Arabia.....	1	.21
Czechoslovakia.....	5	1.04	Sierra Leone.....	1	.21
Dahomey.....	3	.63	Singapore.....	1	.21
Denmark.....	4	.84	Somalia.....	1	.21
Dominican Republic.....	1	.21	Spain.....	9	1.88
Finland.....	2	.41	Sudan.....	1	.21
France.....	73	15.21	Sweden.....	3	.63
Germany, Federal Republic of.....	21	4.38	Switzerland.....	10	2.09
Ghana.....	2	.41	Syria.....	1	.21
Greece.....	5	1.04	Togo.....	1	.21
Guatemala.....	1	.21	Trinidad and Tobago.....	2	.41
Guyana.....	1	.21	Tunisia.....	2	.41
Haiti.....	1	.21	Turkey.....	2	.41
Hungary.....	2	.41	Ukraine S.S.R.....	7	1.46
Iceland.....	1	.21	United Arab Republic.....	5	1.04
India.....	12	2.50	U.S.S.R.....	26	5.42
Indonesia.....	3	.63	United Kingdom.....	41	8.54
Iran.....	2	.41	United States.....	73	15.21
Iraq.....	1	.21	Upper Volta.....	1	.21
Ireland.....	2	.41	Uruguay.....	2	.41
Israel.....	2	.41	Venezuela.....	2	.41
Italy.....	10	2.09	Vietnam.....	1	.21
Ivory Coast.....	1	.21	Yugoslavia.....	3	.63
Japan.....	7	1.46	Stateless.....	2	.41
Kenya.....	1	.21			
Korea.....	2	.41			
			Total.....	480	100.00

¹ Internationally recruited. In addition there are 170 professionals not subject to geographic distribution, nine of whom are American; 1,014 nonprofessionals in locally recruited positions, 23 of whom are American; and 1,549 financed from other funds, 58 of whom are American.

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION—NATIONALITY DISTRIBUTION OF STAFF¹

[As of Dec. 31, 1968]

Country	Number	Percent	Country	Number	Percent
Argentina.....	1	0.75	Germany.....	8	6.02
Australia.....	6	4.52	Greece.....	1	.75
Austria.....	1	.75	Honduras.....	1	.75
Belgium.....	4	3.01	India.....	4	3.01
Bolivia.....	1	.75	Iran.....	1	.75
Brazil.....	1	.75	Ireland.....	3	2.26
Canada.....	19	14.29	Israel.....	2	1.50
Ceylon.....	2	1.50	Italy.....	3	2.26
Chile.....	1	.75	Japan.....	1	.75
China.....	1	.75	Lebanon.....	1	.75
Colombia.....	1	.75	Mexico.....	3	2.26
Costa Rica.....	1	.75	Morocco.....	1	.75
Cuba.....	2	1.50	Netherlands.....	6	4.52
Czechoslovakia.....	2	1.50	New Zealand.....	3	2.26
Denmark.....	3	2.26	Norway.....	2	1.50
France.....	8	6.02	Pakistan.....	1	.75

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION—NATIONALITY DISTRIBUTION OF STAFF ¹—Continued

Country	Number	Percent	Country	Number	Percent
Peru.....	1	0.75	Trinidad and Tobago.....	1	0.75
Philippines.....	1	.75	United Arab Republic.....	3	2.26
Poland.....	1	.75	United Kingdom.....	14	10.53
Portugal.....	1	.75	United States.....	9	6.77
Spain.....	2	1.50	Yugoslavia.....	1	.75
Sweden.....	2	1.50			
Switzerland.....	1	.75	Total.....	133	100.00
Syria.....	1	.75			

¹ Internationally recruited. In addition there are 43 professionals not subject to geographical distribution, two of whom are American; 322 General Service staff, two of whom are American; 57 professionals and 39 General Service employees, two of whom are American and are paid from other funds.

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION—NATIONALITY DISTRIBUTION OF STAFF ¹

[As of Dec. 31, 1968]

Country	Number	Percent	Country	Number	Percent
Afghanistan.....	2	0.17	Luxembourg.....	2	0.17
Argentina.....	17	1.42	Madagascar.....	2	.17
Australia.....	27	2.26	Malta.....	2	.17
Austria.....	8	.67	Mauritius.....	4	.33
Belgium.....	20	1.67	Mexico.....	8	.67
Bolivia.....	6	.50	Morocco.....	1	.08
Brazil.....	14	1.17	Nepal.....	3	.25
Bulgaria.....	1	.08	Netherlands.....	28	2.34
Burma.....	2	.17	New Zealand.....	7	.58
Burundi.....	1	.08	Nicaragua.....	1	.08
Cameroon.....	2	.17	Nigeria.....	3	.25
Canada.....	39	3.26	Norway.....	9	.75
Ceylon.....	14	1.17	Pakistan.....	11	.92
Chile.....	11	.92	Paraguay.....	4	.33
China.....	21	1.76	Peru.....	10	.84
Colombia.....	8	.67	Philippines.....	20	1.67
Costa Rica.....	2	.17	Poland.....	21	1.76
Cuba.....	3	.25	Portugal.....	7	.58
Cyprus.....	1	.08	Romania.....	3	.25
Czechoslovakia.....	25	2.09	Senegal.....	1	.08
Dahomey.....	2	.17	Sierra Leone.....	1	.08
Denmark.....	23	1.92	Somalia.....	1	.08
Dominican Republic.....	1	.08	South Africa.....	1	.08
Ecuador.....	5	.42	Spain.....	15	1.25
Finland.....	2	.17	Sudan.....	2	.17
France.....	101	8.44	Sweden.....	18	1.50
Gambia (nonmember).....	1	.08	Switzerland.....	41	3.43
Germany.....	44	3.68	Syria.....	6	.50
Ghana.....	2	.17	Tanzania.....	2	.17
Greece.....	12	1.00	Thailand.....	2	.17
Guatemala.....	5	.42	Togo.....	3	.25
Haiti.....	13	1.09	Trinidad and Tobago.....	4	.33
Honduras.....	3	.25	Tunisia.....	2	.17
Hungary.....	8	.67	Turkey.....	2	.17
India.....	43	3.59	United Arab Republic.....	34	2.84
Indonesia.....	7	.58	United Kingdom.....	141	11.78
Iran.....	11	.92	United States.....	122	10.19
Iraq.....	1	.08	U.S.S.R.....	36	3.01
Ireland.....	9	.75	Venezuela.....	4	.33
Israel.....	4	.33	Vietnam.....	2	.17
Italy.....	34	2.84	Yugoslavia.....	14	1.17
Jamaica.....	5	.42	Zambia.....	1	.08
Japan.....	13	1.09	Stateless.....	1	.08
Jordan.....	7	.58			
Korea.....	5	.42	Total.....	1,197	100.00
Lebanon.....	10	.84			

¹ Internationally recruited. In addition there are 90 professionals not subject to geographical distribution, two of whom are American; 1,456 locally recruited, 27 of whom are American; and 537 financed from voluntary funds, UNDP, reimbursable and funds-in-trust, International Agency for Research on Cancer, and WJC, 49 of whom are Americans.

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION—NATIONALITY DISTRIBUTION OF STAFF ¹

[As of Dec. 31 1968]

Country	Number	Percent	Country	Number	Percent
Argentina.....	7	1.00	Lebanon.....	4	0.57
Australia.....	23	3.28	Lesotho.....	1	.14
Austria.....	6	.86	Luxembourg.....	1	.14
Barbados.....	1	.14	Malagasy Republic.....	1	.14
Belgium.....	20	2.85	Malaysia.....	1	.14
Bolivia.....	1	.14	Mauritius.....	2	.29
Brazil.....	7	1.00	Mexico.....	5	.71
Cameroun.....	1	.14	Morocco.....	1	.14
Canada.....	34	4.85	Netherlands.....	12	1.71
Ceylon.....	3	.43	New Zealand.....	5	.71
Chile.....	10	1.43	Nigeria.....	3	.43
China (nonmember).....	4	.57	Norway.....	7	1.00
Colombia.....	6	.86	Pakistan.....	6	.86
Costa Rica.....	2	.29	Panama.....	1	.14
Cuba.....	1	.14	Paraguay.....	2	.29
Cyprus.....	2	.29	Peru.....	2	.29
Dahomey.....	2	.29	Philippines.....	4	.57
Denmark.....	8	1.14	Poland.....	5	.71
Ecuador.....	7	1.00	Portugal.....	4	.57
Ethiopia.....	1	.14	Romania.....	1	.14
Finland.....	5	.71	South African (nonmember).....	1	.14
France.....	51	7.28	Spain.....	8	1.14
Germany.....	45	6.42	Sudan.....	2	.29
Ghana.....	2	.29	Sweden.....	13	1.85
Greece.....	4	.57	Switzerland.....	11	1.57
Guinea.....	1	.14	Tanzania.....	1	.14
Guyana.....	2	.29	Thailand.....	3	.43
Hiati.....	1	.14	Togo.....	1	.14
Honduras.....	1	.14	Trinidad & Tobago.....	4	.57
Hungary.....	1	.14	Turkey.....	3	.43
Iceland.....	1	.14	United Arab Republic.....	6	.86
India.....	21	3.00	United Kingdom.....	88	12.55
Indonesia.....	2	.29	United States.....	113	16.12
Iran.....	1	.14	Uruguay.....	2	.29
Iraq.....	3	.43	Venezuela.....	1	.14
Ireland.....	8	1.14	Viet Nam.....	1	.14
Israel.....	1	.14	Yugoslavia.....	6	.86
Italy.....	56	7.99	Stateless.....	1	.14
Ivory Coast.....	1	.14			
Japan.....	10	1.43			
Jordan.....	3	.43			
Korea.....	2	.29			
			Total.....	701	100.00

¹ Internationally recruited. In addition there are 58 professionals not subject to geographical distribution, four of whom are American; 1,555 in locally recruited positions, of whom 29 are American; and 3,299 who are financed from other budgetary funds, including Special Fund, Freedom from Hunger Campaign, World Food Program, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), of whom 183 are American.

INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION—NATIONALITY DISTRIBUTION OF STAFF¹

[As of Dec. 31, 1968]

Country	Number	Percent	Country	Number	Percent
Afghanistan.....	1	0.17	Laos.....	1	0.17
Algeria.....	3	.52	Lebanon.....	3	.52
Argentina.....	10	1.73	Liberia.....	1	.17
Australia.....	9	1.56	Libya.....	1	.17
Austria.....	4	.70	Luxembourg.....	1	.17
Belgium.....	10	1.73	Malagasy Republic.....	1	.17
Bolivia.....	2	.35	Malaysia.....	1	.17
Brazil.....	7	1.21	Mali.....	2	.35
Bulgaria.....	3	.52	Malta.....	1	.17
Burma.....	1	.17	Mauritania.....	1	.17
Burundi.....	1	.17	Mexico.....	4	.70
Byelorussian SSR.....	2	.35	Morocco.....	1	.17
Canada.....	16	2.78	Nepal.....	1	.17
Central African Republic.....	1	.17	Netherlands.....	5	.87
Ceylon.....	4	.70	New Zealand.....	2	.35
Chad.....	2	.35	Nicaragua.....	1	.17
Chile.....	3	.52	Nigeria.....	3	.52
China.....	6	1.04	Norway.....	3	.52
Colombia.....	5	.87	Pakistan.....	8	1.39
Congo (B).....	1	.17	Panama.....	1	.17
Congo (K).....	1	.17	Paraguay.....	2	.35
Costa Rica.....	3	.52	Peru.....	3	.52
Cuba.....	2	.35	Philippines.....	3	.52
Cyprus.....	2	.35	Poland.....	7	1.21
Czechoslovakia.....	7	1.21	Portugal.....	1	.17
Dahomey.....	2	.35	Romania.....	1	.17
Denmark.....	4	.70	Rwanda.....	1	.17
Dominican Republic.....	1	.17	Senegal.....	2	.35
Ecuador.....	2	.35	Sierra Leone.....	1	.17
El Salvador.....	1	.17	Singapore.....	1	.17
Ethiopia.....	2	.35	Somalia.....	1	.17
Finland.....	2	.35	South Africa.....	1	.17
France.....	52	9.02	Spain.....	6	1.04
Gabon.....	2	.35	Sudan.....	1	.17
Germany.....	26	4.51	Sweden.....	10	1.73
Ghana.....	1	.17	Switzerland.....	38	6.59
Greece.....	5	.87	Syria.....	4	.70
Guatemala.....	2	.35	Tanzania.....	1	.17
Guinea.....	1	.17	Thailand.....	1	.17
Guyana.....	2	.35	Togo.....	1	.17
Haiti.....	2	.35	Tunisia.....	1	.17
Honduras.....	1	.17	Turkey.....	5	.87
Hungary.....	1	.17	Ukraine SSR.....	3	.52
Iceland.....	1	.17	United Arab Republic.....	6	1.04
India.....	21	3.64	United Kingdom.....	62	10.75
Indonesia.....	1	.17	United States.....	60	10.40
Iran.....	3	.52	U.S.S.R.....	23	3.99
Iraq.....	1	.17	Venezuela.....	1	.17
Ireland.....	4	.70	Vietnam.....	3	.52
Italy.....	16	2.77	Yugoslavia.....	3	.52
Jamaica.....	1	.17	Stateless.....	1	.17
Japan.....	11	1.91			
Jordan.....	1	.17			
Kenya.....	2	.35			
			Total.....	577	100.00

¹ Internationally recruited. In addition there are 303 professionals not subject to geographic distribution, 11 of whom are American; 1,189 nonprofessional staff, 12 of whom are American; 60 financed from the trust fund and 576 financed from UNDP, 26 of whom are American.

INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION—NATIONALITY DISTRIBUTION OF STAFF¹

[As of Dec. 31, 1968]

Country	Number	Percent	Country	Number	Percent
Afghanistan.....	1	0.74	Mexico.....	1	0.74
Argentina.....	3	2.20	Morocco.....	2	1.47
Australia.....	2	1.47	Netherlands.....	3	2.20
Belgium.....	2	1.47	Norway.....	2	1.47
Bulgaria.....	1	.74	Pakistan.....	1	.74
Canada.....	1	.74	Paraguay.....	1	.74
China.....	2	1.47	Poland.....	1	.74
Czechoslovakia.....	2	1.47	Spain.....	6	4.40
Denmark.....	1	.74	Sweden.....	2	1.47
France.....	22	16.17	Switzerland.....	31	22.79
Germany.....	6	4.40	Tunisia.....	1	.74
Greece.....	1	.74	Turkey.....	1	.74
India.....	3	2.20	United Arab Republic.....	1	.74
Iran.....	1	.74	United Kingdom.....	12	8.82
Iraq.....	1	.74	United States.....	4	2.94
Ireland.....	1	.74	U.S.S.R.....	5	3.67
Italy.....	5	3.67	Yugoslavia.....	1	.74
Japan.....	5	3.67			
Korea.....	1	0.74	Total.....	136	100.00

¹ Internationally recruited. In addition there are 18 professionals not subject to geographical distribution; 282 nonprofessional staff, two of which are American and 54 experts financed from other sources of funding, four of which are American.

WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION—NATIONALITY DISTRIBUTION OF STAFF¹

[As of Dec. 31, 1968]

Country	Number	Percent	Country	Number	Percent
Algeria.....	1	1.30	Netherlands.....	4	5.19
Argentina.....	1	1.30	Norway.....	2	2.60
Australia.....	2	2.60	Pakistan.....	1	1.30
Austria.....	1	1.30	Romania.....	1	1.30
Belgium.....	2	2.60	Spain.....	3	3.89
Brazil.....	1	1.30	Sweden.....	2	2.60
Chile.....	1	1.30	Switzerland.....	11	14.28
Czechoslovakia.....	2	2.60	United Arab Republic.....	3	3.89
France.....	4	5.19	United Kingdom.....	10	12.99
Germany.....	2	2.60	United States.....	6	7.79
Honduras.....	1	1.30	United Soviet Social Republic.....	5	6.49
Hungary.....	1	1.30	Uruguay.....	1	1.30
India.....	2	2.60	Yugoslavia.....	1	1.30
Iran.....	1	1.30			
Italy.....	2	2.60	Total.....	77	100.00
Japan.....	3	3.89			

¹ Internationally recruited. In addition there are 12 professionals not subject to geographic distribution; 123 nonprofessional, two of whom are American, plus 13 experts financed from funds-in-trust.

INTERGOVERNMENTAL MARITIME CONSULTATIVE ORGANIZATION—NATIONALITY DISTRIBUTION OF STAFF ¹
[As of Dec. 31, 1968]

Country	Number	Percent	Country	Number	Percent
Belgium.....	1	3.57	Japan.....	1	3.57
Brazil.....	1	3.57	Netherlands.....	1	3.57
Finland.....	1	3.57	New Zealand.....	1	3.57
France.....	3	10.72	Norway.....	2	7.15
Germany.....	1	3.57	Poland.....	1	3.57
Ghana.....	1	3.57	Sweden.....	1	3.57
Greece.....	1	3.57	U.S.S.R.....	2	7.15
India.....	1	3.57	United Kingdom.....	5	17.85
Italy.....	1	3.57	United States.....	3	10.72
			Total.....	28	100.00

¹ Internationally recruited. In addition, there are five professionals not subject to geographic distribution, 60 nonprofessional and four internationally recruited who are funded from extra budgetary funds of whom one is an American.

NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF SELECTED PROFESSIONAL STAFF¹ IN THE SECRETARIATS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM AND PERCENTAGE OF CONTRIBUTION² TO THE REGULAR BUDGET

Agency	Total staff	U.S. staff	U.S. percent contribution	U.S. percent of contribution	U.S.S.R. staff	U.S.S.R. percent contribution	U.S.S.R. percent of contribution	United Kingdom staff	United Kingdom percent contribution	United Kingdom percent of contribution	France staff	France percent contribution	France percent of contribution
UN	2,163	411	19.00	31.52	127	5.87	14.18	130	6.01	5.90	132	6.10	6.00
UNESCO	562	80	14.23	29.80	27	4.80	13.41	56	9.96	5.58	87	15.48	5.67
FAO	791	119	15.04	31.57	(³)	9.12	13.23	92	11.63	8.33	57	7.21	7.55
IAEA	296	46	15.54	31.45	27	9.12	13.23	20	6.76	5.99	15	5.07	5.43
ICAO	149	13	8.72	30.87	(⁴)	4.43	10.45	18	12.08	8.09	9	6.04	6.72
ILO	609	62	10.18	25.00	27	9.38	6.64	72	11.82	9.12	55	9.03	6.07
IMCO	32	3	9.38	8.08	3	3.08	6.31	4	12.50	10.61	2	6.25	2.86
ITU	130	4	3.08	6.31	4	2.47	13.13	12	9.24	6.31	18	13.85	6.31
WHO	1,297	132	10.18	30.87	32	5.62	10.62	136	10.49	5.95	99	7.63	5.39
WMO	89	7	7.87	23.86	5			10	11.24	6.01	5	5.62	4.52

¹ Staff totals as of Dec. 31, 1970.

² Percentages of contributions for calendar year 1971.

³ U.S.S.R. is not a member of FAO.

⁴ Effective Nov. 14, 1970, the U.S.S.R. became a member of ICAO. The U.S.S.R. percentage of contribution to ICAO will be approved at the organization's next triennial assembly.

APPENDIX IV

U.S. REPRESENTATION ON THE STAFFS OF THE UN SECRETARIAT, THE SPECIALIZED AGENCIES, AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

PERCENTAGE OF AMERICAN PROFESSIONALS EMPLOYED IN SECRETARIATS OF THE U.N., ITS SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND CERTAIN OTHER ORGANIZATIONS

[As of Dec. 31, 1970]

Agencies	Calendar year—				
	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
U.N. ¹	19.24	18.81	18.56	18.20	19.00
UNESCO	15.69	15.35	15.21	14.73	14.23
FAO	14.67	15.29	16.12	15.33	15.04
IBRD ¹	33.98	33.13	29.46	28.36	26.52
ICAO	7.81	8.33	6.76	8.51	8.72
ILO	9.78	11.21	10.39	10.51	10.18
IMCO	11.76	11.76	10.71	8.69	9.38
IMF ²	30.57	29.38	27.93	28.34	28.57
ITU	2.42	2.40	2.93	3.42	3.08
UPU	(²)	2.27	4.00	2.00	(²)
WHO	9.40	10.24	10.19	9.95	10.18
WMO	2.04	5.66	7.79	8.54	7.87
Other large agencies:					
IAEA	16.31	16.93	15.11	15.91	15.54
NATO	7.51	8.94	9.17	9.01	9.21
PAU	31.79	41.16	30.87	30.54	30.43

¹ Organizations whose headquarters are located in the United States.

² During calendar years 1966 and 1970 there were 41 and 48 professional posts, respectively, in UPU. However, there were no U.S. professionals on the staff.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, PERSONNEL STATISTICS—STAFF EMPLOYED IN SECRETARIAT AND FIELD POSTS, AS OF DEC. 31, 1970

Organizations	Total staff			Professional staff			Other staff		
	Total	United States	United States percent	Total	United States	United States percent	Total	United States	United States percent
UNITED NATIONS									
U.N. Secretariat.....	8,355	1,468	17.57	2,163	411	19.00	16,192	1,057	17.07
Special U.N. programs:									
UNRWA ²	84	7	8.33	77	7	9.09	7	0	-----
UNICEF.....	605	97	16.03	190	44	23.16	415	53	12.77
UNHCR.....	306	10	3.27	108	7	6.48	198	3	1.51
UNITAR.....	56	10	17.86	23	4	17.39	33	6	18.18
U.N. Development Program:									
Headquarters.....	502	114	22.71	198	57	28.79	304	57	15.46
Field offices ³	370	39	10.54	246	33	13.41	124	6	4.84
ICJ.....	30	1	3.33	7	0	-----	23	1	4.35
Subtotal.....	10,308	1,746	16.94	3,012	563	18.69	7,296	1,183	16.21
U.N. technical assistance experts and other operational personnel: Regular program of technical assistance ⁴	187	21	11.23	187	21	11.23	0	0	-----
U.N. development program (U.N./TAO) ⁵	1,200	90	7.50	1,200	90	7.50	0	0	-----
U.N. technical assistance for the Congo ⁶	293	3	1.37	293	3	1.37	0	0	-----
Subtotal.....	1,680	114	6.79	1,680	114	6.79	0	0	-----
SPECIALIZED AGENCIES									
FAO:									
Secretariat.....	2,426	142	5.85	791	119	15.04	1,635	23	1.40
U.N. Development Program.....	2,062	151	7.32	1,788	148	8.28	274	3	1.09
WFP (Secretariat).....	163	8	4.91	62	8	12.90	101	0	-----
WFP (projects).....	93	9	9.68	92	9	9.78	1	0	-----
Other programs.....	1,351	47	3.48	696	42	6.03	655	5	.76
Subtotal.....	6,095	357	5.86	3,429	326	9.51	2,666	31	1.54
ICAO:									
Secretariat.....	537	18	3.35	149	13	8.72	388	5	1.29
Regular program of technical assistant.....	3	0	-----	3	0	-----	0	0	-----
U.N. Development Program.....	129	11	8.53	129	11	8.53	0	0	-----
Other programs.....	91	6	6.66	45	6	13.33	46	0	-----
Subtotal.....	760	35	4.61	326	30	9.20	434	5	1.15

See footnotes at end of table, p. 49.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, PERSONNEL STATISTICS—STAFF EMPLOYED IN SECRETARIAT AND FIELD POSTS, AS OF DEC. 31, 1970—Continued

Organizations	Total staff			Professional staff			Other staff		
	Total	United States	United States percent	Total	United States	United States percent	Total	United States	United States percent
ILO:									
Secretariat.....	2,156	92	4.27	609	62	10.18	1,547	30	1.94
Regular program of technical assistance.....	60	3	5.00	60	3	5.00	0	0	-----
UN Development Program.....	726	56	7.71	726	56	7.71	0	0	-----
Other programs.....	89	4	4.49	89	4	4.49	0	0	-----
Subtotal.....	3,031	155	5.11	1,484	125	8.42	1,547	30	-----
IMCO:									
Secretariat.....	1,106	3	2.83	32	3	9.38	74	0	-----
UN Development Program.....	9	0	-----	9	0	-----	0	0	-----
Subtotal.....	1,115	3	2.61	41	3	7.32	74	0	-----
ITU:									
Secretariat.....	451	7	1.55	130	4	3.08	321	3	.93
UN Development Program.....	145	6	4.14	145	6	4.14	0	0	-----
Other programs.....	55	1	1.82	55	1	1.82	0	0	-----
Subtotal.....	651	14	2.15	330	11	3.33	321	3	.93
UNESCO:									
Secretariat.....	1,657	107	6.34	562	80	14.23	1,095	27	2.47
Regular program of technical assistance.....	266	6	2.26	98	6	6.12	168	0	-----
UN Development Program.....	1,007	40	3.98	782	38	4.86	225	2	.87
Other programs.....	256	6	2.34	120	5	4.17	136	1	.74
Subtotal.....	3,186	159	4.99	1,562	129	8.26	1,624	30	1.85
UPU:									
Secretariat.....	89	0	-----	848	0	-----	41	0	-----
UN Development Program.....	23	0	-----	23	0	-----	0	0	-----
Subtotal.....	112	0	-----	71	0	-----	41	0	-----
WHO:									
Secretariat.....	2,949	159	5.39	1,297	132	10.18	1,652	27	1.65
UN Development Program.....	254	25	9.80	243	25	10.29	11	0	-----
Other programs.....	285	23	8.87	163	22	13.56	122	1	.82
Subtotal.....	3,488	207	5.93	1,703	179	10.51	1,785	28	1.57

WMO:	253	8	3.16	89	7	7.87	164	1	.61
Secretariat	11	0	---	11	0	---	0	0	---
Regular program of technical assistance	97	4	4.12	97	4	4.12	0	0	---
UN Development Program	7	1	14.28	7	1	14.28	0	0	---
Other programs									
Subtotal	368	13	3.53	204	12	5.88	164	1	.61
Subtotal, Specialized Agencies	17,806	943	5.30	9,150	815	8.91	8,656	128	1.48
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS									
ADB	490	13	2.67	159	13	8.17	331	0	---
IBRD:									
Secretariat	2,651	681	25.68	1,380	366	26.52	1,271	315	24.78
UNDP	148	25	16.89	148	25	16.89	0	0	---
IFC	155	45	29.03	90	24	26.66	65	21	32.30
IMF	1,176	332	28.23	616	176	28.57	560	156	27.86
IDB	960	178	18.54	452	116	25.66	508	62	12.20
Subtotal	5,580	1,274	22.83	2,845	720	25.31	2,735	554	20.26
INTER-AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS									
Organization of American States (OAS)	1,058	255	24.12	516	157	30.43	542	98	18.08
Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)	677	111	16.40	303	70	23.10	375	41	10.96
Inter-American Indian Institute (IAII)	12	0	---	4	0	---	8	0	---
Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Science (IAS)	391	11	2.81	120	9	7.50	271	2	.74
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC)	31	21	67.74	15	10	66.66	16	11	68.75
Pan American Institute of Geography and History (PAIGH)	45	1	2.22	11	1	9.09	34	0	---
Pan American Railway Association (PARCA)	4	0	---	2	0	---	2	0	---
Postal Union of the Americas and Spain (PUAS)	3	0	---	3	0	---	0	0	---
Subtotal	2,221	399	17.96	974	247	25.36	1,247	152	12.19
OTHER REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS									
North American Treaty Organization	1,112	22	1.98	228	21	9.21	884	1	0.1
North Atlantic Assembly	17	0	---	6	0	---	11	0	---
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)	112	3	2.68	23	3	13.04	89	0	---
Colombo Plan Bureau	30	0	---	4	0	---	26	0	---
International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos (ICC)	40	0	---	4	0	---	10	0	---
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)	1,303	34	2.61	410	31	7.56	893	3	.34
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO)	173	2	---	37	2	---	136	0	---
South Pacific Commission (SPC)	74	2	2.70	30	1	3.33	44	1	2.27
Subtotal	2,861	63	2.20	742	58	7.82	2,119	5	.24

See footnotes at end of table, p. 49.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, PERSONNEL STATISTICS—STAFF EMPLOYED IN SECRETARIAT AND FIELD POSTS, AS OF DEC. 31, 1970—Continued

Organizations	Total staff			Professional staff			Other staff		
	Total	United States	United States percent	Total	United States	United States percent	Total	United States	United States percent
OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS									
Customs Cooperation Council (CCC)	66	0	-----	29	0	-----	37	0	-----
Intergovernmental Commission for European Migration (ICEM)	¹¹ 526	21	3.99	82	11	13.41	444	10	2.25
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)	¹² 1,082	82	7.87	296	46	15.54	786	36	4.58
IAEA-Regular Program of Technical Assistance	25	4	16.00	25	4	16.00	0	0	-----
IAEA-UN Development Program	24	3	12.50	24	3	12.50	0	0	-----
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)	198	10	5.55	70	6	8.57	128	4	3.54
Hague Conference on Private International Law	11	0	-----	4	0	-----	7	0	-----
International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration	6	0	-----	3	0	-----	3	0	-----
International Bureau for the Publications of Custom Tariffs	20	0	-----	2	0	-----	18	0	-----
International Bureau of Weights and Measures ¹³	49	0	-----	42	0	-----	7	0	-----
International Centre for the Study of the Preservation of Cultural Property	14	0	-----	6	0	-----	8	0	-----
International Coffee Organization	68	1	1.47	24	0	-----	44	1	2.27
International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries	6	0	-----	2	0	-----	4	0	-----
International Cotton Advisory Commission	11	3	27.27	6	3	50.00	5	0	-----
International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU)	2	0	-----	2	0	-----	0	0	-----
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL)	108	0	-----	26	0	-----	82	0	-----
International Hydrographic Bureau	19	1	5.26	7	1	14.28	12	0	-----
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law	15	0	-----	8	0	-----	7	0	-----
International Lead and Zinc Study Group	2	2	100.00	1	1	100.00	1	1	100.00
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission	3	1	33.33	2	1	50.00	1	0	-----

International Rubber Study Group	7	0		3	0		4	0	
International Secretariat for Volunteer Services (ISVS) ¹³	8	2	25.00	2	1		6	1	16.66
International Union of Official Travel Organizations (IVOTO)	33	1	3.33	11	0		22	1	4.54
International Whaling Commission	1	0		1	0		0	0	
International Wheat Council	23	1	4.35	10	1		13	0	
Interparliamentary Union (IPU)	11	1	9.99	6	1		5	0	
World Intellectual Property Organization	111	2	1.80	37	2		74	0	
Subtotal	2,449	135	5.51	731	81		1,718	54	3.14
Grand total	42,905	4,674	10.89	19,134	2,598		23,771	2,076	8.74
STATISTICAL SUMMARY									
United Nations Secretariat and Special UN Programs	11,988	1,860	15.52	4,692	677		7,296	1,183	16.21
UN Specialized Agencies	17,806	943	5.30	9,150	815		8,656	128	1.48
Total	29,794	2,803	9.41	13,842	1,492		15,952	1,311	8.22
International Financial Institutions	5,580	1,274	22.83	2,845	720		2,735	554	20.26
Inter-American Organizations	2,221	399	17.96	974	247		1,247	152	12.19
Regional Organizations	2,861	63	2.20	742	58		2,119	5	.24
Other International Organizations	2,449	135	5.51	731	81		1,718	54	3.14
Grand total	42,905	4,674	10.89	19,134	2,598		23,771	2,076	8.73

¹ This total includes professionals in post not subject to geographical distribution and nonprofessional staff.

² In addition there are 13,728 UNRWA locals, 3 of whom are United States.

³ In addition there are 2,080 UNDP locals, 10 of whom are United States.

⁴ Totals include 41 experts, 2 of whom are United States, on projects being executed by UNIDO.

⁵ Total include 209 experts, 22 of whom are United States, on projects executed by UNIDO.

⁶ December 1969 totals.

⁷ June 30, 1970 totals.

⁸ There are an additional 6 temporary professionals, including 1 United States.

⁹ March 31, 1970 totals.

¹⁰ This total includes 22 civilian nonprofessionals in the Secretariat, in addition to 9 military and 5 civilian personnel whose services are contributed by the supervisory powers.

¹¹ In addition, there are 4 experts financed from the operational budget.

¹² Totals include 33 nonprofessionals, 5 United States, with double nationalities.

¹³ Dec. 31, 1969 totals.

APPENDIX V

COMPARISON OF THE UNITED STATES AND UNITED NATIONS GROSS SALARIES FOR CERTAIN SELECTED POSITIONS

TABLE I.—RELATIVE POSITION OF FEDERAL AND U.N. SALARIES BASED UPON GRADE CLASSIFICATIONS

GS	Category and Grade		Minimum gross salary	Maximum gross salary
	FSO	U.N. ¹		
18			\$36,000	\$36,000
	1		35,617	36,000
17			32,546	36,000
		D-2	31,200	33,720
16			28,129	35,633
	2		27,935	33,521
		D-1	26,000	31,040
15			24,251	31,523
		P-5	22,700	28,550
	3		22,135	26,563
14			20,815	27,061
		P-4	18,120	24,280
	4		17,761	21,313
13			17,761	23,089

¹Salaries shown include 8 percent increase effective July 1, 1971.

TABLE II.—U.N.(FAO) AND U.S. ALLOWANCES, ROME, AS OF JULY 1, 1971

	Minimum	Maximum
P-4:		
Family allowance: Wife and 2 children	\$1,000	\$1,000
Repatriation grant	1,044	1,351
Total	2,044	2,351
FSO-4(GS-13): Living quarters allowance	3,600	
P-5:		
Family allowance: Wife and 2 children	1,000	1,000
Repatriation grant	1,274	1,548
Total	2,274	2,548
FSO-3 (GS-14/15): Living quarters allowance	4,000	
D-1:		
Family allowance: Wife and 2 children	1,000	1,000
Repatriation grant	1,431	1,663
Total	2,431	2,663
FSO-2 (GS-16): Living quarters allowance	4,000	
D-2:		
Family allowance: Wife and 2 children	1,000	1,000
Repatriation grant	1,608	1,780
Total	2,608	2,780
FSO-1 (GS-17): Living quarters allowance	4,000	