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COMMITTEE PRINT

FOURTEENTH MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY

REPORT

OF THE

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE FOURTEENTH MEETING OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENTS FROM THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY COUNTRIES, HELD IN BRUSSELS, NOVEMBER 11 THROUGH NOVEMBER 15, 1968

PURSUANT TO

PUBLIC LAW 689—84TH CONGRESS

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SENATE DELEGATION

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
The U.S. delegation	1
Assembly action	2
Assembly officers	4
Appendix I. Financial statement	7
Appendix II. Reports, recommendations, and an order adopted by the Assembly:	
Part I. Reports of—	
Political Committee	8
Military Committee	18
Economic Committee	72
Scientific and Technical Committee	84
Education, Cultural Affairs, and Information Committee	90
Part II. Recommendations and an order of—	
Political Committee	97
Military Committee	100
Economic Committee	100
Scientific and Technical Committee	103
Education, Cultural Affairs, and Information Committee	104

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOURTEENTH MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY

THE U.S. DELEGATION

The 14th meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly—formerly the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference—was held in Brussels during the period of November 11 through 15, 1968. Approximately 200 representatives from the parliaments of 14 of the 15 member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance were listed as being in attendance at the meeting. The dissolution of the Greek Parliament in April of 1967 precluded representation from Greece, a subject for repeated protests by the Assembly. Because of a government crisis most of the Italian delegation could not attend, although Italy was represented at the opening ceremony and at least one important standing committee meeting.

Under the terms of Public Law 689, 84th Congress, which authorizes participation in these annual meetings, the President of the U.S. Senate and the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives appointed the following delegation to attend the meeting.

Delegates and alternates from the Senate:

John Sparkman, Democrat, of Alabama, Chairman.
John Stennis, Democrat, of Mississippi.
Albert Gore, Democrat, of Tennessee.
Henry M. Jackson, Democrat, of Washington.
Birch Bayh, Democrat, of Indiana.
Karl E. Mundt, Republican, of South Dakota.
Roman L. Hruska, Republican, of Nebraska.
John Sherman Cooper, Republican, of Kentucky.
Jacob K. Javits, Republican, of New York.
Mike Mansfield, Democrat, of Montana, alternate.
Lee Metcalf, Democrat, of Montana, alternate.
Claiborne E. Pell, Democrat, of Rhode Island, alternate.
Thomas J. McIntyre, Democrat, of New Hampshire, alternate.
Joseph D. Tydings, Democrat, of Maryland, alternate.
William B. Spong, Jr., Democrat, of Virginia, alternate.
Charles H. Percy, Republican, of Illinois, alternate.

Delegates from the House of Representatives:

Wayne L. Hays, Democrat, of Ohio, Chairman.
Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Democrat, of New Jersey.
L. Mendel Rivers, Democrat, of South Carolina.
Frank M. Clark, Democrat, of Pennsylvania.
Jack B. Brooks, Democrat, of Texas.
Leslie C. Arends, Republican, of Illinois.
Charles E. Chamberlain, Republican, of Michigan.
William H. Bates, Republican, of Massachusetts.
Paul Findley, Republican, of Illinois.

At a preparatory meeting in Washington on November 7, U.S. Senate and House of Representatives delegates were briefed by Secretary of State Dean Rusk. On November 11, in Brussels the delegation held an organizational meeting at which they were briefed by Ambassador Harlan Cleveland. The joint Senate-House delegation at that time named Senator Sparkman as its chairman for the meeting; Senator Mundt was elected vice chairman; and Representative Hays was re-elected as the U.S. member of the Standing Committee of the Assembly for the coming year.

Members of the delegation were assigned to Assembly committees as follows:

Political Committee: Senators Sparkman, Gore, Mansfield, and Javits; Representatives Hays and Arends.

Military Committee: Senators Stennis, Jackson, and Cooper; Representatives Rivers, Clark, Chamberlain, and Bates.

Economic Committee: Senators Bayh, Metcalf, McIntyre, and Percy; Representatives Brooks and Findley.

Scientific and Technical Committee: Senators Pell and Hruska; Representative Rodino.

Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs, and Information: Senators Mundt, Tydings, and Spong; Representative Brooks.

During the meeting of the Assembly, Senator Mundt served as Chairman of the Education, Cultural Affairs, and Information Committee; Senator Javits served as Chairman of the Political Committee; Senator Bayh served as General Rapporteur of the Economic Committee; and Senator Cooper served as Rapporteur of the Military Committee. Representative Rodino served as Vice Chairman of the Scientific and Technical Committee.

ASSEMBLY ACTION

The 14th Annual Conference of the North Atlantic Assembly, meeting at the Palais des Congrès in Brussels, was opened in plenary session on Monday, November 11, by its president, Mr. Matthias A. Mathiesen of Iceland. An address of welcome on behalf of the host country was presented by Belgian Foreign Minister Pierre Harmel, who had done so much to stimulate new thinking about NATO affairs. His address was followed by that of the Secretary General of NATO, Mr. Manlio Brosio, who gave an excellent summation of the condition of the Alliance. He afterward conducted a question-and-answer period in a closed session of the Assembly. It should be noted that the morning ceremonies naturally included solemn recognition of the fact that the parliamentarians were commencing their work on Armistice Day.

During the afternoon on Monday the plenary session was addressed by Mr. Halvard Lange, former Foreign Minister of Norway and one of the "Three Wise Men" of 1956. Following his speech, the new Secretary General of the Assembly, Philippe Deshormes, reported on his efforts to create a better practical working relationship between the Assembly and the NATO Secretary General, the NATO Council and other instrumentalities of the Organization. These methods included agreements on an oral report by the NATO Secretary General to the Assembly, briefings of committees by high NATO officials, and discussion by the Council of the Assembly's recommendations on an unofficial basis.

The last of the prominent guest speakers at the plenary meetings was Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, who remained for a closed session in which he answered questions from the delegates. The various regular committees of the Assembly began their work as early as Monday afternoon in order to have their recommendations ready for consolidation and editing by the drafting committee on Wednesday afternoon.

The plenary debates on the work of the committees took place throughout Thursday and into Friday morning. Meeting in the shadow of the summer's Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the discussions were both more grave and more stimulating than in many years past. Moreover, the usual formal December meeting of the full North Atlantic Council was moved forward and coincided accidentally and helpfully with the last 2 days of Assembly meetings. There is reason to believe that, for example, the work of the Assembly Military Committee, including its consequent recommendation, was influential in terms of the proceedings of the Council. On Friday the Assembly adopted the Committee reports and recommendations as printed in appendix II to this report.

While it might seem injudicious to select for mention here only a few of the subjects that were frankly discussed, there were several items which should be given particular emphasis. We have already mentioned the general recommendation produced by the Military Committee which was adopted by the full Assembly. But it is equally important to stress that the Assembly debate, while naturally concentrating in large measure on defense questions, still recommended the flexibility needed to make possible a future improvement in East-West relations. In this connection, Senator Sparkman—speaking as chairman of the full delegation—recorded his "* * * gratification that the North Atlantic Alliance is maintaining the twin themes of defense and detente, rather than encouraging the perhaps easier course of a rigid defense posture combined with political immobility." The Senator singled out for attention and approval the Political Committee recommendation, introduced by Congressman Wayne Hays, to the effect that it is even more important now to curb the strategic arms race, and recommending that the United States in close consultation with its allies renew efforts to seek talks with the Soviet Union on both offensive and defensive missile systems.

The 14th meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly was adjourned on Friday, November 15, with only a general understanding that the next annual meeting would again take place in Brussels, and without specifying the exact time for its convening during the autumn months.

Before leaving the subject, however, it should be noted that the reports and recommendations contained in the following pages represent only a part of the achievements of such a session—albeit the most important part. There are unique opportunities for private discussions among parliamentarians from many countries, in addition to the close cooperation so often developed by several members from different countries working together on a specific project. In this connection also, the U.S. delegation had fruitful contacts with the European Community Commission during the week. This resulted from a very gracious invitation to luncheon by Commissioners Deniau and Colonna, who are particularly concerned with the trading problems encountered by the European Community as a whole.

Well before leaving Washington for the 14th meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly the U.S. Senate delegation had decided that it was a particularly appropriate time to accept the standing invitation of the Government of the Federal German Republic to visit West Berlin, following the Brussels meetings. This invitation also contemplated opportunities to meet with high West German Government officials at Bonn. Accordingly, a number of members of the Senate delegation proceeded from Brussels to Berlin late on Friday, November 15. The delegation was chaired during this visit by Senator John Stennis because of Senator Sparkman's prior agreement to attend a conference in London. The group met with the top military and diplomatic representatives of the United States in Berlin, toured the western sector of the city and attended a luncheon given by the governing mayor of Berlin, Klaus Schuetz.

At the close of the Berlin visit Senator Stennis continued with his tour of a number of U.S. military establishments in connection with his duties as prospective chairman of the Armed Services Committee of the Senate. During the short but profitable visit to Bonn, while the remaining delegation normally would have been headed by Senator Metcalf as ranking Democrat with the group, he deferred to the seniority of Senator Mundt as a high-ranking member of the Foreign Relations Committee. The latter, therefore, acted as chairman for the delegation during the Bonn meetings with Chancellor Kiesinger, Foreign Minister Brandt and Defense Minister Schroeder. These unusual opportunities were the result both of the generosity of the West German Government and the cooperation extended by Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and his deputy, Mr. Russell Fessenden. The crowded schedule in Bonn was capped by a dinner hosted by members of the Bundestag of the Federal German Republic.

After the conclusion of the official visit made to Germany at the invitation of the Federal Republic Government, the Senate delegation made brief stops at London and at Paris before returning to the United States on November 23. In London, delegates were pleased by the opportunities to meet extensively with British parliamentarians, as well as by the briefings arranged by the American Embassy. In Paris, a high point in the visit was a reception given by the President of the French Senate, Alain Poher, who has also held the position of President of the European Parliament. During the short stay in Paris members of the Senate delegation were given full briefings by Ambassador Shriver and his staff, and by Ambassadors Harriman and Vance and their team of colleagues working on the Vietnam discussions.

ASSEMBLY OFFICERS

The Assembly elected the following officers for the coming year:

President: Mr. Kasim Gülek, Turkey.
First Vice President: Mr. Eugene Schaus, Luxembourg.
Vice Presidents:
Mr. Matthias A. Mathiesen, Iceland.
Dr. M. J. Soares da Fonseca, Portugal.
Hon. Wayne L. Hays.
Treasurer: M. P. deChevigny, France.

The following delegates were elected or reelected to office in the Assembly committees:

Political Committee:
Chairman: Senator Jacob K. Javits, United States.
Vice Chairman: Mr. Finn Moe, Norway.
Rapporteur: Mr. Erik Blumenfeld, Federal Republic of Germany.

Military Committee:
Chairman: Sir Fitzroy Maclean, United Kingdom.
Vice Chairman: Col. W. Wierda, Netherlands.
Rapporteur: Senator John Sherman Cooper, United States.

Economic Committee:
Chairman: Prof. Fitz Burgbacher, Federal Republic of Germany.
Vice Chairman: Mr. Edward Bishop, United Kingdom.
General Rapporteur: Senator Birch Bayh, United States.
Rapporteur for Economic Development: Mr. T. E. Westerterp, Netherlands.

Scientific and Technical Committee:
Chairman: Prof Georges Portmann, France.
Vice Chairman: Hon. Peter W. Rodino, United States.
Rapporteur: M. Georges Mundeleer, Belgium.

Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs and Information:
Chairman: Senator Karl E. Mundt, United States.
Vice Chairman: Mr. Heinz Pohler, Federal Republic of Germany.
Rapporteur: Mr. Jakob Aano, Norway.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I

Financial Statement

Out of the appropriation of $15,000 for the expenses of the Senate delegation to the 14th meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly, $13,500 was expended. A consolidated report showing all expenditures of the delegation has been filed with the Senate in accordance with law.

APPENDIX II

Reports, Recommendations and an Order Adopted by the 14th Meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly, Brussels, Belgium, November 11 Through November 15, 1968

Part I—Reports:
- Report of the Political Committee.
- Report of the Military Committee.
- Report of the Economic Committee.
- Report of the Scientific and Technical Committee.
- Report of the Educational, Cultural Affairs and Information Committee.

Part II: Recommendations and an order:

Political Committee recommendations:
- On the Mediterranean and the Middle East;
- On arms control;
- On Soviet pressure on the Federal Republic of Germany;
- On Greece;
- On a Joint European Arms Procurement Agency;
- On followup of previous Assembly resolutions and recommendations;
- On the economic situation in Iceland.

Military Committee recommendation:
- On the Security of the Alliance.

Economic Committee recommendations:
- On world trade;
- On international monetary cooperation and the balance-of-payments adjustment process;
- On European unity;
- On cooperation for development;
- On balance of payments;
- On precautionary measures which could be taken by the European members of NATO in the event of their supply routes being endangered.

Scientific and Technical Committee recommendations:
- On ocean resources;
- On air pollution.

Educational, Cultural Affairs and Information Committee recommendation:
- On information policy.

Educational, Cultural Affairs, and Information Committee order:
- On establishment of a seminar.

Part I. Reports

REPORT OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE

Rapporteur: Mr. Blumenfeld (Federal Republic of Germany)

A. GENERAL OUTLOOK

1. 1968 was a year of challenge for the Atlantic Alliance. The offensive use of military power in a decisive sector of the demarcation line between East and West in Central Europe, a latent crisis—liable to break out at any time—along the whole of the Alliance's southern flank, growing alarm in the public opinion of many member countries about the future of the Western democracies, a continuing dispute about the involvement of member countries in parts of the world outside the Treaty area and the role of NATO in world politics—these were and are problems which occupied the attention of Foreign Ministers at their meetings in December 1967 and May 1968, of Defense Ministers in May 1968 as well as of the Permanent Council and the Committees of the Assembly.

2. The twentieth year of NATO's existence has demonstrated with growing urgency the need for the development of NATO's own political concept. This concept must be practicable quite independently of the mechanisms of NATO's military machinery. It should neither restrict the security of the member nations as guaranteed by this machinery nor confine itself to the mere translation of the functions of those mechanisms to the political level. At a time of challenge, mutual reporting, information and consultation are more important than ever. This is why the Committees and the Annual Assembly of NATO Parliamentarians should be much better equipped to identify themselves with the political concept of the Alliance and to represent it to the Atlantic-European world through the national parliaments. As part of this development, the process of providing information should be extended beyond the level of the Council in Ministerial and Permanent Session to comprise that of the Assembly and the national parliaments. In 1968, cooperation between the Political Division of the International Staff of NATO and the Secretariat of our Assembly has already been more satisfactory in several respects. These first steps towards practical and lasting solutions of the information problem should be continued and intensified to promote the political cohesion of the Alliance as well as the standing of our Assembly. As part of the public presentation of the Atlantic Alliance, the 20th anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in the spring of 1969 should be the object of an appropriate and dignified commemoration. The Assembly expects the Council in Ministerial Session to take the initiative in this respect at one of its forthcoming meetings.

3. Some of the problems with which the Alliance is faced today arise from the fact that the North Atlantic Treaty is not an "original" political or military treaty but has replaced the mutual aid and non-aggression pacts which existed during the second World War.

The expansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union after the last war caused the West to sign the Treaty of Washington in 1949 which greatly contributed to the stabilisation of the situation in Europe. The importance of such stabilising elements was highlighted in 1968 by the deployment of 20 Soviet divisions in the Western glacis of the Soviet Union. The motives and intentions behind the Soviet military engagement in a communist neighbour country are less decisive than the fact that the Soviets were prepared to engage themselves at all in this way. The West has again been faced with the inescapable conclusion that this preparedness cannot be excluded from its political calculations. The unpredictability of the Soviet Union has become more predictable.

4. However, the fact that the Soviet Union is prepared at any time to engage herself militarily—which is also illustrated by her menacing attitude towards Rumania and Yugoslavia—should not make us overlook the political consistency of the government in Moscow. The case of divided Germany and the exposed city of Berlin should make it clear to all of us that pressure can be exerted even without the actual use of military force. Here, a new phase of political expansionism may be expected following the participation of East German forces in the occupation of Czechoslovakia. The Alliance should be prepared for this so that its reaction is not delayed until the Soviet Union, encouraged by the gain of political terrain, is prepared to engage in new military adventures.

Our understanding of the future Soviet strategy is again improved by a look at the history of the Alliance. The Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO in May 1955. Only five days later, the Soviet Union created a pact in Eastern Europe which was designed to be used as an instrument of intimidation within and outside the Soviet bloc. On the one hand, she forced the members of the Warsaw Pact to align themselves as closely as possible with this organisation by expressing constant propaganda warnings of the "aggressive intentions of NATO" as a result of the detrimental German influence on "American imperialism." On the other hand, she tried to undermine and split NATO by sowing mistrust against one ally: the Federal Republic of Germany.

5. The invasion of Czechoslovakia has completely deprived this hitherto valuable political mechanism of its credibility. The—in the Soviet sense—logical replacement of this mechanism consists in the attempt to claim direct intervention rights in Western Germany. For this purpose, endeavours are being made to turn back the "reversement des alliances" which has occurred since 1945 by invoking parts of the United Nations Charter and of the Potsdam Agreement. This attempt has meanwhile been defeated by identical statements by France, the United Kingdom and the United States (see Annexes). Secretary of State Dean Rusk rejected the Soviet thesis with special emphasis on 2 October 1968 in the United Nations and stated that any such attempt, if put into practice, would constitute the *casus foederis* for NATO.

6. The four principal political objectives of the Alliance-stabilisation of the situation in Central and Eastern Europe, precautionary control of developments on the southern flank, constructive discussions of the integration of the "European nucleus" within the Alliance, and partnership of the European pillar with the United States—must be

seen and evaluated in their real perspectives. All four objectives require the effective organisation of the elements of successful cooperation: an adequate use of the Treaty so as to be able to coordinate divergencies of interest between the allies outside the Treaty area; overcoming the politically vulnerable status of a military pact which at the same time maintains a credible organised strength, definition of the political functions and possibilities of the Alliance with regard to other organisations whose membership and/or activity is wholly or partially identical with the Treaty area. Our Assembly emphatically reminds the Council both in Ministerial and in Permanent Session in this year of challenge of its responsibility for the effective organisation of the above-mentioned elements of successful cooperation concerning all four principal political objectives. Both bodies should invite the Heads of Government of the five states forming the nucleus of the EEC, the United Kingdom and the two Scandinavian allies to attend a joint meeting. One of the most important items on the agenda of this meeting should be the setting-up of a European Authority for Joint Defence Efforts.

The French Government would be welcome to participate in the meeting as well as in the efforts to create the Authority if it so desires. The purpose of these efforts should be to agree on a common armaments budget, on armaments cooperation and the development of European weapons systems and technology.

B. THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

7. The invasion of Czechoslovakia has decisively changed the political and military status quo in Europe. Undeterred by a serious loss of prestige within and outside the socialist camp, the Soviet Union has transferred large parts of her military potential to an important sector of the demarcation line between East and West. This has led to a dangerous de-stabilisation of the situation. The occupation of her military and political glacis might induce the Soviet government to fall victim to miscalculations concerning the possibilities and the necessity of further similar operations, which might have unforeseeable consequences for world peace. The West should, therefore, impress on the Soviet Union the limits of her military possibilities as well as the groundlessness of her accusations.

8. The events of the 21st August in Prague have illustrated the speed with which the Soviet Union and her allies are able to move massive military forces into any desired position.

However, the action against Czechoslovakia would have been unthinkable without the advantages of a geographically extended logistical basis, protracted "military exercises" in preparation of the actual move—preceded and accompanied by negotiations leading to gains of political terrain—and an interlocking system of bi- and multi-lateral agreements. Compared with this, only the superiority of some weapons systems can be brought to bear by the West. This superiority alone, however, cannot guarantee either the necessary cohesion, or the equally necessary freedom of action of the Alliance in case that there should ever be a chance of meaningful negotiations about a generally acceptable peace order in Europe.

9. The solution of the German question including the status of Berlin remains the crucial problem of an overall European settlement. This statement should be taken in its literal sense and is not intended by your Rapporteur as a claim to any legal or political priority. Germany neither opposes—as is alleged by the leaders of the Soviet bloc—a generally acceptable peaceful order in Europe, nor does she insist in advance on special requirements as to the nature of this order—as some Western politicians seem to fear. The only expectation of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is that such negotiations, if they come about, should be well-prepared and comprehensive. The participation of East German troops in the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the granting of certain powers to the East German régime in relation to Berlin and Moscow's claim of an alleged right to intervene in West Germany have caused the Federal Government to judge the possibilities of its Eastern policy without any illusions.

10. In spite of the various actions recently undertaken by the Soviets, a number of different interpretations exist in the West as to the meaning of the word "détente". The Soviet interpretation, on the other hand, has again become clear after the events in Czechoslovakia: it consists in the preparedness—which has, incidentally, always existed—to negotiate after a fait accompli has been created. Your Rapporteur considers it appropriate to repeat his earlier reference to the observation that the Soviet Union invariably takes strategic measures at all levels prior to negotiations at the political front, and that the West must invariably take equivalent action. Whether we think in terms of bilateral arrangements between the super powers, of agreements open to the accession of other states—such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or a possible European Security Conference with the participation of all members of the Eastern and the Western system—your Rapporteur believes that any possibility for such negotiations should primarily be examined under the aspect of which of the measures taken by the Soviet Union she is prepared to subject effectively and verifiably to the various agreements. In this context, particular attention should be paid to the potential interrelationships between the agreements favoured by the Soviet Union, since experience has shown that the signing of separate agreements is frequently to disadvantage of the West.

In this context, your Rapporteur calls to mind the fact—noted by an authoritative source—that our NATO Alliance did not have any control over events beyond the demarcation line either before or during or after the events in Czechoslovakia. It is to be hoped that the Council in Ministerial Session will draw the corresponding conclusions from this for the "Central European concept" of the Alliance at its annual meeting in November of this year.

C. DEVELOPMENTS ON THE SOUTHERN FLANK OF THE ALLIANCE

11. Less spectacular than along the Central European demarcation line between East and West but at least as serious in their effect are the developments on the southern flank of the Alliance. 50 Soviet naval vessels are at present operating in the Mediterranean, among them missile destroyers and helicopter carriers. Soviet technicians are

manning coastal installations of varying size at Mers-el-Kébir, Alexandria, Port Said and Latakia. The defeat of the Arab states in the armed conflict of 1967 has even increased their willingness to become economically, politically and militarily dependent on the Soviet Union. The Mediterranean region is a historical theatre for bloody frontier disputes and conflicts involving ethnic and religious minorities. The natural wealth in mineral resources on the one hand and conspicuous social, industrial and economic backwardness on the other hand offer a contrast that can hardly be surpassed. This creates numerous possibilities for intervention by political forces such as Soviet expansionism.

12. As far as the Middle East is concerned, the Soviet Union is today in a position which permits her direct interference into vital interests of the West. She has skillfully managed to turn NATO's strategic concept for the Mediterranean as a sector of the Alliance which is subject to maritime control upside down. Strategically speaking, the future of the Alliance in this area is no longer at sea but on land. Your Rapporteur is of the opinion that the question whether the 6th US fleet or a joint fleet of the European NATO member countries would be better able to protect the Western interests in the Mediterranean is today only partly relevant. In the same way that the Straits of Gibraltar should be kept open also in the interests of the United States, the European pillar of the Alliance cannot afford to abandon the political arena in the countries of the Middle East to the Soviets. The freedom of action enjoyed by the Europeans is at present greater than that of the United States which many Arab states are facing with mistrust. Thus, the much-quoted political relief of the United States by Europe is going through its first test case in the Middle East in 1968.

13. In particular, your Rapporteur would again like to draw your attention to the political tactics followed by the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean region. Without demanding everywhere the immediate creation or re-introduction of communist parties or popular-front groupings, she is, on the one hand, seeking the support of groups of officers or nationalist parties in the various countries. On the other hand—at least in the present stage of her efforts to gain a footing in the Middle East—she prefers bilateral agreements to enable her to play off the Arab states against each other. She has also proposed a "Mediterranean Potsdam" to obtain an indirect influence over Israel. Her long-term objective might be a Cairo Pact system on the Central European model. This will probably be preceded by a violent propaganda campaign against NATO in line with the observations at the beginning of this report. Already today, the Soviet Union regards as objectionable a mere exchange of views of Arab and non-Arab littoral states with NATO, in contrast to bilateral agreements which are claimed to ensure the "neutrality" of such states. However, the Soviet Union is not familiar with the term "neutrality," she understands "neutralisation" as a step towards the integration of a given country into her sphere of influence.

14. The question of the status of Greece within the Alliance has been frequently discussed in recent months, not least under the impression of the harsh criticism of the Council of Europe. The re-introduction

of democracy after the referendum about the Constitution is the urgent desire and hopeful expectation of the North Atlantic Assembly.

The Greek Government should again be made aware of this through suitable channels. However, your Rapporteur believes that there is no practical yardstick for undemocratic behavior which could be applied to any one member of the Alliance. The same is true of Greece's position within NATO's defence system as it would otherwise have to be doubted whether the Alliance has reacted properly to, for example, France's withdrawal from military integration. This Assembly launches an appeal to the Greek Government to restore the full and active membership of the parliamentarians of its country in this Assembly by holding, as soon as possible, free elections for the Greek National Assembly. If the Alliance claims to be a stabilising factor in the Mediterranean, then this claim should not be abandoned in the case of a member country. The decision as to the possibility, necessity and desirability of Greece remaining in the Alliance rests with the Council in Ministerial Session and the Government in Athens. We expect both the Council and the Greek Government to make a politically acceptable statement on this question so that the imaginary rôle of this Assembly in this discussion can soon be ended.

D. SUGGESTIONS AND ALTERNATIVES FOR A POLITICALLY UNITED EUROPE

15. Europe is today an economic giant who masks his dimensions and wastes his strength. However, a region having 250 million inhabitants and a gross national product of 300 billion dollars cannot escape its duty to assume more political commitments than in the past. Your Rapporteur is of the opinion that the most suitable institutional form of a common political solution would be the creation of a confederation. The step-by-step build-up of a European Confederation would at the same time convincingly disprove the arrogant interpretation of the events in Czechoslovakia as a "traffic accident on the road towards détente." A European Confederation would combine the advantages of political and economic solidarity. States which are prepared to forego these common advantages should be excluded from that solidarity which Europe showed during the May crisis in France.

16. There are three reasons which cannot be ignored any longer and which make it impossible to overlook the need for European solidarity:

Firstly, only Europe's own solidarity can protect it against foreign obligations. The Soviet principle of *divide et impera* may today still offer to this or that country certain political or economic advantages at the expense of its neighbors. Tomorrow, Moscow will tolerate neither neighbours nor advantages. Europe's will to unite is its only chance of political survival.

Secondly, the third world will judge Europe according to whether it will be prepared only to administer and enjoy its privileges or to make them available in a responsible manner in the common interest. If Europe refuses to recognize its responsibility, less privileged countries will no longer recognise Europe and be compelled to seek alignment with other "blocs." Europe would then pass through more hours and years without "grandeur" and would remain the object—instead of becoming the subject—of international politics.

Thirdly, the United States, to whom Europe owes the basis of its privileges after a self-destructive fratricidal war, is today faced with gigantic tasks of its own. The bridge leading to the "Fortress America" will not collapse if it is supported by a massive and secure pillar on this side of the Atlantic. Therefore, the price of the "de-Americanisation" of the European democracies desired by one or more politicians cannot, under any circumstances, consist in a "normalisation" of conditions on the Prague model.

17. The political development of the EEC within a European Confederation would be a milestone also for the Atlantic Alliance. Obstruction against this step has logically led to resignation. Your Rapporteur considers that the much-discussed idea of NAFTA (North Atlantic Free Trade Area) is an expression of the same resignation. It is true that NAFTA would be an attempt to solve the problem of the economic enlargement of the EEC with some elegance by asking EEC to joint it. However, apart from the fact that the economic significance of this new free-trade area would not exceed that of GATT or the Kennedy Round, it might find it difficult to adopt a policy of its own. Europe's survival can only be ensured by a joint policy. The concept of an unpolitical Europe does not exist in practice. The only usefulness of the idea of NAFTA was to revive the discussion of integration projects outside the EEC. This task should therefore remain on the agenda of the Atlantic world of the 15; the European world of the 18, the Western European Union of the 7 as well as the continental-European group of the 6.

The various existing projects of joint European ventures have not yet been sufficiently studied as to whether they permit constructive integration outside the mechanisms of political vetoes. Just as a European Confederation would—in view of present circumstances—have its place partly between and partly above the existing projects of common solutions, your Rapporteur feels that there is a considerable amount of unused space for new initiatives below and beside these projects. Resignation at the undoubtedly existing political shortcomings of EEC should not discourage us from exploiting this space.

E. ASPECTS AND PROSPECTS OF UNITED STATES-EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY

18. In spite of many decades of American-European solidarity, some misconceptions have grown up in the past. The first of these misconceptions concerns the presumed orientation of the two super powers. Several European statesmen on both sides of the demarcation line have occasionally stated the view that the United States was not a European power but only the Soviet Union, and that only the latter could therefore be included in any plans for a European peace order and take part in the corresponding negotiations. Historically speaking, this view is at least highly questionable. It is probably being advanced less on account of the fact that Russia and America are littoral countries of the North Pacific than in view of the observation that the Soviet Union has repeatedly tried to enforce her "European" ambitions by force of arms.

It is true that, the United States, the power protecting free Europe has never produced any such evidence of its presence, and nobody will desire or expect any such evidence. The second misconception concerns

the relationship between the European continent and the two super powers. This misconception assumes the existence of a contradiction between détente in Europe and entente—which is presumed to exist—between the super powers. In theory, this contradiction leads to some ingenious conclusions but must be described as absurd in practice. The policies pursued by a socialist or a non-socialist super power continue to be essentially different even after the end of the cold war. Above all, however, the beginnings of a dialogue between them does not entitle Europe to dream of any power of its own. Such dreams destroy the credibility of those statemen who indulge in them. Thus, the untenable visions of the French President seem to have contributed to the confusion of not a small part of the youth of his country. It is this confusion that is the hotbed of claims and aspirations among the youth of other countries of Europe for romantic and exotic ideologies of the kind which are being propagated by revolutionary leaders in Latin America and Asia for quite different purposes. The third misconception concerns the relationship between the American and the European pillar of the Alliance. The two centres are united by their joint support of democracy, freedom and the rule of law. They are working together in a spirit of solidarity. They know, however, that this solidarity must have its limits where full partnership would lead to both partners being burdened by the internal problems of the other instead of relieving each other in the solution of common problems.

19. The practical realisation of the principle of American-European solidarity is not confined to the Atlantic Alliance, although the spirit of solidarity can only flourish under its protection. For this reason, and under the conditions of 1968, the often-discussed question about the scope of Atlantic solidarity outside the Treaty area can only be answered by pointing out that while the Alliance may make such solidarity possible it cannot bring it about as such. Such a realisation seems to have grown with our American ally since it has established a close relation between security requirements and the monetary and currency policies of the members. Therefore, lasting solutions to both problems not only include arrangements about troop stationing and technological defence planning but also the concerted reassessment of exchange rates and actions by the International Monetary Fund. Meetings of European and overseas Finance Ministers should therefore be better coordinated than in the past with a view to the mutual exchange of experience. The Atlantic security bargain cannot be transacted behind closed doors but must be agreed strictly above the counter so that the prices charged remain reasonable and credible. The same rule should be followed by the members in their plans for the continued existence of the Alliance after 1969 in view of the periods of validity of the Warsaw Pact, and its supporting bilateral agreements.

20. This is 1968 and not 1948. A new generation of statesmen and politicians controls the destinies of our Alliance, a young generation watches its future, a new generation of problems faces it. None of us desire a revival of the cold war because none of us could at present say with certainty that Europe would master this challenge successfully without a renaissance of its political forces. When a newly elected President assumes office in the greatest country of our Alliance, Europe must be able to answer with *one* voice to the questions of the Head of State of the most important Western democracy. This is the great challenge of 1969, the year in which our Alliance comes of age.

Appendixes

Appendix 1

A spokesman of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs has stated on 17th September 1968:

> Our attention has been drawn to an interpretation of article 53 and of article 107 of the Charter of the United Nations which has been set out in the German press and according to which these articles would give to certain countries the right to intervene unilaterally by force in the Federal Republic, without the agreement of the Security Council. Both the letter and the spirit of these articles show that this interpretation is abusive and incorrect.

Appendix 2

TEXT OF THE AIDE MÉMOIRE HANDED TO THE FEDERAL GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTRY BY THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN BONN ON 20 SEPTEMBER 1968

Her Majesty's Government are aware that currency has been given to suggestions that Articles 53 and 107 of the U.N. Charter would under certain circumstances afford a right to the Soviet Union of intervening by force unilaterally in the affairs of the Federal Republic.

Her Majesty's Government wish to assure the Federal Government that it is their considered view that neither Article 53 nor Article 107 nor any other Article of the Charter is capable of such an interpretation.

Should the Soviet Union or any other member of the Warsaw Pact intervene by force unilaterally in the Federal Republic, the provisions of article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty would immediately be brought into effect. The Soviet Union can be under no illusions about this. In that event it goes without saying that Her Majesty's Government would carry out their obligations under the Treaty.

Appendix 3

AIDE MÉMOIRE OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHED ON 17TH SEPTEMBER 1968

The Question has been raised whether Articles 107 and 53 of the United Nations Charter give rise to a right on the part of the U.S.S.R. or other members of the Warsaw pact to intervene in the affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Government of the United States wishes to assure the Federal Republic of Germany that it is its considered view that:

1. Neither Article 107 nor Article 53 nor the two Articles give the Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact members any right to intervene by force unilaterally in the Federal Republic of Germany.

2. If, despite this, the Soviet Union or Warsaw Pact members should intervene by force unilaterally in the Federal Republic of Germany, that act would lead to an immediate allied response in the form of self-defense measures pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty.

3. There can be no, repeat, no question of the validity of the North Atlantic Treaty under United Nations Charter.

REPORT OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE

Rapporteur: SENATOR JOHN SHERMAN COOPER (United States)

In November 1967, as Rapporteur, I submitted my first full report upon the state of NATO as a military alliance. At that time, the countries which this Committee represents were concerned about the serious problems caused by the withdrawal of France from the NATO military command. The report detailed the steps that had been taken and were proposed to restore, as best as possible without the full participation of France, the capacity of NATO to meet the objectives of the alliance.

The report considered the basic objectives of NATO to be:

First, to maintain forces sufficient for a credible deterrent against any potential military threat from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations;

Second, to have forces ready to defend the territory of NATO member nations should an attack occur;

Third, NATO aims to provide the security necessary to achieve better East-West relations and the eventual settlement of issues still outstanding related to Germany, and the aftermath of World War II.

The report in its summary also proposed several questions for the Committee to consider which I believe remain relevant at this time. The events which have occurred since the November meeting have not only emphasized the importance of the issues discussed then, but the need for their examination at this meeting in the most serious and decisive form.

In my preliminary report to the Military Committee on May 20, it was noted:

> Since the Military Committee last met in November 1967 an accelerated trend in Eastern Europe toward more moderate regimes has become evident. This trend, particularly in Czechoslovakia and Rumania is of primary importance to NATO. Czechoslovakia's new rulers have caused repercussions in Moscow and elsewhere in the Soviet bloc. Obviously, it is of importance to the future of NATO to watch events in the Soviet bloc carefully that are a result of the coming to power of a relatively liberal regime in Czechoslovakia. They may provide a key to future developments in the bloc. At the same time, recent Soviet maneuvers in Southern Poland near the Czech border raise questions of security for NATO. These are questions which follow naturally from the conclusions of the NATO Ministerial Meeting in December 1967 in Brussels concerning the adequacy of the NATO forces to meet any possible threat to the security of its member nations.

Unfortunately, the possibilities suggested at the time have been realized.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria, shocking to our countries and to most countries of the world, is the central event which has brought a new awareness of the need to continue the NATO alliance.

It will be apparent to the Committee that this report is based largely on the American viewpoint. This is inevitable, considering that the United States does not have the intimate knowledge of the Warsaw Pact countries, available to the European members of NATO and the United Kingdom, from long association with and proximity to these countries. It is the desire of the Rapporteur that this report will be challenged and criticized if it is considered to be incorrect factually or in interpretation, and that all members of the Committee will present their views as to the significance of the events which have occurred, and the steps they believe should be taken to meet the purposes of NATO.

The facts concerning the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies and interpretations of its military and political intentions have been discussed and analyzed at length by our governments, by NATO officials, and by authorities in all our countries. It will suffice to review only the essential facts for the purposes of our report.

The Warsaw Pact maneuvers had been underway in Southern Poland upon the border of Czechoslovakia for a period of four months before the invasion. Soviet troops had been moved within the Soviet Union near the Czechoslovakian border for "forward exercises."

Maneuvers had been conducted in Czechoslovakia for Warsaw Pact forces in May. Several Soviet divisions were normally stationed on the Czech border. It is estimated that at the time of the invasion, Soviet forces in East Germany and other Warsaw Pact countries had been increased from 22 divisions to about 32 divisions. In addition, ten reserve divisions in the Soviet Union have been upgraded to fill the gap in the Soviet Union caused by the divisions sent to Eastern Europe. Within a period of 24 hours the Soviet Union and its allies moved into Czechoslovakia a force of approximately 25 divisions or about 250,000 men. Of these, 22 were Soviet divisions. Eight Soviet divisions were moved from East Germany, 11 from the Western part of the Soviet Union, two from Hungary, and one airborne division was flown from the Soviet Union and quickly took over airfields and facilities at Prague. In addition, three Polish divisions and smaller units from Hungary, Bulgaria and East Germany took part in this invasion.

The possibility of the invasion of Czechoslovakia was, of course, a matter under serious consideration by NATO members and under constant NATO intelligence surveillance, but it is necessary for the Committee to consider if NATO procedures were adequate, either from the viewpoint of political assessment or military intelligence of the invasion, or for the speed and effectiveness with which it was accomplished.

The political reasons for the Soviet decision to invade an ally, surely with the knowledge that it would cause adverse reaction and condemnation such as has occurred throughout the world and in the Soviet bloc itself have relevance and bearing upon our consideration of Soviet military intentions. The familiar Soviet themes, changing from time to time—"the need to protect Czechoslovakia," "counter-revolu-

tionary bourgeois forces undermining the true Socialist paths," "attempts by Western forces to weaken the Soviet bloc," have been heard and discounted. I believe it is generally agreed that the Soviet Union feared that the liberalizing influences and reforms in Czechoslovakia would spread to other Warsaw Pact countries, and to the Soviet Union itself, that it would upset the status quo and control of the Warsaw bloc allies which the Soviet Union has determined necessary for the protection of its system, both militarily and politically.

The rationale for the invasion of Czechoslovakia was set forth in a *Pravda* article on September 26, 1968, entitled "The Sovereignty and International Obligations of the Socialist Countries." The official doctrine stated:

> One should stress that even if a socialist country strives to adopt a "nonaffiliated" position, it does in fact preserve its national independence thanks to the might of the socialist community and primarily of its main power—the Soviet Union—and the might of its armed forces. A weakening of any link of the world socialist system directly affects all socialist countries, which cannot remain indifferent to this. Thus, the antisocialist forces in Czechoslovakia, through their talk about the right of nations to self-determination, in essence were camouflaging the demands for so-called neutrality and for the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic's withdrawal from the socialist community. But the implementation of such "self-determination," that is, Czechoslovakia's break with the socialist community, would have contradicted its vital interests and caused harm to other socialist countries. Such "self-determination," as a result of which NATO troops would have approached the Soviet frontiers while the community of European socialist countries would have been carved up, actually violated the vital interests of the peoples of these countries, and it completely conflicted with the right of these peoples to socialist self-determination. In fulfilling their international duty to the fraternal people of Czechoslovakia and defending their own socialist achievments, the Soviet Union and other socialist states had to act, and did act, decisively against the antisocialist forces in Czechoslovakia. PZPR Central Committee First Secretary W. Gomulka spoke graphically on this topic: "To those friends and comrades of ours from other countries who think that they are defending the just cause of socialism and sovereignty of peoples by condemning and protesting against the entry of our troops into Czechoslovakia we reply: If the enemy places dynamite under your house, under the community of socialist states, it is our patriotic, national, and international duty to prevent this by the application of such means that may be necessary!"

* * * * *

The Bratislava statement of communist and workers parties says about socialist achievements that "the support, consolidation, and defense of these achievements, won at the price of heroic efforts and the selfless labor of each people, is the common international duty of all the socialist countries."

* * * * *

> Naturally, the communists of the fraternal countries could not permit the socialist states to remain inactive in the name of some abstract idea of sovereignty when they saw how the country was exposed to the danger of antisocialist degeneration. The actions of the five allied socialist countries in Czechoslovakia correspond to the vital interests of the Czechoslovak people themselves. It is clear that it is precisely socialism which has liberated a nation from the fetters of the exploiter system and which insures solution of the vital problems of the national development of any country which has taken the socialist road. But in encroaching on the foundations of socialism, the counterrevolutionary elements in Czechoslovakia were thus undermining the very foundations of the independence and sovereignty of the country.

In addition, Foreign Minister Gromyko, speaking for the Soviet Union at the United Nations on October 3, 1968, said:

> Attempts have been made to reproach us in connexion with the events surrounding Czechoslovakia. There are even statements heard to the effect that the action taken by the allied socialist States was allegedly "abrupt" and "incomprehensible." But what kind of abruptness are they referring to? You know only too well that there was nothing abrupt in the measures of self-defence taken by the socialist countries against imperialist intrigues. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have on many occasions warned those who are tempted to roll back the socialist commonwealth to snatch at least one link from it, that we will neither tolerate nor allow that to happen.
>
> * * * * *
>
> The Soviet Union deems it necessary to proclaim from this rostrum, too, that the socialist States cannot and will not allow a situation where the vital interests of socialism are infringed upon and encroachments are made on the inviolability of the boundaries of the socialist commonwealth and, therefore, on the foundations of international peace.
>
> Let nobody look for contradictions between our determination to defend the interests of socialism, the interests of the security of the socialist commonwealth, and our determination to uphold the cause of peace and international security. Such contradictions are non-existent.

These statements declare a new principle, if it can be called one, which upsets accepted standards of international law and of the Charter of the United Nations. It contradicts the UN Resolution on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in Domestic Affairs of States, which the Soviet Union sponsored in the General Assembly in 1966. It must be taken as a true declaration of Soviet intention to repress liberalizing movements and reforms in the Warsaw Pact countries if the Soviet Union determines it necessary to do so for its interests. It has raised questions about future Soviet intentions toward Rumania and Yugoslavia.

The invasion and subsequent declarations of policy raise questions of great concern to NATO. Has there been a change in Soviet leadership or policy, or both, which would cause the Soviet Union by design

or because of fear, misapprehension or miscalculation, to undertake military action or harassment of NATO members? This concern has been heightened by the declarations of the Soviet Union that it possesses authority to invoke Article 53, Paragraph 1, and Article 107 of the Charter of the United Nations against the Federal Republic of Germany.

Statements continue to be made by both Czechoslovakia and the USSR concerning the withdrawal of troops from Czechoslovakia, six to seven divisions are reported stationed along the Czech-West Germany border, and no one can say with assurance that they will be withdrawn.

The central question before the NATO organization, both political and military, our governments, and our parliaments, is the nature of the response that should be made—both military and political—to this critical situation.

It would appear that the action of our governments following the invasion was practical and wise. I will take the liberty of including in this report a statement made by Senator Mike Mansfield, Majority Leader of the United States Senate, in a report to the Senate, which I believe reflected the American attitude.

U.S. policy has been effectively attuned both to developments in Czechoslovakia and to our capacity to contribute constructively in this difficult situation. The Czechoslovak leaders sought no special assistance from this Nation and none was offered. It was made clear that the United States looked with understanding on the efforts which were being made to bring about reforms within Czechoslovakia. It was also made clear that we were prepared to consider certain specific problems of U.S.-Czech relations which have to do with trade, impounded Czechoslovak gold and other matters of limited significance. Unlike Hungary a decade ago, however, there has been no empty talk of liberating Czechoslovakia. There has been no inadvertently cruel misleading of the Czechoslovak people which would have only contributed to their suffering without, in any sense, alleviating the repression.

This is not to say that there is, today, any more than there was a decade or two decades ago, a recognition on the part of the United States of "spheres of influence" as between the United States and the Soviet Union which would sanction the latter's recent actions in Czechoslovakia. There can be no tacit acquiescence in any Soviet right to dominate Czechoslovakia or any other independent nation in Eastern Europe or anywhere in the world. The avoidance of bombast in present circumstances is merely a recognition of the practical limitations of U.S. action. When conflicts occur beyond the reach of our commitments, unilateral or regional, it is irresponsible and dangerously delusive to ignore the existence of these limitations. The United States has not the omnipotence to alter situations at will in Europe any more than in Asia. The only omnipotence which exists in world affairs, today, is

the omnipotence of the United States and the Soviet Union to insure the nuclear extinction of human civilization.

Now we must deal with the effectiveness of NATO strategy and forces to deter and insure against any aggression against NATO. We must undertake (as the Council of Ministers, Foreign Ministers and Ministers of Finance as well as Defense Ministers are doing) an analysis of these questions of strategy and forces, so that we may discharge our responsibilities in making correct recommendations to our governments.

In my report at the November 1967 meeting of this Committee, I attached an appendix providing the comparable status of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces at that time, which I again refer to the attention of the members of the Committee.

In my preliminary report of June this year, I made the statement that NATO forces were roughly balanced, approximately equal in number on the central front and weaker on the northern flank. The Honorable G. Koudijs, a member of the Military Committee, wrote to me asking for clarification of the statement and also questioning properly the accuracy of the conclusion that NATO forces were superior qualitatively in strength. I could not at the time respond fully as a part of the information I had secured was classified. Since that time, I have received unclassified material which is based on joint NATO intelligence.

The issue raised by Mr. Koudijs is basic to an evaluation of the adequacy of NATO forces and the determination of whether a military balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces actually exists. It is fair to say that the statement in my June report and the information upon which it was based has also been questioned by a report of the Committee on Armed Services of the United States House of Representatives.

I attach to this report the following annexes illustrating this issue:

Annex I: Letter of the Honorable G. Koudijs, M.P., to the Rapporteur.

Annex II: Letter of the Honorable Frederick S. Wyle, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the United States, to the Rapporteur, dated August 30, 1968.

Annex III: Review of a Systems Analysis Evaluation of NATO vs. Warsaw Pact Conventional Forces; Report of the Special Subcommittee on National Defense Posture of the Committee on Armed Services, United States House of Representatives, Ninetieth Congress, Second Session, dated September 4, 1968.[1]

Annex IV: Letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense, Alain Enthoven, to the Rapporteur on the NATO-Warsaw Pact Military Balance.

I believe it will be helpful to the Committee to place in the body of the report at this point three tables illustrating the latest comparison of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces that I have been able to secure.

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[1] The deleted portions of this report represent classified material.

TABLE I.—WORLDWIDE NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES, MID-1968

[Excluding U.S. increases for Vietnam]

	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Manpower:		
Army and marines	3,000,000	2,850,000
Navy	1,070,000	470,000
Air Force	1,400,000	880,000
Total men	[1] 5,470,000	4,200,000
Tactical aircraft:		
Total inventory	11,500	9,000
Nominal inventory value	$27,000,000,000	[2] $16,000,000,000
Total defense budget	[3] $75,000,000,000	[4] $50,000,000,000

[1] This total includes the forces of France.
[2] Approximate.
[3] Does not include U.S. costs for Vietnam.
[4] At U.S. prices. That is, the United States could "buy" the Warsaw Pact forces—pay the men at our pay scales and build the equipment in our own factories—for about $50,000,000,000 per year.

TABLE II.—CENTER REGION NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES,[1] MID-1968 DATA

	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Land forces, M-day:		
Divisions	[2] 28⅔	[3] 46
Manpower in divisions	389,000	+ 368,000
Manpower in division forces	677,000	619,000
Riflemen (NATO as percent of pact)	100	
Equipment (NATO as percent of pact):		
Tanks	60	
Antitank weapons	150	
Armored personnel carriers	130	
Artillery and mortars (number of tubes)	100	
Divisional logistic lift	150	
Total vehicles	135	
Engineers	137	
Tactical air forces:		
Number of deployed aircraft	2,100	2,900
Percentage of worldwide inventory (deployed in Europe)	20	40
Percentage of force by mission capability (center region):		
Primarily interceptors	10	42
Multipurpose fighter attack	48	15
Primary attack	9	6
Reconnaissance	13	8
Low performance	20	29
Total	100	100
Effectiveness indicators (NATO as percent of pact):		
Payload	280	
Typical loiter time	[4] 250–500	
Crew training	180	

[1] These data relate to the situation prior to the Czechoslovakian crisis. Revised figures have not yet been established but they are unlikely to make a significant difference in the rough blaance protrayed in this table. Center region includes West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, and France for NATO; East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia for the pact.
[2] Includes 5 French divisions.
[3] 22 of which are Soviet, and 24 of which are East European, including 8 Czech.
[4] Range depends on tactical mission profile assumed.

TABLE III.—THE MILITARY BALANCE, 1968–69

Country	NATO			Warsaw Pact		
	Armed forces (in thousands)	Army (in thousands)	1968 Defense budget (million dollar equivalents)	Regular forces (in thousands)	Army (in thousands)	Defense appropriations (million dollar equivalents)
Belgium	99.0	75.0	501.0			
Canada	101.6	41.5	[1] 1,589.0			
Denmark	45.5	28.0	[2] 292.0			
France	505.0	328.0	[3] 6,104.0			
Germany	456.0	326.0	5,108.0			
Greece	161.0	113.0	[3] 318.0			
Italy	365.0	265.0	1,940.0			
Luxembourg	.6	.6	[4] 7.5			
Netherlands	128.5	83.5	[4] 898.0			
Norway	35.0	19.0	320.0			
Portugal	182.5	150.0	302.0			
Turkey	514.0	425.0	[2] 472.0			
United Kingdom	427.0	210.0	[1] 5,450.0			
United States	3,500.0	1,535.0	[2] [5] 76,576.0			
Bulgaria				153	125	223
Czechoslovakia				225	175	1,538
East Germany				126	85	1,715
Hungary				102	95	370
Poland				274	185	1,830
Rumania				173	150	551
U.S.S.R.				3,220	2,000	[6] 39,780
Total	6,520.7	3,604.6	102,877.5	4,273	2,815	46,012

[1] 1968–69 budget.
[2] 1968–69 "Defense estimates."
[3] 1968 "Defense expenditure."
[4] 1968 "Defense estimates."
[5] Includes U.S. costs attributable to Vietnam ($25,000,000,000–$30,000,000,000).
[6] The following is noted on pp. 4–5 of source: "The ruble figure represents the declared budget of the Ministry of Defense and does not include certain expenditures such as the cost of nuclear warheads, research and development expenditure on advanced weapons system and the military elements of the space program, which are believed to be included in the budgets of other ministries. At the commercial exchange rate ($=0.42 rubles) the dollar equivalent of the declared defense budget is approximately $18,500,000,000. If calculated at a rate which in the opinion of scholars more accurately reflects the different pricing system used in Soviet industry ($1=0.42 rubles) declare Soviet military expenditure is at the level of $39,000,000,000–$40,000,000,000 a year, and total military expenditure could be of the order of about $50,000,000,000."

Source: "The Military Balance, 1968–1969," London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968.

It will be noted that some categories of equipment are not described in number, but in percentages, because the exact figures are classified. The percentages represent a comparison of the number of weapons employed by both forces. The average strength of a Soviet division varies according to type from 9–10,000. A standard NATO division is approximately 15,000. An average NATO division has about 10,000 men to support its activities, while a Warsaw Pact division is backed up by 5,000 men. A U.S. division has about 23,000 men supporting.

My report of last November stated that the Defense Ministers had on May 9, 1967 approved a policy guiding NATO military commanders on force planning and strategy. Generally, it was agreed that force goals for 1968 would be accepted at the 1967 levels. Thereafter, a continuing process of evaluating forces and resources required would be reviewed annually for the next five-year period. It is assumed that revisions would be made if required by changes in the political or military situation.

Obviously, the question of whether the NATO forces described on page 24 in Table II (in being before the Czechoslovakian crisis) are still in balance with Warsaw Pact forces and are capable of employing successfully the strategy of forward defense and flexible response to deter or to respond successfully to any purposeful probing or outright attack upon NATO territory, depends upon many factors other than

stated numbers of men or equipment. The balance between ground troops, armor and air forces, and their training and deployment, communications, supply, reserves and mobilization base of the NATO members, bear critically upon the capability of NATO forces to perform their mission.

I am attaching as Annex IV the report I have received from the Department of Defense of the United States, entitled "Evaluation of NATO and Warsaw Pact Conventional Forces in Central Europe," which responds to some factors and problems suggested by Mr. Koudijs and others. It also includes a brief discussion of strategies.

Table II (see page 24) indicates that Warsaw Pact and NATO forces were roughly comparable in numbers before the Czechoslovakian invasion. The Warsaw Pact, including Czechoslovakian forces, had 46 divisions numbering 368,000 men, while NATO had 28⅔ divisions, including five French divisions, amounting to 389,000 men. If French forces are included, the overall balance is, according to joint NATO intelligence, 900,000 for NATO versus 960,000 for the Warsaw Pact.

It is the Rapporteur's view that the increase of the Soviet Union's forces and their deployment in Eastern Europe before and during the invasion have upset any assumed balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces. For, between May and late August, ten additional divisions had been moved from within the Soviet Union to forward positions in Eastern Europe. The total of Soviet divisions is now 32.

Further, the establishment of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia with necessary supply and communication lines from the Soviet Union for an indeterminate period according to the treaty recently completed in Prague on October 16, 1968, has provided to the USSR the capability to move additional combat ready forces in the Western Soviet Union to the Southern frontiers of the Federal Republic of Germany.

From all indications, up to this time, the Soviet Union has as its primary objective the subjugation of Czechoslovakia to its will. Despite the increase of its forces by ten divisions, and though several divisions are now deployed in Czechoslovakia against the Bavarian border of West Germany, its forces have not yet shown signs of preparing for an attack against NATO. And for the present, the 225,000 men of the Czechoslovakian forces and their 600 aircraft may be considered unreliable by the USSR for Warsaw Pact duty.

It is obviously a primary task for NATO to monitor carefully the future disposition of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. If the Soviets continue to maintain in Eastern Europe the ten divisions they have brought from the Soviet Union, and if they do not withdraw substantial forces from Czechoslovakia and the Bavarian frontier, and if the Czech forces are considered "reliable" and are given a Warsaw Pact mission, then it will be necessary for NATO to consider adding forces to match this increase.

Under the best of circumstances—a withdrawal of the additional Soviet divisions from Czechoslovakia and Eastern Europe—the closest

examination must be made of the composition and capabilities of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.[2]

The Evaluation contained in Annex IV provides a basis for comparison of forces before the intervention of Czechoslovakia. The Evaluation and other studies made the following comparison of NATO strengths and deficiencies:

NATO forces are superior to those of the Warsaw Pact in number of major weapons in all categories except tanks and aircraft. While the Evaluation states that NATO tank forces are qualitatively superior, in number they represent only 60% of those employed by Pact forces. The Warsaw Pact has superiority in numbers of aircraft—2900 versus 2100—but again the Evaluation argues NATO aircraft to be qualitatively superior, possessing two times the payload capacity and the ability to remain airborne longer.

The deficiencies of NATO forces are glaring:

1. *Protection of Aircraft.* The limited area available denies effective aircraft dispersal and without shelter, aircraft cannot be protected against a surprise attack of the sort carried out by Israel against the Arabs in June 1967. The construction of aircraft shelters should have immediate priority.

2. *Ordnance.* NATO does not have adequate stocks of conventional arms, all types of ammunition, spare parts and replacement vehicles for sustained engagement.

3. *Training.* NATO military authorities have continued to insist, quoting NATO Commander General Lymen Lemnitzer that, "18 months service is the minimum useful service requirement." Since 1951, the United States has required its draftees to serve 24 months. Greece, Turkey and Portugal require 24 months of service, but all other NATO countries have shorter periods than two years or no conscription at all. The failure of adequate training is reflected directly in a lack of reserve strength and adequate mobilization base. It was the conclusion of the Defense Ministers at their meeting in 1967, as expressed by Secretary of Defense McNamara, that the greatest weakness of NATO was its mobilization base. This was the full statement:

> The greatest deficiency in the European NATO forces, however, is the lack of an adequate mobilization base. We, in the United States, have made great progress in raising the combat readiness of our own reserve forces and in providing the means for their movement, and I believe it is most urgent that our European allies do likewise. By adopting such an approach, the flexibility of NATO's force structure could be greatly enhanced.

4. The Committee should ask if the imbalance in the training and reserve forces has contributed to an imbalance in the deployment of NATO forces in Central Europe. I believe it is agreed that the defenses of the North German Plain are not as effective as is required and they should be strengthened.

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[2] There is an obvious need for a new "evaluation" of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces to take account of the changes brought about by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Such an "evaluation" is now in progress, but the key unknown factor is whether the Soviets will withdraw their forces to previous levels.

5. The military situation of the Northern and Southern flanks, and the strategic problems caused by the withdrawal of France remain unchanged.

It is clear that NATO's military capabilities must be improved and quickly.

The question of burden sharing has been a persistent and difficult problem for NATO. Now that there is a clear threat and an indisputable need to keep the NATO alliance militarily strong, the question of sharing the burden of its costs should be discussed frankly and resolved.[3] The North Atlantic Council and particularly the Defense Planning Committee are already addressing this key problem and will be meeting again approximately at the time this Committee will meet.

Despite its deficiencies, the American contribution to NATO constitutes a formidable military organization: There are 304,000 military personnel in Europe including Spain, the Sixth Fleet and Turkey. In West Germany alone there are over four combat divisions, several battalions of medium and short-range missiles with nuclear warheads and their supporting troops; an air force of 85,000 men with 900 tactical aircraft whose weaponry includes large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons. The Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, which is built around two carrier task forces and a total of fifty ships, 200 aircraft and 25,000 men. In the coming year, as was agreed, the United States will conduct exercises in Europe bringing back the two brigades and aircraft deployed to the United States earlier this year. This exercise will help train the two brigades for their NATO mission and demonstrate its airlift capabilities. Additional NATO committed forces in the United States amount to five divisions trained for European action, some 250 ships, and 2,500 planes, 240,000 men of the Atlantic Fleet and a considerable part of the United States Tactical Air Force. A large proportion of the strategic nuclear forces of the United States are devoted to the defense of Europe. The combined U.S. forces in Europe alone form a more powerful military force than that of any nation in the world except the Soviet Union. The United States has taken steps to bring its NATO committed forces up to full combat strength. Needed specialists and experienced officers are being returned to under-strength units from other duties. More intensive maneuvers and training exercises have been scheduled and some are already underway. To pay for this military commitment to NATO, the United States spends, according to some estimates, between 12 and 15 billion dollars annually.

I believe it well settled that it is in the field of conventional forces that NATO faces a great challenge. It is also important to review the nuclear capabilities of NATO and Warsaw Pact allies to determine if these are still adequate.

On February 1, 1968, former Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, reported to the Senate Armed Services Committee a comparative United States-USSR nuclear strength as estimated on October 1, 1967:

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[3] Attached as Annex V is a full discussion of the problems of burden sharing, entitled *United States Troops in Europe*. Report of the combined Subcommittee of Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees, October 1968. Also discussed is the problem of force levels. I commend this report to the members of the Military Committee.

UNITED STATES VERSUS SOVIET INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES, OCT. 1, 1967

	United States [1]	U.S.S.R.
ICBM launchers [2]	1,054	720
SLBM launchers [3]	656	30
Total intercontinental missile launchers	1,710	750
Intercontinental bombers [4]	697	155
Total force loadings—Approximate number of warheads	[5] 4,500	1,000

[1] These are mid-1967 figures.
[2] Excludes ICBM test range launchers which could have some operational capability against the United States. Soviets also have MR/IRBM's capable of striking Eurasian targets.
[3] In addition to the SLBM's on nuclear-powered submarines, the Soviets also have SLBM's on diesel-powered submarines whose primary targets are believed to be strategic land targets in Eurasia. The Soviets also have submarine-launched cruise missiles whose primary targets we believe to be naval and merchant vessels.
[4] In addition to the intercontinental bombers, the Soviets have a force of medium bombers/tankers capable of striking Eurasian targets.
[5] These totals do not include the nuclear force of the United Kingdom.

According to the latest intelligence estimates, the Soviets have made rapid advances and the present nuclear strength is estimated as follows:

	U.S.S.R.	United States
ICBM's	1,050–1,100	1,054
SLBM's	250	656
Long-range bombers	160	680
Short-range missiles and tactical weapons	3,500	7,000

The United States had made considerable progress in the development of MIRV Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles), which would increase the number of missiles with nuclear warheads by a factor of 5–10, whether launched on an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, or on the Polaris or the newly authorized Poseidon missile. The USSR, as the United States, has been hardening and dispersing silos for its land based missiles, and developing Polaris-type missiles and penetration aids. It has also tested a device suitable for multiple warheads. Its FOBS weapon (not yet deployed) can fire at a low trajectory to evade warning sytems and strike directly at a target while in orbit. There is no reason to doubt that the Soviet Union possesses the scientific capability to carry forward these projects, and to undertake other innovations.

The Soviet Union has also worked for some time on an anti-ballistic Missile system—called "Galosh"—centered around Moscow. It has established another defensive system called the "Tallinn." It is believed by some authorities to be an ABM System; by most authorities to be a system designed against bombers and air-breathing vehicles. The United States Congress, after an extended debate, appropriated this year approximately $1.2 billion following research of many years, to initiate the deployment of an ABM system costing approximately $5.5 billion. While recommended to the Congress by the Administration as a "thin system" of defense against a Chinese threat, it is generally acknowledged to be a "building block" for a system against a Soviet threat. A very good description of the Soviet FOBS weapon and the proposed United States Sentinel ABM system is provided in the paper by Dr. Hans Bethe and Dr. Richard L. Garwin and circulated to this Committee earlier this year at the request of the Chair-

man. Further, a very good statement of the relative United States and USSR nuclear strength may be found in the Report of the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services on the Status of U.S. Strategic Power, dated September 27, 1968.[4]

Both former Secretary of Defense Mr. Robert McNamara and the present Secretary of Defense, Mr. Clark Clifford, as well as military authorities have stated categorically that the United States possesses at present an "assured destruction capability," as does the Soviet Union—that is, each has the ability to destroy the other even after sustaining a full-scale first strike nuclear attack. Secretary Clifford has also said that the United States' goal is to maintain nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, as is indicated by the report of the Preparedness Subcommittee, to which I have referred, that Committee considers that the Soviet Union is making such rapid advances in the development of its nuclear strength that it will achieve parity with the United States and perhaps numerical superiority unless greater and intensified efforts are made by the United States.

SOVIET THREAT IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean, the continuing supply of arms to Arab countries by the Soviet Union, the introduction of large naval forces in the Mediterranean, and the consequent pressure of its political influence in the Middle East is a matter of concern to NATO. Two-thirds of the oil supply of NATO countries comes from the Middle East which holds over two-thirds of the world's petroleum reserves. The Arab-Israel conflict provides a base for Soviet intervention and influence and the fear has been expressed that the Soviet Union will achieve a position of dominance in the Middle East and extend its influence in Northern Africa.

Thus far, NATO naval forces in the Mediterranean maintain a vast superiority over the Soviet fleet. The Soviet fleet consisting of approximately 40 ships, including submarines, guided missile ships and small carriers has been able to make use of ports along the Southern rim and the excellent harbors of Alexandria and Port Said in the UAR and Latakia in Syria.

In response to this growing problem, on October 15, acting on a proposal made in 1964 and approved by the DPC in 1967, the United States, the United Kingdom and Italy announced that they would join in a unified command to keep watch on the sizeable Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean. Prior to this time, the separate NATO countries have maintained their own surveillance. The new command is called Maritime Air Force, Mediterranean (MAR/AIR/MED). MAR/AIR/MED, which becomes operative on November 1, consists largely of land based planes, headquartered in Naples.

Prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia there was a strong opinion in the United States that American forces should be withdrawn from Europe. The cost of the war in Vietnam and the balance of payments problem contributed to this view. A resolution sponsored by Senator Mike Mansfield and 43 cosponsors was designed to express the sense

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[4] Title 3 of the report beginning on page 7 and ending with its subsection 9 on page 10, provides a good summary. This relevant portion is appended as Annex VI of the Report.

of the Senate on this subject. More directly, an amendment was offered to the Defense Authorization Bill which would have prohibited the use of funds for the maintenance of U.S. troops in Europe in excess of 55,000 men. This amendment was not actually voted upon, but had strong support, and in the rapporteur's view would have passed the Senate prior to the Czech invasion.

While other delegates from the United States will be present at the meeting of the Military Committee, as rapporteur I believe it is my responsibility to say that the sentiment to remove and withdraw U.S. forces from Europe is not based entirely upon the demands of the war in Vietnam or the balance of payments problem. Many in the Congress of the United States and among our people consider that the United States has maintained an effective force in Europe since 1951, and has done so even though it was engaged in a major war in Southeast Asia. Over 650,000 men are stationed in Southeast Asia and the estimated annual cost of the war is 30 to 35 billion dollars. It is the opinion of many, that in these circumstances the United States should not be called upon to bear the major part of the military burden of NATO unless the other members of NATO meet the requirements for conventional forces, equipment and training needed for an effective alliance and deterrent against aggression. It has been argued that the unwillingness of NATO members to meet these requirements is due to a belief that the massive conventional forces of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies would overrun quickly Western Europe and that the effort to strengthen NATO with additional troops and equipment would be futile. It is also argued by some that a nuclear war would be likely and conventional forces are therefore useless.

The answer to these views is that the continued purpose of NATO has been to maintain a military alliance capable of deterring both conventional and nuclear war. Your rapporteur believes that this Committee should recommend that all members take the necessary steps to provide a capable conventional and nuclear fighting force. The purpose of the provision and maintenance of such a force is to make clear to the Soviet Union and its allies that while seeking detente, NATO's will and determination is to deter war and maintain the peace.

ANNEXES I–VI

Annex I

LETTER FROM ADMIRAL KOUDIJS TO SENATOR J. SHERMAN COOPER

THE HAGUE, *June 19, 1968*
Binnenhof 1–A

DEAR SENATOR COOPER: As a member of the North Atlantic Assembly I had the privilege of being present at the Meeting of the Military Committee on 21st and 22nd May, 1968, in Brussels.

Although every one of us fully realises that circumstances will not always allow you to come over to Europe for the Committee Meeting in the spring, you will understand that your absence was very much regretted by the Chairman and the members present.

Also, we did not therefore have the privilege to hear you elucidate your extremely important and thought-provoking Preliminary Report. Consolitary is the expectation that we may have the benefit of your presence on the November Meeting.

In the meantime, however, time marches on and further developments may be expected to take place both in the international and in the national realms.

For the free world the problem of force-balance as you mention in par. 2 of your Preliminary Report—remains of fundamental importance.

In this respect "the balance sheet on the basis of the December Ministers Meeting" is of great significance. In item 2 thereof it is stated that "NATO has about 900,000 troops compared to 960,000 for the Warsaw Pact countries."

Now, it is not entirely correct in my opinion to compare manpower only. Factors as equipment, standardization, organization, firepower and mobility, training, infrastructure and geographical circumstances may have an important effect on the balance of strength. Moreover, in the present flexible response strategy we must have a large variety of options for NATO reaction in order to deter the different forms of possible attack and for this we need in particular a sufficient number of ready conventional forces.

Admitting that it is difficult to assess with a high degree of reality or reliability the comparative strength of opposing forces, a number of publications, including "The Military Balance 1967–1968," do credit the Warsaw Pact with a distinct superiority in conventional land forces over NATO. According to "The Military Balance" the Soviet Union alone has 86 divisions in Central and Eastern Europe and in European USSR.

During our November 1967 Meeting Dr. Pöhler (Fed. Rep. of Germany) voiced the popular conception that, in the conventional field, the Soviet Union had a ratio of 4 to 1 against NATO.

I would very much appreciate if you would be kind enough to give me some clarification on the considerations leading to the assessment that NATO has about 900,000 troops compared to 960,000 for the Warsaw Pact countries.

In this connection I would like to mention that in the DPC meeting in May of this year the Netherlands Minister of Defence has also noted with great interest the recent U.S. evaluations concerning the strength of Soviet forces. In view of the political significance and the importance for an efficient conduct of the defence planning, he has said, it would be interesting to know the reasons for the difference between the U.S. evaluation and the strength of Warsaw Pact forces as generally accepted up till now.

This matter will of course be more fully discussed during our November Meeting but I would be very grateful if you could give me some information before that time.

I am, Sir, very sincerely yours,

G. Koudijs

Annex II

Letter From Mr. Frederick S. Wyle, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, to Senator J. Sherman Cooper

30 August 1968

Dear Senator Cooper: In response to your request for help in answering Mr. Koudijs' letter, the figure of 900,000 versus 960,000 about which Mr. Koudijs inquires represents the number of troops NATO and the Warsaw Pact, respectively, have deployed in all areas of Continental Europe. The source of the figures for the NATO countries are the various NATO countries themselves; the source of the figures for the Warsaw Pact are of various agreed NATO intelligence estimates.

As to the other general question Mr. Koudijs raises, that is, the U.S. position that the conventional forces on the two sides are in approximate overall balance, versus the frequently alleged superiority of the Soviet conventional forces, I am enclosing excerpts from relevant Congressional testimony or other public statements of the Secretary of Defense and other Defense officials from 1962–1968. These set out the context and the precise statements that U.S. spokesmen have made on this issue. I feel certain that you will conclude from reading these that the U.S. position has consistently been that the NATO countries could not afford to relax their defense efforts but that they, and especially our European allies, should increase those efforts in order to cure qualitative shortcomings in their forces and that the Alliance should take other steps to take full advantage of its overall manpower resources.

(I also enclose for your convenience an extract from the 1967 issue of the London Institute of Strategic Studies' annual "Military Balance.")

It is quite clear from a reading of the U.S. statements that the purpose of the gross comparisons of manpower and resources of the two alliance systems contained in some of these was to shift attention away from a numerical myth of Soviet superiority in manpower and toward the necessary qualitative improvements. U.S. statements have suggested that the gross comparison were only starting points for a proper evaluation of comparative strengths. In the January 1968 Posture Statement, the former Secretary of Defense McNamara said, for example: "While manpower comparisons alone are *not conclusive measures of military strength*, I believe they are reasonable *first approximations of relative ground force capabilities*" (p. 80). [Italic supplied.]

It is in this context that Secretary McNamara cited the fact that "NATO has about 900,000 troops deployed in all regions of continental Europe compared to 960,000 troops for the Warsaw Pact" (p. 80). Those figures are correct and generally undisputed. They do not purport to convey more than what they are: a simple headcount as a useful starting point for the discussion. Unless so elementary a fact as relative manpower is accepted as a starting point, however, it is practically impossible to set the problem into a perspective that would permit rational discussion of how the Alliance should best use its resources. The difficulty of inducing people to accept even undisputed facts can readily be seen from your correspondent's letter. The problem is in great part one of confusion in the discussion, rather than one of differences over such numbers as those cited above.

SOURCES OF CONFUSION IN THE DISCUSSION

A principal factor contributing to confusion in discussing the balance of conventional forces has been the terminology. The traditional practice has been to refer to the Pact's land forces in terms of numbers of divisions only. In discussions in the press, very often the large number of Warsaw Pact divisions is simply compared with the smaller number of NATO divisions, leading inevitably to the conclusion that the Warsaw Pact forces are larger by far—hopelessly so. This technique, reflected in your correspondent's inquiry, ignores the fact that the NATO divisions have very much larger numbers of men in fighting and supporting units than the smaller Warsaw divisions. Your correspondent cites the Institute for Strategic Studies' publication, "The Military Balance 1967–1968," but he recites only division numbers from that publication, *not* the accompanying manpower numbers. In the ISS publication itself, the numerical strength of the total NATO armed forces of all types, as well as the total NATO ground forces, is well in excess of that given for the Warsaw Pact.

WHOM TO PUT IN THE SCALES TO REACH A BALANCE

In discussing the balance of opposing NATO and Warsaw Pact Forces, it is obvious that the balance depends very heavily on whom you put in the scales. Total figures generally include France on the NATO side and Czechoslovakia and Rumania on the Warsaw Pact

side. But of course a computation should be made to test the assumptions one wishes to examine. I would suggest that in discussions on this point, the proponents of different views simply specify the circumstances they have in mind and then make their comparison. If we assume for the moment that the country-by-country figures given in the Institute of Strategic Studies compilation are adequate—at least for measuring gross orders of magnitude—one can construct one's own scenario of which countries would be participating in what kind of hostilities, and then judge about the size of forces on each side in a confrontation. We have not attempted to prescribe any formula for such comparisons, and I do not believe there is much difference in the Alliance on this score.

SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Let me offer some additional thoughts of my own. Whether fortunate or unfortunate, the fact is that nobody can predict in advance who will win a battle, or a war, when the opposing forces are even roughly comparable. The best that can be done is to seek to compare as many factors on both sides as are relevant to the possible conflict one has in mind. In particular, one must specify the circumstances and assumptions of war outbreak, including the preceding political developments and the issues at stake, which give rise to the comparison. The purpose of U.S. statements in NATO over the last six years has been to focus the discussion on qualitative deficiencies, which is where the focus belongs, and to seek to get the discussion away from the emotional and uninformative evocation of the supposed hopeless numerical inferiority of NATO's conventional forces and the spectre of a possible sudden, unprovoked, surprise mass attack following an undetected huge build-up of Soviet forces. That contingency is a theoretical posibility, but in our view its actual likelihood is so small as to make it a poor basis for force planning and analysis.

In summary, I think it is fair to say that "the difference between the U.S. evaluation and the strength of Warsaw Pact forces as generally accepted up to now" to which your correspondent refers is not a difference in factual statements but a difference in approach to what remains a highly emotional subject. The U.S. approach has been an attempt to apply factual analysis to the factual elements of the problem, to make a clear statement of what is and what is not susceptible of comparison, and to concentrate on cures for any real imbalances or asymmetries. It would be unfortunate if this attempt to look at the matter dispassionately should be regarded as a U.S. evaluation in some way downgrading the very substantial Soviet and Warsaw Pact ground and air threat in Europe. It would be even more unfortunate if unfounded suspicions of motivations extraneous to the attempt to analyze, as best we can, the balance of forces with which we must contend, should intrude upon the discussions with our allies of this problem of crucial importance to all of us.

I hope that this response meets your need, and I am of course available to you for any further help I may be able to give.

Sincerely,

FREDERICK S. WYLE.

Annex III

Review of a Systems Analysis Evaluation of a NATO Versus Warsaw Pact Conventional Forces

Report of the Special Subcommittee on National Defense Posture of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, September 4, 1968

Introduction

During a field investigation in May 1968 to examine U.S. military assets and our capability to meet worldwide commitments, the subcommittee became aware that in February 1968 Dr. Alain Enthoven, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) had presented to a NATO group a comparative evaluation of NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces,[1] arrived at through the use of the systems analysis technique.

Subcommittee witnesses were so concerned over the impact of this evaluation on our NATO allies that it was decided to review the methodology involved in the evaluation and test the validity of the conclusions reached. It was also decided to treat this review as a separate matter, not to be included in the subcommittee's report [2] on its broader investigation.

The subcommittee's report and exhibit A were submitted to the Department of Defense for security clearance. The Department's deletions are indicated by blank lines.

BACKGROUND

Everyone wholeheartedly agrees that military force planning in Europe and elsewhere should be on as rational a basis as possible, but not everyone agrees on how this should be done. Although the subcommittee recognizes that systems analysis can be a useful tool to aid in reaching decisions and making judgments, it is also aware that in the highly complex problem of force planning it can be extremely dangerous if used as a substitute for subjective analyses and informed reasoning.

To fully appreciate the significance of the Enthoven briefing and the effect which it can reasonably be expected to have on U.S. efforts to strengthen NATO, an understanding of pertinent historical developments and present attitudes of our NATO partners is important.

Since the inception of NATO in 1949, no member country other than the United States has ever met its force commitments. Germany has come closest, with the other member countries trailing behind at varying distances. During the intervening years, U.S. NATO representatives have made every effort to encourage our allies to meet the responsibilities they have agreed to assume with respect to forces and support.

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[1] Dr. Enthoven's briefing paper, entitled "Methodology for Evaluating Conventional Forces," is attached as exhibit A.

[2] "Review of the Vietnam Conflict and its impact on U.S. Military Commitments abroad," August 24, 1968 (committee print).

For political and economic reasons, this has been an uphill struggle and the difficult problems were compounded when, in 1966, France withdrew from the military affairs of NATO and removed its troops and aircraft from the alliance defence structure. Also, it denied the use of its military bases and strategic geographic area to NATO.

[Deleted.]

Shortly, thereafter, there appears to have been a concerted effort by the radical and leftist elements in some NATO countries to press for further reduction of their country's participation in and contribution to the NATO defence. This was the troubled climate in which U.S. NATO representatives were toiling in February of 1968. They were again seeking to make the other member nations understand that unless NATO were significantly strengthened, it would no longer be an effective force, either militarily or politically.

It was at this point that Dr. Enthoven appeared on the scene with his "Methodology for Evaluating Conventional Forces". The effect of this on the best laid plans of our top U.S. NATO military advisers will not be known for some time to come, but it could hardly be accurate to describe it as helpful. During hearings held by the subcommittee it was described as having had an extremely harmful effect. Dr. Enthoven began his presentation by telling the NATO group that there is no reason for them to increase their currently planned military budgets or the size of their existing forces; that present NATO forces are at least equal to Warsaw Pact forces. If he is right, our best military advisers are wrong; but on the basis of sworn testimony and documentary evidence which the subcommittee has assembled, the subcommittee finds adequate reason to question the validity of Dr. Enthoven's position. For this reason, the subcommittee has sought to make a critical analysis of both Dr. Enthoven's methodology and the conclusions he has reached as a result of his systems analysis exercise. The subcommittee has selected for comment a representative cross section of sufficient size to support its conclusions.

ANALYZING THE ANALYSIS

Many of the most pertinent factors that bear on the effectiveness of military strategy and planning cannot readily be reduced to statistical abstractions. The geography of NATO furnishes a significant illustrative example. It is not a continuous belt of strength facing Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Instead, it is a series of isolated islands of strength (variable strength at that) which may not be mutually supporting. This is particularly true since NATO can no longer count on French forces and facilities in an emergency. The Warsaw Pact, on the other hand, has all the classical military advantages associated with a large, continuous land mass and interior lines of communication. These fundamental geographical differences between NATO and the Pact suggest a multitude of problems and contingencies, both military and political, which must be considered in force planning. If Dr. Enthoven was aware of them, their lack of treatment in his paper would suggest that he chose to ignore them.

Another defect in the Enthoven paper is that it makes finite judgements as to the adequacy of forces, although admittedly without supporting facts (sec. 7, p. 13).[3] However, Dr. Enthoven does not hesitate

[3] Exhibit A.

to substitute his "beliefs" for facts, nor does he hesitate to assume the outcome of studies not yet completed dealing with mobilization capabilities. This leads to potentially dangerous conclusions which encourage acceptance of such patently irrelevant comparisons as those shown on page 1,[4] which match the forces of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries on a worldwide basis. The British Defence Minister, the subcommittee was informed, dealt with the speciousness of such a comparison very neatly in his statement to NATO's Defence Planning Committee. In summary, he said , "With great respect, I do not think you can really count on the British forces in Hong Kong as being available in case of war in Europe." Because of U.S. participation in Vietnam, this can also be said for a significant number of American personnel who represent the dominant weight on the NATO side as portrayed in slide 1.[4]

By the same token, the Soviets would have to hold back some portion of their forces from a European engagement. The point we wish to emphasize is simply that this slide, though it makes NATO look good, has little if any bearing on the purported subject of the briefing—evaluation of forces for a conventional war in Europe. For all practical purposes, it is irrelevant.

It is possible, however, to develop fairly accurate figures on opposing forces, provided one has a good understanding of how the figures are derived and what they mean in terms of capability. But even these conclusions must, of necessity, be more general than finite, since the nature of the total problem is such that it cannot be solved with simplistic answers.

Unfortunately, the systems analysis approach requires the isolation of data in such a way that they can conveniently be "managed." The result is very likely to be an oversimplification of some very complex interrelationships and a tendency to leave out whatever cannot easily be determined or expressed. Dr. Enthoven's presentation recognizes and mentions this problem more than once; nevertheless, it incorporates some of these fundamental invalidating oversimplifications. For example, Dr. Enthoven tends to consider conventional forces as an independent segment rather than a part of the total military balance in Europe. He has, in effect, taken them out of context. Any true evaluation of conventional forces demands that they be viewed against a background of NATO and Warsaw Pact theater nuclear capabilities in several forms; demolitions, artillery, rockets, bombs and missiles.

Another pertinent factor is the substantial Soviet intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missile capability to strike Western Europe, for which NATO has no corresponding deterrent or counteraction force. And at the end of the nuclear spectrum, the total military balance in Europe includes the strategic nuclear forces of the U.S.S.R., the United States, Britain, and, possibly, France. Any computation of conventional capabilities must allow for the fact that some of our resources are, in fact reserved for nuclear contingencies and must remain so.

Approximately [deleted] of the NATO strike and attack aircraft in the central region are currently limited to a nuclear role. They lack a genuine conventional close support capability. There is no indication in the briefing that these [deleted] aircraft were deducted from gross

[4] P. 9, exhibit A.

totals when computing NATO's close air support kill capability Neither does there appear to be adequate recognition that conversion of nuclear strike air squadrons to dual roles or to a strictly conventional role means increased costs to train and maintain proficiency in the different skills involved. Also, Dr. Enthoven is silent on costs of procurement and maintenance of modern conventional air munitions. We have always thought that systems analysis and cost effectiveness were inseparable. While there is room for adjustment in the magnitude of NATO resources devoted to maintaining a theater nuclear capability, both NATO strategy and common sense dictate that such a capability be maintained. The resources allotted to nuclear tasks cannot, therefore, also be added in at full value when computing nonnuclear capabilities.

Aside from the forces under consideration Dr. Enthoven has also been selective on the geographical aspects. He has carefully avoided any discussion of NATO's flanks, which we believe to be a most important consideration. Any failure on the flanks would seriously affect the central region and we think this omission alone casts considerable doubt on his conclusions. The NATO flanks have always posed problems and these are now magnified by France's withdrawal and the Soviet presence in the Mediterranean. Moreover, the Soviet goals in the Middle East are slowly being achieved. Their vast military and economic programmes and their naval operations have bolstered Soviet prestige and power on the southern flank. They have even adopted a more congenial attitude toward Turkey and Iran with some success. One principal Soviet objective, to outflank NATO's land-based defences, has been accomplished by penetrating the Mediterranean.

It also appears that in order to support his general thesis, Dr. Enthoven has not hesitated to compare "apples" and "oranges." This fallacy of false comparisons is illustrated by slide 2,[5] which purports to compute the yearly cost of equipping Soviet divisions at U.S. standards. Dr. Enthoven arrives at a cost of $13 to $14 billion by multiplying the number of Soviet divisions (140) by the average yearly U.S. expenditure on equipment per division ($90 to $100 million). He then estimates the total Soviet defence budget to be $45 to $55 billion at U.S. prices. Dr. Enthoven's purpose in using this latter figure is not readily apparent, since the figure provided to the subcommittee by the Pentagon shows the estimated total Soviet defence budget for fiscal year 1968 to be only $15.6 billion (16.7 billion rubles) and that the fiscal year 1967 and fiscal year 1966 budgets were even smaller.

It is unclear why he considers these figures significant or relevant, since there is no indication that his computations take into account the marked difference between United States and the lesser Soviet production costs. Furthermore, Dr. Enthoven makes no distinction on this slide between the size of a Soviet division and a U.S. division, which is approximately 70 percent larger. This oversight, if such can be, makes it impossible to arrive at any intelligent conclusions, yet Dr. Enthoven not only reaches conclusions, but in the process he apparently feels that his alchemy has changed estimates into what he characterizes as "facts."

In fairness to Dr. Enthoven, it should be pointed out that early in his briefing he confesses that the "division" is a poor unit of measure

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[5] P. 9, exhibit A.

for comparison purposes; yet, recognizing this, he continues to use it. For example, slide 5 [6] portrays total vehicles in divisions and slide 10 [7] shows divisional logistics capabilities. The difference in authorized strength are ignored. The NATO authorized division strength is between 14,000 and 18,000 men per division. The Warsaw Pact has between 6,000 and 10,000 men per division. Of even more importance is Dr. Enthoven's obvious inference that Pact divisions do not have built-in, sustained logistical capability in any way equivalent to NATO divisions. He ignores the fact that Communist military forces obtain sustaining support from the civilian population which accounts for the low inventory of vehicles in their forward operating units and that in an emergency all petroleum stocks and vehicles are commandeered.

The reliability of the division comparison approach is further degraded by the fact that NATO division manning and equipment levels are often at wide variance with prescribed levels. Documentary evidence and testimony in our records show that peacetime manning of U.S. non-NATO divisions averages about [deleted] percent, and some are as low as [deleted] percent of authorized strength. The inventories of onhand equipment follow a similar pattern. Phase II of our earlier report on the Vietnam war and its impact on commitments abroad discusses combat readiness and the condition of onhand inventory of U.S. forces in Europe. Succinctly, it is impossible to compare NATO divisions with each other, much less with Soviet and Pact country divisions.

We agree, as does the presentation, that there is no satisfactory way to make an absolutely convincing quantitative comparison of the type attempted. While the division provides a convenient unit for ground force planning purposes, it is a very poor yardstick for comparing NATO-Warsaw Pact strength.

Avoiding the organization factor altogether is also unsatisfactory. In slides 6 [8] and 9,[9] infantry and engineer capabilities are compared on a gross manpower basis. One cannot equate infantry needs without considering Pact superiority in armor, mobility, and firepower. On the engineers, the subcommittee was informed that there are substantial differences in training and missions.

All arms of the Soviet Army in Eastern Europe, according to the testimony, get far more intensive river-crossing training than do NATO forces. Soviet transport vehicles require less engineer forces for mobility tasks and support. In his presentation, Dr. Enthoven urges that NATO's "substantially greater engineer capability [deleted] should permit substantial delays to be imposed on the Pact through barriers, minefields and the like." [10] This statement borders on illusion and disregards Soviet doctrine, the structuring of forces, and the conceded advantage in numbers of Soviet tanks. The occupation of Czechoslovakia by Pact forces amply demonstrates that they are structured for swift, massive armored penetration. Our evidence shows that the rate of advance, which Soviet doctrine says should achieve 100 kilometers per day, precludes the use of NATO stockpiled mines even if only half this rate were achieved. To construct barriers and lay effective minefields presupposes that NATO will have considerable

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[6] P. 10, exhibit A.
[7] P. 11, exhibit A.
[8] P. 11, exhibit A.
[9] P. 12, exhibit A.
[10] P. 12, exhibit A.

advance notice of Pact movements—a false assumption indeed. We believe these differences require a greater and more meaningful analysis than the presentation demonstrates.

The demonstration on tactical air (slides 11 [11] and 14 [12] is equally suspect in that criteria are very restricted. First, the analysis credits NATO with the cooperation of French aircraft, a most optimistic assumption. Secondly, it disregards the rapid reinforcement capability of the Soviets that could provide some [deleted] fighter aircraft and [deleted] light bombers to support a western front. Here again, the comparisons fail to consider the logistical, geographical, and tactical realities of the European land mass. The loiter time comparison appears to have little relevance because Pact forces can be expected to take advantage of their numerical superiority offensively rather than defensively. A portion of NATO resources, too, would initially be assigned to air defense missions rather than close air and ground support tasks.

In addition to lack of shelters for aircraft and [deleted] mentioned in the presentation, the subcommittee learned at U.S. Air Force, Europe Headquarters, that there is a serious deficiency in dispersal capability. Another deficiency is in effective [deleted].

One other point that cannot be overlooked is that Army air defense resources are being reduced. These deficiencies become particularly critical because of the excessive crowding of logistic depots and air bases. This, of course, results from France's withdrawal of facilities from NATO. Any advantages that might accrue to NATO in range, payload, etc., are offset by its having to use austere and semiprepared bases.

On page 10 of the presentation, we note that a soldier is a "relatively equivalent unit [deleted] if he is similarly trained and equipped." The "if" becomes significant in the light of the complaint of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, that NATO training is plagued by the short length of conscript service in most member countries as compared to Pact periods of service. The subcommittee's record certainly does not support any conclusion that the average NATO soldier is "similarly trained" to one of the Warsaw Pact.

If Dr. Enthoven's analysis, as employed in this presentation, represents the state of the art of systems analysis, the subcommittee cannot accept its employment for strategic planning. Nor does it provide a basis for consultation with the alliance members on political and military matters. We believe that the presentation suffers from serious over-simplification of some facts and failure to consider others. Systems analysis does have a value and it can provide methods for analyzing and defining a given problem, but we think it a very poor vehicle for arriving at absolute solutions. Even if all the data were correct, and the comparisons and criteria reliable, the presentation appears to have as its principal thrust the achievement of parity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. We think that the goal should be superiority, not parity. This methodology for evaluating conventional forces by employing a systems analysis technique produces little in the way of instruction and much to undermine our announced U.S. objectives.

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[11] P. 14, exhibit A.
[12] P. 15, exhibit A.

There are certain means that we are aware of to validate strategic military concepts, the most certain of which is eyeball-to-eyeball armed conflict between opposing forces. War games are extremely useful and produce valuable indicators. They are particularly helpful in pointing out the weakness rather than the strength. War is the only real and final test.

We wonder how a systems analyst would have approached the relative comparisons of military capabilities of the Israel and Arab forces prior to June 1967. That war dramatically portrays the "intangibles" in the military balance. In the field of military strategy and force development, systems analysis, in our view, is still in its infancy.

The subcommittee is now as convinced as ever that there remains a substantial place for military experience, judgment, and professional expertise in military decisionmaking and in military consultations with our allies.

Exhibit A

Outline of Briefing by Alain Enthoven, Assistant Secretary of Defence

Methodology for Evaluating Conventional Forces

I. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

A. As Secretary of State McNamara said for many years, without effective nonnuclear forces NATO is politically weak in a crisis. Nuclear weapons, when both sides have them, are too dangerous and destructive to be a credible response except in the most extreme circumstances. This principle seems now to be accepted by NATO.

B. The purpose today is to discuss our reasons for believing that a satisfactory nonnuclear capability is feasible at about currently planned budgets, provided plans are made and carried out to supply, protect and use NATO's existing forces effectively.

C. The reason for doing this is that we think it is critically important for the leaders of NATO governments to understand that their forces can serve a useful and definable military purpose vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact. Otherwise there will be no good reason for not giving in to the ever present pressures to cut forces a token level; and there will certainly be no reason to undertake the small but vital improvements necessary to make NATO forces realise their full potential.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Military assessments have continually concluded that NATO would be hopelessly outnumbered almost immediately in any sizeable conventional war.

(1) A NATO study in 1965 (the Mountbatten Study) concluded that NATO in the Center Region could handle about [deleted] Soviet divisions and [deleted] aircraft for a period of [deleted].

(2) Other appraisals have been somewhat more favorable, but nevertheless indicated that the Warsaw Pact with its 200 divisions and several thousand aircraft, could overwhelm NATO in a relatively short time.

B. These assessments are a logical result of the normally sound military principle of never underestimating the threat. However, when political conditions make it impossible to supply the forces necessary to meet the threat when so conservatively defined, the result can be dangerous. Instead of supporting fully adequate forces, which is viewed as politically and economically impossible, many people conclude that NATO's military forces are so hopelessly inadequate as to be nearly irrelevant. This sentiment is widespread in our own Congress, for example.

C. (1) We began to re-examine these questions several years ago when we realized that NATO had 30 percent more men under arms and about 25 percent more tactical aircraft than the Warsaw Pact, as shown in the slide. Of course, neither side has all of its forces deployed in Europe; countries on both sides have forces for other theaters. Nevertheless, we felt that with such large worldwide forces, NATO should not be so badly outnumbered in Europe.

SLIDE 1.—WORLDWIDE NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES IN MID-1968

[Excluding U.S. increases for Vietnam]

Manpower	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Army and marines	3,000,000	2,850,000
Navy	1,070,000	470,000
Air force	1,400,000	880,000
Total, men	5,470,000	4,200,000
Tactical aircraft	11,500	9,200

(2) We further realised that our estimates of Soviet defence expenditures were inconsistent with the money they would have to spend to equip their divisions at anything like the NATO standards, as shown in the following slide.

SLIDE 2.—COST OF EQUIPPING SOVIET DIVISIONS AT U.S. STANDARDS

	Average per U.S. divisions (million)	Number of Soviet divisions	Yearly cost required (billion)
Yearly expenditure on equipment	$90–$100	140	$13–$14
Estimated total Soviet defense budget (U.S. prices)			$45–$55

(3) These facts meant—
Either Soviets had some drastic advantage in efficiency, or
Current methods of comparing capabilities were biased in favour of the Soviets.

III. INDICATORS OF CAPABILITY

A. To get a better understanding of this paradox we began to try to develop some straightforward indicators of capability.

(1) I will compare the forward deployed M-Day NATO and Pact forces in the Center Region as an illustrative example of these techniques, but they can also be applied under many different scenarios including reinforcements on both sides.

(2) First, the figures normally used to describe the opposing forces,

SLIDE 3.—NATO AND WARSAW PACT M-DAY FORCES IN THE CENTER REGION

	NATO			Warsaw pact		
	France	NATO, excluding France	Total NATO	Total pact	U.S.S.R.	East Europeans
Divisions	5	[1] 23⅔	28⅔	46	22	24
Tactical aircraft			2,100	2,900		

[1] Includes 2 U.S. Armored Calvalry Regiments as brigades.

From these figures, the impression is naturally gained that NATO is immediately outnumbered by 60% on land and 40% in the air.

(3) These figures, however, fail to take account of some very significant differences in the size and structure of the NATO and Warsaw Pact divisions and aircraft, which I will now discuss in turn.

B. *Land forces:* The following table shows the manpower strength of the same forces displayed on the previous chart.

SLIDE 4.—LAND FORCES IN THE CENTER REGION (EXCLUDES AIR DEFENCE)

	NATO			Warsaw pact		
	France	NATO excluding France	Total NATO	Total pact	U.S.S.R.	East Europeans
Divisions	5	23⅔	28⅔	46	22	24
Manpower in divisions			389,000	386,000		
Manpower in division forces			677,000	619,000		

(1) The average NATO division has 70 percent more men than the average Pact division.

(2) Considering the whole "division force" (division plus combat and combat service support), the difference is nearly 80 percent.

(3) In manpower, thus, NATO M-Day Forces are about equal to the Pact's in the Center Region.

(a) This is very significant because a soldier, unlike a division, is a relatively equivalent unit on both sides, if he is similarly trained and equipped.

(b) Manpower is by far the largest cost in maintaining a Western army; so if we have an adequate number of men under arms we are already paying for most of the cost to have an adequate capability.

(4) We have gone further, however, to obtain a still more detailed idea of the structure and equipment of these two forces, as shown in the following slide. The figures shown pertain to the same forces shown previously.

The slide shows that Pact forces have about [deleted] percent more tanks, but that NATO has the same number or more of other key types of equipment, including more tactical transport vehicles. The key difference in structure is the greater emphasis on tanks by the Warsaw Pact. This of course is a matter of choice, since we could change the mix of weapons in our force if we thought it would be more effective.

SLIDE 5.—LAND FORCES EQUIPMENT

	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Total vehicles in divisions		
Tanks		
Antitank weapons		
Mortars and artillery pieces		
Armored personnel carriers		

[1] Includes 2 U.S. Armored Cavalry Regiments as brigades.

Thus, while our force structure differs considerably from the Pact's, there is no indication that Pact soldiers, on the average, are better equipped than NATO's.

(5) Further measures of capability. To gain an indication of the actual capability of these forces, we have grouped them into five categories—infantry, artillery and mortars, tanks and anti-tank weapons, engineers, and logistics—and have developed capability measures for each. I shoud make it clear that these figures will not predict the outcome of war, since this depends on many unpredictable factors such as intelligence, weather, tactics and the like. Furthermore, the grouping of forces into categories does not at all imply that they would not be used against other categories. The figures, therefore, are intended only as an indication of the relative capability of the forces available to both sides. The following slides will display each of these.

a. *Infantry.* To measure pure infantry capability we have estimated the actual number of men available to both sides in rifle and reconnaissance platoons.

SLIDE 6.—MEN IN RIFLE-RECONNAISSANCE PLATOONS

	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Number of men		

As there is little difference in the equipment or capability per man, this is a fairly good measure and indicates that the infantry capability is about equal. It of course ignores the advantage of the defense being in protected positions.

b. *Artillery and Mortars.* The capability of artillery and mortars is measured by the number of casualties each side can inflict per day, when shooting at typical targets. This is displayed on the following slide.

SLIDE 7.—MORTAR AND ARTILLERY CAPABILITY, NUMBER OF CASUALTIES INFLICTED PER DAY AGAINST TYPICAL TARGETS

	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Number of casualties		

NATO's capability is so much greater because of more effective ammunition (COFRAM for U.S. weapons), more accuracy of certain weapons, and greater ammunition expenditure rates. This measure ignores whatever additional advantage NATO gets from having

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mostly self-propelled, rather than towed artillery. I will come back to the supply rate when I discuss logistics.

c. *Tanks and Anti-Tank Weapons.* Obviously, the Pact's largest potential advantage is in tanks, since they have [deleted] percent more than NATO. On the other hand, NATO tanks, especially the M–60, Leopard and Chieftain ([deleted] percent of NATO's medium tanks) have considerably better accuracy at long range than the T–54 and T–55, the main Warsaw Pact tanks. Also, NATO would be on the defence on most parts of the front, permitting its large numbers of infantry anti-tank weapons to be relatively effective. The slide estimates the number of enemy tanks the NATO tanks and anti-tank weapons could kill before being killed themselves in typical tactical engagements.

This calculation does not show that we could necessarily defeat the enemy tank force. Other relevant factors must also be considered, of course. Most of our anti-tank weapons would be spread more or less evenly across the front, while the enemy can concentrate his armor in a few places. On the other hand, our tactical air forces should be able to destroy many tanks, and the Soviets would lose some from mechanical breakdowns. But the point I want to make here is that the problem posed by the large number of Soviet tanks should be approached in these terms, and not by a simple comparison of the numbers of tanks on both sides.

SLIDE 8.—NATO ANTITANK CAPABILITY

Type weapon	Number available	Capability Kill, enemy tanks
Tanks		
Light antitank weapons		
Medium antitank weapons		
Mines		

[Deleted.]

d. *Engineer Effort.* As shown in the following slide, NATO has a substantially greater engineer capability, as measured by the number of men in engineer units.

SLIDE 9.—NUMBER OF ENGINEERS

	NATO	Warsaw pact
Number of engineers		

This capability should permit substantial delays to be imposed on the Pact through barriers, minefields and the like. NATO Central Region countries have [deleted] anti-tank mines stockpiled, which by World War II standards should inflict about [deleted] tank losses on the Pact, as shown on the previous slide.

e. *Logistics.* Since the NATO forces have considerably more men in and behind the division engaged in logistics tasks, as well as more transport vehicles per combat vehicle, the ability to supply ammunition and fuel, and to keep tanks operating should be greater.

The Soviets apparently have accepted this as indicated by their low artillery ammunition expenditure rates. The following slide shows two measures of logistics capability at the divisional level.

SLIDE 10.—DIVISIONAL LOGISTICS CAPABILITY

	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Cargo life in divisional vehicles		
Days of supply carried in divisional vehicles		

The Soviets can maintain their basic load at an appropriate level of days only by planning on fairly low ammunition supply rates for artillery.

(6) *Summary of Comparisons of Land Forces:* (Slide 4 (Manpower) on again).

a. Because of great differences, in size and structure, the number of divisions is a poor measure of NATO and Warsaw Pact capability.

b. NATO has about slightly more M-Day manpower in combat available units as the Warsaw Pact in Central Europe, although the Pact has 60 percent more divisions. These figures do not describe the overall strength of NATO and the Pact, of course, since they do not consider reinforcements on both sides.

c. A detailed examination of equipment indicates no area where the Pact's different structure provides a major relative advantage, although NATO should improve its [deleted] capability.

(7) *Implications:* I would not want these figures to be taken to suggest that in any sense we have more land forces than we need. Before drawing conclusions on the adequacy of these forces, one must consider carefully a number of other important factors including the readiness and state of training, reinforcement capability of both sides, and the political circumstances in which these forces might be used. I believe that NATO should have some margin of superiority in its land forces on M-Day to offset Pact advantages in reinforcement capability and the fact that the Pact might begin to mobilise before we do.

Mobilisation and reinforcement capabilities are a very important matter, but they are not the subject of my presentation today. The whole question of Warsaw Pact reinforcement capability is under intensive study now.

However, I would like to say that I believe that when Warsaw Pact reinforcement capabilities are looked at realistically, we will find that they could be matched by NATO, approximately within current budget levels, if we organised ourselves efficiently to do it. For example, with short terms of active duty service, many NATO armies are paying very heavy training costs, but not getting full benefit because the trainees soon finish their terms of service. This spending could be converted into effective and relevant military power if these men were organised into fully equipped reserve units.

The point I want to make is this: When we do study these questions and make comparisons of the two sides to test the adequacy of our forces, we should look at specific indicators of capability like the ones I have presented, and not mislead ourselves by simply counting

divisions. The large investment in NATO's existing forces can only be realised if NATO forces are adequately trained, and have adequate stocks of ammunition and other supplies.

C. *Tactical Air Forces:* The following slide shows the number of aircraft units in the Center Region and the percentage of the world-wide inventory.

SLIDE 11.—TACTICAL AIRCRAFT IN THE CENTER REGION

	France	NATO excluding France	Total NATO	Total pact	U.S.S.R.	East Europeans
Number of tactical aircraft unit equipment			2,100	2,900		
Percentage of worldwide inventory			20	40		

1. NATO's deployed forces are only 20 percent of its worldwide inventory (Center Region countries) while the Pact's deployed forces are 40 percent of theirs. However, the main problem in comparing the number of aircraft is that it fails to consider significant differences in characteristics.

The following slide indicates the high proportion of multi-purpose aircraft (with both a significant bombing and interceptor capability) in the NATO force deployed in the Center Region and the high percentage of interceptors in the Pact force. As a result, NATO aircraft have about 2.4 times the payload capability per aircraft.

SLIDE 12

	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Percentage of force by mission capability:		
Primarily interceptors	10	42
Multipurpose fighter-attack	48	15
Primarily attack	9	6
Reconnaissance	13	8
Low performance	20	29
Total	100	100
Payload index	100	35

2. Other significant differences in the air forces are the number of flying hours, the maintenance support and the ability to loiter near the front lines to engage enemy airplanes, as shown in the following slide.

SLIDE 13

	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Crew training: Number of flying hours per month		
Maintenance: Average number of hours out of commission per flying hour		
Frontline air defence: Loiter time of fighters at 100 miles (minutes)		

The average NATO pilot gets twice the flying hours per month of the average Pact pilot. The average Pact aircraft spends 80 percent more time out-of-commission per flying hour as the average NATO aircraft. And the loiter capability of NATO fighters is 3–4 times that of the Pact's.

3. Capability Indicators: As in the case of land forces, we have tried to combine some of these factors into illustrative calculations of capability.

SLIDE 14

	NATO	Warsaw Pac
Illustrative close air support target kill capability:		
Number of tanks damaged per day:		
With ordinary bombs or rockets		
With best available munitions		
Personnel in rifle platoons, casualties inflicted per day:		
With ordinary bombs or rockets		
With best available munitions		
Frontline air defence capability: Total loiter time of first line fighters available at 100 miles (hours per day)		

The first measure is simply the number of tanks or personnel the NATO and Pact forces could kill per day under varying tactical assumptions, if the whole force were applied to either purpose. This takes into account the sortie rate, pilot accuracy and payloads of each air force. It shows that the NATO force has 2.5 to five times the destructive potential of the Pact force, when both sides use ordinary bombs and rockets, and even more if the best available munitions were used.

The second measure is the number of hours of loiter time available per day from first-line fighters. It is a measure of the ability of each side to patrol its front lines to protect its bombers or to attack the other side's bombers.

4. I would like to emphasize that all these advantages of the NATO forces are *potential*, and are in danger of being wasted for two reasons:

a. Our aircraft are vulnerable to attack on their airbases. They must be protected by a vulnerability reduction programme that includes aircraft shelters, runway repair capability, and other measures. Otherwise, we are in danger of losing them in the first few days of the war, as the Arabs did last June.

[Deleted.]

Correction of these problems is one of the most important actions NATO could take to improve its capability; yet the cost is relatively small.

IV. SUMMARY

A. The number of divisions and aircraft is a poor measure of relative NATO/Warsaw Pact capability, because of large differences in the size and capability of these units.

B. Although it is difficult or even impossible to predict the outcome of future wars, it is possible to develop useful indicators of relative capability.

C. If these indicators are used to compare the forces, it becomes apparent that certain weaknesses in the structure and support of the forces are very important, and can be corrected at relatively small cost. These include:

1. Shelters for aircraft.
2. [Deleted.]
3. [Deleted.]

D. I hope that all the national and international staffs studying NATO military problems will find this approach a useful adjunct to their other analyses.

Annex IV

Letter From Alain Enthoven, Assistant Secretary of Defense, to Senator John Sherman Cooper

22nd October, 1968

Dear Senator Cooper: Enclosed is a copy of our analysis of the NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces in Central Europe. I hope this report will prove helpful in your upcoming discussions with European parliamentarians and statesmen.

An appreciation of the state of conventional forces in Europe is essential to show the need for improvements in NATO conventional forces. I thank you for helping make known our view on this vital subject.

My staff and I would, of course, be pleased to provide you with any further information or assistance you require.

Sincerely,

Alain Enthoven

[addendum]

EVALUATION OF NATO AND PACT CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE

I. Introduction

The importance of a significant conventional capability in Europe has been generally accepted by the NATO nations. The NATO Ministers made it official in 1967 by adopting the flexible response strategy. The Ministers' motivation was simple. Without effective non-nuclear forces NATO is politically weak in a crisis. Nuclear weapons, when both sides have them, are too dangerous and destructive to be a credible response except in the most extreme circumstances.

This report reviews the current military balance in Europe and presents our reason for believing that a satisfactory conventional capability is feasible, at planned or moderately increased budget levels, provided NATO supplies protects and uses its existing forces effectively. We think it critically important for the leaders of NATO governments to review the military balance themselves. Otherwise, they could yield to widespread pressures to cut the size of forces to a token level and not undertake the small but vital improvements in quality necessary to make NATO forces realize their full potential.

A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

In Europe and America a popular image formed shortly after World War II about the enormous size of the Soviet military forces, especially land forces. At that time Soviet armies were very large compared with the Western Allies' recently dismantled forces. This image has proven resistant to changing facts.

Since World War II it has been generally thought that NATO would be hopelessly outnumbered almost immediately in any sizable conventional war. There was quite understandable hopelessness about

standing off the 150–300 or more Soviet divisions. We believed that the necessary NATO land forces would have been prohibitively expensive and thus politically unacceptable. Instead of providing fully adequate forces, many governments increasingly concluded that NATO's conventional military forces were so hopelessly inadequate as to be nearly irrelevant except for symbolic/political uses. The futility of having conventional NATO capability in Europe in the face of massive conventional Soviet power was a widespread idea among leaders of western governments as well as the public. NATO relied on nuclear weapons as the sole means to defend against supposed numerically superior Soviet forces by trying to substitute nuclear weapons for conventional forces on the NATO side.

NATO governments often expressed the intention to increase greatly the size of their conventional forces in Europe, such as the 1952 Lisbon force goal of 96 NATO divisions to meet Soviet capability. These intentions were never fulfilled because of the political climate of the times.

Instead, the pessimistic picture of the conventional imbalance between NATO and the Pact made it difficult to get the NATO governments to make even small but vital qualitative improvements in their existing forces, much less increase the size of their forces. Attempts to obtain force increases by scaring people with the enormity of the threat usually produced the opposite effect and a feeling of defeatism.

B. NEW U.S. ANALYSIS OF NATO AND PACT FORCES

In the early 1960s the U.S. began re-examining the conventional capability of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Our analysis shows that the Warsaw Pact does not have much larger forces than does NATO. To reach this simple and limited conclusion, our new analysis considers several kinds of gross comparisons, including numbers of men and equipment, numbers and quality of aircraft. Formerly we looked mostly at number of divisions. While the new analysis can be improved and refined, we can be confident that our general conclusion remains valid. In items of gross size, the forces of the Pact and those of NATO are roughly balanced.

The numerical balance of forces leads to three conclusions. First, as Section IV discusses, a conventional capability is worth while. Second, simple and relatively cheap improvements in the quality of existing NATO forces could yield valuable military returns. Third, since the forces of all the NATO nations contribute to the rough numerical balance between the Pact and NATO conventional capabilities, none of the nations should reduce its forces to a token level. Doing so would destroy the balance.

C. OBJECTIVE OF U.S. ANALYSIS

Our purpose in doing the new analysis was simply realism. Our purpose in making it known is to show that the problems in the Alliance do not arise from numerical inferiority. The money available for military budgets and the military manpower available to NATO are

in fact greater than those available to the Warsaw Pact. We should not be complacent, however. The real problems are those of equipment, training, supplies and related aspects of military forces. We should solve these problems precisely because we already are spending the money and have the manpower. Doing so will improve further our confidence in balancing any possible Warsaw Pact advantages. *We do not believe, however, that we need far more money or manpower than at present.* Our purpose in making gross comparisons between the two alliances is to shift attention away from a myth about numerical inferiority and toward the necessary and feasible improvements.

Our purpose often has been misunderstood. Hence, we should clarify several misconceptions. First, we are not arguing that NATO should aim for equality with the Warsaw Pact forces instead of superiority. If reasonable force contributions from the NATO nations would result in superiority, we certainly ought to consider superiority's benefits and costs. We believe, however, that obtaining much more force is completely unrealistic, barring some extraordinary and unforeseen change in NATO's political climate. Thus, however, desirable superiority might be, it is far from being a practical possibility that debate and analysis should focus instead of feasible defence postures and force improvements.

Second, no one should conclude that a NATO nation could decrease its military forces because NATO has more forces than it needs. Obviously if rough numerical balance exists between opposing forces, unilateral force reductions of any consequence would destroy the balance.

Third, we are also arguing that present NATO forces are satisfactory. During our analyses we have uncovered significant areas where NATO forces definitely need improvement. Until these improvements are made the NATO forces cannot fulfill their full potential and cannot be considered adequate. Examples of this are discussed below.

Fourth, let us emphasise that we are not trying to predict the outcome of a conventional war in Europe. War is one of the most uncertain of all human endeavors. Intangibles such as morale, training, and leadership, while crucial, cannot be measured and predicted. The best that can be done is to seek to compare as many factors on both sides as are relevant to the possible conflict one wants to consider. We can then define the feasible measures which are likely to best improve our chances for wartime success.

Now let us turn to the analysis itself.

II. Indicators of Capability

A. WORLDWIDE FORCES

Table I compares worldwide Warsaw Pact and NATO forces. Soviet forces in the Far East are included. Increases in U.S. forces for Vietnam are excluded. We present this comparison not to imply anything directly about the balance in Europe, but simply to lend perspective, to give some rough idea of forces available for reinforcement, and to indicate the general magnitude of resources each side is putting into its forces.

TABLE I.—WORLDWIDE NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES, MID-1968

[Excluding U.S. increases for Vietnam]

	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Manpower:		
Army and marines	3,000,000	2,850,000
Navy	1,070,000	470,000
Air Force	1,400,000	880,000
Total men	[1] 5,470,000	4,200,000
Tactical aircraft:		
Total inventory	11,500	9,000
Nominal inventory value	$27,000,000,000	[2] $16,000,000,000
Total defence budget	[3] $75,000,000,000	[4] $50,000,000,000

[1] This total includes the forces of France.
[2] Approximate.
[3] Does not include U.S. costs for Vietnam.
[4] At U.S. prices; that is, the United States could "buy" the Warsaw Pact forces—pay the men at our pay scales and build the equipment in our own factories—for about $50,000,000,000 per year.

TABLE II.—CENTER REGION NATO AND WARSAW PACT FORCES,[1] MID-1968 DATA

	NATO	Warsaw Pact
Land forces, M-day:		
Divisions	[2] 28⅔	[3] 46
Manpower in Divisions	386,000	368,000
Manpower in Division Forces	677,000	619,000
Riflemen (NATO as percent of pact)	100	
Equipment (NATO as percent of pact):		
Tanks	60	
Antitank weapons	150	
Armored personnel carriers	130	
Artillery and mortars (number of tubes)	100	
Divisional logistic lift	150	
Total vehicles	135	
Engineers	137	
Tactical air forces:		
Number of deployed aircraft	2,100	2,900
Percentage of worldwide inventory deployed in Europe	20	40
Percentage of force by mission capability (center region):		
Primarily interceptors	10	42
Multipurpose fighter/attack	48	15
Primarily attack	9	6
Reconnaissance	13	8
Low performance	20	29
Total	100	100
Effectiveness indicators (NATO as percent of pact):		
Payload	280	
Typical loiter time	[4] 250–500	
Crew training	180	

[1] These data relate to the situation prior to the Czechoslovak crisis. Revised figures have not yet been established but they are unlikely to make a significant difference in the rough balance portrayed in this table. Center region includes West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, and France for NATO; East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia for the pact.
[2] Includes 5 French divisions.
[3] 22 of which are Soviet, and 24 of which are East European, including 8 Czech.
[4] Range depends on tactical mission profile assumed.

B. CENTRAL EUROPEAN FORCES

The date in the following analysis relate to the situation prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Detailed revised data are not yet available for force comparisons of the current situation. Gross estimates, however, indicate that neither the short nor long-term threat to NATO's Center Region has undergone a major change. Soviet forces are more ready now than before, and they have deployed some additional divisions to Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union. On the

other hand, the decreased dependability of the Czech forces and the need for Pact forces to neutralise them and the Czech population reduce the net threat.

Whether the long term threat to NATO is increased depends on whether the Soviets maintain the same level of readiness and on the dependability of the East European forces in general and the Czech forces in particular. In addition, the sudden aggressiveness displayed by the Soviets in invading Czechoslovakia has introduced the dangerous element of increased unpredictability.

At the present time, then, we will give the data relating to the situation prior to the Czech crisis. Table II compares the land and tactical air forces in Central Europe last spring. Each of the capability indicators which we compare is discussed below.

1. Land Forces

If one counts divisions, NATO is outnumbered in immediately available forces. However, if one counts the number of men in divisions or in division forces, NATO has about ten percent more manpower. If one counts the number of men in rifle platoons, the manpower is about equal. The reason for this disparity in divisions and men is that a NATO and a Pact division are very different. The average NATO division has 70 percent more men than a Pact division. Considering the whole division force, the difference is nearly 80 percent.

That manpower on both sides is roughly equal is very significant. A soldier, unlike a division, is a relatively equivalent unit on either side if he is similarly trained and equipped. Also, manpower is by far the largest cost—something over 80 percent—in maintaining a Western Army. If we have an adequate number of men under arms, we are already paying for most of the cost to have an adequate capability.

We have gone further, however, to obtain a still more detailed idea of structure and equipment of these two forces. Table II shows ratios of available equipment.

a. *Tanks and Anti-Tank Weapons.* The Pact's largest potential advantage is in tanks, since NATO has only 60 percent as many as the Pact. NATO armies have deliberately chosen to place less emphasis on tanks than do the Soviets. We could increase the emphasis if we thought effectiveness would be increased. In any case, NATO tanks have a qualitative advantage, especially the M–60, the Leopard and the Chieftain. They are considerably more accurate at long range than the T–54 and T–55, the main Warsaw Pact tanks. Also, since NATO would be on the defense along most of the front, its 50 percent advantage in infantry anti-tank weapons would be important. Studies show that NATO tanks and anti-tank weapons have a very significant kill potential against the Pact tank force. Although these relative capabilities do not show that we would necessarily defeat the enemy tank force, we clearly are not in a hopeless situation, especially when one adds the tank kill potential of our tactical aircraft.

b. *Armored Personnel Carriers.* NATO has 30 percent more APCs than the Pact. This should give NATO a mobility advantage.

c. *Artillery and Mortars.* The number of artillery and mortar tubes is about equal on both sides. However, because of more effective ammunition, more accuracy of certain weapons, and greater ammunition expenditure rates because of greater logistical capability, NATO's capability to inflict casualties is greater than that of the Pact.

d. *Logistics.* Since NATO forces have considerably more men engaged in logistics tasks behind the division, and more transport vehicles per combat vehicle, NATO's ability to supply ammunition and fuel and to keep tanks operating should be greater. As one would expect the Soviets plan on lower artillery ammunition expenditure than NATO does.

We conclude from this analysis of NATO and Pact forces that the forces facing each other on M-Day are roughly equal in many measures of size. The Pact forces are structured differently, e.g., they place greater emphasis on tanks, but this is more a question of force mix rather than of inadequate force size. We could change our mix of weapons if we thought it would be more effective.

Rough equality in force size does not mean that we have more land forces than we need. Before drawing conclusions on the adequacy of our forces, one must consider carefully a number of other important factors including readiness, state of training, reinforcement capability of both sides, and the political circumstances in which these forces might be used. NATO should ideally have some margin of superiority capability in its land forces on M-Day to offset Pact advantages in reinforcement capability and to allow for the Pact's possibly beginning to mobilize before we do.

Mobilization and reinforcement capabilities are a very important matter, but they are not the subject of this report. The whole question of Warsaw Pact reinforcement capability is under intensive study now.

When this review is complete, we will probably find that while the Pact's capabilities are greater than NATO's today, they could be matched by NATO, if we organise ourselves efficiently. For example, with short terms of active duty service, many NATO armies are paying heavy training costs but not getting full benefit because the trainees soon finish their term of service. This spending could be converted into effective and relevant military power if these men were organised after discharge into fully equipped ready reserve units.

The important aspects of our new analyses are: (1) When we compare forces, we should look at specific indicators of capability like the ones presented here. We should not simply count divisions. (2) When NATO forces are adequately trained and have adequate stocks of ammunition and other supplies, NATO can derive the full benefit from its large expenditures on manpower in existing forces.

2. Tactical Air Forces

Table II shows the aircraft deployed to the Center Region of NATO by both sides and certain other indicators of effectiveness. At first glance the Pact appears to have a significant advantage. It has almost 40 percent more aircraft in the Center Region. However, NATO's deployed aircraft are only 20 percent of its worldwide inventory while the Pact's deployed forces are 40 percent of theirs. Particularly since aircraft are easily moved, NATO has a greater reinforcement capability.

The main problem in comparing air forces is that aircraft quantities alone fail to take account of significant differences in characteristics. NATO forces have a much higher proportion of multi-purpose aircraft while the Pact has a much larger proportion of interceptors. This difference in structure contributes to the fact that the NATO aircraft have about 2.4 times the payload capability per aircraft.

The number of tanks or personnel the NATO and Pact air forces could kill per day under varying tactical asumptions have been analysed. The estimate takes into account the sortie rate, pilot accuracy, and payloads of each air force. The result of these analyses is that NATO forces appear to have two and one-half to five times the destructive potential of the Pact force, when both sides use ordinary bombs and rockets, and even a greater advantage if the best available munitions are used.

NATO airforces also have two and one-half to five times the loiter time capability of Pact first-line fighters. Loiter time is a measure of the ability of each side to patrol its front lines, to protect its bombers, or to attack the other side's bombers. A frequent observation about the tactical air situation is that, although NATO has a greater offensive capability, the Pact has more interceptors. This is certainly true, and a key question therefore is how effective these interceptors would be in stopping our fighter bombers. We do not know precisely, but one thing is clear. With its high percentage of multi-purpose aircraft, NATO has more flexibility than the Pact. NATO can use its aircraft partly for offensive attacks and partly for protection against Pact interceptors, as the situation requires. Combined with the limitations on the Pact's ability to patrol the front lines, many NATO aircraft should be able to penetrate Pact defences and attack Pact troops.

Finally, the average NATO pilot gets twice the flying hours per month than the average Pact pilot. The average Pact aircraft spends 80 percent more time out of commission per flying hours than NATO aircraft. This pilot training and maintenance is expensive, but we believe gives us a more effective air force.

All these factors change the conclusions derived from simple counting of aircraft. NATO air forces have significantly greater tactical air capability than the Pact. However, as with land forces, many of NATO's air advantages are potential. They are in danger of being wasted because relatively inexpensive measures are neglected. For example, the present vulnerability of our aircraft on air bases is a problem which could be rectified inexpensively. We could build aircraft shelters costing only about five percent of the aircraft's cost, establish runway repair capabilities, and other simple measures. Otherwise we are in danger of losing many aircraft in the first few days of the war, as the Arabs did in 1967.

C. CONCLUSIONS

We hope that this analysis will help to counteract the frequent tendency toward gross exaggeration about Warsaw Pact forces. Counting divisions on both sides is misleading. They are not comparable units. Rather, we must count real factors such as soldiers, guns, tanks, vehicles, infantrymen, and engineers, rather than nominal formations. When comparing equipment such as aircraft, we must take into account their different characteristics.

When we analyse capability in this manner we find a rough equality of numbers in Central Europe and in the Alliance as a whole. If NATO's military posture is inadequate—and we think it is—it is not because we are grossly outnumbered. Rather, it is because of readiness deficiencies that NATO has not thought worth fixing.

The balance of forces, however, does not lead to the conclusion that NATO can now match the maximum mobilized strength of the Warsaw Pact armies or that NATO can relax its efforts. Rather, we can have a major conventional option in Europe without substantially greater costs—a very good conventional option is within NATO's reach.

We are not deriving the benefits we could from present forces, although we already have the manpower we need and are incurring most of the necessary costs. To obtain all benefits we must correct certain weaknesses discussed below.

III. Improvements to NATO Forces

A. VULNERABILITY OF AIRCRAFT

Our tactical aircraft are parked on open ramps and are vulnerable to destruction, much as the Arab air forces were in 1967. The importance of shelters in solving this problem has been demonstrated. Shelters should be included in the joint NATO infrastructure programme. A good shelter costs around $100,000; the aircraft it protects costs one to six million dollars.

B. INADEQUATE AMMUNITION

Some non-U.S. forces have small stocks of ordnance, which would prevent their forces from realising their full combat potential. We should continue to stress the need for building balanced ammunition stocks. Ironically, some of our NATO Allies have justified their very small ammunition stocks on the grounds that NATO is sure to be defeated early in a war—a good example of the harmful consequences of exaggeration of Pact forces.

C. MALDEPLOYMENT

Allied forces in the Center Region tend to be poorly deployed; their peacetime military bases are generally located too far south.

D. MOBILISATION

The Central Region allies have a large manpower mobilization base (as a by-product of short terms of service), but in the past have not taken its training or equipping very seriously. The Belgians, Dutch and British should be continually urged to keep their reserve units fully equipped. The Germans now have no major reserve combat units, and should create more reserve battalions to fill out their 12 active divisions to full strength.

IV. Implications for Strategy

The foregoing analysis has some important implications for NATO strategy. A strategy cannot be decided in the abstract; it must relate to the basic facts of the situation.

The new NATO strategy officially recognizes the need for a range of military capabilities, from conventional to strategic nuclear. In this

strategy strategic nuclear forces are a major deterrent to Soviet aggression. Theater nuclear capabilities add to deterrence in Europe, mostly to deter tactical use of nuclear weapons, but also to help deter massive conventional attack.

Our strong conventional forces help deter a deliberate conventional attack by denying the Soviets confidence of success. To obtain any such confidence, they must resort to extremely large-scale mobilization and fighting in which the risk of nuclear war becomes more credible. Having about the same amount of force as the Pact in various stages of build-up would, we believe, deter a Pact invasion. With such a ratio, the Soviets could have little confidence of success.

The main reason for adopting a revised strategy—away from massive nuclear retaliation to any aggression—is that threatening strategic nuclear attack on Soviet cities is no longer a credible deterrent to political pressure or limited military aggression in Europe.

A second reason behind the new strategy is that nuclear weapons for tactical use, when both sides have them, are not an adequate substitute for conventional forces. Nuclear weapons would have to be used in large numbers or high yields to destroy a major Pact invasion force. The Soviets in turn could respond in kind and destroy major forces on our side. Such a war would incidentally also kill millions of civilians and destroy cities. Defence by suicide is not a credible threat. Moreover, such a theater nuclear war would create enormous pressure for even more escalation to destroy the remaining nuclear delivery systems on both sides, which could lead to more attacks on cities.

The importance of keeping such a conventional capability for NATO has been emphasised by the recent invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Soviets have demonstrated that they are ready to use military force in Europe if political means fail, and if they consider their vital interests to be at stake. Over a period of several months, the Soviets made demands on the Czech government, backed up by military mobilization, exercises and the like. Should the Soviets act in this way toward any NATO Ally, NATO should have the ability to respond by building up its own forces as the Soviets build up theirs.

Furthermore, events in Czechoslovakia underscore both the growing pressures within Eastern Europe for liberalisation and Soviet determination to oppose such pressures as forcefully as necessary, even in the face of propaganda costs and the risk of war. The situation in Eastern Europe may therefore become increasingly explosive—this is no time for NATO to cut its forces or ignore ways to make them more effective.

Hon. JOHN SHERMAN COOPER,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR COOPER: A news story has just brought to my attention an unfortunate error in the memorandum I provided you recently on NATO and Pact conventional forces in Central Europe.

The material concerned is in Section II, Part B, so that the error will not be perpetuated, I would deeply appreciate it if you would simply delete the first and second paragraphs of Section II, Part B. Would you also call this deletion to the attention of those to whom you have given the paper?

Actually, that part is not germane to the purpose of the memorandum which was to give a rough comparison of forces prior to Czechoslovakia. But to my personal distress I find that the wording creates an impression which is opposite to the views which I hold and which careful government-wide assessments of the Czech situation confirm.

In short, the net threat—including the availability of forces and the possible Pact willingness to risk their use against NATO territory—has significantly increased, not reduced. It is clear that the Soviet forces in Central Europe, the principal threat, are greater in military strength now than before the occupation of Czechoslovakia. While some of those forces would be needed to watch the Czech population, it is my conclusion, and of course the position of the United States Government, that the Soviet Union has now demonstrated a willingness to use force to interfere in the internal affairs of another state that many persons had hoped was a relic of the past. Therefore, the combination of increased military and political threat is one of real concern to me, and the necessity for improvements in NATO's forces takes on new urgency. I regret any inconvenience caused by the necessity for correcting my memorandum, but it is important that persons using it understand my views.

Sincerely yours,

ALAIN ENTHOVEN.

Annex V

UNITED STATES TROOPS IN EUROPE

Report of the Combined Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees of the U.S. Senate, October 15, 1968

A. SUBCOMMITTEE ACTION

The Combined Subcommittee of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on the Subject of U.S. Troops in Europe was appointed on March 1, 1967, to consider two resolutions, and a number of amendments thereto, relating to the subject of the level of U.S. forces stationed in Europe. These resolutions and amendments had been referred to both the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations.

The two resolutions were Senate Resolution 49, introduced by Senator Mansfield and 43 cosponsors on January 19, 1967, to which amendments were subsequently proposed by Senator Clark and Senator Dodd, and Senate Resolution 83 introduced on February 16, 1967, by Senator Javits and 11 cosponsors, Senate Resolution 49 declared it the sense of the Senate that "a substantial reduction of U.S. forces permanently stationed in Europe can be made without adversely affecting either our resolve or ability to meet our commitment under the North Atlantic Treaty." Senate Resolution 83 declared it the sense of the Senate that the European members of NATO "be urged to make a greater contribution" and that the redeployment of some U.S. forces was "properly an item for determination in consultation with our NATO allies." The texts of these resolutions and amendments are contained in appendix A to this report.

The subcommittee held its first meeting on April 13, 1967, in executive session. Senator Mansfield was elected chairman, and Senator Stennis, vice chairman, of the subcommittee. The subcommittee decided to invite Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defence McNamara to testify on April 26, 1967.

The subcommittee met in executive session on April 19, 1967 to discuss the rescheduling of witnesses and decided to invite Secretary of Defence McNamara and Under Secretary of State Katzenbach—who would be Acting Secretary in the absence abroad of Secretary Rusk—to testify on April 26 and to invite Secretary Rusk to testify alone on May 3.

The combined subcommittee met on April 26 in executive session at which time Secretary of Defence McNamara, Acting Secretary of State Katzenbach, and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Eugene Rostow testified. Although both hearings were in executive session a record of the hearings was published on July 31, after some material had been deleted for national security reasons.[1]

The subcommittee has not met since May 3 of last year. However, individual members of the subcommittee have continued to pursue the questions raised in the subcommittee's hearings in meetings of various Senate committees and on the Senate floor. The speeches on this subject made in the Senate in 1967 and 1968 by members of the subcommittee are contained in appendix B. to this report.

B. INTRODUCTION

There is a division of opinion within the subcommittee on the question of the level of U.S. forces in Europe that should be maintained. Before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, some members of the subcommittee believed that there should be a substantial reduction in these forces phased over a number of years; other members of the subcommittee were opposed to a substantial reduction in these forces under the prevailing conditions in Europe and the Soviet Union. All of the members of the subcommittee are agreed, however, on certain basic propositions:

1. The level and composition of U.S. forces in Europe should be studied on a continuous basis and should be reassessed periodically, taking into account such factors as advances in the techniques of modern warfare, the risks and advantages of dual-basing, and political and military developments in Europe. The invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia make such study and reassessment all the more important.

2. While there is no question of the essential importance to the United States of its NATO commitment, account must obviously be taken of the fact that our other obligations abroad and our responsibilities at home are placing an increasing strain on the resources available to meet this commitment.

3. The responsibility of defending the area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty is a joint responsibility to be shared by the United States and the other NATO countries. It is a responsibility which our NATO allies should take—but often do not seem to have taken—at least as seriously as do we.

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[1] U.S. Troops in Europe, hearings before the Combined Subcommittee of Foreign Relations and Armed Services on the subject of U.S. Troops in Europe, U.S. Senate, 90th Cong., first sess. (Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967.)

4. The foreign exchange costs incurred by the United States through the stationing of its forces in Europe place an unacceptable strain on the U.S. balance of payments. The effective cooperation of our NATO allies is urgently required in seeking a long-term solution to this problem.

5. Changes in any NATO assigned forces are properly matters for consultation among NATO allies.

C. DEFENCE EFFORTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS NATO ALLIES

U.S. forces have been stationed in Western Europe in large numbers since 1951–52, when the United States bolstered its ground forces there by four divisions in the belief that hostilities in Korea augured a sharply increased Soviet threat to the countries of Western Europe.

By the middle of 1952, the buildup of U.S. forces had reached some 350,000. In subsequent years, U.S. Army, Air Force, and naval personnel stationed on or near the European Continent in support of NATO have numbered above 400,000, rising to more than 450,000 during the 1961–62 Berlin crisis, falling below 350,000 beginning in 1967. Dependents and U.S. civilian employees accompanying these forces have numbered at times in the several hundreds of thousands; foreign nationals employed by these forces have averaged, over the years, close to 100,000.

The bulk of U.S. forces in Europe have been stationed in West Germany where, for 16 years, the equivalent of some six U.S. divisions and a large Air Force contingent have shouldered a major portion of the defence burden in NATO's crucial central region. Despite a preoccupying balance-of-payments deficit, which began to assume ominous proportions in 1958; despite the ever more pressing demands of the Vietnam War; despite heavy commitments elsewhere in the world and the rising cost of urgent domestic programmes; the quantity and quality of U.S. forces in Germany and Europe have remained remarkably stable.

Over the years, some necessary and probably overdue trimming of personnel has been accomplished as a result of the phasing out of obsolescent bases and weapon systems and the cost-reduction programme of the Department of Defence. The relocation of U.S. and NATO installations from France in 1966–67 permitted the return to the United States of some 18,000 U.S. military and civilian personnel accompanied by about 21,000 dependents. In recent years, Vietnam has begun to take a toll in shortages of equipment and of trained officers and enlisted men, and in drawdowns in strength. But only this year has the United States finally carried out a limited redeployment of units from Germany—two infantry brigades, one armored cavalry regiment, and four air force squadrons, or about 33,000 military personnel and 15,000 dependents. While stationed in the United States, these units will remain fully committed to NATO and are scheduled to return once a year for exercises in Germany. This redeployment took place following lengthy consultation with West Germany and the United Kingdom during the 1966–67 trilateral talks and subsequent consultation with our other NATO allies.

Today, 18 years after President Truman first announced that he had approved substantial increases in U.S. forces in Europe, the United States still has some 304,000 military personnel in Europe

(including Spain, the Sixth Fleet, and Turkey). In West Germany alone there are about 215,000 men organised in approximately five divisions plus various support groups and air units. Some 7,000 U.S. nuclear warheads are stored in Europe for use by U.S. and other NATO forces in case of need. Accompanying U.S. forces in Europe are about 260,000 dependents, of whom an estimated 165,000 are in Germany, and over 10,000 civilian employees of the Department of Defence. Foreign nationals employed directly or indirectly by U.S. forces in Europe now number over 75,000. Quite apart from the Atlantic Fleet, from U.S. strategic nuclear forces, and from NATO oriented elements of the strategic reserve, the U.S. contribution to NATO—in terms of the U.S. military presence in Europe alone—remains impressive. The U.S. Seventh Army continues to set standards unmet by the forces contributed by other NATO members.

By any reasonable measure, the United States has met its NATO commitments in the past and is meeting them today. By comparison, the efforts of many of our NATO allies have been, and remain, in many respects disappointing.

In April 1951, the U.S. Senate passed Senate Resolution 99 expressing "the belief of the Senate that the threat to the security of the United States and our North Atlantic Treaty partners makes it necessary for the United States to station abroad such units of our Armed Forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute our fair share of the forces needed for the joint defence of the North Atlantic area" (the resolution is contained in appendix C to this report). In paragraphs 4 and 5 of that resolution, the Senate expressed its concern that the other members of NATO maintain and improve their defence efforts, and its "understanding" that the major contribution to NATO's ground forces in Europe should be made by the European members of NATO.

In subsequent years, three Presidents of the United States formally pledged that the United States would keep forces in Europe as long as they were necessary and desired. At the same time, they expressed their expectations that our allies would also make their full contributions to NATO defence, so that the burdens and responsibilities of the NATO's partnership should be shared equitably.

Fair shares of mutual defence burden cannot be quantified exactly, either for 1951 or for 1968. Moreover, it is probably impossible as well as undesirable to set standards for force contributions to the NATO defence effort on the basis of strict rations. Nevertheless, it is worth pointing out that U.S. forces were first sent to Europe in substantial numbers when the countries of Western Europe had not yet recovered from World War II, when the ability of these countries to earn foreign exchange was low and the so-called dollar gap was a serious preoccupation, and when their prospects for political and economic stability appeared uncertain. Yet substantial U.S. forces have remained in Europe while most of the countries of Western Europe have not only recovered from World War II but have reached new heights of prosperity, while some of them have accumulated impressive reserves of gold and foreign exchange, while Great Britain and France have steadily reduced their commitments in other areas of the world, and while a general mood of confidence has taken hold. But despite the

pleas of U.S. and NATO political and military authorities, the defence efforts of our NATO allies have not kept pace with their capacity to contribute.

For example:

1. For years, NATO force goals for the central region in West Germany were 28½ to 30 assigned combat-ready divisions. These goals were never met, either in terms of the number of divisions or in terms of combat readiness. In the late 1950's, Great Britain withdrew almost two of the four divisions it had promised in 1954 to keep on the Continent. France steadily withdrew forces from Germany during the Algerian War, and at the conclusion of that war rebuilt her forces in Germany to only about one-half their previous level and refused to assign forces stationed in France to NATO command.

In April 1965, well behind schedule, West Germany committed the last of its promised 12 divisions to NATO. But several of these divisions were, and remain, undermanned and understaffed. The force contributions of other NATO members, in the central region and elsewhere, have shown similar deficiencies.

In December 1966, NATO adopted new force planning procedures which amounted to an acknowledgement that previous force goals had not been, and were not about to be, met. A 1967 Department of Defence memorandum to the Combined Subcommittee stated the problem thus:

* * * there was a chronic disparity between the force goals proposed by the major NATO commanders and the lesser force levels that most member countries were prepared to provide (that is, commit) to NATO. The goals, in short, tended to be based on purely military considerations which did not reflect the political and economic factors affecting governmental decisions. The result was a shortfall in forces, especially in quality. This, in turn, made it difficult to carry out the strategy on which the goals had been based.[2]

Under the new force planning procedures, members develop and refine force proposals on a rolling 5-year basis and undertake firm commitments for 1 year. This process may indeed result in "realistic" and "attainable" goals, in the words of the Defence Department memorandum cited above. But there is no denying the fact that these goals will not necessarily reflect what NATO military commanders have always thought necessary and what NATO nations should provide and could provide if the political will existed to undertake their full share of NATO's defence burdens.

At present, NATO has on paper some 22 to 23⅓ assigned divisions of uneven quality in the central region. France continues to station some two divisions in West Germany (5000 men were withdrawn in 1968), but they are no longer assigned to NATO. Like all other French forces, and French territory and airspace, NATO commanders cannot count on their availability in times of crisis as a result of French withdrawal from the military structure of NATO in 1966. Early in 1968, Great Britain withdrew one brigade

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[2] U.S. Troops in Europe. Hearings before the Combined Subcommittee of Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on the subject of U.S. Troops in Europe, U.S. Senate, 90th Congress, first sess. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 20.

and an air squadron from West Germany, as agreed in the 1966–67 trilateral talks. In May 1968, British Defence Minister Healey announced that Great Britain would increase forces earmarked to NATO by some 40 percent. Most of these forces, which are among those being withdrawn from "East of Suez" will remain stationed in Britain, however; and the future of the remaining British contingent on the Continent appears to depend on the outcome of the annual round of negotiations with West Germany to offset the balance-of-payments costs of maintaining this contingent. In the summer of 1967, the West German Government decided to cut previously planned defence expenditures by about 10 percent and not to increase its armed forces beyond the present level of about 460,000. These decisions meant that West Germany would not meet its commitment to raise armed forces of 508,000, that its 12 divisions would remain at less than full strength, and that necessary purchases of equipment would be deferred.

Prior to the Czech crisis it also seemed likely that West Germany would reorganise its armed forces to achieve some reductions in active-duty personnel. Also prior to the Czech crisis, Canada was reportedly "reexamining" its commitment of one brigade and six air squadrons to NATO forces in Germany, and the Belgian Government had adopted a reorganisation plan for its armed forces that would have meant a reduction in its NATO-committed brigades from six to four and a probable reduction in its forces in Germany. The status of this Belgian reorganisation plan is at present uncertain. But it is to be noted, in particular, that Belgium's six brigades are understrength and, in general, that reorganisations amounting to revisions downward of commitments to NATO are to be regretted.

The purpose of this report is not to point an accusing finger at some NATO countries and to exclude others. Deficiencies similar to those in NATO forces in the central region are almost certainly also to be found on the northern and southern flanks. Speaking of all of NATO's conventional forces, former Secretary of Defence McNamara said in his January 1968 "posture statement":

"Although there have been great improvements during the last 7 years, NATO, on the whole, does not have well-balanced conventional forces. And, there are still some qualitative deficiencies in the European NATO forces with regard to training, equipment, and supplies." [3]

2. NATO military commanders have long expressed concern about weaknesses in NATO's reserve forces. In case of hostilities, NATO's forces in being would require rapid and massive reinforcement. Most NATO nations stock supplies to sustain these forces in conventional combat in quantities that vary widely and that are reportedly regarded as insufficient by U.S. and NATO authorities. Reesrve forces suffer from lack of training, shortages of modern equipment, and insufficient means of rapid transport. "The greatest deficiency in the European NATO forces," said former Secretary of Defence McNamara in his January 1968 posture statement cited above, "is the lack of an adequate mobilisation base."

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[3] Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, fiscal year 1969, and Reserve Strength, hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 90th Congress, second sess. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 103.

3. Ever since 1951, the United States has required that its army draftees serve 24 months. Numerous efforts have been made to persuade other NATO members to adopt 18 months as the standard term of service for men drafted into their armies. These efforts have met with only partial and short-term success. NATO military authorities continue to believe that to train troops for modern warfare "18 months service is the minimum useful service requirement," to quote the remarks of General Lemnitzer, the Supreme Allied Commander, to the North Atlantic Assembly in Brussels last year.[4]

Today, the only NATO nations other than the United States which require 24 months service for their army draftees are Greece, Turkey, and Portugal; all others have shorter conscription periods or no conscription at all. West Germany requires 18 months service for all its army draftees, but there has been talk of shortening this period. Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, The Netherlands and Norway now require service for from 12 to 16 months, although, again, there have been pressures in many of these countries to shorten this period or even abandon conscription entirely. Canada has had no compulsory military service since World War II, Great Britain abandoned compulsory military training service in 1960, and Luxembourg did so in 1967. Iceland has no national military establishment.

4. Defence expenditures as a percentage of GNP, defence expenditures per capita, and the percentage of men of military age maintained full time in uniform, are at best only rough indicators of the defence effort of any given country. The United States is a wealthy nation; our real dollar per capita GNP is far higher than that of even the most prosperous members of NATO. Moreover, U.S. defence expenditures and the Armed Forces of the United States have expanded substantially in order to meet the ever-rising requirements of the Vietnam conflict. Nevertheless, even when the special achievements and the special burdens of the United States are taken into account, the defence efforts of our NATO allies appear disproportionately low. While U.S. defence expenditures as a percentage of GNP are almost 10 percent, NATO countries coming closest to this percentage are Portugal (6.7 percent), Great Britain (5.7 percent), and France (5.3 percent). All other NATO countries spend less than 5 percent of their GNP on defence. U.S. defence expenditures per capita are more than three times higher than those of France, which are the highest among our NATO allies. Only Portugal has a greater percentage of its men of military age in uniform than does the United States. The percentages of most of our allies are less than half that for the United States.

There has been numerous reports since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia that some of our NATO allies are postponing previous plans to reduce their defence expenditures or otherwise trim their defence efforts.

It is to be expected that there will not only be a postponement of such plans but also a new effort made on the part of our NATO allies to meet their multilaterally agreed commitments which most of them did not seem disposed to meet prior to the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

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[4] Addresses by speakers at the 13th Annual Session, North Atlantic Assembly, Brussels, 1967, p. 33.

It is also to be expected that they will join with the United States in seeking prompt, effective and long-term means to counter the balance-of-payments costs associated with the stationing of U.S. forces in Europe.

The annual average U.S. balance-of-payments deficit from 1960 through 1966 was $2.377 billion. In 1967 the deficit was $3.575 billion, and in the first 6 months of 1968 it was $810 million. From 1961 through 1966, U.S. defence expenditures entering the international balance of payments in Western Europe were some $1.6 billion, receipts from military sales about $900 million, leaving a net foreign exchange gap which averaged annually about $600 million. During calendar year 1967, U.S. defense expenditures entering the international balance of payments in Western Europe were some $1.6 billion, receipts from military sales about $900 million, and the resulting net foreign exchange gap about $700 million, which was covered in part by West German purchases of medium term U.S. securities in the amount of some $250 million.

If U.S. forces and dependents in Europe remain at present levels, there seems little prospect that foreign exchange costs incurred by these forces will sink much below the $1.5 billion average for 1961–66. One-time costs associated with the move from France, the limited redeployment from Western Germany and special U.S. military purchases in Great Britain agreed to in connection with the trilateral talks, have helped to raise these costs to their current level of some $1.6 billion in fiscal year 1968. But even when balance-of-payments savings as a result of the recent redeployments begin to be realised, they seem likely to be offset in large measure by rising maintenance costs. At the same time, receipts from military sales to our European allies have already dropped sharply to an estimated $500 million in fiscal year 1968 and do not show much prospect of rising significantly above this level. This drop in receipts is in large part a result of the termination in July 1967, at the request of the West German Government, of the so-called "offset" arrangements with the United States under which West Germany purchased, over a period of 6 years, U.S. military goods and services in amounts approximating annual U.S. foreign exchange costs in West Germany.

U.S. defence expenditures in West Germany are higher by far than those in any other European country, reportedly amounting currently to well over $800 million annually. At the same time, West Germany is running a large surplus in its balance of payments. In May 1967, and again in June 1968, the United States and West German Governments reached agreements on measures to be taken by West Germany to cover the large foreign exchange gap left by reduced German military purchases in the United States. The chief feature of these agreements, which apply to U.S. fiscal years 1968 and 1969, is the purchase by the West German Bundesbank of medium-term, nonconvertible U.S. securities in the amount of $500 million for each fiscal year. The 1968 agreement also provides for about $100 million in purchases of U.S. military equipment by the West German Defence Ministry and includes a West German undertaking to sell an additional $125 million worth of medium term bonds to private West German investors.

Some members of the subcommittee consider these recent agreements with the West German Government to be unsatisfactory on a number

of counts. First, they are short term in nature, covering only the U.S. fiscal year immediately ahead. Second, while purchases of medium-term bonds count as a capital inflow on the U.S. balance-of-payments ledger, ultimately these bonds must be renewed or redeemed. Hence they should also be regarded as a potential capital outflow. Third, these bonds bear interest at current rates and thus result in some annual capital outflow to bond-holders.

Many Europeans opposed the limited redeployment from West Germany carried out this year and fear further U.S. troop reductions. At the same time, it appears that many NATO governments and central banks have cooperated only partially and sometimes grudgingly with the United States in its search for ways to alleviate its balance-of-payments problems. Even if bond purchases are regarded as an effective means of neutralizing U.S. foreign exchange costs arising from the stationing of U.S. forces in Europe, a significant foreign exchange gap remained in fiscal year 1968 and promises to remain in fiscal year 1969. Moreover, as a result of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the U.S. is reportedly planning to return an air squadron and 2 brigades to Germany for earlier than planned exercises, which could lead to some unanticipated budgetary and balance-of-payments costs in fiscal year 1969.

For the foregoing reasons, the statement of former Secretary of Defense McNamara read at the NATO Ministerial Meeting in December 1967 is still very much to the point:

> We will, therefore, continue to maintain forces in Europe for as long as they are desired. In saying this, however, I must also point out an anomaly in European attitudes which cannot persist. This is that on the one hand there should be no diminution of U.S. forces, but that on the other hand the responsibility for meeting the balance-of-payments deficit caused by such large-scale continuing U.S. deployments in Europe is none of Europe's affair. It is essential that deficits suffered by countries as a result of their stationing troops abroad in the common effort should be treated and solved by their allies on a cooperative basis. We would welcome suggestions from our allies on how to meet this pressing problem, since its solution cannot be further postponed.[5]

D. CONCLUSION

The invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia have had a profoundly disturbing effect on the political atmosphere all over the world but particularly in Europe. In the present unsettled conditions, the time is obviously not propitious for substantial reduction of U.S. forces in Europe. Some manpower reductions might still be made, however, which would not affect the combat capability of U.S. forces on the central front.

Recent reported moves to reduce the number of U.S. administrative personnel in Europe should be encouraged. In this same vein, there should be a reduction in the size of certain military headquarters in Europe.

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[5] U.S. Treasury Department, Maintaining the Strength of the United States Dollar in a Strong Free World Economy. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1968), p. 81.

But if the situation in Czechoslovakia means that the time is not propitious for substantial U.S. reductions, it certainly also means that the time is not propitious for any diminution in the defense efforts of our NATO allies. On the contrary, the military ramifications of the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia should provide Western European governments with more tangible arguments for enlisting the support of their citizens behind defence efforts commensurate with their capacity to contribute.

Annex VI

Investigation of the Preparedness Program

Report by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, September 1968

Chapter III. The Threat: Present and Projected

A. SOVIET UNION

1. General

The Soviet strategic threat is highlighted by the high priority which the U.S.S.R. has given and is giving to strategic nuclear offence and defence. This is evidenced by the dramatic increase in the emplacement of ICBM's during recent years; the development and deployment of new systems, such as the ABM system around Moscow, and the fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS); and the very clear determinaton to devote the resources and technology required to catch up with and perhaps surpass the United States in the strategic field. Future Soviet systems and forces will be the result of force level decisions not yet known to us, which, of course, will be influenced very strongly by its research and development capabilities. Our confidence in projections of the size, nature and composition of future U.S.S.R. forces are relatively low because we are dealing with the question of what they may decide to do, as well as what they are capable of doing.

The Soviet willingness to devote resources and determination to push for superiority in this field is substantiated by Soviet military spending for 1967. With a gross national product of less than half that of the United States, Soviet military and space spending in 1967 approached U.S. defence cost, if the expense of the war in Southeast Asia is excluded. In terms of rubles, as the Soviets would view the burden, this constitutes about 10 percent of the Soviet GNP.

The Soviet outlays over the past few years for offensive missiles and the Moscow ABM system (excluding R&D) have ranged between 10 and 15 percent of their total defence and space expenditures.

Roughly a third of the outlays for these missile systems, however, are for MR/IRBM's which can be targeted only against areas on the Soviet periphery.

It is apparent that the Soviets are building strategic nuclear forces which will give them greatly increased confidence that they will have, even in retaliation, the capability to assure the destruction of a significant portion of U.S. industrial resources and population.

The indications are that they will also strive through both strategic attack and strategic defence programmes to improve their ability to reduce the damage the United States could inflict on them should a nuclear war occur.

2. ICBM's

The number of operational launchers in the Soviet ICBM force has grown from less than 100 launchers in 1963 to some 700 by late 1967. By the end of 1968 they will number several hundred more. The Soviet ICBM force will continue to grow over the next few years, but at a considerably slower rate than in the recent past.

At the same time the Soviets have tried to reduce the vulnerability of their ICBM force to surprise attack. The first Soviet ICBM sites built in the early 1960's consisted of unprotected above-ground launchers and storage facilities. Later the missiles were placed in underground silos clustered together. The latest systems have been deployed in the fashion of the U.S. Minuteman missiles—in hardened and widely dispersed single silos, each presenting a separate aiming point for an attacking force.

The great throw weight of many of these missiles allows the Soviets greater flexibility to provide shielding of components, hardening, penetration aids, multiple warheads, decoys, and other refinements that would substantially enhance the effectiveness, survivability, and penetrability of their ICBM's. This cannot be overlooked in any discussion of the balance of strategic power and will be discussed later in this report.

3. Soviet Strategic Bomber Force

While the ballistic missile has clearly replaced the manned bomber as the primary means of strategic attack, the Soviet bomber force still possesses a substantial strategic strike capability. The Soviet longrange aviation now comprises a force of 1,000 bomber/tanker aircraft. About 200 of these are heavy bombers and tankers and the rest are medium. The heavy bombers have the primary mission of intercontinental attack and it is estimated that the Soviets would use most of this force for that mission.

There is no evidence that the Soviets are proceeding with the development of a new heavy bomber and, should they elect to develop one, it is probable we would see indications of the programme 3 to 4 years before the aircraft become operational.

4. Missile Submarine Force

The Soviets have about 40 ballistic missile submarines and about 50 cruise missile submarines. They are placing increasing emphasis on their ballistic missile submarine force and are building a new nuclear-powered submarine comparable to our Polaris submarine that may be able to fire ballistic missiles to a range of 1,500 miles. The first unit of this class is just becoming operational.

Because of the short flight time and the current absence of detection systems which would ensure adequate warning, submarine missiles constitute one of the greatest threats to all soft military installations such as naval yards and airbases.

5. IRBM's and MRBM's

There have been no recent major changes in the Soviet medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missile forces. The current force comprises something over 700 operational launchers. While not a threat to the continental United States, they are a major threat to Western Europe and other peripheral areas.

6. Defensive Missile Systems

The Soviet Union is employing two defensive missile systems at the present time. The GALOSH system being deployed around Moscow is the only system which the intelligence unanimously considers to have true antimissile capabilities. It is well along in construction and may now have a limited operational capability.

The intelligence assessment is that the GALOSH system probably cannot cope with the sophisticated reentry vehicles, penetration aids, and saturation attacks it would probably have to face in future engagements with U.S. ICBM's.

A second defensive system is the TALLIN system. Some of the intelligence community believe that this system is designed for protection against attacks by new high-performance aircraft and air-to-surface missile like the B–52 launched, Hound Dog. Others of the intelligence believe, however, that the TALLIN system may have a capability against ballistic missiles.

7. Fractional Orbit Bombardment System

A new development in Soviet strategic weapons development has been the programme of space launchings to test what is referred to as a fractional orbit bombardment system (FOBS). This weapon probably would be deployed on the ground, launched at the opening of hostilities, and a nuclear warhead brought down on a preselected target on its first pass around the globe.

While FOBS would probably not be very effective except against a soft target, nevertheless, FOBS would give the Soviets greater flexibility and compound our early warning and defence problems. The weapons could be launched on a trajectory that could avoid BMEWS or on such a trajectory they will come on a target in the United States from the Equator.

8. Reentry Vehilces, Warheads, and Penetration Aids

Although there is no real evidence at this time that the Soviets have initiated any advanced reentry vehicle programme, it must be assumed that future designs will be directed at achieving lower costs of weapons delivery, reducing vulnerability, and improving systems accuracy and penetration capabilities.

Improvements in reentry systems are hard to detect and there is a good chance that the Soviets already have research and development work in this field underway. Much can be done in research and development and the Soviets could be fairly well downstream on advanced programmes before they became known to our intelligence sources.

Among the Soviet objectives which could be accomplished and which must be watched for are the development of multiple reentry vehicles (MRV's), multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV's), penetration aids, reduction of vulnerability of reentry vehicles. The introduction of MIRV's, could have a substantial impact on the balance of strategic power—depending on the effectiveness of U.S. countermeasures.

9. Summary

In the near time, that is within the next year and a half, the Soviet strategic threat to the United States is expected to have more than 1,000 ICBM launchers, about 40 ballistic missile submarines carrying a significant number of missiles, and 150 long-range bombers. During the same period, the estimated threat to peripheral areas will consist of about 700 MRBM and IRBM launchers, some 40 to 50 cruise missile submarines, and about 700 medium bombers.

The Moscow ABM system has been at least 10 years in development. Construction of launch sites and attendant radars began over 5 years ago and has proceeded irregularly since then. There have been recent signs that the Soviets have again slowed down the deployment of the system, thought to be similar to the old U.S. Nike-Zeus system which was never deployed. The missile for the Moscow ABM system, the GALOSH, was first seen in November 1964 when it was paraded, enclosed in its canister, through Red Square in Moscow. The system may now have limited operational capability, but the slow pace of development and the fact that it has not been deployed at other cities probably indicates that Soviet officials have reservations about its effectiveness.

REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

Rapporteur: Senator Birch Bayh (United States)

I. Introduction.
II. General Economic Problems:
- A. World Trade.
- B. International Monetary Cooperation.
- C. The Rate of Economic Growth.
- D. European Unification.
- E. Cooperation in Science and Technology.
- F. East-West Economic Relations.
- G. The World Food Problem.

III. NATO Satellite Communications.
IV. Draft Recommendations:
- A. World Trade.
- B. International Monetary Cooperation.
- C. European Unification.

I. Introduction

World trade has been assisted in 1968 by the implementation of the first stages of the tariff reductions negotiated in the Kennedy Round. Despite various economic disturbances, there has been international recognition that positive measures by some countries can help prevent resort by others to restrictive measures. Problems remain, nevertheless, particularly in agricultural trade and in assuring reasonable export earnings for developing countries.

1968 should go down in history, however, as a landmark in international monetary cooperation. Creation of the two-tier gold market and final decisions on the details of Special Drawing Rights were major events on the road toward a viable international monetary system. The surtax and spending cut adopted by Congress in June 1968 should reduce the overheating of the US economy and help redress its balance of payments. Complementary expansionary action by the European Communities is also contributing to the adjustment process.

In July, the European Communities achieved their full customs union and their economies are slowly, but steadily becoming independent. On the other hand, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, will probably cost, in economic terms, certain increases in military budgets and a disruption of the development of East-West trade.

My review of these developments during the past year helps reinforce conviction that the free world, our Alliance and our own nations depend heavily upon unceasing cooperation in every aspect of our lives. The successes of the past twenty years, in contrast to the failures of the interwar period, confirm beyond measure the necessity of continuous, institutionalized coordination of national economic policies. It seems to me that the meetings of this Committee are an important part of that process and that our deliberations can contribute meaningfully to that cooperation.

II. General Economic Problems

A. WORLD TRADE

Other sections of this report will analyze the problems of equilibrium in organizing international monetary relations and in managing our internal economies. These provide the current context for considering world trade in the post-Kennedy Round period.

Events over the past year and a half in these areas already have had an impact in slowing down the growth of world trade, a trend which is expected to continue at least into early 1969. More important, however, have been our responses to these problems and the solutions we are seeking cooperatively.

Since my last report to the Committee, a good deal of effort has gone into safeguarding the gains made in the Kennedy Round. There has been a segment of opinion which has advised recourse to restrictive trade measures. The US Administration has made clear that it is opposed to any such trend in US trade policy. While protectionism continues to threaten to undo the gains of the Kennedy Round, we have passed through a crucial first phase. With continued goodwill and cooperation, we can be optimistic concerning the future. There appears to be international recognition of the fact that positive measures by some countries would aid in avoiding a resort to restrictive measures by others.

For the present, however, the situation continues to require caution.

For the future, much depends on the success of the measures adopted or being adopted by both deficit and surplus countries to restore payments equilibrium and the implementation of measures to ensure a stable growth in international reserves. All the major trading countries should avoid unilateral actions which might unleash a chain of events that would seriously impede ability to consolidate the gains of the Kennedy Round and to maintain momentum toward freer world trade. In matters of trade, as well as others, we belong to a single community of interests and responsibilities.

While further reductions in tariff barriers would not be a sufficient condition for the achievement of expanded world trade, we must be increasingly concerned about government policies which have a direct or indirect restrictive incidence on the international movement of goods and services.

These non-tariff trade restrictions have been cited by many advocates of protectionism as obstacles which would render useless any further reductions in tariffs.

The GATT is examining future approaches to both tariff reduction in industrial and agricultural products and to the elimination or moderation of non-tariff barriers to trade. Unfortunately, problems in the trade field do not wait for the completion of these studies. The US is continuing therefore, to discuss its trade problems, particularly in the non-tariff areas, on a case by case basis in the several available international forums. For instance, the effect of border tax adjustments on trade is the subject of consultations in the OECD and is also under examination in the GATT with regard to the relationship of existing GATT rules to these adjustments.

I am hopeful that in these discussions we will be able to come to an agreement on means for moderating any trade restrictive effect they may have.

In the area of agriculture, we are faced with difficult and serious problems which are brought about in part by use of subsidies and other aids to exports in an attempt to promote sales abroad at a price lower than that on the domestic market. These, in turn, are being met by policies to counteract the effects of export aids. Agricultural trade is also under discussion in the GATT, both in general terms and in regard to special products. We were not able in the Kennedy Round to accomplish as much in agricultural trade as we had hoped, but one of our major future tasks is to pursue agreement on the difficult problem of turning away from protectionism in agriculture.

The general slowdown in world trade in 1967 and 1968 and its expected continuation into 1969 has had a marked effect on the economic activity of the less developed countries. The majority of these countries have experienced declines in their exports, partly as a result of weakened demand in the industrialized countries.

The problems faced by the developing countries is reaching a sustained and dynamic rate of growth is evidenced by the increase in their deficit on current account as a group to about $6 billion in 1967. This underlines once again that one of the best means for ensuring that the pace of economic development continues in these countries is to maintain a high level of economic activity and trade growth among the industrialized countries.

Otherwise, we are faced with the prospect that the support made available to these countries by financial and technical assistance from the industrialized countries will be cancelled out.

The less developed countries at the second U.N. Conference on Trade and Development presented a catalogue of their views on means to achieve a stable expansion of their export earnings. Some progress was made at UNCTAD II and discussion has continued since then on several of the problems which these countries consider of major concern. Primary among these is the possibility of agreements to moderate the frequent and sharp price fluctuations in a number of primary commodities. Another, to which the less developed countries attach great importance, is the possibility of increasing their export earnings through gaining preferential access for their exports to the markets of all industrialized countries. Progress since UNCTAD II, however, has not been as rapid as the developing countries feel is justified to meet their needs.

In the OCED the possibility of granting temporary and generalized tariff advantages to all the developing countries by all developed countries has been under active consideration since 1967. Both in the OECD and at UNCTAD II the industrialized countries are committed to continue work in accordance with an agreed timetable on the elements which would form the basis of an acceptable generalized preference scheme. The issues are complex and involve conflicting interests whose resolution will have to ensure equivalent advantages for developing countries and an equal sharing of the burden among the developed countries. An issue to which many attach particular importance is the movement in the direction of equality of treatment for all developing countries. The industrialized countries should certainly not be asking favors of the developing countries, such as "reverse preferences."

B. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION

The past year has seen steady progress towards increased cooperation among nations in monetary affairs. After a period of serious instability during which Britain devalued the pound, gold speculation increased and it appeared that there was major disagreement among the industrialized nations on what should be done, action was nevertheless taken which was effective in establishing the context for a long-lasting stable world monetary system.

During 1968, two major decisions were taken which have contributed to stability and should provide the basis for further action. The meetings of the Central Bank Governors of the Gold Pool nations in Washington and the meeting of the Group of Ten in Stockholm were major events on the road towards a strengthened international monetary system. These two meetings were effective in reducing influence of speculators over the expansion of world trade. They affirmed in clear terms the ability and determination of the responsible nations to overcome disagreement and to see the larger interest.

The Washington meeting in mid-March decided to establish a two-tier gold price system, thus effectively ending the unstable relationship between gold speculation and the use of monetary gold as means of international monetary exchange. This action set the basis for orderly adjustments in the international payments system and the means for firmly maintaining the price of monetary gold at $35 per ounce. The participating countries determined that the existing stock of monetary gold is sufficient in view of the prospective establishment of the facility for Special Drawing Rights (SDR).

Further the participants believed that it was no longer necessary to buy gold from the commercial market. This decision was favorably greeted by most of the nations of the free world.

Soon after the Washington meeting, the Group of Ten met in Stockholm and agreed to the creation of the Special Drawing Rights. However, France reserved its position. The Stockholm representatives reaffirmed their determination to cooperate on the maintenance of exchange stability and orderly exchange arrangements in the world based on the present official price of gold.

Nevertheless, major difficulties remain, specifically the continuing deficits in the reserve currency countries and surpluses in the member states of the European Communities (see below under *Economic Growth.*) Further, certain questions remain about the eventual place gold within the total world monetary system.

The day will soon be gone when the deficits of reserve currency countries provide the necessary liquidity for the expansion of the world's trade. For this reason, consideration must be given to the question of major monetary reform and the exact place of gold within the system. I believe, therefore, that our international monetary policy should aim to ensure adequate international reserves and credit facilities to support growing international commerce. In this regard, multilateral decision-making, based on consensus and mutual cooperation, is essential.

In order for us to reach this goal, speculators and gold producers should not have excessive influence on the functioning of the monetary system. Speculators should not be assured of a floor price for their

hoards of gold. Most newly mined gold should be sold to the commercial market. Nor can gold production be relied on as the sole source of future liquidity. The role of gold should eventually diminish as the SDR's provide an increasing portion of the new liquidity.

C. RATE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

Since my last report, we have ssen the establishment of the two-tier gold market, the austere UK budget, the French crisis, the US tax surcharge and spending cut, and the presentation of the French and German budgets for 1969. As a result of these developments and of recent'statistical information, it is easier to predict the course of the world economy for the rest of 1968 and to discern some trends for 1969.

During the first half of 1968 the *United States* economy expanded at a rapid rate. During the same period there was a deterioration in the trade account, but, due to the balance of payments program announced in January 1968, a large improvement followed in the capital account. This provided the means for lowering the over-all deficit in the first half to an annual rate of about $1.7 billion, from the $5.1 billion recorded in the previous six months.

The surtax and spending cut of June 1968 should lead to a decline in the rate of economic expansion in the United States. Various short-term factors causing a reduction in inventory accumulation, as well as increased social security taxes in 1969, should reinforce this decline. Offsetting factors include a strong basic demand for housing and consumer goods. Under these circumstances, the US government expects to see the rate of growth of real GNP from mid-1968 to mid-1969 held to two per cent. (vs. 5% in the previous year). If this goal is reached, the US trade balance ought to improve and with it the overall balance of payments.

As a further step beyond devaluation of the pound, Great Britain introduced a restrictive budget along with major efforts to expand exports in March 1968. Attempts were also made to improve the efficiency and competitive position of the export sectors of the economy. Further measures were taken, including a ceiling on bank advances and new prices and income legislation. In September, at a meeting of the Bank for International Settlements, a $2 billion stand-by credit was granted to the UK which permits sterling area countries to dispose of some of their sterling balances without triggering a major international financial crisis.

Current figures suggest that there should be some improvement in Britain's balance of payments this year, due largely to reduced domestic demand. The March budget and other fiscal and monetary measures are expected to result in real GNP growth from mid-1968 to mid-1969 of about 3¼%. This relatively slow growth should cause a leveling off, if not a decline, in UK imports, which is a necessity if the UK is to restore sterling to a healthy position.

The British Government's target apparently is to achieve a surplus running at an annual rate of some 500 million pounds ($1.2 billion) by the end of 1969. While progress has been made, the problem of achieving both a favorable balance of payments and satisfactory economic growth remains.

While the US and UK import trends indicated above, may reduce the export possibilities of some of their major trading partners, such as Canada, Japan and the European Communities, the latter have substantial reserves which would enable them to withstand some minimum losses in their current account surpluses.

After allowing for the reduction in the US and UK markets, the European Community (EC) still expects real GNP growth from 1968 to 1969 at about the level of 5%. If the EC is successful in maintaining this or an even higher rate of growth, the EC will contribute substantially to the restoration of balance-of-payments equilibrium throughout the world.

While the largest economy in the European Communities is *Germany*, the German Federal budget for 1969 as presented in September 1968 is expected to be fiscally neutral in effect. Nevertheless, substantial economic growth can be expected to result from large-scale public investment by state and local governments, a boom in private investment in plant and machinery and some increase in consumer demand. The German government is now predicting a rate of real GNP growth of 5½%, which should have a stimulative effect on its EC partners and on the rest of the world.

France is still recovering from the crisis last spring, during which there occurred a large outflow of funds and a loss of gold. France is also experiencing a deficit in the trade account which, however, has recently shown signs of recovery. There appears to be room for economic expansion without inflation in France, as well as sufficient reserves to overcome a temporary current account deficit. The budget announced in September 1968 indicated a planned rate of growth of real GNP of 7% from 1968 to 1969.

Expansionary measures are also being taken in *Italy*. The Italian government estimates that, with sufficient productive investment, real GNP could grow by 6 or 7 percent from 1968 to 1969. These trends in the major EC countries are all to the good in terms of world balance.

Japan, while its rate of growth has been slowing, is still far ahead of all other major industrial countries in this respect. It is expected to achieve real GNP growth from 1967 to 1968 of about 10% (vs. 13% the year before).

Reviewing the picture as a whole, the situation appears a great deal more healthy than it did a year ago. The two deficit areas are on the way to redressing their balances and the major surplus area appears to be at least reducing the amount of its surplus. But what is most important, all of this is being accomplished without significant underutilization of capacity or excessive price inflation.

D. EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

The movement to unite Western Europe today centers, in the absence of any other very convincing structure, on the European Communities. It has an impressive functional base and the inherent dynamism that could be the catalyst for a political union embracing most of the Western European states. The extension of Community action to traditional political matters, of course, is not likely to come about in the immediate future. Nevertheless, there has been a political

will to create a customs union and to throw up the skeleton of the economic union that should follow it.

After almost ten years of work, the customs union of the European Communities was established among the Member States and a single tariff applicable to third counteries came into force on July 1, 1968. The achievement of this customs union was a major step toward economic and eventual political unity.

The gradual achievement of the customs union has already stimulated trade among the Member States. It has made the national economies increasingly interdependent. It has reduced the ability of any Member State to insulate itself from its neighbors. And it has accentuated the need for Community action to deal with capital, labor, anti-trust laws, anti-cyclical policy, taxation and all the other aspects of modern economic society.

Trade frontiers have not entirely vanished with the completion of the customs union because differing excise tax and differing health and sanitary rules, among other non-tariff barriers, remain. Yet the process of harmonizing these rules will be speeded by the completion of the customs union.

This positive achievement, however, has been clouded by the failure of the Communities to make any significant movement toward their enlargement. As noted in previous reports, I am convinced that the long term vitality of our Alliance will be enhanced if the European Communities can be expanded to include other Western European democracies. As one who believes that unity in Europe is vital to the strength and prosperity of the Western world, I view this failure with deepening concern.

Those supporting the enlargement of the Communities continue their search for ways to bring the Communities and the candidates for membership closer together. While these efforts are to be praised, let me re-emphasize the cautionary note in my last report. In my opinion it would be a serious mistake if our European friends were to be side-tracked by irrelevant approaches to the problem which may lead into blind alleys and have unfortunate effects on third parties, e.g., the creation of preferential trading arrangements. Scientific and technical cooperation has been suggested and appears worthy of serious exploration. I would hope that some formula could be found that would clearly lead in the direction of greater European unity.

Looking ahead, the Commission of the EEC, in its remarkable statement of July 1, 1968, pointed out that "Europe must have institutions enabling it to become a politically organized continent, having not only its economic institutions * * * but also political institutions enabling it to act and become * * * the European Federation." While no one foresees the early realization of the Communities' ultimate objective, political union, it is nevertheless gratifying that the leaders of the EEC have by no means lost sight of the federal dream.

E. COOPERATION IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

With the publication of the *Defi Américain* (American Challenge) by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber in 1967, the question of the relationship of science and technology to economic growth became a commonplace item of conversation in Europe. The main thrust of Mr. Servan-Schreiber's book is that Europe must integrate if it is to

compete as an equal with the United States. He decries the lack of unity and purpose within Europe and notes that it is up to the Europeans to take constructive action rather than attempt to react merely defensively against the "American Challenge". In particular he pointed out that it is the Americans who are taking advantage of the potential of an integrated European market by seeing what Europe can be. They have organized themselves on a European wide scale, while the Europeans themselves continue to act within a national orientation.

A major study of the "technological gap" was undertaken by the OECD and presented at its Third Ministerial Meeting on Science, which was held on March 11 and 12, 1968. This study concluded that "the problem of the 'technological gap' exists because some countries have made more progress than other in creating the educational, scientific, technological, industrial and economic infrastructure enabling the effective commercial exploitation of scientific and technological advances; and because the resulting differences amongst Member countries are increasingly felt in international economic relationship."

In general, the problem is one of management, of market size and structure, and of financing. This comprehensive OECD study has, hopefully, laid to rest many misconceptions in this area.

Several other organizations have initiated actions looking toward increased cooperation in science and technology. Under the joint sponsorship of the North Atlantic Assembly and the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania, a Conference on Transatlantic Technological Imbalance and Collaboration was held at Deauville, France, in May, 1967. Recommendations adopted at that conference called for both immediate and long-term steps by government, industry, and academic institutions to promote cooperation and development in scientific and technological education, training and research and for increased mobility of scientists.

On October 31, 1967, the Council of the European Communities instructed the "Scientific and Technical Research Policy Working Group" (the Marechal Group), in cooperation with the EC Commission, to recommend programs for Community cooperation in the fields of data processing, telecommunications, transport, oceanography, metallurgy, pollution control and meteorology. The Working Group was also instructed to do the following:

(a) Continue its comparison of national methods, plans programs, and general budgets dealing with research;

(b) Examine the means for creating a Community system for processing and diffusing technical information or for coordinating the national information systems; and

(c) Examine the means for insuring coordinated training and a more intensive exchange of scientists.

The Working Groups has not yet completed these rather formidable tasks.

On March 20, 1968, the Commission of the European Communities presented its Second Medium-Term Economic Policy Program. This program emphasizes the need for European enterprises to adapt to modern conditions. It also urges that future government assistance be directed, not to prolonging the life of moribund industries, but rather toward promoting research and development in new fields with potential for the future.

On October 3, 1968, Belgian Foreign Minister Harmel proposed the use of the Western European Union (WEU) as an instrument for advancing European political, economic and defense integration and unity. As part of this proposal, Harmel suggested the following criteria for effective technological cooperation: (a) it must include all elements of advanced technology; (b) solidarity must extend from the research stage up through production and sales (this presupposes creation of industrial consortia grouping enterprises of several nationalities); (c) each participating country must receive its fair share of employment and new techniques. As this report was being written, it was expected that Mr. Harmel's proposal would be considered further at the WEU Ministerial Meeting scheduled to take place in Rome on October 21.

In the space field, the Europeans have established two main organizations to carry out research and development. One is ELDO (European Launcher Development Organization). The other is ESRO (European Space Research Organization). ESRO has created a strong research and development organization which promises to be a leader in developing satellites for a number of scientific purposes.

In nuclear energy, CERN (European Nuclear Research Center) and ENEA (European Nuclear Energy Agency) have been in existence for a number of years. The former is engaged solely in research projects. The latter was set to develop collaboration among the Western European members of the OECD in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In January 1968, the members of ENEA agreed to begin two new programs to assess the development possibilities of certian types of fast breeder reactors and heavy water power reactors for electric power and other commercial uses.

All of the activities described above indicate that, to an encouraging degree, the Europeans are looking for ways to work with one another in science and technology.

F. EAST-WEST ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The invasion of Czechoslovakia has cast a pall over East-West relations generally and no doubt will cause a slowdown in the progress made in recent years in expanding economic exchanges and contacts between East and West. In these circumstances it is natural to ask what economic course the Western countries should pursue.

In my judgment it would be unwise to resort now to economic sanctions or other cold war measures. To do this would not help us in any way and might well strengthen the hand of the more militant leaders in the USSR. The wiser course would be to recognize the need to keep up our guard during this uncertain period and to maintain our ability to control transactions with the communist countries, while avoiding gestures of good will, friendship and business as usual in our relations with the invading countries. With the passage of time we can hope that the developing situation will permit us to resume progress in expanding trade and contacts with those countries. It seems to me that this policy, to which we all subscribed before the invasion, will again prove to be the best course for us to pursue in the longer term.

G. WORLD FOOD PROBLEM AND DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE

The world food problem remains a major international concern. The related need for improved agricultural production, combined with effective population planning, in the less developed areas of the world will be highlighted during the preparatory work for the Second World Development Decade of the United Nations.

The Development Assistance Committee and the Development Center of the OECD are both giving priority consideration to the world food problem. The OECD Development Assistance Committee is endeavoring to assure that donor countries continue adequate interim food aid until the developing countries are able to increase domestic agricultural production sufficiently to meet their basic needs. The OECD Development Center has begun a new population planning program for the benefit of the developing countries, as well as continuing work on the utilization of the results of new agricultural research discoveries in the food deficit areas of the world.

The OECD Development Assistance Committee also has under way intensive studies of the agricultural problems of the major food aid recipients during the past decade. These detailed studies, being carried out in cooperation with other international agencies, will highlight the problems and needs of Brazil, India, Indonesia, Pakistan and the United Arab Republic. When these studies are completed, they will form the basis for specific action programs by donor countries to help solve the recurring food problems of these countries.

The World Bank also is devoting increased attention to the needs of the less developed countries, including the world food problem and population planning. The World Bank's new President, Robert McNamara, has stated that the Bank will step up the level of its loan commitments over the next five years to help offset declining bilateral government assistance programs. The World Bank also is sponsoring an independent survey of world development needs during the coming decade which will identify major problems and possible solutions. An independent commission under the chairmanship of Lester Pearson, former Prime Minister of Canada, will perform this survey, which is expected to be completed by the end of 1969.

III. NATO Satellite Communications

On previous occasions I have described the three-phase proposal to introduce NATO quickly into the field of satellite communications. The Council, recognizing that satellite capability would add significantly to the flexibility, reliability, and survivability of a future military communications system for NATO, has moved ahead in admirable fashion to make this capability a reality.

Phase I of the program (earth terminals for research and development tests linking SHAPE at CASTEAU and AFSOUTH at Naples) has successfully demonstrated this first international military satellite communications system. The terminals have been in operation since May 1967 and are providing valuable training for the technicians who will operate and maintain the larger terminals which will be provided under Phase II of the program.

Phase II will give NATO's major commanders—the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the Supreme Commander Atlantic and the Commander-in-Chief Channel—instantaneous communications among themselves and with their subordinate commanders as well as communications between NATO Headquarters and participating countries' governments. This will be achieved by a synchronous satellite of the most modern design and thirteen earth terminals. The satellite will be manufactured in, and the launch arranged by the United States. Canadian and European firms are competing for the contract for the earth terminals. Present planning calls for the launch and the initiation of Phase II in the fall of 1969.

This project, while largely military, has important economic implications for future Alliance communications and technological cooperation. Because of its significant benefits, I recommend that it continue to be given the Committee's full support.

IV. Draft Recommendations

A. WORLD TRADE

The Assembly,

Mindful of the economic benefits to be gained from expanded world trade;

Aware of the great gains in removing tariff barriers that have been made as a result of the Kennedy Round negotiations;

Concerned about a tendency in certain countries to adopt unilateral trade-restrictive measures;

Conscious of the major obstacles to expanded trade in agricultural commodities which still exist;

Mindful of the fact that many developing countries are beset by serious problems in trying to increase their export earnings;

RECOMMENDS:

(a) that all members of the Alliance make a determined effort to resist new protectionist pressures;

(b) that all members strive to obtain prompt and significant reductions of non-tariff barriers to trade;

(c) that momentum be maintained towards elimination of remaining non-essential tariffs;

(d) that all members give serious attention to the problems involving agricultural trade;

(e) that efforts be continued to stabilize primary commodity prices in order to help developing countries increase their export earnings;

(f) that progress be made in reaching agreements on a system of temporary, generalized tariff advantages for products of all developing countries in the markets of all developed countries.

B. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ADJUSTMENT PROCESS

The Assembly,

Conscious that adequate gold and foreign exchange reserves are essential to growing world trade;

Aware that the United States and the United Kingdom have recently imposed fiscal and monetary restrictions in order to slow the rates of growth of their economies and to redress the imbalances in their external accounts;

Mindful that such restrictions may tend to reduce US and UK imports which would, in turn, tend to reduce world wide dollar and sterling reserves and, in particular, to reduce export possibilities for their principal trading partner, the European Communities;

Considering that such reduced external demand might have a contractionary effect on the economies of the European Communities;

Convinced that it is in the interest of the European Communities to encourage maximum economic expansion consistent with reasonable price stability and that such expansion is in the interest of the rest of the world;

Welcoming the IMF decision to create "Special Drawing Rights" (SDR), a mechanism for providing supplementary international liquidity;

RECOMMENDS:

(a) that the changes in IMF rules necessary to implement the SDR plan be ratified by the member states;

(b) that, as part of the balance-of-payments adjustment process, the appropriate authorities of the Commission of the European Communities and of the member states keep a close watch on their domestic demand situation, with a view to recommending expansionary policies in the event of any slackening in the rate of growth of such demand.

C. EUROPEAN UNITY

The Assembly,

Condemning with indignation the brutal and inexcusable military action of the Soviet Union and certain of its East European allies against Czechoslovakia:

Considering that these events demonstrate the urgent need for closer political and economic cooperation among the European democracies;

Aware of the efforts to expand the European Communities to include other Western European democracies;

Convinced of the contribution which an expanded Community promises to the vitality of the world economy, and to the assurance of continued European peace;

RECOMMENDS:

(a) that the members of the European communities tenaciously seek constructive and responsible solutions to the problems that delay their expansion to include other democratic European states prepared to build a united Europe;

(b) that the applicants for membership persevere in their efforts to join the Six in the creation of a broadly based Eurpoean Common Market;

(c) that the applicants demonstrate their readiness to participate in the creation of a powerful, democratic and united Europe.

REPORT OF THE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COMMITTEE

Rapporteur: Mr. Georges Mundeleer

1. Reports on the "International Institute of Science and Technology", Mr. O. Giscard d'Estaing and M. O. van H. Labberton.
2. "Summary of Recommendations and Action taken by N.A.A. Parliamentarians on Science and Technology", Colonel John J. Driscoll, (Committee Assistant).
3. Report on "NATO Scientific and Technical Personnel" by M. Georges Mundeleer (Belgium), Rapporteur.
4. Review of the "Scientific Activities of NATO" by M. Deshormes, (Secretary General N.A.A.).
5. Report on "Air Pollution in the United States" by Congressman Peter W. Rodino (U.S.), Vice-Chairman.
6. Introduction to "Algae Resources of the North Atlantic Area" by Congressman Peter W. Rodino (U.S.).
7. "Law of the Sea", Background of the Problem, by Colonel John J. Driscoll (Committee Assistant).
8. Report on "Exploration of the Sea Bed" by Congressman Peter W. Rodino, (U.S.).
9. Considerations on an "Ocean Space Treaty" by Senator Claiborne Pell (U.S.).
10. "NATO and Science": A progress report on the activities of the NATO Science Committee by Mr. Schall, Assistant Secretary General for Scientific Affairs, NATO.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen,

I. INTRODUCTION

It was exactly 12 years ago today that the Scientific and Technical Committee of NATO was set up.

Its major aim was to investigate the problems concerning scientific and technological training in member countries and decide how NATO could make more efficient use of its scientific resources.

The Committee has consistently followed these guidelines.

At the meeting held on 27th May 1968 in Brussels the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Assembly showed us how, in his opinion, it should be possible to further closer collaboration between the Scientific Committee itself and your Committee.

The Secretary General thought that it would be useful for the problems selected by the Scientific and Technical Committee to be interrelated with the work of the NATO Science Committee.

This proposal, accepted by the Committee, recommends the appointment of a science attaché responsible for maintaining contact between this Committee and the NATO Science Committee. In this respect, the Committee voted unanimously to request that Colonel Driscoll, who has been playing a part in its work for over ten years, should be offered this appointment.

* * *

Generally speaking, we may say that the activities undertaken hitherto have been endorsed both in international bodies and in member countries themselves.

We have always dealt with the great issues of the moment. We have on occasion even considered certain specific topics in advance of the major international organizations

—water shortage and desalinisation methods;

—water, air, and food pollution;

—peaceful uses of satellites both for television transmission and meteorology.

These are some of the major subjects with which we have been concerned during the last ten years.

A report drawn up by Colonel Driscoll (L.33) summarises the recommendations made and the measures taken by the Assembly parliamentarians, regarding these various topics, as well as the subsequent follow-up actions.

II. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Only recently at the instigation of our Committee a "Final Report" was published on the setting-up of an International Institute for Science and Technology. This most interesting paper showing the content of the courses offered, as well as the possible location of the institute, is available to the Committee members. Thus, many years of effort by the Committee culminated with the holding of a Conference in Deauville in May 1967 on the technological gaps between Europe and the U.S.A. It considered the problems of training and recommended that steps be taken immediately towards setting-up an international institute of higher education to accelerate technological progress in Europe.

This conference was organised under the auspices of our Scientific and Technical Committee and the International Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania.

Our Chairman, Senator Portmann, presided over the General Assembly which unanimously and enthusiastically adopted the idea of such a project.

Mr. Olivier Giscard d'Estaing, Member of Parliament and president of INSEAD Further Training Committee, presented a most interesting paper on the progress of the project.

Without going into detail, it will no doubt be of interest for you to know that no decision has yet been taken as regards choice of location for this International Institute for Science and Technology. Four towns have been nominated as meeting all the requirements. They are Maestricht, Milan, Fontainebleau, and Strasbourg. Mr. Giscard d'Estaing told us that he hoped the Institute would be in operation in a year's time. The curricula proposed for the Institute fall into two categories:

A. *A curriculum for graduates with a scientific background* immediately after university. One year's study would be devoted to training in applied science and general disciplines; certain students would then go on to a second optional year devoted to specialisation in, and research on, a key industry such as defined in the final report.

B. *Advanced further training courses lasting from one to three months* will be offered to experienced engineers and scientists, and will be oriented towards management of Research and Development in Industry.

I should like to conclude this part of my report by recalling that the NATO Council, commenting on one of our recent recommendations was of the opinion that, although the NATO Science Committee takes a keen interest in such an institute and some of its members have taken an active part in the studies conducted, the NATO Studies Commission feels that the OECD is the most suitable international organisation to cooperate in the setting up of such an institute which would have the status of a private foundation.

* * *

III. FUTURE PROGRAMME FOR THE NATO SCIENCE COMMITTEE

A most interesting paper presented by Dr. Schall informed us that beyond its ordinary programme, including: the granting of study scholarships; the organisation of study sessions (the budget for such programmes amounts to some $3,400,000, i.e., more than half of the Committee's total budget); and the subsidizing of research; the Scientific and Technical Committee has decided to lay special stress on oceanographic research and on the new problem of computer science. In the latter respect, experts from throughout the world have already held a Congress to examine the possibility of setting up an international institute to cater for the problems arising from Computers in every field, especially in regard to programming.

* * *

IV. MARINE ALGAE: GEOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS AND EXPLOITATION

The Assembly is undoubtedly aware that algae surveys have been underway in many areas of the world, particularly during the past 15 years.

Despite such efforts, however, there remains a general deficiency of knowledge on world seaweed resources in general, including our own North Atlantic area.

It is to be expected, unfortunately, that it will be many years before a comprehensive, worldwide analysis is available. It was recommended, therefore, that our Committee urgently initiate a specific research and analysis of the seaweed resources of our own North Atlantic area. The question has been reviewed by the Committee, and Colonel John J. Driscoll is prepared to monitor such a survey on our behalf.

This survey could include:

1. Geographic Analysis of Algae Resources of the North Atlantic Area;
2. Technology and Methodology of Algae Farming;
3. Economic Potential of Algae Production; and
4. Reference Bibliography.

The Committee strongly recommends that such a study should emphasize the species and technologies peculiar to the North Atlantic Area. Our efforts would be coordinated with the United Nations, and other international organisations concerned with seaweed, in order to ensure the correlation of specific North Atlantic data complementing any other studies which may be underway. This is the objective of our first recommendation.

V. AIR POLLUTION

In 1964, the Committee reviewed the overall problems of pollution: air, water, and food.

The air pollution problem has since acquired increasing urgency, owing to its harmful and immediate effects on the wellbeing of our populations.

It is increasingly evident that the parliamentarians, on the whole, are not adequately informed on either the current technological solutions or the existing legislative measures for its prevention and control.

Mrs. Ross (Denmark) described current Scandinavian solutions to the problem.

Our Vice-Chairman, Mr. Rodino, Congressman for New Jersey, presented the U.S. legislative approach towards control: The Air Quality Act of 1967.

The important fact regarding this serious menace to health, which became increasingly evident was that the Member Nations should be kept better informed of the "techno-juridical" aspects of current methods being applied to cope with this truly vital problem.

For this purpose, the Committee felt that a second recommendation was required in answer to the following:

—What technical solutions have proven successful?

—Which approaches are at present undergoing study or experimentation?

—Which might be linked with legal measures for the effective control of this hazard to public health?

VI. LAW OF THE SEA

A background review of the "Law of the Sea" presented by Colonel Driscoll considered in particular the vast resources contained in and under what amounts to no less than 70% of the earth's surface.

Senator Pell (United States) presented a remarkable analysis drawing the Committee's attention to the importance of a complete examination of the law of "ocean space" not subject at present to any international agreement.

The Committee considered the scientific and technological aspects of the exploitation of these resources at present untapped and belonging to no national state.

The rich, technologically advanced nations will not miss the tremendous opportunity that exists for exploiting these resources but they must do so under a system of international licensing which would ensure order in what could be dangerous chaos.

Such a licensing system could, in part, be used to assist the United Nations in their financing problems.

The Committee considered this to be a matter of extreme urgency, bearing in mind the rapid progress already made in the technological ability to exploit these resources and urged an immediate examination of the subject by the Assembly.

In this connection the Committee wholeheartedly supported Senator Pell's proposal for the urgent introduction of an Ocean Space Treaty, specifying the limits within which exploitation of resources might be authorised.

The objectives outlined by Senator Pell were most favourably received by the entire Committee, which looks forward to making a more detailed examination of the Senator's interesting proposals at next year's meeting.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

In concluding its work, the Committee decided to present two recommendations:

1. One relating to the publication of a geographical analysis of the algae resources located in the North Atlantic area and their potential exploitation.

2. The other relating to air pollution. The Committee recommends the publication of an Annual Survey of this problem, reviewing the solutions already initiated.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

Mr. President, you will note that the work of the Committee has always been pursuant to the policy originally established when it was first organised.

The Committee considers that the results of military research should be used to bring benefits on the widest possible social and geographical scale.

It is becoming increasingly clear both how fast scientific research is expanding and how important it is, if catastrophe is to be avoided, that it be kept constantly under man's control.

Indeed, too much technology and too many discoveries may lead us to disaster. It is essential that mankind as a whole be kept carefully and constantly informed and be warned against the dangers by which the world is threatened by the very existence of new techniques. The fantastic development of technology must, if it is to be a source of true enrichment of mankind, as we would like it to be, be accompanied by education, control, and protection.

It behooves us all, therefore, to strive together that our work may produce the maximum effects both in the NATO Council of Ministers and in our national parliaments.

NATO does not exist to make war. It exists, first and foremost, to prevent war and also to enable the civil populations to benefit from the scientific progress achieved in the military domain.

Public opinion throughout the world is at present deeply disturbed. Steps must be taken to dispel the existing confusion and, to that end, we must state clearly what we want and what we are doing. It transpires all too often that our democracies are ignorant of the sincere efforts being made by all the members of NATO to improve living conditions.

Democracies sometimes pass through crises. But it is invariably towards the democracies that people eventually turn when seeking the most effective ways of guaranteeing the fundamental freedoms of mankind.

In this respect, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation represents a particularly significant example of international solidarity. It is more

important than ever that we who belong to the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO should inform our countries of the objectives pursued and the results achieved. This is an essential condition for the survival of an organisation which the free countries joined enthusiastically almost twenty years ago.

It is for this reason that I wish, once more, to thank the members of this Assembly who have taken part in the work of our Committee: and to pay grateful tribute to our brilliant Chairman, Professor Portmann, for his untiring labours; to our Vice-Chairman, Congressman Rodino, who has played a leading part in our work; and to Colonel Driscoll, who, we confidently expect, will shortly be appointed "Science Attaché" to the Committee.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, for your attention.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION, CULTURAL AFFAIRS, AND INFORMATION

Rapporteur: Mr. J. Aano (Norway)

In 1966, at the Twelfth Annual Session of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference (Now: The North Atlantic Assembly) the following recommendation, submitted by the Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs and Information, was adopted:

The Conference,

Recalling that the eleventh annual NATO Parliamentarians' Conference has recommended the creation of a study commission to give immediate attention to the feasibility of establishing an educational centre for the training of civil servants, economic and social administrators of any and all nations, with particular attention to middle level administration and administrators, democratic administrative techniques and values, the creation of a moderate-sized centre staffed by a faculty of high reputation, and the close co-operation of NATO and OECD government in this endeavour,

Noting that no substantial action has been taken on this resolution during the past year,

Recognizing that the Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs and Information, has appointed a sub-Committee to make further recommendations with respect to this proposal,

Requests the Secretariat of the NATO Parliamentarians' Conference to undertake a staff study of the feasibility and means of establishing such a facility and to co-operate with the sub-Committee of this Committee in developing its findings.

Acting on this recommendation, the secretariat, in consultation with the Chairman, Senator Karl Mundt, arranged for Mr. J. Aano, acting Rapporteur, and Dr. Farber, Consultant to Senator Mundt, to travel to several capitals of European NATO countries on a fact finding trip. A detailed report of their findings, with specific proposals for further action with the aim of setting up an international seminar on civil administration, was presented to the Committee meeting at the North Atlantic Assembly's Annual meeting in Brussels, Nov. 1967. (K. 162, CTC, (67) 11). The Assembly in plenary session subsequently unanimously adopted the following recommendation:

The Assembly,

Appreciating the growing and vital role of public servants in the preservation and promotion of democratic institutions, and in view of the increasing importance of co-operation of the NATO governments and agencies,

Noting the need for better understanding of the administrative systems of NATO and other governments, and,

Considering the past pledges of support given by this Conference to efforts to improve the international training of public servants through the establishment of an administrative training centre, and fellowship and exchange programmes,

Recognizing the commendable progress made by the Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs and Information in planning for the improvement of the international training of public servants,

ENDORSES the progress made by the Committee on Education Cultural Affairs and Information and,

RECOMMENDS that the North Atlantic Assembly and NATO Secretariats work with representatives of the Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs and Information, in the establishment and financing of a pilot programme in international training with the College of Europe with the purpose of bringing together men and women who are in important administrative posts in their respective countries.

This recommendation met with favourable consideration by the NATO Council, which at its meeting on July 10th 1968 made the following comments to the matter:

The Council has expressed the view that this is an interesting project, and one that is clearly worthy of consideration.

Nevertheless, the Council is of the opinion that this proposal would, of course, have to be discussed in the appropriate committees of the Organization. It also considers that, before these committees can express a view on any possible financial contribution, it is necessary to have much more detailed information from the North Atlantic Assembly Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs and Information. It is understood that when this Committee met in Brussels on 15th June, they discussed this question and appointed a sub-Committee to prepare a detailed report on the possible implementation of this proposal. The Council hopes that the contents of this report will be made known to the Organization in due course so that the details of the financial and other assistance, which they hope to receive from NATO, can be examined.

However, as early as November of 1967 the Assembly's Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs and Information, in order to implement this recommendation, had already set up a sub-Committee which was instructed, in co-operation with competent persons, to make specific proposals concerning the setting up and administration of such a pilot programme.

On 22nd May 1968, two members of this sub-Committee, Mr. J. Aano (Chairman) and Mr. H. Pöhler, met at NATO headquarters with Dr. Brugmans (Rector of the College of Europe), Mr. Boggs (Observer, U.S. Delegation to NATO) and Mr. Deshormes (Secretary General) for preliminary discussion. The result of these considerations was placed before the Committee at its meeting in Brussels last June. In accordance with the instructions of the Committee, and acting on its behalf, the sub-Committee consisting of Mr. Jakob Aano (Norway), Mr. Heinz Pöhler (Federal Republic of Germany), and Mr. Kenneth Lomas (United Kingdom), and advised by Dr. William Farber of the

University of South Dakota, held a two-day meeting at the College of Europe in Bruges in June 1968, attended by a number of distinguished experts in the domains of administration and political science, including Professor H. Brugmans (Rector of the College of Europe), Professor P. A. Schilling (Institute of International Administrative Sciences, Brussels) and Mr. Magnus Bratten (Director of Training and Education of the Norwegian Civil Service). The agreed conclusions of this meeting, are set out in the document L.72 CIC(68)6 rev. "Proposal to establish a Seminar on Civil Administration with special reference to International Affairs." These proposals, it is hoped, both represent a challenge for the NATO countries, and are convincing enough for the Council to act upon.

North Atlantic Assembly

International Secretariat July 1968

Proposal To Establish a Seminar on Civil Administration With Special Reference to International Affairs

1. THE ORIGINS

Meeting in Brussels in November 1967, the North Atlantic Assembly unanimously adopted the following recommendation: "* * * that the North Atlantic Assembly and NATO secretariat work with representatives of the Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs and Information in the establishment and financing of a pilot programme in international training with the collaboration of the College of Europe, for the purpose of bringing together men and women who are in important administrative posts in their respective countries."

In adopting this recommendation the Assembly noted "The growing and vital role of public servants in the preservation and promotion of democratic institutions" and "the need for better understanding of the administrative systems of NATO and other governments."

In order to implement this recommendation, the Assembly's Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs and Information of which Senator Karl Mundt (United States) is the Chairman, set up a sub-Committee which was instructed, in co-operation with the competent persons, to make specific proposals concerning the setting up and administration of such a pilot programme. The sub-Committee, consisting of Mr. Jakob Aano (Norway), Mr. Heinz Pöhler (Federal Republic of Germany) and Mr. Kenneth Lomas (United Kingdom), was advised by Dr. William Farber of the University of South Dakota. In accordance with the instructions of the Committee, and acting on its behalf, the sub-Committee held a two-day meeting at the College of Europe in Bruges in June 1968, attended by a number of distinguished experts in the domains of administration and political science, including Professor H. Brugmans (Rector of the College of Europe), Professor P. A. Schillings (Institute of International Administrative Sciences, Brussels) and Mr. Magnus Bratten (Director of Training and Education of the Norwegian Civil Service). The proposals set out here represent the agreed conclusions of this meeting.

2. THE AIMS

The immediate proposal is to hold an initial three-year programme of annual international training seminars on civil administration, with special reference to international affairs, for administrative grade civil servants of high promise and calibre in order to determine the desirability and feasibility of sponsoring a long-term programme.

Why is such a programme proposed? The rôle and consequently the training of public servants are crucial to the development and maintenance of a democratic society. The success or failure of governments depends upon the ability of political and administrative institutions to meet complex and urgent contemporary problems. In an attempt to meet these problems, administrators have necessarily been vested with more authority and discretion. It is therefore considered that a "re-cycling" seminar which introduces middle and upper level civil servants to key developments in recent administrative practice and methodology, on a comparative basis, can render an important service to their different national administrations and help to make these more effective. In particular it is considered that the mutual exchange of ideas concerning developments in administration in North America and Europe can be especially useful.

The College of Europe at Bruges was carefully selected by the Committee on Education as being the most suitable centre for the holding of such seminars in view of its long record of successful experience in organising international training schemes both for post-graduate students and, under the auspices of the International Railway Union, for railway experts. The College of Europe, which was set up in 1950, is independent of any national administration or university. The present President of its Board of Administration is Mr. Jean Rey, President of the EEC Commission.

3. PARTICIPANTS

It is suggested that participants should be promising civil servants with about ten years experience. The age-bracket for participants would, therefore, be approximately between thirty-five and forty-five, but this question would be left to the discretion of national authorities and these age limits would not be exclusive. It is expected that the participants would be selected with a view to their being able to play a key role in their national administrations in the future. Since civil service ranks differ from country to country, it is proposed that the precise level of participants should be established separately in the case of each country with the co-operation of national authorities. Since the courses will be held in English and French a working knowledge of these languages is desirable, and interpretation from and into these two languages will probably be provided. Invitations to attend the seminar will be addressed, in the first instance, to member governments of the North Atlantic Alliance but other countries may well wish to partcipate at a later stage. The principal training agency in each of the member countries would have the responsibility for the selection of that country's participants. It is considered that the optimum number of participants should be between 25 and 35. Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States will be invited to send three participants each;

all other members of the Alliance will be invited to send two participants apiece, with the exception of Iceland and Luxembourg which will be asked to send one participant in each case. Governments will be encouraged to submit the name of an alternate so that in the event of some countries not participating and the quotas not being filled alternates could be invited to attend. Spare places would be filled by the larger countries, in the order of the size of their population.

4. PROGRAMME

It is suggested that the seminar should last one calendar month, and mid-June to mid-July is considered as being the most suitable period. The seminar will be held at the College of Europe at Bruges. The continuing title of the course shall be: "Seminar on civil administration with special reference to international affairs." The theme of the first seminar to be held in 1969 will be: "The role of co-ordination in modern administration." The following programme is suggested for the 1969 seminar:

I. Administration in a Changing World

(a) Problems posed to national administrations by the economic, scientific and cultural revolutions. Recent trends in behavioural sciences, methodology and the use of computers, and their effect on administration.

II. Problems of Co-ordination

(b) Problems of co-ordination between ministries and agencies in the modern state.
(c) Problems of co-ordination between the national state and regional entities. Consideration of this theme in the context of both central and federal governmental systems.
(d) Impact of international organisations on the national state with special reference to NATO and EEC.
(e) Co-ordination of national attitudes towards international organisations within the national framework.

III. Future Perspectives

(f) (1) What progress had been made towards the achievement of European co-operation?
(2) What progress has been made towards the achievement of Atlantic co-operation?
(g) The role of Europe and the free world in world affairs—future perspectives.

IV. Evaluation

(h) Evaluation of the seminar by participants.
Suggestions concerning the programme and administration.

As far as the daily organisation of the seminar is concerned, mornings will be devoted to lectures, followed by discussion periods in the afternoons. Participants will be divided up into study groups of five or six persons. Each study group will be expected to make a distinctive contribution to the general discussions. Some evenings will

be devoted to lectures by guest speakers including "witnesses of our time."

The detailed programme for the seminar will be drawn up by the staff of the College of Europe with the assistance of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences at Brussels. Most of the teaching will be carried out by experts on administration drawn from universities and national schools of administration of university level, but the staff of the College of Europe will also play an active teaching role.

The lectures and discussions will be supplemented by study visits to the NATO and EEC headquarters in Brussels and by a visit to the first world war battle-fields in Flanders. There will also be a mid-term break.

Participants will be expected to do some prior reading concerning the main subjects studied and they will be sent a short bibliography of specially selected books and articles.

5. COST AND ADMINISTRATION

It is proposed that the initial programme of seminars should last for a three-year trial period. If the seminars are successful and their results are appreciated by governments it is hoped that it would be possible to place them on more permanent basis. It is hoped that NATO, national governments, foundations and other bodies will be able to guarantee the financing of the seminar for the initital three-year period, during which time arrangements are to be made for the long-term financing of the seminar if this is felt to be desirable. Apart from transport, it is estimated that the seminar will cost $36,000 a year. It is hoped that NATO will make special provisions to provide this amount, or the greater part of it, out of its civil budget.

Transport of participants from and to their home countries will be the responsibility of governments.

The College of Europe will provide meals and lodging for participants. All the day-to-day administration of the seminar will be in the hands of the College. Further, it is suggested that the overall responsibility for the whole organisation of the seminar should be borne essentially by the College, though it is considered that a special Advisory Board should be established which should include representatives of the Assembly's Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs and Information and of NATO.

6. THE PART TO BE PLAYED BY NATO

It is hoped that NATO will assume the major responsibility for underwriting the finances of the seminar for the three-year trial period, and possibly thereafter. As stated above, it is estimated that the seminar will cost $36,000 a year.

It is also hoped that NATO will be prepared to provide some administrative and secretarial help, particularly in preparing the first seminar. NATO could also be of assistance in providing interpreters and interpretation equipment for the seminar. The cost of such material assistance could be reimbursed to NATO by the seminar.

Finally, it would be most helpful if NATO could approach the national governments so as to encourage them to participate fully in the seminar and to give the seminar the financial and other support necessary.

1st August, 1968.

Bruges Seminar

DRAFT BUDGET

Length and timing of the proposed 1969 Seminar: 30 days; possibly from mid-June to mid-July.

	Belgian francs
I. Tuition:	
(a) 4 1/2 weeks with 30 lecture periods or other working hours per week; fees for lecturers and professors, and for special visiting speakers, including "Witnesses of our time"	200, 000
(b) Travel and per diem allowances for visiting professors	120, 000
Total, tuition	320, 000
II. Maintenance:	
(a) Board and lodging, including all meals: 35 students for 30 days, at 400 F. per day	420, 000
(b) Study trips to NATO, EEC and Flanders Battle Fields, 3 days for 35 students, at 1,000 F. per day	105, 000
(c) Welcome reception, farewell reception, entertainment of distinguished lecturers and visitors, including "Witnesses of our time"	30, 000
(d) Selection of leading national newspapers to be available to students	7, 000
Total, maintenance	562, 000
III. Administration:	
(a) Part-time Secretary General to organise and administer the seminar	200, 000
(b) Secretarial assistance	100, 000
(c) Office expenses, including printing of programme and invitations, seminar stationery and reproduction of documents	60, 000
(d) Postal, telephone and telegraph expenses involved in preparing and administering the seminar	40, 000
(e) (i) Special purchases and extra library services for the seminar	50, 000
(ii) Purchase of selected books for special study by students, allowing for some 4 or 5 books per student	100, 000
(f) Supplementary services and costs, including heating and cleaning, and extra secretarial and administrative help provided by the College of Europe during the normal holiday period	108, 000
Total, administration	658, 000
Total	1, 540, 000
IV. Overhead expenses and fee for College of Europe	260, 000

In order to compensate the College of Europe, over and above the direct expenditure so far accounted for, it is normal that the College of Europe should receive a general fee for the considerable demands made on the time of its staff in preparing and organising the seminar, for placing its buildings and facilities at the disposal of students and for its services rendered in general. It is noted that the Board of Administrators of the College of Europe, of which the President is Mr. Jean Rey, requires the College to benefit financially from any extraordinary activities of this kind.

Total	1, 800, 000
Total in United States dollars	36, 000

Part II. Recommendations and an Order

POLITICAL COMMITTEE

RECOMMENDATION ON THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE MIDDLE EAST

The Assembly,

Noting the growing threat to vital NATO interests on its south-eastern flank, caused by the Soviet politico-military penetration of the greater Mediterranean basin, including the major augmentation of its naval force there:

Urges the members of NATO to concert their policies with respect to the Mediterranean and the Middle East to further the progress of free institutions, economic well-being and peace in the area.

RECOMMENDATION ON ARMS CONTROL

The Assembly,

Whereas, the world is still faced with a mounting nuclear arms race that has persisted for two and a half decades, and in view of the certain great costs and uncertain risks of an uncontrolled arms race.

Noting that all members of the Atlantic Alliance share a common interest in furthering their common security,

Recognizing that in this time of heightened tension brought about by the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union and certain other Warsaw Pact countries, it is more—not less—important for the major nuclear weapon adversaries to curb the strategic arms race,

Recommends that the United States, in continuing close consultation with its NATO and other Allies, renew efforts to seek agreement with the Soviet Union, on a basis consistent with enhancing Western security, to curb the arms race in the field of both conventional and nuclear weaponry, the ultimate aim being the controlled destruction of stocks of nuclear weapons.

Further recommends that the Council give consideration to the establishment of a NATO arms control agency to serve as a center for information, research and idea-development in the field of arms control and in time, hopefully, also to serve as the agency for negotiating arms control agreement with nations outside NATO.

RECOMMENDATION ON SOVIET PRESSURE ON THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The Assembly,

Noting that

(1) the Soviet Union and her East German ally are continuing a policy of pressure against the Federal Republic of Germany and in particular against West-Berlin;

(2) the Soviet Union, especially after August 21st endeavours to spread disunity amongst the members of the Alliance by creating mistrust between the Federal Republic of Germany and her allies;

(3) the Federal Republic of Germany has always undertaken to fulfill her obligations within the Alliance and is therefore entitled to have its full protection;

(4) the German problem, including the problem of Berlin can be solved only within the framework of a lasting European peace order;

Recommends the Governments of the Alliance:

(1) to seize every opportunity in order to make it quite clear to the Soviet bloc that one of the essential duties of the Alliance is to protect the freedom of the Federal Republic of Germany including that of Berlin;

(2) to oppose any efforts to isolate the Federal Republic of Germany;

(3) to make it unmistakably clear to the Soviet Union that Articles 107 and 53 of the UN Charter do not give any State a right to intervene in the affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany and that therefore every intervention of this kind would mean an act of aggression against the Alliance, as a whole; and

(4) to support the statements of the United States, United Kingdom and France which unequivocally reject the interpretation of Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter by the Soviet Union in respect of the Federal Republic of Germany.

RECOMMENDATION ON GREECE

The Assembly,

Recalling the recommendation on Greece adopted at its Thirteenth Annual Session;

Expressing its regret that fundamental human and civil rights have still not been restored in this country;

Noting that Greece occupies a strategic position in the Mediterranean and that continuation of the present situation might lead to dangerous tensions;

Recommends that member-Governments of the Alliance urge the Greek Government to agree to a speedy restoration of civil liberties and truly democratic parliamentary elections enabling a properly elected parliamentary delegation to resume its rightful place in the North Atlantic Assembly at the 1969 Session.

RECOMMENDATION ON A JOINT EUROPEAN ARMS PROCUREMENT AGENCY

The Assembly,

Believing that a political confederation of Europe would be more effectively advanced by setting up joint working-groups with definite aims and representing all interested European members of the North Atlantic Alliance;

Recalling that all endeavours aiding Europe to share collectively responsibilities with the North American members of the Alliance and to benefit from a balanced partnership with them are also the avowed policy and in their interest as Alliance members;

Urges the North Atlantic Council and the member governments to take all necessary measures in order to prepare at an early date a conference of heads of governments of these nations; and

Suggests that a prime item of the agenda of this conference should be the setting-up of a joint European Arms Procurement and Defence Agency;

Recommends that this Agency be given autonomous budgetary power enabling it to finance the research and development of con-

ventional arms systems and weapons technology, arms production and procurement and in ordering subsequent arms production, to keep in mind the need for the growth of industrial, technological and management potential, relating to Alliance security;

Recommends that the activities of this Agency should remain closely affiliated with, and in conformity with, NATO military strategy and foreign policy planning in general.

RECOMMENDATION ON FOLLOW-UP OF PREVIOUS ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Assembly,

Noting serious developments concerning the maintenance of peace within the Treaty area as defined in Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and adjacent thereto, as shown by

(a) The accelerated build-up of a powerful naval force of the Soviet Union in the Mediterranean

(b) The continuing supply of sophisticated arms and of diplomatic support by the Soviet Union to certain governments in the Middle East

(c) The implicit threats to the sovereignty and independence of other European states

Noting the inconclusive comments of the North Atlantic Council upon the Recommendations of the Political Committee adopted by the Assembly in November 1967

Requests answers by the North Atlantic Council in ministerial session to the following questions:

(a) What effective collective actions are being undertaken in response to the urgent challenge to vital Alliance interests posed by Soviet naval activities in the Mediterranean and Soviet politico-military activities in the Middle East?

(b) What contingency plans have been made by the Alliance to assure the continued flow of strategic fuel imports from the Middle East and continue free access to the strategic sea, air and land routes in the Mediterranean and the Middle East which link Europe with Asia and Africa?

(c) What measures are contemplated to meet the implicit threat of the extension of Soviet politico-military control over other European states which feel threatened thereby?

RECOMMENDATION ON THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN ICELAND

The Assembly,

Considering the devaluation of the Icelandic currency;

Considering the urgent economic problems of this country, especially because of its dependence upon the fishing industry;

Considering the importance of pursuing the economic welfare of the Icelandic people;

Noting the economic aims of the Alliance as set out in Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

Recommends that the North Atlantic Council should, as a matter of urgency, ask its member governments to assist Iceland, to enable the country to improve and broaden its basic economic and industrial structure.

MILITARY COMMITTEE

RECOMMENDATION ON THE SECURITY OF THE ALLIANCE

The Assembly,

United in its conviction that fully adequate NATO conventional forces and a nuclear deterrent are essential to deter war and maintain the peace;

Condemns the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria;

Regrets that progress toward detente and better East-West relations has been arrested by the Soviet action against Czechoslovakia;

Expresses grave concern at Soviet activities in the Mediterranean Basin;

Believes that the present level of NATO conventional forces is inadequate to meet the defence objectives assigned to them;

Calls on the Council of Ministers:

To strengthen NATO conventional forces in all sectors by taking immediate and vigorous action to eliminate the deficiencies in men, material, training, mobilization base, aircraft protection and deployment that have become evident following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the increased Soviet presence in the Mediterranean.

Urges the Governments and Parliaments of all member nations:

1. To support and carry out the above recommendations of the North Atlantic Assembly to the North Atlantic Council for strengthening the military forces of the Alliance;

2. To bear their full share of all the financial and other burdens involved.

ECONOMIC COMMITTEE

RECOMMENDATION ON WORLD TRADE

The Assembly,

Mindful of the economic benefits to be gained from expanded world trade;

Aware of the great gains in removing tariff barriers that have been made as a result of the Kennedy Round negotiations;

Concerned about a tendency in certain countries to adopt unilateral trade-restrictive measures;

Conscious of the major obstacles to expanded trade in agricultural commodities which still exist;

Mindful of the fact that many developing countries are beset by serious problems in trying to increase their export earnings;

Recommends:

(a) that all members of the Alliance make a determined effort to resist new protectionist pressures;

(b) that all members strive to obtain prompt and significant reductions of non-tariff barriers to trade;

(c) that momentum be maintained towards elimination of remaining non-essential tariffs;

(d) that all members give serious attention to the problems involving agricultural trade;

(e) that efforts be continued to stabilize primary commodity prices in order to help developing countries increase their export earnings;

(f) that progress be made in reaching agreements on a system of temporary, generalized tariff advantages for products of all developing countries in the markets of all developed countries.

RECOMMENDATION ON INTERNATIONAL MONETARY CO-OPERATION AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ADJUSTMENT PROCESS

The Assembly,

Conscious that adequate gold and foreign exchange reserves are essential to growing world trade;

Aware that the United States and the United Kingdom have recently imposed fiscal and monetary restrictions in order to slow the rates of growth of their economies and to redress the imbalances in their external accounts;

Mindful that such restrictions may tend to reduce US and UK imports which would, in turn, tend to reduce world wide dollar and sterling reserves and, in particular, to reduce export possibilities for their principal trading partner, the European Communities;

Considering that such reduced external demand might have a contractionary effect on the economies of the European Communities;

Convinced that it is in the interest of the European Communities to encourage maximum economic expansion consistent with reasonable price stability and that such expansion is in the interest of the rest of the world;

Welcoming the IMF decision to create "Special Drawing Rights" (SDR), a mechanism for providing supplementary international liquidity;

Recommends:

(a) that the changes in IMF rules necessary to implement the SDR plan be ratified by the member states;

(b) that, as part of the balance-of-payments adjustment process, the appropriate authorities of the Commission of the European Communities and of the member states keep a close watch on their domestic demand situation, with a view to recommending expansionary policies in the event of any slackening in the rate of growth of such demand.

RECOMMENDATION ON EUROPEAN UNITY

The Assembly,

Condemning with indignation the brutal and inexcusable military action of the Soviet Union and certain of its East European allies against Czechoslovakia;

Considering that these events demonstrate the urgent need for closer political and economic cooperation among the European democracies;

Aware of the efforts to expand the European Communities to include other Western European democracies;

Convinced of the contribution which an expanded Community promises to the vitality of the world economy, and to the assurance of continued European peace;

Recommends:

I. (a) that the members of the European Communities tenaciously seek constructive and responsible solutions to the problems that delay their expansion to include other democratic European states prepared to build a united Europe;

(b) that the applicants for membership persevere in their efforts to join the Six in the creation of a broadly based European Common Market;

(c) that the applicants demonstrate that they are ready to participate in the creation of a powerful, democratic and united Europe.

II. That the Governments of the member countries of the European Economic Community, together with the Governments of the countries applying for membership take steps forthwith to initiate a dialogue with a view to the eventual achievement of a united Europe.

RECOMMENDATION ON CO-OPERATION FOR DEVELOPMENT

The Assembly,

Considering that it is of the utmost importance for the maintenance of peace and for the harmonious development of the peoples that provision be made for increased aid to developing countries as well as for the drafting of a proper charter and a global development strategy.

Deems that such charter and strategy must be founded on the notion of a common responsibility and cooperation between industrialized countries and developing countries.

Recommends that the governments and parliaments of Member States of the Atlantic Alliance implement the recommendation made at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development that every economically advanced country should endeavour to provide developing countries with funds corresponding to at least 1% of its gross national product.

Addresses an urgent appeal to the North Atlantic Council and to all governments of countries belonging to the Atlantic Alliance to participate actively in the drafting of a charter and a development strategy in view of the United Nations Second Development Decade.

RECOMMENDATION ON BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

Whereas military expenditures by NATO countries outside their own territories for their agreed common defence contribute to balance of payments problems among NATO members;

Believing that the effects on the balance of payments from spending for the common defence is a special problem for which longer term solutions would strengthen the Alliance;

Noting that the added importance which recent developments in Eastern Europe give to the strengthening of NATO defences;

Recommends:

That, for the longer term, the national and international authorities concerned examine the possibilities of multilateral approaches which offer practical means of achieving more permanent

political, military and economic stability in future handling of the military balance of payments effects within NATO; and

That, in the interim, member countries of the Atlantic Alliance continue their present efforts to conclude arrangements on a bilateral basis with the military balance of payments problem.

RECOMMENDATION ON PRECAUTIONARY ECONOMIC MEASURES WHICH COULD BE TAKEN BY THE EUROPEAN MEMBERS OF NATO IN THE EVENT OF THEIR SUPPLY ROUTES BEING ENDANGERED

The Assembly,

Mindful that whenever military action has been taken in the past, especially in the Middle East, the strategically important role played by Soviet naval forces in international waters has been made clear;

Recognising that all NATO countries depend on imports in a variety of fields and that in the absence of these imports, the national economies of the European NATO countries would not be viable;

Considering that it is against this background that the economic situation of the NATO countries should be examined;

Recommends that a strategic economic plan should be worked out by the EEC Commission for the Six member countries and by the National Economics Ministries for the other European NATO countries providing answers to the following questions:

1. Which import items are of such vital importance that they cannot be dispensed with?
2. What is the annual requirement of these goods?
3. What is the period of time—expressed in years or months—for which reserves should be created?
4. What will be the cost of implementing this plan?

Requests the North Atlantic Council to provide such information and assistance to the Economic Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly as will enable it to play a constructive part in the formulation of the above mentioned strategic economic plan.

SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COMMITTEE

RECOMMENDATION ON OCEAN RESOURCES

The Assembly,

Reaffirming N.A.T.O.'s interest in the ocean resources of the North Atlantic area;

Noting the potential dividends which could be derived, particularly for the less-developed nations, from the systematic utilization of the uncharted resources of algae, in the form of food products, pharmaceuticals, and industrial products;

Recognizing the deficiencies in our knowledge of algae resources in our North Atlantic, despite efforts towards worldwide surveys;

Considering that the scientific correlation of North Atlantic algae resource studies is feasible and, if made available, could produce important economic and technological benefits to the N.A.T.O. nations;

Recommends that the N.A.T.O. nations assist the Scientific and Technical Committee in the publication of a geographic analysis of North Atlantic algae emphasizing the species, farming technologies, and economic potentials peculiar to the North Atlantic Area.

RECOMMENDATION ON AIR POLLUTION

The Assembly,

Recognizing the ever-increasing dangers of air pollution throughout all the nations of the NATO Alliance;

Recalling that corrective action has been initiated in a few of the NATO nations in the form of both technological solutions and law enforcement measures;

Appreciating that the majority of the NATO national parliaments are not abreast of the latest technogolical developments;

Recommends that NATO, under the guidance of the NAA Scientific and Technical Committee publish an annual survey of the specific air pollution problems, including all technological accomplishments and legal measures combatting this growing menace.

EDUCATION COMMITTEE

RECOMMENDATION ON INFORMATION POLICY

The Assembly,

Considering the extent and character of youth and student unrest throughout the world,

Recognizing the political and social consequences of youth activity in modern society, and

Noting the need for further understanding of youth problems,

Recommends the creation of a special joint NATO-NAA committee to study information policy, especially youth problems, and report its findings and recommendations next year to the Committee of Education, Cultural Affairs and Information and the North Atlantic Assembly.

ORDER ON ESTABLISHMENT OF A SEMINAR

The Assembly,

Reviewing the proposals to establish a seminar on civil administration with special reference to international affairs,

Considering the continued vital role of public servants in the preservation and promotion of democratic institutions, and

Mindful of the importance of stressing the non-military as well as the military function of NATO,

Instructs its Secretariat to continue to seek prompt funding by NATO of the seminar on civil administration so that the first seminar may be held in the Summer of 1969.

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