Y 4
J 89/2
W 26

GOVERNMENT

Storage

A11600 679422

FARRELL LIBRARY
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY

JAN 18 1990

DOCUMENTS

AUTHENTICATED
U.S. GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION
GPO

FARRELL LIBRARY
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY

JAN 18 1990

DOCUMENTS

DOC EXP
KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY

89/2
J26

91st Congress
1st Session } COMMITTEE PRINT

THE WARSAW INSURRECTION: THE COMMUNIST VERSION VERSUS THE FACTS

PREPARED FOR THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE

BY THE LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE
OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS



Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
34-895 WASHINGTON : 1969

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402—Price 20 cents

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, *Chairman*

JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carolina
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut
PHILIP A. HART, Michigan
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
BIRCH BAYH, Indiana
QUENTIN N. BURDICK, North Dakota
JOSEPH D. TYDINGS, Maryland
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia

ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
HIRAM L. FONG, Hawaii
HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
MARLOW W. COOK, Kentucky
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., Maryland
ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, Michigan

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

JAMES O. EASTLAND, Mississippi, *Chairman*
THOMAS J. DODD, Connecticut, *Vice Chairman*

JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas
SAM J. ERVIN, JR., North Carolina
BIRCH BAYH, Indiana
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia

ROMAN L. HRUSKA, Nebraska
HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania
STROM THURMOND, South Carolina

J. G. SOURWINE, *Chief Counsel*
JOHN R. NORPEL, JR., *Director of Research*
ALFONSO L. TARABOCHIA, *Chief Investigator*

RESOLUTION

Resolved, by the Subcommittee on Internal Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, That a study entitled "The Warsaw Insurrection: The Communist Version Versus the Facts," prepared by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress for the use of the subcommittee shall be printed for the use of the subcommittee.

Approved: October 24, 1969.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

AUGUST 11, 1969.

Hon. JAMES O. EASTLAND,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The purpose of this letter is to request that the Subcommittee on Internal Security publish as a committee print the attached study entitled "The Warsaw Insurrection: The Communist Version Versus the Facts." I believe that the publication of this document can contribute significantly to a better understanding of the nature of communism.

The document consists of three parts:

1. An introduction which I have prepared.
2. A study of the Warsaw insurrection prepared by Miss Irene Lazutin, foreign affairs analyst at the Library of Congress.
3. A statement put out by the Polish Communist Embassy in Washington on the 25th anniversary of the Warsaw uprising.

With my thanks for your consideration,

Sincerely,

THOMAS J. DODD.

THE WARSAW INSURRECTION: THE COMMUNIST VERSION VERSUS THE FACTS

INTRODUCTION

By Senator Thomas J. Dodd

August 1, 1969, marked the 25th anniversary of the Warsaw uprising, one of the most heroic and desperately fought acts of organized resistance in human history.

With the Soviet Red army approaching Warsaw, liberation seemed to be on the order of the day. The Polish Home Army in Warsaw numbered only 35,000 men, of whom only 20,000 were armed with rifles and light machineguns. The Wehrmacht and the Luftwaffe still had formidible forces deployed in the Warsaw area. So great was the degree of popular support for the Home Army and so irresistible their elan, however, that, after 5 days of fighting, they controlled two-thirds of the city.

But the heroism of the Polish Home Army was rewarded by one of the crassest betrayals in history.

For some reason the Soviet Red army, which had been advancing with relatively little opposition, stopped its advance at the approaches to Warsaw, and failed to make any effort to break through to the beleaguered freedom fighters. . . . No help of any kind came from the Soviet side. Britain and the United States, at great risk, airdropped small quantities of supplies over the liberated areas of Warsaw. But the effort was sadly limited in volume because of the refusal by the Soviets to permit the British and American planes to land and refuel at the various airfields which the Red army controlled just east of Warsaw.

Granted complete freedom of action by the Soviets, the Nazis responded to the Warsaw uprising with a merciless artillery and aerial assault on the liberated areas of the city.

For 63 days, against hopeless odds, the Polish Home Army fought on, while the city of Warsaw was razed, block by block, around them and over their heads.

Finally, those who could not escape capitulated.

All told, this epic battle cost the Poles 250,000 casualties, killed, wounded, and missing.

On the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the Warsaw uprising, the Embassy of the Polish People's Republic in Washington put out a statement ostensibly hailing the heroism of those who fought in the battle of Warsaw. It was an anniversary which the Polish Communist government could not ignore, because they would convict themselves in the eyes of their people if they failed to pay homage to it.

But the statement which they issued turned out to be a despicable amalgam of pretended tribute and of historical falsification intended to conceal the real role played by the Soviet Union and its Polish quislings in the battle of Warsaw.

The statement put out by the Polish Embassy*, after paying tribute to those who fought in the Warsaw uprising, pointed out that during the first 6 weeks of fighting the insurgents suffered from a terrible shortage of weapons. The weapons flown from the West, it said, were reaching the insurgents only in small quantities because of the large distance, strong antiaircraft fire, and small drop areas. It quoted a Home Army source as saying that total British and American airdrops amounted to only 52 tons of material, and that the situation improved only toward the end of the uprising "thanks to Soviet supplies, which . . . reached 160 tons."

But the facts are too well-documented for the Communists to be able to pull the wool over anyone's eyes on the issue of the Warsaw uprising. These facts were set forth in a devastating documentation prepared, in conjunction with the 25th anniversary of the uprising, by Miss Irene Lazutin, foreign affairs analyst for the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress.

The Embassy statement says nothing about the attitude of the Moscow government toward the uprising; nor does it offer any explanation for the failure of the Red army to even attempt to break through to the rescue of the freedom fighters during the 63 days of the seige of Warsaw; nor does it mention the fact that the Soviet Government refused point blank to permit the landing and refueling of British and American planes at the half dozen airports which they controlled within a 25-mile radius of Warsaw.

In its closing paragraphs, the statement put out by the Polish Communist Embassy sought to portray the uprising as an act of political adventurism called for by "the emigree political forces in London." It said that the uprising had taken place without the approval of or consultation with the Soviet Army, and that its real purpose was "to forestall the Red army's entry into Warsaw . . ."

The fact is, as Miss Lazutin points out in this study, that on July 29, 2 days before the uprising, the Soviets had called upon the Poles to take up arms against the Nazis in support of the advancing Red army. The Soviet-controlled Kosciuszko radio station broadcast this appeal:

> Poles! The time of liberation is at hand! Poles, to arms . . . Every Polish homestead must become a stronghold in the struggle against the invader . . . there is not a moment to lose.

As Miss Lazutin's study confirms, Stalin deliberately permitted the Nazis to crush the Warsaw uprising because the Polish Home Army, in addition to being anti-Nazi, was anti-Communist. "While the plight of the Warsaw Poles grew more desperate," says the study, "the combined efforts of Roosevelt and Churchill failed to persuade Stalin to order Soviet troops to cross the Vistula to aid the rebels."

Stalin and his quisling Poles made it clear that they would give no assistance to the uprising unless the Polish Government in exile, then in London, abdicated in favor of Moscow's so-called Lublin Committee. Only when Stanislaw Mikolajczyk agreed to resign as Prime Minister of the London government on September 12 and to concede

---

*See official statement issued by Polish Embassy in Washington, p. 15.

14 of the 18 seats in a coalition government to the Communists, did the Kremlin revise its stand on aid to Warsaw.

But even then the amount of aid given was carefully rationed.

It was enough to permit Moscow to say that it had sought to assist the Warsaw Poles in the last weeks of their battle.

But it was definitely not enough to permit the Nazis from mercilessly crushing the revolt.

As Churchill put it, Stalin wanted to see the anti-Communist Poles killed to the fullest.

Warsaw surrendered on October 2, 1944.

The contrast between Miss Lazutin's study of the Warsaw uprising and the version of the uprising put out by the Polish Communist Government provides a lesson that pertains to the present every whit as much as it does to the past. Indeed, I can think of no more effective answer to those who argue that we have been too distrustful of the Communists.

I have asked that this study be printed in the interest of the historical accuracy and as a tribute to the scores of thousands of heroic Poles who fought and died and were so cruelly betrayed.

34-895—69——2

THE WARSAW INSURRECTION

(Prepared by Irene Lazutin, Foreign Affairs Analyst, Foreign Affairs Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress)

I. The Warsaw Uprising in its Diplomatic Setting

A. Government-in-exile

The Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of nonaggression, signed in secret August 23, 1939, divided Poland between Germany and Soviet Russia. The following month the Polish state was liquidated by the German invasion. A circle formed of members of the Polish Government and military escaped to France and England. This group established a Polish Government-in-exile in London under Prime Minister Sikorski. Both Britain and the United States recognized this group as the legal Government of Poland and accepted it as a full ally. It contributed substantially to the defense of Britain and to operations in Italy and France. But the Soviet Government scorned it.

During the thrust eastward, German troops occupied the parts of Poland which had been absorbed by Russia. After Germany invaded Soviet Russia in June 1941, it was hoped that Stalin and Sikorski would be reconciled out of a common interest in defeating Germany. But Sikorski demanded that Poland's frontiers be restored to their status before September 1939. Stalin refused; the friction between them continued.

In July 1941, Sikorski was killed in a plane accident over Gibraltar. A new cabinet was formed under Prime Minister Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, head of the Polish Peasant Party. The new cabinet was composed both of men who might take a more compromising posture on relations with the Soviets and those who would not surrender Sikorski's goals.

B. The Polish underground

The Polish underground reappeared October 7, 1939, in the form of *Armiia Ludowa*, the Home Army. Its original purpose was to mobilize the population against the German occupation. After Russia was invaded in 1941, the Home Army relieved the strain on Soviet forces on the eastern front by forcing the Germans to retain troops in Poland. After the Soviets began to advance across East Europe in 1944, the Home Army expanded its sabotage of German communication and supply lines. During the uprising in Warsaw, the Home Army was under the command of Gen. Tadeusz Bor-Komorowski. He adopted the pseudonym "Bor," with the symbolic meaning of "forest" in the Polish language, while he was a colonel in the underground.

C. Allied diplomatic relations

The outcome of the Warsaw uprising was decided in foreign capitals. Relations among the Big Three—England, the United States, and Soviet Russia—were determined by a number of factors which domi-

nated Allied diplomacy throughout the war. Although the objectives of the Big Three often conflicted on specific issues, they were united in defeating Hitler. For this reason, measures related to winning the war took priority over the demands of minor powers and their representatives.

However, after the Red army had defeated the Germans in Russia and entered East Europe, the position of these countries took on a greater importance. For the first time the United States and England had to consider the implications of a Europe under Soviet occupation. The Soviets had played a major role in the defeat of Germany. Churchill and Roosevelt wanted to retain Stalin's cooperation in world affairs after the armistice. But the expansion of Soviet power had upset the prewar balance of power in Europe and caused tensions in relations among the Big Three.

The seeds of the cold war were planted during this period. Latent tensions among the Big Three erupted into open discord in late 1944 when the focal point in Allied diplomacy was East Europe. The demands of the nations about to be "liberated" by the Red army exaggerated this friction. For example, one discussion with Mikolajczyk so angered Churchill that he assailed the Polish Prime Minister:

> If you think you can conquer Russia, well, you are crazy, you ought to be in a lunatic asylum. You would involve us in a war in which twenty-five million lives might be lost. You would be liquidated. You hate the Russians, I know you hate them. We are very friendly with them, more friendly than we have ever been. I mean to keep things like that. I tell you, we'll become sick and tired if you continue arguing. We shall tell the world how unreasonable you are. We shall not part friends.[1]

D. Soviet objectives

The original Soviet strategy for the offensive into Poland in June 1944 is not clear. In a letter to U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Averell Harriman, dated July 5, 1944, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov said that the Red armies were headed for Konigsberg with the intention of moving through East Prussia and north Poland, thus bypassing Warsaw entirely. He specified that the Soviets planned to leave the liberation of Warsaw to the Polish partisan army after German communications to the West had been cut.[2] If such was the original Soviet plan, there are several possible motives for the abrupt halt before Warsaw: (1) As Churchill and the Polish Government in London believed, Stalin deliberately waited until the Home Army had been liquidated; (2) The Soviet thrust northward was not executed as planned, and thus the German lines of communication remained unsevered; or (3) As Stalin said, the Soviet troops had to wait while their defenses were strengthened because the German hold in Warsaw was too strong.

But the Poles who survived the Warsaw Uprising of 1944 had no doubts as to Soviet motives in allowing German planes and tanks to destroy Warsaw. The vanguard of the Polish underground movement supported Mikolajczyk's government-in-exile. Many Poles charge that Stalin wanted this group to be liquidated so that he could replace it with a puppet government. This case has often been stated. If there is a case for the other side, we have yet to hear it.

---

[1] Lord Moran. Churchill: the Struggle for Survival. Cambridge. Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966, p. 215.
[2] Feis, Herbert. Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 194.

II. Initial Success of the Uprising in Warsaw

A. The decision to revolt

In late July the German forces started to evacuate Warsaw in large numbers, prompting the underground to insurrection. According to the testimony at the Nuremberg trials of Chief of Staff of German Forces General Heinz Guderian:

> The whole front, if it can be called a "front," was hardly more than an agglomeration of the remains of our armies which were endeavoring to withdraw to the line of the Vistula; 25 divisions were completely annihilated.[3]

While these troops were being withdrawn, contingents were left behind in Warsaw, apparently to intensify repression against the civilian population and prepare for the anticipated Soviet liberation of Warsaw. The probable German intention to mobilize Warsaw was reflected in repeated announcements over loudspeakers that 100,000 men and women were needed to dig fortifications along the River Vistula. During an interview with the London Times, General Bor was asked to justify the timing of the revolt. He replied:

> If we had not taken up arms on or about the 1st of August, we should never have been able to fight at all because the Germans were beginning to seize our men for digging trenches or for transfer far from Polish soil.[4]

The bitter experience of the civilians of Wilno, Lwow, and Bialystok during the German withdrawal probably encouraged the people of Warsaw to revolt.

The leadership of the Home Army further recognized that the success of the operation depended on Russian support. General Bor expected Soviet assistance against German troops for several reasons. The Russian offensive into Poland began in June 1944. By the end of July, the Red army had smashed the central German defensive line and had advanced about 300 more miles. They had seized at least six airfields within a radius of 25 miles from Warsaw.[5] The Government-in-exile in London had granted General Bor the authority to make decisions necessitated by the Russian advance on July 29 the Soviets personally invited the Poles to take up arms through the Soviet-controlled Kosciuszko radio station:

> Poles, the time of liberation is at hand! Poles, to arms . . . Every Polish homestead must become a stronghold in the struggle against the invader . . . there is not a moment to lose.[6]

It had been reported that Soviet units had broken into the German bridgehead in Warsaw, had shattered it, and had already occupied Radosc, Milosna, Okuniew, Wolomin, and Radzymin. With Soviet support, the underground did not expect the fighting to last more than a week. Had Soviet bombers been made available, General Bor estimated that the victory could have been won in a few days. Acting on these intelligence reports General Bor issued the order to begin battle at 5 o'clock, August 1, 1944.

B. The first week of battle

People in the street reacted with shouts and applause at the sight of the Polish eagle or the uniform which they had not seen for five years and when they saw German prisoners or captured arms. In this case, a window was flung open and a

---

[3] The Destruction of Warsaw. Katowice, 1966, p. 117.
[4] Polish Facts and Figures, Oct. 15, 1944, p. 22.
[5] Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 378.
[6] Bor-Komorowski, T. The Secret Army. London, Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1950, p. 205.

loudspeaker started up the song "*Warszawianka,*" the Polish revolutionary song composed 114 years before. Everyone in the street, whether passing by or busy at the barricades, stood to attention, and joined in the song. I was deeply affected by the fervor of the crowd. I think those moments were the happiest of the whole war. Unfortunately, they were short-lived.[7]

After 5 years of bitter experiences under German occupation, civilian Poles took part in the revolt under the leadership of the Home Army. According to the estimates of General Bor, the Home Army numbered about 35,000 in Warsaw; 20,000 of these were armed with rifles and light machineguns. Because there were not enough weapons to supply civilian volunteers, they used picks and spades, and made bombs from bottles of petrol. They tore up the pavements and used the blocks for barricades. In one way or another, all Warsaw was committed to the uprising. Bor-Komorowski attributes the initial success of the revolt to the "impetuous fervor" of the first atttack.[8]

The initial Polish onslaught caught the Germans off guard. Thinking that these were merely local skirmishes, they continued their evacuation proceedings. But after reappraising the situation, on August 2 they began to move tanks into the centers of battle, hoping that these Panzer units of 18 tanks would finish the seemingly helpless Poles in a few hours. But the "Panzer monsters, heavily armed, appeared to be helpless when in a street where they were attacked from doors and windows on all sides." [9]

Neither did the Germans take into account the extent of the civilian contribution to the battle. Among their feats, the record of a 12-year-old boy soon became a legend. After knocking out a Tiger tank with a bottle of petrol at a range of 5 feet, he was carried about on the shoulders of his comrades wearing a tin French helment, a relic of the last war, and nicknamed "Tiger." The lad was armed with more *filipinki* (gas bombs) and soon earned the rank of sergeant by destroying more tanks.[10]

As a result of extraordinary efforts, four districts of Warsaw had been seized by the Poles in the first 24 hours of battle. The next day Bor reported that 40 percent of the city was controlled by the Home Army. By August 5, two-thirds of the city was in the hands of the underground. The Poles now controlled the major factories of Warsaw, the public utilities, and many of the administration buildings. They had organized a "Home Council of Ministers." The population of Warsaw already supported the Home Army as a military organization. Now the success of these efforts at administration and providing services earned their respect as a government. This was an important victory for the underground in view of Stalin's later attempts to force a Soviet-controlled government on Poland, Mikolajczyk's mission to aid Warsaw, and diplomatic efforts to prevent Poland from becoming a vassal state of Soviet Russia.

Alarmed at the success of the rebellion in Warsaw, the Germans began to take more radical measures. On August 4 they staged the first Luftwaffe raid on Warsaw since the campaign of 1939. They tied women and children to tanks and used herds of civilians to cover an advancing German battalion. They put armored trains into action to fire on parts of the city controlled by rebels. They used Goliath tanks and the heaviest kind of cannon fire. Although his efforts to

---

[7] Bor-Komorowski, *op. cit.*, p. 234.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 225.
[9] *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 223.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 241.

secure Allied reinforcements were obstructed by the Soviets, Mikolajczyk went on the air September 1 to thank the Poles for their courage. This tragic reply followed:

> Warsaw is waiting. We received yesterday Mikolajczyk's message in a soldierly spirit. We did not have and have no choice. The soldiers of Wola, Mokotow, the Inner City, and Powisle are faithful soldiers. We believe in the cause of our struggle and therefore we shall go on fighting to the last drop of our blood. . . . The democratic world looks on whilst thousands of old people, women, and children are perishing. Warsaw is waiting for help.[11]

The underground had hidden enough food and medical supplies to last 1 week—without Soviet support. The air raids took a heavy toll on the underground forces. The rebels found themselves running out of weapons, food, and medical supplies, which they had expected to be replenished by the Russians. After the first week of August, the Polish offensive was clearly in trouble, but the Poles persisted in fighting because they hoped that Soviet troops would enter Warsaw as soon as they had overcome the German counterattack.

C. Mikolajczyk in Moscow

The visit to Moscow of the Prime Minister of the Polish Government-in-exile was prompted by a number of factors which could have radically altered the future of Poland. On July 22, 1944, a "Committee of National Liberation" was established in Lublin under Soviet auspices. The Russians announced that liberated Polish territory would be placed under the control of this group. The London government recognized this development as a challenge to the future sovereignty of Poland and to a legitimate Polish Government. Mikolajczyk wanted to negotiate with Stalin the terms of Soviet support for the joint liberation of Warsaw. Fearing another partition of Poland, Mikolajczyk went to register his disapproval of the "Curzon line," Stalin's plan to shift the Polish-Soviet border westward, and of Stalin's interference in domestic Polish political affairs. The exiled Prime Minister arrived in Moscow July 20, on the eve of the Warsaw uprising which catalyzed all these issues and frustrated his purposes.

When Mikolajczyk finally was allowed to meet with Stalin August 3, his first question was for assistance for the Poles embattled in Warsaw. Stalin rejected the proposal: "I cannot trust the Poles. They suspect me of wanting to occupy Poland again. They're making trouble for me." [12] Instead Stalin immediately pushed for Mikolajczyk to recognize the Lublin Committee and deal with it as the legitimate Government of Poland. Citing the insignificant contribution of the Soviet-sponsored Polish People's Army of 400 men as compared to the 40,000 forces of the Home Army, Mikolajczyk protested that Stalin had no right to pass off the Lublin Committee as the force responsible for the liberation of Poland. Referring to the Lublin Poles as "the Polish Government," Stalin warned Mikolajczyk that if he did not come to some "arrangement" with them, he would back the Lublin group as the only government in Poland and deal with it as such. Mikolajczyk succumbed.[13]

The following day, August 5, a delegation of the leading members of the Lublin Committee was rushed to Moscow. Among these were known Polish Communists such as Boleslaw Beirut, head of the first

---

[11] Mikolajczyk, Stanislaw. The Rape of Poland. New York, McGraw-Hill Company, Inc., 1948, p. 84.
[12] Mikolajczyk, Stanislaw. Pattern of Soviet Domination. London, Sampson Low, Marston, & Co., Ltd., 1948, p. 81.
[13] Lane, Arthur Bliss. I Saw Poland Betrayed. New York, The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1948, p. 45.

Communist regime to rule Poland after the war, Wanda Wasilewska, Andrzej Witos, Marshal Rola-Zymierski, and Edward Osobka-Morawski. The Lublin group attempted to deny that there was any fighting in Poland. After Mikolajczyk showed them a few communiques from General Bor, Wanda Wasilewska conceded: "Well, if it's time, the help will come soon. After all, we want to establish ourselves there as soon as possible." [14] Beirut offered to Mikolajczyk to grant five posts in the postwar government of Poland to non-Communists if the government-in-exile would recognize him as president. Mikolajczyk was incensed:

> I cannot even discuss this with you. First of all, I am already the Prime Minister of a legally formed government that, together with its underground arm, fought the Germans when you—as a Communist—were allied with Hitler. We were formed under a constitution for which I have no particular appetite. But at least it was a constitution of a legalized government, recognized throughout the war by the major powers. My government has subscribed to the Atlantic Charter, signed the Lend-Lease deals, and made our connection with UNRRA. What you are asking me to do is sell out the Polish people. You're asking me to become a swine. [15]

The meeting ended in an impasse with Stalin offering to aid the insurgents in Warsaw if Mikolajczyk would agree to the Curzon line and the compromised status of his government-in-exile.

III. Soviet Obstructionism

As soon as Stalin heard of Churchill's plans for the airlift to Warsaw, he assailed the insurrection as a "reckless and terrible adventure," blamed "Polish emigre cricles" for inciting the revolt, and refused to admit United States and British planes to Soviet airfields. Most important he failed to order Soviet troops to cross the Vistula to aid the Poles embattled in Warsaw. While the plight of the Warsaw Poles grew more desperate, the combined efforts of Roosevelt and Churchill failed to persuade Stalin to order Soviet troops to cross the Vistula to aid the rebels. Britain and the United States joined in sending supplies to Warsaw. These missions from Italy and Britain were perilous because the planes, which were prevented from landing, had to complete the mission without refueling. On one occasion "28 aircraft did the 700 miles from Italy. Three were lost. This was the fourth flight made . . . under these quite exceptional conditions." [16] On August 17, Roosevelt personally intervened by authorizing Ambassador to the Soviet Union Harriman to ask for Soviet assistance to embattled Warsaw.

When Molotov protested that Soviet involvement would only lead to more "sacrifices," Harriman questioned the wisdom of sacrificing Warsaw to Allied unity: "When the American public fully understands the facts, then there will be serious repercussions in the public opinion in the United States and even in its confidence and hopes for the success of postwar collaboration." [17] Churchill, too, favored more honesty in Allied relations: "We are nations serving historical causes and must give true counsels toward world peace even at the risk of Stalin resisting it. Quite possibly he wouldn't." [18]

---

[14] Mikolajczyk, *op. cit.*, p. 76.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 77.
[16] Churchill, Winston. Triumph and Tragedy. Cambridge, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1953, p. 133.
[17] Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 51.
[18] Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

When it was clear that world opinion and this diplomatic offensive would not alter the Soviet position on aid to Warsaw, the United States and Britain shifted their position. They continued to apply diplomatic pressures. But their actions were more determined by the need to preserve a united Allied front against Hitler and the demands of peace in the postwar world. In this vein, Roosevelt urged Mikolajczyk to establish a working relationship with the Lublin Poles.

> I feel, however, that these unfortunate developments should not deter you from presenting reasonable proposals to the Polish Committee of National Liberation and I am of the firm opinion that if reasonable proposals are not presented to the Committee, and if a crisis should arise in the Polish Government, such developments could only worsen the situation.[19]

The same day Roosevelt sent a message to Churchill indicating that no further action could be taken without Soviet approval.[20]

IV. Failure of the Uprising

A. The Warsaw battleground

Early September was the beginning of the end for the Warsaw insurrection. The city's powerhouse and waterworks were bombed September 4. Although United States and British airlifts were appreciated, they could not begin to satisfy the desperate needs of the rebels. Under cover of Luftwaffe, the Germans burned districts of Warsaw house by house. Poles who fled the buildings were arrested and assembled behind barbed wire. For the perpetration of the worst atrocities, the Germans used the "Kaminski brigade," Soviet prisoners who had been freed to enlist as units in the German Army.

The Poles tried to broaden their appeal. They sent communiques to foreign press. The Polish radio gave uninterrupted coverage to the situation in Warsaw: "We have a desperate feeling of loneliness and frustration. We are sending this report because we feel that you do not realize under what conditions we are living and fighting."[21] On September 9 Mokotow fell. On September 30 Zoliborz followed. The Germans concentrated their offensive on the midtown center, with its quarter of a million inhabitants. The resistance of the Poles was nearly broken now. The city was in ruins. A Polish airman who flew six missions to Warsaw during the uprising recorded his impressions:

> Warsaw looks as if she would cease to exist at any moment. There are innumerable fires everywhere. In fact there is hardly a house which is not alight. . . . Our cabin is full of smoke but it helps us hide from the German searchlights. . . . The Germans are trying to locate us through the thick screen of smoke and are sending rockets up into the sky.[22]

B. Last-minute diplomatic efforts

Desperate to save Warsaw, Mikolajczyk went to Churchill September 11 ready to compromise with the Lublin government. The London government had agreed to concede 14 of the 18 seats in the planned coalition which would rule Poland. Mikolajczyk sent one last message to Stalin pleading with him to liberate Warsaw. There was no response. Mikolajczyk resigned the following day:

> The Big Three regarded us as saboteurs of their unity because of our refusal to yield on all points. My own cabinet felt that I had compromised too much,

---

[19] Mikolajczyk, *op. cit.*, p. 287.
[20] Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 139.
[21] Polish Facts and Figures, Oct. 15, 1944.
[22] *Ibid.*, pp. 18–19.

although I explained to them that they were on the verge of being cut off from the Polish people by the threatened recognition of the Lublin group by all major Powers. , . . My stand was the position of a minority. I resigned.[23]

While Mikolajczyk's cause failed, Churchill's efforts to secure American aid for Warsaw led to one large-scale successful airlift. In late September, 100 bombers flew over Warsaw dropping supplies. "The desperately grateful people of Warsaw came up from their ruins to cheer the Americans." [24]

C. Soviet intervention

After more than 1 month of obstructionism, the Soviets finally began to react to the needs of Warsaw. Mikolajczyk's resignation was probably a determining factor. Stalin finally opened the Soviet airfields to American planes September 10. Soviet artillery began to fire on the eastern outskirts of Warsaw. The first signs of the Red air force finally appeared over Warsaw September 11 to drop ammunition and guns. But the ammunition did not fit the guns dropped, nor the guns of the Poles. Food was dropped also, but in defective chutes or without chutes. It smashed in the ruins of the city. However, the Soviet propaganda machine did not mention these details.

D. Surrender

Warsaw finally submitted to surrender October 2, 1944, the 63d day of battle. The operation which was expected to last a week had destroyed the city. That day the Polish radio announced bitterly:

Warsaw is no more. There are only ruins left. Those Poles who are fighting abroad will have to rebuild the capital. * * * A new city will rise in which a new generation will dwell succeeding those who stood up to fight and fought until death. The rising in Warsaw was for this generation.[25]

The human cost of the struggle was enormous. A million people were living in Warsaw when the uprising began. A quarter of these, including the cream of Poland's youth and 15,000 members of the underground, were killed, wounded, or missing at the time of capitulation. The revolt cost the German army 10,000 killed, 7,000 missing, and 9,000 wounded. These proportions indicate the hand-to-hand character of the struggle. "When the Russians entered the city 3 months later they found little but shattered streets and unburied dead. Such was their liberation of Poland, where they now rule." [26]

While such losses are unacceptable, the Poles were probably equally touched by the exigencies of power politics which allowed Soviet troops to attend the massacre as spectators. One of the last messages to leave Warsaw expressed this feeling:

This is the stark truth. We were treated worse than Hitler's satellites, worse than Italy, Rumania, Finland. May God, who is just, pass judgment on the terrible injustice suffered by the Polish nation, and may He punish accordingly all those who are guilty.

Your heroes are the soldiers whose only weapons against tanks, planes, and guns were their revolvers and bottles filled with petrol. Your heroes are the women who tended the wounded and carried messages under fire, who cooked in bombed and ruined cellars to feed children and adults, and who soothed and comforted the dying. Your heroes are the children who went on quietly playing among the smoldering ruins. These are the people of Warsaw.

Immortal is the nation that can master such universal heroism. For those who have died have conquered, and those who live on will fight on, will conquer, and again bear witness that Poland lives when the Poles live.[27]

---

[23] Mikolajczyk, *op. cit.*, p. 105.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 85.
[25] Bor-Komorowski, *op. cit.*, p. 293.
[26] Churchill, *op. cit.*, p. 145.
[27] Mikolajczyk, *op. cit.*, pp. 86–87.

V. Poland Becomes a Soviet Satellite

The fate of Poland after the Warsaw uprising was left to the great powers. At Yalta in February 1945, the Big Three agreed that the Lublin Committee should be reorganized to include other groups in a coalition. The actual composition of this government reflected a Soviet interpretation of the Yalta accords. Of the 21 members of government, only five were newcomers, including Mikolajczyk as deputy premier. Sixteen of these were members of the Lublin group, including Edward Osobka-Morawski as premier. Boleslaw Beirut was named provisional president. In July Britain and the United States recognized the Warsaw government and withdrew recognition from the group exiled in London. The elections held January 17, 1947, were described in the Western press as neither free nor fair. The Communist-controlled Democratic bloc took 382 seats out of 444. A purge of nationalists and "right-wing deviationists" began in 1947. In October of that year Mikolajczyk was accused of being an "ally of foreign imperialists," and was forced to escape to London. This strategy of removing anti-Soviet nationalist elements was designed to extend control over Poland of pro-Soviet communists. The main army of the underground had perished in Warsaw. The destruction of the main army of the underground facilitated the achievement of Soviet political objectives.

THE 25TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE WARSAW UPRISING

(Statement issued by Polish Embassy in Washington)

A quarter of a century is passing this year since the uprising against the Nazis in the Poland's Capital broke out. The Anniversary which the Poles have been observing—ever since summer 1944, will be of particularly solemn character this year—the 25th year of liberated Poland.

The 63 Days

The Warsaw uprising broke out on August 1, 1944, and lasted for 63 days. Some 50,000 Polish soldiers took part in it. Against them the Germans used about 25,000 troops organized in a special corps under the SS General Erich von dem Bach. German units were recruited at first mainly from the SS police and auxiliary Wehrmacht detachments under generals: Heinz Rheinefarth, Hans Bohr and Hans Köllner. The insurgents fought armed with light weapons: pistols, rifles, grenades, and tommy guns. They also had some heavy machineguns, antitank guns, and mortars.

The Germans used air force and artillery, including heavy guns and all types of tanks.

During the first 6 weeks of fighting the insurgents suffered great shortage of weapons. The weapons flown from the West was reaching the insurgents in small quantities only, due to the large distance, strong antiaircraft fire and small drop areas. According to Home Army sources, the total British and American air drops amounted to 52 tons of material. This state of affairs improved only toward the end of the uprising, thanks to the Soviet supplies, which according to the Home Army sources, reached 160 tons.

Historians do divide the uprising in Warsaw into two stages: the offensive (August 1 to 4) and defensive ones (August 5 to October 2, 1944). In the first stage the insurgents attacked the Germans, forced them into a defensive posture and seized large sections of the city, mainly in its center, situated on the left (western) bank of the Vistula River. (The uprising in the eastern part of the city, called Praga, was not successful and was put down by the Germans already on the 2d of August.) The success of insurgents in the first days of the uprising resulted—to a large extent—from the support of the civilian population of Warsaw, which joined them en masse. It was thanks to them that the areas seized by the insurgents were fortified with numerous barricades and antitank trenches. However, the weapons were scarce and the supply of ammunition inadequate; the successes of insurgents were only temporary. All major German posts in Warsaw which were protected by concrete bunkers and barbed wires managed to defend themselves, although some of them were encircled by insurgents. Thus the part of the city in the Polish hands did not present a whole entity. It was rather composed of four separated areas: the center,

Mokotów, Ochota and Żolibórz (the latter being the south, southwest, and north Warsaw districts). An attempt at linking those centers into one tactical-operational entity did not succeed, a fact which later facilitated to the Germans the liquidation of the uprising. The uprising spread also to the neighboring areas of Warsaw, especially to the great forest units (Puszcza Kampinoska, Chojnów and Kabaty Forests), which were used as supply and airdrop bases. In those areas there were large partisan groups of the Home Army.

The first German counterattack began already on the 5th of August and after 2 days of bitter fighting resulted in dividing of the insurgent forces in the center into two separate groups. The Nazis became masters of one of the two main east-west arteries of Warsaw and surrounded the Old Town from all directions. Till August 11, the Germans liquidated the insurgent forces in the Wola and Ochota districts, killing the civilian population amidst acts of pillage and violence. In both those districts some 50,000 civilians were killed. Reluctant to weaken their front lines the Germans could not launch too large forces against the insurgents, especially the crack front troops. That is why von dem Bach took full advantage of the existence of isolated resistance centers and applied the tactics of successive concentrated attacks against those centers depending on which center presented in a given moment the greatest threat to the Germans.

Wishing to stabilize their positions and aggravate the isolation of the insurgent headquarters in the center the Germans launched mass attacks against the insurgent Old Town garrison, composed of over 9,000 soldiers, including some 1,200 soldiers of People's Army (PA), Polish People's Army (PPA) and the Security Corps (SC). The defense of Old Town, attacked on all sides, subjected to aerial and artillery bombardment, lasted from August 12 to September 2, 1944. It remains in the history as one of the most beautiful and heroic chapters of the uprising. In spite of the crushing superiority the Germans did not succeed in breaking the resistance of the insurgents or forcing them into capitulation. After exhausting all possibilities of defense, when there was not a single house left and the tormented civilian population suffered from thirst and hunger, the insurgents left the Old Town and through the city canals (sewers) withdrew to the Polish-held position in the center of the city. Having entered in the Old Town the Nazis organized a new massacre of the civilian population, killing and, in several cases, burning alive almost all gravely wounded insurgent soldiers who were left there.

After the fall of the Old Town the Germans began to storm the center of the city. The attack was stopped however when the Red army and the Polish People's Army started their offensive against Praga. Fearing the possibility of Polish and Soviet troops forcing the Vistula River in order to link with the insurgents, von dem Bach sent his main forces (including i.e. armored units withdrawn from the front) to fight against insurgent areas adjacent to Vistula (Powiśle and Upper Czerniaków) with a view of pushing the insurgents away from the river and establishing the German front on the western bank of the Vistula River. On September 15—when the units of the 1st Polish Army began to cross the Vistula to help the insurgents, the Germans had the situation on the west bank of the river already well under control. The Polish detachments crossing Vistula were therefore landing in the area occupied by the enemy, who was well prepared to

repulse the attack. Only in the upper Czerniaków sector two Polish battalions of the 9th Infantry Regiment landed on a small bridgehead, still held by the insurgents. Bitter fighting over the bridgehead, entirely isolated from the insurgents main forces in the center, lasted till September 23, and brought no success to Polish forces. Altogether in attempts to force the Vistula River the 1st Polish Army lost, between September 15–23, 3,764 soldiers (killed, gravely wounded, or missing). In this action the units of the Red army (air forces, artillery, landing crafts) cooperated with Polish detachments. During the fighting over the Czerniaków bridgehead the People's Army Command proposed to the Home Army a joint attack from the center toward the Vistula River with a view of joining the troops fighting in the bridgehead. However the Home Army Command rejected this proposal owing—as it was explained—to lack of sufficient forces.

After the fall of Czerniaków General von dem Bach concentrated his troops at Mokotów, Żolibórz and Puszcza Kampinoska. Mokotów capitulated on September 27, Żolibórz—after heavy fighting—in the evening of September 30. A day earlier on September 29, the German crushed near Żyrardów a large concentration of Home Army troops which tried to break away from Puszcza Kampinoska to the Swiętokrzyskie Mountains in the Kielce district. In this situation the Home Army General Command gave up further struggle and on October 2, 1944, signed at Ożarów near Warsaw the final act of capitulation. The document signed by the Home Army Command and the Germans assured relatively favorable conditions for the insurgents who were given by the Germans the full combatant rights (which were however not universally observed by the Germans afterward). With respect to the civilian population however the capitulation act contained provisions leaving it entirely at the mercy of the occupant. Warsaw was to be completely evacuated and all its inhabitants sent to the transit camp at Pruszków, from where they were to be directed to various localities in the country still occupied by the Germans. In practice however, all young and fit persons were sent from Pruszków to various concentration and labor camps in Germany.

The Warsaw uprising in spite of its great contribution to the armed struggle against the Nazi occupant brought the losses out of all proportions to its results. During the 2 months of fighting in Warsaw over 200,000 people lost their lives, including some 15,000 armed fighters—killed and missing, other thousands were wounded. The remaining civilian population had to leave the city, leaving everything they possessed, at the mercy of the bestial enemy.

Initiated in the rear of the German front surrounded on all sides by the preponderant German forces, threatened with the genocidal order of Hitler on the destruction of Warsaw and the extermination of its inhabitants, the uprising was transformed into a struggle for life and death in which no quarters were given. Irrespective therefore of that or another attitude toward political motives of the initiators and leaders of the uprising, during the uprising all armed organizations of the Polish underground from the National Armed Forces (NAF) on the right, to People's Army on the left took part in the fight against the Germans. Thus in the face of the deadly threat on the part of the occupant, at the insurgent barricades in Warsaw we saw a unified front of struggle. This front however could not be a lasting one. It came about as a result of the situation created under

emergency conditions. It was not, since it could not be, stabilized at that time by any political agreement.

The operation "Tempest"—code name for the uprising—was aimed at explicit political targets. The forces of the Warsaw district of Home Army were to attack the Germans when the latter would be in retreat and when the entry of the Red army into Warsaw would be a foregone conclusion. The point was not so much to help the troops approaching the city from the east (though of course it would also result in it) but rather to forestall the Red army's and the Polish army's entry into Warsaw with a view of accomplishing a definite political aim.

The uprising was called for and it was commanded by the emigré political forces then in London.

Attempting to grip the political control over Poland's capital and later on over the entire country the emigré leaders and the commanders of the Uprising refused to coordinate the action with the representatives of the Polish Committee for National Liberation—which in July commenced to execute Polish sovereign rule over the liberated territory and was organizing future administration for that part of Poland which still remained under the German occupation. No consultations were held with the Soviet Army, which was soon to approach the banks of the Vistula River (the consultations were possible if only through the intermediary of the Unified Allied Command in the west).

The political aims of the uprising were never to be achieved. The history proved the emigré conceptions to be miscalculated.

The uprising though became one of the most heroic chapters in the history of fighting Poland and as such its anniversary is observed by the Poles.

INDEX

(NOTE.—The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee attaches no significance to the mere fact of the appearance of the name of an individual or an organization in this index.)

Page

B

Beirut, Boleslaw 9, 10, 13
Big Three (England, United States, Soviet Russia) 5, 6, 11, 13
Bohr, Hans 15
Bor-Komorowski, Gen. Tadeusz 5, 7, 8

C

Churchill 2, 3, 6, 10, 11
Committee of National Liberation 9
Curzon Line 10
Czerniakow sector 17

D

Document: Letter, Thomas J. Dodd to James O. Eastland, August 11, 1969 III
Dodd, Senator Thomas J ..... III, 1

E

Embassy of the Polish People's Republic (Washington, D.C.) 1, 2, 15

F

First Polish Army 16, 17

G

Guderian, Gen. Heinz 7

H

Harriman, Averell 6, 10
Hitler 6, 11, 17
Home Army 18
Home Army Command 17
Home Council of Ministers 8

K

Kaminski brigade 11
Kielce district 17
Kollner, Hans 15
Kosciuszko (radio station) 7
Kremlin 3

L

Lazutin, Irene ..... III, 2, 5
Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service 2
London Times (newspaper) 7
Lublin Committee 2, 9, 13
Lublin Government 11
Lublin Group 13
Luftwaffe 1, 11

M

Page

Mikolajczyk, Stanislaw ---- 2, 5, 6, 9–11, 13
Mokotow ---- 11, 16–17
Milosna ---- 7
Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister ---- 6, 10
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact ---- 5

N

National Armed Forces (NAF) ---- 17
Nazis ---- 1, 2, 15–16
Ninth Infantry Regiment ---- 17

O

Ochota ---- 16
Okuniew ---- 7
Osobka-Morawski, Edward ---- 10, 13
Ozarow ---- 17

P

People's Army ---- 16–17
Polish Communist Government ---- 1, 3
Polish Government-in-exile ---- 5
Polish Home Army ---- 1, 2, 5, 8, 15
Polish Peasant Party ---- 5
Polish People's Army ---- 9, 16
Puszcza Kampinoska ---- 17

R

Radosc ---- 7
Radzymin ---- 7
Rheinefarth, Heinz ---- 15
Rola-Zymierski, Marshal ---- 10
Roosevelt ---- 2, 6, 10–11

S

Security Corps (SC) ---- 16
Sikorski, Prime Minister ---- 5
Soviet Army ---- 2
Soviet Red Army ---- 1, 18
Soviet Union ---- 2
Soviets ---- 1
Stalin ---- 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 11, 12
Swietokrzyski Mountains ---- 17

V

Vistula River ---- 7, 10, 15–18
von dem Bach, SS Gen. Erich ---- 15–17

W

Wasilewska, Wanda ---- 10
Wermacht ---- 1, 15
Witos, Andrezej ---- 10
Wolomin ---- 7

Z

Zoliborz ---- 11, 16–17
Zyrardow ---- 17