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MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING IN EAST
AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

A STAFF REPORT

PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
AND SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENTS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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FOREWORD

FEBRUARY 16, 1971.

Late in 1969 the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments was requested by the chairman of the full House Foreign Affairs Committee to conduct a review of the military assistance training program (MAP training), which provides instruction for foreign military personnel. In carrying out its survey of MAP training, the subcommittee has sought to review and analyze the concept, objectives, content, operations, and status of U.S. military training programs being conducted worldwide under military assistance.

Last January a special study mission of subcommittee members visited four countries in Latin America and the Canal Zone to see firsthand the operations of the programs in that region. The report of that visit has been published as part of the document *Reports of the Special Study Mission to Latin America on I. Military Assistance Training; II. Developmental Television.*¹ More recently the subcommittee has held a series of hearings on MAP training with witnesses from research organizations, academic life, and the Government. Those proceedings have been issued under the title, *Military Assistance Training.*²

For some time the subcommittee had contemplated a study mission to Asia following the November elections as a means of rounding out its on-the-scene exposure to the operations and effects of military training. It was recognized that the program is conducted somewhat differently in "forward defense" countries than it is in regions like Africa and Latin America where the threat of Communist aggression is less immediate. Furthermore, there was great interest in observing the effects of the so-called Nixon doctrine as it was being applied in East and Southeast Asia.

Because of the scheduling of a postelection congressional session, however, plans for a study mission had to be canceled. Instead, I asked the subcommittee staff consultant, Dr. John H. Sullivan, to undertake the study. He left Washington on October 19 and returned on November 12, visiting Japan, Korea, Okinawa, Taiwan, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Headquarters, Pacific Command, in Hawaii.

During his mission he was briefed by and held discussions with both U.S. military and embassy personnel, and with military and civilian officials of MAP recipient countries. He inspected a number of U.S.-supported training facilities and, in each country, interviewed officers and enlisted men who had received training under U.S. programs.

This report contains data gathered by Dr. Sullivan, together with his analysis and findings on the operation of MAP training programs in the countries he visited. The views expressed are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the subcommittee or any member thereof.

¹ Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong. (May 7, 1970).


² Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 91st Cong., 2d sess. (Dec. 22, 1970).

The subcommittee hearings, the Latin American study mission report, and this study will provide the basis for the subcommittee's final report on MAP training, which is to be issued soon. It is hoped that the final report will be of assistance to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and to the Congress in the work of restructuring the military assistance portions of the foreign aid legislation.

CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI,
*Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security
Policy and Scientific Developments.*

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MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING IN EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

A CONTEXT FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING IN ASIA

A study of military assistance training in Asia must necessarily be conducted within the framework of prevailing political and social, as well as military, conditions in the area. It must also take into account recent adjustments in U.S. policy.

Since the December 7, 1941, attack on Pearl Harbor, this Nation has been involved in three major conflicts in Asia: the war with Japan, the Korean conflict, and currently, the Vietnam war. Although hostilities have threatened elsewhere in the world, only in Asia since 1945 have significant numbers of American troops been engaged in armed combat.

In 1969 a new policy was enunciated with the objective of taking American forces off the firing line in Asia. Often referred to as the "Nixon doctrine," this approach "calls for any country whose security is threatened to assume the primary responsibility for providing the manpower needed for its own defense."¹

Clearly, such a doctrine has significant implications for military assistance training. The policy calls for the United States to provide assistance to friendly and allied countries to help them assume their responsibilities more quickly and effectively. The ability of the United States to reduce its presence abroad, therefore, will depend in large measure on the amount and quality of training which can be provided to foreign military personnel.

In each location visited for this study, U.S. military and civilian officials were attempting, with varying degrees of success, to translate the rhetoric of the Nixon doctrine into concrete practicalities of operations and programs which would lead to the desired results. As a consequence, there was more introspection and questioning about the MAP program by both U.S. and host country officials than might have been the case at other times. The resulting climate proved to be beneficial to the development of this study.

¹ President Richard Nixon, "Foreign Assistance for the Seventies," message to the Congress, Sept. 15, 1970.

JAPAN

Since the end of the Korean war and the signing of the peace treaty with Japan, the United States has reduced its forces in that country from about 185,000 to below 40,000. U.S. military facilities in Japan at the end of March 1970, as compared with those in 1952, are about one-sixth in terms of land area and one-third in terms of building floor space. Moreover, the United States has announced that about 12,000 additional troops will be withdrawn by next June and additional bases will be closed.

As U.S. troops have been withdrawn, Japanese military "self-defense" forces have increased from virtually none to a quarter of a million men in three services: army, air force, and navy. Beginning with police training in 1952 and moving to actual military training in 1954, the United States played an important role in advising and instructing the Japanese Self-Defense Forces during the 1950's and early 1960's. From 1954 to the present almost 10,000 Japanese officers and enlisted men have received U.S. training and some 71 senior officers have been graduated from U.S. command and general staff schools. As a result, there has been close association between the Japanese and American military. Japanese military doctrine and procedures bear a distinct kinship to U.S. doctrine and procedures. American diplomatic and military personnel in Japan view as very important this rapport between the Japanese and American military establishments.

As the Japanese achieved self-sufficiency in the training and equipping of their military forces, the U.S. MAP program was reduced and finally terminated in 1967. Some training has continued, purchased by the Japanese from the United States under the foreign military sales program (FMS).

As the MAP closed down, the military assistance advisory group (MAAG) in Japan which once numbered 800 was replaced by a Mutual Defense Assistance Office (MDAO). That office is assigned five U.S. officers, five U.S. civilians, and six Japanese civilians. Its principal activity is assisting in the operation of the foreign military sales program. In that connection the MDAO keeps the Japanese informed on the price and availability of U.S. training, particularly training associated with the acquisition of new weapons systems. Its personnel also aid the Japanese in meeting English language requirement for training in the United States.

Self-Sufficiency and its Effects

As a nation which has become largely self-sufficient in training its military forces under U.S. tutelage, Japan provides a prototype of what might be expected in other nations if the Nixon doctrine is carried through. As a prototype, of course, Japan is somewhat atypical because it is a developed nation with a long military history. At the same time, the Japanese example is instructive. Self-sufficiency in training in Japan seems to have had these effects:

1. *An increasing unwillingness to send Japanese students to U.S. military schools.*

Limited to less than 1 percent of the gross national product for defense spending and convinced of the quality of their own military schools, the Japanese are sending almost no one to the United States for training now that they must bear the entire cost. Exceptions are training under FMS and graduate training in U.S. universities.¹ In the crucial area of command and general staff training, however, only one or two officers a year are being sent to the United States from Japan.

2. *The time is fast approaching when the United States will no longer have the advantage of having trained the military leadership of Japan.*

The majority of men in the top echelons of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces have had at least one training tour in the United States, speak English, have been exposed to American life and institutions, and have formed friendships with their American counterparts. In the next few years, however, these men will be retired and their places are likely to be taken by men who have not been U.S. trained, who do not speak English, and who do not have personal ties with America and Americans as their predecessors did. Table 1 demonstrates this. Although more than two-thirds of Japanese general officers are U.S. trained, only two of every 100 captains and seven of every 1,000 lieutenants are.

TABLE 1.—PERCENTAGE OF U.S. TRAINEES BY RANK IN JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES
(STATISTICS AS OF 1968)

Rank	Total number	U.S. trained	Percent U.S. trained
General.....	105	72	69
Colonel.....	543	193	35
Captain.....	5,815	115	2
Lieutenant.....	7,862	60	0.07

3. *Increasing divergence by the Japanese from U.S. military doctrine may be expected.*

It is ironic that at a time when the United States is encouraging Japan to play a larger role in the security of the western Pacific, our two military establishments are growing farther apart, with a consequent decline of communications and a lessened influence for the United States. This is not to invoke a specter of resurgent Japanese militarism, which most informed observers do not find credible. Yet more and more the Japanese will set their own course in military matters. This is evident in the Japanese Defense Agency's recent decision to strengthen its own intelligence apparatus and end dependence on the United States, and by the publication in October of Japan's first national defense white paper. The white paper, it should be noted, stresses the ability of the Self-Defense Forces to maintain Japan's security independent of the United States. It also limits reliance on the United States to situations of nuclear war or other large-scale conflict originating outside Japanese territory.

¹ Reportedly, no Japanese university will accept military personnel for postgraduate training.

It is generally accepted that continued close political and economic relations between the United States and Japan is a vital U.S. interest. That being so, continued close military relations should also be a prime objective. Yet important means of maintaining close relations are no longer operating as they once did. In the case of Japan, self-sufficiency in training has resulted in some potentially undesirable effects which may have been inadequately understood or compensated for. In view of the importance of the American-Japanese relationship imaginative, long-range planning should be directed to maintaining the rapport between the two military establishments.

Suggestions in the Area of Training

Although it is beyond the scope of this report to describe in detail methods of insuring continued United States-Japan military cooperation, some steps may be advisable in the area of military training:

1. *Encourage the Japanese to send increased numbers of their key middle-level officers to the United States for staff and command training, perhaps through an exchange program under which American officers would attend Japanese military schools.*

When a nation is no longer eligible for MAP, it is thrust into the chill world of cash on the barrelhead for items like CONUS² training. In countries where defense budgets are limited and priorities do not favor training, as in Japan, the flow of military trainees to the United States is likely to dry up. It would seem to be in U.S. interests to devise "halfway house" programs to encourage continued contacts with key military officers of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. One such program might entail exchanges of officers, with American military men also attending Japanese command and general staff schools.

In any such exchange, the language barrier would be an inhibiting factor. Potential benefits, however, should outweigh the costs of language training for officers selected to attend Japanese schools.

2. *United States-Japanese joint tenancy on bases should provide opportunities for on-the-job training exchanges.*

Under current plans, the United States and Japan will be joint tenants on certain bases and military installations now solely under U.S. authority. Co-location should provide some opportunities for personnel exchanges for the purpose of on-the-job training. Efforts should be made to identify possible training slots on those bases and to obtain military trainees from the Japanese. At the same time the Japanese should be encouraged to locate areas in which Americans might usefully be trained in Japanese procedures.

3. *Joint military training exercises with the Japanese should be encouraged.*

Although the United States and Japan have engaged in joint training exercises in air defense and at sea, some of these programs may be in peril over methods of financing. In 1970 for the first time the Navy sought to bill the Japanese \$32,000 following the training of a submarine crew in Hawaii, an annual exercise which previously had involved no charge. Although U.S. officials in Japan were successful in having the bill withdrawn, the submarine exercise apparently is in danger of being canceled in 1971. Such an eventuality would run

² Continental United States.

counter to the apparent desirability of maintaining close operational ties with the Japanese military.

While the Japanese should be expected to pay a reasonable share of expenses involved in most joint training operations, when minimal costs to the United States are involved they might be absorbed in the interest of encouraging such cooperative efforts.

4. Expand opportunities for Japanese military personnel to participate in correspondence courses from U.S. service schools.

At present a number of Japanese officers and enlisted men are taking correspondence courses produced by U.S. service schools, generally in technical and management subjects. Although no official recognition is given by the Japanese for successful completion of such courses, they continue to attract students. If the Japanese could be convinced to give some measure of credit to those who enhance their skills through such courses and if the scope of available courses is broadened sufficiently, another useful point of contact could be established.

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

The onset of the Korean war more than a generation ago began an era of close military cooperation between the United States and the Republic of Korea (ROK). The conflict, fourth largest in our Nation's history, cost the United States 142,091 casualties, including 33,629 killed, and an estimated \$20 billion.

Up to the present day, the United States has maintained significant numbers of troops in Korea and has provided more than \$3 billion in military assistance to the South Koreans. As a result, with the exception of Vietnam, the Korean MAP has been the largest military grant aid program in the world.

Training has been an important and integral part of U.S. military assistance to South Korea. Since 1950, some 20,730 Korean officers and enlisted men have been trained in the United States and an additional 9,190 overseas at U.S. installations. This training has had significant effects, both military and nonmilitary.

Militarily, MAP training has upgraded the Korean armed forces which number 627,000 and are the largest free world forces in Asia outside of Vietnam. The Korean military is considered to be highly motivated, well trained and well disciplined, and now mans all but 18 miles of the front line along the demilitarized zone created by the Korean Armistice of 1953. Moreover, it has successfully coped with North Korea's continuing efforts to probe its defenses and to infiltrate agents into the country.

U.S. military training is also credited by U.S. officials with having contributed to the development of professional and technical abilities required for the civilian sector of a developing nation. The skills, techniques, and management practices learned at U.S. service schools are said to have provided the Republic of Korea with a trained manpower resource which has, in part, accounted for Korea's rapid economic expansion.

Moreover, the country's political elites are largely the products of American military training schools, including 87 percent of the President's Cabinet and the Korean National Assembly.

Withdrawal of American Forces

Korea has been called "a good test case" of the Nixon doctrine's emphasis of local forces taking over local defenses. Because of the level of self-sufficiency which has been reached by the ROK military, the United States is now in the process of reducing its authorized troop strength in Korea by some 20,000—from approximately 63,000 at the time of the *Pueblo* affair to a targeted 43,000 by the end of the current fiscal year.

This reduction has caused considerable consternation among the South Koreans. Their relationship with the United States has been a long and largely happy one. Far from resenting Americans, many Koreans see Americans as liberators who freed them first from the Japanese and later from the North Koreans and Chinese. They find

it difficult to think of their country standing on its own in the maintenance of its security.

Fears of renewed North Korean aggression at the direction of an irrational and determined Kim Il Sung are expressed repeatedly to U.S. officials. South Koreans appear to believe that reductions in troop strength automatically weaken U.S. treaty commitments to their nation.

In order to assure the South Koreans of a continuing U.S. commitment to their security and to insure the ability of ROK forces to deal with possible aggression from the North, the United States has embarked on a modernization program for the ROK military forces. This program will permit continuing reductions in U.S. forces, although complete withdrawal is not contemplated.

To begin the modernization, a request for \$150 million in additional MAP funds for Korea was included in the President's December 1970 request to Congress for supplemental foreign assistance. The funds were approved, together with authority for the Department of Defense to transfer defense articles now being used by U.S. troops to ROK forces.

Of the money provided for Korean force modernization by far the greatest amount is to be spent for new equipment, with a minimal amount programed at least initially for training. It is clear, however, that instruction connected with the new equipment—including pilot, mechanic, and operator instruction—will require substantial increases in CONUS training for Koreans. Most of those training slots will go to the Korean Air Force with some increased training for ROK Navy personnel. During the same period, however, MAP training for ROK Army forces may decrease substantially if recommendations by U.S. Army MAP officials are accepted by the Koreans.

"Time Frame Phase-Out Plan"

In order to assist the ROK Army in achieving in-country training self-sufficiency by fiscal year 1979 and to meet restrictions imposed by decreasing training funds and the limitation on numbers of CONUS training slots,¹ the U.S. Army has proposed to the Koreans a "time frame phase-out plan" on MAP training.

This plan, which would operate from fiscal year 1972 to fiscal year 1976, is designed to eliminate or substantially reduce MAP training space requirements, especially for types of training which can be effectively accomplished through use of the ROK Army's own resources.

Among the kinds of training to be eliminated would be intelligence, combat, and combat service support-type courses currently included under MAP. Koreans are being encouraged to expand their own service school system and to use civilian educational facilities to furnish English-language and other related academic training. Officer advanced courses at U.S. service schools would be continued for updating the ROK Army service school doctrine but attendance would be limited to every second or third year. During the interval publications, including lesson plans and other training materials, could be provided to the Koreans from the service schools.

¹ An amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, adopted by Congress as sec. 510 in 1969, limits the number of foreign military trainees who can be brought to the United States each year to the number of foreign civilians brought to the United States in the immediately preceding fiscal year under the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961. This amendment is sometimes called the Fulbright amendment after its author.

Findings and Conclusions

1. *U.S. MAAG officials should continue to press for Korean self-sufficiency in most types of training, as embodied in the "time frame phase-out plan."*

To date the Koreans have failed to give training the priority it deserves in bringing their security forces to the point of self-sufficiency. Because of a Korean tendency to rely on the United States for training, and an American disposition to go along with that attitude, the \$3 billion invested by the United States in ROK military forces has not brought the required self-reliance in the vital area of training.

Modernization will require increased U.S. training for the next 5 years because of the sophistication of the equipment involved. But the Koreans must develop their own continuing capability to operate and maintain that equipment. The U.S. Army's "time frame phase-out plan" points the way to self-sufficiency. The Koreans should be encouraged to adopt it and perform by its standards.

2. *English-language proficiency training in Korea is inadequate and requires improvement.*

In fiscal year 1970 Korea lost 30 training spaces which it had been allocated because of inadequate language ability among possible candidates. This failure caused considerable problems for the efficient management of Korean MAP training.

The difficulties appear to derive principally from a lack of centralization in the Korean administration of language instruction. Each service conducts its own English-language programs, with no clear national standards for training procedures, length of courses, or proficiency required for graduation. Moreover, because of the proliferation of schools, there are inadequate numbers of trained, competent instructors.

U.S. MAAG officials have long encouraged the consolidation of English-language training in the Korean Department of Defense. Prospects for improvement of Korea's English-language programs suffered a setback recently when ROK bureaucratic rivalries prevented implementation of a plan for unified language training. While there is hope that the plan can be revived, the outlook for change at this time is not favorable.

3. *Increased emphasis on training self-sufficiency is desirable in the KATUSA program.*

Some 10,200 Republic of Korea soldiers, known as KATUSA's (Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army), serve as integral parts of U.S. combat support units. They eat, sleep, perform their duties, and recreate with American military personnel. They wear American uniforms and are paid in part by both governments.

The system dates back to the Korean war when ROK recruits were channeled into American units and has helped maintain bonds of friendship between ROK and U.S. units. Composed entirely of ROK Army enlisted men, the KATUSA program has a twofold mission: to increase the operating capability of U.S. units (one soldier in six is a KATUSA, on the average) and to provide the Korean Army with trained specialists and skilled technicians.

In the past KATUSA's have trained alongside their U.S. counterparts. Because of language difficulties and cultural differences,

KATUSA's often failed to reach skill levels required and were relegated to less challenging jobs.

Although KATUSA's do not come under the MAP program,² their presence in U.S. outfits presents an excellent opportunity to provide specialized, formal instruction in military-related skills which can help lead Korea to self-sufficiency. The annual cost to the United States of a KATUSA (see Table 2) is but a fraction of the expenditure required to train a Korean in the United States. Although considerable advanced planning and some changes in the KATUSA program might be required in order to develop its full training potential, the effort seems desirable.

TABLE 2.—ESTIMATE OF KATUSA PROGRAM COSTS (8TH ARMY ANNUAL COST DATA (PER MAN PER YEAR)
SERVICE FUNDED: 10,200 TOTAL KATUSA'S)

U.S. support:	
Rations.....	\$543. 80
Clothing.....	202. 74
Comfort items (soap).....	37. 48
Medical.....	27. 00
Miscellaneous.....	40. 00
Total, U.S. support (83 percent).....	851. 02
Korean budget support:	
Pay.....	40. 47
Allowances (estimate).....	10. 00
Clothing issue.....	120. 00
Total, Korean support (17 percent).....	170. 47
Total cost.....	1, 021. 49

4. *The present MAAG structure in Korea should be abolished as soon as possible and be replaced by a joint U.S. military assistance advisory group (JUSMAAG) in order to reflect more adequately current U.S. objectives.*

The present MAAG organization in Korea is a jerry-built structure which is a holdover from wartime days. Each service advisory group is commanded by the respective American service component commander. That is, the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG) is commanded by the commanding general of the U.S. 8th Army; the Navy Advisory Group (NAG) is under the commander of U.S. Naval Forces, Korea; and the Air Force Advisory Group (AFAG) is under the commander of U.S. Air Forces, Korea.

Atop these three components is the Joint Military Assistance Advisory Group, Korea (Provisional) or ProvMAAG-K. While it provides overall surveillance and coordination of Korean MAP, including training, ProvMAAG-K has no command function over the other MAAG's and cannot direct compliance from the services in the interests of an integrated MAP. The major general who heads ProvMAAG-K sits as the MAAG representative on the Embassy "country team" but has no authority to enforce decisions reached in that group.

Perhaps as a result of the present structure, training programs in Korea have been designed more to support and complement U.S. forces than to provide the Koreans with a self-contained, self-sufficient security force.

Although plans have been made to replace the present structure with the JUSMAAG system common to other MAP countries, the changes

² Other on-the-job programs are operated for Koreans through the U.S. MAAG but at no cost to the MAP program. For example, 127 Koreans trained with the 8th Army during fiscal year 1970.

have yet to be implemented. They should be, and as soon as possible, in order to permit a more efficient and effective organization commensurate with the new U.S. objectives in Korea. The changes should also permit a significant reduction in the number of MAAG personnel in Korea from the present level of 320.

OKINAWA

Okinawa, the most important island in the Ryukyu Archipelago, has been a vital center for "forward defense" military activity in the western Pacific for more than two decades. An awesome garrison on which all military services are represented, Okinawa is strategically located 970 miles southwest of Tokyo, 410 miles north of Taipei, 900 miles northwest of Manila, 830 miles northeast of Hong Kong, and 550 miles east of Shanghai.

Despite its central location, Okinawa has not been a major center of U.S. military training for foreign personnel in Asia, as the Panama Canal Zone has been in Latin America.

Okinawa is, however, the site of the U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC) Intelligence School, which is devoted entirely to providing intelligence-related courses to officers and enlisted men of friendly and allied Asian nations. In addition, other U.S. units on the island provide on-the-job training and training workshops. Those include:

—An Air Force on-the-job training program for instruction in aircraft support functions in which some 670 trainees have participated during the past 2 years;

—U.S. Marine on-the-job training courses and orientation visits in which 50 officers and enlisted men from allied nations have taken part since 1969;

—An annual Army psychological operations workshop of a week's duration which is attended by from 300 to 400 foreign military personnel; and

—A periodic workshop in sea survival with 20 available training spaces for foreign military.

U.S. military authorities believe that the opportunity exists on Okinawa for expanded on-the-job training of Asian military personnel, particularly in logistics and supply management. With the limitations on CONUS training spaces and budgetary considerations, Okinawa may be used increasingly in the short run as a site for foreign military training.

The long-term prospects of creating a major training center on the island, however, are not bright. At the present time negotiations are moving forward between the United States and Japan which will lead to the reversion of the island to Japanese administration by 1972. After Okinawa's return to Japan, discussions are expected to begin on closing down or relocation of some U.S. bases.

In the past, Japan has forbidden the training of third-country nationals at U.S. military bases on its soil. When Okinawa becomes a Japanese prefecture in 1972, Tokyo may seek an end to the training of other Asian nationals on the island and the matter could become an issue in post-reversion negotiations.

The USARPAC Intelligence School

The USARPAC Intelligence School is, together with the Army and Air Force schools in the Canal Zone, one of three U.S. service schools

for which instruction is provided only to foreign nationals. The school was founded on Okinawa in 1958 to fill a perceived need for better intelligence systems in allied and friendly Asian nations.

The central location on Okinawa meant budgetary savings over CONUS training, less cultural shock among trainees, and easier handling of language and cultural difficulties. Moreover, for security reasons, the Army's U.S. intelligence schools, such as Fort Holabird in Maryland, do not accept foreign nationals.

Although the school is administered by the Army, training is given on a tri-service basis to recipient countries. Budgetary support for the school comes primarily from the Army, with some reimbursements for training through MAP and military assistance service funded programs (MASF). (See Table 3.)

Through fiscal year 1970, the total number of students trained at the school was 3,670, including personnel from 16 countries. Student loads have been averaging more than 450 students annually for the past 4 years with heavy attendance by students from Vietnam and Laos.

TABLE 3.—USARPAC INTELLIGENCE SCHOOL BUDGET

	Fiscal year 1970 ¹	Fiscal year 1971 ²	Fiscal year 1971 ³
Total.....	\$195, 590	\$193, 000	\$238, 590
MAP—Reimbursement.....	28, 050	35, 000	48, 400
Service funded—Reimbursement.....	24, 540	15, 000	47, 190
(OMA) direct obligation authority.....	143, 000	143, 000	143, 000
Number students.....	479	438	458

¹ Actual as of June 30, 1970.

² Program as of Jan. 30, 1970.

³ Revised program as of Sept. 20, 1970. Increase in reimbursements due to increase in programmed student input from Korea (MAP) and Air Force and Navy students from Thailand and Vietnam (service funded).

At the same time attendance by other Asians, including the Koreans and Chinese, has declined sharply as they have achieved training self-sufficiency in unit level intelligence activities.

Although intelligence staff officer courses are taught in English, much of the instruction is carried on through interpreters. In such cases each class is composed of a single nationality. The group brings with it as interpreters men who have previously completed the course and who understand English. The interpreters orally translate in the classroom as the instructor gives his lesson. They also answer questions and otherwise assist with classroom work.

Despite a serious and dedicated director and staff, the USARPAC Intelligence School appears to have serious shortcomings, particularly in the following areas:

1. *Instructor personnel.*—Because the rank of Asian trainees in officer courses may be as high as full colonel, U.S. instructors for officer-level classes are to hold the rank of captain or above. The Army, however, has failed to provide men of sufficient rank and many officer courses are being taught by young lieutenants and noncoms. Given the rank, age, and status consciousness of most Asians, particularly in the military, the situation is far from satisfactory.

2. *English-language instruction.*—The intelligence officer courses include 50 hours of English-language enhancement. The language

program has two sections: there are small workshop groups which emphasize conversational ability taught by five women, most of them wives of U.S. servicemen on Okinawa, and a single large classroom session conducted by the director of the English program, a Ryukyuan civilian.

Unfortunately, the director himself speaks English with a strong accent and at times is difficult to understand. Of the five women employed to conduct the conversation workshops, only one at the time of the visit had had any prior experience in language instruction. Moreover, students had no access to language laboratory facilities and printed aids, including formal language lessons, appeared to be minimal.

Informal discussions with officer trainees reputed to speak English revealed some apparently severe comprehension and articulation difficulties.

3. *Physical facilities.*—The school is located in two converted barracks at Fort Buckner which include classrooms, laboratories, administrative offices, laundry, dining and recreational areas, and living quarters for the students. There was evidence of classroom overcrowding and a generally unfavorable environment for optimum learning.

Findings and Recommendations

1. *Effective operation of the USARPAC Intelligence School requires increased allocation of resources to it by the Army.*

The USARPAC Intelligence School has been allowed to limp along without sufficient support while attempting to cope with the increased student loads of recent years. Problems besetting the institution could be cured by the Army if it is willing to allocate additional resources of men, money, and material to the task.

To the extent which the school is able to bring Asian nations to a point of self-sufficiency in intelligence operations swiftly and effectively, it may be worth additional expenditures.

2. *For the long run, however, consideration should be given to closing the school and meeting residual intelligence training needs of Asian nations through other means.*

Should the training of third-country nationals on Okinawa not be feasible following reversion, as seems possible, the USARPAC Intelligence School would be required to close there.

Reestablishing the school elsewhere—as on Guam or in Hawaii—does not seem justified since many of the Asian countries involved are attaining self-sufficiency in intelligence training. Other countries could be helped to achieve that goal in the months which remain before the school is closed on Okinawa. Remaining needs for intelligence instructions could be supplied by mobile training teams (MTT's) or by other means.

REPUBLIC OF CHINA (TAIWAN)

Over the past few years the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) on Taiwan has been able, because of a strong economy, to take on much of the burden of maintaining and paying for its own military establishment. The GRC has steadily increased its own budgetary support of its armed forces, including cash and credit purchases of military equipment from the United States. It now expends more than 9 percent of its gross national product on defense—one of the highest such percentages in the world and in marked contrast to some other MAP countries.

As a result, U.S. military aid to Taiwan has declined sharply from a level of about \$85 million in 1966 to \$23 million in fiscal 1970. U.S. MAAG personnel have been reduced substantially as the MAP has decreased. The United States also maintains a number of noncombat military units on Taiwan, usually estimated at 9,000 troops, most of whom are engaged in supporting the war in Vietnam.

If Japan is a model of a nation which has reached self-sufficiency, then Taiwan is exemplary of a government which has made important strides toward that goal. The in-country capability for maintenance, repair, and limited manufacture of military equipment and supplies has been expanded. Recently the GRC also began a reorganization, reduction, and modernization of its forces.

For Taiwan, however, self-sufficiency has recognized bounds. The military threat to the island from mainland China is such that the United States cannot expect the GRC to defend itself alone if there were an all-out attack. It does not possess sufficient air or naval forces to insure destruction of an invading force, nor does it have a nuclear capability as does Communist China.

As a result, in the absence of a political settlement of Peking's claim to Taiwan, continued U.S. protection in the form of air and sea power will be necessary to fulfill the requirements of the 1954 U.S.-GRC Mutual Defense Treaty.

MAP Training

Since 1954 more than 30,000 GRC officers and enlisted men have received training under U.S. military aid programs, the largest group of MAP trainees in East Asia. Of that number somewhat more than 20,000 were trained in the continental United States. Through 1970, 141 Chinese officers have been graduated from U.S. command and general staff schools.

As the MAP for the GRC has been reduced, so also have the number of trainees. From 606 training slots in fiscal year 1968, the program dropped to the 300-400 level in the 2 succeeding years and decreased to 130 in the current fiscal year.

For the future, U.S. MAAG officials profess the goal of creating sufficient Chinese armed forces expertise to enable it to assume the obligation of training *all* its armed forces personnel and permitting a

phase-out of MAP-supported training. In order to reach that goal, the MAAG has developed a "5-year plan" for training.

According to U.S. MAAG officials in Taiwan, the guidance used in developing the plan was as follows:

A. Major emphasis on training personnel who will be utilized as instructors in service schools or as a cadre to develop an on-island capability.

B. Emphasis on training designed to improve leadership and management capabilities.

C. Training for efficient operation and maintenance of new MAP-supported weapons systems or equipment is programed only in conjunction with a concurrent plan to develop an on-island training capability.

D. Training to correct a critical skill deficiency is programed only as an on-island capability is concurrently developed.

E. Orientation tours to CONUS are programed as a means of providing an insight and appreciation for the methods and procedures used by U.S. forces.

F. Any additional training is limited to areas where careful analysis shows that an on-island capability is impractical. When training is beyond the capability of the GRC, sources of training are checked in the following order:

(1) On-island resources, such as U.S. military units, technical representatives working with U.S. and GRC units, etc.

(2) OJT or formal training overseas.

(3) OJT or formal training in CONUS as listed in the course catalogs.

Given this seemingly stringent guidance and assertions by MAAG officials that beginning in fiscal 1973 the Chinese armed forces are expected to have the capability to carry on much of their training internally, it is surprising to learn—and, perhaps at first, difficult to understand why—future levels of CONUS training for the GRC are actually projected to *increase* over current levels.

Although the increases are not large and are related to deliveries of new equipment, the situation suggests that "technical imperatives," for which it is difficult or impossible to build an in-country training capability, may keep the GRC requirement for outside training at a relatively high, stable level for the foreseeable future.

Such training need not, however, continue to be paid for under MAP. Just as Japan now purchases technical training under the foreign military sales program, so the GRC should soon be in a position to do the same. U.S. officials acknowledge that if MAP training ceases or is drastically curtailed, it is anticipated that the Chinese would complete its training program through military sales or third-country training.

Problems of English-Language Training

In recent months it has become apparent that Chinese English-language training capabilities are considerably less adequate than previously believed.

The GRC English-language program had been rated among the best for a number of years. Instructors, equipment, and a number of laboratories were considered very good.

Discovery of inadequacies followed upon information from CONUS schools and other facilities, such as the USARPAC Intelligence School on Okinawa, that Chinese trainees were scoring significantly lower on their English-language comprehension tests than they had on tests administered in Taiwan by the MAAG.

Upon subsequent investigation it was learned that the Chinese were emphasizing "teaching the test" rather than facility in the language. When the MAAG changed to a new series of tests, it experienced a severe problem in obtaining qualified candidates for CONUS training.

It presently is conducting a detailed study to determine the causes for the decline of English-language capabilities in the Chinese armed forces. Early indications are that the situation has resulted from a lack of command emphasis, centralized control, and adequate funding.

Interviews held with some 20 Chinese military men who had returned from CONUS training programs in the past 1 to 3 years revealed a generally substandard ability to understand and articulate English, when compared to students from other countries visited.

This may be partially explained by a complete lack of "language refresher" facilities and programs on Taiwan for returned CONUS trainees. The need for them is evident since the training materials, technical manuals, and other documents provided by the United States to the GRC for updating the techniques and skills of its armed forces are in English and only seldom are translated into Chinese.

A notable exception to the low quality of English-language instruction is the program at the Air Defense School, a pre-CONUS training facility operated by the 605th Air Defense Missile Group of the Republic of China Army.

At this facility, which is funded by the GRC, the candidates spend a full year studying English and basic electronics, in preparation for later studies in the United States which will train them to operate and maintain the GRC's surface-to-air missiles, either Nike Hercules or Hawk batteries.

The curriculum includes modern-language laboratory use and live English-language instruction with paid U.S. dependents providing accent and idiom.

After successfully passing the MAAG tests and interviews, Air Defense School students are sent to the United States for courses ranging in length from 20 to 52 weeks. Following graduation, officers must work in the air defense program for a mandatory 5 years, and enlisted men for 4 years.

A walk-through inspection of the 605th's repair facilities indicated the success of the training system. Young Chinese enlisted men were working on complicated mechanisms using English-language technical manuals. Their ability to speak and understand English also seemed fully adequate to the tasks at hand.

MAAG Training and Advisory Functions

As the size of the Taiwan MAAG has steadily decreased, problems of personnel allocations have become more acute.

In terms of percentages, staff cuts have come generally from field advisory personnel, rather than from headquarters staffs. Some U.S. MAAG officials believe that increased numbers of field advisory personnel will be needed as more sophisticated military equipment is delivered to Taiwan as part of the GRC armed forces modernization program.

They argue that when new equipment is delivered to unit levels, important and costly mistakes can occur which could be avoided by the presence of a U.S. adviser. With present numbers of personnel, such aid can be given only on a "spot check" basis. With further reductions in its size expected, there are fears that the MAAG will be largely unable to accomplish its delivery and "end use" check functions, some of them required by legislative mandate.

It should be possible, however, to make further reductions from headquarters staffs, rather than from field personnel.

At present there are U.S. MAAG service sections co-located with the GRC Air Force, Navy, and Combined Service Forces headquarters in Taipei. Both the GRC Air Force and Navy, however, are scheduled to move their headquarters out of the capital to other locations on Taiwan.

At that time, it should be possible for the MAAG to end Air Force and Navy sections co-located and consolidate at Headquarters, MAAG, with some resulting reduction in manpower needs. Those slots might be eliminated rather than field advisory positions in any future cuts in MAAG strength.

Findings and Conclusions

1. *The United States should encourage the shifting of as much CONUS training as possible from the Military Assistance Program to foreign military sales for the Republic of China.*

“Self-sufficiency” in training should not be narrowly construed to mean only an in-country—or in the case of Taiwan, on-island—capability. When sophisticated weapons systems, such as surface-to-air missiles, are involved, it is neither practical nor desirable for the recipient country to develop its own training base. Thus continued and, in the case of the Republic of China, increased CONUS training is necessary. In those situations, “self-sufficiency” must mean an increased ability and willingness to shoulder the cost of such training.

The GRC has demonstrated a past willingness to pay for essential training. For example, it recently agreed to defray the cost of transporting its trainees from Taiwan to the west coast of the United States by using its national air carrier. The net saving to the MAP is estimated to be \$29,000 annually. U.S. officials should continue to urge that the GRC contribute to the cost of CONUS technical training, possibly through the FMS program.

2. *The GRC English-language program should be revamped and upgraded to reflect the vital, continuing need of its armed forces for English-language competence rather than the short-term goal of passing the MAAG test.*

The example of the Air Defense School demonstrates that when mission-oriented command and control is exercised over English-language training, together with adequate funding and facilities, the results are impressive. This model should be emulated throughout the GRC military language training program.

3. *To the maximum extent possible, future cuts in Taiwan MAAG personnel should come from the headquarters staff rather than from field advisory personnel, particularly during periods of new equipment deliveries.*

INDONESIA

Indonesia has often been cited as the exemplar of the political benefits which can result from MAP training. At the time of the attempted Communist coup and military counter-coup of October 1965, more than 1,200 Indonesian officers, including senior military figures, had been trained in the United States.

As a result of this experience, numerous friendships and contacts existed between the Indonesian and American military establishments, particularly between members of the two armies. In the post-coup period, when the political situation was still unsettled, the United States, using these existing channels of communication, was able to provide the anti-Communist forces with moral and token material support.

With the eventual emergence of the "New Order," the reestablishment of good relations between the United States and Indonesia was thereby much facilitated.

The strength of ties created by MAP training may have been appreciated by the plotters in their calculations of which officers to assassinate. All the generals killed during the coup attempt, called Gestapu by the Indonesians, had been trained in the United States or had friendly relations with Westerners in Djakarta.

The outcome in Indonesia indicates the success of U.S. policies from 1963 to 1965 in continuing to supply training to the Indonesian military in spite of criticism at home and abroad that the United States was only strengthening Sukarno's Indonesia for aggression against its neighbors.

This success may be compared to the debacle which faced the Soviet Union. With its East European satellites, it had provided Indonesia with more than \$1 billion in military equipment between 1960 and 1965. Subsequently, Moscow was forced to look on helplessly as its equipment was used to suppress the Communist Party of Indonesia.

Current Training Programs

Until the current fiscal year, the Indonesian MAP had been limited to about \$5 million annually. Of that amount, approximately \$800,000 was spent each year for training, with the rest being expended for civic action-related equipment, including trucks, road graders, bulldozers, and spare parts for heavy equipment.

Following the May 1970 visit by President Suharto to Washington, the United States agreed to expand significantly its MAP in Indonesia and for the first time since the early 1960's to provide weapons aid. An additional \$13 million was made available to Indonesia in August for a total fiscal year 1971 program of \$18 million. (See breakdown in Table 4.)

TABLE 4.—BREAKDOWN OF FISCAL YEAR 1971 INDONESIAN MAP

	<i>Millions</i>
Civil action (equipment and training).....	\$11.9
Upgrading selected combat units (including weapons).....	5.1
Packing, crating, handling, and transportation.....	1.0
Total.....	18.0

During fiscal year 1970, 155 Indonesian officers and enlisted men took training in U.S. schools, an additional 55 were trained in third-country locations such as Okinawa, and some 40 more underwent in-country instructions through the employment of U.S. mobile training teams.

Projecting future Indonesian MAP funds at a level similar to the fiscal year 1971 figure, priorities for training for the next 5 years likely will be these:

First priority will be given to CONUS training, within the limits of congressional restrictions, with particular emphasis on training Indonesian officers in badly needed professional skills related to communications, transportation, management, and logistics.

Second priority has been given to upgrading the quality of instruction in certain selected, key Indonesian military schools. For example, the United States currently has a two-man mobile training team attached to the military engineering school at Bogor. They are following up on work begun by an 18-man U.S. team sent to the school in 1968 to assist the Indonesians in training instructors, operators, and mechanics on new civic action equipment donated by the United States.

Another team is working in Bandung at the headquarters of the Indonesian Army's "Special Schools"—a conglomerate of 14 instructional facilities located throughout the archipelago. Evidence of U.S. support to the schools is a recently donated language laboratory at Bandung with modern electronic equipment, to be used in preparing Indonesian trainees in the English language.

In addition to CONUS and MTT training, the United States provides some technical assistance to the Indonesians out of MAP operations and maintenance funds. Military and civilian technicians are sent on a temporary duty basis to assist the Indonesians in such tasks as regaining an automotive rebuilding capability.

The Defense Liaison Group

In Indonesia, the MAP is administered by a Defense Liaison Group (DLG) rather than a MAAG—part of the American effort to retain a "low profile" on the Indonesian scene. A MAAG would have revived memories of a large military mission which the United States retained in Indonesia during the early 1960's.

The DLG currently is composed of 20 Americans—10 officers and 10 enlisted men—and 20 Indonesians, about half of them drivers. It is commanded by a U.S. colonel and operates on a fully integrated basis; that is, there are no separate service sections. Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine personnel serve together in a single, unitary command structure.

The staff is divided into three functional sections: plans and programs, material and training requirements, and support services.

Although this integrated approach to MAP administration has been commended by some observers,¹ it has encountered increasing operational difficulties in Indonesia as the program has been expanded.

The problems result principally from two conditions:

First, the Indonesian military itself is organized along service lines with considerable independence and rivalry between the sections. Although the present government is attempting to impose a central, unified command—called HANKAM—the operational control of that headquarters is not yet fully effective.

¹ See, for example, testimony of Dr. Paul Y. Hammond, The Rand Corp., in "Military Assistance Training," hearings, p. 23.

The DLG finds itself working 90 percent of the time with the separate services and only 10 percent with HANKAM. As a result, a U.S. Army major may be involved in transactions involving aircraft with general officers of the Indonesian Air Force where his competence is strained and the confidence of the Indonesians in him may be less than desirable.

In an effort to help correct the situation, U.S. officials have urged HANKAM to establish a special office of military assistance, a central point through which all U.S. MAP aid could be channeled.

Second, problems beset the integrated DLG because of the nature of the equipment being delivered under MAP. In order to properly supervise the delivery and usage of relatively sophisticated equipment, the United States must have personnel available who have had experience with such items.

When the United States was giving only civic-action-related equipment, the task was relatively simple. The recent move to provide combat-related equipment, including aircraft and boats, has resulted in a need for more specialized knowledge on the part of DLG personnel, which has meant assignments along U.S. service lines.

The DLG is increasingly being forced away from an integrated structure toward the more familiar MAAG organization, with its separate service sections.

Effects of the MAP Increase in Indonesia

It seems clear that the increase in MAP aid to Indonesia for fiscal year 1971 and the levels of such aid for the future are having, and will continue to have, some significant effects:

1. The United States has resumed the role of arms supplier to Indonesia.

After a number of years in which the United States has declined to provide Indonesia with weapons aid, the decision has been made to resume shipments of arms and combat-related items to that nation. With the exception of very limited help from the Australians, the United States thus becomes a sole-source supplier of weapons to Indonesia, much as the Soviets were in the early 1960's, although on a much smaller scale.

Almost immediately following the fall of Sukarno, the Indonesian military began its quest for weapons aid from the United States. For 4 years those requests were turned down on the grounds that Indonesia's priority needs were economic, not military. Now that position has been changed in order to "supplement Indonesian efforts to create a military organization capable of maintaining internal security."² Observers on the scene point out, however, that Indonesia's internal security situation is the best it has been since the nation became independent in 1948 and that the maintenance of security by the Suharto government is not seriously in question.

2. Emphasis on training in the Indonesian MAP has been decreased.

During the past several years, training funds in Indonesia have amounted to something over \$800,000 annually or about 17 percent of the total MAP for Indonesia. In the revised and expanded Indonesian

² Testimony of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Nov. 25, 1970.

MAP presented to Congress, funds for training dropped below the past levels and are only 4.2 percent of the total current program.

It seems apparent that despite a rhetorical commitment to training as the keystone of U.S. MAP aid in Indonesia, the funds are flowing in other directions. Training, which has paid such enormous dividends to the United States in Indonesia in the past, is being relatively ignored in favor of arms aid.

3. The new Indonesian program will inevitably require a larger U.S. military presence in Indonesia and revision of the integrated structure of the military mission.

The Defense Liaison Group structure which administered a \$5 million MAP in Indonesia is not capable of handling the expanded \$18 million program without increased numbers of American military personnel and an altered structure. U.S. military officials in the DLG were firm in that conclusion.

Their arguments are these: If the United States is effectively and efficiently to carry on a sizable MAP in Indonesia, in accord with legislative dictates on monitoring end use of supplies and trained manpower, an increased staff of U.S. officers and enlisted men will be required. Moreover, the current integrated mission structure will require revision or modification in order to provide sufficient expertise in the operation and maintenance of specific weapons systems. This may demand that the DLG take on the characteristics of a MAAG, with individual service sections.

4. The net result of the increased MAP in Indonesia would appear to be a step away from the successful "low profile" policy in that country.

U.S. policies in Indonesia since 1965 have been characterized as "low profile." They have concentrated on helping friendly and receptive elements in that country, without seeming to be a major actor on the scene. Numbers of American officials in the country, civilian and military, have deliberately been kept to the minimum. Economic assistance has been given through multilateral mechanisms, with monitoring by international financial institutions. In order to reduce numbers of official Americans, USIA branch libraries have not been reopened nor has the Peace Corps been allowed to return—despite requests by the Indonesian Government. Until recently MAP aid has been kept small, has emphasized training and civic action, and has not included weapons.

Now the United States has increased its MAP in Indonesia by more than 300 percent in 1 year; it has emphasized equipment, including weapons, over training; and it will undoubtedly be required to increase numbers of U.S. military personnel in that country. This can only be seen as a departure from the policy stance initiated in large part by former Ambassador Marshall Green, a policy which has led to the current state of cordial relations between the United States and Indonesia.

Findings and Conclusions

1. Consideration should be given to providing Indonesia with increased military assistance in an international framework, perhaps similar to the consortium through which economic aid is given.

If Indonesia requires increased military assistance, it might more beneficially be provided in a manner which would little affect the "low profile" policy. Rather than take on the position of prime supplier of weapons aid to Indonesia, the United States might seek to provide such assistance through a multilateral structure, similar to the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) which coordinates all economic aid. Although MAP aid would continue to be supplied bilaterally, there would be multilateral coordination among interested nations.

Other countries which might be interested in joining in such an arrangement might be Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, the Netherlands, France, and perhaps even Japan. Although such a consortium would be an innovation and its creation would not be easy, the long-term interests of the United States in Indonesia might well be served by the attempt.

2. Training should be given increased emphasis in any expanded program of military aid to Indonesia.

The decline of training funds as a percentage of the entire MAP for Indonesia may well be just cause for concern. In the past, U.S. training of Indonesian officers and enlisted men proved to be the most productive form of aid—particularly when viewed against the failure of the Soviets' massive equipment and weapons assistance to Indonesia.

Today Indonesia does not lack weapons or combat equipment. Much of what they have, however, has been allowed to fall into disrepair or to be exposed to the elements or to be cannibalized to the extent that equipment is no longer operative nor can be efficiently repaired. That situation can be traced to a lack of personnel skills in management of resources, logistics, and maintenance.

Nothing has happened since 1965 to inculcate those abilities into the Indonesian military establishment. If U.S. equipment is not to meet the same fate as Soviet equipment, extensive training of Indonesians in operations and maintenance surely will be required.

THAILAND

Linked to the United States through the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), Thailand became an important part of U.S. "forward defense" strategies with the direct commitment of American troops into the Vietnam conflict in 1965.

Thailand has allowed the United States to develop seven major air-bases and a major port complex on its soil for use by American forces engaged in the Vietnam war. In total, the United States maintains a presence at some 70 locations in Thailand.

U.S. military strength in Thailand increased sevenfold between January 1965 and July 1969, reaching a high of over 48,000 men. Current strength is about 36,000 and further reductions are contemplated before the end of fiscal year 1971.

More than 98 percent of the U.S. forces in Thailand are there to support the air war, to provide logistics and communications support to U.S. elements deployed there, and to accomplish expansion and modernization of the base facilities. Less than 2 percent of U.S. armed forces in the country provide advice and assistance to the Thai armed forces.

The only SEATO country on mainland Southeast Asia, Thailand has a common border with Burma, Malaysia, Laos, and Cambodia. It must be concerned with the danger of direct Communist aggression originating from those countries.

Moreover, for the past several years Thailand has been plagued by an indigenous guerrilla problem. During 1969 Communist forces in Thailand were involved in some 1,800 incidents, including terrorism, armed clashes, assassination and propaganda. The number of such incidents is increasing annually.

This guerrilla activity is located principally in three areas: the northeast, a poor agricultural area with a significant North Vietnamese refugee population; the north, where Communist agitators have found fertile ground among non-Thai hill tribes; and the south, on the Kra Peninsula, where some 1,000 Communist terrorists controlled by the Malayan Communist Party are located.

Military Assistance to Thailand

The U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand (USMAC-THAI), and the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand (JUSMAGTHAI), are organized in a unified command headed by a single senior military representative, currently Maj. Gen. Louis T. Seith, U.S. Air Force.

In addition to its responsibilities for administration of the military aid program to Thailand, USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI is also responsible for operational command of U.S. Army units involved in logistics and communications work in Thailand.

Because of a perceived need for increased budget flexibility in the wartime environment of mainland Southeast Asia, military assistance

to Thailand in 1967 was transferred from the foreign assistance program to direct funding out of the budget of the Department of Defense. This system, which also obtains for Vietnam and Laos, is called Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF).

Assistance is provided by three U.S. advisory groups—Army, Navy, and Air Force—to their counterpart Royal Thai services and by the Joint Staff to the Ministry of Defense and Supreme Command Headquarters.

Advice is rendered to the Thais from the highest staff to the regimental level, including aid in training the Thai ground forces which have been deployed in Vietnam since August 1967 and which are to be withdrawn in the near future.

An important element in improving the administration of the Thai armed forces are a series of bilateral Thai-United States committees designed to encourage sound planning and management procedures and techniques within the Thai defense establishment.

The Bilateral Training Committee is the chief vehicle for resolving Royal Thai armed forces training problems. Its subcommittees are studying methods of improving English-language training, counter-insurgency training, on-the-job training, and problems of translating training literature.

Evaluation of training and the use of MASF trained personnel is undertaken by a joint Thai/United States planning committee and four evaluation teams which conduct periodic inspections to determine the readiness of MASF-supported units. Reports of evaluation and areas of deficiency are sent to the highest levels on both the United States and Thai sides.

Military Assistance Training in Thailand

As is common with the armed forces of developing countries, the Royal Thai military suffers from deficiencies which are related to a lack of personnel skills and training. With an evident sense of mission, U.S. military authorities have put a high priority on improving the operational and technical proficiency of the Thais and of making them self-sufficient, particularly in lower skill level training.

The U.S. Special Forces have, in particular, been tasked with the support of unit training by preparing Thais for instructor roles. One of the locations at which this training has been taking place is at Nong Takoo. Begun as a joint United States/Thai facility, the Nong Takoo camp has now been turned over to the Thai Special Forces.

Most of the American personnel have now departed and training in company level counter-insurgency tactics and leadership is carried on by the Thais themselves. The remaining U.S. advisers seemed genuinely enthusiastic about their ability to work themselves out of a job in the near future. The same process is reported to be taking place at other Special Forces-run installations in Thailand.

Despite the fact that Thai students, being MASF funded, do not fall under the CONUS training restrictions of the MAP, U.S. officials have sought to economize by using in-country training opportunities whenever possible. Although the Thais are eager for CONUS training, before it is approved—according to U.S. officials—it must be determined that no in-country training source is available and that a mobile training team is not appropriate. As a result of limiting CONUS training,

it has been possible to increase the emphasis on training without significantly increasing training costs. (See Table 5.)

An important role in cost reduction has been played by the MASF in-country, on-the-job training program conducted by the U.S. Air Force at six up-country USAF facilities. Training designed to meet Royal Thai Air Force requirements in specific areas, particularly in the operation and maintenance of equipment common to both countries, is conducted at no additional cost to the U.S. Government.

TABLE 5.—MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM—TRAINING—THAILAND

[Dollar amounts in thousands]

	Number of trainees			Student trainee costs		
	United States	Overseas	Total	United States	Overseas	Total
Fiscal year 1964.....	507	149	656	\$1,824	\$76	\$1,900
Fiscal year 1965.....	431	242	673	1,068	95	1,163
Fiscal year 1966.....	460	270	730	2,320	80	2,400
Fiscal year 1967.....	478	251	729	1,608	80	1,688
Fiscal year 1968.....	585	158	743	1,967	56	2,023
Fiscal year 1969.....	745	214	959	2,507	58	2,565
Fiscal year 1970.....	551	417	968	2,001	66	2,067
Fiscal year 1971.....	687	473	1,160	1,212	149	2,261
Total.....	4,444	2,174	6,618	15,407	660	16,067

Note: Breakout by years prior to 1964 are not available. Consolidated data as available for these years is as follows:

Years	Number of trainees			Total training program (thousands)
	United States	Overseas	Total	
1950-63.....	6,078	1,664	7,742	\$24,129

Since its inception in 1964, the program has trained 875 men and has enabled the United States to substantially reduce the numbers of Thai Air Force personnel sent abroad for training.

A particularly striking example of this program is training to support Thai acquisition of the OV-10 aircraft. As of December 1970, 58 Thai maintenance and support personnel were trained in-country, resulting in an estimated saving of \$222,760 over CONUS training.

A visit to a base where this training was being conducted indicated impressive progress being made by Thai trainees, despite low English-language comprehension abilities. Through the use of visual demonstrations and on-the-spot interpreters, the Thais were taking an active part in maintaining operational OV-10's although they had only begun their OJT course 4 days previously.

American airmen who were providing the on-the-job instruction were uniformly warm in their praise of the ability of the Thais to master quickly the often complicated techniques of repairing and maintaining the aircraft.

For the past 2 years the U.S. Air Force has conducted a vigorous program of locating possible training opportunities at their facilities and of finding qualified Thai enlisted men and officers to be instructed. In fiscal year 1969, 146 Royal Thai Air Force personnel received this training; in fiscal year 1970, 219; and the projected figure for the current fiscal year is some 315.

The U.S. Air Force has also opened this OJT program to men from the Royal Thai Army and Navy. Each service placed 16 in fiscal year

1970 and are expected to increase that number substantially during fiscal year 1971.

Findings and Conclusions

1. *U.S. military training in Thailand, particularly the U.S. Air Force in-country OJT program, might well serve as a model for MAP training elsewhere in Asia.*

Military training programs for Thailand are impressive for the zeal in which they have been conceived, in the scope on which they are being conducted, and in their apparent beneficial effects. Particularly encouraging is the Air Force in-country OJT program which, at no additional cost to the United States, will have provided proficiency training for an estimated 1,192 Thais by the end of the current fiscal year.

Although the circumstances prevailing in Thailand lend themselves particularly well to such a program, there are other locations in Asia where it might be emulated.

2. *Consideration should be given to establishing in Thailand, with U.S. support, a common facility for training military personnel from allied and friendly nations in Asia.*

U.S. military authorities in Thailand have contemplated the possibilities of establishing in that country a regional training facility at which the nationals of allied and friendly nations could come for instruction, particularly on MAP-supplied equipment common to the armed services of the several countries.

Such a facility, it is believed, could be located on one of the bases developed by the United States whose use is likely to revert to the Thai Government in the near future.

The instruction initially could be undertaken by U.S. personnel who would gradually turn over the principal training burdens to the Thais, who could conceivably use some instructors from other participating countries. The Thais have been gaining experience as instructors of foreign forces through their work with the military of neighboring countries.

While the creation of such an institution would entail difficulties springing from language and cultural differences and the demands of sovereignty, the problems do not seem insurmountable so long as U.S. encouragement and support attend the project.

The proposed regional training facility in Thailand would appear to further several American aims. It would permit the United States a "lower profile" in training Asians, especially in the operation and maintenance of MAP-supplied equipment. It would promote Asian regionalism and military cooperation. And, finally, it would promise some long-term financial savings when compared with costs of CONUS training for comparable numbers of troops.

The idea deserves further consideration and exploration with the Thais and other allied and friendly nations in the area.

THE PHILIPPINES

Because of the former colonial relationship, the United States has had a long-term, intimate relationship with the military establishment of the Republic of the Philippines.

In pre-World War II times, the United States established the basis for the present Filipino military, even to educating its future leaders at U.S. military academies, such as West Point. During World War II, Americans and Filipinos fought side by side against the common enemy.

Following the war, the United States continued its interest in the military of the Philippines. Since 1950, when the MAP began, the United States has spent more than \$440 million on equipment, support, and training for Filipino forces.

The results of this investment, most observers agree, have not been heartening. The Philippine military establishment—which includes army, navy, air force, and the internal security constabulary force—has failed to measure up to expectations of its readiness and competence.

One basic disability has been the unwillingness of a succession of Philippine administrations to allocate sufficient funds to support a modern military force.

Only about 10 percent of the government's budget goes for defense. Seventy-five percent of that amount is consumed in salaries for the troops, with the remaining portion being expended for operations and maintenance.

Apparently Philippine leaders have expected the United States to provide for the balance of their defense needs—expectations which the United States largely has fulfilled in the past.

At the present time, for example, the United States buys "commercial consumables" out of MAP funds for the Philippine military, including such items as gasoline, oil, vehicle batteries, and tires. Although this practice is to be terminated during fiscal year 1972 under an agreement with the government, the Philippine military continues to request such aid.

Virtually all "investment" in new equipment for Philippine forces has come from the United States through MAP or the excess equipment program.

Efforts by the United States to encourage greater Philippine defense spending—now at about \$65 million annually—have had little effect. The government is reluctant to increase spending because it would necessitate increased taxes which are unpopular.

This attitude persists despite concern by some American military officials that the Philippines is vulnerable to invasion from mainland China and to insurgency from the Huk movement in central Luzon. Although the case for a Red Chinese invasion, given the present state of the Chinese navy, is hard to sustain, the insurgency problem may be a more legitimate cause for concern.

Some observers noted the recent growth of student unrest and urban terrorism with a Maoist character, and described links between urban dissidents and the rural Huk insurgents. Other observers believe, however, that despite an effort to give the Huks an increased ideological character, they remain primarily a bandit group with no serious chance of overthrowing the government.

The situation is further complicated by the drawdown of American forces in the Philippines. From a high of about 26,000 the United States has withdrawn about 6,000 troops in recent months, with more to leave soon. Several military facilities have been turned over to the Philippines or soon will be. In the latter category is the Sangley Point Naval Base, near Manila, which has been in American hands since 1898.

The Philippine Government has been reconciled to these changes as an expression of the Nixon doctrine but expects increased MAP funding for equipment and training as a substitute for U.S. troop presence.

Military Assistance Training

Since the inception of Philippines MAP in 1950, 13,588 Republic of the Philippines military men have received training, including 8,729 who have received instruction in U.S. schools. Among that number are some 153 senior officers who have attended U.S. command and general staff schools.

In fiscal year 1970 CONUS training was reduced approximately 50 percent under Philippine MAP, because of a balance-of-payments deficit and resultant shortage of dollars in the Philippines. President Marcos felt it was necessary to curtail all travel and stopped military students from attending CONUS schools.

In fiscal year 1971, again about one-half of the programmed students (136 planned, as against 77 attending) could not be sent to the United States, reportedly because of restrictions related to the Fulbright amendment.

As a result, there has been a sharp increase in in-country, on-the-job training in the Philippines and in third-country training, principally on Okinawa. In fiscal year 1970 for example, non-CONUS trainees (which include those trained in-country) were 561, while CONUS training accounted for 253.

U.S. military facilities in the Philippines have been used to provide on-the-job training. For example, an estimated 317 students are to undergo training at Clark Air Force Base during the current fiscal year, in such courses as medical and dental technician, jet engine maintenance, and jungle survival.

Much of the U.S. training and advisory effort is directed toward making the Philippine military establishment as capable as possible in as short a time frame as possible, and at improving the Filipino ability to use and maintain MAP-donated equipment.

For example, emphasis is still being placed in the area of engineer training for the Philippine Army in order to increase the effectiveness of the 10 engineer construction battalions which were outfitted by the United States in return for the deployment of Philippine engineers to Vietnam.

In the same vein is a Navy program to improve the ability of the Filipinos to meet their responsibilities for antismuggling and for the inspection, licensing, and regulation of Philippine merchant vessels and personnel.

As a result, the objective of "training trainees" to bring the Philippines to a large measure of self-sufficiency in military training has not been given as high a priority as it has been elsewhere. In the Philippines proficiency training—not self-sufficiency training—has occupied the attention of the MAAG.

Why has the United States so little in Philippine military self-sufficiency to show for its MAP training dollars spent there to date? The answer would appear to lie in the political, cultural, and social conditions prevailing in the Philippine Republic.

Findings and Conclusions

1. *Reaching optimum self-sufficiency in training in a nation like the Philippines requires a firm commitment from its government that self-sufficiency is desirable.*

Training has not been given a high priority by the Philippine Government in terms of its willingness to spend money to upgrade the skills of its armed forces. Instead, it has tended to rely on the United States to provide for required training, particularly instruction linked to equipment deliveries under MAP.

The goal of Philippine military training self-sufficiency can be pursued with sincere vigor by U.S. military officials, but will not be successful unless Philippine military and civilian officials are convinced that self-sufficiency is in their national interest. In situations where the commitment to training lags, progress will be impossibly slow.

This suggests that renewed efforts should be made to encourage increased Philippine attention to efficient training and some sharing of the costs involved. Last July the four Philippines services merged their separate staff schools into a single armed services staff college, a step expected to improve quality of instruction for officers.

Perhaps the RP Government can be convinced to take other such commendable steps toward improving the institutional framework in which military instruction is given and, moving on from there, to work for the maximum possible use of its own resources for training.

2. *The establishment of a bilateral committee on training, composed of Filipino and American military authorities, could increase cooperation in upgrading performance in that area.*

As we have seen, in Thailand a bilateral committee was formed by the Thais and the Americans to assess the proficiency of the Royal Thai armed forces. A subcommittee devoted itself to training, its evaluation and improvement. U.S. officials in Bangkok were enthusiastic over the results, believing that deficiencies were being brought to the attention of top government leaders in a framework which allowed shortcomings to be more easily accepted and remedial measures instituted.

Perhaps a similar formal instrument for upgrading Philippine military training could have beneficial results.

THE PACIFIC COMMAND

A frequently heard complaint from U.S. MAAG personnel in Asia, which also is occasionally heard from U.S. diplomats, is that the meaning of the Nixon doctrine has not been clearly communicated to them. They believe this to be important because of their role as the direct emissaries of the United States in dealing with their military counterparts in Asian governments which are being affected by, or will be affected by, the application of the Nixon doctrine.

They report that on a day-to-day basis they must cope with questions and puzzlings of Asian military leaders who are understandably concerned about the impact of U.S. policy changes on them and their country. All too often, some Americans report, they are at a loss to present an explanation which both meets their perception of the situation and will satisfy their interrogators.

Those Americans—and they may be representative of a larger whole—are unable to see a central, political rationale behind the Nixon doctrine and perceive only the budgetary restrictions which have forced cutbacks in U.S. programs and personnel in Asia. Since their Asian counterparts also tend to see the problem purely in financial terms, it is difficult for them to convey confidence that there is a larger strategic purpose behind the withdrawals of troops and cuts in MAAG strengths which will, in the end, benefit our Asian allies as well as ourselves.

This problem was further aggravated during the current fiscal year by the directives from Washington reducing sharply certain already agreed programs—such as those in Taiwan—in favor of transferring the funds to Cambodia and Indonesia. This process seemed to run against the grain of promises of greater MAP aid as U.S. troop presence is reduced. Although restoration of the funding through the foreign assistance supplemental appropriation will ameliorate the feelings of Asian recipients, the sudden cuts did nothing to heighten confidence in the relationship with the United States.

Discussions of this issue with U.S. authorities at the Pacific Command in Hawaii revealed a significant divergence of view from the field perspective. That command, more commonly referred to as CINCPAC (Commander in Chief, Pacific), is responsible for communicating policy directives from Washington to the U.S. MAAG's.

CINCPAC officials contend that a constant flow of political and military guidance on the effects of the Nixon doctrine flow from National Security Council, Department of State, and Department of Defense channels through their headquarters to the missions. Those Americans "on the ground" who profess not to know the rationale of policy are, it was suggested, far down in the line of command and have no "need to know" the full explanation of what is happening and why.

While U.S. MAAG personnel may not need a complete and detailed explanation of every action, it may be advisable to communicate a greater amount of information to them on policy matters as a means

of enhancing their confidence in current policies and enabling them to convey that confidence to those among whom they work daily in the recipient nations.

Guidance on Training Programs

CINCPAC is the central location through which all MAP training in Asia is guided and coordinated. Its principal instrument is training survey teams—one for each service—which visit each MAP country to plan with their service counterparts in the MAAG the training program for the coming fiscal year.

These CINCPAC teams bring with them estimates of the quantity and types of training which will be available the following year in CONUS and in third countries. The MAAG people then present their estimate of training needs for the coming year, the amount of in-country training which may be available, and the requests which have been made of them by the recipient country.

Subsequently there follows a period of adjustment and negotiation from which finally emerges the agreed country program.

While this procedure is considered highly satisfactory by both CINCPAC and the missions, it risks the danger that attention will be focused too narrowly on the short-run needs and objectives and that, despite 5-year advance planning, insufficient attention is given during these meetings to the larger ends of policy.

As a result, though such terms as “training trainers” and “training self-sufficiency” are in common parlance throughout the region, they may have rather different meanings for the MAAG in each recipient country.

Thus, as has been noted, CONUS training for the Taiwanese is projected to *increase* over the next few years, despite program directives which emphasize self-sufficiency. There is a danger that fashionable terms like “self-sufficiency” and “Nixon doctrine” will become rhetorical tokens which may communicate vastly different things to different people or, in fact, have no real meaning at all.

This suggests a need for more intensive attention to the broad perspective of U.S. military assistance training, what it has accomplished, what it can accomplish, and how it best can meet the objectives set for it by the Congress and the executive branch.

To cite one example: self-sufficiency in training in Japan has resulted in progressively less rapport and contact with the United States at a time when U.S. interests seem to require even closer liaison than when Japan had little or no military force.

Would such problems be on the horizon for Korea and Taiwan if they too cut the training umbilical cord which has tied them to the United States? Nothing indicates that this hard issue, or others, has been given nearly the attention it deserves by either military or civilian authorities.

The first part of the document is a letter from the Secretary of the State to the President, dated 17th March 1847. It contains a report on the state of the country and the progress of the war. The letter is signed by the Secretary and is addressed to the President.

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